WHO ASKS FOR DEMOCRACY AND WHY?The effects of poverty on demand for democracy in ten African

countries (2000-2008)

A b s tract

This paper is an attempt to contribute to the body of studies challenging theparadigm of African political backwardness that has dominated Africanistpolitical science. It moves from the shortcomings in the literature about thepoverty-democracy link and raises the question whether African poor are sobackwarded to be unable to ask for democracy. Poor Africans have been chosenas the cases to concentrate on principally because poverty has been presentedby the mainstream of political science debates as one of the obstacles todemocratic attitudes and behaviors. Poor Africans are particularly suited caseson which to control the African political backwardness at the individual level,because poverty is so diffused in Africa to make them quasi-representative. Thelogistic regression analyses performed using data mainly from four waves ofthe Afrobarometer surveys (2000-2008) reveals that poverty instead of being anobstacle can sometimes stimulate demand for democracy. Such a resultprovides further support to the body of studies calling into question theparadigm of African political backwardness because it shows that even poorAfricans should not be excluded from the possibility to ask for democracy.

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I. Introduction

Recent coups in Guinea, Niger, Madagascar and what isgoing on by now in Cote d’Ivoire, provide further examplesto those who have been already claiming for the Africandemocratic backwardness (Debezies 1992; Horrowitz 1993).What makes more sustainable such a position is also thefact that many African countries lack very basicrequirements to be regarded as democratic. Suffice it tolook at Freedom House ratings, the MoIbrahim foundationIndex and many other attempts to measure democraticpractices. However, if democratic backwardness is sostraightforwardly sustainable for African countries, theextent to which such a judgment applies to Africans remainscontroversial.

We find on the one hand scholars claiming that democracyshould be a kind of «luxury good» for Africans. We referhere to the huge literature studying the relationshipbetween poverty and democracy (Schumpeter, 1946; Harrington1962; Lipset 1959; Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2005)displaying democracy as a sort of «luxury good» (Barro,1994) for poor populations. However another group of studies sustains that democracy isnot a luxury good. We refer here to qualitative andquantitative researches claiming that African history isplenty of popular demands for democracy (Bipoun 1986,Chazan 1993, Gordon 2000, Bratton, Mattes and Ghymah Boadì2005, Somaini 2009) and recent studies discovering thatpoor people are not less democratic than their richercompatriots (Przeworski in 2000 Alvarez, Cheibub andLimongi 2000; Yadav 2000, Mattes 2007). The first group of scholars seems challenged by recentAfrican history where democratic reforms have been takingplace as a result of popular calls, among many otherfactors. The second group seems sustainable but still fails

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in establishing the direction of the relationship betweenpoverty and calls for reforms. Economic conditions seem tomake no difference. This is paradoxical in places wherepoverty is perceived as the most important problem (Brattonand Mattes 2005). It should influence in one direction oranother political attitudes and behaviors. The same groupof studies also fails in explaining who is more likely toask for reforms in contexts lacking very basic means forpolitical attitudes and behaviors because they considerpoverty as a kind of neutral factor. That is why, in ourview, the question about who asks for democracy in Africaand the question about the reasons why she/he asks for itdeserves further explorations.

This study explores such a question in order tocontribute to the body of studies challenging the paradigmof African political backwardness that has dominatedAfricanist political science. Poor Africans areparticularly suited cases on which to control the Africandemocratic backwardness at the individual level, becausepoverty is so diffused in Africa to make them quasi-representative.

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II. Definitions and measurements

II.1. dependent variable

Bratton and colleagues (2005) have defined demand fordemocracy as support for democracy combined with aversiontowards undemocratic rules. However, demand for democracyis a broader concept. Its definition of demand fordemocracy requires a choice of one definition among aplethora of conceptions of demand and democracy. Withreference to the common meaning of demand provided by theOxford English Dictionary (2008), we understand that demandis about values, attitudes and behaviors because whodemands should have basic convictions about what is rightor wrong in doing what he does (values), feelings and moodstowards the desired good (attitudes) and act in a way thatmay lead to obtain such a good (behavior). Following thisidea of demand together with the maximalist view ofdemocracy (Patenam 1970, Cronins 1989, Fishkin 1991, Dahl1989), demand for democracy can be defined as the «Aversiontowards undemocratic rules (value) followed by advocacy for freedomsenabling democratic participations (attitudes) and behaviors accepted indemocratic games (behaviors)». Demand for democracy is atridimensional phenomenon and not one-dimensional one asBratton and colleagues maintain.

This study labels aversion towards undemocratic regimesvalue-driven demand for democracy. Instead, advocacy forfreedom and “democratic” behaviors have been respectivelylabeled attitudinal and behavioral demand for democracy.The measures of these dimensions have been made using allfour rounds of the Afrobarometer surveys (2000-2008) andconcentrating only on ten countries that have beenclassified as free or partly free by Freedom House1. The1 South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Namibia, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, Nigeria, Ghana and, Mali. The choice has been driven by the conviction

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measurement of value driven demand for democracy is anaverage value of people registering some degree ofrejection of one-man rule, one-party rule and military-rule2. The attitudinal demand for democracy is instead anaverage value of respondents calling for freedom to joinpolitical organization, freedom of speech and, freedom tochoose who to vote for3. Behavioral demand for democracyhas been operationalized referring to civic participationand contacting activities; collective (join the others to

that a good can be demanded in context where at least some aspects of it are already available.2 Rejection of undemocratic rules regimes has been measured accountingfor three different questions formulated as follows: «There are manyways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of thefollowing alternatives: a) the army comes in to govern the country?(Military rule); b) Elections and Parliament/National Assembly areabolished so that the President/Prime Minister can decide everything?(One man rule); c) only one political party is allowed to stand forelection and hold office? (One party-rule). ». The options for answerswere labeled: 1=Strongly Disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Neither Approvenor Disapprove, 4=Approve, 5=Strongly, Approve, 9=Don’t Know,98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data. We have considered demandingdemocracy all those who to some degree disapproved all threestatements. We have then recoded those variables assigning 1 to thosedisapproving and 0 to all the others. Value driven demand fordemocracy has been therefore considered as a dichotomous variable.3 Three Afrobarometer questions have been picked up: «We are going tocompare the current administration under [president] with the previousadministration under [president]. Please tell me if the followingthings are worse or better now than they used to be, or about thesame: a) Freedom to say what you think? b) Freedom to join anypolitical organizations? c) Freedom to choose who to vote for? ». Foreach of these questions the options for answers were coded: 1=Muchworse, 2=Worse, 3= same, 4=Better, 5=Much better, 9=Don’t Know,98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data. We considered asking fordemocratic freedoms those registering the worsening of freedoms. Wethen dichotomized the variable assigned them 1 and 0 to all others.Demanding democracy people are those expressing some degree ofdissatisfaction towards freedom of expression, organization and votingin their respective countries. All the others are excluded from thatcategory. Here comes once again a categorical and dichotomousvariable.

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raise an issue, voting) as well as individual initiative(contacting officials)4.

When taking all the aspects of demand for democracy inorder to assess whether once put in the same factoranalysis the picture we draw below together with thevariables we constructed deserve fundamental modificationwe find instead good news. In all the four rounds of theAfrobarometer surveys have been extracted three differentcomponents giving further empirical support to thedistinction we make between value-driven, attitudinal andbehavioral demand for democracy (Table 1). Moreinterestingly, as a confirmation that the three aspects arereally separated, running a correlation analysis takinginto account mean percentages of each dimension of demandfor democracy, we find either weak or no correlations atall between the new variables (Table 2). After havingcontrolled the ‘internal validity’5 of the measures of4 Attendance has been measured looking at the following questions:«Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. Foreach of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done anyof these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if youhad the chance: a) attended community meeting; b) joined the others toraise an issue? ». Respondents’ answers have been labeled: 0= No,would never do this, 1=No, but would do if had the chance, 2=Yes, onceor twice, 3=Yes, several times, 4=Yes, often, 9=Don’t Know, 98=Refusedto Answer. We considered demanding democracy those who claimed to haveattended community meeting or to have joined others to raise an issue.We assigned them value 1 and 0 to all others. Variables concerningcontact with official instances have been grasped taking into accountthe following questions: «how often have you contacted any of thefollowing persons for help to solve a problem or to give them yourviews: (a) local councilor? (b) Member of the parliament? ». Givenanswers have been labeled: 0=Never, 1=only once, 2=A few times,3=Often, 9=don’t Know, (98) Refused to Answer. We considered those whodeclared to have contacted leaders as demanding democracy (1, 2, and3). We assigned them value 1 and 0 to all others. Have been considereddemanding democracy people those registering some degree of communitymeeting attendance and that have contacted at least sometimes officialinstances. 5. Internal validity refers to the extent to which we can state thatthe independent variables produced the observed effects. Therefore, ifwe find the effects on the dependent variables in the independent

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demand for democracy, we also controlled whether they werecorrelated with other measures dealing with democracyexamining this way their external validity. The choice ofitems has been driven by the conviction that there is nodemocracy without respect for human rights in general andcivil and political rights, in particular. Such a choicefits also the idea of democracy Afrobarometer respondents’display: «Democracy is about political and civil rights»(Macpherson 1967; Owusu 1992; Ake 1996; Schaeffer 1998). Wetherefore considered indicators concerning levels ofparticipation, transparency and corruption as well as theratings of freedom of press and participation. We used theMo Ibrahim foundation data set to measure politicalparticipation, rule of law, transparency and corruption andconsidered the scores assigned to each considered countryby Freedom House. Table 2 shows that the dimensions ofdemand for democracy are, to some extent, significantlyassociated with other measures of democracy. It is alsointeresting to notice that demand for democracy isnegatively linked to measures of democracy.

II.2. The main independent variable: Poverty

Three elements emerge from a plethora of definitions ofpoverty. Poverty is about is about asymmetry between needsand means; awareness to live in a poor community andindividual perceptions of inequality. This way of lookingat poverty coincides with the distinction economists makebetween relative and absolute poverty (Piketty 1999;variables, the internal validity is achieved (See Cook and Campbell(1979). What has that to do with a Principal Component Analysis? Evenif it serves at reducing data complexity, PCA can be used also insolving regression problems (Eric Bair et al., Prediction bySupervised Principal Component, September 2004). Although itemsintroduced in a PCA cannot be properly considered as predictors of thePrincipal Components they are so strongly related to such a Componentto allow to use the term internal validity which is better suited toregression analyses.

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Ravallion 1992, Sen 1983). Poverty is not only aboutdeprivation, it is also about the feeling of living inworse conditions if compared to others. Taking into accountthe two dimensions of poverty was worth doing because whenpoor conditions are shared, they are very unlikely to belabeled as such. Thus, putting together absolute andrelative poverty allows to better account for poverty.Poverty, defined this way, has been measured picking upfrom the Afrobarometer surveys questions regarding the lackof basic goods like food, water, healthcare andelectricity6 together with questions asking people todescribe the current economic conditions of theircountries, their own living conditions and their livingconditions compared to those of others7. Absolutely poor6 This aspect of poverty has been measured using four questions of theAfrobarometer surveys: «1) Over the past year, how often, if ever,have you or anyone in your family gone without: Enough food to. (2)Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in yourfamily gone without: Enough clean water for home use? (3) Over thepast year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gonewithout: Medicines or medical treatment? 4) Over the past year, howoften, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without: cashincome?» The answer options were labeled as follows : 0=Never, 1=Just once ortwice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don’t know,998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data. Recoding the answers, weassigned 1 to all those registering some degree of deprivation and 0to all others. We therefore obtained four dummies. The measurement ofabsolute poverty is the average score of the so obtained dummies.7 Relative poverty has been measured considering three questions of theAfrobarometer surveys: « a) In general, how would you describe: Thepresent economic condition of this country?? b) In general, how wouldyou describe: Your own present living conditions? c) In general, howdo you rate your living conditions compared to those of others?» Theanswer options to the first two questions were labeled as follows:1=Very bad, 2=Fairly bad, 3=Neither good nor bad, 4=Fairly good,5=Very good, 9=Don’t Know, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data.Those of the last one instead has been labeled as follows: 1=Muchworse, 2=Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better, 5=Much better, 9=Don’t know,998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data. We recoded them assigning 1 tothose who declared fairly bad and bad their conditions and those oftheir country and those who considered much worse and worse theirliving conditions if compared to the living conditions of their

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are those going sometimes without basic goods andrelatively poor those who declared to get worse off thantheir neighborhood.

A factor analysis interestingly confirmed thedistinction between relative and absolute poverty (Table3). At this stage it was worth controlling whether themeasures of poverty we proposed were not isolated from therest of measurements dealing with poverty. We thenconsidered GDP per capita in PPP as a proxy measure ofgeneral economic conditions. The GINI index has beenaccounted for as a measure of relative poverty for it dealswith the extent to which the income distribution deviatesfrom a perfectly equal income distribution. A correlationmatrix with the measures of poverty constructed from theabove mentioned factor analysis plus GDP per capita and thescores of the GINI Index8 revealed two interestinginsights: first, absolute and relative poverty are not sohighly correlated to be considered as the same thing.Second, absolute poverty is negatively associated with GDPwhile relative poverty was positively related to the GiniIndex (Table 4).

neighbors. We instead assigned 0 to all the others. We therefore buildthree dummies for every single round of the Afrobarometer project. Themeasure of relative poverty is the average score of these dummies.8. Scores of GDP and GNI index have been taken for the year 2005 formost of the country and for 2006 for South Africa. Such a choice wasdriven by the fact that surveys we use have been compiled in such aperiod. Deserves mention also the fact that we associated by countryvalues to each observation. Data for each of these sub-sub-categories(indicators) are drawn primarily from two standard internationalsources, the OECD and African Development Bank’s African Economic Outlook2007/2008 and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) 2007and 2008.1 We supplement these figures with additional data from ourown country research, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers for selectedcountries, and several other sources, as detailed in the descriptionto these three indicators.

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III. The effects of poverty on the likelihood of demand fordemocracy

III.1. Exploring the null-hypotheses

Trying to answer the above raised research question,the first task to fulfill is to provide good reasons thatthere is (or not) a relationship between demand fordemocracy and poverty. Making clarity about such a linkrequires to control whether there are not competingexplanations which can make poverty an insignificant ofdemand for democracy (falsification step). Thereafter,reasonable hypotheses can be proposed (constructive step).

In the attempt to reject the null-hypothesisparticular reference to the determinants of demand fordemocracy suggested by political science theories onpolitical values, attitudes and behaviors is worth doingespecially because demand for democracy is here conceivedas a set of values, attitudes and behaviors. The sametheories provide alternative explanations that help inchecking whether other explanations of demand for democracyare competing with or additive to poverty.

Classics of the political culture approach maintainthat attitudes and behaviors proceed from values that areculturally embedded and socially received (Almond and Verba1963 and 1980). The explanations the political cultureapproach refers to the most are national identity (Rustow1970 and 1990; Gellner 1983; and Linz and Stepan, 1996);tolerance (Chazan, 1993; Etounga-Manguelle, 2000) andinterpersonal trust (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama,1995; Lin, Cook and Burt, 2001). The cognitive awarenessapproach, instead, links popular attitudes and behaviors tothe awareness they have of political procedures and factsand refers to explanations such as formal education, mediaexposure, and interest in politics. The performance

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evaluation approach claims that people’s attitudes andbehaviors depend pragmatically on the actual performance ofdemocratic institutions and leaders. In Elster's (1993:268) words, «democracy will be undermined if it cannotdeliver goods in the economic sphere». This is thetheoretical family Bratton, Mattes and Gymah Boadì (2005)have given priority in their attempt to explain demand fordemocracy. It all these theories applies also to Africa,Africans asking for democracy are expected to fulfill therequirements that the explanations of political attitudesand behaviors embeds. Therefore, some of them will ask fordemocracy not only because they are poor but also becausethey are driven by other socio-structural factors, by theirculture, their awareness about and expectations fromdemocracy and their evaluation of the performance of thecurrent regime and government of their respectivecountries.

Some of the explanations linking poverty to thelikelihood of demand for democracy can however be highlyrelated with poverty leading this way to multicollinearityproblems. The variables which are more likely to cause sucha kind of problem are particularly those suggested by thesocial structure approach (gender, rural residentiallocation and unemployment) and by some contextual factors(income). For instance, on the one hand women can ask fordemocracy because they are poor. On the other their poorconditions can be explained by their gender. This impliesthat gender can influence both demand for democracy andpoverty. In addition if we consider the fact a hugeliterature tend do show that female are poorer that theirmale counterpart, poverty should be highly, positively andsignificantly associated with the fact of being femaleleading perhaps to a collinearity problem. The same can bemaintained for what concerns the rural residentialposition, especially for African countries where politics

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seems to be a matter of big cities (Champaud 1983;Haeringer 1983). Furthermore, people can demand fordemocracy because their live in countries with very low GDPand low income. At the same time such low income is alsoone of the sources of their poverty.

However, the empirical literature on the effects ofgender on poverty in developing countries is plagued by alack of consensus. An early study by Visaria based on thepercentage of females in households, ranked by deciles,concludes that women do not seem to be heavilyoverrepresented among the poor, (Visaria 1980a, 1980b). Arecent review of 61 studies that examined the relationshipbetween headship and poverty, reveals that 62 percent ofthese studies has shown that woman-headed households areoverrepresented among the poor, using a variety of povertyindicators—not an overwhelming majority. In addition, areview by Lipton and Ravallion (1995) argues that femalesare not generally overrepresented in consumption-poorhouseholds; nor are female-headed households more likely tobe poor. Furthermore, studying the effects of gender onpoverty, scholars use to compare households in which thehead is a male and those in which the head is a female.Some of them find that the second group is poorer than thefirst one. Using a measure of poverty which takes intoaccount shortage of basic needs and self-perception aspoor, poverty will not be necessarily positively associatedwith gender. This is what Agnes R. Quisumbing, LawrenceHaddad, and Christine Peña find when studying the linkbetween gender and poverty. Their results suggest that,among the very poor, persons in male- and female headedhouseholds may not differ significantly (Quisumbing et al.2005:1). Studying the effects of rural residential positions onpoverty measured in terms of income, only partial evidenceabout a strong positive relationship can be provided.

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Indeed, in most African countries, poverty concerns ruraland urban populations as well. What makes the difference isinstead the kind of poverty people experience. While urbanpoor can lack food and water just because they have noincome, rural poor have food and water and lack income andaccess to health care. Considering poverty as deprivationof basic needs and self-perception as poor, we understandthat in African countries, the residential position doesnot neither immunize against nor expose to poverty. This iswhat Fisher (2004) finds when studying the associationbetween rural residence and poverty. Using an instrumentalvariables approach, accounting for correlation betweenrural residence and the poverty equation error term, sheshows that there are no measured effects of rural locationon poverty. What about unemployment? Since in most countries poorpeople in working age are also those going without jobs, apositive relationship has been found between unemploymentand poverty. But if we take into account a context wherewages are very law this relationship will probablydisappear. In such places, people can get jobs and beunable to afford some of their basic needs either becausethey are unpaid or because their salaries are verymiserable. This is the case of most of the Africancountries where we cannot reasonably expect unemployment tobe collinear with poverty because a good portion ofemployed people are not able to afford basic needs andperceive themselves as poor.

My expectations about the link between the variablesfrequently used by the social structure approach andpoverty have been confirmed by a correlation analysis usingdata from the more recent Afrobarometer surveys (fourthround) including the two dimensions of poverty, gender,rural residence, education and unemployment displayed intable 5. It shows that they are so weakly associated to

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raise collinearity problems. It is especially interestingto notice that unemployment is positively related toabsolute and relative poverty meaning that those whodeclare to be unemployed are also those lacking basic goodsand perceiving themselves as poor. In addition, beingfemale and education are negatively related to alldimensions of poverty meaning that female and educatedpeople are less likely to suffer from deprivation of basicgoods and to perceive themselves as poor. Rural positioninstead is associated negatively with absolute poverty andpositively with relative poverty meaning that even if ruralpopulation perceive themselves as poor they do however haveaccess to basic goods such as food and water. This is notinstead the case for urban poor who should lack basic needsand feel poor at the same time. These results have to behowever taken very carefully because the relationships theydisplay are very weak. What can be claimed is that thenull-hypothesis can be rejected because empirical evidencesuggests that social structure variables are weaklyassociated with poverty. Before taking for granted that thenull hypotheses can be rejected, I also account forcontextual factors which are likely to influence bothpoverty and demand for democracy. Taking into account forinstance economic factors such as the levels of HumanDevelopment (HDI) or the levels of income inequality(measured by the Uneven Development Index) we understandthat they can have a certain influence on people’s capacityto afford basic needs and lead them to perceive themselvesas poor. In addition, if people are worse off in terms ofincome and income inequality, they may ask for democracyespecially if they believe that such a form of governmentcan better their living conditions. However, looking at thecorrelation matrix built in order to check for the externalvalidity of the measurements of poverty (Table 4), thereare no associations leading to wonder about any kind of

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collinearity problem between economic contextual factorsand lived poverty.

A part from social structure variables and contextualones, the other determinants provided by theories onpolitical attitudes and behaviors seem to be lessproblematic in terms of collinearity with poverty. They arelikely to be additive or intervening and not competingexplanations of demand for democracy. If we take intoaccount the approach giving weight to cultural values suchas risk tolerance, national identity or interpersonaltrust, we understand that individual demand for democracycan be explained by the fact that people prefer peacefulsocieties regardless of their poor conditions. The same canbe claimed about the sense of national belonging andinterpersonal trust which can influence popular demand fordemocracy without influencing poverty. If we consider the institutional approach regardingpolitical attitudes and behaviors as a consequence of theorganizing principles of formal and informal institutions,we understand that in non-democratic countries, people arenot given the opportunity to develop their attitudestowards democracy and to behave accordingly. This is notthe case of democratic polities where people can expresstheir support for democracy and behave accordingly justbecause they are given the opportunity and not necessarilybecause they are poor. This reasoning applies to otherinstitutional facilities for demand for democracy such asfreedom of press and so forth. It then goes without sayingthat, since the African countries this study considers areat least electoral democracies where people enjoy some ofthe political liberties, institutional facilities willprobably play a role in people’s demand for democracyindependently from their poor conditions or just as anintervening variable (that is poor ask for democracy forthey are given institutional opportunities to ask for it).

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Accounting for the political awareness approach, wenotice that demand for democracy can arise from cognitivedispositions. Advocacy for democracy can be made justbecause one knows about advantages of democracy throughmedia, education and other channels of political knowledgeregardless of his or her poor conditions. It could bereplied that poor people are also those lacking access tomedia and education. However, there are diffuse media whichare available to poor people such as radios. Furthermore,the same poor people can get information from theirassociational life and other unconventional channels ofinformation. This reasoning leads not only to excludecollinearity problem between poverty and cognitiveawareness but also to conceive the latter as an interveningvariable between poverty and demand for democracy.

Considering the performance evaluations approach whichmaintain that people’s attitudes and behaviors are a resultof their evaluation of governments’ performance in economy(managing economy in creating jobs, in keeping pricesstable, government performance in narrowing income gaps)and politics (performance on crime and safety) as well aspeople’s trust in institutions, we understand thatdemocracy can be demanded by people just because they arenot satisfied with institutional performances regardless oftheir economic conditions. It can be demanded for the samereasons by the richer portion of the population.Notwithstanding and contrary to what Bratton and colleagues(2005) in their attempt to model demand for democracy inwhich they exclude social structure explanations,performance evaluations can be considered as interveningvariable between poverty and demand for democracy. Indeed,poor can ask for democracy because their conditions leadthem to evaluate negatively the current government andpolitical games (regime).

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The same reasoning applies to political contextualfactors such as level of political and civil libertieswhich can instigate calls for democracy. People can ask fordemocracy just because the levels of respect for humanrights, especially levels political liberties areunsatisfactory in their country. Such a demand will not bea concern only of the poor portion of the society but willalso involve richer citizens. Here once again, thecontextual factor can be considered as an interveningvariable to the extent that the vulnerability of the poorportion of the population can lead them to suffer more frominfringement of human rights and therefore to be kin toreject undemocratic rules, call for political freedoms andbehave in such a way to get democratic reforms.

The above sustained reasoning leads to maintain thatthe null-hypotheses can be rejected because collinearityproblems between poverty and other explanations of values,attitudes and behaviors are unlikely. We can thereforemaintain that in case there is a relationship betweenpoverty and demand for democracy, it will not disappeareven if we introduce in the analyses explanations takenfrom the major theoretical families explaining politicalvalues, attitudes and behaviors.

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III.2. Hypotheses

If there is a relationship between poverty and demandfor democracy, how does it look like? Which direction doesit go? In other words, what are the reasonable hypothesesthat can be checked when studying the relationship betweenpoverty and demand for democracy? As far as demand fordemocracy as well as poverty are multidimensional, thefirst step in building our hypotheses should just link eachaspect of poverty to every single dimension of demand fordemocracy obtaining the scheme displayed in Figure 1. Thefollowing task will be to determine the direction of eachsingle relationship.For what concerns value-driven demand for democracy, thedirection of its relationship with the two aspects ofpoverty can be defined referring to the shared statementthat democratic values are so widespread and simple thatthey are available in the majority of cultures (Marcus20019; Somaini 2009). Such a statement implies that we canexpect different forms of poverty to make any differencewith regard to value-driven demand for democracy. Poor andnon-poor are likely to ask for value-driven demand fordemocracy. Further theoretical support to such anexpectation arises when we consider three dilemmas makingit difficult to map out the direction of the relationshipbetween value-driven demand for democracy and poverty.First of all, those fighting for survival can rejectundemocratic rules on the one hand because they consider9 Marcus (2001) explores the universality of democratic notions andnorms. He disaggregated definitions of democracy, and reported theresults of empirical studies that asked Ugandan and Malagasy citizensto define democracy. Comparing these results to a parallel study thatasked Americans living in Florida to define democracy, the principalfinding was that the response trend was the same for all three studies.The majority of people defined democracy in terms of “freedom,” andgenerally specific individual freedoms, as opposed to elections,political participation, elements of good governance, economicdevelopment, or other common factors.

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democracy as a chance for individual socio-economicintegration. On the other hand in case non-democraticregimes offer them means for survival, they are also likelyto give them support and keep aside their potential demandfor democracy. This makes very difficult to define thedirection of relationship between absolute poverty andvalue-driven demand for democracy. Instead, those inconditions of relative poverty are likely to preferdemocracy to other regimes without any kinds of dilemmabecause regimes different from democracy are likely toundermine their chance for equality. Such reasoning leadsto expect relative poverty to increase the likelihood ofvalue-driven demand for democracy. Although the previousreasoning leads to expect relative poverty to be immunefrom any kind of dilemma, relatively and absolutely poorpeople will probably perceive democratic institutions atthe one hand as a chance for the betterment of theirconditions. On the other hand, they might perceive the sameinstitutions as responsible of their actual harshconditions. In both cases they will assume demandingattitudes towards democratic institutions. As far assupport for democratic institutions can be assumed in theirrejection of authoritarian rules, here arises anotherstringent dilemma. Another dilemma all two kinds of poorare very likely to share in African settings is the onederived from the influence of previous repressive regimes(colonial and authoritarian). On the one hand theexposition to authoritarian regimes is likely to decreasethe rejection of undemocratic rules, on the other hand, theexposition to authoritarian regimes can make people activeand venturesome (Frey 1998). This makes it difficult toguess about a very precise relationship between bothdimensions of poverty and value-driven demand fordemocracy.

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This is also straightforward when it comes to look atthe effects of poverty on attitudinal demand for democracy.Calls for political freedoms are very unlikely to bedifferent for poor and richer populations. Indeed thosefeeling absolutely and relatively poor aspire to betterchance as well their richer compatriots. If both groupsperceive political freedoms as channels by which they canbetter their conditions they will all ask for them even iffor different reasons. However, the difference between thedifferent economic groups can be accounted for referring tothe hierarchy of need thesis, according to which peoplebuild their choices and attitudes following a certain scaleof priorities (Zaller 1992; Diamond 1992; Sarris 2004).Those who are poor because they feel to possess less thanothers will probably give priority to equality and thosesuffering from absolute poverty will probably give priorityto survival. However, when we consider that those goingwithout basic goods (absolute poverty) are exposed the mostto social marginalization (Sen 1999; Griffin 2000; Jenson2000; Dean 2007) and feel to possess less than others, thevery expression of marginality will be registered amongthose lacking basic goods. This leads to expect absolutepoverty to enhance the probability of calls for freedoms(called here attitudinal demand for democracy).

This is also the case when it comes to determine thedirection of the relationship between aspects of povertyand behavioral demand for democracy. In addition, referringfor instance to the reasoning about the comparativeadvantages of poverty, we understand that absolute povertymay register effect on the likelihood of behavioral demandfor democracy. Indeed, the idea of comparative advantagesof poverty refers to the fact that if money consumingactivities may be a domain of incapacity for poor people,the same should not be necessarily expected for time-consuming ones. Yet, correlation analyses considering

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patience in answering surveys as a proxy measure of thefact of having more time than others, we notice that thoselacking basic goods are also those with more time at theirdisposal (Table 7). Applying such a finding to thebehavioral demand for democracy, it becomes reasonable toexpect poverty to increase the likelihood of politicalattendance and contacting activities (called herebehavioral demand for democracy).

Summing up, while absolute and relative poverty arenot expected to play any role in value-driven demand fordemocracy, absolute poverty will probably enhance thelikelihood of attitudinal and behavioral demand fordemocracy. If this expectation is consistent, thestraightforward hypotheses to be considered at theindividual level are: deprivation increases the likelihoodof calls for democratic freedoms and politicalparticipation. In other words, absolute poverty willincrease the probability of the attitudinal and behavioraldemand for democracy

IV. Empirical assessments and findings

If individual poverty increases the likelihood of demandfor democracy, being poor will be placed into one categoryof each dimension of demand for democracy whoseoperationalizations have been made building dichotomousvariables (likelihood). It then goes without saying that,instead of a linear model, the model will describe therelationship between a dichotomous outcome variable and aset of independent variables (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989:1).Our model is a set of three logistic functions respectivelyrepresenting the relationship between poverty and everysingle aspect of demand for democracy. Value-driven demandfor democracy function built in accordance with the above

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displayed expectations (poverty makes no difference) is thefollowing:

where DfD is value-driven demand for democracyα is the constantβs represent the increase or reduction in the log odds ofthe dependent variableaP is absolute povertythe sign is simply in line with the idea that differentforms of poverty will make no difference in the likelihoodof value-driven demand for democracy.The attitudinal demand for democracy function is similar tothe value-driven demand for democracy one with somemodifications. Since we consider that poor people demanddemocratic freedoms because they are marginalized,dissatisfied with the way the current regimes performespecially in terms of supply of democratic opportunities,and more importantly because they are cognitively mobilizedfor that, attitudinal demand for democracy function is asfollows:

Where Pe is performance evaluationCa, cognitive awareness andM, Media exposure.The second part of the equation means that performanceevaluation cognitive awareness as well as media exposurecan be considered as intervening variables between povertyand behavioral demand for democracy. The multiplication ofthe two parts represents the fact that if the sum ofintervening variables is 0, the effects of poverty will benullified.

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When it comes to look at the effect of poverty onbehavioral demand for democracy the basic function will beslightly changed. If we consider that poor people willengage in civic participation because they have got moretime than their richer compatriots (relative advantage ofpoverty), because they have been cognitively (mediaexposure, membership in association) and institutionally(membership in associations, party identification)mobilized or finally because they are unsatisfied with theway their current regime works the basic demand fordemocracy function will be reformulated as follows:

where DfD is behavioral demand for democracyα is the constantβs represent the increase or reduction in the log odds ofthe dependent variableaP is absolute povertyPe is performance evaluationCa is cognitive awarenessT represents time each respondent is supposed to have atits disposal.The second part of the equation means that performanceevaluation, cognitive awareness as well as time can beconsidered as intervening variables between poverty andbehavioral demand for democracy. The multiplication of thetwo parts represents the fact that if the sum ofintervening variables is 0, the effects of poverty will be0.

Running a logistic analysis in which the dependentvariable is the likelihood of value-driven demand fordemocracy and paying attention to poverty as well as tocompeting explanations of political attitudes, we find anegative and significant relationship between relative

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poverty, absolute poverty (Table 8). Table 8 seems toprovide empirical support to the elitist view of democracyexcluding the poor portion of the population fromdemocracy-demanding attitudes. However, when we payattention to the exponential B, we understand that value-driven demand for democracy is not more unlikely to bepresent (Y=1) among those declaring to go without basicgoods and those feeling relatively poor. Table 8 shows thatexponential B of relative and absolute poverty registers ascore that is below 1. The only indicator taken from thesocial structure explanation which registers acceptableeffects on the likelihood of value-driven demand fordemocracy is residential position. In facts, table 8witnesses that rural citizens are more likely than theirurban compatriots to reject undemocratic rules (Mamdani1986). A part from this exception, the previous studies hadalready found empirical support sustaining that cognitiveawareness accounts better for value-driven demand fordemocracy. Formal (education, media exposure) and informal(membership in associations) means of information registerpositive and reliable (in terms of exponential B) effectson the likelihood of value-driven demand for democracy.This results is confirmed when we perform the same analysison other rounds of the Afrobrarometer surveys (Table 9).The same reasoning find support when instead of consideringAfrica as a whole, we look at single country thisdissertation considers (Table 10).

The expectations about the effects of poverty on thelikelihood of advocacy for democratic freedoms seem to findsupport when we perform a logistic analysis. Table 11 showsclearly that people going without basic goods are thosemore likely to ask for freedom of association, speech andvoting. Such a result can be extended to all selectedcountries with the exception of Tanzania, Nigeria andBotswana as table 13 shows. The same can be stated when

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comparing the estimation of the effects of absolute povertyon attitudinal demand for democracy using data fromdifferent rounds of the Afrobarometer surveys. A part fromthe second round (circa 2003) in which poverty registers nosignificant effects of the likelihood of attitudinal demandfor democracy, the results displayed in table 11 aresubstantially confirmed in all other rounds as table 12clearly shows. The above mentioned effects of absolutepoverty on attitudinal demand for democracy are not onlysignificant but have an expected B that makes reliable thedisplayed probability. When it comes to look at the reasonswhy poor people ask for democratic freedoms, we realizethat performance evaluation predictors register significantand reliable effects on the likelihood of attitudinaldemand for democracy. Indeed, those asking for freedoms arethose prevalently considering undemocratic their owncountries as well as those who are unsatisfied with the waydemocracy works in their countries. Cognitive awarenessexplanations register positive and significant effect. Theabove displayed results find support even when we performthe same analysis on every single African country includedin this dissertation.

The hypothesis expecting absolute poverty to increasethe likelihood of civic participation and contacting hasfound broad empirical support. A Logistic regression madeon data taken from the more recent wave of theAfrobarometer surveys (2008) shows that there is apositive, significant and reliable effect of absolutepoverty on the likelihood of behavioral demand fordemocracy (Table 14). This means that people who actuallylack basic goods are more likely to engage in civicparticipation and to contact official instances. It isinteresting to notice that such an empirical support isconfirmed when we take data from the three previous wavesof the Afrobarometer surveys. A part from the exception

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observed on 2000, in all other waves, we find positive,significant and reliable (in terms of exponential B)effects. (Table 15). Whether absolute poverty increases ornot the likelihood of behavioral demand for democracy, apositive answer have been found even performing logisticregression in every single country included in theanalysis. A part from the exception of Malawi and Uganda,in all other countries we find positive and reliableeffects of absolute poverty (Table 16). Looking at thereasons of such a positive relationship, time, cognitiveawareness, performance evaluations and economic andpolitical contexts find empirical support. Indeed, we seethat having time to answer surveys increases the likelihoodof civic participation and contacting. So do also formaleducation, cognitive engagement, membership in association,if we account for cognitive awareness explanations. Thesame can be stated when looking at the effects of levels ofHuman development and rule of law and transparency. Theresults (Table 14) show that civic participation andcontact with official instances are less likely incountries where people are better off and in those withhigher levels of rule of law and accountability.

V. Conclusive remarks

Who then asks for democracy and why? For the Who-question the above mentioned analysis seems to suggest thatadvocacy for democracy can also be made by poor people. TheWhy-question can be answered looking at the way absolutepoverty increases the likelihood attitudinal and behavioraldemand for democracy. To the extent that it is erroneous toexclude for poor Africans the possibility of asking fordemocracy, the paradigm of the African backwardness findshere an indirect challenge.

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In case what we discovered is sustainable, it will be verydifficult to further support that poor people andmarginalized ones are likely to have authoritarianaffinity. Even African poor and marginalized citizens arenot probably in needs to be democratized. They need perhapsmeans by which they can make real the values they alreadybelieve in. Therefore, the question is not so much aboutthe suitability of democracy with actual African settings,but about the people empowerment. This is what sustainsalso Naomi Chazan in her article about Africa’s quest fordemocracy:

«While Africans exhibit a sophisticated familiarity withdemocracy, they have not invented suitable modes ofdemocratic practice because they have been unable toaugment the amount of the government in order toreconstruct its forms […] The challenge confrontingAfricans remains one of endowing by-now entrencheddemocratic percepts with integrative structural expressionsthrough the creative consolidation of locally-rootedpolitical institutions at the state level» (Chazan 1992:140-141)

Calls for social equality, official probity and publicaccountability come very often from the excluded portion ofthe society. Those who do not feel excluded will notprobably ask for what belong to the group of thosedemanding democratic values and opportunities. As far asless marginalized people are also those likely to lead theState, here seems to find some empirical confirmation whatBayard said about demand for democracy in Africa: «it seemsmost profitable to explain the continued quest fordemocracy as a commentary upon the relationship betweenstate and society» (Bayart 1986: 11). Should the above displayed result be true, this study willhave provided new evidence to the body of knowledge aboutthe relationship between poverty and political culture.Indeed, the results we get cast some light on the

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discussion between those sustaining that democracy is aluxury good (Barro 1997) and those claiming that poorcitizens participate equally vigorously in a plethora ofdemocratic activities (Bratton, Gyimah Boadi 2005). Such aresult suggests also that modernization theories shouldhave taken into account different forms of poverty anddifferent dimensions of demand for democracy before movingto conclusions they reached. Of course, some of itsconclusions have been here confirmed but for only specificforms of poverty and specific dimensions of advocacy fordemocracy.Should the above displayed result confirmed taking abroader sample of countries, some aspects of the previousliterature on the poverty-democracy link will find supportwhile some others will be heavily challenged. While the“luxury good” theses will deserve a complete revalidation,those observing that poverty don’t make any difference indemand for democracy will find partial comprehensionbecause neither relative nor absolute poverty increases ordecreases the likelihood of value-driven demand fordemocracy. Both ways of looking at the poverty-democracylink will be however seriously challenged when we willhappen to deal with the effects of poverty on other aspectsof demand for democracy. Indeed, as we have alreadymentioned, absolute poverty increases the likelihood ofattitudinal and behavioral demand for democracy. If from a very a theoretical point of view it seems thatthe social structure explanations deserves a certainreevaluation in African countries, for poverty shows to beinstead a stimulus for demand for democracy, from apractical point of view, policy makers interested inenhancing advocacy for democratic values should invest notso much in the propaganda for democratic values among poorpopulations but to improve their influence on governingelites.

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