Unruly Bodies (Standing against apartheid)
Transcript of Unruly Bodies (Standing against apartheid)
Chapter 10 in Cameron, A, Dickinson, J and Smith, N (eds) (2013)
Body/State, Farnham: Ashgate
Unruly Bodies (Standing Against Apartheid)
Gavin Brown
Introduction
For nearly four years from 19th April 1986 the members and
supporters of the City of London Anti-Apartheid Group [hereafter
City Group, as they referred to themselves] maintained a Non-Stop
Picket on the pavement outside the South African Embassy in
Trafalgar Square calling for the release of Nelson Mandela. They
stayed on that pavement twenty four hours a day, 365 days a year
until he was released from jail (and then some – the Non-Stop Picket
did not actually end until two weeks after Mandela’s release). For
most of that time, as a teenager, I was part of that protest. This
chapter describes the distinctive culture of solidarity created by
the material space of the Picket and the practices that sustained it
(Brown and Yaffe 2012). It examines how the cosmopolitan friendship
networks created amongst Picketers enabled them to see beyond their
own life experiences and extend their understanding of solidarity in
important ways. City Group and the Non-Stop Picket had a culture of
direct action against the representatives of the apartheid regime
(and their supporters) in Britain. Through this non-violent, but
confrontational political stance, the young Picketers learned to
think and act against the (British) state, using their bodies in
unruly ways. In the pages that follow, I examine both the positive,
empowering aspects of holding this stance, but also consider the
understandable, but less positive, paranoia that this could lead to.
In doing so, I highlight the uneven terrain of this unruliness,
demonstrating how some picketers could take (and get away with) the
risks associated with being unruly more safely than others; whilst
some found themselves positioned as ‘unruly’ in relation to the
Picket’s own culture.
Standing in Solidarity
City Group was formed by Norma Kitson (an exiled African National
Congress [ANC] member), her children, friends and supporters in 1982
(Kitson 1987). City Group’s unconditional solidarity with all
liberation movements in South Africa (not just the ANC) and its
principled linking of the struggle against apartheid with anti-
racism in Britain led to group’s eventual expulsion in 1985 from the
national Anti-Apartheid Movement which viewed the ANC as the only
legitimate liberation movement in South Africa (Fieldhouse 2005;
Thörn 2006; Trewala 1995). City Group deployed diverse tactics,
including direct action, to express its solidarity with those
opposed to apartheid. Due to the national Anti-Apartheid Movement’s
close allegiance to the exiled leadership of the ANC and South
African Communist Party, it refused to extend solidarity to
activists from other political traditions in South Africa, such as
the Pan-Africanist Congress, Black Consciousness Movement of Azania
or the imprisoned trade union leader Moses Mayekiso. In contrast,
City Group took up their causes. Its support for those sidelined by
the exiled leadership of the ANC was valued by activists in South
Africa (Bozzoli 2004, Maaba 2001). The Picket played a key role as a
‘convergence space’ (Routledge 2003) through which transnational
activist discourses and practices addressing the politics of race
were articulated – fostering dialogue and the exchange of ideas not
just between British and South African activists, but wider networks
of activists from diverse nations who passed through London and
engaged with the Picket.
The Picket was a highly visible protest against apartheid.
Through its constant presence, the Picket developed a distinctive
appearance, culture and sense of community. Bright hand-sewn banners
(often in black, green and gold, the colours of the ANC) provided a
backdrop to the Picket, declaring its raison d'etre; additionally
picketers carried placards which declared their solidarity and
commented on topical events and campaigns in South Africa. Members
of the picket would leaflet and petition passers-by, whilst others
made impromptu speeches on a megaphone or sang South African freedom
songs. This petitioning served both as an opportunity for political
debate with the public and also as a means of collecting donations
to sustain the Picket’s campaigning (and to send as material aid to
the families of political prisoners in South Africa). Larger themed
rallies were held on Friday evenings, and on Thursdays the Picket's
numbers swelled as supporters danced to the music of a group of
street musicians, the Horns of Jericho.
The culture of the Picket not only conveyed its political
message of solidarity, but helped individual participants define
their personal identities (Thörn 2009). For many picketers, but
particularly the young, the opportunity to stand on a pavement in
the centre of London singing, shouting and pushing the limits of
legality with the police was powerful and empowering. This is not to
throw their commitment to the struggle against apartheid into
question, or accuse them of apolitical delinquency, but to recognise
that the act of standing in solidarity, against the policies of the
Thatcher and Botha governments, unleashed powerful emotions
(including rage, fear, despair, pride, righteousness and joy,
amongst others) that exceed easy political categorisations. To be on
the picket was the bend or break the rules of appropriate behaviour
in public space. The social and political life of the Picket had a
particular emotional geography through which individuals overcame
social isolation, transformed their sense of self, and enjoyed being
‘unruly’ in public space (Roseneil 2000).
The geography of the Non-Stop Picket extended beyond its
location and its relationship with the struggle in South Africa. The
combination of the Picket’s central location and its expression of
solidarity through confrontation with the representatives of
apartheid attracted a broad and diverse group of mostly young
activists from the UK and beyond (including participants from many
European countries, Australia, Brazil and the USA). Some of these
‘international’ picketers were studying in London at the time, some
were migrant workers and some, having first encountered the Picket
whilst on holiday, moved to London to be part of it. The Picket
provided ‘uncommon ground’ through which friendship networks
developed that crossed boundaries of nationality, ethnicity and
social difference (Chatterton 2006). Brought together by their
common opposition to apartheid, young picketers protested alongside,
and socialised with, people from very different backgrounds to their
own. Although their activism entailed extending solidarity with
distant others, the everyday life of the Picket fostered more
immediate experiences of subaltern cosmopolitanism and enabled
participants to see beyond their own positionality and (often
limited) prior life experiences. The Picket provided a safe and
supportive milieu in which to experiment with different identities
and ways of being. This was not, of course, without its problems or
limits. For example, at times the Picket became something of a haven
for young street homeless people living in the West End, although
their involvement was often short-lived and marked by the
reassertion of social hierarchies by more settled and privileged
members of the Picket.
Transnational solidarity connects people across territories
where often there was no obvious prior ‘connection’ between them
except a shared critique of existing power relations (Massey 2008;
Olesen 2005). Such solidarity frequently seeks to reconfigure
spatial relations between (and within) nations. Real and imagined
connections forged through the international anti-apartheid movement
(which was active in more than 100 different countries) contributed
to creating contemporary global civil society and addressing global
political concerns in new ways (Sapire 2009; Thörn 2006). Solidarity
is a practice of taking responsibility for geographical inequalities
(Massey 2004; Thörn 2009), but solidarity activists can still
themselves be complicit in reproducing uneven geometries of power
within their movements and colonial power relations towards those
distant others that they seek to support (Koopman 2008; Sundberg
2007). White activists on the Non-Stop Picket were not immune from
accusations of racism and these unleashed many tense political
debates amongst the group. Similarly, class privilege could
sometimes be reproduced on the Picket – particularly in the ways
homeless youth were treated with suspicion by some picketers,
discouraged from interacting with the public and relegated to the
role of 'klingon' (holding the banner for extended periods of time).
This does not negate the potential for grassroots cosmopolitan
connections to be forged through the contacts provided by
transnational solidarity. As Thörn (2009) has articulated,
transnational anti-apartheid activism transcended some borders (of
race and nation), but it also (re)produced others (between different
liberation movements and solidarity groups; as well as reinforcing a
'them' and 'us' attitude towards most white South Africans). Such
complex power relations further complicate the emotional geographies
of activism that are the internal life of movement politics (Bosco
2007; Brown and Pickerill 2009; Goodwin et al 2001) and which inspire,
sustain and, at times, curtail on-going political involvement.
Learning to Be Against the State
Positioned on the pavement directly outside South Africa House, the
picket was strategically placed (Bosco 2006) to draw attention to
apartheid and bring pressure to bear on the regime's representatives
and allies in the UK. The Picket did not just stand outside the
Embassy bearing witness to apartheid’s crimes it took direct action
against apartheid’s representatives. This inevitably brought
picketers into conflict with the police, courts and other
representatives of the British state. These experiences of arrest,
harassment, surveillance and, at times, police violence led many
young activists to question the role of the state. Through the
Picket, many picketers learned how to act against the state
(although this did not necessarily produce anti-state perspectives
or challenge state-like thinking-behaviours within the group).
Standing in solidarity provoked picketers to critically reflect on
the functioning of the state and the exercise of political power ‘at
home’. In this way, transnational solidarity became a reciprocal
process with knowledge and learning flowing in more than one
direction (not just from Britain to resisting distant others). Here,
I consider how this happened.
Over the years, several attempts were made to surround the
Embassy. This was achieved on 16th June 1988 at a rally to
commemorate the 22nd anniversary of the massacre of protesting
schoolchildren in Soweto in 1976. On this weekday evening, over 1500
people joined the protest and the Embassy was completely surrounded,
hundreds of commemorative black balloons were released and, as
frequently happened at rallies both large and small, flowers were
laid on the Embassy gates. This audacious protest provoked a violent
response from the Metropolitan Police who attacked the Picket and
physically threw many picketers over the (largely ineffective)
crowd-control barriers. Five picketers were arrested. At 10.30pm
that evening there were still over three hundred protestors on
Picket.
The ‘Surround the Embassy’ protest was characteristic of the
high profile, spectacular actions City Group could mobilise and the
direct action approach that they favoured. On 6th September 1989,
the day of what turned out to be the last whites-only election in
South Africa, the best part of a thousand protestors took direct
action blocking the road directly outside the Embassy for over two
hours. To block the road, protestors used their bodies in unruly
ways – darting through lines of police to enter the road, risking
their safety by lying in front of cars and buses, linking arms and
going ‘limp’ to hamper police efforts to remove them from the
roadway (and then jumping straight back in again). Despite the
significant disruption caused to the evening rush hour traffic in
central London, the police were more restrained on this occasion –
undoubtedly on political orders, as hundreds of arrests outside the
Embassy on that day would have been politically embarrassing to de
Klerk’s government and his supporters in the British Parliament. The
state’s response to this event highlights the relational nature of
policing and protest on the Picket – picketers would try out new
forms of protest, using their bodies in new ways to confound
established police tactics, but they could never fully anticipate
how the police would respond to their unruliness.
Actions on the Picket were undertaken for a number of reasons.
Sometimes they sought to directly disrupt the functioning of
apartheid’s representatives in Britain, sometimes they were designed
to produce photo opportunities or significant arrests that could
generate press coverage for the Picket and its message; and, at yet
other times they were more symbolic. For example, in August 1988, a
group of women activists marked Azanian Women’s Day by taking
scrubbing brushes to the fabric of the Embassy to wash off the
bloody taint of apartheid and draw attention to the double
oppression of women under apartheid. These actions embodied the
Picket’s spirit of unruliness – part of the challenge (and fun) of
even the most low key action was to see how far the police could be
pushed. The unruly presence of the Picket was often performed
through small acts of defiance that sought to assert and expand the
space controlled by the protestors outside the embassy. Whether
active participants in these actions, or witnesses to them,
picketers learned to take an unruly stance in relation to the
police, the courts and other representatives of the British state.
The Embassy repeatedly complained to the British Government about
the Picket’s presence:
You are well aware of the numerous fruitless attempts to
terminate or contain the City of London Anti-Apartheid
Group picket outside South Africa House which to our mind
constitutes harassment and impairment of the dignity of
the Embassy. [Extract from a letter a letter from a South
African Embassy official to the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office dated 10 December 1987] (FCO n.d).
The Embassy encouraged the British government to restrict and ban
the protest, and for nearly two months (6th May-2nd July) in 1987,
the Picket was removed from outside the Embassy by the Metropolitan
Police (following an action in which three City Group activists
threw several gallons of red paint over the entrance to the Embassy
to protest the whites-only election taking place in South Africa on
that day). During this period, the Picket relocated to the steps of
nearby St. Martin-in-the-Fields Church and activists repeatedly
risked arrest to break the police ban on their protest and defend
the right to protest outside the Embassy. The police used an arcane
Victorian bylaw, "Commissioner's Directions", which allowed the
Metropolitan Police Commissioner to curtail public gatherings within
a mile of Parliament, to allow MPs free movement to go about their
business, to ban the Picket during this period. Prior to the paint-
throwing action on 6th May, the Metropolitan Police had briefly
moved the Picket under Commissioner’s Directions on 30th April 1987.
Clearly, under pressure from the Embassy, they were looking for an
excuse to relocate and restrict the protest. This bylaw, designed to
facilitate the movement of those bodies essential to the functioning
of the liberal democratic state, was used to limit the presence of
those bodies that challenged its policies, authority and legitimacy.
Eventually, the ban was broken when four MPs protested outside the
Embassy alongside other picketers and the police were unable to
justify the ban any longer (Bailey and Taylor 2009: 318). In total
173 people were arrested during City Group's campaign to break the
police ban and defend the right to protest. All charges were
eventually thrown out of court. During the period of the ban on the
Picket, City Group supporters acted in an unruly manner, breaking
the law in order to defend their right to protest and thereby defend
a space in which to be unruly. The irony of both the manner in which
the Picket was restored to its place in front of the Embassy and
picketers’ subsequent legal victories in court was that the
Metropolitan Police were exposed as bending legal ‘rules’ in order
to curtail unruliness.
City Group’s activism was not restricted to Trafalgar Square:
picketers took direct action against apartheid across the UK and
toured the country mobilising solidarity. These extended campaigns
of direct action away from the Non-Stop Picket included 'trolley
protests' against the sale of South African goods in supermarkets
across London, where activists filled trolleys with South African
produce, took them to the checkout and then refused to pay for them.
At their most effective, these protests could tie up the majority of
checkouts in a targeted supermarket simultaneously. In October 1986
City Group coordinated simultaneous trolley protests at seven
supermarkets across ethnically diverse areas of inner London. In a
similar vein, City Group organised frequent occupations of the South
African Airways (SAA) offices in Oxford Circus through their "No
Rights? No Flights!" campaign. These offices were frequently closed
through successive occupations several times in a day. As the
security staff at the SAA offices increasingly recognised repeat
‘offenders’, activists needed to utilise more and more imaginative
disguises to enable their initial access to the premises. During one
protest on South African Women's Day in 1988 a large party of women,
varying in age from their mid-teens to their seventies, successfully
entered the SAA offices dressed as nuns and a class of convent
girls. Finally, City Group activists took direct action at sporting
venues around the UK, including pitch invasions at various rugby and
cricket grounds, in protest at sportsmen and women who had broken
the sports boycott of South Africa (Maaba 2001). For these actions
to be successful, activists used their bodies in particular ways to
occupy space or block certain activities from taking place. They
relied on their bodies’ potential for intense speed (or slowness) to
get into place to protest, evading capture by police officers or
security guards, or to hamper their removal from the South African
Airways offices or the cricket crease at Lords’. Frequently they
would disguise their bodies or mask their identities in order not to
appear unruly or out of place, thereby enabling their planned
unruliness. Very often, as I have noted, these disguises could take
absurd forms – so much so that it is a wonder they were not spotted
and caught out more frequently. Timing was everything – protestors
waited patiently for the optimum moment to act, and coordinated
their arrival at an action carefully (to arrive too early could draw
attention to oneself, but being late could leave others exposed and
vulnerable). As should be clear, to create the potential to use
their bodies in unruly ways, picketers exercised a high degree of
calculation and control over their bodies.
Paranoid Stances
I turn now to an examination of how City Group established and
applied its own rules and consider how certain bodies were
positioned as unruly in relation to the political culture of the
Picket. Unlike the functional anarchism of some of other long-term
protests in 1980s Britain, such as the Greenham Common Women’s Peace
Camp (Roseneil 2000), the Non-Stop Picket was highly organised and
City Group operated through a hierarchical leadership structure.
Political leadership was provided by the Group’s Convenor, Deputy
Convenor and Secretary; a committee met weekly to plan and organise
the Group’s campaigning, and a volunteer Picket Organiser worked to
ensure that shifts on the Picket’s rota were adequately covered. On
each shift (of either three or six hours), one picketer acted as the
Picket’s Chief Steward. For the most part, this responsibility was
taken by an experienced and trusted (but not necessarily older)
picketer, but a competent and committed activist could quickly find
themselves in this role (especially on those shifts that were harder
to cover on the rota). The role of the steward was, first and
foremost, a political one. As an internal ‘user guide’ to the
Picket, circulated in the final few months of the Picket in early
1990 stated,
“The rules and policies of the picket are established at
democratic meetings of City of London Anti-Apartheid
Group. These rules and policies obtain despite the
disposition of the picket at any given time. It is the
responsibility of the Chief Steward to defend what City
Group stands for. There is a political duty to ensure
that the message gets through. The Chief Steward is the
‘custodian’ of the picket’s political message.” (City of
London Anti-Apartheid Group 1990: 1)
The rules referred to here were simple, few in number and stood
throughout the duration of the Picket. These rules served to ensure
the political integrity of the protest and the safety of its
participants. They banned the use drugs and alcohol on the Picket,
and stated that no-one under the influence of either was allowed to
be present there. Participants were encouraged to fully participate
in the political work of the Picket and to ensure that it was tidy
and presentable. The rules expressly forbade picketers from engaging
in conversations with the police (or responding to taunts and abuse
from racists).
Despite how the Non-Stop Picket fostered unruly stances in
relation to the state, the group did not tolerate unruliness in
relation to its own standards of conduct. The Chief Steward was
empowered as the sole conduit for impromptu negotiations with the
police. The same user guide advised,
“In all tactical decisions consider:
I. What do we stand to gain?
II. What do we stand to lose?
Discuss situations as they develop. Let the whole picket know what the problem is.
Consider whether to stand firm or make a tactical withdrawal. Always look at a
decision in terms of what is to be achieved and what is to be lost. If in doubt,
consult [the Convenor],” (City of London Anti-Apartheid Group 1990: 1).
This level of organisation certainly enabled the Picket to continue
as long as it did with a clear political message and, to an extent,
to minimize avoidable arrests and conflict with the police. Some
picketers benefited more from this framework than others.
Participating in the Picket, and particularly in direct actions, was
riskier for some picketers than others.
In the autumn of 1986, six months into the Non-Stop Picket, City
Group led a campaign against police harassment of women picketers,
several of whom had been strip searched in front of male police
officers, groped and assaulted, and subjected to lewd and abusive
remarks following arrests on the Picket. Around this time, and
throughout the four years of the Picket, high profile Black
activists were also targeted for repeated arrest by the police. City
Group took the defence of its supporters seriously, arranging for
people to wait outside police stations until arrestees were
released, organising and funding their legal defence, and supporting
them in court. In the case of the sexual harassment of women
picketers in 1986, a writ was even issued against the Commissioner
of the Metropolitan Police and civil action taken in the courts.
This level of organisation, support and solidarity was effective as,
of the more than 500 arrests made during the first two years of the
Picket, City Group secured a 92% acquittal rate. City Group may have
stood against the state, but it was very effective at using the
courts as a political platform when necessary.
City Group did not just experience arrests and harassment at the
hands of the Metropolitan Police, they were the subject of ‘dirty
tricks’ by agents of the apartheid regime. On at least two occasions
bogus leaflets were distributed in an attempt to smear City Group
and cause further divisions between the Picket and the mainstream
anti-apartheid movement. These leaflets carefully mimicked the house
style of City Group’s publicity material, contained correct contact
details for the group, and even promoted the group’s regular weekly
meetings.
In this context of police harassment and dirty tricks, City
Group activists were aware that they and their activities were under
surveillance not just by the Metropolitan Police and British Special
Branch, but also by the South African state’s intelligence services.
They were aware that the group was probably infiltrated by the
police and South African agents. Although no such agents were ever
identified with any certainty, this suspicion was justified – after
all, the ANC’s Chief Representative in London throughout the 1980s
Solly Smith (real name Samuel Khanyile) was later revealed as a
long-term agent for the apartheid regime. He was a key player in
engineering City Group’s expulsion from the national Anti-Apartheid
Movement.
That City Group managed to operate so effectively, and its
activists were able to pull off so many clandestine direct actions
over the years, was in large part a measure of how seriously they
took security. In this regard, Norma and David Kitson, drawing on
their experiences of operating underground in South Africa in the
early 1960s, were fine mentors for many young activists. This regard
for security infused many of the practices through which the Picket
(and the broader work of the group) were constituted. One of the
reasons for directing conversations with the police on the Picket
through the serving Chief Steward was to minimize ‘careless talk’.
Similarly, picketers were discouraged from having personal
discussions on the Picket, and from bringing personal diaries or
address books with them there. All key activists took care over what
they discussed on the phone. Great care was taken to maintain the
security of the Group’s office and new activists often had to wait
quite some time before they were trusted with knowledge of its exact
location. Again, given that the London offices of the ANC were
bombed by South African agents in March 1982, this concern was not
exaggerated. By following these precautionary security practices,
activists enabled the success of many direct actions, and undermined
the efforts of the police to successfully prosecute activists on
conspiracy charges that could have resulted in lengthy custodial
sentences.
This regard for the security of the Group’s actions at times
fostered paranoia in many activists. Although City Group operated in
an open and democratic manner, and the Picket survived for so long
because the Group was pro-active in encouraging the participation
and inclusion of new members and supporters, it was easy for
individuals to find themselves the object of suspicion. If the act
of standing in solidarity on the Picket produced unruly bodies
prepared to break the law to demonstrate their opposition to
apartheid and to take on the state to defend their right to protest,
then at times the internal life of City Group could produce state-
like relations between people in response to events that were
perceived to jeopardise the integrity of the Picket. Over the years,
a number of activists were investigated by the group, called to
disciplinary hearings with the Committee, with several expelled from
the Group and banned from the Picket. Within City Group, the most
unruly bodies were those that were suspected of stealing from the
Group or acting as police informers.
Conclusion
Throughout this chapter I have outlined the distinctive culture of
solidarity created on and by the Non-Stop Picket of the South
African Embassy in London in the late 1980s. In examining (and
remembering) life on and around the Non-Stop Picket, this chapter
makes three important contributions to debate. First it offers a
deeper understanding of the embodied nature of activism and direct
action. Second, it offers new insights into the emotional
geographies of activism and resistance – examining both how protest
spaces can foster the empowerment of their participants, but also
the limits of this that result from paranoid cultures of security
(reproducing certain forms of state-like social relations). Third, I
have articulated the reciprocal nature of transnational solidarity,
arguing that the Non-Stop Picket did not just extend solidarity to
those resisting apartheid in South Africa, but that in doing so it
also created a space to think critically about racism in Britain and
the role of the British state. In this regard, the cosmopolitan
friendship networks created amongst picketers enabled them to see
beyond their prior life experiences to question accepted political
wisdom and experiment with the boundaries of social conventions.
These grassroots cosmopolitan networks cohered as a result of shared
opposition to apartheid, but through their quotidian reproduction
contributed to extending and deepening cultures of (transnational)
solidarity.
A study of the Non-Stop Picket’s culture of direct action
against the representatives of the apartheid regime has been central
to this chapter. I have argued that through this non-violent, but
confrontational political stance, the young picketers learned to
think and act against the (British) state, using their bodies in
(sometimes mundane, but often extraordinary) unruly ways. The space
occupied by the Picket, on that pavement in Trafalgar Square, and
the vibrant noisy culture of the protest, allowed teenage protestors
and others the opportunity and freedom to express themselves in ways
that they found constrained in other areas of their lives. More
spectacularly, picketers used their bodies on and off the Picket to
physically block the normal functioning of apartheid’s
representatives in Britain, trade with South Africa and those who
sought to break the international sanctions against apartheid. In
these ways, individuals not only learned how to use their own bodies
in unruly ways, but through repeated joint actions with other
picketers developed tacit knowledge of how other bodies would
respond in particular circumstances. These embodied memories of
(one’s own and others’) unruliness are persistent – more than ten
years after the Picket ended, I had chance encounter with some
former picketers on another protest. Frustrated by the timidity of
other protestors when faced with the private security guards
employed to protect the object of our protest, it took little more
than a few exchanged glances for the three of us to click back into
action, work our bodies together and anticipate what each other was
about to do next. A new younger generation of protestors followed
our lead, with one asking me with admiration “where did you learn to
do that?” Twenty years on, although many current activists have never
heard of the Non-Stop Picket, its legacy ripples through
contemporary protests around Britain and beyond.
Note
Azania was the preferred, decolonized, name for ‘South Africa’ used
by the Pan-Africanist Congress and groups working in the Black
Consciousness tradition developed by Steve Biko and others.
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