Jamie Matthews and Martin Jansson SÖDERTÖRNS HÖGSKOLA

UNTANGLING THE WEB OF SWEDISH NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY

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Abstract

A historical case study of Swedish nuclear energy policy and use, where the researchers will

investigate what kind of actors and events have shaped Swedish nuclear energy policy from

the 1970’s up until the present day. This will be done by applying theories from the fields of

communication, political and environmental science to our source material, which include a

wide variety of academic journals as well as previous research done on Swedish nuclear

policy and public perception. We expect to find that there has been a continuous gap between

media, politicians and public opinion regarding beliefs and opinion not only on nuclear

energy but also on what the different actors believe that the other actors’ beliefs are. The

actors that we have focused on in this research includes the public, politicians, political

parties, mass media and scientists & experts. The research shows that there is an on-going

struggle for influence amongst the different actors, and that they all shape each other’s

actions, messages and to an extent, also beliefs.

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Table of Contents

Chapter / Title Page

Abstract

List of abbreviations

1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………….....4

1.1 Background ……………………………………………………………….....4

1.2 Brief timeline of nuclear events ……………………………………………..4-5

1.3 Research problem and questions …………………………………………….6

1.4 Research objective ………………………………………………………......6

1.5 Previous research ……………………………………………………………7-8

2 Theory / Theoretical Perspectives ……………………………………………..9

2.1 Environmental Science Perspectives ………………………………………..9

2.1.1 Risk perception …………………………………………………………10-11

2.1.2 Environmental rhetoric and social construction ………………………..11-12

2.2 Communications Theory ……………………………………………………12-15

2.3 Political Theory ……………………………..………………………………15

2.3.1 Advocacy Coalition framework ………………………………………..15-16

2:4 Justification of theories ……………………………………………………..16-17

3 Method & Methodology ………………………………………………………..17

3.1 Methodological Issues ………………………………………………………17-19

4 Empirical Data …………………………………………………………………..20

4.1 Three Mile Island (TMI) / Referendum ……………………………………...20-25

4.2 Chernobyl …………………………………………………………………….25-27

4.3 Fukushima ……………………………………………………………………27-30

4.4 Surveys & opinion polls ……………………………………………………...30-31

4.5 Framing of overall issue ……………………………………………………...31-34

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4.6 Rhetoric’s to the nuclear discourse …………………………………………..34-35

4.7 Technical aspects …………………………………………………………….35-37

5 Analysis ……………………………………………………………………………38-41

6 Discussion & Conclusion…………………………………………………………..42-44

Appendix A …………………………………………………………………………...45-46

Appendix B, C, D & E (separate sheets)

Reference List …………………………………………………………………………47-50

List of abbreviations

DN=Dagens Nyheter.

C=Centre party

FP=Liberal People’s Party

M=The Moderate Party

V/VPK=The Left Party, formerly The Left Party Communists

(Changed to The Left Party in 1990)

ACF=Advocacy Coalition Framework

SOM=Society, Opinion, Media (institute)

TMI=Three Mile Island

SKB=Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB, Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co

SRSA=Strålsäkerhetsmyndigheten, Swedish Radiation Safety Authority

SKI=Statens kärnkraftinspektion, The Governmental Nuclear Inspection Agency, now part of

the SRSA.

SR=Sveriges Radio, Swedish Radio

SSI= Statens strålskyddsinstitut, The Governmental Radiation Protection Agency

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background

On the 28th of April 1986, the Forsmark nuclear power reactor measured elevated

radioactivity in the air. At first, the media was reporting that there was a leakage at the plant,

but as other nuclear plants sounded the alarm, suspicions turn to eastward. Two days earlier

one of the reactors at the Chernobyl plant in current Ukraine had exploded (DN, 2014-04-24,

p.2). This is one important event in the history of nuclear energy in Sweden, and the world.

The popular view seems to be that this soured an already distrusting populace on the use of

nuclear energy, and further cemented the decision to close down all Swedish nuclear reactors

by the year 2010. Besides Chernobyl, there have been two larger events involving nuclear

power, the Three Mile Island accident in Harrisburg, USA, in 1979, and Fukushima in Japan

in 2011.

Over the last few decades, different actors have become important actors on the global stage,

by combining knowledge of how to interact with news media with involvement in global

policy-making. Concurrently, smaller, more local environmental groups have emerged. These

groups do often have a narrower agenda, and their relationship with media is somewhat

ambivalent. Environmental groups, both large and small, are aware of the importance of

symbolism in presenting their message in the media (Allan et al 2000, p.93).

Usually, Sweden’s politics follow a somewhat predictable left-right divide. Nuclear energy

does not follow this formula (Holmberg & Asp, p.11f), which adds extra interest to the issue

of nuclear energy.

1.2 Brief timeline of Nuclear Power in Sweden:

1945 - In November the government set up the Atomic Committee, to find methods to utilize

atomic power (Anshelm, 2009, p.44)

1947 - Sweden began research into Nuclear energy, adhering to military purposes.

1970/71 - Every party represented in the Swedish parliament supported the decision to invest

in nuclear power, and build 11 reactors.

1973 - The Centre Party questions nuclear energy. The oil crisis puts the energy issue at the

centre of political debate (Holmberg & Asp, p.11).

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1976 - Nuclear energy first begins to emerge in the political spectrum in Sweden. Coalition

government consisting of the Centre party (C) with Liberal People’s Party (FP) and the

Moderate Party (M). The Centre Party held strong anti-nuclear views.

1979 - Three Mile Island disaster in Pennsylvania, US. A partial nuclear meltdown occurred

in one of the nuclear reactors. Claimed wide scale international attention, highlighting the

dangers of nuclear power.

1980 - Consequently from the previous year’s disaster, a Swedish nuclear power referendum

was held in March 1980. The Swedish parliament accumulated a nuclear phase-out,

envisioning all nuclear power plants to be closed by 2010. (25 year period was chosen,

supposedly to coincide with 25 year lifetime of reactors.

1981 – The coalition government split up. Nuclear energy was an issue parties were very

much divided upon.

1986 – The Chernobyl disaster in Ukraine. Incidentally a few days later, abnormal radiation

levels reached and were detected at the Forsmark Nuclear power plant in Sweden and only

after did the former Soviet Union admit to the population an accident had occurred. Again

this prompted questions of nuclear safety and plans for shutting down nuclear plants in

Sweden sped up.

1988 - The Green Party enter the Parliament, having been formed 7 years earlier, mainly as a

reaction to the nuclear referendum

1992 – Small scale incident at Barsebäck 2 Nuclear Power Plant, Sweden revealed that 5

older reactors had no emergency cooling system. Received minor media attention. Danish

government against Barsebäck from the beginning.

1999 – Barsebäck 1 is shut down in November.

2005 – Detection of a leak at the nuclear waste store in Forsmark Sweden.

2006 – The previous year’s incident led to the shutdown of three out of ten nuclear reactors in

Sweden.

2010 – Swedish parliament reversed the nuclear phase out decision.

2011 – Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster, Japan prevailed what was to be a nuclear

meltdown on a catastrophic scale.

2011 – After the Fukushima disaster, public opinion polls showed 64% of Swedes were

opposed the building of new reactors and 27% supported them.

2014 - 5th March Greenpeace activists broke into Oskarshamn nuclear power plant -

Questions followed surrounding tightening up security measures of nuclear power plants, a

more physical security presence,

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1.3 Research Problem and questions

Possible problem: There are some similar reports written, of which some are not so recent,

and the researchers feel that our report can contribute, as it is written sometime after

Fukushima, and the most sensationalistic reporting about it should have died down.

-What are the main sources of influence over time in Swedish nuclear energy policy and use?

-Can we explain why Swedish nuclear energy policy has developed as it has?

- How is nuclear framed? How is the technical knowledge handled by journalists and the

media in general?

1.4 Research Objective

The objective of this research paper is to develop a historical case study, portraying the main

sources of influence, over time, in Swedish nuclear energy policy and use. A further objective

is to adhere to a multidimensional structure throughout. In order to do so, the researchers aim

to answer the main question by addressing the following three dimensions; environmental

science perspectives, media and communication perspectives and political decision making

perspectives. Throughout an examination and analysis will be made on the three part

relationship between the chosen actors; experts, politicians/parties and the public, through the

media and environmental groups, in Sweden. An exploration of how the chosen actors

intertwine, influence or have knock on effects with one another will hopefully be shown

throughout.

The nuclear discourse is heavily discussed, as a result precision is a key objective throughout.

Key dates will be shown, however attention will be drawn towards certain years which have

had larger influence in Swedish nuclear energy policy and use. These larger influences will

include nuclear disasters such as Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima, the Swedish

nuclear referendum and the reversal decision. In justifying why these events have been

chosen, it is plausible to suggest they are what inadvertently bring changes to policies and

legislations.

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1:5 Previous Research & Sources

Previous research about Swedish nuclear energy seems to mostly focus on politics, and Sören

Holmberg is a name that is frequently seen in various articles and journals. He is a political

scientist who has a vast amount of articles published in relation to Sweden. Additionally he is

often at the forefront of the media’s reports on nuclear energy policy in Sweden. It is feasible

to suggest he is somewhat of an expert or commentator the media frequently acknowledge.

Communication is a fundamental aspect in shaping our perceptions of environmental issues.

For this reason Robert Cox’s book entitled Environmental Communication and the public

sphere (2013) has been used throughout the paper. Still, it is the only comprehensive text

within the emerging field of environmental communication, which fits acutely to a

multidisciplinary perspective. To avoid bias here, the researchers have depicted particular

theories addressed by Cox, as opposed to his personal accounts.

Sources have been used to gain a wider knowledge of the nuclear power discourse and to

assist the researchers throughout (Allan, Adam & Carter, 2000, Palfreman, 2006 and Wyss,

2008). Various authors and themes have a prevailing presence with an emphasis of nuclear

power in Sweden, regarding; Comprehending the different phases of Swedish nuclear energy

policy (Rossegger & Ramin, 2012); the importance of language and metaphors (Anshelm,

2010); crisis decisions after catastrophic events (Nohrstedt, 2007); the historical importance

of public attitudes for energy policy decision in Sweden, with the need for better models,

implemented to understand people’s perceptions of risk (Viklund, 2004). Safety is often

featured within Swedish nuclear politics with reasoning adhering to the projected safety

culture in Sweden, as opposed to other countries such as the United Kingdom (Rowe, Frewer

& Sjöberg, 2000). Furthermore, in relation to safety, Sweden often gets characterised as

“pioneering” or as a “forerunner”, without these labels being scrutinised further (Uba, 2010).

Scholars and academics often criticise the media’s portrayal of nuclear and other

environmental issues, arguing they lack the required knowledge and skills (Curtin &

Rhondenbaugh, 2001 and Foust et al, 2009).

Advocacy coalition framework is a theoretical approach which appears in the literature.

Within the discourse of nuclear energy in Sweden, inconsistencies arise, as contradictory

surveys have been an issue, notably Holmberg & Hedberg (2011) and Johansson &

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Westerståhl (1998). Here different surveys show different results, so we have had to develop

certain assumptions.

The literature often frames nuclear energy within a political context or just as a

generalisation. However, a thorough account of the Swedish media’s reactions after

influential events discussed within this paper, is lacking within the literature. Although a

large content analysis, is not applicable here, an attempt will be made in highlighting the

media’s position and framing of certain events and then applying it with the additional

perspectives of this paper in contributing to a new stance. Furthermore, some of the

established theoretical tools from current research will be used and applied to this empirical

case.

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Chapter 2: Theory

The following section addresses the theoretical approaches / perspectives that will be applied

throughout this paper. Firstly each perspective with the applied theory will be introduced

separately. Again, aiding with the multidimensional structure, justifications of how the

different theories collaborate together will be addressed.

2.1 Environmental Science Perspectives

Experts and scientists

Nuclear technology is an advanced and complex kind of technology, not a field of science

where one can become an authority over night. We feel that this might be a reason for

scientists to be more involved in the policy process, than usual. As their knowledge is needed

and desired, their power and ability to influence policy increases. Some scientists are more

willing than others, to engage in the political process, Pielke identifies four different kind of

possible roles that a scientist can assume; pure scientist, arbiter, issue advocate and honest

broker. These are idealized roles, and one scientist can, naturally, assume a mixed role,

depending on various factors (Pielke, 2012). During the research for this paper, the

researchers will look for influential experts and scientists that have made a contribution to the

outcome of the political process.

We write scientists and experts for a reason, scientists are often regarded as experts, but is the

reverse relationship correct? Uba (2010) names one of her stakeholder groups as advisors,

where both scientists and experts are included. We feel that her distinction of these two is

another way to describe Pielke's different kind of scientists. Usually, a scientist’s input is

used to legitimize governmental decisions. In this view, scientists are objective actors who

have no agenda of their own, their agenda is that of correct science. But another view of

scientists is that their input and advice should be seen as coming from a specific stakeholder

group, that is just as involved the process as other stakeholder (Uba, p6676f). When this

happens, we feel that the distinction between scientist and expert is needed.

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2.1.1 Risk perception

To scientists and analysts, risk is something that is understood as facts, or what they believe

to be facts. But human behaviour is mostly driven by perception, not facts. According to most

cognitive psychologists, common-sense reasoning, cultural traditions, personal experience

and communication is what forms perceptions. Patterns of risk image creation and evaluation

are related to evolutionary mechanisms associated with danger. These mechanisms have

evolved over time, and have fused with cultural patterns. These have been divided into two

classes of qualitative perception patterns; risk-related & situation-related patterns. Perceived

dread of consequences is one example of risk-related patterns. Despite statistical odds being

in favour of dying in a car accident over an airplane accident, the perception is reversed

(Renn, 2008, p.93f).

Situation-related patterns are tied into feelings of personal control. A risk that is believed to

be personally controlled is perceived as less serious, and it's often found where eating habits

are concerned. Food additives, mostly harmless, are seen as more serious of a risk than sugar-

rich food or alcohol. These two patterns constitute what is known as semantic risk patterns,

and the brain organises risks in a fashion similar to a filing cabinet. In addition to these

cognitive functions, the brain also has a tendency to stigmatize certain risks. These risks are

associated with specific dreadful associations, such as cancer and nuclear energy. The

public's perception of the risk is often amplified by media reporting, and the elements of the

risk that are amplified are hard to explain when focusing on ”hard” risk factors such as

probabilities and direct losses (Renn, p.94f).

Research has shown that probabilities are not really a factor with public risk perception.

When drawing upon reference about risks four different patterns constitute probabilities and

they are as follow:

Availability bias – This means that if a risk is easily and quickly recognized, chances are

that the probabilities of the risk are being overestimated.

Anchoring effect - Anchoring effect means that a risk that provokes associations with

known events is more likely to be overestimated to occur.

Distribution of risk over time - If a risk source is constant and the losses occurred by the

risk are similar over time, the chance of underestimation of the impact of these losses

increases.

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Assessment bias - If the uncertainty of loss expectation is high, it is more likely that the

average assessment of losses is close to the median of all known loss expectations. This

means that risks that are low in objective loss expectations are overestimated, and vice

versa (Renn, 2008, p.95).

Aside from these factors, emotions and affect does also play a part in shaping risk perception.

This is especially true for situations of interpretive ambiguity (what is the right answer?) and

trade-off decisions. In these cases, it appears that people often focus on cues that send the

strongest affective signals, to resolve the problems (Renn, p.96).

Risk characterization and evaluation

When it comes to the characterization and evaluation of risk, the literature talks of

ambiguities that need to be addressed (Renn, ch.5). In the case of nuclear energy, there is

both normative and interpretive ambiguity. There will not be a focus on the technical aspects

of risk, but rather how the evaluation of nuclear energy has been handled in Sweden, and how

the framing of the issue has been managed by the government.

2.1.2 Environmental Rhetoric and the social construction

To pinpoint definite theoretical frameworks within environmental science is a difficult task.

Coherently with this thought, in relation to an environmental science perspective, the next

section will discuss environmental rhetoric and social construction. Robert Cox (2013)

discusses this perspective and although it is not a theory as such, it does provide a framework

as a way of organising; the social-symbolic perspective deals with people's perceptions,

fundamentally on the matters and sources that construct these perceptions of what we

contemplate to be an environmental problem (Cox, 2013, p. 60).

Rhetorical perspective

Running parallel, rhetorical perspective, embedded with the use of language and symbolism

is central in aiding us to define environmental problems. This perspective is embedded with

intent and purpose in persuading society’s opinions and attitudes through communication

(Cox, 2013, p. 63). Arguably within a pragmatic sense, this paper can act practically, raising

awareness, educating and informing citizens about the issue of nuclear energy within Sweden

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and the risks that are involved. Rhetoric also uses various resources such as metaphors, tropes

and genres, all of which aid social-symbolic constructions. Comprised in language,

metaphors and tropes open up ways in which we can think, providing powerful images,

useful in an environmental perspective. Selecting the use of a metaphor can have instrumental

effects where presupposed views or perceptions are adhered to. Metaphors can conjure

questions regarding ethics and advocacy of science.

2.2 Media and Communication Perspectives

In today's ever expanding media saturated society our worldviews and opinions are heavily

influenced and shaped from the content of media around us. Adhering to a media and

communications perspective framing theory and the agenda-setting role of the media will be

applied throughout this paper. Essentially to frame is to select certain aspects in defining

problems, diagnosing causes, making moral judgements and to suggest remedies (Entman,

1993, p. 52). Furthermore there is an apparent lack of frames for a coherent relationship for

governmental figures, the media and citizens within an environmental perspective in framing

the truth (Lakoff, 2010). Language is instrumental in framing and can ultimately lead to a

misunderstanding of a frame, in that hearing a word can activate a frame. Truthful framing is

required in order for the true realities of an environmental problem to be perceived. Too often

moral compromise in the media is hidden behind the political compromise (Lakoff, 2010, p.

81). Another media and communications perspective applied here is agenda setting -what

constitutes newsworthiness?

The media all have an agenda in satisfying their shareholders needs and in relation to

environmental news, Cox (2013) argues agenda setting is one of the most influential theories

of media effects. It does not explicitly state what people think about a certain issue, however

it does reiterate the importance of a particular issue for the public. Cox (2013) addresses

Ader’s (1995) study on the effects that real-world conditions, public opinion and the media’s

agenda setting have on one another in news reports about the environment. He placed

emphasis on pollution and found a strong influence of agenda setting, showing even though

the pollution had declined within the study period; the chosen media’s coverage had

increased. Again, this reiterates how agenda setting can raise awareness of environmental

issues.

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The media’s coverage of science and environmental issues is quite a debatable topic in itself.

Often the media has been criticised for lacking perception of environmental issues in

contributing content of a disarraying nature to the public (Foust et al, 2009). Moreover it is

argued reporters do not always possess the required educational grasp on issues whereby they

have to rely on various conflicting amounts of sources (Curtin & Rhondenbaugh, 2001, p.

180). Jon Palfreman (2006) contrasts the media’s depictions of nuclear energy and global

warming; arguing the true extent of media’s coverage of environmental issues is far more

complex than the common notions stated above. Still with its omnipresent nature the media

will always have practices and set agendas to abide by, however there is a need for journalists

to expand on the narratives at their disposal. Two dimensions of the story should be reported,

first the risk, the physical narrative, and secondly people’s perceptions and feelings about the

risk, the psychological subtext (Palfreman, 2006, p. 38).

Risk Communication

Risk communication was initially developed as a means to communicate expert assessments

to the public, to bridge the divide between the judgment of experts and the perception of the

public. This way of looking at risk communication has been modified, as it turned out that

this “educational” approach wasn’t optimal, and that the public preferred reduction and

management of modern risks (Renn, p.201).

In Leiss’s risk communication review, he identified an evolution in the field, consisting of

three phases. The first was the educational phase, where the public was to be educated about

probabilistic thinking, and to accept existing risk management institutions. The most

prominent tool in this phase was comparisons of different risks. As people rejected the notion

of the comparisons based risk and expected values phase 2 was initiated. The second phase

focused on behavioural risks such as smoking and alcohol consumption, while trying to

downplay the more advanced technological risks, such as nuclear energy. This did not

convince the public that the current risk management of the more complex risks was the

correct one, although it did apparently have some effect on smoking and similar activities.

Phase 2 was mostly a one-way communication, meant to educate the public, albeit in a more

subtle way (Renn, p.201f).

Phase 3 is the “current” way of doing risk communication. Dialogue between the public and

risk managers, meant to create trust and assist stakeholders to better understand decisions and

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assessments related to risk management. According to Renn, risk communication is needed

during the entire risk chain. Risk communication can be divided into internal and external

communication, where the internal communication deals with organisational structure in

organizations, while the external communication deals with engaging and informing

stakeholders that are not directly involved with the risk process (Renn, p.202).

Communicating risk is not easy, and there are several possible outcomes of poor risk

communication. External stakeholders are often not familiar with risk management and

assessment, and it is not uncommon for them to pursue own agendas that may be in direct

conflict with the risk communication goals. When communicating risk, it is important to

differentiate between potential properties of a substance (hazard) and the estimations of the

risks associated with these properties, as well as their relation to usage and exposure (Renn,

p.202f).

Renn lists four major functions of risk communication

Education: Educate the public about risks and risk management.

Risk training and behavioural change: Helping the public to prepare for risks.

Confidence creation: Create confidence in institutions that are responsible for risk

management.

Involving stakeholders in decisions and conflict resolutions: Give non-official

stakeholders the ability to participate in the risk process.

These four functions all point to communication that is more one-way than a dialogue, but it

is important to include the public in such a way that they feel involved. Confidence cannot be

created out of thin air, but must be built by performance, transparency and effective

communication. Effective communication can be defined as communication that answers

questions that people are asking, not deciding what they should know (Renn, p203f).

According to Power (Power, 2004), the legitimacy of risk management policy comes from

communication with stakeholders, and the public. An extension of this claim is that risk

communication is two-fold, where not only the technical risks are managed, but also the

second order risks are managed. Second order risks can be seen as soft, reputational risk. This

second order risk management is often aimed at avoiding blame, but an expectation gap is

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also dealt with as a second order risk. This gap exists when public perceptions and

expectations of something differ. We feel that this can be applied to nuclear energy policy as

well.

2.3 Political Perspectives

Just as Daniel Nohrstedt (Nohrstedt, 2007) does, we use external shocks as the basis for our

political perspective, and we apply the Advocacy Coalition Framework on these shocks, as a

way to analyse Swedish nuclear policy.

2.3.1 Advocacy coalition framework

The Advocacy coalition framework is one of the more prominent and progressive theories to

apply to policy research. It is described as eclectic, which is a good trait for a paper with a

multidisciplinary approach. It has been used extensively in studies on environmental policies

and natural resource management (Sotirov & Memmler, 2011).

As the University of Denver (UoD, 2014) explains it, “The Advocacy Coalition Framework

(ACF) was initially designed in the late 1980s by Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith to

help explain coalition structure and behaviour, the role of scientific and technical information

in policy, policy-oriented learning, and belief and policy change in contentious policy

subsystems”.

This was to be done by taking a long term view on policy and how it changes, and to include

a more complex view on subsystems. It also wanted to view individuals based on psychology,

rather than microeconomics (Weible et al, 2011, p.349).

In 2012 Rossegger and Ramin published a study on how Sweden ended its nuclear phase-out

policy that was based on ACF (Rossegger & Ramin, 2012). Throughout this paper the ACF

will be used in a similar fashion, but where Rossegger & Ramin focus on this specific

decision, the researchers here will try to explain a longer time period, and use the ACF

together with other theories and concepts, especially risk perception, framing and agenda

setting. It appears apparent that most of the previous work done with the AFC is lacking

media & communications perspective, which the researchers hope will provide interesting

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insights. Furthermore within advocacy coalition there is an apparent lack of detailed

questions around policy outcomes (Rossegger, U & Ramin, R, 2012, p. 325). Rossegger and

Ramin (2012) argue there is an array of scientific literature on Sweden’s nuclear politics;

however the political process of decision making is an apparent missing feature, at the

expense of a concentration on key events. The researchers feel that the ACF is an interesting

concept to apply to Sweden’s nuclear energy policy, as it has involved several actors and has

gone through several different phases. What the ACF theory lacks in, we hope to fill with the

other theories and concepts we have chosen.

2.4 How are the theories related?

As previously stated the researchers have adopted for environmental science perspectives as

opposed to definite theories within environmental perspectives. Highlighted above, risk

perception and rhetoric’s creating constructions of meaning are applied within the

environmental science perspective. Both of which cooperate together in utilising societies

perceptions of environmental issues and risks. The researchers are acutely aware of how the

three perspectives can relate to one another. On this note the concept of perception is one way

in which can link all three perspectives together. It would appear apparent that a truthful

perception of nuclear is needed in gaining an understanding of the influences of nuclear in

Sweden and in order for citizens to perceive the true realities of the issue and the risk

associated. Perceptions are heavily contextualised, relating to our cultural backgrounds,

which are further developed within the frameworks adhered to in a political and media

context. So too can rhetorical genres connect the three alternative perspectives of this paper.

It has been observed that environmental sources have been dependent upon rhetorical genres

in order to influence people’s perceptions or environmental issues and problems (Cox, 2013,

p. 65).

Arguably the media and its framing will continue to have an important impact on the future

of nuclear energy. Nuclear technology is embedded within political discourse, whereby the

industry depends on political parties to advocate their support which in turn lead to the

depictions by the media. For a truthful perception around nuclear energy in Sweden there

needs to be a well-defined relationship with coherent communication between the three

perspectives addressed in this paper. Thus, whereby depictions of a crisis shown towards the

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public highlight decision making and bureaucratic actions contributing to an outcome as

opposed to just solely focusing on the specific event (Allan et al, 2000, p. 8).

Chapter 3: Method & Methodology

In order to carry out the research throughout, the chosen method will be a historical case

study. The researchers are both fully aware that the methodology is not a format in order to

find out a particular solution. Rather it is used within a theoretical perspective and the

implication is to achieve the goal of expanding and elaborating on available theories.

Additionally researchers run the risk of being bias to themselves by only writing about

findings that acknowledge and support their presupposed set of conclusions or hypothesis

(Creswell, 2014). Regarding Swedish nuclear policy, we are also aware that bias may exist in

our sources. According to a poll conducted by Johansson & Westerståhl (Johansson &

Westerståhl, 1998), some 60% of experts wants to develop and expand Swedish nuclear

energy. It is not unreasonable to assume that at least some of our sources are written by

scientists that wants to develop nuclear energy. As we think about Creswell’s thoughts on

bias, and how they relate to us, we must also think about how they relate to the scientists

whose work we rely on.

Throughout the paper a qualitative approach will mainly be applied, where the researchers

will carry out a thorough in depth analysis. It is beyond the scope of this research paper to

address every year in detail from the 1970s onwards and for this reason attention will be

drawn towards the larger events of influences on nuclear with Sweden.

3.1 Methodological Issues

Issues: A large extent of materials

The main aim of this project is to develop a historical case study documenting the main

sources of influences, over time, in Swedish nuclear energy use. As a form of a longitudinal

study, there are of course problematic issues that can arise. All case studies run a risk of bias

interpretation. Fundamentally the main issue within this kind of study is embedded within the

aspect of observation. As the nuclear energy discourse invokes much discussion and debate

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the researchers are aware for the need to narrow down and clarify sources and materials in

order to incorporate only the most relevant issues. The implication here is that sources will be

critically assessed so they are scrutinised and allowing a motivation as to why particular ones

were chosen. For this sources are provided which conflict, alter or show another perspective

of an argument. This could be a main methodological issue that will arise within this paper.

Issue: An alternative method

Rationale

It is worthy to acknowledge why this choice of methodology was chosen for gathering data

and analysis as opposed to other methodological approaches. As opposed to solely focusing

on Sweden, a comparison study with x amount of units of measurements (countries) could

have been applied. Applying this kind of study could have allowed a broader perspective to

be obtained, aiding the researchers with more sufficient validity. However there are

implications and reasoning as to why this method was not carried out. Most importantly the

results from a comparison study might not be able to be used to generalise. If x was more

efficient than y, it might just be in that particular case, meaning the results are limited only to

those specific countries compared.

Additionally in order to obtain wider results where a generalisation could be gathered the

researchers would have to discuss a large number of units (countries). Here a comparison

between 10 different countries for example could allow for wider generalisations, which for

limitations regarding time and financial measurements is not achievable. Furthermore

alternative research techniques could have been applied throughout the paper, including

carrying out of interviews or surveys. The motivation behind not choosing either is

fundamentally due to strains on time within the completion of the project. Furthermore, to

enhance and develop on the validity and reliability of the paper quantitative research methods

such as face-to-face interviews could have been conducted with relevant individuals on

nuclear energy use in Sweden. However, it must be addressed, there were several attempts

made at obtaining an interview with a scientific reporter of the Metro newspaper and with a

member of the Greenpeace party in Sweden, to no accord.

Issue: Sources

On initial thought a further problematic issue with sources could be with regard to language,

as translation of documents may not always be available. Governmental reports too are not

19

always easy to obtain. This is still a reasonable assumption to make, however through further

in-depth research some governmental findings have also been available in English. Still,

some interesting findings have only been available in Swedish, so in order to overcome this

problem the researchers have cooperated efficiently with regards to the workload throughout

this paper.

There exists large amounts of survey data on both nuclear energy, and energy in general, that

is useful. The problem with this data is that it is mostly from the 80’s and onwards. Survey

data from the 1970’s and earlier is scarce. Therefore we’ve had to rely on non-quantitative

statistical sources from this time period, while we ourselves can check survey data from years

later on.

Issue: Time scale

Adhering to the structure of the paper, being the multi-dimensional environmental analysis,

there could occur the possibility of running the risk in being too broad. Timescale permitting,

limitations could arise in not being able to focus an equal amount on each possible aspect

within the three perspectives of the paper. Again, in order to overcome this problem, the

researchers have to enable a strategy for scrutinising sources of biases so only the most

relevant and interesting information is chosen in allowing an adequate amount of space for

each perspective.

Issue: Validity and Reliability

Regarding external validity, for a coherent and enriching argument throughout, the principal

aims will be adhered to throughout the research paper, and only then within the analysis /

findings observations will made in order to see if the case study can be analytically

generalized to other situations.

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Chapter 4: Empirical Data

As previously mentioned in the paper attention, due to the limitations, attention will be given

to key events surrounding the nuclear discourse. These events include three large nuclear

disasters, which are the Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima and also the Swedish

referendum. As the referendum was a response to the Three Mile Island incident, both events

will be discussed in the same section.

To understand the Swedish nuclear discourse, we believe that just information about these

specific events isn’t enough. Therefore, we have also included a section on surveys and

public opinions related to nuclear energy, and one on how the nuclear issue has been framed.

Within this section the researchers will present the empirical data (which will be the events

mentioned above) in a descriptive and impartial manner. Attention will be drawn towards

presenting factual information surrounding the events focused on and then later within the

analysis section this data will be analysed further.

4.1 Three Mile Island (TMI) / Referendum

Any kind of political system and its way of creating policy is affected and influenced by

external shocks to this system. Swedish energy and nuclear policy is no exception. Some are

very direct and obvious, some are not. As previously stated attention will focus on three of

these external shocks. The first of these shocks, the Three Mile Island accident, is tightly

intertwined with the 1980 referendum. These will therefore be analysed together. These

external shocks did not happen in a vacuum, and neither did the policy outcomes prior to

them, and after them, happen with these shocks as the sole influence.

Harrisburg and the 1980 Referendum

The 1980 referendum must be analysed in light of several different events and trends that

preceded it. On the 4th of April, 1979 Olof Palme and the Social Democrats decided that they

wanted to hold a referendum on the issue of nuclear energy. This day became known as “The

Crazy Wednesday”, as this was a shift in Social Democratic politics, and it created a flurry in

the media.

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A big part of the reversal in the opinion of the Social Democratic Party can be attributed the

events on Three Mile Island, outside of Harrisburg in the US. Just a few days before “The

Crazy Wednesday” the cooling system of one of the reactors in Three Mile Island nuclear

power plant stopped functioning. Radioactive steam was released through a leak, and in

Middletown, a community near the plant, increasing radiation was detected (Holmberg &

Asp, p.49). It is not unlikely that Palme still remained a supporter of nuclear power, but

according to Johansson & Westerståhl, Palme wanted nothing to do with the nuclear issue

during the upcoming election, and a referendum to be held after the election was a rational

strategy to make the issue “disappear. The fact that a large number of S voters, most notably

women and young people, were anti-nuclear did also most likely play a part in Palme’s

choice (Johansson & Westerståhl, p.18).

The morning papers paid little attention to the accident, but the tabloids give it far more

attention. The morning papers' focus on that day was on another nuclear issue. The SKI1 had

approved two new reactors, Forsmark 1 and Ringhals 3. The reactors were supposed to be

online during the autumn of 1979, but were delayed, awaiting the result of the referendum.

But during the following days, the Three Mile Island accident reporting picked up steam, and

on the 31st March, TV, radio and the papers were dominated by Harrisburg reporting. There

was talk about a meltdown and evacuation of nearby areas (Holmberg & Asp, p.49f).

Although the first nuclear accident occurred in 1979, the nuclear energy issue had become

politicized in Sweden some 6 years prior, when the Centre Party came out against nuclear

power (SNES, 2011:5, p.2). Hannes Alfvén was a Nobel Prize winning Swedish physicist

who in 1973 joined the Centre Party. Initially a proponent of commercial nuclear energy, he

became a staunch anti-nuclear advocate while teaching in California. He supposedly played a

big part in Torbjörn Fälldin’s views on nuclear energy, who was the first major party leader

who took a clear stance against nuclear energy (Fof. 2008, University of St Andrews,

Scotland, 2008 and Johansson & Westerståhl, p.15).

The influence of Alfvén on Fälldin came through Birgitta Hambræus, MP of the Centre Party.

She was the first Member of Parliament to question nuclear power, and in 1974 was also the

one who was the first to bring forth the idea of a referendum. She claimed that the public

deserved to make their voices heard regarding the risks surrounding nuclear energy

(Johansson & Westerståhl, p.16).

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The Left Party soon followed the Centre Party as anti-nuclear. Alfvén's influence was not the

only factor that led to the politicization of nuclear energy. A big part of this process was the

oil crisis of 1973 (Holmberg & Hedberg, 2010, p.4). The continued politicization of the

nuclear energy issue created new constellations in Swedish politics, and the public followed

their party’s preferences, to differing degrees. Before Fälldin's change of heart, C votes were

mostly positive, or neutral, towards nuclear energy. This they shared with the voters of M, FP

and S. But as Fälldin changed, so did his base. He also swayed a substantial minority of S

voters to become anti-nuclear. In the election of 1976, the nuclear issue is often attributed as

the cause for the Centre Party's success, and the weak results of S. Fälldin formed a coalition

government with FP and M, who in the campaign had been very quiet about their pro-nuclear

stance, so that Fälldin could attack S for their views on nuclear energy, while not attacking

his potential government partners (SNES, 2011:5, p.2f).

Previously, polls showed that the Swedish population were mostly either indifferent or in

favour of expanding nuclear energy, but mid-1970s, the intensive nuclear debate saw the anti-

nuclear opinion gaining ground, at the expense of indifferent views and pro-nuclear

sentiments. After the 1976 election, the anti-nuclear movement lost momentum, and Prime

Minister Fälldin was “forced” by his coalition partners FP and M to break (SNES, 2011:5,

p.2f)

A referendum is usually a clear yes or no-situation, examples being the Swedish referendums

of joining the EU, Switching to the Euro and changing to right side driving. The 1980

referendum on nuclear power was not a yes or no-situation, however. First, there were three

alternatives on the ballot. Options 1 and 2 both argued for an expansion of nuclear, before a

phase-out, while the third option was for a 10 year phase-out of nuclear energy (Johansson &

Westerståhl, p.17). This less than crystal clear formulation of the different choices would

come up again later.

Before the voting had even started, the anti-nuclear side could claim some kind of victory, as

all three referendum choices meant that Sweden's nuclear reactors would eventually be shut

down. The difference between the choices being what would happen before the phase-out,

and the pace of the phase out. In the media and in the mind of the public, options one and two

were joined together to create the “user-line” while the third line was the no-option, which

was supported by C and VPK. Why was there two user-lines, instead of one? The Social

23

Democrats did not want people to think that they were in an alliance with M, who were

behind the first option. They therefore included language and ideas of public ownership of

nuclear energy. This gave them a separate line, but just as the media and public saw it, they

were both under the same pro-nuclear banner (Johansson & Westerståhl, p.17f&20).

Mass Media and the voters at the time of the referendum

During the period prior to the referendum, information regarding nuclear energy and the

referendum was abundant. Holmberg and Asp analysed how media affected the voters. Their

analysis follows Cerha’s three paths to information, and also talk about a fourth path to

information, more focused on each individual voter and her ability to generate knowledge

through information. These paths are far from straight, they are winding, and cross each other

often (Holmberg & Asp, p.203-206).

Their findings include

Those that voted for option three were more personally active. More of the option

three voters attended meetings, discussed nuclear energy and tried to convince others,

than those that voted for options one and two.

Those that worked actively for the third option, in an official or unofficial capacity,

reached more people in personal communication, than those that worked for options

one and two.

The public seemed to pay less attention to nuclear energy coverage in mass media,

during the referendum, than in elections in 1976, 1979 and 1982, despite similar

statistics for TV news exposure during the time period.

4 out of 10 voters did not see any of the special informational TV programs that aired

during the referendum campaign.

The public’s interest in the nuclear issue declined during the referendum period.

Women and those that lacked higher education felt that the information from mass

media was difficult to process, to a higher degree than men and higher educated

people.

(Holmberg & Asp, p.208-228).

There was irritation from the yes-campaign, directed at SR, who was seen as doing the no-

campaign’s bidding. At the same time, the no campaign also criticized SR for not airing TV

programs that would, according to SR, favour the no-campaign. In a survey, 20% of all voters

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thought that option three’s treatment in the media was too favorable, while options one and

two got 4% and 6%, respectively (Holmberg & Asp, p.229-232).

Referendum results (Not 100% done yet)

In the actual referendum, 75,7% of the eligible voters participated. Options 1, 2 and 3

received 18,9%, 39,1% and 38,7%, respectively (Election Authority). So despite the TMI

accident, the pro-nuclear side “won” with a clear majority of the vote. According to

Holmberg and Hedberg, the pro-nuclear side won the referendum because the pro-nuclear

parties managed to sway their voters to vote the party line, some 75% of the voters voted the

view of their preferred party (SNES, 2011:5, p.4f)

The user-line won, and Swedish nuclear would not be dismantled during a ten year period.

But what would happen to Swedish nuclear? Both of the “yes” options said that nuclear

would be phased out, according to different criteria. About half of those that voted for options

one and two did not want new plants to be built, while the remaining half wanted to keep the

issue open for discussion. No real timetable for the final phase-out had been proposed.

Shortly after the referendum a proposition surfaced, where the timeline for nuclear power was

said to be 25 years. This was the only source that was used, when the decision was made to

make 2010 the end date for Swedish nuclear (Johansson & Westerståhl, p.22f).

Pre-Discussion/Conclusion/Analysis thoughts

Here we can see that the influence “factor” was like a circle, where party politics were

influenced by voter opinion that in turn was influenced by how politicians acted and that

certain scientists also played an important part in creating opinion. This circular influence

was also “aided” by external shocks that acted as catalysts for change and new opportunities.

In this case the academic community seems to be in agreement, that the most important

external influences were the oil crisis of 1973 and TMI in 1979.

The different options in the referendum are all somewhat puzzling, if we follow the reasons

put forth, to phase out nuclear. The no option stated that nuclear energy was much too

dangerous and risky, to be allowed to continue. Yet the option called for a ten year phase-out

period. If the risk of nuclear energy was deemed to be an unacceptable risk, then that risk is

just as probable the day after the referendum, as ten years after. According to Johansson &

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Westerståhl, the ten year phase-out plan was to make it seem less drastic (Johansson &

Westerståhl, p.18)

4.2 Chernobyl

The Chernobyl accident awakened the dormant nuclear issue in Sweden. During the 1976 and

1979 elections, nuclear was a hot topic, with 21% and 26% respectively, naming it the single

most important issue. In the 1982 election this number had dropped below 5%. The political

parties withdrew from active participation in the nuclear debate, after 1980 (SNES, 2011:5,

p.5)

The Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident, in the former Soviet Ukraine occurred on the

26th April 1986. One of the nuclear reactors began to fail and attempts were made to activate

the emergency shutdown system, which incidentally was a 20 second procedure, however

steam and chemical explosions occurred, resulting in the top of the reactor being blown off.

As a prevailing effect, the nuclear reactor was destroyed.

That same year, in 1986, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published a report,

entitled ‘Summary Report on the Post-accident Review Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident’.

Compromised of Soviet experts as well as IAEA members and experts, this official report

deemed fault as an operation / operator error and also deficiencies and flaws in the design of

the reactor. There was found to be a lack of knowledge from staff and personnel, whereby

safety protocols were breached and notable safety systems had been cut off. Here, lack of

knowledge is fundamental, linking in with risk perception, which is highlighted throughout

this paper.

Chernobyl prompted questions of nuclear safety and design, throughout Europe. The phase-

out process in Sweden had the potential to be changed and ratified because of Chernobyl, but

had no desired effect. However after the event, the Swedish government had crisis decisions

to make, coincided with growing public distrust, plans to start the shutdown process of

nuclear power plants did speed up progressively, showing how Chernobyl did affect Swedish

nuclear power policy (Rossegger and Ramin, 2012, p. 323).

Furthermore, Chernobyl allowed for countries in Western Europe to push dirt on the former

Soviet Union. Within Swedish politics investigators and Swedish governmental figures

26

depicted Swedish nuclear reactors versus soviet reactors, whereby technological similarities

between both reactors were ignored and instead concentration was placed on exaggerating the

differences (Nohrstedt, 2007, p. 132).

Within a political perspective there were similarities between TMI and Chernobyl with both

events halting Swedish policymaking. The agreement between the political governments to

stop nuclear expansion once twelve reactors were running was brought into conflict because

of the TMI incident. Then inadvertently, in early 1986 the Social Democrats proposed a

decommissioning of the first reactors by the end of the 1990’s (Nohrstedt, 2007, p. 128).

The accident at Chernobyl led to increased fears of safety and radiation spreading throughout

Sweden and as a prevailing result the Social Democrat’s established the years 1995/1996,

whereby two nuclear reactors would be closed down and mark the beginning of a phase-out

plan of nuclear energy. However three years later amidst criticism from labour and industry

unions, it was found an early phase-out would have cost the Swedish society SEK 200

billion; so the Social Democrat’s previous decision was cancelled by a centre right coalition

government (Bergenäs, 2009). It can be observed within a political context an early phase out

here could have been disastrous.

Media framing of Chernobyl

It is important to acknowledge how balanced a story depicted by the media is framed. Allan

et al (2007) highlight how there were distortions of differing media reporting of Chernobyl.

The news coverage that the Chernobyl disaster accumulated was framed as a freak accident,

one that appeared to be an unforeseen event. Reporters covering the catastrophic event of

Chernobyl did not have much previous experience of such events, albeit for many their only

reference point was the disaster at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant (Allan et al.

2000, p.7).

Unlike the TMI incident with reporting’s of action at a distance, the Chernobyl incident

transformed and brought geographical locations closer to Sweden, a situation which both

policy planners and the media were not acquainted for.

27

Rowe, Frewer and Sjöberg (2000) carried out a cross national study depicting newspaper

reporting of Chernobyl in both Sweden and the United Kingdom. The study was carried out

between a two month periods, March-May in 1996, marking the 10 year anniversary of the

Chernobyl incident. Within their data size they found to be a similarity in the amount of

articles which reported about Chernobyl. However, there was a substantial amount of

journalistic reports of risks and safety in the Swedish newspapers, accumulating to four times

the amount depicted in the UK press. Suggestions to this were leaning towards the idea of

Swedish safety culture. In Sweden it was suggested media generalisations occurred as an

increase of other nuclear hazards prevailed. The media were seen to lack any use of statistical

reporting and content surrounding Fukushima was of an alarming nature as opposed to

reassuring.

Interestingly though, throughout their study is no mention of the geographic proximity (of

Chernobyl to Sweden) nor how radiation from Chernobyl is still affecting Northern parts of

Sweden or how radiation was first detected at the Barsebäck nuclear station in Sweden. On

taking these points into consideration it seems plausible to suggest they contribute to why

reports were framed around safety.

4.3 Fukushima

On the 11th March 2011 the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant in Ōkuma Fukushima, Japan

encountered an erupt failure on a catastrophic scale whereby three out of six reactors had

failed and were destroyed. Events unfolded because a tsunami, caused by the Tōhoku

earthquake, hit the Fukushima nuclear power plant making it the largest nuclear disaster since

Chernobyl in 1986.

Prior to Fukushima, Swedish nuclear energy policy had obtained a fairly stable amount of

support for continuing with nuclear energy. The incident at Fukushima was heavily discussed

in the Swedish media, raising concerns about risks and safety however it led to no

implications within Swedish nuclear politics. The Green Party wanted a parliamentary bill

passed, allowing nuclear decommissioning in Sweden, however this was turned down in May

28

2011, as Parliament did not want the Fukushima incident to be used as a catalyst for rash and

panicky decisions (Fjaestad, & Arainen 2013, p. 1).

Sweden and Germany are both similar countries with regards to their environmental

movements; however post Fukushima both countries deviated from one another. Germany’s

phase out decision has led to polarising political opinions in Sweden, with the left praising

and the right warning of increased greenhouse emissions. Fukushima and discussion

afterwards has highlighted the strong left, right divide in Sweden and how neither side are

ready to compromise or review their positions, despite catastrophic events outside of Sweden

(ibid).

Media’s reaction to Fukushima

In the aftermath of Fukushima, Western media were predominantly focusing upon the content

of radiation and the incapability of controlling these radiation levels, as opposed to the actual

earthquake and tsunami. Thousands lost their lives to both the earthquake and resulting

tsunami. David Spiegelhalter, professor of the Public understanding of risk at Cambridge

University, believes the threat of radiation will always be depicted with high levels of risk.

He states, radiation “is an invisible hazard, mysterious and not understood, associated with

dire consequences such as cancer and birth defects. It feels unnatural” (BBC, 2011).

Although a thorough newspaper content analysis is beyond the scope of this paper and most

importantly not the objective here; Appendix B and C highlights the Svenska Dagsblådet’s

constant use of the words radioaktiva and Strålning (radioactivity and radiation). Over a six

day period either one of these words were depicted 10 times within the headline of a story.

Appendix D and E, also over a six day period shows the Dagens Nyheter headlines regarding

Fukushima. With less counts of the words radiation or radioactivity, they still include

sensationalist headlines, speculating on melt downs, death counts and spreading fear. The

labels “expert” are used to presumably guide the reader to scale of importance. On the 14th

March the SvD, provide two contradicting headlines, whereby they state; "En kontrollerad

katastrof" (a controlled disaster) and “Expert: Situationen är utom kontroll” (Expert: The

situation is out of control) (Appendix B & C). Furthermore, the headline “Vi utsätts för

strålning varje timme” (we are exposed to radiation every hour"), is true, however when

29

placed and framed within this context it spreads more fear and panic. However these are all

related to the agenda setting of the media, adhering to what they regard as newsworthiness.

How did the Swedish government react after the Fukushima disaster?

Although, as already stated, Fukushima never actually changed Swedish nuclear politics, of

course the government still reacted. Following the catastrophic events at the Fukushima

nuclear power plant in Japan the Swedish government, on the 8th April 2010, assigned the

Swedish Radiation authority (SSM) with the task of documenting an analysis to oversee the

repercussions for long-term safety, within the nuclear industry in Sweden.

Finland, a neighbour of Sweden, were to review their nuclear energy policy because of

Fukushima, however in contrast Sweden decided against this. Swedish Prime Minister

Fredrik Reinfeldt, stated "We have to do all we can to put safety questions first and try to find

a way for producing energy that has the least possible impact on the environment, the least

possible use of fossil fuels and finite natural resources” (Kinnunen & Johnson, 2011).

Safety was projected at the forefront and the SSM’s official report highlighted safety could

only be maintained in the long term if additional safety measurements and improvements was

made. This would incorporate regular in depth safety reviews of the maintenance of nuclear

power stations, management and staff.

How did other countries react after Fukushima?

Areva, a French group, are the world’s largest nuclear company who in 2011, published an

assessment showing the impact Fukushima had on the nuclear power sector and how various

countries responded. France stood firm by their pro nuclear notion, resilient to making quick,

radical decisions. They assigned safety reports / measurements, and wanted to wait for

results. - Just like Sweden. Finland as already stated were to review their nuclear energy

policy. In the UK governmental figures called upon Dr. Mike Weightman to create a

thorough report depicting the implications from Fukushima and how future changes can be

implemented. Germany, however started to take down seven of their oldest reactors from the

1970s for a preliminary period of three months. Overall there was a general pattern of calling

for regular safety check-ups on countries nuclear power plants and not taking any drastic and

30

rash decision making. This was particularly implemented by Sweden with a recently elected

government in strong support of nuclear power (Areva, 2011).

4.4 Surveys and public opinion

In 1976 the total amount of people who considered themselves as opposed to nuclear energy

was 46%, while those in favor stood at 29%. This number was in 1979 at 38%, while those

opposed were at 43%. Some two and a half years after the TMI accident, the numbers stood

at 39% and 45%, respectively. According to these numbers, the TMI accident did not leave a

lasting impression on the general public (SNES, 2011:5, p.)

Holmberg & Asp did a study on policy issues for the 1979 and 1982 elections. In this study,

they researched which issues that the voters, parties and mass media prioritized. This study

supports other research that claimed that the single most important issue for the voters in

1979 was nuclear energy, and that mass media also focused on this issue, while the parties, as

a whole, did not want to talk nuclear energy. In the following election in 1982, all three

groups had almost forgotten about nuclear energy (Holmberg & Asp, p.240f).

A few months after the Chernobyl accident, The Governmental Radiation Protection Institute

(Now a part of the SRSA) conducted a survey. IN this survey 57% wanted Swedish nuclear

to be shut down prior to 2010, 26% said that 2010 was fine, and 17% wanted the reactors to

continue after 2010. Yet a few months after that, the authors and Sören Holmberg performed

two more surveys asking the same questions. Now 34% wanted the shutdown to occur earlier

than 2010, while 33% supported nuclear beyond 2010, the same number that said that 2010

was a good date for a shutdown (Johansson & Westerståhl, p23).

During the actual phase-out period of 1999-2005, support for the phase-out declined. In 1998

the support for a phase-out stood at 57%, and by 2005 this number had dropped to 33%

(SNES, 2011:5, p.). These numbers are somewhat puzzling. Did support for the phase-out

really drop by that much, or was there something other going on, that caused these changes in

public opinion?

The Kärnkraftsäkerhet och Utbildning (KSU) is a nuclear safety and training organisation,

who in 2011 one month after the Fukushima disaster realised a Novus Poll (Novus Poll,

2013) showing how public support for the continued use of nuclear power (and if necessary

the expansion of new reactors) had fallen down from 40% in August 2010 to 33% in May

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2011. As the support for nuclear energy declined heavily, public opinion for the continued

phase out of nuclear, to be decided by political decisions increased from 19% in August 2010

to 24% in May 2011. Public opinion before Fukushima showed a trend of increasing support

for nuclear energy. These figures suggest more Swedes were favouring a nuclear phase out,

shortly after the Fukushima accident. This strong Fukushima-effect didn’t last very long,

however because by October of 2013, the trend of growing support for nuclear energy use

and expansion as evidently shown by surveys, continued (SOM-rapport 2013:4 & Novus

Poll, 2013).

An interesting observation, the support for a nuclear expansion is accompanied by a decline

in the support for new reactors replacing old reactors, if the need should arise. In 2010 the

support for new replacement reactors were 61%, and by late 2013 that support had dropped to

47% (Novus Poll, 2013).

In a repeating survey (1986 and 1997) on sources of information, scientists and technicians

were the most trusted sources in both years, with a slight increase over time. As a distant

second, we find environmental groups. Journalists and politicians receive the lowest grades.

In 1997 politicians got the absolute worst grade, while journalists had that dubious honour in

1986.

4.5 Framing of the overall issue

First phase of the framing

Katrin Uba’s (2010) case study highlights which kinds of actors are involved in Swedish

energy policy. Sweden, with regard to energy policy, is often labelled or categorised as

“pioneering” or as a “forerunner”, however this study argues for an opposing notion as a

broad systematic data for testing the validity of these assumptions, is lacking. Many actors

are needed in order to obtain legitimacy, especially with renewable energy policies.

Swedish policy-making regarding energy (environment and climate) can arguably be framed

and characterised with inconsistencies involving contrasting views. There is a duel battle

between political frame and experts: the conflicts between the two different actors: industry

and not. The article aims to highlight these contradictions and add clarification.

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Anshelm (2010) argues nuclear energy, in its earlier existence, was framed as a revolutionary

character, entering an age of a technological fantasy and envisions of monumental

proportions. Arguably though, any new technology can be seen as revolutionary to an extent

as it envisions change from its predecessor. Contrasting slightly Jon Palfreman labels it as

‘the stuff of media myth’ (Palfreman, 2006, p. 25), whereby initially the public were not

concerned.

However over time popular culture was rather instrumental with conjuring up and

maintaining this fantasy association of nuclear energy. Interestingly scientists have not

always criticised these science fiction-like visions which were depicted throughout popular

newspapers, magazines and television. In response to social, economic, political and

environmental problems nuclear energy was depicted as a solution. A further common

recurrence which was used in politics was the notion of helping 3rd world countries

(Anshelm, 2010, p. 45).

Second phase

In the 1970’s, the nuclear energy debate wasn’t, according to Evert Vedung, about specific

electricity generating techniques. Nuclear energy was a symbol for the risks associated with

economic growth, and against ecological balance. The entire Swedish environmental

movement mobilized against nuclear energy. Besides the ideological risk framing, the actual

risks of nuclear energy was also a big issue of the debate whereby risks included waste

containment, accidents, mining of nuclear fuel, cancer and genetic defects (Johansson &

Westerståhl, p.15).

Rossegger and Ramin (2012) hold a slightly contrasting stance in accumulating the different

phases of nuclear energy within Sweden. They address four different policy phases to gain an

understanding of why in 2010 the Swedish government reversed their decision of a nuclear

phase out.

1976 was a rather instrumental year for nuclear energy within Sweden, as it is the prevalence

of key political debates surrounding the topic. Nuclear energy was framed as a pragmatic

issue within a political context, resulting in indecisive decision making leading to the

downfall of two Swedish Governments. The political parties were very much divided,

33

holding contrasting opinions; to say that nuclear energy, with the 1970s, was not resolved

politically could be an understatement to say the least (Rossegger, U & Ramin, R, 2012, p.

327).

During a period surrounding the 1980 referendum, a pivotal role in the debate was the

“apprehension argument”. This argument was not primarily about the actual, physical risks of

nuclear energy, it was more about the unease that some of the public felt, regarding nuclear

energy (Johansson & Westerståhl, 1998, p.19f). The spread of radiation from the Chernobyl

disaster in Ukraine led to a framework of national energy vulnerability (Rossegger and

Ramin, 2012).

This apprehension argument is, in our opinion, closely related to risk perception and

communication. Politics is as much about feelings and perceptions, as it is about facts. But

these perceptions can be created and steered towards “desirable” viewpoints, whether or not

these “desirable” views are grounded in science or not.

Third phase

In 1988, as result of Chernobyl, the third stage involved the implementation for shutting

down two nuclear reactors at Barsebäck, by 1995 and 1996, respectfully. The required

procedures were put into place, however the promised measures of action from the

announcements were not put into practice, resulting in contradictions (Rossegger & Ramin,

2012). Concerns, as depicted above, involving the astronomical costs of an early phase out,

contributed to delays in shutting down Barsebäck 1 in November 30th 1999 and Barsebäck 2

in May 31st 2005.

According to SIFO surveys, in the wake of the Chernobyl accident, the Swedish population

started to trust Swedish nuclear energy, while eastern nuclear energy became the number one

risk. Climate change, emissions and chemicals in food were also rated as higher risks than

Swedish nuclear (Johansson & Westerståhl, 1998, p.20f). Together with the above mentioned

concerns, the delays are not all that surprising.

34

Fourth phase

It is apparent that Swedish nuclear power policy can be framed as problematic, involving

inconsistencies over time (Rossegger and Ramin, 2012). Prior to the actual revoked phase out

decision in 2010, the Swedish government in 2009 was already debating about this change.

Furthermore the phase-out lacks any credibility; firstly there was never a clear majority in

parliament. Secondly the 2010 phase out went against the opinions and decisions of the

Swedish public on nuclear energy from the original 1980 referendum. Fundamentally there is

a violation of the public’s opinions from the referendum if the revoking decision is accepted

freely (Rossegger and Ramin, 2012). Possible questions could be addressed as to why there

has not been a further referendum to conjure a collaborative viewpoint of the Swedish public

on nuclear energy, as the reversal seemingly makes their opinions matter less.

Prior to the 2009 debate, in 1997 there had been a decision made by S, C and V, where an

earlier shutdown of two reactors was decided, on the condition that the loss of generated

electricity could be compensated. In this decision, it was also said that 2010 was no longer a

relevant end date for nuclear energy (Johansson & Westerståhl, p.25f).

According to Johansson & Westerståhl, as there were no real “yes, more nuclear” alternative

in the 1980 referendum, many of the voters would have voted for such an alternative, and

perhaps the initial phase out decision was not entirely correct, just by referencing to the

referendum. If there had been a clear yes option alongside the no option, the referendum may

have played out entirely different, and Sweden’s nuclear policy might have been quite

different (Johansson & Westerståhl, p.17ff).

4.6 Applying rhetoric’s to the nuclear discourse

It appears apparent on face value, with a depiction in popular culture, to suggest that the term

meltdown can be commonly associated within the nuclear discourse, evoking a bold and

strong picture of a disaster on a large scale. Larson (2009) observed that the metaphor,

meltdown, can be associated in various ways and used in different contexts. The term first

appeared in the wake of The Three Mile Island disaster to portray a meaning showing the

deterioration of nuclear reactors. In contemporary times financial markets, the internet or a

child's tantrum can be described as a meltdown. This diversity of the metaphor meltdown is

problematic within environmental science, as scientists need to be accounted for using

35

metaphors precisely if the public are to gain true realities of environmental issues. A further

metaphor of nuclear energy used by Gösta Funke, a secretary of the Atomic Committee, in

the 1950s was that of a building brick (Anshelm, 2010, p. 47). Here nuclear energy was

envisioned as progress, but not just a normal progression, but an acceptance by all, enabling it

as a process of civilisation (ibid). Additionally rhetorical genres are used to suggest the type

of narrative being told where a distinctive tone can be implied. Initially in gaining support for

nuclear energy, of which involved the largest financial contribution within an industrial sense

in Swedish politics, various stakeholders had to convince the general public. Scientific,

technological and political discourse was not enough in itself to create public support as

scientists had to turn to the world of myths (Anshelm, 2010).

4.6 Technical information on nuclear power

While it is beyond the scope of this paper to have a detailed account of all the technical

aspects on nuclear power, here the researchers will provide additional information, regarding

nuclear safety and nuclear waste in Sweden. As Sweden’s first reactors came online in the

early 1970’s, their output was just over 2% of overall energy generation, by 1976 it was

18,1%. During the following years it rose quite quickly and in 1985 nuclear energy, for the

first time, stood for half of Sweden’s energy production. The years since have seen nuclear

energy generating around 40-50% of overall energy production (Holmberg & Hedberg, 2010,

p.4).

Currently, Sweden has three nuclear power plants, with a combined total of 10 reactors. Two

of the plants, Ringhals and Forsmark, are operated by the publicly owned Vattenfall, while

Oskarshamn is operated by OKG, co-owned by E.On and Fortum. The reactors in these three

power plants are of two kinds, seven are boiling water reactors, and three are pressurized

water reactors. Both of these types are light water reactors. The pressurized water reactors,

Ringhals reactors 2-4, were manufactured by Westinghouse, and the Swedish company Asea

Atom built the boiling water reactors. In 1999 the first of Barsebäck’s reactors were shut

down, and in 2005 the final Barsebäck reactor was shut down. Barsebäck is, so far, the only

Swedish nuclear power plant that has been decommissioned (Vattenfall, 2014 & SRSA,

2013).

36

Nuclear safety In Sweden

The Strålsäkert Säkerhets Myndigheten (The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority) has a

mandate from the Swedish government and predominantly deals with nuclear safety in

Sweden. Their research comprises around four differing areas:

Safety at nuclear power plants

Waste, transports and physical protection

Radiation protection

Nuclear non-proliferation (SRSA, 2013).

Nuclear Waste

The Swedish National Council for Nuclear Waste (SNCNW) is an independent committee

established in 1992 by the Swedish government. Their main principles are to advise the

government on investigations and matters related to nuclear waste and any dismantling of

nuclear infrastructures (SNCNW, 2014). Other stakeholders such as the nuclear power

industry, NGO’s and concerned public authorities also rely on the council for a foundation of

knowledge. In order to not give a centralised viewpoint the council’s members are

compromised from differing fields of knowledge such as natural science, technology and the

social sciences (SNCNW, 2014). In 2010 they published a report entitled ‘Nuclear Waste

State of the Art Report 2010, challenges for the final repository programme’. The report

provided relevant and up to date information, gathered from seminars and hearings on the

issue of nuclear waste in Sweden throughout 2009. They depicted two important issues, or

rather challenges as they label them: the engineered barriers and the concept of retrievability

NWSR (2010).

Retrievability and reversibility entail restoring nuclear waste. Both of these concepts are

apparent in many countries nuclear waste management programmes, including Sweden’s.

According to the Council, attitudes of Swedish people towards the notion of retrieving have

become more favourable over the years. Running parallel to this Jon Palfreman (2006) argues

people in France feel safer when nuclear waste is stored and adequately watched, as opposed

to being dumped. People’s perception matters, if the characterisations of a nuclear waste site

can be readdressed, then so too can people’s perceptions and attitudes towards the waste itself

(Palfreman, 2006).

37

Within discussions of nuclear waste the risk perceptions appear to be fundamental. Further

on, Jon Palfreman (2006, p. 36) addresses why it is a difficult task in disposing of nuclear

waste. Ideas of equity and fairness arise because if a whole country is gaining from nuclear

energy why should a certain region carry the burden of disposing the waste. He argues there

is no benefit for holding nuclear waste sites, only negative. Although it is beyond the scope of

this paper, it appears from the literature a thorough analysis of whether this is true in Sweden,

has not been attempted and could be plausible for further research.

Where is Sweden’s nuclear waste?

Sweden’s nuclear waste is managed by the SKB, which was jointly founded by Sweden’s

nuclear energy companies in the 1970’s, as a response to a law that mandated waste

management by the ones responsible for creating the waste. The current plan for waste

management is to store Sweden’s nuclear waste in Forsmark, where a nuclear power plant

currently operates. Oskarshamn is the location of Sweden’s interim storage facilities, where

spent nuclear rods are stored in water, while they cool down from their highly radioactive

state (http://www.skb.se/).

38

Chapter 5: Analysis

In this next section an analysis will be made by applying the theoretical perspectives and

frameworks discussed in chapter 2 upon the empirical data found within this paper. At first

glance, with a reversal of the referendum decision there appears an apparent diminishment of

the original opinions. Applying a rhetorical perspective to the actual 1980 referendum can

seem somewhat plausible. Here the layout and the language used in the three options of the

referendum can suggest it was already layered with flaws, as the three options were more or

less all saying no at different interpretations. Arguably though in contrast the reversal of the

referendum does not abolish the original results, as voted by the public. We must however,

take into consideration the fact that the two first options were “re-branded” as yes to nuclear,

in the public debate, and our data seems to suggest that not a small number of voters voted

for options one and two as ”yes to nuclear”. Research also show that quite a large group of

voters would have preferred the government and parliament to make a decision regarding

nuclear energy, instead of relying on a referendum (Johansson & Westerståhl, p.17). As

we've shown, the referendum was mostly political strategy, and if you analyse how the issue

has been handled since, the opinion of the referendum results does not seem to be all that

high, amongst decision makers.

Collaborating risk perception, agenda setting and rhetoric

The theories of risk perception with how it is communicated and framed within the media can

be applied to the information on nuclear in the empirical data. The mysterious and difficult to

comprehend elements of nuclear (i.e. radiation) are exactly what the media thrive off. The

media is part of the truth generating machine, with regard to agenda setting the media will

always constitute to what elements are newsworthy. Arguably radiation, like climate change,

is difficult to comprehend precisely because it is ‘invisible’. Only over time, consequences

and effects can be seen. For this reason, communication will always be fundamental for

issues of an environmental nature, in making them a reality. On this note, truthful and

adequate media reporting is what’s needed. However framing radiation within a level of

understanding is problematic. Upon analysing the newspaper headlines within the appendix it

is notable that in appendix D & E there is no reference to the actual tsunami, and in B & C

there is only 1 reference made throughout 35 headlines. The actual tsunami is of importance

here, as it is what hit the actual nuclear power plant, causing the catastrophe.

39

People’s perceptions are fundamental to the theory of risk perception and the environmental

perspective of rhetoric’s, as previously discussed. Upon applying both, it can be plausible to

suggest the negligence of the tsunami could be because the geographic proximities of

Sweden, in practice, would not allow for a tsunami of that magnitude. A nuclear meltdown,

leaking radiation appears closer to home than a nuclear meltdown caused by a tsunami.

The media often depict the measurements of radiation - millisieverts (msv) or roentgen

equivalent in man (rems). Large numbers are expressed within this format, making it

seemingly incomprehensible to grasp. The media will often brandish about these

measurements and other technical aspects related to nuclear energy, without expanding and

elaborating further. Questions have to be asked whether the journalists themselves have

actually fully comprehended these technicalities.

Arguably with framing radiation you can’t reassure people, especially when the media

exhaustively report on the topic with an agenda of fear and panic, coincided with

incomprehensible terminology. Radiation is permitting all around us, from ourselves to the

foods we eat and within the atmosphere in general. Without a collaboration of adequate

framing and communication from the three perspectives within this paper the perceptions of

the risks embedded in nuclear would differentiate.

While metaphors and tropes provide a powerful associated image, furthermore the nuclear

discourse has arguably altered associated meaning of places. Events such as Chernobyl and

Fukushima are metonymies, in the sense that the actual place has been substituted for the

event itself, i.e. the nuclear disasters that happened on both occasions. Upon hearing these

names, not only are they suggestive of the apparent catastrophe but they act as a symbol or an

indicator for the prevailed repercussions. A further factor contributing to the social

constructivist view is through the use of visual rhetoric’s. The perception of these places is

associated with risks inherent in nuclear energy, be they real, perceived or the probabilities of

them being so small that they are all but impossible.

Scientists, mass media and the public regarding risk

In the surveys on information sources in the part surveys and public opinion, scientists were

the most trusted source of information, according to the public. We believe that this pattern

still holds as somewhat true. Yet scientists have not been all that visible in the debate, as

evidenced by the sensationalistic headlines in the papers, and how risk communication has

40

been carried out. The exception here seems to be Hannes Alfvén, who acted much more an

advocate, acting on personal conviction and extending pacifistic concerns unto nuclear

energy. We also believe that this can explain, partly, why journalists seem to have such a

large part in influencing public opinion, despite the lack of trust that the public have in

journalists, in the issue of nuclear energy.

A large majority of the public trusts the scientists, and they believe that scientists are pro-

nuclear (Johansson & Westerståhl, p.48f). This could lead one to draw the conclusion that the

public, in general, would be positive to nuclear, and to attribute this to their trust in pro-

nuclear scientists. One could also believe that this would lead to a more “correct” risk

perception. While the general public is more pro-nuclear than journalists, the rest of these

assumptions seem to be incorrect. This is one of many inconsistencies we've found in our

research.

As journalists have failed to properly communicate risks associated with nuclear energy, and

instead opting for a sensationalistic and dramatized style of communication, it is no wonder

that the public have a hard time creating a “true” sense of risk perception regarding nuclear

energy, especially coupled with the fact that we have an inherent bias against the type of risks

that nuclear energy belongs to. This more extravagant type of news reporting, that is shown

to come from a tendency, when supposed to show expert opinion and thoughts, to instead opt

for showing their own conceptions coupled with the famous objectivity of media(both sides

get equal amount of exposure) helps to create a difficult picture for the public to

comprehend(Johansson & Westerståhl, p,50f).

We have not been able to find any specific examples of poor risk communication by official

Swedish sources, such as the government or the SRSA, but neither have we found any

examples of good risk communication. And here, we can claim evidence by lack of evidence.

If the government indeed had done a good job with risk communication, journalists and their

sensationalistic views had not been as dominant as they seem to be. Good risk

communication is not only correct information, but also to get it out there. We've obtained an

excellent scientific guide published by the National Food Administration in 1986, and written

by professor Bo Lindell, previously head of the SSI, as a response to Chernobyl (Lindell,

1986), but as we have not encountered it, or similar texts, we must conclude that the part of

communicating this knowledge was not very successful.

41

Nuclear energy vs. nuclear arms

A lot of the opposition towards nuclear energy came from a fear for nuclear weapons and the

terrible possibilities that they brought with them. Hannes Alfvén was one of those opposed to

nuclear power, and he managed to influence Swedish nuclear policy, quite a bit. This fear or

nuclear weapons is very understandable, as Japan showed us how much destruction they can

bring. The merger of the two different kinds of nuclear power, done by early

environmentalists and peace movements (who were often the same) made it more difficult to

have a debate about nuclear energy. This successful framing of the issue, done by the

opponents of nuclear, must also be seen in the light of the rhetoric of the pro-nuclear side, in

the early days of nuclear energy.

The rhetoric’s of the nuclear discourse have depicted a dual purpose; the frame of endless

possibilities of nuclear vs the frame of destructive powers of nuclear weapons. Nuclear was

embedded with the rhetoric’s and metaphors of progress and moreover mythical

connotations, throughout the world of science, politics and the media (Anshelm 2010).

Framing an understanding of the benefits of nuclear using rhetoric’s can be problematic, as

the future is not always easy to envision, and framing nuclear weapons problematic because

of the wide scale fear. This is probably the ultimate reason as to why people are afraid or

opposed of nuclear technology, because if you have the technology to create nuclear energy

you have the technology for nuclear weapons. The rhetoric’s of nuclear technology here are

that we have to accept accelerating technological advancements. By focusing on the

rhetoric’s and the need of mythical connotations by different actors, it appears feasible to

suggest it contributes to the confusion and indecisiveness of the nuclear discourse in Sweden.

42

Chapter 6: Discussion & Conclusion

Firstly, as highlighted throughout, the discourse of nuclear energy in Sweden has been

embedded with inconsistencies and various contradictions. It is feasible to suggest that

politics have been at the forefront of the discourse. Also we have to take into account there is

a political agenda within media reporting; as political actors have influential roles in shaping

the ideological standpoints of media positioning. Additionally the media decide who the

“expert” is, paving way for a reasonable way of thinking and believing it must be true.

However, surely we have to challenge this dominant discourse in becoming more conscious

of this label as they freely brandish it around without an explicit distinction made. Can’t it be

that too often scientists are regarded as experts, in a way, regardless of their status in the

process? Furthermore the way mass media is produced, coincided with journalists generally

perceived as anti-nuclear, it’s feasible to suggest it is not really suitable for complex issues

like nuclear. Reporting of a sensationalist nature with an emphasis on risks spreads further

panic. However that is not to suggest the media are the only actors influencing the spread of

fear.

As we've stated in the theory part, the ACF theory has been weak in explaining policy

outcomes, and we are not so sure that we have had much more luck, than previous research.

Partly, coalition is a matter of definition. During the referendum there was very clearly

interesting coalitions advocating for their views. The most coherent coalition was the anti-

nuclear coalition, headed by the Centre Party and the environmental groups. Despite this,

they lost to the more fragmented pro-nuclear coalition. Unfortunately, we do not believe that

we can generalize from this single example, and we also feel that for the ACF to be fully

examined and tested in this setting, we would have needed to focus on different actors in the

process. Those that are missing here are mostly industrial and economic actors. What we

have been able to uncover is that some coalitions are more by accident than deliberate action,

and that this can have both good and bad consequences, we are mainly referring to the

critique of SR during the time of the 1980 referendum, and how this is perceived by voters.

Regarding politics, we feel that we have not made any new, real contributions regarding the

interplay between the political parties. What we have managed to do, that we have not seen

earlier, is to bring risk discussion and constructions of perception through rhetoric’s and

framing and join them with the political data, to better understand the interplay between the

43

different actors, mainly, we feel, the voters, mass media and the politicians, and how they

react and influence each other.

Overall coherent communication between media, public and experts/politicians is quite

problematic within Swedish nuclear energy. For example the media’s presentation of

radiation contributes to a spread of panic, fear and confusion. It is not only within Swedish

energy policy that this is evident, but this is a very visible example. And it is not all that

surprising, all the actors involved in the process have their own agenda and viewpoint that

they want to promote.

Controversy, sensationalism and uncertainty will continue to be criteria for selection, in order

for financial gain. We need better frames for all three perspectives to coherently understand

nuclear, Lakoff (2010) addresses that we actually need a new frame of understanding. There

appears an enriching amount of articles from academia, which are all quick to suggest

reasoning as to why journalists are not adequately equipped to report the true realities

surrounding the nuclear discourse. Nor how policy makers or politicians are adequately

prepared amidst times of crisis (e.g. nuclear power phase out not accelerated after Chernobyl

or referendum reversal). Instead, attention should highlight why this is the case and how we

can adopt change.

To get a clearer, more accurate view of Swedish nuclear energy policy, more focus should

have been on the process described in the ACF theory, and on the various political and

economic actors. As this multidisciplinary research paper’s focus has been spread out on

three different fields, the kind of detailed investigation into the political side has not been

possible, given our constraints, time wise. Further research into this field could be interesting

to pursue. It would be beneficial to investigate the relations and influence of actors that were

not part of this research paper, such as Vattenfall, and also how larger geo-political

considerations influenced the process.

How have we been able to answer our research questions? Our answer is a soft yes. We feel

that we have shed light on the questions that we asked, and that the answer says something

interesting and feasible about the chosen subject. The multidisciplinary approach has helped

us to see old research and established theoretical frameworks in a new light, but it has also

had negative qualities. As mentioned, we feel that some important actors are left out of our

research, and that an involvement of these would have added greatly to our research.

44

Therefore, we are not quite willing to proclaim that this research paper has a high validity

and/or reliability, but given our constraints and limitations, it does help to explain the subject.

45

Appendix A - The 1980 Referendum (Bergenäs, 2009)

Include the actual 3 options within the 1980 Swedish referendum.

Option one was supported by the conservative party and read:

Nuclear power shall be phased out, while taking consideration of the need for electric power

for the maintenance of employment and welfare. In order to, among other things, lessen the

dependency on oil, and while waiting for the availability of renewable energy sources, at

most 12 of the reactors shall be used, be they existing or under construction. No further

expansion is to take place. The order in which the reactors will be taken out of production

will be determined by security concerns.

Option two, supported by the Social Democratic Party and the Liberal Party, was nearly

identical to option two, but included the following addition:

Energy conservation shall be pursued vigorously and stimulated further. The weakest groups

in society shall be protected. Measures shall be taken to control consumption of electricity,

e.g. prohibiting direct electric heating in the construction of new permanent housing.

Research and development of renewable energy sources shall be pursued under the

leadership of the community (read: "the government"). Environmental and safety improving

measures are to be carried out. A special safety study is to be made at each reactor. To allow

insight by the citizens a special security committee with local ties is appointed at each

nuclear power plant. Production of electricity from oil and coal is to be avoided. The

community (read: "the government") shall have the main responsibility for production and

distribution of electric power. Nuclear power plants and other future installations for the

production of significant electric power shall be owned by the state and by the municipalities.

Excessive profits from hydroelectric power generation are reduced by taxation.

Option three, supported by the Centre Party, Christian Democratic Party and the Left

Communist Party, read:

46

NO to continued expansion of nuclear power. Phasing out of the currently operating six

reactors with at most ten years. A conservation plan for reduced dependency on oil is to be

carried through on the basis of: continued and intensified energy conservation; greatly

increased development of renewable energy sources. The operating reactors are subjected to

heightened safety requirements. Non-fuelled reactors will never be put into production.

Uranium mining is to be prohibited in our country. If ongoing or future safety analyses

demand it, immediate shutdown is to take place. The work against nuclear proliferation and

nuclear weapons shall be intensified. No fuel enrichment is permitted and the export of

reactors and reactor technology is to cease. Employment will increase through alternative

energy production, more effective conservation of energy and refinement of raw materials.

47

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