What is the purpose of Marx’s critique of political economy?Word Count: 2998

Abstract

This paper positions itself on the academic dispute between

traditional interpretations of and negative-dialectical

approaches to Marx’s critique of political economy as outlined in

Capital. At its outset, this paper defines core premises of the

traditional interpretation which holds that Marx’s critique

reveals inherent contradictions in classical political economy’s

labour theory of value and thus, amounts to an alternative

economic meta-theory. However, part II of this paper exhibits

that a scientific Marxist economics is fundamentally incompatible

with Marx’s understanding of conceptual imminence, individual

agency and the ‘objective illusion’ of capital relations. In

fact, part III will demonstrate that the purpose of critique lies

in revealing the human social relations hidden in universal,

scientific ‘objectivism’ and moreover, the negation of everything

that appears established. Finally, this paper concludes that

while Marx’s critique cannot be ‘realised’ within the existing

structures of social life, it nonetheless possesses momentous

radical practicality. Critique enlightens, transcends and thus,

may free society from the indignity of capital’s ‘spiritualised

coercion’.

1

Introduction

In the light of poverty, unfreedom and degradation, political

urgency has often marginalised conceptual questions and critical

methodologies (Gunn,1991:193-6; Psychopedis,1992:1-2) Instead, it

favoured a practical literature which interprets Marx’s critique

of political economy as inherently constructive and potentially

problem-solving (Mohun,1979; Agnoli,2003:31). Marxist economics

holds that if unpaid human labour is revealed as the true basis

of capitalist reproduction, it becomes possible to form a post-

capitalist society on the basis of an alternative economic,

Marxist meta-theory. However, such an interpretation of the

purpose of critique is contradictory. Indeed, Marx’s critique of

political economy, as presented in Capital, does not and cannot

offer concrete ‘solutions’ to the intrinsic inconsistencies of

capitalism (Postone,1993:14). On the one hand, Marx perceives

critique as immanent and thus, not superior to but a moment within

the social practice whose ‘objective’ form it challenges

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(Gunn,1991:200). On the other hand, Marx’s critique is ad hominem

(Adorno,1966; ) because reveals that Man and social relations

constitute all things and vice versa. Indeed, Marx’s critique of

political economy translates into the radical and outright

realisation that in the light of all misery, man may find utopia

only in the negation of the state of fetishized things, and thus,

in the enlightenment that “things are not so” (Agnoli,2003:33;

Adorno,1973:10-12; Holloway,2003:21).

Part I: Marx’s critique as an economic Meta-theory

In the view of traditional Marxist economics, Marx’s Capital should

be acknowledged first and foremost for introducing a critical

approach to classical political economy and its labour theory of

value (Heinrich,2004:33). Indeed, in Capital, Marx fundamentally

challenges the Smithian theorem which holds that necessary labor-

time translates ‘naturally’ into the value of a commodity. In

line, premises such as that “labour is the real measure of the

exchangeable value of all commodities” (Smith,1996) are rejected

on the basis that they provide an incoherent explanation of the

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real relationship between economic categories (Bonefeld,2001:54).

Instead, Marx puts forward a novel economico-theoretical

framework in which surplus value is identified as an expression

of the exploitative use of labour-power by the capital-holding

class. Thus, in Marx, the Present Crisis and the Future of Labour, Mandel

(1985) argues that if the working class was able to collectively

abolish traditional economic categories such as private property

(1992), it had a chance at becoming the master its own social

organisation of labour. In a successive form of labour

organisation, based on cooperation and solidarity, economic

categories could then be reinterpreted and transformed into a

“self-managing socialism” (Mandel,1985:451). Arguably, this

belief in a potential reconstruction of orthodox economic

categories springs from a ‘productive’ understanding of the

purpose of Marx’s critique of political economy as offering a

morally more coherent economic meta-theory (Heinrich,2004: 34;

Postone,1993: 7).

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On this account, the ultimate purpose of Marx’s critique of

political economy is first, to reveal labour as the fundamental

source of all social wealth and then, to illustrate that all

surplus-value is ultimately “created” by equalised labour

(Arthur,2001; Postone,1993:6-9). Consequently, the existence of

‘surplus’ and profit-making in the capitalist mode of production

may be attributed solely to the exploitation of labour power by

the capital holding class of society. This suggests that

relations of domination are primarily understood in terms of

structural divisions between the social relations that exemplify

capitalism and its forces of production. Marxist economics

therefore constructs a logic of a universal, binary social

opposition (Mohun,1979: 238) in which one class actively exploits

while the other is passively being exploited (Postone,1993:10),

and in which the benefits of economic production are not

distributed fairly to all its members. Consequently, a

differentiation is drawn between on the one hand, the market and

capitalist private property, and industrial production on the

other hand. The traditional interpretation of Marx’s critique of

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political economy amounts then to the social criticism of

capitalist exploitation from the “standpoint of labour”

(Postone,1993: 65).

Since this traditional understanding of Marx’s critique

constructs a novel labour value theory based on developing a

conscious understanding of class domination and exploitation

(Mohun,1979: 257), it often also attributes an active role to the

working class. The working class is considered the “true subject

of history” for it will, after having appropriated the means of

production, construct a universal class in post-capitalist

society. Post-capitalism, in the form of applied socialism, may

then be defined by a superior economic distribution and the end-

point of capitalist exploitation (Mandel,1985; 1992). Within a

socialist economic distribution, industrial production is not

replaced by other forms of labouring but instead, the means of

production are now owned collectively so that economic planning

becomes a shared social activity. Moreover, social relations, in

this form of societal organisation, will be transparent in labour

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in productive activities (Mohun, 1979:235-6). In the view of

Marxist economics, socialism thus transforms into the “historical

negation of capitalism” (Postone,1993:7-8).

Most relevant though to the dispute on the purpose of Marx’s

critique of political economy and moreover, to understanding the

shortcomings of traditional Marxist economics as an

interpretative framework for the latter, is its claim that

critique generates an alternative meta-theory through which it

becomes possible to accurately comprehend capitalist economic

relations. From the standpoint of Marxist economics, Marx’s

critique of political economy provides a more successful

scientific integration of economic form and content which

transcends the analytical shortcomings of Smithian classical

political economy (Bonefeld,2001:55). In other words, traditional

Marxist economics maintains that in contrast to subjective,

speculative philosophy, it may generate universally applicable,

strict concepts of “objective scientific validity” which are

relevant to practical reality (Adorno,1976). Like the meta-

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theoretical classical political economy, traditional Marxist

economics therefore insists on the “cognitive and normative-

political role of [its own] universals” (Gunn,1991:202).

Part II: Misconceptions of Marxist economics

It has frequently been argued that Marxist economics and

traditional scientific interpretations are, however, defined by

inherent contradictions (Bonefeld,2001:53) which challenge their

interpretation of Marx’s critique of political economy

(Postone,1993). First, Marxist economics attributes a degree of

agency and ‘moral superiority’ to the working class which it does

not possess. In the Preface to A Critique of Political Economy, Marx

maintains that men can neither consciously determine their social

relations nor mode of existence, because their social being

“determines their consciousness” in the first place

(Marx,2000a:425). This is to say that the social practice an

individual pursues becomes ‘quasi-independent’ from her once she

engages in social interaction with other individuals

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(Postone,1993:3-4). Such interactions are indispensable and yet,

independent of her own will (Marx,2000a:424). Working class

individuals cannot possess a privileged perceptive position in

capitalist relations (Heinrich,2004:78-9) because its

consciousness itself is integral to the formation of capitalism

and its domination over productive relations (Postone,1993:17).

Consequently, Postone illustrates that working class action, no

matter how radical, always remains “represents capital-

constituting, rather than capital-transcending” (1993:371). It

follows that Marx’s critique by being immanent that means, but a

moment within social interactions, cannot take the standpoint of

labour.

Marx’s critique of political economy is not only incompatible

with the idea of individual human agency and morally superior

perceptions of capitalist relations. Moreover, Postone maintains

that the prospect of post-capitalist, socialist relations as an

outcome of a working class-led appropriation of the means of

production is fundamentally misleading (1993:9-18). In order to

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illustrate this point, imagine a highly interventionist society

in which free exchange of commodities is nonetheless practiced.

In this society, industrial labour unions are strong, minimum

wage and welfare benefits are high and the accumulation of

private property is restricted. Moreover, questions of justice

are addressed by the formal equality of all citizens before the

law. In short, material inequality and relations of domination

between the capital holding and working class are largely

restricted by the forces of the state. However, Marx would argue

that in this imagined society, a fairly-paid worker remains an

exploited worker because he is still part of capital relations

and traditional industrial production chains. In analogy, an

improved wage relationship is still a perverted relationship of

exploitation taking the form of wages (Bonefeld,2001:204).

Indeed, in A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx (1859)

argues that the “form of production determines […] the social

consciousness”. Since the mode of producing is “intrinsically

related to capitalism” itself, it has to be deconstructed not

only materially but also as a form of consciousness (Marx,1895).

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It becomes clear that while traditional Marxist economics may

overcome bourgeois capital class, it cannot transcend capital

itself (Postone,1993:372). Instead, Marxist economics exhibits an

“affirmative attitude” towards capitalist universals and

industrial forms of production because it transforms the latter

into the foundation of post-capitalist socialism

(Postone,1993:9).

It follows that understanding Marx’s critique as economic meta-

theory does not provide a way to transcends the ‘objective’ and

seemingly “trivial” forms of capitalist society (Marx,2013:46).

Indeed, it leaves largely unchallenged the classical assumption

that economic categories exist which are not rationally

analysable because they possess an “a priori character”

(Backhaus,1992:60). The subsequent analysis will illustrate that

these short-comings of Marxist economics rest in a fundamental

misconception of the purpose of Marx’s critique of political

economy. In fact, Marx argues in Capital that the objectivity of

economic forms rests on an ‘objective’ illusion. He shows that

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commodities possess a “mystical character” and are but ‘deranged’

or ‘alienated’ forms (Marx,2013:48-9; Backhaus,1992:62). While

Marxist economics may identify the outcomes of such displacement

like, for instance, the inhumanness of capitalist production, it

cannot abolish ‘deranged’ forms themselves. This is because it

does not seek to exhibit their “genesis” and engage in revealing

the genuine origins of things (Backhaus,1992:62-3). According to

Backhaus, Marxist economics “presuppose[s] what needs to be

explained” (1986) and thus, is unable to provide a “satisfactory

conception of the nature of capitalism itself” (Postone,1993:14).

In fact, reducing Marx’s critique exclusively to a meta-

theoretical critique of capitalist economic categories fails to

acknowledge its quasi-universalistic purpose. Instead of merely

challenging the paradigms of capitalist economics, Marx’s

critique deciphers those relations which are constitutive of

‘real’ modes of existence.

Part III: Critique as Negation of ‘Objective Illusions’

In order to illustrate that the purpose of Marx’s critique of

political economy lies in deciphering hegemonic, ‘objective’

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forms and conceptions about social untruths, it will prove

fruitful to draw a brief analogy with Marx’s earlier analyses of

the concepts of God and religion. In his Preface to The German

Ideology (1845), Marx argues that men “have arranged their

[social] relationships according to their ideas of God”. Thus, he

implies that religion is but a disguised, ‘masked’ expression of

definite human social relations which transform into ‘real’ forms

of truth and thought by being perceived as such (Wolff,2011).

According to Marx (1845), this forces men to “[bow] down before

their creations” which appear as “independent beings endowed with

life” (Marx,2013:47). However, to reveal that “man makes

religion, religion does not make man” (Marx,1970:1) does not

suffice to free man from the constraints which the illusion of

religion puts on her. This is because man herself is not an

unambiguous abstract but conceptual insofar as her thoughts are

founded on and shaped by human interaction. The human essence,

too, “is the ensemble of the social relations” (Marx,2000b:171).

To speak then of the potential establishment of a secular world

independent of the religious one, as suggested for instance by

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Feuerbach, is self-contradictory (Marx,2000b:172). For Marx,

there exists only one world, the one in which human social

relations appear in the form of God. Thus, if social relations

are revealed as the basis of religion, the former have to be

destroyed or “demystified” (Marx,2000b:173). It follows that for

Marx the immediate task of critical philosophy is to “unmask

self-estrangement in its unholy forms, once the holy form of

human-self-estrangement has been unmasked (Marx,1970:1)

In analogy, the purpose of Marx’s critique of political economy

becomes evident in Section VI of Volume I, Chapter I of Capital

(2013) in which he describes the ‘secret’ of fetishized

commodities. In this section, Marx does not ask why human

relations are expressed in the form of God and religion, but

instead why they take the quasi-objective form of capital and

value-producing labour. Marx criticises that in capitalist

society, the grand variety of private human labour is reduced to

one unified, abstract value-producing type. In exchange, “the

social character of labour appears to us to be an objective

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character of the products themselves” (Marx,2013:49). It follows

that the relation between one labourer and the other do not

appear “as direct social relations” between individuals, but

instead are abstracted as “material relations between persons and

social relations between things” (Marx,2013:48). The primary

example of such an objective abstraction identified in Capital is

capital itself. Holloway, Matamoros and Tischler maintain that

capital should not be understood as a thing but “a social

relation, a forced transformation of people’s activity into

labour” (2009:6) in order to produce profit. As a universal form,

capital thus requires the reduction of all difference to the

same, exchangeable abstraction. Abstracted in relations of

production and exchange, the human being which constitutes the

substance of capital, is rendered invisible (Bonefeld,2009:135).

In his Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Marx moreover refers to the

universal category of private property as an illusionary

“abstraction of an abstract nature” (1970:70). Thus, it appears

as though for Marx, every ‘objectivised’ definite form, whether

economical or religious, is inherently perverted

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(Bonefeld,2001:56) because it is always an expression of denied

constitutive social practice. In capitalist society, people are

again ruled by ‘real’ things which they created themselves

(Marx,2013:50).

The actual purpose of Marx’s critique of political economy

reveals itself precisely in this critical methodology, the reductio

ad hominem, of “everything that appears established” to a human

essence (Adorno,1966:379). Marx’s critique deciphers their human

basis, enlightening their social origins, and therefore

challenges conceptions which constitute fetishized, universal

dogmatisms (Bonefeld,2009:125). Therefore, Marx’s critique

fundamentally challenges the presupposition that classical

political economy builds on “a priori” elements which constitute

a “self-evident necessity imposed by Nature” (Marx,2013:54) and

cannot be rationally analysed (Backhaus,2005). In Capital Marx

questions, for instance, the law-like relationship between the

social classes or what Smith describes as men’s natural

propensity to truck, barter and exchange (Clarke,1991:18). While

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economic conceptions and their scientific presupposition,

according to Marx, are ‘real’ insofar as they constitute real

phenomena shaping peoples’ actions, they are nonetheless but

“objective illusions” (Backhaus,2005). Economic conceptions are,

after all, mediations of thought, and thus, they are penetrable

to thought, too.

According to Holloway, critique therefore deciphers that what we

were once sure of was as a given or constituted the truth, is “in

fact not so” (2003:21-22). If, however, everything we thought was

real is identified as false or simply “not so” and we ourselves

are constructed by those untrue forms, there can be no other

purpose in critique than to first, reveal the human essence and

then, to negate it. Indeed, Marx’s critique of political economy

translates into the realisation that in a “world of untruth, the

only concept of truth that we can have is negative”

(Holloway,2003:17). It would therefore be inconsistent to argue

that Marx sought to establish an alternative economic meta-

theory. Unlike traditional Marxist economics, the critical,

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negative-dialectical interpretation of Marx’s critique of

political economy cannot claim to possess an “infinite object”

(Adorno,1973:13). Agnoli argues that in Capital, Marx’s “wanted

neither to construct nor to affirm. He wanted primarily to

negate” (2003:28). The purpose of Marx’s critique therefore lies

not in a problem-solving critique of economic categories and

their inhumane, distributive consequences, but more importantly,

in revealing and rejecting the contradictions of the apparent

objectivism of the value form of capital (Bonefeld,2005).

Thus, it has then been illustrated that Marx’s critique of

political economy cannot be “realised within the existing

structures of social life” (Postone,1993:361). If the whole is an

illusion (Adorno,1973), all conceptions which emerge from this

whole have to be affected by its falseness, too. More

specifically, since Marx’s critique shows that the way we

conceive the world is “bound up intrinsically with what we do”

(Gunn,1991:193), it appears impossible for critique to ever grasp

the circumstance that human social practise is constitutive of.

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While this strengthens the understanding that the purpose of

Marx’s critique of political economy lies in its negation, it

still raises the question whether this conceptual negation may

entail any revolutionary practicality. Is the purpose of Marx’s

critique, in fact, purposeless?

However, only if understood as negative-dialectics-centric and

demonstrating the reduction ad hominem, that is showing that Man

constitutes all things and vice versa, Marx’s critique of

political economy grasps the root of the matter. Only in this

form can it be truly radical. This is because to reveal the

illusion of independence and objectivity that economic categories

possess and capital relations are built on, opens up the

possibility to transcend those deranged, abstracted forms. By

enlightening the human constitution of the capitalist world and

the constructed nature of capital relations, Marx’s critique of

political economy frees humanity from the chains of capitalist

domination (Bonefeld,2001:58-9). Or else, only if society

understands the non-identical, the subjective, the untrue, it may

develop the potentiality of liberating itself from the

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“spiritualised coercion” of capital (Adorno,1973:6). Thus, only

when the ‘real’ dissolves its form as an appearance

(Marx,1943:64), it becomes possible to imagine individuals who

interact with each other not as abstractions and character masks,

but genuine social beings and that is, most importantly, with

dignity.

Conclusion

This paper demonstrated that the purpose of Marx’s critique of

political economy lies in revealing the human social relations

which are hidden in, but constitutive of the economic categories

of capitalism and its entire mode of existence. Thus, critique

radically positions itself against scientific objectivism,

universalistic forms and everything that appears established. The

central argument of this paper was developed through a technique

of negation of the central assumptions of Marxist economics.

Thus, Part II of this paper illustrated that traditional

interpretations of critique as economic meta-theory are

incompatible with Marx’s understanding of conceptual imminence,

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working class agency and ‘objective illusions’ of capital

relations. In fact, this paper concluded that critique cannot be

constructive. Instead, Marx’s critique of political economy

derives its practical radicalism from the negation of fetishized

domination, and thus, the enlightenment of genuine, dignified

relations between individuals.

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