"Worse than cancer and worse than snakes": Jimmy Carter's Southern Baptist Problem and the 1980...

the journal of policy history , Vol. 26, No. 4, 2014. © Donald Critchlow and Cambridge University Press 2014 doi:10.1017/S0898030614000232

n eil j . y oung

“Worse than cancer and worse than

snakes”: Jimmy Carter’s Southern Baptist

Problem and the 1980 Election

A month before the 1980 election, the pastor of Faith Baptist Church in

Princeton, Texas, sent Jimmy Carter a questionnaire so his church members

could know the president’s positions on various matters. Drawn up by the

Moral Majority, the questionnaire ignored the bleak economy, the energy

crisis, and the tense international situation to focus instead on social issues

such as abortion, homosexuality, the ERA, pornography, prostitution, school

prayer, and sex education. Casting aside the seeming complexities of such

issues, the questionnaire reduced them all to a fundamentalist simplicity. “Do

you agree that this country was founded on a belief in God and the moral

principles of the Bible?” the form asked, allowing a candidate only to check

answers under “yes” or “no.” 1 Bob Maddox, the White House’s liaison to the

religious community, waited until just days before the election to respond,

likely uneager to make the president’s case to yet another group of conserva-

tive Christians disenchanted by Carter. Maddox wrote that despite the bad

I am grateful to Kevin Kruse for generous comments on various draft s of this article.

Thanks also to Wallace Best, Gillian Frank, Judith Weisenfeld, the members of the

Princeton University Religions in the Americas Workshop, and the anonymous reviewers

of the Journal of Policy History for their insightful comments on this article. I would also

like to thank the archival staff s of the Gerald R. Ford Library, the Jimmy Carter Library,

the Kenneth Spencer Research Library at the University of Kansas, and the Southern

Baptist Historical Library and Archives.

480 | “Worse than cancer and worse than snakes”

press generated by publications like the Moral Majority Report , “I assure you

that President Carter, a man of deep faith in Jesus Christ, is profoundly con-

cerned about the moral and spiritual welfare of the nation.” However, Carter

could not respond to the enclosed questionnaire, Maddox explained, because

“legitimate answers cannot be given in terms of a quick yes or no.” 2 But for

fundamentalists, like those at Faith Baptist and throughout the Southern

Baptist Convention, “yes” or “no” responses were indeed legitimate answers

to the complex questions facing the nation; no gray areas existed on such

matters as abortion or homosexuality. Th e Southern Baptist Convention had

undergone a theological shift to biblical literalism in the late 1970s, and this

doctrinal transformation led to hardline political positions and directly

undermined support for Carter’s reelection. As a Houston pastor had told

a reporter at a political rally of fi ft een thousand Southern Baptist and evan-

gelical ministers earlier that summer, “We believe in absolutes. . . . Th e Bible

is a book of absolutes.” 3

For political historians, the story of Reagan’s victory in the 1980 presi-

dential election has also seemed like one of absolutes. A straightforward

narrative, largely put in place during the election itself, has generally governed

how scholars have understood this watershed moment. As soon as Reagan

won in 1980, religious conservatives insisted they had been the key to the

election. Buoyed by the impressive turnout of conservative Christian voters,

these leaders of the newly christened “Religious Right” hoped to guarantee

Reagan’s commitment to their agenda by controlling the narrative of his

victory. Moral Majority’s Jerry Falwell claimed his new organization had

registered 4 million first-time voters for Reagan, “millions of voters who

otherwise would not have been at the polls,” as he described them, and had

pumped $5 million into the campaign. 4 One publication claimed that the

evangelical vote had provided two-thirds of Reagan’s ten-point win over

Carter. 5 Th e lesson seemed unambiguous: Ronald Reagan had won because

of the evangelical voter. 6

Soon, however, scholars began questioning religious conservatives’ role

in Reagan’s victory. Some argued the Religious Right had, as one study

contended, “virtually no infl uence at all” on the election. 7 Others reached

opposite conclusions. 8 Historians and other scholars have, from the vantage

point of time, worried less about determining the Religious Right’s precise

electoral infl uence in 1980 and instead observed the deeper cultural and

political bases for the rise of Christian conservatism and Reagan’s election. 9

Th ese scholars tend to see Reagan as the white knight of the Religious Right—

a folksy politico who captured religious conservative voters with biblically

n eil j . y oung | 481

inflected language and hollow promises regarding their chief issues. Yet

another group of scholars, while smaller, has contended that religious conser-

vatives spurned Carter as much, if not more, than they picked Reagan, rebuffi ng

the president because of his positions on topics like abortion, gay rights, and

the Equal Rights Amendment. 10 Although historians diff er on whether the

Religious Right coalesced around supporting Reagan or deposing Carter,

they have tended to agree on a seemingly straightforward point—the idea

that evangelicals, the Religious Right’s foundation, came to conservatism

through politics, as they mobilized in reaction to the social changes of the

previous two decades. 11

Th is article suggests a diff erent perspective for understanding the political

emergence of evangelical voters. By looking at Southern Baptists’ response to

Carter’s presidency, it argues that evangelicals came to conservatism not

through politics but through religion, namely, the theological remaking of

their denomination that established biblical literalism as the basis of Christian

belief and identity. Carter’s presidency coincided with one of the most tumul-

tuous times in Southern Baptist history, as moderates and fundamentalists

wrestled for control of the denomination and battled over questions of

biblical inerrancy, scriptural authority, and the very meaning of being a

Christian. While religious scholars have closely examined the fundamentalist

realignment of the SBC that began in 1979, they have largely overlooked the

political consequences of that refashioning in light of its obvious theological

and institutional results. 12 Yet, I argue, the victory of fundamentalists over

moderates in the SBC and the hardening of Baptist belief around biblical

literalism and scriptural inerrancy had ramifi cations far beyond the denomi-

nation’s headquarters and pulpits, extending to the realm of national politics.

For millions of Southern Baptists, biblical literalism off ered more than an

interpretive guide to scripture; it also provided a political worldview that

reduced issues to a yes-or-no rubric, as seen in the Moral Majority questionnaire.

Alongside the concretizing of biblical literalism at the heart of Southern

Baptist theology and denominational identity, fundamentalists also moved

their denomination away from muddled stances on political issues like abortion

and the ERA to hardline positions articulated through and justifi ed by the

language of scriptural absolutism. Th ese developments happened hand in

hand as fundamentalists used abortion, homosexuality, and the ERA to make

abstract theological leanings visible through uncompromising political resolu-

tions, underscoring the religious basis of Southern Baptists’ rightward shift .

Scholars have rightly understood the 1980 election as a watershed

moment in American political history, a turning point that ushered in the rising


tide of modern conservatism and brought about a fundamental realignment

of American politics and culture. 13 In that story, Jimmy Carter has stood as

the weak defender of a collapsing liberalism, rendered ineff ective as he sought

to appease the various Democratic constituencies of a fraying political order. 14

Yet Carter was also caught within the realignment of his religious denomina-

tion, and he and the nation faced the political consequences of Southern

Baptism’s doctrinal shift . Carter’s presidential bid in 1976 coincided with the

country’s evangelical resurgence, and Southern Baptists were eager to dem-

onstrate their political clout and cultural relevancy by supporting one of their

own. As one Baptist pastor enthused about Carter at the SBC’s 1976 meeting,

“We’ve been talking about the need for Christian statesmen. Now that we

have one, let’s just unwrap him and show him.” 15

But once they peeled back the layers, Southern Baptists recoiled at what

they found. Carter’s theological alignment with his denomination’s moder-

ates increasingly became a political handicap for the president among con-

servative Baptists, and his presidential decisions confl icted with the SBC’s

new political resolutions. As Carter took moderate and sometimes liberal

positions on the ERA, abortion, and homosexuality, the SBC passed unyielding

conservative resolutions against them, further distancing the president from

the SBC’s fundamentalist base. Increasingly through his presidency, Carter’s

Baptist critics responded with spiritual assessments that questioned his

Christian standing because of his political stances, an evaluation Southern

Baptists were engaging in repeatedly with one another throughout the

denomination’s churches, seminaries, and agencies. Th ey had voted for Carter in

1976 in order to elect a fellow born-again believer who could be their standard-

bearer. Southern Baptists went to the polls in 1980 not to elect the California

governor with his own spotty record on their pet issues, but rather to reject

the wolf in sheep’s clothing who had misled them about who he truly was.

f undamentalist t akeover

Carter’s bid for the White House in 1976 benefi ted from the nation’s religious

upsurge. Th e pollster George Gallup Jr. recently had found that 34 percent of

Americans, representing some fi ft y million adults, claimed to have undergone

a “born again” experience, leading Gallup to christen 1976 “Th e Year of the

Evangelical.” 16 Evangelicals had enjoyed a steady increase in the postwar

period, a development the national media fi nally recognized in 1976, but the

growth had also exposed factions and disagreements within the evangelical

community, culminating in the Bible battles of the 1970s. Evangelicals debated


with one another the nature of their beliefs, the authority of the Bible, and the

very definition of what it meant to be a Christian. Harold Lindsell’s 1976

book, Th e Battle for the Bible , brought all those questions to a head as he

defended biblical inerrancy and attacked evangelical bodies like the Lutheran

Church–Missouri Synod, Fuller Th eological Seminary, and the Southern

Baptist Convention for tolerating unorthodoxy in their midst. 17 Th e Battle for

the Bible electrifi ed evangelical circles. Billy Graham described the book as

“one of the most important of our generation.” 18 Students at Christian colleges

and evangelical seminaries read and debated Lindsell’s book together. Pastors

passed dog-eared copies back and forth. “It is a timely book,” Christianity

Today contended, “since it seems that evangelicals who do not accept biblical

inerrancy are not aware of the seriousness and danger of their decision,

and also many evangelicals who believe in inerrant Scriptures are not suffi -

ciently aware of the threat to biblical Christianity that denying this doctrine

presents.” 19

Fundamentalists within the Southern Baptist Convention appreciated

their denomination’s diagnosis by Lindsell, a Baptist himself. In 1979, funda-

mentalists organized to take control of the SBC. For years there had been

grumblings about the denomination’s direction among the SBC’s most con-

servative ranks who feared that liberalism had infi ltrated the Convention.

Fundamentalists complained about the Convention’s seminaries and univer-

sities, where professors sometimes questioned the most orthodox views in

their classes or publications. Also disturbing was the Convention’s bureau-

cracy in Nashville, the various institutional agencies of the denomination, the

trustees, and the Baptist state newspapers. Southern Baptist conservatives

thought all of these Convention agencies were controlled by moderates

who were sliding into liberalism and spiritual heresy and fundamentalists

organized to wrest control of the denomination from their rivals. 20

While outsiders would have been hard-pressed to spot the diff erences

between the fundamentalist and moderate factions, Southern Baptists saw an

immense divide between the two groups. Th e “moderates” were in fact con-

servatives, but the fundamentalists had taken to calling them moderates and

even “liberals” on occasion because of some of their less than orthodox views.

Th e moderates argued they were the heirs of the Baptist tradition, and they

called themselves “conservatives” or “traditionalists” because they supported

the historical legacy of Baptist anticreedalism, the priesthood of all believers,

and congregational authority, whereas the fundamentalists desired a new

emphasis on denominational uniformity and theological orthodoxy. Moder-

ates shared the theological conservatism of their fundamentalist brothers on


most key issues such as the exclusive saving nature of Christ and the authority

of the Scripture. Yet it was not the Scripture’s authority but rather the nature

of Scripture itself over which fundamentalists and moderates disagreed. Fun-

damentalists argued that the Bible was inerrant, containing no mistakes in

regard to history, science, or geography, let alone theology. Moderates, in

contrast, claimed that God alone was inerrant. His Word provided perfect

spiritual authority over their lives, they contended, but, possibly, contained

human errors of translation or sometimes off ered symbolism rather than

literal history. Th is view was held by the denomination’s controlling elite, but

fundamentalists regarded this conception of Scripture as no less than heresy.

To declare that the Bible was not entirely inerrant was to disbelieve in the

Bible; to not believe in the Bible, fundamentalists contended, was to reveal

oneself as not a Christian.

By 1979, fundamentalists had endured the moderates’ control of the SBC

long enough. Several prominent fundamentalists realized that the key to

remaking the denomination depended on capturing the SBC presidency,

since he appointed new trustees of SBC agencies as spots opened up. Such a

transformation would not be immediate, of course, but generational, and two

leaders of the fundamentalist camp wrote and disseminated a ten-year plan

for gaining control of the denomination. However, the fi rst step rested on

winning the presidency, which could be fulfi lled right away. Adrian Rogers,

pastor of the eleven-thousand-member mega-church Bellevue Baptist in

Memphis, was the fundamentalists’ choice, and they packed the 1979 SBC

meeting convening in Houston that summer with supporters to elect Rogers.

Before they voted, Rogers delivered a fiery sermon. Entitled “The Great

Deceiver,” Rogers’s talk warned against the country’s increasing embrace of

Satan’s lies, including the Equal Rights Amendment. “Satan’s fi b about women’s

lib,” Rogers characterized it. 21 But while Satan had hold over the nation, he

also had gained a foot in the Southern Baptist Convention, luring some

Baptists through the appeals of intellectualism as he had tempted Eve with

the fruit of knowledge. Th ough the SBC had historically championed the

priesthood of the believer—that is, the spiritual autonomy of the individual—

and congregational authority, fundamentalists now felt the spoiled fruit of

this legacy was the large body of unorthodox, perhaps even unchristian,

members and leaders of the denomination. Instead of conciliation, the funda-

mentalists urged cutting off the moderate elements. Earlier that summer, one

leading fundamentalist had stated that Southern Baptists needed to hold fi rm

on biblical inerrancy even if it meant losing fi ve hundred thousand members. 22

Rogers had more direct words. “It’s time that we got out of the boat,” he railed,


“and let the devil take the hindmost, live or die, sink or swim, every inch,

every ounce, and go for God.” 23

Southern Baptists across the theological spectrum had coexisted for

decades rather peaceably, a harmony in part achieved by Baptist principles and

practices like congregational authority and the denomination’s decentralized

organizational structure. But the inerrancy battle of the 1970s, set against the

decade’s larger cultural and political shift s, convinced fundamentalist Baptists

that they could no longer quietly tolerate doctrinal diversity within the

denomination. Tellingly, Southern Baptist preachers at the 1979 meeting

characterized their cause as a spiritual confl ict rather than an organizational

shuffl e. “My friends, we are in a battle,” the Dallas televangelist James Robison

warned the crowds, “And we are in a battle with satan [sic].” 24 Robison urged

Southern Baptists to elect not only a biblical inerrantist, but one who was also

devoted to cleaning house. “We must elect a president who is totally com-

mitted to the removal from this denomination any . . . who does not believe

that the Bible is the inerrant, infallible word of the living God,” Robinson said.

Acceptance of anything but biblical orthodoxy would no longer be allowed.

“If you tolerate any form of liberalism,” Robison explained, “you are the

enemy of God.” 25 “Friend, when satan [sic] attacks, he will attack from within,”

he continued. “Friend, the enemy will spring up from among us.” 26 Th is was as

much a message to the moderates, the alleged abettors of the adversary, as it was

to the fundamentalists. In calling for a fundamentalist takeover, Robison and

others were also advocating a denominational purge of the moderates.

“I wouldn’t tolerate a snake of any kind in my house . . . and I wouldn’t tolerate

a cancer in my body,” Robison raged. “I want you to know that anyone who

casts doubt on the word of God is worse than cancer and worse than snakes.” 27

Aft er the sermons, Adrian Rogers won the SBC’s presidency on the very

fi rst ballot over fi ve challengers. 28 Previous SBC presidential candidates had

won on the fi rst ballot only a handful of times. Th e easy win for Rogers

signaled the strength and energy of the fundamentalist movement within the

Southern Baptist Convention. Th e SBC’s remaking into a thoroughly funda-

mentalist organization would take another decade, but the political eff ects of

the SBC’s growing theological and organizational overhaul would be felt

much sooner by Jimmy Carter.

t he b orn- a gain p resident

Initially, Southern Baptists had delighted in the candidacy of Jimmy Carter, a

fellow believer who frequently touted his Baptist credentials and professed of


his conversion experience. Carter was an active Baptist, having served as a

deacon and Sunday school teacher, and he had chosen the SBC’s Broadman

Press to publish his campaign autobiography in 1975. 29 As the fi rst presiden-

tial candidate to describe himself as “born again,” Carter attracted the interest

of evangelical voters just as they were beginning to coalesce as a self-conscious

political constituency. “Th e most important thing in my life is Jesus Christ,”

Carter declared on the campaign trail. 30 If previous presidential candidates

had felt the same way, none had so plainly and frequently expressed his faith.

Among Baptists, Carter benefi ted from the support of several infl uential

Southern Baptists pastors. In the summer of 1976, Bailey Smith, a mega-church

pastor in Oklahoma, stumped for Carter during his keynote address at the

SBC’s annual meeting. Declaring that the nation needed a “born again man in

the White House,” Smith noted, “And his initials are the same as our Lord’s!” 31

But other Baptist pastors, notably those from some of the SBC’s most

prominent congregations, withheld their support from Carter for reasons

ranging from reports that he occasionally enjoyed alcohol to his support for

appointing an ambassador to the Vatican. 32 For undecided Baptists, Carter’s

Playboy magazine interview settled matters. It was bad enough that Carter

had met with a pornographic publication, Baptists felt, but Carter’s salty

language—he had used the word “screw”—drew even more outrage. “‘Screw’

is just not a good Baptist word,” admonished Bailey Smith, the one-time

Southern Baptist enthusiast for Carter. 33 Other ministers, including Carter’s

own pastor in Plains, questioned Carter’s language. 34 In Virginia, Harold

Lindsell, who had just published Th e Battle for the Bible , attacked Carter in a

sermon also broadcasted on his popular radio show, wondering aloud how

“a man who . . . professes to be a Christian . . . gets himself all tied up in speaking

words which at best are most questionable.” 35 Dr. Jerry Vines, a pastor from

Mobile, was more explicit: “A lot of us are not convinced that Mr. Carter is

truly in the evangelical Christian camp, and this tends to indicate to us that

he isn’t.” 36 At one campaign rally, Carter faced a picketer holding a sign asking,

“With Christians Like Carter, Who Needs Pagans?” 37 W. A. Criswell, pastor of

the First Baptist Church of Dallas and author of the book Why I Preach that

the Bible Is Literally True , switched his endorsement from Carter to Ford aft er

the release of the Playboy interview. Criswell’s church, the world’s largest

Baptist congregation, boasted nineteen thousand members, and the pastor

reached millions more through his weekly radio show. First Baptist had also

opened the Criswell Bible Institute in 1971 to off er a fundamentalist alterna-

tive to the SBC’s seminaries, and Criswell had emerged as one of the most

important conservative voices in the convention. Aft er the Playboy interview,


Criswell suggested that Carter’s faith was suspect and predicted that Baptists

would agree: “I think he’s mixed up in his moral values, and I think the entire

church membership will feel the same way.” 38 Shortly before the election,

Ford visited First Baptist Dallas, smiling throughout the sermon as Criswell

attacked Carter. Aft er the service, Criswell told reporters, “I’m for him,” as he

stood by Ford on the church’s front steps. 39

Prominent Southern Baptist pastors, many of whom would help

orchestrate the fundamentalist takeover, publicly opposed Carter’s 1976

campaign, but their words could not weaken Baptist support. While these

pastors represented some of the largest congregations, their influence

remained largely local. On election day, 60 percent of Southern Baptist

voters selected Carter. No Democrat since Harry Truman had won a majority

of Southern Baptists. 40 In the nation’s ninety-six most heavily Baptist counties,

some of which had not picked a Democrat since FDR, Carter received 58

percent of the vote. 41 In a close election, Carter’s showing among Southern

Baptists helped push him over the edge. Though he held a nearly two-

million-vote advantage, Carter won with a fi ft y-seven-point electoral college

advantage that depended on his sweeping all of the former Confederate States

except Virginia. Several of these southern states gave Carter over a ten-point

margin. Th e support from Southern Baptists had been critical to Carter’s

victory.

But Southern Baptist support quickly ended once Carter assumed the

presidency, matching the discomfort conservative pastors had shown for him

during the campaign. Many of those pastors increased their profi le during

Carter’s presidency, their prominence helping refashion the SBC and remake

Southern Baptist opinions about Carter. Th rust into the spotlight by a media

eager to document their responses to Carter and emboldened by a president

who provided them with so many causes for reaction, these pastors oversaw

the politicization of their denomination, bringing a host of issues to the

forefront of Southern Baptist life. Carter’s handling of the Equal Rights

Amendment, gay rights, and abortion led conservative Christians to question

the validity of his professed faith and spurred them to remove him from

offi ce. As a conservative Christian publication declared shortly before the

1980 election, “Th e one observation which must be made is the intensity of

the evangelicals’ opposition to Carter on moral issues.” 42 Notably, Southern

Baptists articulated their opposition to Carter not solely as a political leader

and candidate but primarily as a Christian man and fellow Southern Baptist.

For sure, Carter had set the stage for such a response himself. Repeatedly,

Carter had touted his own religious faith and made his spiritual commitment


central to his candidacy in 1976. At one point he had even boasted, “I’ll be a

better president because of my deep religious convictions.” 43 But the sword

cut both ways. If Carter hoped his born-again status would attract voters to

him, conservative Christians also expected a certain course of leadership in

exchange. Failure to actively oppose the troubling issues of the Equal Rights

Amendment, abortion, and gay rights would have been disappointing, but

possibly forgivable; Carter’s support for such issues, however, was unpardonable.

Worse, it drew into question the very claims Carter had made about himself

to Christian conservatives and emboldened their spiritual response, by way

of a presidential election, to repudiate his suspect faith. In doing so, Southern

Baptists not only voted a president from offi ce, but they also hardened their

own conception of salvation. More than just a personal born-again experience

authenticated by Baptist beliefs of individual conscience and the priesthood

of the believer, one’s salvation could have political indicators. Th e politicization

of the SBC during the Carter administration delivered a litmus test of issues

by which Baptists might judge one another’s eternal state. In the years between

Carter’s 1976 triumph and 1980 defeat, certain positions on the ERA, abortion,

and homosexuality became visible signifi ers of one’s true relationship with

God and proper understanding of Scripture. Carter failed on all these counts.

Southern Baptists came out in droves to repudiate Carter in 1980 just as they

were driving out the unorthodox elements in their denomination.

t he c arter p residency

While Carter publicly touted his Christian faith and Baptist identity, Carter’s

1976 campaign documents show that his election team frequently worried

about evangelical voters. As a candidate, Carter had a mixed record on the

issues that concerned Southern Baptists, including the ERA, gay rights, and

abortion, and his staff understood evangelicals were becoming increasingly

galvanized by these matters. 44 Although Carter’s campaign team, drawn

largely from his Georgia staff , included many churchgoing Christians, hardly

any of them belonged to conservative congregations and so they largely failed

to see the political implications of the rising conservative tide within the SBC

and other Protestant denominations even as they fretted about the results. 45

Instead, as Carter moved from the primaries to the general election, he less-

ened his religious talk, following recommendations from those like his Jewish

adviser Stu Eizenstat, who counseled Carter to describe his religious beliefs as

“quite normal Baptist views” but were otherwise strictly personal and would

not aff ect his decisions as president. 46


Ford’s own discomfort with speaking openly about his Episcopalian faith

aided Carter’s reticence, and their similar positions on several issues of

concern to religious conservatives minimized their weight in the election.

Both Carter and Ford supported the ERA, for instance, neutralizing the issue

in 1976. But Carter’s energetic advocacy for the amendment as president

enraged conservative Southern Baptists, who expected him merely to voice

his support for the ERA, as Ford had, rather than actively campaign for it.

Douglas Brewer, a Baptist pastor from Tennessee, wrote to the director of the

SBC’s political arm, the Christian Life Commission, describing the work that

women in his and other nearby churches were doing in response to the eff ort

that “some ‘women’s groups’ are doing toward infl uencing President Carter . . .

in pushing for acceptance of immoral practices and standards.” Brewer

enclosed materials his women had created opposing Carter and urged the

Christian Life Commission to use them in any way it saw fi t. 47 Aft er Carter

addressed the Southern Baptist Convention’s 1978 meeting, many Southern

Baptists expressed displeasure at his invitation because of his eff orts for the

amendment. “Since Carter . . . supports ERA and the Women’s Movement . . . this

makes one believe that he supports the things that they stand for—I and

many other Southern Baptist [ sic ] resent him being the Speaker [at] the Southern

Baptist Convention,” one woman wrote the Christian Life Commission. 48

Carter’s mild support for gay rights further angered Southern Baptists.

Th ough he had hardly been a gay rights advocate during the 1976 campaign,

Carter’s administration made a signifi cant outreach to the gay community. In

May 1977, Midge Costanza, a presidential assistant, met with a group of gay

rights activists. 49 Th e Voice of Florida , a conservative newsletter, declared the

White House’s meeting with a “delegation of sodomites who wanted to talk

about their rights certainly has raised very strong doubts whether President

Carter is really a born-again Southern Baptist as he claims.” 50

Carter fueled those doubts by opposing California’s 1978 ballot initiative,

Proposition 6. 51 Also known as the Briggs Initiative aft er its originator,

Republican State Senator John Briggs, Proposition 6 permitted California

school boards to fi re or refuse to hire anyone who engaged in or even publicly

supported homosexuality. Briggs, a Catholic, found his strongest support

among Southern Baptists and other fundamentalists in California. By the

1970s, the SBC was a truly national denomination; with 320,000 Southern

Baptists in California, the SBC ranked as the state’s second largest Protestant

denomination, making them a potentially powerful political force. 52 Just a

year before, the Southern Baptist General Convention of California had passed

a resolution asserting the sin of homosexuality and supporting opposition to


the employment of homosexuals in particular jobs, including public education,

and Southern Baptists and other religious conservatives were increasingly

concerned with what they saw as a mounting gay rights movement. 53 Evangel-

icals had long opposed homosexuality, of course, but the rise of a visible and

active gay rights movement encouraged them to translate private convictions

into public theological discussions and political actions. Despite such views,

Californians rejected Proposition 6 by a 2-to-1 margin. Briggs met with a

crowd of 250 supporters the night of the election and promised to place another

antigay initiative on the ballot in 1980. “Cocktail Republicans” and Ronald

Reagan, who had also opposed the measure because of libertarian concerns

over privacy, were to blame for the proposition’s defeat, Briggs fumed.

Blaming Reagan for its defeat, Briggs warned that conservative Christians would

not forget the former governor’s betrayal of their issue. “Th ey will remember

that,” Briggs charged, “I think he’s fi nished as a national politician.” 54

Th ough Carter and Reagan both opposed Briggs, just as Carter and Ford

had both supported the ERA, Carter became the target of Southern Baptists

and other evangelicals who believed he had turned on them, revealing his

suspect Christian faith. A month after the election, the Southern Baptist

General Convention of California informed Carter of a resolution it had just

passed. Th e resolution “express[ed] our grave disappointment to President

Jimmy Carter for his public opposition to an issue so strongly supported by

his fellow Christians and Baptists. We furthermore encourage him to recon-

sider his stand and to give his unreserved support to future eff orts to oppose

the acceptance of homosexuality as a normal if not privileged lifestyle.” 55 A

separate letter to Carter from the group’s president drove home Baptist dissat-

isfaction with Carter’s actions and underscored the distrust many of them

had for Carter’s spiritual authenticity. “We have worked hard to pass Proposi-

tion 6,” William Hann wrote Carter, “and your statement hurt us. Christians .

. . are wondering why Southern Baptists are not together on moral issues.” 56

In 1980, for the fi rst time, the Democratic Party listed “sexual orientation”

as a category deserving protection from discrimination in its convention

platform. 57 Such a move further confi rmed suspicions that Carter supported

gay rights and had abandoned his Baptist convictions. “I am appalled,” a

Baptist pastor from Greenville, Texas, wrote Bob Maddox, the moderate

Southern Baptist minister who served as the White House’s liaison to the

religious community, “at the fact that you, a Southern Baptist Minister, would

condone the dreadful sin of sodomy by approving and encouraging others to

approve the Gay rights plank.” Th e pastor urged Maddox to use his infl uence

to “reverse [Carter’s] stand on homosexuals” before it cost him the election.


But with this pastor, Carter had already lost. “I will encourage as many of the

evangelicals that I come in contact with to vote for Governor Reagan,” he warned,

“because I want no part of such a whitewash as you put on homosexuality.” 58

Other letters from ministers poured into the White House demanding Cart-

er’s position on the sin of homosexuality. Maddox continued to handle the

responses, writing in the political language of constitutional protections and

minority rights to address the question of homosexuals. But the ministers

fi red back again with scriptural absolutes against homosexuality and judgments

about Maddox’s faith. “You are not a Christian and need to become one,” one

letter attacked Rev. Maddox, but Carter bore the brunt of those charges. 59

Th ough Carter had continually expressed his moral opposition to abortion

during the 1976 race, his refusal to advocate for an overturning of the law

rendered his personal feelings on the matter insignifi cant in the eyes of his

antiabortion foes. Worse, in 1978, Carter hired Sarah Weddington as his

Special Assistant with advising responsibilities on women’s issues and minority

rights. As a private attorney, Weddington had argued successfully in favor of

Roe before the Supreme Court in 1973 before serving as president of the

National Abortion Rights Action League. 60 Her appointment led one pro-life

publication to characterize Carter as a “president who has surrounded

himself with abortion advocates in key executive and judicial positions.” 61 An

onslaught of disapproval fi lled the White House mailbags. In one week alone,

the White House received 328 letters related to Weddington’s appointment;

97 percent voiced their opposition. 62 Th at Carter would employ Weddington

while refusing to support a human life amendment to the Constitution belied

his moral opposition of abortion, pro-life activists argued. Indeed, even his

public statements had shown an increasing insistence for the legality of abor-

tion while expressions of his moral objections to abortion had decreased in

volume and conviction. Coupled with a White House staff that many knew

to be pushing for the extension of abortion rights, Carter was seen as an

untrustworthy chameleon, changing his colors to suit worldly trends.

Yet Baptist views on abortion were changing too. In 1971, the SBC had

passed a resolution calling for Southern Baptists to “work for legislation that

will allow the possibility of abortion under such conditions as rape, incest,

clear evidence of severe fetal deformity, and carefully ascertained evidence of

the likelihood of damage to the emotional, mental, and physical health of the

mother.” 63 After the Court issued Roe , the national Baptist news service

declared that the Supreme Court had “advanced the cause of religious liberty,

human equality, and justice.” 64 And the Baptist General Convention of Texas

included a pastor’s sermon in its newsletter that contended there existed


“no clear, biblical command dealing with . . . [abortion] in a specifi c way.” 65 A year

later, SBC delegates reaffi rmed the 1971 resolution. 66 When a conservative

pastor wrote SBC headquarters to protest the denomination’s apparent sup-

port for abortion rights, Carl Bates, the SBC’s president, responded that

Baptist strength owed in part to the “unity that still exists in diversity.” 67 Yet

that diversity was what conservative Southern Baptists intended to stamp out

of their denomination as they plotted the fundamentalist takeover, and

fundamentalists used the abortion issue as one of their chief means of

denominational reform in the late 1970s. Where moderate Baptist theologians

and denomination leaders had pondered the uncertainty of life’s beginnings

and wondered about the Bible’s view on abortion, fundamentalist pastors and

laypersons fought back with a fi rm insistence that Scripture denounced abortion

as murder and clearly maintained that life began at conception. 68 In doing so,

they made abortion both a symbol and a measure of scriptural inerrancy and

biblical authority. One could not equivocate on abortion without revealing

their less-than-orthodox view of the Bible, thereby exposing their unsaved

soul. Th e right Christian understood clearly the Bible’s prohibition against

abortion just as plainly as they knew Scripture contained the inerrant, infallible

word of God.

The interconnection between a strict interpretation of the Bible and

particular political views became a hallmark of Baptist identity and was

plainly revealed in a series of resolutions at the SBC’s 1980 convention, a year

aft er the 1979 fundamentalist takeover began and just months before November’s

presidential election. Messengers to the convention affi rmed that the SBC’s

seminaries and universities should only employ those “who believe in the

divine inspiration of the whole Bible, infallibility of the original manuscripts,

and that the Bible is truth without any error.” 69 Th e delegates then passed a

host of resolutions addressing some of the hottest political issues of the day

and underscoring the denomination’s fundamentalist direction. 70 A resolution

on abortion overturned the mild support off ered by previous resolutions as it

denounced the nation’s “abortion on demand” ethos and called for legislative

eff orts “and/or” a constitutional amendment prohibiting abortion in all cases

but to save the life of the mother. 71 A resolution on women condemned the

ERA. 72 (Just three years earlier, two anti-ERA resolutions had not been able to

emerge from the Resolutions Committee for a vote by the general audience.) 73

Other resolutions in 1980 opposed pornography, homosexuality, children’s

rights, and providing birth control to minors without parental consent. 74 But

the “Resolution on the White House Conference on the Family” issued a

direct blow at Carter. Carter had promised a White House meeting on the


state of the American family in his 1976 campaign. Finally held in 1980, the

White House Conferences on Families, renamed to reflect the organizers’

diff erent visions of what constituted a family, elicited the ire of religious con-

servatives because of its endorsement of the ERA, abortion rights, and

homosexuality. 75 Th e SBC’s resolution blasted the White House conference

for its “general undermining of the biblical concept of the family.” 76

While Baptists had always addressed a contemporary issue or two at

their annual meeting, no convention had ever passed as many political reso-

lutions as the 1980 convention considered. Representing the SBC’s overt

politicization, the resolutions also signaled the numbered days for Carter’s

presidency. Carter’s apparent changing position on abortion and gay rights

may have refl ected similar trends among the American public, but this was

exactly what troubled so many of the Southern Baptists who supported their

denomination’s overhaul. For them, Carter’s changes too closely mirrored

mainline Protestant accommodation of the world and its values. At the same

time, the emerging tensions between moderates and fundamentalists within

the Southern Baptist Convention brought many political issues, like abortion,

to the center of denominational politics. Fundamentalists worried that this

same worldly accommodation that had overtaken mainline Protestant

denominations was festering inside their own house, and they sought to push

out moderate Southern Baptists, both within the convention and inside the

White House, who threatened to steer the denomination from orthodoxy and

lead it toward apostasy.

o rganizing a gainst c arter

Not long aft er the 1979 fundamentalist takeover of the SBC, a group of

prominent ministers, mostly Southern Baptist, gathered near Dallas to

discuss how they might also take the presidency from Carter. Notably, the

talks focused on removing Carter from offi ce rather than rallying around

Reagan. Elected California’s governor in 1966, Reagan enjoyed more than a

decade of national political prominence, including his 1976 bid for the Repub-

lican nomination, but he had still yet to attract the support of religious con-

servatives, who opposed his fairly liberal record on social issues as governor

and worried about his spotty personal life. 77 Th e group in Dallas included

some of the SBC’s most infl uential pastors, like newly elected SBC president

Adrian Rogers, James Robison, Jimmy Draper (SBC president from 1982 to

1984), and Charles Stanley of First Baptist Atlanta (SBC president from 1984

to 1986). A few non–Southern Baptist ministers also attending included Pat


Robertson, Rex Humbard, and Clayton Bell, Billy Graham’s brother-in-law.

Th e pastors had gathered to pray for the country and discuss what they could

do about the nation’s moral affl ictions. Urgency fi lled the meeting, as each of

them worried aloud that the nation’s fate depended on turning the country

from its evil ways. Th e pastors committed to each other that they would moti-

vate their congregations to become politically involved in the upcoming elec-

tion. Part of the discussion focused on the complicity complacent Christians

held for the direction the country had turned because of the legacy of funda-

mentalist noninvolvement in politics, and the pastors vowed to end that

disengagement. 78

After the Dallas meeting, Charles Stanley organized a “Campaign

Training Conference,” inviting Southern Baptist ministers to First Baptist

Atlanta for training on voter registration and education about pivotal moral

issues they could share with their congregations. Paul Weyrich was one of the

conservative activists who led the conference for Stanley, and he realized aft er

spending time with the Southern Baptist ministers that Carter would lose.

One pastor aft er another stood up and testifi ed to their disillusionment with

Carter and their suspicions of his Christian faith. “‘I was part of Carter’s team

in 1976,’” Weyrich remembered various ministers saying, “‘I delivered my

congregation for Carter. I urged them all to vote for Carter because I thought

he was a moral individual. I found out otherwise, and I’m angry.’” 79

Baptist organizing against Carter did not go unnoticed by the White

House, thanks to Bob Maddox. Maddox, a moderate pastor of First Baptist in

Calhoun, Georgia, and an acquaintance of the president for more than ten

years, had off ered to help the White House’s outreach to religious Americans

in 1978, but the president had spurned the suggestion. 80 A year later, Carter

would reconsider. Realizing the potential political consequences of the SBC’s

fundamentalist takeover and his own shaky standing with religious conserva-

tives, Carter asked Maddox to serve as his special assistant for religious aff airs

to help smooth relations with religious conservatives. 81 Maddox urged Carter

to talk again about his deep faith in order to connect with religious voters he

knew were souring on the president. Noting in a White House memo the

“coalescing of conservative, evangelical, religious groups for political action

is one of the important political phenomenon [ sic ] of our day,” Maddox

recommended that Carter also meet with a group of influential pastors

and televangelists, including Jerry Falwell, Tim LaHaye, Oral Roberts, and

James Bakker. 82 The meeting—and Maddox’s other attempts with religious

conservatives—backfi red, however. Maddox hoped that Carter could connect

to religious conservatives on spiritual grounds, emphasizing their shared faith


and religious convictions. But the pastors only wanted to talk politics, and in

their minds Carter’s positions on ERA, abortion, and gay rights rendered

his Christian professions invalid. “We had a man in the White House who

professed to be a Christian, but didn’t understand how un-Christian his

administration was,” LaHaye recalled of the meeting. 83 As 1980 progressed,

Carter’s prospects with Southern Baptists and other evangelicals worsened.

Maddox let the White House know that the SBC’s meeting that summer had

passed a “range of conservative, fundamentalist resolutions,” in his view

spelling trouble for Carter. As a moderate Southern Baptist, Maddox lamented

the theological remaking of his denomination, but he also understood the

implications for Carter, warning that the resolutions “refl ect the rising tide of

political conservatism in the country.” “Th is swing to the right causes me

great concern,” Maddox concluded. 84

Th e Republican National Committee also watched the 1980 SBC meeting

closely, believing the denomination’s remaking would benefit the party’s

election chances. RNC chairman Bill Brock congratulated Bailey Smith, the

Oklahoma pastor who had briefl y backed Carter in 1976, on his election to

the SBC presidency and off ered his prayers for the denomination. Brock

reminded Smith that he had recently met with Adrian Rogers at RNC head-

quarters, where they had discussed the “problems and issues we mutually

face,” and he off ered to meet with Smith to discuss “the practical implementa-

tion of voter registration and participation by Christians who in the past have

not had their full political impact.” “Our goal is a mutual one,” Brock con-

cluded, “to articulate and achieve the values we share—faith, freedom, and

family.” “I would love to take advantage of that,” Smith responded. 85 In the last

months of the 1980 campaign, Southern Baptist and other conservative

churches launched full-scale voter registration drives and focused their con-

gregants on the coming election. “Jimmy Carter was the chief target of this

activity,” the New York Times noted. 86

Of course, no minister could back a specifi c candidate from the pulpit,

but by preaching on the biblical injunctions against abortion, homosexuality,

and the ERA, pastors could communicate their political endorsement indi-

rectly. Randy Stewart, a Baptist minister and Moral Majority member in

Lexington, Kentucky, explained to a reporter, “I will talk about the issues in

my church. I will recommend issues to the congregation, not candidates. But

when I get through, they will know who I am voting for: Ronald Reagan.” 87

Other pastors showed less circumspection. A Baptist pastor in Tampa fi lled out a

ballot supporting Reagan and distributed copies of it to church members. 88

Dr. James W. Bryant, a Baptist pastor in Fort Worth, used his church’s publication


to weigh in on the approaching election through a comparison of the candi-

dates’ positions. Noting that Reagan and Carter held “vastly diff erent” political

philosophies, Bryant urged his congregants to study their stances and to ask

God for help in deciding which candidate to support. Bryant suggested

focusing on the candidates’ positions on four “moral issues”: abortion, the

ERA, gay rights, and humanism. Bryant couldn’t back a candidate, of course,

but his choice of issues tacitly endorsed Reagan. But, more than that, his

explanation of each issue engendered doubts about the authenticity of Carter’s

Christian faith. If a candidate supported abortion or gay rights, Bryant wrote,

he was “anti-biblical.” Support for the ERA meant “taking the opposite view

of God’s ordained chair-of-authority.” Last, a true Christian would work

against the humanist forces threatening to overtake the nation through con-

trol of the government. “Both candidates claim to believe in a supernatural

God,” Bryant wrote, “Unfortunately, President Carter has appointed an

avowed humanist as the new Secretary of Education.” 89 Even when Carter

spoke directly about his faith, his words worked against him with Southern

Baptist fundamentalists. One minister said that although Carter talked of

being born again he also “quoted [the liberal theologian] Reinhold Niebuhr,

so we knew that he wasn’t reading the right things.” 90

Even the First Lady suff ered from suspicions among fellow Baptists. One

Southern Baptist woman complained to the SBC’s president about Rosalyn

Carter’s attendance at the International Women’s Year Conference in Houston,

where she appeared alongside “confi rmed lesbians.” 91 Other Southern Baptist

women were more hesitant to turn their backs on Mrs. Carter. Joyce Rogers,

the wife of Adrian Rogers, wrote Rosalyn aft er she visited the White House

with her husband following his election as SBC president. Even aft er spending

time with the First Lady, Mrs. Rogers’s letter revealed her confusion about

who Mrs. Carter truly was. “I perceive you are a godly woman with great

ability and great commitment to Christ, your country, and your convictions,”

Mrs. Rogers wrote. But, she continued, she along with “many Southern

Baptist and other Christian women” wanted to know where the First Lady

truly stood on the various issues confronting women. Christian charity, if not

denominational loyalty, compelled Mrs. Rogers to inquire directly of Mrs.

Carter, conceding that it was diffi cult to arrive at the truth via the media’s

accounts. She hoped that the First Lady might communicate “on these vital

issues” with her and set the record straight. 92 Her husband, however, showed

no confusion—or charity—about the president’s spiritual standing in his

meeting with Carter. “I hope you will give up your secular humanism and

return back to Christianity,” Rogers said to him. 93


Closer to the election, Rogers announced his endorsement of Reagan.

Th roughout the denomination, Southern Baptists, the group that had been so

critical to Carter’s 1976 win, were now ready to vote against their own. One

letter to the SBC’s president encapsulates the sentiments many Southern Bap-

tists felt toward the president who had let them down. Mrs. Albert Kemp of

Oklahoma City wrote Bailey Smith, accusing Carter of trying to retain South-

ern Baptists’ support “while at the same time woo the Homosexuals.” Mrs.

Carter earned her scorn as well for supporting the ERA and attending the

IWY conference, and she blamed Carter for not preventing his wife from

doing so. “A man that can’t rule his family has no business in the White

House,” Kemp declared. Like so many other Southern Baptists who felt mis-

led by Carter, Kemp doubted the realness of Carter’s faith. “Th e Blacks are

given credit for electing Mr. Carter to offi ce,” Kemp explained, “But I fi rmly

believe it was the Southern Baptists and other Christians hoping that he was

‘born again.’” For many Southern Baptists like Kemp, Carter’s policies and

actions in offi ce had spoken more clearly than any testimony of faith he had

ever professed. If Carter was a Christian, he was not their kind of Christian,

and he certainly represented the elements of the Southern Baptist Conven-

tion that the resurgent fundamentalists felt must be purged from their pews.

Kemp concluded with a plea that Smith use his infl uence against Carter’s

reelection. “I know that you cannot use your pulpit for politics, but in your

contact with people I beg you to please point out the discrepancies of Jimmy

Carter,” Kemp urged. “Our country cannot stand him for another four years.” 94

“Amen! Amen! Amen!” Bailey Smith wrote back. “I agree with everything you

have said.” 95

In their letters to the SBC, Southern Baptists connected their worries

about the direction of the country and that of the denomination. “I am one of

many Southern Baptist Women (as well as men),” Cindy Miller of Tulsa wrote

Smith, “who are concerned not only with the way our country is being run

and by whom, but also with those offi cially within our Southern Baptist Con-

vention who are helping push our country towards its questionable directions

. . . and deceiving Southern Baptists at the same time.” Miller documented her

off enses with the Carter administration and Southern Baptist moderates,

connecting theology to politics. “I would also like for you to know,” she con-

cluded, “that there are some conservative Southern Baptists who . . . have

been actively involved in working for what we believe to be Scriptural

truths.” 96 In the face of seeming equivocation over questions of absolute truth,

fundamentalists in the SBC had sought to drive out the moderate powers of

the denomination. And at the polls in 1980, fundamentalists would vote out


Jimmy Carter, the Southern Baptist president who, like the moderates of his

denomination, saw moral complexity where they saw clear-cut certainties.

When the polls closed, Carter’s loss among Southern Baptists was devas-

tating, refl ecting almost a 25 percent drop from 1976. In all his losses with

various voter groups, Carter’s biggest decline came from his fellow Southern

Baptists, who gave Carter only a third of their support. 97 And in the ninety-

six most heavily Baptist counties, Reagan won 60 percent in 1980, besting

Carter’s showing of 58 percent in those same counties in 1980. 98 Carter lost

every southern state except his own.

Southern Baptists, then, were a critical component of the voters who

turned from Carter in 1980. Th ose who identifi ed themselves as strongest

fundamentalists gave Reagan greater support than any other group did. Evan-

gelicals were more likely to vote in the 1980 election than any other group of

voters, and they likely provided the margin in Reagan’s slim victories in

Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Tennessee,

all states Carter won in 1976. But Reagan’s wins were hardly decisive in these

states as he failed to claim more than 50 percent of the vote in any of them.

His biggest margin among the six was a meager 2.1 percent edge—a sharp

contrast to Carter’s 1976 showing, when he had won several of them by

double-digit leads. In the other fi ve, Reagan won by a slim 1.3 percent or less. 99

In light of this, Reagan’s win hardly seems tantamount to an evangelical land-

slide for the Gipper, but more accurately as Carter’s loss.

“Everybody I talk to is voting for Reagan + most of them voted for Pres

[ sic ] Carter before,” one evangelical had warned the White House in the

summer of 1980. “In the last election 70% of evangelicals didn’t vote.” 100 While

his numbers may not have been exact, his political forecasting proved correct.

Evangelicals were energized to come out in 1980, vote Carter out, and bolster

a Republican landslide that won back the Senate for the fi rst time since 1952

and posted impressive gains in the House. Th ough the results may have been

immediate, the forces for such a movement had been at work far longer,

building from the SBC’s debates over the Bible and its theological shift .

Shortly before the election, one Baptist minister pointed to the theological

developments of the 1970s as the basis for what he hoped would be a political

revolution in 1980. “For the last 10 years, we’ve been raising a generation that

believes in the Bible as the word of God,” Reverend Pennell explained. “And

they’re ready to vote now. You see?” 101

Even aft er Carter had left offi ce, many Southern Baptists still bristled at

the notion that he was one of them. “Former President Carter, used the

church, always toten his bible [ sic ], and saying he was born again, to be


elected,” one woman wrote the SBC, clearly situating the rejection of Carter

in the context of the Southern Baptist Convention’s own internal struggles.

“Th e deceit of Carter, of a nation, and the corruption in our churches has

brought down the wrath of God on us, and would seem we are members of

the Seven Churches of Revelation.” 102

c onclusion

Fundamentalists were remaking the Southern Baptist Convention, but they

had also helped redirect the political direction of the nation. Emboldened by

the message to purify their denomination, Southern Baptists embraced a

hard-line faith that challenged anything but the most orthodox beliefs as

unchristian. Carter, the most famous moderate Southern Baptist in the

nation, paid the political price for the remaking of the Southern Baptist

Convention, but that refashioning, of course, would have national implica-

tions too.

Underappreciated in the narrative of the rise of the Religious Right is the

important love and loss religious conservatives felt for Jimmy Carter. Examining

the 1980 election in the context of the Southern Baptist Convention’s funda-

mentalist takeover helps us understand the rise of the Religious Right as a

theological story with political implications. Southern Baptists and other

conservative evangelicals had spent the 1970s wrestling over powerful doctrinal

questions of scriptural inerrancy and biblical authority. What they had really

been debating was the basic defi nition of what it meant to be a Christian.

While previous generations of Southern Baptists had allowed a range of theo-

logical views and worship practices throughout the Convention—the Baptist

principles of congregational authority and the priesthood of all believers

demanded such acceptance, aft er all—the Bible battles of the 1970s exposed

divisions that even Christian comity could not overlook. Conservative

Baptists saw in their moderate denominationalists doctrinal threats that had

to be confronted. Led by fundamentalist pastors who depicted the theological

battle as not merely an interpretive disagreement but, instead, the very work

of Satan, these conservatives rallied to purify their denomination. In calling

their rivals the “enemy,” in likening them to “snakes,” and in characterizing

the denomination’s reorganizational moment as a “battle,” Southern Baptist

fundamentalists equipped their cause with the language of spiritual warfare.

Th is was not a metaphor for them but rather an objective reality. And it drew

the dividing line not across diff ering Christians but between the true believer

and the heretic, between the forces of God and of his adversary.


Th at dividing line separated Jimmy Carter from the bulk of conservative

Southern Baptists. Increasingly over his presidency, Carter endured ques-

tions about his spiritual authenticity from fellow Baptists. In letters to the

White House and to SBC’s headquarters, in denominational publications and

Sunday sermons, Southern Baptists judged the state of Carter’s soul, calling him

unchristian and disbelieving his born-again testimony. Southern Baptists

were hardly alone in these conclusions. More generally, evangelicals frequently

raised doubts about Carter’s Christianity. 103 In the last months of the campaign,

a group called Christians for Reagan ran television advertisements in conser-

vative Christian districts charging, “Although Jimmy Carter calls himself a

Christian, he hasn’t been acting one.” 104 Those judgments may be lost on

political historians as the inconsequential preoccupations of the faithful, but

their importance to the religious conservatives who made them—and to our

understanding of those religious conservatives—cannot be overstated. Over

and over, Southern Baptists scrutinized Carter’s presidential decisions

through the rubric of evangelical orthodoxy, testing his faith just as they

assessed the convictions of their moderate brethren in the denomination

before finally disposing of them both. Other evangelicals, as members of

denominations undergoing their own divisions or simply aware of the larger

theological battles within conservative Protestantism, made similar judg-

ments of Carter and helped usher him from the White House. “President

Carter’s Christianity, like his policies, is diffi cult to understand,” one evangelical

wrote to Christianity Today halfway through Carter’s presidency. 105 But con-

servative Christians understood Carter’s policies and his presidency through

their evaluation of his Christianity, underscoring the theological basis of the

ascendant Religious Right. Political historians would do well to understand

that now too.

New York, NY

n otes

1. Questionnaire, attached to Letter, Rev. Pat Andrews to Mr. Carter, 10/2/80, fi le:

“Moral Majority,” Name File, Jimmy Carter Library. Hereaft er Carter.

2. Letter, Bob Maddox to Reverend Pat Andrews, 10/27/80, fi le: “Moral Majority,”

Name File, Carter.

3. Bill Keller , “ Christian Vote Ratings: Study in Absolutes ,” Congressional Quarterly

Weekly Report , 6 September 1980 , in Christian Life Commission Resource Files, 1955–90, AR

138-2, box 61, folder 3, Southern Baptist Historical Library and Archives. Hereaft er SBHLA.


4. Bruce Buursma , “ Moral Majority: Crusade Has Just Begun ,” Chicago Tribune ,

6 November 1980 ; Glenn Frankel and Karlyn Barker, “Virginia Republicans Now More

Eager For ’81 Election,” Washington Post , 6 November 1980.

5. Edwin Warner , “ New Resolve by the New Right ,” Time , 8 December 1980 , 24 .

6. See also Buursma, “Moral Majority”; Frankel and Barker, “Virginia Republicans

Now More Eager For ’81 Election”; John Herbers , “ Once-Democratic South: An Era Ends ,”

New York Times , 6 November 1980 ; and Warner, “New Resolve by the New Right.”

7. Stephen D. Johnson and Joseph B. Tamney , “ Th e Christian Right and the 1980

Presidential Election ,” Journal for the Scientifi c Study of Religion 21 , no. 2 (June 1982 ) :

128. See also Paul R. Abramson , John H. Aldrich , and David W. Rohde , eds., Change and

Continuity in the 1980 Elections ( Washington, D.C. , 1982 ), 101 ; Jerome L. Himmelstein and

James A. McRae Jr ., “ Social Conservatism, New Republicans, and the 1980 Election ,” Public

Opinion Quarterly 48 , no. 3 (Autumn 1984 ): 592 – 605 ; Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl

Raab , “ Th e Election and the Evangelicals ,” Commentary , March 1981 , 25 – 31 .

8. Jeff rey L. Brudney and Gary W. Copeland , “ Evangelicals as a Political Force:

Reagan and the 1980 Religious Vote ,” Social Science Quarterly 65 , no. 4 (December 1984 ) :

1076. It is diffi cult to get at a precise estimate for the number of evangelicals who voted for

Ronald Reagan, as various studies employ diff erent qualifi cations to identify evangelical voters.

Some intend “evangelicals” to include fundamentalists, while others diff erentiate the two.

Th e political scientist Andrew Busch found that Reagan outpolled Carter by a measure of

2-to-1 among “white fundamentalist or evangelical Christians.” Andrew E. Busch, Reagan’s

Victory: Th e Presidential Election of 1980 and the Rise of the Right (Lawrence, Kans., 2005),

127. Th e sociologist James Davison Hunter, however, claims that only 61 percent of white

evangelicals voted for Reagan. James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: Th e Struggle to Defi ne

America (New York, 1991), 280. Th ough he does not cite his source, Hunter is likely using

the results of the New York Times /CBS News poll conducted of more than twelve thousand

voters. Of this group, 17 percent identifi ed themselves as “born-again white Protestants,”

and 61 percent of those said they had voted for Reagan. Poll cited in E. J. Dionne Jr ., Why

Americans Hate Politics ( New York , 1991 ), 234 . One study found that the stronger one’s

fundamentalist beliefs, the more likely one picked Reagan, with those in the highest

category of fundamentalism giving him 85 percent of their votes. Arthur H. Miller and

Martin P. Wattenberg , “ Politics from the Pulpit: Religiosity and the 1980 Election ,” Public

Opinion Quarterly 48 , no. 1 (Spring 1984 ): 312 –13.

For other works that argue that the Religious Right was an important factor in the

1980 presidential election, see Steve Bruce , The Rise and Fall of the New Christian

Right: Conservative Protestant Politics in America, 1978–1988 ( Oxford , 1988 ), 91 – 103 ;

Kevin P. Phillips , Post-Conservative America: People, Politics, and Ideology in a Time of Crisis

( New York , 1982 ): 189 –92 ; John H. Simpson , “ Social-Moral Issues and Recent Presidential

Elections ,” Review of Religious Research 2 , no. 2 (December 1985 ): 115 –23 ; and Corwin Smidt ,

“ ‘Born Again’ Politics: Th e Political Attitudes and Behavior of Evangelical Christians in the

South and Non-South ,” in Religion and Politics in the South: Mass and Elite Perspectives , eds.

Tod Baker , Robert Steed , and Larry Moreland ( New York , 1983 ), 27 – 56 .

9. Donald T. Critchlow , Th e Conservative Ascendancy: How the GOP Right Made

Political History ( Cambridge , Mass ., 2007 ), 174 –77 ; Kenneth J. Heineman , God Is a

Conservative: Religion, Politics, and Morality in Contemporary America ( New York , 1998 ),

93 – 123 ; William Martin , With God on Our Side: Th e Rise of the Religious Right in America


(New York, 1996 ), 191 – 220 ; and Daniel K. Williams , God’s Own Party: Th e Making of

the Christian Right ( New York , 2010 ), 188 – 94 . See also Matthew D. Lassiter , “ Inventing

Family Values ,” in Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the 1970s , eds. Bruce

Schulman and Julian Zelizer ( Cambridge , Mass. , 2008 ), 13 – 28 .

10. See Andrew R. Flint and Joy Porter , “ Jimmy Carter: Th e Re-emergence of Faith-

Based Politics and the Abortion Rights Issue ,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 35 , no. 1 (March

2005 ): 28 – 50 ; and Robert Freedman , “ Th e Religious Right and the Carter Administration ,”

Historical Journal 48 , no. 1 (March 2005 ): 231 –60. Th e historian J. Brooks Flippen’s recent

book provides a forceful case for centralizing Carter in the story of the Religious Right.

Still, his work reaffi rms a largely political narrative of Christian conservatism, seeing

Carter’s struggles with this constituency as a function of his political pivoting between

secular liberals and religious conservatives. Flippen credits the political organizing of

Christian conservatives by New Right and Christian Right leaders that culminated with

the election of Reagan, but he largely overlooks the theological basis of the Religious Right

and how doctrinal controversies and denominational realignment, particularly within the

context of the Southern Baptist Convention, shaped religious conservatives’ rejection of

Carter. J. Brooks Flippen , Jimmy Carter, the Politics of Family, and the Rise of the Religious

Right ( Athens , 2011 ). Th e political scientist Oran P. Smith sees Carter’s loss in the context of

the Southern Baptist Convention’s conservative realignment in 1979, but merely notes that

Carter, like his fellow moderate Baptists in the convention, lay on the losing end of both a

religious realignment in his denomination and a political realignment in the nation. Oran

P. Smith , Th e Rise of Baptist Republicanism ( New York , 1997 ), 94 – 97 .

11. Ruth Murray Brown, For a “Christian America”: A History of the Religious

Right (Amherst, 2002); Darren Dochuk , From Bible Belt to Sunbelt: Plain-Folk Religion,

Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Evangelical Conservatism ( New York , 2011 ) ; Samuel

S. Hill and Dennis E. Owen , Th e New Religious Political Right in America ( Nashville ,

1982 ) ; Erling Jorstad , Th e New Christian Right, 1981–1988: Prospects for the Post-Reagan

Decade ( Lewiston, N.Y. , 1987 ) ; Frank Lambert , Religion in American Politics: A Short

History ( Princeton , 2008 ), 184 – 217 ; Martin, With God on Our Side ; Steven P. Miller, Billy

Graham and the Rise of the Republican South (Philadelphia, 2009); Williams, God’s Own

Party ; Daniel K. Williams , “ Jerry Falwell’s Sunbelt Politics: Th e Regional Origins of the

Moral Majority ,” Journal of Policy History 22 , no. 2 (Summer 2010 ): 125 –47 ; Garry Wills ,

Under God: Religion and American Politics ( New York , 1990 ). See also Steve Bruce , Th e

Rise and Fall of the New Christian Right: Conservative Protestant Politics in America,

1978–1988 ( Oxford , 1988 ) ; Michael Lienesch , Redeeming Politics: Piety and Politics in the

New Christian Right ( Chapel Hill , 1993 ) ; David G. Bromley and Anson Shupe, eds., New

Christian Politics (Macon, Ga., 1984); Robert C. Liebman and Robert Wuthnow , eds., Th e

New Christian Right: Mobilization and Legitimation ( New York , 1983 ) ; Duane Murray

Oldfi eld, Th e Right and the Righteous: Th e Christian Right Confronts the Republican Party

(Lanham, Md., 1996); and Clyde Wilcox, God’s Warriors: Th e Christian Right in Twentieth-

Century America (Baltimore, 1992).

12. Nancy Ammerman , Baptist Battles: Social Change and Religious Confl ict in the

Southern Baptist Convention ( New Brunswick , 1990 ) ; Ellen M. Rosenberg , Th e Southern

Baptists: A Subculture in Transition ( Knoxville , 1989 ), 184 –94 ; and Walter B. Shurden

and Randy Shepley, Going for the Jugular: A Documentary History of the SBC Holy War

(Macon, Ga., 1996). See also Nancy Ammerman, ed., Southern Baptists Observed: Multiple


Perspectives on a Changing Denomination (Knoxville, 1993); Joseph Barnhart, Th e Southern

Baptist Holy War (Austin, 1986); Arthur Emery Farnsley III, Southern Baptist Politics:

Authority and Power in the Restructuring of an American Denomination (University Park,

Pa., 1994); James Hefl ey, Th e Truth in Crisis: Th e Controversy in the Southern Baptist

Convention (Dallas, 1986); Bill J. Leonard, God’s Last and Only Hope: Th e Fragmentation of

the Southern Baptist Convention (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1990).

Oran P. Smith does attribute the fundamentalist resurgence in the SBC to the rise of

what he calls “Baptist Republicanism,” but he sees that political development within a

larger history, dating back to the 1920s, of the cultural, social, and political developments

within both the denomination and the American South. See Smith, Th e Rise of Baptist

Republicanism , 48–67 and passim.

13. On the 1980 election and Reagan’s place in modern conservatism, see Steven

F. Hayward, Th e Age of Reagan: Th e Fall of the Old Liberal Order, 1964–1980 (Roseville,

Calif., 2001), and The Age of Reagan: The Conservative Counterrevolution, 1980–1989

(New York, 2009); Gil Troy, Morning in America: How Ronald Reagan Invented the 1980s

(Princeton, 2005); Sean Wilentz, Th e Age of Reagan: A History, 1974–2008 (New York,

2008). On the rise of modern conservatism, see Mary C. Brennan , Turning Right in the

Sixties: Th e Conservative Capture of the GOP ( Chapel Hill , 1995 ) ; Dan T. Carter , Th e Politics

of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation

of American Politics ( New York , 1995 ) ; Critchlow, Th e Conservative Ascendancy ; Jerome

L. Himmelstein , To the Right: Th e Transformation of American Conservatism ( Berkeley ,

1990 ) ; Godfrey Hodgson , Th e World Turned Right Side Up: A History of the Conservative

Ascendancy in America ( Boston , 1996 ) ; Kevin M. Kruse , White Flight: Atlanta and the Rise

of Modern American Conservatism ( Princeton , 2005 ) ; George H. Nash , Th e Conservative

Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945 ( New York , 1976 ) ; Kim Phillips-Fein , Invisible

Hands: Th e Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Deal to Reagan ( New York ,

2009 ) ; Lisa McGirr , Suburban Warriors: Th e Origins of the New American Right ( Princeton ,

2001 ) ; Rick Perlstein , Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American

Consensus ( New York , 2001 ) ; Jonathan M. Schoenwald, A Time for Choosing: Th e Rise of

Modern American Conservatism (New York, 2001). For two recent reviews of the literature of

American conservatism, see Kim Phillips-Fein, “Conservatism: A State of the Field,” Journal

of American History 98, no. 3 (December 2011): 723–43; and Julian E. Zelizer , “ Rethinking the

History of American Conservatism ,” Reviews in American History 38 , no. 2 (June 2010 ): 367 –92.

14. Gary M. Fink and Hugh Davis Graham, eds., Th e Carter Presidency: Policy

Choices in the Post–New Deal Era (Lawrence, Kans., 1998); Frye Gaillard, Th e Unfi nished

Presidency: Essays on Jimmy Carter (Wingate, N.C., 1986); Alonzo L. Hambly, Liberalism

and Its Challengers: From FDR to Reagan (New York, 1985); William E. Leuchtenburg, In

the Shadow of FDR: From Harry Truman to George W. Bush (Ithaca, 2001); Leo P. Ribuff o ,

“ Jimmy Carter and the Ironies of American Liberalism ,” Gettysburg Review 1 (Autumn 1988 ):

739 –49. On the decline of the New Deal order and American liberalism, see Jeff erson Cowie

and Nick Salvatore , “ Th e Long Exception: Rethinking the Place of the New Deal in American

History ,” International Labor and Working-Class History 74 (Fall 2008 ): 3 – 32 ; Steve Fraser

and Gary Gerstle, Th e Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930–1980 (Princeton, 1989);

Th omas J. Sugrue, Th e Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit

(Princeton, 1996); and Jonathan Rieder, Canarsie: Th e Jews and Italians of Brooklyn Against

Liberalism (Cambridge, Mass., 1985).


15. Edward E. Plowman , “ Southern Baptists: Platform for Presidents ,” Christianity

Today , 16 July 1976 , 49 .

16. Kenneth L. Woodward, “Born Again!” Newsweek , 25 October 1976, 68.

17. Harold Lindsell, Th e Battle for the Bible (Grand Rapids, 1976).

18. “Bible Battles,” Time , 10 May 1976, 57.

19. Francis Rue Steele , “ Inerrancy Is Indispensable ,” Christianity Today , 9 April 1976 , 35 .

20. Th is section draws from Ammerman, Baptist Battles ; Rosenberg, Th e Southern

Baptists , 184–94; and Going for the Jugular , ed. Shurden and Shepley.

21. Adrian Rogers, “Th e Great Deceiver,” in Going for the Jugular , ed. Shurden and

Shepley, 18.

22. Shurden and Shepley, Going for the Jugular , 9.

23. Ibid., 22.

24. James Robison, “Satan’s Subtle Attacks,” in Going for the Jugular , ed. Shurden and

Shepley, 25.

25. Ibid., 31.

26. Ibid., 37.

27. Ibid., 29.

28. “Conservative Wins Top Baptist Post,” Washington Post , 13 June 1979.

29. Smith, Th e Rise of Baptist Republicanism , 51.

30. Quoted in Gary Scott Smith, Faith and the Presidency: From George Washington

to George W. Bush (New York, 2006), 295. For a highly sympathetic “spiritual biography” of

Carter, see Dan Arial and Cheryl Heckler-Feltz, Th e Carpenter’s Apprentice: Th e Spiritual

Biography of Jimmy Carter (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1996).

31. Myra McPherson, “Evangelicals Seen Cooling on Carter,” Washington Post , 27

September 1976.

32. “Carter Vatican Stance Invites Baptist Wrath,” Baptist Standard , 15 September

1976, in folder: “ACCL Political File: 76 Presidential Campaign—Ford Campaign (4),”

box 45, American Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. Records, Gerald R. Ford Library.

Hereaft er Ford. See also “Carter Wouldn’t Oppose Vatican Ambassador,” Baptist Standard ,

8 September 1976, in same folder.

33. McPherson, “Evangelicals Seen Cooling on Carter.”

34. Robert G. Kaiser , “ Remarks on Sexuality Draw Mixed Response ,” Washington

Post , 21 September 1976 .

35. Myra McPherson , “ Remarks in Playboy Draw Pulpit Attack ,” Washington Post ,

27 September 1976 .

36. Michael Satchell , “ ‘Barnyard Language’ Denounced ,” Washington Star , 21 September

1976 .

37. Photograph, in folder: “ACCL Political File: 76 Presidential Campaign—Carter

(2),” box 44, American Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. Records, Ford.

38. Jules Witcover, Marathon: Th e Pursuit of the Presidency, 1972–1976 (New York,

1977), 567.

39. President Ford Committee Newsletter, “Southern Baptist Leader Endorses

President,” 10/11/76, folder: “ACCL Political File: 76 Presidential Campaign—Religious,”

box 44, American Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. Records, Ford.

40. Most estimates place Southern Baptist support for Carter in 1976 in the high

50 percentages. One estimated 56 percent of Southern Baptists voted for Carter: Warner,


“New Resolve by the New Right.” ABC/Louis Harris pegged Carter’s win among Baptists at

57 percent, Albert J. Menendez, Religion at the Polls (Philadelphia, 1977), 198.

41. Menendez, Religion at the Polls , 198–99.

42. Action Line: Christian Action Council Newsletter , 12 September 1980, Wilcox

Collection, Kenneth Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas. Hereaft er Wilcox

Collection.

43. Flint and Porter, “Jimmy Carter,” 31.

44. For Carter campaign concerns about evangelical voters, see Memo, Lynn

Darden to Chuck Parrish and Atlanta, “Ecumenical Movement (Relationship of Carter to

Protestants-Baptists Types),” 9/15/76, fi le: “Protestants [3],” box 280; Letter, B. Stuart Hoarn

to Mr. Carlin, 9/15/76, fi le: “Protestants [3],” box 280; Memo, John Carlin to Landon Butler,

“Growing Baptist ‘Evangelical’ Problem,” 9/1/6/76, fi le: “Protestants [3],” box 280; and Phil

Strickland to Jimmy Carter and Carter Campaign Personnel, “Support from Southern

Baptists and other segments of the Religious Community,” undated, fi le: “Protestants [2],”

box 280, all in Jimmy Carter Pre-Presidential 1976 Campaign, Carter.

45. In the 1970s, several Protestant denominations split over disputes about doctrinal

questions, liturgical practices, and other issues, like the ordination of women. Th ese splits

were institutional responses to tensions within the denominations between conservative

evangelical and moderate factions that separated those forces for good. For a history of the

schisms in the Presbyterian Church in the United States (PCUS), the Lutheran Church–

Missouri Synod, and the Episcopal Church during the 1970s, see Bryan V. Hillis, Can Two

Walk Together Unless Th ey Be Agreed? American Religious Schisms in the 1970s (Brooklyn,

1991). In the PCUS and the Episcopal Church, the conservative factions broke off to form

their own new denominations; whereas, in the Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod, the

moderate wing left the conservative parent.

46. Memo, Stu Eizenstat to Governor Carter, 5/3/76, “Religion, 2/75–6/76,” box 27,

Jimmy Carter Pre-Presidential 1976 Campaign, Carter.

47. Letter, Douglas Brewer to Th e Director, Christian Life Commission, 10/20/77,

Christian Life Commission Resource Files, 1955–90, AR 138-2, box 48, folder 15, SBHLA.

48. Letter, Mrs. M. E. Robinson to unnamed, undated, in Christian Life Commission

Resource Files, 1955–90, AR 138–2, box 48, folder 15, SBHLA. Underlining in the original.

49. “Anita Bryant Scores White House Talk with Homosexuals,” New York Times , 28

March 1977.

50. Th e Voice of Florida Newsletter , September 1977, Voice of Florida Collection,

Wilcox Collection.

51. Harry Kelly , “ Carter Risks Ire of Gay Foes ,” Chicago Tribune , 4 November 1978 .

52. Dochuk, From Bible Belt to Sunbelt , 341.

53. Russell Chandler and John Dart , “ Many Church Leaders Oppose Prop. 6 ,”

Los Angeles Times , 3 November 1978 .

54. Jeffrey Perlman, “‘Battle Is Not Over,’ Briggs Vows to Prop. 6 Supporters,”

Los Angeles Times , 9 November 1978.

55. Letter, Robert D. Hughes to Mr. Jimmy Carter, 12/7/78, fi le: “Southern Baptist

Convention,” Name File, Carter. At the same time, the convention also passed a resolution

opposing “any law that would make homosexuals a legal minority under the Fair

Employment Act of California.” See “State’s Southern Baptists Settle Baptism and

Communion Issues,” Los Angeles Times , 18 November 1978.


56. Letter, William R. Hann to Th e Honorable Jimmy Carter, 11/7/78, fi le: “Southern

Baptist Convention,” Name File, Carter.

57. For the full text of the Democratic Party Platform of 1980, see http://www.presi-

dency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29607 .

58. Letter, Kenneth Bowden to Dr. Robert L. Maddox, 8/21/80, fi le: “Gay Issues,” box

8, Offi ce of Public Liaison, Bob Maddox, Carter.

59. Letter, Ralph E. Lewis to Dr. Robert L. Maddox, n.d., fi le: “Gay Issues,” box 105,

Offi ce of Ann Wexler, Special Assistant to the President, Robert L. Maddox’s Religious

Liaison Files, Carter. See other correspondence in the same folder. I am grateful to Kyle

Goyette for sharing these documents with me.

60. On Weddington, see her autobiography, Sarah Weddington, A Question of Choice

(New York, 1992).

61. Action Line: Christian Action Council Newsletter , 10 October 1980, Wilcox Collection.

62. Memo, Hugh Carter to the President, 11/3/78, fi le: “11/8/78 [1],” box 108, Offi ce of

Staff Secretary, Presidential Handwriting File, Carter.

63. “Resolution on Abortion,” June 1971, http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/amResolu-

tion.asp?ID=13 .

64. Cynthia Gorney, Articles of Faith: A Frontline History of the Abortion Wars (New

York, 1998), 188.

65. “Abortion Newsletter,” Christian Faith in Action , July 1973 in Christian Life

Commission Resource Files, 1955–90, AR 138-2, box 92, folder 11, SBHLA.

66. “Resolution on Abortion and Sanctity of Human Life,” June 1974, http://www.sbc.

net/resolutions/amResolution.asp?ID=14 .

67. Letter, Carl E. Bates to Th e Reverend Ed Gardner, 3/21/72, Carl Bates Papers, AR

298, folder 7, SBHLA. See also other letters in same folder from Baptist pastors and congre-

gants who denounced the SBC’s supportive position on abortion reform.

68. For examples of Southern Baptist moderation on abortion, including argu-

ments that the Bible did not specify when life began or clearly forbid the practice, see

Andrew D. Lester , “ Th e Abortion Dilemma ,” Review & Expositor 68 , no. 2 ( Spring 1971 ):

227 –44 ; and “Abortion Newsletter,” Christian Faith in Action , July 1973.

69. http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/amResolution.asp?ID=443 .

70. Dan Martin , “ SBC Continues March Toward Th eological Right ,” Illinois Baptist ,

18 June 1980 .

71. http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/amResolution.asp?ID=19 . See also James L. Franklin,

“Southern Baptist Abortion Stance Sends Shock Waves,” Dallas Herald , 12 June 1980, in

Christian Life Commission Resource Files, 1955–90, AR 138-2, box 79, folder 4, SBHLA.

72. http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/amResolution.asp?ID=1091 .

73. J. Marse Grant , “ SBC Didn’t Act on ERA ,” Biblical Recorder , 19 November 1977 .

74. For these resolutions, see http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/AMResSearchYear.asp?

SearchBy=Year&frmData=1980 .

75. Hunter, Culture Wars , 178–80.

76. “Resolution on the White House Conference on the Family,” http://www.sbc.net/

resolutions/amResolution.asp?ID=530 .

77. On Reagan’s 1976 race for the GOP nomination, see Craig Shirley, Reagan’s

Revolution: Th e Untold Story of the Campaign Th at Started It All (Nashville, 2005). Notably,

Shirley’s book makes no mention of evangelicals.


78. Martin, With God on Our Side , 205–6.

79. Ibid., 206–7.

80. Letter, Bob Maddox to President Jimmy Carter, 1 September 1978, fi le: “Religious

Matters 20 January 1977–32 December 1978,” box RM-1, White House Central File, Carter.

For Carter’s rejection of Maddox’s 1978 offer, see Handwriting on Memo, Susan to

Mr. President, 23 September 78, fi le: “Religious Matters 1/20/77–1/20/81,” box RM-1, White

House Central File, Carter.

81. Freedman, “Th e Religious Right and the Carter Administration,” 246.

82. Memo, Bob Maddox to Phil Wise and Anne Wexler, “Meeting with Ad Hoc Group

of Conservative Religious Leaders,” 8/28/79, fi le: “Religious Matters 1/20/77–1/20/81,” box

RM-1, White House Central File, Carter.

83. Martin, With God on Our Side , 189.

84. Memo, Bob Maddox to Anne Wexler, “Southern Baptist Convention,” 6/17/80, in

fi le: “Southern Baptist Convention,” Name File, Carter.

85. Letters, Bill Brock to Dr. Bailey Smith, 23 June 1980, and Bailey E. Smith, President

to Mr. Bill Brock, 7/8/1980, in Bailey Smith Papers, AR 671, box 1, folder 52, SBHLA.

86. Herbers, “Once-Democratic South.”

87. Church, “Politics from the Pulpit,” 35.

88. Lawrence Lader , Politics, Power, and the Church: Th e Catholic Crisis and Its

Challenge to American Pluralism ( New York , 1987 ), 64 .

89. Dr. James W. Bryant, “How Will You Vote? For Reagan or Carter . . . ,” reprinted

in Pro Family Forum Newsletter , October 1980, in Pro Family Forum Collection, Wilcox

Collection.

90. Ammerman, Baptist Battles , 99.

91. Letter, Mrs. Albert Kemp to Bailey E. Smith, 2 July 1980, Bailey Smith Papers, AR

671, box 1, folder 18, SBHLA.

92. Letter, Joyce Rogers to Mrs. Carter, 24 August 1979, “Adrian Rogers,” Name File,

Carter. Rogers signed her letter, “Joyce Rogers (Mrs. Adrian) Wife of the President of the

Southern Baptist Convention.”

93. Flippen, Jimmy Carter, the Politics of Family, and the Rise of the Religious Right , 218.

94. Letter, Mrs. Albert Kemp to Bailey E. Smith, 2 July 1980, Bailey Smith Papers, AR


95. Letter, Bailey E. Smith to Mrs. Albert Kemp, 8 July 1980, Bailey Smith Papers, AR


96. Letter, Cindy Miller to Dr. Bailey Smith, undated, Bailey Smith Papers, AR 671,

box 1, folder 38, SBHLA.

97. Edwin Warner of Time magazine reported that only 34 percent of Southern

Baptists voted for Carter in 1980. Warner, “New Resolve by the New Right.” Albert

Menendez estimated that Southern Baptist support was 40 percent. Albert J. Menendez,

Evangelicals at the Ballot Box (Amherst, 1996), 139.

98. Dionne, Why Americans Hate Politics , 234.

99. Busch, Reagan’s Victory , 125–28.

100. Letter, John Lester to Anne Wexler, 23 June 1980, quoted in Freedman, “The

Religious Right and the Carter Administration,” 247.

101. Dudley Clendinen , “ ‘Christian New Right’s’ Rush to Power ,” New York Times ,

18 August 1980 .


102. Letter, Leslie Jacobs to Rev. Bailey Smith, 3 April 1981, Bailey Smith Papers, AR


103. For example, see the article series, “Does Carter’s Christianity Count?” Christianity

Today , 3 November 1978, 14–21.

104. Steven R. Weisman , “ Appeals Backing G.O.P. Said to Portray Views as Contrary to

Bible ,” New York Times , 1 November 1980 .

105. Letter to the Editor, Th omas J. Mullen Jr ., “ Question for a Question ,” Christianity

Today , 15 December 1978 , 4 .

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