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INTR 2012

SHORT ESSAY. Due: 10/08/2015

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1 “China – the Cake of Kings and… of Emperors”. Image attained from: http://climbingthegreatwall.com/being-mindful-of-the-past-respect-context-and-culture-2/chine/, accessed August 5th, 2015.

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Question 2:

What is the impact of the so-called "century of humiliation" on China's foreign policy?

Words: 1, 099 / 1, 099

In 1972, after considerable

deliberation, China opened her doors to the West. The decision

to normalize relations has resulted in a prosperous China. In

2015, China’s economy is second only to the United States.2 The

normalization decision was vastly dissimilar from China’s

‘closed door’ pre-1972. How did this policy change occur? This

essay argues that the ‘century of humiliation’ can largely

explain why Maoist China had an isolationist foreign policy

(1949-1972). The theoretical framework for my argument is

predicated upon the historian Albert Feuerweker’s important

article “China’s History in Marxian Dress”.3 Feuerweker

demonstrates how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) perceived

the history of their country through a Marxist-Leninist

ideological lens. This essay further argues that, the shift in2 In terms of GDP.3 Albert Feuerweker, “China’s History in Marxian Dress”, The American HistoricalReview, Vol. 66, No. 2, (1961), p. 325.

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ideology that led to relations being normalized, was

influenced by China’s reluctance to become economically

interdependent during the century of humiliation.

The century of humiliation is the term given to the period

between 1839 and 1949 when Western and Japanese imperialists

exploited China. “The rape of Nanking” was the darkest hour of

humiliation.4 Approximately 300,000 were massacred.5 The ‘rape’

of Nanking epitomizes the century of humiliation. In many ways

the century of humiliation was a ‘long rape’ of China.6 Though

crude, this expression captures the exploitation experienced.

During the century of humiliation, China was unable to resist

imperialist aggression because it was too weak militarily. Its

hard power projection capabilities were antiquated. The

policies of Sinocentrism and exceptionalism had prevented the

adoption of up to date military technology, such as swivel

turning cannons.78 This two-headed epistemology had underpinned4 William A. Callahan, “National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, andChinese Nationalism”, Alternatives, Vol. 29, (2004), p. 205. 5 Callahan, “National Insecurities”, p. 205. 6 Callahan, “National Insecurities”, p. 205. 7 Peter Ward Fay. The Opium War 1840-1842, (Chapel Hill: University of NorthCarolina Press, 1975), pp. 260-63.8 Also ships made out of impenetrable iron. These, and other technological advantages made a large difference in open naval battles.

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the bureaucracy of the Celestial Empire since 221BC. The

Sinocentric system was characterized by its hierarchic system

of international relations. In this system China had unequal

first place. This ‘closed door’ system disallowed the

huawaizhidi ( 化 化 化 化 ), or ‘uncivilized lands’ from having

significant economic interaction with China.

From 1839 to 1945, imperialist powers, such as Japan, abused

this system. This ‘century of humiliation’ energized Chinese

nationalistic fervour and led Chairman Mao Tse Tung

(henceforth Mao) to proclaim, “Ours will no longer be a nation

subject to insult and humiliation. We have stood up.”9 10 Mao

and the standing members of the politburo recognized the

importance of building a strong economy that could fund

adequate hard power projection capabilities. John

Mearsheimer’s offensive realist theory of international

relations is able to explain China’s policy decisions at this

time.11 In order for China to become the Asian regional hegemon

it needed to develop its hard power capabilities. This would

ensure China’s survival in the Westphalian system, an

9 Mao Tse Tung, Selected works of Mao Tse Tung, Volume V, (Peking: People’s Publishing House, 1977), p. 17. 10 On the 21st September 1949.11 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), n.p.

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anarchical, ‘self-help’ system.12 China was attempting to do

what Mearsheimer explains realist powers do to gain influence:

a strong economy for a strong military. Such measures were

in aid of preventing a second century of humiliation.13

Having had no experience in the Westphalian tradition, Mao

adopted a Stalinist approach to international relations.14 As

Alison Kaufman maintains, China’s bitter experiences during

the century of humiliation provided a “cautionary tale about

the dangers of the system”15and thus China became independent,

not interdependent, economically. Therefore, to achieve the

goal of building a strong military and economy independently,

Mao implemented a foreign policy that was ideologically

isolationist.

After centuries of exceptionalism, the West wanted China’s

doors to open.16 Rather, from 1949 to 1972, the doors to China

remained closed, except for trade, military armaments and

12 Elman Colin. "Realism", in Paul Williams (ed.), Security Studies: An Introduction,Routledge: New York, 2008, pp. 15-27.13 Mao Tse Tung. Selected works of Mao Tse Tung, pp. 17-117.14 Alison A. Kaufman, “The Century of Humiliation, Then and Now: Chinese Perceptions of the International Order”, Pacific Focus, Vol. 25, No. 1 (April 2010), pp. 1-33. 15 Alison A. Kaufman, “The Century of Humiliation, Then and Now: ChinesePerceptions of the International Order”, Pacific Focus, Vol. 25, No. 1 (April2010), pp. 1-33. 16 United States. Dept. of State, The China White Paper, August 1949, Vol. 1-2,p. 20.

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investment deals vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc. Again, the century

of humiliation is able to account for this seemingly

paradoxical situation. Inspired by Marxist doctrine, Mao and

the CCP elite viewed the history of China as the history of

class struggles. Mao said:

These class struggles of the peasants - the peasant uprisings and peasant

wars - alone formed the real motive force of historical development in

China… 17

Evidently, Mao believed the century of humiliation was

evidence of imperialist/capitalist aggression over the

proletariat in China. Mao used this narrative of oppression to

justify his adoption of the ‘lean-to-one-side’ foreign policy.

Feuerweker addressed this in his article “China’s History in

Marxian Dress”.18 Utilizing the historiographical framework

presented by Feuerweker, it is understood that the century of

humiliation narrative was utilized by Mao and Zhou Enlai to

shape foreign policy actualizing the Marxist-Leninist thesis

of capitalist vs. socialist world war. The century of

humiliation being an underlying factor propelling Communist

17 Albert Feuerweker, “China’s History in Marxian Dress”, The American HistoricalReview, Vol. 66, No. 2, (1961), p. 325.18 Feuerweker, “China’s History in Marxian Dress”, pp. 323-353.

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China into fighting or supporting the Korean, Indo-China and

Vietnamese19 Wars is evidence pertaining to this.20

A necessity of the ‘lean-to-one-side’ foreign policy was the

military. A strong military requires a strong economy. To

achieve a prosperous economy, Mao and the elites of CCP

‘collectivized the land’ and ‘organized the peasants into

communes’.21 This was only temporarily successful. Throughout

the 1950s there was strong growth, but the Great Leap Forward,

the Cultural Revolution and widespread famine saw China’s

economy slow dramatically by the 1960s. The reason for this

economic depression can be explained using Feuerweker’s

framework: despite having learnt the first lesson of the

century of humiliation, industrialization and idea sharing,

Mao had failed to learn the second lesson of that fateful

century, the importance of an ‘open door’ policy. In 1972,

after pressure from China’s petroleum industry22 and the after

effect of the Soviet-Sino split, China’s foreign policy

19 Brantly Womack. China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry, (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2006), p. 176. 20 Feuerweker, “China’s History in Marxian Dress”, pp. 323-353. 21“China’s Foreign Policy: The Historical Legacy and the CurrentChallenge”,http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_foreign_policy.htm,accessed August 6th, 2015. 22 Jonathan D. Spence. The Search for Modern China, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1999), p. 597.

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transitioned from isolationism to normalization. In doing so

the failure of the ‘lean-to-one-side’ policy was recognized.

This essay argued that the century of humiliation had a

significant impact on China’s foreign policy during the Maoist

period. Firstly, the essay argued that historical grievances

were used by the CCP to explain China’s involvement in anti-

capitalist and anti-imperialist conflicts such as the Korean

War. Utilizing Feuerweker’s framework, the essay demonstrated

that the CCP was able to justify its role in these conflicts

because it interpreted the century of humiliation as an

example of proletariat oppression. This re-interpretation of

history energized the isolationism movement. The policy of

isolation was only later dismissed when domestic issues, like

famine, and the unlearnt lessons of the century of humiliation

prompted the ‘open door’ policy in 1972.

Today, the CCP views Taiwan as a vestige of the century of

humiliation period. Many Chinese scholars believe that China’s

recovery will be incomplete unless the Taiwan issue is

rectified. 23 Rectification means a return to the mainland.24

23 Alison Kaufman, “The “Century of Humiliation” and China’s National Narratives”, http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/3.10.11Kaufman.pdf, accessed August 10th, 2015. 24 Ibid.

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Meanwhile, Forbes25 estimates that China’s economy will surpass

the U.S by 2020.26 It is unknown how China’s foreign policy

will be affected by this change and the Taiwan ‘question’.

Even so, as demonstrated, it is likely that the century of

humiliation will continue to play a significant part in

justifying new foreign policy in coming decades. As an aging

Mao once exhorted, “We must use the past to serve the

present.”27

25 “By 2020, China No. 1, US No. 2”, http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2011/05/26/by-2020-china-no-1-us-no-2/, accessed on August 10th, 2015.26 Ibid.27 William A. Callahan, “National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism”, Alternatives, Vol. 29, (2004), p. 199.

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Bibliography

Callahan, William A. “National Insecurities: Humiliation,Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism,” Alternatives, Vol. 29,(2004), pp. 199-218.

“China – the Cake of Kings and… of Emperors”. Image attainedfrom: http://climbingthegreatwall.com/being-mindful-of-the-past-respect-context-and-culture-2/chine/, accessed August 5th,2015.

“China’s Foreign Policy: The Historical Legacy and the CurrentChallenge”,http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_foreign_policy.htm, accessed August 6th, 2015.

Elman, Colin, "Realism", in Paul Williams (ed.), Security Studies:An Introduction, (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 15-27.

Fay, Peter Ward. The Opium War 1840-1842, (Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina Press, 1975), pp. 260-63.

Feuerweker, Albert. “China’s History in Marxian Dress”, TheAmerican Historical Review, Vol. 66, No. 2, (1961). pp. 323-353.

Jian, Chen. Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 2001).

Kaufman, Alison A. “The Century of Humiliation, Then and Now:Chinese Perceptions of the International Order”, Pacific Focus,Vol. 25, No. 1 (April 2010), pp. 1-33.

Kaufman, Alison. “The “Century of Humiliation” and China’sNational Narratives”,http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/3.10.11Kaufman.pdf,accessed August 10th, 2015.

Kapur, Harish, The End of an Isolation: China After Mao, (Dordrecht:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985).

Kissinger, Henry. On China, (New York: Penguin, 2012).

Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001).

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“Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic ofChina”, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/, accessedAugust 5th, 2015.

Spence, Jonathan D. The Search for Modern China, (New York: W.W.Norton and Company, 1999), p. 597.

Tse-tung, Mao Selected works of Mao Tse Tung, Volume V, (Peking:People’s Publishing House, 1977), p. 17.

United States. Dept. of State, The China White Paper, August 1949,Vol. 1-2, p. 20.Womack, Brantly. China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 176.

Zhang, Feng. Chinese Hegemony: Grand Strategy and International Institutions in East Asian History (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015).