utah's war on poverty: local programs of and

UTAH’S WAR ON POVERTY: LOCAL PROGRAMS OF AND

REACTIONS TO THE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY ACT

by

Jennifer Sue Harward

A dissertation submitted to the faculty of The University of Utah

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of History

The University of Utah

May 2016

T h e U n i v e r s i t y o f U t a h G r a d u a t e S c h o o l

STATEMENT OF DISSERTATION APPROVAL

The dissertation of Jennifer Sue Harward

has been approved by the following supervisory committee members:

L. Ray Gunn , Chair 12-22-2015

Date Approved

Susie S. Porter , Member 01-06-2016

Date Approved

Elizabeth Clement , Member 12-22-2015

Date Approved

Matthew Basso , Member 12-22-2015

Date Approved

Ronald J. Hrebenar , Member

Date Approved

and by Isabel Moreira , Chair/Dean of

the Department/College/School of History

and by David B. Kieda, Dean of The Graduate School.

ABSTRACT

In August of 1964, Congress responded to President Lyndon B. Johnson’s

declaration of War on Poverty, passing the Economic Opportunity Act (EOA). Three

months later, Johnson secured a landslide victory for a second term, and for the last time

in the twentieth century, the Utahns gave their electoral votes to a Democratic

presidential candidate. From the very beginning, Utahns have had a complicated

relationship with the federal government, insisting that federal officials leave them alone,

while at the same time, benefitting greatly from many federal programs.

Within the context of this complex history, this dissertation examines the

implementation of the EOA antipoverty programs in Utah and analyzes how Utahns

responded to them. Using Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) records, the public

papers of elected officials, and newspaper coverage—both statewide and local—this

study outlines how political and religious leaders and the general public responded to the

EOA. The architects of the EOA established a number of programs to target the causes

of poverty, and this dissertation describes the establishment of those programs in Utah

and the local response to each. Individual chapters focus on the extent and nature of

poverty in the state prior to the passage of the law and specific EOA programs designed

to improve the lives of the state’s rural poor, including Native Americans and migrant

workers, and the poor living in urban areas. Programs spotlighted include the

Neighborhood Youth Corps, Volunteers in Service to America, Community Action

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Programs, Head Start, Upward Bound, Legal Services, and Job Corps, the largest and

most economically significant EOA program in Utah.

Though many expressed their dislike of federal involvement in social matters and

of individual EOA programs, groups in the state applied for OEO aid and gradually

established the full complement of programs to assist the poor. Whether they liked or

disliked them, Utahns employed similar arguments as people across the nation to justify

their feelings about each program. While the EOA did not end poverty in Utah, it

succeeded in creating programs that improved the lives of many residents, and they

continue to positively impact many people, more than fifty years later.

In the immortal words of Paul McCartney:

When I find myself in times of trouble, Mother Mary comes to me

Speaking words of wisdom, let it be…

Thanks, Mom!

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………...………... iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS……………………………………………………………… vii Chapters 1 INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………...…... 1 2 THE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY ACT AND THE “WAR ON

POVERTY”: HISTORICAL ROOTS, DEBATES, AND CONTROVERSIES. 13 3 UTAH’S HISTORY: FEDERALISM, PUBLIC WELFARE, AND

POLITICS—FROM THE TERRITORIAL PERIOD TO THE PASSAGE OF THE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY ACT.………………………………... 76

4 THE NEED FOR THE EOA IN UTAH: POVERTY AND RACE…..……… 137 5 ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY ACT IN RURAL UTAH: PROGRAMS

AND REACTIONS………………..……………………………………..…… 172 6 ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY ACT IN URBAN UTAH: PROGRAMS

AND REACTIONS………………..………………………………….………. 227 7 JOB CORPS IN UTAH: LOCAL CENTERS AND PUBLIC REACTION…. 285 8 CONCLUSION…………..……………………………………………….…… 338 BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………...……………… 373

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My quest for a PhD in history officially began in the fall of 2008, but my

academic journey began long before that, and I have incurred many debts along the way.

Therefore, I am taking this opportunity to thank some of the most important people who

helped me along the way.

At the University of Utah, I wish to thank many individuals who made this

process possible. As a history undergraduate, I had the privilege of taking Ron

Coleman’s African American history course. It was a profound experience for me, and

he is an exceptional teacher. I believe that he is a big part of why I came back to earn my

master’s degree, and he also served on my master’s committee. Bob Goldberg is

responsible for my continuation into the PhD program. When I asked him to serve as the

chairman of my M.S. committee, he told me that he did not want to work with students

seeking an M.S. degree, so I changed my degree. Without that change, I would not have

been eligible for the PhD program. He fostered a sense of community among his

graduate students, and it was during a presentation at his home that I became interested in

the subject of this dissertation. Rebecca Horn was a fantastic professor who originally

agreed to serve on my PhD committee. Although we decided that someone with a

modern area of expertise might be more useful, given my research topic, she graciously

introduced me to several VISTA volunteers, and so began my dissertation. I would like

to thank my PhD committee—chair Ray Gunn, Ron Hrebenar, Susie Porter, Matt Basso,

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and especially Beth Clement, who often went above the call of duty for me. I appreciate

your time and effort and all that you have done to make my dissertation better. I realize

that I am definitely a nontraditional graduate student, and I appreciate their willingness to

accept me into the program and work with me. Before I leave the history department, I

would like to thank Karlton Munn and Amarilys Scott. Without their assistance,

graduation would have been an impossibility. They had all the answers or knew where to

find them.

During my time working on this dissertation, I had the privilege of using the

resources of many libraries and other repositories, and I benefitted from the knowledge of

the people who worked in each. Thanks to the staffs of the National Archives in Denver,

Kansas City, and College Park, the Utah Historical Society in Salt Lake City, the L. Tom

Perry Special Collections at the Harold B. Lee Library at Brigham Young University, and

the Special Collections at the Stewart Library at Weber State University. For many

years, the Marriott Library at the University of Utah became a home away from home for

me. I would like to thank Walter Jones and Paul Mogren and their staff in the library’s

Special Collections and Robert Behra and the ARC and Course Reserves staff for all of

their help with the state’s newspapers. I never thought that I would say it, but I will

actually miss spending time at the Marriott Library.

I would also like to express my gratitude to the many individuals who shared their

personal stories about the time that they were affiliated with EOA programs. My

dissertation began as a study of the VISTA program in Utah, and my earliest research

involved interviews with volunteers who served in Utah, many of whom chose to stay in

the state. I appreciate Dan Johnson, Brian Watanabe, Al Church, Anne McGugin, Gregg

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Schiller, and David Nimkin for their time and their insight about VISTA. Those

interviews were a highlight of this project. I wish to thank Cathy Hoskins who was the

head of the SLCAP when I began collecting information about that organization. She not

only provided a digital copy of the minutes of SLCAP meetings held during the time of

this study but also suggested that I interview John Florez, one of the earliest and most

influential CAP organizers in Utah. It was a privilege to meet Florez and hear his first-

hand accounts of community organizing in Salt Lake City.

I would not have completed this journey without the help and support of many

friends and coworkers. Amy Ehresman has been my technology guru, providing

invaluable assistance with Photoshop and Microsoft Word and assuring me that she

would help me to take care of all formatting questions. Carla Money served as my

“surrogate mother,” providing care, food, and even a blanket to keep her “purple friend”

warm. Brad Dobson and Mylei Zachman frequently asked how things were going and

commiserated or celebrated with me, whatever the situation called for. Since my junior

year in high school, Kelly Oram has been a mentor and dear friend, and he showed his

support of this project by giving me a Dr. J bobblehead doll to remind me of my end goal.

Corine Barney shared her son’s struggles in his PhD program to remind me that I am not

alone, and she gave me the Mickey Mouse flash drive that has housed my dissertation

chapters once I got close to completion. Mickey and I have been inseparable for quite a

while now. LeeAnn Hyer has always been supportive, listened as I complained, and

loaned me the laptop that I have used during the last year of this project. Tracey Meade

and Carrie Follett have often been on the “front lines” with me in this process. They

seem to know when to ask me about my progress and when to avoid the subject. They

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understood that there were things that I could not do because of my commitment to this

project and even accepted it when I stayed in the condo in Kona researching and writing

about Mormon welfare policies while they went on an ocean cruise without me. I would

also like to thank Mark Zaremba. Although I do not see him often, he never fails to ask

how things are going, he thoughtfully listens to my progress and makes informed

suggestions, and he more than once reminded me of how helpful the lessons of marathon

running have been in this process.

None of this would have been possible without the love and support of my family.

In this aspect of my life, I have been very blessed. My grandparents, including two very

strong grandmothers, have supported me all of my life and let me know that I am loved

and that they are proud of me. My nephews—Jake, Jude, James, Waylon, and Wayde—

have had to share me with this project for most of their lives. Thanks for loving and

supporting me even when I was unavailable to do fun things. Hopefully, I will be more

available now. To my siblings—Murly, Ben, and Holly—thanks for all of your support,

even when you thought I was crazy for doing this. To my dad, who passed away before I

began the quest for this degree, I thank him for teaching me about hard work and the

importance of treating all people with respect, regardless of how they appeared or their

station in life. Thanks to my stepfather, Lynn Benjamin, for providing stability in my

life, for his example of completing a university degree, and for his love and support.

Most of all, I would like to thank my mom, Mary Benjamin. She made all things possible

for me. She sacrificed so that we would have all of the things that we needed and

demonstrated that the “impossible” is only impossible until you achieve it.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

On January 8, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson delivered his first State of the

Union Address. In that speech, he stated that one in five Americans could not “meet their

basic needs” and declared “unconditional war on poverty.”1 Johnson explained that

poverty in America resulted from a lack of opportunity and that the country needed new

legislation to increase employment and improve education, housing, health care, and

community development to provide a higher standard of living for those living in city

slums, small towns, migrant camps, and on Indian reservations.2 He recognized that the

“war” had to be fought not only on a national level but “also be organized at the State and

the local level and…be supported and directed by State and local efforts” because he

believed that “the war against poverty will not be won…in Washington. It must be won

in the field, in every private home, in every public office, from the courthouse to the

White House.” Johnson stressed:

It will not be a short or easy struggle, no single weapon or strategy will suffice, but we shall not rest until that war is won. The richest Nation on earth can afford to win it. We cannot afford to lose it. One thousand dollars invested in salvaging an unemployable youth today can return $40,000 or more in his lifetime.3

1 Lyndon B. Johnson, “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union” (given at the United States Capitol in Washington, D.C., 8 January 1964), Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1964, http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/640108.asp (accessed 25 April 2009). 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.

http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/640108.asp

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Given general economic prosperity in the country, Johnson felt that he could pursue the

goal of social justice for the poor without increasing the tax burden on more affluent

Americans.4 By the end of the Eighty-Ninth Congress in October 1966, LBJ’s grand

vision for a “Great Society” resulted in the passage of 181 out of 200 major pieces of

legislation, including the Economic Opportunity Act.5 Despite this legislative success,

these diverse, ad hoc measures stirred up a great deal of controversy.

The Economic Opportunity Act (EOA) of 1964, the legislation at the heart of the

“War on Poverty,” introduced a variety of measures—including Job Corps, Head Start,

Community Action Programs (CAP), and Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA)—

intended to eliminate poverty in the U.S. In the process, it revived several fundamental

debates about the causes of poverty, ways to end it, and the appropriate role of the

government in this process. People argued about the extent, causes, and possible

solutions to the nation’s poverty problem. Johnson’s antipoverty agenda led to

discussions about the appropriateness of encouraging the poor to play a significant role in

the design and implementation of plans to eliminate poverty. It also reignited long-

standing arguments about the relationship between the federal government and state and

local governments. Like officials, political scientists, and the general public during that

period, historians continue to analyze these issues debated during the War on Poverty.

In the Preface to Marvin Schwartz’s study of the VISTA program in Arkansas,

then-Governor Bill Clinton stated, “The progress of history is not limited to the grand

sweep of major events or milestone occurrences. History is linked to the progress of

4 John A. Andrew III, Lyndon Johnson and the Great Society (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1998), 12-13. 5 Ibid., 13-17. Johnson first publicly used the phrase “Great Society” in a commencement address at the University of Michigan on May 24, 1964.

3

people—to the slow and sometimes imperceptible changes that pass from one generation

to the next.”6 Clinton praised VISTA as a program that worked towards this type of

change, he commended Schwartz for being the first historian to use a state case study

approach to shed light on the goals, methods, and achievements of VISTA, and he

suggested that this work might “inspire other states to support written histories of their

VISTA experiences.”7 Similarly, historian William Clayson argued the need for more

local histories in order to bring the “big picture” into focus.8

Although there are many books that investigate the EOA, including public

responses and the overall impact of the act, most present a broad national perspective or

provide a detailed look at a specific EOA program. Few studies examine the impact of

the EOA from the perspective of a specific state or region. As Clinton and Clayson

suggested, this study presents the history of how the Economic Opportunity Act affected

one location—the state of Utah. Using Utah as a lens, it examines how debates over the

EOA affected a specific part of the country, including the types of programs established,

local reactions to the law and its programs, and how closely these reactions mirrored

national responses from 1964 to 1969.

On the eve of the War on Poverty, census data indicate that Utah had a poverty

rate slightly lower than the national average. Still, thousands of Utahns lived in poverty,

and the poor were not evenly distributed throughout the state. Migrants working in

northern Utah and other rural parts of the state, Native Americans on reservations in

6 Marvin Schwartz, In Service to America: A History of VISTA in Arkansas, 1965-1985 (Fayetteville: The University of Alabama Press, 1988), xiii. 7 Ibid., xiv. 8 William Clayson, Texas Poverty and Liberal Politics: The Office of Economic Opportunity and the War on Poverty in the Lone Star State (Ann Arbor: UMI Dissertation Services, 2006. Ph.D. Dissertation, Texas Tech University, 2001).

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eastern and southeastern Utah, and many living in Utah’s biggest cities felt the extreme

effects of trying to survive and make a life on incomes far below the national poverty

line. State political leaders habitually failed to allocate enough money to provide

adequate social welfare programs to assist these groups and other state residents living in

poverty. This study demonstrates that many Utahns needed and welcomed federal

antipoverty assistance that the EOA offered.

Nevertheless, there were at least two factors that complicated the question of how

Utahns responded to offers of EOA assistance. Ever since the first pioneers settled in the

Salt Lake Valley in 1847, they had a troubled relationship with the U.S. government.

These first settlers were trying to escape the reach of the federal government, and the

legacy of earlier conflicts informed Utah’s response to Johnson’s antipoverty programs.

While some welcomed the revenue and jobs that these agencies brought to the state,

others argued that it was simply another example of federal meddling in state affairs. In

spite of the antifederal rhetoric which continued during the 1960s and beyond, Utah

applied for and accepted EOA money to create antipoverty programs, but they were never

universally popular. Even as the state accepted federal funds to create Job Corps centers,

Head Start facilities, CAPs, Legal Services offices, and programs to assist migrants and

Native Americans, many Utahns shared their outrage over these examples of federal

overreach.

Another variable that affected the state’s response to the EOA was the large

percentage of residents who were members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day

Saints (LDS). Mormons not only made up a significant portion of the state’s population,

they made up an even larger percentage of the state legislature. Given that the LDS

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Church has had a church-sponsored welfare program since the nineteenth century, church

leaders and members and the majority of state legislators opposed public antipoverty

programs at the state or national level. They were deeply committed to the philosophy of

taking care of their own. Unfortunately, many Utahns did not qualify for church

assistance, and even among members, church welfare was never enough. As a result,

Utahns accepted EOA assistance, but given the church’s position on public welfare, many

continued to oppose government solutions to poverty.

This study examines the intersection of debates in Utah and the nation over the

causes and nature of poverty and possible ways to eliminate it. It begins with a historical

overview of these issues, but primarily focuses on the period from 1964 to 1969, from

Johnson’s declaration of “war” through the early legislative changes during the Nixon

administration. Then, it shifts to a discussion of specific EOA programs established in

Utah—both rural and urban, local feelings about these programs, and the controversies

surrounding and accomplishments of each. Overall, Utahns’ reactions to the EOA were

very much in line with national reactions. Debates centered on issues related to

federalism, cost, effectiveness, misadministration, and the possible racial and social

consequences of these programs. Despite the common national perspective that Utah is

different than other places, the responses of Utahns to Job Corps, CAPs, Head Start,

VISTA, and other EOA programs were not that different.

Although poverty was not limited to one segment of the population, some

minority groups experienced higher poverty rates than the general population. For this

reason, the EOA focused on helping those groups to get ahead. While Utah has

historically had a small minority population, during the 1960s, the state did have minority

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populations unevenly distributed throughout the state, and poverty rates were higher

among these groups. Therefore, this manuscript looks at the impact that the War on

Poverty had on Utah’s Indian reservations, migrant workers, and poor urban minority

populations. Though I hoped to include the perspectives and actions of those living in

poverty, documents that disclosed their feelings about and involvement in EOA programs

were difficult to find. Consequently, they do have some presence in this narrative, but I

leave it to future researchers to find the sources that more fully reveal this aspect of the

EOA story.

This study is comprised of six body chapters that begin with a broad historical

look at how people in the United States have understood, dealt with, and written about

poverty and then shifts its focus to events in Utah, before concluding with a brief

discussion of the long term impact of the EOA in Utah. Chapter 2 presents a historical

discussion of U.S. poverty policies, including beliefs about who should help the poor and

who deserved to receive assistance, from the colonial period to the eve of the War on

Poverty. Then, it transitions to an analysis of the national debates during the drafting of

the Economic Opportunity Act. Both of these topics provide a foundation for discussing

the history of the EOA in Utah, allowing us to evaluate how the act and its reception in

Utah compared with other places.

In Chapter 3, the state of Utah and its history take center stage. It outlines the

historical relationship between the state’s residents and the federal government, focusing

on their rhetoric of self-sufficiency and rugged individualism and juxtaposes that with

their actual dependency and dislike of the federal government. It looks at how Utahns

felt about the poor and how they dealt with poverty, emphasizing their beliefs that

7

voluntary organizations should assist the poor, that only “worthy” individuals should

receive assistance, that hard work was essential to any assistance program, and that LDS

Church welfare was superior to government doles. The chapter concludes with a

discussion of how political and religious leaders in the state responded to the EOA during

its early development and implementation.

Chapter 4 examines the extent and nature of poverty in Utah at the time that the

EOA became law. It focuses on some of the more extreme pockets of poverty in rural

and urban parts of the state, including the economic situation of Native Americans in San

Juan, Uintah, and Duchesne Counties, migrant workers in the northern Utah, and the

urban poor in the counties along the Wasatch Front. These examples demonstrate that

there were many Utahns who needed and would benefit from federal EOA assistance.

Chapter 5 discusses attempts to end poverty in Utah’s rural areas. It begins with a

look at some programs that helped all rural residents living in poverty and then focuses

on programs designed to assist minorities in these areas, including Native Americans and

migrant workers. Rural counties used EOA money to create NYC projects and Head

Start centers for all residents living in poverty, and these programs were quite popular

because they emphasized helping the young, provided educational assistance, and

promoted a strong work ethic. The OEO also allocated money to establish CAPs on the

Navajo and Uintah-Ouray reservations, increasing educational and economic

opportunities and contributing to improved living conditions for Native Americans in

Utah. Local reformers also utilized available EOA funds to continue and expand

programs set up to help Utah’s migrant workers.

In Chapter 6, the discussion centers on EOA programs established in Utah’s two

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largest urban counties, Salt Lake and Weber. It examines the types of programs

introduced—NYC, CAPs, VISTA, Legal Services, Upward Bound, and Head Start—and

the reactions that county residents had to each. Many of these programs remained fairly

small, won over a few supporters, and failed to gain recognition from the majority of

residents. Some, especially CAPs, generated controversy over racial issues and concerns

about local control. Educational programs and those that targeted young people,

emphasizing the importance of school and hard work, were the most popular in Utah.

Chapter 7 highlights the Job Corps program in Utah. It had the greatest economic

impact on the state and generated the most controversy. It was also the most interesting

program, given the EOA’s emphasis on eliminating poverty. Although it had a profound

effect on the state’s economy, Job Corps centers in Utah did not directly help the state’s

poorest residents, seemed to benefit the successful Thiokol Corporation most of all, and

provided the greatest economic “uplift” in Davis County, an area that was one of the most

economically affluent in the state. The chapter discusses arguments that state residents

used to support and oppose the creation of the Castle Valley, South Weber, and Clearfield

Job Corps centers, reinforces the idea that the reactions of Utahns to the Job Corps

program were not very different from those used in other parts of the nation, and

demonstrates that Job Corps-related controversies continued long after each center

became operational.

In order to write this study, I consulted manuscript collections at multiple

facilities. The National Archives in Denver, Kansas City, and College Park all contain

files pertaining to the dimensions of poverty in Utah in the 1960s, specific EOA

programs established in the state, and local reactions to these programs. The Utah

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Historical Archives in Salt Lake City houses the papers of Calvin Rampton, the

Democratic governor elected in 1964, who played a pivotal role in the creation of EOA

programs in Utah, especially the state’s Job Corps facilities. These collections helped me

to understand the nature of poverty in Utah, the role that the EOA played in trying to end

poverty in the state, and some of the reactions to poverty and the EOA.

At the University of Utah’s Marriott Library Special Collections, I utilized the

papers of Frank Moss, a long-time Democratic senator, and David S. King, a Democrat

who served one term in the U.S. House of Representatives, to outline the EOA programs

in Utah, determine the extent of federal funding for these programs, and analyze the

responses of political and other leaders and the general public to the state’s EOA

programs. Moss was a strong supporter of the War on Poverty and especially

instrumental in securing federal money for EOA programs in Utah. These sources helped

me to understand the perspectives of some of the EOA’s most ardent proponents.

The Laurence Burton papers, housed at Weber State’s Stewart Library, and the

Wallace Bennett papers in the L. Tom Perry Special Collections at Brigham Young

University provided additional information about the EOA and insight into how they and

their constituents felt about the War on Poverty. Burton was a long-term Republican

congressman, and Bennett was a longstanding Republican senator, and neither were

especially fond of the EOA. The inclusion of information from these sources allows for a

more balanced view of the EOA in Utah.

The director of the Salt Lake Community Action Program graciously allowed me

to use most of their records from the period of this study. Unfortunately, some of them

have been lost over the years. Still, the minutes of meetings, memos, press releases, and

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other sources she shared allowed me to write a more detailed analysis of the efforts,

achievements, and controversies associated with the SLCAP. She also gave me contact

information for John Florez, a key organizer of the Central City CAP efforts, and as a

result, I was able to interview him. Unfortunately, I had technical difficulties that

prevented me from transcribing or officially using that interview. However, it was a

privilege to talk with him, and I feel that our discussion helped me to understand the back

story of the SLCAP and their community organizing efforts in Salt Lake County and the

controversies that plagued that organization.

During the earliest stages of this project, I intended to write the history of the

VISTA program in Utah. I was interested in the idea of volunteering to help the poor at

home rather than traveling to help the poor in other countries as Peace Corps volunteers

did (and do). I had the good fortune to connect with several individuals who came to

Utah during the 1960s and early 1970s as VISTA volunteers. Some of my earliest—and

most rewarding work—was interviewing those volunteers. I interviewed three in person,

one over the phone, one via e-mail, and another through a combination of phone calls and

e-mail. Of those individuals, four were profoundly affected by their time as VISTAs and

decided to relocate to Utah permanently. These interviewees offered an inside glimpse

into several EOA programs, the situation in Utah at that time, and the reactions of Utahns

to these antipoverty efforts.

Newspapers from the period allowed me to fill in some of the gaps in my research

and my narrative. I started with the two statewide papers, the Salt Lake Tribune and the

Deseret News, and quickly scanned all editions from 1964 to 1969 for articles, editorials,

and letters to the editor dealing with poverty, welfare, and the EOA. Since it covers a big

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part of the state—northern Utah—with a sizeable population, I did the same for the

Ogden Standard-Examiner. These papers supplied a great deal of information about the

programs of the EOA and local reactions to the War on Poverty. Once I finished with

these larger newspapers, I shifted to a search of smaller local papers in places that had

programs spotlighted in my study. To get a better understanding of the Utah Migrant

Council and local feelings about migrant worker programs, I consulted the Box Elder

News (in addition to the Standard-Examiner). The San Juan Record, the Uintah Basin

Standard, and the Vernal Express provided additional understanding of the EOA

programs designed to help Native Americans on reservations in those counties. Though

the larger newspapers had significant coverage of the Job Corps program, The Helper

Journal and the Weekly Reflex offered additional insight into the local reactions to plans

to establish Job Corps centers in their communities, the specific programs that these

centers provided for corpsmen and the surrounding communities, and the problems and

achievements of each center. Although these newspaper sources often failed to include

the perspectives of the corpsmen, they furnished a great deal of information about EOA

programs and local feelings about them.

*******

Americans did not win the War on Poverty in Utah or any other part of the nation.

Poverty was still a fact of life for far too many Utahns. Nevertheless, the Economic

Opportunity Act created programs that improved the lives of the poor in many ways and

left a lasting impact on the state and the nation. Job Corps, Head Start, CAPs, VISTA,

Legal Services, and the agencies that evolved from these original programs continue to

impact the lives of Utahns, even after fifty years. When national leaders first debated the

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EOA and eventually passed it and during the evolution of this antipoverty legislation in

the years since then, Utahns have consistently responded to these programs in ways

similar to people in other parts of the country.

CHAPTER 2

THE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY ACT AND THE “WAR ON POVERTY”:

HISTORICAL ROOTS, DEBATES, AND CONTROVERSIES

Poverty…is not remarkable in India. For relatively few, fate is otherwise. But in the United States, the survival of poverty is remarkable. We ignore it because we share with all societies at all times the capacity for not seeing what we do not wish to see. Anciently this has enabled the nobleman to enjoy his dinner while remaining oblivious to the beggars around his door. In our own day, it enables us to travel in comfort through the South Bronx and into the lush precincts of midtown Manhattan. But while our failure to notice [poverty] can be explained, it cannot be excused. “Poverty,” Pitt [Prime Minister of Great Britain during the late eighteenth century] exclaimed, “is no disgrace but it is damned annoying.” In the contemporary United States, it [poverty] is not annoying but it is a disgrace.1

So wrote economist John Kenneth Galbraith in 1958. As this quote conveys,

living in poverty was the normal condition for the vast majority of people throughout

history and continued to be the norm for many around the world on the eve of the 1960s.

However, Galbraith emphasized that the existence of poverty amidst the plenty found in

the United States in the late twentieth century was completely unacceptable. It is into this

“land of abundance” that the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 emerged, and this

omnibus legislation built upon the philosophies, theories, precedents, and biases of those

who came before.

From the time of colonization, the people of the United States (even before it was

1 John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Boston: Mariner Books, 1998), 242.

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formally the United States) dealt with issues of poverty and how to remedy it. During the

colonial period, the hardship of living isolated on the frontier led to a strong commitment

to community and reinforced the idea of local responsibility for the poor.2 As long as the

poor were permanent members of a community, the citizens felt an obligation to assist

them. In contrast, if the locals identified the poor as transients, leaders refused assistance

to avoid possible long-term social, political, and financial difficulties for their

community.3 Many embraced the ideas that the existing social order was the result of

God’s will, that aiding the poor was the moral obligation of those in a position to do so,

and that the rewards would be equally as significant for the giver as for the receiver. At

that time and long afterward, gender added a wrinkle to discussions about rights and

obligations, including the right to receive financial assistance and the obligation to work.

Historian Linda Kerber argues that as a result of our inherited English system of laws and

culture, men (both fathers and husbands) controlled the lives of women, that women

received benefits based on their relationships with men, and that their obligations were to

their fathers and husbands rather than to the state.4 Women, at least middle-class, white

women, should only work for their husbands, and they received welfare and other

benefits based on the employment of their husbands.5

In the period after the American Revolution, social welfare policy became more

complex. The ideals of the Enlightenment and the Revolution led to a more critical

reaction to the poor as the populace began to question the idea that the poor were simply

2 Walter I. Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History of Social Welfare in America (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 16-19. 3 David J. Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), 5, 7-8. 4 Linda K. Kerber, No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), xxviii, 36-38. 5 Ibid., 53-55.

15

a permanent part of a divinely created social hierarchy.6 Instead, it became more

common to blame the poor for their situation, citing drunkenness, idleness, and other

vices as proof of their moral failings.7 During the Jacksonian period, the emphasis on

the Protestant work ethic and the message of the Second Great Awakening underscored

the idea that society could reform the poor. Reformers argued that changing times led to

family and societal instability, contributing to poverty, and that the poor would be better

off if they were removed from the chaos and treated in a more orderly, controlled asylum.

This led to a shift from a system based primarily on outdoor relief to one almost

exclusively dependent on institutionalization.

Despite the “general welfare” clause in the U.S. Constitution, the United States

did not enact a unified national welfare system. Instead, state legislatures created

separate systems based on diverse experiences and separate court decisions.8 While this

approach minimized the role of the central government in assisting the poor and led to a

more flexible welfare system, it also led to a great deal of confusion and inefficiency.

During this period, the public generally accepted that voluntary associations and

institutions should take the lead in social welfare policy, that religious groups and other

charity organizations should maintain their own welfare institutions to aid the poor, and

that the government should stay out of these matters as much as possible.

After the Civil War, the country experienced significant economic and social

changes, and these transformations affected ideas about work and the treatment of the

poor. With Herbert Spencer’s introduction of Social Darwinism, a philosophy of life that

6 Trattner, 53. 7 Rothman, 161-62, 180-88. 8 Trattner, 41-42.

16

combined the ideas of laissez-faire economics with the individual’s struggle for existence

and survival of the fittest, the American public did little to help those in need. Instead,

Social Darwinists argued that competition among all people was the law of nature and

that self-help was the only way to improve one’s lot in life.9 Neither public nor private

entities should assist the poor because in doing so, they would only prolong their ill-fated

struggle and weaken future generations. During that time, gender, class, and race

continued to add complexity to discussions of work and relief. While society expected

white, middle-class women to stay home, avoid employment outside the home, and raise

respectable future citizens, poor women—especially black women—had an obligation to

work.10 Unlike black women, most white women did not have an obligation to enter

extended work contracts, even when they did work outside the home.11

With the rise of cities, increasing immigration, and the problems and miseries that

resulted, the turn of the twentieth century witnessed increased efforts to eliminate human

suffering, often referred to as the Progressive Movement. Among other things,

Progressive reformers focused on improving living and working conditions.12 The

settlement house movement, often identified with Jane Addams and Chicago’s Hull-

House, attempted to improve the social and economic conditions for the poor so that

more people might share in the promises of the American Dream. While settlement

house workers were similar to earlier reformers in some ways, they did have some

differences. Like other reformers, they believed that living conditions in the city hurt the

poor, felt that volunteerism was essential to bring about change, adopted a religious tone

9 Trattner, 89. 10 Kerber, 55-56. 11 Ibid., 66-67. 12 Trattner, 165-66.

17

in their reform efforts, and felt that a scientific approach was the best way to deal with

problems. Unlike earlier reformers, settlement house workers were less likely to

emphasize individual or moral causes of poverty or differentiate between the “worthy and

unworthy poor.”13 Instead, reformers more frequently argued that poverty was the result

of a flawed economic system rather than because of individual failings.14 Structural

causes of poverty included technological changes, cyclical economic recessions, and

business failures. Settlement houses played a valuable part in the struggle to improve

social welfare and provide equal justice for all at the dawn of the twentieth century.15

Like colonial New Englanders before them, settlement house workers saw the individual

as a member of a larger group and sought to improve the community by taking care of all

its citizens, even the most disadvantaged.

During the Progressive Era, reformers increasingly supported the idea of public

assistance, believing that public welfare programs could work hand-in-hand with private

charity organizations, but they did not believe that all needy individuals were equally

worthy of help, often differentiating between the poor who were victims of an unfair

economic system and those who were lazy and undeserving of help.16 Dependent

children were among the groups most often targeted for public assistance. In 1909,

President Theodore Roosevelt called for the White House Conference on Dependent

Children, with high-profile reformers such as Lillian Wald, Jane Addams, and Florence

Kelley attending. The conference marked a reversal of public policy, demonstrating that

13 Ibid., 166. 14 James T. Patterson, America’s Struggle against Poverty in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 3-6. 15 Trattner, 168-70. 16 Ibid., 214; Patterson, 7.

18

the federal government should play an active role in the development of social welfare

policy.17 A significant result of the conference was the creation of the U.S. Children’s

Bureau, a research agency that investigated and called attention to the condition of

children from all classes in the United States. This agency helped to design important

legislation like the Sheppard-Towner Act, a law that provided health care funding for

women and children, and widows’ pensions that allocated money to women so that they

could take care of their children at home.18 Unlike earlier reformers who favored

breaking up poor families so that children could be removed from dysfunctional homes,

Progressive reformers argued that preservation of the family was actually better for most

children.19

Gwendolyn Mink argues that as Progressive reformers tried to preserve the

family, they also created policies that further solidified existing gender, race, and class

inequalities. The mothers’ pensions that gained acceptance at the state level provided

financial assistance to needy but morally upstanding women so they could stay home and

raise their children to be productive and responsible citizens.20 Unfortunately, not all

women benefitted equally. Most often officials identified white women, including

immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, as worthy recipients, providing financial

help and cultural training so that these women might be effective mothers. 21 For

immigrant women who had not had the benefit of being raised in the U.S., these

reformers emphasized that culture was a product of environment, not biology, and

17 Trattner, 215-18. 18 Ibid., 221-22. 19 Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1986), 124. 20 Gwendolyn Mink, The Wages of Motherhood: Inequalities in the Welfare State, 1917-1942 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 3-26. 21 Ibid., 23-24.

19

established training programs to Americanize them and systems of home observations

that allowed administrators to carefully monitor the cultural transformation of immigrant

women.22 Rarely did these programs benefit African American or Hispanic mothers and

their children.23 Because individual states determined the extent to which they

participated in these programs and identified those who were worthy of assistance,

minority women—who often had the greatest financial need—received very little. Local

authorities frequently judged minority women to be “morally unfit and uneducable,”

“unworthy,” and “ill-suited to domestic motherhood.”24 Even at a time when activists

sought to improve the status of women because of their important role as mothers and

caregivers, race and class discrimination prevented all women from benefitting equally.

With the rapid growth of the U.S. economy during the early twentieth century,

many believed that the country’s increasing abundance might not only reduce poverty but

also prevent it, but in order for that to happen, Progressives agreed that society had to

teach young people about the importance of self-discipline and hard work.25 Despite the

passage of time, reformers continued to emphasize the old Protestant work ethic. They

stressed that working hard in school was an effective way to prevent poverty, and Horatio

Alger’s formulaic rags-to-riches stories remained popular.26

The Great Depression greatly tested the poverty philosophies and policies of the

United States. By 1933, 12.8 million Americans, roughly twenty-five percent of the

population, were unemployed.27 Banks and businesses folded. Families lost their homes

22 Ibid., 24-26. 23 Ibid., 49. 24 Ibid., 51. 25 Patterson, 19-22. 26 Ibid., 31. 27 Ibid., 41.

20

and farms. Long bread and soup lines became the norm in many large cities, and

Hoovervilles, makeshift shantytowns, appeared in locations across the nation. In the

early days of the depression, cities and states continued to rely on local private agencies

to relieve the suffering of the poor, unemployed, and homeless, but it did not take long

for authorities to realize that these traditional remedies were completely inadequate to the

tasks at hand. Despite the failure of past solutions, the shift to acceptance of widespread

public action took time because the old ways were simply too deeply entrenched.28

Many Americans, including President Herbert Hoover, continued to oppose government

involvement in helping the poor.29 Hoover believed that federal assistance would disrupt

the natural laws that regulated the economy, hurt the country’s credit, violate the balance

between federal and state/local responsibility, and subjugate those who received it.

As the depression continued and intensified, more Americans grudgingly accepted

the idea that poverty was often caused by societal factors beyond the control of the poor

and that relief measures should be broader and more systematic.30 Calls for government

relief on the state and national level became more common and insistent, and the public

began to accept the idea that government assistance was a right of citizenship. One

politician that embraced these new ideas was New York Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt.

As the leader of that state, he experimented with bold actions, arguing that the

unemployed, like the elderly and widows, had little control over their situation, and that

the state should allot money to help local governments provide for the unemployed. New

York became the first state to provide unemployment relief, and soon other states, and

28 Trattner, 274. 29 Ibid., 276-77. 30 Ibid., 274-76.

21

eventually the federal government, followed New York’s lead.31

When Roosevelt was inaugurated in 1933, he used his “New Deal” to introduce

national policies similar to those he launched in New York. New Deal policymakers

seemed to accept that society should ensure that the needs of all people are met, that the

economic system needed regulation, that public assistance was often necessary and

appropriate, and that a democratic government must be able to safeguard the welfare of

its citizens.32 In keeping with these ideals, Roosevelt led the federal government into the

relief business, creating a plethora of organizations that provided financial assistance and

jobs to the unemployed and those in need such as the Federal Emergency Relief Act

(FERA), the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), and the Works Progress Administration

(WPA). Most Americans looked favorably upon these relief programs because they

emphasized that public assistance was something earned not simply given, thereby

allowing millions of unemployed individuals receiving government help to retain their

self-respect.33 In spite of the good that it did, New Deal legislation did not apply equally

to all Americans, often discriminating on the basis of race, gender, and class.

Despite the lofty goals of the New Deal, relief programs rarely lived up to the

promises made. The primary objective of Roosevelt’s administration was the protection

and security of the free enterprise system.34 Full employment was not on the agenda

because partial unemployment kept salaries low and that was important to private

employers. Those on work relief worked fewer hours for lower wages than those with

similar jobs in private enterprise because government officials wanted to ensure that

31 Ibid., 280. 32 Ibid., 281. 33 Ibid., 284. 34 Ibid., 283-84.

22

workers would return to the private sector as soon as jobs became available. While New

Deal programs aided many individuals in need, they often proved more beneficial to local

and state politicians who profited from the flow of federal dollars and jobs into their

jurisdictions.35 Given the severe economic stagnation, politicians did not focus on long-

term structural problems or on plans to make society more equitable but instead

concentrated on providing temporary relief to those in need.36 As soon as the first crisis

passed, President Roosevelt returned relief efforts back to the states where he thought

they belonged.37

One of the most historically significant New Deal acts was the Social Security

Act of 1935. It included a number of provisions that combined two lines of defense

against poverty. The first component was a system of contributory social insurance that

required workers to pay taxes on their wages in order to receive benefits at age sixty-

five.38 Because these benefits depended on the wages earned over an entire career, only

those who worked in qualified fields and who had steady employment were eligible for

this social insurance. The second was a system of federal-state unemployment insurance

that required employers to contribute an established percentage of their payroll to fund

the insurance program and set a fixed percentage of money that returned to the states to

set up unemployment insurance programs.39 Like the earlier Sheppard-Towner Act,

Title IV of the Social Security Act created a federal program to assist mothers who had

dependent children and no spousal support, and Title V provided federal assistance to

35 Ibid., 283. 36 Patterson, 43, 65. 37 Katz, 217. 38 Trattner, 289. 39 Ibid., 289-90.

23

states to establish maternal and child health programs.40 By tying benefits to wage work

in this way, “employment emerged as a boundary line demarcating different kinds of

citizenship,” with some people receiving benefits based on their family position (mostly

women) and others based on their paid employment (mostly men).41 This differentiation

became the basis for the United States’ version of the welfare state. Generally, women

received “unearned” means-tested benefits while men “earned” their benefits through

their employment throughout their careers, and this commitment to a gender division of

benefits greatly impacted future ideas about “what people can and ought to do.”42

The Social Security Act was both controversial and important. Some individuals

questioned the connection between lifetime employment and wages and later levels of

assistance at the heart of the act, but others recognized that some security was better than

none at all.43 This seemed to reaffirm the notion that some people were more

“deserving” of assistance than others. Benefits were tied to employment, and many jobs

were not covered under the Social Security Act. For instance, agricultural workers and

domestic servants did not qualify under the original act, leaving most women and

minority workers outside the safety net.44 Because of these exclusions, the act did not

provide coverage for three-fifths to two-thirds of all black workers.45 Women benefitted

only as wives and mothers.46 Historian George Lipsitz is one of many who emphasizes

the racial inequalities of the Social Security Act. He argues that it and many other New

40 Ibid., 225-26, 221. 41 Alice Kessler-Harris, In Pursuit of Equity: Women, Men, and the Quest for Economic Citizenship in 20th-Century America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 4. 42 Ibid., 17. 43 Trattner, 289. 44 Mink, 123-33, 135-38 45 Kerber, 73. 46 Mink, 130.

24

Deal acts demonstrate the government’s role in perpetuating this country’s “possessive

investment in whiteness,” exempting the jobs of blacks and other minorities from

coverage.47

Although the act won acceptance, it was attacked from the right and the left.

Those on the right felt it threatened important American ideals like the need for self-help

and individual responsibility.48 Those on the left argued that it did not go far enough

because it exerted a regressive effect on purchasing power, did not cover agricultural

workers or the self-employed, discriminated against women and minorities, did not

include health insurance, and failed to guarantee an acceptable standard of living for all

Americans.49 For many who participated in the drafting of the act, the last thing they

wanted was to create a policy that redistributed the wealth of the nation.50 There was

much debate over the local and state implementation of Social Security programs. While

some feared that this arrangement would lead to an unacceptable level of federal control

over local relief programs, others felt that the act put excessive control in the hands of

local authorities, and therefore there would be too much variation in relief payments from

state to state. 51 Despite its shortcomings, the Social Security Act was a landmark

legislative achievement that expanded government involvement in welfare programs,

advanced the nation’s handling of the poor, and helped to decrease poverty without a

severe threat to “individual freedom and human dignity.”52 Under the Social Security

47 George Lipsitz, The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: How White People Profit from Identity Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006), vii, 5-6, 38-39, 217. 48 Trattner, 291-92; Patterson, 71. 49 Trattner, 291-92; Patterson, 71. 50 Katz, 238. 51 Patterson, 66-77; Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2013), 260. 52 Trattner, 293-94.

25

Act, public welfare in the United States evolved from a limited, inadequate system to a

broader structure that provided a wide range of assistance to those in need, and the

federal government became a permanent and important player in public welfare.

The Social Security Act was only one of many New Deal acts that unfairly

distributed government resources to citizens of the United States. The National Recovery

Administration refused to establish codes to regulate hours or wages of agricultural or

domestic workers, virtually eliminating black workers and many female workers from its

protection and guaranteeing that whites worked fewer hours for higher wages than

blacks, and recognized regional wage differentials that kept workers in some parts of the

country, especially in the South, in abject poverty.53 The Tennessee Valley Authority

protected the racist social order in the South by refusing to establish fertilizer programs at

black colleges, hiring black workers for only the most menial jobs, barring black students

and workers from associated vocational schools and training programs, and rigidly

enforcing segregation in TVA communities.54 Similarly, the Wagner Act and the Fair

Labor Standards Act exempted agricultural and domestic workers from receiving the

benefits that protected workers in other sectors of the economy.55

The New Deal certainly left its mark on U.S. welfare policy, but its impact was

also mixed. Rather than a radical shift, New Deal policy was built on a chain of

compromises with the past. While the federal government became more involved in

helping the needy, neither the politicians nor the American people seemed to be

completely comfortable with this change. As a result of the New Deal, the relationship

53 Katznelson, 241-42. 54 Ibid., 254-55. 55 Ibid., 260, 270-71.

26

between the federal government and the states changed, but in many ways it stayed the

same. At times, it seemed that public assistance had become a “right,” but that belief

often evaporated with the next economic recovery. By tying certain benefits, such as old

age pensions, to wage work but refusing to include many kinds of jobs, the New Deal

solidified the distinction between those who “earned” their benefits and those who

received benefits as a matter of public charity. More people began to accept structural

explanations for poverty, but this acceptance was far from complete. Notions of the

“deserving” and “undeserving” poor remained, and politicians took great care to preserve

the U.S. economic system and to avoid the redistribution of wealth in the nation. The

division of welfare into social insurance (earned) and public assistance (charity)

remained, and future reformers would have to continue to navigate this divide.

During and after World War II, one of major government programs instituted to

improve the economic future of many Americans was the Serviceman’s Readjustment

Act, more popularly known as the GI Bill of Rights. It provided financial assistance for

post-high school education, vocational training, housing, and the establishment of

businesses, but in order to qualify, an individual had to have served in the military.

Because women have always been exempted from required military service, they failed

to qualify for this assistance.56 They also failed to qualify for the preferential hiring

practices often extended to veterans, including the practice of “treating veterans as first to

be promoted and last to be laid off.”57 Even if they wanted to serve, military policies

deprived women of the right to participate in most military occupations and then refused

to grant benefits because of their failure to serve, perpetuating the practice of

56 Kerber, 223. 57 Ibid., 225.

27

underpaying women throughout their lifetimes.58 By design, the GI Bill provided male

breadwinners a leg up as World War II was ending and denied women an equal financial

opportunity.

In the postwar period, the federal government concerned itself with the impact

that the transition from war to peace might have on the economy, but national leaders did

not create legislation to benefit all equally. With the Employment Act of 1946, Congress

tried to stabilize the economy and prevent a return to the Great Depression after the war,

but it proved to be controversial and allowed many prospective workers to slip through its

safety net. While the original purpose was to ensure that workers could find jobs as the

economy transitioned from wartime to peacetime, the final bill removed the guarantee

that all workers have a “right” to a job and instead emphasized the need to maintain

purchasing power by curbing inflation.59 Part of the reason for the weakening of the final

law was that Southern economic leaders feared the impact that full employment might

have on their black labor force.60 Powerful Southern legislators refused to accept a

national law, and they successfully fought to establish legislation that allowed each state

to create local employment offices to protect their segregated labor system and guarantee

the continued availability of low-paid field workers.61 Southern legislators also opposed

a national unemployment program to prevent low paid workers in the South from quitting

their jobs in order to qualify for a national unemployment insurance that was higher than

their working wages, and given the number of Southerners who chaired key

58 Ibid., 285-86. 59 Katznelson, 380-381; “Employment Act of 1946,” Federal Reserve History Website, http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/15 (accessed 5 May 2015). 60 Katznelson, 382-85. 61 Ibid., 384-87.

http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/15

28

congressional committees, they were able to establish a system that allowed state

unemployment offices to accept federal funding and then independently decide how to

allocate those funds, protecting the Southern racist way of life.62 When Republicans in

Congress determined that labor had become too powerful, they passed the Taft-Hartley

bill over President Truman’s veto.63 While this new law provided a lengthy list of

“unfair labor practices,” the authors of the bill failed to include racial discrimination as

“unfair” in employment and continued to perpetuate the same discriminatory policies as

earlier labor legislation, including exemptions for agricultural workers and maids.64

Even when the federal government introduced new labor laws, they failed to protect all

workers.

During the 1950s, more women than ever entered and remained in the job market,

but society’s response to this situation was quite complex. While more women entered

the work force, society still saw men as the breadwinners and often labeled white women

who chose to work as “ill or abnormal.”65 At the same time, mainstream society ignored

minority and poor women who had no choice but to work, accepting that their

employment outside the home was to be expected.66 So, society encouraged white,

middle-class women to stay home, dependent on their husbands and fulfilling their roles

as wives and mothers, and at the same time, demanded that poor women work outside

their homes to avoid economic dependency.

As the 1960s began, two authors reflected on the staggering number of people in

62 Ibid., 386-89. 63 Ibid., 395. 64 Ibid. 65 Rickie Solinger, “Dependency and Choice: The Two Faces of Eve,” in Whose Welfare?, ed. Gwendolyn Mink (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 10. 66 Ibid., 14-15.

29

the United States who lived in poverty despite the country’s high average standard of

living. Their resulting works became very important to President John Kennedy’s

investigation of the poverty situation and President Lyndon Johnson’s development of the

War on Poverty. The first work was economist John Kenneth Galbraith’s The Affluent

Society, published in 1958. The second was Michael Harrington’s The Other America:

Poverty in the United States, published in 1962.

In The Affluent Society, Galbraith discussed the evolution of economic theory, the

existence of poverty in the United States despite widespread prosperity, and the actions

and policies needed to eliminate poverty. Perhaps the most important concept that he

introduced was the idea of “conventional wisdom,” and he used it to outline the reasons

why poverty had not yet been eliminated. According to Galbraith, economic and social

phenomena do not follow an organized pattern but instead seem chaotic and frustrating.67

When faced with chaos, humans demand an explanation for the madness. In the absence

of hard evidence and concrete truth, people come to adopt as “truth” that which is most

acceptable, convenient, and understandable, even if it is not accurate. Galbraith argued

that an individual embraces “conventional wisdom” because it is in line with his/her own

self-interest, and this acceptance increases the individual’s sense of personal well-being.

After outlining popularly-held notions about the causes of poverty and ways to eliminate

it, he sought to challenge these very ideas.68

While “conventional wisdom” held that poverty was the result of moral defects of

the poor, Galbraith argued that poverty resulted from an economic structure that focused

more on productivity than on the equality of individuals living and working within that

67 Galbraith, 6-7. 68 Ibid., 17.

30

economy and emphasized that businessmen, and not workers, had the government and the

laws on their side.69 Under capitalism, businesses continually produced a greater variety

and volume of products, and this increased productivity contributed to the relative

poverty of many workers because they could not afford all of the goods and services

mainstream society deemed necessary.70 Since these workers—many of them

minorities—lacked the material resources and political power of the affluent, the unequal

distribution of wealth increased over time.71 Although “conventional wisdom” assumed

that rising production was a better solution to the poverty problem than a redistribution of

wealth and resources, Galbraith stated that this could never truly eliminate poverty.

Instead, he argued that poverty could only be eradicated if the government developed a

tax system that adjusted to meet the needs of the people, allowing for increased

expenditures on social programs, and that a key to ending poverty was greater investment

in the future of children, improving the educational, housing, nutritional, and health

services available to the poor.72

Political scientist and social activist Michael Harrington built on Galbraith’s

work. He challenged widely held assumptions about American affluence and analyzed

the persistence of poverty in a land of plenty. Harrington stated that twenty to twenty-

five percent of Americans lived in poverty in the early 1960s.73 Unlike the poor in

developing nations, he acknowledged that poor Americans rarely died from starvation but

emphasized that they lived in conditions that were unacceptable by American standards,

69 Ibid., 78-79, 84-85. 70 Ibid., 235. 71 Ibid., 238-39. 72 Ibid., 226, 240. 73 Michael Harrington, The Other America: Poverty in the United States (New York: Touchstone, 1997), 182, 190.

31

lacking adequate nutrition, shelter, education, and health care.74 Like Galbraith,

Harrington argued that the causes of poverty were structural in nature and that the poor

were trapped in a vicious cycle they could not escape.75 Unlike most Americans, the

poor did not benefit from technological advances because they could not afford these

newly-created items that became “necessary” for the average American, leading to an

increase in relative poverty as the poor tried to keep up with the new and improved

American way of life. Advances in technology also contributed to the mechanization of

the workplace, resulting in the loss of jobs, especially those held by the poor, and they

lacked the education and training to qualify for new jobs created by advancing

technology. Due to poor nutrition, awful living conditions, and inadequate or non-

existent health care, the poor more often felt the negative economic effects of lost wages

and unemployment.

Although one in four Americans lived in poverty, Harrington emphasized that

most Americans failed to recognize this because the poor were “invisible” in a land

identified with widespread abundance.76 They lived in rural areas far from public

attention or in segregated urban slums that most people avoided. Many were minorities

or were mentally ill. The poor lacked a strong political voice, economic unity, and a

sense of community. They were invisible because they were powerless.

Harrington insisted that poverty could be fixed but it would take a significant shift

in the mindset of the American people. Although he believed that the United States had

material resources to put a stop to poverty, he felt that those in a position to make this

74 Ibid., 2. 75 Ibid., 12-15. 76 Ibid., 1-2, 3-5, 61-80, 121-38.

32

happen lacked the will to do so, and this had to change in order to eliminate poverty.77

He argued that the wealthy and powerful had to recognize the humanity of the poor,

acknowledge the shame of allowing them to live that way, get angry about this injustice,

and unify to eliminate poverty. Like Galbraith, Harrington argued that continued

economic growth was not enough to lift people out of poverty.78 Any attempt to end

poverty had to overcome the pessimism of the poor but also had to enlist the aid and good

will of the entire nation to achieve this goal. He asserted that any plan to end poverty had

to integrate the poor into all aspects of life—political, economic, and social—on equal

terms with all citizens. Harrington acknowledged that this would take planning, an

expansion of existing programs like Social Security, minimum wage, and health care, an

end to racial prejudice, and the empowerment of the poor, and he maintained that the

federal government was the only institution capable of overseeing and implementing a

comprehensive antipoverty plan.79 As he saw it, cities, states, and private agencies

lacked the funds necessary to end poverty, and many individuals within these

organizations had a vested interest in maintaining the economic status quo. He ended the

book with the following rally cry: “The means are at hand to fulfill the age-old dream:

poverty can now be abolished. How long shall we ignore this underdeveloped nation in

our midst? How long shall we look the other way while our fellow human beings suffer?

How long?”80 The question was, “Was anyone in power listening?”

The War on Poverty, like many other aspects of the Great Society, began before

Lyndon Johnson became president. Like Galbraith and Harrington, many intellectuals,

77 Ibid., 159. 78 Ibid., 163, 167, 169. 79 Ibid., 168-74. 80 Ibid., 174.

33

scholars, and activists focused on and worked towards the eradication of poverty in the

late 1950s and early 1960s. Saul Alinsky, a well-known community activist in Chicago,

had a profound impact on the evolution of the War on Poverty. He discussed the

existence of poverty in the United States and the need to eliminate it, advocating a

community action approach. Alinsky emphasized that it would take conflict between the

haves and the have-nots and that the poor required political power and had to learn to

speak for themselves in order to end poverty.81 He spurned experts and professionals

who tried to manipulate the poor and stated that organizers should only help if the poor

invited them and then only on a temporary basis, setting the wheels of protest in motion

and then removing themselves from the front lines of the poverty struggle.82

At the time, many politicians “rediscovered” the issue of poverty and decided to

make its elimination an important item on their political agenda. This list included

Senator Paul Douglas, a Democrat from Illinois, and Senator John Sparkman, a Democrat

from Alabama. Sparkman chaired a committee that investigated poverty, and the

committee found that, despite general economic prosperity, low-income families got left

behind and concluded that poverty could only be overcome with a concerted attack from

all facets of society.83 During his reelection campaign in 1954, Senator Douglas, a

leading economist, linked the rapid development of technology after World War II to

significant economic dislocation and committed himself to educating national politicians

about the need to focus on economic development in underdeveloped areas struggling

81 Trattner, 311; Patterson, 109. 82 Patterson, 135. 83 Trattner, 311.

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with high unemployment, low average incomes, and failing businesses.84 Adlai E.

Stevenson, the Democratic nominee for president in 1956, also embraced the need to end

poverty as a part of his presidential campaign.85

Before his death in November of 1963, President Kennedy expressed an interest

in reducing or eliminating poverty in the United States. During the 1960 campaign,

Kennedy was deeply affected by the poverty that he witnessed in West Virginia and

chose to focus on poverty-related issues during the campaign.86 He criticized the

Eisenhower administration’s failure to deal with these issues. After his victory, Kennedy

stated that “man holds in his mortal hands the power to abolish all forms of human

poverty,” and he called for “a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny,

poverty, disease, and war itself.”87 After reading The Other America, or at least Dwight

Macdonald’s New Yorker review of the book, and Homer Bigart’s 1963 New York Times

articles on the horrible living conditions of eastern Kentucky coal miners, Kennedy

assigned his advisers to investigate U.S. poverty.88 In doing so, he endorsed the idea that

the federal government should play a part in improving the standard of living of the

country’s poorest citizens and tried to erase some of the complacency that marked the

American response to important issues like poverty.89

The Kennedy administration explored the causes of poverty and possible ways to

eliminate it. Early in his presidency, his advisors began to focus on the issues of juvenile

84 Sar A. Levitan and Joyce K. Zickler, Too Little But Not Too Late: Federal Aid to Lagging Areas (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1976), 2. 85 Trattner, 311. 86 Patterson, 122; Trattner, 313. 87 Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States. Washington, D.C. Bartleby.com, 2001. www.bartleby.com/124/. (accessed 6 June 2012). 88 Michael L. Gillette, Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 1; Patterson, 97. 89 Trattner, 321.

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delinquency, mental health, and regional economic development. In the spring of 1961,

Kennedy established the President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth

Crime, headed by Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and later signed into law the

Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act, which funded and provided

assistance to projects focused on preventing and eliminating juvenile delinquency in

inner cities.90 Other measures included the Mental Retardation Facilities and Community

Mental Health Centers Act, which provided federal money to research, construct, train

and staff community mental health facilities, the Area Redevelopment Act, which

provided incentives for new industries to relocate to areas with high levels of

unemployment, and the Manpower Development and Training Act, which was designed

to retrain individuals who lost their jobs as a result of technological changes in the

workplace.91 Each of these acts aimed to eliminate specific causes of poverty.

As they looked toward the 1964 election, President Kennedy and his advisers felt

that the elimination of poverty was a key domestic campaign focus. To investigate this

possibility, a diverse and ever-changing group of academics and officials from the

Bureau of the Budget and the Departments of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW),

Labor, Agriculture, and Justice met during informal Saturday “brown bag” lunches.92

According to Robert J. Lampman, a member of the staff of the Council of Economic

Advisers and a “brown bag” lunch participant, this unofficial group argued about

definitions of poverty and introduced and debated possible solutions starting in May,

1963.93 James Sundquist, the deputy undersecretary of Agriculture, also participated, and

90 Ibid., 320; Patterson, 123. 91 Trattner, 320-22. 92 Robert J. Lampman cited in Gillette, 1, 5-6. 93 Ibid., 6.

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he recalled that in the fall of 1963, the administration agreed on a more formal agenda

entitled “Widening Participation in Prosperity,” and each department concentrated on

three specific topics: preventing poverty, helping those in poverty to escape, and

improving the conditions for those who failed to escape.94 Before they could formulate a

concrete antipoverty program, President Kennedy died in Dallas, and Lyndon Johnson,

who was mostly disconnected from these proceedings, inherited the reins of power. This

unexpected transfer of power contributed to feelings of confusion about what to do next.

William M. Capron, a member of the Council of Economic Advisers and the president’s

poverty task force, explained that they were working on two unresolved questions at that

time, whether the proposed poverty program should fall under existing government

agencies or whether separate bureaucratic agencies should be created to handle the

programs for the poor and who should lead the charge on the antipoverty agenda and sell

it to Congress.95 There were even disagreements about the true purpose of the

antipoverty programs. Some argued that they were not really designed to end poverty but

rather to protect the image of the United States as a land of affluence within a Cold War

context or as a political ploy to ensure the loyalty of black voters to the Democratic

Party.96 Despite this confusion, the programs begun under President Kennedy provided a

starting point for President Johnson’s “War on Poverty.”

On November 23, 1963, his first full day in office, President Johnson met with

Walter Heller, the head of the Council of Economic Advisers and a key member of the

antipoverty task force. During the meeting, the two men discussed many things,

94 James Sundquist cited in Gillette, 12-13. 95 William M. Capron cited in Gillette, 8, 20-22. 96 Trattner, 313; Patterson, 129.

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including the status of the antipoverty program. When Heller explained the work that

had been done on this issue, President Johnson responded in a favorable way, stating,

“That’s my kind of program. I’ll find money for it one way or another. If I have to, I’ll

take money from things to get money for people.”97 Given Johnson’s background as a

teacher in rural Texas among poor Hispanic students and his earlier position as state

director of the National Youth Administration during the New Deal, this does seem like

his “kind of program.” This conversation was the beginning of what would become the

“War on Poverty,” and over time, those involved in the fight had numerous obstacles

standing in the way of victory.

One of the first challenges was the selection of an individual to oversee the

antipoverty programs. According to James Sundquist, the decision-makers reasoned that

this person had to be capable of selling the program to the American people and be

familiar with the legislative process in order to design a bill that Congress would

support.98 While the original list included many names, all parties eventually agreed

upon Sargent Shriver, President Kennedy’s brother-in-law, because he embodied a

number of qualities necessary for success. He had the Kennedy charisma, was an

experienced administrator who had presided over the Chicago Board of Education and

the Peace Corps program, agreed to work for one dollar per year, had many powerful

friends and connections, and knew how to craft legislation and a message to win over

Congress and the American public.99 Although he was hesitant to accept the position

due to his continued grief over Kennedy’s death and his commitment to the Peace Corp,

97 Walter Heller cited in Gillette, 15-16. 98 Sundquist cited in Gillette, 28-29. 99 Gillette, xvii-xviii, 30-31; Sargent Shriver cited in Gillette, 34.

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after being subjected to the “Johnson Treatment,” he agreed to head the antipoverty

taskforce while continuing as Peace Corps director.100 As the leader of the Peace Corps,

he emphasized that Americans can achieve great things but only through personal

sacrifice and extreme commitment, and he effectively used these same arguments to win

support for Johnson’s antipoverty agenda.101

Members of the taskforce also struggled with the decision of whether to work

through the existing federal bureaucracy or create a new agency to oversee the

antipoverty programs. Some government officials, including Secretary of Labor Willard

Wirtz and Secretary of HEW Anthony Celebrezze, fought to control antipoverty

programs within their own departments rather than see this power turned over to a new

agency.102 Many members of the antipoverty taskforce disagreed, arguing that there

would be no significant change in the poverty rate if existing agencies simply absorbed

the limited funds allotted for this new antipoverty initiative because the money “would

just get gobbled up in the usual bureaucratic crap.”103 Over time, officials continually

reevaluated and adjusted the entities that oversaw each antipoverty program.

Because of constant underfunding, antipoverty officials had to adjust to

insufficient space, staffing, and materials. Lacking adequate funds to hire enough

personnel, the task force borrowed people from other government agencies or individuals

simply volunteered their time, working nights and weekends with no compensation.104 In

100 Ibid., 31-35. 101 Murray Kempton, “The Essential Sargent Shriver,” New Republic 150 (March 28, 1964), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/81794/the-essential-sargent-shriver (accessed 12 January 2015). 102 Capron cited in Gillette, 20-22. 103 Ibid., 22. 104 Robert J. Lampman, Adam Yarmolinsky, and William P. Kelly Jr. cited in Gillette, 63-65, 75-76. Yarmolinsky was the chief of staff for the antipoverty taskforce and was on loan from the Department of Defense. Kelly held a number of positions including assistance director for management of the OEO, acting director of the CAPs, and the third director of Job Corps.

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the beginning, the taskforce did not even have office space and instead used old,

abandoned government buildings or “squatted” on the office space of others, and they

even had to “borrow” office supplies from other agencies.105 Inadequate funding and

associated problems continued to plague antipoverty officials even after the passage of

the EOA.

The antipoverty taskforce also faced a severe time crunch to formulate detailed

legislation and win Congress’s support of the bill. Unlike the architects of the New Deal

who had an unprecedented economic emergency that affected many Americans, War on

Poverty officials designed their program during a time of general prosperity, making it

more difficult to convince Congress and the general public that the law was necessary.

Members of the task force diligently worked to design a bill that both houses of Congress

would pass before they adjourned at the end of the summer because President Johnson

wanted to use this legislative success to campaign in the fall.106 Given that Johnson first

discussed poverty as a campaign issue in November, 1963, declared “War on Poverty”

during his State of the Union address and appointed Shriver to lead the charge in January,

it took a herculean effort on the part of officials to produce and submit a multifaceted

antipoverty bill to Congress on March 16, 1964. 107 To make matters even more difficult,

President Johnson made it very clear that his first legislative priority was a tax cut to

benefit Americans and boost general prosperity and that the antipoverty program could

not interfere with the passing of that tax bill.108 It is amazing that the members of the

105 Edgar May and Christopher Weeks cited in Gillette, 30, 55, 65, 73-75. May was a member of the taskforce and the author of a book about poverty. Weeks was one of the first taskforce members that Shriver recruited. 106 Gillette, 30; Yarmolinsky cited in Gillette, 129. 107 Gillette, 26-29. 108 Capron cited in Gillette, xviii, 21.

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taskforce succeeded in getting the EOA drafted and submitted under these conditions.

Managing that complicated task was a diverse group of individuals. There were

idea men like Michael Harrington and Paul Jacobs, who had actively researched the topic

of poverty, provided background information, and made suggestions, but there were also

legal and political experts like John Steadman, from the Department of Justice, and

Christopher Weeks, from the Bureau of the Budget, who were in charge of drafting the

actual legislation.109 As they began, the task force cast their net widely, encouraging

debate and the free flow of ideas.110 Some promoted Saul Alinsky’s ideas about

community organizing. Others focused on the need for educational reform. Secretary of

Labor Wirtz pushed for a “utopian” employment program to create more jobs.111 At the

helm, Shriver encouraged out-of-the-box thinking and a variety of solutions to deal with

the complexities of poverty.112 He instructed those drafting the bill to use general

language that would allow them to do many things to minimize poverty, but as the

discussion progressed, the bill came into focus.113 With the submission of this

legislation, Johnson put the power of the presidency behind the crusade to end poverty.

Molly Orshansky, an employee of the Social Security Administration’s Office of

Research and Statistics and the creator of an index that established an official definition

of poverty, emphasized the complexity of poverty. She stated:

Neither the present circumstances nor the reasons for them are alike for all

109 Frank Mankiewicz, Yarmolinsky, and William Cannon cited in Gillette, 13, 50-51, 64-65, 72-73. Mankiewicz and Cannon were members of the antipoverty task force. Mankiewicz was an attorney and Cannon was the assistant chief of the Office of Legislative Reference in the Bureau of the Budget. 110 Mankiewicz, Sundquist, and Ann Oppenheimer Hamilton cited in Gillette, 56-57, 58, 69. Ann Oppenheimer Hamilton worked at the Bureau of the Budget and arranged to be detailed to the poverty task force. 111 Cannon cited in Gillette, 14. 112 Mankiewicz cited in Gillette, 56-57. 113 John Steadman cited in Gillette, 73. Steadman was an employee at the Justice Department who served on the antipoverty taskforce.

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our impoverished millions, and the measures that can help reduce their number must likewise be many and varied. No single program…will succeed. Any complex of programs that does not allow for the diversity of… the poor will…leave the task undone. The poor have been counted many times. It remains now to count the ways by which to help them gain a new identity.114

In keeping with Orshansky’s advice, those who designed the EOA created a multifaceted

law, authorizing ten separate programs to attack the diverse causes of poverty. Congress

appropriated nearly $950 million to fund the EOA for the first year, and under the

provisions of the law, antipoverty officials worked to improve educational opportunities,

establish job training programs, organize community development programs, and

increase volunteerism, all in an attempt to lessen poverty in the United States.115

The EOA had to overcome significant opposition to win Congressional approval.

Republicans in both houses saw the bill as an election-year Democratic ploy to win votes,

as further contributing to an already unwieldy federal bureaucracy, and as a random

collection of measures that would do little to eliminate the underlying causes of

poverty.116 Congressional Republicans worked to enlist southern Democrats as allies to

defeat the bill, arguing that it ignored states’ rights, prevented governors from vetoing

antipoverty projects in their states, and encouraged controversial racial integration.117 To

deal with some of these issues and better ensure the bill’s passage, members of Congress

added a series of amendments, including a provision to give governors the power to veto

certain kinds of projects in their states.118 Shriver saw this as a nod to the doctrine of

114 Mollie Orshansky, “Counting the Poor: Another Look at the Poverty Profile,” The Social Security Bulletin (January 1965), 26. 115 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., H.R. 11377, Congressional Quarterly Almanac (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1965), 208. 116 Ibid. 117 Ibid. 118 Ibid. The amendments allowed governors to veto the placement of Job Corps camps and training centers and over all federally aided community action projects.

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states’ rights and hoped it would allow more Southern politicians to support the

legislation, but EOA supporters trusted that governors would veto few projects because

they wanted federal antipoverty money for their states.119 Another amendment required

that some participants in antipoverty programs swear an oath of support to the U.S.

government and openly reject communism.120 According to task force member

Christopher Weeks, this was a controversial amendment because many saw it as an

attempt to inject McCarthyism into the antipoverty process, thereby creating an obstacle

to the passage of the bill, but the law passed despite this amendment.121

Both houses of Congress approved the EOA, and President Johnson signed Public

Law 88-452 on August 20, 1964 in a White House ceremony.122 Johnson celebrated

what he considered to be a major legislative success, stating: “Today is the first time in

all the history of the human race, a great nation is able…and…willing to make a

commitment to eradicate poverty among its people…We want to offer the forgotten fifth

of our people opportunity and not doles,” and in recognition of his hard work, President

Johnson gave one of the pens to Sargent Shriver.123 Echoing John Kenneth Galbraith, the

act began with the following “Declaration of Purpose:”

Although the economic well-being and prosperity of the United States has progressed to a level surpassing any achieved in world history, and although these benefits are widely shared…, poverty continues to be the lot of a substantial number of…people. The United States can achieve its full economic and social potential…only if every individual has the opportunity to contribute to the full extent of his capabilities and to participate in the workings of society. It is, therefore, the policy of the United States to eliminate the paradox of poverty

119 Shriver cited in Gillette, 170-71. 120 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 208. The amendments required Job Corps enrollees and VISTA volunteers to swear oaths of allegiance to the U.S. government and denied affiliation with the Communist Party or another other organizations committed to the violent overthrow of the government. 121 Weeks cited in Gillette, 171-72. 122 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 208, 226, 228; Gillette, 128-29. 123 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 208, 228; Gillette, 129.

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in the midst of plenty…by opening to everyone the opportunity for education and training, …to work, and …to live in decency and dignity.124

Given the multifaceted nature of poverty, the EOA consisted of seven different sections,

each creating one or more new programs to eliminate poverty.

Title I focused on young people and attacked two major causes of poverty among

this population—lack of education and marketable job skills. To combat these causes,

Title I created Job Corps, Work-Training Programs, and Work Study Programs. Of these

three programs, Jobs Corps was one of the largest and most controversial parts of the

EOA. It was loosely designed to replicate the New Deal Civilian Conservation Corps

(CCC) and the National Youth Administration (NYA), except that the Job Corps focused

on retraining youth rather than providing short-term money for public work projects.125

Both Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota and President Kennedy had previously

attempted to resurrect the idea of conservation work combined with job training, but it

took President Johnson’s War on Poverty to get the idea off the ground once again. The

Job Corps program selected low-income men and women aged sixteen to twenty-one and

provided educational and vocational training as well, as work experience, in rural or

urban residential training centers.126 In addition, Job Corps provided medical and dental

care to corpsmen, and for many, it was the first time they had ever received these

services.127 While the length of enrollment varied, participation was not to exceed two

years, except in special cases. In the beginning, program officials preferred placing Job

124 Economic Opportunity Act, Statutes at Large 78 (1964). http://heinonline.org.tproxy01.lib.utah.edu/HOL/Page?handle=hein.statute/sal078&men_hide=false&men_tab=citnav&collection=statute&page=508, 508. (accessed 20 March 2009). 125 Gillette, 105; Patterson, 123. 126 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 210. 127 Economic Opportunity Act, Statutes at Large, 509.

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Corps participants in camps far from their homes, as they believed this would eliminate

some of the environmental factors that contributed to the cycle of poverty.128 During the

drafting of the EOA, there were great debates about which agency would oversee Job

Corps, who would be eligible for the program, and how the program would work. Even

after the EOA became law, controversy continued to surround the program.

There was much debate over which agency should run the Job Corps program.

Secretary of Labor Wirtz requested that his department control any job-training and job-

creating programs, including Job Corps.129 Instead, President Johnson placed the

program under the newly created Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), and this

decision exacerbated already existing bureaucratic turf wars. Adam Yarmolinsky, a key

figure on the taskforce, argued that the EOA provided for the creation of the OEO to

oversee Job Corps and other antipoverty programs because of the old Roosevelt concept

that competition between agencies guaranteed the most effective and efficient services

for the target population.130 The friction between existing and new agencies continued to

cause conflict throughout the life of the EOA.

Many established groups played a substantial role in the administration and

management of Job Corps centers. The Departments of Agriculture and the Interior

operated the smaller rural conservation camps. Based on the earlier CCC model, these

agencies used corpsmen to conserve, develop, and manage public resources and

recreational areas. According to John Baker and Jack Howard, the executive assistant to

the undersecretary of Labor, many policy makers believed that hard work in the fresh air

128 John A. Andrew III, Lyndon Johnson and the Great Society (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1998), 64. 129 Yarmolinsky cited in Gillette, 105, 107; Michael B. Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), 83, 89. 130 Yarmolinsky cited in Gillette, 107.

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was good for the human soul and might help to rehabilitate corpsmen, but Baker and

Howard emphasized that many corpsmen were quite different from those who had served

in the CCC and that antipoverty officials just employed this argument to justify using

existing CCC facilities in rural areas.131

Major corporations managed the larger urban centers that provided more

specialized vocational training. Although many pro-Republican businessmen were

skeptical of the EOA because they believed that it was nothing but a political

“boondoggle,” Vernon Alden, the man chosen to develop Job Corps, stated that many

corporate leaders, suffering during the 1964 business recession, recognized the

organization and management of Job Corps centers as an opportunity for economic

gain.132 Some of the country’s most successful corporations, including General Electric,

IBM, Litton Industries, and Westinghouse, operated urban training centers.133 Although

the quality of corporate leadership varied from center to center, Otis A. Singletary, the

first full-time director of the Job Corps, maintained corporate-run centers operated

efficiently and that the Camp Gary center in Texas, run by Texas Instruments and several

large oil companies, was one of the top Job Corp centers.134 Yet, the connection between

big business and government antipoverty programs led some to question whether the

government was more interested in helping big business than the poor .135

Many involved in Job Corps believed that academia should play a significant role

131 Baker and Jack Howard cited in Gillette, 106, 111-12. 132 Vernon Alden cited in Gillette, 111, 116-17. Prior to his selection to develop the Job Corps program, Alden had been the president of Ohio University, and antipoverty officials believed that his previous experience would improve Job Corps. 133 Allen J. Matusow, The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1986), 237. 134 Otis A. Singletary Jr. cited in Gillette, 188, 225-26. 135 Matusow, The Unraveling of America, 32-33; John Morton Blum, Years of Discord: American Politics and Society, 1961-1974 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991), 272-73.

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in designing the program. President Johnson and Sargent Shriver felt that Job Corps

should provide not only vocational training but also much needed general educational

opportunities for corpsmen.136 Shriver believed that a strong connection between Job

Corps and academia would contribute to greater public support and respect for the

program. To build this crucial relationship, Johnson and Shriver approached academic

visionaries to assist in the design and direction of the program. They selected Vernon

Alden, the president of Ohio University, to direct the planning effort for Job Corps

because of his academic credentials and his strong connections with the business

community.137 When Alden later stepped down, Shriver replaced him with Otis A.

Singletary, Jr., the chancellor of the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, another

man with a strong academic background. While many believed that connections with

academia would bring educational distinction to Job Corps and ensure its success, the

results were mixed. Alden felt that too often academics saw Job Corps as their own

research program and treated enrollees as lab rats in an experiment rather than providing

practical opportunities for them to learn skills to make them more employable and useful

in society.138

There were also debates about who should be allowed or encouraged to attend,

including the gender of eligible enrollees. Using the CCC as their example, there were

those who felt that only young men should be eligible, but others strongly disagreed.

Many on the task force believed that the most pressing problem was providing the

education and skills necessary for male drop-outs to secure gainful employment and

136 Alden cited in Gillette, 115-18. 137 Ibid., 111, 114-15. 138 Ibid., 117.

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protect the ideal of the male breadwinner, and they thought that the inclusion of young

women would complicate things, contributing to additional problems such as unwanted

pregnancies.139 They also rejected the idea of separate Job Corps centers for men and

women, and it seemed that women would be completely excluded from the program until

Representative Edith Green got involved. Green, a former educator, was a Democratic

congresswoman from Oregon and an influential member of the House Education and

Labor Committee, the group in charge of the initial EOA investigation.140 Although

many members of the task force opposed the inclusion of women in the program, when

Green demanded that they be included, “it was obvious that the answer was going to be

yes.”141 As a result of Green’s challenge, Job Corps became a coeducational training

program, but there continued to be separate centers for males and females.

Additionally, officials debated whether Job Corps should focus on those living in

the most extreme poverty or concentrate on individuals who only needed a little boost to

rise out of poverty. Although the purpose of the EOA was to end poverty, the prevailing

philosophy among Job Corps officials was to concentrate on the “cream of the ‘crap,’”

arguing that if they focused on the toughest cases first, the chances of failure were greater

and might jeopardize the success of the entire program.142 By directing their attention to

those who had the greatest potential, program directors hoped to help some individuals

out of poverty and then use what they learned with these corpsmen to improve their

chances of success with more difficult youth. Still, Job Corps officials continued to

accept and work with young people that all other institutions had forgotten, including

139 Weeks and Norbert A. Schlei cited in Gillette, 82, 135. 140 Weeks cited in Gillette, 134-35. 141 Ibid., 135; Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 216. 142 Hamilton cited in Gillette, 112.

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individuals who had confronted educational, racial, and economic obstacles before

entering the program.143 Officials only rejected those with serious criminal records or

mental or physical handicaps that were beyond the scope of the Job Corps program.144

Given the explosive civil rights situation in the mid-1960s, program officials had

to carefully consider the impact that the racial make-up of each center would have on the

level of support in each location, and racial issues further aggravated the tension between

those who felt that the poverty programs should focus on urban problems and those who

believed that rural areas should receive more attention. This tension stemmed from the

conventional wisdom that poverty was a black problem despite the fact that the majority

of the poor people living in the United States were white and that in spite of their

rhetoric, white liberals were not highly sensitive to the economic problems of black

Americans during the planning phases of the War on Poverty.145 Many liberals feared

that focusing on programs to help individuals in the ghetto would undercut the support of

the American public and Congress necessary for the continuation of the program.146

Therefore, Job Corps officials often ignored discussion about the problems in inner cities

and emphasized the poor living in Appalachia and other rural areas, underscoring the fact

that the poor were white as well as black. Because Job Corps centers were racially

integrated, Southern political leaders opposed the placement of centers in their states.

This led to an EOA amendment, allowing governors to veto the placement of Job Corps

facilities in their states, and as a result, there were no centers in the Deep South.147

143 Weeks cited in Gillette, 220-21; Matusow, 238. 144 Weeks cited in Gillette, 220-21. 145 Gareth Davies, From Opportunity to Entitlement: The Transformation and Decline of Great Society Liberalism (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1996), 45. 146 Alden cited in Gillette, 115-17. 147 Kelly cited in Gillette, 217-218; Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 208.

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Controversies over racial considerations continued to plague Job Corps.

Another issue that continued to stir up controversy was the cost of educating

corpsmen. Opponents claimed that the program cost up to $7,500 per enrollee per year,

comparable to the price tag of a Harvard education.148 Supporters, especially those

directly involved in developing and overseeing the program, vehemently denied these

claims. Director Singletary stressed that none of these young men could get into Harvard

and urged adversaries to calculate the money spent on a Harvard freshmen throughout his

entire educational career and compare that to the sum paid to educate a corpsman prior to

his admission into the Jobs Corps program.149 In light of these calculations, the cost of

the program did not seem so large. Others joined Singletary in disputing these excessive

projections. George D. McCarthy, a special assistant to the director of the Job Corps,

argued that opponents included all of the start-up costs of the program, including the

building and upgrading of facilities, when they figured the average cost per year for each

corpsmen, and when those expenses were amortized over the life of the program, the cost

of Job Corps was much cheaper than Harvard and almost identical to the price tag for an

inmate in prison.150 According to a one time director of the program, President Johnson

urged people to see Job Corps expenditures as more than an investment in natural

resources and jobs; it was an investment in human potential that would improve the

quality of life for young men and women in the program and produce positive ripple

effects for the nation as a whole.151 In light of these gains, perhaps the cost of the

program was not as high as some reported.

148 Patterson, 124; George D. McCarthy cited in Gillette, 232; Matusow, 238. 149 Singletary cited in Gillette, 231-32. 150 George D. McCarthy cited in Gillette, 232. 151 Singletary cited in Gillette, 234.

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Critics also objected to what they perceived as a high dropout rate among

corpsmen, but once again, defenders argued that statistics were misleading. Although the

dropout rates varied depending on the source, opponents maintained that from one-third

to two-thirds of all enrollees quit before finishing the six- to nine-month program.152

Director Singletary acknowledged that a thirty-five percent dropout rate (a frequently

cited Job Corps dropout rate) was “pretty high,” but he felt that opponents were not

taking all relevant factors into consideration.153 He argued that Job Corps favorably

compared to college dropout rates, stating that the projected dropout rate for college

freshmen in most years was fifty percent. He also encouraged skeptics to remember that

one hundred percent of corpsmen had dropped out of school somewhere else before

entering Job Corps, so if only thirty-five percent of corpsmen quit before completion,

sixty-five percent stuck with it and received the benefits of completing the program.

Others challenged the decision to remove young men and women from their home

environments and place them in residential centers in other parts of the country. Shriver

explained the policy of relocation in the following way:

…a large number of the poor, unemployed teenagers in America are to some extent victims of their surroundings. They grow up in a certain social environment which is almost conducive to keeping them the way they are. I felt it was important to extract them out of that environment and to put them in a different environment, twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year, two years, a totally new environment, … Expose them to a new culture: a culture of work, …discipline, …personal responsibility. I thought that to take them away from where they were and to put them into this new culture,…would be profoundly transforming…and beneficial to them.154

Critics disputed Shriver’s logic. Jack Howard, the Department of Labor official in charge

152 Patterson, 124; Matusow, 238. 153 Singletary cited in Gillette, 231-32. 154 Shriver cited in Gillette, 233.

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of all poverty planning in 1964, argued that it was much too expensive to transport

recruits and reasoned that moving them was a bad policy that led to cultural problems

between corpsmen and the communities near the Job Corps centers and that the great

distance between the corpsmen and their homes deprived these young men and women of

any existing support networks.155 He believed that if the recruits stayed in camps closer

to home, they could visit their families and friends on weekends, and this would prevent

the emergence of cultural divisions between corpsmen and the communities surrounding

the centers, avoiding some of the glaring problems that emerged when they were

relocated to distant, unfamiliar parts of the country. Christopher Weeks, the first deputy

director of Job Corps, seconded many of Howard’s objections. He claimed that because

Job Corps took kids from chaotic backgrounds and put them 2,000 miles away from

home, when they received letters or phone calls about a disaster at home, the natural

reaction of the corpsmen was to do anything possible to get home, undercutting the

effectiveness of the program. 156

Singletary and others opposed the call for more localized centers. He maintained

that the removal of poor kids from troubled environments and their placement in

residential centers was at the very heart of the Job Corps program.157 William P. Kelly

Jr., an assistant to Shriver and later director of Job Corps, believed that if Job Corps had

been developed as a nonresidential program that allowed corpsmen a direct link to home,

it would have resulted in almost immediate failure because corpsmen would have

maintained established ways, avoided positive change, and failed to show up for

155 Howard cited in Gillette, 110-11. 156 Weeks cited in Gillette, 227-28. 157 Singletary cited in Gillette, 222.

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scheduled courses and training.158 Like Singletary, Kelly emphasized that distance was

critical to success. Shriver justified it another way, arguing that poverty was a national

problem and that it would be unfair to concentrate efforts to end poverty in the areas with

the highest poverty rates.159 He believed that fighting poverty—like a national defense—

required a national effort, and Job Corps centers—like military bases—needed to be

located throughout the country. Shriver also maintained that the act of traveling to new

places was an educational experience and that it had a positive impact on the corpsmen.

As with other EOA provisions, one of the most controversial features of Job

Corps was the way this program affected the relationship between the federal

bureaucracy and state and local governments. Given the complex nature of U.S.

federalism, there has often been tension when state and local officials believed that

national leaders were controlling them and dictating unwanted policies and programs.

According to William Kelly, hardline states’ rights supporters like Congresswoman

Green believed that the power of the federal government should be limited to establishing

guidelines for programs, reviewing state plans to make sure they meet the guidelines,

writing checks, and allowing the states and local communities to carry out the

programs.160 Since antipoverty officials believed that local leaders too often failed to

help the poor, they purposefully bypassed state and local leaders, increasing this already

existing tension and negatively affecting local feelings about the Job Corps program.

When policymakers designed the EOA, they did make some attempts to quiet the fears of

state authorities. Section 109 stated that a governor had thirty days to review a detailed

158 Kelly cited in Gillette, 75, 222. 159 Shriver cited in Gillette, 222-23. 160 Kelly cited in Gillette, 346-47.

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plan for any proposed Job Corps camp within his state and had the authority to veto the

creation or placement of a camp, and section 104 required enrollees to take an oath to

support the Constitution and the nation’s laws and oppose the country’s enemies.161

Shriver called the governors’ veto a compromise measure to protect state sovereignty and

encourage skeptical members of Congress to ratify the EOA, and Congress inserted the

loyalty oath to reassure local officials that they would not have to deal with communists

and other subversives.162 In spite of these concessions, the program remained divisive,

and negative media stories about problems at specific Job Corps centers contributed to

local opposition to the establishment of camps in many places.163

Another central question was whether Job Corps could actually contribute to a

reduction of poverty in the United States. Labor Secretary Wirtz argued that a training

program, such as Job Corps, without any guaranteed employment at the end could not

possibly end poverty, and therefore, he proposed a massive job-creation program.164

President Johnson ignored Wirtz’s proposal, feeling that his proposed tax cut would

generate more jobs for graduating corpsmen. Still, many felt that the lack of an

employment component ultimately undercut the effectiveness of Job Corps, leaving too

many graduates unemployed or employed in jobs that failed to pay enough to get them

out of poverty.

Others questioned whether Job Corps training actually prepared young men and

women for existing and future jobs. Some argued that the program’s emphasis on

161 Economic Opportunity Act, Statutes at Large, 509, 511. 162 Shriver cited in Gillette, 170-71. 163 Patterson, 125; Kelly cited in Gillette, 196-97; Matusow, 238. 164 Yarmolinksy cited in Gillette, 105, 107.

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conservation work failed to prepare corpsmen for industrial or technological jobs.165

John Baker, a member of the antipoverty taskforce, acknowledged that Job Corps focused

more on vocational training and less on manpower development and provided benefits

that were more general than specific.166 Hidden in this description, Baker seemed to

accept that, while graduates gained skills through their participation in the program, these

skills did not necessarily prepare them for well-paying jobs. When Adam Yarmolinsky

reflected on the impact of Job Corps, he mourned the fact that there were few jobs

available for corpsmen and that too many of the available jobs kept graduates below the

poverty line.167 Former director William P. Kelly acknowledged that, at the time he took

over the program, there was no data to demonstrate that the program helped graduates to

obtain well-paying jobs, and this lack of information contributed to public questions

about the program’s effectiveness.168 While there was some evidence that graduates

earned higher wages and had lower unemployment rates than Job Corps dropouts,

surveys conducted in 1966 and 1967 cast a shadow of doubt on this, stating that those

who graduated had no more success in the labor market than applicants who were

accepted but decided not to join Job Corps and that over a quarter of all Job Corps

graduates were unemployed six months after finishing the program.169 These statistics

failed to provide a flattering assessment of the program.

In addition to Job Corps, Title I of the EOA created Work-Training Programs,

more popularly known as the Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC), and Work Study

165 Patterson, 124. 166 Baker cited in Gillette, 229. 167 Yarmolinsky cited in Gillette, 356. 168 Kelly cited in Gillette, 339-40. 169 Matusow, 238.

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Programs, and compared to Job Corps, these programs were much smaller, less

controversial, and delegated to already existing government agencies. The NYC gave

federal assistance to state and local agencies to provide work experience for young men

and women—age sixteen to twenty-one—so that they might gain necessary vocational

skills, encourage them to remain or return to school, and complete community service

projects. 170 The NYC included an “in-school” option that employed current students for

twelve to fifteen hours a week, and an “out-of-school” option that allowed individuals to

work up to thirty-two hours per week and receive eight hours of “counseling, remedial

education, and job-related training” in preparation for more long-term employment.171

While there were more people involved with the NYC than Job Corps, they were all local

youth that lived at home, and as a result, the size and cost of the program was smaller,

and it remained more popular and less controversial than Job Corps.172

Unlike Job Corps, the Department of Labor oversaw the NYC, and the Office of

Economic Opportunity (OEO) merely served as a conduit of information and funds for

the Labor Department.173 C. Robert Perrin, the OEO’s assistant director for

governmental relations, saw the NYC as a “consolation prize” for Secretary Wirtz to

make up for the rejection of his massive job-creation proposal and OEO control of Job

Corps.174 The Labor Department administered the program with little OEO input.175 As

170 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 211. 171 “Quick Facts on the Programs of the Office of Economic Opportunity,” Office of Economic Opportunity. David S. King Papers, Box 16, Folder 15, Special Collections, Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City. 172 “Economic Opportunity Programs,” Office of Economic Opportunity. Calvin L. Rampton Papers, Series 14250, Reel 17, Box 8, Folder 32, Utah State Archives, Salt Lake City. By the end of the second year of the War on Poverty, there were 800,000 NYC participants compared to only 88,000 Job Corps enrollees. 173 “Direct and Delegated Authority,” Office of Economic Opportunity. Rampton Papers, Series 14250, Reel 17, Box 8, Folder 32; C. Robert Perrin cited in Gillette, 302-05. 174 Perrin cited in Gillette, 128, 303. 175 Ibid., 302-05.

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a result, there was a constant battle between the two agencies over the underlying

philosophy of the program—whether it should provide true job training or simply

distribute a little money to a handful of students.176 While NYC officials wanted the

program to be meaningful, their limited budget prevented them from making radical

changes.

Members of the taskforce hoped that the NYC programs would seamlessly bring

together federal, state, and local officials and agencies to help those in need. The EOA

stipulated that the national director would cooperate with state and local organizations,

local educational authorities, and existing training programs to train local youth, improve

facilities and programs, and develop natural resources and recreation areas, but it

prohibited cooperation between NYC and partisan groups, such as political parties, an

attempt to keep the NYC above party politics.177 For the first two years, the federal

government paid up to ninety percent of NYC costs, but the federal investment dropped

to fifty percent after the second year. Antipoverty officials hoped that this formula would

enable state and local authorities to create useful projects and only gradually have to

increase the local costs associated with NYC projects. In hopes of winning greater

support, the EOA also had safeguards against the displacement of local workers,

promising to keep NYC wages consistent with local standards.178 In some places, the

NYC failed to live up to this promise, paying higher wages than local employers, and this

caused problems, but in many cases, local officials chose to overlook this because they

recognized how much money this program brought to their communities.179

176 Levine, 66. 177 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 211. 178 Economic Opportunity Act, Statutes at Large, 512. 179 Howard cited in Gillette, 314.

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Title I of the EOA also created the Work-Study Programs. These programs

encouraged institutions of higher learning to employ low-income students on a part-time

basis so they could afford a post-high school education, thereby breaking the cycle of

poverty.180 Francis Keppel, the commissioner of education, had previously tried to create

a similar program, but to no avail.181 During the drafting of the antipoverty law, Keppel

approached Shriver about including a work-study component in the EOA, and he agreed.

Since officials at the Office of Education came up with this idea, the EOA delegated

work-study to them, allowing OEO to focus on helping those in the most need.

Created under Title II, Community Action Programs (CAP) were at the heart of

the EOA, and they proved to be among the most controversial EOA programs. Through

CAP, OEO provided the resources necessary for all types of communities to organize

locally and create programs targeting the causes and effects of poverty specific to each

neighborhood.182 While the act attempted to define the term “community action

program,” the concept remained vague, leading to continual debate and conflict over the

true definition and primary purpose of CAPs. According to the EOA, OEO officials had

the authority to award grants to any state or local agency that had a plan to combat

poverty by creating new employment opportunities, providing vocational or educational

training, increasing the motivation of the poor to find jobs, or improving the living

conditions of disadvantaged individuals.183 Although the EOA identified the

“community” as the intended recipient of aid, the definition of “community” was very

broad, allowing entire states, large metropolitan areas, or multiple cities or counties to

180 Economic Opportunity Act, Statutes at Large, 513. 181 Shriver cited in Gillette, 305. 182 Economic Opportunity Act, Statutes at Large, 516. 183 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 211.

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qualify for CAP money.184 Nonprofit agencies were also eligible for funding, but the

EOA prohibited political parties from creating CAPs. The act referred to these

coordinating groups, whether administered by a state, county, city, or other entity, as

community action agencies (CAA). To qualify for a CAP grant, a CAA had to ensure the

“maximum feasible participation” of the poor in the process of identifying problems and

developing effective and reasonable solutions.185 The idea of “maximum feasible

participation” remained one of the most controversial aspects of CAPs because no one

really knew what the poor might attempt once they were organized. To reassure local

officials and win their support, the EOA gave state governors the power to review the

plans for any proposed CAP for thirty days and veto those they opposed, allowing them

to control local matters in accordance with states’ rights philosophy.186

As with other EOA programs, the federal government covered ninety percent of

CAP costs during the first two years, but the federal share dropped to fifty percent after

that time, unless the OEO director determined otherwise. The act allocated up to fifteen

percent of CAP money for research and training by colleges, states, and other nonprofit

organization, and the OEO director could distribute additional funds for technical

assistance and the training of personnel to help communities develop local action

projects.187

The EOA’s CAP component built on the experiences of numerous community-

based programs across the nation. Saul Alinsky, perhaps the most famous community

184 Economic Opportunity Act, Statutes at Large, 516. 185 Ibid., 520, 523. 186 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 211. 187 “Guide to the Program of Grants to States for Providing Technical Assistance to Communities,” Office of Economic Opportunity. Rampton Papers, Series 14250, Reel 3, Box 1, Folder 21.

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organizer, created the Back of the Yards movement, a group that brought about change

by organizing the discontented poor.188 Beginning in the 1950s, Alinsky shined a

spotlight on U.S. poverty and the need to eradicate it and emphasized the importance of

teaching the poor to speak for themselves, to organize, and to discover and utilize their

own political power to facilitate change.189 He recognized that the process required

conflict between the poor and those in power and maintained that the role of outside

organizers was to offer hints about tactics and then allow the poor to speak and act for

themselves.190 At first, Alinsky served as a part-time CAP consultant, but he soon

became one of the most vocal critics of the way CAPs evolved under government

control.191

In addition to Alinsky’s project, there were several others that served as models

for CAP. In New York City, Mobilization for Youth (MFY) established by Lloyd Ohlin,

the research director at the Columbia School of Social Work, and his colleague Richard

Cloward used the ideas developed at the University of Chicago during the 1930s to create

a program to help juvenile delinquents gain a sense of control, organize, and collectively

improve their environment. 192 During the early 1960s, Richard Boone and other

community organizers used Ford Foundation funding to establish the “gray areas”

program that used community action projects to reintroduce hope and opportunity to

areas with low property values. Harlem Youth Opportunities Unlimited (HARYOU)

received a planning grant from the President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency in

188 Matusow, 248; Robert F. Clark, Maximum Feasible Success: A History of the Community Action Program (Washington, D.C.: The National Association of Community Action Agencies, 2000), 57. 189 Trattner, 311; Patterson, 109. 190 Andrew, 73; Patterson, 135. 191 Matusow, 248; Trattner, 323. 192 Ibid., 109.

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1962, and Director Kenneth Clark and others used those funds to create neighborhood

groups in black ghettos to empower the poor and train them to push for much needed

institutional change.193 During the summer of 1964, the Students for a Democratic

Society (SDS) created the Newark Community Union Project (NCUP), a program that

used white students to organize the poor to improve their community, and as a result,

they faced a great deal of hostility from business and political interests in Newark.194

Not all community action attempts occurred in northern cities. The North

Carolina Fund, directed by Governor Terry Sanford and funded by the Ford Foundation,

the Babcock and Reynolds Foundation, and matching grants from local and federal

sources, used the community action model to assist government agencies in improving

education, employment, welfare, and health services for the poor in cities and counties

throughout North Carolina.195 Each of these demonstration projects influenced the CAP

component of the EOA.

Despite these early examples, the taskforce’s definition of community action

remained quite vague. The proponents of the EOA used this ambiguity to build support

for community action. By declaring “unconditional war on poverty,” President Johnson

created the illusion of a moral cause that made it easy for Americans to support and

difficult for them to oppose, creating a sense of unity for the greater good.196 To

maintain the illusion, those conducting the “war” used nebulous language to avoid

specifically defining targets in pursuit of their overall goal because they feared the loss of

193 Ibid., 257. 194 Andrew, 69. 195 Gillette, 419; Clark, 54. 196 David Zarefsky, President Johnson’s War on Poverty: Rhetoric and History (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1986), xiii, 32-33; Levine, 31.

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political support if they provided explicit details about methods and objectives of CAPs.

This lack of specificity led to much debate about and disillusionment with CAPs.

Politicians, the American public, and the poor argued about the meaning of “community

action” and “maximum feasible participation” and questioned the goals of CAPs and the

appropriate relationship between federally-sponsored CAPs and entrenched state and

local political systems and other established organizations.

Once the EOA passed, those implementing the law had to deal with these

ambiguities, a problematic task that never went away, undercutting the overall

effectiveness of community action programs.197 Supporters of CAPs argued that they

were an excellent example of democratic theory in action, including Sargent Shriver, who

described them as a modern parallel to the New England town meeting. Even those who

saw CAPs as a manifestation of democracy disagreed over whether they should follow a

participatory, grass-root democracy model with widespread participation of the poor or a

representative democracy model using elected officials to represent the will of the people,

including the poor. This debate included disagreements about methods and objectives.

Those supporting a participatory agenda felt the poor had the best understanding of the

causes and nature of poverty, that they should be actively involved in the planning and

implementation of antipoverty solutions, and that the logical and necessary outcome of

the process should be empowerment of the people.198 In contrast, those who advocated

for a representative model felt that CAPs should be used to improve the efficiency and

coordination of services to the poor, much like the Peace Corps had done globally.199

197 Zarefsky, 120-22. 198 Andrew, 73; Katz, The Undeserving Poor, 97-98. 199 Andrew, 73.

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The role of the poor in this more paternalistic system was to help identify community

problems and establish agencies to provide the services necessary to eliminate poverty.200

Closely related to the debate over the meaning of community action was the

deliberation over the definition of “maximum feasible participation.” The EOA stated

that CAPs should be developed and administered with the “maximum feasible

participation” of the group being served, but this left a lot of room for interpretation.201

Even those who helped design the law disagreed about what it meant. While it seemed

clear that the poor should be involved in the development of workable solutions to end

poverty, the debate seemed to be about the level and depth of that participation. Richard

Boone, a man with a long history of community action experience and the man most

responsible for designing Title II of the EOA, is often credited with coining this phrase.

Boone believed that those who received services should play a part in managing and

organizing antipoverty programs, that they should serve on antipoverty boards, and that

those experiences should contribute in very real ways to their sense of empowerment.202

He emphasized that maximum feasible participation was a critical ingredient necessary to

bring about institutional changes and the end of poverty in the United States.203

Others saw “maximum feasible participation” as a more limited concept. Norbert

Schlei, an assistant attorney general on the antipoverty taskforce, believed that the poor

should play a role in these programs but did not think they should be in control because

they did not have the experience necessary to be successful as leaders.204 Daniel Patrick

200 Katz, The Undeserving Poor, 99. 201 Economic Opportunity Act, Statutes at Large, 516. 202 Richard Boone, “New Dimensions for the War on Poverty” (speech given at the Mid America Institute, Dallas, Texas, 23 April, 1968), copy given to the author; Davies, 89. 203 Matusow, 251. 204 Schlei cited in Gillette, 88-89.

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Moynihan, a representative of the Labor Department on the taskforce who later criticized

CAPs, claimed that lawmakers included the phrase “maximum feasible participation”

without much thought and that those who implemented these programs used the most

liberal interpretation possible, creating CAPs that gave the poor more power than the

designers of the bill intended.205 To eliminate some of the ambiguity and silence debate,

later amendments to the EOA eliminated the phrase and made it clear that the

involvement of the poor would be limited to one-third of the members on each CAP

board.206 While this change outraged those who supported a broad definition of

maximum feasible participation, President Johnson approved the change, feeling that it

would keep the extremists from taking control of CAPs.207

There were significant disagreements over the relationship between CAPs and

state and local governments and agencies already dealing with poverty. The EOA was

unclear in explaining the extent to which CAAs had to work with the governor’s office,

the mayor’s office, and established local welfare departments, and even those most

directly involved with the implementation of CAPs had different ideas about this

relationship.208 Some argued that CAAs should be separate from local and state agencies

because these individuals and entities had not done enough to eliminate poverty in the

past, and in many cases, the existing agencies were actually responsible for its continued

existence.209 Frank Mankiewicz, a member of the antipoverty taskforce, specifically

identified public school systems, existing manpower programs, social welfare agencies,

205Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding (New York: Free Press, 1969), 87-91. 206 John Morton Blum, Years of Discord: American Politics and Society, 1961-1974 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992), 172-173. 207 Ibid., 173. 208 Yarmolinsky, Shriver, Frederick O’Reilly Hayes, Frank Mankiewicz, Schlei, and Kermit Gordon cited in Gillette, 89-95. 209 Gillette, 89-99.

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and city and county governments as institutions that had failed to help the poor.210

Others, including Adam Yarmolinsky, felt that CAPs bypassed state and local power

structures to overcome entrenched racism and discrimination in some locations.211

Sargent Shriver stated that he never envisioned a CAA working through the traditional

channels of local government, seeing them as independent agencies, like local school

boards, that would speak out to improve the lives of the poor.212

Others believed that CAAs should work with existing local power structures to

end poverty. President Johnson communicated to close advisor Bill Moyers that he

assumed local and state governments would be in charge of the development of CAPs.213

Frederick O’Reilly Hayes, a member of the taskforce and assistant director of CAP,

thought existing educational, social, and welfare agencies should become more

responsive to the needs of their clients, but he firmly believed that local governments

should oversee CAPs.214 Clearly, there was an important split in opinion among those

who developed and implemented CAPs.

In some places, CAPs introduced controversial tactics, crises occurred, and state

and city leaders responded with outrage and calls for changes in the law. Richard

Cloward, the prominent community organizer, advocated that the poor directly challenge

unfair groups and policies to overcome their feelings of powerlessness.215 This conflict

model of community organizing led to dramatic events including rent strikes and school

boycotts. CAP attorneys educated the poor about their rights under the EOA and

210 Mankiewicz cited in Gillette, 92. 211 Yarmolinsky cited in Gillette, 94. 212 Shriver cited in Gillette, 90-91. 213 Yarmolinksky cited in Gillette, 89. 214 Hayes cited in Gillette, 82, 91-92. 215 Patterson, 135.

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encouraged them to confront local authorities and demand their rights.216 Community

action became a way of challenging the status quo and forcing changes on unresponsive

institutions. These clashes caught the attention of policymakers and led them to question

the wisdom of funding these confrontational CAPs with public money, especially in cases

where things became violent.217 Leaders in Syracuse, Chicago, and locations throughout

Mississippi complained that CAPs bypassed local government, encouraged violence, and

threatened deeply entrenched racial norms.218 Some questioned the role CAPs played in

the riots that rocked the nation during the summers of the mid- to late-1960s, though

there were many who felt that most CAP employees defused the tensions at the heart of

the riots.219 Although only a few CAPs engaged in the direct use of violence, a cloud of

controversy hung over community action programs.

Others challenged CAPs on the basis of perceived misadministration. Many

conservative members of both political parties, as well as the press, charged CAPs with

questionable accounting, ineffective administration, reverse discrimination, and having

ties to communism. Mississippi Senator John Stennis accused the Child Development

Group of Mississippi (CDGM), a Head Start project for disadvantaged preschoolers, of

unacceptable civil rights activities and inaccurate accounting.220 Conservatives used

phrases like “poverty grab bag” and “the Santa Clause of free lunch” to describe

CAPs.221 On the other side of the political spectrum, radicals like Saul Alinsky attacked

the programs, arguing that too many CAPs represented politics as usual because

216 Blum, 172. 217 Davies, 91. 218 Clark, 92-94, 104-05; Matusow, 248. 219 Davies, 194-95. 220 Matusow, 253. 221 Trattner, 323-24.

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traditional stakeholders controlled the money, used the programs to provide well-paying

jobs for loyal supporters, and prevented meaningful change.222

While many called for the elimination of federally-supported CAPs, the

controversies surrounding CAPs instead led to a redefinition of these programs during the

1966 and 1967 legislative sessions. In 1966, Congress attempted to deal with the

ambiguity of the phrase “maximum feasible participation,” stating that this phrase meant

that at least one-third of each CAP board of directors had to be selected by low-income

residents in that community.223 Congress also tightened the financial reigns, increasing

the earmarks associated with specific types of programs, capping the federally-funded

portion of the salary of CAA employees, and increasing the nonfederal share of these

programs to twenty percent. Of great importance, one amendment stated that CAA

employees were subject to the Hatch Act, prohibiting them from engaging in partisan

political activity and outlawing tactics like voter registration drives.224

As Congress attempted to gain more control over CAPs, they shifted their

emphasis from locally created CAPs to a series of “national emphasis” programs,

antipoverty programs designed at the national level to be used across the nation. National

emphasis programs provided services that so many poverty-stricken neighborhoods

needed and included Project Head Start, a federally-sponsored preschool program; Legal

Services, a program that provided attorneys to help the poor with civil legal problems;

Foster Grandparents, an organization that trained the elderly to work with disadvantaged

and mentally retarded children; Comprehensive Health Services, an organization that

222 Ibid., 323; Matusow, 248-49. 223 Clark, 107. 224 Ibid.

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provided general medical care to poor neighborhoods; and Upward Bound, a group that

helped underprivileged students prepare for college.225 Most of these programs emerged

and evolved in communities across the nation shortly after the passage of the EOA and

were then replicated in other places. Due to the increasing political storms over many

locally-created CAPs, Congress earmarked more funds for national emphasis programs,

hoping to limit controversy and gain more control over CAPs.226 Lawmakers hoped to

increase CAP success and generate more public support for antipoverty programs. Still,

critics of the national emphasis programs argued that they undermined local control and

reduced funding available for creative indigenous solutions.227

Representative Edith Green of Oregon not only challenged the original EOA but

continued to attack the act, proposing an amendment during the 1967 legislative session

that gave local government the power to take over and operate all CAAs within their

state.228 She believed that this amendment would guarantee more local control over the

goals and tactics of CAPs. It gave state or local governments the power to create a CAA

out of an existing public or private organization, to revoke a previous CAA designation,

or to opt out of participating in any CAPs within their jurisdiction. There is some debate

over whether Green wanted to kill CAPs or save them.229 Regardless of her intent, many

felt the Green Amendment represented a practical compromise that saved CAPs by

winning over Southern politicians and mayors and governors from across the nation who

225 Theodore M. Berry cited in Gillette, xix-xx, 241-242, 243-245. Berry was the mayor of Cincinnati, and he developed a CAP program for that city. Because of his success, Shriver appointed him assistant director of CAPs. 226 Clark, 96, 112-113; Zarefsky, 135-36. 227 Zarefsky, 136. 228 Matusow, 269; Clark, 121. 229 Matusow, 269.

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had opposed CAPs because they felt that they could not control them.230 After the

ratification of the Green Amendment, Congress reauthorized the EOA for two years for

the first time in its history. While the amendment ensured the continuation of CAPs,

some believed the changes were a betrayal of the EOA’s early emphasis on the

participation of the poor.231 After these changes, many local officials made their peace

with CAAs, recognized that CAPs were an important way of getting much-needed money

into their communities, and learned to exercise their influence over them in quiet ways

instead of trying to destroy them.232

In addition to CAPs, Title II also created Adult Basic Education (Part B) and

Voluntary Assistance for Needy Children (Part C) programs. Those who designed the

Adult Basic Education Program subscribed to the widely-held belief that adequate

educational training might enhance an individual’s economic opportunity. The EOA

stipulated that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) would

administer the Adult Basic Education Programs, in conjunction with state educational

agencies.233 To receive funds, a state had to present a plan to help local agencies create

adult education pilot programs, provide financial assistance for these programs, or help

educational agencies improve technical services for adult education. Once HEW

approved a state’s adult education plan, the state was eligible for at least $50,000 and

possibly more, depending on the number of adults with less than a fifth-grade education.

230 Clark, 122. 231 Davies, 196. 232 Perrin, William G. Phillips, and Eric Tolmach cited in Gillette, 61, 192, 250-51. Phillips was an assistant director for congressional relations at OEO. Tolmach worked at the Labor Department and was on the poverty task force. He helped plan the CAP. 233 “A Summary of Education Implications: Economic Opportunity Act for 1964 (Public Law 88-452),” State Department of Public Instruction, T. H. Bell, Superintendent. Rampton Papers, Series 14250, Reel 3, Box 2, Folder 22.

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While Title II Part C called for individuals to assist in the creation of city or county

programs to provide assistance to needy children, the EOA provided few details about

these programs or how they would function.234 Project Head Start is the best known

example of this type of program. Starting as a national emphasis program, it provided

(and provides) preschool for children living in poverty.

Compared to Titles I and II, the rest of the EOA created smaller, less complicated,

and, for the most part, less controversial programs. Title III was entitled “Special

Programs to Combat Poverty in Rural Areas,” and under the authority of the Farmers

Home Administration (FHA) in the Department of Agriculture, these programs attacked

rural poverty problems and focused on increasing the income and living standards of the

rural poor, including migrant agricultural families.235 Under Title III, the FHA had the

power to authorize fifteen-year loans of up to $2,500 to low-income people in rural areas

to buy or improve property or reduce liens against property they already owned.236 The

FHA could make thirty-year loans to local cooperative associations that provided

essential goods and services to low-income families. Title III also provided funds to state

and local entities to establish programs to help migrant workers.

Title IV provided resources and incentives for the creation and improvement of

small businesses. The EOA delegated this program to the Small Business

Administration, and that agency was directly responsible for its administration. 237 SBA

officials had the power to offer fifteen year loans of up to $15,000 to small business

owners, with the stipulation that they would provide jobs for the long-term unemployed,

234Economic Opportunity Act, Statutes at Large, 523. 235 Quick Facts on the Programs of the Office of Economic Opportunity.” King Papers. 236 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 212. 237 Perrin cited in Gillette, 302-03.

70

and they could also defer loan payments, if necessary.238 In addition to hiring the

chronically unemployed, those receiving loans had to participate in a management

training program to help them effectively oversee their workers.239 While few Americans

opposed this program, the one controversial aspect was the stipulation that loans were

only available in areas serviced by a Small Business Development Center because not all

states had one.240

Under Title V, the EOA created work experience programs for heads of

households who received money under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children

program.241 The EOA delegated these programs to the Welfare Administration and

empowered the director of the antipoverty agency to appropriate necessary funds to the

HEW Secretary for work experience pilot projects. The types of programs varied but

included adult education, vocational training, medical assistance, and other social

services for the participant and other eligible family members.242 Unlike most of the

EOA, the federal government paid the entire cost of these programs, at least for fiscal

year 1965, but the work experience programs began small and disappeared quickly.243

The purpose of Title VI was two-fold: it created the Office of Economic

Opportunity (OEO), the administration that oversaw the diverse EOA antipoverty

programs, and Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA), a domestic version of the

Peace Corps. Because so many on the antipoverty taskforce felt that existing

238 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 212; “Quick Facts on the Programs of the Office of Economic Opportunity.” King Papers; Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 212. 239 Perrin cited in Gillette, 302-03. 240 “Quick Facts on the Programs of the Office of Economic Opportunity.” King Papers. 241 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 212. 242 “Quick Facts on the Programs of the Office of Economic Opportunity.” King Papers. 243 “Poor People Served in Two Years in the War on Poverty,” Office of Economic Opportunity. Rampton Papers, Series 14250, Reel 17, Box 8, Folder 32.

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bureaucracies were, at best, ignoring the poverty situation and, at worst, contributing to

the problems of the poor, the EOA created the OEO to focus solely on ending poverty.244

The act placed the OEO within the Executive Office of the President, hoping that this

would centralize decision-making and largely remove Congress from the process, and the

OEO staff included a director, a deputy director, and three assistant directors, appointed

by the president with the confirmation of the Senate.245 The EOA authorized the director

to create new programs and distribute funds to these programs. Critics argued that the

OEO disrupted the checks and balances system—giving too much power to the Executive

branch, that it unnecessarily duplicated existing agencies and programs, and that it

created a “poverty czar”—placing too much power in the director’s hands.246 The EOA

also mandated that the OEO coordinate all antipoverty programs, and opponents saw this

as a conflict of interest because the director would protect his own programs and agencies

at the expense of other groups involved in ending poverty.247

Title VI also established Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA), a domestic

version of the highly-popular Peace Corps. The OEO director had the power to recruit

and train volunteers—in cooperation with state and local agencies—to fight poverty

locally, assist groups with especially high poverty rates, and lend a hand to the Job Corps

and CAPs.248 Each volunteer committed to a year of service, received their training at

universities or through local antipoverty groups, and were assigned to and worked

244 Zarefsky, 149. 245 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 212; Andrew, 65. 246 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 215-216. 247 Sundquist, Lampman, Charles L. Schultze, Bertrand M. Harding, and James C. Gaither cited in Gillette, 2, 187-88, 193-96, 199, 406-09. Schultze was the assistant director of the Bureau of the Budget during the War on Poverty. Harding was deputy director of OEO starting in May 1966 and acting director starting in March 1968. Gaither was a staff assistant to President Johnson from 1966 to 1969 and was responsible for the War on Poverty. 248Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 212.

72

directly with CAAs, Job Corps centers, or Head Start programs.249 According to Edgar

May and Glenn Ferguson, former directors of VISTA, the volunteers lived and worked in

poor communities, functioned as “agents of change,” and attempted to empower the poor

by teaching them to use all resources available in the community.250 For their service,

each VISTA received $50 per month for living costs.

Like other parts of the EOA, the VISTA program experienced its share of

controversies. State governors had to approve VISTA volunteers, but this check was not

always enough to avoid problems.251 Some big city mayors disliked that the federal

government gave money directly to local VISTA programs without local consent or

oversight.252 Local leaders questioned some VISTA activities. Just as there was a debate

between those who felt that CAPs were intended to provide services for the poor and

those who felt that their chief responsibility was to organize the poor and encourage them

to fight for their own rights, those who organized and implemented the VISTA program

witnessed the same argument.253 While officials usually accepted VISTAs who

promoted the service model of assistance, problems occurred when volunteers embraced

more confrontational methods, such as rent strikes and calls to assert land rights among

natives in Alaska.254

An especially problematic aspect of the VISTA program was the involvement of

volunteers in political activities like voter registration drives and protests against

249 Gillette, 281. 250 Edgar May and Glenn W. Ferguson cited in Gillette, 55, 285, 292-93; William H. Crook and Ross Thomas, Warriors for the Poor: The Story of VISTA, Volunteers in Service to America (New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1969), 29. 251 Economic Opportunity Act, Statutes at Large, 530. 252 David Jacob Pass, The Politics of VISTA in the War on Poverty: A Study of Ideological Conflict (Ann Arbor: Xerox University Microfilms, 1976. Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1976), 198-200. 253 Ibid., xviii-xx. 254 Ibid., 200, 140-41.

73

governmental authorities in the communities they served, and some members of Congress

worked relentlessly to remedy this. In 1965, Republican Congressman Albert Quie of

Minnesota proposed that all OEO employees, including VISTA volunteers, be placed

under the provisions of the Hatch Act, prohibiting federal employees from involvement

in partisan political activities.255 Through the efforts of Democratic Congressman Adam

Clayton Powell of New York and others, this attempt to impose the Hatch Act on

VISTAs failed in 1965, but opponents of OEO resurrected it, and VISTAs came under

the provisions of the Hatch Act a year later. With the passage of the Green Amendment

in 1967, the role of VISTA volunteers further shifted from controversial political

organizing to providing essential services to the poor. In 1967, Congress also considered

amendments that gave governors thirty days to eliminate VISTA projects or expel

individual volunteers, tightened the admission and screening requirements for VISTAs,

banned the use of VISTA appropriations for any organized labor activities, outlawed

VISTA participation in picketing or planned group demonstrations, and prohibited their

participation in any political activities.256 Clearly, the VISTA program generated more

controversy than many of its designers intended.

The final section of the EOA, Title VII, explained how antipoverty assistance

affected Social Security benefits. It stated that income received from one of the

antipoverty programs would not affect an individual’s Social Security assistance.257

Lawmakers hoped that this would prevent state officials from reducing aid to families

and that eligible individuals would continue to receive unemployment benefits.

255 Ibid., 168-70, 175-76, 179-80. 256 Ibid., 180-81. 257 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 212, 255.

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*****

While those who created the EOA tried to design new and innovative ways to deal

with poverty, these individuals and the EOA were definitely products of the nation and its

history. Historically, most U.S. citizens believed that poverty was a matter best dealt

with on the local level by voluntary groups and organizations and that some were worthy

of assistance while others were not, and even though these ideas softened over time, they

still influenced the design of the EOA. Like earlier reformers, they clung—sometimes

unconsciously—to the belief that general economic prosperity was the salvation of even

the poorest members of society, that opportunity was the key to success, and that

education was necessary for economic advancement and equal opportunity. Some EOA

controversies emerged as it became apparent that economic prosperity, equal opportunity,

and improved education were not enough to win the War on Poverty. Other

controversies developed because reformers pursued solutions that went beyond these age-

old solutions and called for more radical answers to poverty-related problems. The EOA

contributed to the trend of increasing federal involvement in areas that many identified as

the exclusive domain of state and local governments and the angst that this perceived

encroachment caused.

In her book The Way We Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia

Trap, Stephanie Coontz argues that, in spite of Americans’ love of the idea of self-

reliance, depending on others such as family members, churches, fraternal organizations,

and even the federal government was the rule rather than the exception.258 She provides

numerous historical examples to support her assertion, from the Homestead Act, military

258 Stephanie Coontz, The Way We Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia Trap (New York: BasicBooks, 1992), 68-92.

75

protection, and public land grants associated with the transcontinental railroad in the

1800s to the GI Bill, the National Defense Education Act, and FHA home loans after

World War II.259 Coontz emphasizes that government assistance has not been limited to

the poor, arguing that the Middle Class and affluent Americans living in the suburbs have

been the greatest beneficiaries of federal help.260

The next chapter continues the investigation of the contradictions of a society that

values “self-reliance” in the face of evidence suggesting that true self-reliance never

really existed, but instead of using a national focus, it uses Utah as a lens to examine

these contradictions in greater detail. It examines the history of how Utah’s citizens have

dealt with poverty and treated the poor, and it analyzes the nature of the relationship

between the people of Utah and the federal government, including how residents of Utah

felt about federal economic and social assistance, from the territorial period until the

early 1960s. This analysis provides a context to understand how the implementation of

the EOA in Utah and how the state’s citizens responded to EOA programs.

259 Ibid., 73-78. 260 Ibid., 72, 76-79.

CHAPTER 3

UTAH’S HISTORY: FEDERALISM, PUBLIC WELFARE, AND POLITICS—

FROM THE TERRITORIAL PERIOD TO THE PASSAGE OF THE

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY ACT

Most of the population was yearning…to throw off the yoke of Washington,

there has been…a persistent distrust of Washington’s meddling in local matters, there has also been…a pronounced eagerness to secure Utah’s share of reclamation, defense, and other federally funded projects…The fact is that the federal government has great power in the state. The blessings of the federal influence have been mixed. Economically there can be no doubt that federal dollars have increased prosperity and stimulated growth… But there is also a negative side to consider. The growth of federal influence has caused us to trade autonomy for prosperity.1

In recent years, Utah has earned a reputation as one of the most economically,

politically, and socially conservative states in the nation. Like so many Western states,

Utah has had a love-hate relationship with the federal government that continues to this

day. The people of Utah emphasize that they are a self-reliant people who—past,

present, and future—have had no need of federal intervention, but reality is quite

different. In dealing with issues of poverty and social welfare programs, Utahns seemed

to follow national trends, believing that private, voluntary organizations and charities

should help those in need and should focus on the worthy poor and emphasize the

importance of hard work. This view endured until the catastrophic events of the Great

1 Dean L. May, Utah: A People’s History (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1987), 192-93.

77

Depression convinced many that economic hardships did not just affect the lazy and that

the state and federal governments must play a part in relieving the suffering of the poor.

This historical relationship between Utah’s people and the federal government and how

Utahns felt about the poor and social welfare policy affected the way they responded to

the EOA.

In terms of their thinking about the relationship between the state and the federal

government and their feelings about how to handle poverty and the poor, Utahns shared

views with people in other parts of the nation. Although Utah was unique in some ways,

it was very much a product of its time, of the western region, and of the United States.

These commonalities, as much as the things that made Utah different, influenced how the

people of the state responded to the War on Poverty. In order to understand Utah’s

response to the EOA, this chapter outlines the relationship between the state and the

federal government, analyzes how Utahns felt about and dealt with poverty, and

examines how political and church leaders responded to the EOA.

Despite contrary rhetoric, the federal government has played, and continues to

play, a very important role in Utah. A prominent historian declared that if there was one

word to summarize state’s economic history, it would be “dependency.”2 This also

seems to be true of Utah’s political history. Utahns, like the many in the West, have a

“congenital dislike of Big Government,” but have called on the federal government to

build railroads, set up military bases, and fund massive irrigation projects.3 By the late

2 James L. Clayton, “Contemporary Economic Development,” in Utah’s History, Richard D. Poll, Thomas G. Alexander, Eugene E. Campbell, and David E. Miller, eds. (Logan: Utah State University Press, 1989), 542. 3 Leonard J. Arrington, “The Sagebrush Resurrection: New Deal Expenditures in the Western States, 1933-1939,” The Pacific Historical Review (Vol. 52, No. 1, February 1983), 2.

78

twentieth century, the federal government was the number one employer in the state, with

one out of ten people working for federal agencies and another five percent employed in

defense industries or the military. The federal government was (and is) the largest

landowner in the state, owning over seventy percent of the land within Utah’s borders.

State politicians gained political power and clout to the extent that they were able to

secure federal money and agencies to benefit the state. Yet, with federal money comes

federal control, and this control continues to rankle the conservative population of Utah.

Utahns depend on the federal government for so much and, at the same time, despise this

dependency.

Throughout its history, the people of Utah experienced poverty, and political and

religious leaders debated the appropriate way to help those in need. From its earliest

history, Utah’s citizens embraced many of the same ideas as the rest of the nation about

the causes of poverty and ways to eliminate it. Utahns believed it was the responsibility

of private organizations and groups to deal with the poor and that government, especially

the federal government, had no jurisdiction over poor relief. As in other places, it took

the traumatic and unprecedented events of the Great Depression to introduce changes in

poverty policy. The trends begun during the Great Depression led to a changing federal-

state-local relationship, and this evolution continued during the War on Poverty, affecting

the way state and church leaders responded to the proposed EOA. Although change

occurred, it was accompanied by apprehension, controversy, and opposition.

*****

Many Western historians emphasize the role that the federal government played

in the development of the region. Patricia Nelson Limerick argues that the most

79

important concepts in the study of the West are its conquest by the federal government

and the lasting impact that this conquest has had on the people in the western states.4 She

states that just as the institution of slavery shaped slaves and their owners, the conquest of

the West had a significant effect on the conquered and its conquerors, left questions about

the principles and ethics at the heart of the nation, and created a legacy that endures to the

present. Richard White reinforces this argument, emphasizing the profound effect that

the federally-controlled territorial period and the continual presence of the federal

government has had on Utah and the other states of the American West.5 According to

these historians, the federal government has been a perpetual presence in the West,

through land ownership, hands-on governing, economic control, and military oversight.6

Despite the popularly-held image of the West as an independent region full of self-reliant

and hardy individuals free from the influence of big business and big government, the

reality is much different than the myth. Limerick contends that the relationship between

Washington D.C. and the West was always more complex than people acknowledged and

that popularly-held ideas about Western rugged individualism were always suspect.7

Utah, like many other Western states, benefited from, but fought against, federal control.

While the first people migrated into modern-day Utah as early as 12,000 years

ago and the Spanish expedition of Fathers Dominguez and Escalante arrived in

September 1776, the people most associated with the settlement of the state were the

4 Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1987), 18. 5 Richard White, “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own”: A History of the American West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 155-77. 6 At the time of the Great Depression, the federal government owned or managed sixty-nine percent of the land in Utah. See Thomas G. Alexander and James B. Allen, Mormons & Gentiles: A History of Salt Lake City (Boulder: Pruett Publishing Company, 1984), 199; White, 174. 7 Limerick, 78.

80

members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS) who entered and

settled the valley of the Great Salt Lake starting in July of 1847. This group, often

referred to as the Mormons, was made up of religious refugees who wanted to worship

freely without interference from outsiders, including the federal government.

Although some of the beliefs, ideas, and actions associated with the LDS Church

were in harmony with traditional American values, ultimately those outside the religion

emphasized the ways that this group deviated from mainstream ideas, refused to accept

the Mormons, and violently drove them from communities in several states. As is

traditional in the United States, Mormons promoted the Puritan work ethic and a strong

faith in progress, valued the importance of family, honored the Constitution, and held

firmly to the idea of constructing “a city upon a hill” for others to look up to and

emulate.8 In spite of these time-honored values, outsiders focused on their less

acceptable characteristics, such as their commitment to plural marriage, their belief in

ongoing, direct revelation from God to a living prophet, their strong sense of community

and desire to withdraw from the larger society, their ability to affect elections through

bloc voting, their dedication to a theocratic political system, and their creation of

separatist economic and military systems.9 Due to these objectionable differences,

groups in Ohio, Missouri, and Illinois forced the Mormons to leave their communities,

often using extreme violence. While government officials did not play a direct part in the

forced removal of Mormons, they frequently turned a blind eye to these events and

refused to guarantee equal protection and equal justice to this persecuted group.10 This

8 Todd M. Kerstetter, God’s Country, Uncle Sam’s Land: Faith and Conflict in the American West (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006), 36, 169, 170; Limerick, 286. 9 Limerick, 281-83; Kerstetter, 50, 169, 173; May, 43. 10 Kerstetter, 174.

81

lack of protection, supposedly guaranteed to all U.S. citizens, contributed to the feelings

of distrust that Mormons felt towards the federal government.

Despite the growing tension between Mormons and mainstream American

society, church leader Brigham Young made the difficult decision to aid the U.S. military

during the Mexican-American War. As Young led his group to self-imposed exile in

Utah, Colonel Stephen Kearney sent an officer to ask the Mormon leader to allow and

encourage male church members to help the U.S. Army in their fight against the Mexican

government to gain western land. Although Young had serious misgivings about the

proposal, especially given how U.S. citizens had treated church members, he recognized

the advantages of the arrangement. Mormon pioneers desperately needed money to

finance their westward settlement, and this pact with the military would subsidize the

migration of the larger group of pioneers, directly support the migration of 549 men (and

their families) who enlisted, and allow them to explore areas for future settlement. In

spite of their dislike and distrust of the U.S. government, church leaders and members

understood that it was sometimes necessary to compromise to ensure the achievement of

their most important goals.

Even after the Mormons arrived in Utah, they continued to have problems with

the federal government. In 1857, President James Buchanan opposed the Mormon

theocracy in Utah and sent a military unit to install federally-appointed leaders to

guarantee that the people in Utah would accept and follow American political institutions

and practices, an event that became known as the Utah or Mormon War.11 Buchanan

appointed Alfred Cumming to replace Young as the territorial governor and sent a

11 Ibid., 34-35.

82

military expedition under Albert Sidney Johnston to establish order. In response, Utahns

prepared to meet this external threat, mustering their own military force, known as the

Nauvoo Legion, building fortifications, gathering food stores to withstand a prolonged

attack, and organizing raiding parties to harass the invaders. Young declared a state of

marital law and warned that the militia would resist, with force if necessary, any invasion

of Utah. Although some minor skirmishes occurred, there were no combat casualties and

eventually diplomacy led to the begrudging acceptance of Alfred Cumming as territorial

governor in April of 1858. Nevertheless, it took some time to establish easy relations

with the new administration. Even when the Utah War came to an end, the tension

between the people of Utah and the federal government continued.

Polygamy continued to be a point of contention. Mormon leaders secretly

instituted the practice of plural marriage before the migration to Utah, but in 1852, Young

instructed Orson Pratt to publicly announce the practice of polygamy, stating that it was

socially and morally superior to monogamy.12 Church leaders invoked the principles of

states’ rights and popular sovereignty to justify polygamy, just as people in other places

used those ideas to justify slavery.13 National leaders responded. The newly-created

Republican Party established a political platform calling for the eradication of the “twin

relics of barbarism”: slavery and polygamy. For nearly thirty years, Congress struggled

to end plural marriage, but the number of polygamous marriages actually increased

during the periods when federal opposition was strongest.14 Because of the Mormon

commitment to plural marriage and other un-American practices, Utah statehood was

12 Bruce L. Campbell and Eugene E. Campbell, “Pioneer Society,” in Utah’s History, 289; May, 95. 13 White, 163. 14 Limerick, 285-86; Campbell and Campbell, “Pioneer Society,” in Utah’s History, 289.

83

delayed for many decades. Between 1849 and 1887, the territorial legislature applied for

statehood six times, and Congress denied each application because of polygamy and the

“temporal power” of the LDS Church.15 Obviously, many national leaders felt that Utah

fell too far outside the American mainstream to receive statehood.

In the face of an intense national attack, the LDS Church quietly began to move

away from the practice of plural marriages. In 1890, Wilford Woodruff wrote in his

journal, “I have arrived at a point in the history of my life as President of The Church of

Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints where I am under the necessity of acting for the

temporal salvation of the Church.”16 On September 24, 1890, he issued a proclamation,

known as the Woodruff Manifesto, bidding all church members to “refrain from

conducting any marriage forbidden by the law of the land,” and on October 6, the

Mormons gathered in General Conference and unanimously approved the manifesto.17

Finally on January 4, 1896, President Grover Cleveland admitted Utah as the forty-fifth

state after Congress approved a state constitution, granting women’s suffrage, outlawing

the practice of polygamy, and emphasizing the separation of church and state.18

Although statehood marked a turning point in the relationship between the federal

government and the people of Utah, historical events continued to influence their

interactions in the twentieth century, including ideas about the poor and who was

responsible to help them, and the state’s acceptance and implementation of the EOA.

In the new century, the federal government continued to have a significant impact

on agriculture in Utah. Although Congress had passed the Homestead Act in 1862,

15 Gustive O. Larson, “Government, Politics, and Conflict,” in Utah’s History, 243-44. 16 Gustive O. Larson, “The Crusade and the Manifesto,” in Utah’s History, 272. 17 Ibid. 18 May, 128.

84

Utahns continued to acquire large quantities of free federal land well into the twentieth

century. Utah State University, created in 1888 as a federal land grant college, improved

agriculture and mechanical training, positively affecting the state’s economy.19 Utah

sugar beet producers, a powerful economic bloc, benefited from federal tariff subsidies.

With the Newlands Act in 1902, Utah received federal funds to supplement the

construction of local reclamation projects.

Utah’s farming sector also depended on national demand to maintain reasonable

prices and ensure sufficient work for farmers. During World War I, government

contracts for agricultural products were a boon to the economy, but with the cessation of

the fighting, the demand for Utah goods dried up, hurting the state’s economy. As a

result, Utah entered an economic depression that affected the state until 1922, and the

farming sector felt the greatest long-term effects. In addition, the Interstate Commerce

Commission’s refusal to establish and enforce more equitable freight rates hurt Utah’s

farmers. They also suffered when the government ended wartime business controls,

leading to an increase in inflation, rising interest rates that made it harder to get loans and

more difficult to pay off loans, and a severe cutback in federal spending that resulted in

fewer jobs and lower incomes.20

During the Great Depression, farmers and ranchers increasingly depended on

federal assistance. The New Deal, which helped the West more than any other part of

the nation, aided Utah’s agriculture, constructing several dams that improved water

19 James B. Allen, “Education and the Arts in Twentieth-century Utah,” in Utah’s History, 593. 20 Thomas G. Alexander, “From War to Depression,” in Utah’s History, 463-65.

85

storage and resource management.21 The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 opened the

federally-controlled public domain to ranchers for the grazing of their livestock.22 The

federal government also purchased and slaughtered unwanted livestock during the harsh

1934 drought, and Utah farmers profited from the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the Rural

Electrification Administration, and federal programs that provided credit and guaranteed

mortgages.23 Even when local politicians continued to extol the virtue of small,

independent farms during World War II and into the Cold War period, federal agriculture

policy encouraged behemoth corporate agriculture because it was so much more efficient,

providing subsidies for specialized crops, reclamation projects, and crop storage

programs.24

The federal government also played a large role in developing transportation

networks in Utah, connecting the state with the rest of the nation. During the late

nineteenth century, the federal government established a public-private hybrid system of

road construction, granting contracts to civilian businesses to establish much-needed

roads.25 While private companies set up stage coach lines, it would have been virtually

impossible to do so if the government had not provided contracts for road construction

and mail delivery, subsidies to start up the stage lines, and troops to protect passengers

and goods.26 The federally-sponsored transportation innovation that had the most

profound impact on Utah, the West, and the nation was the construction of the

21 Leonard Arrington, “The New Deal in the West: A Preliminary Statistical Inquiry,” The Pacific Historical Review (Vol. 38, No. 3, August 1969), 311; John F. Bluth and Wayne K. Hinton, “The Great Depression,” in Utah’s History, 489. 22 Limerick, 87. 23 Bluth and Hinton, “The Great Depression,” in Utah’s History, 489. 24 Gerald D. Nash, The Federal Landscape: An Economic History of the Twentieth-Century West (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1999), 106. 25 White. 127-28. 26 Ibid., 128.

86

transcontinental railroad. The government provided substantial land grants from the

public domain and long-term, low-interest loans to the private construction companies as

an incentive to build the railroad, and on May 10, 1869, the two railroad lines came

together at Promontory Point, Utah.27 While Brigham Young recognized that the railroad

threatened the hegemony of the Mormon Church in Utah, he also understood the benefits.

He heavily invested in the railroad venture, served as a director of the Union Pacific

Railroad Company for three years, urged the legislature and the population to support

construction, negotiated contracts for Mormon labor to construct the railroad within Utah

to limit the number of non-Mormons working in the territory, and ensured that future

converts and much-needed supplies had a more efficient way to get to Utah.28

In the twentieth century, federal transportation assistance continued. With the

Federal Highways Act of 1916, the government committed financial support for the

construction of a national highway system.29 This new network of roads provided a

more efficient and dependable network for mail delivery, benefited farmers, who could

more easily get their goods to market, and the rising number of automobile owners, and

connected isolated areas with larger population centers. The Highway Act of 1956 gave

an additional federal boost to western road construction, allocating $10 billion over ten

years for the construction of an interstate highway system. Most westerners supported the

law because it would link isolated areas to larger population centers, increase tourism in

large western state, contribute to economic development in the West, and enhance the

27 Ibid., 145-46. 28 Dean L. May, “Towards a Dependent Commonwealth,” in Utah’s History, 218-19. 29 “July 11, 1916: President Woodrow Wilson Signs Federal Aid Road Act,” This Day in History. History.com. http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/president-woodrow-wilson-signs-federal-aid-road-act. (accessed 13 August 2012).

http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/president-woodrow-wilson-signs-federal-aid-road-act

http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/president-woodrow-wilson-signs-federal-aid-road-act

87

military security of the region.30 Utahns responded to this development with mixed

emotions. They condemned federal interference while simultaneously appealing for

increased federal spending. Some appreciated the resulting economic development and

the influx of tourist dollars, but others opposed the adverse environmental impact and

mourned the decline of towns bypassed by the new interstates.31

From the earliest territorial period, the U.S. military has had a profound impact on

Utah. In the beginning, the relationship was confrontational, but over time, the state

benefited from a strong military presence. Early interactions included John C. Fremont’s

scientific and geographical explorations into the valley of the Great Salt Lake in the

1840s, and the involvement of Mormon volunteers in the Mexican-American War. The

U.S. military presence in, and impact on, Utah increased and became more adversarial

during the Utah War in 1857-1858 when federal troops constructed Camp Floyd, the first

of many military installations in the state.32 During the Civil War, the U.S. Army

established Fort Douglas, an encampment that proved more irritating to the Mormon

population than Camp Floyd because it was larger, located closer to the city, and had a

vociferously anti-Mormon commander, Colonel Patrick E. Conner, who aimed to

Americanize the people of Utah.33 On a more positive note, these troops generated a

greater demand for local retail goods and became an important source of government

contracts for services and supplies, bolstering the area’s economy. 34

In the twentieth century, the relationship between the people of Utah and the U.S.

30 Nash, 64-65, 151-152. 31 White, 177, 571. 32 Eugene E. Campbell, “Governmental Beginnings,” in Utah’s History, 164-65. 33 May, Utah: A People’s History, 115. 34 Gustive O. Larson, “The Mormon Gathering,” in Utah’s History, 188; Dean L. May, “Economic Beginnings,” in Utah’s History, 204.

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military improved, and the connection with the military brought many benefits. During

World War I, Utah produced agricultural and metallurgical items that were in great

demand, resulting in a level of prosperity previously unknown to Utahns. During the

war, past differences between the state’s citizens and the national government faded into

the background as Utah’s political leaders and the general population rallied behind the

U.S. military’s objectives, instituted public campaigns to promote Americanism, and

embraced the patriotic fervor sweeping the nation. Utahns raised money for the war

effort through Liberty Bond drives and provided troops for military service.35 Just before

the U.S. entered World War II, local politicians actively sought defense contracts and the

creation of new military installations to bring additional money to Utah during the

depression, and this process continued once the country entered the war. During World

War II, Utah received over $300 million in federal money for the construction of war-

related manufacturing facilities, representing ninety-one percent of the state’s wartime

economic expansion, which led to the construction of important manufacturing centers,

such as United States Steel Geneva Works in Utah County and the Remington Small

Arms Plant in Salt Lake County, more jobs, higher local wages, more opportunities for

technical training for workers, and continued economic benefits even after the war.36 In

addition to small arms and steel, Utah produced a long list of agricultural and

manufactured goods that helped to win the war.37

Utah leaders also promoted the state as a logical location for government-owned

35 May, Utah: A People’s History, 172. 36 John E. Christensen, “The Impact of World War II,” in Utah’s History, 497-98, 500-01; Nash, 29-30; Thomas G. Alexander and Leonard J. Arrington. “Utah’s Small Arms Ammunition Plant during World War II,” The Pacific Historical Review (Vol. 34, No. 2, May 1965), 196. 37 John E. Christensen, “The Impact of World War II,” in Utah’s History, 502-04. This list included oil, silica, radio tubes, parachutes, aluminum, tungsten, vanadium, coal, iron, dolomite, limestone, copper, gold, and natural gas.

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and -operated facilities and military posts devoted to winning the war. Given its interior

location, officials emphasized its relative security from enemy attack, and they

underscored Utah’s close proximity to key Pacific port cities and its accessibility by road,

rail, and air.38 These arguments ultimately paid off, and by 1942, the federal government

had built ten major military bases in Utah, including three training facilities, one research

and testing facility, huge supply depots, and repair and maintenance bases.39 During the

war, the federal government stationed more than 60,000 military personnel in Utah, and

the bases employed an additional 60,000 civilians.40 Ultimately, it was due to increased

military spending and the growth of the defense industry that Utah’s economy bounced

back from the depths of the Great Depression.41

Federal defense spending continued to have an impact during the Cold War,

especially through the creation of additional government installations. The military-

industrial complex affected the number of people living in Utah, greatly increasing the

population of the state, the types of employment available, and local wages. The impact

of the military and defense industry peaked in the early 1960s when defense industries

and defense were Utah’s largest manufacturing sector, and the state’s defense-related

employment, as a percentage of all nonagricultural employment, placed Utah as the third

most defense-oriented state in 1960 and at the top in 1963.42 By 1965, Utah had received

more than four billion dollars in defense contracts, and the largest contractor in the state

38 Christensen, “The Impact of World War II,” in Utah’s History, 498. 39 Nash, 24. These federal military installations included the Ogden Arsenal, Hill Air Force Base, Ogden Defense Depot, Deseret Chemical Depot, Tooele Army Depot, Naval Supply Depot at Clearfield, Camp W. G. Williams, Fort Douglas, Wendover Air Force Base, Kearns Air Force Base, and Dugway Proving Ground. The Naval Supply Depot would later serve as the location of one of the Job Corps Centers established in Utah as a part of President Johnson’s War on Poverty. 40 Ibid. 41 Alexander and Arrington. “Utah’s Small Arms Ammunition Plant during World War II,” 185. 42 Clayton, “Contemporary Economic Development,” 535.

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was Thiokol Corporation, an aerospace company that employed more than fifty thousand

people in Utah. With the increasing arms race, missile production at Thiokol Corporation

was the most important sector of Utah’s economy.43

Whether examining religion, agriculture, transportation, or defense, each provides

a lens to better understand the complex relationship between the U.S. government and the

people of Utah. While the earliest settlers resented the government’s attempts to control

them and restrict their religious freedom, the federal government simultaneously brought

many economic benefits to the region. At the same time that the citizens of Utah chafed

under the U.S. military presence, those same troops created a greater demand for Utah

products, resulting in greater profits for local citizens. In many ways, Utahns resented

and yet benefited from their interactions with the federal government. This complex

relationship had an effect on how the people of Utah reacted to EOA.

*****

The history of poverty and antipoverty ideals and programs in Utah involves

many stakeholders, both public and private, and a variety of opinions on who should be

assisted, who should be involved in assistance programs, and the most effective types of

assistance. Historically, the people of Utah felt that the care of the poor should be

voluntary and that private organizations and groups should play the primary role in this

care. Because of the unique history of Utah, the LDS Church has been a significant

participant in the development of and implementation of programs to assist the poor, but

in spite of their dominance, other groups and organizations also participated. Utahns felt

that local and state governments should play a limited part in helping the poor, and the

43 Nash, 91, 95. Thiokol Corporation went on to secure the contract for the largest Job Corps center in Utah.

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national government had no role to play. With the extreme economic turmoil of the

1930s, Utahns gradually accepted that private charities and state and local governments

were simply incapable of handling the misery of so many and grudgingly acknowledged

that they needed federal assistance. The tension between their essential belief in

voluntary, private assistance to the poor and their twentieth-century realization that

sometimes economic problems require federal involvement affected the way Utahns

responded to the EOA.

The philosophies of LDS leaders about economics in general and poverty and

assistance began to evolve long before the first Mormons arrived in Utah. Joseph Smith

sought to establish an independent economic system, separate from the rest of the nation.

Church members dedicated themselves to communal rather than individual ambitions,

cooperation over competition, and internal assistance to members in need as opposed to

asking for assistance from outsiders. They believed in the literal idea of the “universal

brotherhood and sisterhood of all human beings,” and that as brothers and sisters, they

had to take care of one another, both spiritually and temporally, providing food, shelter,

and other assistance for the worthy who were in need.44 Still, church doctrine stressed

that everyone must strive for self-sufficiency and avoid charity. Church leaders and

members embraced three basic goals: the eradication of poverty, the encouragement of

self-reliance, and the eventual creation of a social and economic utopia.45 Given the

large percentage of Utahns who belonged (and belong) to the church, these theological

ideals have played a big part in the formulation of Utah’s poverty policy.

44 Garth Mangum and Bruce Blumell, The Mormon’s War on Poverty: A History of LDS Welfare, 1830-1990 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1993), 3. 45 Ibid., 3-5, 14.

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Although church members wanted to separate themselves from the rest of the

nation, some American ideals remained too deeply ingrained to abandon. They held onto

the belief that it is the civic responsibility of citizens to take care of the poor within their

community. The earliest Mormons were a product of their time, an era when notions of

social welfare were evolving and many groups experimented with communitarian

settlements. As the Mormons moved across the country from Ohio to Illinois to Utah,

they believed that they needed to take care of their own as a matter of religious and civic

obligation. Joseph Smith instituted the laws of consecration and stewardship. Under

these church laws, all members gave their worldly possessions to the church

(consecration), and in return, they received all resources that they needed for survival

(stewardship).46 In this way, all worthy individuals had all that they needed, and to the

best of their abilities, everyone contributed to the success of the group, providing for

widows, orphans, missionaries, recent converts, and others in need.

Due to general poverty among church members, few actually consecrated land in

Ohio. Through continuing revelations, church leaders began to emphasize proselyting as

the number one goal for members, sharing the gospel to convert new members, and

redefined the law of consecration, requiring that members give their excess to the church

so that it could be redistributed to those in need. When Mormon migrants arrived in

Missouri, they had limited resources and encountered unfriendly neighbors. As a result,

church leaders required settlers to pool their money and resources and participate in

cooperative farming. They also instituted a tithing to provide revenue for the church to

do all necessary things, including assisting the poor.47

46 Ibid., 5, 13, 22. 47 Ibid., 25-29, 31.

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From 1839 to 1846, Nauvoo, Illinois was the last significant Mormon community

established before the mass exodus to Utah. In Nauvoo, church leaders emphasized the

importance of community, divided land equitably among all members, reminded

members to take care of other members in need, pay a full tithing, and donate labor for

the construction of the temple and other necessary structures and projects.48 On March

17, 1842, church leaders established the Relief Society, a women’s auxiliary group that

became instrumental in the development of church welfare programs and in helping ward

bishops to care for the temporal needs of the poor: collecting money, making and

distributing clothes, and providing food.49 With this emphasis on family and church

members assisting one another, Mormon communities did not build almshouses for the

poor as happened in other parts of the country at that time. By the time they left Nauvoo,

church members fully embraced the goals that all should be self-reliant but that they

should help the poor among them.50

The exodus of Mormons to Utah presented additional challenges for church

leaders. They asked members to share within the community, but there was often little to

share. In the semipermanent communities along their route, church leaders encouraged

cooperative labor in agriculture and other areas and often assigned families with more

resources to care for the poor. When Brigham Young became the leader of the church, he

continued to develop communal programs to help the poor. In 1849, church leaders

launched the Perpetual Emigrating Fund. They encouraged members to deposit their

savings in this fund, and the money would be loaned to poor members of the church still

48 Ibid., 36. 49 Ann Vest Lobb and Jill Mulvay Derr, “Women in Early Utah” in Utah’s History, 342. 50 Mangum and Blumell, 44-45.

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residing in the Midwest or in England so that they could come to Utah. Then as these

new settlers began to prosper, they would repay the loans, allowing additional members

to migrate, in perpetual fashion. Unfortunately, this system did not work as intended

because the amount of money needed exceeded available funds and because those who

moved to Utah were often unable to fully repay their debts. Still, the Perpetual

Emigrating Fund demonstrated the commitment of the church to providing assistance to

the poor so that they might have access to greater opportunity and become self-reliant.51

Once settled in Salt Lake, Young further developed the ideas of self-sufficiency,

cooperation within the group, and assistance to struggling members. He established

cooperatives, such as Zion’s Cooperative Mercantile Institution (ZCMI), and created the

United Order of Enoch. The church initiated the cooperative movement, establishing a

parent company in Salt Lake and a chain of smaller companies in towns throughout Utah.

Church leaders encouraged members, both wealthy and humble, to purchase stock in the

cooperative. As a result, the cooperative’s purchasing power increased, allowing the

company to buy goods in larger quantities at lower prices. The directors of the

cooperative controlled prices and established boycotts against Gentile competitors.

During General Conference in 1868, church leaders went so far as to instruct all members

to boycott any business not owned by a member of the LDS Church.52 Clearly, church

leaders were willing to use almost any means to ensure Mormon economic superiority in

Utah.

Under the United Order of Enoch, church members combined their possessions,

land, and labor to produce all that the community needed and agreed not to trade with

51 Ibid., 48-51. 52 Alexander and Allen, 70.

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others outside the Order, in order to create a self-sufficient society. The church first

attempted this social and economic arrangement in St. George, Utah, in 1873 and then

followed up in communities across the territory.53 Because Young encouraged church

members to only patronize Mormon-owned businesses, some observers claimed that the

United Order movement was not just a move towards self-reliance but was also intended

to destroy non-Mormon businesses.54 However, these communitarian experiments failed

fairly quickly because they were never able to provide for all of the needs of the

population, and with the coming of the railroad, the Mormons were never as isolated as

they wanted to be. While church leaders demonstrated a desire for self-sufficiency and

self-help, their emerging social welfare system had an “us vs. them” quality. It seems

that only church members warranted assistance.

From the beginning, church leaders established and managed programs to assist

the poor. As Mormons set up their original settlements in Utah, they divided each

community into wards, an ecclesiastical designation with a bishop at its head. In the

early days, Salt Lake City had nineteen wards, and the bishop of each took charge of the

welfare of the poor in his area, collecting surplus resources from members and

distributing them to the needy. Those who received a cash paycheck paid a ten-percent

tithing to the church, and bishops used this money to purchase additional items that ward

members needed.55 As the population increased and the administration of social welfare

became more complex, church leaders established the Tithing Office and the Bishop’s

Central Storehouse, key institutions that oversaw the collection of surplus commodities

53 White, 241. 54 Ken Verdoia and Richard Firmage, Utah: The Struggle for Statehood (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1996), 102. 55 Mangum and Blumell, 56-57.

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and money from members and the redistribution of these resources, usually in the form of

commodities, to the poor.56

Church doctrine considered idleness to be extremely destructive to the individual

and the group. Consequently, church leaders stipulated that those who needed assistance

had to work for what they received. They insisted that an effective welfare program had

to motivate people to be self-sufficient and provide instruction so that people could learn

to take care of themselves and their families. Despite the clear division between

members and nonmembers, church leaders were vocally opposed to Social Darwinism,

and there were examples of wards that assisted nonmembers.57 In 1855, Eliza R. Snow

reestablished the Relief Society in Utah, and it played a key role in the collection and

redistribution of donated fast offerings to the poor.58 Although the railroad threatened the

isolation and self-sufficiency of Utah, church leaders tried to remain separate, creating

the Zion’s Central Board of Trade. Among other things, this board tried to oversee

economic development, control output, and regulate competition, but it did not last long.

Church leaders tried to ease the suffering of members during the economic crisis of the

1890s. They created an LDS employment bureau during the winter of 1896-1897 that

tried to match the unemployed with available jobs, purchased land where the unemployed

could grow vegetables, and discouraged new members from migrating to Utah to prevent

additional employment issues.59

At the dawn of the twentieth century, church welfare shifted from a strong focus

on collective self-reliance to an emphasis on individual self-sufficiency, although there

56 May, Utah: A People’s History, 79-80. 57 Mangum and Blumell, 57, 65-68. 58 Alexander and Allen, 77-80. 59 Mangum and Blumell, 71-73; Alexander and Allen, 125.

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was still a commitment to care for the poor within the congregation. On the church level,

the Presiding Bishopric and the Relief Society tried to provide for the basic needs of the

poor, and local wards supplemented the services and resources provided at the church

level. As church leaders identified members who needed assistance, they emphasized the

obligation to help the “worthy poor” who found themselves in poverty because of

“unfavorable conditions.”60 They carefully investigated the causes of an individual’s

poverty, noted each individual’s commitment to and involvement in the church, and tried

to prevent transient individuals from taking work from long-term residents of the state.61

During the late 1800s, the LDS Church was not the only organization providing

needed social services, especially in the area of medical care. Other denominations

established medical facilities, and eventually local and territorial governments got

involved. In 1872, the Episcopalian Church established St. Mark’s Hospital, the first

hospital in Utah, and this institution primarily cared for miners and other industrial

workers but also served as the hospital for Salt Lake County until 1912.62 A group of

women from various Protestant denominations opened the Orphan’s Home and Day

Nursery to provide for the needs of infants and children without parents.63 In 1875, the

Roman Catholic Sisters of the Holy Cross established the second hospital in Utah, Holy

Cross.64 In 1882, the LDS Relief Society created the Deseret Hospital, which provided

training for area nurses until LDS Hospital replaced it in 1905. Many different

organizations created benevolent aid societies to benefit their members, and in 1890, the

60 Mangum and Blumell, 78-79. 61 Ibid. 62 Campbell and Campbell, “Pioneer Society,” in Utah’s History, 284. 63 Alexander and Allen, 111. 64 Campbell and Campbell, 284.

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first almshouse to assist the poor, regardless of denomination, opened its doors.65 The

YMCA, an organization first established in Boston, Massachusetts, in 1851, came to Salt

Lake City in 1893.66

While private organizations were responsible for the establishment of many care

facilities, eventually, public entities began to play a role in health care. In 1869, Salt

Lake City built the first institution for the treatment of the mentally ill, though Dr.

Seymour B. Young took over private ownership in 1879 and worked under contract to the

city.67 In 1885, the publicly owned Utah Territorial Insane Asylum opened in Utah

County. 68 The poor had a better chance of receiving assistance if they lived in or near

Salt Lake City because with increasing urbanization, the city developed more social

service programs to help them. In 1890, Salt Lake City became one of the last cities in

the United States to create a public health department. Congress even played a part in

providing social services, funding the Industrial Christian Home in the 1880s to help

women and children trying to escape polygamy.69 While the LDS Church often took the

lead on providing social services in Utah, other private organizations and government

entities also provided for the needs of the people.

From the late 1800s until the Great Depression, the territorial and state

governments provided little in the way of public assistance for the poor. In 1888, Utah’s

territorial legislature passed a law stating that county commissioners were responsible for

the care of the “poor and indigent” and that they should handle all necessary assistance

65 Alexander and Allen, 109-11. 66 The YMCA of Utah Website. http://www.ymcautah.org (accessed July 2013). 67 Campbell and Campbell, 285. 68 Ibid. 69 Alexander and Allen, 111.

http://www.ymcautah.org/

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with the help of private charities in the vicinity. 70 The state legislature passed a law to

help with this process, giving each county the option of creating special levies to provide

funding for aid to mothers with dependent children. When Utah entered the post-World

War I agricultural depression, the legislature responded with a small concession to the

economic crisis, granting Governor Charles R. Mabey the authority to create a welfare

commission to study the responses of counties and surrounding states, in hopes that

political leaders might develop more effective solutions to future economic problems.

This was the last step that the legislature took prior to the Great Depression.

As Utah’s population increased and the state became more urban, the unemployed

and those living in poverty multiplied. The LDS Church created organizations and

programs to assist them. The church formalized the collecting of fast offerings and used

these funds, in addition to some tithing revenue, to assist the poor. To deal with the

medical needs of the community, as in the influenza epidemic in the late 1910s, the

church financed the construction of the aforementioned LDS Hospital and Primary

Children’s Hospital in 1922. During times of disaster, such as the Schofield mine

catastrophe in 1900 and the San Francisco earthquake in 1906, church leaders provided

assistance to those in need, regardless of church membership.71

During the Progressive Era, church leaders often coordinated with public agencies

and other secular groups to organize relief efforts. Church medical institutions worked

closely with the local division of the American Red Cross to deliver needed services.

70 Utah Foundation, Public Welfare in Utah, November, 1946, 2. Special Collections, Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City. 71 Mangum and Blumell, 79-81. In the LDS Church, members are encouraged to forgo eating two meals on the first Sunday of the month and then donate the money they would have spent on those meals for assistance to those who need it in the ward.

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LDS bishops, the women’s Relief Society Social Service Department, and other church

groups assisted county welfare agents, investigating the worthiness of members applying

for public assistance. Women played an active role in organizing reform efforts.

Through the Relief Society, reformer Amy Brown Lyman and others worked for

favorable social welfare legislation like the Sheppard-Towner Mother and Child Health

Care Act and foster care and adoption laws to help needy children, assisted in educating

local residents on the proper procedures in the newly emerging field of social work,

operated boardinghouses for young women training to be nurses, and established job

placement programs for women.72 Women in the church also served as visiting teachers,

calling on specific female members once a month to make sure that they were doing well,

and they used these visits to evaluate the social status of those they visited, informing

male church leaders of individuals and families that needed financial assistance. Despite

the church’s active role in the development and execution of many social welfare

programs, or perhaps because of it, Utah was among the states with the lowest public

spending on charitable programs during the 1920s.73

With the stock market crash in 1929 and the onset of the Great Depression,

Utahns still maintained that state and federal authorities should play no part in poor relief.

Nonetheless, unfolding events forced everyone to reconsider existing welfare programs

and those eligible to receive them. Given Utah’s dependence on the export of

agricultural and mining products, the decreasing demand for them adversely affected the

state’s economy. From 1900-1920, Utah failed to keep pace with the nation’s economic

growth as the state’s per capita income dropped from above ninety percent of the national

72 Ibid., 84-88; Alexander and Allen, 183. 73 Mangum and Blumell, 89-92.

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average to below eighty percent of the national average. This trend continued during the

1920s. After the stock market crash, Utah felt the shockwaves immediately. At the

height of the depression, over thirty-five percent of state’s work force was unemployed.74

Given this bleak economic picture, traditional private charities and religious groups

struggled to meet the needs of those suffering, and local, state, and national governments

began to accept radically different roles, picking up the slack from traditional caregivers.

During the earliest stages of the crisis, Utah’s political leaders responded as they

had in the past, clinging to the idea that local governments were responsible for the poor

and expanding the ways that these localities might provide for those suffering. Initially,

Democratic Governor George H. Dern assured President Herbert Hoover that the state

legislature could handle the situation and that no federal assistance would be needed. He

proposed a long-range plan consisting of the construction of public buildings and roads to

help the unemployed and prevent the poor from looking to federal aid, and he redoubled

his efforts to provide employment for the poor as the depression deepened.75 In 1929, the

legislature passed a law allowing counties the option of creating special taxes to provide

for old-age assistance. In 1931, they gave each county the option of creating additional

taxes to aid the blind.76 At the 1930 conference of governors held in Salt Lake City,

Dern warned that states should “resist the tide of Federal encroachment which threatens

to engulf them and to hinder them in the proper discharge of their legislative functions.”77

Until that time, Utah had no centralized unemployment relief, and the state did not

74 Bluth and Hinton, 481-82. 75 Thomas G. Alexander, Utah, the Right Place: The Official Centennial History (Salt Lake City: Gibbs Smith, Publisher, 1995), 313-14. 76 Utah Foundation, 2. 77 James T. Patterson, The New Deal and the States: Federalism in Transition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 45.

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allocate funds for poor relief. Instead, the state relied on private agencies and local

boards to provide outdoor relief to the poor, and the public generally accepted that

laziness was the primary cause of unemployment.78 The depression eventually changed

Dern’s feelings about federal relief and how the state should handle unemployment and

poverty.

It was not until 1933, when Utah’s unemployment rate exceeded twenty-five

percent, that the legislature took the first step towards state responsibility for the

economic welfare of Utah’s population. To deal with the ever-worsening crisis, they

passed the Emergency Revenue Act of 1933, sometimes called “the dictator bill.”79

Among other things, it provided for a general sales tax and a temporary beer production

tax to generate money for poor relief and gave the governor broad powers to curtail any

spending that he deemed unimportant, to use all available resources to help the poor, and

to cooperate with national, local, and private agencies to combat the depression.80

Although some questioned the constitutionality of the law and many found it

controversial, the Emergency Revenue Act easily passed both houses of the legislature,

with the Senate passing it unanimously.81

At the same time, the LDS Church attempted to maintain its position of caring for

its own, despite the severity of the crisis. One plan to alleviate suffering was the

reintroduction of the Bishop’s Storehouse, a place where members could donate surplus

goods and members in need could request essential food and clothing items. In keeping

78 Ibid., 41. 79 J. Brent Haymond, Janet L. Geyser, and Pamela R. Benzon, The Utah State Legislature: Centennial History, 1896-1996 (Salt Lake City: The Office of the Third House, Utah State House of Representatives, 1996), 12. 80 Utah Foundation, 1-3. 81 Haymond, Geyser, and Benzon, 12.

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with the goal of self-sufficiency, the church required that members who received goods

from the storehouse spend time working there, stocking and organizing shelves, and

encouraged community canning, sharecropping, in-town gardens, and collective coal and

wood yards to ensure that the needs of all were being met.82 Members who worked in the

canneries or other church-owned establishments received a share of the commodities,

relative to the size of their families, and cash payments of one dollar for each day that a

man worked and fifty cents for each day that a woman worked. To help the unemployed,

stake leaders organized a committee to oversee a regional employment center that paired

the unemployed with available jobs.83 As unemployment rates climbed, church leaders

required those seeking aid to bring referrals from their bishop, and they gave priority to

members in good standing. Although official church policy outlined the need to help

worthy members first, Presiding Bishop Sylvester Q. Cannon stated, “…bishops should

ensure that none lacked food and shelter, whether LDS or not.”84 Even as they

implemented this plan, the needs of the people far outpaced available resources, and

church leaders underscored the importance of paying a full tithing, to lessen the gap.85

During the depression, church officials worked hand-in-hand with public welfare

agencies to provide for those in need. Although they were committed to providing for all

members, the unprecedented unemployment rate prevented this. Instead, church leaders

negotiated with county welfare officials on behalf of the unemployed and needy in their

congregations. In most Utah communities, excluding mining towns, LDS church

82 Mangum and Blumell, 106-09. 83 Glen L. Rudd, Pure Religion: The Story of Church Welfare since 1930 (Salt Lake City: The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 1995), 6, 25. 84 Mangum and Blumell, 103-05. 85 Ibid., 100.

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members still made up the vast majority of the population, making this public-private

cooperation easy. Food pantries, usually located in urban areas, were often jointly funded

by church, county, and private organizations. They provided supplies for those who were

able-bodied and unemployed. As the crisis deepened, church leaders lightened their

relief obligations, sending inactive members and transients to the county for public

assistance.86

As the LDS Church and other groups that traditionally assisted the poor realized

the extent of the crisis and that they did not have adequate resources, many began to

reconsider their position on the role of government relief. The Salt Lake City Chamber

of Commerce, a group representing the interests of business owners and one usually

opposed to government involvement in economic affairs, responded to the spiraling

economy and rising unemployment, asking that relief be recognized as an important role

of the government. In response, Salt Lake City’s municipal government initiated several

public works projects, including improvements to the fairgrounds and the University of

Utah campus, and paid all laborers a set daily wage. The city also joined with Salt Lake

County to provide work to the unemployed on a water project, cooperated with the LDS

Church in setting up two warehouses where those in need could go for food, clothing, and

other necessary items, and even organized a benefit concert, donating all proceeds to the

poor. Other city and state employees tried to do their part, donating a percentage of their

income to the relief effort. State employees at the Capitol agreed to donate four percent,

teachers pledged two percent, and the mayor of Salt Lake City donated ten percent of his

paycheck to the city’s Community Chest. Decision-makers in Salt Lake County agreed

86 Ibid., 104-05.

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to rotate county employees and use them in a part-time capacity to increase the number of

workers taking home a paycheck.87 In 1933, the legislature considered a two-year debt

moratorium, but they ultimately refused to pass the law because conservative members of

the community successfully attached a “communist” label to the poor in the state,

allowing lawmakers to more easily justify their reluctance to act.88 Due to this lack of

state assistance, local governments seized the properties of people who failed to pay their

taxes, and banks foreclosed on homes, farms, and businesses of those delinquent in their

payments.

Like Governor Dern, President Hoover hoped that the economic crisis would pass

quickly, but events forced him to change his position on federal assistance to the poor.

He gradually began to approve increasing expenditures for public works projects and

eventually signed into law the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), an

unprecedented federal program that provided emergency loans to banks, railroads, and

agricultural stabilization corporation.89 While the default position on welfare in Utah

was that the people of the state should take care of their own, many welcomed this

federal assistance, and the LDS Church cooperated with the RFC and city and county

welfare agencies to improve the standard of living of its members.90 Many unemployed

Utahns benefited from federal assistance. From 1932 to 1933, federal RFC loans

provided sixty-eight percent of the relief funds in Utah, as compared to twelve percent

coming from private charities and twenty percent from local and state agencies, and

87 Alexander and Allen, 202-05. 88 Alexander, Utah The Right Place, 312. 89 David M. Kenney, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 199), 84. 90 Mangum and Blumell, 110.

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almost a third of the state’s population received some assistance from this agency.91 The

RFC selected the Utah Construction Company as one of six companies to build Hoover

Dam, employing many Utahns, and the federally funded construction of a massive tunnel

in Zion National Park provided additional employment.92 During the lifetime of the

RFC, the state of Utah ranked second in per capita funds received.93 This was only the

first of many federal agencies that provided help to Utah’s poor in the 1930s.

Despite the creation of the RFC and other federal relief programs during his

administration, people felt that President Hoover provided “too little, too late,” rallying

around Democratic presidential-nominee Franklin D. Roosevelt. Utah voters came

together in support of Roosevelt, and state leaders and citizens alike accepted that the

federal government must take the lead in attacking the economic crisis. In 1933, Utah’s

newly-elected Democratic Governor Henry H. Blood stated in his first inaugural address

that the people of Utah would look to the national government for direction and

assistance.94 Following Roosevelt’s lead, Blood declared a bank holiday in 1933 and

appointed a State Advisory Committee on Public Welfare and Emergency Relief to

distribute relief dollars (mostly federal money) to those in need. Utah, a state that had

expressed its desire to be self-sufficient, was now working closely with the federal

government to provide poor relief.

Still, Utahns favored relief programs that provided assistance to those who

worked on projects to improve their communities and, at the same time, allowed them to

maintain their self-respect. In keeping with this philosophy, they accepted federal relief

91 Bluth and Hinton, 484-85. 92 Alexander, Utah The Right Place, 312. 93 Mangum and Blumell, 112. 94 Bluth and Hinton, 485-86.

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jobs with the Civil Works Administration during the winter of 1933-1934, the Civilian

Conservation Corps, and the National Youth Administration.95 State political leaders

also created the Utah Emergency Relief Administration to help those in need. Eighty

percent of this money came from the federal government.96 During the depression,

Utahns experienced the short-term benefits of federal relief programs as well as the long-

term benefits, including construction of roads, schools, airports, and reclamation projects.

During the New Deal, Utahns received more than their fair share of federal relief

assistance, and most citizens were quite receptive to this help, especially in the early

years of the depression. The state’s unemployed received direct aid from the FERA and

found jobs working on a PWA-funded water project and WPA-funded improvements to

the Salt Lake airport.97 Utahns also adopted federal NRA codes governing wages, hours,

and prices, took advantage of federal housing money made available through the Home

Owner’s Loan Corporation and the FHA, and accepted the gains made by labor under the

Wagner Act.98 The New Deal had a profound impact on Utah.

The passage of the Social Security Act in 1935 dramatically affected the state, not

only in terms of the amount of federal aid that people received, but also in terms of

changes to the public welfare system. Prior to 1935, the state had gradually gotten into

the welfare business due to the worsening economic situation, but it had no real

mechanism for handling public assistance programs. The Social Security Act required

that each state establish a department to handle all welfare programs to qualify for federal

money. In response, the legislature created the State Department of Public Welfare on

95 Ibid., 487. 96 Ibid., 487-488. 97 May, Utah: A People’s History, 177-79. 98 Alexander and Allen, 209-212.

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March 14, 1935.99 This group, headed by a three-man commission and aided by a six-

member Public Welfare Advisory Council, took full responsibility for the distribution of

federal Social Security funds as well as all other forms of public assistance, services for

dependent children, and oversight of all state institutions. This represented a significant

change. In the past, local authorities and private charities had handled most of these

programs, if they existed at all. After these changes, county governments were

responsible for operating all county facilities, taking care of indigents, overseeing the

foster care program, and the burial of the poor. Federal law also stipulated that public

money could only be administered by public agencies, preventing state welfare agencies

from continuing their cooperative work with private groups such as the LDS Church.100

Because of the Social Security Act, Utah’s rate of old-age assistance became the second

highest in the nation, and the state welfare structure changed radically and

permanently.101

After 1935, the state accepted more responsibility for the administration of public

assistance, assuming many of the tasks that counties once accomplished, but the federal

government supported the state in the fulfillment of many of these new duties. In 1937,

the legislature amended existing welfare laws, giving the state full responsibility for all

forms of general assistance, including foster care for children, care of unemployables,

dependent adults, and public burials. Because the counties had previously handled these

things, the amendment required counties to provide fifteen percent of the funding for

these programs. The amendment also emphasized that the elderly qualified for earned

99 Utah Foundation, 3, 10. 100 Ibid. 101 Bluth and Hinton, 483-86.

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assistance, whereas aid to the young was based solely on proven need. This distinction

corresponded to national trends in public assistance. As the state’s responsibilities

increased, the federal government agreed to redouble their efforts to help the state. In a

series of amendments to the Social Security Act passed in 1939, Congress raised the

amount that they provided for assistance to the elderly and the blind and increased the

federal share of assistance to dependent children from one-third to one-half.102 These

changes decreased the role of local governments in public welfare, but they dramatically

increased the responsibilities of the state and federal governments.

Church leaders responded to the expanding federal relief programs with mixed

emotions. At the biennial LDS General Conference, in October 1933, some church

leaders showed support and trust in the activities of the government while others were

less supportive. Apostle Stephen L. Richards strongly counseled church members to give

their united support to the government as national leaders attempted to deal with the

economic crisis. Apostle David O. McKay endorsed the actions of President Roosevelt,

specifically confirming his support of the National Recovery Act. Yet, J. Reuben Clark,

former solicitor of the State Department and ambassador to Mexico and then second

counselor to President Heber J. Grant, proved to be one of the most vocal critics of the

New Deal. At the same General Conference, Clark declared his opposition to

government relief programs, stating that they would have a corrupting influence on

members of the church.103 He speculated that federal aid would undermine members’

ethic of self-sufficiency and then disappear once they were no longer able to take care of

102 Utah Foundation, 4, 6. 103 Brian Q. Cannon, “’What a Power We Will Be in This Land’: The LDS Church, the Church Security Program, and the New Deal,” Journal of the West (Vol. 43, No. 4, Fall 2004), 66; Mangum and Blumell, 120.

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themselves.104 With the passage of time, more LDS church leaders became critical of the

New Deal and supporters became much less common. Within a year of his statement of

support, Apostle Richards expressed significant reservations about many aspects of

federal relief programs, and at the same time, Apostle George Albert Smith bemoaned the

sense of entitlement that many felt as a result of massive spending on federal assistance.

Even Republican Senator and Apostle Reed Smoot interjected his opposition to the New

Deal, lamenting the growing national debt and the alarming expansion of relief rolls.105

Although some church leaders, like Presiding Bishop Sylvester Q. Cannon, continued to

support federal relief because he felt that combined public and private attempts at the

local and state levels were inadequate to deal with the current crisis, increasing

dissatisfaction with federal aid led church leaders to develop their own alternative to

government assistance.

Concerned with the increasing number of church members receiving federal relief

and hoping to directly address the problems of unemployment and idleness, President

Grant publicly announced the creation of the Church Security Plan (later renamed the

Church Welfare Plan) at LDS General Conference in April, 1936. Church leaders

selected Salt Lake City commissioner and president of the Pioneer Stake Harold B. Lee

to direct the new program. At its core, the Church Security Plan was not a new program

but a centralization of the existing ward-based church assistance program. Under the

plan, church leaders stressed that members needed to donate fast offerings and pay a full

tithing, emphasized the importance of ward bishopric and Relief Society involvement,

104 Mangum and Blumell, 121-22. 105 Cannon, 66-67.

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and declared a preference for work relief rather than direct relief.106 In addition, the

church surveyed unemployed members about their occupational skills and attempted to

find them jobs in related industries and planned work projects so that members could

work for the things they needed most. In 1938, the church created Deseret Industries

(DI), an institution patterned after Goodwill. The goals of Deseret Industries were two-

fold: collecting donations of clothing and other necessary household items that would

then be sold at reasonable prices and providing vocational training and an income for the

elderly, physically and mentally handicapped, and new immigrants, who refurbished

donated items, encouraging independence and a strong work ethic.107 Church leaders

also started the Central Storehouse Building Project at Welfare Square near downtown

Salt Lake City. Using unemployed members as their labor force, this facility canned

food, milled flour, and stressed the importance of food storage as a safeguard against

starvation in times of national emergency. Church leaders stated that the primary

objective of the church’s welfare programs was to build character in all members, the

givers as well as the receivers.108 Although there were examples of church assistance to

nonmembers, it was never a central focus of the church welfare program.

While LDS Church leaders instituted these programs to provide for unemployed

members and demonstrate that they could take care of their own, they failed to eliminate

federal relief programs in Utah. Although a greater number of members received

assistance through the Church Welfare Program, federal welfare programs in Utah rose

sharply during the Great Depression. In 1933, Utahns received more federal relief funds,

106 Mangum and Blumell, 130-32; Rudd, 41-42. 107 Mangum and Blumell, 138-39, 148-49; Rudd, 127. 108 Mangum and Blumell, 149, 175; Rudd, 44-45.

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per capita, than residents in any other state.109 For every dollar that the people of Utah

paid in federal income tax, the national government sent seven dollars back to the state

through various relief agencies and projects.110 The New Deal, based on a per capita

comparison, benefited the West more than any other section of the nation, and Utah was

number twelve out of forty-eight states in terms of federal New Deal expenditures.111

While people in New England and the South seemed hesitant to ask for federal help,

citizens of the West, including Utah, were the most inclined to accept federal assistance,

and the West received sixty percent more federal aid than the South, the section most

often identified with New Deal aid.112 Despite the best efforts of the LDS Church, these

statistics indicate a state that needed and accepted federal assistance.

Even as the depression was ending, many Utahns still faced intense economic

hardship, and the state’s role in public welfare programs continually increased. In 1939,

the legislature passed public welfare legislation creating the Emergency Relief Fund and

stipulated that all money from state sales and use taxes would go into this fund, and in

combination with funds from parallel federal programs, they would be used to provide for

the poor. In 1941, the State Department of Public Welfare took on even more

responsibility when the legislature placed the Juvenile Court System, the Probation

Courts, the Tuberculosis Sanatorium, the Utah State Hospital, the State Training School,

and the State Industrial School under the jurisdiction of this department. Two years later,

the legislature entrusted the State Department of Public Welfare with all drug and alcohol

addiction programs, provided that the patient could cover twenty-five percent of cost of

109 White, 473. 110 Alexander and Allen, 201. 111 Arrington. “The New Deal in the West,” 311, 315. 112 Arrington, “The Sagebrush Resurrection,” 10-13.

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the program. The expansion of the state’s involvement in public welfare continued far

beyond the New Deal. Since 1929, public welfare has been one of the three largest state

expenditures, along with education and road construction and maintenance. From 1937

to 1946, state spending on public welfare increased 172%, and by the end of that period,

nearly sixty percent of all public aid went to the elderly.113 In 1947, the legislature

passed a two-year $50 million budget, and of that amount, $17 million went to public

welfare programs.114

Utahns continued to receive federal money for public welfare. In 1939, Congress

amended the Social Security Act, increasing the amount that the federal government

spent on the elderly and the blind and changing the federal responsibility for dependent

children from one-third to one-half of the costs.115 In 1939, Utah residents ranked second

in federal assistance to the elderly under the Social Security Act, fifth in the percentage of

dependent children whose parents received funds from the Social Security Act, and third

in the percentage of workers accepting government unemployment relief.116 By 1946,

Utah ranked fourth in average general assistance, seventh in average old-age assistance,

seventh in aid to dependent children, and eighth in aid to the blind.117

During World War II and the boom times of the 1950s, poverty and the need to

help the poor attracted less public attention, but as the focus returned to this topic in the

late 1950s and early 1960s, the LDS Church responded to the new national emphasis with

their own antipoverty programs. Although the Church Welfare Program continued to

113 Utah Foundation, 1-14. 114 Haymond, Geyser, and Benzon, 13. 115 Utah Foundation, 6. 116 Cannon, 72. 117 Utah Foundation, 50.

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provide assistance, the church added a six-part program to help the poor, and many of

these efforts paralleled national antipoverty programs. As with earlier church welfare

programs, the new system was family-based, encouraging families to actively prepare for

future emergencies, and emphasized the need for individuals and families to care for their

own and produce enough surplus to donate to others in need. Like national antipoverty

initiatives, the LDS welfare program stressed the importance of literacy, education, and

career development, and provided training in financial and resource management, home

production and storage, and physical, emotional, and spiritual health. The church used

existing programs for children and young adults to teach these topics. As in the past, the

primary assistance for those in need came from church leaders and members at the ward

level (the local ecclesiastical unit) or from the stake (the unit just larger than a ward), and

ward bishop’s and Relief Society leaders oversaw and provided for the needs of those

living in the ward. In 1950, the church ended their cooperation with public relief

programs on the local, state, and national levels, and church leaders gradually accepted

that some members needed public assistance.118

As Congress debated the EOA, the state legislature continued to underfund

welfare programs, perhaps because of the church’s emphasis on voluntary, private

assistance to the poor, and the federal government provided for those that church welfare

and other voluntary programs missed.119 During the 1960s, local newspapers were full of

articles, editorials, and letters to the editor about the state’s lack of welfare funding and

the failure of voluntary welfare programs to provide adequate assistance, especially in

118 Mangum and Blumell, 160-74, 207. 119 “Advisers to Welfare Plan,” Deseret News, 3 October 1964, 6A; “Welfare Trial Over,” Deseret News, 5 April 1965, 8A; “New Welfare Plan Would Cut Surplus,” Deseret News, 16 June 1964, B1.

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cases where the people in question were not active LDS Church members and therefore

unable to qualify for church assistance.120 In 1964, even before the EOA became law,

Utah received more than $94 million from the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and

Welfare (HEW), and the federal government increased their share of state welfare costs,

from fifty percent to seventy-five percent of the total.121 In spite of this increase, Utah

State Welfare Commission Chairman Ward C. Holbrook lamented the lack of state

welfare funds and worried that only if his department did some significant “belt-

tightening” and possibly found some additional funds “from other sources,” would they

manage to survive without substantial benefit cuts for those who relied on state assistance

for survival.122 The state welfare system failed to keep pace with the needs of its most

unfortunate citizens.

The Mormons who settled in Utah shared many of same philosophies about

poverty and welfare as citizens in other parts of the country. They believed that

assistance should be voluntary and handled by private organizations, that some recipients

were more worthy of aid than others, and that all welfare plans needed to reinforce a

commitment to hard work. In Utah, as in the rest of the nation, the Great Depression

forced people to see that poverty was caused by economic forces beyond an individual’s

control. Still, many LDS Church leaders clung to the notion of self-help, unveiling their

Church Welfare Plan. Even with this new program, Utahns failed to adequately take care

of their own and were forced to rely on federal programs. In the 1950s and 1960s, state

120 New Welfare Plan Would Cut Surplus;” Plea for Clothing,” Salt Lake Tribune, 4 September 1964, 20; “Tightening Of Funds On Welfare,” Deseret News, 17 March 1965, B1, B11; “Rampton Scolds Medical Group Over Welfare Patient Issue,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 21 April 1965, 6B. These are only a small sampling of articles dealing with lack of welfare funding. Many others could have been included. 121 “U.S. Welfare Gives Utah $94 Million,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 1 February 1965, 12; “New Welfare Plan Would Cut Surplus.” 122 “Tightening of Funds on Welfare.”

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welfare programs were constantly underfunded and continued to rely on the federal

government.

*****

The Economic Opportunity Act was a proposed political solution to poverty, a

social and economic problem. Politicians debated and voted on this measure at the heart

of the War on Poverty. Utah’s political representatives were a part of the process, and the

state’s political history affected how they reacted to the EOA. Although the political

beginnings of the state were unique, given the large LDS majority and their often

antagonistic relationship with the federal government, once Utah became a state, it

generally followed national political trends. By the time Congress considered the EOA,

Utah politicians responded to this proposed legislation in much the same way as other

politicians across the country. In the end, the bill passed, and even many who voted

against it found ways to benefit from the legislation.

From 1896 until the 1964, Utahns generally followed national voting trends.

During that time, Utah’s presidential returns were quite balanced and only differed from

national outcomes in three elections.123 On the state level, the Republican Party had a

slight edge, but there was greater parity between the parties than observers in the twenty-

first century might imagine. That was the political status quo in Utah when the EOA

came before Congress. At that time, Utah had four representatives in Congress, two in

the House and two in the Senate. Each of them participated in the EOA debates and

voted on it in August, 1964. Once the law passed, they each had an impact on how state

officials implemented it, even those who voted against it, and they also affected how the

123 The exceptions are that Utah voted for William J. Bryan in 1896, William H. Taft in 1912, and Richard Nixon in 1960. Poll, Utah’s History, 700-01.

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EOA evolved on the national level as they took part in the yearly vote to renew the act

and adjust EOA appropriations. In the House, Republican Laurence J. Burton, a native of

Ogden, represented the First Congressional District, and Republican Sherman P. Lloyd,

an Idaho transplant, represented the Second Congressional District. Utah’s senators were

Republican Wallace F. Bennett and Democrat Frank Moss. During the debates on the bill

and in the period immediately after its passage, each of these men commented on the

EOA. Of these men, only Moss voted for the EOA, while Utah’s three Republican

members voted against it. Though he was not a member of Congress when the EOA

passed, Democratic Congressman David S. King also played a part in the implementation

and development of the antipoverty programs. In 1964, he replaced Lloyd as the

representative of Utah’s Second Congressional District and served a single two-year

term, during the early days of the EOA.

Of all of the state’s representatives during the 1960s, Moss was the strongest and

most consistent supporter of the EOA. First elected in 1958, this three term senator

served during the Johnson administration, and some believed that Moss “attached himself

to…Johnson’s coattails.”124 He cosponsored the EOA, served on committees considering

several aspects of the bill, encouraged constituents to support it, and voted for it.

Once President Johnson announced his intention to focus on ending poverty,

Congress established a “Select Fact-Finding Committee on Poverty,” and Moss played an

active role, cosponsoring Senate Resolution 305, the measure that established the

committee and then served on that committee.125 Its purpose was to provide a

124 F. Ross Peterson, “Utah Politics Since 1945” in Utah’s History, 522. 125 Senator Gaylord Nelson to Senator Frank Moss, 7 April 1964, Frank E. Moss Papers, Box 95, Folder 1, Special Collections, Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City; “Moss Urges Solon Study On Poverty, Deseret News, 17 March 1964, B11.

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“systematic review of information already available [on poverty], of programs already in

progress, and of new ideas proposed… to deal effectively with the problem of poverty,”

and those who served on the committee intended to include a survey of what was being

done at all levels to eradicate poverty, including private and public efforts.126 In addition,

Moss cosponsored Senate bill 2642, the original version of the EOA, introduced in

March, 1964, and he assured constituents that he would give the bill his full support.127

During the developmental stages, Moss worked to build support for the EOA

among his constituents, many of whom were generally opposed it. When one constituent

called the act a “total sham,” a “fool’s answer” to the question of poverty, and a

“Socialist’s” attempt to interject government into the lives of people when existing

legislation already provided ways to end poverty, Moss vehemently defended the

legislation, stated that the bill was desperately needed, and concluded, “It will be tragic if

the affluence of many American’s today deadens our social conscience which is essential

to a well-ordered society.”128

Other constituents challenged the act because they that felt poverty was a state

issue outside the domain of federal power, that national incomes were too high and

unemployment too low to warrant a War on Poverty, and that only bureaucrats would

benefit from the EOA, but Moss countered their arguments. He argued that poverty was

such a large problem that it would only be defeated when governments at all levels—

national, state, and local—decided to work together to find solutions.129 Using what he

126 Senator Gaylord Nelson to Senator Frank Moss, 7 April 1964, Moss Papers. 127 Senator Frank Moss to J. F. Collier, Jr., Brigham City, 6 May 1964, Moss Papers, Box 95, Folder 1. 128 Joseph G. Raymond, Salt Lake City, to Senator Frank Moss, 23 April 1964, Moss Papers, Box 95, Folder 1; Senator Moss to Joseph G. Raymond, Salt Lake City, 29 April 1964, Moss Papers, Box 95, Folder 1. 129 Senator Moss to Charles H. Ketchum, Salt Lake City, Moss Papers, Box 95, Folder 1.

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saw during a twenty-one county tour of Utah, Moss emphasized that many counties in the

state experienced profound poverty, despite general prosperity, and that the antipoverty

agenda was not simply an election year gimmick.130 He felt that the EOA provided “a

practical and humanitarian program designed to help people help themselves” and argued

that Republicans should like it because “it does what they advocate because it prevents

dependency” by providing training that enabled people to help themselves.131

Democratic Representative David S. King, who represented Utah’s Second

Congressional District from January of 1965 to January of 1967, also supported the EOA.

Though he was not a member of Congress when it originally passed, King was a strong

proponent of the antipoverty legislation for the two years that he served. During his term,

he demonstrated his support through communications with constituents and his voting

record.

In the summer of 1965, Congress had its first chance to reevaluate the EOA and

decide whether to refinance the antipoverty programs for another year, and King was a

member of the House at that time. He voted to continue EOA funding for another

year.132 A year later, a disgruntled resident of Provo wrote to King to express his

bitterness about the poverty programs in general and to bemoan the many scandals

connected with this $2.5 billion “boondoggle” funded at taxpayer expense, and he urged

King to take a good hard look at the EOA before voting to refinance it.133 In response,

130 “Moss Proposes 5-Point Plan For Rural Help,” Deseret News, 3 March 1964, B11; “Sen. Moss Calls for ‘All Out War’ On Utah’s Depressed Rural Areas,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 4 March 1964, 11A; Senator Moss to Darrell Crawford, Ogden, 7 July 1964, Moss Papers, Box 95, Folder 1. 131 Senator Moss to Lynn Gordon, Park City, 30 July 1964, Moss Papers, Box 95, Folder 1; “Political Pot: Scent of Votes Fills Air,” Deseret News, 23 September 1964, B4. 132 “2 Vote for Poverty Bill, Deseret News, 23 July 1965, B1. 133 William W. Wagner, Provo, to Congressman King, 15 August 1966, David S. King Papers, Box 16, Folder 14, Special Collections, Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City.

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King highlighted the many positive attributes of the EOA while also acknowledging the

“bugs.”134 He declared the ideas underlying the EOA to be “the most exciting we have

ever tried in the poverty and welfare field” and celebrated this legislation as “the ounce of

prevention that saves the pound of cure” for those in need.135

Among Utah Republicans in Congress, Representative Lawrence Burton was

most supportive of the EOA. Burton voted against the original EOA in 1964, but over

time, he provided a fairly balanced assessment of the antipoverty legislation and the

programs it created. While he frequently acknowledged the problems of the EOA, he

also praised its positive results. When it came up for renewal, Burton was one of only

two Republican representatives from the Intermountain West who voted for its

refunding.136 Unlike many politicians he was willing to recognize that few things in life

are entirely good or bad, and his reaction to the War on Poverty was no different.

Like many Republicans, Burton worried about the size and cost of these programs

and the resulting increase in federal power. He argued that the “President’s [antipoverty]

recommendations contained many duplications of programs already pending before

Congress, or programs already rejected by Congress and the American people.”137 He

stated, “It is impossible to estimate the cost, the number of new government employes

[sic] and the number of new agencies and bureaus that will be created just to administer

these programs,” …but “we can be sure that the cost will not be cheap and the degree of

government influence and interference in our lives will not be small.”138 Burton believed

134 Congressman King to William W. Wagner, Provo, 9 September 1966, King Papers, Box 16, Folder 14. 135 Congressman King to William W. Wagner, King Papers. 136 “2 Vote For Poverty Bill,” Deseret News, 23 July 1966, B1. 137 “Moss Urges Solon Study on Poverty,” Deseret News, 17 March 1964, B11. 138 “Candidates Hammer at Taxes, Rights,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 16 July 1964, 8B.

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that many federal programs could be eliminated with little negative impact on the country

and that government “gifts” did not help anyone and often encouraged people to be less

self-sufficient and more dependent.139

Asserting a very traditional position on helping the poor, Burton emphasized that

“the best weapon against poverty is beefing up the ability of the head of families to earn a

living.”140 He felt that if authorities focused on helping the heads of household to find

well-paying jobs, poverty numbers would shrink. To this end, Burton was hopeful about

the EOA’s educational and vocational programs, believing that they might enhance the

“opportunity [of the poor] to work so that they can better themselves” and help those who

depended on them.141 He stated that “some phases of the education and training part of

this program do deserve our careful consideration,” and that if they were handled

correctly, these programs might help individuals to remove themselves from the state’s

welfare rolls.142

Recognizing that poverty was complex, Burton stated that the War on Poverty had

to be multifaceted, with different programs to attack different aspects of poverty.143 He

accepted that there were some people who could not provide for themselves for many

reasons, including poor health, mental or physical problems, or a general lack of

education or training.144 While he supported government programs to help the truly

139 Keith T. Brickey, Provo, to Congressman Burton, 8 April 1966, Laurence J. Burton Papers, Box 194, Folder 12, Special Collections, Stewart Library, Weber State University, Ogden; Congressman Burton to Keith T. Brickey, Provo, 26 April 1966, Burton Papers, Box 194, Folder 12. 140 “The Political Pot,” Deseret News, 7 October 1964, B15. 141 Keith T. Brickey, Provo, to Congressman Burton, Burton Papers; Congressman Burton to Keith T. Brickey, Provo, Burton Papers. 142 “Moss Urges Solon Study On Poverty;” “Candidates Hammer at Taxes, Rights.” 143 Congressman Burton to Reva W. Bishop, Sandy, 1 August 1966, Burton Papers, Box 194, Folder 11. 144 Congressman Burton to Susan Bratton, Brigham City, 12 December 1967, Burton Papers, Box 199, Folder 10.

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needy, he felt that all possible precautions should be taken to ensure that “chiselers”

capable of working should not reap the benefits of these programs.145 He felt that it

would take a unified effort of local, state, and federal governments and private industry

and that the antipoverty programs needed to be comprehensive and provide the poor with

training and motivation to improve their lives.146

Burton proved himself a pragmatic politician, declaring that too often laws won

acceptance for reasons other than those originally intended. When a resident from St.

George expressed his opposition to the EOA, Burton tried to explain why the antipoverty

programs were accepted in a place like Utah, where public support was not originally

strong.147 He argued that although there was much resistance to antipoverty programs in

the beginning, ultimately “the federal carrot is just too much for local areas to turn

down.”148 Opposition crumbled in the face of pressure from those who stood to benefit

from these programs, even when many of the beneficiaries were middle-class bureaucrats

rather than the poor.

When Utahns questioned the lack of proper management over the antipoverty

programs, resulting in the mismanagement of funds and wasted tax dollars, Burton

sympathized with, but tried to ease, their concerns. He acknowledged that there had been

some mismanagement but explained that House Republicans had started an investigation

of all OEO programs to determine the existence and extent of mismanagement and waste

145 Ibid. 146 Congressman Burton to Reva W. Bishop, Sandy, 1 August 1966, Burton Papers. 147 B. H. Seegmiller, St. George, to Congressman Burton, 20 February 1966, Burton Papers, Box 194, Folder 12. 148 Congressman Burton to B. H. Seegmiller, St. George, 3 March 1966, Burton Papers, Box 194, Folder 12.

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within each program.149 He presented himself as a watchdog over the antipoverty

programs, promising to minimize problems through his support of amendments intended

to curb abuses.150

Congressman Lloyd was a more consistent EOA opponent who rarely had

anything good to say about the antipoverty programs. He served in the House when the

EOA became law, and like the other Utah Republican politicians, he voted against it. In

the 1964 election, he unsuccessfully challenged Frank Moss for his Senate seat, and as a

result, he had a two-year “hiatus” from national politics. Despite that setback, Lloyd won

reelection to the House in 1966 and had an impact on the EOA and its implementation in

the period after that election. Although he eventually voted to continue the antipoverty

programs, this change was more a matter of political reality than a true change of heart.

When Congress was crafting the original EOA, Lloyd had significant concerns

about the proposed antipoverty measure. He argued that the EOA could not possibly

ensure that millions in federal money would target the causes of poverty, and at best, it

would simply remove some symptoms in a few areas for a limited time.151 Lloyd

expressed his commitment to capitalist solutions untainted by government involvement,

stating that “basic, economic stability will generate its own business potential in

depressed areas” to help those who needed it most and suggesting that if the federal

government wanted to be involved, they should continue to fund road construction and

reclamation projects, and protect private enterprise.152 Lloyd believed that the EOA was

149 Congressman Burton to Erhart. T. Poelzl, Brigham City, 1 February 1966, Burton Papers, Box 194, Folder 12. 150 Congressman Burton to S. Kenneth Robbins, Provo, 17 November 1967, Burton Papers, Box 199, Folder 10. 151 Congressman Lloyd to E. J. Janss, Salt Lake City, 27 July 1964, Sherman P. Lloyd Papers, Box 19, Folder 30, Special Collections, Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City. 152 Ibid.

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a “costly, burdensome and redundant effort that could be better accomplished through

existing programs.”153 In 1964, he voted against the EOA.

During his Senate campaign in 1964, Lloyd attacked the new law. He argued that

it failed to target the “basic causes” of poverty and that the program was “just another

grand scheme for disbursement of favors” to the Democratic faithful, “purchased with

taxpayer dollars.”154 To be more effective, Lloyd suggested that the programs needed to

“emphasize the role of education and rehabilitation among those whose lives are blighted

with poverty,” and suggested that a “special emphasis should be placed on slum area high

school programs.”155 He stressed his commitment to nongovernment solutions, stating

that ending poverty was a worthy goal, but it “can only be successful if reliance is placed

on the private sector of our economy rather than public charity.”156 Like other

Republicans, Lloyd felt the bill was politically motivated, that there should be more

emphasis on educational programs, and that private solutions were far superior.

During the Republican primary election for the Senate in 1964, Lloyd lost to

former (and future) Brigham Young University president Ernest Wilkinson, and in turn,

the incumbent, Frank Moss, defeated Wilkinson in the general election to retain his

Senate seat. As a result, Lloyd was shut out of the Washington political scene for two

years, but he reclaimed his seat in 1966. Upon his return, Lloyd had a slight change of

heart about the EOA. Perhaps it was brought on by his two years in “political exile” or

by the political situation when he regained his seat, but in 1967, Lloyd voted to renew

153 Congressman Lloyd to P. A. Maughan, 5 August 1964, Lloyd Papers, Box 19, Folder 30. 154 “3 Hopefuls Lash At Democrats,” Deseret News, 10 March 1964, B11. 155 Ibid. 156 “Wilkinson, Lloyd Rap Demo Policy, Ogden Standard-Examiner, 18 March 1964, 5A.

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EOA funding for another year.157 At that time, he acknowledged his political reversal.

Lloyd stated that he originally voted against the EOA because he felt that “there were

other and better methods…to assist the poor,” but since the passage of the EOA, the

government had invested heavily in EOA programs, and “we cannot turn away from the

investment that has been made, nor can we be blind to the facts and dangers which exist

in America…due to poverty conditions.”158 He continued, “The facts are that at an

extravagant, even profligate, expense we have at least developed tools and gained

experience” about how to help the poor, and it would be even more wasteful to

discontinue these programs now that so much has been put into them. Though Lloyd

changed his vote on the EOA, it was certainly a lukewarm change of heart.

Of all Utah’s political leaders, Senator Bennett was the least supportive of the

EOA. From the very beginning, he fought to defeat it, voting against it. Bennett opposed

the legislation for a number of reasons, including his belief that poverty was a matter best

left to state and local authorities, that the EOA was politically motivated, that it simply

duplicated existing programs, and that the ideas behind it were economically unsound.

Two of his biggest concerns were that the EOA was more about Democratic

politics during an election year than about ending poverty and that it was a dangerous

step towards socialism. When concerned citizens claimed that there was “too much

politics” in the bill during an election year, that Democrats were using it to buy votes and

mortgaging the future to do so, and that it was socialistic, “dishonest, illegal, and

immoral,” Bennett did not disagree.159 He acknowledged that “…a great deal of the basis

157 Frank Hewlett, “Lloyd Calls for Poverty Aid Support,” Salt Lake Tribune, 12 December 1967, 2. 158 Ibid. 159 Darrell Crawford to Senator Bennett, 2 July 1964, Wallace F. Bennett Papers, Series 2, Subseries B, Box 408, Folder 8, L. Tom Perry Special Collections, Harold B. Lee Library, Brigham Young University,

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for the poverty bill is politics,” and said that the only way to kill the EOA was to defeat

the Democrats in the November election.160 Less than a year after the passage of the

EOA, Bennett went even further when he publicly joined Senator Milward Simpson of

Wyoming in condemning the antipoverty program as nothing more than a “gold-plated

WPA” and that it was “a mass employment program giving jobs to out-of-work

Democratic politicians.”161 They were especially angry over the high salaries paid to key

antipoverty officials and vowed that they would work to reduce these salaries.162 Bennett

saw the EOA as a perfectly timed Democratic attempt to win votes by providing jobs,

injecting money into local economies, and padding the wallets of OEO officials.

Bennett also opposed the EOA because he believed that poverty was a local

problem, requiring a local—rather than a national—solution. While he understood that

there was a poverty problem in the country, he did not approve of the EOA’s methods to

end poverty and promised concerned citizens that he would do whatever was necessary

“to see that it does not become law.”163 He told one constituent, “You can be sure I will

not support the tremendous boondoggle that the President will try to sell to the American

people under the attractive label of an anti-poverty program.”164 Although the federal

government had played a critical role in providing aid to those in need since the Great

Depression—if not before, Bennett believed that state and local authorities should be left

Provo, Utah; Chas. B. Pekor, Columbus, GA, to Senator Bennett, 24 July 1964, Bennett Papers, Series 2, Subseries B, Box 408, Folder 8. 160 Senator Bennett to Darrell Crawford, 7 July 1964, Bennett Papers, Series 2, Subseries B, Box 408, Folder 8; Senator Bennett to Chas. B. Pekor, Columbus, GA, 29 July 1964, Bennett Papers, Series 2, Subseries B, Box 408, Folder 8. 161 “Poverty Program Attacked,” Deseret News, 22 April 1965, B1. 162 Ibid.; “Boobytraps in War Against Poverty, Ogden Standard-Examiner, 29 April 1965, 8A; “’Poverty Pay’ Irks Bennett,” Salt Lake Tribune, 22 April 1965, 4A. 163 Senator Bennett to Darrell Crawford, Bennett Papers. 164 Senator Bennett to Charles Ketchum, Salt Lake City, 6 July 1964, Bennett Papers, Series 2, Subseries B, Box 408, Folder 8.

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alone to develop and implement their own welfare programs.

Like many EOA opponents, Bennett argued that it would not alleviate poverty but

would add substantially to size of the federal bureaucracy. He felt that the act was

“primarily political,” that it would simply duplicate existing agencies that had done very

little to reduce poverty, and that at a time when it was critical to reduce the federal debt,

the EOA would add to it.165 In a letter to a faculty member at the College of Southern

Utah, Bennett summarized his position, stating, “The proposed bill does not, in my

opinion, represent an economically sound answer to the problem. It duplicates some

existing programs…would pour millions of dollars into certain areas without providing

the new industries and manpower training necessary to sustain the economy independent

of continued Federal subsidies.”166 He became even more upset when Congress diverted

money from one of his pet projects, the Central Utah Project—what he considered to be a

solid reclamation project that would pay for itself—to finance an antipoverty program

that he felt would never achieve its intended aims.167

Overall, Bennett was not a fan of the War on Poverty. He frequently promised

constituents that he would do everything in his power to kill it, and he delivered on those

promises when he voted against the EOA.168 In summing up the legislative actions of the

Congress that passed the EOA, Bennett concluded that, thanks to the Great Society

legislation, it was “potentially one of most dangerous sessions” ever and that the first

order of business during the next session was to fully analyze “the hastily passed

165 Senator Bennett to John H. Zenger, Provo, 20 July 1964, Bennett Papers, Series 2, Subseries B, Box 408, Folder 8, L. 166 Senator Bennett to D. C. Schmutz, 14 May 1964, Bennett Papers, Series 2, Subseries B, Box 408, Folder 8. 167 “Bennett Attacks Central Utah Cut, Deseret News, 25 May 1965, B3. 168 Senator Bennett to Charles Ketchum, Salt Lake City, 6 July 1964, Bennett Papers; Senator Bennett to Darrell Crawford, Bennett Papers; Senator Bennett to Chas. B. Pekor, Bennett Papers.

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programs of the past year to see what changes should be made.”169

These five individuals were Utah’s representatives in Congress during the original

debate over the EOA and its gradual implementation. True to their Democratic Party

affiliations, Senator Moss and Congressman King were the most supportive of the

original legislation and its associated programs. Among Utah’s Republican voices at the

national level, Congressman Burton seemed the most open to at least some EOA ideas.

While he originally voted against it and continued to have reservations about some

aspects of the antipoverty programs, he eventually voted for continued funding and

actually embraced some facets of the antipoverty agenda. Congressman Lloyd was a

vocal opponent of the legislation in its earliest stages and only came around to supporting

its renewal because of the money that had already been invested. At least in general

terms, Senator Bennett was the most dedicated opponent of the EOA.

Although not directly involved, LDS Church leaders have had an impact on

politics in Utah, and some shared their feelings on the EOA, affecting how it was

received and implemented in the state. After the struggle for statehood, church leaders

tried to stay above party politics, but until 1936, they sometimes took official positions on

political, economic, and social issues, and state and national elections. Even after 1936,

the church failed to prevent its leaders and members from speaking out on political issues

of concern. Church leaders sometimes announced their positions on moral issues like

prohibition or Sunday closing laws.170 Yet, not all church leaders held the same political

opinions, often disagreeing about what was best for the state and the nation. For

169 “Congressional Delegation Reviews 89th Session,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 24 October 1965, B1. 170 James B. Allen, “Religion in Twentieth-century Utah,” in Utah’s History, 619 ; Thomas G. Alexander, “The Emergence of a Republican Majority in Utah, 1970-1992,” in Politics in the Postwar American West, ed. Richard Lowitt (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995), 274.

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example, President Heber J. Grant and First Counselor J. Reuben Clark, Jr. publicly

condemned federal New Deal programs while Brigham H. Roberts, a member of the First

Council of the Seventy, supported the New Deal. Hugh B. Brown, a member of the

church’s First Presidency, was very active in the Democratic Party in the 1960s while

Ezra Taft Benson, a Mormon apostle and later president of the church, was active in the

Republican Party and served as President Eisenhower’s Secretary of Agriculture in the

1950s. Church leaders were also divided over the EOA.

Church leaders firmly believed that if all members worked together to strengthen

church welfare, there would be no need for government programs. As a part of each

General Conference, church leaders organized a welfare session to discuss ways to help

the poor. During the welfare session held in the fall of 1964, President N. Eldon Tanner,

Second Counselor in the First Presidency, presented an outline of how church welfare

should work.171 The most important point in Tanner’s talk was that to qualify for church

welfare, one had to be a member of the church, and therefore, conversion was a must.172

Nonmembers simply did not qualify. While this might have been a valuable tactic to

increase church membership, it left anyone who was not a member outside the safety net

of church welfare, adding to the need for sizeable state and federal programs.

Unfortunately, state lawmakers did not provide adequate funding for public assistance.

As church leaders spoke about the virtues of their welfare program, they often

used rhetoric that compared it to “inferior” public assistance. This became more prevalent

after the introduction of the War on Poverty, though they regularly took a subliminal

approach, refusing to identify any particular government program by name. Church

171 “Advisers to Welfare Plan,” Deseret News, 3 October 1964, 6A. 172 Ibid.

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welfare versus government welfare was again a topic at the General Conference in the

spring of 1965. As in the past, Tanner was one of the primary speakers during the

welfare session, and he asserted that “government socialism” might be completely

abolished under the Church Welfare Program if all members pulled together and worked

to ensure the success of the endeavor, especially those who benefited from church

welfare.173 Another ecclesiastical leader, Presiding Bishop John H. Vandenberg

delivered a warning to those who received welfare benefits but refused to work in

exchange for the help they received.174 He stressed that “the dole is a sad situation,” and

only through continued efforts of all members might the church welfare system succeed

in eradicating the need for government welfare.175 These leaders seemed to be saying

that only church welfare was praiseworthy, and all government programs were

contemptible, creating lazy and unmotivated individuals.

That was not the only time that church leaders warned against the curse of the

dole. In a June, 1965 article about Welfare Square, church leaders again sounded a

warning. Welfare Square was a church-owned collection of facilities on 700 South in

Salt Lake City that included a grain elevator, a cannery, a dairy, and a clothing factory,

and its purpose was to follow through on the church’s “principle of aiding and assisting

those who find themselves in need” by providing necessary commodities.176 Church

leaders expected all members, the wealthy and the poor alike, to put in their time at this

facility in order to “re-enthrone” work “as the ruling principle of the lives of our church

173 “LDS Official Urges Aid for Welfare,” Salt Lake Tribune, 6 April 1965, 4. 174 Ibid. 175 Ibid. 176 Maurice A. Jones, “Welfare Square of LDS Rates High in Meaning,” Salt Lake Tribune, 13 June 1965, 6C.

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membership.”177 As they promoted Welfare Square and its underlying philosophies,

organizers presented a comparison between the church’s welfare plan and government

welfare strategies that complimented the former while degrading the latter. Whereas

church welfare emphasized hard work, helping “people to help themselves,” and

“independence, industry, thrift and self-respect,” government assistance represented a

system associated with “the curse of idleness” and the evils of the dole.178 Glen L. Rudd,

the coordinator at Welfare Square stated, “The members of the church do accept that

idleness is a curse, and no true, honest Latter-day Saint would accept a dole, which is

something for nothing.”179 This article did not specifically mention the EOA, but given

its timing, the article likely referred to the War on Poverty programs and inferred that

they were inferior to church welfare.

Again and again, church leaders reinforced the idea that church welfare, unlike

government programs, helped individuals to build character and develop self-respect.

During the fall session of General Conference in 1965, President Tanner reminded

members that “the most important thing we are trying to do is build souls—to save men

and lead them to immortality and eternal life” and urged those affiliated with the Church

Welfare Program to focus on helping those in need to “regain self-respect.”180 Because

saving souls was their primary goal, Tanner argued that people who think government

welfare programs “can take the place of or improve on the programs we have in the

Church” are greatly mistaken.181 At the welfare session of General Conference the

177 Ibid. 178 Ibid. 179 Ibid. 180 “Welfare Goal: Building Souls,” Deseret News, 2 October 1965, A5; “’Self-Respect’ to Keynote LDS Welfare Program,” Salt Lake Tribune, 3 October 1965, 14A. 181 “Welfare Goal: Building Souls;” “’Self-Respect’ to Keynote LDS Welfare Program.”

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following year, the refrain was the same. Tanner reminded those in charge of church

welfare that they must preserve the self-respect of those receiving assistance by requiring

them to provide honest work in return, and Elder Harold B. Lee, another church leader,

warned that “if you give to people without them giving something in return,” it will ruin

the morale of those being assisted.182 Given the opinions of Tanner and other leaders in

charge of church welfare programs, it seems the EOA was unneeded and unwanted for

the state and for church members throughout the nation.

Another individual officially affiliated with the LDS Church who had political

aspirations and much to say about government welfare programs was Ernest L.

Wilkinson. From 1951 to 1970, Wilkinson served as the president of Brigham Young

University (BYU), the LDS Church-owned school, but in 1964, Wilkinson briefly

stepped down as university president to successfully challenge Sherman Lloyd and then

unsuccessfully oppose Frank Moss for one of Utah’s two U.S. Senate seats.183 During

that brief hiatus from his BYU position, Wilkinson frequently attacked the War on

Poverty. He built his campaign on a strong opposition to high taxes, the concentrated

power of the federal government, excessive federal spending, and government-sponsored

social welfare programs like the EOA. Wilkinson opposed the War on Poverty because

he claimed that it stifled “the innate right of the individual to chart his own destiny.”184

In a statement specifically issued to oppose the EOA, Wilkinson said, “Poverty will never

be cured by teaching men to depend on government handouts,” and that “poverty could

182 “Self-Respect Stressed In Welfare Programs,” Deseret News, 9 April 1966, 4A. 183 Allen, “Education and the Arts in Twentieth-century Utah,” in Utah’s History, 595; Peterson, “Utah Politics Since 1945,” in Utah’s History, 522. 184 Allen, “Religion in the Twentieth-century Utah,” in Utah’s History, 620; “U.S. Senate: Republican,” Deseret News, 8 August 1964, A3.

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be reduced through self-effort if the size, cost and power of the federal government were

whittled down.”185 He emphasized that the best way to end poverty was to allow private

businesses to establish new jobs instead of creating more “shopworn” government

programs or increasing federally sponsored “welfare handouts.”186 In his acceptance

speech before the Republican State Nominating Convention, Wilkinson affirmed, “Let

there be light so that the children of America may be delivered out of the wilderness of

their political bondage into the promised land [sic], not of a welfare state, but of a

responsible and Republican America.”187 During the general election, Wilkinson

condemned Moss for supporting President Johnson’s political agenda, including the War

on Poverty, arguing that the spending on these programs deprived taxpayers of necessary

income, represented “irresponsible government” policies that took from the “haves” and

gave to the “have nots,” and demonstrated the federal government’s lack of respect for

the integrity of state governments and “their greater ability to solve most state problems,”

including poverty.188 While these arguments were not especially original, they

demonstrate that Wilkinson embraced the Republican Party line about federal programs,

and while his positions did not represent the “official” position of the LDS Church, the

fact that Wilkinson served as president of BYU both before and after making these

statements seems to indicate that church leaders were not strongly opposed to his political

opinions on these matters.

While President McKay and members of his First Presidency had personal contact

185 “Political Pot,” Deseret News, 10 August 1964, 22B. 186 Ibid. 187 Wilkinson Acceptance Speech, Republican Nominating Convention, June 13, 1964, Wilkinson Papers, Box 183, Folder 4, quoted in James Seaman, “Critical Campaign: Republicans, Democrats, and the 1964 Election in Utah,” Masters Thesis, University of Utah, 2007, 2. 188 “Political Pot,” Deseret News, 7 October 1964, B15; “Politics 1964: Utah Candidates for Senate State Views,” Deseret News, 17 September 1964, A6.

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with President Johnson, both in Salt Lake City and Washington D.C., this seems to have

had little effect on the church’s position on the EOA. Although most church leaders

refrained from taking part in the political debate or issuing official political statements

about the antipoverty programs, they frequently shared their opposition during

conference speeches and in articles about church welfare. McKay stayed out of public

discussions on these matters, but behind the scenes, he worried about “the menace of

communist subversion in America.”189 President Brown was one of the very few who

vocally supported the War on Poverty.190 Much more common was the opposition to the

EOA as presented by Ezra Taft Benson and Ernest Wilkinson.

*******

The Founding Fathers consciously and deliberately created the new concept of

“territories” rather than “colonies,” in the sincere hope that they could prevent the kind of

animosity that the original colonies felt for Great Britain, but they were unable to prevent

all such problems. Utah, like so many of her western neighbors, began as a territory

under the strict control of the federal government, and even after the difficult road to

statehood, the new state continued (and continues) to feel the heavy hand of the federal

government at times. During the mid-1960s (and still today), the national government

owned or controlled a huge percentage of the land within Utah’s borders, and many

citizens wholeheartedly believed (and still believe) that federal ownership and regulation

prevented them from fully developing their resources, growing their economy, and

exercising the self-determination that they deserved. Given Utah’s religious history,

members of the LDS Church, a majority of the state’s population, had additional reasons

189 Seaman, 7. 190 Allen, “Religion in the Twentieth-century Utah,” 620.

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to distrust the motives and actions of national political leaders. Despite these negative

feelings about the national government, federal policies and programs often benefitted the

state’s economy. Whether it was in the guise of federal money for needed irrigation

projects, defense dollars for new military installations, lucrative government contracts for

locally owned businesses, or jobs and paychecks for the unemployed, the federal

government aided the people and the economy of Utah in many ways. This complex

relationship between Utah and the federal government affected the way Utahns

responded to the War on Poverty and the EOA. Some saw it as a legitimate attempt to

help those in need, some saw it as the latest example of government overreaction, and

some saw it as the next great opportunity to enrich themselves and the state.

Utahns entered the twentieth century believing that those who were lazy and

refused to work ended up in poverty, that private, voluntary charities should provide

assistance to the “worthy” poor, and that state and federal governments should not play a

part in alleviating the suffering of the unemployed and those living in poverty. During

the Great Depression, with its unprecedented unemployment and human suffering that

even affected those who KNEW how to work, Utahns began to accept that market forces

beyond the control of any individual sometimes led to poverty and that state and federal

governments had a responsibility to reduce the suffering of the poor and improve the

economy. Although their commitment to these ideals waxed and waned, depending on

the strength of the economy at any given time, Utahns established a precedent of

allowing the government to help the poor, when necessary.

The next chapter focuses on the extent and nature of poverty in Utah when the

EOA became law. It compares the poverty situation in Utah to the nation as a whole. It

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specifically examines the extent and nature of rural poverty, urban poverty, and the

standard of living of Native Americans and migrant workers in the state. The chapter

demonstrates that poverty existed in Utah, that it unevenly affected people, that many

Utahns clearly needed some kind of assistance, and that local and voluntary solutions

were not enough. Though the poverty rate in Utah was not as high as the national

average, there were many who needed and welcomed federal assistance under the newly

passed Economic Opportunity Act.

CHAPTER 4

THE NEED FOR THE EOA IN UTAH:

POVERTY AND RACE

Eighteen thousand migrant farmlaborers will work the fields and orchards of Utah this year. And…the migrant families will face isolation and exploitation. The migrant and seasonal farmworker…finds himself at the very bottom of social, economic and legislative hierarchy…the farmworker is politically impotent and therefore unprotected by labor legislation…The migrant farmlaborer works harder for less money than any other labor force in the U.S…He is shunned by the community in which he works and therefore deprived of educational and social opportunities.1

With Johnson’s declaration of War on Poverty, the national discourse on poverty

increased, Congressional debates on poverty-related issues expanded, and the discussion

of the EOA began. While these events transpired in the nation’s capital, legislators,

ordinary Americans, and the poor living in states across the county experienced the long-

term ripple effects of this “war.” Even the people of Utah, situated geographically in the

Great Basin on the far edge of the Rocky Mountains and ideologically in the group of

western states where the people prided themselves on their self-sufficiency and their

disdain for the overreaching federal government, became entangled in the discussions

about the poor, programs and policies to end poverty, and the role that local, state, and

the federal government should play in this process.

1 “History and Growth of the Utah Migrant Council,” Utah Migrant Council, 3. (Utah Migrant Council brochure given to the author by a member of the Council).

138

This chapter outlines poverty in Utah on the eve of the War on Poverty to

establish the state’s need for assistance under the EOA. It compares the poverty situation

in Utah to the national situation. The EOA was a complex bundle of antipoverty

programs that targeted different suffering populations: the rural poor, those living in

urban ghettos, and disadvantaged minority groups. For that reason, this chapter discusses

the nature of rural poverty across the state, poverty in Utah’s urban areas—almost

entirely concentrated along the Wasatch Front, and minorities living in poverty in the

state—especially Native Americans and migrant workers. By examining poverty in

Utah, we can better understand the extent to which the state needed federal antipoverty

funds and programs, the areas and groups most in need of assistance, and the types of

programs that might have been the most useful to help the poor living in the state.

*******

Unfortunately, poverty was (and is) a reality of life. As John Kenneth Galbraith,

Michael Harrington, and others so eloquently reminded Americans during the mid-

twentieth century, there was an “other America” of people living in abject poverty in

contrast to the affluence so often associated with the United States at that time. As in the

nation at large, many Utahns lived in poverty. As Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and

other national leaders began to focus on this issue, Utah’s political leaders turned their

attention to investigating and defining the extent of poverty in the state. State policy

makers used this developing picture of the poor to influence local responses to the

problem and their level of support for national antipoverty programs.

As Congress debated the EOA, state leaders examined the poverty numbers in

Utah. According to the 1960 Census, 30,768 families in Utah lived below the nationally

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established poverty line of $3000.00 per year.2 This represented almost fifteen percent of

the families in the state, compared with a national poverty rate of nearly twenty percent.3

Yet, poor families were unequally distributed throughout the state, and since the EOA

designed different types of programs to help rural and urban areas, it was important to

establish the extent of poverty in each area. In Utah, less than thirteen percent of urban

families lived below the established poverty line, but the poverty rate for rural families

was over twenty percent.4 While this might seem like a significant difference, the overall

population in Utah’s urban areas was so much higher than in rural areas that the vast

majority of people living in poverty resided in the state’s urban areas. In Utah, there are

twenty-nine counties. As indicated in Table I and Figure I, nineteen had populations that

were mostly, or entirely, rural.5 These counties had a total population of 144,406 of

which 109,720, or seventy-six percent, lived in rural areas.6 In comparison, there were

four counties along the Wasatch Front—Salt Lake, Weber, Utah, and Davis—that each

had populations that were at least eighty percent urban, and these counties had a total

population of 665,580, a population close to five times larger than the nineteen most rural

counties, as demonstrated in Table I and Figure I.7 Despite the higher percentage of

poverty in rural counties, apparent upon comparing the date in Table I and Figures II and

III, the greatest number of poor people were living in Utah’s urban areas, and as a result,

the poor residing in urban areas required more EOA funding and programs than those

2 “Table 65,” Census of the Population: 1960. Vol. I. Part 46, Utah. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), 86. 3 James T. Patterson, America’s Struggle against Poverty in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 77. 4 “Table 66,” Census of the Population: 1960, 51. 5 “Table 29,” Census of the Population: 1960, 55-56; “Table 28,” Census of the Population: 1960, 52-54. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid.; “Table 29,” Census of the Population: 1960, 55-56.

140

living in rural parts of the state.

In addition to the rural-urban divide, Washington policymakers recognized the

existence of “pockets of poverty,” often among minority groups, and designed the EOA

to target these populations. Although the state had a predominantly white population,

some minorities lived in Utah, but like the poverty population, they were not equally

distributed throughout the state, as indicated in Figure III. In the 1960 Census, Utah had

a total population of 890,627, and of that number, 873,828 (98.11%) people were white.8

This left a non-white population that was less than two percent of the total population.

Although the census provides few details defining this non-white population, it does

indicate that the largest minority group was Indians with 6,961 individuals (.78%) and

that there were 4,371 Japanese (.49%) and 4,148 “Negros” (.47%).9 The census did not

identify, define, or count the number of Hispanic Americans, a group that the EOA

focused on helping, and it certainly did not include those who illegally immigrated into

the state.10

While the number and percentage of non-white individuals in Utah were very

low, some counties had larger minority populations than others. Figure III identifies the

counties with the highest percentage of minorities—San Juan, Uintah, and Duchesne—

and their minority populations consisted almost entirely of Native Americans.11 Box

Elder, the county with the fourth highest minority percentage, had a more diverse

minority population, though the largest percentage were Native Americans.12 Depending

8 “Table 15,” Census of the Population: 1960, 21. 9 Ibid. 10 Vincente V. Mayer, “After Escalante: The Spanish-Speaking People of Utah,” in Helen Z. Papanikolas, ed., The Peoples of Utah (Salt Lake City: Utah Historical Society, 1981), 440. 11 “Table 28,” Census of the Population: 1960, 52-54. 12 Ibid., 52.

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on the time of year, Box Elder also had a significant Hispanic migrant labor population.

The counties with the highest minority percentages were rural, but as with county poverty

percentages, these figures were based on very small population totals. Even though the

urban Wasatch Front counties had smaller minority percentages, given their much larger

population totals, they also had larger minority populations than the state’s rural counties.

*******

In 1960, most Utah counties had either an entirely rural population or a majority

of residents lived in the rural parts of the counties. Of the twenty-nine counties in Utah,

fourteen had populations that were entirely rural, and in five additional counties, the

majority of residents lived in rural areas (Table I and Figure I).13 These nineteen counties

had a total population of 144,406 of which 109,720, or seventy-six percent, lived in rural

areas.14 Included in this group of the nineteen most rural counties were all but three of

the counties with poverty rates at or above the national average (Figure I and II).15

Figure II indicates that six counties had poverty rates of at least thirty percent, including

Wayne County, with a state high forty-one percent poverty rate, and all of them had

mostly rural populations.16 Although rural counties experienced the highest rates of

poverty in the state, it should be remembered that just over sixteen percent (16.2%) of the

state’s population in 1960 resided in the nineteen most rural counties (Table I and Figure

II).17 So, while the poverty rates in these counties indicated a need for federal

13 “Table 29,” Census of the Population: 1960, 55-56; “Table 28,” Census of the Population: 1960, 52-54. 14 “Table 29,” Census of the Population: 1960, 55-56; “Table 28,” Census of the Population: 1960, 52-54. 15 “Table 36,” Census of the Population: 1960, 65. The three non-rural counties (less than 50% rural population) that had poverty rates at or above the national average were Cache, Juab, and Wasatch. 16 Ibid.; “Poverty in Utah, January, 1965,” Calvin L. Rampton Papers, Series 14250, Reel 17, Box 8, Folder 32, Utah State Archives, Salt Lake City. In addition to Wayne, the counties with poverty rate of at least 30% were Emery, Millard, Rich, Sanpete, and Washington. 17 “Table 29,” Census of the Population: 1960, 55-56; “Table 28,” Census of the Population: 1960, 52-54.

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antipoverty assistance, their extremely small populations limited the funding these

counties received. In addition to their sparse population density, these counties had

several other things in common.

Although there were some economic diversity, the people in most of the state’s

rural counties relied on agriculture and ranching for their livelihood, but they rarely, if

ever, had an easy time of it. In twelve of the most rural counties, agriculture was the

primary occupation of residents, and in three additional counties, agriculture was one of

the top two economic endeavors.18 In places like Rich County, located in extreme

northern Utah, farmers and ranchers had to contend with long, cold winters and short

growing seasons, and in most of the state’s rural counties, farmers and ranchers struggled

due to lack of water and spent much of their time and energy irrigating their crops and

watering their livestock.19 In counties where agriculture was not the primary economic

pursuit, residents earned a living in manufacturing, as in Box Elder and Kane Counties, in

mining, as in Carbon, Emery, and San Juan Counties, and in public administration, as in

Morgan County.20 Even some counties that primarily relied on agriculture had at least

minimal economic diversity, earning an income through timber, oil, and even tourism.21

Compared to the state as a whole, Utah’s rural counties experienced a higher

18 “Table 85,” Census of the Population: 1960, 127-29. 19 Robert E. Parson, A History of Rich County, Utah Centennial County History Series (Salt Lake City: Utah State Historical Society, 1996), 54-55, 77-78, 177; Edward Leo Lyman and Linda King Newell, A History of Millard County, Utah Centennial County History Series (Salt Lake City: Utah State Historical Society, 1999), 177-83; Edward A. Geary, A History of Emery County, Utah Centennial County History Series (Salt Lake City: Utah State Historical Society, 1996), 4-5, 259, 274-77, 316; Douglas D. Alder and Karl F. Brooks, A History of Washington County: From Isolation to Destination, Utah Centennial County History Series (Salt Lake City: Utah Historical Society, 1996), 182-97. 20 “Table 85,” Census of the Population: 1960, 127-29. 21 Miriam B. Murphy, A History of Wayne County, Utah Centennial County History Series (Salt Lake City: Utah Historical Society, 1999), 151, 197-202, 209-217; Parson, 168-69; Geary, A History of Emery County, 3, 64-66, 108-11, 136-39, 192, 205; Alder and Brooks, 30-31, 109-13, 215-35, 257-65.

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unemployment rate. According to the 1960 Census, Utah’s statewide civilian labor force

had an unemployment rate of just over four percent (4.1%).22 Collectively, the state’s

most rural counties had an average unemployment rate of almost six percent (5.87%).

While some rural counties had low unemployment rates, hovering around two percent

(Millard, Daggett, and Box Elder), others had double digit, or near double digit,

unemployment (Carbon, Paiute, and Garfield).23 As a result of these higher

unemployment numbers, many rural counties experienced an outmigration of people who

moved to other counties, especially urban areas, where it was easier to find work.24

Though most rural counties had an unemployment rate higher than the state average,

these counties represented such a small percentage of the state’s population that the

number of unemployed individuals was much smaller than in more populated areas,

despite the higher percentages.

Most of these rural counties had a long history of economic problems, and many

struggling residents accepted federal aid long before the passage of the EOA. Since most

depended on agriculture for their livelihood, they were all too familiar with the boom and

bust cycles brought on by harsh weather conditions and undependable national and

foreign markets. Residents of rural counties accepted government assistance during the

Great Depression and beyond and benefited from increasing federal defense spending

during and after the world wars.25 As the primary landowner in the state, the federal

22 “Table 36,” Census of the Population: 1960, 65. Unless otherwise noted, all unemployment statistics come from this table. 23 The exact unemployment percentages are Millard (1.9%), Daggett (2.1%), Box Elder (2.3%), Carbon (9.4%), Paiute (11%), and Garfield (15.4%). 24 Albert C. T. Antrei and Allen D. Roberts, A History of Sanpete County, Utah Centennial County History Series (Salt Lake City: Utah Historical Society, 1999), 315; Geary, 315-16. 25 Geary, 274-77, 297-307, 316, 345, 352-53; Lyman and Newell, 285-90; John F. Bluth and Wayne K. Hinton, “The Great Depression,” in Utah’s History. Richard D. Poll, Thomas G. Alexander, Eugene E. Campbell, and David E. Miller, eds., (Logan: Utah State University Press, 1989), 487-88.

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government had a tremendous economic impact on these counties through agencies like

the U.S. Forest Service, the National Park Service, and the Bureau of Land Management.

This extensive public ownership of land proved a mixed blessing. While these agencies

provided employment opportunities and worked to bring important tourist dollars to the

local economy, they also instituted strict guidelines concerning grazing land, irrigation,

and timber resources, often creating controversy and hard feelings among the locals.26

Given the high poverty and unemployment rates and general lack of economic

development in these counties, it is not surprising that they had a hard time maintaining

their populations. From 1950 to 1960, eleven of the state’s nineteen rural counties lost

population, an average loss of almost sixteen percent (15.9%).27 Other predominantly

rural counties witnessed a shift of their populations from rural to more urban parts of the

county or saw their urban areas grow at a faster pace than the sparsely populated parts of

the county. For example, Box Elder County saw an increase of almost seventy-three

percent (72.7%) in their urban areas compared to only a three-percent increase in their

rural areas, and Washington County had a modest increase in population (4.4%), but the

county’s cities saw a noticeable population increase (12.5%) while rural areas actually

lost population (-2.5%).28 Many rural counties struggled to maintain their populations.

Just as they accounted for a very small percentage of the overall population, often

about one percent, most of Utah’s rural counties had very small non-white populations.

In the nineteen most rural counties, nearly ninety-seven percent (96.9%) of the population

was white.29 Figure III demonstrates that thirteen counties had white populations that

26 Murphy, 172-73; Charles S. Peterson, “Natural Resource Utilization,” in Utah’s History, 651-66. 27 “Table 6,” Census of the Population: 1960, 11. 28 Ibid. 29 “Table 28,” Census of the Population: 1960, 52-54.

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exceeded ninety-nine percent, and another five counties had white populations above

ninety percent.30 The biggest outlier in population diversity was San Juan County, in the

extreme southeast corner of the state, with a white population of just over seventy

percent.31 Like San Juan, Uintah, Duchesne, and Box Elder Counties were the rural

counties with the largest percentage of non-white residents, and in these counties, Native

Americans comprised the largest, and sometimes the only, non-white population. This

was also true in Utah’s other rural counties.

San Juan County, located in the four corners area, had the highest minority

percentage in the state. According to the 1960 Census, minorities made up almost thirty

percent of San Juan’s population, and although the county ranked fourteenth in total

number of citizens, it ranked third in terms of the number of minorities in the county,

behind only the large urban counties of Salt Lake and Weber.32 Native Americans made

up almost all of San Juan County’s minority population, but the area around Monticello

saw a significant increase in the number of Hispanic Americans coming from

neighboring states during the 1920s and another jump during World War II.33 Of the

2,693 minority residents of the county, 2,668 were Native Americans, primarily Navajos,

but there were also Utes and Paiutes.34 Over the years, these tribes lost a tremendous

amount of land to white settlers and fought to make a living and preserve their culture.35

Members of the tribes tried to adapt to life as ranchers, raising sheep, cattle, and horses,

30 Ibid. 31 “Table 28,” Census of the Population: 1960, 53. 32 “Table 27,” Census of the Population: 1960, 48, 51. 33 Jorge Iber, Hispanics in the Mormon Zion, 1912-1999 (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2000), 6, 56; Mayer, “After Escalante,” in The People’s of Utah, 439. 34 “Table 27,” Census of the Population: 1960, 48; “Table 28,” Census of the Population: 1960, 53; Robert S. McPherson, A History of San Juan County: In the Palm of Time, Utah Centennial County History Series (Salt Lake City: Utah Historical Society, 1995), xii. 35 Ibid., 121-41, 145-65, 194.

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but this became more and more difficult as they gradually lost critical range land.36 As a

result, they suffered from high poverty rates and a low standard of living. In 1959,

twenty-eight percent of families in the county had incomes below the national poverty

line, the tenth highest poverty rate in the state, but at the same time, over seventy-two

percent (72.43%) of non-whites in the county lived in poverty.37 In addition, San Juan

had an unemployment rate of over five percent (5.2%), higher than the state average, but

the unemployment rate for non-white workers was nearly eight percent (7.8%) and over

nine percent (9.4%) for non-white men.38 Given these statistics, many people in San

Juan, and especially the non-white population, needed some type of public assistance.

Until 1914, Uintah and Duchesne had been one county, and their histories and

demographics were quite similar. The 1960 Census indicates that just over ten percent of

Uintah’s population was non-white, the second highest percentage in Utah, and all but

two of them were Native American, and while the county had a poverty rate just above

twenty-percent (20.4%), non-whites had a poverty rate of over fifty-one (51.47%)

percent.39 Neighboring Duchesne County had the third highest percentage of minorities,

but it had a higher overall rate of poverty (29.3%) than either San Juan or Uintah.

Unfortunately, the 1960 Census does not provide comparative non-white poverty data for

Duchesne County. Over four percent (4.65%) of Duchesne’s population was non-white,

all but two of them Native Americans, and almost thirty percent of residents lived below

the poverty line. 40

36 Ibid., 200-01. 37 “Poverty in Utah, January, 1965,” Rampton Papers; “Table 88,” Census of the Population: 1960, 134. 38 “Table 36,” Census of the Population: 1960, 65; “Table 87,” Census of the Population: 1960, 133. 39 “Table 27,” Census of the Population: 1960, 49; “Table 28,” Census of the Population: 1960, 54; “Table 88,” Census of the Population: 1960, 134. 40 “Table 27,” Census of the Population: 1960, 45; “Table 28,” Census of the Population: 1960, 52; “Poverty in Utah, January, 1965,” Rampton Papers.

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In both counties, the Ute tribe accounted for this high Native American

population.41 While the ancestors of these Native Americans predated Mormon

settlement, the Native American population of these counties increased during the second

half of the nineteenth century when the federal government created the Uintah-Ouray

Reservation and relocated tribes from other areas to this reservation. 42 Unfortunately, the

government failed to adequately provide for the needs of the Utes on the reservation or

keep white settlers from encroaching on their land, and these failures hindered the tribe’s

ability to develop a stable economy, leaving a poor economic legacy for the Native

Americans in these counties.43

According to the 1960 Census, Box Elder County had a minority population that

represented just over four percent of the county’s population, the fourth highest

percentage of minorities for any county in the state. 44 Unlike the three counties with

higher percentages, Box Elder had a more diverse minority population that included

Native Americans, blacks, and a sizable Hispanic migrant population that was nearly

impossible to quantify. While the poverty rate in the county was eleven percent, lower

than the state average, the poverty rate for non-whites included in the census was over

fifteen percent (15.46%), and those numbers did not include migrant workers, some of

the most disadvantaged people in the county.45

Native Americans, including the Shoshoni, Paiute, Goisute, and Ute, lived in the

41 John D. Burton, A History of Duchesne County, Utah Centennial County History Series (Salt Lake City: Utah Historical Society, 1996), vii-x. 42 Doris Karren Burton, A History of Uintah County: Scratching the Surface, Utah Centennial County History Series (Salt Lake City: Utah Historical Society, 1996), 7, 29; Burton, A History of Duchesne County, x, xiv. 43 Burton, A History of Uintah County, 37-44; Burton, A History of Duchesne County, 56-57. 44 “Table 27,” Census of the Population: 1960, 44. 45 “Table 86,” Census of the Population: 1960, 130; “Table 88,” Census of the Population: 1960, 134.

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area before white settlers arrived, and their numbers increased during the twentieth

century with the creation of the Intermountain Indian School in Brigham City, a boarding

school for Navajo children that eventually enrolled children from other tribes.46 By the

time of the 1960 Census, there were almost 600 Native Americans living in Box Elder,

slightly more than two percent of the county’s total population.47

Box Elder also had a significant Hispanic migrant population. Historically,

migrant workers have been underrepresented in every census due to the difficulty of

counting a moving population. As a result, historians have often used the presence of

Spanish-surnames in documents and Catholic baptismal records as they try to flesh out

the presence and historical impact of Hispanic immigrants in a particular region.48

Although it is difficult to establish a specific number, there was clearly a migrant worker

presence in Box Elder County long before the 1960s. Mexican workers came to the

region during the construction of the transcontinental railroad, but most left upon its

completion.49 Others came later to work in the sugar beet fields and orchards but usually

moved on quickly.50 Garland, a small farming community in the county, witnessed the

creation of an agricultural colonia of sixty Spanish-speaking families. Additional

Mexican laborers arrived during the sugar beet harvest in 1918, and the number expanded

and contracted seasonally and over time.51 During the difficult years of the 1930s, the

46 Frederic M. Huchel, A History of Box Elder County, Utah Centennial County History Series (Salt Lake City: Utah Historical Society, 1999), 31, 55-56, 281-82. These children were taken from the impoverished conditions on reservations. They received a mainstream American education, as well as vocational training, to improve their economic futures and break the cycle of poverty, a paternalistic “solution” attempted in many locations. 47 “Table 28,” Census of the Population: 1960, 52. 48 Mayer, “After Escalante,” 437-38. 49 Huchel, 230. 50 Ibid. 51 Mayer, 444; Iber, 9, 36.

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colonias in Garland and other locations disbanded as workers moved more frequently

looking for jobs, and at the same time, the United States government dealt with the

depression by deporting Hispanic workers.52

During World War II, the Hispanic population in the county increased once again

because of the Emergency Labor Program of 1942, also known as the Bracero program,

which brought temporary workers into an area to provide much needed agricultural

labor.53 Despite the fluctuation in the number of Hispanic settlers, migrants living in

Utah constantly dealt with prejudice, discrimination, substandard housing and education,

and had to settle for the hardest and most dangerous jobs for the lowest pay.54 They

suffered because they had no agents to represent or speak for them, and they had a much

higher rate of illiteracy than earlier immigrants.55

The above discussion provides a snapshot of Utah’s rural counties on the eve of

the War on Poverty, including the nature of poverty and the status of minorities.

According to the 1960 Census, nineteen of the twenty-nine counties in the state were

either entirely rural, or a majority of the population lived in rural parts of the county, but

these counties represented a small percentage of the state’s overall population and

struggled to maintain their population numbers. With only three exceptions, rural

counties had the highest poverty rates in the state, according to Figures II and III. While

most rural counties had few minorities, the counties with the four highest minority

percentages were rural. In general, rural counties had higher unemployment rates than

52 Ibid., 447, 461. 53 Ibid., 462; Leslie G. Kelen and Eileen Hallet Stone, Missing Stories: An Oral History of Ethnic and Minority Groups in Utah, (Logan: Utah State University Press, 2000), 440. 54 Mayer, 463-64. 55 Ibid., 441.

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more urban counties, and the unemployment rate for minorities was higher than for the

white population in each county. Just as rural counties had higher poverty rates than the

rest of the state, non-whites living in rural counties experienced more extreme poverty

than their white neighbors. In the 1960s, the population in these counties still depended

on agriculture for their livelihood, and given the unpredictable nature of agriculture, they

were no strangers to economic instability nor federal intervention and assistance. Under

the circumstances, many people living in Utah’s rural counties needed some type of

public assistance.

*******

While most of Utah’s counties were sparsely populated, there were ten counties in

which most residents lived in urban areas. Of these ten counties, four had urban

populations that were slightly larger than their rural populations, two had an urban

population than included seventy to seventy-five percent of the county’s residents, and

four had urban populations that were eighty percent or higher.56 This section focuses on

three of the most urban counties, located along the Wasatch Front, a narrow corridor of

land bordered on the east by the Wasatch Mountains and on the west by the Great Salt

Lake and Utah Lake. From north to south, they are Weber, Davis, Salt Lake, and Utah,

and the greatest percentage of the state’s population lived in these counties. 57 They had

the most prosperous and diverse economies, and while they did not have the highest

percentages of poverty or minority populations, given their overall population, the

56 “Table 6,” Census of the Population: 1960, 11. The percentages of people living in urban areas in each county were 90.4% in Salt Lake County, 86.8% in Weber County, 84.3% in Utah County, and 80.0% in Davis County. The non-Wasatch Front urban counties were Grand (73.8%), Iron (69.9%), Cache (59.4%), Juab (55.8%), Wasatch (55.3%), and Tooele (51.1%). 57 Though Utah County had the third highest population in Utah in 1960, it does not appear in later chapters of this dissertation. So, Utah County’s general demographics are included in the early part of this section, but there is not a more detailed discussion of Utah County later in this section.

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greatest number of people living in poverty and the largest minority populations were

concentrated in these places. According to the 1960 Census, almost seventy-five percent

(74.7%) of Utah’s population and nearly sixty percent (58.5%) of the state’s minorities

lived along this narrow strip of land, demonstrated in Table I and Figure III.58 Salt Lake,

Weber, and Utah Counties represented, from largest to smallest, the three great

metropolitan areas in the state. Davis County did not qualify as a metropolitan area, but

it had a large population, especially given that it was geographically the smallest county

in the state, and it had a larger minority population than Utah County, despite Utah

County’s much larger overall population.59 Given the size and diversity of their

economies, their large populations, and the concentration of minority groups in these four

counties, especially in Salt Lake and Weber Counties, the Wasatch Front warrants special

consideration because this area attracted the most federally-sponsored antipoverty

programs, and programs in these counties affected the most people.

Throughout the history of Utah, Salt Lake County has been at the heart of

everything. When the Mormon settlers arrived in 1847, their first settlement was Salt

Lake City, and it became the permanent headquarters of the Church of Jesus Christ of

Latter-day Saints. Other than the brief period when Fillmore was the territorial capital

(and probably even then), Salt Lake County has been the political center of the state.

From the very beginning, it had the largest population and the most impressive and

diverse economy. As the number of economic opportunities multiplied and expanded,

the county witnessed an increase in the number of minorities who arrived, looking for

jobs and to improve their standards of living.

58 Ibid; “Table 27,” Census of the Population: 1960, 44-51. 59 “Table 6,” Census of the Population: 1960, 11; “Table 27,” Census of the Population: 1960, 44-51.

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Of all the Utah counties, Salt Lake has offered the greatest economic

opportunities. The earliest settlers were small farmers who sought self-sufficiency, but

even in the beginning, agriculture was not the only economic endeavor.60 In the

mountains to the east and west of the Salt Lake Valley, the mining of copper, silver, and

other metals provided a livable income for many people.61 The importance of mining

fluctuated over time, taking a substantial hit during the Great Depression, but rebounding

during World War II and the postwar period.62 Even though laborers constructed the first

transcontinental railroad north of Salt Lake County, soon the building of additional lines

made Salt Lake one of the most important transportation hubs in the western U.S.63

Starting with the first U.S. troops sent to Utah to monitor the actions of the Mormons and

continuing with the establishment of key military installations during World War II and

the Cold War, Salt Lake County was an important military center.64 In addition, Salt

Lake provided economic opportunities in banking and finance, retail sales, recreational

industries, construction, education, medicine, and a broad array of businesses.65 Salt

Lake County was truly the religious, political, and economic capital of the state.

In 1960, Salt Lake County had great economic diversity in stark contrast to many

rural counties that depended so heavily on agriculture. Unlike those who lived outside

the Wasatch Front, very few people in Salt Lake County make their living in agriculture.

Less than two percent of workers in Salt Lake County were employed in agriculture-

related jobs, and fifty percent of the working population made a living as white collar

60 Linda Sillitoe, A History of Salt Lake County, Utah Centennial County History Series (Salt Lake City: Utah Historical Society, 1996), 3, 29, 80-81. 61 Ibid., 3, 7, 94-95, 127. 62 Ibid., 168, 189. 63 Ibid., 3, 8, 80-81. 64 Ibid., 4, 60, 147, 189-92, 211. 65 Ibid., 65, 67-68, 99, 101-02, 138-39, 144-45, 208-10, 219-29.

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workers.66 Men in the county found employment as craftsmen and foremen, in

professional and technical areas as engineers and educators, and as managers and public

officials.67 Among women, professional and technical jobs, such as educators and

clerical and service-related jobs, were among the most frequently listed.68 Other

occupation groups mentioned in the census include manufacturing, retail trades, public

administration, mining, finance, insurance, and real estate.69 Given the tremendous

economic opportunities available, Salt Lake County witnessed a nearly forty percent

population increase from 1950 to 1960, and the population growth was even greater in

the urban parts of the county.70 According to the 1960 Census, Salt Lake County’s

civilian unemployment rate was lower than the state unemployment rate, but given the

size of the population, this still represented a significant number of people.71

In 1960, Salt Lake County had the largest population and the greatest number of

minorities in the state. According to the census, the county had over 383,000 residents,

representing forty-three percent of the state’s population, and more than ninety percent

(90.3%) lived in urban parts of the county.72 In the years from 1950 to 1960, Salt Lake

County’s population increased by almost forty percent (39.3%), with a larger gain in the

urban areas (48.3%) and a drop in rural population (-11.4%).73 Just under twelve percent

(11.76%) of the county’s population lived in poverty, a figure that was below the state’s

average (14.7%), but given the county’s comparatively large population, that means that

66 “Table 84,” Census of the Population: 1960, 125. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 “Table 85,” Census of the Population: 1960, 128. 70 “Table 6,” Census of the Population: 1960, 11. 71 “Table 36,” Census of the Population: 1960, 65. Salt Lake County’s unemployment rate was 3.4% while the state had a 4.1% unemployment rate. 72 “Table 28,” Census of the Population: 1960, 53; “Table 6,” Census of the Population: 1960, 11. 73 “Table 6,” Census of the Population: 1960, 11.

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over 45,000 county residents lived in poverty.74

Although Salt Lake County ranked ninth in the state for the percentage of

minorities in the population, it ranked number one in terms of the actual number of

minorities, and the minority population was quite diverse. In 1960, Salt Lake had a

minority population of 5,348, less than two percent (1.4%) of the overall population, but

that number was larger than the total population of Utah’s ten least populated counties.75

Though non-white residents had greater economic opportunity here than in other parts of

the state, they still faced discrimination. While the unemployment rate for the county

was just over three percent (3.4%), the unemployment rate for non-white males was

slightly higher (3.7%).76 The difference in poverty numbers was even greater. Almost

twelve percent (11.76%) of the county’s population lived below the poverty line, but the

poverty rate for non-whites in the county was nearly twenty-seven percent (26.75%).77

The earliest non-white residents in the Salt Lake Valley were Native Americans.

They lived in the area before white settlers arrived, but over time, their numbers dropped

dramatically as a result of violent encounters and forced relocation.78 Most of the natives

ended up on unsatisfactory land outside the Salt Lake Valley and relied on government

assistance to maintain a minimal standard of living.79 At the time of the 1960 Census,

only 620 Native Americans remained in Salt Lake County.80

There was a black presence in Utah even before the Mormons arrived, and

74 “Table 36,” Census of the Population: 1960, 65. 75 “Table 27,” Census of the Population: 1960, 48; “Table 28,” Census of the Population: 1960, 52-54. As has been mentioned before, this figure does not include the county’s Hispanic population. 76 “Table 91,” Census of the Population: 1960, 136; “Table 87,” Census of the Population: 1960, 133. 77 “Table 86,” Census of the Population: 1960, 131; “Table 88,” Census of the Population: 1960, 134. 78 Gustive O. Larson, Outline History of Utah and the Mormons (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book Company, 1958), 148; Sillitoe, 45. 79 Larson, 148; Sillitoe, 45. 80 “Table 28,” Census of the Population: 1960, 53.

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permanent black settlement began with the arrival of the Mormons. African Americans,

both free and enslaved, were among the earliest pioneers to settle in the Salt Lake Valley.

Slavery officially ended in the Utah Territory in 1862, but discrimination against blacks

continued well into the twentieth century.81 Discriminatory laws limited the jobs they

could find, where they lived, who they married, and available entertainment, but African

Americans still managed to fashion lives for themselves, finding jobs, creating their own

organizations and churches, and starting their own newspapers.82 At the time of the 1960

Census, 1,701 African Americans lived in the county, the second largest total of any

county in the state, but they still represented less than one percent of the population.83

Economic opportunities brought many Hispanic workers to Salt Lake County,

though most jobs available to them were difficult, dangerous, and low-paying. World

War I contributed to a scarcity of workers, and rising nativism and more restrictive

immigration policies in the 1920s increased the demand for Spanish-speaking laborers to

work in the mines, on the railroads, and in agriculture.84 While most early Hispanic

immigrants were male, the number of women and children increased dramatically by the

1930s, and these women found employment as domestic workers, and in the garment and

food processing industries.85 While Hispanic workers were a fairly mobile population,

rarely staying in one place for very long, new Hispanic workers often moved into Utah to

replace those who left. By 1930, over 4,000 individuals of Mexican descent lived in

Utah, with over half of them concentrated in Salt Lake and Weber Counties, and in the

81 Ronald G. Coleman, “Blacks in Utah History: An Unknown Legacy,” in Helen Z. Papanikolas, ed., The Peoples of Utah (Salt Lake City: Utah Historical Society, 1981), 117; Sillitoe, 41-42. 82 Coleman, 121-23, 130-38; Sillitoe, 176. 83 “Table 21,” Census of the Population: 1960, 35. 84 Mayer, 444. 85 Iber, 16, 46.

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period after World War II, that number increased as they found jobs in defense industries,

transportation, mining, manufacturing, construction, and the service sector.86

Although Hispanics helped to win World War II and played an active part in the

state’s defense industries after the war, they failed to gain equality or the full rights of

American citizens. Hispanic soldiers who had fought for liberty and equality felt the

sting of prejudice and discrimination in employment, education, and housing after the

war, and as a result, many turned their attentions to eliminating the inconsistencies

between the rhetoric of the American dream and the reality of Hispanic-Americans living

in Utah.87 Hispanics in Utah had limited funds and little economic or political clout,

lived in the poorest urban centers, and suffered due to inferior housing, medical care, and

educational opportunities.88 In the 1950s and 1960s, the state’s Hispanic residents fell

well below the median income range, with over twenty-five percent of families living on

annual incomes below $2,000.89 Many lived in migrant labor camps where conditions

were horrible, and Utah legislators refused to pass laws to improve and regulate the

conditions in the camps.90 In the 1960s, the federal government enacted a law that set a

higher minimum wage for agricultural workers, but many farm owners mechanized to

avoid paying higher wages.91 Researchers in Utah in the 1950s and 1960s found that

children with Spanish surnames, the largest minority group in northern Utah schools,

rarely graduated and had the lowest grade point averages and the lowest scores on

standardized tests.92

86 Ibid., 40-47, 55-59, 86. 87 Ibid., 65-66. 88 Ibid., 69-73. 89 Ibid., 73. 90 Ibid., 75. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid.

157

Given these less than ideal conditions, Hispanics organized to improve their daily

lives and initiate long-term changes for their communities. For instance, the Centro

Civico Mexicano (CCM), created in Salt Lake City in 1936, concentrated on promoting

Hispanic unity and maintaining their culture through social and educational activities.93

In addition to sponsoring language and history classes, athletics, and after-school

activities, the CCM purchased a radio station to keep the public informed about Mexican

news and events and served as a mutual aid society, providing funds to injured or infirm

members in need.94 In 1946, Hispanics created two branches of the Sociedad Proteccion

Mutua de Trabajadores Unidos (SPMDTU), one in Salt Lake City and one in Ogden.

This organization fought against economic barriers and all types of discrimination against

Spanish-speaking residents.95 Twenty years later, the Guadalupana Society established

the Guadalupe Center in Salt Lake City, offering Hispanic residents a credit union, adult

literacy courses, a cooperative food market, and organized social action for change.96

Then in December, 1967, Dr. Orlando Rivera and Father Jerald Merrill created the

Spanish-Speaking Organization for Community, Integrity, and Opportunity (SOCIO), a

grass roots organization established to eliminate social problems and improve living

conditions in Salt Lake City.97 These groups had their work cut out for them, and many

applied for EOA assistance, including CAP funding.

Weber County, on the extreme northern end of the Wasatch Front, was second

only to Salt Lake County in total population and urban population percentage, and it had

93 Ibid., 77-78. 94 Ibid., 78-79. 95 Ibid., 79. 96 Ibid., 80. 97 Ibid., 84.

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a significant minority population. With the city of Ogden at its center, Weber County

had a population of 110,744, representing over twelve percent (12.4%) of the state’s

population, and over eighty-six percent (86.8%) of county residents lived in urban areas

(Table I and Figure I).98 From 1950 to 1960, Weber County’s overall population

increased (32.9%), with a large bump in its urban population (36.4%) and a modest

increase in rural areas (13.7%).99 Like Salt Lake County, Weber had diverse economic

opportunities that attracted people to the area. While there was some agriculture west of

Ogden and in the mountain valleys east of the city, the majority of residents made their

livings in occupations other than farming. While the percentage of people living below

the poverty line was below the state average, given the county’s population, this still

represented a significant number of people living in poverty. Weber County had almost

3,000 non-whites, and given the overall population, this placed the county in second

place, behind Salt Lake, in terms of total non-white residents.100 However, Weber ranked

sixth in the percentage of minorities, with an almost three percent (2.7%) non-white

population, a higher percentage than in Salt Lake County.101

Weber County began as a farming area, but its economy quickly diversified.

Ogden developed a thriving commercial area with many successful shops, craftsmen, and

factories.102 While mining in the mountains above Ogden was a limited success, the most

important economic event in Weber County was the construction of the transcontinental

98 “Table 6,” Census of the Population: 1960, 11. 99 Ibid. 100 “Table 27,” Census of the Population: 1960, 51. 101 “Table 28,” Census of the Population: 1960, 54. As with the rest of the state, these numbers do not include Hispanic Americans. 102 Richard C. Roberts and Richard W. Sadler, A History of Weber County, Utah Centennial County History Series (Salt Lake City: Utah Historical Society, 1997), 86-89.

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railroad, making Ogden one of key transportation centers in the West.103 The railroad

provided many jobs—constructing and maintaining the tracks and working on the

trains—but it also indirectly created jobs in hotels and restaurants built to accommodate

train passengers and personnel. Other economic enterprises included banking, medical

and educational institutions, and military installations—especially during and after World

War II, and government agencies.104

Though the county offered diverse economic opportunities, there were still those

who struggled financially. As in Salt Lake, a small percentage of Weber’s population

earned a living in agriculture, and almost fifty percent worked in white collar

occupations.105 According to the census, the largest occupational groups for men were

craftsmen and foremen, managers and officials, and professional and technical jobs, and

for women, clerical workers, service industry jobs, and professional and technical jobs.106

Many jobs were in public administration, retail, manufacturing, transportation, and

construction.107 In 1960, over eleven percent (11.64%) of the county’s population lived

in families making less than $3,000 per year, and while this was below the state average,

given the large overall population, this meant that almost 13,000 people were living in

poverty, a number larger than the total population of many Utah counties.108 The

county’s non-white population was in a more difficult position, with over sixteen percent

(16.15%) of minority families living below the poverty line.109 The civilian

unemployment rate for the county was almost five percent (4.7%), higher than the state

103 Ibid., 107-17, 211-13, 230-33, 275-76. 104 Ibid., 215-35, 285-304. 105 “Table 36,” Census of the Population: 1960, 65. 106 “Table 84,” Census of the Population: 1960, 126. 107 “Table 85,” Census of the Population: 1960, 129. 108 “Table 36,” Census of the Population: 1960, 65. 109 “Table 88,” Census of the Population: 1960, 134.

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average, and the unemployment rate among non-whites was nearly nine percent

(8.7%).110 This economic snapshot presents a situation similar to Salt Lake County but

quite different from most other counties in the state.

As previously mentioned, Weber County had the largest percentage of non-whites

of all the urban counties. Not surprisingly, Native Americans were the first non-whites in

the county. As white settlers entered the area and made claims on native lands, violence,

disease, and government removal policies took their toll on the Native American

population.111 When the federal government introduced the “Termination Program”

during the 1950s, encouraging Native Americans to leave the reservations, many

“returned” to Weber County.112 Some arrived hoping to secure lucrative railroad jobs,

and many children came as participants in the LDS Church’s Indian Placement Program,

a program that placed young Native Americans in the homes of LDS families so that they

could attend public schools, receive training in the ways of white society, and be exposed

to the teachings of the Mormon Church.113 Many of the people who worked at the

Intermountain Indian School in neighboring Brigham City actually lived and socialized in

Weber County, and Weber State College in Ogden encouraged Native American students

to enroll, promoted Native Americans culture on campus, and hired counselors to work

with these students.114 They also found jobs in defense-related industries and worked as

agricultural laborers in the rural areas.115 By 1960, there were 233 Native Americans

living in the county.116

110 “Table 36,” Census of the Population: 1960, 65; “Table 87,” Census of the Population: 1960, 133. 111 Ibid., 18-19, 98-99, 392. 112 Ibid., 394. 113 Ibid. 114 Ibid., 395. 115 Ibid. 116 “Table 21,” Census of the Population: 1960, 35.

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There was an even larger African American population in Weber County in 1960.

Initially, blacks migrated to Ogden to find railroad construction jobs or employment as

porters, waiters, and cooks on the trains.117 Others found defense industry jobs in Weber

and neighboring counties. 118 Life was not especially easy for blacks in Ogden as city

ordinances and general practices restricted where black families could live and

discriminated against them in many other ways.119 Some owned businesses in Ogden,

such as barbers shops and beauty parlors, cafes and restaurants, and pool halls and clubs,

but they often failed to stay in business for long.120 The largest businesses were hotels,

including the Davis Hotel that offered rooms to all African Americans, the Porters’ and

Waiters’ Club that provided rooms and a club-like atmosphere to railroad workers, and

the Royal Hotel where black entertainers stayed while they were in town.121 Additional

proof of a thriving African American community was the presence of black religious

institutions, including the African Methodist Episcopal Church, first organized in 1908,

and the Wall Avenue Baptist Church that had a majority black congregation, established

in 1916.122 Blacks had their own separate social organizations, such as the Colored

Benevolent Protective Order of Elks of the World and the American Legion Pioneer Post

No. 66, and recreation opportunities, including a black baseball team and local black

boxers.123 According to the census, 1,971 blacks lived in Weber County in 1960,

accounting for nearly two percent (1.7%) of the population.124

117 Roberts and Sadler, 184. 118 Coleman, 132-33. 119 Roberts and Sadler, 184. 120 Ibid., 397-98. 121 Ibid., 398-99. 122 Ibid., 162. 123 Ibid., 402. 124 “Table 21,” Census of the Population: 1960, 35.

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Although the exact number is hard to determine, Weber County had a visible

Hispanic presence in 1960. While farming was not the primary economic enterprise,

there were still functioning farms, and many farmers relied on Hispanic laborers,

especially during and after World War II. Utah did not participate in the Bracero

program to the same extent that other states did, but Weber County saw a marked

increase in the number of Mexican nationals working on farms when authorities

established a Hispanic labor camp in an old abandoned school in Kanesville, a rural

community west of Ogden.125 One hundred and fifty Mexican workers lived in tents,

shared common kitchen and dining facilities, and worked thinning beets, maintaining

irrigation canals, picking fruit, and weeding and harvesting vegetables.126 Most stayed as

long as there was work available and then moved on. In 1945, local farmers finally

established set wages for these laborers.127 They continued to use Hispanic migrant

laborers beyond the end of the war, and county officials even established a permanent

agricultural labor camp to encourage migrant workers to return to the area.128 Migrant

workers in Weber County, as elsewhere, lived unstable lives marked by poverty and a

lack of economic alternatives.

Davis County, geographically the smallest county in the state, is located between

Weber and Salt Lake Counties. With a population of 64,760 in 1960, it was the fourth

most populated county in Utah, representing just over seven percent (7.27%) of the

state’s population, but given its size, it was the second most densely populated county

125 Iber, 56; Roberts and Sadler, 268. 126 Roberts and Sadler, 268. 127 Ibid. 128 Ibid., 270.

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behind only Salt Lake.129 While it was once almost totally rural and agricultural, in the

mid- to late twentieth century, with the construction of the federal interstate system, it

became a more suburban area as farms were transformed into housing developments and

more people commuted to work in neighboring counties.130 These changes had a definite

impact on the county’s population. From 1950 to 1960, Davis County’s population grew

by over one hundred percent (109.8%), and while the rural parts of the county saw a

population drop (-22.3%), urban areas increased by over two hundred percent

(265.2%).131 Economically, Davis County was in fine shape, with very low poverty and

unemployment rates. As was true of most suburban areas in the 1960s, the population in

the county was predominantly white.

Davis County began as an agricultural and grazing area, but over time, the

growing economy provided numerous white and blue collar job opportunities. In 1960,

Davis County had a very strong economy. Only 8.6% percent of families lived in

poverty, the second lowest in the state, and the unemployment rate was 3.2%, among the

very lowest in the state.132 According to the 1960 Census, almost fifty percent of the

county’s workers were employed in white collar occupations.133 While many commuted

to Salt Lake or Weber Counties for work, the job market in Davis County expanded in

areas such as merchandising, banking, medicine, education, journalism, transportation,

and construction.134 Though there was a revitalization of farming during the world wars,

129 “Table 6,” Census of the Population: 1960, 11. Salt Lake County had 501.4 people per square mile while Davis County had 241.7 people per square mile. 130 Glen M. Leonard, A History of Davis County, Centennial County History Series (Salt Lake City: Utah Historical Society, 1999), 360-64. 131 “Table 6,” Census of the Population: 1960, 11. 132 “Table 36,” Census of the Population: 1960, 65. 133 Ibid; “Table 85,” Census of the Population: 1960, 127. 134 Leonard, 98, 106, 113-15, 142-43, 229, 263-80.

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it became less important in the postwar period, as more and more farms were converted

into subdivisions.135 By 1960, only four percent of the county’s residents made a living

in agriculture.136 The wars also led to an increase in military and defense related jobs

with the construction of Hill Air Force Base and the U.S. Naval Supply Depot in

Clearfield, and these industries continued to have an influence on the county even after

the war.137 So, from its founding in the mid-1840s to the 1960s, Davis County evolved

from a mostly agricultural to suburban area with a more varied economy.

Compared to Salt Lake and Weber Counties, Davis County did not have a large

minority population, but it was more diverse than Utah County. According to the 1960

Census, over ninety-eight percent (98.5%) of the county’s population was white.138 Of

those identified as non-white, the 1960 Census stated that 310 were “Negro,” almost

entirely in the northern part of the county, and 684 were “other,” again almost all in

northern Davis County.139

Not surprisingly, economic opportunities brought an increasing number of

minorities to Davis County. Agriculture, during the nineteenth and early twentieth

centuries, and the growth of defense and military related industries during and after

World War II contributed to the growing (but still limited) diversity. At the end of the

nineteenth century and during the early decades of the twentieth century, Japanese,

Hispanic, and Filipino laborers moved to Davis County because of the increasing need

for agriculture workers, especially in the sugar beet industry.140 In the twentieth century,

135 Ibid., 236-45, 314-15. 136 “Table 84,” Census of the Population, 124. 137 Leonard, 332-38. 138 “Table 24,” Census of the Population: 1960, 40. 139 Ibid. 140 Leonard, 224.

165

the growth in defense-related industries put pressure on the available labor pool so

employers recruited workers, including minorities, from other parts of the county. The

Naval Supply Depot in Clearfield employed over 2,400 African Americans from the

South, Native Americans from New Mexico and Arizona, and Japanese Americans who

had been interned in Utah after the attack on Pearl Harbor.141 At the same time, the

demand for agricultural workers remained high, and minorities continued to fill these

positions. In 1944, county officials established a migrant labor camp in Layton, a

community in central Davis County, for hundreds of Mexican agricultural workers.142

By the early 1950s, the county’s population was more diverse than ever before,

and minorities often faced great difficulties. Given the relatively homogenous

population, newcomers experienced challenges and prejudices because of their racial and

ethnic backgrounds. Non-white residents found it difficult to buy a house, establish a

business, or participate in the social life of Davis County.143

******

As Congress debated and passed the Economic Opportunity Act in 1964, there

were a number of reasons why Utah would not have been at the top of the list of

antipoverty fund recipients. First, the state did not have a very large population,

accounting for less than five percent of the population in the United States, and only

thirteen states had populations smaller than Utah.144 Second, the poverty situation was

141 Ibid., 338. 142 Ibid., 340. 143 Ibid., 344-45. 144 U.S. Census Website. https://www.dsdmail.net/owa/redir.aspx?C=sVAvRqoZn06IWdPg4iBS5F707IJ8CNEIUO9Rrf3spiqWlReVj_RAnQ-qoitqEwoPVxt_AipvdlA.&URL=http%3a%2f%2fwww.census.gov%2fpopulation%2fwww%2fcensusdata%2fPopulation_PartII.xls (accessed 27 February 2014).

https://www.dsdmail.net/owa/redir.aspx?C=sVAvRqoZn06IWdPg4iBS5F707IJ8CNEIUO9Rrf3spiqWlReVj_RAnQ-qoitqEwoPVxt_AipvdlA.&URL=http%3a%2f%2fwww.census.gov%2fpopulation%2fwww%2fcensusdata%2fPopulation_PartII.xls




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not as bleak as in other parts of the nation. In 1964, the national poverty rate was about

twenty percent, and Utah’s poverty rate was less than fifteen percent. Undoubtedly, there

were places that needed more antipoverty assistance than Utah. Third, there were

relatively few minorities living in Utah, less than two percent of the state’s population.

Given the emphasis that lawmakers placed on helping disadvantaged minorities with the

EOA, the absence of substantial diversity in the state might have prevented greater EOA

funding in Utah. Finally, Utah had a history of antifederal rhetoric, claiming that the

government should play no part in state matters, including attempts to end poverty.

Despite these obstacles, there were conditions in Utah that demonstrated a need

for additional help to end poverty and improve the lives of the poor. Even though the

total population of the state was smaller than many other states and while Utah’s poverty

rate was lower than the national average, there were still many people living in poverty.

The existence of poverty in rural and urban areas across the state indicated that many

needed EOA antipoverty assistance. While the minority population was small, there was

still a minority presence in the state, and some of them existed in “unlivable” conditions,

especially Native Americans in rural eastern counties, African Americans living in the

poorest parts of the state’s urban areas, and Hispanic migrant farm workers. These

groups definitely needed assistance. And as for Utah’s dislike of federal involvement in

state matters, the people of Utah have a long history of accepting federal assistance,

especially in times of crisis. During the Great Depression, Utah was one of the primary

recipients of federal relief dollars, despite rhetoric to the contrary. In the end, the state’s

poverty conditions convinced various local officials to request EOA assistance and

federal lawmakers agreed to provide EOA funding to Utah, and as a result, Utahns reaped

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the benefits of many EOA programs.145

The remaining chapters more closely examine the development of EOA programs

in Utah from 1964 to 1969, including the types of programs established, the benefits they

provided, and the reactions that state policymakers, the general population, and those

who received assistance had to these programs. Chapter 5 provides an overview of rural

EOA programs, including rural loans assistance and Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC)

projects, but it offers a more detailed look at the programs designed to help Native

Americas in San Juan, Uintah, and Duchesne Counties and migrant workers in the

northern part of the state. Chapter 6 outlines the various EOA programs introduced to

help Utahns living in urban poverty, but it specifically spotlights the efforts of the Salt

Lake Community Action Program (SLCAP). Chapter 7 focuses on Job Corps, the EOA

program that injected the most federal dollars into the state, though there is much debate

about the extent to which this program helped Utahns living in poverty. Together, these

chapters more clearly define the impact of the EOA in Utah and analyze how the state’s

citizens felt about these federal programs.

145 “Highlights—Utah, September 28, 1966,” Office of Economic Opportunity, Frank E. Moss Papers, Box 164, Folder 14, Special Collections, Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City; Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., H.R. 11377, Congressional Quarterly Almanac (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1965), 212.

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Table I Utah, 1960—Rural Population, Total County Population, Percentages: Information taken from the 1960 Census. See columns and rows for specific page numbers.146

County Rural

Population in the

County Table 29

Pgs. 55-56

Total Population

in the County (Rank)

Table 28 Pgs. 52-54

Rural Population

as % of County

Population (Rank)

County Population as a % of

overall State Population (890,627) (99.9%)

Beaver (Pgs. 52, 55) 4,331 4,331 (22) 100% (T-1) 0.5% (22) Box Elder (Pgs. 52, 55) 13,333 25,061 (6) 53.2% (18) 2.8% (6) Cache (Pgs. 52, 55) 14,545 35,788 (5) 40.6% (23) 4.0% (5) Carbon (Pgs. 52, 55) 11,374 21,135 (7) 53.8% (17) 2.4% (7) Daggett (Pgs. 52, 55) 1,164 1,164 (29) 100% (T-1) 0.1% (29) Davis (Pgs. 52, 55) 12,959 64,760 (4) 20.0% (26) 7.3% (4) Duchesne (Pgs. 52, 55) 7,179 7,179 (16) 100% (T-1) 0.8% (16) Emery (Pgs. 52, 55) 5,546 5,546 (19) 100% (T-1) 0.6% (19) Garfield (Pgs. 52, 55) 3,577 3,577 (23) 100% (T-1) 0.4% (23) Grand (Pgs. 52, 55) 1,663 6,345 (17) 26.2% (25) 0.7% (17) Iron (Pgs. 53, 55) 3,252 10,795 (11) 30.1% (24) 1.2% (11) Juab (Pgs. 53, 55) 2,031 4,597 (21) 44.2% (22) 0.5% (21) Kane (Pgs. 53, 55) 2,667 2,667 (25) 100% (T-1) 0.3% (25) Millard (Pgs. 53, 55) 7,866 7,866 (15) 100% (T-1) 0.9% (15) Morgan (Pgs. 53, 55) 2,837 2,837 (24) 100% (T-1) 0.3% (24) Piute (Pgs. 53, 56) 1,436 1,436 (28) 100% (T-1) 0.2% (28) Rich (Pgs. 53, 56) 1,685 1,685 (27) 100% (T-1) 0.2% (27) Salt Lake (Pgs. 53, 56) 36,740 383,035 (1) 9.6% (29) 43.0% (1) San Juan (Pgs. 53, 56) 9,040 9,040 (14) 100% (T-1) 1.0% (14) Sanpete (Pgs. 53, 56) 11,053 11,053 (10) 100% (T-1) 1.2% (10) Sevier (Pgs. 54, 56) 6,153 10,565 (12) 58.2% (16) 1.2% (12) Summit (Pgs. 54, 56) 5,673 5,673 (18) 100% (T-1) 0.6% (18) Tooele (Pgs. 54, 56) 8,735 17,868 (8) 48.9% (20) 2.0% (8) Uintah (Pgs. 54, 56) 7,927 11,582 (9) 68.4% (15) 1.3% (9) Utah (Pgs. 54, 56) 16,824 106,991 (3) 15.7% (27) 12.0% (3) Wasatch (Pgs. 54, 56) 2,372 5,308 (20) 44.7% (21) 0.6% (20) Washington (Pgs. 54, 56) 5,141 10,271 (13) 50.1% (19) 1.2% (13) Wayne (Pgs. 54, 56) 1,728 1,728 (26) 100% (T-1) 0.2% (26) Weber (Pgs. 54, 56) 14,638 110,794(2) 13.2% (28) 12.4% (2)

146 “Table 29,” Census of the Population: 1960, 55-56; “Table 28,” Census of the Population: 1960, 52-54.

169

Figure I: Most of Utah’s counties were rural. The major exceptions were those located along the Wasatch Front, from Weber County to Utah County.147

147 “Table 29,” Census of the Population: 1960, 55-56; University of Texas at Austin, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection. http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/states/utah.gif (accessed 10 February 2014). Author used map and added population density information from the census table listed.

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/states/utah.gif

170

Figure II: Poverty was defined as families living on annual income of less than $3,000. 148

148 “Table 36,” Census of the Population: 1960, 65; University of Texas at Austin, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection. http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/states/utah.gif (accessed 10 February 2014). Author used map and added poverty data from the census.


171

Figure III: Most Utah counties had very small or no minority populations. San Juan County’s minority population was the largest in the state (as a percentage of the county’s overall population), and almost all were Native Americans.149

149 “Table 27,” Census of the Population: 1960, 44-54; University of Texas at Austin, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection. http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/states/utah.gif (accessed 10 February, 2014). Author used map from the Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection and added minority data from the census.


CHAPTER 5

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY ACT IN RURAL UTAH:

PROGRAMS AND REACTIONS

Few things have happened on the Navajo Reservation which have excited and awakened our people as did our summer NYC [Neighborhood Youth Corps] program…our communities have seized the initiative in organizing projects and determining community goals.1

******* They [migrant farmworkers] reap for themselves little money, less hope, and an astonishingly small crop of bitterness.2

In 1964, Utah had a relatively small population and a smaller percentage of

people living in poverty than the national average. The state also had a history of

verbally opposing federal overreach into state matters, though state residents historically

accepted, and even embraced, federal assistance. Most of the state was sparsely

populated, but rural areas had the highest poverty rates. While most rural counties had

few, if any, minority residents, several had significant minority populations, at least for

Utah, and these inhabitants, mostly Native Americans and Hispanic migrant workers,

struggled economically. This chapter outlines the EOA programs introduced to help rural

Utahns living in poverty and analyzes local reactions to these programs, covering the

1 Letter from Raymond Nakai to David S. King, September 3, 1965, David S. King Papers, Box 16, Folder 9, Special Collections, Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City. 2 “History and Growth of the Utah Migrant Council,” Utah Migrant Council, 3. (Utah Migrant Council brochure given to the author by a member of the Council).

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period from 1964, when the EOA became law, to 1969, when the Nixon Administration

inherited these programs.3 While the chapter generally covers the breadth of federal

antipoverty programs for the rural poor, it provides a more detailed discussion of the

programs created to help Native Americans in San Juan County—primarily Navajos—

and in Uintah and Duchesne Counties—predominantly Utes—and migrant workers in

Box Elder County and other parts of the state. These examples demonstrate that, contrary

to the well-worn narrative, some individuals and groups in Utah applied for, accepted,

and even appreciated federal assistance and that, in some instances, federal antipoverty

dollars actually got to the people who needed it most.

In an attempt to analyze the state’s reaction to rural EOA programs, this chapter

includes the perspectives of individuals who had diverse opinions about this law and the

programs it created. Unfortunately, available sources do not allow us equal access to the

opinions of all individuals and groups. It is easier to access the opinions of politicians

and those who wrote letters to their elected leaders or local newspapers about these

programs than to uncover the impressions of migrant workers, those who lived on

reservations, and other intended beneficiaries of these programs. Therefore, there are

significant gaps in the analysis of how Utahns reacted to these rural EOA programs. The

chapter relies on the public papers of many Utah politicians, including the letters and

memos they wrote and the speeches they delivered but also the constituent letters they

received. It also builds upon state newspaper coverage of the EOA, the programs related

to the law, and local responses to the law and its programs. These include the Deseret

News, owned and operated by the LDS Church and the oldest newspaper in the state; the

3 Because some of these programs were slow to begin, the coverage of some programs continues beyond 1969.

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Salt Lake Tribune, another statewide newspaper that has generally presented a more

liberal perspective than the church-owned paper; the Ogden Standard-Examiner, a

regional newspaper that covered the most important stories in Ogden and the counties of

northern Utah; and several other smaller, local newspapers

*******

Utah received EOA antipoverty assistance, including the state’s rural areas that

had the highest poverty percentages. One year into the implementation of the new law,

Utah ranked thirty-first in total OEO funds received, though it was only forty-fourth in

terms of the number of poor people living in the state.4 Although policymakers designed

the EOA to circumvent state leaders and distribute money to county or local agencies in

hopes of more efficiently getting aid to the people who needed it, there were several

statewide EOA grants intended to benefit needy people throughout the state.5 As of the

end of June, 1966, the OEO had approved seven statewide grants, two Community

Action Program (CAP) grants, two Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC) grants sponsored

by the Utah State Department of Fish and Game, and three Work Experience Project

grants through the Utah Department of Public Welfare, and these seven EOA grants

represented a federal investment of $334,702 to reduce poverty in Utah.6 Though

available documents do not outline how state agencies distributed this money, it seems

likely that most counties in the state received at least a percentage of this federal money.

Since the OEO allocated most of their funds to agencies in specific counties or

locations, it is easier to determine which areas benefited, and it is clear that people living

4 “Highlights—Utah, September 28, 1966,” Office of Economic Opportunity, Frank E. Moss Papers, Box 164, Folder 14, Special Collections, Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City. 5 “Status of Programs: Utah,” Office of Economic Opportunity, 961, Moss Papers, Box 164, Folder 14. 6 Ibid.

175

in rural parts of Utah received EOA assistance. In fact, Daggett County, the least

populated county with the lowest poverty rate in the state, was the only county—rural or

urban—that did not receive any federal antipoverty money.7 Other than Daggett County,

all of Utah’s rural counties accepted funding from various EOA programs by June,

1966.8 Rural parts of the state applied for and received Title II CAP funding, including

money to establish CAP infrastructure, adult education programs, Head Start, and Legal

Services; Title III money to provide rural loans to farmers and others in need; and Title V

Work Experience Program assistance to help those who qualified for Aid to Families

with Dependent Children.9 This section discusses the development of those programs

and the public’s reaction to them, but later sections of the chapter focus more specifically

on programs created to help Native Americans and migrant workers in Utah’s rural

counties.

Among other things, Title I of the EOA established work-training programs, more

popularly known as the Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC), and they were among the

most popular EOA programs in rural parts of Utah and throughout the state.10 Rooted in

the popular Civilian Conservation Corps of FDR’s New Deal, the NYC provided local

work experience for young men and women to increase their employability and enable

7 “Table 6,” Census of the Population: 1960. Vol. I. Part 46, Utah. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), 11; “Table 86,” Census of the Population: 1960, 130; “Status of Programs: Utah.” Daggett County may have received some EOA money through the statewide grants. 8 “Highlights—Utah, September 28, 1966.” During the early years, Utah did not benefit from the small business loans program because the state did not have a small business loans office to administer the program. Also, only two counties—one rural and one urban—received Job Corps funds. This program will be discussed in great detail in Chapter 7. 9 “Status of Programs: Utah.” 10 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., H.R. 11377, Congressional Quarterly Almanac (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1965), 211. Title I also created Job Corps and Work-Study Programs. Job Corps will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7 and Work-Study Programs will be discussed briefly in Chapter 6.

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them to continue their education while providing public service to the community.11

Statewide, this was the third largest EOA program in terms of federal money spent,

behind only Job Corps and CAPs.12 At the end of June, 1966, the OEO had sponsored

thirty NYC programs in eleven of the nineteen rural counties in Utah, and these programs

provided employment opportunities for 2,208 young people at a cost of $1,029,175.13 In

implementing these programs, federal officials worked with local school districts, boards

of education, city and county governments, high schools, and CAPs to help young men

and women earn much needed income and provide them with the means to stay in school.

San Juan County’s NYC program employed youths as clerical workers, custodians,

teacher aides, and maintenance workers, and Box Elder County’s NYC program allowed

youth to work as secretaries and teacher and custodial assistants.14 As the War on

Poverty continued, NYC programs existed in almost every county in the state.

Like Job Corps and CAPs, interest in NYC generated many newspaper articles in

Utah. While many of the NYC articles simply provided an explanation of the program

and encouraged interested parties to apply, in some cases, individuals behind the articles

or editorials emphasized positive or negative aspects of the program, hoping that readers

might adopt their opinions about the NYC. In fact, many articles included the same basic

information—the number of hours that participants worked, the wages they earned, and

the hope that those involved would stay in school or return to school if they had already

left.

11 Ibid. 12 “Highlights—Utah, September 28, 1966.” As of June 30, 1966, the OEO had allocated $13,787,401 to Job Corps, $3,279,165 to CAPs, and $2,617,383 to NYC in Utah. 13 “Status of Programs: Utah.” 14 “CAP Program Activates Youth,” San Juan Record, 5 September 1968, 9; “Youth Corps Project,” Box Elder News, 8 February 1970, 1.

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Although they had recently opposed the creation of a Job Corps center in their

community, residents of Milford (Beaver County) embraced the creation of a local NYC

project. County commissioners, church and civic leaders, and members of the Beaver

County Board of Education filed petitions opposing a Job Corps center because they

objected to the importation of “uneducated and underprivileged youths from other areas”

but enthusiastically supported the NYC proposal because it “would give opportunities for

learning and job training to youths in their own communities,” and many high profile

agencies in the county signed on to work with the youth involved in the NYC.15

Moreover, the NYC injected much appreciated money into Utah’s economy. A

Salt Lake Tribune article from October, 1966, reminded state residents that this EOA

program not only helped those living in poverty but also provided nearly $400,000 to the

state’s economy during the summer of 1966 alone.16 This money made its way into

counties throughout the state and almost 800 disadvantages youths and their families

were directly affected, allowing the students to stay in school, benefiting the long-term

health of the state’s economy.17 Two years later, a similar article celebrated the impact

that the NYC program had on Carbon County, an area desperately in need of economic

assistance. In addition to the 600 individuals who received salaries and training through

the program and the numerous community improvement projects they completed during a

three year period, the NYC infused $450,000 into the local economy, “easing some of the

blues of economically depressed Carbon County.”18

15 Steve Williams, “Neighborhood Job Plan Requested for Beaver,” Salt Lake Tribune, 21 March 1965, 18A. 16 “Aide Says 22 Youth Corps Projects Inject $387,740 in Utah Economy,” Salt Lake Tribune, 12 October 1966, B3. 17 “$387,000 for Youth Corps,” Deseret News, 18 October 1966, A17. 18 Bob Holden, “Youth Corps Eases Carbon’s Economic Blues,” Salt Lake Tribune, 21 July 1968.

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The NYC was a popular program, helping counties throughout the state. A

cursory look at the state newspapers from 1964 to 1969 indicates that officials in at least

sixteen of the twenty-nine counties applied for and received OEO funds to create NYC

programs at some time during the period. Most of the articles and editorials that

discussed the NYC were supportive of the objectives of the program. Because the

program targeted young people, encouraged hard work, emphasized the importance of

education, provided useful vocational training, injected money into the economy, and

enabled communities to complete public projects that might not have gotten done

otherwise, the NYC won over many supporters without generating much opposition.

Rural counties in Utah received Title II EOA money to establish CAPs and create

CAP-related programs. Sometimes the OEO earmarked CAP money for a specific

county, but given the EOA required that any entity requesting assistance had to represent

a population of 40,000 or more and because the populations of many rural counties were

so small, it was fairly common for two or more counties to form a multicounty agency

and jointly apply for CAP assistance.19 Box Elder, one of the more populated rural

counties, was the only rural county that qualified for its own CAP conduct and

administration grant.20 All of the other rural counties that applied did so as a part of a

multicounty agency. Still, Box Elder joined with rural Rich County and slightly more

urban Cache County to form the Northern Utah CAP, and together they applied for and

received a CAP program development grant.21 Six Utah counties, including Millard,

Piute, Sanpete, Sevier, and Wayne Counties, formed the Central Utah CAP,

19 “Must Pool Counties for Poverty Aid,” San Juan Record, 28 January 1966, 1. 20 “Status of Programs: Utah.” 21 Ibid.

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headquartered in Ephraim (Sanpete County) and obtained a CAP development grant.22

Under the direction of Kenneth Silliman, the Southeastern Utah CAP, headquartered in

Price (Carbon County), included Carbon, Emery, San Juan, and Grand Counties, and it

secured a CAP grant “to develop and survey needs of low income groups, determine the

effective anti-poverty programs necessary for the relief of the disadvantaged citizens, and

initiate projects to assist them to help themselves.”23 By June, 1966, these rural areas

accepted $116,827 to help the poor. 24

Once these agencies established vital infrastructure, they began to implement

CAP-sponsored programs to improve the lives of the poor. The Northern Utah CAP and

the Southeastern Utah CAP each secured OEO funding to create senior citizen

employment programs.25 Many CAPs also focused on education-based solutions to

poverty, using federal funding to launch Head Start and Adult Education Programs in

their areas. Although not specifically provided for under the EOA, Head Start began as a

result of Title II, Part C which provided for the creation of voluntary assistance programs

for needy children.26 By June, 1966, four rural counties secured federal funding to

establish Head Start programs that provided educational, medical, and nutritional help to

disadvantaged children entering elementary school.27 Carbon and Millard Counties

applied for and received CAP money to create Adult Education Programs to help drop-

22 Ibid. The other county involved was slightly more urban Juab County; “OEO Grant Approved for SE Utah Community Action,” San Juan Record, 26 May 1966, 1. 23 “Status of Programs: Utah;” “OEO Grant Approved for SE Utah Community Action.” 24 “Federal Grant Given,” Manti Messenger. 16 June 16 1966. http://udn.lib.utah.edu/cdm/ref/collection/mm5/id/26498 (accessed 19 March 2014). 25 “Status of Programs: Utah.” 26 Economic Opportunity Act. (1964). http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-78/pdf/STATUTE-78-Pg508.pdf, 523. (accessed 25 February 2015). 27 “Status of Programs: Utah.” Counties establishing Head Start programs included Box Elder, Carbon (2 grants), Duchesne, and Sevier. These do not include the Head Start programs established solely for Native American or migrant populations.

http://udn.lib.utah.edu/cdm/ref/collection/mm5/id/26498

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-78/pdf/STATUTE-78-Pg508.pdf

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-78/pdf/STATUTE-78-Pg508.pdf

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outs return to school and earn their diplomas or GEDs.28 Rural Morgan County joined

with urban neighbor Weber County to secure a CAP Legal Services grant to provide

much needed legal assistance to the indigent populations in both counties.29

In many locations across the nation, CAPs—with their emphasis on the

“maximum feasible participation” of the poor—and their associated programs and

activities sparked a great deal of discussion, much of it controversial. That was not the

case with CAPs in rural Utah. While the major newspapers in the state included stories

to give an overview of the community organizing concept, they rarely carried stories—

either positive or negative—about rural Utah CAPs or their activities. A cursory

examination of papers from 1964 to 1969 reveals nothing of interest about rural senior

citizen employment programs, rural adult education programs, or Legal Services

activities in Morgan County, although there was some controversial coverage of Legal

Services activities in neighboring Ogden. The one rural CAP related program that

received some media attention was Head Start.

Head Start proved to be one of the largest and most popular EOA educational

programs in Utah. Beginning in 1965, Utah newspapers regularly carried articles and

editorials that emphasized the benefits of Head Start. With the successes of that first

summer of Head Start—helping over 200 Utah children, the state developed and received

OEO funding to develop a Head Start program during the traditional school year, and

thereby, helped even more children over a longer period of time.30 Supporters of Head

Start celebrated the achievements of the program, such as the educational “head start”

28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 “Schools of City Propose Agenda for ‘Head Start,’” Salt Lake Tribune, 12 June 1966, B9.

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that young children received as they approached elementary school, supplemental

benefits including medical and dental care and improved nutrition, and additional help to

parents, volunteers, and other members of the community. An early editorial that

appeared in the Salt Lake Tribune stated that the program was a “mighty good place to

start” to break the generational cycle of poverty and that although the federal government

initiated the program, it would take the efforts of individuals in local communities to

ensure the success of this endeavor.31 John Zupio, a state representative from Duchesne

County, wrote an editorial outlining the improvements that Head Start made in the lives

of children, providing well-balanced meals, medical and dental check-ups, often for the

first time in their lives, and special counseling that might allow them “to take their place

as future leaders.”32 In San Juan County, the local newspaper regularly included positive

articles about Head Start, beginning in 1967 and continuing into the 1970s.

While much of Head Start’s publicity came from people directly associated with

the program and their comments were overwhelmingly positive, not everyone delivered

positive feedback about Head Start. In the fall of 1969, the Box Elder County School

District discussed the possible creation of a Head Start program in their district, and those

involved in the decision-making were deeply divided.33 As the Box Elder School Board

considered the decision, several members voiced strong objections to the program. Board

President Eberhart Zundel opposed its creation because there was not enough money to

provide services for all qualified students, and he argued that the elimination of eligible

students went “against the very foundation on which public education is based.”34 Board

31 “’Head Start’ to Break Poverty Circle,” Salt Lake Tribune, 19 May 1965, 12. 32 John Zupio, “Operation Head Start,” Salt Lake Tribune, 16 September 1965, 20A. 33 “Box Elder Board Votes for Head Start Classes, Ogden Standard-Examiner, 9 October 1969, 1C. 34 Ibid.

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members Dr. Arnold B. Gilbert and Delores Stokes questioned the objectives and

effectiveness of the program. They were not convinced that the program was capable of

achieving its stated goals. Superintendent J. C. Haws opposed the lack of local control,

citing problems with Head Start in neighboring districts because those districts simply

acted as “landlords” over this federally directed program. The general consensus of those

opposing the creation of a Box Elder Head Start program was that the elimination of

qualified students would lead to problems, and the school district would have to respond

to these problems without enough power or control to fix them. Eventually, the school

board brought the motion to a vote, and in a 3-2 decision, they agreed to create a

program, though several members continued to object. This example demonstrates that

not all residents favored the Head Start program and that their objections were very much

in keeping with the concerns of people in other parts of the country.

Title III of the EOA authorized the creation of programs to raise the income and

standard of living of poor rural families, and as Senator Moss witnessed during his 1964

tour of twenty-one counties in Utah, the state’s rural population desperately needed

additional assistance to combat drought, low livestock prices, and a lack of industry.35

Some of these needy individuals received relief through the EOA rural loan program. By

the end of June, 1966, the Farmers Home Administration approved 142 rural loans in

twenty-three of the state’s twenty-nine counties, injecting $269,730 into Utah’s

economy.36 Each individual was eligible for up to $2,500 to finance agricultural or non-

35 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 212; “Moss Proposes 5-Point Plan for Rural Help,” Deseret News, 3 March 1964, B11. Title III also provided for the creation of programs to assist migrant workers, but this will be covered in more detail later in this chapter. 36 “Status of Programs: Utah.” The only counties in which individuals did not receive rural loans were Daggett, Grand, Rich, Salt Lake, Tooele, and Weber.

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agricultural enterprises, but they only qualified if no other credit source was available.37

Recipients had up to fifteen years to pay off the loan at an interest rate that the Treasury

Department established. Washington County, in the southwestern corner of the state,

qualified for the most rural loans and received the greatest amount of money through this

program.38

The rural loan programs was a very small component of the EOA, and while it

helped some Utah residents, it did not have a huge impact on the state. The program

attracted little media or public attention. Of the few articles that discussed the loan

program, most provided a broad overview of many EOA programs and concentrated on

general information rather than presenting or analyzing public opinion. For instance, an

article in the Deseret News in April, 1965, simply mentioned that the OEO had approved

six rural loans in Utah and that the total amount of the loans was less than $9,000.39

Another Deseret News article appearing two months later stuck to general facts and

figures. By that time, forty families had received rural loans, about half agricultural and

half nonagricultural.40 After that article, the EOA rural loans program disappeared from

the state’s major newspapers. While the rural loan program had an impact on Utah, it

was fairly small and generated few waves and little attention.

Almost none of the newspaper pieces dealt with the state’s reaction to the rural

loan program. The vast majority of people saw little to get excited about. One of the few

articles that provided any insight into public reaction questioned the intelligence of

providing loans to rural farmers. This 1964 editorial argued that providing financial

37 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 212. 38 “Status of Programs: Utah.” 39 “Poverty Program Attacked,” Deseret News, 22 April1965, B1. 40 “40 Utah Families Get Poverty Loans, Deseret News, 30 June 1965, A19.

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assistance to those who ran “marginal farms” merely institutionalized “poverty by

keeping farmers in the same impoverished area when they might be moving on to jobs in

new areas.”41 There were no challenges to this position, but no one raised a voice in

support of it either. The rural loan program flew under the radar, neither exciting nor

angering the general population.

Title V of the EOA empowered the director of the OEO to distribute federal funds

for work experience projects to employ and train heads of households receiving

assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children.42 In addition to the three

grants awarded to the Utah Department of Public Welfare to benefit eligible recipients

statewide and two grants awarded to the mostly urban counties along the Wasatch Front,

several rural counties received work experience project money.43 Rural Carbon,

Duchesne, San Juan, Summit, and Uintah Counties, along with slightly more urban

Tooele and Wasatch Counties qualified for a work experience grant of $204,700 in

March, 1966. These counties used that money to establish a vocational training program,

focusing on business education and technical, mechanical, and construction skills, and

166 welfare recipients participated. Officials hoped that the program would prepare

participants for jobs in food service, technical trades, construction, stone masonry, auto

mechanics, and as maids, service station attendants, and rug weavers.44 While this

program brought assistance to those in need, it failed to generate a noticeable public

response, and newspaper reports included only general program information rather than

public reaction.

41 “Which Way To Fight Poverty?,” Deseret News, 29 July 1964, A18. 42 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 212. 43 “Status of Programs: Utah.” 44 “Welfare Project Funds Approved,” San Juan Record, 24 March 1966, 1.

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Utah’s rural poor received help under Titles I, II, III, and V of the EOA. The

NYC and Head Start seemed to have the greatest impact on these counties and generated

the most publicity—mostly positive. Both programs aided the young, emphasized the

importance of education, and tried to instill the importance of hard work. While rural

Utahns also witnessed the creation of multicounty CAPs and received financial and

vocational assistance from the rural loans and work experience programs, these seem to

have had a smaller impact on the people in these counties and failed to attract much

attention. While this section has provided a brief overview of EOA programs in rural

Utah, the rest of the chapter presents a more detailed analysis of EOA programs that

assisted Native Americans and migrant workers in rural areas.

*******

Although few people associate the state of Utah with a large minority population,

there are several counties that had larger concentrations of minorities. The three counties

with the highest minority percentages—San Juan, Uintah, and Duchesne—all had

significant Native American populations. San Juan County, located in the southeastern

corner of the state, had a large Navajo population. Uintah and Duchesne Counties,

neighbors that had been one county until the twentieth century, had a large Ute

population. Geographically, Native American reservations made up a large part of each

of these counties. Tribes in each area had incredibly high poverty rates and lacked

natural resources including water, sufficient infrastructure such as passable roads and

adequate housing, economic development and jobs, and educational opportunities. Many

faced discrimination in the communities surrounding the reservations, and far too many

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became addicted to alcohol as a way of dealing with their problems. 45 To overcome

these obstacles, members of both tribes organized, submitted grants for EOA aid, and

received OEO assistance.

San Juan County had the highest percentage of minorities of all counties in the

state, a poverty rate that was higher than the state or national average, and a minority

poverty rate that was even higher. According to the 1960 Census, minorities accounted

for nearly thirty percent (29.8%) of the county’s population, mostly Navajos.46 While

twenty-eight percent of the county lived on incomes below $3,000 per year, the poverty

rate among minorities was over seventy-two percent (72.4%).47 In 1965, the Utah

Taxpayers Association announced that San Juan County had a greater percentage

(44.24%) of its population on welfare than any other county in Utah and that most

individuals receiving welfare were Native Americans.48 Given these circumstances, the

Navajo tribe sought EOA assistance and received funds to establish a number of

antipoverty projects.

Recognizing the difficulties of reservation life, the OEO invested a great deal of

money in the Navajo reservation in the Four Corners region. Tribal leaders used much of

this funding to create CAPs to identify their most critical problems and develop solutions

based on local input. In 1965, the OEO approved a $920,400 grant to the Navajo Tribal

Council of Window Rock, Arizona to establish a CAP for the Navajo Indians, and the

Navajo Tribal Council used these funds to organize the Office of Navajo Economic

45 Margaret Eberley, interview by Floyd O’Neil, 3 August 1967, interview 57, transcript, Doris Duke Oral History Collection, Special Collections, Marriot Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City; Mark Sissman, interview by Floyd D. O’Neil, 9 August 1967, interview 63, transcript, Doris Duke Oral History Collection. 46 “Table 27,” Census of the Population: 1960, 48, 51. 47 “Table 36,” Census of the Population: 1960, 65; “Table 88,” Census of the Population: 1960, 134. 48 “County Has Highest Welfare Case Ration,” San Juan Record, 30 December 1965, 1.

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Opportunity (ONEO).49 Once in place, ONEO officials used the grant to create

economic, social, cultural, legal, and educational programs.50 They established the first

comprehensive preschool program on any reservation, the first business development

center on any reservation, a NYC that employed 3,500 young adults, and a recreation and

physical fitness program. 51 They also generated a survey to study the feasibility of

establishing a community college for Navajos, took the first steps towards creating a

manpower center and a leadership improvement course, and organized a VISTA division

to supervise and coordinate all volunteer activities. Referring to the creation of the first

NYC program, Raymond Nakai, Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council, said:

Few things have happened on the Navajo Reservation which have excited and awakened our people as did our summer NYC program…our communities have seized the initiative in organizing projects and determining community goals. For a people who have long been passively dependent on others to initiate community projects, their reaction…appears miraculous to those of us who bear the scars of faltering and failing programs of the past. They want to resume those parental and community responsibilities long since apathetically surrendered to those in authority along with prerogatives normally enjoyed by Americans who are not ‘wards of the federal government.’52 That 1965 grant was just the beginning as ONEO officials applied for many other

OEO grants to help their communities. They recognized that to improve life on the

reservation they needed to focus on expanding economic opportunities. ONEO officials

used a $5.7 million OEO grant, awarded in August, 1967, to create a Community

Development Program and a program to expand opportunities for migrant and seasonally

49 “President’s War on Poverty Program: A Quick Reference Guide,” Records of the Community Service Administration, Box 106, Entry 12, RG 381, Records of the Office of Public Affairs, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland. 50 “Navajos Receive Federal Grant to Upgrade Education, Leadership,” Salt Lake Tribune, 4 March 1965, 8A. 51 “Area’s Navajos Winning Poverty War, Aide Says,” Salt Lake Tribune, 3 December 1965, A15. 52 Letter from Raymond Nakai to David S. King, September 3, 1965, King Papers.

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employed agricultural workers.53 Through the Community Development Program, forty

professionals and 104 nonprofessionals trained field personnel to investigate and discover

the needs of the community, develop needed programs based on what they found, and

provide guidance to local developers.54 To help migrant and seasonal workers, they

created five centers and employed eleven individuals who served as liaisons between

workers and growers, stressed the value of Navajos as “good, dependable, productive

workers” to local employers, coordinated the filling of available jobs, arranged for

housing and transportation for Navajo migrants, and protected workers from exploitation

and mistreatment at the hands of their employers.55 Authorities were hopeful that this

migrant and seasonal worker program would positively affect 7,000 Navajo families and

ensure the effective use of available labor resources.56

The OEO also funded the Work Incentive Program (WIN) to economically assist

people on the reservation. The purpose of WIN was to create employment in chronically

unemployed or underemployed areas, and at the same time, introduce broader positive

changes into the community. One group of WIN participants constructed a new medical

clinic at Montezuma Creek on the Navajo reservation.57 The San Juan Resource

Development Council, a CAA incorporated in 1968, oversaw the project, and it had many

53 Office of Economic Opportunity Press Release, 25 August 1967, Records of the Community Services Administration, Box 495, Entry 37, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations—Indian Program State File, 1965-1972, NARA, College Park. 54 Ibid. 55 OEO Press Release, 18 July 1969, Records of the Community Services Administration, Box 495, Entry 37, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations—Indian Program State File, 1965-1972, NARA, College Park. 56 OEO Press Release, 25 August 1967. 57 “WIN Program Men Help Build Clinic,” Indian Community Action, Vol. 5, No. 7, Arizona-California, March, 1970, 6. Found in Records of the Community Service Administration, Box 498, Entry 39, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations—Arizona State University Indian Community Action Newsletter, 1965-72, NARA College Park.

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positive effects.58 During the construction phase, it employed 120 WIN workers and

provided them with training in the building trades. Once the clinic was complete,

reservation residents received quality medical and dental care at the facility, including

out-patient care and tuberculosis and mental health care. There was a WIN agricultural

training program that taught participants how to cultivate alfalfa hay, introducing a new

commodity that allowed more Navajos to adopt a settled lifestyle, and it encouraged the

development of tourism in the area, including advertising campaigns that promoted the

beauty of Monument Valley, the culture of the Navajo people, and the historical

importance of the ancient Pueblo ruins in the region. The San Juan County Road

Department oversaw another WIN project that taught trainees how to operate heavy

equipment and build much needed roads on the reservation.59

In addition to the CAP money that ONEO received, San Juan Navajos also

secured a Title V Work Experience grant to increase the incomes of those living in

poverty. In 1966 and again in 1967, the Utah Department of Public Welfare received

federal money for San Juan County—one of seven counties—to provide additional

assistance to welfare recipients.60 Different counties used this money in different ways,

and in San Juan, this program paid Navajo men and women for the indigenous blankets

and moccasins that they made and then state welfare officials auctioned these handmade

items to the highest bidder. Cleal Bradford, the supervisor of work experience and

training in the county’s Department of Public Welfare, argued that the purpose of the

work experience program was to “get the Indian off the welfare rolls and onto a payroll”

58 Ibid. 59 “WIN Trainees Build Roads,” San Juan Record, 7 May 1970, 7. 60 “Title V Will Continue Indian Skills Program,” San Juan Record, 20 April 1967, 8.

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so that instead of asking for public assistance, they would ask for employment.61 Bruce

Shumway, director of the county’s welfare services, concluded, “The money and food

received by the Indians are not given as a handout…We endeavor to give the Indians

incentive to become self-supporting through work projects.”62 This EOA program

improved the standard of living for many Navajos, paying them for their native skills that

were often overlooked or unappreciated.

Although officials designed most CAP programs to expand economic opportunity,

many also attempted to improve the social and cultural lives of the Navajo. Recognizing

the detrimental impact of alcoholism, ONEO officials used a 1967 EOA grant to establish

the Alcoholism Prevention and Treatment Program. 63 This program used informative

educational programs to stop alcohol abuse before it started but also provided

rehabilitation and follow-up services for those who were already suffering due to alcohol

abuse. 64 The program reduced alcoholism and provided employment thirty-four

individuals, helping the economy of the area.

Adequate housing was another concern, and EOA funds allowed Navajos to

improve available housing while also developing vocational skills. In May and June of

1967, the OEO, in association with the Department of Housing and Urban Development

(HUD), the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), and the Department

of the Interior, funded two construction and apprenticeship grants for home building and

implemented a construction training program on the reservation.65 Combined, these

61 Dorothy O. Rea, “Program Aids Navajo Life,” Deseret News, 15 February 1967, B1, B5. 62 Ibid. 63 OEO Press Release, 25 August 1967. 64 Ibid. 65 OEO Press Release, 16 May 1967, Records of the Community Services Administration, Box 495, Entry 37, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations—Indian Program State File, 1965-1972, NARA, College Park; OEO Press Release, 2 June 1967, Records of the Community Services Administration, Box 495,

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grants provided nearly $8,000 for materials and equipment per house, positively impacted

1,300 families, and provided training and employment for 200 workers.66 With the

approval of a third grant in August of 1967, the program continued, training Navajo

workers to use simple construction tools and complete basic home improvement projects

and encouraging them to move from their traditional hogans to more conventional

American homes.67 In addition to improving their living conditions, this program

developed skills that prepared workers to enter construction trades training programs.68

Thanks to this funding, homes became more livable and sanitary, many Navajo workers

learned valuable vocational skills, and workers found gainful employment.69

Access to nutritional food and quality medical care was a continual problem, and

CAP officials applied for EOA grants to meet these needs. In the summer of 1969, the

OEO approved an ONEO grant for $250,000, and they used the money to provide

emergency food and medical services.70 ONEO used it to improve the health and

nutrition of the residents through direct assistance programs, establish outreach programs

to help those with the greatest need, and instruct residents about proper food

preparation.71 CAP workers rented trucks to transport commodities to outlying areas,

relocated and renovated buildings for food storage, constructed a food distribution center,

hired ten workers to drive trucks and operate distribution and storage facilities, and hired

Entry 37, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations—Indian Program State File, 1965-1972, NARA, College Park. 66 OEO Press Release, 2 June 1967. 67 OEO Press Release, 25 August 1967. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. 70 OEO Press Release, 18 July 1969, Records of the Community Services Administration, Box 495, Entry 37, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations—Indian Program State File, 1965-1972, NARA, College Park. 71 Ibid.

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six people to teach food preparation courses.72 Five public schools received $6,000 each

to establish breakfast programs for 750 children.73 While Utah already had a food stamp

program, there were many needy families that did not qualify for food stamps. This grant

allowed CAP officials to create a contingency food fund and commodity distribution

program to assist those who fell through the cracks of the existing system.74 In addition

to providing commodities to those in need, this program employed twenty-eight

individuals, providing much needed income to their families.75

The EOA also provided cultural assistance to the Navajos. A 1967 grant provided

funds for the creation of the Navajo Culture Center. 76 Once the center became

operational, employees collected information about the culture, traditions, history and

mythology of the Navajo people and shared it with researchers and tourists who visited

the facility. 77 They also planned to publish a Navajo history textbook to disseminate this

information to a more global audience. 78 In addition to the obvious culture impact of the

Navajo Culture Center, it also provided jobs for many living on the reservation, including

the elderly.

CAP officials recognized that many Native Americans were at a disadvantage

because they did not understand the laws of the United States and their rights under the

law. In 1966, the ONEO secured an OEO grant to establish a Legal Services program on

the Navajo reservation to remedy this situation. ONEO leaders used the $872,851 grant

create a Legal Services office and provide legal aid and advocacy to the poor on the

72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 OEO Press Release, 25 August 1967. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid.

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reservation.79 They established five offices, employed a staff of three attorneys, and

provided counsel to 96,000 impoverished residents.80 This was one of the few Legal

Services programs established in the state.

Education was another top priority because Navajo leaders believed that long-

term improvement was impossible without adequate educational opportunities. In hopes

of helping future generations, they put a lot of energy into securing OEO assistance for

Head Start programs on the reservation. In March of 1967, the OEO approved a San Juan

School District grant to administer a two-month summer Head Start program in six

communities throughout the county.81 According to an article in the local paper, the sole

purpose of the program was to prepare “culturally disadvantaged children to enter the

public schools” by developing language skills and emphasizing “personal cleanliness,

toilet training, nutrition, and close cooperation with the home and parents.”82 In addition

to helping numerous preschool children, this Head Start grant provided gainful

employment for forty community members.83

Three months later, the OEO approved a $1.6 million grant to establish a seven-

month Navajo Head Start program to provide educational, nutritional, and health services

for children living on the reservation, and San Juan County received over $100,00 of that

amount to establish Head Start centers for Navajos in Utah.84 Head Start Director

Frankie Paul oversaw the construction of eighty-four Head Start Centers, hired 116

79 William G. Phillips letter to Senator Frank Moss, 22 April 1966. Moss Papers, Box 164, Folder 7. 80 Ibid. 81 “Applications Taken for ‘Head Start’ Program,” San Juan Record, 23 March 1967, 8. 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid. 84 OEO Press Release, 27 June 1967, Records of the Community Services Administration, Box 495, Entry 37, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations—Indian Program State File, 1965-1972, NARA, College Park; “Moss Announces $131,201 OEO Headstart Grant,” San Juan Recorder, 29 June 1967, 1.

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professionals and 191 nonprofessionals, and provided essential services to 1,840 pre-

school children throughout the multistate reservation.85 Two years later, the OEO

approved another grant of nearly $100,000 for the creation of a Summer Head Start

program on the reservation.86 The ONEO used this funding to establish a two-month

child development program for 400 four- and five-year-olds.87 In all, this organization

created twenty centers across three states and employed twenty professionals and sixty

nonprofessionals to create and operate these facilities.88 In keeping with the underlying

ideas of the EOA, the OEO allocated these funds for the education of Navajo children,

believing that a quality education would lead to a better future for participants.

Although the Head Start program primarily assisted children, it was also designed

to help adults in the community, especially the parents of the Head Start students. In

1969, several mothers of Mexican Hat Head Start students expressed a desire to learn

how to make clothes for their children, themselves, and the other children in the program,

and the members of the committee in charge of the program agreed to teach them. 89

These women learned how to use patterns and sewing machines and began to make

clothing for many on the reservation. According to Ray Brown, the Social Services

Coordinator, this was a very important program because the ladies learned something of

personal interest, not something pushed upon them.90

The OEO also provided funding for the postsecondary education of older Navajo

85 OEO Press Release, 27 June 1967. 86 OEO Press Release, 23 June 1969, Records of the Community Service Administration, Box 495, Entry 37, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations—Indian Program State File, 1965-1972, NARA, College Park. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid. 89 “Head Start Reports,” San Juan Record, 2 February 1969, 2. 90 Ibid.

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students. During the summer of 1968, the OEO approved a $454,150 demonstration

grant for the establishment of the Navajo Community College in Many Farms, Arizona,

an institution built to educate members of the Navajo tribe.91 This grant served as “seed

money” to get the school started, but OEO sponsorship continued beyond that original

investment.92 In October 1969, OEO officials pledged their continued support, stating

that the school represented a “unique attempt to prove that a college can be responsive to

the educational and economic needs of a rural community.”93 On December 15, 1971,

federal support of the Navajo Community College continued with the passage of Public

Law 92-189, a law that appropriated $5.5 million to “ensure that the Navajo Indians and

other qualified applicants have educational opportunities which are suited to their unique

needs and interests.”94

Those who established the community college emphasized the importance of

education, cultural identity, community service, student-faculty exchanges, and inter-

tribal cooperation and also developed the principles of organized community action,

promoting personal involvement, the mobilization of resources, and the need to eliminate

prior traditions of “aloofness, exclusiveness, and indifference.”95 Temporarily housed at

a local high school, the Navajo Community College—later known as Diné College—

opened its doors to students on January 21, 1969 and was the first tribal community

college in the country, representing a great experiment in education that founders hoped

91 OEO Press Release, 25 July 1968, Records of the Community Service Administration, Box 495, Entry 37, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations—Indian Program State File, 1965-1972, NARA, College Park. 92 Ibid. 93 Alvin M. Josephy Jr., Joane Nagel, and Troy Johnson, Red Power: The American Indians’ Fight for Freedom (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), 177. 94 Ibid., 177. The law was known as the Navajo Community College Act. 95 OEO Press Release, 25 July 1968.

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other communities would adapt and replicate.96 President Robert Roessel and his faculty

and staff recruited promising and high-risk Navajo youths and illiterate adults to attend

the two-year community college and provided vocational and basic education training to

prepare students for jobs in industries located on the reservation.97 Working together,

staff, students, and community members developed a general studies program,

comprehensive adult offerings, and a Bachelor of Arts transfer program for students who

wished to continue their studies beyond a two-year program.98 The college offered

many programs and services, including research projects and consultant services, an

outreach program, a teacher education program, and courses in Navajo language, history,

and culture.99 By the late 1990s, Diné College was still the only academic postsecondary

school controlled by the Navajo Nation Council, and it continued to emphasize the

importance of helping students to develop educational goals based on ethical values,

preparing students for additional education and careers, promoting and protecting the

Navajo language and culture, and providing community services based on intensive

research about the specific needs of the population.100

Judy Carlile, an OEO official, reflected on the importance of OEO-supported

CAPs for Native Americans, but in her public statement, she unintentionally exposed

some of the problems associated with these programs. In her summary of Native

American CAPs, she stated:

Before OEO programs, community action was not new to American Indians living on Federal Reservations—they had made communal decision for over a hundred years. But what was new was that the Indian people could now do

96 Josephy, Nagel, and Johnson, 177, 182. 97 OEO Press Release, 25 July 1968. 98 Ibid. 99 Josephy, Nagel, and Johnson, 183. 100 Ibid., 182-83.

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things for themselves. They could analyze their needs, plan, organize, and administer their own programs. Programs were not designed for them and they were not told what to do. They did not have to sacrifice their cultural and traditional background, their identity and initiative. By having direct contact with OEO…, they could retain their own heritage, culture, values, and identity and at the same time participate in the full-range of OEO programs. This new community action approach has succeeded and the Indians think it has succeeded.101

While OEO-sponsored CAPs were certainly well-intentioned and undoubtedly improved

the lives of many Native Americans, Carlile’s summary is problematic. When she stated

that Native Americans had acted communally for “over a hundred years” on federal

reservations, she ignored the fact that they had lived communally and made collective

decisions long before they lived on reservations. When she asserted that they “could now

do things for themselves,” she failed to recognize that they had effectively taken care of

themselves long before they encountered European Americans. Carlile also failed to

acknowledge that the government funded CAP projects were dependent on federal

funding. While Native Americans used the CAP initiative to improve life on the

reservation and celebrate their unique culture and history, they only received funding if

OEO officials approved their proposals.

Even after the Nixon administration inherited the War on Poverty in 1969, San

Juan County and the Navajos living in the region continued to receive federal EOA

assistance. Well into the 1970s, local newspapers regularly carried stories about NYC

programs, CAP activities, and Head Start centers in the area. While these articles were

usually short, contained only a brief explanation of the activities associated with each

program, and failed to provide great insight into people’s opinions about the programs,

101 Judy Carlisle, “State Summary for Utah—Indian Programs,” n.d., Records of the Community Services Administration, Box 495, Entry 37, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations—Indian Program State File, 1965-1972, NARA, College Park.

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the fact that they continued to impact the lives of Utahns indicates continued acceptance

of these federal programs.

San Juan County was not the only area with a large concentration of Native

Americans. Uintah and Duchesne Counties, located in eastern Utah, also had sizable

Native American populations. In 1960, Uintah had the second highest minority

percentage (10.29%), and Duchesne had the third highest percentage (4.65%), almost all

of them members of the Ute tribe.102 Both counties also had high poverty rates, well

above the state average and at or above the national average. Just over twenty percent

(20.4%) of Uintah residents lived in poverty, and the poverty rate in neighboring

Duchesne County was nearly thirty percent (29.3%).103 Compared to Uintah’s twenty

percent poverty rate among all residents, more than fifty-one percent (51.47%) of non-

white families lived in poverty.104 While the 1960 Census did not provide comparable

non-white poverty rates for Duchesne, it seems likely that the situation was similar.

Many Native Americans in these counties lived in poverty, needed EOA assistance, and

received it.

The Uintah-Ouray reservation, located in these counties, received assistance

under the EOA even before the tribes organized a CAP. Early in 1965, the Uintah and

OMURAY Tribal Business Council secured two VISTA volunteers, the first anywhere in

the state.105 Among other things, these volunteers assisted in the development of

educational, vocational, recreational, and health service programs for those living on the

102 “Table 27,” Census of the Population: 1960, 45, 49. 103 “Table 86,” Census of the Population: 1960, 134. 104 “Table 88,” Census of the Population: 1960, 45, 49. 105 “Plans on Poverty in Utah,” Deseret News, 18 January 1965, 2A; “2 ‘Poverty Projects’ for Utah,” Salt Lake Tribune, 19 January 1965, 3.

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reservation.106 The number of VISTAs working on the reservation quickly increased to

ten and their influence continued to expand.107 This was the first of many EOA programs

to impact the Uintah-Ouray Reservation.

In 1966, Utes first received OEO funding to establish a CAP, and once it was in

place, CAP workers introduced other programs to improve life on the reservation.108

Tribal leaders were especially concerned about the extremely high unemployment rate

among the Utes, estimated to be over sixty-eight percent.109 Acting Executive Director

Jacson Cuch and other reservation leaders used the early grant to establish an

employment service and a vocational training program, provide loans to small business

owners, and create educational programs for children.110 A 1967 OEO grant showed

their continuing support of CAP development.111 Most of the money funded the creation

of a CAP administrative staff to coordinate and centralize community action efforts, but

officials also used it to improve communications—establishing a reservation newsletter

and radio station—and establish a small business consultation service.112 In 1968, the

OEO renewed their support of the Ute CAP, awarding money to pay their staff, develop

additional programs, and foster partnerships with other agencies that might assist CAP

efforts.113

106 “Plans on Poverty in Utah;” ‘Poverty Projects’ for Utah.” 107 Jerome K. Full, “Utah Culture Due to Feel LBJ Stamp,” Salt Lake Tribune, 4 April 1965, 1B, 6B; “Status of Programs: Utah.” 108 OEO Press Release, n.d., Records of the Community Services Administration, Box 495, Entry 37, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations—Indian Program State File, 1965-1972, NARA, College Park. 109 Economic Development Act Technical Assistance Proposal for the Urea Fertilizer and Allied Products Manufacturing Plant Study, 1967. Moss Papers, Box 224, Folder 1. 110 OEO Press Release, n.d. 111 OEO Press Release, 20 July 1967. Moss Papers, Folder 224, Folder 4. This grant awarded over $100,000 to the Ute tribe for CAP development. 112 Ibid. 113 OEO Press Release, 2 October 1968, Records of the Community Services Administration, Box 495, Entry 37, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations—Indian Program State File, 1965-1972, NARA, College Park; CAP Grant Application, 1 September 1968-31 August 1969, Records of the Community

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One of the first priorities of the Uintah-Ouray CAP was to expand economic

opportunities, cut the unemployment rate, and improve the financial future of those living

on the reservation. To achieve these goals, the Ute Tribal Council submitted several

grants, and the OEO agreed to fund some experimental projects. In 1969, the OEO

approved a twelve-month construction and apprenticeship grant to help establish a Ute

partnership with The Formica Company of Cincinnati, Ohio.114 Under this agreement,

the tribe provided building space, machinery, and workers to complete subcontracted

Formica-related projects and craft jobs under the direction of this private company.115

Two months later, the tribe received another construction and apprenticeship grant.116

Under its terms, the University of Utah and the Department of Labor oversaw economic

expansion on the reservation, helping small Indian-owned business to obtain loans,

encouraging outside businesses to relocate to the reservation, assisting in the creation and

administration of a manpower program, all in hopes of creating more jobs.117

Another EOA program provided training and resources to improve existing

housing and construct additional homes. This 1970 grant provided the Ute Tribal

Council with over $100,000 and stipulated that members of five reservation communities

Services Administration, Box 495, Entry 37, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations—Indian Program State File, 1965-1972, NARA, College Park. This grant provided $48,000. 114 OEO Press Release, 20 June 1969, Records of the Community Services Administration, Box 495, Entry 37, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations—Indian Program State File, 1965-1972, NARA, College Park. This grant awarded $50,000 to the Utes. 115 Ibid. 116 OEO Press Release, 18 August 1969, Records of the Community Services Administration, Box 495, Entry 37, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations—Indian Program State File, 1965-1972, NARA, College Park; CAP Grant Application, 1 September 1969-31 August 1970, Records of the Community Services Administration, Box 495, Entry 37, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations—Indian Program State File, 1965-1972, NARA, College Park. This grant provided $78,000. 117 OEO Press Release, 18 August 1969; CAP Grant Application, 1 September 1969-31 August 1970. This grant provided $78,000.

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be actively involved in planning and implementing the program.118 The tribal CAP and

the University of Utah provided technical and training assistance for workers.119 To

begin, workers constructed a building to house the Ute Fabricating Company and provide

office space and an expanded warehouse.120 Forty unemployed men received

construction training under experienced supervisors, developed much-needed vocational

skills, and built thirty-three homes and company buildings.121 The program dramatically

improved the work skills of participants who then used them to secure jobs and also

improved the Ute housing situation.

In 1970, the Ute Tribal Council received a grant to help the reservation’s

economy and other goals. Using the $77,000 OEO grant, several agencies, including the

tribal CAP, Indian Health Services, the Utah State University (USU) Extension Service,

the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Department of Agriculture, and the Utah State Bureau

of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife, worked together to increase employment and improve

nutrition, education, medical care, and recreational opportunities.122 Tribal leaders hired

a coordinator to establish an emergency food program, created a voucher system to

extend food stamps to those not yet covered, and employed a nutritionist and outreach

workers to teach homemakers about food preparation, better nutrition, homemaking

118 CAP Grant Application, 1 March 1970-31 August 1970, Records of the Community Services Administration, Box 495, Entry 37, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations—Indian Program State File, 1965-1972, NARA, College Park. 119 OEO Press Release, 4 February 1970, Records of the Community Services Administration, Box 495, Entry 37, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations—Indian Program State File, 1965-1972, NARA, College Park. 120 Ibid. 121 Ibid. 122 OEO Press Release, 11 June 1970, Records of the Community Services Administration, Box 495, Entry 37, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations—Indian Program State File, 1965-1972, NARA, College Park; CAP Grant Application, 1 September 1970-31 August 1971, Records of the Community Services Administration, Box 495, Entry 37, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations—Indian Program State File, 1965-1972, NARA, College Park.

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skills, and budgeting. Other programs included a college credit program administered by

the USU Extension Service, an emergency medical services program, and an outdoor

recreation project that provided recreation opportunities, employment, and additional

economic development.

Too often, alcohol contributed to high poverty and unemployment rates on the

reservation so tribal officials applied for OEO grants to attack this problem. In 1970,

tribal leader Dennis A. Mower, using data released by the University of Utah School of

Alcohol Studies, asked for funding to create an alcoholism outreach program.123 The

resulting program dealt with the health-related issues caused by alcohol abuse, economic

issues such as unemployment and reduced employability associated with alcoholism, and

social issues, including the negative impact that alcoholism had on family life. The

program included an educational program for individuals and family members to promote

a better understanding of the disease and improve overall health, job attendance, and

work habits of alcoholics.124

The expansion of educational opportunity was another goal of leaders on the

Uintah-Ouray Reservation, and Head Start was a big part of achieving that goal. In the

fall of 1966, the OEO approved a $140,086 grant to create a twelve-month Head Start

program for Ute children.125 The tribe used the money to establish five Head Start

centers and provide educational, nutritional, and social services for 186 preschool

children. The following year, OEO officials allocated an additional $199,462 to fund a

123 CAP Grant Application, 1 September 1970-31 August 1971; OEO Press Release, 23 June 1970, Records of the Community Services Administration, Box 495, Entry 37, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations—Indian Program State File, 1965-1972, NARA, College Park. 124 OEO Press Release, 23 June 1970. 125 OEO Press Release, 10 October 1966, Records of the Community Services Administration, Box 495, Entry 37, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations—Indian Program State File, 1965-1972, NARA, College Park.

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ten-month child development program, offering the same important services to 150

additional preschool children.126 In 1968, the tribe received a grant for a full-year Head

Start program and a supplemental grant to establish additional Head Start centers.127

Though the Nixon administration shifted Head Start from the OEO to HEW,

federal support for Head Start continued. The Ute tribe, headquartered at Fort Duchesne,

secured two Head Start grants in 1969. 128 In 1970, HEW allocated $220,156 for a full-

year, full-day Head Start program for 160 Ute children.129 Much larger than earlier

appropriations, it provided medical care for enrolled children through the Roosevelt

Medical Center; dental care through Delta Dental; social services and counseling through

the CAA Community Outreach program, the Bureau of Indian Affairs Social Services,

the Department of Public Welfare, and the University of Utah Graduate School of Social

Work; and nutritional services through the Home Demonstration Agent from the

University of Utah Extension Service.130 Dennis Mower argued that the creation of new

jobs on the reservation created greater need for day care services, and this HEW grant

provided the funds for additional programs.131 Francis Wyasket, chairman of the Tribal

Business Committee, summed up his faith in education and Head Start when he said, “I

126 OEO Press Release, 21 September 1967, Records of the Community Services Administration, Box 495, Entry 37, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations—Indian Program State File, 1965-1972, NARA, College Park. 127 OEO Press Releases, 3 October and 26 November 1968, Records of the Community Services Administration, Box 495, Entry 37, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations—Indian Program State File, 1965-1972, NARA, College Park. 128 OEO Press Release, 17 June 1969, Records of the Community Services Administration, Box 495, Entry 37, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations—Indian Program State File, 1965-1972, NARA, College Park. 129 Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Press Release, 1970, Records of the Community Services Administration, Box 495, Entry 37, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations—Indian Program State File, 1965-1972, NARA, College Park. 130 Ibid. 131 Ibid.

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have always maintained that education will be the salvation of the Tribe.”132

Although the University of Utah, located in Salt Lake City, was a long way from

the reservations in San Juan, Uintah, and Duchesne Counties, this institution played a key

role in using EOA money to improve the lives of Native Americans in these locations and

throughout the West. In the summer of 1965, the OEO selected the University of Utah as

one of a small group of institutions to help Native Americans tribes develop CAPs and

train the individuals who ran the CAPs once they were established.133 Program director

S. Lyman Tyler assigned faculty personnel, field representatives, and consultants to visit

the reservations, at tribal request, help complete grant applications, and organize and

administer CAPs on more than forty reservations in the West, including the two in

Utah.134 The Salt Lake Tribune called the university’s CAP training program “the most

realistic and workable so far offered by the white man to make amends to the red man,”

and quoted Dr. Y. T. Witherspoon, the director of the University of Utah’s Bureau of

Indian Services, who stated, “The key feature of the program is that the Indians are given

the opportunity to help themselves…The Indian tribal leaders are encouraged to evaluate

their situations themselves, decide what action needs to be taken, then contact the

university.”135 Dr. S. Lyman Tyler, Witherspoon’s successor, applauded the development

of CAPs, stating, “For the first time, under this program, reservation inhabitants, both

Indian and non-Indian, are coming together to study their own problems and map plans of

132 “$140,086 Ear-marked for Ute ‘Head Start,’” Uintah Basin Standard, 22 September 1966, 1. 133 “Status of Programs: Utah;” Statutes at Large 78 (1964). http://heinonline.org.tproxy01.lib.utah.edu/HOL/Page?handle=hein.statute/sal078&men_hide=false&men_tab=citnav&collection=statute&page=518, 518. (accessed March 2009); Judy Carlisle, “State Summary for Utah—Indian Programs,” n.d. The OEO originally allocated $206,454 to establish this training center. From 1965 to 1968, the OEO earmarked an additional $914,254 for the program. 134 OEO Press Release. 31 May 1966. King Papers, Box 16, Folder 15. 135 “U. Starts Project To Assist Indians,” Salt Lake Tribune, 3 December 1965, 3.

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solution.”136

Additionally, the OEO selected the University of Utah to create a regional

training center for the development of Native American Head Start programs and a

training center for VISTA volunteers who served on reservations in the western United

States.137 The university assisted in the establishment of Head Start centers on

reservations in Utah and five other western states. 138 Head Start officials felt that the

involvement of parents was crucial because too often they had misunderstandings or

prejudices against the school system, and only through discussions between parents and

officials would they create common ground, help parents to see the value of traditional

education, and fashion a preschool program that might actually help these kids to succeed

in school. 139

When the designers of the EOA created VISTA, they envisioned that volunteers

would venture into the “pockets of poverty” in the United States, including Indian

reservations, and serve as catalysts for change, helping the poor to help themselves. The

University of Utah’s VISTA training program helped to make that vision a reality. By

the end of 1966, the university was one of only ten institutions training VISTA

volunteers, and this Utah-based program had trained 400 volunteers in the less than two

years of its existence.140 While much of their six-week training took place on the

university’s campus, each VISTA spent two to three weeks on the Uintah-Ouray

reservation, living amongst the Utes and receiving on-the-job training at reservation

136 William F. Smiley, “U. Bureau Advances Tribal Community Action,” Salt Lake Tribune, 31 July 1966, B1. 137 “Status of Programs: Utah.” 138 Smiley, “U. Bureau Advances Tribal Community Action.” 139 Ibid. 140 “VISTA Graduation Monday,” Salt Lake Tribune, 18 December 1966, 4B.

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schools, homes, tribal offices, and other locations.141 The trainees learned a great deal

from their time on the reservation, and then some of them were assigned to serve there

after they concluded their training.

Many Utah leaders supported the VISTA program and the volunteers that devoted

a year of their lives to help Native Americans and others living in poverty. At a VISTA

training graduation ceremony held at the University of Utah Union Ballroom in the fall of

1965, Senator Moss spoke, thanking the volunteers for their service and the good work

they were doing.142 Governor Cal Rampton was another supporter of VISTA. He

described the volunteers as individuals “who have…made the decision to pursue not

material wealth, but spiritual wealth” and assured them that “while you are aiding others

to realize their full worth as humans on this earth, you will realize your own worth” and

described the program as “a people-to-people program; not a government hand-out but a

personal hand-up given by people who care and supported by a nation that cares.”143 In

1966, Max E. Rich, the executive vice president and secretary of the Salt Lake Area

Chamber of Commerce, “praised the selfless attitude of the volunteers and promised

them rewards in satisfaction equal to their achievements and achievements equal to the

effort they put forth,” and he reminded them of their responsibility to help those in need

“to find their rightful place and to attain human dignity” by convincing them to help

themselves and showing them how to do that. 144 Dr. Robert C. Bennion, a BYU

141 “VISTA Volunteers Train with Ute Tribe on Reservation,” Uintah Basin Standard, 18 November 1965, 1; “VISTA Workers to Train 3 Weeks at U & O,” Uintah Basin Standard, 13 January 1966, 1; “VISTA Trainees Tour Ute Lands, Learn Ute Ways,” Vernal Express, 2 September 1965, 10. 142 “VISTA Crews to Begin Indian Work,” Salt Lake Tribune, 1 October 1965, 12B. 143 Governor Calvin L. Rampton Message to VISTA Volunteer Graduation, 1 December 1965, Calvin L. Rampton Papers, Series 17587, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 60, Utah State Archives, Salt Lake City. Underline in the original. 144 “VISTA Group Praised by C. of C. Aide,” Salt Lake Tribune, 21 December 1966, B11.

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professor and a clinical psychologist with the VISTA training facility at the University of

Utah, commended the volunteers on their willingness to go “where 95 percent of the

American people have never been and where 99 percent don’t want to be” and their

commitment to “serve wherever they are needed and requested and are assigned.”145

Rose Mary Pedersen, a Deseret News staff writer, also supported the program, calling the

volunteers “truly dedicated people” who “willingly put in long and exhausting hours and

give up many personal interests and pleasures” to help the poor.146 In her final

assessment, she stated, “Understanding and helping the poor. This is the goal of the

VISTA program…And, perhaps, it should be the goal of us all.”147 Clearly, many Utahns

supported VISTA and appreciated its goals.

Still, the VISTA program was not universally popular in Utah. Senator Bennett

was outraged by the behavior of some VISTA volunteers, though not those serving in

Utah, but he worked to prevent their bad behavior from spreading. He was not alone in

his concerns, as other leaders across the nation fought to prevent VISTAs from engaging

in political behavior. To better control their activities, Bennett co-sponsored a bill to

bring VISTA volunteers under the provisions of the Hatch Act.148 The Deseret News ran

an editorial in support of the bill, stating, “It doesn’t take much imagination to appreciate

how politically-minded bureau chiefs—from neighborhood corps supervisors to the

administration itself—could use poverty funds and workers and a little intimidation to

build a political machine to perpetuate itself.”149 The editorial concluded, “Senator

145 Rodger Dean Duncan, “Helpers of Poor Train at Utah U.,” Salt Lake Tribune, 24 April 1967, 24. 146 Rose Mary Pedersen, “Volunteering—The VISTA Way,” Deseret News, 31 May 1969, 14B. 147 Ibid. 148 “Utahn Fights Politics in Poverty War,” Salt Lake Tribune, 25 February 1966, 3. 149 “Keep Poverty War Non-Political,” Deseret News, 26 February 1966, 10A.

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Bennett’s proposal is a good one and deserves the immediate consideration of Congress.

It is simply a matter of keeping politics out of the poverty war.”150

Under the EOA, the OEO allocated money to establish CAPs and associated

programs on Utah’s reservations, funneling much needed funds to San Juan, Uintah, and

Duchesne Counties and helping to improve the standard of living for members of the

Navajo and Ute tribes. Many of these programs tried to develop solutions to economic

problems on the reservation or emphasized that increased educational opportunities

would provide long-term solutions to many problems. These programs attracted some

media attention, but many articles simply outlined the amount of money granted and

provided basic information about the types of programs. While newspapers did carry

some commentary about Native American CAPs, in almost every case, it was a program

insider who shared his or her optimism about the program. There was little insight into

the feelings of those who “benefited” from the programs, and there were no editorial

comments from the general public. In the end, it seems that CAP efforts on the

reservation remained small but managed to do good work without attracting significant

public response.

*******

Migrant and other seasonal agricultural workers experienced some of the worst

conditions of any population in Utah. Many spoke little to no English and could not even

read their native language, and this communication barrier prevented them from

improving their quality of life. Far too often, they went without basic necessities. They

struggled to find housing, lived on inadequate diets, rarely had medical or dental care,

150 Ibid.

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and were educationally disadvantaged. Most of the members of migrant families worked

hard with little compensation and none of the benefits that other workers expected.

Wages were poor and the demand for workers was erratic, affected by variables beyond

their control. Although an exact number is hard to determine, by the late 1960s, there

were approximately 15,000 to 20,000 migrant farmworkers in Utah, mostly of Hispanic

descent but also a smaller number of Navajo and Kickapoo Indians, and they were

concentrated in a few counties in northern and central Utah.151 With the passage of the

EOA, local initiative and federal funding came together to improve the lives of migrant

workers. Eventually, they established the Utah Migrant Council, an organization

committed to continuing this important work.

The Utah Migrant Council began as separate grassroots groups in multiple

locations fought for the rights of migrant workers and later came together to form a more

cohesive and effective organization. Two of these local groups were the Box Elder

Migrant Worker Council in Brigham City, originally organized by the Council of

Churches in that area, and the Cache Valley Migrant Council in Logan. 152 Under Title

III of the EOA, Congress gave the OEO director authority to create special programs to

combat poverty in rural areas, and Section 311 provided for the development of programs

to assist migrants and other seasonally-employed agricultural workers, providing loans to

improve housing, sanitation, education, and daycare programs.153 Both of these counties

151 “History and Growth of the Utah Migrant Council,” 3; David Nimkin, interview by author, 5 March 2009, Salt Lake City, audio recording and transcript, in the possession of the author, 4. These counties included Box Elder, Cache, Davis, Salt Lake, Tooele, and Utah. Though many of those counties were not truly “rural,” the migrant populations lived and worked in the rural parts of each county. 152 OEO Press Release, 24 March 1966, Records of the Community Services Administration, Box 515, Entry 42, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations, Records of the Directory, Migrant Workers’ Programs State Files—Utah, 1966-1972, NARA, College Park. 153 Statutes at Large 78 (1964), 524-25.

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had significant migrant worker populations so it is not surprising that grassroots

organizations emerged there. In the beginning, these local groups raised their own funds

and developed their own programs, but when the EOA became law, they applied for OEO

funds to expand their efforts. Eventually, the members of the Utah Migrant Council

worked together to secure federal funding, evaluate the areas of greatest needs, and

design and implement programs to improve the lives of migrants workers throughout the

state.

Some individuals in Box Elder County focused on the plight of the migrant

population even before the passage of the EOA. Observant people in this agricultural

area recognized the difficulties that their migrant farmworkers faced and worked to

implement change. In 1964, the Box Elder County Commissioners urged USU’s

Extension Service to sponsor an educational program to assist migrant workers and their

families.154 They offered a one-month summer school program for migrant children in

several elementary schools—emphasizing basic subjects such as English, reading, and,

mathematics—and established an adult education program. Many individuals and groups

came together to organize these offerings, including the Box Elder Migrant Workers

Council, school board members, the Farm Bureau, and several religious groups.155 One

of the ways they financed their programs was through a thrift store in Brigham City that

sold much needed clothes to migrant workers at very reasonable prices and then

reinvested the money into programs to improve the lives of migrants. 156

154 “Programs Aid Migrant Workers during Stay in Box Elder Area,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 31 May 1964, 9A. 155 Ibid; Kay Bowcutt, “Box Elder Readies Migrant Program,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 18 April 1965, 8A. The Box Elder Migrant Council was established in 1961. 156 “Programs Aid Migrant Workers during Stay in Box Elder Area,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 31 May 1964, 9A; Bowcutt, “Box Elder Readies Migrant Program.”

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In the summer of 1964, the council offered a series of classes for women in the

migrant community.157 The series began with sewing and cooking classes taught by

home economics teachers from the Intermountain Indian School. They added classes that

taught about health issues and basic first aid. Local women witnessed the needs of the

community and did their best to help migrant women improve the lives of their families.

An editorial in the Box Elder newspaper commended the council’s voluntary efforts to

establish a summer school program on a “shoe string basis.”158 Given their limited

funding, the council applied for supplemental federal aid to further their cause.

The Box Elder Migrant Council was the first migrant worker program in Utah to

receive EOA assistance, reorganizing as a community action agency (CAA) to qualify for

funding. 159 One of the goals of the council was to use this federal funding to expand

migrant educational opportunities. When they applied, the OEO sent representatives to

evaluate the county’s migrant situation, and on the basis of the tremendous work they

were already doing, the officials committed to provide 100% of the funds needed,

waiving the usual ten percent local funding requirement, and agreed to more funding than

the council requested.160 With this federal help, the council established a six-week

summer school for migrant children, a daycare center for preschool students, night school

programs at several labor camps, and a recreational center in Brigham City.161 While the

editorial writer acknowledged the federal government’s obligation to help improve the

lives of migrant workers, the editorial argued that the level of funding was excessive,

157 “Adult Classes Set for Migrants,” Box Elder News, 14 July 1964, 3. 158 “Proper Role, But…,” Box Elder News, 20 April 1965, 2. 159 Bowcutt, “Box Elder Readies Migrant Program.” 160 “Proper Role, But…” 161 Ibid.

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especially compared to similar state-run educational programs, and favored greater

“prudence” in spending for migrant programs in Box Elder and elsewhere.162 In response

to this editorial, Maxine Clark, a four-year volunteer with the Box Elder Migrant Council,

explained that their funding had always been too small to create all the programs needed

to help migrants, and with the OEO’s financial commitment, the volunteers at the council

could dramatically expand educational opportunity and get migrant workers and their

families more involved in the development of these programs.163

In July, 1965, the OEO allocated funds for the construction of a migrant

educational opportunity center in the county.164 The center provided a central facility for

all educational and job-training programs, distributed information about job opportunities

and community events, and housed counselors and other guidance personnel to help the

target population.165 In addition, the center employed fifty migrants as aides and

numerous local teachers and recent college graduates to teach preschool classes, remedial

classes for migrant teenagers struggling in school, and adult education classes. This grant

allowed the Box Elder Migrant Council to expand available programs as volunteer

Maxine Clark suggested. Local newspapers praised Box Elder’s efforts to help migrants.

One editorial “commended” county “officials and residents…for the progressive attitude

they are taking on the touchy problem of attracting migrant workers," given the critical

role that these workers played in the county’s agricultural economy, and another declared

that the Box Elder Migrant Council should serve as a “model for community action

162 Ibid. 163 Maxine Clark, “Explains Aid Increase,” Box Elder News, 27 April 1965, 2. 164 “Status of Programs: Utah;” “Community Action Programs—11/19/65,” Rampton Papers, Series 14250, Reel 11, Box 6, Folder 4. 165 “Approval Given $32,489 Plan to Aid Migrants,” Box Elder News, 6 July 1965, 1; “OK Box Elder Grant to Assist Migrants,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 6 July 1965, 2B.

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across the nation.”166

In May 1966, the Box Elder County CAP received three additional CAP grants.167

One allocated funds for the general administration of the CAP, one established an

enrichment program for older students and a vocation education program for migrant

adults, and one provided for a day care program for 1,750 migrant children.168 Officials

estimated that over 400 migrant workers and their children benefitted from these

programs.169 In addition to the educational advantages, this funding provided health

services for many migrants and employed eight professionals, five nonprofessional

teachers’ aides, and five migrant aides.170

The Cache Valley Migrant Council, another volunteer group that predated the

EOA, also secured OEO funding. When the council received an $11,900 grant, its board,

made up of USU faculty, representatives of the local school district, a social worker, and

four migrant representatives, debated the most pressing needs of the local migrant

population.171 Together, they designed a consumer education program to teach migrants

how to purchase goods and services, how to use checks and money orders, how to budget

their money, and the benefits and dangers of using credit. The board also created a

summer education program for thirty-five migrant children, ages six to thirteen, and the

166 “Box Elder Migrants,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 20 April 1965, 6; Ken Lewis, “’Golden Door’ Open to Migrants,” Salt Lake Tribune, 16 December 1965, 1B. 167 “Status of Programs: Utah.” 168 OEO Press Release, 24 March 1966, Records of the Community Services Administration, Box 515, Entry 42, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations, Records of the Directory, Migrant Workers’ Programs State Files—Utah, 1966-1972, NARA, College Park; OEO Press Release, 31 May 1966, Records of the Community Services Administration, Box 515, Entry 42, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations, Records of the Directory, Migrant Workers’ Programs State Files—Utah, 1966-1972, NARA, College Park. 169 “U.S. Tags $75,151 Grant for Local Migrant Plan,” Box Elder News, 15 May 1966, 1. 170 OEO Press Release, 31 May 1966. 171 OEO Press Release, 24 March 1966, Records of the Community Services Administration, Box 515, Entry 42, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations, Records of the Directory, Migrant Workers’ Programs State Files—Utah, 1966-1972, NARA, College Park.

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children attended classes eight hours a day for eight weeks. Through the summer of

1966, the Box Elder Migrant Worker Council and the Cache Valley Migrant Council

were the only two groups dedicated to migrant issues in Utah to receive OEO assistance.

In the fall of 1966, volunteers from Box Elder, Cache, and other rural areas joined

forces to improve the lives of migrant workers throughout the state and developed the

underlying philosophy and organizational structure of the Utah Migrant Council, a group

officially established in 1968.172 The UMC headquarters were in Salt Lake City, but the

council had offices in other parts of the state, including Box Elder, Davis, Utah, Carbon,

and Iron County—wherever there were large numbers of migrant workers.173 In the

beginning, the group relied on volunteers, but as EOA money became available, the

UMC hired full-time employees to fight for the rights of Utah’s migrant workers.174

Many of the state’s most active reformers were involved in the development of the UMC,

including Father Jerald Merrill, the primary administrator of the Guadalupe Center in Salt

Lake City, John Florez, the deputy director of the Salt Lake CAP, and Dr. Clark

Knowlton, director of the University of Utah Center for the Study of Social Problems.

The UMC helped migrants in all parts of the state—especially Box Elder, Utah, Weber,

and Davis Counties—providing much needed educational, health, and welfare services.

Dr. Knowlton reasoned that the only way to prevent unrest and violence among the

migrant population was to help them develop employment skills to make a brighter

economic future possible.175 The UMC’s work began in earnest when the council

received a $75,000 OEO grant to fund activities and programs to help migrants working

172 “History and Growth of the Utah Migrant Council,” 4. 173 Nimkin interview, 2-3. 174 “History and Growth of the Utah Migrant Council,” 4. 175 “Public Concern Spurs Aid for Migrants,” Salt Lake Tribune, 21 November 1968, 2B.

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“in the stream” and those who wanted to leave the migratory lifestyle behind.176

During of winter of 1968, the Box Elder Migrant Worker Council continued their

efforts to help the migrants. That winter, many workers stayed in the area hoping to find

winter employment, but many were laid off and struggled to provide the basic needs of

their families or Christmas gifts for their children.177 In response, members of the Box

Elder Migrant Worker Council asked local residents to donate winter clothing, bedding,

and Christmas toys, and the CAP provided busses and workers to transport all donated

items to those in need. Once again, the local migrant organization used CAP funding and

local donations to improve the lives of migrant workers.

In the spring of 1968, the UMC received an OEO grant for $85,000, selected an

executive director, hired a small staff, set up area offices, and launched a small-scale

outreach program for migrants in outlying areas who needed assistance.178 VISTA

volunteers served as an important labor force for the UMC, and even though federal

money allowed the council to hire additional workers, VISTAs continued to run the UMC

outreach program.179 Together, the paid staff and volunteers worked to improve wages,

benefits, housing, and health standards for migrant workers and helped them find

“comfort, peace, and dignity.”180

When heavy rains destroyed the state’s cherry crop during the summer of 1969,

many migrants were stranded without jobs or basic necessities, and the UMC organized a

relief effort to help those impacted. Arthur Estrada, the executive director of the council,

176 Ibid. 177 “Food, Clothing Asked For Migrant Families,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 20 December 1968, 2C. 178 “History and Growth of the Utah Migrant Council,” 4. 179 Ibid.; Nimkin interview, 3. 180 “History and Growth of the Utah Migrant Council,” 3.

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urged Utahns to donate clothing, blankets, and canned food to ease the suffering of those

affected.181 Locals responded with donations, but due to the severity of the situation,

they failed to meet demand, and UMC workers continued their appeals for assistance.182

In this emergency situation, the UMC came to the aid of migratory workers, but those

concerned about the welfare of this population realized that they needed a long-term plan

to ensure the welfare of migrant workers.

In pursuit of this objective, the governor’s office, the UMC, and the OEO came

together to develop a plan. Once the immediate flooding crisis was over, representatives

met to discuss the creation of a committee to “monitor health and welfare conditions in

Utah’s migrant work camps.”183 The committee also focused on the construction of more

and better housing for the state’s migrant population. Dr. Knowlton suggested that the

committee tap unused federal sources to construct better housing. He explained that with

the mechanization of larger and more prosperous farms in California and other

surrounding states, the number of migrants permanently settling in Utah would rise, and

he suggested that this growing migrant population could be a tremendous resource or a

source of trouble, depending on how well the state prepared for the resulting

transportation, housing, employment, health, and educational issues.184 Art Estrada

suggested that the development of programs to help this rising migrant population would

be an appropriate way to spend their recent OEO grant.185

With the passage of time, the UMC became a more powerful force fighting for the

181 “Utahns Give Food, Help to Migrants,” Deseret News, 28 June 1969, 2B. 182 “Migrants Helped But Still In Need,” Deseret News, 30 June 1969, B1. 183 “State Plans Migrant Camp Panel,” Salt Lake Tribune, 4 July 1969, 22. 184 “Utah Becoming Haven For Migrant Workers,” Deseret News, 4 July 1969, C5. 185 “’Migrant Agency to Get $85,000,” Ogden Standard-Examiner13 May 1969, 1B; Utah Becoming Haven for Migrant Workers.”

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rights of migratory farm workers, securing funds to establish educational, medical, and

vocational training programs. In May of 1970, the council obtained a grant to establish a

Head Start program for the children of migrant laborers, and the following year, the OEO

increased migrant Head Start funding.186 In 1971, the UMC secured additional funds to

hire area coordinators, set up regional offices throughout the state, and extend their

services into areas with the greatest concentration of migrants.187 The UMC also

received funding from other sources, including a grant from the Center for Disease

Control (CDC) to improve the quality of migrant health care and a manpower grant to

provide vocational training.188 Through their hard work and dedication and with the

financial assistance of the OEO and other agencies, UMC workers made a difference for

migrant and seasonal workers.

In 1971, the UMC set a goal of expanding into new parts of the state. With

$265,000 in federal OEO assistance, the council expanded their outreach program to

twelve Utah counties, added regional offices in Payson (Utah County), Ogden (Weber

County), and Brigham City (Box Elder County), with each serving at least two counties,

and hired additional workers, including area coordinators, migrant health aides, and

migrant outreach workers.189 Programs created or expanded included a licensed daycare

for nine communities and 150 kids, an adult education program, and a self-help housing

program that taught migrants how to construct and improve their own housing units.190

They established area advisory boards to advise migrants on local policies and procedures

186 “History and Growth of the Utah Migrant Council,” 4, 5. 187 Ibid., 4. 188 Ibid., 4, 5. 189 Ibid., 5. 190 OEO Press Release, Records of the Community Services Administration, Box 515, Entry 42, RG 381, Records of the Office of Operations, Records of the Directory, Migrant Workers’ Programs State Files—Utah, 1966-1972, NARA, College Park.

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and a forum for input from and participation of the workers in each area, in keeping with

the EOA principle of “maximum feasible participation” of the poor.191 Originally, the

UMC Board included only traditional community leaders, but they gradually added

representatives from the migrant population.192 The board focused on the most

immediate needs of migrant workers—food, shelter, health care, and child care—but also

worried about their long-term requirements—education, job training, the availability of

well-paying jobs, the ability to settle down, and their acceptance and involvement in their

adopted communities.193

Utah migrant workers suffered because they did not have access to adequate food

and safe housing, and the UMC worked hard to remedy these conditions. They created

programs to improve nutrition, including an agreement to provide food stamps to those

who participated in UMC vocational training programs.194 In 1965, the Box Elder

Migrant Workers Council used a CAP grant to construct a new housing unit at the

migrant camp west of Tremonton. 195 Later, the UMC secured Farmers Home

Administration money, under EOA Title III, to build twenty-eight housing units for

migrants in Davis County.196 They also established self-help housing projects that helped

seasonal farmworkers secure loans for building lots and materials, provided technical

training in home construction, and arranged for experts to oversee these building

projects.197 The first project was located in Box Elder County, and it became a model for

191 “History and Growth of the Utah Migrant Council,” 5. 192 Ibid. 193 “Goals, Objectives and Focus of the Utah Migrant Council,” Utah Migrant Council, 7. 194 “Migrant Education,” Utah Migrant Council, 17. 195 Bowcutt, “Box Elder Readies Migrant Program.” 196 “Housing Programs for Farmworkers,” Utah Migrant Council, 19. 197 Ibid.

219

projects in other places.198 This program increased and improved housing for migrant

workers and provided training to help them secure future employment.199

Improving health care was another goal. Migrants encountered medical issues

that the average American never experienced, and their mobile lifestyle often

complicated matters. Discrimination frequently prevented them from receiving the

treatment they needed. In response, the UMC board created the UMC Health

Component, and the underlying principle of the group was that all people—regardless of

race, class, or other “differences”—deserved comprehensive medical care in a sterile and

suitable environment.200 To provide adequate health care, the UMC set up several

different types of facilities with trained medical professionals. In some locations, they

established area medical offices staffed by a health coordinator, at least one migrant

health specialist, and a nurse.201 The personnel working in these offices educated

migrants about available health services and distributed vouchers that they could use to

pay for doctor visits or prescriptions.202 During the summer months, the UMC Health

Component set up clinics in several counties to provide medical care for migrants, with

local health departments furnishing office space and personnel to staff them.203 The

directors set clinic hours to accommodate migrant work schedules and hired bilingual

aides to communicate with non-English speakers.204 They also created mobile units that

visited farms, fields, and camps to provide on-site medical care.205 Migrant workers who

198 “Housing Programs for Farmworkers,” Utah Migrant Council, 19. 199 Ibid. 200 “Health Services,” Utah Migrant Council, 11. 201 Ibid. 202 Ibid. 203 “History and Growth of the Utah Migrant Council,” 6; Health Services,” Utah Migrant Council, 11. They set up offices in Box Elder, Weber, and Salt Lake Counties. 204 Health Services,” 11. 205 Ibid.

220

participated in UMC-run vocational training programs received government-subsidized

medical care, including physical exams.206

In addition to these measures, the UMC went even further to ensure suitable

medical care. They created a migrant health specialist training program. They selected

former migrant workers to participate in a six-week program that provided instruction on

basic health education, procedures associated with simple health screenings, and useful

home healthcare practices.207 Once they completed their training, they staffed the health

clinics, traveled to migrant camps and workplaces providing on-site medical care, and

educated migrants about basic sanitation and lifestyle practices to improve their health.208

They upgraded medical records to include medical histories of migrant workers and

established a system to ensure that complete records followed workers from place to

place.209 This prevented migrants from being “either the best immunized or the worst

immunized” patients.210

Given their poor wages, all available migrant family members had to work, and

this made dependable, safe daycare a necessity for migrant laborers. The UMC board

tapped OEO and other funding sources to establish eight Head Start programs for migrant

children.211 Working with the Division of Family Services, the Governor’s Office, the

State Department of Health, the United States Department of Health, and the OEO, the

UMC-run Head Start programs provided bilingual educational instruction, medical and

dental programs, and nutritious meals, increasing the likelihood that the children of

206 “Migrant Education,” Utah Migrant Council, 17. 207 Health Services,” 12. 208 Ibid. 209 Ibid. 210 Nimkin interview, 4. 211 “Head Start/Day Care,” Utah Migrant Council, 15.

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migrant workers were well-prepared to start formal schooling.212 They also trained and

employed migrant women as directors and teacher’s aides, providing them with

opportunities to improve their language skills, develop technical skills, learn more about

child development, improve their chances of finding other employment, and supplement

their family income.213

The UMC worked diligently to involve the child, the parents, and the larger

community in the creation of Head Start centers. Head Start workers helped migrant

children to develop a sense of pride in their culture, a more positive self-image, and a

desire to learn and improve themselves. The UMC encouraged parents to play a hands-

on role, evaluating and giving advice on the curriculum and practices at each center.214

Authorities sought the input of migrants. In the summer of 1969, the Utah State Board of

Education conducted a weeklong migrant education workshop at Vae View Elementary

in Layton (Davis County), and a central component of the workshop was a panel of

laborers who shared their personal experiences, illustrating the educational problems they

faced and offering suggestions to help migrant children learn.215

The nation’s changing economy, characterized by increasing mechanization and a

shrinking demand for manual labor, convinced UMC Board members that migrant

workers needed programs to develop vocational skills for future employment. Using

Labor Department funds, the UMC created the Manpower Development and Training

Program at the Utah Manpower Training Center in Ogden to help migrants transition

212 Ibid. 213 Ibid. 214 Ibid. 215 Gary Blodgett, “Panel Airs Problems of Migrant Workers,” Deseret News, 7 June 1969, 2B.

222

from farm work to nonagricultural jobs.216 The thirty-five week program accommodated

approximately eighty migrant laborers per year, but no more than two members per

family eligible at one time, provided a broad-based general education, and continued with

more specialized vocational training after they finished general education classes.217 To

ensure survival, trainees received some financial compensation during their training.218

The Labor Department stipulated that each applicant had to pass an English

language exam with at least fifth grade proficiency to enter the training program, and this

was a significant stumbling block for many migrants.219 Because few were able to meet

this standard, the UMC established an adult education program, with a strong language

component, to help improve their language skills.220 Once they met the minimal

language requirement and officially entered the program, migrants continued to work on

these skills, both reading and speaking, as well as basic math and computation, and all

classes were self-paced, allowing participants to progress according to their abilities.221

After trainees completed the general education requirements, they entered the

vocational training and job placement stage of the program, and each choose from

different vocational pathways, including clerical, automotive, metal craft, and

healthcare.222 They could also work with the State Vocational Education Program to

train for jobs in food preparation and the service-sector or with local businesses that

offered training in cosmetology, social work, child development, medical assistance,

216 “Migrant Education,” 16-17; Nimkin interview. 217 “Migrant Education,” 16-17. 218 Ibid., 16. 219 Ibid., 17. 220 Ibid., 16-17. 221 Ibid., 17. 222 Ibid.

223

building trades, and computer programing.223 When they completed all vocational

classes, the manpower program worked closely with the Employment Security Office, the

Weber State College Skills Center in Ogden, and the Utah Technical College in Salt

Lake, to connect prospective employees with appropriate jobs.224 The UMC developed

business ventures to provide additional job opportunities, and some even offered

management training courses.225

The UMC tried to improve relationships between migrants and the communities

where they worked, hoping to ease their transition from farm work to more settled

employment, and encourage them to get more involved in their communities. UMC staff

taught classes about Anglo culture to help them better understand the values of the

society they were entering and improve their employment chances outside agriculture,

but they also tried to educate the general population about the needs and problems of the

migrant workers they employed, believing that increased community awareness would

lead to greater empathy and a better future for all.226 OEO-sponsored Legal Services

hired attorneys to help migrants settle legal issues involving labor conditions, medical

matters, and even land claim cases.227

The UMC also encouraged migrants to become involved in the setting the

council’s agenda, discussing common problems, and playing a critical part in the

decision-making process.228 For the nearly 18,000 migrants who made their way into

Utah each year, the area advisory boards gave them an opportunity to provide input, and

223 Ibid. 224 Ibid. 225 “History and Growth of the Utah Migrant Council,” 6. 226 “Migrant Education,” 17; “Goals, Objectives and Focus of the Utah Migrant Council,” Utah Migrant Council, 7. 227 Economic Opportunity Act. Statutes at Large 78 (1964), 516; Nimkin interview, 4-5. 228 “Goals, Objectives and Focus of the Utah Migrant Council,” 8.

224

with a majority of the UMC Board of Directors coming from the farm-working

population, the migrant population had a significant voice on the state and local levels.229

Migrants and former migrants worked on the staffs of the state and regional councils,

serving as area coordinators, health coordinators, out-reach specialists, and secretaries.230

Some used this experience as a springboard to find better employment and to become

more involved in politics.231

The UMC improved the lives of some of the poorest and most disadvantaged

people in the state. By bringing together conscientious local reformers, federal funding,

and VISTA volunteers, the UMC brought about much needed change. Migrant workers

gained greater access to food, housing, medical care, and educational and vocational

programs. Agricultural working conditions improved, but the UMC also made sure that

they could find nonagricultural jobs with the possibility of greater advancement and the

hope of a better future. Migrants became more accepted in their communities and played

a more active role in local politics.

Community organizing to improve the lives of migrants in Utah began long

before the passage of the EOA and expanded with the injection of federal EOA money.

Groups established prior to the law, such as the Box Elder Migrant Workers Council and

the Cache Valley Migrant Council, worked to make life better for migrant workers, and

when CAP money became available, they applied for federal funds and put them to good

use. Eventually, this led to the creation of the Utah Migrant Council, a statewide

organization that coordinated and implemented educational, economic, and social

229 Ibid. 230 Ibid. 231 Ibid.

225

programs to benefit the state’s migrant population. During this period, local newspapers

included articles that discussed the need to improve the standard of living for this

population and explained the good works of local reformers. There were editorials that

praised the efforts of specific groups and individuals, and some that questioned the

increasing federal financial investment in these projects.

*******

Utah’s rural areas received EOA assistance from the time of the law’s passage in

1964 until long after the end of the Johnson administration. People in these areas used

federal money to create CAPs, establish NYC projects, and set up Work Experience

programs. The NYC and Head Start were the most popular OEO-sponsored rural

programs because they focused on the youth and embraced the hopeful notion that hard

work and education could go a long way towards ending poverty. Collectively, EOA

programs generated little publicity and even less controversy but did provide some relief

to rural residents who needed it.

Native Americans in San Juan, Uintah, and Duchesne Counties secured

significant OEO funding to improve the standard of living on their reservations. As in

other rural areas, they used this money to establish CAPs and create greater economic

and educational opportunities for themselves and future generations of Native Americans.

Specific projects provided jobs, developed vocational skills, improved housing, created

learning institutions, and struggled to reduce alcoholism and the negative effects of this

disease. VISTA volunteers played an important role in helping people on Utah’s

reservations. While public reaction to these EOA programs was limited, most responses

were complimentary.

226

Efforts to help migrant workers began before EOA funding was available. Local

volunteers tried to develop educational opportunities and improve housing, nutrition, and

medical care for migrants. When federal funding became available, these agencies used

EOA money and VISTA volunteers to expand their efforts. Eventually, these grassroots

groups united to establish the Utah Migrant Council, and then, this statewide agency

worked hand-in-hand with local groups to provide for the immediate and long-term needs

of migrants. Public reaction to these efforts was limited but overwhelmingly positive.

Utah’s rural population reaped the benefits of the EOA. These rural counties—

many with high poverty percentages—applied for and accepted federal funding to create

CAPs, NYC projects, Head Start centers, and other programs intended to alleviate the

worst effects of poverty and provide more hopeful futures for struggling farmers, rural

youth, Native Americans, and migrant workers. While there was not a massive

groundswell of support for these programs, there was also little opposition. Local

agencies appreciated the additional funding, and state politicians praised those

individuals willing to give a year of their lives as VISTA volunteers. Newspaper editors

complimented groups that used federal money to improve conditions for migrants, and

Native American leaders applauded the efforts of CAPs to provide greater educational

and economic opportunities for tribal members. Although there were opponents who felt

that the federal government was spending too much money, that it was wasteful to

continue loans to farmers, and that worried about the political activities of volunteers, this

group was not very big or very loud. The EOA contributed to improving conditions in

rural areas without creating much controversy.

CHAPTER 6

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY ACT IN URBAN UTAH:

PROGRAMS AND REACTIONS

We can list by name the poor who are participating in our local Community Action Program but there is no space to enter the dignity reborn in a man when he is asked for the first time to participate actively in determining his own future. We can record the number of teenagers, men and women who enter training or education courses or are asked to join with their neighbors in developing plans for improving their own community but there is no place on a graph to indicate precisely what that training and education means to them as wage earners and useful, full-time members of society.1

*******

We are all aware that in order for a democratic government to remain strong, adequate censorial opportunities must be vested in the people. If we are to remove the sense of helplessness and apathy from the poor we must help them to see how they can participate actively in their community life. They must be able to feel they they [sic] are not only clients but citizens; and not only do they have rights, but responsibilities as well.2

During the 1960s (and today), the vast majority of Utahns lived in the mostly

urban counties along the Wasatch Front. While these counties did not have the highest

percentage of people living in poverty, given the overall population, they contained most

of the state’s economically disadvantaged people. Although these counties did not have

1 “The Intangibles,” Frank E. Moss Papers, Box 165, Folder 8, Special Collections, Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City. 2 Letter from John Florez to Calvin L. Rampton, April 11, 1966, Calvin L. Rampton Papers, Series 14250, Reel 11, Box 6, Folder 4, Utah State Archives, Salt Lake City.

228

the highest percentage of minorities, they did have the greatest number of minorities.

The Wasatch Front received a substantial amount of EOA antipoverty funding, and

interested parties converted this aid into programs to benefit those in need. Compared to

rural areas, these urban programs attracted a fair amount of attention—from the media

and the general public—and generated some controversy. This chapter provides an

analysis of the EOA programs that evolved in Utah’s urban areas, focusing primarily on

Salt Lake and Weber Counties, and considers the local responses to these programs.

Though the chapter examines the EOA programs and reactions in both counties, there is

an imbalance, with the Salt Lake programs receiving more coverage. This is because Salt

Lake received more EOA assistance, resulting in more programs, and because the sources

provide more detailed information about Salt Lake’s programs. As in the last chapter, the

feelings and reactions of the target population are underrepresented, given the difficulty

of accessing sources that uncover their perspectives. From 1964 until well beyond the

end of that decade, Utah’s urban poor received assistance through EOA-related programs,

and as a result, many experienced improvements in their daily lives. Apparently, many

committed individuals and groups in Utah accepted the premise that the federal

government had a role to play in alleviating the suffering of the poor, but federal

assistance did not end urban poverty in the state nor was the idea universally popular.

*******

According to the 1960 Census, 493,779 people lived in Salt Lake and Weber

Counties, representing more than half (55.4%) of the state’s population.3 While neither

had the highest percentage of minorities or residents living in poverty, because of the

3 “Table 28,” Census of the Population: 1960. Vol. I. Part 46, Utah. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), 52-54.

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sheer number of people living in these areas, most of the state’s minorities and most of

those living in poverty resided in these two counties. In 1960, Salt Lake County had over

eleven percent (11.67%) of its population, or approximately 44,700 people, living in

poverty, but among its non-white population, over twenty-six percent (26.75%) lived in

poverty.4 At the same time, the poverty rate in Weber County was also over eleven

percent (11.64%), affecting approximately 12,890 individuals, and among the county’s

non-white population, over sixteen percent (16.15%) lived in poverty.5 Given the lack of

state welfare funding, these people needed federal assistance, and with the passage of the

EOA, many received help from the federal government.

Both counties benefitted from statewide EOA programs and qualified for federal

money as members of multicounty agencies. In 1965, they received OEO money to

create Work Experience Projects.6 With this funding, they established programs that

helped 452 participants, training them for employment as hospital aides, gas station

attendants, cooks, custodians, food service workers, landscape workers, nurses’ aides,

tanners, and mechanics.7 In the spring of 1966, the OEO approved a Utah Department of

Public Welfare grant for $294,700, and Salt Lake, Weber, Utah, and Davis Counties used

it to implement additional on-the-job training programs and develop the vocational skills

of those receiving AFDC aid. Weber County joined with neighboring Morgan County to

form the Ogden Area Community Action Committee (OACAC), and they jointly

received OEO aid.8 On June 17, 1966, the OEO approved a $96,252 CAP grant, and this

4 “Table 86,” Census of the Population: 1960, 131; “Table 88,” Census of the Population: 1960, 134. 5 “Table 86,” Census of the Population: 1960, 131; “Table 88,” Census of the Population: 1960, 134. 6 “Status of Programs: Utah,” Office of Economic Opportunity, 961, Moss Papers, Box 164, Folder 14. Davis and Utah Counties also received this money. Combined, the four counties received $369,400 for Work Experience Projects. 7 “Status of Programs: Utah,” 961. 8 Ibid.

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committee used the money to create a two-county Legal Services program.9 This was

one of only three Legal Services programs in the state.10 Because Salt Lake and Weber

Counties each had more than 40,000 people, they separately qualified for additional EOA

assistance, and these multicounty and statewide grants represented only a small part of

their federal antipoverty aid.

Neither Salt Lake nor Weber County directly received any Job Corps money, the

biggest and most expensive EOA program in the state, but they collected the largest

amount of non-Job Corps EOA funding and also indirectly benefited from Job Corps

money since the two largest Job Corps centers were located in neighboring Davis County,

and corpsmen frequently visited Salt Lake City and Ogden. From August, 1964 to June,

1966, agencies in Salt Lake County received $3,050,352, over forty percent of the state’s

non-Job Corps OEO funds, in addition to the statewide and multicounty money they

collected.11 During the same period, Weber County secured $812,116 in OEO aid, over

ten percent of the state’s non-Job Corps allotment of antipoverty funds.12 Together, these

two counties accounted for more than fifty percent of the state’s non-Job Corps EOA

funding, and they used that money to design programs to end poverty and improve the

overall standard of living in both areas.

*******

As in the rural parts of the state, groups in Salt Lake and Weber Counties used

OEO money to establish Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC) programs starting in 1965,

9 Ibid. 10 “Highlights—Utah, September 28, 1966,” Office of Economic Opportunity, Moss Papers, Box 164, Folder 14. 11 “Status of Programs: Utah,” 961, 965-66. 12 Ibid., 961, 968-69.

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and these projects were quite popular in both locations.13 Like the CCC before it, the

NYC hoped to save young people by teaching them the value of hard work through

involvement on outdoor projects or other tasks that improved the community around

them. Unlike Job Corps, only local youths could participate in the NYC, and proponents

argued that they developed important vocational skills, earned much needed paychecks to

help their families, and received encouragement to stay in school or go back if they had

already dropped out. Sponsoring agencies included Salt Lake County, Jordan School

District, the Weber County Board of Education, Ogden City Schools, Roy City, and

Ogden City Corporation, among others.14

From the beginning, the NYC had many supporters, including average citizens as

well as some in fairly high positions. Mayor Merle E. Allen, was “delighted” with the

NYC in Ogden—the first NYC project in the state—and believed that it filled a “long-felt

need” and meant “a lot to the young people involved and to the community.”15 When

Salt Lake County established their first NYC program, Governor Rampton added his

cautious vote of approval. He commented, “I haven’t seen full plans for the program, but

from what I know, I am favorably disposed. The program does not bring out-of-state

youth in, but wholly benefits Utah youth. I have difficulty seeing any grounds at present

on which I would disapprove of such neighborhood youth projects.”16 While his

statement of support was somewhat hesitant, he showed greater confidence in the

program in 1965 when he allowed seventeen-year-old April Jorgensen, a NYC worker, to

13 “Status of Programs: Utah,” 966. 14 Ibid. 15 Cliff Thompson, “Early Okay Seen For Youth Corps Project in Ogden,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 9 December 1964, 1B. 16 “Youth Corps Screening To Begin within Week,” Deseret News, 27 April 1965, 12B.

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serve as a full-time clerk and secretary in the governor’s office during the summer.17

Other leaders and residents were also optimistic about the program. Dewey L.

Moore, Salt Lake County’s NYC director, argued that the program trained

“economically-deprived young people in good working habits and useful vocational

skills,” encouraged “them to return to school for more education,” and provided much-

needed service to the county through the projects they completed.18 Moore believed the

program represented “the first time someone has cared or taken an interest in the lives of

many of the young workers.”19 Dr. J. Clark Ballard, the associate director of USU’s

extension services that oversaw many NYC projects, stated, “This program provides a

real chance for youth to render service to the community and at the same time receive

supervised training to be better prepared for a vocation.”20 Paul S. Rose, chairman of the

Salt Lake County Recreation Department, emphasized the importance of the NYC’s

community service projects, asserting that without the program, it would have taken years

to complete the projects—due to lack of funding and manpower—that the NYC workers

completed in one summer.21

Other Utahns were not as optimistic about the NYC. Ogden City Councilman

Harm DeBoer feared possible repercussions because federally-funded NYC workers

earned $1.25 per hour while city employees doing the same jobs only earned $1.00 per

hour.22 Ogden resident Harriet J. Lemmon disliked the program because she felt it

rewarded drop-outs and low-income youth with jobs while preventing hard-working

17 “Youth Corps ‘In Office’ of Rampton,” Salt Lake Tribune, 16 June 1965, 20A. 18 “Youth Corps Screening to Begin within Week.” 19 Bruce Hadfield, “The Door of Opportunity Opened by Youth Corps,” Deseret News, 19 June 1965, A13. 20 “Youth Corps of Utah Gets New Leader,” Salt Lake Tribune, 7 August 1965, 30. 21 “Youth Corps Spruces Up County Parks, Deseret News, 6 September 1965, A18; George A. Sorenson, “Recreation Chief Praises Youth Corps,” Salt Lake Tribune, 14 October 1965, D3. 22 “City Gets Green Light on Federal Youth Corps,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 4 June 1965, 1B.

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students (like her son) from securing the same jobs, creating an incentive for students to

drop out of school.23

Those who participated in the NYC had mixed feelings about the program. A

reporter for the Deseret News interviewed the participants in Salt Lake County’s first

NYC project to get their reactions. Several responded favorably, stating that it gave them

an opportunity to learn a trade and, if they worked hard, they would get positive

recommendations that might lead to future permanent jobs.24 Some indicated that they

would be able to return to school at the end of the project because of the money they had

earned. Others were less enthusiastic, stating that they hated “being cooped up.”25 In a

later interview, all participants acknowledged that their primary reason for entering the

program was to earn money, but they also listed other benefits, including the opportunity

to pay off debts, the possibility of using it as a spring board into trade school, the chance

to make new friends, and one even planned to use the money to enter a pre-med

program.26 In 1969, the Ogden Standard-Examiner interviewed a group of young women

involved in a NYC summer program, and their responses were very positive. They felt

that it taught them responsibility, how to handle money, basic job and communication

skills, and gave them a sense of personal accomplishment.27

While a few individuals challenged the program because they felt it paid

participants “too much” and took jobs away from “more deserving” recipients, most

people generally supported urban NYC programs. Since it helped vulnerable youths,

23 Harriet J. Lemmon, Ogden, “Youth Corps,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 20 July 1965, 6A. 24 “21 Youths Begin Corps Projects,” Deseret News, 24 May 1965, B11. 25 Ibid. 26 Hadfield, “The Door of Opportunity Opened by Youth Corps.” 27 “Youth Corps Girls Enjoy Jobs,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 28 August 1969, 1D.

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encouraged hard work and the importance of education, provided useful vocational

training, injected money into the economy, and enabled communities to complete

projects that might not have gotten done otherwise, NYC programs in Salt Lake and

Weber Counties won over many supporters without generating too much opposition.

*******

Just as the OEO approved funding for the development of rural CAPs, they also

provided money to establish CAPs in Utah’s most populated areas to help the urban poor.

In many communities, these programs were well-functioning and highly productive,

identifying local problems and devising solutions with the input of the poor. CAPs in

Salt Lake and Weber Counties improved general living conditions, provided vocational

training and helped the unemployed to find jobs, and increased educational opportunities

for the poor of all ages. Over time, they accomplished a great deal. Compared to urban

NYC programs, CAPs in Salt Lake and Ogden affected more people of all ages, attracted

many volunteers and supporters, but also received a fair amount of bad press.

In the 1960s, Salt Lake County used substantial OEO funding to create the largest

and most active CAP in Utah, the Salt Lake Community Action Program (SLCAP)

administered by the Salt Lake Area Community Action Committee (SLACAC). In 1964,

the SLACAC investigated the poverty situation in the county and submitted a detailed

report to the OEO. The report identified six to ten neighborhoods or sub-communities

with high poverty rates, and the committee planned to focus on these areas, using OEO

money to extend existing programs and create new ones.28 They wanted to improve

education, health care, job training and employment programs, housing, recreational

28 Larry Calloway, “Group Says 120,000 Utahns in Poverty,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 11 January 1965, 7; Robert C. Mitchell, “Action against Poverty,” Deseret News, 1 January 1965, 1B.

235

opportunities, and welfare programs for the poor.29 According to the SLACAC report,

“The action program will in every respect be a community-wide program. It will not,

however, be a giveaway program, but a program to help people help themselves.”30 They

submitted a basic outline of their proposed program to the OEO, requested $250,000 to

$500,000 in assistance, and selected CAP leaders to develop necessary infrastructure.31

The OEO approved the first SLACAC grant in August, 1965, and over the next

ten months, the committee received over $180,000 to establish the state’s first urban

CAP.32 With funding in place, the committee selected L. Lorraine Cook, a Republican

and former State Welfare Department commissioner, as the director of the SLCAP, a

position she held throughout the entire period of this study.33 Members of the SLACAC

hired a staff to develop and implement a detailed action plan. Their primary goal was to

mobilize, organize, and unify the entire community to improve the lives of county

residents. CAP workers had many goals, but most fell into one of three categories:

general community improvement, the development of vocational and employment

opportunities, and the expansion and improvement of educational programs for people of

all ages.

During the early days of the SLCAP, many individuals associated with the

program publicly shared their enthusiasm about their endeavor and tried to build support.

Dr. Reed C. Richardson, the chairman of the SLACAC, assured the public that the CAP

was not a dole, emphasizing that “we only offer assistance to those who want to help

29 Mitchell, “Action against Poverty.” 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid.; “Poverty Unit Names Chairman,” Deseret News, 17 February 1965, 20B. 32 “’Poverty’ Funds Okayed,” Deseret News, 3 August 1965, 2B. 33 Ibid.

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themselves.”34 SLCAP Director Cook agreed. She explained that no one involved in the

CAP received any direct financial assistance because “there is nothing that will make a

person more dependent than to give him a check every month,” and “there is nothing

more devastating to a person’s integrity” than the dole.35 Instead, she argued that the

SLCAP worked to build the self-respect of everyone involved and targeted children in

hopes of changing behaviors to prevent them from becoming second- or third-generation

welfare recipients. John Florez, another CAP employee, was deeply committed to the

program, calling it a “real grass-roots effort to combat poverty.”36 He stated that the

purpose of CAPs was to mobilize all local resources and help community members learn

to work together to implement change. When asked about the SLCAP, Florez responded,

“Giving things to the poor isn’t going to help. People who help are those who come in

and do something with the poor, not for them,” and he argued that CAP employees tried

to “help the poor see there are other channels of complaints rather than riots, that they

CAN bargain with city hall” to bring about needed change.37

One of the most critical objectives of the SLCAP was to organize community

residents and resources to improve the quality of life in the county’s poorest

neighborhoods. To begin, community organizers accepted the SLCAP suggestion that

different neighborhoods needed different kinds of help, identifying four individual

neighborhoods in need of assistance—Central City, Northwest, Murray-Midvale (south),

and Oquirrh (southwest). 38 In each of these high-poverty areas, organizers used OEO

34 “’Poverty’ Funds Okayed.” 35 “Help—Not Handouts—Is Basis of Community Action Program,” Deseret News, 17 January 1966, A13. 36 John Florez, “Defends Poverty War,” Deseret News, 11 February 1966, A14. 37 Paul Swenson, “’Giving of Oneself Key to Winning Poverty War,’” Deseret News, 5 April 1966, 6B. 38 “Community Action Program Board of Directors” Minutes, 16 February 1966, Salt Lake Community Action Program, Salt Lake City. (The author has a digital copy of these minutes.)

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funds to build neighborhood centers, elect boards of directors, establish neighborhood

councils, and coordinate all services to avoid duplication. Each neighborhood’s

community center provided residents a space to meet, suggest and debate needed

improvements, and develop a sense of responsibility for improving local conditions.39

CAP employees and volunteers in each neighborhood organized projects most needed to

improve the appearance, health, and quality of life in that area. In addition to focusing on

neighborhood infrastructure, CAP projects tried to improve the economy in each

neighborhood, through vocational training and employment services, and to expand

educational opportunities for residents of all ages.

Some needs were common across all neighborhoods. Most community centers

offered homemaking classes, in conjunction with the extension services of the state

universities.40 USU established homemaking programs that taught residents about child

development, sewing and cooking, budgeting, and consumer-related issues and employed

over fifty residents from the target neighborhoods.41 Through these classes, community

organizers provided basic instruction concerning child care, improved home

management, and consumer education. SLCAP organized neighborhood youth councils

across the valley, and nearly 800 young people participated.42 These youth councils

organized recreational programs, sports teams, arts and crafts classes, and fundraisers to

purchase clothing for the poor. They involved the most disadvantaged youths, including

some that had been through the juvenile court system or were parolees of the state

39 “Anti-Poverty Group Elects 1 Board,” Deseret News, 26 November 1965, C10; “High Lights, Community Action Program, Salt Lake Area, Covering Period September 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966,” Moss Papers, Box 165, Folder 8. 40 “High Lights, CAP, Salt Lake Area, Covering Period September 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966,” Moss Papers. 41 “CAP Board of Directors” Minutes, 10 August 1966, SLCAP. 42 “High Lights, CAP, Salt Lake Area, Covering Period September 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966.”

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industrial school. By providing constructive activities for them, community organizers

hoped to improve their lives and the overall quality of life in their neighborhoods. Other

concerns were more specific to individual neighborhoods.

Central City was the neighborhood closest to downtown Salt Lake City,

immediately south and east of the downtown area, and the people who lived there had

specific ideas about they could do to improve the area. John Florez, a key community

organizer in the Central City neighborhood, led the charge for the construction of the

Central City Neighborhood Center, believing it would provide a place for residents to

come together, hold meetings, and develop a neighborhood identity.43 Through the

efforts of Florez and others and funding from the OEO, the Central City Multipurpose

Neighborhood Center became a reality, and it allowed local residents to access medical

and welfare services, daycare assistance, recreational opportunities, and legal aid services

without leaving the neighborhood.44 Residents used the community center to organize

their efforts to improve the neighborhood. They set up a community clean-up program,

successfully petitioned for the installation of additional street lights to make the area

safer, and suggested the construction of a neighborhood credit union.45 The Central City

Action Center, a SLCAP-sponsored group, worked to build better relationships between

neighborhood landlords and their tenants and improve the upkeep and appearance of

homes and yards in the area.46 They got involved in the Days of ’47 Parade, organized a

street dance as a fundraiser for the multipurpose center, and started a Summer Recreation

43 “Center Proposed For Poverty Area,” Deseret News, 11 May 1966, 12A. 44 “Aid Centers in 2 Areas?,” Deseret News, 13 June 1966, 10A. The other proposed community center was for the Northwest Neighborhood. 45 “CAP Board of Directors” Minutes, 13 April, 11 May, 10 August 1966, and 14 June and 9 August 1967, SLCAP. 46 Ibid., 9 March 1966 and 8 March and 12 April 1967, SLCAP.

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Program to help neighborhood youth learn work habits, have fun, and stay out of

trouble—reducing the overall crime rate in that part of the city.47

In the Northwest neighborhood located north and west of downtown Salt Lake,

residents identified their own key issues. These included the need for a part-time

babysitting service to help working parents, an Alcoholics Anonymous program for those

struggling with addiction, and a recreational program to provide opportunities for young

people as well as other interested community members.48 Residents organized a street

cleaning program, initiated Project CHEER to clean, paint, and repair rundown homes

using community volunteers and supplies provided by landlords, organized a Family Fair

Day as a fundraiser for the Northwest Center, and established a Little League tournament

for children.49 With the help of Sister Anne Josephine, a nurse at Holy Cross Hospital,

residents established an on-site medical clinic next to the Northwest Center.50 This

clinic solved the difficult problem of transporting those in need of medical assistance

across town, coordinated a much needed well-baby clinic, provided screenings to assess

the medical and dental needs of residents, and operated health education classes.51

Residents in Murray and Midvale—located south of downtown Salt Lake City—

identified the needs of their communities and used OEO money and CAP projects to meet

those needs. They asked for an adult education program to help those who had not

graduated from high school and called for more recreational opportunities for local

youth.52 Through their efforts, they built a community center in Midvale, created a gun

47 Ibid., 14 June, 9 August, and 11 October 1967, SLCAP. 48 Ibid., 13 April, 11May, 10 August 1966, and 14 June and 9 August 1967, SLCAP. 49 Ibid., 14 June, 9 August, and 11 October 1967, SLCAP. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid., 13 April, 11 May, 10 August 1966, and 14 June and 9 August 1967.

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club to teach young people how to use and clean guns safely, and organized a girls’

recreation softball team that placed second in their league.53

The Oquirrh neighborhood was the most removed from downtown Salt Lake City,

located in the far southwestern part of the county, and it covered a large geographical

area. Community concerns varied throughout that large area. Many worried about the

severe pollution problems near Decker Lake and the need for immediate clean-up in that

area. 54 Residents along Redwood Road called attention to an unsafe canal in, requested a

safer way for pedestrians to cross that busy road, and urged community leaders to

construct a second road to enter and exit their neighborhood, in case of emergency.55 In

Magna, a community on the western edge of the county, resident wanted to build a

coffeehouse that could serve as a community center, disseminating information to

locals.56 Residents across the entire area requested an adult education program,

recreation opportunities for youth, and first aid classes to improve health and safety for

all. 57 Through their efforts, the Oquirrh neighborhood secured Farmers Home

Administration funds to build a sewer treatment plant and convinced authorities to build a

pedestrian bridge over Redwood Road, using NYC workers and Job Corps students to

complete the overpass in time for the 1967-1968 school year.58 They created youth

recreation opportunities, including a battle of the bands in Kearns, a five-team youth

baseball league, a two-week summer swimming program, and a winter basketball

league.59 In addition, they established a tutoring program for junior high and high school

53 Ibid., 14 June, 9 August, and 11 October 1967. 54 Ibid., 13 April, 11 May, 10 August 1966, and 14 June and 9 August 1967. 55 Ibid., 9 March 1966 and 8 March and 12 April 1967. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid., 9 March, 13 April, 11 May, 10 August 1966, and 8 March, 12 April, 14 June and 9 August 1967. 58 Ibid., 14 June, 9 August, and 11 October 1967. 59 Ibid.

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students, set up an adult basic education program at Granger High School, started a

program to financially assist people who had gotten behind in their utilities payments to

avoid loss of service, and the Magna City Council organized civil defense classes to

prepare residents for large-scale emergencies and medical self-help classes.60

In addition to addressing infrastructure concerns, the SLCAP promoted economic

improvement in the county, and the Salt Lake Community Action Program for Economic

Opportunity (SLCAPEO), a sub-group of the SLCAP, oversaw many of these programs.

An OEO grant in December, 1965, provided funds to create the SLCAPEO, and once this

group was established, they secured an additional OEO grant to start Operation Medicare

Alert.61 Under the direction of Mignon Richmond and in cooperation with the Social

Security Administration, this program employed local seniors to find elderly people in

the community not registered for Medicare and provide information about the program

and assistance in registering for medical benefits.62 In March, 1966, SLCAPEO received

federal money to launch Project Enable, a community parent education program.63

Sponsored by the SLCAP and delegated to the Family Service Society, this program

employed neighborhood workers to meet with groups of parents, discuss problems related

to family life and child development in that neighborhood, and use their research findings

to develop solutions to problems on a neighborhood-by-neighborhood basis.64 The

following year, the OEO increased SLCAPEO’s funding so that the group could focus on

60 Ibid. 61 “Status of Programs: Utah,” 965. 62 “High Lights, CAP, Salt Lake Area, Covering Period September 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966;” “CAP Board of Directors” Minutes, 16 February 1966. 63 “Status of Programs: Utah,” 965; “CAP Board of Directors” Minutes, 9 March 1966. 64 “High Lights, CAP, Salt Lake Area, Covering Period September 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966;” “CAP Board of Directors” Minutes, 16 February 1966.

242

improving employment through the development of vocational skills training courses.65

On September 1, 1966, the SLCAP and Employment Security jointly launched

Project LIVE (Local Improvement Vocational Employment), an outreach program that

placed manpower experts in the four low-income neighborhoods to help the unemployed

and underemployed find gainful employment.66 Program directors used neighborhood

community centers to gather information about local economic concerns and provide

vocational counseling to those who requested it.67 The SLCAP created, and the

Community Services Council operated, the Volunteer Training Project, a program

designed to recruit both impoverished and middle class volunteers, provide them with

necessary training, and place them with social agencies in need of additional

manpower.68 Through the Volunteer Training Project, creators promoted the importance

of involvement and responsibility and hoped participants would become more

employable.69 Director Cook estimated that between vocational skills courses and CAP-

sponsored employment services, they helped thirty-six families to end their long-term

dependence on welfare and saved the state thousands of dollars in public assistance

costs.70

Another SLCAP-sponsored employment program was the Work Release

Program. It identified nonviolent incarcerated individuals who might benefit from

vocational training and reenter society before their prison terms expired. The first person

to take advantage of this program, an inmate serving one-to-ten-years on a gambling

65 “Status of Programs: Utah,” 965. 66 “High Lights, CAP, Salt Lake Area, Covering Period September 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966;” “CAP Board of Directors” Minutes, 10 August 1966. 67 “CAP Board of Directors” Minutes, 9 March 1966. 68 “High Lights, CAP, Salt Lake Area, Covering Period September 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966.” 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid.

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conviction, completed training and was released from the Utah State Prison, saving the

state $1,740 per year. 71 He found employment, worked hard, earned the respect of his

employer, and planned to register for classes at the University of Utah. Eighty-four

unemployed or underemployed workers found jobs through SLCAP referrals, saving the

state the cost of public welfare assistance to those individuals and their families.72

In addition to their involvement with the OEO-sponsored Head Start program

(which will be covered later in the chapter), the members of the SLCAP played an

instrumental part in the success of educational programs for older children. They

organized, and the Central City schools ran, an enrichment program that continued Head

Start-like services for children through the elementary grades.73 The SLCAP also

developed the Voluntary Improvement Project (VIP), a tutorial program that provided

two hours of after school help for those who needed it.74 Headquartered at the Guadalupe

Center, VIP used university students as tutors, and the University of Utah provided

training for all volunteers.75 The SLCAP, Salt Lake City School Board, and the

University of Utah cooperated in the development of another program, the Central City

School Child Development Project. Originally proposed in 1964, the project received

OEO funding for the 1966-1967 school year, and it created an extended school day for

children who had fallen behind and needed additional assistance.76 Eligible students

received remedial reading help, worked one-on-one with teacher aides, participated in

71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 “CAP Board of Directors” Minutes, 8 March 1967, SLCAP. 75 “Our Mission and History,” Guadalupe School, http://guadalupeschoolslc.org/our-mission/ (accessed 4 June 2014); “CAP Board of Directors” Minutes, 8 March 1967, SLCAP. 76 “CAP Board of Directors” Minutes, 16 February, 9 March, 1966, SLCAP; Anne McGugin e-mail interview with the author, completed 29 March 2009. The author has a digital copy of McGugin’s responses.

http://guadalupeschoolslc.org/our-mission/

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enrichment activities, and had greater access to library facilities and other important

educational resources.77

SLCAP also developed educational programs to help teens. The SLCAP and the

Youth Opportunity Center helped more than 120 young adults from impoverished

neighborhoods—nearly three-fourths of them from families receiving welfare—find

summer employment that kept them off the streets, out of trouble, and provided financial

assistance to their families through the paychecks they earned.78 The Murray-Midvale

neighborhood got creative and applied for CAP funds to create a Head Start Project for

Teens. Under this program, neighborhood youths were able to tour local industries and

businesses and learn about the educational requirements necessary for different types of

jobs.79 CAP volunteers successfully recruited and placed fifty-two young men and

women in Job Corps or other OEO-sponsored training programs, in hopes that their

futures might be brighter than their pasts.80

SLCAP neighborhood workers took an interest in the success of the adult

education programs in their communities, going door-to-door “urging, encouraging, and

following up on absentees,” providing transportation to those who needed it, and even

arranging babysitters so that parents might attend classes.81 The Jackson School in

Central City was one of the first to implement an adult education program, providing

general education classes two nights a week.82 In addition to core classes, they offered

adult drivers’ training because organizers realized how difficult it was to find and keep a

77 “CAP Board of Directors” minutes, 16 February 1966, SLCAP. 78 “High Lights, CAP, Salt Lake Area, Covering Period September 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966.” 79 “CAP Board of Directors” Minutes, 9 March 1966, SLCAP. 80 “High Lights, CAP, Salt Lake Area, Covering Period September 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966.” 81 Ibid. 82 “CAP Board of Directors” Minutes, 9 March 1966, SLCAP.

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job without the ability to drive.83

As in many rural parts of the state, Salt Lake received EOA funding to create

CAPs to help the poor in the county. Because of the size of the population, the large

geographical area covered, and the varying needs of individuals in different

neighborhoods, the SLCAP divided the county into four neighborhoods and tried to tailor

poverty solutions for each area. Sometimes their needs led to common solutions, but in

other cases, the projects were quite different. Like Salt Lake, Weber County also

developed CAPs to help improve the lives of the poor.

In order to qualify for CAP money, residents in Weber County formed the Ogden

Area Community Action Committee (OACAC) with neighboring Morgan County.

Through this committee, the federal government injected significant money into the

area’s economy, much of it used to establish educational programs. The OACAC used

federal money to establish three neighborhood centers: one on Lincoln Avenue, one on

Grant Avenue, and one in West Ogden.84 In 1965, the OACAC received their first EOA

grant to establish the underlying CAP framework.85 The same year, the OEO authorized

several additional grants, one for the creation of a special summer school for children of

low-income families, one to create a broad educational program in the county, and the

final one funded a summer Head Start program to provide educational and medical

assistance for 129 preschool children.86 In 1966, the OEO continued to fund educational

programs in the county. During the summer, the OACAC received funding to continue

83 “CAP Board of Directors” Minutes, 11 October 1967, SLCAP. 84 “Committee Opens New Center in Poverty Program Monday,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 7 May 1967, 9A. 85 “Status of Programs: Utah,” 968. 86 Ibid., 968-69.

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their Head Start program for 135 children and secured EOA money to start an Upward

Bound program at Weber State College, one of only two such programs in the state at

that time.87 As in Salt Lake County, the OEO allocated money to the OACAC for

Operation Medicare Alert, a program that enabled volunteers to canvas neighborhoods

and educate the elderly about the benefits of Medicare.88

From the beginning, urban CAP activity aroused more response than those in the

rural parts of the state. Some saw CAPs as an ideal way to bring about needed

community changes while empowering the poor. Others saw them as agencies that

helped the poor when more traditional avenues failed. CAPs in Utah experienced some

of the same controversies as in other places across the nation, with opponents arguing

that they created more trouble than they were worth. They challenged CAPs because of

perceived racial discrimination, because they believed that federally supported CAPs

usurped state power and circumvented local authority, and because they felt the projects

represented government involvement in activities that the private sector should handle.

These reactions were not very different from the way people in other parts of the country

responded to CAPs.

Lucybeth Rampton, the wife of Governor Cal Rampton, was a committed

supporter of the SLCAP. Instead of isolating herself in the governor’s mansion—

oblivious to poverty problems—Mrs. Rampton toured poor neighborhoods, observing the

good works of the SLCAP and calling attention to their efforts.89 After visiting the

87 “Status of Programs: Utah,” 969. The second Upward Bound program was created at Utah State University in Logan, Utah. 88 Ibid. 89 Keith Burris, “Mrs. Rampton Tours 2 Poverty Projects,” Deseret News, 26 March, 1966, 8A; “Tour Shocks Mrs. Rampton,” Deseret News, 1 April 1966, B3.

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Central City and Northwest Neighborhood Centers, she acknowledged the unacceptable

poverty conditions in many parts of the city and commended CAP workers for their

efforts to include the poor in developing viable solutions.90 Based on her observations,

she argued that the SLCAP helped those living in poverty to find their voice, and that as a

result, they were doing things to help themselves rather than waiting for others to do

them. Rampton declared that “the most exciting thing about it [CAP] is not what is being

done for the people but what is being done by the people.”91 Rampton became a high

profile representative of those who had no direct connection to CAPs but supported their

efforts and appreciated the work they were doing.

The SLCAP helped those in the greatest need to secure necessary goods and

services, and the recipients of this aid voiced their support of the program. Bernell

Leggroan, a black single mother from Los Angeles who moved to Salt Lake, arrived with

little money and nowhere to stay, and the SLCAP came to the rescue.92 She contacted

the Salt Lake County Welfare Department, and they denied her assistance because she

was not an established resident. At that point, her caseworker recommended that she get

in touch with the Central City Community Action Committee. Once she contacted them,

immediate relief arrived. They found her a place to stay, despite the reluctance of many

to rent to a single black mother, and VISTA and Job Corps volunteers helped to clean and

furnish her new residence. Leggroan publicly thanked Raye Razo, a CAP worker, John

Florez, the Central City program coordinator, and the other SLCAP volunteers who

helped her to adjust to life in in a new city.

90 Burris, “Mrs. Rampton Tours 2 Poverty Projects.” 91 Ibid. 92 “Job Corpsmen Give Big Hand to Hard-Luck Mother, Son, 5,” Salt Lake Tribune, 8 October 1966, 44.

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After ten months of hard work, the SLCAP released a report outlining their

activities, and according to the report, the initial results were quite impressive. By

helping heads of households to find jobs, they saved the state’s taxpayers more than

$79,000 in welfare costs.93 Through the efforts of several SLCAP-sponsored projects,

three nonviolent prisoners from the Utah State Prison qualified for the Work Release

Program, more than eighty unemployed or underemployed adults found better

employment, and over 800 teens found work and earned paychecks through the CAP-

sponsored NYC programs. These tangible results contributed to a stronger economy in

Utah, but according to Director Cook, the most impressive results were less tangible. She

said, “We can list, by name, the poor who are participating in our local Community

Action Program. But there is no space in which to enter the dignity reborn in a man

when he is asked for the first time to participate actively in determining his own

future.”94 An editorial in the Salt Lake Tribune acknowledged the good works of the

SLCAP during that ten-month period, stating, “We think the Salt Lake City Community

Action Program deserves commendation and continuance.”95

John Ladky, a volunteer at the Central City Neighborhood Center, was another

firm believer in the intangible positive effects of the SLCAP.96 In the spring of 1967, he

participated in the CAP-organized clean-up campaign, and he argued that, while “poverty

[was] an adjective used to describe the economic level of a substantial number of

residents of the…area” and many residents were poor “in dollar and cents,” that was not

93 “Community Action Project Saving Tax Dollars,” Salt Lake Tribune, 10 August 1966, 2B. 94 Ibid. 95 “Helping the Poor to Help Themselves,” Salt Lake Tribune, 12 August 1966, 14A. 96 John Ladky, “Good for Central City!,” Salt Lake Tribune, 6 May 1967, 22.

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the whole story. 97 Thanks to the clean-up project, he learned firsthand that the

neighborhood was one of the “richest” in terms of “warm-heartedness,” neighbors

helping neighbors, and “people working together in a common effort.” 98 Ladky was

most impressed with the way CAP projects brought people together and helped them to

develop a sense of community. While he recognized that the clean-up effort was only a

beginning, he asked people to see it as a very good beginning.

The editorial staff of the Salt Lake Tribune also applauded the SLCAP efforts,

especially those of the Central City Neighborhood Council. According to the editorial,

“The best weapons in the War on Poverty are those that motivate low income people and

communities to lift themselves,” and the “neighborhood action organizations, and

particularly Salt Lake’s Central City Council, have done much in demonstrating that

community involvement means community accomplishment.”99 The editorial

highlighted the positive efforts of the neighborhood council to get community members

more involved in commonsense solutions, including a tutoring program that enlisted

bright students from low-income families to help low-performing children and a proposal

to use school and social worker aides recruited from the neighborhoods being served.

Despite these positive reactions, not everyone had good things to say about CAPs.

In Ogden, a city smaller than Salt Lake but with a more concentrated minority

population, the black community challenged the “racist” policies of the OACAC.100 In

the spring of 1966, NAACP leaders sent a letter to the city’s CAP, requesting an

97 Ibid. 98 Ibid. 99 “Keep Poverty War Motivation Moving,” Salt Lake Tribune, 28 September 1967, 20A. 100 “Table 27,” Census of the Population: 1960, 48, 51.

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investigation into the behavior of its director John Owen.101 James H. Gillespie, the

president of Ogden’s NAACP chapter, identified three areas of concern. First, they

worried because Owen and OACAC refused to focus on helping identified “target

areas”—places with the highest poverty and minority concentration—instead providing

aid throughout the city, regardless of economic conditions. Second, they objected to the

CAP’s implementation of the “Medicare Alert” program because they felt that jobs in the

program should have gone to the city’s poorest residents, but CAP failed to hire those

with the greatest need, and the number of minorities hired was not in keeping with their

percentage in the city’s population.102 Third, they challenged a proposed neighborhood

clean-up of lower Twenty-Fifth Street because they felt that CAP officials targeted

minority-owned businesses for closure. Gillespie argued that Owen either needed to end

racial and economic discrimination and follow established CAP guidelines or resign.

Charges of racial discrimination against Utah CAPs did not end there. In 1967,

black leaders in Ogden and Salt Lake City accused several EOA programs—including

CAPs—of discriminating against minorities. Leaders in these two cities—including Dr.

Palmer S. Ross, president of the Salt Lake NAACP, Dr. Charles Nabors, a member of the

Salt Lake NAACP chapter, and James Gillespie—organized a letter-writing campaign,

urging black residents to send letters to OEO Director Sargent Shriver and Donald

Adamson, regional director of CAP in Kansas City, to complain about the lack of

minorities in administration or supervisory positions in the state’s CAPs.103 They

included references to a number of black candidates recommended for promotion who

101 “NAACP Seeks Probe in ‘Poverty’ Program,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 14 March 1966, 12A. 102 “Ogden’s Unit of NAACP Asks Probe,” Salt Lake Tribune, 14 March 1966, 26. 103 “Utah Negroes Charge CAP Discrimination,” Deseret News, 25 November 1967, 2A.

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failed to advance. They argued that CAP leaders were not “relating to the poor” because

they were middle class and focused on protecting the status quo instead of being

responsive to the needs of the poor.104 Shortly after this campaign began, Hispanic

leaders in northern Utah added their voices to those alleging discriminatory hiring

practices and called for a greater minority presence in local CAP leadership positions.105

In response, SLCAP leaders promised to hire and promote “persons from poverty and

minority” populations to their central administrative staff.106

Another conflict revolved around the question of who had ultimate authority over

poverty matters—state and local leaders or federal antipoverty officials. In the spring of

1966, political leaders in Murray accused Murray-Midvale CAP officials of exceeding

their authority and engaging in activities that only elected city officials had the power to

do. The disagreement occurred when Phillip Thorpe, the neighborhood coordinator of the

Murray-Midvale CAP office, called a town meeting to discuss problems associated with

the “police, schools, streets, and public facilities.” 107 Though the number of people

attending the meeting was small, those in attendance included Murray’s mayor, police

chief, city attorney, and a member of the city’s school board, and they made it clear

during the meeting that CAP officials had no authority in these matters. Thorpe defended

the meeting, stating that most of these problems were related to poverty and that city

officials often failed to focus on problems when those requesting action were poor

community members. He argued that the purpose of the meeting was to organize groups

to research possible solutions to poverty problems, and with their attendance, city

104 “NAACP Raps S.L. Area Poverty Plan,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 26 November 1967, 15A. 105 “Racial Meet Complains Of CAP Discrimination,” Salt Lake Tribune, 8 December 1967, 4B. 106 “’Minorities’ May Fill 4 Poverty Positions,” Deseret News, 28 November 1967, B1-B2. 107 Dave Briscoe, “Poverty War Causes Local Battle,” Deseret News, 1 April 1966, B1, B8.

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officials thwarted much needed reform. This debate over ultimate authority resided

occurred in cities and states across the nation during the War on Poverty.

The argument over federal involvement in programs to end poverty in Utah

continued as OEO officials in Kansas City considered several Head Start grant

applications from Utah. During a meeting between Governor Rampton and OEO

officials—called to discuss the delay in the processing of applications—Rampton

expressed his outrage at the way OEO and other federal agencies bypassed state agencies

and worked directly with local community leaders.108 Regional OEO deputy director

William Shovell defended these tactics, stating, “This is the way that the federal law is

written, and we have to administer the programs the way the law says.” 109 While this

exchange did not end the controversy, it demonstrates that officials in Utah—like those in

other places—disagreed with the OEO’s management of what they saw as a local matter.

Though the poor were the intended beneficiaries of CAP projects, there were

some who actually opposed them because they believed organizers imposed unwanted

changes in their neighborhoods and refused to support the changes that local residents

desired. In the spring of 1967, a controversy involving some residents of the Redwood

neighborhood and the SLCAP’s Oquirrh Neighborhood Center attracted attention. Lee

Giles, a neighborhood resident, and twenty-one other individuals submitted a letter to the

editor of the Deseret News, opposing the Oquirrh neighborhood CAP.110 According to

Giles and the other signatories, CAP workers came into their neighborhood, promising to

help and pledging to “open doors,” but they failed to give residents the money they

108 “U.S. Officials Vow Speed in Head Start Program,” Salt Lake Tribune, 9 March 1967, B1. 109 Ibid. 110 Lee Giles, “CAP—‘Go Elsewhere,’” Deseret News, 8 May 1967, A17.

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needed and succeeded only in invading their privacy. Giles felt that “they have brain-

washed and misled the people of the community…and disagreed with and blocked every

betterment project we have tried to do ourselves.” 111 He concluded, “We feel we can

handle our own problems if they would take their propaganda and go elsewhere!” 112

Ron Burris, the coordinator of the Oquirrh center, denied these charges, arguing that the

majority of people in the area supported CAP efforts and activities.113 He claimed that

the blocked “betterment project” that Giles spoke of was the construction of a community

park and that it was the environmental division of the Salt Lake County Health

Department that stopped construction because an open ditch posed a hazard to residents.

In response to claims that CAP had done nothing to improve the community, Burris

pointed to the creation of a “highly successful” community council, a neighborhood

beautification campaign, and CAP-sponsored adult education and Head Start, among

other programs, to demonstrate their achievements.

Giles continued to oppose the CAP presence in his neighborhood. In January,

1968, he tried to block Community Council elections because he felt they were

“undemocratic, unconstitutional, and ‘rigged’ by the Oquirrh Center.”114 He also started

a petition that stated his neighborhood “wasn’t a poverty area and the services of CAP

weren’t needed,” and gathered the signatures of thirty individuals who agreed with

him.115 In response, CAP leaders argued that their agency was in the best position to

coordinate all resources, not only in that neighborhood but throughout the valley, and

111 Ibid. 112 Ibid. 113 “Group Asks CAP to Leave,” Deseret News, 8 May 1967, 24B. 114 “Area Opposes Poverty Agency,” Deseret News, 4 January 1968, 20B. 115 Ibid.

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tried to convince Giles to join forces with them. He refused.

Others opposed CAP activities because they felt that they encroached on those of

the private sector. When the SLCAP applied for an OEO grant to establish a medical and

dental clinic for indigent patients, they touched off a firestorm. Local doctors and

dentists opposed the project, arguing that the poor should be referred to private medical

offices and that CAP’s attempt to establish this clinic was nothing but a “political

boondoggle.” 116 Governor Rampton supported the SLCAP’s effort to create a clinic but

recognized that it would never happen without the cooperation of area medical

professionals. He offered to mediate between the two sides to reach a compromise, but

representatives of the medical professionals refused to participate. Ultimately, the two

sides failed to find common ground, and OEO denied the SLCAP grant request.117

Although CAP’s comprehensive medical proposal had the governor’s support, the

opposition of the medical profession—on the grounds that private medical offices should

handle these services—prevented the establishment of a clinic.

At the end of 1967, Americans were seriously reconsidering the EOA, especially

the CAP component, and this impacted the program in Utah. Since the creation of CAPs,

many disliked the way they circumvented state control. This led to a series of proposed

amendments that, if passed, would result in direct state and local control over CAPs

within their jurisdiction, a requirement that local groups contribute a much higher

percentage of the overall CAP costs, and a stipulation that CAP volunteers and

employees refrain from any political activities, including voter registration drives.118

116 “Gov. Rampton Acts to Get CAP Fund,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 18 May 1967, 11A. 117 “$2 Million Bid For S.L. Area Denied by OEO,” Salt Lake Tribune, 15 July 1967, 1B. 118 “Poverty Move Opposed,” Deseret News, 7 November 1967, 4B.

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Local reactions to these changes were mixed. Dr. Reed Richardson, a University of Utah

economics professor and an early SLCAP member, argued that the SLCAP was free from

“political overtones,” demonstrated “excellent grass roots participation,” and did not need

direct local government oversight.119 Reverend Wesley Frensdorff, the SLCAP board

president, argued that putting it under local government control would make it a “political

football” and that associated programs would become less stable. 120 Salt Lake City

Commissioner James L. Barker Jr. also favored the continued autonomy of the SLCAP,

stating, “CAP is doing a good job in teaching citizens to take care of their own problems

and help themselves.” 121 John Florez and Richard Finder, the associate coordinator of

the Northwest CAP, organized local protests of the amendments and encouraged

residents to write letters to their representatives in Washington D.C., highlighting local

CAP achievements.122 Florez worried that the proposed changes would jeopardize the

future of CAPs because local groups could not afford to pay a higher percentage of the

costs, organizers could no longer “make poor people aware of their rights as citizens”

because of the new stipulations against CAP political involvement, and if local officials

had control of CAPs, they would become even more political than they already were. 123

A Salt Lake Tribune editorial argued that while not all OEO programs were great, “the

Community Action Program as it has operated in Salt Lake” showed “promise” and that

“the OEO should be allowed more time to prove its worth.”124

Some individuals believed that there should be greater checks on the power of

119 “CAP Aides Favor Local Autonomy,” Deseret News, 4 November 1967, 4B. 120 Ibid. 121 Ibid. 122 “Poverty Move Opposed.” 123 Ibid. 124 “Don’t Clip Poverty Office Too Short,” Salt Lake Tribune, 8 November 1967, 12A.

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EOA programs, especially CAPs. Salt Lake Mayor J. Bracken Lee not only approved of

the amendments curbing CAPs but also suggested that the “existing war on poverty

programs…be completely evaluated for their effectiveness.”125 Lee continued, “We need

someone who really wants to help the poor study the program. Let’s have some people

who have their heart in it and not their pocketbook.”126 He believed that those involved

in CAPs were more interested in their own personal financial futures than in improving

the lives of the poor and that the proposed amendments would eliminate many problems.

Resident Clark L. Rasmussen also questioned CAP activities. He leveled a number of

charges against area CAPs, including “non-involvement of supervisors,” “…inefficient

use of personnel and public funds, ineffective and meaningless programs, failure to use

potential community resources and the stifling of potential leadership within the

beneficiary groups.”127 He argued that CAPs did not help the poor, instead perpetuating

poverty and contributing to “community stagnation.” 128 Although Rasmussen did not

explicitly support the EOA amendments, he agreed that state officials should be more

involved in overseeing CAPs and other EOA programs.

Ultimately, the proposed amendments passed, changing the way CAPs operated.

In the wake of those changes, Utahns still had mixed feelings about CAPs. At the end of

February, 1968, CAP authorities in Salt Lake issued a report, acknowledging that the

SLCAP failed to gain the support of the general public and even had trouble convincing

the poor that they could benefit from CAP involvement.129 Newly appointed members of

125 “Community Action Plan, Big Payroll Face Peril,” Salt Lake Tribune, 5 November 1967, 6A. 126 Ibid. 127 Clark L. Rasmussen, “What’s Wrong With CAP?,” Salt Lake Tribune, 14 December 1967, 26A. 128 Ibid. 129 “Panel Doesn’t Back CAP, Leaders Say,” Deseret News, 29 February 1968, B3.

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SLCAP’s central administration—John Florez, Shirley Woodward, Richard Fields, and

Dennis Lee Roybal—unanimously announced that although CAP had made significant

inroads into identifying critical problems of the poor and had begun to develop solutions,

program coordinators failed to adequately educate the general population and the poor

about the benefits of the program. As a result, the public did not rally around the

SLCAP, and the SLCAP failed to fully mobilize available resources to end poverty.

Officials recognized that they needed to do a better job of communicating the goals of the

program, and Fields stated, “…once everyone understands CAP’s program, they’ll want

to participate because it is the most sensible plan for eliminating poverty.”130

A few months later, two CAP workers presented a more optimistic picture of the

SLCAP’s impact. Dave Ramos, a CAP assistant coordinator for two years, stated, “The

CAP program is one of the most effective federal poverty programs in helping to get

people off welfare rolls and make them independent.”131 He credited them with making

important resources available to those who had never had access to them before,

mobilizing agencies that improved the lives of the poor, and including the poor in the

process rather excluding them. In contrast to the earlier report, Juanita Pierce, an aide in

the Central City CAP office, argued that the community had embraced CAP activities and

that as a CAP representative, she had never been turned away by anyone.132 These two

individuals, working at the grassroots level of the SLCAP, felt it was a program making a

difference and that it was well received by the community.

At this point, John Florez, a long-time CAP insider and supporter, presented a

130 Ibid. 131 “CAP Program Defended,” Deseret News, 7 May 1968, B7. 132 Ibid.

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gloomier picture. Thought he was deeply committed to community action, he was

disappointed at the way SLCAP leaders implemented it. He believed that “localism” was

at the heart of CAPs, and his biggest complaint was that local residents—especially the

poor—were “infrequently consulted” on the best way to eliminate poverty.133 Florez

argued that the War on Poverty had achieved little because of inefficient administration

and the failure to determine whether programs were actually achieving their stated goals.

Instead of earmarking money for specific purposes, he urged federal policy makers to

give CAP leaders the freedom to develop essential programs with local input. 134

Although he strongly believed in the CAP idea, Florez argued that they would never

really work until local leaders and residents had the power to investigate the city’s

problems and implement locally planned solutions.

As 1968 ended, another SLCAP controversy was brewing. The Central City

Neighborhood Center was scheduled to open, but no one could agree on which agency

controlled the facility.135 Since the SLCAP played a large part in getting the center built,

securing sizeable OEO grants and working to win public support for the facility, CAP

officials believed they should control the center. Members of the Salt Lake City

Commission and Salt Lake County officials disagreed. Both felt they should oversee the

facility. The situation was chaotic and led to fighting and hard feelings. A group of

nearly thirty residents living near the center accused CAP officials of intimidating them

and ordering them around “like cattle.”136 Velma Austin, the chairman of the Central

City Neighborhood Center, appeared before the Salt Lake City Commission, representing

133 Bryan Gray, “CAP Official Assails Poverty War Waste,” Deseret News, 22 July 1968, 10A. 134 Ibid. 135 “Central City Center Needs a Good Start,” Salt Lake Tribune, 16 January 1969, 14A. 136 “Poverty Agency Charged With Intimidation,” Deseret News, 11 December 1968, 10B.

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the disgruntled residents, and told them that more people wanted to attend the meeting,

but they were afraid that CAP officials would retaliate and prevent them from using the

facility. A Salt Lake Tribune editorial discussed the controversy, warning that too much

time and money had been invested in the center to allow the dispute to continue, and

urged officials to cut through the “unimportant red tape” so that all neighborhood

residents might benefit from the center.137 About three weeks later, the Tribune ran a

more optimistic article, crediting the center with providing a place for teens to

congregate, keeping them off the streets and out of trouble, a room for senior citizen

activities, a much needed daycare center for children, and “lots of hope” for all people.138

In 1968, Congressman Lloyd questioned the efficacy of the SLCAP. Lloyd had

never been a fan of the EOA and had reservations about who should control CAP

activities—local, state, or federal officials.139 To “determine if benefits and potential

[were] commensurate with expenditure for Community Action,” Lloyd organized a

public meeting at the Northwest Community Center, and during the three hour meeting,

many area residents shared their feelings about the SLCAP. One high school student

credited CAP tutoring with helping him to pass a difficult algebra class, and another

explained that the CAP neighborhood center kept him off the street and out of trouble.

On the other side of the debate, residents accused CAPs of discrimination, failure to

provide promised benefits, and having too few trained professionals qualified to help the

poor. Lloyd listened and took notes. At the end of the meeting, he explained how

impressed he was with the passion and dedication of the CAP volunteers, especially those

137 “Central City Center Needs a Good Start.” 138 Jack Fenton, “In Central City, Lots of Hope,” Salt Lake Tribune, 9 February 1969, B1. 139 “Poverty War—Rep. Lloyd Takes Pulse,” Deseret News, 31 December 1968, 16B.

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working with elementary school children, and promised to continue his investigation.

After the conclusion of his study, Lloyd expressed his support of the SLCAP but called

for greater local autonomy over the selection and implementation of projects.140 When

Nixon took office, Lloyd commented, “We hope the new administration will change the

trend of running local programs from Washington.” 141

In the spring of 1969, the SLCAP once again faced charges of unfair hiring

practices. That April, John Florez secured a job with the National Urban Coalition in

Washington D.C., creating a job opening at the SLCAP, and the problem began when

officials posted an advertisement for the position.142 Given Florez’s impressive

credentials, CAP officials wrote a job description that required the same qualifications,

and residents argued that no one in the neighborhood would qualify for the position.

Members of the NAACP and the Spanish Organization for Community Integrity and

Opportunity (SOCIO) called a joint press conference, protesting SLCAP’s “lack of

concern” for community participation and unwillingness to hire minorities for

administrative positions.143 During the meeting, a group of eighteen “Spanish-

Americans” disrupted the proceedings with a prepared statement that directly attacked

Lorraine Cook, accusing her of “setting standards too high” to allow Hispanic Americans

to compete for the operations director position.144 SOCIO representatives organized a

letter-writing campaign, urging members to complain to OEO about Cook’s

discriminatory hiring policies.145 The letters also warned OEO officials not to hire Cook

140 “Action Program Requests U.S. Funds, Less Control,” Salt Lake Tribune, 15 February 1969, 17. 141 Ibid. 142 “Community Project Aide Takes Urban Coalition Job,” Salt Lake Tribune, 4 April 1969, 2B; “OEO Confab Gets ‘Stormy,’” Deseret News, 28 May 1969, B14. 143 “OEO Confab Gets ‘Stormy.’” 144 Ibid. 145 “Dismiss Aide, CAP Asked,” Deseret News, 5 September 1969, B1.

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as the director of the new OEO office in Denver. Dr. Charles Nabors and Tina Garcia,

both members of the SLCAP board and screening committee, joined representatives of

SOCIO in calling for Cook’s removal from SLCAP. Shortly after this letter-writing

campaign, the SLCAP hired Gregorio E. Coronado as the new director of SLCAP

Neighborhood Operations, a decision at least partially motivated by a desire to quiet

minority protests against the SLCAP.146 Cook explained that the selection committee

submitted three names for final consideration, and she made the decision to hire

Coronado.

Questions about possible discriminatory policies of the SLCAP did not end there.

In August of 1969, minorities objected to a strong police presence at the Central City

Neighborhood Center.147 In a joint statement issued by the representatives of the Black

Brothers Organizational Society (BBOS), the Black Sisters Organizational Society

(BSOS), the Mexican-American Organization, and the Youth Council, these groups

argued that the police presence at the center undermined attempts to develop community

unity, establish their own group norms, and create programs built on a foundation of self-

determination. Keith E. Belnap, a resident of neighboring Bountiful, defended the

SLCAP policy because he worried that minorities in Utah might adopt the same militant

behavior as minority groups in other cities and felt that a strong police presence would

prevent radical activities from becoming commonplace in Salt Lake.148 He commended

Cook for implementing policies to protect residents, people from all races and

nationalities, who “have…demonstrated their love of peace” and intolerance for “those

146 “CAP Director Names Analyst to Position,” Deseret News, 8 September 1969, 12B. 147 “Central City Police Stir Mixed Emotions—Will Be Pared,” Salt Lake Tribune, 3 August 1969, B1 148 Keith E. Belnap, Bountiful, “S.L. Protest Group?,” Deseret News, 6 August 1969, 10A.

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elements whose goals are obviously intended to divide us.”149 These opposing positions

reveal a racial divide in Utah, affecting the public’s opinions about the SLCAP.

Later the same month, Cook was once again in the middle of a brewing

controversy. When the Utah chapter of the National Welfare Relief Organization

(NWRO) held a routine meeting at the Central City Neighborhood Center, it turned into

an out of the ordinary protest session. At the meeting, Bonnie Batchelder, the state

chairman of the NWRO, asked for Cook’s dismissal because she felt that Cook was

incapable of relating to the poor and regularly implemented policies that discriminated

against them.150 Although Batchelder claimed to represent a unified group and that the

call for the dismissal was unanimous, others at the meeting disagreed, as a group of

individuals presented a signed counter-statement to demonstrate their support for Cook.

Once again, this incident presents a community divided over the SLCAP, its policies, and

the officials in charge of the program.

In the face of these continuing accusations, Cook called for a meeting at the

Central City Center, in hopes of creating unity out chaos.151 Manuel Torres, the head of

the neighborhood council, refused to bend to her wishes because he felt that the SLCAP

ignored the poor and regularly treated them like “garbage.” Torres argued that CAP

officials failed to adequately understand or deal with the problems of the poor and that

they allowed a militant black group to take control of the Central City Center and

terrorize the non-black patrons. Cook acknowledged that her organization had failed to

bring diverse groups together but that they were not ready to concede defeat, and she

149 Ibid. 150 Robert McQueen, “Meet Protests Poverty Aide Ouster Try,” Salt Lake Tribune, 10 August 1969, 4C. 151 “Central City Airs Disunity,” Deseret News, 25 October 1969, B3.

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asked those present to work with CAP to solve the problems at the Central City Center.

The situation spun so far out of control that Salt Lake City Commissioner James L. Baker

Jr. asked for an OEO investigation of the SLCAP and the situation at the Central City

Neighborhood Center.152 Cook expressed surprise at the call for an investigation but

agreed to cooperate to the fullest, though she requested that Washington OEO officials

handle the investigation because the regional office in Kansas City had investigated the

SLCAP before and failed to resolve anything. As the year ended, the SLCAP still

operated under a cloud of controversy, and the OEO began their investigation. The

leaders of the other CAP community centers were angry because, with so much time

spent on problems at the Central City Center, CAP officials failed to deal with important

issues in the other neighborhoods.153 Instead of bringing residents together, the SLCAP

seemed to breed discord among county residents.

During the War on Poverty, Utah’s two largest cities took advantage of available

OEO funds to establish CAPs and improve the lives of some of their most disadvantaged

residents. While these urban CAPs helped many in need, they also generated a fair

amount of controversy. Supporters believed that these agencies empowered the poor,

allowing them to participate in the process of reducing poverty and its effects on

community residents. Opponents claimed that CAPs allowed federal agencies to overstep

their authority and interfere in state and local matters, encouraged city residents to engage

in confrontational behaviors, antagonized racial divisions, and were guilty of

misadministration. As in other places, CAPs in urban Utah triggered mixed responses.

152 “Director of S.L. County CAP to Urge ‘Washington, Not Regional’ Probe,” Salt Lake Tribune, 27 November 1969, 1B. 153 “Left Out, CAP Centers Say,” Deseret News, 9 December 1969, A11.

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*******

As the state’s CAPs worked to improve the lives of the poor, VISTA volunteers

were an important part of that process. Coming from diverse places and backgrounds,

these volunteers—young and old—shared a commitment to empowering the poor and a

great deal of passion and energy focused on changing lives and neighborhoods for the

better. VISTAs joined CAP workers as they focused on multiple facets of community

improvement, but much of their efforts was concentrated on expanding educational

opportunities for the residents of the poorest urban neighborhoods.

VISTA volunteers were critical to the success of educational programs sponsored

by the SLCAP, the Salt Lake Board of Education, and the University of Utah. Because

their roles were rarely well defined, VISTAs had to work hard, think creatively, and take

the lead when existing agencies and leaders were unwilling to act. Given VISTA’s

objectives to promote self-help in poverty communities and teach skills to improve living

conditions in these areas, many volunteers labored to improve educational opportunities

for people of all ages.154 Over time, people in the target neighborhoods began to see the

VISTAs as an important resource, other agencies used them as a free source of labor—

especially for community outreach, and the VISTAs brought about needed change

without ruffling too many feathers.155

Anne McGugin, a VISTA who lived in Salt Lake for two years starting in August,

1969, initially focused on creating an alternative adult education program, but during her

time in Utah, she worked on a number of educational programs.156 Because of the high

154 McGugin interview. 155 Ibid. 156 Ibid. McGugin was from Yonkers, New York.

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dropout rate, the SLCAP, the Salt Lake Board of Education, and the University of Utah

created alternative schools in three neighborhoods, including the Oquirrh School on

Fourth East in Central City and the Jackson School in Northwest.157 Along with other

VISTAs, McGugin recruited adults without diplomas from poor neighborhoods and

tutored them in their adult education classes and also contacted state and local agencies to

teach vocational skills, and helped them find jobs.158 Many of these students were

immigrants so VISTAs helped them with their language skills.159 Brian Watanabe, a

VISTA and friend of McGugin, remembered establishing a door-to-door outreach

program, leaving flyers on neighborhood porches to recruit students to participate.160

Once they had enough students, Watanabe and the other volunteers taught any classes

that the students needed—remedial reading, basic math, and even typing.161 Through the

efforts of McGugin, Watanabe, and others, many adults learned to read, completed

required courses, received vocational training, and earned their GEDs.162

While she originally recruited and tutored students in the adult education

program, McGugin soon learned that she was more interested in helping in other ways.

She felt that too many children went to school hungry and tried to learn with empty

stomachs so McGugin decided to help create an inner city school breakfast program.163

She tried to enlist school officials, but they did not see a need for the program. When she

scheduled meetings with board members, they left her waiting, but she did not let this

157 Ibid. 158 Ibid. 159 Ibid. 160 Brian Watanabe interview with the author, 10 February 2009. The author has a digital voice recording and typed transcript of the interview. Watanabe was from Hawaii. 161 Ibid. 162 McGugin interview; Watanabe interview. 163 McGugin interview.

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stop her. Instead, McGugin contacted WIC (Women with Infants and Children) officials

and asked them to help her find funding sources for the project.164 With the help of an

energetic ex-convict who she discovered through a SLCAP employment program, she

established a school breakfast program within six weeks.165 Together, they created a

breakfast menu with items that were both delicious and nutritious, according to McGugin,

and they hired workers from the target neighborhoods to staff the program.166

The results were impressive. Student attendance and participation in school

activities improved once the program was in place.167 Under McGugin’s direction, the

program went online in April of 1970, and she ran it through the end of the school year.

Due to the program’s success, the Salt Lake Board of Education took control of it and

gradually introduced breakfast service in other schools. Eventually, all schools in the

state offered breakfast for their students. This is an impressive example of the impact

that a VISTA had on the educational system in Salt Lake City, and eventually, the rest of

the state.

Like McGugin, Al Church came to Utah in the summer of 1969 as a VISTA

volunteer to help the poor, and he too played an important part in developing educational

opportunities in inner-city Salt Lake.168 When he arrived, he spent nine months helping

to create the adult night school program at the Jefferson Elementary School on Salt

Lake’s west side.169 Together with other volunteers, he tried to get neighborhood parents

more involved in their children’s Title I schools and recruited drop-outs to attend the

164 Ibid. 165 Ibid. 166 Ibid. 167 Ibid. 168 Al Church interview with the author, 12 February 2009. The author has a digital voice recording and typed transcript of the interview. Church was from Detroit, Michigan. 169 Ibid.

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night school program. The night school offered basic education classes, introductory

business courses, citizenship classes, and an ESL (English as a Second Language)

program for anyone who needed those services.170

Along with their involvement in developing educational opportunity, the VISTAs

expanded the extracurricular opportunities for the city’s underprivileged youth. One of

their most popular ventures was a weekend ski program, established through the

combined efforts of VISTA volunteers and officials at the Guadalupe Center. The

Guadalupe Center’s Father Merrill arranged for the buses, helped round up the necessary

ski equipment, and secured free lift passes at Alta Ski Resort.171 VISTAs drove the bus

and accompanied the children on the skiing adventures.172 David Nimkin, a VISTA who

worked with the Utah Migrant Council, got involved because of his personal connections

to the Salt Lake VISTAs, and he fondly remembered these excursions.173 Nimkin drove

the bus while another VISTA—a former member of the ski patrol at Mammoth Mountain

resort in California—taught the kids how to ski.174 Anne McGugin marveled that,

despite their proximity to the Wasatch Mountains, these children had never been to the

mountains—let alone skiing, and these trips provided them with a new cultural

experience.175

VISTAs also worked on other community improvement projects. Both McGugin

and Church worked at Odyssey House, a national substance abuse program established in

Salt Lake City in 1971, and they both volunteered at the Thunderbird Youth Center, a

170 Ibid. 171 McGugin interview. 172 Ibid. 173 Nimkin interview. 174 Ibid. 175 McGugin interview.

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community center for teens, affiliated with the Guadalupe Center.176 Gregg Schiller, a

VISTA in Salt Lake from 1970 to 1972, was involved in several extracurricular

endeavors, including coaching youth football and establishing a storefront library in one

of the city’s poor neighborhoods.177 During a rubella measles outbreak, McGugin helped

with a campaign to educate the poor about the need for vaccination, attempting to

improve the city’s healthcare.178 Both Church and Watanabe helped create a food co-op

in Salt Lake.179 In an effort to reduce the price of food, co-op workers bought durable

commodities in bulk. However, it was difficult to get the poor—who lived from

paycheck to paycheck—to buy in large quantities, even at reduced prices.180 Ultimately,

the food co-op failed.

Officials also assigned VISTAs to serve the community in other ways. In 1966,

through an arrangement with the Utah Juvenile Court System, six VISTA volunteers

worked with “delinquent and neglected families” in the poorest neighbors of Ogden and

Salt Lake.181 Due to the heavy caseloads of parole officers and social workers, many

families needed additional assistance, and these volunteers tried to rehabilitate delinquent

youths, provided educational assistance to struggling students, and even arranged

babysitters or daycare for parents in need of those services.182 A Deseret News article

published in November, 1966, heaped praises on the volunteers working with the juvenile

176 Ibid.; Church interview; Odyssey House website, http://odysseyhouse.org/ (accessed 10 June 2014). 177 Gregg Schiller e-mail interview with the author, completed 30 March 2009. The author has a digital copy of Schiller’s responses. Schiller was born in Leavittown, New York and raised in Orange County, California. 178 McGugin interview. 179 Church interview; Watanabe interview. 180 Church interview. 181 “VISTA Aides to Work in S.L. Area,” Deseret News, 2 April 1966, 8A. 182 “Utah Aligns VISTA Aid For Youths, Salt Lake Tribune, 2 April 1966, 23.

http://odysseyhouse.org/

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court system.183 According to the article, Juvenile Court Judge John Farr Larson

commended the VISTAs who participated in the program, trying to keep former juvenile

delinquents in school, and applauded the local youths who were reforming themselves

with the help of these volunteers.

In spite of this positive acknowledgment, some VISTAs felt that state residents

were often less than supportive of their efforts. When asked about local reactions to their

efforts, Al Church indicated that most Utahns ignored them.184 He argued that

mainstream Utah culture was antagonistic to government intervention of any kind and

that church leaders, political leaders, and average citizens failed to accept that poverty,

racial and drug problems, or other negative social conditions existed in their state. For

instance, he found that people either refused to accept that there were poor people in Salt

Lake City, or they maintained that the only poor people were those who did not work

hard enough, pray hard enough, or failed in both of these areas.185 Church also witnessed

significant drug usage, not only among the poor but also among the Middle Class, white,

Mormon teenage population, but he was disgusted that the parents of these children

refused to accept it, simply burying their heads in the sand.186 As they tried to create a

night school program, VISTAs encountered resistance from principals who “hated” the

program, refused to see the value of having them in their schools because they brought in

the riff raff, and did not allow them to use their schools, and as a result, they felt like “the

loneliest damned VISTA project…in the United States.”187 The administrators at

183 Arnold Irvine, “Dropout? VISTA to the Rescue,” Deseret News, 23 November 1966, 18B. 184 Church interview. 185 Ibid. 186 Ibid. 187 Ibid.

270

Oquirrh Elementary School and Lincoln Junior High kicked them out, and only Don

Baxter, the principal at Jefferson Elementary School, allowed them to use his building.188

According to Church, another obstacle to successful community organization in Utah was

the mindset of the poor. As in other locations, he found the people living in these

disadvantaged neighborhoods to be very conservative, and they were willing to accept the

status quo, not wanting to rock the boat. According to Church, these conditions made it

difficult to mobilize the poor and create programs to help them.

*******

The EOA indirectly provided financial assistance for communities to establish

Legal Services programs under its Title II CAP provisions, and both Salt Lake City and

Ogden received Legal Services funding. Though both cities established programs, the

Ogden branch seemed to be the most active and received a greater share of attention in

the newspaper, especially in the Ogden Standard-Examiner. While the local offices

engaged in the same kinds of activities as Legal Services offices across the nation and

definitely ruffled a few feathers, they did not create the same firestorms as programs in

other U.S. cities.

In the summer of 1966, the OEO approved a SLACAC grant to establish a Legal

Services program, run by the Legal Defenders Association and the County Bar

Association. 189 It offered legal counsel and representation to those charged with civil

offenses, if they were not able to afford private counsel, but the attorneys who staffed the

local antipoverty offices worked hard to “pick up the slack in legal services already

188 Ibid. 189 “Highlights—Utah, September 28, 1966,” OEO, Moss Papers, Box 164, Folder 14. The grant provided $173,810 to create the SLACAC Legal Services.

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available to the poor” without stepping on the toes of existing governmental and private

practices.190 Three attorneys, one part-time and two full-time, provided legal assistance

to neighborhood residents—researching legal questions, educating them about their

rights, and on occasion, representing them in court.191 Unfortunately, the Legal Services

program was not always able to help those seeking assistance, usually because of

inadequate funding.192

After the Salt Lake Legal Services office had been opened for nine months, the

Salt Lake Tribune ran a story about their activities, and while the writer commented on

the reactions of the poor, he did not include a description of the general public’s response

to the program. Brent T. Lynch, the director of the Salt Lake County Bar Legal Services,

Inc. (SLCBLS), explained that they were fighting the legal battles of the poor on three

fronts: “providing advice and in-court services,” “conducting research into legal

problems of the poor and then drafting legislation to alleviate inequalities in the laws,”

and “conducting educational programs for the poor.”193 Ronald N. Boyce, a University

of Utah professor affiliated with the program, argued that one of the their major obstacles

was establishing a means of communications with the population they served, given that

lawyers use language that is difficult for non-attorneys to understand.194 Despite the

communication difficulties, Boyce stated that the program received mixed reviews from

their “clients.” While some welcomed the opportunity to learn about their legal rights,

190 “High Lights, Community Action Program, Salt Lake Area, Covering Period September 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966,” Moss Papers; “Legal Aid Program For Indigent,” Deseret News, 4 February 1966, 13A. 191 “CAP Board of Directors” Minutes, 11 May 1966, SLCAP; “Legal Aid Program for Indigent,” Deseret News, 4 February 1966, 13A. 192 “CAP Board of Directors” Minutes, 11 October 1967, SLCAP. 193 William G. Smith, “Legal Group Tries New Plan To Protect Rights of the Poor,” Salt Lake Tribune, 12 July 1967, 17. 194 Ibid.

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others seemed indifferent to the offerings of the SLCBLS.

Weber County had its own Legal Services program that provided assistance to the

poor in that county and in neighboring Morgan County. 195 In addition to the Ogden Area

CAP and the OEO, the Weber County Bar Association and the National Legal Aid and

Defender’s Association participated in the development of the program. 196 Together,

they designed a plan that included the creation of a neighborhood legal services center

with a full-time director, two trial attorneys, a social worker, an investigator, and two

part-time secretaries.197 The investigator completed the background research to

determine whether those seeking services were eligible for assistance, allowing the

trained legal staff to focus on the cases that the investigator approved. Ogden had a full-

time office while Roy, Plain City, and Morgan had part-time offices.198

In 1967, the OEO announced its renewed support of the Ogden Area CAP,

including funding Legal Services, and CAP director James Felsted took that opportunity

to celebrate the Legal Services’ achievements. During its first year in operation, Felsted

explained that more than 1,000 indigents in the two-county area had obtained legal

assistance through the program.199 Though he did not include specific details or

individual cases, his statement indicates a successful program that the target population

utilized. An Ogden Standard-Examiner editorial published at the time argued that all of

the programs funded by the OEO grant, including the Legal Services program in Weber

and Morgan Counties, “have been well received…and have made important contributions

195 “Legal Aid to Needy OK’d for 2 Counties,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 17 June 1966, 1B. 196 “’Law, Poverty’ Plan Backed by Members of Bar Association,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 3 April 1966, 1B. 197 Ibid. 198 “Legal Aid to Needy OK’d for 2 Counties.” 199 “U.S. OKs $499,000 for War on Poverty Programs in County,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 14 September 1967, 1B.

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toward providing an opportunity for constructive action in meeting the problems of the

disadvantaged.”200 A few months later, speaking before area businessmen, Dale E.

Stratford, the director of the Legal Services program, explained that over 1,200

individuals benefitted from the services that his agency provided.201 So in addition to the

area CAP director and the Legal Services director, the editorial board of the city’s

newspaper applauded the Legal Services program. At that time, there were no articles or

editorials that challenged or opposed the program.

Until late 1968, Legal Services in Utah managed to assist people with their legal

issues without creating waves. In September, 1968, it seemed that might change as the

Ogden Legal Services program decided to take on issues that had created problems in

other cities. At that time, John Blair Hutchinson, a lawyer affiliated with the Weber

County Legal Bar Services, unveiled their plan to use “legal action to win statutory

recognition of tenants’ rights in Utah.”202 Among other issues, the Weber County Legal

Bar Services planned to use court cases to protect tenants from immediate expulsion for

asking landlords to fix problems in their rented homes, to encourage renters to form a

tenants’ union to protect the poor against “slum lords,” and to investigate financial

institutions that used “usury contracts” with their less well-off customers.203 In matters

not directly related to tenant rights, the Weber County Legal Bar Services planned to

challenge the practice of school boards and administrators who cavalierly expelled

indigent students from school, forcing families to pay for the involuntary

institutionalization of their children at the State Industrial School, and the alleged racial

200 “Ogden ‘Poverty’ Grant,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 16 September 1967, 4. 201 “Poverty Programs ‘Succeeding Here,’” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 9 November 1967, 1B. 202 “Agency to Study Tenants’ Rights,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 28 September 1968, 16C. 203 Ibid.

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and economic imbalance in the selection of jurors. With an agenda like that, the Legal

Services program took on some weighty issues that had the potential to attract significant

media attention, but it failed to materialize. In March, 1969, the OEO announced their

continued financial support of the Ogden Area CAP and the Weber County Legal Bar

Services, given the rate of past participation in the program among eligible individuals

and families and the cultural and ethnic diversity in Ogden.204 Despite their public

commitment to a fairly radical agenda the previous year, state newspapers—especially

the Ogden Standard-Examiner—focused on the continuation of federal funding and

ignored the more radical aspects of the Legal Services’ agenda.

That fall, the Ogden Standard-Examiner ran a story about Ogden’s Legal Services

that concentrated on the activities of the agency, but it did not present Legal Services as

an especially radical organization. According to Paul D. Vernieu, the director of Legal

Services for the Poor, Inc., the main purpose of the organization was to “make the

necessary reforms that will have a significant effect on eliminating some causes of

poverty” in their communities.205 During the previous year, over 1,300 people applied

for Legal Services assistance at the Ogden and Morgan offices, an increase of over 300

individuals from the year before, most often receiving help in divorce cases, or ones

involving “serious problems in consumer transactions, land or tenant relationships,

welfare [issues], employment relations and opportunity, unemployment compensation,

workman’s compensation, social security, veterans administration, and industrial

accidents.”206 While this article examined Legal Services activities in northern Utah, it

204 “U.S. Agency Awards $182,000 in Local Battle on Poverty, Ogden Standard-Examiner, 12 March 1969, 1B. 205 “Legal Agency Combats Poverty Causes,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 19 October 1969, 4B. 206 Ibid.

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did not describe a militant activist group mobilizing the poor for radical change.

When Congressional leaders proposed an amendment to the EOA that would have

allowed governors to veto “any OEO legal services program in his state, even a pending

law suit, without giving a formal reason,” an Ogden Standard-Examiner editorial vocally

opposed the change.207 Based on the 1,450 applications for legal aid at offices in Weber

and Morgan Counties to that point in 1969 and the key role that Legal Services played in

“changing methods for selection of juries…to assure equal representation of all

taxpayers,” the editorial writer argued that the agency was important and the governor

should not have the power to use a veto, or the threat of a veto, to undermine any project

intended “to bring equal rights to all Americans.”208 This editorial demonstrates that

some Utahns recognized the importance of Legal Services and were willing to fight to

ensure its continuation.

If press coverage is any indication, it seems the Legal Services program in Ogden

was more active than the one in Salt Lake City. Ogden’s Legal Services adopted an

agenda that included potential controversial issues like tenant rights, but their activities

failed to trigger a public backlash. The two programs provided civil legal assistance to

the poor in those areas and did so without upsetting too many people. Even the poor did

not fully embrace the program.

*******

Architects of the EOA believed that education was critical to personal and

economic uplift, and that idea was as popular in Utah, as in other parts of the nation. The

antipoverty law introduced a number of educational programs intended to provide a way

207 “Legal Services for Poor Threatened,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 19 November 1969, 6A. 208 Ibid.

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for the poor to improve their lives and their standard of living. Two educational

programs that had an important impact on people in Utah’s urban areas were Upward

Bound and Head Start, and they proved to be popular and long-lasting. Both had an

immediate impact on the state’s youth, and they still continue to provide educational

assistance to students today.

Designed to inspire disadvantaged teens to be the first in their families to enroll in

post-high-school programs, provide training and counseling to those in danger of leaving

school before earning a diploma, and encourage high school dropouts to return to school,

Upward Bound encapsulated much of the idealism and optimism that Great Society

planners had about the power of education and its ability to reduce or eliminate poverty.

To do this, the Upward Bound staff focused on increasing the motivation for these

students to pursue postsecondary education and improving their academic skills so that

they would be accepted and successful at the institutions they attended.209

USU, located in Logan, established the first Upward Bound program in the state

in 1966, and 100 students participated during that first summer.210 According to Dr.

Frances Hallstrom, the director of the program, her committee selected youths who were

dropouts, potential dropouts, or the “socially deprived” from high schools in Salt Lake,

Ogden, Logan, the Intermountain Indian School, and the State Industrial School, and

these students received training to help them understand their potential, appreciate the

diverse programs of study available to enhance their socioeconomic futures, see the value

of working with others to improve their lives, identify long-term educational and

209 “CAP Board of Directors” Minutes, 16 February 1966, SLCAP. 210 “CAP Board of Directors” Minutes, 9 March 1966, SLCAP.

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economic goals, and establish a game plan to achieve them.211 She stated that they

watched so many of these young people enter the program with little understanding of the

importance of education or hope that it might improve their futures, but over time, they

began to believe that education could give them the chance to do things that they had

“always wanted to do.”212 The students spent most of the summer living on campus,

getting to know each other and the program, and learning to work together. During the

school year, they returned home, and program officials stayed in contact with them, their

families, and their teachers and counselors, providing the support the students needed to

make progress in school and remain committed to their long-term educational goals.

While Dr. Hallstrom was an Upward Bound insider with a vested interest in its success,

she firmly believed that the program had value and that it was improving the lives of

teens, and she used the state media as a forum to get the word out to others.

Ogden’s Weber State College also had an Upward Bound program. During the

spring of 1967, there were 100 students enrolled in the program from Weber, Morgan,

Davis, and Salt Lake Counties, as well as the Fort Duchesne Indian Reservation.213

James D. Condie, an assistant professor of psychology, was the director of the program,

and he argued that it was “proving its worth,” given that forty-one of the forty-three at-

risk seniors in the program the previous year graduated from high school and eighty

percent of them enrolled in college.214 He stated, “We feel the program is making

satisfactory progress in changing the attitudes of boys and girls who have been

211 Thomas Brown, “Aid for Dropouts,” Deseret News, 8 August 1966, B1, 10B. 212 Ibid. 213 “’Upward Bound’ Group Opens 2-Day Meeting,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 21 April 1967, 1B; “WSC Continues ‘Upward Bound,’” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 2 July 1967, 1B. 214 “WSC Continues ‘Upward Bound,’” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 2 July 1967, 1B.

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handicapped by economic, cultural, and educational conditions.”215 Like Hallstrom,

Condie was an insider, but he also made a strong case for the good work of the program.

However, not all supporters were directly involved with the program. In the fall

of 1967, Richard C. Sweetland, a Logan resident, added his support. In a letter to the

editor, he explained that he was not initially a fan because he saw it as one more example

of a government program taking money from hard-working taxpayers and spending it on

“costly projects which at best have questionable effectiveness.”216 With that mindset, he

visited USU to investigate their Upward Bound program, and he emerged with a very

different opinion. He was impressed that eighty percent of the underachieving students

who participated in the program entered college, compared with only two percent of

similar students not enrolled in the program. Sweetland stated, “I feel that these potential

high school dropouts will pay the taxpayers back ten fold in future years, not only by not

destroying public and private property during riots and in staying off our relief rolls, but

in increased payment in taxes and in making solid contributions to our society.”217

Sweetland had no connection to the program and was originally a critic, but as he became

more familiar with the program, he became a vocal supporter.

By 1969, the high school and college students involved in the Upward Bound

were not the only beneficiaries of the program. With continued OEO funding, Weber

State College developed a program that used Upward Bound students as tutors at seven

high schools and seven elementary schools in Weber and Davis Counties.218 The tutoring

215 Ibid.; Susan Glasmann, “Upward Bound Plan Stimulates Many Youths to Higher Ideals,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 17 July 1967, 10B. 216 Richard C. Sweetland, “Upward Bound,” Deseret News, 4 September 1967, 18A. 217 Ibid. 218 “70 Participate in Tutorial Program with Upward Bound, Ogden Standard-Examiner, 24 November 1969, 8B.

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program provided support to teachers in struggling schools, enhanced the self-esteem of

high school and elementary students involved, and improved their attitudes about school

and the importance of education. Although never very large, the Upward Bound program

put down roots in Utah, provided encouragement and support to at-risk students, and

generated public support without measurable opposition.

The Head Start program was consistently popular in the state. When the OEO

approved the state’s first Head Start grant, it provided funding for nineteen centers in six

school districts, all but one in urban Salt Lake or Weber County.219 With the success of

that first summer, helping over 200 children, the state secured additional funding to

continue the program during the school year, helping more children over a longer period

of time.220 Utah supporters of Head Start celebrated many aspects of the program,

including the educational “head start” that young children received before entering

school, medical and dental care, improved nutrition, and additional help to parents,

volunteers, and other community members. An early editorial in the Salt Lake Tribune

stated that the program was a “mighty good place to start” to break the generational cycle

of poverty, and while it was a federally-initiated program, it allowed (and required) the

participation of locals to ensure its success.221

Because children were at the center of the program, those promoting Head Start

focused on immediate and long-term benefits for kids. At the end of the first Head Start

session during the summer of 1965, an article in the Deseret News praised the program,

highlighting the children’s social and educational progress, the importance of early

219 “School Grants Okayed for Poverty Areas,” Deseret News, 18 May 1965, 8A. Carbon County got the other Head Start center. 220 “Schools of City Propose Agenda for ‘Head Start,’” Salt Lake Tribune, 12 June 1966, B9. 221 “’Head Start’ to Break Poverty Circle,” Salt Lake Tribune, 19 May 1965, 12.

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detection and treatment of health problems, and the increase in parental involvement in

the educational process.222 In addition, observers commended the program for taking

children on field trips to places like the State Capitol and Hogle Zoo, broadening their

cultural experiences, and teaching important life skills, including verbalization and

communication, which were often underdeveloped in this population.223 Volunteers and

parents called it “one of the most successful anti-poverty programs” because it taught

children how to respond to new challenges they would face in school and in life, how to

interact and get along in new social situations, and how to communicate more

effectively.224 Others commented that one of the program’s most important contributions

was helping children to develop positive self-images and feel good about themselves,

enhancing their chances for future success.225

In addition to improving the lives and futures of children, Head Start proponents

argued that the program helped other members of the community, including parents,

program volunteers, and the larger community. In keeping with the EOA’s emphasis on

“maximum feasible participation” of the target population, those developing and

implementing Head Start in Utah encouraged the involvement of the parents whose

children were in the program. An article that appeared in the Salt Lake Tribune

recognized the “educational lift” that the program provided to over 200 local children but

argued that it delivered an even greater “head start” to the parents because it helped them

to better understand and appreciate the educational system, exorcising many of their fears

about schools and allowing them to more effectively help their children to adjust to their

222 Lavor Chaffin, “It’s Educational ‘Head Start,’” Deseret News, 21 July 1965, B4. 223 “’Head Start’ In Jordan, S.L.,” Deseret News, 13 June 1966, 8A. 224 Paul Swenson, “Head Start Session Ends, Deseret News, 31 July 1968, B1-B2. 225 Paul Swenson, “Head-Starters Get Treatment,” Deseret News, 1 March 1969, B1.

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entry into elementary school.226 Another Tribune article returned to this theme, quoting

an involved mother who said, “If you can help me, maybe I can help my young child with

his problems.”227 Salt Lake Head Start volunteer Pat Peck believed that the use of

parents as volunteers was one of the program’s greatest strengths because she did not

realize how “emotionally troubled and withdrawn” her son was until she saw him interact

with other children, and this experience allowed her to more helpful to him.228

Head Start officials recognized the diversity within each community and tried to

employ representatives from each group. Because ten percent of Salt Lake City’s Head

Start children were black, that center hired two black teachers to serve as role models for

them.229 This not only helped the children, providing successful adults for them to

emulate, but also gave adult minorities opportunity for employment and advancement.

Though Head Start was a popular program, not everyone was happy about the

way it was administered. In the fall of 1969, Ogden’s NAACP chapter challenged the

operation of the Head Start program in the Ogden School District. Chapter president

James H. Gillespie threatened to pursue a federal court order to stop the Ogden Head

Start program or, at least, remove it from the control of the city’s school district.230 He

felt that the district was not following OEO guidelines because they refused to listen to

the parent advisory committee, as stipulated by the “maximum feasible participation”

clause of the EOA. According to Gillespie, the parent advisory committee should have

been allowed to participate in the selection of Head Start directors and program

226 Melba M. Ferguson, “’Head Start’ Gives Lift to Parents,” Salt Lake Tribune, 9 August 1965, 21. 227 “Schools of City Propose Agenda for ‘Head Start,’” Salt Lake Tribune, 12 June 1966, B9. 228 “8-Week Head Start for 350,” Deseret News, 20 June 1968, 16A. 229 Paul Swenson, “Head Start Gets ‘Running Start,’” Deseret News, 5 February 1968, 20B. 230 “NAACP Asks Change in Head Start Program,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 13 October 1969, 1B.

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participants and the assignment of students to school locations, and in each of these cases,

he felt the district ignored the parent committee’s input. He also claimed that the district

was attempting to wrestle control of Head Start away from the OACAC and place it

solely under district control, and he questioned the hiring practices used to fill program

positions, arguing that many were not qualified for the positions they received. Gillespie

and the members of the Ogden NAACP were not opposed to the Head Start program, but

they did question the school district’s operation of the program.

While there were many articles about Utah’s urban Head Start programs from

1965 to 1969, most were purely informational, explaining the program and encouraging

eligible residents to enroll their children. During that time period, there were a few

articles or editorials that provided a glimpse into how people felt about the program.

Most were written by or included the input of Head Start insiders, and these were

overwhelmingly positive. Some demonstrated the support of parents who had children in

the program and who worked as Head Start volunteers. However, the Ogden example

demonstrates that there were some who felt there were problems in the administration of

the program. Still, Head Start became a permanent and well-respected program in Utah’s

urban areas, as in the rest of the state.

**********

During the period of this study, the urban counties along the Wasatch Front had

the largest populations in Utah and the greatest number of people living in poverty, and

Salt Lake and Weber Counties were the most populous. Fittingly, these two counties

received a majority of the state’s non-Job Corps EOA funding, and they used the money

to create a number of urban EOA programs. Though some felt that the NYC was unfair

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because these projects paid more than similar state-directed programs and rewarded drop-

outs with jobs, most people favored the NYC because it helped the state’s disadvantaged

youths, provided vocational training and encouraged education, and its workers

completed much-appreciated community service. Of all programs discussed in this

chapter, CAPs were the largest and the most controversial. Supporters argued that these

agencies empowered the poor and allowed them to actively participate in the process of

community improvement. Opponents claimed that CAPs gave the federal government

too much control over local issues, promoted confrontational behavior, stirred up racial

unrest, and were guilty of misadministration.

Other programs had mixed results and reviews. While VISTAs helped to improve

the lives of the poor in a number of ways, especially through educational programs,

community reaction to the program was mixed. The volunteers who worked with

juvenile delinquents in Salt Lake and Ogden received positive reviews from legal

personnel associated with the program, but many VISTAs felt that community leaders

and the general public simply ignored them. Both Salt Lake and Ogden established Legal

Services programs, and though they provided civil legal assistance to the poor, local

reactions were mixed, even among the poor.

In general, the EOA educational programs were popular. Utahns liked the idea

that people can help themselves if they have access to quality education. Upward Bound

programs, located in Logan and Ogden, encouraged teens from disadvantaged

backgrounds to become the first in their families to get a college education and tried to

provide support and assistance that would allow them to be successful. Head Start helped

preschoolers to prepare for school and encouraged parents and other members of the

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community to get involved and recognize the importance of education. Both programs

began with the EOA and continued long after the law disappeared.

In the final analysis, the implementation of and reactions to EOA programs in

Utah’s urban areas were not that different from other places. Most Utahns gradually

came to accept EOA programs. Some programs remained small and barely noticed,

while others were bigger, receiving significant federal funding and attracting public

attention. Supporters felt these programs increased opportunity, provided education and

assistance to the poor, and included the poor in the identification of problems and the

development of solutions. Opponents argued that urban EOA programs failed to end

poverty, discriminated against minorities, gave the federal government too much power

over local problems, and did not allow for the “maximum feasible participation” of poor

residents in the development of antipoverty solutions. Despite these differing opinions,

Utahns accepted, and even encouraged, the creation of diverse programs, and many of

these programs continue to impact Utah today.

CHAPTER 7

JOB CORPS IN UTAH: LOCAL CENTERS AND PUBLIC REACTION

I am opposed to bringing 2,000 dropouts and delinquents into the middle of the city of Clearfield. If they are the kind of people that must be detained behind fences with guards on the gate and must be escorted wherever they go, they are not the kind of citizen that I want my children to associate with.1

*******

Is there not delinquency in this area now? Are the youth in this area under such surveillance as the youth in the job corps camps? These boys are not necessarily delinquents but are the underprivileged and school dropouts… Why can’t we give a helping hand to those who need and want it?2

From 1964 to 1969, the Job Corps, of all the EOA programs, had the greatest

economic impact on Utah. The OEO spent more money on this program in the state than

on all of the other EOA programs combined. Government agencies and business

executives converted that funding into three Job Corps centers, located in two Utah

counties, one rural and one urban. Once they were in operation, these facilities impacted

the lives of thousands of young men. For many participants, Job Corps gave them their

first access to medical and dental services. The program provided them the opportunity

to get an education and earn a high school diploma or GED. They received vocational

1 Lyngby A. Stoker letter to Senator Moss, 8 January 1966, Frank E. Moss Papers, Box 165, Folder 7, Special Collections, Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City. 2 Donna Murdock, “Supports Job Corps,” Deseret News, 28 October 1965, A6.

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training to prepare them for economic self-sufficiency. The early Job Corps program also

required that they relocate to another part of the country, in hopes that they could leave

their problems behind and get a fresh start in a new environment.

Though it was created by the EOA, an antipoverty law, the Job Corps impact on

poverty in the state is questionable, and because of the design of the program, it

generated a considerable amount of controversy. Since the beneficiaries were young men

brought in from other states, Utah’s three Job Corps Centers had little effect on reducing

poverty among the local population. To receive the benefits of the program, eligible Job

Corps participants in Utah had to relocate to other states. Given the size of the centers,

especially the one located in Clearfield, Job Corps undoubtedly had an impact on the

economies of the communities surrounding the centers, increasing the number of jobs

available to residents and providing additional revenue for local businesses. As a result,

some disadvantaged residents likely profited from the program, but it seems that the

primary beneficiary was the Thiokol Chemical Corporation, the company that ran the

Clearfield Job Corps center. The irony that a prosperous corporation benefited most from

this antipoverty law is matched by the fact that the OEO approved the establishment of

two of the three Job Corps centers in Davis County, an area that had the second lowest

poverty rate in the state and the lowest among highly populated counties.

This chapters examines the early history of Job Corps in Utah. It discusses the

initial debates about the value of the Job Corps program and general arguments over

allowing the program to enter the state. It looks at the arguments that communities used

to support and oppose the establishment of these facilities, the positive and negative

impact that the centers had on Davis, Carbon, and their neighboring counties, and the

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responses that program officials and local residents had to the Utah Job Corps program.

It was not uncommon to find newspaper editorials about the benefits or deficiencies of

the program, to see Utah residents praising corpsmen who simply wanted a chance to

improve their lives or lamenting the fact the these trouble-making minorities were

invading the state in the letters to the editor section of the paper, and to discover letters

from residents of Price, South Weber, or Clearfield, Utah to their congressional

representatives, urging or vehemently opposing the construction of Job Corps centers in

their backyards. Unfortunately, there are few sources that present the feelings that

corpsmen had about the program, and therefore, their voices do not inform this survey.

Despite Utah’s unique demographics that included a large percentage of LDS Church

members, the arguments that individuals used to justify their local acceptance or rejection

of the program were similar to those used in other locations across the nation.

*******

From the very beginning, the Job Corps program absorbed the largest chunk of

Utah’s EOA dollars. Established under Title I of the EOA, Job Corps attacked two major

causes of poverty, the lack of education and of marketable job skills among the poor. Job

Corps recruited low-income men and women, aged sixteen to twenty-one, and provided

“education, vocational training, and useful work experience” in rural or urban residential

training centers.3 Often, the government relocated participants to camps far from their

families and homes, attempting to attack environmental factors believed to contribute to

the continuation of poverty.4 With three Job Corps centers, Utah played a part in trying

3 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., H.R. 11377, Congressional Quarterly Almanac (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1965), 210. 4 John A. Andrew III., Lyndon Johnson and the Great Society, The American Way Series (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, Inc., 1998), 64.

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to achieve the program’s goals. At the end of the 1966 fiscal year, the OEO’s first full

year of operation, Utah received nearly $14 million to create and operate two small rural

conservation centers and one large urban center.5 Since Utah’s total OEO allocations for

that fiscal year were just over $21 million, Job Corps money accounted for nearly sixty-

five percent of the state’s EOA antipoverty funds.6

As Congress debated the EOA and Job Corps began, the state’s residents

discussed the positive and negative ramifications of establishing Job Corps centers.

These discussions became common and were often quite public. As communities began

applying to host Job Corps center, citizens shared their feelings about the program. Some

saw it as a positive good that might help disadvantaged young men (and possibly women)

while providing benefits to the surrounding area. Others saw it as a problematic

organization that would bring unwanted youth into the area and cause problems that local

officials were unprepared to handle. Many did not see it as completely good or entirely

evil; they recognized the benefits but did not overlook the possible negative

consequences of living near a Job Corps center.

Like others across the nation, many Utahns disapproved of allowing troubled

outsiders to “invade” the state. In September, 1964, a Deseret News editorial voiced

local fears of allowing Job Corps outsiders to come to Utah. The writer argued that

“whenever possible, youths should be assigned to camps in their own areas” so that they

would be more aware of available jobs and expressed concern about the impact that the

5 “Highlights—Utah, September 28, 1966,” Office of Economic Opportunity, Moss Papers, Box 164, Folder 14. The actual amount allocated to Utah Job Corps centers for the 1966 fiscal year was $13,787,401. 6 Ibid. Utah received $21,266,158 in OEO antipoverty funding in 1966 so the Job Corps received 64.83% of that total amount.

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importation of more prospective job seekers might have on Utah’s already high

unemployment rate.7 The editorial also discussed the existence of regional differences,

and though these differences were fading, the editorial emphasized that “…any program

is likely to be more successful if it works within the regional framework.”8 While the

writer did not explicitly mention race, it seems likely that this reference to “regional

differences” was a veiled way of saying that Utahns should not encourage a program that

might change the racial demographics of the state, encouraging young minorities to settle

in the area. It is also possible that the editorial writer is worried about the introduction of

a large number of youth unaffiliated with the LDS Church. The argument against

corpsmen as outsiders continued to plague the Job Corps program in Utah.

While many Utahns shared these feelings, others felt differently. In a Salt Lake

Tribune letter to the editor, Stephen Kondor of Murray took Senator Bennett to task for

his plea to keep troubled youth in their local regions when assigning them to Job Corps

centers.9 Kondor argued that the country was already too divided, that it was ill-advised

to further encourage the entrenchment of “ethnic areas,” and that these young men would

benefit from being relocated to a place where they might leave their problems behind and

make a new start. He believed that travel would allow them to experience new places,

meet new people, and develop ways of overcoming challenges. Kondor went so far as to

compare Bennett’s position with that of many Communist dictators when he wrote, “We

castigate dictators of Communist countries for holding their people prisoners within their

countries’ boundaries, fearing to let them visit neighboring countries lest they form

7 “Utah Youths for Utah Camps,” Deseret News, 29 September 1964, A16. 8 Ibid. 9 Stephen Kondor, “Ethnic Areas Now?,” Salt Lake Tribune, 15 September 1964, 10.

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unfavorable opinions about their own system.”10 He believed that Job Corps would help

end poverty by allowing young men to escape their troubled environments and learn new

skills in a new place.

This letter triggered a response from D. S. Larson, who took exception to

Kondor’s arguments. While Larson agreed that travel was a great pastime and that he

would like to travel more, he opposed the idea of taxpayers paying for corpsmen to

relocate to centers far from their homes.11 He reasoned, “If the government is going to

set up a plan to support the young men of our nation, let them do it as inexpensively as

possible.”12 Larson believed that Kondor’s position was just an example of a member of

the Democratic Party attacking the ideas of a Republican senator, and he worried that this

political hatred would be the undoing of the country.

Blanche R. Rasmussen, another Utah resident, shared her own misgivings about

the prospects of more outsiders entering the state. While she believed that the corpsmen

would likely help the state’s conservation efforts, she felt that that advantage would be

outweighed by the problems they introduced in the communities where the centers were

located.13 Rasmussen declared:

Of marked concern to each of us, especially those with teenage children, is the proposed relocation within this state of a number of problem youth and their inevitable association with our communities and our own children. The provision of a desirable environment and wholesome companions for our youth is already a difficult enough task without compounding it by the presence of these camps. Some of the youth scheduled for these centers are undoubtedly fine individuals, but considered as a group, would any of us intentionally choose such associates for our sons or daughters?14

10 Ibid. 11 D. S. Larson, “Who Pays Bills?,” Salt Lake Tribune, 25 September 1964, 16A. 12 Ibid. 13 Blanche R. Rasmussen, “The Problem of Problem Youths,” Deseret News, 30 September 1964, A20. 14 Ibid.

291

Clearly, Rasmussen was opposed to having a Job Corps center in her area, and though

she did not specifically mention racial concerns, it seems likely that she opposed the

probable increase in the number of minorities in her neighborhood.

Similarly, some residents questioned whether Job Corps participants were worthy

of assistance at taxpayer’s expense, and this argument generated considerable debate. In

a letter published in the Salt Lake Tribune, M. K. Sharp asked, “Is it the obligation of

responsible citizens to coddle young people who do not have the backbone to complete

their secondary education?,” and he answered his own question, arguing that if “poorly

motivated kids of average or better intelligence” were willing to ignore the consequences

of dropping out of school, they should have to take “their lumps” and not expect special

programs to bail them out at public expense.15 Sharp’s letter began a dialogue among the

readers of the Tribune.

When Layton resident Bonnie Lorenc read Sharp’s letter, she struck back with a

letter of her own. Lorenc responded, “For heavens [sic] sake! What kind of people are

these who object to ‘responsible citizens’ coddling the underprivileged boys who seek

help through the channels of the Job Corps?”.16 She urged Sharp and other program

opponents to realize that Job Corps did not draft corpsmen or force them to enter against

their will. Instead, responsible church, welfare, and civic organizations carefully

screened and recommended disadvantaged youth who sincerely wanted to improve their

lives and who were willing to work in order to succeed in the program. Lorenc

concluded, “God help the shortsighted citizen who can’t see beyond his own little world.

Utah is a bigger place than that, and I have faith in the practical, human goodness of its

15 M. K. Sharp, “Should We Coddle?,” Salt Lake Tribune, 30 November 1964, 18. 16 Bonnie Lorenc, “What Kind of People?,” Salt Lake Tribune, 3 December 1964, 22A.

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people.”17 The “discussion” did not end there.

After reading these letters, John L. Guymon responded. He did not believe that

high school drop-outs should be “coddled” or be placed in taxpayer-funded programs.

He argued that all young men who dropped out of high school before age eighteen should

“mandatorily serve two years in the armed forces” where they would be forced to finish

high school, fulfill their military obligations, and “learn to face the responsibility of our

society.”18 While Lorenc’s letter illustrates that not all Utahns harshly judged the

prospective corpsmen, the other two individuals who participated in this “conversation”

demonstrate that many felt the corpsmen were unworthy of assistance, that they did not

deserve a government-sponsored program to get them on the right track, and that

compulsory military service might be the most appropriate solution to their problems.

Many Job Corps supporters emphasized the similarities between this program and

the New Deal’s Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). Just as the CCC completed

environmental projects while teaching young men the importance of hard work, many in

Utah saw Job Corps as a similar program that could improve the lives of troubled youth

through their physical efforts in nature. Given the number of National and State Parks

and other recreational areas in Utah, this argument appeared again and again, espoused

by supporters of the Job Corps program, yet some cautioned against overemphasizing the

similarities between the Job Corps and the CCC.

In late 1964, as federal and state officials considered the possible construction of

Utah Job Corps centers in locations like Price, Clearfield, South Weber, Kane County,

Orem, and Tooele, the Deseret News published an editorial, asking decision-makers to

17 Ibid. 18 John L. Guymon, “Both Miss Boat,” Salt Lake Tribune, 12 December 1964, 22.

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accurately evaluate the nature of Job Corps before giving the green light to construction

of centers. The editorial conceded that there might be some environmental benefits to the

program but urged people to realize that for those who designed the Job Corps,

conservation was not the primary purpose of the program.19 Instead, the most important

goal was to provide vocational training to nearly one million young people identified as

“unemployable,” individuals who had “not proven themselves to work or study

effectively.”20 Despite the constant comparisons between Job Corps and the CCC, this

editorial stated that the differences were much greater than most people understood.

Because of the unprecedented economic collapse in the 1930s, the CCC employed some

of the most gifted youth in the nation who could not get jobs otherwise, and completing

conservation projects was the most important objective of the program. In contrast, Job

Corps included only underprivileged youth, the primary objective of the program was to

provide “basic education and skilled training” to these individuals, and conservation

projects were only a secondary goal.21 In the end, this editorial did not support or oppose

the creation of Job Corps centers, but it did encourage people to make decisions about the

program based on facts and not just suppositions.

Writing six months later, Grant M. Prisbey had a more optimistic view of Job

Corps, focusing on the benefits of the program, and chose to emphasize the similarities

between Job Corps and the CCC.22 Prisbey believed that Utah would eventually have

many Job Corps centers and that the centers would have a tremendous impact on the

state’s economy, hiring administrators, teachers, and other staff, creating a greater

19 “Conservation Comes Second,” Deseret News, 24 November 1964, A12. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Grant M. Prisbey, “Job Corps Benefits,” Salt Lake Tribune, 12 May 1965, 12.

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demand for local products, and enhancing the state’s transportation industry. As

someone who appreciated the natural resources of the state and who liked to travel,

Prisbey argued that Utah needed help improving roads, water storage, and recreational

and conservation areas and that Job Corps might provide an adequate labor force to

complete these projects, just as the CCC did during the 1930s. According to Prisbey, the

establishment of Job Corps centers would greatly improve the economy and development

of the state’s natural resources.

Another common complaint about Job Corps was the tremendous cost associated

with the program. Geneve Cornell—one of many Utahns who argued that the program

was too expensive—quoted Sargent Shriver, estimating that taxpayers would spend

$4,700 a year on a corpsman’s education, and cited Representative M. G. Snyder’s

figures, stating that tuition at Harvard was only $4,201 per year.23 Using those statistics,

Cornell reasoned that Utahns should not accept a poverty program that was almost $500

more expensive, per student per year, than a Harvard education. Ilene S. Cook of

Kaysville shared Cornell’s concerns. Her letter began, “Help! I am being robbed and so

is every taxpayer in this country.”24 She criticized the costs of the War on Poverty, in

general, but saved most of her anger for Job Corps. She wrote:

Something smells! It is terribly wrong that conscientious hard-working Americans must save for years to send their children to college while paying taxes to support such wasteful programs. It is wrong that the cost of educating each Job Corps student should be 19 times the national cost of educating our public school children. It is wrong that our country continue to support the weak and lazy elements in our society at the expense of the ones who are trying.25

In Utah and across the nation, many individuals shared the opinions of Cornell and Cook,

23 Geneve Cornell, “Work Camp Cost,” Salt Lake Tribune, 2 November 1964, A15. 24 Ilene S. Cook, “Job Corps Costs,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 2 August 1966, 4A. 25 Ibid.

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attacking Job Corps because they believed that program costs were extreme and an unfair

burden on hard-working taxpayers.

In response, supporters challenged these assertions. B. R. Diamond, a community

relations executive for the Thiokol Job Corps Center and the assistant mayor of Ogden,

explained that the figures associated with Job Corps were misleading.26 While the $12.8

million OEO grant for the Clearfield center seemed like a lot of money, he emphasized

that much of that money would be spent on infrastructure, trying to get the facilities ready

to go. He argued that the less than $5,000 spent per year on each corpsman was much

less than what it would cost to keep them on welfare for their entire lives. During his

address to the Ogden’s Lions Club, Diamond maintained that each corpsman who

successfully completed the program would pay back the money invested in his education

within five years through his payroll taxes.27 Dr. E. D. Morton of Ogden made a similar

argument, asking how much it would cost to keep a man in prison for ten, twenty, or even

thirty years and how much it would cost to support a family of eight on welfare

indefinitely.28 Robert L. Marquardt, the vice president for economic development for the

Thiokol Chemical Corporation, agreed that the cost of educating a corpsman was high but

that they required things that a Harvard undergraduate did not.29 The money allocated

for a corpsman’s education included all dental and medical costs, and food, clothing,

housing, and educational costs required to compensate for the deficiencies that Harvard

students did not have. He also stated that Harvard University was able to utilize millions

of dollars in endowments, in addition to tuition, to cover operating costs, making Harvard

26 “Job Corps Center Calls for Support,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 4 August 1966, 16A. 27 “Plea Made To Uphold Job Corps,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 30 September 1966, 4C. 28 E. D. Morton, M.D., “Give Corps a Chance,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 9 August 1966, 2A. 29 Robert L. Marquardt, “Job Corps Appraisal,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 18 August 1966, 4A.

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much more expensive than Job Corps. These individuals asked Utahns to accept that Job

Corps was cheaper than prison or welfare and that there really was no comparison

between the costs associated with a Harvard education and a Job Corps education.

Even after several communities agreed to the establishment of Job Corps centers,

a kind of tension existed between the locals and the corpsmen. Locals were hesitant to

accept the corpsmen in their communities. When the Castle Valley and South Weber Job

Corps centers opened and Clearfield was considering the creation of a center, officials

from Washington D.C. visited the state to set up a coordinating council “to help integrate

Job Corpsmen into community life.”30 These officials argued that corpsmen needed

regular social and cultural experiences—in addition to their training—and the council

would coordinate leisure time activities in the community. Given the diverse

demographics of Job Corps, compared to Utah’s cities and towns, community residents

seemed to fear racially integrated activities, making them hesitant to accept the corpsmen.

H. V. Daniels, a national Job Corps community relations director, warned that racial

discrimination was unacceptable and used Grand Junction, Colorado, as an example of an

area with few blacks that succeeded in including the racially diverse corpsmen in

community activities, hoping that Utahns would follow suit.31 The lack of recreation

facilities for corpsman was a problem, and Job Corps officials, the editorial staff of the

Ogden Standard-Examiner, and others made frequent pleas to the people of Salt Lake,

Weber, Davis, and Carbon Counties to provide locations for these young men to spend

their leisure time and include them in local activities.32

30 “Session Mulls Job Corps Integration,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 2 February 1966, 5A. 31 Ibid. 32 “Job Corpsmen Need Recreation Aid,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 22 June 1966, 4A.

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Not everyone responded favorably to this request. After reading the Standard

editorial, Ogden resident Jerome C. Mietchen wrote his own letter to the editor. He

argued that it was the responsibility of the government, and not the community, to

provide recreational facilities and opportunities for corpsmen, just as it was the

government’s responsibility to do the same for him and his friends who participated in

the CCC during the 1930s.33 Mietchen stated that he was all for “good brotherhood,” but

he did not believe in “babysitting” corpsmen.34 Many opponents were also convinced

that Job Corps was full of juvenile delinquents, and this kept residents from inviting

corpsmen to participate in local events. For the Job Corps program to succeed in Utah,

this obstacle had to be overcome. Job Corps officials encouraged local churches to

accept the corpsmen, invite them to religious services and related extracurricular

activities, and provide transportation to and from these events as a way to assimilate them

into the community.35

When it was first introduced, local residents had plenty to say about the Job Corps

program. Supporters felt that it would give troubled youth a chance for a new start in a

fresh environment, providing corpsmen with the educational and vocational training they

needed to be successful in life. In the process, they reasoned that it would help the state’s

economy and that corpsmen would complete environmental and recreational projects that

might not get done otherwise. Opponents argued that the program would introduce too

many outsiders into the state and that they would take jobs that were already scarce.

They believed that many corpsmen were lazy juvenile delinquents, including many

33 Jerome C. Mietchen, “No Babysitting,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 29 June 1966, 8A. 34 Ibid. 35 “Clergymen Tour Job Corps Site,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 16 February 1966, 1B.

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minorities, and that this would have a negative impact on local communities. They also

opposed the cost of the program and argued that hard-working taxpayers should not be

shouldering this tremendous economic burden. These same arguments surfaced in

Carbon and Davis Counties as officials established Job Corps centers in those locations.

*******

The first Job Corps facility established in Utah was the Castle Valley Job Corps

center, located a few miles south of Price in Carbon County. This part of the state was

economically dependent on coal mining and the railroad and was experiencing greater

economic difficulties than Davis County, the site of the state’s two later Job Corps

centers.36 According to the 1960 Census, Carbon County had a population of 21,135, one

of the most populous counties outside the Wasatch Front, but the county’s population was

dropping.37 This was at least partially due to economic troubles. Almost sixteen percent

of the county lived below the poverty line, and even more telling, over nine percent of the

county’s workers were unemployed, more than twice the state’s unemployment

average.38 Neighboring Emery County had over 5,000 residents, a thirty-three percent

poverty rate, and over four percent of the county’s workers—just over the state average—

were unemployed.39 Given the economic situation in these counties, many local residents

saw the Job Corps program as a way to inject much needed money into their economy.

The Castle Valley center had the support of Utah’s political leaders. Republican

Governor George Dewey Clyde gave his “early approval,” contingent on the feelings of

36 Ronald G. Watt, A History of Carbon County, Utah Centennial County History Series (Salt Lake City: Utah State Historical Society, 1997), 71-91. 37 “Table 27,” Census of the Population: 1960. Vol. I. Part 46, Utah. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), 44. 38 “Table 36,” Census of the Population: 1960, 65. 39 Ibid.; “Table 27,” Census of the Population: 1960, 45.

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Carbon County’s residents, and they voiced their support for a center.40 In November,

1964, Senator Moss contacted Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall about the

possibility of establishing a Job Corps Center in Carbon County.41 In his letter, Moss

emphasized that the county was in desperate need of assistance because of high

unemployment, that the residents of the county were in favor of having a camp in their

area, and that it would be a great place to establish a camp given the many conservation

project possibilities in the area.42 Perhaps Moss’ entreaties had an effect because

Secretary Udall and OEO officials agreed to create a center in Carbon County, and

Governor Clyde, in consultation with newly elected Democratic Governor Rampton and

Carbon County officials, approved the camp in December, 1964.43

The Castle Valley Job Corps Center opened its doors to the first corpsmen—all

Utah outsiders—on July 29, 1965, and the following month, dignitaries, including

keynote speaker Congressman Burton, faculty and staff, and corpsmen officially

dedicated the center.44 Administered by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), this

rural conservation center was only the second Job Corps facility under BLM control and

the first one built from the ground up.45 Corpsmen worked on conservation projects,

including the construction of recreation sites at Cedar Mountain and the Carbon County

Fairgrounds, building fences, trails, and roads, making road signs, and planting seeds and

40 “Job Camp Okayed,” Deseret News, 24 December 1964, B1; Lorin J. Welker and Edward R. Evatz, “Young Men of Castle Valley,” Our Public Lands (summer 1966): 26, 27; “2 Job Corps Camps Favored by Utahns,” Deseret News, 17 December 1964, B15. 41 Senator Moss letter to Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall, 23 November 1964. Moss Papers, Box 95, Folder 1. 42 Ibid. 43 Welker and Evatz, 26-27. 44 Ibid.: “2 Job Corps Rites,” Deseret News, 12 August 1965, C15; “Job Corps Give Youth New Start,” Ogden Standard Examiner, 15 August 1965, 11A. 45 Welker and Evatz, 26.

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landscaping to prevent soil erosion.46 Castle Valley officials worked to help young men

find a purpose and pursue it, provide vocational, educational, and recreational

opportunities for the corpsmen, and at the same time, provide community service and

improve the area’s natural resources.47 Corpsmen enrolled in basic education classes that

emphasized math and reading skills, but they also took classes based on their own

interests, such as drivers’ training, arts and crafts, physical education, and typing.48 In

addition, they learned basic skills in areas like carpentry, plumbing, landscaping, the use

of hand and power tools, and driving trucks and large equipment to better prepare them

for future employment.49 The Castle Valley center originally accommodated 100

corpsmen, but the OEO later approved its expansion to 200 corpsmen, because of the

center’s stellar record, and the county commissioners and Price officials “went on record

as favoring the expansion of the center.”50 Ed Evatz, the director of the center,

emphasized the low drop-out rate as proof of success, and Carbon County Sheriff Albert

Passic remarked that the relationship between the residents of the center and the county

was very positive and that his job would be much easier if all youth in the county

behaved as well as the corpsmen.51 The center also injected much needed money into the

local economy through jobs at the facility and contracts with area businesses.52

On the one year anniversary of the center, officials reflected upon their

46 Ibid., 25-27. 47 Ibid. 48 OEO Report: Conservation Work Done by Castle Valley and Weber Basin Job Corps. Moss Papers, Box 165, Folder 11. 49 Ibid. 50 Welker and Evatz, 25-26; “Plans for Job Corps Center Enlargement Are Proposed,” Helper Journal, 15 January 1966, 1. 51 Welker and Evatz, 27. 52 “Jobs Corps Calls for Bids on Food Items,” Helper Journal, 24 June 1965, 1; “Poverty Program Spends Over $1 Million in Area,” Helper Journal, 20 January 1966, 1; “Job Corps Contract Let by BLM,” Helper Journal, 30 June 1966, 1.

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accomplishments. During that year, eleven corpsmen completed the program and found

jobs, four entered the military, two returned to high school with a better chance of

success because of the their Job Corps experience, and one graduated to a more

specialized urban Job Corps training center.53 Though there were some disciplinary

problems and fourteen corpsmen were sent home, the camp was frequently held up as an

example of model corpsmen behavior, and it even received a Unit Citation from the

Department of the Interior for its outstanding record.54 The individuals associated with

the program made numerous environmental contributions to the region, including the

development and improvement of recreational areas, and the community accepted the

corpsmen, inviting nearly 100 of them to visit their homes during the holidays.

In spite of those achievements, a Deseret News article published in September,

1966, gave a more mixed review of the center. On the plus side, the article recognized

that the corpsmen completed multiple public works projects that benefited the community

and that the program rehabilitated many corpsmen, but on the negative side, there were

several serious incidents involving corpsmen, and this left the locals with a strong

“legacy of mistrust and suspicion” of the corpsmen and the program.55 There were two

incidents of violence between corpsmen and local youth, one alleged rape incident, and a

number of possible car and house burglaries. Several witnesses conceded that local boys

were at least partially responsible for the violent episodes, and the events surrounding the

alleged rape were suspect. Still, the article stated that three youths received six-month

53 William F. Smiley, “Job Corps Center Plans ‘Birthday’ Open House,” Salt Lake Tribune, 31 July 1966, 4C. 54 “Job Corps Center Receives Citation,” Helper Journal, 12 May 1966, 1. 55 “Morals Charge On, Jobs Corpsmen Hearing Friday,” Helper Journal, 21 July 1966, 1; Dexter C. Ellis and Robert D. Mullins, “Incidents Mar Image of Job Corps,” Deseret News, 23 September 1966, B1.

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jail terms for “assault with intent to commit carnal knowledge,” though it did not

specifically confirm that the three individuals convicted in the case were corpsmen.56

Although locals played a part in these events, county residents held the Job Corps

program responsible for the problems, and this tarnished the reputation of the program.

As a result, officials refused to let corpsmen walk on the road into town from the center,

limited the number of passes needed for corpsmen to visit Price, and restricted the days

and duration of those visits. Residents, almost all white, expressed concern about the

racial make-up of the camp, which at times had sixty percent black corpsmen, and were

especially outraged when black corpsmen married local girls. Despite the problems,

juvenile judge Paul Keller stated that many of the incidents were “blown up out of

proportion,” and County Commissioner Walter H. Maynard shared his appreciation for

the corpsmen who helped to complete important environmental projects.57 In addition,

many residents acknowledged the positive impact that the camp had on the local

economy, providing jobs and spending money at county business establishments.58

When President Nixon was elected, his administration reevaluated all EOA

programs, shifted the Job Corps from the OEO to the Labor Department, and reduced

funding for antipoverty programs. After the Department of Labor reviewed the Job

Corps program in 1969, labor leaders decided to eliminate sixty-five Job Corps centers

throughout the U.S., and the Castle Valley Job Corps was on the closure list.59 Some

state leaders strongly opposed this decision. Senator Moss recognized the need to reduce

the budget but argued that closing the Castle Valley Job facility and other centers was a

56 Ellis and Mullins, “Incidents Mar Image of Job Corps.” 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid., B2. 59 “Cuts Won’t Include Ogden Area Corps,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 10 April 1969, 1A.

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“shortsighted decision of the Nixon administration” because, in his opinion, the Job

Corps was “one of the most important programs to eliminate poverty, provide training

and skills for our young people and in the long run cut our relief expenditures.”60 In a

Senate speech a month later, Moss referred to the closing of Job Corps centers as a

“tragic error” and urged, “We can’t turn our backs on them [corpsmen]—not on

humanitarian grounds and not on economic grounds—because it is in our best interest to

turn them into contributing members of our society.”61 At the annual Utah Democratic

convention, Governor Rampton also publicly opposed the closing of Castle Valley and

other centers.62 In spite of this, the Castle Valley center gradually closed, and corpsmen

were given the option of transferring to other centers in the region or going home, and

about half chose to leave the program.63 When the camp officially closed on June 30,

Utah’s first Job Corps center was no more.

*******

Unlike Carbon County, Davis County was a mostly suburban county located

along the Wasatch Front and had the second lowest poverty rate in the state, and the

lowest among the state’s most densely populated areas. Therefore, it seems unexpected

that Davis County received more EOA antipoverty money that any other Utah county,

and it was the huge federal expenditures on two Job Corps facilities in the county that

accounted for most of that funding. Since Davis County represented only 7.3% of the

state’s population and only 8.6% of the county’s families lived in poverty, it is surprising

60 “Moss, Others Protest Closure of Job Corps,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 11 April 1969, 16C. 61 “Moss Berates Closing of Jobs Centers,” Salt Lake Tribune, 14 May 1969, 4A. 62 Douglas L. Parker, “Demos Dispute ABM Plans, Job Corps Cuts,” Salt Lake Tribune, 20 April 1969, B1, 8B. 63 Arva Smith, “Doors Closing At Job Camp,” Deseret News, 19 May 1969, 8A.

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that the county received nearly $13,000,000 in federal antipoverty aid, considering the

state as a whole collected slightly less than $22,000,000.64 This funding was used to

establish the Weber Basin Job Corps center, a small conservation facility in South Weber,

and the Clearfield Job Corps center, a much larger urban training center.

The Weber Basin Job Corps center, under the direction of the Bureau of

Reclamation, was the second conservation facility established in Utah. Situated at the

mouth of Weber Canyon in the northeastern part of Davis County, it was located near the

mountains and reservoirs, providing direct access to recreational areas in need of

development, but it was also close to Ogden and Salt Lake City, places that offered

leisure time activities for corpsmen. However, this location was not OEO’s first choice,

and there was significant community opposition to its creation. In the beginning,

officials wanted to establish a Job Corps center at the Freeport Center in Clearfield, a

community in the western part of the county, but that site fell through when Clearfield

residents organized a campaign to stop its construction.65 When Governor Rampton

vetoed the Clearfield Job Corps proposal, responding to local pressure, officials proposed

a camp at Military Springs on the Weber-Davis border in December, 1964, but South

Weber concerns about having a Job Corps center led to delays.66

In early January, 1965, government officials in charge of the proposal invited

Weber and Davis County residents to meet with them at a local church, giving them a

chance to ask questions and air their concerns about having a Job Corps center in their

64 “Table 28,” Census of the Population: 1960, 52; “Table 36,” Census of the Population: 1960, 65; “Status of Programs: Utah,” Office of Economic Opportunity, 961, 963-64, 969, Frank E. Moss Papers, Box 164, Folder 14, Special Collections, Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City. 65 “Job Corps Seeks New Utah Site,” Deseret News, 16 December 1964, B1. 66 “2 Job Corps Camps Favored by Utahns,” Deseret News, 17 December 1964, B15.

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community.67 About 200 residents of South Weber and Uintah attended the meeting, and

their reactions were mixed.68 George R. Wright of Uintah questioned the wisdom of

locating the camp in a place that was hit by extreme canyon winds every day, but Job

Corps officials said they were happy with the location because it had access to water and

utilities and it was close to the areas in need of conservation work. Other residents

worried about troublemaking corpsmen moving into the area and associating with their

children. After nearly two hours of discussion, city officials, residents, and Job Corps

authorities agreed to a two-week postponement to allow all vested parties to examine the

facts and fully discuss the ramifications. During that two-week period, residents and city

officials agreed to use a secret ballot vote to decide whether to approve the center.69 At a

very raucous meeting, residents shared their concerns about the Job Corps center and then

overwhelming voted to reject the center. South Weber voted 131-11 against, and Uintah

voted 27-7 against the project.70 Despite this lopsided vote, Clinton Woods, a Bureau of

Reclamation official, reminded those in attendance that their vote was not final and that

Governor Rampton had the final say on the construction of the center.71

As South Weber residents struggled with this decision, several pieces in the

Ogden Standard-Examiner favored the creation of the center, and many used religious

arguments to support their position. Bonnie Lorenc of Layton wrote a letter in support of

the South Weber center and publicly admonished the residents of Uintah and South

67 “Communities Slate Job Camp Meet,” Salt Lake Tribune, 23 December 1964, 33. 68 “Uintah, South Weber Ask More Time on Job Camp Proposal,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 5 January 1965, 1B. 69 “Communities to Ballot on Job Camp,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 15 January 1965, 1B. 70 “South Weber, Uintah Reject Job Corps after Stormy Session, Ogden Standard-Examiner, 20 January 1965, 1B. 71 Ibid.

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Weber for their atrocious behavior during the meeting held to discuss the center.72 She

accused them of acting in a “discourteous, un-Christian way” that brought shame upon

the state and implied that residents of these communities did not have “a legitimate

reason” to reject the center.73 Vera B. Murdock, a resident of Ogden, found it “rather

ironic that regardless of the area suggested, our respected people veto” the creation of Job

Corps centers.74 Murdock was upset that people she considered to be “good citizens,”

“ardent church members,” and “civic minded” rejected “any plan which would give our

youth jobs which would help them prevent…delinquency.”75 She urged residents to

accept the center so that these troubled young men might attend local churches and

concluded, “By welcoming these boys into our churches we would be performing a big

mission right here at home.”76 Dan Bingham and Jay Gortcinsky of Ogden disapproved

the un-Christian behavior of South Weber residents, stating that their rejection of the Job

Corps center was an example of “love thy neighbor as thyself but don’t bring him in my

neighborhood.”77 They argued that it was better to approve this camp than let these

young men join the ranks of the unemployed and asked residents to consider the many

economic benefits that the center would bring to their communities.78

Despite community opposition, President Johnson approved the South Weber Job

Corps site at the end of April, 1965 and placed the final decision in Governor Rampton’s

hands.79 Rampton leaned towards approving the camp but insisted that area residents and

72 Bonnie Lorenc, “Simple Courtesy,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 26 January 1965, 6. 73 Ibid. 74 Vera B. Murdock, “Give Boys a Chance,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 26 January 1965, 6. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid. 77 Dan Bingham and Jay Gortcinsky, “Industrial Promotion,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 28 January 1965, 6A. 78 Ibid. 79 Flora Ogan, “President OKs Site of Davis Job Camp,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 28 April 1965, 1B.

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Bureau of Reclamation officials needed to iron out their differences before he would give

the camp his final approval.80 Once Bureau of Reclamation administrators agreed to

strictly control the leisure hours of corpsmen and protect the town’s water supply from

corpsmen sabotage, city officials agreed to give the center a chance, and Rampton

officially approved the center.81 After many construction delays, the Weber Basin center

was finally completed, and the first corpsmen arrived in mid-December, 1965, with

additional groups arriving after the first of the year.82

The Weber Basin center provided underprivileged young men with an opportunity

to improve their lives by toiling in the fresh air, improving the land, and developing

vocational skills and a determined work ethic, but at the same time, allowed them to

participate in the social life of these nearby Ogden and Salt Lake City. The center’s 200

corpsmen lived and ate in a communal environment, attended general and vocational

education classes, gained important work experience, and positively affected the physical

environment around them. They lived in one of four fifty-man dormitories and ate their

meals cafeteria style.83 The general education program was self-paced, allowing them to

progress as quickly as they were able, and emphasized math and reading but also

included vocational guidance classes, a drivers’ education program, and physical

education, and corpsmen attended classes on an alternate day schedule, working one day

and attending classes the next.84 The work programs at Weber Basin were diversified,

80 “Governor Leaves Door Open for Youth Camp,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 3 May 1965, 1B. 81 “Youth Camp Cleared?,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 6 May 1965, 1B; “Weber Gains Job Corps Camp Okeh,” Salt Lake Tribune, 13 May 1965, 10B. 82 “Initial Job Corps Group Arrives at ‘Home Away From Home’,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 16 December 1965, 1B; “15 Job Corps Youth at Weber Camp,” Deseret News, 16 December 1965, 2C. 83 OEO Report: Conservation Work Done by Castle Valley and Weber Basin Job Corps. Moss Papers, Box 165, Folder 11. 84 Ibid.

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allowing corpsmen to gain experience building mountain trails and bridges, in carpentry,

heavy-equipment operation, surveying, truck driving, and the work leaders were

journeymen in their areas with many years of experience.85 Job Corps officials expected

all corpsmen to take responsibility for general camp chores, maintain a neat appearance,

be responsible, and develop good work habits.86 Corpsmen in good standing had an

opportunity to participate in various on-site recreations, including intramural sports,

games, and crafts, or earn passes that allowed them to take trips to Salt Lake, local

amusement parks, or even take backpacking trips into the Uintah Mountains.87

During its first months of operation, the South Weber Job Corps center received

mixed reviews. On a positive note, the South Weber corpsmen worked on many

conservation projects that expanded recreational opportunities in the area, and at least

thirty corpsmen successfully completed the program and went back to school, got jobs,

entered the military, or enrolled in urban Job Corps training centers.88 The center did not

have any serious incidents like those that occurred at other centers, and center director

Richard Ulrich was pleased at how little friction there was between the community and

corpsmen.

Unfortunately, not all reports about the center were as positive. During the first

eight months, almost thirty percent of corpsmen dropped out or were dismissed, and eight

corpsmen were arrested, most for drinking.89 In the early summer of 1966, Ogden City

parks officials alleged that corpsmen acted inappropriately in the city’s Municipal

85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid. 88 Dexter C. Ellis, “Weber Job Center Feels Its Way,” Deseret News, 24 September 1966, B1. 89 Ibid.

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Gardens.90 On a number of occasions, park patrons accused them of making “obscene

statements and gestures,” “rowdy conduct,” and acts of vandalism.91 Ogden Police Chief

Ernest Shaw indicated that corpsmen had engaged in unacceptable behavior but also

recognized that they were not the city’s only trouble-makers. Arvin Shreeve, the county

parks director, insisted that Job Corps students contributed to a rise in vandalism and city

costs to repair damages. When Shreeve wrote to Director Ulrich to discuss this situation,

he was careful to emphasize that corpsmen of all races, Caucasians as well as blacks and

Hispanics, were guilty of improper behavior and that it was not “a racial problem.”92

Due to limited evidence and vague accusations, it is difficult to determine whether

corpsmen were responsible for the increase in vandalism and improper conduct or

whether they simply became the scapegoat for a rise in bad behavior in Weber County.

As in other places, the South Weber center faced allegations of racial

discrimination. During the summer of 1968, Ogden NAACP leaders complained about

the center, charging that conditions bordered on that of “slave labor camps.”93 Ogden

NAACP president James H. Gillespie charged that “manual labor rather than useful

training” was the primary purpose of the South Weber Job Corps facility.94 He also

claimed that the center unfairly jailed corpsmen, cut off communications between

corpsmen and the NAACP, and failed to hire minority employees in proportion to the

number of minority corpsmen at the facility. Director Ulrich responded to these

allegations, stating that most jobs at the center were filled according to civil services rules

90 “Park Official Flays Job Corps Conduct,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 23 June 1966, B1. 91 Ibid. 92 “Park Official Flays Job Corps Conduct,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 23 June 1966, B1. 93 “Rights Aide Assails 2 Job Centers,” Salt Lake Tribune, 16 July 1968, 9. 94 Ibid.

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and regulations, and therefore, they were not free to hire whomever they wanted. He also

explained that he had no knowledge of problems with jailing and that the center

encouraged NAACP involvement in the development of the center’s educational

programs and urged corpsmen to get involved in NAACP activities.95

The South Weber conservation center experienced some problems, but they were

few in number and limited in severity. Local officials accused corpsmen of behaving

badly, but the evidence was limited and the complaints were broad. Like centers in other

places, there were also accusations of racial discrimination, and some argued that the

program failed to prepare corpsmen for jobs in demand at that time. Despite the

complaints, the South Weber Job Corps center weathered the storm, and after fifty years,

it is still operational.

*******

Although the OEO considered the establishment of several other Job Corps

centers in Utah, including a proposed Powell Job Corps Center—to be run by the U.S.

Forest Service in rural Kane County—and an urban center in Orem (Utah County), they

ultimately approved the urban Clearfield Job Corps center, the third and final one in

Utah.96 Although the possibility of establishing a center at that location generated a lot of

discussion, debate, and opposition, gradually those who favored it managed to pull

together a strong coalition, and it became the largest Job Corps center in the state. In

early 1966, the OEO approved the establishment of this urban industrial camp at the

95 Ibid. 96 Peter S. Marthakis II to Governor Calvin L. Rampton, 7 September 1965, Calvin L. Rampton Papers, Series 14250, Reel 3, Box 1, Folder 21, Utah State Archives, Salt Lake City; “Kane Group Urges Job Corps Unit,” Salt Lake Tribune, 22 February 1965, 28; “Reconsider Job Corps,” Ogden Standard Examiner, 9 March 1965, 7.

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former Clearfield Naval Supply Depot, selected the Thiokol Chemical Corporation to run

it, granting them a renewable fifteen-month contract, and allocated $12,850,000 for the

renovation of existing buildings, the construction of other needed facilities, and the early

operation of the camp.97 Given the size of the facility and the number of recruits

involved, Clearfield and surrounding communities worried about the impact that the

center would have on them. While all three Utah Job Corps centers faced local

opposition, the discussion in Clearfield lasted longer than in any other Utah community.

Even before the construction of the Weber Basin center, OEO officials wanted to

build a Job Corps facility in Clearfield. As soon as Congress passed the EOA in 1964,

the OEO chose the Freeport Center—near the old naval supply depot in Davis County—

as their preferred site for one of the first three conservation centers in the Mountain

West.98 Senator Bennett announced the selection of the Clearfield location and informed

the public that once Governor Clyde gave his final approval, 100 corpsmen would fill the

center, and they would focus on conservation and recreation projects at Willard Bay State

Park in neighboring Weber County. Given the tone of Bennett’s announcement, it

seemed that the decision was final, but a newspaper article appearing the next day made it

seem less certain. It indicated that the governor was awaiting the release of additional

information before giving his support to the center.99 Clyde stated, “In general, I am in

favor of this program, particularly if the camp participants do something constructive,”

but he wanted to know more about who would be assigned to the center, their proposed

97 “Status of Programs: Utah,” 964; Ken Lewis, “Urban Job Corps Contract Officially Given Thiokol,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 31 March 1966; OEO Press Release, 31 March 1966. Moss Papers, Box 165, Folder 11. 98 “Youth Corps Site Selected,” Deseret News, 19 August 1964, B1. The other two sites selected were on the Nez Perce National Forest in Idaho and in Casper, Wyoming. 99 “Clyde Waiting Word on Clearfield Camp,” Deseret News, 20 August 1964, F5.

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activities, and other relevant information before he signed off on the camp.100

An Ogden Standard-Examiner editorial provided some insight into the reasons for

the governor’s delay. According to the editorial, property owners at the Freeport Center

urged him to make sure that there would be “adequate security measures” to prevent

corpsmen from roaming through their businesses and vandalizing before he gave his

approval.101 While the writer recognized that their security concerns were reasonable, the

editorial also argued that involved parties should quickly resolve the matter and the

governor should approve the camp so that “the Job Corps can make a lasting

contribution—to the youth it helps train and to the community.”102 The following day,

the Standard-Examiner again ran an editorial in support of the Clearfield center, stating

“Job Corps definitely can make an important contribution to our area” by completing

important environmental projects, injecting nearly $15,000 into the local economy each

month, and providing young men with valuable educational and vocational training.103

In the midst of the early indecision about establishing the Clearfield center, the primary

newspaper in northern Utah demonstrated its support of the Job Corps program.

Many locals opposed the establishment of the center because they believed that

many corpsmen were criminals. Opponents of the center engaged in a smear campaign,

alleging that most prospective corpsmen had criminal records and that many would be

coming directly from the riot-rocked streets of Watts, California.104 Even Salt Lake

Mayor J. Bracken Lee and the Salt Lake City Commission got involved, hurling

100 Ibid. 101 “Job Corps Camp,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 2 September 1964, 4. 102 Ibid. 103 “Utah Job Corps Conservation Camp,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 10 September 1964, 6A. 104 “Thiokol Defends Job Corps as Protests Mount,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 27 September 1966, 1B.

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accusations about the criminality of prospective corpsmen, in order to halt the

construction of the Clearfield center, fearing that troubles in Davis County would spread

to Salt Lake.105 Job Corps officials denied these allegations, and invited anyone with

concerns to look at the records of the corpsmen coming to Utah.106 Davis County Sheriff

Kenneth Hammon shared his belief that, based on events in other locations, the crime rate

would increase and county officials were not prepared to handle the increase.107

As Governor Clyde continued to deliberate, twelve Clearfield residents met with

the governor to protest the proposed camp.108 James F. Hannon, director of the

Clearfield Freeport Center and spokesman for the residents, argued that the housing of

troubled youth at the old naval depot posed a security risk to all businesses located there

and stated, “The Job Corps camp is being crammed down our throats.”109 While Hannon

liked the idea behind the program, he did not appreciate that federal authorities were

unwilling to listen to their concerns. Frank C. Stuart, Davis County industrial bureau

director, told the governor that an undertaking of this size required more planning than

the center had received.110 C. Ross Kearl, a member of the Clearfield City Council,

stated that city officials were never consulted about the placement of the center.111

Another member of the group was David E. Adams, the president of Clearfield Chamber

of Commerce. Adams felt that they needed to develop a policy to deal with corpsmen

accused of breaking the law because he feared that, if problems arose, there would be

105 “Welcoming Hand for Job Corpsmen,” Salt Lake Tribune, 26 September 1966, 20; William C. Thompson, “Stop Slandering Job Corps,” Salt Lake Tribune, 26 September 1966, 20. 106 “Thiokol Defends Job Corps as Protests Mount.” 107 Brink Chipman, “’More Crime,’ Predicts Sheriff about Job Corps,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 30 September 1966, 1B. 108 “Job Corps Starts in October,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 25 September 1964, B1, B3. 109 “Group Protests Youth Camp Plans,” Salt Lake Tribune, 25 September 1964, C1. 110 Ibid. 111 Ibid.

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conflicts between Job Corps officials and city leaders over how to handle them.112 At the

conclusion of the meeting, Governor Clyde indicated that he had mixed feelings about

Job Corps, admitting that he saw it as something of an “election gimmick,” but he hoped

that it might make some useful environmental contributions to the area and, at the same

time, help corpsmen to develop skills for a brighter economic future.113

Following the meeting, Clearfield City officials lodged a formal protest of the

center with the governor’s office. A letter, written by Mayor Joseph Knight and

delivered by City Manager Glen Willardson, stated that city leaders opposed the center

because of possible security concerns.114 Given the proposed location, corpsmen would

have to cross private property to enter and exit the center, and the owners of that property

worried that they posed a threat and might prevent prospective businesses from relocating

to the Freeport Center. Members of the city council and the chamber of commerce felt

that the presence of so many young men living together in a confined space might

“encourage problems.”115 While they opposed the proposed location for this center, city

officials emphasized that they were not opposed to the Job Corps program and expressed

their hope that the OEO might consider another location in the state, suggesting the

Canyonlands National Park area.

As the deadline for a final decision on the center approached, many came forward

to share their support for the program, in general, and the creation of a Clearfield Job

Corps center. In a letter to the editor, Glen O. Buckland of Brigham City, a man who had

112 Ibid. 113 Ibid. 114 “City in Davis to Oppose Work Camp,” Salt Lake Tribune, 29 October 1964, E1; “Clearfield Votes ‘No’ on Proposed Job Corps Camp,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 27 October 1964, 1B. 115 “Clearfield Votes ‘No’ on Proposed Job Corps Camp.”

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spent his adult life as a policeman and a correctional officer, expressed his support.116

Based on his own personal experiences, he argued that Job Corps was needed and would

positively impact many lives. He admitted that during his youth he had been a

troublemaker, but the CCC had saved him, and he believed that many of the prisoners he

met while working for the California Department of Corrections would have stayed out

of trouble if they had participated in a similar program. He concluded, “Utah has the

reputation of being one of the few states who give one hang for young people. Show

these young people it is true. Give them a chance so guys like me don’t stand over them

some day with a shotgun.”117 When M. Ralph, a resident of Layton, read Buckland’s

letter, he emphatically agreed with its main points. He said that, despite his close

proximity to the proposed camp, he had no fear of the corpsmen who would live there

and argued that these troubled young men might actually teach the locals some important

life lessons.118 To emphasize how important this issue was, Ralph stated, “I feel that if

the people of Davis County turn their backs on these boys then our shame is greater than

that of Dallas,” referring to the Kennedy assassination.119 In his conclusion, Ralph urged

local officials to listen to the opinions of all residents on this issue, not just the opponents,

and he suggested that the issue be put to a vote.

An editor at the Ogden Standard-Examiner added his voice in support of the

center. He set his tone early, stating, “One of the greatest personal feelings is that of

being wanted. Not to be wanted is about the worst sensation that a person can have.”120

116 “Job Corps Camps,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 14 October 1964, 6A. 117 Ibid. 118 “Wants Camp,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 23 October 1964, 6A. 119 Ibid. 120 “Corps Not Wanted,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 29 October 1964, 16A.

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He then recounted all of the reasons that Clearfield officials and members of the chamber

of commerce gave for not wanting the center, including the possible negative impact on

business development in the area. The editorial challenged these positions, arguing that

the center would inject much needed money into the local economy through salaries and

purchased supplies, rehabilitate “poverty-stricken youths,” and complete environmental

projects at places where they needed “all of the help they can get.”121

Despite these supportive voices, the desires of the mayor, the city council, and the

chamber of commerce drown them out, and the OEO removed Clearfield from their list

of prospective Job Corps locations.122 Even after the decision was made, northern Utah

residents continued to share their feelings about the program in the state’s newspapers.

Buckland once again weighed in to share his disappointment, attacking the moral

conscience of the newspaper’s readers, in the process. He argued that the Freeport Center

was not as economically important as city officials believed and that the residents of

apartments in the area were no better than prospective corpsmen.123 In his conclusion,

Buckland said, “Oh well, I guess compassion is truly dead…When you go to church next

Sunday say a prayer, not for those boys but for yourself. They don’t need it. You do.”124

After reading Buckland’s letter, Florence E. Anway of Roy joined him in attacking

Clearfield residents. Anway questioned, “Sure, there will be extra problems with these

young men but aren’t we concerned with what happens to the youth of our nation?”125

She reminded readers of the Golden Rule and the many obstacles that corpsmen had

121 Ibid. 122 “Nix on NSD Job Corps Site,” Salt Lake Tribune, 17 November 1964, 17. 123 Glen O. Buckland, “Job Corps Center,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 3 November 1964, 4. 124 Ibid. 125 Florence E. Anway, “Why Turn Our Backs?,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 10 November 1964, 6A.

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already faced in their young lives and concluded, “Someone has to hold out their hand to

help these boys…Let them come here and let’s be hospitable and bid them welcome.”126

Ed Herzog, a Salt Lake Tribune reader, also invoked the Golden Rule and condemned

Utahns for failing to live up to a religious standard that they often quoted but rarely

followed.127 To support his claim, Herzog referred to Clearfield’s rejection of a Job

Corps center and local examples of racial discrimination happening at the same time that

state residents vocally denounced Southern treatment of blacks.

In the immediate aftermath of Clearfield’s rejection of the first Job Corps center

proposal, Bonnie Lorenc of Layton was one of the few Davis County residents to

publicly share her support of the decision. While she generally approved of the Job

Corps program, she also accepted the reasons that Clearfield officials gave for rejecting

the center.128 Because she had attended all public meetings about the proposed center

location, asked questions, and visited the Freeport Center, Lorenc felt that she was “well

qualified to set the record straight” on the city’s opposition to the center.129 After seeing

the apartments, businesses, and the school for handicapped people located at the Freeport

Center, she understood the arguments against building a facility in that location, but she

still supported the creation of Job Corps centers in other places.

When the OEO informed Governor Clyde that Clearfield location was no longer

being considered and that South Weber had taken its place, it seemed that that was the

end of the matter, and things calmed down in Clearfield. However, the vacant Freeport

126 Ibid. 127 Ed Herzog, “Utah’s Bad Image,” Salt Lake Tribune, 23 December 1964, 18. 128 Lorenc, “What Kind of People?;” Bonnie Lorenc, “Opposition Reasons,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 20 November 1964, 6A. 129 Lorenc, “Opposition Reasons.”

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Center facility proved too promising for Job Corps authorities to ignore. In the fall of

1965, new rumors of a possible Job Corps center began, and this time, they did not go

away. Instead of establishing a rural conservation center, Thiokol Chemical Corporation,

a business most associated with the development of rockets, proposed a larger urban

training center and quickly won the support of Governor Rampton.130 Rampton stated, “I

firmly believe it offers a sound opportunity to advance the economy of northern Utah,”

and he confirmed that he had discussed it with the state’s congressional delegation and

that they “support it and are working actively for this proposal.”131 The proposed

training center would be larger than the previously considered conservation center,

enrolling over 1,000 youth rather than only 100 to 200, and if approved, this center would

provide “more specialized, intensive vocational training” than a conservation center.132

Thiokol officials projected that this facility would employ at least 350 local workers and

pump approximately $7.5 million into the northern Utah economy.133

When he announced a city council meeting to discuss the second Job Corps

proposal, Clearfield Mayor Joe Knight stated that Thiokol’s plan to establish an urban

training center at the Freeport Center “came as a big surprise” and recommended that

everyone interested in the matter attend the meeting.134 Based on available newspaper

articles from the period, it appears that the Clearfield City Council, quite likely the same

individuals that rejected the earlier Job Corps proposal, were more open to the creation of

this larger urban training center.135 It also had the support of important political,

130 Don C. Woodward, “Rampton Backs Thiokol on Job Center,” Deseret News, 9 September 1965, B1, B4. 131 Ibid., B1. 132 Ibid., B4. 133 Cliff Thompson, “Thiokol Bids for Urban Job Corps Training Plan,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 9 September 1965, B1. 134 “Two Items of Interest on Clearfield Docket,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 13 September 1965, 5A. 135 “Clearfield Okays Job Corps,” Deseret News, 14 September 1965, 6B.

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religious, and community leaders. Governor Rampton championed the center, stating:

It means additional jobs for…men and women who will be involved in the training, additional business for those firms that will supply the Job Corps Camp, and will provide us with a reservoir of well trained young men with which to attract new industry into our state. Most importantly, it will give us…the opportunity to demonstrate our leadership in providing aid and guidance to these young men, doing our part to help them become useful and productive citizens for our county.136

Congressmen King and Burton and Senators Moss and Bennett also endorsed the Thiokol

center.137 To demonstrate his support, King stated, “This program is an example of

Federal, State, and Local cooperation in its finest form from which all three will

benefit.”138 Although he qualified his support of the center, contingent on the wishes of

local officials, Burton declared:

I have long believed that the way out of poverty and unemployment is on a highway paved with education. The Job Corps concept seeks to afford underprivileged Americans an opportunity to travel along this road. As President Johnson has said, ‘We seek to make tax-payers out of tax-eaters.’ I support the Thiokol application and hope the community leaders will also.139

The Bi-City Urban League, headquartered in Ogden, supported the training center

because its leaders felt that it was “greatly needed” and would be “a decided asset to the

Intermountain Area.”140 Other groups that declared their support included Ogden City

and Roy (Weber County), all the municipal governments in Davis County, the Davis and

Weber County Commissioners, the Ogden and Clearfield Chambers of Commerce, the

Ogden Ministerial Association, the Ogden NAACP, the Utah State AFL-CIO, state

136 “Statement of Governor Calvin L. Rampton,” 31 March 1966, Rampton Papers, Series 14250, Reel 11, Box 6, Folder 4. 137 “Seek Clearfield Job Camp,” Salt Lake Tribune, 5 October 1965, 2; “Burton Backs Job Camp,” Salt Lake Tribune, 23 November 1965, 16; “Moss States Job Camp about Ready,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 26 December 1965, 1B; Senator Bennett Telegram, 8 September 1965, Moss Papers, Box 165, Folder 10. 138 Representative King Telegram, Moss Papers, Box 165, Folder 10. 139 Representative Burton Telegrams, 8-9 September 1965, Moss Papers, Box 165, Folder 10. 140 Bi-City Urban League Letter to Governor Rampton, 21 September 1965, Rampton Papers, Series 14250, Reel 3, Box 1, Folder 21.

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school superintendent T. H. Bell, the University of Utah, and Weber State College.141

Even the First Presidency of the LDS Church indicated that they had “no objection” to

the establishment of the training camp.142 This time around it seemed that the most

influential people in Utah got behind the Job Corps program.

As politicians and businessmen weighed the benefits of establishing a training

center, there was little, if any, public debate about the ways that this proposal differed

from the one that failed less than a year earlier. Yet, it is possible to read between the

lines to establish the reasons why the first center failed and the second succeeded. First,

the original proposal was very small in scale and was under the direction of a government

agency while the later program was much larger and under the control of a private

corporation that had proved itself very successful at training workers in northern Utah.

Due to sheer size, the Thiokol plan would have a more profound impact on the area’s

economy, and men like Governor Rampton focused on encouraging economic

development. As happened in so many places, local political and business leaders used

federally-sponsored programs to help the middle class and the overall economy as much

as, or more than, the specific population these programs were intended to help. Second,

the people of Utah may have had more faith in Thiokol’s ability to provide marketable

vocational training for these young men compared to the manual labor and conservation

focus of the earlier proposal. Third, Thiokol officials likely benefited from the earlier Job

Corps failure because they were able aware of the issues that most concerned the

community—such as security fears—and developed solutions to those problems prior to

141 List of Clearfield Job Corps Supporters, Moss Papers, Box 165, Folder 10. 142 Governor Rampton telegram to Senator Moss, 2 September 1965, Rampton Papers, Series 14250, Reel 3, Box 1, Folder 21.

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submitting their proposal.

After all the discussions, debates, and arguments, Senator Moss finally announced

the official approval of the Thiokol-operated training center.143 He stated that Thiokol

officials would use the $12 million OEO grant to begin assembling a staff in August, that

remodeling and construction on the site would also begin then, and that corpsmen would

begin arriving in October. With this official announcement, supporters urged

neighboring communities to recognize the positive impact that the facility would have on

the local economy and do all they could to ensure the success of the program. An Ogden

Standard-Examiner editorial emphasized the tremendous economic benefits of the

program, including 350 new jobs and $12 million injected into the local economy, but

questioned whether the area would actually earn that money.144 The editorial reasoned

that the commitment between the Thiokol center and Clearfield was a two-way street that

could bring economic rewards to the area but only if the community embraced the

program and did all they could to improve the lives of the corpsmen. Speaking at the

ceremony to celebrate the official approval of the center, Governor Rampton echoed the

sentiments of the Standard-Examiner editorial.145

Even after staffing, training, and construction of the center had begun, people

continued to express concern about Job Corps and the Clearfield training center. In a

letter to the editor, Ray Wylie returned to a common complaint, the cost of Job Corps

education.146 To make his argument, Wylie did some simple math, comparing the cost of

143 “Thiokol Gets OK To Operate Urban Job Corps Center,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 23 March 1966, B1; Gordon Eliot White, “Thiokol Okays Job Corps,” Deseret News, 23 March 1966, B1. 144 “Challenge of Clearfield ‘College’,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 25 March 1966, 6A. 145 “Freeport Ceremony Officially Signals Clearfield Urban Job Corps Center,” Salt Lake Tribune, 1 April 1966, B3. 146 Ray Wylie, “Lost Sense of Proportion,” Salt Lake Tribune, 12 April 1966, 10.

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educating a corpsman and a student at the University of Utah, and concluded that society

had its priorities backwards, spending more on Job Corps students than college students.

He also admonished Moss for referring to the Clearfield Job Corps program as “a highly

economical operation,” inferring that it was anything but economical.147 About a month

after the Thiokol camp was announced, the Deseret News printed a story about how

Clearfield residents were responding to news of the center, and responses varied

dramatically. Some expressed concern at the high percentage of blacks enrolled in Job

Corps and questioned the social implications of introducing a sizeable minority

population into Clearfield’s relatively homogenous population.148 Clearfield Mayor

Charles J. Eddy also had mixed emotions about the center. He was hopeful about the

work that the corpsmen would complete and the way the community would respond to

the center, but he had significant concerns about the extra burdens that it might place on

the city, especially the police, fire department, and water and sewage systems. Though

the center was scheduled to open soon, residents continued to have reservations.

Even as the Clearfield center prepared to receive its first corpsmen, it seemed

possible that opponents might prevent its opening. In late September, less than a month

before the first corpsmen were set to arrive, there were rumors of a protest meeting, and

Thiokol representatives scheduled their own meeting, hoping to provide answers to

difficult questions and preempt a protest.149 They invited the mayors and city council

members from all towns in Davis County, many of whom had taken office since the

training center was approved, so that they could voice their concerns and a company

147 Ibid. 148 Wanda Lund, “Community Accepts Job Corps Challenge,” Deseret News, 3 May 1966, B2. 149 “Special Meeting Called On Job Corps Center,” Deseret News, 26 September 1966, 22B.

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spokesmen could respond to them and build support for the center. At the meeting,

officials from as far away as Salt Lake City shared their fears about the Clearfield center.

The Salt Lake contingent insisted that only Utahns should be able to enter the program,

Davis County Sheriff Ken Hammond and others worried that the crime rate in the county

would skyrocket, and many feared that corpsmen would fraternize with local girls.150 In

response to Sheriff Hammon’s concerns, William W. Dodgson, the director of the

Clearfield JC center, conceded that introducing 1,200 new residents into a community,

regardless of who they were, might lead to more crime, but he assured Hammon that they

had a security plan in place, including thirty-four counselors and two patrol cars with

radios to monitor the corpsmen, and that they would deal with all problems

immediately.151 Davis County Commissioner Glen Flint and others expressed their anger

with Thiokol representatives and state leaders for their secretive conduct prior to the

public announcement of the training center proposal.152 Thiokol officials tried to

reassure those in attendance, but many remained skeptical. Mayor Morris Swapp of

Farmington was one of the few Job Corps supporters because he was a high school drop-

out and the GI Bill had provided him a chance to get an education and become an

elementary school principal and the mayor of the largest town in the county. He

recommended that everyone put their reservations on hold and give the program a

chance. Because of the imminent arrival of corpsmen, even those who were opposed

agreed to go along with the center but to carefully watch the program.

150 Gary Blodgett and Muriel Shupe, “Citizens Voice Fears of Center,” Deseret News, 27 September 1966, B1, 10B. 151 “Thiokol Prepared to Deal with Job Corps Difficulties,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 2 October 1966, 1B. 152 Blodgett and Shupe, “Citizens Voice Fears of Center.”

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Those who favored the Clearfield Job Corps center used state newspapers to build

support for the program. A Salt Lake Tribune editorial admonished the Salt Lake City

Commission for their attack on corpsmen while expressing a certain level of

understanding about the concerns associated with bringing a large number of diverse

young men into northern Utah communities.153 The editorial recognized that there had

been some troubling incidents at the Castle Valley and South Weber centers but reminded

readers that local high school and college students sometimes caused problems, and yet

their communities survived. In essence, the editorial urged people not to worry

unnecessarily about possible problems, emphasizing that corpsmen were screened before

being accepted to filter out juvenile delinquents. The editorial argued that Job Corps

centers had lower crime rates than the average U.S. city and a lower drop-out rate than

many colleges, and therefore, residents should make the best of the situation, embrace the

program, and help the corpsmen to succeed. William C. Thompson of Price asked Mayor

Lee and other Job Corps opponents to stop repeating unfounded rumors about the alleged

criminal behaviors of corpsmen because the screening process kept the worst

troublemakers out of the program.154 Because local youths sometimes took part in illegal

activities, dropped out of school, and ended up in reform schools, Thompson encouraged

his readers to accept that everyone makes mistakes and avoid holding corpsmen to a

standard that many locals could not meet.

Whether Clearfield residents were ready, the Thiokol Corporation completed all

necessary construction and on-site renovations, and the first corpsmen arrived. Three

hundred corpsmen arrived in October when the center officially opened, 400 entered in

153 “Welcoming Hand for Job Corpsmen,” Salt Lake Tribune, 26 September 1966, 20. 154 William C. Thompson, “Stop Slandering Job Corps,” Salt Lake Tribune, 26 September 1966, 20.

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November, 200 came in January, an additional 200 entered in February, and with the

final group of 100 corpsmen arriving in March 1967, the full complement of 1,200

recruits were in place.155 At its peak, the center employed nearly 500 staff members,

including teachers, administrators, and support personnel, and became the largest Job

Corps facility in the state.156 In many ways, the Clearfield facility was the same as the

other two centers in Utah. Corpsmen received housing, medical and dental care, well-

balanced meals, and all necessary clothing, and they had access to personal services such

as barbers, shoe and clothing repair, and laundry facilities.157 The center provided a self-

paced basic education program, emphasizing functional literacy for employability,

guidance counseling, important life-skills lessons, recreation opportunities, vocational

training, hands-on work experience, and job-placement services upon completion of the

program.158 Like other centers, the Clearfield Job Corps’ primary objective was to train

young men for useful employment and a brighter future.159 Yet, the Clearfield facility

was different as it was the only urban training center and the only one privately operated.

Given the differing needs of each corpsman, the program allowed each participant

to select his own educational pathway. Some completed the full complement of courses,

normally taking a year to do so, and these graduates earned a diploma.160 Others spent at

least seven months but less than a year in the program, taking general education and

vocational classes, and they received an “institute diploma” upon completion.161

155 Clearfield Urban Job Corps Training Center Fact Sheet. Moss Papers, Box 165, Folder 12. 156 Ibid. 157 Ibid.; OEO Report: Conservation Work Done by Castle Valley and Weber Basin Job Corps. 158 Clearfield Urban Job Corps Training Center Fact Sheet; OEO Report: Conservation Work Done by Castle Valley and Weber Basin Job Corps. 159 Clearfield Urban Job Corps Training Center Fact Sheet. 160 Clearfield Job Corps Center News Release, 4 November 1968. Moss Papers, Box 225, Folder 7. 161 Ibid.

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Corpsmen also earned GED certificates by completing high school equivalency classes in

their deficient areas and passing a standardized test covering general knowledge.162 If a

corpsman failed to pass the test the first time, he could study and take the test again.

These options allowed each corpsman the chance to select the educational program that

was best for his particular situation.

At the same time, corpsmen received vocational training and gained valuable

work experience. Because it was an urban center focused on developing industrial skills,

students had a variety of vocational options, including some that were more technically

advanced than those offered at a conservation center. Vocational programs prepared

corpsmen for jobs as veterinarian assistants, automotive and small engine repairmen,

food processors, chemical and plastics technical laboratory assistants, and heating, air

conditioning, and refrigeration technicians.163 Given the nature of these programs,

Clearfield corpsmen were better prepared to find industrial work and become

economically self-sufficient than those who attended the state’s conservation centers.

To counter the bad press and tarnished reputations associated with Job Corps

facilities in other places and build support for the program in Davis County, Thiokol

officials emphasized that community service was vital to the success of the Clearfield

center. They believed that community involvement would help corpsmen to develop

good relationships with surrounding cities and towns and teach them the importance of

giving back to their communities.164 Program directors cultivated opportunities to have

162 Ibid. 163 Ken Lewis, “Urban Job Corps Contract Officially Given Thiokol,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 31 March 1966, B1; “Job Corps Explained To Clearfield Kiwanis,” Weekly Reflex, 7 July 1966, 1. 164 “Jobs Corpsmen Emphasize Community Services,” Thiokol Chemical Corporation newsletter, 5 July 1967. Moss Papers, Box 225, Folder 7.

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their students interact with locals. Over the years, corpsmen assisted with CAP projects,

organized community outreach to recruit eligible youth to the Job Corps program,

repaired park equipment, provided assistance to elderly welfare recipients opening a used

clothing store, cleaned up local recreation areas, and helped a local family with a

construction project to expand their home.165 Charles J. Moxley, the director and general

manager of the Clearfield center, believed that these projects taught the corpsmen

responsibility and helped them to gain acceptance from and learn about local residents.166

Over time, the center developed a strong reputation for doing good work, and this

led the OEO to approve a VISTA training program at the Clearfield center. Starting in

early 1968, OEO allocated $349,000 to the Thiokol Corporation for the creation of a

training program for new VISTA volunteers.167 In February, the first volunteers arrived

for four weeks of training that focused on the skills necessary to volunteer at Job Corps

facilities across the nation, including training in student counseling, basic education,

vocational education, and general life skills.168 Between February and mid-July, ten

VISTA trainee groups received training at the Clearfield center and then OEO reassigned

them to other Job Corps centers.169 Many institute-trained Job Corps graduates who had

finished the preliminary program but stayed on for advanced training worked as

counseling, teaching, and recreational aides for the VISTA training program.170 This

program became a model for other VISTA training programs.

Still, the struggle to win community acceptance continued. Shortly after the first

165 Ibid. 166 Ibid. 167 Thiokol Chemical Corporation News Release, 12 January 1968. Moss Papers, Box 225, Folder 7. 168 Ibid. 169 Ibid. 170 Ibid.

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corpsmen arrived, Clearfield Mayor Eddy and Senator Bennett warned OEO director

Sargent Shriver that if the city did not receive additional funding to strengthen the local

police force and fire department, they would do everything in their power to close the

center.171 In his letter to Shriver, Bennett emphasized that Clearfield was a small town,

and any increase in police or fire personnel required because of corpsmen’s misbehavior

would put an undue financial burden on the city and that insurance companies had

already warned property owners that their premiums would increase.172 To offset these

costs, Bennett demanded that Thiokol and the OEO needed to provide more money. This

situation was not immediately resolved, continuing well into 1967.

Because the city would not collect significant tax revenue from the Job Corps

center until the end of 1967, the mayor warned the OEO and Thiokol that if they did not

come up with addition money to help his city, he would declare Clearfield off limits to

corpsmen as a way to prevent problems and reduce costs, or he would impose a head tax

on all corpsmen to generate needed funds.173 While some agreed with the mayor’s

proposals, R. D. Stevens, a Clearfield resident, spoke for those who opposed the mayor’s

ideas. He compared Eddy’s proposal to the tactics of the Gestapo, wondered if the mayor

understood or truly appreciated the U.S. Constitution, and argued that if the city placed a

head tax on corpsmen, no one should be exempt, including the mayor.174 Another

resident stressed that juvenile delinquency existed in Clearfield before corpsmen arrived,

but city officials had not been overly concerned about that before the creation of the

171 “Corps Police, Fire Funds Sought,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 13 October 1966, 1B; Merle Shupe, “Clearfield Demands Job Corps Center Aid,” Deseret News, 11 November 1966, A9. 172 “Bennett Spurs Job Corps Policing,” Weekly Reflex, 20 October 1966, 2. 173 “Mayor Answers Thiokol Charge,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 2 January 1967, 1B; R. D. Stevens, “Deeply Concerned,” Ogden Standard Examiner, 5 January 1967, 8A. 174 Stevens, “Deeply Concerned.”

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center and had certainly never considered a head tax.175 In February, Thiokol officials

agreed to a head tax in order to get on with the business of educating corpsmen.176

According to the agreement, Thiokol paid a tax for each employee—a tax that all

businesses paid, but they also paid $7.80 for each corpsman. When they reached full

capacity, it resulted in almost $11,000 in revenue to the city each year.

As if Clearfield Job Corps officials did not already have enough to worry about, at

the end of 1966, the local program received some bad press, including stories about

corpsmen who got into trouble with the law and a story about corpsmen flying home for

the holidays at government expense. In November, a Job Corps trainee brandished a

knife during a community dance in Ogden and tried to flee when police arrived, but

officers arrested him and turned him over to the Weber County juvenile authorities.177 A

month later, two corpsmen were arrested in Salt Lake City on charges of drunkenness,

vandalism, carrying a concealed weapon, and use of abusive language, and three under-

aged corpsmen faced disciplinary measures on similar charges.178 Police in Ogden and

Salt Lake City warned Thiokol officials that they needed to have better control over their

corpsmen when they visited these cities, or they would no longer be welcomed to visit.179

As Christmas approached, the media again delivered an attack on the program

when they broke a story that the federal government paid for corpsmen to go home on

leave while some GIs were forced to pay their own way home.180 These incidents did not

improve opinions of Job Corps in a community that was already questioning its value.

175 L. J. Rarden, “Unjustified Charges,” Ogden Standard Examiner, 5 January 1967, 8A. 176 “Thiokol Agrees to Pay Clearfield ‘Head Tax’,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 2 February 1967, B1 177 “Job Corps Gives Security Briefing,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 16 November 1966, 1C. 178 “Corps Youth Face Jail, Discipline after Spree,” Deseret News, 12 December 1966, 6B. 179 “Job Corps Warned To Exert Greater Control of Youths,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 14 December 1966, 1B. 180 “Corpsmen Fly Free, GIs Pay Own Fare,” Salt Lake Tribune, 23 December 1966, B1, 2B.

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W. Jeffrey Fillmore was one of many who expressed his outrage, stating, “I was amazed

and appalled to read…that members of the Job Corps were eligible for government-paid

visits home after six months service…One can only wonder what other spending magic is

being practiced by the Office of Economic Opportunity…which the public knows

nothing about.”181

Still, some individuals continued to support the program and encouraged others to

do the same. Eleanor Willhard of Bountiful felt that Job Corps got more than its fair

share of negative press and failed to get enough positive attention, even when the

circumstances called for it.182 According to Willhard, every time a corpsman got into

trouble it appeared in the paper, but when local youths engaged in the same sorts of

behaviors, it never made headlines. She also felt that the airfare story was distorted

because military personnel often had the option of flying free on military aircrafts, that

they made more money than corpsmen, and that many soldiers had family members that

could subsidize their travel while most corpsmen did not. Jann P. Swanson and John

Ladky, men who worked for the Central City CAP, also expressed their regret that Job

Corps only received negative press.183 They were dismayed that stories of corpsmen

behaving badly never failed to appear in the papers, but when a group of corpsmen

helped Father Merrill and Eugene Jelesnik host a Guadalupe Center Christmas party for

eighty disadvantaged youths, there was not a single mention in any local paper.

In an attempt to offset some of this negative press, state Job Corps officials tried

to initiate their own media campaign filled with positive stories about the program. One

181 W. Jeffrey Fillmore, “Job Corps Trips Protested,” Salt Lake Tribune, 31 December 1966, 8. 182 Eleanor Willhard, “Unfair to Job Corpsmen?,” Salt Lake Tribune, 27 December 1966, 14A. 183 Jann P. Swanson and John Ladky, Salt Lake City, “Applause for Corpsmen,” Salt Lake Tribune, 31 December 1966, 8.

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highlighted a project at the Clearfield Job Corps center in which corpsmen used their

recently learned vocational skills to create wooden toys for area Head Start students.184

Another congratulated corpsmen who volunteered two days a week to help children in an

Ogden City extended school day program.185 The corpsmen coached athletic events and

facilitated arts and crafts activities, creating a positive bond between the corpsmen and

the school children. They also escorted children to a summer YMCA camp, escorted

disabled children to the Shriners Circus in Ogden, and assisted with a recreation program

for migrant children.186 Winifred Hazen, the chairman of the YWCA Youth Committee,

publicly thanked the corpsmen for their time and effort.187 According to Hazen, the

corpsmen “not only supervised and looked after the children, but were helpful to the staff

and very responsible. Their friendliness greatly added to the children’s pleasure.”188

One of the most significant votes of support came from Salt Lake City Police

Chief Dewey Fillis. When the Clearfield center was first proposed, planners suggested

that corpsmen could spend free weekends in either Ogden or Salt Lake City because they

would be less disruptive in those larger communities. From the beginning, Chief Fillis

opposed the plan, and once the Job Corps center opened and corpsmen started to come to

Salt Lake on weekends, he regularly complained about how this added to his

workload.189 Over time, Thiokol officials and Salt Lake authorities worked together to

develop a system to facilitate the corpsmen’s weekend visits, and as a result, Fillis

changed his opinion about the corpsmen, stating that they had not eliminated all

184 “Corpsmen Boost Youth Program,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 16 April 1967, 2B. 185 “Corpsmen Aid Day Program,” Deseret News, 24 May 1967, A15. 186 “Job Corpsmen Give Community Service,” Deseret News, 8 August 1967, 8C. 187 Winifred Hazen, “Job Corpsmen Thanked,” Salt Lake Tribune, 14 July 1967, A18. 188 Ibid. 189 “Job Corpsmen No Problem Here, but S.L. Complains,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 25 April 1967, B1.

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problems, but that there was better understanding, relations were improving, and his job

was easier now.190 Each of these examples demonstrates that at least some people in

Utah supported the efforts of Job Corps, even some who had previously questioned the

program.

As at other centers, the Clearfield Job Corps faced charges of alleged racial

discrimination. In January, 1968, the leader of Ogden’s NAACP branch accused

Clearfield Job Corps officials of racial discrimination, and this led to an OEO

investigation.191 Gillespie charged that the Clearfield center failed to provide enough job

opportunities for minorities and that minorities who did have jobs had no employment

stability, citing as proof the statistic that thirty-two minority employees had been fired or

pressured to leave their positions at the center. He claimed that when an employee was

fired or a corpsman was removed, there was no place to appeal the decision, and that

while Thiokol paid the required head tax to offset law enforcement costs, still corpsmen

were not allowed to go into Clearfield. Center director Charles J. Moxley denied any

knowledge of an investigation but said that he and his staff welcomed it and believed it

would prove that the center was an equal opportunity employer.192

The investigation got underway on January, as four individuals from the Kansas

City office looked into the NAACP’s claims.193 After a three-day inquiry, the committee

met with Job Corps officials, and they agreed that the center would hire an equal

employment opportunity officer to handle all future complaints related to discriminatory

190 “One-Time Critic Praises Thiokol Job Corps Center,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 2 September 1967, 12. 191 “Civil Rights Team Will Begin Job Corps Probe Next Week,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 4 January 1968, 1B. 192 Ibid. 193 “’Rights’ Team Opens Probe of Job Corps,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 17 January 1968, 1B.

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hiring and firing practices and that the center needed to do more to improve community

relations.194 Gillespie was not especially happy with the outcome of the investigation

because it did not deal with the veracity of past discrimination charges but simply

established a plan to deal with future problems. Shortly after the investigation, the center

made some staff changes, including the hiring of Charlotte White—a black woman—as

the center’s new community relations director.195 In that position, White was in charge

of all community relations, tours of the center, coordination of service projects, and the

operation of the Community Relations Council. None of the articles covering the hiring

of White discussed the racial ramifications of the hiring, but it seems likely that, in light

of the OEO investigation, center officials felt that hiring a minority might diffuse some of

the racial tension and contribute to improved relations with minority groups in the

community, as suggested by the OEO investigators.

At the end of their first year in operation, Clearfield Job Corps officials presented

an evaluation of their accomplishments. In that time, approximately 3,000 corpsmen

attended the center, and officials estimated that at least thirty percent of them benefited

from their training because they found jobs, continued their schooling, or joined the

military.196 Of those who stayed at least ninety days, sixty-two percent were placed in

jobs, and the longer they stayed, the better the jobs they found. These numbers reflected

only the corpsmen that they knew about, but officials speculated that additional corpsmen

benefited from the training. While thirty percent, or even sixty-two percent, may not

seem like great success, it is important to remember that one hundred percent of these

194 “Job Corps Will Appoint Equal Opportunity Aide,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 21 January 1968, 1B. 195 “Center Fills Job Vacancy,” Deseret News, 23 January 1968, A7; “2 Get Staff Positions at Job Corps Center,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 24 January 1968, 1C. 196 “Job Corps Notes Gains,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 4 February 1968, 1B.

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corpsmen were drop-outs before they entered the Job Corps program and that any

individual who emerged from the program with a job was considered a success. Director

Moxley emphasized that employment was just one measure used to evaluate the

program’s achievements. On average, corpsmen advanced one grade level in reading for

every two months they spent at the center and left with a little less prejudice and a little

more hope than when they entered.197 Moxley argued that “the important thing about the

Job Corps is that it gives young men and women a chance to climb out of a poverty

situation and be self-respecting citizens who pay taxes and can help others.”198

The Clearfield Job Corps program continued to provide valuable community

service. In February, 1969, the corpsmen—under the direction of their student

government—worked with personnel at the Marshall White Community Center in Ogden

to organize a Red Cross blood drive.199 During the summer, thirty-five corpsmen from

the center assisted in the search for a nineteen-year-old man lost in the Uinta Mountains

and stated that they would not accept any offered reward if they found the young man.200

Despite its successes, the center still had its share of problems. In January, 1968,

four Clearfield corpsmen were arrested in connection with a burglary in Ogden, and

another was arrested for allegedly receiving stolen goods, including pistols, ammunition,

and knives.201 A jury found one of the corpsmen guilty and two of them not guilty, and a

judge dismissed the charges against the fourth corpsman.202 Two months later, twenty-

two corpsmen ran away from the center less than a week after entering the program,

197 “Job Corps Helps Many Find Work,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 23 February 1968, 1B. 198 Charles J. Moxley, “Clearfield Clarification,” Salt Lake Tribune, 7 November 1968, 20A. 199 “Job Corps to Assist On Blood Drive,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 24 February 1969, 9A. 200 “Job Corpsmen Join Hunt for Youth,” Salt Lake Tribune, 23 August 1969, 11. 201 “Police Arrest Job Corps Youths; Recover $3,000 in Stolen Loot,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 9 January 1968, 8B. 202 “Corpsman Found Guilty in U.S. Property Theft,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 5 March 1969, 15A.

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intending to return to their homes.203 While thirteen eventually returned, nine dropped

out. Another corpsman was arrested and put on trial for murdering a woman in a Salt

Lake City motel room, and although a jury eventually acquitted him of the charges, it was

yet another story that hurt the reputation of the Clearfield Job Corps and adversely

affected public feeling about the program.204 During the summer of 1968, some

corpsmen were linked to a series of automobile thefts and burglaries in Layton.205 The

following year, several violent clashes between corpsmen at the Clearfield center left

eight injured, including two who required medical attention at a local hospital, and led to

the resignation of thirteen corpsmen.206 In November, a group of corpsmen overturned

three cars on the Clearfield campus. According to Director Moxley, center officials were

taking steps to ensure that something like that would never happen again and emphasized

that few corpsmen were involved, that most corpsmen opposed this behavior, and that the

corpsmen were taking their own actions to prevent this type of behavior from

reoccurring.207 Each of these stories caused some state residents to question the

continued presence of the Job Corps program in Utah.

As 1969 came to an end, Job Corps officials attempted to limit the harmful effects

of these stories by sharing stories that highlighted the positive behavior of corpsmen and

demonstrated that many in the community supported the program. In mid-November,

over seventy percent of the corpsmen volunteered to donate some of their limited income

203 “13 Corpsmen to ‘Stay Put’,” Desert News, 14 March 1968, 2B; “Corpsmen Stage ‘Walk Out’ at Clearfield Hub,” Salt Lake Tribune, 14 March 1968, B1. 204 “Clearfield Job Corpsman to Face Trial in Shooting at S. L. Motel,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 16 May 1968, 9A; “Ex-Corpsman, Innocent of Murder, Goes Home,” Salt Lake Tribune, 21 July 1968, 2B. 205 “Job Corpsmen Involved in Layton Burglaries,” Weekly Reflex, 1 August 1968, 1. 206 “13 Job Corpsmen Resign after Fights at Clearfield,” Salt Lake Tribune, 16 October 1969, B5. 207 “Officials Investigating Job Corps Disturbance,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 9 November 1969, 14A.

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to a northern Utah charity drive to assist those who were struggling financially.208 They

also participated in Project Navajo, a drive to collect food, clothing, and toys for the

Navajos in the Four Corners region, packaging and delivering all donated goods to the

tribe.209 During the holidays, Job Corps officials encouraged community members to

invite corpsmen to visit their homes on Thanksgiving and Christmas as a way to lessen

homesickness and enhance their enjoyment of the holidays. The “Holiday Hospitality”

program proved to be very successful at Thanksgiving, as more than 500 corpsmen had

dinner with local families, and the center director thanked the community and asked them

to extend additional invitations for Christmas dinner.210

By the end of 1969, the Clearfield Job Corps center had become a permanent

fixture at the Freeport Center, but the relationship between the center and community

residents remained complex. It was the largest Job Corps facility in the state, trained

thousands of corpsmen, employed hundreds of local workers, and had a profound impact

on Davis County’s economy. Still, not everyone appreciated its presence in this small

northern Utah town. Despite mixed reviews, the center managed to maintain a toehold in

the county, and as of this writing, it is still in operation.

*******

From the very beginning, Job Corps funding represented a large majority of

Utah’s EOA money. The OEO approved three Jobs Corps centers in the state, the first a

conservation center south of Price, a second conservation center in South Weber on the

border between Weber and Davis County, and a much larger urban training center in

208 “Corpsmen Aid in Combined Funds Drive,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 13 November 1969, 1D. 209 “Indian Project Under Way,” Deseret News, 25 November 1969, 22B. 210 “Clearfield’s Hospitality Program Termed ‘Success’,” Deseret News, 26 November 1969, 4A; “Invite Corpsmen to Dinner, Clearfield Center Suggests,” Ogden Standard-Examiner, 19 December 1969, 1C.

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Clearfield. However, community residents often fought the creation of these centers,

especially in Davis County, and once they were built, they continued to have complicated

relations with the centers and the corpsmen who lived there. Utahns who supported the

Job Corps emphasized that it provided educational and vocational training to a population

in need and helped them to secure a brighter economic future, had a positive effect on the

local economy by providing jobs and increasing the demand for local products, and

improved Utah’s physical environment through the completion of conservation projects.

Opponents feared allowing outsiders—especially minorities—to settle in their

communities and the impact they would have on local youth, and assumed that corpsmen

were lazy dropouts—even criminals—who were unworthy of the vast sums of money that

taxpayers invested in the program. Whether supporting or opposing the program, Utahns

justified their positions using arguments that echoed across the nation. Carbon and Emery

Counties, the areas closet to the Castle Valley Job Corps center, were struggling

economically and welcomed the money that Job Corps injected into their economies, but

Davis County was a more interesting choice as a location to build two centers, given the

county’s overall economic health. Over the years, corpsmen completed many important

projects and provided community service, but some participated in activities that

generated ill will towards the program. Though the Castle Valley center closed in 1969

as a part of the Nixon administration’s budget cuts, the South Weber and Clearfield

centers remain open and have become accepted institutions in Davis County.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

In the end, the War on Poverty was really more a Cold War-era “police action”

designed to minimize the effects of poverty than a real “war,” and the Economic

Opportunity Act did not achieve its goal of ending poverty in Utah or any other part of

the nation. In fact, it is difficult to determine exactly what impact it did have.

Nevertheless, at that time, many Utah residents lived in poverty and had need of

additional assistance, and therefore, Utahns applied for and accepted EOA assistance to

establish various types of antipoverty programs. Though the EOA did not end poverty, it

introduced many improvements and succeeded in making the lives of some people better.

While none of the programs was universally popular, each had supporters, and whether

they supported or opposed the EOA, Utahns used arguments that were common across

the nation to justify their positions. Almost every EOA program introduced in Utah still

exists, in some form, today, more than fifty years later. They have become a permanent

part of the social welfare landscape, and many people still depend on them.

*******

Historians of the Great Society debate how successful the War on Poverty was,

and they approach the task in many different ways. Some have taken a broad approach,

analyzing how the War on Poverty and its programs affected people across the nation.

Some works consist of a collection of individual essays or chapters written by many

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scholars who each concentrate on different aspects of the antipoverty agenda. These

include A Decade of Antipoverty Programs: Achievements, Failures, and Lessons edited

by Robert H. Haveman, The Great Society: A Twenty Year Critique edited by Barbara C.

Jordan and Elspeth D. Rostow, and The Great Society and the High Tide of Liberalism

edited by Sidney Milkis and Jerome M. Mileur. These studies attempt to identify the

overarching goals of President Johnson’s domestic agenda and determine the ways and

the extent to which the Great Society was able to achieve those objectives.

While historians agree that the primary objective was to end poverty in the United

States, they have differing opinions about the War on Poverty’s contributions and faults.

All agree that the EOA did not end poverty in the United States. According to Plotnick

and Skidmore, poverty declined very little from 1965 to 1972, and while there was a

slight reduction in absolute terms, there was actually an increase by relative standards.1

In spite of the failure to end poverty, historians provide a more complex picture of the

effects of the War on Poverty. Robert H. Haveman argues that it is nearly impossible to

evaluate the impact of Johnson’s antipoverty measures and suggests that, given the nature

of poverty, a single law could never eradicate it.2 In spite of this inability to provide an

all-encompassing evaluation of President Johnson’s antipoverty measures, Kent Germany

contends that the Great Society had a mixed record of successes and failures.3 Those

who believe that the EOA improved the lives of many argue that it brought attention to

the poverty problem and identified and assisted specific minority groups in need.4 Those

1 Robert D. Plotnick and Felicity Skidmore, Progress against Poverty: A Review of the 1964-1974 Decade (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1975), 175-76. 2 Robert H. Haveman, ed., A Decade of Federal Antipoverty Programs: Achievements, Failures, and Lessons (New York: Academic Press, 1977), 9. 3 Kent Germany, New Orleans after the Promise: Poverty, Citizenship, and the Search for the Great Society (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2006), 2-18, 62. 4 Haveman, 47.

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emphasizing the law’s failures assert that the EOA promised too much, that policy

makers set goals but failed to create a plan to achieve them, and that even though they

had the resources needed to end poverty, administration officials tried to do more than

most Americans were willing to support.5 Allen J. Matusow states that national leaders

were too willing to compromise with big corporations, political bosses, and other power

groups, and this prevented the EOA from providing adequate assistance to those in need.6

Frank Stricker, like Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz, contends that the War on Poverty

failed to achieve greater success because it focused on providing education and job

training when what the country really needed was public job creation.7

Many agree that an important result of the War on Poverty was that it helped

Americans to understand that the federal government must play a role in ending poverty.

According to John A. Andrew III, the EOA failed to end poverty, but it “identified

poverty and joblessness as the responsibility of the federal government.”8 Milkis and

Mileur agree, arguing that President Johnson’s Great Society agenda taught Americans to

expect more from the federal government in terms of social welfare programs, often at

the expense of state power.9

The EOA did not end poverty in Utah, but the poverty rate did go down.

According to the 1960 Census, almost fifteen percent of Utah’s families lived below the

5 Frank Stricker, Why America Lost the War on Poverty—and How to Win It (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 76, 180; Haveman, 47. 6 Allen J. Matusow, The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Harpers Touchstone, 1984), 220-21, 237. 7 Stricker, 235. 8 John A. Andrew III, Lyndon Johnson and the Great Society, The American Ways Series (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, Inc., 1998), 93. 9 Sidney Milkis and Jerome M. Mileur, eds., The Great Society and the High Tide of Liberalism (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005), xvi-xx.

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nationally established poverty line.10 After nearly five years of EOA programs, poverty

had not disappeared. The 1970 Census indicates that over eleven percent (11.4%) of

Utahns still lived in poverty, and this percentage was much higher for individuals living

in female-headed households (34.7%), those who were 65 years or older (26.2%), and

African Americans (44.1%).11 Among Utah families, nearly nine percent (8.8%) of

whites, over twenty-five percent (25.6%) of African Americans, and over seventeen

percent (17.6%) of Spanish-speaking families lived in poverty.12 Though poverty

remained, the drop in the overall rate represents one of most significant reductions in our

history. Ten years later, over ten percent (10.3%) of Utahns and almost nineteen percent

(18.5%) of Spanish-speaking people still lived in poverty.13 By 1990, almost nine

percent (8.6%) of families and over eleven percent (11.4%) of individuals lived in

poverty.14 In the twenty-first century, the problem of poverty remained. According to

the 2000 Census, over nine percent (9.4%) of Utah’s population lived in poverty, and

twenty-nine percent of female-headed households lived below the poverty line, and the

U.S. Census Bureau website indicates that in 2014, almost fifteen percent (14.8%) of

Utahns were living in poverty.15 Though Johnson’s War on Poverty seemed to reduce

poverty, after fifty years, it remained an unpleasant fact for far too many Utahns.

10 “Table 65,” U.S. Bureau of the Census. Census of the Population: 1960. Vol. I. Part 46, Utah. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), 86. 11 U.S. Bureau of the Census. Census of the Population: 1970. Vol. I. Part 46, Utah. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), 103. 12 “Table 58,” Census of the Population: 1970, 131. 13 “Table 245,” U.S. Bureau of the Census. Census of the Population: 1980. Vol. I. Part 46, Utah. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 327, 329. 14 “Table 29,” U.S. Bureau of the Census. Census of the Population: 1990. Vol. I. Part 46, Utah. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 44. 15 “Table 15,” U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2000 Census of Population and Housing: Summary Social, Economic, and Housing Characteristics. Part 46, Utah. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), 72; United States Census Bureau Website, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/IPE120214/00 (accessed 28 December 2015).

http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/IPE120214/00

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Despite its failure to end poverty, the EOA did have an impact on the state of

Utah. As Haveman suggests, it did bring attention to the poverty problem in the state and

helped local officials to identify and assist those in need, especially minority groups.16

From 1964 to 1969, groups from across the state applied for and received EOA

assistance, and they used the money to create programs to help the poorest residents, as

well as other groups from across the economic spectrum. Though these programs

generally helped all Utahns living in poverty, many focused on especially disadvantaged

groups, including Native Americans and migrant farm workers in the state’s rural

counties and minorities living in poor urban neighborhoods. Neighborhood Youth Corps

programs employed teens who needed economic assistance, encouraged them to stay in

school or return if they had already dropped out, and completed important community

service projects in places throughout the state. Head Start, Upward Bound, and adult

education programs increased educational opportunities for disadvantaged people of all

ages. Community Action Programs, with the assistance of VISTA volunteers, worked to

identify the most pressing problems in each neighborhood, recruited the poor to provide

input and actively seek solutions, and tried to raise the standard of living and quality of

life for these individuals. Legal Services staff worked to educate the poor about their

rights and responsibilities, ensure that no one was infringing on their rights, and provide

legal assistance in civil cases. Job Corps centers injected the most money into the state,

and while these centers did not directly benefit underprivileged Utahns, age sixteen to

twenty-one, they provided economic assistance to a wide variety of people and local

communities through jobs and government contracts. In addition, the conservation

16 Haveman, 47.

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centers completed environmental and recreational projects that benefitted surrounding

areas.

In keeping with Haveman’s suggestion that the War on Poverty led to the

identification of and assistance to minorities in need, many EOA programs in Utah

focused on Native Americans and migrant workers.17 Among the Native American

population, the EOA sponsored programs to enhance economic opportunities, improved

housing, celebrated the cultural heritage of native tribes through the creation of cultural

centers and colleges for native students, and addressed common problems such as

alcoholism. To help the state’s migrant populations, the EOA provided funding for

educational programs to help people of all ages, improved medical care services,

improved working conditions, encouraged them to become more involved in their

surrounding communities and tried to improve understanding and acceptance across

cultures, and contributed to the establishment of the statewide Utah Migrant Council.

Though people often complained that the OEO did not provide enough funding and that

the federal government was too involved in state matters, these programs helped to

improve the lives of many of Utah’s poorest rural residents.

Just as Matusow suggested, there is evidence to suggest that Utahns were far too

willing to compromise with large corporations and other traditional powerbrokers,

sacrificing the War on Poverty’s overarching goal of helping the poor.18 Although policy

makers intended the EOA as an antipoverty measure, the single biggest beneficiary in

Utah was the Thiokol Corporation, the company that operated the Clearfield Job Corps

center. At a time when many Utah counties had poverty rates higher than the national

17 Haveman, 47. 18 Matusow, 220-21, 237.

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average, the OEO approved two Job Corps centers in Davis County, one of the most

affluent counties in the state. Although there were poor citizens who benefited from

these centers, many of the jobs went to middle class individuals who did not need OEO

assistance. Leaders of the Ogden NAACP regularly protested the actions of OEO-related

programs, including the local CAPs unwillingness to hire those in need to work for the

Medicare Alert program, the unfair closing of minority owned business, and the hiring

practices at the Weber Basin and Clearfield Job Corps centers. In Utah, EOA assistance

often failed to help those most in need.

During Johnson’s administration, and especially after the passage of the EOA,

federal investment in antipoverty programs in Utah increased. Many groups recognized

the existence of poverty throughout the state and understood that OEO funding could

help the poor. Yet, there was never enough money to eliminate poverty. The EOA

continued the trend of federal involvement in the socioeconomic life of the state, and

while Utahns applied for OEO assistance, proving that some were willing to accept

federal help, many individuals protested OEO-sponsored programs. Whether it was Job

Corps centers in Davis and Carbon Counties, CAPs designed to help Native Americans

on the reservations or migrant workers in Box Elder County, or Neighborhood Youth

Corps projects to benefit underprivileged students, there was public opposition to each of

these programs. As John A. Andrew III and others argue, federal involvement in welfare

matters was commonplace in Utah, but it was never universally popular.19

Not surprisingly, long-term beliefs and feelings about poverty and the poor

affected public reaction to the EOA. According to Michael Katz, James Patterson, and

19 Andrew, 93.

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others, most Americans shied away from structural explanations for poverty, instead

choosing to blame the poor for their situation, and this has shaped welfare policy and

public feelings about poverty. Most Americans were deeply committed to the ideal of

male breadwinners, the belief men should earn an adequate wage to provide for their

families and women should stay at home attending to domestic matters.20 In general,

they believed (and believe) that there are people worthy of assistance and those who are

undeserving, lazy, irresponsible, apathetic, and unworthy of help.21 Both national leaders

and the public argued that instilling a strong work ethic was crucial for any welfare

program and feared the detrimental effects of handouts.22 According to most Americans,

private agencies, rather than public entities, should handle welfare programs, and this

belief hindered the development of government programs and the acceptance of public

programs when they emerged.23 There was also the perception that most poor Americans

were minorities. The truth was that most of the poor were white, but many minorities

lived in abject poverty.24 In accepting this discriminatory poverty myth, the public

hindered attempts to create effective welfare legislation and led to continued public

20 In order to protect his ideal, economic and social welfare policies favored assistance to men, helping women only when there was no male in the household. Society considers women’s needs, desires, and rights as secondary to those of husbands and children, accounting for many economic institutions and practices recognized as traditional, including “the sexual division of labor, disparate wages for male and female jobs, the feminization of poverty, protective labor legislation for women only, women’s dependence on government welfare.” Alice Kessler-Harris, In Pursuit of Equity: Women, Men, and the Quest for Economic Citizenship in 20th Century America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 3. 21 In describing the poor or the public’s perception of the poor, historians and public policy makers frequently use these terms. See Palmer R. Anderson, “Job Corps and Neighborhood Youth Corps: A Critical View,” Humboldt Journal of Social Relations (Vol. 1, No. 1, Fall 1973), 8-16; Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1986), x, 19-20, 50-61, 188-89, 278, 333-34; James T. Patterson, America’s Struggle against Poverty in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 8, 14, 20, 45-49, 88-89, 91-93. 22 The historiography of poverty and welfare policies are full of references to these ideas. See Anderson, 8-16; Kessler-Harris, 3-18; Katz, ix, 3-14, 25-32, 152-53; Patterson, 122-49. 23 Katz, x, 43-46, 74, 170, 216-17, 237-40, 271-72, 333; Patterson, 55-75. 24 Michael Harrington, The Other America: Poverty in the United States New York: Touchstone, 1962), 190.

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opposition to welfare policies once they were in place.25

Utahns allowed their prejudices and stereotypes about the poor and about welfare

to affect their feelings about the War on Poverty. In dealing with the poor, Utah residents

consistently supported educational and vocational programs intended to expand

opportunity rather than structural plans that would radically alter the state’s economic

system. Most Utahns believed that the poor only needed to improve themselves and

poverty would disappear. They praised EOA programs like Head Start and Upward

Bound because they promised educational solutions and opposed anything that they felt

hinted at socialism.

Most Utah residents were committed to the belief that not everyone was equally

worthy of financial help, that any antipoverty solution had to emphasize work, and that

relief was the responsibility of private institutions, especially the LDS Church. Given the

history and demographics of the state, LDS church members greatly affected the

development of social welfare policies in Utah. Church doctrine emphasized that

members had an obligation to help the “worthy poor” who suffered due to “unfavorable

conditions,” and church leaders “investigated the recipient’s religious activity and causes

of poverty” to determine who deserved financial assistance.26 During the biannual

General Conference sessions, church leaders firmly reminded members that they must

work for any assistance they received and that government doles could never replace

church assistance, with its emphasis on saving souls. Religious doctrine dramatically

affected the stunted development of state welfare programs. Because church leaders

25 Jill Quadagno, The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 4, 11-15, 33-60. 26 Garth Mangum and Bruce Blumell, The Mormon’s War on Poverty: A History of LDS Welfare, 1830-1990 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1993), 78-79.

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instructed all members to take care of their own and that only the worthy deserved help,

there was no need to approve state expenditures for public welfare, and as a result, the

state’s welfare system was perpetually underfunded and its development lagged behind

those in other states.

In their assessments of the EOA, state political leaders and citizens reinforced the

importance of these same ideas. When constituents challenged the EOA, Senator Moss

tried to win them over, claiming that this law encouraged the poor to work for the help

they received and promoted self-sufficiency. Though he was skeptical about much of the

EOA, Congressman Burton was hopeful that its educational and vocational programs

might help male breadwinners provide for their families, but he also cautioned that

officials should remain vigilant to prevent “chiselers” from receiving public assistance.

Governor Rampton did not always support EOA programs, but he energetically

championed the parts that strengthened the local economy and added jobs, such as the

Thiokol Job Corps center in Clearfield, even if the primary beneficiaries were middle and

upper class Utahns. Perhaps he supported them BECAUSE the beneficiaries were middle

class and/or the owners of big corporations, and he trusted them more than he trusted the

intended beneficiaries. Utahns that publicly commented on the EOA indicated that they

opposed federal involvement in antipoverty measures, including one of Moss’

constituents who maintained that the EOA was a Socialist attempt to interject government

into the lives of people when existing legislation already provided ways to end poverty.

Just as the majority of those living in poverty across the nation were white, so

were most of the poor in Utah. Still, the state had pockets of extreme poverty among its

minority populations, especially Native Americans on reservations and migrant workers.

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Leaders on reservations, in poor sections of Salt Lake and Ogden, and in rural areas with

large migrant populations witnessed the horrible conditions in these places and applied

for OEO assistance to help the poor. Few people outside those immediate areas were

familiar with these horrific conditions, their requests for federal aid, or the resulting

federal programs. While a few citizens complained that attempts to help migrants were

too costly or that this assistance represented federal overreach, most federally sponsored

actions failed to attract media attention or generate public reaction of any kind.

Ultimately, Job Corps spawned the greatest response—much of it negative—because it

brought poor outsiders into the state, many of them minorities and few of them Mormons.

Opponents argued that program participants threatened the social and moral fabric of

their communities.

Many historians have chosen to examine the War on Poverty through the lens of a

single OEO program, and most have focused on either CAPs or Job Corps. Of these

programs, CAPs seem to have captured the most attention. Many historians have tried to

identify the most important CAP goals and determine whether these programs achieved

them. Scholars debate whether CAPs fought to ensure the maximum feasible

participation of the poor, expanding democracy and increasing the political participation

of the poor, or whether they simply wanted to expand services available to improve the

lives of the poor. Daniel P. Moynihan, one of the architects of the Great Society, argues

that those who designed the EOA never envisioned that the poor would be directly

involved in organizing and implementing community action.27 Instead, they hoped that

CAPs would provide a way of circumventing white southern institutions and other

27 Daniel P. Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 86-87, 90-100.

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obstructionist forces to get much needed resources to blacks and other individuals who

needed them most. Frank Stricker also argues that CAP architects designed these

programs to improve social services for the poor rather than to mobilize the poor to

initiate change.28 He argues that local politicians, not the poor, controlled most projects

and that there were always too few resources allocated to generate dramatic systemic

changes.

Others take exception to the position that CAPs were mostly concerned with the

improved distribution of services to the poor. Though they did not necessarily speak to

the original intent of CAP architects, Noel A. Cazenave, William S. Clayson, Annelise

Orleck, and Kent Germany argue that some CAPs succeeded in organizing and

mobilizing grassroots efforts that allowed the poor to actively and directly create positive

change and improve their own lives.29 In some locations, these bottom-up efforts

continued beyond the end of the Johnson administration, but in other places, local

politicians challenged these activities and succeeded in killing them. When CAPs

actually organized locally directed efforts that mobilized the poor for more radical

change, Lillian Rubin and others contend that OEO leaders shifted their emphasis to

nationally driven programs like Head Start and Upward Bound, hoping to reduce friction

points and gain control of CAPs.30

During this period, Utahns associated with CAPs participated in formal and

28 Stricker, 54-55, 72-77. 29 Noel A. Cazenave, Impossible Democracy: The Unlikely Success of the War on Poverty Community Action Programs (Albany: State University of New York, 2007), 172; William S. Clayson, Freedom Is Not Enough: The War on Poverty and the Civil Rights Movement (Austin: University of Texas, 2010), 5; Annelise Orleck, Storming Caesars Palace: How Black Mothers Fought Their Own War on Poverty (Boston: Beacon Press, 2005), 1-6; Germany, 2-18, 62. 30 Lillian Rubin, “Maximum Feasible Participation: The Origins, Implications, and Present Status,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (Vol. 385, Evaluating the War on Poverty, September 1969), 26.

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informal debates about the ultimate goal of these projects: providing more and better

services to help the poor or actually organizing and mobilizing the poor to generate their

own change. Of the two goals, evidence suggests that CAPs in Utah had greater success

in creating agencies to provide services for the poor, but there are a few instances that

demonstrate that grassroots groups came together to challenge the status quo. Rural

CAPs in Utah almost entirely focused on improving services to help the poor. CAAs

created programs to expand educational opportunities for all ages, enticed businesses to

relocate to these areas to create jobs, and worked to improve nutrition and health care. In

contrast, there is little to suggest that rural CAPs intended to push for changes that were

more dramatic.

As in rural areas, Utah’s urban CAPs used OEO assistance to create agencies and

organizations that improved services for the poor. CAPs, with the assistance of VISTA

volunteers, created programs to provide education and established recreation and tutoring

programs and neighborhood health care centers. They opened neighborhood centers in

different parts of Salt Lake City and Ogden and allowed residents to help set the agenda

for improvements in each area. Unlike their counterparts in rural areas, urban CAPs

witnessed some mobilization and put pressure on traditional community and business

leaders, even though their efforts failed to lead to radical results. When officials in the

Central City neighborhood center introduced a regular police presence in the facility,

local residents attracted media attention when they argued that the police interfered with

their ability to create a cohesive neighborhood identity. When John Florez secured a job

in Washington D.C. and SLCAP director Lorraine Cook demanded that his replacement

have the same impressive credentials as Florez, neighborhood residents reasoned that this

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prevented locals, especially minorities, from filling his position and forced CAP officials

to accept a member of the community in that position. Cook, a Republican and long-time

welfare administrator in the state, was again the target of a grassroots attack when the

newly created local branch of the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) called

for her resignation as the head of the SLCAP. Members of the NWRO argued that she

was incapable of empathizing with the poor or representing their interests because she

was more interested in saving the state money by reducing the welfare rolls than in

helping the poor to improve their own lives. Though the NWRO efforts did not result in

Cook’s removal, their actions illustrate that the poor in Salt Lake were able to organize

and bring public attention to issues of concern. The Ogden Legal Services placed

controversial goals on their agenda, including a demand for tenant rights and an attack on

unfair lending practices, and even though this did not lead to dramatic changes, it

indicates that they had more radical ambitions than similar groups in other parts of the

state.

Many histories of CAPs emphasize the importance of organic intellectuals,

individuals who lived in neighborhoods in need and became active leaders for change.

Building on the ideas of Antonio Gramsci, George Lipsitz, Nancy A. Naples, Lillian

Rubin, Annelise Orleck, and others argue that successful community action required the

involvement of indigenous leaders who worked within the CAP to identify critical

problems, develop logical solutions, and created bridges between federal programs and

locals who demanded change.31 Whether in the form of a black man organizing protests

31 George Lipsitz, A Life in the Struggle: Ivory Perry and the Culture of Opposition (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995), 9-14; Nancy A. Naples, Grassroots Warriors: Activist Mothering, Community Work, and the War on Poverty (New York: Routledge, 1998), 179-83; Rubin, 14, 17-26; Orleck, 1-3.

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in inner city St. Louis or women who migrated from the South to Las Vegas and took on

big casinos and Nevada politicians, these individuals succeeded in improving lives

because they stopped being clients and instead became catalysts for change.

Though Utah’s CAP efforts seem limited compared to those in St. Louis, Las

Vegas, and Los Angeles, organic leaders emerged and worked tirelessly to use EOA

funding to help those in need. James Gillespie, the head of the NAACP branch in Ogden,

was a vigilant watchdog over EOA sponsored antipoverty programs in the state. When

he witnessed what he perceived to be discriminatory policies of the Ogden Area CAP, the

city’s Head Start program, and the Job Corps, he challenged them and organized

community members in protest. John Florez, the son of Mexican immigrants, was born

and raised in Salt Lake City.32 Though he grew up poor, his parents taught him the value

of hard work and instilled in him a sense of pride in his cultural heritage. He used these

lessons to lead his high school team to the state playoffs, win all-state honors as the South

High quarterback, and attend the University of Utah.33 After he graduated, he became a

greatly respected leader in the Central City neighborhood of Salt Lake, a driving force

behind community action efforts in that area, and someone capable of using EOA funding

and resources to implement changes local residents needed.

Those who opposed CAPs in Utah utilized many of the same arguments as people

in other parts of the country to justify their opposition to CAPs and the larger War on

Poverty. Some challenged CAPs because they felt the federal government controlled the

evolution of these programs, and they demanded a greater degree of local control over

32 Jorge Iber, Hispanics in the Mormon Zion, 1912-1999 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 45. 33 Ibid., 76.

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CAPs. Public officials in the Murray-Midvale section of Salt Lake argued that the

SLCAP was meddling in issues, such as educational reform, infrastructure improvement,

and law enforcement, over which they had no authority. Governor Rampton,

Congressman Lloyd, and Salt Lake City Mayor J. Bracken Lee demanded more local

control over CAP projects. Lee Giles, a local resident, demanded that the Oquirrh

neighborhood center disband because CAP officials were pursuing “improvements” that

locals did not want and obstructing changes that neighborhood residents felt were

essential. Others objected to CAPs because they felt that project leaders promoted

programs that were the domain of private enterprise. This was the case when Salt Lake

City doctors protested a CAP-sponsored community health care center, arguing that

medical professionals should govern the establishment of all health-related facilities.

Doctors felt threatened by this proposal, and they mounted a powerful protest, preventing

the construction of the medical center.

A number of studies have also focused on the Job Corps program. Many present

an unflattering view of the program. Michael Gillette’s history based on oral interviews

conducted with those who created and implemented the War on Poverty introduces many

of the same themes that later histories have also investigated.34 Some argue that the

program was too costly, and therefore unfair to overburdened taxpayers, especially

considering the program’s mediocre results.35 A common complaint about the program,

at the time of its creation and in later analyses, revolved around the decision to relocate

corpsmen from their homes to other parts of the country.36 Others argued that the

34 Michael L. Gillette, Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1996). 35 Patterson, 124; Matusow, 238; Anderson, 11. 36 Anderson, 11; Gillette, 110-11, 222-23.

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program failed to prepare corpsmen for available jobs that would enable them to earn a

decent salary and provide for their families.37 Palmer R. Anderson takes an especially

dim view of the Job Corps program’s ability to prepare corpsmen for future careers.38 He

argues that program officials admitted black corpsmen and trained them for low-level

jobs that would never pay enough in reformatory-like institutions far from home, treating

them like deviants who did not know how to work.39 One of Anderson’s biggest

complaints about the program is that no one conducted any longitudinal studies to

determine how successful the program has been, how many corpsmen found well-paying

jobs, or whether graduates were more successful than those who dropped out.40

In Utah, Job Corps was the most significant EOA program, accounting for two-

thirds of federal OEO funds spent in the state. Using this money, officials created three

Job Corps centers in Utah. Each center focused on providing corpsmen a general

education and more specific vocational training, hoping to prepare them for a brighter

economic future. The interactions between corpsmen and community residents and local

reactions to the Job Corps program were complicated. While Carbon and neighboring

Emery County desperately needed the money that the program provided, Davis County

was one of the most affluent areas in the state, and the corresponding populations

responded to these facilities based on their economic needs. Carbon County residents

supported the construction of a center in their vicinity, but Davis County residents fought

the establishment of both centers in their area. There were individuals throughout the

state who supported and opposed the program, but just as most historians have presented

37 Patterson, 124; Gillette, 229, 356. 38 Anderson, 9. 39 Ibid., 9-11. 40 Ibid., 14.

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a more pessimistic view of the program, most Utahns with an opinion on the matter

argued that Job Corps promised more than it actually accomplished.

Job Corps supporters used many of the same arguments as those in other locales

to justify their position. Some claimed that the program helped those in need, injected

money into the local economy, and improved the environment through conservation

projects. Program supporters often used religion rhetoric to sway those opposed,

reasoning that they must follow the Golden Rule and that the program might increase the

number of LDS Church converts. The possibility of economic benefits led many

influential individuals to back the establishment of centers in Utah, including Governor

Rampton’s change of heart about the Clearfield Job Corps center when Thiokol, a

successful company that he felt might have a profound economic impact on the area,

submitted a second proposal to establish a center in that city. Given the popularity of the

earlier CCC projects in the state, some hoped that Job Corps might have a similar impact

on worthy corpsmen and the environment.

Opponents defended their dislike of the program in a number of ways. Utah

residents frequently challenged Job Corps because they felt it was too costly and that it

was an unfair burden on taxpayers. As in other places, those who did not want Job Corps

centers in the state compared the cost of a Job Corps education to a university education

and argued that it was too expensive for serious consideration. Some were angry because

hard-working Americans who saved to send their children to school now had to pay

higher taxes to send lazy, no-good delinquents to Job Corps. Some objected to the

additional cost of relocating corpsmen, arguing that if the program had to exist, the

government should do it as inexpensively as possible, and they became incensed when

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they learned that OEO used taxpayer money to fly corpsmen home for family visits

during the holidays.

Like Palmer R. Anderson, many Utahns charged that Job Corps forcibly relocated

deviant juvenile delinquents to isolated areas in order to reform them, and they were

angry and afraid of the impact that this relocation might have on areas surrounding Job

Corps centers.41 Parents worried that corpsmen would corrupt their teenage children.

Residents of South Weber fretted that subversive corpsmen might contaminate their

drinking water. People in Ogden, Clearfield, and Salt Lake believed that corpsmen

engaging in random acts of vandalism and violence threatened public safety and property

values and added to the economic burdens on their cities. Leaders in Clearfield even

forced Thiokol officials to pay a head tax on all corpsmen to offset any additional

expenses that misbehaving corpsmen might incur. Those who opposed Job Corps most

often used their fear of undesirable corpsmen to argue against the construction of centers

in their communities.

As in the larger historiography of the War on Poverty and Job Corps, Utahns

discussed the impact that the program might have on the racial status quo in the state.

Some feared that the creation of Job Corps centers would result in a sizeable influx of

minorities that would permanently alter the state’s demographics. Even before the

construction of the first center, state residents encouraged the admission of local youth

into the Job Corps program in Utah to prevent the introduction of “regional differences,”

a likely reference to racial concerns. Job Corps officials struggled to find community

facilities that would welcome corpsmen during their recreational time. Carbon County

41 Ibid., 8-16.

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residents complained that black corpsmen fraternized with local girls. Clearfield

residents expressed concern about the number of minority corpsmen in their community,

given the size of the Thiokol training center.

In contrast, minorities in Utah hoped that EOA programs, including Job Corps,

might result in greater opportunities for minorities, but they were usually disappointed.

James Gillespie, the head of the Ogden branch of the NAACP, regularly challenged what

he considered racist behavior on the part of the Job Corps officials. He argued that

conditions at the Weber Basin Job Corps resembled “slave labor camps,” training

corpsmen—predominantly minorities—for manual labor but failing to prepare them to

compete in the modern labor market. He also claimed that the center unfairly jailed

corpsmen, refused to allow corpsmen to communicate with the NAACP, and failed to

hire an adequate number of minority employees in comparison with the percentage of

minority corpsmen at the facility. Once the Clearfield Job Corps center opened, Ogden’s

NAACP leaders leveled similar attacks against that facility, arguing that they engaged in

discriminatory hiring and firing practices and urged OEO officials to investigate. Clearly,

minorities in Utah felt that Job Corps did not provide equitable educational or economic

opportunities for all races.

Like historians, many Utahns debated Job Corps overall impact, including

whether the program achieved the objectives that the creators envisioned. Many argued

that Job Corps did not live up to its promises. In center after center, state residents

pointed out the alarming number of corpsmen who dropped out or that program officials

sent home because of misbehavior. Leaders of Ogden’s NAACP and others questioned

whether the program actually provided the training necessary to improve the economic

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future for corpsmen. The state’s Job Corps center directors responded with limited

anecdotal evidence, arguing that some corpsmen found jobs, joined the military, and

improved their reading skills, but even center directors had limited concrete data to

convince the public that Job Corps was effective at helping the poor.

As the program evolved, corpsmen won the support of some locals through their

community services but alienated others with their sometimes unlawful and violent

behavior. Given the antipoverty goal of the War on Poverty and the Job Corps program,

one of the most inexplicable things about Job Corps in Utah is that Thiokol Corporation

and Davis County reaped the most benefits from the program. These examples seem to

support the common belief that social welfare programs often benefit the middle and

upper classes more than they help the poor. Despite mixed reactions, two out of the three

Job Corps centers remained open at the end of the decade, and state officials, including

Governor Rampton and Senator Moss, publically opposed the closure of the Carbon

County center, though their efforts failed to prevent the closure.

Some of the more interesting histories of the War on Poverty approach the topic

from the perspective of the poor, demonstrating the significant part they played in

attempts to end poverty and improve lives. Both Nancy A. Naples and Annelise Orleck

build on earlier gendered history to put poor women at the center of the action. Just as

Alice Kessler-Harris and Gwendolyn Mink illustrate for earlier periods in U.S. history,

Naples and Orleck demonstrate that the OEO treated men and women differently when

they distributed aid to the poor and explore how women responded to these inequities.42

Naples uses interviews of sixty-four women who actively participated in community

42 Kessler-Harris, 3-15, 19-63; Gwendolyn Mink, The Wages of Motherhood: Inequality in the Welfare State, 1917-1942 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), vii-xi, 174-84.

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action programs, representing the efforts of over two million women who organized

grassroots efforts across the nation. She labels their work “activist mothering.”43 Orleck

focuses on a group of poor women in Las Vegas, Nevada who built and operated a

successful CAP that provided social services, health care, job training, and other services.

These women stopped being clients who received help from others and became active

catalysts of change.44

In their article analyzing the Job Corps program, Jill Quadagno and Catherine

Forbes state that the architects of Job Corps did not want to include women, but because

of the pressure of Congresswoman Edith Green and others, officials relented.45 Officials

agreed that young women would make up one-third of all Job Corps participants, giving

preferential admissions to women who had few marriage prospects, and they conducted

interviews with each girl to evaluate her possibility of marriage, a less than scientific

process.46 According to Quadagno and Forbes, the Job Corps program, like all

educational institutions in the United States, replicated the gendered division of labor,

providing men with job training to ensure their ability to be breadwinners and training

women as middle-class homemakers. Even when young women in Job Corps received

job training, it prepared them for poorly paid women’s work.

The War on Poverty also played out in gendered ways in Utah. Unlike the

situations that Naples and Orleck discuss, the primary sources, at least the ones used in

the study, fail to establish women as major players in Utah’s CAPs but that does not

43 Naples, 179-83. 44 Orleck, 1-6. 45 Jill Quadagno and Catherine Forbes, “The Welfare State and the Cultural Reproduction of Gender: Making Good Girls and Boys in the Job Corps,” Social Problems (Vol. 42, No. 2, May 1995), 174-75. 46 Ibid.

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mean that women were uninvolved. Women were active in the development of programs

to help migrant workers prior to the creation of the Utah Migrant Council. Native

American CAPs taught men construction skills so that they could provide for their

families, and women learned homemaking skills so that they could carry out their roles as

wives and mothers. With the creation of the Head Start program, many women worked

as Head Start aides so that they could learn more about nutrition, education, and child

development, generally the domain of women. In Utah, there were no Job Corps centers

for women so we do not have the ability to analyze the way that gender affected this

particular program in the state. Though the sources dealing with gender and the EOA in

Utah are limited, those that are available demonstrate that gender affected the

implementation of EOA programs.

Historians of the War on Poverty also emphasize the ways that race affected the

development of antipoverty programs. The common public perception at that time (and

still) was that most of the poor were minorities.47 That view was not accurate, though

many minorities lived in extreme poverty. Most of the poor in the U.S. were (and are)

white. Still, many Americans refused to support public welfare programs because they

saw them as primarily benefiting minorities. Julie Quadagno argues that racial

discrimination is a big reason why U.S. welfare programs, including the War on Poverty,

have failed, and Palmer R. Anderson, emphasizes the same point, stating that Job Corps

officials often selected black corpsmen and trained them for low-paying jobs, preventing

them from becoming effective breadwinners.48 According to Anderson, this situation

47 Gareth Davies, From Opportunity to Entitlement: The Transformation and Decline of Great Society Liberalism (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 45. 48 Quadagno, 3-15, 33-60; Anderson, 9-12.

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proved that most Americans favored civil rights on principle but not in practice, and it

seems very much in keeping with George Lipsitz’ claim of a “possessive investment in

whiteness.”49

Other historians have studied the way that the War on Poverty and race

intersected in specific locations across the nation. As mentioned in the above discussion

of gender, Annelise Orleck looks at the way black women in Las Vegas took ownership

of EOA programs in that city and succeeded in creating agencies to help themselves.

William Clayson argues that there were strong links between War on Poverty programs

in Texas, especially CAPs, and the civil rights movement in that state.50 In his book

about New Orleans, Kent Germany discusses how the development of CAPs contributed

to the expansion of black power and political involvement in that city.51 Robert Bauman

also offers an examination of the impact that race had on antipoverty efforts in his history

of the War on Poverty in Los Angeles, complicating the usual black-white biracial

narrative with his inclusion of the CAP activities of African American and Hispanic

American groups in multiple Los Angeles neighborhoods.52

Though Utah had a smaller minority population than Las Vegas, Texas, New

Orleans, or Los Angeles, the state did have a minority population, many of whom were

poor, and the EOA succeeded in providing programs and assistance to help many

minorities in need. Leaders on the Navajo reservation publicly acknowledged the

positive impact of several NYC projects, stating that they helped members of the tribe to

49 Anderson, 8; George Lipsitz, The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: How White People Profit from Identity Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006), 5-6, 38-39, 217. 50 William S. Clayson, Freedom Is Not Enough: The War on Poverty and the Civil Rights Movement in Texas (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010), 3-11. 51 Germany, 2-18. 52 Robert Bauman, Race and the War on Poverty: From Watts to East L. A. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 4-9.

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organize and determine their own goals. CAPs in San Juan, Uintah, and Duchesne

Counties helped to create greater economic and educational opportunity for tribal

members in those areas, though it seems that they more often followed the service

distribution model of help rather than allowing the target population to take a more active

role in the development of CAP agendas. While these programs existed and helped

many, they failed to end poverty. Poverty rates among Native Americans in Utah

remained unacceptably high. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the poverty rate

among Native Americans in Utah from 2007-2011 was over thirty percent (31.7%) at a

time when the overall poverty rate in the state was just below thirteen percent (12.7%).53

Residents of northern Utah and other parts of the state recognized the intolerable

living conditions of most migrant workers and used OEO funding to improve their lives.

They created educational programs for all ages, worked to improve their housing,

nutrition, and health services. Like the situation on the reservations, these programs

focused more on improving services than fulfilling the EOA’s maximum feasible

participation goal. Though they assisted many, poverty remained a problem for many

Hispanics in Utah. In 2013, the U.S. Census Bureau estimated that over twenty-two

percent (22.5%) of the state’s Hispanic population lived in poverty.54

In truth, Utah minorities challenged the implementation of EOA programs. As

discussed earlier in this chapter, James Gillespie and other members of Ogden’s NAACP

took the lead on many of these racial challenges, attacking perceived discriminatory

53 Suzanne Macartney, Alemayehu Bisha, Kayla Fontenot, “Poverty Rates for Selected Detailed Race and Hispanic Groups by State and Place: 2007-2001,” American Community Survey Briefs (February 2013). http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acsbr11-17.pdf (accessed 26 January 2016); United States Census Bureau website. http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/49000.html (accessed 26 January 2016). 54 Macartney, Bisha, Fontenot.

http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acsbr11-17.pdf

http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/49000.html

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practices of Job Corps, the Ogden City School District’s Head Start program, and the

city’s CAPs. Minorities in Salt Lake also challenged discriminatory CAP policies,

including their hiring practices, the way that SCLAP officials treated their minority

clients, and the strong police presence in the Central City neighborhood center that

minority residents claimed prevent them from forging a strong community connection.

Though the War on Poverty and none of the individual EOA programs were

universally popular in Utah, all of them found groups and individuals who approved of,

supported, and defended them. Among politicians, Senator Moss and Congressman King

consistently supported the EOA, Congressman Burton supported some EOA programs

but remained skeptical of many programs, Congressman Lloyd initially opposed the EOA

but eventually changed his mind due to the extensive funding and planning that went into

these programs, and Senator Bennett remained the most consistent opponent of the

antipoverty legislation. Opinions about the War on Poverty divided LDS church leaders,

though most opposed it, arguing that the Church Welfare Plan was far superior to public

programs because it focused on saving souls, promoted self-sufficiency, and required that

people work for what they received. The public was also conflicted about whether the

EOA was a worthy proposal or a colossal waste of money and a glaring example of

federal overreach.

*******

Although the EOA failed to end poverty, historian Robert Bauman argues that it

succeeded in creating a number of well-meaning programs that continue to have a

profound impact on the lives of many.55 This seems to be as true in Utah as in the rest of

55 Bauman, 137-42.

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the nation. Many have become long-term social welfare institutions that carry on the

work of making life better for many. EOA programs that continue to benefit Utahns

include Head Start, Upward Bound, the Salt Lake Community Action Program (SLCAP),

VISTA-AmeriCorps, Legal Services, and Job Corps.

Historian John A. Andrew III argues that the Head Start program is the most

effective and successful of the EOA programs and that it proves the continued positive

impact of the War on Poverty.56 Since its founding in 1965, Head Start has helped

disadvantaged children to prepare for school and provided “health, nutrition, and family

services to poverty-level children and their families.”57 In addition to the original focus

on children entering elementary school, it has expanded to include Early Head Start, a

program designed to serve eligible students from birth to age three and provide assistance

to expectant mothers, as well, and Head Start continues to provide services for the

children of migrant and seasonal workers.58 Today, there are twelve Head Start grantees

in Utah, and they oversee centers in all twenty-nine counties.59

In the beginning, there was only one Upward Bound program at Utah State

University, but soon after, Weber State College established a second program. Today,

Upward Bound has a presence on seven in-state campuses, including Dixie State

University, Southern Utah University, the University of Utah, USU Blanding, USU

Eastern, Utah Valley University, and Weber State University.60 The Upward Bound

56 Andrew, 76-78. 57 Utah Head Start Association Website, http://www.uhsa.org/ (accessed 5 November 2015). 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Dixie State University Website, http://www.dixie.edu/trio/upward_bound.php (accessed 4 November 2015); Southern Utah University Website, http://www.suu.edu/trioub/what-is-ub.html (accessed 4 November 2015); University of Utah Website, http://trio.utah.edu/upward-bound/index.php (accessed 4 November 2015); USU Blanding Website, http://sjc.usu.edu/trio/htm/upward-bound (accessed 4 November 2015); USU Eastern Website, http://usueastern.edu/upward-bound/ (accessed 4 November 2015); Utah

http://www.uhsa.org/

http://www.dixie.edu/trio/upward_bound.php

http://www.suu.edu/trioub/what-is-ub.html

http://trio.utah.edu/upward-bound/index.php

http://sjc.usu.edu/trio/htm/upward-bound

http://usueastern.edu/upward-bound/

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program at each university is responsible for students from select junior highs, middle

schools, and high schools in their area. They provide academic support to low-income

students with the potential to attend and succeed at postsecondary institutions and

become the first person in their families to earn college degrees. Eligible students receive

after-school academic assistance during the school year and attend supporting summer

programs.

Established in 1965, the Salt Lake Community Action Program (SLCAP) is still

in existence, helping poor county residents in a variety of ways. The SLCAP provides

housing, heating, weatherization, nutritional, and educational assistance to county

residents living in poverty.61 Last year, 2,000 individuals received some kind of housing

assistance as the SLCAP helped them to find housing, arranged for financial assistance,

and educated individuals about their tenant rights and responsibilities. Nearly 15,000

people accepted SLCAP assistance for home heating costs. They helped to winterize 659

homes, benefitting 1,769 people. Seventy-four percent of the county’s poorest residents

received some form of nutritional assistance from the SLCAP, including emergency

groceries, help in applying for food stamps, and education on other types of nutritional

programs. In addition, SLCAP’s Head Start program assisted 2,400 families and

numerous adults obtained their GEDs, ESL assistance, and vocational training through

the SLCAP’s adult education programs. It may be fifty years later, but the SLCAP still

does the good work they began in 1965, and it is one of nine Community Action

Valley University Website, http://www.uvu.edu/trio/ub/ (accessed 4 November 2015); Weber State University Website, https://www.weber.edu/upwardbound (accessed 4 November 2015) 61 Salt Lake Community Action Program Website, http://www.slcap.org/ (accessed 5 November 2015).

http://www.uvu.edu/trio/ub/

https://www.weber.edu/upwardbound

http://www.slcap.org/

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Agencies (CAA) still fighting a war on poverty in Utah.62

The VISTA program became AmeriCorps VISTA, but the tasks of volunteers in

this program are much the same as fifty years ago. They serve full-time for one year and

focus on eliminating poverty, improving poor neighborhoods, and encouraging

individuals to get involved in community service projects in their own neighborhoods.63

According to a 2013 Corporation for National and Community Service report, there were

twenty-four AmeriCorps projects underway in Utah during March of that year, involving

1,275 participants, and 193 participants completed an additional twenty-five projects

during the previous twelve months.64 These projects helped to improve the lives of the

poor in many ways and in many parts of the state.

The VISTA program continues to affect the state in another way. Some of the

original volunteers that came to Utah in the 1960s and 1970s fell in love with the state

and decided to stay. Just as a spirit of voluntarism first brought them to Utah, many

selected careers with a strong service component. Brian Watanabe, a VISTA who came

to Utah from Hawaii, became an elementary school teacher on the west side of Salt Lake

City.65 During his time as a VISTA, he helped with one of the adult education programs,

62 Community Action Partnership of Utah Website, http://caputah.org/our-network/utah-community-action-agencies (accessed 9 November 2015). The others are the Bear River Association of Governments (Box Elder, Cache, and Rich), the Community Action Services and Food Bank (Summit, Utah, and Wasatch), the Family Connection Center (Davis and Morgan), the Five County Association of Governments (Beaver, Iron, Washington, Garfield, and Kane), the Ogden-Weber Community Action Partnership, the Six County Association of Governments (Juab, Millard, Sanpete, Sevier, Paiute, and Wayne), the Southeastern Utah Association of Local Governments (Carbon, Emery, Grand, and San Juan), and the Uintah Basin Association of Governments (Daggett, Uintah, and Duchesne). 63 The United Way of Utah County Website, https://www.unitedwayuc.org/americorps-vista-project/what-americorps-vista (accessed 9 November 2015). 64 Corporation for National and Community Service Website, http://www.nationalservice.gov/sites/default/files/upload/state_profiles/pdf_2013/UT%20AmeriCorps.pdf (accessed 6 November 2015). 65 Brian Watanabe interview with the author, 10 February 2009. The author has a digital voice recording and typed transcript of the interview.

http://caputah.org/our-network/utah-community-action-agencies

http://caputah.org/our-network/utah-community-action-agencies

https://www.unitedwayuc.org/americorps-vista-project/what-americorps-vista


http://www.nationalservice.gov/sites/default/files/upload/state_profiles/pdf_2013/UT%20AmeriCorps.pdf

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and he decided that real educational change required helping students when they were

still young enough to change. Though he graduated with a degree in secondary

education, his first job was with a Head Start program, and he eventually became an

elementary school teacher and stayed in that position for the rest of his career.66 Al

Church, a VISTA who worked as a volunteer at one of the adult education programs on

Salt Lake City’s west side and then came back as a paid VISTA employee in charge of an

adult education program, ultimately stayed in Utah and in secondary education.67 He

earned an administrative degree and served as the principal of the Academy of Math,

Engineering, and Science (AMES) in Salt Lake City. David Nimkin, a VISTA who

worked with the Utah Migrant Council, has also lived much of his adult life in Utah.68

He has worked in a number of fields, but they have all had a community service

component in common. He worked at the Crossroads Urban Center, an organization that

has been fighting against poverty in Utah since 1966, helped to build low-cost housing in

California and Utah, served as the vice board chair of Local First Utah, served as the

chief of staff to Mayor Rocky Anderson, and was a regional director of the National

Parks Conservation Association.69 Each of these men came to Utah as VISTA

volunteers, decided to stay, and continued to serve the people of the state in many ways.

In 1966, Utah received OEO approval to create the state’s first Legal Services

offices in Salt Lake and Weber Counties. Almost fifty years later, there is still a

66 Ibid. 67 Al Church interview with the author, 12 February 2009. The author has a digital voice recording and typed transcript of the interview. 68 David Nimkin, interview by author, 5 March 2009, Salt Lake City, audio recording and transcript, in the possession of the author. 69 Ibid.; Crossroads Urban Center Website, https://www.crossroadsurbancenter.org/ (accessed 10 November 2015); National Parks Conservation Association Website, https://www.npca.org/ (accessed 10 November 2015).

https://www.crossroadsurbancenter.org/

https://www.npca.org/

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significant Legal Services presence in Utah. In 1974, Congress passed the Legal Services

Corporation Act, an amendment to the EOA that officially transferred the Legal Services

program from the OEO to the Legal Services Corporation, where it has remained since

that time.70 Today, the Utah Legal Services (ULS) has offices in Salt Lake, Ogden,

Provo, and St. George and continues to provide noncriminal legal assistance to those who

qualify for the program.71 ULS staff can “answer questions, give advice, prepare legal

documents, and represent clients in court and before administrative agencies.”72 They

handle many types of cases, including those involving family problems, public assistance,

health benefits, housing, consumer issues, seniors, migrant workers, Native Americans,

bankruptcy, and survivors of sexual assault.73 Over the years, the ULS has helped

thousands of individuals each year and brought about lasting change through cases that

have expanded the protections for victims of domestic violence and renters living in

dangerous homes and apartments and challenged the state’s guardianship laws.

Job Corps, the EOA program that had the greatest economic impact on the state

from 1965 to 1969, still has a significant presence in Utah and is still engaged in

improving the lives of young men and women who need a second chance. Both the

Weber Basin (South Weber) and Clearfield centers are still in operation, though they are

now under the direction of the Department of Labor instead of OEO, and provide

academic and technical training for eligible youth, age sixteen to twenty-four.74 At both

70 Legal Services Corporation Website, http://lsc.gov/about-lsc/laws-regulations-guidance/lsc-act (accessed 10 November 2015). 71 Utah Legal Services Website, http://www.utahlegalservices.org/ (accessed 10 November 2015). 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Weber Basin Job Corps Center Website, http://weberbasin.jobcorps.gov/about.aspx (accessed 11 November 2015); Clearfield Job Corps Center Website, http://clearfield.jobcorps.gov/about.aspx (accessed 11 November 2015).

http://lsc.gov/about-lsc/laws-regulations-guidance/lsc-act

http://www.utahlegalservices.org/

http://weberbasin.jobcorps.gov/about.aspx

http://clearfield.jobcorps.gov/about.aspx

369

facilities, they support the Job Corps mission of “teaching eligible young people the skills

they need to become employable and independent and placing them in meaningful jobs or

further education.”75 Today, many of the corpsmen at these facilities are from Utah, a

shift from the program’s original policy and one that many state residents actively and

repeatedly requested.

The Weber Basin center, under the direction of the U.S. Department of

Agriculture, Forest Service division, is the oldest in Utah.76 Corpsmen at this facility

take basic education classes, including reading and math, complete a GED program or

earn a high school diploma through Weber Basin High School, and earn college credit

through USU classes taught on-site. This center specializes in training that prepares

corpsmen for jobs in manufacturing, automotive, and construction trades, including

business technologies, bricklaying, carpentry, facility maintenance, landscaping, painting,

and welding. The center also offers culinary arts training. Graduates are eligible for a

transition allowance of up to $1,000 to help with housing and transportation costs, job

placement assistance, and career counseling.77 Corpsmen still receive housing, food,

clothing, and health and dental benefits, are eligible to participate in many recreational

activities on site and in the surrounding communities, elect their own Student

Government Association, and give back to the community through service projects each

year.

Today, the Clearfield Job Corps center, under the direction of the Management

and Training Corporation, is the third largest Job Corps campus in the country, with over

75 Ibid. 76 Weber Basin Job Corps Center Website. 77 Ibid.

370

1,000 corpsmen enrolled at any given time.78 Each corpsmen can earn a high school

diploma from Great Basin High School, and the center offers an English Language

Learning (ELL) program. Although there is some overlap with the vocational programs

offered at the Weber Basin center, the Clearfield center still offers a wider variety and

several more rigorous career pathways. Like Weber Basin, Clearfield corpsmen can

specialize in business technology, carpentry, tile and brick laying, culinary arts, facilities

maintenance, and welding, but they can also train for careers in material handling,

composites, computer repair, electrical wiring and plumbing, health occupations and

pharmacy technicians, machine shop trades, and advanced automotive trades.79 The

Clearfield center is the only Job Corps center in that nation that offers the United Auto

Workers - Labor Employment and Training Corporation (UAW-LETC) Advanced

Automotive Training Program, a career technical training program that attracts students

from across the nation. Students in this program receive training from industrial leaders

at companies such as AAMCO Transmissions, Toyota, and Lexus. All students admitted

to the program receive training for the Automotive Service Excellence (ASE)

certification tests and can earn up to a year of on-the-job training experience towards

their two-year ASE requirement. After all these years, these Job Corps centers continue

to help young men and women develop knowledge and skills that will enable them to

have a brighter future.

*******

Whether they supported or opposed these programs, Utahns’ arguments mirrored

those used in other parts of the nation. Many supporters saw the EOA as a genuine

78 Clearfield Job Corps Center Website. 79 Ibid.

371

attempt to end the cycle of poverty in the United States. Since local and voluntary efforts

had failed to do this, it was morally imperative that the federal government put their

power, prestige, and pocketbook behind President Johnson’s war. Proponents saw the

EOA as focusing on all of the most important things to end poverty. They believed that it

expanded opportunities for the poorest members of society. It provided educational

programs for disadvantaged people of all ages, and Americans liked to believe that

education was the silver bullet for curing society’s ills. The EOA created programs that

emphasized helping the poor help themselves—“making taxpayers out of tax eaters”—

another popular idea. Some also promoted the idea of ending poverty as a Christian

obligation in keeping with the Golden Rule. Newspaper articles and editorials and letters

to politicians in Utah and other parts of the country from 1964-1969 regularly carried

these messages.

EOA opponents also utilized nationally popular arguments to justify their

opinions. Some saw the antipoverty program as a political ploy by President Johnson—

and Democrats in general—to win votes. Many adversaries challenged EOA programs

because they opposed federal government interference in what they believed were state

matters, arguing that church welfare, state programs, and private enterprise solutions

were far superior to anything the federal government might implement and that taxpayers

should not have to pay the excessive costs of these wasteful and misdirected programs.

Some opponents argued against the programs on racial grounds. Most worried about the

negative consequences of introducing minority Job Corps outsiders into a state and

communities that were relatively homogenous, including the possibility that black

corpsmen might fraternize with local white women. There were also those who generally

372

supported these programs but challenged them because they felt the programs

discriminated against minorities in terms of hiring, firing, and advancement and in other

ways. Some felt that the programs benefitted the middle class, businesses, and other

groups more than they helped the poor.

Though the EOA failed to end poverty in Utah or the United States, it introduced

a number of programs that focused on improving the lives of those who lived in poverty.

In Utah, it seems that EOA programs created greater opportunity, though not necessarily

equal opportunity, and failed to guarantee equal results. Utahns did not always approve

of these agencies or their methods, but gradually more residents recognized that local

solutions were not working and the poor needed additional assistance. Over time, OEO-

funded programs and agencies emerged and began to help those with the greatest need.

Even after fifty years, many are still functioning, working hard to make the lives of some

Utahns easier.

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