the journal of policy history , Vol. 26, No. 4, 2014. © Donald Critchlow and Cambridge University Press 2014 doi:10.1017/S0898030614000232
n eil j . y oung
“Worse than cancer and worse than
snakes”: Jimmy Carter’s Southern Baptist
Problem and the 1980 Election
A month before the 1980 election, the pastor of Faith Baptist Church in
Princeton, Texas, sent Jimmy Carter a questionnaire so his church members
could know the president’s positions on various matters. Drawn up by the
Moral Majority, the questionnaire ignored the bleak economy, the energy
crisis, and the tense international situation to focus instead on social issues
such as abortion, homosexuality, the ERA, pornography, prostitution, school
prayer, and sex education. Casting aside the seeming complexities of such
issues, the questionnaire reduced them all to a fundamentalist simplicity. “Do
you agree that this country was founded on a belief in God and the moral
principles of the Bible?” the form asked, allowing a candidate only to check
answers under “yes” or “no.” 1 Bob Maddox, the White House’s liaison to the
religious community, waited until just days before the election to respond,
likely uneager to make the president’s case to yet another group of conserva-
tive Christians disenchanted by Carter. Maddox wrote that despite the bad
I am grateful to Kevin Kruse for generous comments on various draft s of this article.
Thanks also to Wallace Best, Gillian Frank, Judith Weisenfeld, the members of the
Princeton University Religions in the Americas Workshop, and the anonymous reviewers
of the Journal of Policy History for their insightful comments on this article. I would also
like to thank the archival staff s of the Gerald R. Ford Library, the Jimmy Carter Library,
the Kenneth Spencer Research Library at the University of Kansas, and the Southern
Baptist Historical Library and Archives.
480 | “Worse than cancer and worse than snakes”
press generated by publications like the Moral Majority Report , “I assure you
that President Carter, a man of deep faith in Jesus Christ, is profoundly con-
cerned about the moral and spiritual welfare of the nation.” However, Carter
could not respond to the enclosed questionnaire, Maddox explained, because
“legitimate answers cannot be given in terms of a quick yes or no.” 2 But for
fundamentalists, like those at Faith Baptist and throughout the Southern
Baptist Convention, “yes” or “no” responses were indeed legitimate answers
to the complex questions facing the nation; no gray areas existed on such
matters as abortion or homosexuality. Th e Southern Baptist Convention had
undergone a theological shift to biblical literalism in the late 1970s, and this
doctrinal transformation led to hardline political positions and directly
undermined support for Carter’s reelection. As a Houston pastor had told
a reporter at a political rally of fi ft een thousand Southern Baptist and evan-
gelical ministers earlier that summer, “We believe in absolutes. . . . Th e Bible
is a book of absolutes.” 3
For political historians, the story of Reagan’s victory in the 1980 presi-
dential election has also seemed like one of absolutes. A straightforward
narrative, largely put in place during the election itself, has generally governed
how scholars have understood this watershed moment. As soon as Reagan
won in 1980, religious conservatives insisted they had been the key to the
election. Buoyed by the impressive turnout of conservative Christian voters,
these leaders of the newly christened “Religious Right” hoped to guarantee
Reagan’s commitment to their agenda by controlling the narrative of his
victory. Moral Majority’s Jerry Falwell claimed his new organization had
registered 4 million first-time voters for Reagan, “millions of voters who
otherwise would not have been at the polls,” as he described them, and had
pumped $5 million into the campaign. 4 One publication claimed that the
evangelical vote had provided two-thirds of Reagan’s ten-point win over
Carter. 5 Th e lesson seemed unambiguous: Ronald Reagan had won because
of the evangelical voter. 6
Soon, however, scholars began questioning religious conservatives’ role
in Reagan’s victory. Some argued the Religious Right had, as one study
contended, “virtually no infl uence at all” on the election. 7 Others reached
opposite conclusions. 8 Historians and other scholars have, from the vantage
point of time, worried less about determining the Religious Right’s precise
electoral infl uence in 1980 and instead observed the deeper cultural and
political bases for the rise of Christian conservatism and Reagan’s election. 9
Th ese scholars tend to see Reagan as the white knight of the Religious Right—
a folksy politico who captured religious conservative voters with biblically
n eil j . y oung | 481
inflected language and hollow promises regarding their chief issues. Yet
another group of scholars, while smaller, has contended that religious conser-
vatives spurned Carter as much, if not more, than they picked Reagan, rebuffi ng
the president because of his positions on topics like abortion, gay rights, and
the Equal Rights Amendment. 10 Although historians diff er on whether the
Religious Right coalesced around supporting Reagan or deposing Carter,
they have tended to agree on a seemingly straightforward point—the idea
that evangelicals, the Religious Right’s foundation, came to conservatism
through politics, as they mobilized in reaction to the social changes of the
previous two decades. 11
Th is article suggests a diff erent perspective for understanding the political
emergence of evangelical voters. By looking at Southern Baptists’ response to
Carter’s presidency, it argues that evangelicals came to conservatism not
through politics but through religion, namely, the theological remaking of
their denomination that established biblical literalism as the basis of Christian
belief and identity. Carter’s presidency coincided with one of the most tumul-
tuous times in Southern Baptist history, as moderates and fundamentalists
wrestled for control of the denomination and battled over questions of
biblical inerrancy, scriptural authority, and the very meaning of being a
Christian. While religious scholars have closely examined the fundamentalist
realignment of the SBC that began in 1979, they have largely overlooked the
political consequences of that refashioning in light of its obvious theological
and institutional results. 12 Yet, I argue, the victory of fundamentalists over
moderates in the SBC and the hardening of Baptist belief around biblical
literalism and scriptural inerrancy had ramifi cations far beyond the denomi-
nation’s headquarters and pulpits, extending to the realm of national politics.
For millions of Southern Baptists, biblical literalism off ered more than an
interpretive guide to scripture; it also provided a political worldview that
reduced issues to a yes-or-no rubric, as seen in the Moral Majority questionnaire.
Alongside the concretizing of biblical literalism at the heart of Southern
Baptist theology and denominational identity, fundamentalists also moved
their denomination away from muddled stances on political issues like abortion
and the ERA to hardline positions articulated through and justifi ed by the
language of scriptural absolutism. Th ese developments happened hand in
hand as fundamentalists used abortion, homosexuality, and the ERA to make
abstract theological leanings visible through uncompromising political resolu-
tions, underscoring the religious basis of Southern Baptists’ rightward shift .
Scholars have rightly understood the 1980 election as a watershed
moment in American political history, a turning point that ushered in the rising
482 | “Worse than cancer and worse than snakes”
tide of modern conservatism and brought about a fundamental realignment
of American politics and culture. 13 In that story, Jimmy Carter has stood as
the weak defender of a collapsing liberalism, rendered ineff ective as he sought
to appease the various Democratic constituencies of a fraying political order. 14
Yet Carter was also caught within the realignment of his religious denomina-
tion, and he and the nation faced the political consequences of Southern
Baptism’s doctrinal shift . Carter’s presidential bid in 1976 coincided with the
country’s evangelical resurgence, and Southern Baptists were eager to dem-
onstrate their political clout and cultural relevancy by supporting one of their
own. As one Baptist pastor enthused about Carter at the SBC’s 1976 meeting,
“We’ve been talking about the need for Christian statesmen. Now that we
have one, let’s just unwrap him and show him.” 15
But once they peeled back the layers, Southern Baptists recoiled at what
they found. Carter’s theological alignment with his denomination’s moder-
ates increasingly became a political handicap for the president among con-
servative Baptists, and his presidential decisions confl icted with the SBC’s
new political resolutions. As Carter took moderate and sometimes liberal
positions on the ERA, abortion, and homosexuality, the SBC passed unyielding
conservative resolutions against them, further distancing the president from
the SBC’s fundamentalist base. Increasingly through his presidency, Carter’s
Baptist critics responded with spiritual assessments that questioned his
Christian standing because of his political stances, an evaluation Southern
Baptists were engaging in repeatedly with one another throughout the
denomination’s churches, seminaries, and agencies. Th ey had voted for Carter in
1976 in order to elect a fellow born-again believer who could be their standard-
bearer. Southern Baptists went to the polls in 1980 not to elect the California
governor with his own spotty record on their pet issues, but rather to reject
the wolf in sheep’s clothing who had misled them about who he truly was.
f undamentalist t akeover
Carter’s bid for the White House in 1976 benefi ted from the nation’s religious
upsurge. Th e pollster George Gallup Jr. recently had found that 34 percent of
Americans, representing some fi ft y million adults, claimed to have undergone
a “born again” experience, leading Gallup to christen 1976 “Th e Year of the
Evangelical.” 16 Evangelicals had enjoyed a steady increase in the postwar
period, a development the national media fi nally recognized in 1976, but the
growth had also exposed factions and disagreements within the evangelical
community, culminating in the Bible battles of the 1970s. Evangelicals debated
n eil j . y oung | 483
with one another the nature of their beliefs, the authority of the Bible, and the
very definition of what it meant to be a Christian. Harold Lindsell’s 1976
book, Th e Battle for the Bible , brought all those questions to a head as he
defended biblical inerrancy and attacked evangelical bodies like the Lutheran
Church–Missouri Synod, Fuller Th eological Seminary, and the Southern
Baptist Convention for tolerating unorthodoxy in their midst. 17 Th e Battle for
the Bible electrifi ed evangelical circles. Billy Graham described the book as
“one of the most important of our generation.” 18 Students at Christian colleges
and evangelical seminaries read and debated Lindsell’s book together. Pastors
passed dog-eared copies back and forth. “It is a timely book,” Christianity
Today contended, “since it seems that evangelicals who do not accept biblical
inerrancy are not aware of the seriousness and danger of their decision,
and also many evangelicals who believe in inerrant Scriptures are not suffi -
ciently aware of the threat to biblical Christianity that denying this doctrine
presents.” 19
Fundamentalists within the Southern Baptist Convention appreciated
their denomination’s diagnosis by Lindsell, a Baptist himself. In 1979, funda-
mentalists organized to take control of the SBC. For years there had been
grumblings about the denomination’s direction among the SBC’s most con-
servative ranks who feared that liberalism had infi ltrated the Convention.
Fundamentalists complained about the Convention’s seminaries and univer-
sities, where professors sometimes questioned the most orthodox views in
their classes or publications. Also disturbing was the Convention’s bureau-
cracy in Nashville, the various institutional agencies of the denomination, the
trustees, and the Baptist state newspapers. Southern Baptist conservatives
thought all of these Convention agencies were controlled by moderates
who were sliding into liberalism and spiritual heresy and fundamentalists
organized to wrest control of the denomination from their rivals. 20
While outsiders would have been hard-pressed to spot the diff erences
between the fundamentalist and moderate factions, Southern Baptists saw an
immense divide between the two groups. Th e “moderates” were in fact con-
servatives, but the fundamentalists had taken to calling them moderates and
even “liberals” on occasion because of some of their less than orthodox views.
Th e moderates argued they were the heirs of the Baptist tradition, and they
called themselves “conservatives” or “traditionalists” because they supported
the historical legacy of Baptist anticreedalism, the priesthood of all believers,
and congregational authority, whereas the fundamentalists desired a new
emphasis on denominational uniformity and theological orthodoxy. Moder-
ates shared the theological conservatism of their fundamentalist brothers on
484 | “Worse than cancer and worse than snakes”
most key issues such as the exclusive saving nature of Christ and the authority
of the Scripture. Yet it was not the Scripture’s authority but rather the nature
of Scripture itself over which fundamentalists and moderates disagreed. Fun-
damentalists argued that the Bible was inerrant, containing no mistakes in
regard to history, science, or geography, let alone theology. Moderates, in
contrast, claimed that God alone was inerrant. His Word provided perfect
spiritual authority over their lives, they contended, but, possibly, contained
human errors of translation or sometimes off ered symbolism rather than
literal history. Th is view was held by the denomination’s controlling elite, but
fundamentalists regarded this conception of Scripture as no less than heresy.
To declare that the Bible was not entirely inerrant was to disbelieve in the
Bible; to not believe in the Bible, fundamentalists contended, was to reveal
oneself as not a Christian.
By 1979, fundamentalists had endured the moderates’ control of the SBC
long enough. Several prominent fundamentalists realized that the key to
remaking the denomination depended on capturing the SBC presidency,
since he appointed new trustees of SBC agencies as spots opened up. Such a
transformation would not be immediate, of course, but generational, and two
leaders of the fundamentalist camp wrote and disseminated a ten-year plan
for gaining control of the denomination. However, the fi rst step rested on
winning the presidency, which could be fulfi lled right away. Adrian Rogers,
pastor of the eleven-thousand-member mega-church Bellevue Baptist in
Memphis, was the fundamentalists’ choice, and they packed the 1979 SBC
meeting convening in Houston that summer with supporters to elect Rogers.
Before they voted, Rogers delivered a fiery sermon. Entitled “The Great
Deceiver,” Rogers’s talk warned against the country’s increasing embrace of
Satan’s lies, including the Equal Rights Amendment. “Satan’s fi b about women’s
lib,” Rogers characterized it. 21 But while Satan had hold over the nation, he
also had gained a foot in the Southern Baptist Convention, luring some
Baptists through the appeals of intellectualism as he had tempted Eve with
the fruit of knowledge. Th ough the SBC had historically championed the
priesthood of the believer—that is, the spiritual autonomy of the individual—
and congregational authority, fundamentalists now felt the spoiled fruit of
this legacy was the large body of unorthodox, perhaps even unchristian,
members and leaders of the denomination. Instead of conciliation, the funda-
mentalists urged cutting off the moderate elements. Earlier that summer, one
leading fundamentalist had stated that Southern Baptists needed to hold fi rm
on biblical inerrancy even if it meant losing fi ve hundred thousand members. 22
Rogers had more direct words. “It’s time that we got out of the boat,” he railed,
n eil j . y oung | 485
“and let the devil take the hindmost, live or die, sink or swim, every inch,
every ounce, and go for God.” 23
Southern Baptists across the theological spectrum had coexisted for
decades rather peaceably, a harmony in part achieved by Baptist principles and
practices like congregational authority and the denomination’s decentralized
organizational structure. But the inerrancy battle of the 1970s, set against the
decade’s larger cultural and political shift s, convinced fundamentalist Baptists
that they could no longer quietly tolerate doctrinal diversity within the
denomination. Tellingly, Southern Baptist preachers at the 1979 meeting
characterized their cause as a spiritual confl ict rather than an organizational
shuffl e. “My friends, we are in a battle,” the Dallas televangelist James Robison
warned the crowds, “And we are in a battle with satan [sic].” 24 Robison urged
Southern Baptists to elect not only a biblical inerrantist, but one who was also
devoted to cleaning house. “We must elect a president who is totally com-
mitted to the removal from this denomination any . . . who does not believe
that the Bible is the inerrant, infallible word of the living God,” Robinson said.
Acceptance of anything but biblical orthodoxy would no longer be allowed.
“If you tolerate any form of liberalism,” Robison explained, “you are the
enemy of God.” 25 “Friend, when satan [sic] attacks, he will attack from within,”
he continued. “Friend, the enemy will spring up from among us.” 26 Th is was as
much a message to the moderates, the alleged abettors of the adversary, as it was
to the fundamentalists. In calling for a fundamentalist takeover, Robison and
others were also advocating a denominational purge of the moderates.
“I wouldn’t tolerate a snake of any kind in my house . . . and I wouldn’t tolerate
a cancer in my body,” Robison raged. “I want you to know that anyone who
casts doubt on the word of God is worse than cancer and worse than snakes.” 27
Aft er the sermons, Adrian Rogers won the SBC’s presidency on the very
fi rst ballot over fi ve challengers. 28 Previous SBC presidential candidates had
won on the fi rst ballot only a handful of times. Th e easy win for Rogers
signaled the strength and energy of the fundamentalist movement within the
Southern Baptist Convention. Th e SBC’s remaking into a thoroughly funda-
mentalist organization would take another decade, but the political eff ects of
the SBC’s growing theological and organizational overhaul would be felt
much sooner by Jimmy Carter.
t he b orn- a gain p resident
Initially, Southern Baptists had delighted in the candidacy of Jimmy Carter, a
fellow believer who frequently touted his Baptist credentials and professed of
486 | “Worse than cancer and worse than snakes”
his conversion experience. Carter was an active Baptist, having served as a
deacon and Sunday school teacher, and he had chosen the SBC’s Broadman
Press to publish his campaign autobiography in 1975. 29 As the fi rst presiden-
tial candidate to describe himself as “born again,” Carter attracted the interest
of evangelical voters just as they were beginning to coalesce as a self-conscious
political constituency. “Th e most important thing in my life is Jesus Christ,”
Carter declared on the campaign trail. 30 If previous presidential candidates
had felt the same way, none had so plainly and frequently expressed his faith.
Among Baptists, Carter benefi ted from the support of several infl uential
Southern Baptists pastors. In the summer of 1976, Bailey Smith, a mega-church
pastor in Oklahoma, stumped for Carter during his keynote address at the
SBC’s annual meeting. Declaring that the nation needed a “born again man in
the White House,” Smith noted, “And his initials are the same as our Lord’s!” 31
But other Baptist pastors, notably those from some of the SBC’s most
prominent congregations, withheld their support from Carter for reasons
ranging from reports that he occasionally enjoyed alcohol to his support for
appointing an ambassador to the Vatican. 32 For undecided Baptists, Carter’s
Playboy magazine interview settled matters. It was bad enough that Carter
had met with a pornographic publication, Baptists felt, but Carter’s salty
language—he had used the word “screw”—drew even more outrage. “‘Screw’
is just not a good Baptist word,” admonished Bailey Smith, the one-time
Southern Baptist enthusiast for Carter. 33 Other ministers, including Carter’s
own pastor in Plains, questioned Carter’s language. 34 In Virginia, Harold
Lindsell, who had just published Th e Battle for the Bible , attacked Carter in a
sermon also broadcasted on his popular radio show, wondering aloud how
“a man who . . . professes to be a Christian . . . gets himself all tied up in speaking
words which at best are most questionable.” 35 Dr. Jerry Vines, a pastor from
Mobile, was more explicit: “A lot of us are not convinced that Mr. Carter is
truly in the evangelical Christian camp, and this tends to indicate to us that
he isn’t.” 36 At one campaign rally, Carter faced a picketer holding a sign asking,
“With Christians Like Carter, Who Needs Pagans?” 37 W. A. Criswell, pastor of
the First Baptist Church of Dallas and author of the book Why I Preach that
the Bible Is Literally True , switched his endorsement from Carter to Ford aft er
the release of the Playboy interview. Criswell’s church, the world’s largest
Baptist congregation, boasted nineteen thousand members, and the pastor
reached millions more through his weekly radio show. First Baptist had also
opened the Criswell Bible Institute in 1971 to off er a fundamentalist alterna-
tive to the SBC’s seminaries, and Criswell had emerged as one of the most
important conservative voices in the convention. Aft er the Playboy interview,
n eil j . y oung | 487
Criswell suggested that Carter’s faith was suspect and predicted that Baptists
would agree: “I think he’s mixed up in his moral values, and I think the entire
church membership will feel the same way.” 38 Shortly before the election,
Ford visited First Baptist Dallas, smiling throughout the sermon as Criswell
attacked Carter. Aft er the service, Criswell told reporters, “I’m for him,” as he
stood by Ford on the church’s front steps. 39
Prominent Southern Baptist pastors, many of whom would help
orchestrate the fundamentalist takeover, publicly opposed Carter’s 1976
campaign, but their words could not weaken Baptist support. While these
pastors represented some of the largest congregations, their influence
remained largely local. On election day, 60 percent of Southern Baptist
voters selected Carter. No Democrat since Harry Truman had won a majority
of Southern Baptists. 40 In the nation’s ninety-six most heavily Baptist counties,
some of which had not picked a Democrat since FDR, Carter received 58
percent of the vote. 41 In a close election, Carter’s showing among Southern
Baptists helped push him over the edge. Though he held a nearly two-
million-vote advantage, Carter won with a fi ft y-seven-point electoral college
advantage that depended on his sweeping all of the former Confederate States
except Virginia. Several of these southern states gave Carter over a ten-point
margin. Th e support from Southern Baptists had been critical to Carter’s
victory.
But Southern Baptist support quickly ended once Carter assumed the
presidency, matching the discomfort conservative pastors had shown for him
during the campaign. Many of those pastors increased their profi le during
Carter’s presidency, their prominence helping refashion the SBC and remake
Southern Baptist opinions about Carter. Th rust into the spotlight by a media
eager to document their responses to Carter and emboldened by a president
who provided them with so many causes for reaction, these pastors oversaw
the politicization of their denomination, bringing a host of issues to the
forefront of Southern Baptist life. Carter’s handling of the Equal Rights
Amendment, gay rights, and abortion led conservative Christians to question
the validity of his professed faith and spurred them to remove him from
offi ce. As a conservative Christian publication declared shortly before the
1980 election, “Th e one observation which must be made is the intensity of
the evangelicals’ opposition to Carter on moral issues.” 42 Notably, Southern
Baptists articulated their opposition to Carter not solely as a political leader
and candidate but primarily as a Christian man and fellow Southern Baptist.
For sure, Carter had set the stage for such a response himself. Repeatedly,
Carter had touted his own religious faith and made his spiritual commitment
488 | “Worse than cancer and worse than snakes”
central to his candidacy in 1976. At one point he had even boasted, “I’ll be a
better president because of my deep religious convictions.” 43 But the sword
cut both ways. If Carter hoped his born-again status would attract voters to
him, conservative Christians also expected a certain course of leadership in
exchange. Failure to actively oppose the troubling issues of the Equal Rights
Amendment, abortion, and gay rights would have been disappointing, but
possibly forgivable; Carter’s support for such issues, however, was unpardonable.
Worse, it drew into question the very claims Carter had made about himself
to Christian conservatives and emboldened their spiritual response, by way
of a presidential election, to repudiate his suspect faith. In doing so, Southern
Baptists not only voted a president from offi ce, but they also hardened their
own conception of salvation. More than just a personal born-again experience
authenticated by Baptist beliefs of individual conscience and the priesthood
of the believer, one’s salvation could have political indicators. Th e politicization
of the SBC during the Carter administration delivered a litmus test of issues
by which Baptists might judge one another’s eternal state. In the years between
Carter’s 1976 triumph and 1980 defeat, certain positions on the ERA, abortion,
and homosexuality became visible signifi ers of one’s true relationship with
God and proper understanding of Scripture. Carter failed on all these counts.
Southern Baptists came out in droves to repudiate Carter in 1980 just as they
were driving out the unorthodox elements in their denomination.
t he c arter p residency
While Carter publicly touted his Christian faith and Baptist identity, Carter’s
1976 campaign documents show that his election team frequently worried
about evangelical voters. As a candidate, Carter had a mixed record on the
issues that concerned Southern Baptists, including the ERA, gay rights, and
abortion, and his staff understood evangelicals were becoming increasingly
galvanized by these matters. 44 Although Carter’s campaign team, drawn
largely from his Georgia staff , included many churchgoing Christians, hardly
any of them belonged to conservative congregations and so they largely failed
to see the political implications of the rising conservative tide within the SBC
and other Protestant denominations even as they fretted about the results. 45
Instead, as Carter moved from the primaries to the general election, he less-
ened his religious talk, following recommendations from those like his Jewish
adviser Stu Eizenstat, who counseled Carter to describe his religious beliefs as
“quite normal Baptist views” but were otherwise strictly personal and would
not aff ect his decisions as president. 46
n eil j . y oung | 489
Ford’s own discomfort with speaking openly about his Episcopalian faith
aided Carter’s reticence, and their similar positions on several issues of
concern to religious conservatives minimized their weight in the election.
Both Carter and Ford supported the ERA, for instance, neutralizing the issue
in 1976. But Carter’s energetic advocacy for the amendment as president
enraged conservative Southern Baptists, who expected him merely to voice
his support for the ERA, as Ford had, rather than actively campaign for it.
Douglas Brewer, a Baptist pastor from Tennessee, wrote to the director of the
SBC’s political arm, the Christian Life Commission, describing the work that
women in his and other nearby churches were doing in response to the eff ort
that “some ‘women’s groups’ are doing toward infl uencing President Carter . . .
in pushing for acceptance of immoral practices and standards.” Brewer
enclosed materials his women had created opposing Carter and urged the
Christian Life Commission to use them in any way it saw fi t. 47 Aft er Carter
addressed the Southern Baptist Convention’s 1978 meeting, many Southern
Baptists expressed displeasure at his invitation because of his eff orts for the
amendment. “Since Carter . . . supports ERA and the Women’s Movement . . . this
makes one believe that he supports the things that they stand for—I and
many other Southern Baptist [ sic ] resent him being the Speaker [at] the Southern
Baptist Convention,” one woman wrote the Christian Life Commission. 48
Carter’s mild support for gay rights further angered Southern Baptists.
Th ough he had hardly been a gay rights advocate during the 1976 campaign,
Carter’s administration made a signifi cant outreach to the gay community. In
May 1977, Midge Costanza, a presidential assistant, met with a group of gay
rights activists. 49 Th e Voice of Florida , a conservative newsletter, declared the
White House’s meeting with a “delegation of sodomites who wanted to talk
about their rights certainly has raised very strong doubts whether President
Carter is really a born-again Southern Baptist as he claims.” 50
Carter fueled those doubts by opposing California’s 1978 ballot initiative,
Proposition 6. 51 Also known as the Briggs Initiative aft er its originator,
Republican State Senator John Briggs, Proposition 6 permitted California
school boards to fi re or refuse to hire anyone who engaged in or even publicly
supported homosexuality. Briggs, a Catholic, found his strongest support
among Southern Baptists and other fundamentalists in California. By the
1970s, the SBC was a truly national denomination; with 320,000 Southern
Baptists in California, the SBC ranked as the state’s second largest Protestant
denomination, making them a potentially powerful political force. 52 Just a
year before, the Southern Baptist General Convention of California had passed
a resolution asserting the sin of homosexuality and supporting opposition to
490 | “Worse than cancer and worse than snakes”
the employment of homosexuals in particular jobs, including public education,
and Southern Baptists and other religious conservatives were increasingly
concerned with what they saw as a mounting gay rights movement. 53 Evangel-
icals had long opposed homosexuality, of course, but the rise of a visible and
active gay rights movement encouraged them to translate private convictions
into public theological discussions and political actions. Despite such views,
Californians rejected Proposition 6 by a 2-to-1 margin. Briggs met with a
crowd of 250 supporters the night of the election and promised to place another
antigay initiative on the ballot in 1980. “Cocktail Republicans” and Ronald
Reagan, who had also opposed the measure because of libertarian concerns
over privacy, were to blame for the proposition’s defeat, Briggs fumed.
Blaming Reagan for its defeat, Briggs warned that conservative Christians would
not forget the former governor’s betrayal of their issue. “Th ey will remember
that,” Briggs charged, “I think he’s fi nished as a national politician.” 54
Th ough Carter and Reagan both opposed Briggs, just as Carter and Ford
had both supported the ERA, Carter became the target of Southern Baptists
and other evangelicals who believed he had turned on them, revealing his
suspect Christian faith. A month after the election, the Southern Baptist
General Convention of California informed Carter of a resolution it had just
passed. Th e resolution “express[ed] our grave disappointment to President
Jimmy Carter for his public opposition to an issue so strongly supported by
his fellow Christians and Baptists. We furthermore encourage him to recon-
sider his stand and to give his unreserved support to future eff orts to oppose
the acceptance of homosexuality as a normal if not privileged lifestyle.” 55 A
separate letter to Carter from the group’s president drove home Baptist dissat-
isfaction with Carter’s actions and underscored the distrust many of them
had for Carter’s spiritual authenticity. “We have worked hard to pass Proposi-
tion 6,” William Hann wrote Carter, “and your statement hurt us. Christians .
. . are wondering why Southern Baptists are not together on moral issues.” 56
In 1980, for the fi rst time, the Democratic Party listed “sexual orientation”
as a category deserving protection from discrimination in its convention
platform. 57 Such a move further confi rmed suspicions that Carter supported
gay rights and had abandoned his Baptist convictions. “I am appalled,” a
Baptist pastor from Greenville, Texas, wrote Bob Maddox, the moderate
Southern Baptist minister who served as the White House’s liaison to the
religious community, “at the fact that you, a Southern Baptist Minister, would
condone the dreadful sin of sodomy by approving and encouraging others to
approve the Gay rights plank.” Th e pastor urged Maddox to use his infl uence
to “reverse [Carter’s] stand on homosexuals” before it cost him the election.
n eil j . y oung | 491
But with this pastor, Carter had already lost. “I will encourage as many of the
evangelicals that I come in contact with to vote for Governor Reagan,” he warned,
“because I want no part of such a whitewash as you put on homosexuality.” 58
Other letters from ministers poured into the White House demanding Cart-
er’s position on the sin of homosexuality. Maddox continued to handle the
responses, writing in the political language of constitutional protections and
minority rights to address the question of homosexuals. But the ministers
fi red back again with scriptural absolutes against homosexuality and judgments
about Maddox’s faith. “You are not a Christian and need to become one,” one
letter attacked Rev. Maddox, but Carter bore the brunt of those charges. 59
Th ough Carter had continually expressed his moral opposition to abortion
during the 1976 race, his refusal to advocate for an overturning of the law
rendered his personal feelings on the matter insignifi cant in the eyes of his
antiabortion foes. Worse, in 1978, Carter hired Sarah Weddington as his
Special Assistant with advising responsibilities on women’s issues and minority
rights. As a private attorney, Weddington had argued successfully in favor of
Roe before the Supreme Court in 1973 before serving as president of the
National Abortion Rights Action League. 60 Her appointment led one pro-life
publication to characterize Carter as a “president who has surrounded
himself with abortion advocates in key executive and judicial positions.” 61 An
onslaught of disapproval fi lled the White House mailbags. In one week alone,
the White House received 328 letters related to Weddington’s appointment;
97 percent voiced their opposition. 62 Th at Carter would employ Weddington
while refusing to support a human life amendment to the Constitution belied
his moral opposition of abortion, pro-life activists argued. Indeed, even his
public statements had shown an increasing insistence for the legality of abor-
tion while expressions of his moral objections to abortion had decreased in
volume and conviction. Coupled with a White House staff that many knew
to be pushing for the extension of abortion rights, Carter was seen as an
untrustworthy chameleon, changing his colors to suit worldly trends.
Yet Baptist views on abortion were changing too. In 1971, the SBC had
passed a resolution calling for Southern Baptists to “work for legislation that
will allow the possibility of abortion under such conditions as rape, incest,
clear evidence of severe fetal deformity, and carefully ascertained evidence of
the likelihood of damage to the emotional, mental, and physical health of the
mother.” 63 After the Court issued Roe , the national Baptist news service
declared that the Supreme Court had “advanced the cause of religious liberty,
human equality, and justice.” 64 And the Baptist General Convention of Texas
included a pastor’s sermon in its newsletter that contended there existed
492 | “Worse than cancer and worse than snakes”
“no clear, biblical command dealing with . . . [abortion] in a specifi c way.” 65 A year
later, SBC delegates reaffi rmed the 1971 resolution. 66 When a conservative
pastor wrote SBC headquarters to protest the denomination’s apparent sup-
port for abortion rights, Carl Bates, the SBC’s president, responded that
Baptist strength owed in part to the “unity that still exists in diversity.” 67 Yet
that diversity was what conservative Southern Baptists intended to stamp out
of their denomination as they plotted the fundamentalist takeover, and
fundamentalists used the abortion issue as one of their chief means of
denominational reform in the late 1970s. Where moderate Baptist theologians
and denomination leaders had pondered the uncertainty of life’s beginnings
and wondered about the Bible’s view on abortion, fundamentalist pastors and
laypersons fought back with a fi rm insistence that Scripture denounced abortion
as murder and clearly maintained that life began at conception. 68 In doing so,
they made abortion both a symbol and a measure of scriptural inerrancy and
biblical authority. One could not equivocate on abortion without revealing
their less-than-orthodox view of the Bible, thereby exposing their unsaved
soul. Th e right Christian understood clearly the Bible’s prohibition against
abortion just as plainly as they knew Scripture contained the inerrant, infallible
word of God.
The interconnection between a strict interpretation of the Bible and
particular political views became a hallmark of Baptist identity and was
plainly revealed in a series of resolutions at the SBC’s 1980 convention, a year
aft er the 1979 fundamentalist takeover began and just months before November’s
presidential election. Messengers to the convention affi rmed that the SBC’s
seminaries and universities should only employ those “who believe in the
divine inspiration of the whole Bible, infallibility of the original manuscripts,
and that the Bible is truth without any error.” 69 Th e delegates then passed a
host of resolutions addressing some of the hottest political issues of the day
and underscoring the denomination’s fundamentalist direction. 70 A resolution
on abortion overturned the mild support off ered by previous resolutions as it
denounced the nation’s “abortion on demand” ethos and called for legislative
eff orts “and/or” a constitutional amendment prohibiting abortion in all cases
but to save the life of the mother. 71 A resolution on women condemned the
ERA. 72 (Just three years earlier, two anti-ERA resolutions had not been able to
emerge from the Resolutions Committee for a vote by the general audience.) 73
Other resolutions in 1980 opposed pornography, homosexuality, children’s
rights, and providing birth control to minors without parental consent. 74 But
the “Resolution on the White House Conference on the Family” issued a
direct blow at Carter. Carter had promised a White House meeting on the
n eil j . y oung | 493
state of the American family in his 1976 campaign. Finally held in 1980, the
White House Conferences on Families, renamed to reflect the organizers’
diff erent visions of what constituted a family, elicited the ire of religious con-
servatives because of its endorsement of the ERA, abortion rights, and
homosexuality. 75 Th e SBC’s resolution blasted the White House conference
for its “general undermining of the biblical concept of the family.” 76
While Baptists had always addressed a contemporary issue or two at
their annual meeting, no convention had ever passed as many political reso-
lutions as the 1980 convention considered. Representing the SBC’s overt
politicization, the resolutions also signaled the numbered days for Carter’s
presidency. Carter’s apparent changing position on abortion and gay rights
may have refl ected similar trends among the American public, but this was
exactly what troubled so many of the Southern Baptists who supported their
denomination’s overhaul. For them, Carter’s changes too closely mirrored
mainline Protestant accommodation of the world and its values. At the same
time, the emerging tensions between moderates and fundamentalists within
the Southern Baptist Convention brought many political issues, like abortion,
to the center of denominational politics. Fundamentalists worried that this
same worldly accommodation that had overtaken mainline Protestant
denominations was festering inside their own house, and they sought to push
out moderate Southern Baptists, both within the convention and inside the
White House, who threatened to steer the denomination from orthodoxy and
lead it toward apostasy.
o rganizing a gainst c arter
Not long aft er the 1979 fundamentalist takeover of the SBC, a group of
prominent ministers, mostly Southern Baptist, gathered near Dallas to
discuss how they might also take the presidency from Carter. Notably, the
talks focused on removing Carter from offi ce rather than rallying around
Reagan. Elected California’s governor in 1966, Reagan enjoyed more than a
decade of national political prominence, including his 1976 bid for the Repub-
lican nomination, but he had still yet to attract the support of religious con-
servatives, who opposed his fairly liberal record on social issues as governor
and worried about his spotty personal life. 77 Th e group in Dallas included
some of the SBC’s most infl uential pastors, like newly elected SBC president
Adrian Rogers, James Robison, Jimmy Draper (SBC president from 1982 to
1984), and Charles Stanley of First Baptist Atlanta (SBC president from 1984
to 1986). A few non–Southern Baptist ministers also attending included Pat
494 | “Worse than cancer and worse than snakes”
Robertson, Rex Humbard, and Clayton Bell, Billy Graham’s brother-in-law.
Th e pastors had gathered to pray for the country and discuss what they could
do about the nation’s moral affl ictions. Urgency fi lled the meeting, as each of
them worried aloud that the nation’s fate depended on turning the country
from its evil ways. Th e pastors committed to each other that they would moti-
vate their congregations to become politically involved in the upcoming elec-
tion. Part of the discussion focused on the complicity complacent Christians
held for the direction the country had turned because of the legacy of funda-
mentalist noninvolvement in politics, and the pastors vowed to end that
disengagement. 78
After the Dallas meeting, Charles Stanley organized a “Campaign
Training Conference,” inviting Southern Baptist ministers to First Baptist
Atlanta for training on voter registration and education about pivotal moral
issues they could share with their congregations. Paul Weyrich was one of the
conservative activists who led the conference for Stanley, and he realized aft er
spending time with the Southern Baptist ministers that Carter would lose.
One pastor aft er another stood up and testifi ed to their disillusionment with
Carter and their suspicions of his Christian faith. “‘I was part of Carter’s team
in 1976,’” Weyrich remembered various ministers saying, “‘I delivered my
congregation for Carter. I urged them all to vote for Carter because I thought
he was a moral individual. I found out otherwise, and I’m angry.’” 79
Baptist organizing against Carter did not go unnoticed by the White
House, thanks to Bob Maddox. Maddox, a moderate pastor of First Baptist in
Calhoun, Georgia, and an acquaintance of the president for more than ten
years, had off ered to help the White House’s outreach to religious Americans
in 1978, but the president had spurned the suggestion. 80 A year later, Carter
would reconsider. Realizing the potential political consequences of the SBC’s
fundamentalist takeover and his own shaky standing with religious conserva-
tives, Carter asked Maddox to serve as his special assistant for religious aff airs
to help smooth relations with religious conservatives. 81 Maddox urged Carter
to talk again about his deep faith in order to connect with religious voters he
knew were souring on the president. Noting in a White House memo the
“coalescing of conservative, evangelical, religious groups for political action
is one of the important political phenomenon [ sic ] of our day,” Maddox
recommended that Carter also meet with a group of influential pastors
and televangelists, including Jerry Falwell, Tim LaHaye, Oral Roberts, and
James Bakker. 82 The meeting—and Maddox’s other attempts with religious
conservatives—backfi red, however. Maddox hoped that Carter could connect
to religious conservatives on spiritual grounds, emphasizing their shared faith
n eil j . y oung | 495
and religious convictions. But the pastors only wanted to talk politics, and in
their minds Carter’s positions on ERA, abortion, and gay rights rendered
his Christian professions invalid. “We had a man in the White House who
professed to be a Christian, but didn’t understand how un-Christian his
administration was,” LaHaye recalled of the meeting. 83 As 1980 progressed,
Carter’s prospects with Southern Baptists and other evangelicals worsened.
Maddox let the White House know that the SBC’s meeting that summer had
passed a “range of conservative, fundamentalist resolutions,” in his view
spelling trouble for Carter. As a moderate Southern Baptist, Maddox lamented
the theological remaking of his denomination, but he also understood the
implications for Carter, warning that the resolutions “refl ect the rising tide of
political conservatism in the country.” “Th is swing to the right causes me
great concern,” Maddox concluded. 84
Th e Republican National Committee also watched the 1980 SBC meeting
closely, believing the denomination’s remaking would benefit the party’s
election chances. RNC chairman Bill Brock congratulated Bailey Smith, the
Oklahoma pastor who had briefl y backed Carter in 1976, on his election to
the SBC presidency and off ered his prayers for the denomination. Brock
reminded Smith that he had recently met with Adrian Rogers at RNC head-
quarters, where they had discussed the “problems and issues we mutually
face,” and he off ered to meet with Smith to discuss “the practical implementa-
tion of voter registration and participation by Christians who in the past have
not had their full political impact.” “Our goal is a mutual one,” Brock con-
cluded, “to articulate and achieve the values we share—faith, freedom, and
family.” “I would love to take advantage of that,” Smith responded. 85 In the last
months of the 1980 campaign, Southern Baptist and other conservative
churches launched full-scale voter registration drives and focused their con-
gregants on the coming election. “Jimmy Carter was the chief target of this
activity,” the New York Times noted. 86
Of course, no minister could back a specifi c candidate from the pulpit,
but by preaching on the biblical injunctions against abortion, homosexuality,
and the ERA, pastors could communicate their political endorsement indi-
rectly. Randy Stewart, a Baptist minister and Moral Majority member in
Lexington, Kentucky, explained to a reporter, “I will talk about the issues in
my church. I will recommend issues to the congregation, not candidates. But
when I get through, they will know who I am voting for: Ronald Reagan.” 87
Other pastors showed less circumspection. A Baptist pastor in Tampa fi lled out a
ballot supporting Reagan and distributed copies of it to church members. 88
Dr. James W. Bryant, a Baptist pastor in Fort Worth, used his church’s publication
496 | “Worse than cancer and worse than snakes”
to weigh in on the approaching election through a comparison of the candi-
dates’ positions. Noting that Reagan and Carter held “vastly diff erent” political
philosophies, Bryant urged his congregants to study their stances and to ask
God for help in deciding which candidate to support. Bryant suggested
focusing on the candidates’ positions on four “moral issues”: abortion, the
ERA, gay rights, and humanism. Bryant couldn’t back a candidate, of course,
but his choice of issues tacitly endorsed Reagan. But, more than that, his
explanation of each issue engendered doubts about the authenticity of Carter’s
Christian faith. If a candidate supported abortion or gay rights, Bryant wrote,
he was “anti-biblical.” Support for the ERA meant “taking the opposite view
of God’s ordained chair-of-authority.” Last, a true Christian would work
against the humanist forces threatening to overtake the nation through con-
trol of the government. “Both candidates claim to believe in a supernatural
God,” Bryant wrote, “Unfortunately, President Carter has appointed an
avowed humanist as the new Secretary of Education.” 89 Even when Carter
spoke directly about his faith, his words worked against him with Southern
Baptist fundamentalists. One minister said that although Carter talked of
being born again he also “quoted [the liberal theologian] Reinhold Niebuhr,
so we knew that he wasn’t reading the right things.” 90
Even the First Lady suff ered from suspicions among fellow Baptists. One
Southern Baptist woman complained to the SBC’s president about Rosalyn
Carter’s attendance at the International Women’s Year Conference in Houston,
where she appeared alongside “confi rmed lesbians.” 91 Other Southern Baptist
women were more hesitant to turn their backs on Mrs. Carter. Joyce Rogers,
the wife of Adrian Rogers, wrote Rosalyn aft er she visited the White House
with her husband following his election as SBC president. Even aft er spending
time with the First Lady, Mrs. Rogers’s letter revealed her confusion about
who Mrs. Carter truly was. “I perceive you are a godly woman with great
ability and great commitment to Christ, your country, and your convictions,”
Mrs. Rogers wrote. But, she continued, she along with “many Southern
Baptist and other Christian women” wanted to know where the First Lady
truly stood on the various issues confronting women. Christian charity, if not
denominational loyalty, compelled Mrs. Rogers to inquire directly of Mrs.
Carter, conceding that it was diffi cult to arrive at the truth via the media’s
accounts. She hoped that the First Lady might communicate “on these vital
issues” with her and set the record straight. 92 Her husband, however, showed
no confusion—or charity—about the president’s spiritual standing in his
meeting with Carter. “I hope you will give up your secular humanism and
return back to Christianity,” Rogers said to him. 93
n eil j . y oung | 497
Closer to the election, Rogers announced his endorsement of Reagan.
Th roughout the denomination, Southern Baptists, the group that had been so
critical to Carter’s 1976 win, were now ready to vote against their own. One
letter to the SBC’s president encapsulates the sentiments many Southern Bap-
tists felt toward the president who had let them down. Mrs. Albert Kemp of
Oklahoma City wrote Bailey Smith, accusing Carter of trying to retain South-
ern Baptists’ support “while at the same time woo the Homosexuals.” Mrs.
Carter earned her scorn as well for supporting the ERA and attending the
IWY conference, and she blamed Carter for not preventing his wife from
doing so. “A man that can’t rule his family has no business in the White
House,” Kemp declared. Like so many other Southern Baptists who felt mis-
led by Carter, Kemp doubted the realness of Carter’s faith. “Th e Blacks are
given credit for electing Mr. Carter to offi ce,” Kemp explained, “But I fi rmly
believe it was the Southern Baptists and other Christians hoping that he was
‘born again.’” For many Southern Baptists like Kemp, Carter’s policies and
actions in offi ce had spoken more clearly than any testimony of faith he had
ever professed. If Carter was a Christian, he was not their kind of Christian,
and he certainly represented the elements of the Southern Baptist Conven-
tion that the resurgent fundamentalists felt must be purged from their pews.
Kemp concluded with a plea that Smith use his infl uence against Carter’s
reelection. “I know that you cannot use your pulpit for politics, but in your
contact with people I beg you to please point out the discrepancies of Jimmy
Carter,” Kemp urged. “Our country cannot stand him for another four years.” 94
“Amen! Amen! Amen!” Bailey Smith wrote back. “I agree with everything you
have said.” 95
In their letters to the SBC, Southern Baptists connected their worries
about the direction of the country and that of the denomination. “I am one of
many Southern Baptist Women (as well as men),” Cindy Miller of Tulsa wrote
Smith, “who are concerned not only with the way our country is being run
and by whom, but also with those offi cially within our Southern Baptist Con-
vention who are helping push our country towards its questionable directions
. . . and deceiving Southern Baptists at the same time.” Miller documented her
off enses with the Carter administration and Southern Baptist moderates,
connecting theology to politics. “I would also like for you to know,” she con-
cluded, “that there are some conservative Southern Baptists who . . . have
been actively involved in working for what we believe to be Scriptural
truths.” 96 In the face of seeming equivocation over questions of absolute truth,
fundamentalists in the SBC had sought to drive out the moderate powers of
the denomination. And at the polls in 1980, fundamentalists would vote out
498 | “Worse than cancer and worse than snakes”
Jimmy Carter, the Southern Baptist president who, like the moderates of his
denomination, saw moral complexity where they saw clear-cut certainties.
When the polls closed, Carter’s loss among Southern Baptists was devas-
tating, refl ecting almost a 25 percent drop from 1976. In all his losses with
various voter groups, Carter’s biggest decline came from his fellow Southern
Baptists, who gave Carter only a third of their support. 97 And in the ninety-
six most heavily Baptist counties, Reagan won 60 percent in 1980, besting
Carter’s showing of 58 percent in those same counties in 1980. 98 Carter lost
every southern state except his own.
Southern Baptists, then, were a critical component of the voters who
turned from Carter in 1980. Th ose who identifi ed themselves as strongest
fundamentalists gave Reagan greater support than any other group did. Evan-
gelicals were more likely to vote in the 1980 election than any other group of
voters, and they likely provided the margin in Reagan’s slim victories in
Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Tennessee,
all states Carter won in 1976. But Reagan’s wins were hardly decisive in these
states as he failed to claim more than 50 percent of the vote in any of them.
His biggest margin among the six was a meager 2.1 percent edge—a sharp
contrast to Carter’s 1976 showing, when he had won several of them by
double-digit leads. In the other fi ve, Reagan won by a slim 1.3 percent or less. 99
In light of this, Reagan’s win hardly seems tantamount to an evangelical land-
slide for the Gipper, but more accurately as Carter’s loss.
“Everybody I talk to is voting for Reagan + most of them voted for Pres
[ sic ] Carter before,” one evangelical had warned the White House in the
summer of 1980. “In the last election 70% of evangelicals didn’t vote.” 100 While
his numbers may not have been exact, his political forecasting proved correct.
Evangelicals were energized to come out in 1980, vote Carter out, and bolster
a Republican landslide that won back the Senate for the fi rst time since 1952
and posted impressive gains in the House. Th ough the results may have been
immediate, the forces for such a movement had been at work far longer,
building from the SBC’s debates over the Bible and its theological shift .
Shortly before the election, one Baptist minister pointed to the theological
developments of the 1970s as the basis for what he hoped would be a political
revolution in 1980. “For the last 10 years, we’ve been raising a generation that
believes in the Bible as the word of God,” Reverend Pennell explained. “And
they’re ready to vote now. You see?” 101
Even aft er Carter had left offi ce, many Southern Baptists still bristled at
the notion that he was one of them. “Former President Carter, used the
church, always toten his bible [ sic ], and saying he was born again, to be
n eil j . y oung | 499
elected,” one woman wrote the SBC, clearly situating the rejection of Carter
in the context of the Southern Baptist Convention’s own internal struggles.
“Th e deceit of Carter, of a nation, and the corruption in our churches has
brought down the wrath of God on us, and would seem we are members of
the Seven Churches of Revelation.” 102
c onclusion
Fundamentalists were remaking the Southern Baptist Convention, but they
had also helped redirect the political direction of the nation. Emboldened by
the message to purify their denomination, Southern Baptists embraced a
hard-line faith that challenged anything but the most orthodox beliefs as
unchristian. Carter, the most famous moderate Southern Baptist in the
nation, paid the political price for the remaking of the Southern Baptist
Convention, but that refashioning, of course, would have national implica-
tions too.
Underappreciated in the narrative of the rise of the Religious Right is the
important love and loss religious conservatives felt for Jimmy Carter. Examining
the 1980 election in the context of the Southern Baptist Convention’s funda-
mentalist takeover helps us understand the rise of the Religious Right as a
theological story with political implications. Southern Baptists and other
conservative evangelicals had spent the 1970s wrestling over powerful doctrinal
questions of scriptural inerrancy and biblical authority. What they had really
been debating was the basic defi nition of what it meant to be a Christian.
While previous generations of Southern Baptists had allowed a range of theo-
logical views and worship practices throughout the Convention—the Baptist
principles of congregational authority and the priesthood of all believers
demanded such acceptance, aft er all—the Bible battles of the 1970s exposed
divisions that even Christian comity could not overlook. Conservative
Baptists saw in their moderate denominationalists doctrinal threats that had
to be confronted. Led by fundamentalist pastors who depicted the theological
battle as not merely an interpretive disagreement but, instead, the very work
of Satan, these conservatives rallied to purify their denomination. In calling
their rivals the “enemy,” in likening them to “snakes,” and in characterizing
the denomination’s reorganizational moment as a “battle,” Southern Baptist
fundamentalists equipped their cause with the language of spiritual warfare.
Th is was not a metaphor for them but rather an objective reality. And it drew
the dividing line not across diff ering Christians but between the true believer
and the heretic, between the forces of God and of his adversary.
500 | “Worse than cancer and worse than snakes”
Th at dividing line separated Jimmy Carter from the bulk of conservative
Southern Baptists. Increasingly over his presidency, Carter endured ques-
tions about his spiritual authenticity from fellow Baptists. In letters to the
White House and to SBC’s headquarters, in denominational publications and
Sunday sermons, Southern Baptists judged the state of Carter’s soul, calling him
unchristian and disbelieving his born-again testimony. Southern Baptists
were hardly alone in these conclusions. More generally, evangelicals frequently
raised doubts about Carter’s Christianity. 103 In the last months of the campaign,
a group called Christians for Reagan ran television advertisements in conser-
vative Christian districts charging, “Although Jimmy Carter calls himself a
Christian, he hasn’t been acting one.” 104 Those judgments may be lost on
political historians as the inconsequential preoccupations of the faithful, but
their importance to the religious conservatives who made them—and to our
understanding of those religious conservatives—cannot be overstated. Over
and over, Southern Baptists scrutinized Carter’s presidential decisions
through the rubric of evangelical orthodoxy, testing his faith just as they
assessed the convictions of their moderate brethren in the denomination
before finally disposing of them both. Other evangelicals, as members of
denominations undergoing their own divisions or simply aware of the larger
theological battles within conservative Protestantism, made similar judg-
ments of Carter and helped usher him from the White House. “President
Carter’s Christianity, like his policies, is diffi cult to understand,” one evangelical
wrote to Christianity Today halfway through Carter’s presidency. 105 But con-
servative Christians understood Carter’s policies and his presidency through
their evaluation of his Christianity, underscoring the theological basis of the
ascendant Religious Right. Political historians would do well to understand
that now too.
New York, NY
n otes
1. Questionnaire, attached to Letter, Rev. Pat Andrews to Mr. Carter, 10/2/80, fi le:
“Moral Majority,” Name File, Jimmy Carter Library. Hereaft er Carter.
2. Letter, Bob Maddox to Reverend Pat Andrews, 10/27/80, fi le: “Moral Majority,”
Name File, Carter.
3. Bill Keller , “ Christian Vote Ratings: Study in Absolutes ,” Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Report , 6 September 1980 , in Christian Life Commission Resource Files, 1955–90, AR
138-2, box 61, folder 3, Southern Baptist Historical Library and Archives. Hereaft er SBHLA.
n eil j . y oung | 501
4. Bruce Buursma , “ Moral Majority: Crusade Has Just Begun ,” Chicago Tribune ,
6 November 1980 ; Glenn Frankel and Karlyn Barker, “Virginia Republicans Now More
Eager For ’81 Election,” Washington Post , 6 November 1980.
5. Edwin Warner , “ New Resolve by the New Right ,” Time , 8 December 1980 , 24 .
6. See also Buursma, “Moral Majority”; Frankel and Barker, “Virginia Republicans
Now More Eager For ’81 Election”; John Herbers , “ Once-Democratic South: An Era Ends ,”
New York Times , 6 November 1980 ; and Warner, “New Resolve by the New Right.”
7. Stephen D. Johnson and Joseph B. Tamney , “ Th e Christian Right and the 1980
Presidential Election ,” Journal for the Scientifi c Study of Religion 21 , no. 2 (June 1982 ) :
128. See also Paul R. Abramson , John H. Aldrich , and David W. Rohde , eds., Change and
Continuity in the 1980 Elections ( Washington, D.C. , 1982 ), 101 ; Jerome L. Himmelstein and
James A. McRae Jr ., “ Social Conservatism, New Republicans, and the 1980 Election ,” Public
Opinion Quarterly 48 , no. 3 (Autumn 1984 ): 592 – 605 ; Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl
Raab , “ Th e Election and the Evangelicals ,” Commentary , March 1981 , 25 – 31 .
8. Jeff rey L. Brudney and Gary W. Copeland , “ Evangelicals as a Political Force:
Reagan and the 1980 Religious Vote ,” Social Science Quarterly 65 , no. 4 (December 1984 ) :
1076. It is diffi cult to get at a precise estimate for the number of evangelicals who voted for
Ronald Reagan, as various studies employ diff erent qualifi cations to identify evangelical voters.
Some intend “evangelicals” to include fundamentalists, while others diff erentiate the two.
Th e political scientist Andrew Busch found that Reagan outpolled Carter by a measure of
2-to-1 among “white fundamentalist or evangelical Christians.” Andrew E. Busch, Reagan’s
Victory: Th e Presidential Election of 1980 and the Rise of the Right (Lawrence, Kans., 2005),
127. Th e sociologist James Davison Hunter, however, claims that only 61 percent of white
evangelicals voted for Reagan. James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: Th e Struggle to Defi ne
America (New York, 1991), 280. Th ough he does not cite his source, Hunter is likely using
the results of the New York Times /CBS News poll conducted of more than twelve thousand
voters. Of this group, 17 percent identifi ed themselves as “born-again white Protestants,”
and 61 percent of those said they had voted for Reagan. Poll cited in E. J. Dionne Jr ., Why
Americans Hate Politics ( New York , 1991 ), 234 . One study found that the stronger one’s
fundamentalist beliefs, the more likely one picked Reagan, with those in the highest
category of fundamentalism giving him 85 percent of their votes. Arthur H. Miller and
Martin P. Wattenberg , “ Politics from the Pulpit: Religiosity and the 1980 Election ,” Public
Opinion Quarterly 48 , no. 1 (Spring 1984 ): 312 –13.
For other works that argue that the Religious Right was an important factor in the
1980 presidential election, see Steve Bruce , The Rise and Fall of the New Christian
Right: Conservative Protestant Politics in America, 1978–1988 ( Oxford , 1988 ), 91 – 103 ;
Kevin P. Phillips , Post-Conservative America: People, Politics, and Ideology in a Time of Crisis
( New York , 1982 ): 189 –92 ; John H. Simpson , “ Social-Moral Issues and Recent Presidential
Elections ,” Review of Religious Research 2 , no. 2 (December 1985 ): 115 –23 ; and Corwin Smidt ,
“ ‘Born Again’ Politics: Th e Political Attitudes and Behavior of Evangelical Christians in the
South and Non-South ,” in Religion and Politics in the South: Mass and Elite Perspectives , eds.
Tod Baker , Robert Steed , and Larry Moreland ( New York , 1983 ), 27 – 56 .
9. Donald T. Critchlow , Th e Conservative Ascendancy: How the GOP Right Made
Political History ( Cambridge , Mass ., 2007 ), 174 –77 ; Kenneth J. Heineman , God Is a
Conservative: Religion, Politics, and Morality in Contemporary America ( New York , 1998 ),
93 – 123 ; William Martin , With God on Our Side: Th e Rise of the Religious Right in America
502 | “Worse than cancer and worse than snakes”
(New York, 1996 ), 191 – 220 ; and Daniel K. Williams , God’s Own Party: Th e Making of
the Christian Right ( New York , 2010 ), 188 – 94 . See also Matthew D. Lassiter , “ Inventing
Family Values ,” in Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the 1970s , eds. Bruce
Schulman and Julian Zelizer ( Cambridge , Mass. , 2008 ), 13 – 28 .
10. See Andrew R. Flint and Joy Porter , “ Jimmy Carter: Th e Re-emergence of Faith-
Based Politics and the Abortion Rights Issue ,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 35 , no. 1 (March
2005 ): 28 – 50 ; and Robert Freedman , “ Th e Religious Right and the Carter Administration ,”
Historical Journal 48 , no. 1 (March 2005 ): 231 –60. Th e historian J. Brooks Flippen’s recent
book provides a forceful case for centralizing Carter in the story of the Religious Right.
Still, his work reaffi rms a largely political narrative of Christian conservatism, seeing
Carter’s struggles with this constituency as a function of his political pivoting between
secular liberals and religious conservatives. Flippen credits the political organizing of
Christian conservatives by New Right and Christian Right leaders that culminated with
the election of Reagan, but he largely overlooks the theological basis of the Religious Right
and how doctrinal controversies and denominational realignment, particularly within the
context of the Southern Baptist Convention, shaped religious conservatives’ rejection of
Carter. J. Brooks Flippen , Jimmy Carter, the Politics of Family, and the Rise of the Religious
Right ( Athens , 2011 ). Th e political scientist Oran P. Smith sees Carter’s loss in the context of
the Southern Baptist Convention’s conservative realignment in 1979, but merely notes that
Carter, like his fellow moderate Baptists in the convention, lay on the losing end of both a
religious realignment in his denomination and a political realignment in the nation. Oran
P. Smith , Th e Rise of Baptist Republicanism ( New York , 1997 ), 94 – 97 .
11. Ruth Murray Brown, For a “Christian America”: A History of the Religious
Right (Amherst, 2002); Darren Dochuk , From Bible Belt to Sunbelt: Plain-Folk Religion,
Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Evangelical Conservatism ( New York , 2011 ) ; Samuel
S. Hill and Dennis E. Owen , Th e New Religious Political Right in America ( Nashville ,
1982 ) ; Erling Jorstad , Th e New Christian Right, 1981–1988: Prospects for the Post-Reagan
Decade ( Lewiston, N.Y. , 1987 ) ; Frank Lambert , Religion in American Politics: A Short
History ( Princeton , 2008 ), 184 – 217 ; Martin, With God on Our Side ; Steven P. Miller, Billy
Graham and the Rise of the Republican South (Philadelphia, 2009); Williams, God’s Own
Party ; Daniel K. Williams , “ Jerry Falwell’s Sunbelt Politics: Th e Regional Origins of the
Moral Majority ,” Journal of Policy History 22 , no. 2 (Summer 2010 ): 125 –47 ; Garry Wills ,
Under God: Religion and American Politics ( New York , 1990 ). See also Steve Bruce , Th e
Rise and Fall of the New Christian Right: Conservative Protestant Politics in America,
1978–1988 ( Oxford , 1988 ) ; Michael Lienesch , Redeeming Politics: Piety and Politics in the
New Christian Right ( Chapel Hill , 1993 ) ; David G. Bromley and Anson Shupe, eds., New
Christian Politics (Macon, Ga., 1984); Robert C. Liebman and Robert Wuthnow , eds., Th e
New Christian Right: Mobilization and Legitimation ( New York , 1983 ) ; Duane Murray
Oldfi eld, Th e Right and the Righteous: Th e Christian Right Confronts the Republican Party
(Lanham, Md., 1996); and Clyde Wilcox, God’s Warriors: Th e Christian Right in Twentieth-
Century America (Baltimore, 1992).
12. Nancy Ammerman , Baptist Battles: Social Change and Religious Confl ict in the
Southern Baptist Convention ( New Brunswick , 1990 ) ; Ellen M. Rosenberg , Th e Southern
Baptists: A Subculture in Transition ( Knoxville , 1989 ), 184 –94 ; and Walter B. Shurden
and Randy Shepley, Going for the Jugular: A Documentary History of the SBC Holy War
(Macon, Ga., 1996). See also Nancy Ammerman, ed., Southern Baptists Observed: Multiple
n eil j . y oung | 503
Perspectives on a Changing Denomination (Knoxville, 1993); Joseph Barnhart, Th e Southern
Baptist Holy War (Austin, 1986); Arthur Emery Farnsley III, Southern Baptist Politics:
Authority and Power in the Restructuring of an American Denomination (University Park,
Pa., 1994); James Hefl ey, Th e Truth in Crisis: Th e Controversy in the Southern Baptist
Convention (Dallas, 1986); Bill J. Leonard, God’s Last and Only Hope: Th e Fragmentation of
the Southern Baptist Convention (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1990).
Oran P. Smith does attribute the fundamentalist resurgence in the SBC to the rise of
what he calls “Baptist Republicanism,” but he sees that political development within a
larger history, dating back to the 1920s, of the cultural, social, and political developments
within both the denomination and the American South. See Smith, Th e Rise of Baptist
Republicanism , 48–67 and passim.
13. On the 1980 election and Reagan’s place in modern conservatism, see Steven
F. Hayward, Th e Age of Reagan: Th e Fall of the Old Liberal Order, 1964–1980 (Roseville,
Calif., 2001), and The Age of Reagan: The Conservative Counterrevolution, 1980–1989
(New York, 2009); Gil Troy, Morning in America: How Ronald Reagan Invented the 1980s
(Princeton, 2005); Sean Wilentz, Th e Age of Reagan: A History, 1974–2008 (New York,
2008). On the rise of modern conservatism, see Mary C. Brennan , Turning Right in the
Sixties: Th e Conservative Capture of the GOP ( Chapel Hill , 1995 ) ; Dan T. Carter , Th e Politics
of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation
of American Politics ( New York , 1995 ) ; Critchlow, Th e Conservative Ascendancy ; Jerome
L. Himmelstein , To the Right: Th e Transformation of American Conservatism ( Berkeley ,
1990 ) ; Godfrey Hodgson , Th e World Turned Right Side Up: A History of the Conservative
Ascendancy in America ( Boston , 1996 ) ; Kevin M. Kruse , White Flight: Atlanta and the Rise
of Modern American Conservatism ( Princeton , 2005 ) ; George H. Nash , Th e Conservative
Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945 ( New York , 1976 ) ; Kim Phillips-Fein , Invisible
Hands: Th e Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Deal to Reagan ( New York ,
2009 ) ; Lisa McGirr , Suburban Warriors: Th e Origins of the New American Right ( Princeton ,
2001 ) ; Rick Perlstein , Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American
Consensus ( New York , 2001 ) ; Jonathan M. Schoenwald, A Time for Choosing: Th e Rise of
Modern American Conservatism (New York, 2001). For two recent reviews of the literature of
American conservatism, see Kim Phillips-Fein, “Conservatism: A State of the Field,” Journal
of American History 98, no. 3 (December 2011): 723–43; and Julian E. Zelizer , “ Rethinking the
History of American Conservatism ,” Reviews in American History 38 , no. 2 (June 2010 ): 367 –92.
14. Gary M. Fink and Hugh Davis Graham, eds., Th e Carter Presidency: Policy
Choices in the Post–New Deal Era (Lawrence, Kans., 1998); Frye Gaillard, Th e Unfi nished
Presidency: Essays on Jimmy Carter (Wingate, N.C., 1986); Alonzo L. Hambly, Liberalism
and Its Challengers: From FDR to Reagan (New York, 1985); William E. Leuchtenburg, In
the Shadow of FDR: From Harry Truman to George W. Bush (Ithaca, 2001); Leo P. Ribuff o ,
“ Jimmy Carter and the Ironies of American Liberalism ,” Gettysburg Review 1 (Autumn 1988 ):
739 –49. On the decline of the New Deal order and American liberalism, see Jeff erson Cowie
and Nick Salvatore , “ Th e Long Exception: Rethinking the Place of the New Deal in American
History ,” International Labor and Working-Class History 74 (Fall 2008 ): 3 – 32 ; Steve Fraser
and Gary Gerstle, Th e Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930–1980 (Princeton, 1989);
Th omas J. Sugrue, Th e Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit
(Princeton, 1996); and Jonathan Rieder, Canarsie: Th e Jews and Italians of Brooklyn Against
Liberalism (Cambridge, Mass., 1985).
504 | “Worse than cancer and worse than snakes”
15. Edward E. Plowman , “ Southern Baptists: Platform for Presidents ,” Christianity
Today , 16 July 1976 , 49 .
16. Kenneth L. Woodward, “Born Again!” Newsweek , 25 October 1976, 68.
17. Harold Lindsell, Th e Battle for the Bible (Grand Rapids, 1976).
18. “Bible Battles,” Time , 10 May 1976, 57.
19. Francis Rue Steele , “ Inerrancy Is Indispensable ,” Christianity Today , 9 April 1976 , 35 .
20. Th is section draws from Ammerman, Baptist Battles ; Rosenberg, Th e Southern
Baptists , 184–94; and Going for the Jugular , ed. Shurden and Shepley.
21. Adrian Rogers, “Th e Great Deceiver,” in Going for the Jugular , ed. Shurden and
Shepley, 18.
22. Shurden and Shepley, Going for the Jugular , 9.
23. Ibid., 22.
24. James Robison, “Satan’s Subtle Attacks,” in Going for the Jugular , ed. Shurden and
Shepley, 25.
25. Ibid., 31.
26. Ibid., 37.
27. Ibid., 29.
28. “Conservative Wins Top Baptist Post,” Washington Post , 13 June 1979.
29. Smith, Th e Rise of Baptist Republicanism , 51.
30. Quoted in Gary Scott Smith, Faith and the Presidency: From George Washington
to George W. Bush (New York, 2006), 295. For a highly sympathetic “spiritual biography” of
Carter, see Dan Arial and Cheryl Heckler-Feltz, Th e Carpenter’s Apprentice: Th e Spiritual
Biography of Jimmy Carter (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1996).
31. Myra McPherson, “Evangelicals Seen Cooling on Carter,” Washington Post , 27
September 1976.
32. “Carter Vatican Stance Invites Baptist Wrath,” Baptist Standard , 15 September
1976, in folder: “ACCL Political File: 76 Presidential Campaign—Ford Campaign (4),”
box 45, American Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. Records, Gerald R. Ford Library.
Hereaft er Ford. See also “Carter Wouldn’t Oppose Vatican Ambassador,” Baptist Standard ,
8 September 1976, in same folder.
33. McPherson, “Evangelicals Seen Cooling on Carter.”
34. Robert G. Kaiser , “ Remarks on Sexuality Draw Mixed Response ,” Washington
Post , 21 September 1976 .
35. Myra McPherson , “ Remarks in Playboy Draw Pulpit Attack ,” Washington Post ,
27 September 1976 .
36. Michael Satchell , “ ‘Barnyard Language’ Denounced ,” Washington Star , 21 September
1976 .
37. Photograph, in folder: “ACCL Political File: 76 Presidential Campaign—Carter
(2),” box 44, American Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. Records, Ford.
38. Jules Witcover, Marathon: Th e Pursuit of the Presidency, 1972–1976 (New York,
1977), 567.
39. President Ford Committee Newsletter, “Southern Baptist Leader Endorses
President,” 10/11/76, folder: “ACCL Political File: 76 Presidential Campaign—Religious,”
box 44, American Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. Records, Ford.
40. Most estimates place Southern Baptist support for Carter in 1976 in the high
50 percentages. One estimated 56 percent of Southern Baptists voted for Carter: Warner,
n eil j . y oung | 505
“New Resolve by the New Right.” ABC/Louis Harris pegged Carter’s win among Baptists at
57 percent, Albert J. Menendez, Religion at the Polls (Philadelphia, 1977), 198.
41. Menendez, Religion at the Polls , 198–99.
42. Action Line: Christian Action Council Newsletter , 12 September 1980, Wilcox
Collection, Kenneth Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas. Hereaft er Wilcox
Collection.
43. Flint and Porter, “Jimmy Carter,” 31.
44. For Carter campaign concerns about evangelical voters, see Memo, Lynn
Darden to Chuck Parrish and Atlanta, “Ecumenical Movement (Relationship of Carter to
Protestants-Baptists Types),” 9/15/76, fi le: “Protestants [3],” box 280; Letter, B. Stuart Hoarn
to Mr. Carlin, 9/15/76, fi le: “Protestants [3],” box 280; Memo, John Carlin to Landon Butler,
“Growing Baptist ‘Evangelical’ Problem,” 9/1/6/76, fi le: “Protestants [3],” box 280; and Phil
Strickland to Jimmy Carter and Carter Campaign Personnel, “Support from Southern
Baptists and other segments of the Religious Community,” undated, fi le: “Protestants [2],”
box 280, all in Jimmy Carter Pre-Presidential 1976 Campaign, Carter.
45. In the 1970s, several Protestant denominations split over disputes about doctrinal
questions, liturgical practices, and other issues, like the ordination of women. Th ese splits
were institutional responses to tensions within the denominations between conservative
evangelical and moderate factions that separated those forces for good. For a history of the
schisms in the Presbyterian Church in the United States (PCUS), the Lutheran Church–
Missouri Synod, and the Episcopal Church during the 1970s, see Bryan V. Hillis, Can Two
Walk Together Unless Th ey Be Agreed? American Religious Schisms in the 1970s (Brooklyn,
1991). In the PCUS and the Episcopal Church, the conservative factions broke off to form
their own new denominations; whereas, in the Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod, the
moderate wing left the conservative parent.
46. Memo, Stu Eizenstat to Governor Carter, 5/3/76, “Religion, 2/75–6/76,” box 27,
Jimmy Carter Pre-Presidential 1976 Campaign, Carter.
47. Letter, Douglas Brewer to Th e Director, Christian Life Commission, 10/20/77,
Christian Life Commission Resource Files, 1955–90, AR 138-2, box 48, folder 15, SBHLA.
48. Letter, Mrs. M. E. Robinson to unnamed, undated, in Christian Life Commission
Resource Files, 1955–90, AR 138–2, box 48, folder 15, SBHLA. Underlining in the original.
49. “Anita Bryant Scores White House Talk with Homosexuals,” New York Times , 28
March 1977.
50. Th e Voice of Florida Newsletter , September 1977, Voice of Florida Collection,
Wilcox Collection.
51. Harry Kelly , “ Carter Risks Ire of Gay Foes ,” Chicago Tribune , 4 November 1978 .
52. Dochuk, From Bible Belt to Sunbelt , 341.
53. Russell Chandler and John Dart , “ Many Church Leaders Oppose Prop. 6 ,”
Los Angeles Times , 3 November 1978 .
54. Jeffrey Perlman, “‘Battle Is Not Over,’ Briggs Vows to Prop. 6 Supporters,”
Los Angeles Times , 9 November 1978.
55. Letter, Robert D. Hughes to Mr. Jimmy Carter, 12/7/78, fi le: “Southern Baptist
Convention,” Name File, Carter. At the same time, the convention also passed a resolution
opposing “any law that would make homosexuals a legal minority under the Fair
Employment Act of California.” See “State’s Southern Baptists Settle Baptism and
Communion Issues,” Los Angeles Times , 18 November 1978.
506 | “Worse than cancer and worse than snakes”
56. Letter, William R. Hann to Th e Honorable Jimmy Carter, 11/7/78, fi le: “Southern
Baptist Convention,” Name File, Carter.
57. For the full text of the Democratic Party Platform of 1980, see http://www.presi-
dency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29607 .
58. Letter, Kenneth Bowden to Dr. Robert L. Maddox, 8/21/80, fi le: “Gay Issues,” box
8, Offi ce of Public Liaison, Bob Maddox, Carter.
59. Letter, Ralph E. Lewis to Dr. Robert L. Maddox, n.d., fi le: “Gay Issues,” box 105,
Offi ce of Ann Wexler, Special Assistant to the President, Robert L. Maddox’s Religious
Liaison Files, Carter. See other correspondence in the same folder. I am grateful to Kyle
Goyette for sharing these documents with me.
60. On Weddington, see her autobiography, Sarah Weddington, A Question of Choice
(New York, 1992).
61. Action Line: Christian Action Council Newsletter , 10 October 1980, Wilcox Collection.
62. Memo, Hugh Carter to the President, 11/3/78, fi le: “11/8/78 [1],” box 108, Offi ce of
Staff Secretary, Presidential Handwriting File, Carter.
63. “Resolution on Abortion,” June 1971, http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/amResolu-
tion.asp?ID=13 .
64. Cynthia Gorney, Articles of Faith: A Frontline History of the Abortion Wars (New
York, 1998), 188.
65. “Abortion Newsletter,” Christian Faith in Action , July 1973 in Christian Life
Commission Resource Files, 1955–90, AR 138-2, box 92, folder 11, SBHLA.
66. “Resolution on Abortion and Sanctity of Human Life,” June 1974, http://www.sbc.
net/resolutions/amResolution.asp?ID=14 .
67. Letter, Carl E. Bates to Th e Reverend Ed Gardner, 3/21/72, Carl Bates Papers, AR
298, folder 7, SBHLA. See also other letters in same folder from Baptist pastors and congre-
gants who denounced the SBC’s supportive position on abortion reform.
68. For examples of Southern Baptist moderation on abortion, including argu-
ments that the Bible did not specify when life began or clearly forbid the practice, see
Andrew D. Lester , “ Th e Abortion Dilemma ,” Review & Expositor 68 , no. 2 ( Spring 1971 ):
227 –44 ; and “Abortion Newsletter,” Christian Faith in Action , July 1973.
69. http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/amResolution.asp?ID=443 .
70. Dan Martin , “ SBC Continues March Toward Th eological Right ,” Illinois Baptist ,
18 June 1980 .
71. http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/amResolution.asp?ID=19 . See also James L. Franklin,
“Southern Baptist Abortion Stance Sends Shock Waves,” Dallas Herald , 12 June 1980, in
Christian Life Commission Resource Files, 1955–90, AR 138-2, box 79, folder 4, SBHLA.
72. http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/amResolution.asp?ID=1091 .
73. J. Marse Grant , “ SBC Didn’t Act on ERA ,” Biblical Recorder , 19 November 1977 .
74. For these resolutions, see http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/AMResSearchYear.asp?
SearchBy=Year&frmData=1980 .
75. Hunter, Culture Wars , 178–80.
76. “Resolution on the White House Conference on the Family,” http://www.sbc.net/
resolutions/amResolution.asp?ID=530 .
77. On Reagan’s 1976 race for the GOP nomination, see Craig Shirley, Reagan’s
Revolution: Th e Untold Story of the Campaign Th at Started It All (Nashville, 2005). Notably,
Shirley’s book makes no mention of evangelicals.
n eil j . y oung | 507
78. Martin, With God on Our Side , 205–6.
79. Ibid., 206–7.
80. Letter, Bob Maddox to President Jimmy Carter, 1 September 1978, fi le: “Religious
Matters 20 January 1977–32 December 1978,” box RM-1, White House Central File, Carter.
For Carter’s rejection of Maddox’s 1978 offer, see Handwriting on Memo, Susan to
Mr. President, 23 September 78, fi le: “Religious Matters 1/20/77–1/20/81,” box RM-1, White
House Central File, Carter.
81. Freedman, “Th e Religious Right and the Carter Administration,” 246.
82. Memo, Bob Maddox to Phil Wise and Anne Wexler, “Meeting with Ad Hoc Group
of Conservative Religious Leaders,” 8/28/79, fi le: “Religious Matters 1/20/77–1/20/81,” box
RM-1, White House Central File, Carter.
83. Martin, With God on Our Side , 189.
84. Memo, Bob Maddox to Anne Wexler, “Southern Baptist Convention,” 6/17/80, in
fi le: “Southern Baptist Convention,” Name File, Carter.
85. Letters, Bill Brock to Dr. Bailey Smith, 23 June 1980, and Bailey E. Smith, President
to Mr. Bill Brock, 7/8/1980, in Bailey Smith Papers, AR 671, box 1, folder 52, SBHLA.
86. Herbers, “Once-Democratic South.”
87. Church, “Politics from the Pulpit,” 35.
88. Lawrence Lader , Politics, Power, and the Church: Th e Catholic Crisis and Its
Challenge to American Pluralism ( New York , 1987 ), 64 .
89. Dr. James W. Bryant, “How Will You Vote? For Reagan or Carter . . . ,” reprinted
in Pro Family Forum Newsletter , October 1980, in Pro Family Forum Collection, Wilcox
Collection.
90. Ammerman, Baptist Battles , 99.
91. Letter, Mrs. Albert Kemp to Bailey E. Smith, 2 July 1980, Bailey Smith Papers, AR
671, box 1, folder 18, SBHLA.
92. Letter, Joyce Rogers to Mrs. Carter, 24 August 1979, “Adrian Rogers,” Name File,
Carter. Rogers signed her letter, “Joyce Rogers (Mrs. Adrian) Wife of the President of the
Southern Baptist Convention.”
93. Flippen, Jimmy Carter, the Politics of Family, and the Rise of the Religious Right , 218.
94. Letter, Mrs. Albert Kemp to Bailey E. Smith, 2 July 1980, Bailey Smith Papers, AR
671, box 1, folder 18, SBHLA.
95. Letter, Bailey E. Smith to Mrs. Albert Kemp, 8 July 1980, Bailey Smith Papers, AR
671, box 1, folder 18, SBHLA.
96. Letter, Cindy Miller to Dr. Bailey Smith, undated, Bailey Smith Papers, AR 671,
box 1, folder 38, SBHLA.
97. Edwin Warner of Time magazine reported that only 34 percent of Southern
Baptists voted for Carter in 1980. Warner, “New Resolve by the New Right.” Albert
Menendez estimated that Southern Baptist support was 40 percent. Albert J. Menendez,
Evangelicals at the Ballot Box (Amherst, 1996), 139.
98. Dionne, Why Americans Hate Politics , 234.
99. Busch, Reagan’s Victory , 125–28.
100. Letter, John Lester to Anne Wexler, 23 June 1980, quoted in Freedman, “The
Religious Right and the Carter Administration,” 247.
101. Dudley Clendinen , “ ‘Christian New Right’s’ Rush to Power ,” New York Times ,
18 August 1980 .
508 | “Worse than cancer and worse than snakes”
102. Letter, Leslie Jacobs to Rev. Bailey Smith, 3 April 1981, Bailey Smith Papers, AR
671, box 1, folder 31, SBHLA.
103. For example, see the article series, “Does Carter’s Christianity Count?” Christianity
Today , 3 November 1978, 14–21.
104. Steven R. Weisman , “ Appeals Backing G.O.P. Said to Portray Views as Contrary to
Bible ,” New York Times , 1 November 1980 .
105. Letter to the Editor, Th omas J. Mullen Jr ., “ Question for a Question ,” Christianity
Today , 15 December 1978 , 4 .
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