1

What to Do with Parametric Variation in

the Context of Plato’s & Darwin’s Problems

plus Third-Factor Principles

Norio SUZUKI

Abstract

I note (at least) the following three assumptions appearing in All Parametric Variation

Originates from CI-Related UG-Residues (AllPV, henceforth): (i) restriction of the

concept of parametric variation to CI-related UG-residues; (ii) innately given

bootstrapping as the major ingredient of biological acquisition; and (iii) a stronger

position on the nature of bootstrapping triggers that only SM-interface properties,

namely sounds count for bootstrapping triggers. I take these assumptions central to

the primary discussion and arguments advocated in the main paper to be potential

problems with a varying degree of seriousness in view of much recent biolinguistic

theorizing, specifically from the viewpoint of Darwin’s problem, which requires a

biological system to be small and simple that emerged in a short evolutionary time.

Attempts will be made in this section to reanalyze and reinterpret the basic

assumptions in the main paper, in the major direction of reconciling them with a

number of important, recent developments in minimalist biolinguistics, perhaps, of

course, with a varying result of success for each case. While the main emphasis of

discussion here is placed on how to take parametric variation across grammars in terms

of its theoretical status, important theoretical implications and their consequences will

also be taken up emerging from the assumption of a maximally underspecified UG/an

SMT-conforming FLN.

Keywords: parametric variation, competence vs. performance, morphology and syntax,

CI-related UG-residues, SMT, core vs. periphery, productivity, Elsewhere

Condition, epigenesis/epigenetics, edge-features, uninterpretable

features, phenotypical, NS-/WF-internal competence, NS-/WF-internal

performance, biological acquisition, bootstrapping

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1. Some Basic Considerations and Assumptions with

Special Emphasis on Parametric Variation

The major purpose of the present paper is to explore the locus/loci of parametric

variation across grammars, its mode(s) of existence, and its true nature.1

As for the loci of parametric variation, I specifically pay special attention to

Richards (2008: 133), according to which there should be two kinds of variation

corresponding to the two domains in which indeterminacies may arise in a minimalist

architecture with a minimally specified UG: (i) variation in the narrow-syntactic (NS)

domain (due to the minimalist assumption that UG is maximally underspecified); and

(ii) variation at the phonological (sensorimotor (SM)) interface (‘externalization,’ the

mapping to PF; because of Chomsky’s (2005b, 2007) assumption that language is

optimally designed only for the purpose of satisfying conditions imposed by the

semantic (conceptual-intentional (CI)) interface. And let me point out specifically for

the purposes of discussion here that the first domain of variation in the sense of

Richards (2008) above (i.e., ‘variation in the narrow-syntactic (NS) domain’) does

virtually correspond to the whole empirical domain of the concept of parametric

variation in the sense of AllPV, which somehow restricts points of parametric variation

to CI-related UG-residues (see above and also Suzuki 2008a, which is actually based on

the earlier idea of ‘true optionality’ in the sense of Biberauer and Richards 2006).

Based on the certain validity of NS (i.e., NS as it pertains to NS-internal performance;

see the discussion in section 2.3 above of AllPV arguing for the dichotomy between

NS-internal competence, which I assume to consist of raw materials for grammar

formation and to hence be uniform across grammars, and NS-internal performance,

which is actually NS-derivation and is assumed by Biberauer and Richards 2006,

Richards 2008, and me to count as a locus of parametric variation; see also Epstein

2003/2007 and note 1 of AllPV above) as a possible locus of parametric variation (due to

the concept of ‘true optionality’ in the sense of Biberauer and Richards 2006), I somehow

make an attempt to assess the case for the “parametric” concept of variation at the

phonological (sensorimotor (SM)) interface (because of Chomsky’s (2005b, 2007)

assumption that language is optimally designed only for the purpose of satisfying

conditions imposed by the semantic (conceptual-intentional (CI)) interface, but not for

the purposes of ‘externalization,’ the mapping to PF) specifically from the viewpoint of

“abstractness” and the concept of I-language (see also note 1 below for the notion of

‘accidents’ in the sense of Smith and Law 2009).

I further take into account Yang (2011: 180), where given Chomsky’s (2005a: 6)

three factors determining the properties of the human language faculty (i.e., the genetic

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endowment, the experience, and principles not specific to FL), “we approach the

problem of variation from the angle of acquisition by developing a framework in which

all three factors are given a fair billing.” For the purposes of “parametric variation”

discussion here, I specifically take up the “core vs periphery” distinction, which Yang

(2011) discusses in some depth, along with the important ingredients of Yang’s (2011)

framework, such as the notion of “productivity” and the linguistic principle of the

Elsewhere Condition in the original sense of Kiparsky (1973 ‘”Elsewhere” in phonology,’

in A Festschrift for Morris Halle).

As for the other three important references for discussion here, Uriagereka (2007),

Vercelli and Piattelli-Palmarini (2009), and Balari and Lorenzo (2009), I assume that

they are specifically relevant to the second major assumption/problem in AllPV, that is,

the problem of innately given bootstrapping as the major ingredient of biological

acquisition within a grammatical system with a minimally specified UG. That is, a

strong device with rich innate properties, such as innately given bootstrapping as part

of a parameter system belonging under a (rich GB-type) UG, could not possibly be

countenanced within a biolinguistic system with a maximally underspecified UG. A

promising candidate for technology for the purpose of overcoming this seeming

difficulty may be the concept of “epigenesis/epigenetics” from biology.2 Uriagereka

(2007) makes use of this notion for the purpose of describing how at least some species

of parameters work or are implemented, while Vercelli and Piattelli-Palmarini (2009)

somehow deploy the concept in a wholesale manner, as the title of their paper indicates,

for a wide variety of general, biolinguistic discussion on language design, evolution,

acquisition, and so on. Their key idea may be found in the following observation by one

of the authors of the paper: “… by minimizing what you encode and then being very

plastic in the way you use what you encode” (p.107). Further, in view of the major

assumptions and direction in the field of Evolutionary Developmental Biology

(Evo-Devo) adopted and refined by Balari and Lorenzo (2009), I specifically note the

theoretical importance of the following observations from Balari and Lorenzo (2009): (i)

“Evo-Devo aims to explain the origins and evolution of natural designs (phylogeny) by

means of hereditary perturbations affecting the developmental plans of organisms

(ontogeny)” (p.2; an ‘ontogeny-over-phylogeny’ stance); (ii) “A plan for the development

of an organism consists of a set of morphogenetic parameters (not just genetic factors)”

(pp.2-3; perhaps, constituting part of the solution for Carstairs-McCarthy’s 2010

intriguing question of why language has two systems for encoding semantic

relationships: syntax and morphology); and (iii) “The idea that evolution is strongly

constrained by the very same factors that strongly constrain the development of

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individuals is common ground for every Evo-Devo oriented approach” (p.3). Moreover,

I note based on observation (ii) above about morphogenetic parameters that complex

interactions among these parameters relate non-linearly with phenotypic outcomes,

which means that a parameter can be continuously changing without any significant

consequence, that once a certain critical value is reached (see Yang 2005, 2011 for a

statistically/probabilistically couched, ‘’Elsewhere Condition’-based resolution of

morphological productivity), a minor change of the same parameter can be enough to

introduce some radical phenotypic manifestation, the latter minor but far reaching

perturbations on development can eventually attain evolutionary significance, which

evolutionary novelties can emerge without introducing new developmental factors or

changing the nature of parameter interactions, and that a system of morphogenetic

parameters sets the limits of the forms attainable from such a developmental plan,

leading to the conclusion that the direction that development can take from a certain

phenotypic state is strongly constrained by the geometry of the parametric space so

defined (see Balari and Lorenzo 2009: 3; see also Yang 2011: 202-203 for the observation

that ‘From a formal learnability point of view, a finite space of parameters or

constraints is still our best bet on the logical problem of language acquisition’).

Specifically on the basis of Uriagereka’s (2007: 106) observation that “… These

invite the inference, explicit in Chomsky (2005 (sic); see Chomsky’s (2001: 2) Uniformity

Hypothesis, which states that “In the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary,

assume languages to be uniform, with variety restricted to easily detectable properties

of utterances” ― NS), that variation is restricted to the second factor (i.e., ‘after-birth

stimulus’). In my view, in contrast, variation starts actually in the very first factor, the

genetic endowment (emphasis ― NS) ― and following Vercelli and

Piattelli-Palmarini (2009 ― NS) ― I take this variation to be quite literally of an

epigenetic sort (emphasis ― NS),” I pursue a possibility of obtaining what AllPV has to

say, which is virtually an attempt to derive the whole empirical contents of the concept

of parametric variation across human grammars from the presence of CI-related

UG-residues. Recall in connection with the notion of weak I(nterface)-realization in

section 5.2.2 of AllPV above that “… generally, the typical case of improper I-realization

should be one in which we obtain an “imperfect” many-to-one correspondence between

FLN and interfaces. CI-related UG residues typically arise in cases where

correspondences between FLN and interfaces are many-to-one.” Which typically leads

in actual terms to the general binarity of human language parameters. Then I make a

further attempt to examine and scrutinize in some detail what Uriagereka’s (2007: 106)

interpretation of the Chomsky hierarchy of grammars (i.e., finite-state, context-free,

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and context-sensitive grammars, on a complexity scale) can have to say in the direction

of making finer distinctions among various species of FLN/NS resources, which stand

opposite the CI-interface/semantic interpretation for the purposes of the “CI-related UG

residue” business.

Notice incidentally that approaches to parametric variation across grammars

exemplified above may generally be radically different from that adopted by Boeckx

(2008c, 2011b) that roughly requires points of variation/parameters to be confined

especially to the morpho-phonological component (PF), given his (2011b: 210) Strong

Uniformity Thesis to the effect that “Principles of narrow syntax are not subject to

parametrization; nor are they affected by lexical parameters,” a stronger version of

Chomsky’s (2001: 2) Uniformity Hypothesis, which states that “In the absence of

compelling evidence to the contrary, assume languages to be uniform, with variety

restricted to easily detectable properties of utterances” (see also Berwick and Chomsky

2011: 37 for a similar observation that ‘Parametrization and diversity, then, would be

mostly ― possibly entirely ― restricted to externalization’ with the connection

between FLN/NS and the semantic-pragmatic interface having primacy over that

between FLN and the PF-interface.)3

2. More on NS-internal Competence vs. Performance: Extending the

Dichotomy to the Domain of Morphology

Recall the following presented in section 2.3 of AllPV above for the purpose of making a

distinction between “competence” and “performance” in the domain of narrow-syntax

(NS):

(1) a. NS-internal competence

Raw materials for grammar formation: e.g., operations such as Agree, Merge;

properties such as recursion; parameter values biased toward the language in

question, with other values also available due to SG incorporated in the

system; components mapping to interfaces.

b. NS-internal performance

NS derivation.

In my forthcoming paper I scrutinize the inventory of “raw materials for grammar

formation” for the purposes of NS-internal competence, making a further attempt to

restrict the inventory in accordance with Richards’ (2008) assumption that the contents

of a maximally empty UG (for evolutionary reasons) are restricted to the two kinds of

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formal features on which narrow-syntax (NS) operates: (i) edge features (EF) in the

sense of Chomsky (2005b, 2007); and (ii) uninterpretable features (uF).

Notice that my case here is for the assumption that NS-internal competence is

common and uniform across human grammars, while it is NS-internal performance in

the form of “NS-derivation” that should be the (only) locus of parametric variation

across grammars. Here I make a further attempt to extend this dichotomy between

“competence” and “performance” to the domain of “morphology.” By the term

morphplogy, I simply mean the inventory of “words/lexical items” belonging under the

lexicon. Chomsky (2000: 100-101) makes the following observation about the

“construction of a lexicon” for a particular language:

(2) a. “UG makes available a set F of features (linguistic properties) and operations

CHL(the computational procedure for human language) that access F to

generate expressions… Operative complexity is reduced if (the language ―

NS) L makes a one-time selection of a subset [F] of F, dispensing further access

to F. It is reduced further if L includes a one-time operation that assembles

elements of [F] into a lexicon, Lex, with no new assembly as computation

proceeds. On these (fairly conventional) assumptions, acquiring a language

involves at least selection of the features [F], construction of lexical items Lex,

and refinement of CHL in one of the possible ways ― parameter setting”

(p.100).

b. (i) Select [F] from the universal feature set F.

(ii) Select Lex, assembling features from [F].

(iii) Select LA (a lexical array ― NS) from Lex.

(iv) Map LA to Exp (an expression ― NS), with no recourse to [F] for narrow

syntax. (p101: Chomsky’s 2000 (3a-d))

Chomsky (2000: 101) goes on to observe that “If FL operates with the economy

principles just reviewed, then a language L follows procedures (3a) and (3b) (i.e., (2bi,ii)

above) to specify the language (apart from parameter setting), then applies (3c) and (3d)

(i.e., (2biii,iv) above) to derive a particular Exp.”

Notice that the procedures (2bi,ii) seem to be responsible for constructing a lexicon,

that is, for the purposes here of the domain of morphology. And I assume the universal

feature set F to be uniform and common across all human grammars, calling the latter

universal set Word-Formation (WF-)internal competence. I further take the

procedures (2bi,ii) for the purpose of constructing a lexicon, which I call WF-internal

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performance, to be subject to (parametric) variation. Then the remaining procedures

in (2biii,iv) above should be responsible for NS-internal performance (i.e.,

NS-derivation) in (1b) above, which I take to be subject to parametric variation. The

empirical contents of WF-internal competence are a universal set of “raw materials for

word formation,” while the truism to the effect that different languages have different

words specifically with different pronunciations may derive from the concept of

WF-internal performance, which might subsume under it major effects of Boeckx’s

(2008c, 2011b) Strong Uniformity Thesis requiring points of variation/parameters to be

confined especially to the morpho-phonological component (PF). But as you notice,

Boeckx’s (2008c, 2011b) case may only be valid for the purposes of the “morphology-side”

of the “parameter/variation” story.4

Sigurđsson (2004) is an interesting attempt to offer a solution to the paradoxical

situation Chomsky (2001) is confronted with when the latter argues that language is

uniform in the relevant sense (L-uniformity), but, on the other hand, he also assumes

that languages make different selections of features from a universal feature set

(L-selection). Sigurđsson’s (2004) solution to this problem resides in his position that

L-uniformity should be favored for language description to the exclusion of L-selection.

While I do not disagree with Sigurđsson (2004) in every aspect of his conception of

human language, I take issue with his solution to Chomsky’s (2001) alleged paradox,

given L-uniformity and L-selection at the same time. If my argument above for the

dichotomy between competence and performance in the two domains of narrow-syntax

and morphology is on the right track, L-uniformity should be a matter of competence

and L-selection a matter of performance, and hence, no paradox.

3. Deriving Merge, Agree, Transfer, and Recursion from Edge Features

(EF) and Uninterpretable Features (uF) as the Minimal Components

of a Maximally Empty UG: Richards (2008)

Suppose that the universal operations Merge, Agree, and Transfer, and the property

Recursion are shared across species. And assume with Richards (2008) that the

contents of a maximally empty UG (for evolutionary reasons) are restricted to the two

kinds of formal features on which narrow-syntax (NS) operates: (i) edge features (EF) in

the sense of Chomsky (2005b, 2007); and (ii) uninterpretable features (uF). The former

UG features are assumed to be responsible for NS-structure building and the latter for

association/connection of (partially derived) NS-structures with sound and meaning

(and, perhaps, with ‘pragmatics’; see López 2003, Suzuki 2007a: chapter 4) via phasal

Transfer (spell-out).5 Then we may be able to at least partly describe/show the

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(possible) way the operations across species (i.e., Merge , Agree, Transfer) and the

property Recursion (also assumed to be shared across species) may be used for the

purposes of language specifically in the case of Homo sapiens alone. It may be the case

that the UG-feature EF is instrumental in making the operation of Merge possible by

providing a lexical item with a locus for another to attach to, which I assume to be

mechanically implemented through epigenetic mechanisms in acquisitional terms (see

Vercelli and Piattelli-Palmarini 2009: 101; see also Fodor ’s 1998 notion of ‘learning by

parsing’ and Suzuki 2007a: chapters 2, 5, 6 for some discussion), while uF may

contribute to making the Agree operation possible, presumably by epigenetically

making the relevant elements visible for the purposes of the operation in terms of

acquisition. And Recursion may epigenetically arise from the undeletability of EF

from the perspective of acquisition (see Chomsky 2007: 11 for some discussion leading to

the conclusion that ‘EF is undeletable,’ which property may also arise epigenetically

from the viewpoint of acquisition). Moreover, it may be conjectured that “isolated

words” must somehow have come to have the property described by the term EF in a

short revolutionary time. As for uF, there is an interesting evolutionary story on the

part of Uriagereka and others which takes an uninterpretable feature for the purposes

of language (evolution) to play an important role in the manner of a “virus” in the

evolution of a biological system (see Uriagereka 2009 for the important, basic points in

the ‘virus’-evolutionary story and also, an interesting suggestion that ‘EF may be a

virus’). Notice here that the intriguing observation arising from the discussion above

on the dichotomy between the contents of the genes (i.e., UG-features, such as EF and

uF) and epigenetically obtained phenotypical entities, such as Merge, Agree, Transfer,

Recursion) may point to the validity of Longa and Lorenzo’s (2008b) remark that “the

genes establish certain phenotypical conditions from which the growing of a linguistic

capacity becomes inescapable” (see also CHAPTER 4 of this volume/Suzuki 2011d:

34-35).6

4. On the Status of AllPV’s Major Assumption Restricting Parametric

Variation to CI-related UG-Residues

Following AllPV and specifically, Suzuki (2010a), I take a “CI-related UG-residue” to

arise in the absence of (proper) interface-realization (i.e., due to ‘lack of a perfect

one-to-one correspondence between NS-structures and CI-interface representations)

and further, such a CI-related UG-residue to be related to NS-internal performance (i.e.,

‘those NS-derivations which cannot be (properly) realized CI-interface-wise are

CI-related UG-residues’; Suzuki 2010a: 30-31).

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Both morphology and (narrow-)syntax have the competence and performance

components to them, based on Chomsky’s (2000) economy-based FL-procedures (see

(3bi-iv) of section D1.1 above): that is, WF-internal competence and WF-internal

performance, and NS-internal competence and NS-internal performance. And we have

assumed that the competences are common and uniform across grammars since they

provide universal sets of raw materials, while the performances are subject to

(parametric) variation.

Of the two performance domains subject to variation, we have somewhat discussed

WF-internal performance in connection with Boeckx’s (2008c, 2011b) Strong Uniformity

Thesis (SUT) requiring points of variation/parameters to be confined especially to the

morpho-phonological component (PF). We have seen that the concept of WF-internal

performance may account for the truism to the effect that different languages have

different words specifically with different pronunciations, subsuming under it at the

same time major effects of Boeckx’s (2008c, 2011b) SUT. And if something like

Boeckx’s (2008c, 2011b) Strong Uniformity Thesis works in some domain of

narrow-syntax, NS-internal competence (with a universal set of raw materials for

grammar formation) should be such a domain.

We are left with the other performance domain subject to variation, that is,

NS-internal performance (i.e., NS-derivation). Specifically, I take this domain to be

subject to parametric variation (in some standard sense of the term). Look at the

NS-operation (i.e., ‘Move’ or ‘Merge’) of V-to-T raising, which is present in French while

it is not in English, which situation I take to point to there being (at least, or just) two

NS-structures (i.e., one structure with V raised to T and the other with V in situ) and

just one CI-interpretation corresponding to the two NS-structures, an instance of an

imperfect correspondence between NS-structures and CI-interface representations.

This is a typical example of a CI-related UG-residue. I call this typical in that it is an

example of an imperfect two-to-one correspondence (i.e., two NS-structures vs. one

CI-interpretation) and also a typical example of a binary parameter of human language

(see Suzuki 2010b: 25-26 for some discussion on the possible origins of the concept of

binarity as it appears in human language as a binary-parameter system). Then we can

safely conclude that the status of CI-related UG-residues at least as one factor in the

emergence of parametric variation across grammars can be established both

conceptually and empirically.

Richards (2008: 158-159) makes a distinction between two kinds of variation: (i)

variation due to the imperfect mapping to PF, in which the resolution of competing

linearization options takes the form of PF-based macroparameters; and (ii) variation

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due to an underspecified UG, in which competing options are tolerated in the syntax,

with no parameter resolution. Variation of the second sort corresponds to instances of

true optionality, with the following two cases: one in which competing options are seen

in a single language (e.g., Afrikaans, the concept of ‘true optionality’ in the sense of

Biberauer and Richards 2006), and the other in which such options are observable

across grammars, which generally leads to the binary-parameter system of human

language. As for the first kind of variation, Richards (2008) seems to take it to be a

PF-based macroparameter.

But under the assumption above that CI-related UG-residues are related to

NS-internal performance in that those NS-derivations which cannot be (properly)

realized CI-interface-wise (due to ‘lack of a perfect one-to-one correspondence between

NS-structures and CI-interface representations) are CI-related UG-residues, Richards’

(2008: 147) interpretation of Mark Baker ’s Polysynthesis Parameter (see Baltin and

Collins 2001; also Roberts and Holmberg 2010 for some discussion on microparameters

and macroparameters) as a PF-linearization-based macroparameter of the (i) sort above

may well be reformulated as an NS-related parameter. That is, given Richards’ (2008:

147) distinction between “linearization by Merge” (via EF; ‘directionality’) and

“linearization by Agree” (via uF; ‘polysynthesis’), I would claim that at least

CI-interface-wise two NS-operations such as Merge and Agree are involved across

grammars in building two kinds of NS-structures for the purposes of a single

CI-interpretation, which situation should point to there being two NS-structures (i.e.,

one structure based on Merge and the other on Agree) and just one CI-interpretation

corresponding to the two NS-structures, an obvious instance of a CI-related UG-residue

and, possibly, a case of a binary parameter across grammars (i.e., ‘NS-structure-

b u i l d i n g b y M e r g e ’ v s . ‘ N S - s t r u c t u r e - b u i l d i n g b y A g r e e ’ ) .

Notice that Uriagereka (2007: 106) provides three different kinds of

variation/parameters for each of the three grammar types of the Chomsky hierarchy: (i)

peripheral variation for finite-state grammars; (ii) sub-case parameters for context-free

grammars; and (iii) core parameter variation for context-sensitive grammars. One

interesting point is Uriagereka’s (2007: 99) observation that they constitute three

progressively deeper forms of variation, presumably as a result of being associated with

three Chomsky hierarchy grammars on a complexity scale. As for “peripheral

variation” of the (i) sort, it is extremely restricted, in particular to first-order data

analysis in what amounts to the left-periphery of parsed sentences (Uriagereka 2007:

106). Variation of the (ii) kind presupposes a distinction between a marked and an

unmarked value, with resulting subset/superset relations. Sub-case situations of this

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sort must involve second-order data analysis (concretely, statements involving category

types), and this should allow the child to have access to second-order grammatical

descriptions of available data, which Lightfoot (1999) calls “cues” and Fodor (1998)

“(structural) triggers” (but see Suzuki 2007a: chapter 2 for discussion on the Access

Problem pertaining to ‘cues’ and ‘structural triggers’ as abstract I-language elements

and also on Fodor’s 1998 concept of ‘learning by parsing’). Now, as for core parameter

variation of the (iii) sort, Uriagereka (2007: 99-100) discusses Mark Baker’s

Polysynthesis Parameter (see discussion above of Richards’ (2008) two kinds of

variation). Now, I note just in passing that as long as the three grammar types of the

Chomsky hierarchy are realized in NS-internal performance (perhaps, with their

original definitions belonging under the category of NS-internal competence, though),

the three kinds of variation pertaining to the grammar types must reside in the

NS-domain, presumably leading to possible CI-related UG-residues and hence,

constituting possible binary parameters.

5. What to Do with Innately Given Bootstrapping as the Major Ingredient

of Biological Acquisition

The second major problem with the framework suggested by AllPV should be the

presence of a genetically, fairly strong (i.e., in the sense that the relevant gene(s) must

be wholly responsible for the ‘bootstrapping’ business, a bona fide ‘gene-centric’ stance

on acquisition) approach to first language acquisition, with innately given

bootstrapping as the major ingredient of biological acquisition (see specifically section

2.2 above of AllPV and Suzuki 2007a: chapter 5 for the important concepts of ‘biological

acquisition’ and ‘bootstrapping’). The task we are currently faced with for evolutionary

reasons (but, of course, the problem must be an empirical one) is how to move

from “genetics” to “epigenetics” without losing much of the explanatory power we have

gained so far, so as to enable biolinguistics/minimalism to live up to the standard

criteria of empirical sciences. Let us see what we can do for these purposes by taking a

look at what Suzuki (2007a: chapter5) has to say about an example of bootstrapping:

(3) a. “Let us see the case of NPI in (7: ‘A formulation of the putative after-birth

child’s rule for sika: Sika is a negative polarity item (NPI)’ ― NS) and

consider some possible workings of a bootstrapping mechanism.

(8) a. The semantic notion of “narrowness,” “fewness,” etc.

b. The notion of NPI.

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Roughly, (8a) is a (semantic) interface property, whereas (8b) is an FLN

notion. My claim here is that (8a) and (8b) are innately closely connected with

each other, and I call connection of this sort “bootstrapping.” (emphasis ―

NS). Recall that (8a) may be a product of evolution (Chomsky 2002), and I

would presume that FLN, which existed not necessarily for

communication/language purposes at some time of evolution (Hauser,

Chomsky, & Fitch 2002), somehow evolutionarily came to be interconnected

with products of evolution such as (8a), possibly due to the nearness and

neural interconnectivity between the interface components and FLN in the

human system (all of which should be the basis on which to motivate an

evolutionary interpretation of the SMT in the sense that the concept (i.e.,

SMT) should have been instrumental in the formation of FLN properties in

evolutionary terms of mutation, adaptation, or whatever (emphasis ― NS)).

The FLN notion in (8b) should have come to exist as a result of evolutionary

neural interconnectivity of the sort above between an interface and FLN, thus

describing some part of the workings of the SMT. Recall that in Japanese the

semantic notion in (8a) is typically instantiated/realized as part of the

meaning of such lexical items as sika, mo, zenzen, and so forth…” (p.149).

b. “Notice that it is the task of bootstrapping to enable the learner to reach an

FLN notion through an interface property (emphasis ― NS), and no more.

The content of the relevant FLN notion should be innately given. As for the

case of (7: ‘A formulation of the putative after-birth child’s rule for sika:

Sika is a negative polarity item (NPI)’ ― NS) and (8) above, I assume the

innately

given content of the FLN notion of NPI to be like the following, which should

constitute the nature part of our SOLUTION (II) for the acquisition of the

Japanese expression sika-nai (emphasis ― NS):

(10) A formulation of the putative innate NPI principle

An NPI is in a local relation with a negative element.

Note that the content of the relevant notion is given in the form of a licensing

condition, presumably thanks to the deductive nature of FLN notions/UG.

And I here limit the discussion to relations of NPIs with negative elements,

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and largely abstract away from the precise identification of the notion “local,”

apart from sporadic remarks below to that effect. As noted above,

bootstrapping may only function to the extent that the learner has (just)

succeeded in having access to the FLN concept of NPI (in this case; emphasis

― NS). Given the inaccessibility of the content of (10), the whole of which

must largely consist of a variety of arguably inaccessible FLN entities plus

some version of implicational (sentential) structure that may underlie the

proposition in (10) (…), how then can the learner go on to grasp the content of

the NPI principle in (10) and to perform according to its instructions

(“brain-wise,” though, as is usual with this kind of discussion)? Noting that

this should be a quite interesting problem and anticipating that it will be a

long, recalcitrant one, I here simply observe that every FLN entity in (10)

(and, perhaps, even the concept of implication underlying the proposition

there) should need a corresponding bootstrapping mechanism reflecting a

pertinent interface property in order for the leaner to succeed in having access

to it (emphasis ― NS). All in all, the innate NPI principle in (10) should start

to function only when the learner has succeeded in having access to every

FLN entity (and the concept of implication) there (emphasis ― NS). (Note

that functioning of this sort on the part of innate principles should be

implemented as part of the learner’s actual (brain-wise) linguistic behavior, in

something like the fashion of Fodor’s 1998 “learning by parsing” (emphasis ―

NS); that is, the moment of the initial functioning of the innate principle (10)

as part of the learner’s linguistic behavior must be that of the accomplishment

of the learner’s acquisition of (10) (emphasis ― NS)” (pp.150-151).

Note that an instance of biological acquisition in the sense of Suzuki (2007a: chapter 5)

necessarily involves a “bipartite” bootstrapping mechanism consisting of an FLN

entity inaccessible to the child (i.e., target of bootstrapping) and its innately associated

trigger/cue in the form of an interface ingredient that is accessible to her (see section 1

of AllPV above) and that the general formulation of biological acquisition usually

consists of the nurture and nature parts, the former being the after-birth part of

acquisition, which is constrained by the lexical condition on language acquisition to the

effect that the child’s language acquisition after birth is only concerned with the

lexicon/lexical items (Suzuki 2007a: 147), and the latter involving at least some FLN

resource (i.e., target of bootstrapping) (along with a bootstrapping mechanism for the

purpose of enabling the learner to have access to it).

14

And notice that the problem here is that the system does not accommodate any

more an FLN notion appearing in the nature part of biological acquisition as a genetic

resource (e.g., the concept of NPI in (3b10) of Suzuki (2007a: chapter5); also see above).

Then, we would have to obtain this concept in some way or other, specifically in some

epigenetic way for our purposes here.

Partly on the basis of the definition given in note 2 below of “epigenetics” from

Vercelli and Piattelli-Palmarini (2009), I take up two procedures/devices/mechanisms

proposed in the literature thus far as possible resources that could be capitalized on in

an epigenetic fashion.

One such resource is Fodor’s 1998 “learning by parsing,” according to which the

moment of the initial functioning of a linguistic phenomenon as part of the learner ’s

linguistic behavior must be that of the accomplishment of the learner’s acquisition of

that phenomenon. Then, for example, Merge must epigenetically have been acquired

the moment the child utters a two-word sentence (based on a UG resource such as EF).

And I believe the other promising concept for these purposes to be the SMT as it is

interpreted in evolutionary terms (with necessary adjustments with respect to the

contents of UG and elsewhere; see also (3) above, and Suzuki 2007a: 169-172).7 I

would conjecture that given UG-features (i.e., genetic resources) such as EF and uF, the

SMT must evolutionarily have been instrumental in urging the emergence of such

NS-operations as Merge, Agree, etc. (on the basis of EF and uF) so as to meet the

third-factor constraints, such as principles of efficient computation. This must (first)

have been implemented in phylogenetic terms. And, ontogenetically, the learner

epigenetically acquires Merge, Agree, etc. on the basis of her genetic, UG resources,

such as EF and uF, by way of satisfying the third-factor requirements, such as efficient

computation, with, of course, effects of the SMT constantly in place, just in the manner

of the well-known biological observation that “Ontogeny repeats phylogeny.”

Following Balari and Lorenzo (2009), let us try to see some possible epigenetic

workings of UG/FLN (both phylogenetically and ontogenetically, and perhaps,

quantum-theoretically governed by the SMT; see note 7 below for the view that

the SMT may be an instance of the superposition principle in the quantum-theoretic

sense) in providing human grammar with universal operations, such as Merge, Agree,

etc., on the basis of its innate (linguistic) features, EF and uF, with the hope of obtaining

epigenetically FLN notions appearing in the nature parts of instances of biological

acquisition as genetic resources in the sense of Suzuki (2007a: chapter5), and of also

having provided enough causal resources in terms of the SMT reinterpreted as a case of

the quantum-theoretic superposition principle for the purposes of something like

15

bootstrapping for FLN/NS notions inaccessible to the learner as such appearing in the

nature parts of instances of biological acquisition (Suzuki 2007a: chapter 5; note 7

below). Take a look at the following from Balari and Lorenzo (2009):

(4) a. “Evo-Devoists, …, attribute part of this creative capacity (i.e., evolution,

capacity for organizing an otherwise amorphous material ― NS) to

constraints acting upon development and that limit the scope of attainable

designs” (p.3).

b. “The main claim of the present contribution is that the different levels of

computational complexity reflected in the Chomsky Hierarchy (Chomsky

1956a: ‘Three models for the description of language,’ 1959: ‘On certain formal

properties of grammars’ ― NS) are the possible phenotypes of a cognitive

parametric space defined by a restricted set of morphogenetic factors. These

parameters are non-linearly related to the development of the cortical

resources that supply the memory requirements of each computational model.

We argue that the kind of (mildly) context-sensitive grammar which can be

attributed to the computational system of FL is an emergent consequence of a

minor perturbation affecting the development of a cortico-striatal circuit, once

the value of a morphogenetic parameter attains a certain critical value in the

course of human evolution. Thus, the adoption of this computational regime

by FL can be seen as an evolutionary outcome strictly channeled by the

organic conditions settled by the parameters at hand” (pp.3-4).

c. “… the internal organization of the mind is in itself a constraining system that

biases evolution in favor of certain forms of cognition and limits the power of

the environment in the shaping of the organic design of minds” (p.4).

One of the interesting observations in (4b) is that “the different levels of computational

complexity reflected in the Chomsky Hierarchy are the possible phenotypes of a

cognitive parametric space defined by a restricted set of morphogenetic factors.” I

interpret this evolutionary phenomenon as phylogenetically created in the system as a

result of “a minor perturbation affecting the development of a cortico-striatal circuit”

(first) in the individual, and simultaneously as ontogenetically repeated for each

individual. And I conjecture that some interactions of a similar sort created by

relevant morphogenetic factors (i.e., presumably, UG-features such as EF, uF, in this

16

case) in the cognitive domain/parametric space may have led to the

evolutionary/phylogenetic emergence of such universal operations as Merge and Agree

etc. and may ontogenetically be operative for these purposes in the resolution of Plato’s

problem for each learner (see also above). Notice that in both (4b) and the story of the

emergent UG-operations, what is missing is the agent behind all these evolutionary

changes. Of course, the phrasing in (4b) to the effect that “once the value of a

morphogenetic parameter attains a certain critical value in the course of human

evolution” may point to the presence of a possible powerful agent for evolutionary

purposes. But what causes a certain critical value to emerge? Maybe the answer is

chance, accident. But it seems to me that it may be rather difficult to ignore a certain

kind of teleological flavor inherent in the definition and workings of the SMT, and, of

course, the very presence of the quantum-theoretic superposition principle should be

intended to capture the mystery of the universe that could not possibly explained away

in terms of approaches based on the familiar chance-necessity dichotomy. So I

presume that something like Chomsky’s SMT has always been and is operative in all

aspects of the language-business as the powerful, driving agent.

Note also that on the basis of Locke ’s (1997: ‘A theory of neurolinguistic

development’ Brain and Language 56) theory of neurolinguistic development, where

language acquisition goes through a series of four main stages, Lorenzo and Longa

(2009: 1311-1312) observe that “… It is therefore safe to contend that the appearance of

Merge is one of the milestones of the transition from SP-L (the first two stages, which

constitute a phenotypic stage ― NS) to SS (the steady state ― NS).”

6. On a Stronger Position on the Nature of Bootstrapping Triggers

(B-Triggers) that Only SM-Interface Properties Count for B-Triggers

I continue to assume the general validity of what Suzuki (2007a: 42-47) has to say in

terms of what I call the Access Problem or the bootstrapping problem there (see Pinker

1984, 1994; also Dresher and Kaye 1990, Dresher 1999 for the Epistemological Problem)

about the typical L1-acquisition situation where the persistent, recalcitrant problem

has been: “How do children use nonsyntactic information (such as phonology, position,

or meaning) to arrive at syntactic knowledge? (Bloom 1999: 285)” This is because

syntactic knowledge is generally inaccessible to the learner due to its abstractness

arising from the generally deductive organization of the grammar, while I somehow

assume that such interface resources as sounds and meanings are generally accessible

to her. Note further that these preliminary considerations have led to the proposal in

Suzuki (2007a: chapter 5) for the concept of biological acquisition basically consisting of

17

the nurture and nature parts, the latter part necessarily containing an FLN/NS notion

calling for the implementation of bootstrapping (but section 5 above for

rethinking of these strongly gene-centric explanatory resources in a grammatical

system with a minimally specified UG, and also with the SMT reinterpreted as an

instance of the superposition principle in the quantum-theoretic sense).

Given the observation in sections 4 and 4.1 of AllPV above that my basic

assumption concerning the nature of a trigger/cue for a bootstrapping mechanism is

that it is expressed in terms of SM-interface-related properties (i.e., ‘sounds’; or at least

the latter properties are predominant in case a parametric choice has to be made;

limiting the discussion to spoken language; only signs counting in the case of signed

language), let us make an attempt to empirically scrutinize its general plausibility

based on Uriagereka’s (2007) proposal for three progressively deeper forms of variation

and Locke’s (1997: ‘A theory of neurolinguistic development’ Brain and Language 56)

four L1-acquisition main stages, quoted and discussed by Lorenzo and Longa (2009:

1311-1312).

Uriagereka (2007: 106) conjectures that there are variations across grammars

corresponding to levels of the Chomsky Hierarchy of grammars available to

grammatical description: (i) Finite-state structures should be the locus of Peripheral

variation/Micro-variations (perhaps, restricted to the domain of the last CP phase or

even to its edge); (ii) Context-free structures should contain Sub-case parameters (with

a distinction presupposed between a marked and an unmarked value; e.g., the Clitic

Parameter; with the subset principle relevant here); and (iii) Context-sensitive

structures should be involved in Core parametric variation (e.g., Mark Baker ’s

Polysynthesis Parameter). Uriagereka (2007: 108) goes on to observe that the course

of syntactic change may involve a hierarchy: Peripheral change ➔ Sub-case change ➔

Core change. As for (grammatical) resources needed to acquire grammars of the

Chomsky Hierarchy, Uriagereka (2007) notes that you will only require “first-order data

analysis in the left-periphery of parsed sentences” (i.e., dealing with ‘mere word token

combinations,’ ‘adjacency (between grammaticalized forms) ’) for the purpose of

acquiring a finite-state grammar, that the acquisition of a context-free grammar must

involve “data of a second-order sort” (concretely, statements involving category types),

and that for the purposes of a context-sensitive grammar, there usually exists robust

evidence for it and learning is trivial, with no distinction between a marked and an

unmarked option (in connection with core parameters).

On the surface, SM-interface properties/phonological resources/sounds can only

deal with “first-order data” since the other species of data seem to involve “structural

18

information” of some sort (and hence, do not seem to live up to the requirements

imposed on prospective L1-acquisition resources by the Access Problem in the sense of

Suzuki 2007a; see above). But it seems to me that sounds with “prosodic resources” to

them can possibly do more than that (presumably, with the aid of bootstrapping

resources of some sort; see sections 4 and 4.1 of AllPV above for the formulations of the

Head-Complement Parameter and the V-to-T Parameter (Roberts’ and my formulations

for comparison purposes), respectively, in terms of phonological/prosodic bootstrapping),

which I repeat here for expository purposes:

(5) Head-Complement Parameter ( = (7) in section 4 of AllPV)

a. Parameter: v* {has/does not have} an extra EPP-feature which attracts O.

b. Trigger/Cue/Expression for Default/Unmarked Value: weak-strong word

sequence within an intonational phrase → EPP is absent (for VO).

c. Trigger/Cue/Expression for Marked Value: strong-weak word sequences

within an intonational phrase → EPP is present (for OV).

(6) Roberts’ (2007: 271) formulation of the V-to-T Parameter

( = (8) in section 4.1 of AllPV)

a. Parameter: Finite T {has/does not have} an EPP-feature which attracts V.

b. Default: EPP is absent.

c. Trigger/Cue/Expression: (finite) V is marked with person agreement in all

simple tenses.

(7) My formulation of the V-to-T Parameter ( = (9) in section 4.1 of AllPV)

a. Parameter: Finite T {has/does not have} an EPP-feature which attracts V.

b. For Default/Unmarked Value: “[T V] X (V)” (with its associated qualifications

and conditions) is absent.

c. Trigger/Cue for Marked Value: “[T V] X (V)” (or its counterpart; an NS-

and SM-expression, namely, a treelet with sound; ‘X’ = phonologically

non-null; order irrelevant except for the position of ‘X’)

Note that the in Richards’ (2008) minimalist system with a maximally underspecified

UG, the Head-Complement Parameter belongs under the category of macroparametric

variation, along with Mark Baker ’s Polysynthesis Parameter. Recall further that

Wexler, Schütze, and Rice (1998: 321) observe based on Wexler (1994) that “children

know the correct grammatical features of basic clause structure and inflectional

19

morphemes, including properties that dictate whether a particular language shows verb

movement, and so on,” claiming further on the basis of the hypothesis (“Very Early

Parameter Setting”) proposed by Wexler (1996, 1998) that “Children normally set their

basic clause structure/inflectional parameters correctly at least from the time they

begin to produce two-word utterances” and adding that “ … children are outstanding

learners of clausal and inflectional properties: they do it well and they do it before they

have a chance to be corrected for making mistakes (i.e., before they produce the

constructions)” (see also Suzuki 2007a: chapter 6 for the intriguing case of Helen Keller

in the context of Very Early Parameter Setting). Then, specifically based on Wexler’s

(1996, 1998) hypothesis of Very Early Parameter Setting, we could almost conclude that

at least at the earlier stages of development, SM-interface-related properties (namely,

sounds, with ‘prosodic resources’; see above) alone are sufficient for resolution of

parameter choice. But take a closer look at the Trigger/Cue for Marked Value portion

(7c) of my formulation of the V-to-T Parameter (7) above, which contains the conditional

clause: ’[T V] X (V)’ (or its counterpart; an NS- and SM-expression, namely, a treelet

with sound; ‘X’ = phonologically non-null; order irrelevant except for the position of ‘X’).

The phrasing “an NS- and SM-expression, namely, a treelet with sound” as such

appearing in the conditional clause seems to already point to the necessity of “data of a

second-order sort” (i.e., information on category types, etc.) in the sense of Uriagereka

(2007) for the bootstrapping mechanism involved in L1-acquisition. Then, it seems

necessary to loosen the restriction of B-Triggers to SM-interface properties so as to

accommodate such Very Early Parameters (Wexler 1996, 1998) as the V-to-T Parameter,

where the learner may need to have access to such “structural information” as “data of a

second-order sort” in the sense of Uriagereka (2007) above. Still, given the dichotomy

between morphology and syntax as reformulated in terms of the WF-internal vs.

NS-internal domains (see section 2 above), the restriction of acquisitional resources to

SM-interface properties seems to continue to obtain in the former domain, which I

assume is lacking in UG-resources such as EF and uF (see above and also note 4 below).

Let us then look at Locke’s (1997: ‘A theory of neurolinguistic development’ Brain

and Language 56) four L1-acquisition main stages, quoted and discussed by Lorenzo

and Longa (2009: 1311-1312), and continue to assess on the basis of the latter data the

stronger position on the nature of B-Triggers, which restricts B-Triggers to

SM-interface-related properties, namely sounds with ‘prosodic resources’ (see above;

ignoring for the time being qualifications resulting from the treatment of the

V-to-T Parameter (7)). First take a look at the following “four acquisitional stages”

proposed by Locke (1997), as they are quoted and discussed by Lorenzo and Longa

20

(2009: 1311-1312):

(8) a. Phase of vocal learning: “Infants become acquainted with vocal cues that

identify people, regulate social behavior, and superficially characterize the

expression of their native language” (Locke 1997: 271).

b. Phase of utterance acquisition: “It gives infants a set of ‘starter’ utterances

that can be used appropriately in restricted contexts, and provides infants

with the opportunity to participate in adult-like social interactions” (Locke

2007: 273).

c. Phase of structure analysis and computation: “The structure analysis system

locates recurring elements within and across utterances and thereby learns

the rules by which utterances are to be synthesized and parsed. In effect, it

presents the child with the units needed for morphology, phonology, syntax,

and the lexicon ― thereby endowing the propositionally generative child

with the capacity to make infinite sentential use of finite phonemic means”

(Locke 1997: 273-274).

d. Phase of integration and elaboration: “Once analytical and computational

capabilities are integrated with acquisitive systems, it becomes possible to

achieve a far larger lexicon. For when applied to stored forms, structural

analysis produces systemic rules. These rules, in turn, impose organization on

incoming utterances, thus expediting the learning of new words” (Locke 1007:

274).

According to Lorenzo and Longa (2009: 1312), “transitions from one stage to the next

are a function of the maturation of certain neurological mechanisms,” “another

important detail of Locke’s account is that grammatical machinery is completely lacking

until the emergence of the third phase,” and “these two early (pre- and proto-linguistic)

phases establish a phenotypic stage which define a set of limiting conditions acting as a

sine qua non for the emergence of complex mature language (referred to as SP-L; see also

section D1.4 above).” And for the purpose of conceptualizing the transition from SP-L to

SS (the steady state) from a minimalist point of view, Lorenzo and Longa (2009: 1312)

point to the “epigenetic” appearance of Merge (see also section 3 above) being one of

the milestones of the transition from SP-L to SS, the latter universal NS-operation

emerging as a result of “a function of the phenotypic stage attained at a certain point of

the process plus certain stimulation conditions to which the organism has become

sensitive at this point.” I note here that the phrasing “These rules, in turn, impose

21

organization on incoming utterances” in the Phase of integration and elaboration part

(8d) above may be interpreted as an instance of possible implementation of Fodor’s

1998 “learning by parsing.”

Given Locke’s (1997) theory of four acquisitional phases in (8) and Lorenzo and

Longa’s (2009) interpretation of it as presented above, it seems that even the setting of

the prosodically formulated Head-Complement Parameter (5; in terms of ‘weak-strong

word sequences within an intonational phrase’ vs. ‘strong-weak word sequences within

an intonational phrase’) must have access to some “data of a second-order sort” in the

sense of Uriagereka (2007), presumably because in any case you need phonological

structures/prosodic hierarchies of various sorts to arrive at the recognition of the

intricate, phonological/prosodic structures involved in the formulation of the

Head-Complement Parameter (5). Then our problem here may not be any more one of

whether to limit B-Triggers to sound resources (originally intended to be without

structure, but later with structure as an indispensable ingredient) alone or not, with

structure ubiquitous in language (apart for the time being from ‘Peripheral variation’ in

the sense of Uriagereka 2007; also apart from interest of some sort expressed in

specifically pursuing phonologically/prosodically formulated B-Triggers), because

grammatical machinery of any sort can only be available with the emergence of the

third phase (see (8c) above), where the child is endowed with the capacity to make an

infinite number of sentences on the basis of finite phonemic means, with the universal

NS-operation Merge in place, and also because B-Triggers of the kind appearing in

biological acquisition/parameter-setting in the sense of Suzuki (2007a: chapter 5) are

necessarily involved in intricate connection with the targets of bootstrapping, which are

necessarily abstract FLN/NS concepts inaccessible to the learner as such, which

situation of some implicational sort involving the inaccessible target of bootstrapping

and its corresponding B-Trigger usually made from accessible interface resources

should in any case have both parties (i.e., target of bootstrapping and its corresponding

B-Trigger) share structure of some sort which must of necessity emerge from their

status at least belonging under the category of Locke’s (1997) third acquisitional phase

(i.e., Phase of structure analysis and computation (8c)).

7. Core vs. Periphery, the Elsewhere Condition, and Productivity

(Yang 2005, 2011)

Yang (2011) is very explicit in claiming that there must be three kinds of variation each

corresponding to the three factors involved in L1-acquisition: (i) the genetic endowment

(albeit with qualifications resulting from the postulation of a minimally specified UG;

22

also the important distinction between genetics and epigenetics ― NS); (ii) experience,

after-birth stimulus (again with qualifications pertaining to the distinction between

genetics and epigenetics ― NS); and (iii) principles and constraints not specific to FL

(i.e., principles of efficient computation and the interface conditions (Richards 2008) ―

NS). According to Yang (2011: 181), the space of the kind of variation corresponding to

the first factor (i) (i.e., UG) constitutes the initial state of linguistic knowledge, which

traditionally has been considered the “core” linguistic system (Chomsky 1981, with a

rich GB-style UG, though). The child’s task is one of selection from a narrow range of

options (e.g., parameter values; see Richards 2008 for the view that ‘parameters can no

longer be part of UG’; presumably, also relevant to the syntax/NS-internal domain in

the sense of Carstairs-McCarthy 2010 (section 1) and section 4). Quite a different

type of variation consisting of language-specific generalizations derived from the

linguistic environment corresponds to the second factor (ii) (i.e., after-birth experience).

This type of variation can be identified with the periphery of FL, the child’s task being

one of evaluation: decision-making processes that determine the scope of inductive

generalizations based on the input yet still “within a fairly narrow range” (presumably,

relevant to the morphology/WF-internal domain in the sense of Carstairs-McCarthy

2010 (section 1) and section 4). And there is another instantiation of variation

in which the learner follows at least certain principles not specific to FL (iii). For the

purposes of selection amongst alternatives in the core parameter system in (i), the

mechanism of selection is probabilistic in nature, while the acquisition of the periphery

system in (ii) involves general principles of efficient computation so as to optimize the

time course of online processing of linguistic structures, much in the spirit of the

evaluation measure in the sense of Chomsky (1965). According to Yang (2011), the

important point is that “both types of learning mechanism show sensitivity to certain

statistical properties of the linguistic data” (p.181).

As for Selection (i.e., the learner’s task in connection with the core/factor (i); for the

purposes of the syntax/NS-internal domain; see above and sections 1 and 4) and its

corresponding variation, Yang (2011: 181-191) first advocates a UG with a system of

syntactic parameters (presumably, roughly of the GB-type) and then makes a case for

probability-based implementation of parameter-setting, which process of selection

eliminates grammatical hypotheses not attested in the linguistic environment (i.e., the

notion of Penalty Probability). And for the purposes of Evaluation (i.e., the child’s task

with respect to the periphery/factor (ii); in connection with the morphology/WF-internal

domain; see above and sections 1 and 4) and its associated variation, Yang (2011: 191-

202) observes that the logical problem of language acquisition faced by the learner is the

23

same as in the case of the core linguistic system, and that upon seeing ａ sample

that exemplifies a construction or a rule which may contain exceptions (e.g., irregulars),

the learner’s decision-making task involves the recognition of the productivity of the

language-particular processes. On the basis of the notion of an evaluation measure

(Chomsky 1965) of some sort, which may be obtained through workings of Chomsky’s

third-factor principles of efficient computation playing an important role in the

organization of FL, it is conjectured that the mental representation of morphological

knowledge is driven by an evaluation metric of the time complexity of online processing,

productivity emerging as a result of maintaining an optimal balance between lexical

and productive rules (e.g., between irregular and regular verbal past-tense forms,

respectively; Yang 2011: 193).

Now, this is where the linguistic principle of the Elsewhere Condition (Kiparsky

1973: ‘”Elsewhere” in phonology,’ in A Festschrift for Morris Halle) kicks in, regulating

the overall execution of the principle of efficient computation that motivates the

productivity model. Algorithmically, the Elsewhere Condition may be implemented as

a serial search procedure, which treats exceptions as a list of if-then statements that

must be evaluated and rejected before reaching the rule-following words, with the

consequences of a productive rule inducing considerable time complexity in online

processing and hence, of productivity not coming for free. And the formal properties of

the processing model motivated by the Elsewhere Condition may be expressed in terms

of the following mathematical procedure (based on Yang 2005):

(9) R is productive if T(N, M) ≺ T(N, N); otherwise R is unproductive.

As for (9), consider a rule R that can in principle apply to a set of N lexical items, out of

which M items are exceptions that are represented in the form of the Elsewhere

Condition (i.e., as a list of exceptions with if-then statements). Let T(N, M) be the

expected time of processing if R is productive: in other words, (N − M) items will need

to wait until the M exceptions have been searched and rejected. And let T(N, N) be the

expected time of processing if R is not productive and all N items are listed as

exceptions. Further considerations go on to point to the number of exceptions needing

to be fairly small compared to the number of rule-following items so as to warrant

productivity.

It may be interesting to summarize the discussion here by pointing out that the two

domains where Yang (2011) assumes that there exists (parametric) variation across

grammars (i.e., the domain of factor (i)/UG/the core and the domain of factor

24

(ii)/experience/the periphery) roughly correspond to the domains of NS-internal

performance and WF-internal performance, respectively, both of which I take to be

subject to (parametric) variation (see section D1.1 above). As for the third kind of

variation (i.e., another instantiation of variation in which the learner follows at least

certain principles not specific to FL; see above), I defer until future research the

interesting problem of locating its ultimate status in view of Richards’ (2008) remark

that “Note that Factor II cannot be the locus of variation. Rather, Factor II is the trigger

for variation, with different final states being acquired depending on the linguistic

environment to which the child is exposed… since Factor II is language- and

organism-external (E-language, not I-language” (note 1, p.135).

Notes

1 While it should be an empirical, possibly important and recalcitrant issue to tell

possible ‘parametric’ instances of variation across human language grammars from

‘non-parametric’ ones, given much recent ‘rule vs. micro-parameter’ debate and

related discussion in this connection (see Hornstein 2009, Newmeyer 2004, 2005,

among others; and also Suzuki 2010 for some discussion), I tentatively refer the

reader to Smith and Law (2009) for some interesting discussion based on their

‘three-way distinction among Universal Principles, parameters, and Accidents.’

2 We see a rough idea in the following of what ‘epigenetics’ is from Vercelli and

Piattelli-Palmarini (2009):

“Epigenetics is the study of changes in gene expression and function that are

heritable, but occur without altering the sequence of DNA. What changes is the

functional state of the complex aggregate formed by DNA and proteins. These

changes ― extremely dynamic, plastic, potentially reversible ― occur in

response to developmental and/or environmental cues that modify either the

DNA itself (by appending chemical groups to the sequence, which remains

unaltered) or by changing the proteins around which the DNA is wrapped (i.e.,

the histones). By modifying the core proteins around which the DNA is

assembled, or the chemical tags appended to the DNA, the functional state of a

gene is also modified” (p.99).

3 Notice that Boeckx’s (2008c, 2011b) Strong Uniformity Thesis (SUT), where

principles of narrow syntax (with a uniform NS-computational system) are not

25

subject to parametrization, may belong under the category of syntactic frameworks

countenancing a unified/single syntactic computational system across grammars

with the differences expressed (depending on the language in question) with

respect to where a relevant category is pronounced (see Groat and O’Neil 1996 for

some motivational discussion). But given the dichotomy between the competence

and performance in the NS-domain and the plausible restriction of the concept of

uniformity/universality to the domain of NS-internal competence (see section 2

above for some discussion), I would presume that deploying the SUT may bring

about a grammatical framework in violation of an economy principle of some sort.

Take a look at the following paradigm (see Suzuki 2007a: chapter 1 for some

discussion of a similar paradigm in the context of L2 acquisition), which might be

dealt with in a framework with the SUT:

(i) a. Do you like what books? (Japanese)

b. What do you like [twhat books]? (Russian)

c. What books do you like twhat books? (English)

Ignoring the potential importance of language-particular ‘lexical items’ and ‘word

order’ for the purposes of discussion here, note that in (ia-c) above the examples are

all expressed in an English fashion. Note further that the NS-derivations in (ia-c)

are results of NS-internal performance. Recall that what is needed for the

interpretation of what books in (ia-c) should at least be its θ -theoretic

interpretation, which is standardly assumed to be implemented in its in situ

position, and the interpretation of the wh-elements, what and what books, which is

presumably implemented in some C-peripheral position(s). According to Chomsky

(1995: 202-204), sentences corresponding to (ib-c) may have different

interpretations: “Along the same lines, we will interpret which book did John read

either as ‘[which x, x a book] [John read x ]’ (answer: War and Peace) or as ‘[which

x ] [John read [x book]’ (answer: that (book))” (p.204). So assuming that all the

structures in (ia-c) are necessary for some interpretation, we could assume that

these NS-structures may well be shared by all grammars.

But what about the following German paradigm from Felser (2004), discussed in

some detail by Suzuki (2007a: chapter 4)?:

(ii) a. Wovon glaubst du, wovon sie träumt? (wh-copying)

of.what believe you, of.what she dreams

26

(What do you believe that she dreams of?)

b. Wovon glaubst du, dass sie träumt? (long-distance extraction)

of.what believe you that she dreams

(What do you believe that she dreams of?)

c. Was glaubst du, wovon sie träumt? (partial movement)

what believe you of.what she dreams

(What do you believe that she dreams of?/

What do you believe as to what she dreams of?)

I refer the reader to Suzuki (2007a: chapter 4) for further analytical details. What

the SUT apparently requires should be that such intricate NS-structures with

messy, language-particular properties as those in (iia-c) above be shared by all

human grammars, which might not be a logical impossibility, but should definitely

be a grossly anti-economical consequence.

4 I presume that Chomsky’s (2000) operational ingredients in (2bi-iv) of section 2

above (and my dichotomy based on them between competence and performance in

the two domains of morphology and (narrow-)syntax) may offer a possible answer

to Carstairs-McCarthy’s (2010) question of why human language has two

grammatical systems for encoding semantic relationships, syntax and

morphology, but not one. And I would conjecture that we can see here a clear

difference between human and animal language: roughly, morphology may be the

possession of both, while syntax is the possession of human beings alone.

5 According to Richards (2008), “Uninterpretable features yield Agree insofar as they

lack values and must seek these in order to be deleted for Full Interpretation (FI

― NS); for the same reason, they also trigger Transfer upon valuation (emphasis

― NS; …), thus yielding a point of Transfer every time a uF is valued ― that is,

they yield phases. Thus from EF and uF, the minimal components of UG, we

obtain Merge, Move, Agree and Transfer (spell-out), the principal mechanisms of

FL” (p.139).

Partly on the basis of Epstein and Seely’s (2002) observation that “To satisfy

FI efficiently, uFs must be deleted as soon as they are valued,” Richards (2008:

142-143) somehow reaches the conclusion that “uF must descend from edge to

nonedge (i.e. from C to T, v* to V, etc.)” (his (7); which somehow derives

Chomsky’s 2005b mechanism of ‘feature inheritance’), under the assumption that

both VTS (Value-Transfer Simultaneity) and PIC (Phase Impenetrability

Condition) are required to ensure efficient satisfaction of FI.

27

6 Notice also that perhaps in an extremely rare case where an adult second language

learner should encounter a target second language with one or another of the

epigenetically obtained phenotypical ingredients that her first language happened

to lack, she would have a hard time acquiring it precisely because epigenetic

properties (for the purposes of first language acquisition) are safely assumed to

arise on exposure to after-birth stimulus during the critical period/the sensitive

period. That is, neurological and physiological factors of some sort for the purposes

of biological development of language which seem to greatly contribute to the ‘rapid’

learning of words in L1 acquisition, for example, may be missing from this L2

learner (see Suzuki 2007a: chapter 4). Then, how does the L2 learner acquire this

phenotypical ingredient, which she could have acquired quite naturally (i.e.,

epigenetically) during the critical period had her mother tongue possessed it as part

of its grammatical system? Assuming the validity of a full access approach to L2

acquisition (see Suzuki 2007a: chapter 1 for some argument for the claim that an

L2 learner should have ‘full access to UG’ in the task of her L2 acquisition and also

Suzuki 2007a: chapter 5 for Fodor’s 1998 notion of a supergrammar) and hence,

taking the (major) difference between L1 and L2 acquisition to be that of the

acquisition timing, which may be most clearly seen in the presence vs. absence of

biological factors of physiology and neurology, I tentatively assume that the L2

learner here faced with the problem of acquiring an epigenetic, phenotypical device

may have roughly much the same kind of difficulty that she would have in

acquiring words as an L2 learner.

7 Something like Chomsky’s (2000, 2001, 2004, 2005a,b, 2007) intriguing concept of

the SMT, which requires (among others) FLN/NS to serve for interface purposes,

including sound, meaning, and discourse resources, and efficient computation

purposes (see Richards 2008), has either implicitly or explicitly been at the heart of

minimalist/biolinguistic theorizing for more than two decades, at least since

Chomsky’s (1995: 162) observation that “There are ‘computational tricks’ that

permit easy determination of the grammatical properties of an S-Structure

representation in a large class of cases, broad enough to allow for language to be

usable in practice (emphasis ― NS)….” While there have been a number of

approaches to and interpretations of the earlier recognition of “language design as

dysfunctional” (Chomsky 1995: 162), the most impressive event in minimalist

theorizing during the last two decades has been the introduction of the concept of

the SMT by Chomsky (2000).

Then, my question here is: What is the (theoretical) status of the SMT? The

28

SMT might be a meta-theory, but what is, then, the theoretical status of a

meta-theory in minimalism? It might be a species of guiding principle, but what is

this guiding principle with such power as it actually has?

I here try to motivate the presence of something like the SMT in minimalist

theorizing, and ultimately in language (design), on the basis of the notion of the

superposition principle from modern quantum theory (see Polkinghorne 2002,

Osawa 2010). First, the following paragraph is devoted to a basic understanding of

the ideas involved in the quantum-theoretic superposition principle on the part of

the reader.

Taking a piece of chalk and breaking it into two, Paul Dirac said in his

Cambridge lectures that classically there is only one situation where one piece of

chalk is ‘here’ and the other is ‘there,’ but that replacing the chalk by an electron

in the quantum world, “there are not only states of ‘here’ and ‘there’ but also a

whole host of other states that are mixtures of these possibilities (emphasis ― NS)

― a bit of ‘here’ and a bit of ‘there’ added together” (from the section on Quantum

mechanics; Polkinghorne 2002: 21). The famous “double slits experiment” by

Richard Feynman goes as follows: Given a screen with two slits, A and B, in it, a

detector screen (which electrons arrive at through the screen with the slits), and an

electron gun that fires a steady stream of particles, the intriguing conclusion is that

“the indivisible electron went through both slits… The state of motion of the

electron was the addition of the states (going through A) and (going through B)”

(from the section on Double slits and superposition; Polkinghorne 2002: 22-24). In

the section on Probabilities, Polkinghorne (2002) notes that “In the quantum case,

things are different because of the superposition principle permitting the electron

to go through both slits. What classically were mutually distinct possibilities are

entangled with each other quantum mechanically” (p.41). And Polkinghorne (2002)

goes on to observe in connection with Quantum computing that “In the quantum

world, …, the switch could be in a state that is a superposition of these two classical

possibilities (i.e., the switch being either definitely on or definitely off ― NS). A

sequence of such superpositions would correspond to a wholly novel kind of parallel

processing. The ability to keep so many computational balls in the air

simultaneously could, in principle, represent an increase in computing power which

the addition of extra elements would multiply up exponentially, compared with the

linear increase in conventional circumstances” (emphasis ― NS; pp.75-76).

I conjecture based on the discussion above on the superposition principle from

quantum theory that Chomsky’s concept of the SMT (both phylogenetically and

29

ontogenetically) may be a bona fide instance/application of the superposition

principle in the quantum-theoretic sense, making it possible for language to at the

same time have a number of aspects to it operative (i.e., syntax, semantics,

pragmatics, phonology, morphology, etc.; see above for the section on Quantum

computing from Polkinghorne 2002: 75-76), and to also have possibilities of

obtaining the Chomsky Hierarchy of progressively more complex grammars (see

Uriagereka 2007, Balari and Lorenzo 2009).

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