Writing politics: Isocrates' rhetoric of philosophy

Writing Politics: Isocrates' Rhetoric of PhilosophyAuthor(s): Niall LivingstoneSource: Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Winter 2007), pp. 15-34Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the International Society for the History ofRhetoricStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/rh.2007.25.1.15 .

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Niall Livingstone

15

Rhetorica, Vol. XXV, Issue 1, pp. 15–34, ISSN 0734-8584, electronic ISSN 1533-8541. ©2007 by The International Society for the History of Rhetoric. All rights re-served. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce articlecontent through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website,at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: RH.2007.25.1.15.

Writing Politics:Isocrates’ Rhetoric of Philosophy

Abstract: Isocrate emploie le mot philosophia en trois sens distincts:

(i) la sagesse pratique commune a tous les hommes; (ii) tout systeme

d’education; (iii) l’education qu’il pratique lui-meme, la seule vraie.

Il se sert d’oppositions entre les trois pour cacher un paradoxe: qu’il

veut son propre philosophia a la fois pres de la sagesse quotidienne, et

d’une perfection et valeur unique. Comme les discours chez Thucy-

dide, ses oeuvres ecrites crystallisent la rhetorique quotidienne de

la polis; mais en lui otant son aspect antilogique, elles creent un

logos politikos unifie, harmonieux, bienseant, mais depourvu des

ressources de sa propre critique.

It is a familiar paradox that while Isocrates has since an-tiquity been canonised in the history of rhetoric, he him-self never uses the word rhetorike,1 and instead constantly

refers to his own activity as philosophia. This paradox becomes allthe more interesting against the background of the relatively recentunravelling, in the wake of work by Thomas Cole, Edward Schiappaand others, of received ideas about the early history of rhetoricaltheory, and the growing acceptance of the view that the oppositionbetween philosophy and rhetoric, and the use of this opposition todefine each as a distinct discipline or practice, are things which weowe above all to Plato.2

1ûητορεÐα, “skill in public speaking,” is used at Against the Sophists 21, andûητορικì, “skilled in public speaking,” at Nicocles 8 (cited at Antidosis 256), but ineach case the reference is clearly to a faculty rather than a discipline or art.

2Thomas Cole, The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece (Baltimore: The Johns Hop-kins University Press, 1991); Edward Schiappa, “Did Plato coin rhetorike?,” American



R H E T O R I C A16

In this light, the well-established opposition between Plato thephilosopher and Isocrates the rhetorician becomes extremely prob-lematic; as Chloe Balla has said, it is question-begging, “insofar as thedistinction between philosophy and oratory seems to be the productrather than the cause of the opposition.”3 More generally, the under-standing of rhetoric and philosophy as clearly distinct and opposedactivities, so important in the later development of Greek and Ro-man culture and later intellectual history, is all too easily read backinto earlier periods; and it is often unhelpful when we are trying tounderstand the diverse intellectual life, and the range of practicesamong teachers and users of logoi in all the senses of that word,which characterised the democratic city of Athens. The impulse isall too strong to organise intellectual phenomena of the 5th and 4thcenturies bce under anachronistic “philosophical” and “rhetorical”headings, and to hail particular developments as precursors (or con-versely dismiss them as dead ends) in relation to later disciplinaryparadigms, meanwhile losing sight of their significance in their ownhistorical context.

While accepting the main thrust of Cole’s and Schiappa’s de-bunking of the notion of a pre-Platonic discipline of rhetoric, HarveyYunis has provided an important qualification.4 Yunis underlines theextraordinary “rhetorical situation” created in democratic Athens,where functioning as a citizen means engaging in politics, and engag-ing in politics means striving to persuade. Within this situation, evenin the absence of a systematic discipline of rhetoric, a vigorous interestin political eloquence is both inevitable and well-documented. Thepractices of antithetical argument and “antilogy” (opposing speechesside-by-side) are fundamental to democracy, and Yunis shows howtheir elaboration in literary rhetoric creates a medium not just fordemonstration and display of debating strategies, but for criticalreflection. He focuses in particular on Thucydides’ History, a textwhich demands to be read and re-read, and which is punctuatedby intense and significant antilogic set-pieces. The written text re-

Journal of Philology 111 (1990): 457-70; Edward Schiappa, The Beginnings of RhetoricalTheory in Classical Greece (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999).

3Chloe Balla, “Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle on Rhetoric,” Rhizai 1 (2004): 45-71(p. 53).

4Harvey Yunis, “The Constraints of Democracy and the Rise of the Art ofRhetoric,” in Deborah Boedeker and Kurt A. Raaflaub, eds., Democracy, Empire, andthe Arts in Fifth-Century Athens (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998),223-240. See also Donald Russell’s review of Cole, Journal of Hellenic Studies 112 (1992):185-6.



Writing Politics 17

moves the dimension of time, and thus the excitement or banal-ity of a potentially endless to-and-fro of refutation; and it presentsthese exchanges to a readership for whom the merit of the argu-ments may be more important than the outcome of the debates.Thus Thucydides is able to refine antilogy into “a flexible tool ofexpression and instruction,”5 something which is less a re-enactmentor display of rhetoric than a distillation both of its power and ofits weaknesses.

Yunis’ discussion of Thucydides, to which I will return below,shows that without a systematic and self-conscious discipline ofrhetoric there may still be sophisticated reflection on rhetorical prac-tice (and that unsystematic rhetorical teaching based on set-piecesneed not be merely imitative). It reminds us that while we mustbe cautious about reading rhetoric as a systematic art or disciplineback into texts for which this was not yet a given, we must equallyavoid the mistake of assuming that what is not systematic is thereforehaphazard or unsophisticated.

Isocrates: neither rhetoric nor philosophy

Isocrates’ work has suffered more than most in modern scholarlyestimation for its failure to fit disciplinary categories. What he does isclearly not philosophy with a capital “P” (for Plato), and thereforemust be the other thing, namely rhetoric. This of course was theconsensus of ancient scholars, for whom he takes his place in thelist of the Ten Orators.6 For much modern scholarship, Isocrates hasseemed also an unsatisfactory rhetorician, being neither an activepractitioner (for most of his career) nor a systematic theorist. Thusfor a long time it was only in the history of Greek and Latin prosestyle that his work held a clear and uncontested place. Since the lastdecades of the twentieth century, however, there has been a strongresurgence of interest in Isocrates, still to some extent dominatedby the well-established practice of using him as a foil to Plato andAristotle, but also addressing his work from the point of view ofmodern interests in the construction of political discourse, the nature

5Yunis, “Constraints of Democracy,” p. 238.6As well as in the shorter list of ancient orators influentially discussed by Diony-

sius of Halicarnassus. On the formation of the canon of orators, see I. Worthington,“The Canon of the Ten Attic Orators,” in I. Worthington, ed., Persuasion: Greek Rhetoricin Action (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 244-63.



R H E T O R I C A18

of authorship and authority, and the relationship between authorand text.7

Against this background, it is not a new observation that Isocratesis a problematic case from the point of view of the traditional oppo-sition between rhetoric and philosophy. By way of background tomy own discussion, I refer briefly to two studies, one by StephenHalliwell and the other by Chloe Balla.8 Both present critical re-evaluations of the activity or cultural domain which Isocrates callsphilosophia. Both observe that Isocrates, who consistently denies thateloquence can be imparted by systematic instruction, is problematicas a representative of the category of “rhetorician,” and reach similarconclusions on other issues: they concur that there are serious prob-lems in identifying Isocrates as a primary target of Plato’s attackson rhetoric, and they find signficant connections between Isocrates’account of persuasive speech and Aristotle’s.9 They reach differentconclusions on Isocrates’ title to be taken seriously as a philosopherin the modern sense of the term (or more generally as a thinker).

7E.g. Christoph Eucken, Isokrates. Seine Positionen in der Auseinandersetzung mitden zeitgenossischen Philosophen (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1983); Sylvia Usener, Isokrates, Pla-ton und ihr Publikum. Horer und Leser von Literatur im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr. (Tubingen:Gunter Narr Verlag, 1994); Agostino Masaracchia, Isocrate. Retorica e politica (Rome:Gruppo Editoriale Internazionale, 1995); Yun Lee Too, The Rhetoric of Identity inIsocrates. Text, Power, Pedagogy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Evan-gelos Alexiou, Ruhm und Ehre: Studien zu Begriffen, Werten und Motivierungen beiIsokrates (Heidelberg: Winter, 1995); Takis Poulakos, Speaking for the Polis: Isocrates’Rhetorical Education (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1997); Niall Liv-ingstone, A Commentary on Isocrates’ Busiris (Leiden: Brill, 2001); Wolfgang Orth,ed., Isokrates. Neue Ansatze zur Bewertung eines politischen Schriftstellers (Trier: Wis-senschaftlicher Verlag, 2003); Ekaterina V. Haskins, Logos and Power in Isocrates andAristotle (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2004); Takis Poulakos andDavid Depew, eds., Isocrates and Civic Education (Austin: University of Texas Press,2004).

8Stephen Halliwell, “Philosophical Rhetoric or Rhetorical Philosophy? TheStrange Case of Isocrates,” in Brenda Deen Schildgen, ed., The Rhetoric Canon (Detroit:Wayne State University Press, 1997), and Balla, “Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle,” citedin n. 3 above. See also Edward Schiappa, “Isocrates’ Philosophia and ContemporaryPragmatism,” in Steven Mailloux, ed., Rhetoric, Sophistry, Pragmatism (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1995), 33-60; David M. Timmerman, “Isocrates’ Com-peting Conceptualisation of Philosophy,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 31 (1998): 145-59;Schiappa, Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory, cited in n. 2 above, pp. 162-84.

9Points of connection and contrast with Aristotle are explored further byDavid Depew, “The Inscription of Isocrates into Aristotle’s Practical Philosophy,”in Poulakos and Depew, Isocrates and Civic Education, pp. 157-85; by Eugene Garver,“Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Civic Education in Aristotle and Isocrates,” in the samecollection, pp. 186-213; and by Haskins, Logos and Power.



Writing Politics 19

Halliwell emphasises Isocrates’ failure explicitly to articulate a ratio-nal basis for the claims he makes for philosophia, but what he ulti-mately finds most damaging is the fact that Isocrates accords littleimportance to the critique or questioning of his own methods.10 Balla,on the other hand, presents Isocrates as a proto-empiricist, for whomadvances in command of logos are made cumulatively through trialand error, and the only criterion needed is human opinion, doxa,which while lacking absolute certainty, generally tracks the truth;there is thus no need for instruction or eloquence to be grounded inabstract principles.

My own inquiry in this paper follows slightly different lines,asking in the first instance not what Isocrates’ philosophia is or whetherit can be identified or made compatible with modern conceptions ofphilosophy (or rhetoric), but how Isocrates’ texts make use of the termphilosophia itself.11 This will, however, bring us back to the question ofthe nature, claims and limitations of Isocratean philosophia.

The rhetoric of philosophia

As has been seen, Isocrates’ description of his own work asphilosophia (φιλοσοφÐα) challenges us to reconsider the conceptualcategories we will need in order to understand the intellectual worldof the 4th century bce. It has caused some embarrassment to modernscholarship; it is surprising, for instance, that Yun Lee Too, who hasstriven with great success to understand Isocrates on his own terms(or “in his own write,” as she puts it), regularly refers to him asa “rhetorician” and to what he does as “rhetoric.”12 I aim here toanalyse the range and consistency of Isocrates’ use of the word, and

10“The lack of any conceptual provision for intellectually open self-criticism is, ifI am right, the besetting and crippling weakness of the Isocratean agenda.” Halliwell,“Philosophical Rhetoric,” cited in n. 8 above, p. 121.

11Important earlier discussions of Isocrates’ conception of φιλοσοφÐα (in addi-tion to those cited in n. 7 above) are Hans Wersdorfer, Die φιλοσοφÐα des Isokratesim Spiegel ihrer Terminologie. Untersuchungen zur fruhattischen Rhetorik und Stillehre(Leipzig: Kommissions-Verlag O. Harassowitz, 1940), and Eino Mikkola, Isokrates:Seine Anschauungen im Lichte seiner Schriften (Helsinki: Annales Academiae ScientiarumFennicae 89, 1954), 193-209.

12Too, Rhetoric of Identity, cited in n. 7 above: see e.g. p. 190 “‘philosophy’ (bywhich he means ‘rhetoric’),” p. 193, and note also the absence of philosophia fromthe index of Greek words on p. 266. Similarly Garver, “Philosophy, Rhetoric,” citedin n. 9 above, seems to take it for granted that philosophy and rhetoric are clearlyestablished categories and that what Isocrates does is rhetoric.



R H E T O R I C A20

to present an interpretation of the role it plays in the writer’s self-presentation and engagement with his readers. In what follows I use“philosophia” when referring to Isocrates’ use of this Greek word andits cognates, and “philosophy” when referring to philosophy as aconcept in modern English.

I begin with a brief discussion of Against the Sophists, probablythe first published work offering a substantial account of philosophia.13

In this work, Isocrates’ principal objective is to contrast his ownmeasured claims as a teacher, one who gives due weight to naturalability and practice, with the charlatanism of “sophists” who professto sell success on a plate. The first sentence launches the attack:

If everyone who offered education was prepared to tell the truth andmake promises no greater than what they can deliver, they would nothave such a bad reputation among ordinary people (idiotai). But in fact,there are people who are so bold as to make ambitious claims with nothought for the consequences; and they have created a situation wherechoosing idleness seems a more sensible decision than devoting timeto philosophia.

Against the Sophists 114

Too many would-be educators make promises which they can-not keep; the result is that idleness has come to seem a betterchoice than “spending time on philosophia.” This is already inter-esting; the sentence implies that the charlatan educators and theirpupils will be included, in the mind of the general public, in thecategory of “those who spend time on philosophia.” At the sametime, it presents idleness, rhathumia, as the obvious alternative tophilosophia; and the idea that idleness is preferable appears as a para-dox. Later, both Isocrates’ reasonable claims and the wild claimsof his competitors are identified as claims about the power ofphilosophia:

13For the date of Against the Sophists, see Antidosis 193; Livingstone, Commentary,cited in n. 6 above, p. 42. The chronology of Isocrates’ works is problematic, and thereare some grounds for thinking of them as a unified corpus within which indicationsof date are themselves a literary trope (Too, Rhetoric of Identity, pp. 41-53), but thisapproach too would place Against the Sophists at the “beginning.”

14εÊ π�ντε ¢θελον οÉ παιδεÔειν âπιχειροÜντε �ληθ¨ λèγειν καÈ µ� µεÐζου ποιεØσθαιτ� Íποσχèσει Áν êµελλον âπιτελεØν, οÎκ �ν κακÀ ¢κουον Íπä τÀν ÊδιωτÀν; νÜνδ' οÉ τολµÀντε λÐαν �περισκèπτω �λαζονεÔεσθαι πεποι κασιν ¹στε δοκεØν �µεινονβουλεÔεσθαι τοÌ ûαøθυµεØν αÉρουµèνου τÀν περÈ τ�ν φιλοσοφÐαν διατριβìντων.



Writing Politics 21

It would be worth more to me than a great deal of wealth, if philosophiawere as powerful as they say; I might find myself no more deficient inthis respect than others, and not be the smallest beneficiary.


and in a famous passage, one of Isocrates’ most explicitly pro-grammatic statements, philosophia is identified with paideusis, edu-cation:

Perhaps it is wrong for me to denounce others without putting forwardmy own opinion as well. I think all sensible people would agree thatmany who have pursued philosophia have remained undistinguished(idiotai), while others who have never spent time with any sophisthave become adept in speaking and in public affairs. This is becausethe faculties for speaking, and for all other action, develop in thosewho are naturally endowed and who have trained themselves throughpractice. (15) Education makes such people more expert and increasestheir facility for invention; it teaches them to grasp more readily whatthey previously came upon haphazardly. It cannot turn those in whomnatural ability is lacking into excellent debaters or speechmakers, butit can help them make progress, and equip them with a more informedoutlook on many subjects.

Against the Sophists 14-1516

Isocrates identifies the proper outcome of philosophia with the abilityto use logos and perform as a citizen, legein kai politeuesthai. Abil-ity in logoi, as in all other activities, depends on natural ability andpractice. Education will make the able “more skilled” (tekhnikoteroi:it is not clear exactly what this means, but presumably it involvesknowledge of ideai or eide, see below and n. 18), and improve

15âγ° δà πρä πολλÀν µàν �ν χρηµ�των âτιµησ�µην τηλικοÜτον δÔνασθαι τ�νφιλοσοφÐαν íσον οÝτοι λèγουσιν; Òσω γ�ρ οÎκ �ν �µεØ πλεØστον �πελεÐφθηµεν, οÎδ’�ν âλ�χιστον µèρο �πελαÔσαµεν αÎτ¨.

16εÊ δà δεØ µ� µìνον κατηγορεØν τÀν �λλων �λλ� καÈ τ�ν âµαυτοÜ δηλÀσαι δι�νοιαν,�γοÜµαι π�ντα �ν µοι τοÌ εÞ φρονοÜντα συνειπεØν íτι πολλοÈ µàν τÀν φιλοσοφησ�ντωνÊδιÀται διετèλεσαν îντε, �λλοι δè τινε οÎδενÈ π¸ποτε συγγενìµενοι τÀν σοφιστÀν καÈλèγειν καÈ πολιτεÔεσθαι δεινοÈ γεγìνασιν. αÉ µàν γ�ρ δυν�µει καÈ τÀν λìγων καÈ τÀν�λλων êργων �π�ντων âν τοØ εÎφυèσιν âγγÐγνονται καÈ τοØ περÈ τ� âµπειρÐα γεγυµ-νασµèνοι; (15) � δà παÐδευσι τοÌ µàν τοιοÔτου τεχνικωτèρου καÈ πρä τä ζητεØνεÎπορωτèρου âποÐησεν; οÙ γ�ρ νÜν âντυγχ�νουσι πλαν¸µενοι, ταÜτ' âc áτοιµοτèρουλαµβ�νειν αÎτοÌ âδÐδαcεν, τοÌ δà καταδεεστèραν τ�ν φÔσιν êχοντα �γωνιστ� µàν�γαθοÌ £ λìγων ποιητ� οÎκ �ν �ποτελèσειεν, αÎτοÌ δ' αÍτÀν προαγ�γοι καÈ πρäπολλ� φρονιµωτèρου διακεØσθαι ποι σειεν.



R H E T O R I C A22

their facility for finding material. It will not turn the less ableinto successful competitors (in verbal contests) or composers of lo-goi, but it will help them make progress and give them “a moreinformed outlook on many subjects.” Thus far, the emphasis isvery much on the modest quality of Isocrates’ claims philosophia.The account now becomes, by Isocrates’ standards, almost techni-cal:

Having gone this far, I would like to express my views on this subjecteven more clearly. What I say is, that to acquire a knowledge of the formalelements from which all the speeches we deliver or compose are derivedis not a particularly hard task, provided one puts oneself in the hands ofinstructors who know something about the subject, as opposed to thosewho make easy promises; but to choose the correct elements for eachpractical circumstance, to combine them with one another and organisethem suitably; not to miss the opportunities offered by the occasion, andmoreover to embellish the whole speech with appropriate reasoning,and maintain a rhythmical and musical use of words – (17) this is whatrequires much practice, and is a task for a bold and imaginative mind(psykhe andrike kai doxastike). The pupil, in addition to having the requirednatural talent, must learn the types of speeches, and exercise himself intheir uses; while the teacher must be able to present the types with suchprecision as to omit nothing that can be taught, and beyond that, hemust present himself as such an example (18) that those who receive hismark and are able to imitate him will instantly be seen to have a greaterfreshness and charm in their speech. When all these conditions are inplace, the practitioners of philosophia will be fully-formed; if any of thethings I have mentioned is missing, it is inevitable that the students willbe correspondingly deficient.

Against the Sophists 16-1817

17βοÔλοµαι δ' âπειδ περ εÊ τοÜτο προ¨λθον, êτι σαφèστερον εÊπεØν περÈ αÎτÀν.φηµÈ γ�ρ âγ° τÀν µàν ÊδεÀν, âc Áν τοÌ λìγου �παντα καÈ λèγοµεν καÈ συντÐθεµεν,λαβεØν τ�ν âπιστ µην οÎκ εÚναι τÀν π�νυ χαλεπÀν, ¢ν τι αÍτäν παραδιδÀú µ� τοØ ûαøδÐωÍπισχνουµèνοι �λλ� τοØ εÊδìσιν τι περÈ αÎτÀν; τä δà τοÔτων âφ' áκ�στωú τÀν πραγµ�των� δεØ προελèσθαι καÈ µεÐcασθαι πρä �λλ λα καÈ τ�cασθαι κατ� τρìπον, êτι δà τÀνκαιρÀν µ� διαµαρτεØν �λλ� καÈ τοØ âνθυµ µασι πρεπìντω íλον τäν λìγον καταποικØλαικαÈ τοØ æνìµασιν εÎρÔθµω καÈ µουσικÀ εÊπεØν, (17) ταÜτα δà πολλ¨ âπιµελεÐα δεØσθαικαÈ ψυχ¨ �νδρικ¨ καÈ δοcαστικ¨ êργον εÚναι, καÈ δεØν τäν µàν µαθητ�ν, πρä τÀú τ�νφÔσιν êχειν οÑαν χρ , τ� µàν εÒδη τ� τÀν λìγων µαθεØν, περÈ δà τ� χρ σει αÎτÀνγυµνασθ¨ναι, τäν δà διδ�σκαλον τ� µàν οÕτω �κριβÀ οÙìν τ' εÚναι διελθεØν ¹στε µηδàντÀν διδακτÀν παραλιπεØν, περÈ δà τÀν λοιπÀν τοιοÜτον αÍτäν παρ�δειγµα παρασχεØν (18)¹στε τοÌ âκτυπωθèντα καÈ µιµ σασθαι δυναµèνου εÎθÌ �νθηρìτερον καÈ χαριèστεροντÀν �λλων φαÐνεσθαι λèγοντα. καÈ τοÔτων µàν �π�ντων συµπεσìντων τελεÐω écουσιν οÉφιλοσοφοÜντε; καθ' ç δ' �ν âλλειφθ¨ù τι τÀν εÊρηµèνων, �ν�γκη ταÔτηù χεØρον διακεØσθαιτοÌ πλησι�ζοντα.



Writing Politics 23

The basic components of logoi, here identified as ideai,18 are rela-tively easy to learn; the challenge is to choose, combine and ar-range these ideai appropriately, to find the right ones for the rightmoment (kairos), to give the logos a suitable argumentative colour,and to deploy words in a measured and melodious way. This re-quires practice, natural ability (“a manly and doxastic soul”), plusthe right level of commitment from both student and teacher. Afinal twist is added at the end of the discourse, when Isocrates con-fronts head-on the question of the teachability of virtue or excellence,arete:

Those who are willing to obey the commands of philosophy mightfar sooner be advantaged in respect of decency of character than ofskill in speaking. And let no-one imagine me to be saying that moralgoodness (dikaiosune) can be taught: I believe that there is absolutely notechnique (tekhne) with the ability to instil temperance (sophrosune) andmoral goodness in those who are naturally ill-endowed in respect ofvirtue (arete); but I think that the cultivation of political discourse cando more than anything else to assist by providing encouragement andtraining.


For those who are ready to “obey the orders” of philosophia, it willsooner help them towards decency of character, epieikeia, than to-wards rhetoreia, the skills of a public speaker. This strong soundingclaim is quickly qualified: it is not to say that morality is teachable,natural virtue being indispensable: all the same, “practice in politicallogoi” can do more than anything else to provide encouragement andtraining (askesis) in this respect.

In these passages from Against the Sophists we can identify threeways of using the term philosophia which, I will argue, are crucial toan understanding of how the term functions throughout Isocrates’work. Firstly, philosophia is intellectual exertion and self-improvement

18On the semi-technical terms Êδèα and εÚδο in Isocrates (roughly, “elements” ofrhetorical composition), see Robert N. Gaines, “Isocrates, Ep. 6.8,” Hermes 118 (1990):165-70; Robert G. Sullivan, “Eidos/ idea in Isocrates,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 34 (2001):79-92 (esp. 89-90).

19καÐτοι τοÌ βουλοµèνου πειθαρχεØν τοØ Íπä τ¨ φιλοσοφÐα ταÔτη προστατ-τοµèνοι πολÌ �ν θ�ττον πρä âπιεÐκειαν £ πρä ûητορεÐαν ²φελ σειεν. καÈ µηδεÈοÊèσθω µε λèγειν ± êστιν δικαιοσÔνη διδακτìν; íλω µàν γ�ρ οÎδεµÐαν �γοÜµαι τοιαÔτηνεÚναι τèχνην, ¡τι τοØ κακÀ πεφυκìσιν πρä �ρετ�ν σωφροσÔνην �ν καÈ δικαιοσÔνηνâµποι σειεν; οÎ µ�ν �λλ� συµπαρακελεÔσασθαÐ γε καÈ συνασκ¨σαι µ�λιστ' �ν οÚµαι τ�ντÀν λìγων τÀν πολιτικÀν âπιµèλειαν.



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of an obvious, commonsense kind: something in preference to whichit would obviously be mad to choose rhathumia. Secondly, it denotesformal educational (or would-be educational) activities of all kinds,including both what Isocrates does himself and a range of ques-tionable practices ascribed to his rivals. But thirdly, there is also aphilosophia – the philosophia which is outlined in §§ 15-18, and cred-ited with limited powers of moral improvement in § 21 – which risesabove these rival versions: an authentic philosophia of which Isocratesis the champion and a lonely, if not unique, practitioner.

To begin with the first of these senses: philosophia and its cognatesare frequently used in a broad sense of intellectual effort and com-mitment to progress and self-improvement. The verb philosophein iscoupled, for instance, with verbs implying effort and concentration,such as ponein and skopein;20 conversely, it is placed in antithesis withidleness and neglect, rhathumia and ameleia.21 Related to this are anumber of passages where philosophein and its cognates are used ofthe process of composing or working on a logos.22 Philosophia is also,for Isocrates as for Plato, the “care of the soul,” psykhes epimeleia.In Isocrates’ ironic praise of the Egyptians in Busiris, they are cred-ited with inventing medicine for the body and philosophia for thesoul, while in Antidosis, philosophia is similarly paired with gymnastictraining.23

Secondly, philosophia is used to refer to diverse intellectual andeducational practices, including some of which Isocrates is critical orcontemptuous. This category includes passages in Against the Sophistsalready discussed, references in Helen and elsewhere to “eristics,”slighting references to odd (possibly Platonic) educational regimesin Busiris and elsewhere, and passages such as To Nicocles 50-1, where

20φιλοσοφεØν καÈ πονεØν: Panegyricus 186, Evagoras 78, Antidosis 247 (πìνωú καÈφιλοσοφÐαø), 285, Panathenaicus 11, and compare [Isocrates?] To Demonicus 40 πειρÀ τÀúµàν σ¸µατι εÚναι φιλìπονο, τ¨ù δà ψυχ¨ù φιλìσοφο. φιλοσοφεØν καÈ σκοπεØν/ σκèψασθαι,Panegyricus 6, Peace 116. Note also To Nicocles 6 âµπειρÐαø µèτιθι καÈ φιλοσοφÐαø, Peace5 µελετ�ν καÈ φιλοσοφεØν, and similar formulations such as Evagoras 8 âν τÀú ζητεØν καÈφροντÐζειν καÈ βουλεÔεσθαι τä πλεØστον τοÜ χρìνου διèτριβεν. On this use of φιλοσοφÐα,see Mikkola, Isokrates, cited in n. 11 above, pp. 202-3.

21E.g. Against the Sophists 1, Philip 29.22E.g. Helen 66, Busiris 48, Panegyricus 6, Nicocles 1, 9, Evagoras 8.23ψυχ¨ âπιµèλεια: Against the Sophists 8, Evagoras 10, Antidosis 181 and 304; cf.

[Isocrates?] To Demonicus 6, and Plato Apology 29e, Phaedo 107c, Laws 807c. Paired withmedicine, Busiris 22. Paired with παιδοτριβικ : Antidosis 181. Cf. Eucken, Isokrates,cited in n. 6 above, p. 15: “Schließlich kann ... ein von Schulmethoden unabhangiges,in einzelnen Menschen oder in der Kultur wirkendes Bildungsstreben ‘Philosophie’heißen.”



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we are told that “people whose work is philosophia” disagree about theappropriate exercises for the soul, and advocate eristic, or political,or other kinds of logoi, but are all in agreement that the aim of theirteaching is the ability to deliberate (bouleuesthai).24 An extension ofthis is Isocrates’ assertion of his role as the defender of the boundariesof philosophia. In Busiris, for instance, Isocrates prefaces his advice tothe paradoxographer Polycrates by acknowledging that he has a duty,as an experienced practitioner, to help someone who is in difficultiesand “trying to make money from philosophia.” The advice he givesconsists of such scathing criticism that its effect is to show that whatPolycrates does is not in fact philosophia as Isocrates understands it atall. The problem is that outsiders do not understand this: philosophiais “on a knife-edge, beset by resentment”; disreputable work likethat of Polycrates will only make things worse, and we are left withthe understanding that Isocrates’ real duty is to defend philosophia,properly understood, by policing its boundaries.25

Finally, the third recurrent use of philosophia. This is where itrefers to a wholly admirable, and to some extent specialised, activity,based on learning and teaching the creation of political discourse,logoi politikoi.26 This is a philosophia which belongs par excellence, ifnot exclusively, to Isocrates himself. It is expounded most fully inAntidosis, where Isocrates returns to the stance he assumed in Busirisas champion, defender (and potential martyr) of philosophia. Herethe writer puts himself fictionally on trial because he sees philosophiaas being actually the victim of unjust accusations. In his defence, hedescribes and justifies his own practice as writer and educator, a prac-tice designated as philosophia. He does so in terms very reminiscentof Against the Sophists; not a surprise in view of his strategy in thisspeech of defending himself by quoting from his other works (Against

24Helen 6 (� περÈ τ� êριδα φιλοσοφÐα) and 67; Busiris 17, 22, 28, To Nicocles 50-51:περÈ µàν τÀν γυµνασÐων τÀν τ¨ ψυχ¨ �µφισβητοÜσιν οÉ περÈ τ�ν φιλοσοφÐαν îντε,καÐ φασιν οÉ µàν δι� τÀν âριστικÀν λìγων, οÉ δà δι� τÀν πολιτικÀν, οÉ δà δι' �λλωντινÀν φρονιµωτèρου êσεσθαι τοÌ αÍτοØ πλησι�ζοντα, âκεØνο δà π�ντε åµολογοÜσινíτι δεØ τäν καλÀ πεπαιδευµèνον âc áκ�στου τοÔτων φαÐνεσθαι βουλεÔεσθαι δυν�µενον.See also Antidosis 84-85 (οÉ âπÈ τ�ν σωφροσÔνην καÈ τ�ν δικαιοσÔνην προσποιοÔµενοιπροτρèπειν), 147 (an unusually neutral reference to other people besides Isocrateswhose profession is φιλοσοφÐα, put in the voice of Isocrates’ friend), and 215-6; Philip84; and Panathenaicus 19-32, discussed below.

25Busiris 1 (τοØ âκ φιλοσοφÐα χρηµατÐζεσθαι ζητοÜσιν) and 49 (τ¨ φιλοσοφÐαâπικ ρω διακειµèνη καÈ φθονουµèνη); see also notes ad loc. in Livingstone, Commen-tary, cited in n. 7 above.

26On Isocrates’ work as logos politikos, see especially Too, Rhetoric of Identity, citedin n. 6 above, pp. 10-35.



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the Sophists 14-18 is cited at Antidosis 194). In 184-5, he pursues thealready-mentioned analogy between physical exercise for the bodyand philosophia as exercise for the mind (n. 22 above): students learnthe ideai of logoi, practise their use and grow accustomed to exertingthemselves, gain a surer grasp of what they have learned, and thus“grow closer in their estimation of what the occasion demands.”27

Practice is everything because knowledge of changing situations isimpossible; but consistent attention and reflection on events will leadto a higher rate of success. Similarly at Panegyricus 10, the writer im-plicitly puts himself forward as the one best able to speak about“philosophia concerning logoi” (� περÈ τοÌ λìγου φιλοσοφÐα). AtPanathenaicus 9, embarking on another defence of his life’s work,he refers to it as “the philosophia I have chosen” (τ�ν φιλοσοφÐαν, �νπροειλìµην). At Antidosis 271, denying that human beings can everhave certain knowledge of the right course of action, he defines assophoi those who “are able for the most part to hit the mark of what isbest with their opinions,” and as philosophoi those who “spend theirtime in activities which will secure them such understanding as soonas possible.”28

This tripartite division of Isocrates’ use of philosophia is undoubt-edly over-schematic, especially when we are dealing with a writer solittle enamoured of abstract definitions and fixed systems, and it willnot be helpful in explicating every passage where the word occurs. Itcould also be extended to take in paideia “education” and its cognates,often used almost interchangeably with philosophia. It does, however,enable us to identify a significant persuasive and promotional strat-egy. To recap: first, philosophia is part of the life of every intelligentthinking person: the basic exercise of intellectual energy, reflectionbefore action, and mental self-improvement. Second, it is a term forthe attempts of Isocrates and others to organise these impulses intoa programme of education: for specialist practices, innovative andin noisy competition with one another, which set those who engagein them apart from ordinary citizens or idiotai. Third, it is also theright form of education, Isocrates’ own. Isocrates makes effective andsubtle use of the first two as foils to the third. Comparison betweencommonsense philosophia and the philosophia of the other specialists

27Antidosis 184 Ñνα... τÀν καιρÀν âγγυτèρω ταØ δìcαι γèνωνται. The analogy withphysical training is developed further in 209-12.

28σìφου µàν νοµÐζω τοÌ ταØ δìcαι âπιτυγχ�νειν ± âπÈ τä πολÌ τοÜ βελτÐστουδυναµèνου, φιλοσìφου δà τοÌ âν τοÔτοι διατρÐβοντα, âc Áν τ�χιστα λ ψονται τ�ντοιαÔτην φρìνησιν.



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(or would-be specialists) whom Isocrates criticises shows the latterremote from reality, impractical, extravagant in its claims, generallyabsurd.29 Comparison between Isocrates’ philosophia and these samerivals shows his own philosophy as easy to understand, realistic inits claims, practical, commonsensical, free from abstruse methodsand obscure technical terms.30 Comparison between his philosophiaand commonsense philosophia reveals similarity, but highlights thepractice, polish, and mature development of Isocrates’ version, itsakribeia.31

Thus the shifting application of the term philosophia in Isocrates’work is used to mitigate, or to obscure, a paradox in his self-presentation. On the one hand, he regularly insists that his philosophiahas no secret formulae but depends simply on ability, basic infor-mation, practice, and hard work. On the other hand, he constantlyemphasises its excellence, desirability, social and political benefits,and transformative power, and generally places it at the pinnacle ofcultural achievement. This is not really an inconsistency; the excel-lence of Isocrates’ philosophia is precisely that it is the quintessence ofcommon sense. The problem presented by his desire to claim spe-cialist authority while disclaiming specialist methods or doctrine is arhetorical one, and the versatility of the term philosophia is part of thesolution. The tension between specialisation and common sense isconcealed as each is contrasted with rival versions of philosophia, use-less by commonsense standards, arrogant and remote by comparisonwith what Isocrates offers.

Distilling politics: live debate and

written discourse

Isocrates’ philosophia presents itself as the purest and most per-fect refinement of an ordinary philosophia common to all; somethingwhich surpasses common sense without departing from it. To illus-trate this further, I turn to a passage not discussed in the previous

29E.g. Against the Sophists 1, discussed above; Helen 1.30E.g. Antidosis 84 “They invite us to a virtue and understanding which is

unknown to others, and disputed amongst themselves; I to the one agreed byall.” For Isocrates as exemplar of τä πρακτικìν in philosophy, see also Dionysiusof Halicarnassus, Isocrates 4.

31This contrast is seldom explicit, but see e.g. Against the Sophists 17-18, discussedabove, and Antidosis 48 on the superior logoi of which (his) philosophia can make uscapable.



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section, but which is probably Isocrates’ most famous treatment ofphilosophia: Panegyricus 47-50. Here, in a majestic periodic sentencewhich represents Isocrates’ epideictic style at its most elevated andmemorable, philosophia appears as the climax in his enumeration ofAthens’ historical benefactions to Greece. The previous section (43-6)praises the institution of the festive assembly (panegyris), a peacefulinterlude of pleasure and improvement, and goes on to celebrateAthens herself, with her displays of wealth and culture; her flood ofvisitors, and consequent opportunities to make friends and engagein varied conversations; and the prizes she awards in contests notonly of strength, but of skill and intelligence: all of which make her“a year-round festival.” Philosophia, Athens’ discovery, is then intro-duced as that which “shared in the invention and organisation ofall these things,” and characterised as the precondition of civilisedexistence. This, then, is philosophia in the broad sense of intellectualculture and the cultivation of the mind. Having revealed philosophiato the world,32 Athens went on to “cultivate logoi, which all desire,though they resent those who understand them.” This still suggestsphilosophia in my first sense, mental exercise broadly conceived, butthe distinction made here between experts and non-experts beginsa shift towards the second sense, involving organised and delim-ited educational practices. After praise of logos as the touchstoneof human excellence in 48-49, Isocrates finishes the sentence with aflourish: Athens has excelled so much in the cultivation of logos thather pupils have become the teachers of others, “and she has madethe name of ‘Greeks’ seem to belong not to the race but to the castof mind, and it is those who share in our education (paideusis), morethan those who share in the common nature, who are called ‘Greeks”’(Panegyricus 50).33 Education, not birth, is what makes a Greek.

The significance of this passage has been much debated:34 isIsocrates broadening the concept of Greekness by opening it to non-

32On the religious connotations of κατèδειcεν (§ 47) see Too, Rhetoric of Identity,cited in n. 6 above, p. 172.

33καÈ τä τÀν ÃΕλλ νων îνοµα πεποÐηκεν µηκèτι τοÜ γèνου, �λλ� τ¨ διανοÐα δοκεØνεÚναι, καÈ µ�λλον �Ελληνα καλεØσθαι τοÌ τ¨ παιδεÔσεω τ¨ �µετèρα £ τοÌ τ¨ κοιν¨φÔσεω µετèχοντα.

34E.g. Julius Juthner, “Isokrates und die Menschheitsidee,” Wiener Studien 47(1929): 26-31; Werner Jaeger, Paideia: die Formung des griechischen Menschen, vol. 3(Berlin: de Gruyter, 1947), 139-41; Edmund Buchner, Der Panegyrikos des Isokrates.Eine historisch-philologische Untersuchung (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1958),58-65; Eucken, Isokrates, cited in n. 6 above, pp. 168-71; Dieter Grieser-Schmitz,“Kulturbestimmte politische Vorstellungen des Isokrates,” in Orth, Isokrates, citedin n. 6 above, pp. 111-27 (esp. 122-7). I find Eucken’s discussion the most convincing.



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Greeks? Or is he narrowing it, imposing an additional educationalqualification? In the context, where Isocrates is enumerating Athens’benefactions to Greece in order to demonstrate her right to hege-mony, the primary point is clearly that those who are Greeks by racenow look to Athens for their cultural identity: Athens is already theircultural leader and deserves to be their political leader as well. Butthe potential significance of the passage reaches beyond its imme-diate context, claiming for philosophia the power both to define andto extend the boundaries of the Greek world.35 Also significant, andimportant, is the ambiguity of the phrase “our education”: primarily,of course, it means Athenian education, but we can also hear it as re-ferring to Greek education – or Isocratean education. For Isocrates, ofcourse, the three are strictly speaking coextensive, since the only trueGreek education is Athenian, and the only true Athenian educationis his own.

The Panegyricus passage forcefully connects Athens’ claim tohegemony with Isocrates’ panhellenic project: philosophia is Athens’invention, has made Athens what it is, and has also come to be thedefining criterion of Hellenic identity itself. If Athens is a year-roundpanegyris, Isocrates’ Panegyricus and other writings are the textualembodiment of this spiritual feast; his philosophia is the distillate ofthe extraordinary cultural achievement of Athens, and thus of Hel-lenic identity itself. The prestige of Athens thus helps to resolvethe paradox of philosophia: Athens is the place where the common-sense philosophia of the many forms the political wisdom of the cityas a whole; and of course Isocratean philosophia is outstanding inits excellence, just because it is this common sense writ large. It isthis which confers plausibility on the identification of Isocrates’ ownactivity with the philosophia that he idealises in Panegyricus – thephilosophia which at once was made by Athens, made Athens whatshe is, and confers on Athens the power to make, or to be, the essenceof “Greece” and “Greekness” as well.

When I say “common sense writ large,” writ large, of course,is the key point. In refining and perfecting Athenian commonsensephilosophia, the practical wisdom on which the polis depends (and

35The wider significance is acknowledged by Buchner, Der Panegyrikos, p. 64.Isocrates’ thinking on the Greek-barbarian antithesis is no more systematic than it ison other matters: see Eucken, Isokrates, cited in n. 6 above, p. 170. On the panhellenicambitions of Isocratean philosophia, see also Niall Livingstone, “The Voice of Isocratesand the Dissemination of Cultural Power,” in Yun Lee Too and Niall Livingstone, eds.,Pedagogy and Power: Rhetorics of Classical Learning (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1998), 263-81.



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which in Panegyricus is central to her claim for leadership of theGreek world), Isocrates takes it out of the polis arena, turning delib-eration into discourse, dialogue into monologue. Yun Lee Too hascharacterised Isocrates’ ideological rejection of oral performance infavour of writing as “the politics of the small voice,” constructinga textual voice of quiet authority in contrast with the shouting ofthe “new politicians” or demagogues.36 But through his claims forphilosophia, Isocrates also presents this textual voice as the highestrefinement of the public discourse of the democratic city.

In the chapter discussed earlier, Yunis shows how Thucydides’crystallised versions of antilogic debates transform rhetorical dis-course by removing the dimension of time and transforming thecompetitive situation into something like a dialectical one. The writ-ten speeches which articulate the philosophia of Isocrates, gesturing atperformance while rejecting it, crystallise debate in a comparable butsignificantly different manner. They are aberrant, by the standardsof both democratic debate and early rhetorical practice, in that theyare (with important qualifications, one of which will be discussedbelow) essentially monologic. This may be connected with Isocrates’political commitment to homonoia, unity of purpose, as a precondi-tion for his panhellenic agenda; but more fundamentally, it reflectshis conviction that good logos tends towards the truth; thus there willnot, in general, be two equally valid sides to the same questions. Theresult is a “philosophised” version of politikos logos, the discourse ofcitizenship, in which the process of decision-making recedes into thebackground, and debates are replaced by idealised representationsof speeches giving the best possible advice.

Thucydides, in line with his commitment to creating a workof timeless value rather than something for immediate agonisticperformance (1.22), transforms antilogic debates by removing themfrom their agonistic setting and freezing them in time. Instead ofwaiting eagerly to see how one speaker’s argument trumps another’s,his readers are made to see the tenuousness of these momentaryvictories; the unresolved tensions and things unsaid; the dangersof moral equivocation, the threat of devaluation of ethical terms,and the risk that verbal dexterity may mask, rather than illuminate,the exercise of power. Isocrates’ textual transformation of politicaldebate is rather different. For Thucydides, part of the power of thewritten text is its ability to freeze the deliberative process and holdit up for analysis. For Isocrates, written speeches open up an iterative

36Too, Rhetoric of Identity, cited in n. 6 above, pp. 74-112.



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process, a process of re-writing, in which the competition betweenspeakers or writers is not a competition between opposing pointsof view, but a competition in the shared endeavour of doing justiceto the requirements of the situation and the merits of the subject athand. Since all worthwhile discourse aims at what is best, antilogyis not merely unnecessary, but pointless; speeches on great subjectsare provisional because of their potential, not to be answered, butto be outdone.37 Isocrates abstracts and appropriates logos politikosfrom popular common sense and live political performance, not bycriticising it or subjecting it to a critique or by redefining it accordingto systematic principles, but simply by transferring it to the realmof writing – and to the guardianship of those who have the leisureto refine it, through reading and rewriting, to its highest degree.

By creating an adaptable, self-confident Hellenic political dis-course which takes “commonsense” ethical values for granted, Iso-crates inaugurates the tradition of Hellenic paideia, and thus, indi-rectly, the later humanist culture built on Greco-Roman models, withthe ideal of culture as a mutually respectful exchange between (elite)individuals united by their commitment to the edifying and civil-ising power of logos. On the other hand, in abandoning antilogy inthe name of consensus and homonoia, he also anticipates situations inthe modern world where the transition from public or parliamentarydebate to monologic communication in the mass media risks creat-ing an overweeningly confident, unitary political discourse in whichdissent and critique are easily marginalised as irrational or absurd.

Panathenaicus: a dialectical coda?

Panathenaicus is Isocrates’ last work (or, if we follow Yun LeeToo’s reading of the corpus, the work which rhetorically places itselfat the end of his career). Near the start, we are told how someof Isocrates’ pupils recounted to him an incident in the Lyceumwhere some “common sophists” ended a popular epideixis on thepoetry of Homer and Hesiod by accusing Isocrates of despising allsuch activities, and indeed of rejecting all forms of philosophia andpaideia except his own; their comments win some approval from thecrowd in attendance (18-9). At first, he says, he was distressed andthrown into confusion by this evidence of how he is misjudged (20).He soon rallies, however, with a confident reassertion of his own

37E.g. Panegyricus 5.



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educational views (26-32), making use once again of the threefoldsenses of philosophia discussed above (though here the term used ispaideia). So far is he from despising the ancestral forms of educationthat he even commends the paideia that has been established inthe present generation (meaning “geometry, astrology, and so-callederistic dialogues,” 26). He has nothing against them, to the extent thatthese are broadly harmless pastimes for the young; but, as he makesclear in 30-2, these activities which call themselves paideia are notthe real thing; the title of “educated people,” pepaideumenoi, belongsexclusively to those who have had the benefit of proper Isocrateanpaideia.38

This confident self-assertion near the start of Panathenaicus is ininteresting counterpoint with the less confident note struck at the end.Having made Athens’ case against Sparta for the leadership of theGreek world, Isocrates’ concludes his speech with an extraordinarydramatisation of the process of its own completion (200-65). Hepresents himself revising the unfinished speech in the company ofa few pupils; their verdict is that all that is needed is a conclusion. Hedecides, however, to put it to a further test by summoning anotherformer pupil who is known as an admirer of Sparta; this pupil’scontribution will be, ostensibly, to check the speech for factual errors(200). The Laconising pupil duly reads it and commends it, butcomplains that whatever else they may have done, the Spartans atleast deserve gratitude for inventing the best social system (“formsof conduct,” epitedeumata) and demonstrating it to the rest of Greece(202). After an exchange in which he is reprimanded by Isocrates(203-28), the Laconiser is silenced. Isocrates is applauded by his otherpupils, but he himself is left in distress and confusion – just as he wasearlier by his pupils’ account of the sophists’ remarks in the Lyceum(232-3, cf. 20); so much so, that he considers destroying what he haswritten (232). Instead of doing so, he summons another meeting ofhis pupils, including the Laconiser. When the speech has once againbeen read and applauded, the other pupils talk amongst themselvesabout what they have heard, but the Laconiser speaks privately toIsocrates, taking a line very different from his earlier criticism. Hehas realised, he says, that the present gathering is a test of the pupils’philosophia. Isocrates has constructed an ambiguous speech (logous

38Note how the attack on “eristics” and mathematical sciences saves Isocratesfrom having to articulate in detail the relation between “ancestral” paideia and his own.Compare 33-4, where discussion of the educational value of poetry is disingenuouslypostponed “for another occasion.”



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amphibolous, 240), and those who read carefully will understand thatit is by no means simple, but full of subtlety and instructive falsehood(246); it contrives to praise both cities – Athens at the level of populardoxa, Sparta in the estimation of those who try to get to the truth (261).He should therefore not destroy it, but publish it, in the interests of“those who truly practise philosophia” (262, cf. 260).

The pupil’s speech is the first occasion in Isocrates’ oeuvre wherephilosophia has been qualified by a cognate of alethes “true” (here theadverbial phrase hos alethos “in the true sense,” “genuinely”). Thedestructive effect is extremely interesting. Gone is the straightfor-ward relationship between Isocrates’ philosophia and common sense,doxa, what everyone thinks. A fourth sense of philosophia opens upbefore us, as we are presented with a distinction between Isocrateanphilosophia as it appears on the surface, and Isocratean philosophiaas correctly understood by those in the know. Isocrates’ voice, thepolished textual voice embodying and perfecting popular wisdom,is fractured, seen to be ambiguous and to demand interpretation;and this need for interpretation inaugurates not a public, populardebate where common sense may be the arbiter, but a contest forauthority among a coterie of the elite. The pupil concludes by sayingthat publication of the speech will confound Isocrates’ critics, whodo not realise that he surpasses them more than Homer surpassesthe other epic poets. This points back ironically to the scene at 18-19, where the Lyceum sophists’ attack on Isocrates was prefaced byan incompetent exposition of the poetry of Homer and Hesiod, andsuggests once again that the inevitable penalty of communicating“beneath the surface,” and thus of requiring interpretation, is both tobe exploited by others and to be misunderstood.39

Here, at the very end of Isocrates’ career (or corpus), we findsome recognition of the limits of his project of sublimating popu-lar philosophia into a harmonious, ethically admirable prose versionof logos politikos. The subversive comments are, of course, put inthe voice of a mere pupil (and a Laconiser); in “his own” voice,Isocrates does not pronounce a verdict, but allows the pupil “to re-main in the state in which he has put himself” (265), an enigmaticacceptance of the limits of the pedagogical relationship. The dialoguebetween Isocrates and his pupil could be read as demonstrating that,contrary to the Lyceum sophists’ prejudice, Isocratean philosophia iscapable of embracing differently valid points of view. The pupil reads

39For a less pessimistic interpretation of the “polysemy” of Panathenaicus 260-5,see Too, Rhetoric of Identity, cited in n. 6 above, pp. 68-73.



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Panathenaicus as transcending antilogy, praising Athens for the Athe-nians and Sparta for the Spartans – which in each case may be the bestway of enlisting them to the panhellenic cultural and political pro-gramme, and therefore the best thing for the practitioner of philosophiato do. Another interesting effect of the dialogue is that it makes theIsocratean corpus end (setting aside the biographical-programmaticconclusion in paragraphs 266-72) in a kind of classroom scene, andone in which the figure of Isocrates himself steps back from pedagogi-cal and authorial control. This may be a way of suggesting that it is notIsocrates’ written works themselves, but the practices they exemplify,that should stand as an example for future educational practice. Atthe close of the speech, in the long final sentence (272), the confidentIsocratean voice reasserts itself, commending this speech to hearerswho recognise that “instructive and artistic speeches,” which criticisefaults and aim at the truth, are better than those which aim to please.But it is hard not to feel that we are left with a note of doubt as well;an uncomfortable awareness, perhaps, that a system of political andeducational discourse which has only one voice lacks the ability toexamine, or to justify, its own premises.



Writing politics: Isocrates' rhetoric of philosophy

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