MASTER'S THESIS M -591

WAGONER, F re d E m e r so n ,THE C O PPER BELT O F NORTHERN RHODESIA:A BAROM ETER TO THE FU T U R E O F SOUTHERN AFRICA.

The A m erican U n iv e r s ity , M .A ., 1964 P o litica l S c ie n c e , in te rn a tio n a l law and r e la t io n s

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan

U -

THE COPPERBELT W NORTHERN RHODESIA;A BAROMETER TO THE FUTURE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

? "Fred Et Wagoner

Submitted to the Faculty of the School of International Service

of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degreeof

MASTER OF ARTS

Date: IQ/U-

es oF Committee:l€ijLÊ^

Signatures o^ Commit tee Chairman:

Date: December 1963AMERICAN UNa'ERSlAX

library MAR 2 01064

WASHINGTON.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER page

I. INTRODUCTION...................................1PART ONE: BACKGROUND, 1900 - 1962

II. THE LAND AND ITS PEOPLE.........................8III. THE RISE OF THE COPPER INDUSTRY................18

The Years of Exploration and Development . . . . 18

Commercial Interests and Other Agencies . . . . 25IV. AFRICAN ADVANCEMENT IN LABOR AND SOCIAL RELATIONS. 31

The First Seeds of Discontent .............. 33The African Trade Union Movement.............. 39An Assessment of African Advancement.......... 50

V. THE RISE OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM................57The Federation.............................. 61The Constitutional Framework through 1958. . . . 64 Rising Tension and the Monckton Commission . . . 67 African Advancement through the 1962 Elections . 70

PART TWO: THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE

VI. THE POLITICAL SCENE............................ 80

Political Inter-Party Frictions................80The Copperbelt Riots ....................... 87

iiCHAPTER PAGE

Frictions within Political Parties and %adeUnions..................................... 90

The Position of the Mining Companies............96VII. COPPER AND THE ECONOMY......................... 102VIII. THE HUMAN S C E N E ............................... 119

IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS........................131BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................ 141

LIST OF TABLES

table page

I. Major Towns of the Copperbelt................ 12II. Country of Origin and Citizenship of the Non-

African Population of Northern Rhodesia asof 1961................................... 17

III. Copperbelt Mining Interests.................. 26IV. African Education in the M i n e s ........ . 53V. 1963 Election Results in Northern Rhodesia. . . . 76VI. Statistics on African Education in Northern

Rhodesia, 1962 126VII. Net Migration of Non-Africans Federation of

Rhodesia and Nyasaland....................... 129

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE PAGE1. European Population Growth in Northern Rhodesia

1938 to 1962 ............................... 162. Origin of the Gross Domestic Product, Northern

Rhodesia, 1962 ............................. 1043. (1) Average Yearly Copper Prices (Per Long Ton),

1948 to 1962; (2) Revenues from Income andProfits Taxes, Northern Rhodesia, 1953 to 1961 . Ill

LIST OF MAPS

MAP PAGEI. Northern Rhodesia.............................. 9II. The Copperbelt.................................. 11

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

If a visitor asks what will happen if the price of copper should fall catastrophically, people blanch andchange the subject Seldom has any country hitchedits wagon to such a single star

In early July 1963, representatives from the three territorial governments of Northern Rhodes ia. Southern Rho­desia and Nyas aland met at Victoria Falls with the Prime Min­ister of the Federation and the British Minister for Central African Affairs. It was agreed that the Federation of Rho­desia and Nyas aland would be dissolved. A breakup date of 31 December 1963, was set as a target.^ Thus it is that the grand experiment of 'Partnership*, as envisioned in the Pre­amble of the 1953 Constitution, has ended in failure. The three territories, having failed to live together, will go their separate ways. For Northern Rhodes ia the next step will be a constitutional conference,followed by elections, followed by independence under an African majority government - - -perhaps

^John Qinther, Inside Africa (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 615.

^The Rhodesia Herald. 3 July 1963.

In 1964. And so the tide of African nationalism takes another step south— this time to the very borders of white supreaeey country.

A little over a century ago Northern Rhodes ia was largely unknown bush. In the late 1920's, vast mineral re­sources were discovered in an area that becas&e known as the Copperbelt. Since that time the Copperbelt has become one of the richest copper mining areas of the world. In an area two- thirds the size of Long Island are located about one-quarter of the copper reserves of the world, producing about fifteen per cent of the free world's copper. Northern Rhodes ia with the Copperbelt is ranked third in world production a pal­try 814 short tons behind Chile.^

To go a step further, it was largely the wealth of the Copperbelt that caused the white settler government in South­ern Rhodes ia to seek formation of the Central African Federa­tion in 1953. Certainly there were other motives, but these were often overlooked in favor of political considerations, until soaring copper demands and prices in the reconstruction years after World War II made union with the Copperbelt eco­nomic good sense. The Federation became not a union of South­ern Rhodesia with Northern Rhodes ia and Nyasaland, but perhaps

^T. W. Childs, "U.S. Capital on the Copperbelt", Africa. Special Report. February 1958.

3more realistically a union of Sputhern Rhodesia with the wealth of the Copperbelt with Nyas aland added at the in­sistence of the British Colonial Office.

In terms of hard, cold cash the Copperbelt in 1955, accounted for: 94 per cent of Northern Rhodesia's exports;63 per cent of the Federations's exports; 32 per cent of the total Government tax revenues; 80 per cent of the taxes paid by export industries; 61 per cent of Northern Rhodesia's net domestic output; and 29 per cent of the Federation's net do­mestic output. In short, the Copperbelt is known as aneconomic polarization point probably second in importancein Africa only to the Witwatersrand of the Republic of South Africa. It is an economic base upon which the whole future development of Northern Rhodes ia will be built. "In the last thirty years Northern Rhodesia has become a house built on copper."2

But more goes into a house than copper. There are also people. The copper industry has become the largest employer of labor and the most important taxpayer in the country. In

U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic Deve 1 opments in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyas a land (Washington, DC.: U.S. Government Printing Office).

2L. H. Gann, "The Northern Rhodesia Copper Industry and the World of Copper: 1923-1952", "Rhodes Livings tone Journal #18 (Manchester University Press),1955.

the early days the Copperbelt supported perhaps a thousand primitive Africans scratching out subsistence in scattered kraals. Today the Copperbelt supports 300,000 of the most ad­vanced people in the territory. The mines employ about 8,000 Europeans and about 35,000 Africans, but this is only one part of the figure. Within a fifty mile radius of the center of the Copperbelt live another 32,000 Europeans, 235,000 Africans and other races whose livelihood depends on the economy of copper---the merchants, mechanics, servants, etc. The Copper­belt itself is poor for agriculture, so to feed the region there is a hundred-mile wide strip extending from the Belt southwest to Livingstone on the Southern Rhodesia border. Through this so-called 'Line of Rail' flows the major road and rail network in Northern Rhodesia. Along this Line of Rail live another 35,000 Europeans for a total white-black ratio of about one to seven from the Copperbelt to Livingstohe. Though such a ratio would not affect the political swing to an African dominated government under 'one man one vote' , in terms of wealth and technical capability this white minority wields considerable influence. In terms of the ideological struggle their numbers and concentrât ion (and perhaps military training) is sufficient to teaq>er fears of being hopelessly swamped by black numbers---especially when united with sym­pathizers south of the Zambezi.

Thus, where once there was bush there are now large cities with a melting pot of races, origins and ideologies--- all linked by road, rail, telephone and telegraph. Where once a few short years ago were a few African subsistence culti­vators there are now thousands of clerks, managers, tradesmen and laborers in the mines -— all politically alert and keenly anticipating (or fearing) independence. And as independence approaches, Africa, and especially Africa south of the Zam­bezi, will watch the Copperbelt. For there are many who feel that on the future of the Copperbelt hangs the future of Northern Rhodesia, and on the future of Northern Rhodesia could well hang the future of 'White Man's Africa'. If the African is to progress in Northern Rhodes ia while at the same time allaying white fears of economic chaos, uprooted stan­dards of living and black racialism, the Copperbelt could serve as the indicator. If economic or political chaos does occur, it could begin in the copper industry.

Nowhere in Africa has such an industrial empire been turned over to African leadership. Nowhere in Africa south of the Sahara have so many whites been ' left at the mercy' of so few blacks. If African nationalism in Northern Rhodesia turns independence into civil and tribal strife for one party power, such trends could have greatest effect on the copper industry. The Copperbelt could thus be both a barometer and

a tlttderboz In the future of southern Africa. Success in sol­ving the dilemmas ahead could well stand as an example for all Africa in multi-racial unity and economic developsmnt. Failure could result in increased white entrenchment to the south that would make a 'White Curtain' of the Zambezi.

* * * * * * * * *It is the purpose of this thesis to examine the con­

ditions and events that have occurred in Central Africa that have bearing on the Copperbelt, and in turn, the effect these factors may have on the future of Northern Rhodesia and per­haps southern Africa.

The remaining portion of this paper is divided into two parts. Part One will provide a background, essentially between 1900 and 1962-— a description of the land and its people; the copper industry; the rise of African labor ; and the rise of African political power. Part Two will provide a more contemporary analysis of events and problems on the political, economic and human scenes. The final chapter will be a summary of the major factors analyzed and certain con­clusions for the future.

PART ONE

BACKGROUND: 1900 - 1962

CHAPTER II

THE LAND AND ITS PEOPLE

If you look at a map you will see that Northern Rho­desia has a very odd shape, like a lop-sided butterfly, and the head of the butterfly is the Copperbelt. The Cape-to-Congo railway with its attendant towns and far­ming areas runs up from the Vicoria Falls through the body of the butterfly to its head. The body is, realis­tically, the centre of nearly all the countries* activ­ities, and the two great wings have stayed, except for an occasional flutter, quiet, beautiful and changeless.

Northern Rhodes ia, with an area of 288,130 square miles is divided administratively into seven provinces and the Protectorate of Barotseland(See Map I, Page 9). Practi­cally cutting the country in half, the Congo Pedicle juts down from the north and divides the country into two almost equal regions— -serving as a reminder of an earlier episode in the history of the Scramble for Africa.^

Historically, the three provinces of the eastern re­gion were opened by early pioneers from Nyas aland, and today their links are more with the east. The four provinces of the

^Kenneth Bradley, Copper Venture (London: Max Parrish, 1952), p. 1.

^For an account of the 'Stairs Incident' in the early history of Northern Rhodesia, see Ibid.. pp. 43-45.

The Copperbelt Line of Rail

PROVINCESI LuapulaII NorthernIII EasternIV WesternV CentralVI SouthernVII North-Western

Mbp J. N(XtTHERN RHODESIA

western region were opened from the south, and similarly its links are in that direction.^ Barotseland exists as an entity within itself. Established as a special British Protectorate in 1890, the Lozi have looked neither east nor south but to the Zambezi, which runs through the heart of the land and controls much of their economy and culture.

Both regions, the 'wings of the butterfly', are African*

Ibid.. p. 16.

10dominated economic backwaters characterized by shifting sub­sistence agriculture, widespread presence of the tsetse fly, and limited development. In the eastern region of 132,000 square miles is a population of about 1.6 million people with three thousand Europeans concentrated mainly in the Fort Jameson and Abercom areas. In the western region of about 137,000 square miles from the Zambezi to the Congo are .5 mil­lion people with about one thousand Europeans. Extensive pros­pecting has disclosed no substantial minerals, and even if another copper belt were found, it is doubtful that it would be developed as long as the Copperbelt reserves last.

Running from the Congo Pedicle south to the Southern Rhodes ia border is the heart of Northern Rhodes ia— -the 'head and body of the butterfly'. The Copperbelt is the head and the Line of Rail is the body. The Copperbelt lies along the western boundary of the Pedicle, and encompasses an area of the Western Province running eighty miles southeast to north­west and some twenty-five miles wide(See Map II, Page 11). This area follows the belt of copper ore and thus it includes the mines that extract the ore and the cities and mine town­ships that service the mine population. In all, this two thou*

^L. P. Green and T. J. D. Fair, Development in Africa (Johannesburg: Witswatersrand University Press, 1962), pp. 113-114.

11

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sand square mile area contains the seven towns and six active mines that comprise the heart of the Copperbelt (See Table 1, Page 12).

Each of the Copperbelt towns Is separated from its neighbor by from ten to twenty miles of largely undeveloped bush country. The area lies on the Congo-Zambezi watershed at an average altitude of 4100 feet. The soils are poor In humus, are highly acidic and have little capacity for utili­zing plant nutrients. Rainfall averages fifty Inches per year and Is concentrated In the five sumner months In torrential downpours typical of tropical areas. The highly concentrated population of the Copperbelt Is thus dependent upon bordering

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regions for supply of foodstuffs especially the richerfarming areas along the Line of Rail.

It is apparent from Table 1 and Map II that there is a close connection between the distribution of popula­tion and the operations of the mines. The population pattern of the Copperbelt is characterized by seven separate and distinct nodes, each relatively self-contained and highly dependent upon the copper cooq>anles for their prosperity. To a large extent they exist as miniature welfare states looking to the copper companies for most of their existence.^

The dense concentration of people in the Copperbelt area is also apparent. Figuring within the two thousand square mile rectangle that comprises the Belt, the popula­tion density approximates 190 persons per square mile. Expressed another way, about sixteen per cent of the total population of Northern Rhodes ia is jammed into less than one per cent of the available land. Since most of the people live within one of the seven population nodes, It has been estimated that at least ninety per cent of the Copperbelt population Is urbanized in varying degrees.^

IColin Morris, The Hour After Midnight (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., Ltd., 1961), p. 10.

^Green and Fair, o£. cit. . p. 129.

14

In 1961, the mines eaqployed 7,641 Europeans and 39,036 Africans, or about thirteen per cent of the total Copperbelt population. J. Clyde Mitchell, on behalf of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute conducted a social survey in 1951 of the African populations of Luanshya and Ndola to determine the extent of urbanisation and stabilization.When the African population in the mines and its satellite commercial organizations was largely migratory, relatively few social problems arose. The African laborer came to the mines to earn his hut or poll tax or odd spending money and then quickly returned to the tribal reserve. But by 1951, the survey had revealed an increasing nuud>er of Africans coming to the mines with no intention or indefinite plans to return to their tribal reserves. This urban population was increasing at a tremendous rate, and as it increased it began to organize and "shake themselves out of the lethargy concerning their general standard of living".^ The effects of this social change will be examined in more detail in Chapters Four and Five, but suffice to say at this time that this social phenomena of urbanization and detribaliza- tion was largely responsible for the advance of African labor and for the subsequent rise of African nationalism.

Ij. Clyde Mitchell, African Urbanization in Ndola and Luanshya (Lusaka: Rhodes -Livings tone Communication Nr. 6, 1954), p. 3.

15An examination of the origins of the African popula­

tion working on the Copperbelt in 1961 reveals that fifty- six per cent came from the eastern three provinces and that twenty-six per cent came from territories outside Northern Rhodesia.^ Of this extra-territorial force a recent survey shows that approximately eighty-five per cent came from Nyas aland and Tanganyika.^ Thus, it would appear that movement of the African labor population to the Copperbelt was predominantly a surge from the east and northeast.Though no statistics are available, labor movement from the remaining provinces of the central, southern and western areas is probably directed more toward the Line of Rail and Southern Rhodes ia.

The origin and growth of the European population is critical for the purposes of this study. The recent survey conducted by C. A. Rogers and C. Frantz in Southern Rho­des ia demonstrated the relationship of racial attitudes to country of birth and length of residence in the new country. Though local attitudes in Southern Rhodes ia may vary from those in Northern Rhodes ia because of the difference

Chamber of Mines Yearbook 1961. p. 36.2Green and Fair, op_. cit., p. 33.^C. A. Rogers and C . Frantz, Racial Themes in Southern

Rhodes ia. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

16

in the progress of African nationalism, there are nevertheless distinct similarities. The graph below shows the total Euro­pean population in Northern Rhodes ia from 1938 to 1962. The reader will note that in the decade from 1948 to 1957, the European population almost tripled. Expressed another way, it was during this recent decade that about two-thirds of the present European population may have arrived in Northern Rho­des ia; however, this conclusion is rough at best.

(000)80

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20

FIGURE 1

EUROPEAN POPULATION GROWTH IN NORTHERN RHODESIA1938 TO 1962

Source: Colonial Reports Northern Rhodes ia 1961, p. 124.

Table 2 on Page 17 shows the country of origin and currently held citizenship of the Non-African population In

17Northern Rhodesia as of the 1961 Census. It will be noted that less than one-quarter of the population were b o m in Northern Rhodesia and that only about forty per cent of the current population have taken out citizenship in the Federation. The largest group of immigrants come from the Republic of South Africa, followed by the United Kingdom. Though no statistics are available to break down the origin of the Copperbelt pop­ulation, it has been estimated that at least one-half were born in the Republic and retain South African citizenship.

TABLE 2COUNTRY OF CHtlGIN AND CITIZENSHIP

OF THE NON-AFRICAN POPULATION OF NORTHERN RHODESIAAS OF 1961

Country Currently held of Birth Citizenship

Southern Rhodes ia 6920Northern Rhodes ia 20880Nyasaland 280The Federation 33460Rep. of South Africa 25280 19480U.K. and British Protected 18900 25520Italy 840 930United States 500Netherlands 610 660India 4580Germany 450Ireland 930Other 5320 3800

Total 84380

Source: Central Statistical Office Files, Salisbury,

CHAPTER III

THE RISE OF THE COPPER INDUSTRY

The development of modern Africa began with the ex- ploitation of rich mineral and agricultural pockets--- with 'the picking of its eyes' .

I. THE YEARS OF EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT

The early history of the Copperbelt and the central region along the Line of Rail is a story not of copper but of slaves and ivory. Though natives had worked copper mines for years forging copper jewelry and exchange bars and using copper sulphate dressings for tropical ulcers, the area was more valuable as a raiding ground. With the coming of the Arab slave traders and the establishment of trade routes to the east and west, what Is now the densely populated Cop- perbe^t was then occupied by a few thousand Lamba tribes­men hiding in fear among the rocks and tall grasses from the raids of the powerful warrior peoples surrounding the area----the Luba from the north; the Bemba and Ngoni from the east; the Ndebele from the south; and the Malozl

1 Green and Fair, o£. cit., p. 120.

19

from the west. So it was that the emissaries of Cecil Rhodes, when they arrived in the 1890*s with offers of protection from the Great White Queen, were for the most part thank­fully welcomed.

Northern Rhodesia was but a step along the Cape-to- Cairo railroad dream of Rhodes, but to finance this dream, somehow the British South Africa Company had to find the means to make it pay. The early dlleimnas of the Charter Company are typical of the economic development problems of today. To develop a mineral or agricultural potential huge sums must first be spent to open the country---peace, law and order, and communications are obvious prerequisites. But to finance administration and railroads , capital had to be found for the Chartered Company. But capital cannot be attracted in any large scale until the minerals are found.So it was that close on the heels of the early treaty-makers came the prospectors— looking for another Rand, but finding only copper and lead.

Thus the early history of the Copperbelt is a story of pioneer prospectors and small development companies--- going into the bush usually before law and order were es­tablished. It was truly an era of the 'Wild West'. Though this period has many heroes and romantic episodes , only the highlights are essential within the framework of

20

this paper.Two raining groups emerged during this early period.

In 1899, the British South Africa Company formed the North­ern Copper Conqpany under Sir Edmund Davis. In the same year Sir Robert Williams formed the Tanganyika Concessions Lim­ited with a concession from King Leopold to explore for min­erals in the Congo in return for sixty per cent of any min­erals developed. George Grey was sent by the latter group to head for Katanga with all speed , for this was the day of the paper treaties and the Germans and Portuguese were hot in the race. On the way north Grey discovered old African copper workings at Kansanshi. Continuing north he found the 'Star of the Congo' mine in Katanga which was to become the center of Belgian copper interests. In 1902, T. G. Davey, representing the Northern Copper Company, discovered exten­sive lead and zinc deposits at Broken Hill. In the same year W. C. Collier staked outcroppings at the present Roan Antelope and Bwana Mkubwa mine s ites.

In the meantime, the railroad was being pushed north through Southern Rhodesia by the Charter Company. By 1904, the railroad reached the Falls and pressure was coming from both development groups to continue north. By 1906, the railroad had reached Broken Hill, and three years later to the Congo border. In 1910, the Bwana Mkubwa was opened and

21

in the same year Moffat Thompson, the Native Commissioner at Ndola, staked a claim which he later sold for a mere fclOO a claim which fifteen years later was to become the Nkanamine.

The first decade saw most of the claims staked by individuals and companies with limited capital. Until the 1920's , little was done to develop these claims with the exception of Broken Hill and Bwana Mkubwa. One reason was the poverty of the Charter Company. As World War I came along there were few investors willing or able to risk capital in a territory flanked by German interests (i.e. Tanganyika and South West Africa) . But perhaps the main reason was that the Northern Rhodesia discoveries , with the exception of the Bwaba Mkubwa, were low grade sulphide ores (copper content of two to four per cent) . The ores found in Katanga and at Bwana Mkubwa on the other hand were oxide ores extremely rich in copper content (e.g. forty-two per cent at Bwana Mkubwa) . To complicate the situation further, the sulphide ores were found deep in the ground, generally below the oxide ores that quickly gave out. Thus,

any development of the sulphide ores would require operations on a big scale, which required extensive capital that was largely unavailable or directed more profitably across the

L. H. Gann, op. cit.

22

border. So the records of the early discoveries in the Copperbelt gathered dust in the files.^

Beginning in 1920 the picture began to change. The war was over and there were now demands for copper from the expanding auto and communications industries. In 1914, Mr. Clyde Beatty, an American mining engineer, formed the Se­lection Trust Limited with capital of b50,000. In 1920, the Company took over interest in the Bwana Mkubwa, and thus began to concentrate American interests and money in the Northern Rhodes ian copperfieIds. A short time later a new method was developed that would render processing of the sulphide pres more profitable.

In 1923, the British South Africa Company turned over its administrative obligations to the British Government and embarked upon a new economic policy. Rather than grant con­cessions to small concerns, the Charter Company began to solicit big companies which had the capital and know-how to start development on a big scale. One such company was the Selection Trust. Another company was the Rhodes ian Congo Concession Corporation Limited (later to become the Rhokana Corporation) with financial interests tied to the Anglo- American Corporation of South Africa. Thus, through con­solidation of the many separate claims and interests, the

iBradley, o£. ci^. , pp. 70-74.

23new combines were able to more efficiently finance the operations necessary to sink the shafts, lay the railroads, and construct the necessary houses and offices. By 1930, the Copperbelt was booming. Mines and townships were either in operation or under construction at Bwana Mkubwa (Ndola) , Roan Antelope (Luanshya) , Nkana (Kitwe) , Mufulira, and Nchanga (Chingola).

Then came the world slump in copper prices. On the London market copper prices went from over b70 to under b30 per ton. By 1932, the African labor force had dropped from 29,000 to less than 7,000. In 1930, theBwana Mkubwa closed down never to open again.^ But inactuality the depression years served to advance the Rhodes ian copper Industry. The copper companies emerged from the depression as low-cost producers better able to compete on the world market. There were no trade union­ists to force wages up. There were no welfare obligations such as unemployment pay and retirement funds. The African laborer during the slump simply returned to his reserve and the European emigrated from the Territory altogether. As a non-producer of copper Britain after the crisis of the

L. H. Gann, o.. cit.

^Richard Gray, The Tw University Press, 1960), p. 92.

2Richard Gray, The Two Rations (London: Oxford

24depression began to rely lÿore and more on the Copperbelt for increasing needs. The United States and Russia had become self-sufficient, and Germany under Hitler began to substitute aluminum. Thus, by the late 1930's, "Rhodesia had found a safe market" in Britain.^

The Copperbelt boomed again in the late 1930*s, and then came World War II. This was a war of the internal com­bustion engines and highly specialized equipment. A battle­ship communication system required two million pounds of copper and a bomber required two miles of copper wiring. Between 1939-1944, the labor force on the Copperbelt in­creased by fifty per cent. After the war, reconstruction in Europe placed further demands on copper. Then came the Korean War. In 1951, Rhokana's profits jumped from h6.7 million to ilO.5 million.2 Northern Rhodes ia exports, due

almost wholly to copper, rose from bl2.8 million in 1946, to h93.7 million in 1953— as compared to Southern Rhodesia's expansion in exports from bl8.6 million to B54.0 million for the same period. Thus, in the early 1950*s, the question of Federation between the two Rhodesia's assumed greater econ­omic importance.

L. H. Gann, o . cit.^Ibld.C. H. Thompson and H. W. Woodruff, Economic Develop­

ment in Rhodes ia and Nvas aland (London: Oxford Press) , p. 200

25II. COMMERCIAL INTERESTS AND OTHER AGENCIES

From these early years of exploration, expansion, and development, three powerful commercial interests have emer­ged. These companies, together with their srhsldiary inter­ests and production, are listed In Table 3, Page 26.

The British South Africa Company, by the agreements of 1923 and 1949, shares royalties on mineral rights as develop­ed by the other two concerns. These royalties are computed at 13.5 per cent of the average monthly price paid for ore per long ton on the London Metal Exchange---less eight pounds per ton. Thus, during 1961 when the average price of copper per long ton was b229.7, the Company royalty received for each ton of copper ore sold was B23 (l.e.b229.7 X 13.5% - B8). In 1961, these royalties totaled about B13 million.^ From these revenues the Company then pays twenty per cent to the Northern RhodesIan Government. In 1986, mineral royalties will no longer be paid by the mining conq>anles to the Charter Company, but will be paid directly to the Northern Rhodes Ian Government. With this Income loss In mind the policy of The British South Africa Couqpany In recent years has been geared to diversifying Investments In subsidiary mining, manufactur­ing, agricultural and commercial enterprises. In addition.

Chamber of Mines Yearbook. 1961. p. 13.

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a

27the Company Is a major stockholder in various companies to Include the mining companies

The mining Interests of Rhodesian Anglo-American are but one part of even greater Industrial holdings of the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, Ltd., under the Chairman, Mr. H. F. Oppenhelmer. The total capital Invest­ment of the major company amounts to about B75 million In mining companies, financial Investment conqpanles, and other Industrial Interests. These Investments Include diamond In­terests, gold, coal. Iron, lead and zinc-— as well as copper. Most of these Interests are located In the Republic of South Africa; however, some cover all parts of the world. For ex­ample, through the companies' Interests (21.16%) In DeBeers Consolidated Mines, Ltd., Anglo has holdings In diamond mines In the Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone and Tanganyika. Other In­terests are In Southern Rhodesla (The Wankle Colliery) and In Canada (Hudson Bay)

The RhodesIan Selection Trust under Chairman Sir Ron­ald L. Praln Is similarly controlled by bigger Interests.The American Metal Climax, Inc. with headquarters In New York

^W. V. Brels ford (Editor) , Handbook to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. (London: Cassell and Go..Ltd.. 1960). pp. 793-794.

^Annual Reports of Rhodesian Anglo-American, Ltd. and Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, Ltd., 1962.

28City controls approximately forty-three per cent of R.S.T.^ In addition, both Anglo and R.S.T. have Indirect Interests in each others' mines. Ramifications of these Interests in terms of the so-called 'Interlocking directorships' will be dis­cussed In Chapter Six.

The requirements of the mining Industry have led to the formation of a number of supervisory, subsidiary, and functionary agencies In addition to the labor unions. These major agencies and their functions are as follows:

(1) The Department of Labor within the Territor­ial Ministry of Mines and Labor has Government responsibil­ity for Industrial relations, trade testing, workmen's com­pensation, apprenticeship programs, and safety Inspection. Numerous Labor Officers are assigned throughout the Copper­belt.

(2) The Labor Consultative Council was set-up by the Minister for Mines and Labor in September 1962, to "ad­vise upon such matters of common interest to employers and workers as are referred to it by the Minister".^ The Council consists of representatives from employee's and employer's organizations under the chairmanship of a representative

^Mr. H. R. Finn, Vice-President of Rhodes ian Selection Trust to author in Salisbury, 7 August 1963.

^Chamber of Mines Yearbook. 1962. p. 9.

29from the Ministry.

(3) The Mining Joint Industrial Council was estab­lished in 1959 as a discussion and negotiation panel between mining companies and the Northern Rhodes Ian Mlneworkers Union (predominantly European).

(4) The Chamber of Mines was formed in 1941 by the mining companies to act on matters of common Interest. In this sense, the organization might be considered a kind of 'trade union' for the companies.

(5) The Rhodes Ian Congo Border Power Corporation, Ltd. is a subsidiary of the mining companies responsible for planning, supply and coordination of all electric power re­quirements on the Copperbelt. Prior to 1957, power was gen­erated locally by thermal power units. In 1957, the Corpora­tion began drawing from the Le Mdrlnel Hydro-Electric Station in Katanga, and in December 1959, the first power was drawn frcMtt the Kariba Hydro-Electric Station through a distribution switching center In Kitwe. By the end of 1962, Kariba wasfurnishing s ixty per cent of the total requirements.

* * * * * * * *

Thus , with the first shipment of copper from Roan Antelope In 1931, through the world depression, the Second

^Ibld. pp. 11 and 37.

30

World War, Korean War, and the boom years of 1955-1956, the Copperbelt has seen spectacular development. Shafts were sunk, smelters built, rivers dammed to generate power, elec­tric transmission lines constructed, and townships were hacked out of the bush for the working force. The early days were not only rugged but dangerous---with malaria and black water fever a constant threat. The companies had to build everything---the homes, schools, and hospitals. In effect, miniature welfare states had to be created. A drive through the Copperbelt cities today reveals modem, busy communities ---tributes to the capital outlay and planning of the copper companies. Driving the twenty or thirty miles between these cities one cannot help but note the starkly contrasting bush country with the only sign of construction being the tower­ing anthills that are found everywhere. With this contrast one cannot help but be impressed with the past thirty years or so of development by the mining companies.

CHAPTER IV

AFRICAN ADVANCEMENT IN LABOR AND SOCIAL RELATIONS

It was, of course, feudalism all over again---the lord of the manor and his peasants establishing an easy, In- foroMl relationship within the framework of a static social order, each one knowing Instinctively his place. As the race tempo quickened, I observed these pleasant relation­ships dissolve one by one, to be replaced by sullenness on one side and suspicion on the other. The peasant was be­coming a threat to the manorial lord.^

The European miners who came to the Copperbelt, and the art Is Ians, shopkeepers and businessmen who followed In their wake, came for much the same purpose. There was excitement In a new country and perhaps unemployment and boredom In theold. But most of all there was the opportunity for fatter pay-

2checks and a higher standard of living. There was the attrac­tion of the 'three s's' - --sunshine, servants, and social pleasures.

The companies during the expansion of the 1930*s had to create a garden spot out of the wilderness. Everything had

^Colln Morris, The Hour After Midnight. (London: Long­mans, Green, and Co., Ltd. 1961) p. 17.

2Anthony St. John Wood, Northern Rhodesia: The Human Background. (London: The Pall Mall Press, 1961), p. 54.

32to be brought in, and the most expensive and hard-to-get importwas skilled labor not only for the mines, but also for theoffices, maintenance shops and supporting amenities. The European had to be paid, housed and fed handsomely. There was no need to pay the Indigenous African the same wages He was unskilled, uneducated and unorganised, and In the early 1930*8 his average monthly wage of twenty-two shillings (under­ground worker) was sufficient for his needs---or so It appeared. But this apathy on the part of the African was not to last for long.

The culture and color bar was apparent from the begin­ning. Those coming from the Union brought their prejudices with them; those coming from other countries soon fell In step with the majority. Thus were created the dilemmas of the copper companies, who stood between the stockholders demanding maximum efficiency, and the workers and Colonial Government demanding protection of their separate I n t e r e s t s T h e pattern has been the same down through the years-— how to meet the African demands for advancement without alienating (and thus losing) the skilled European workers that the mining industry required. The struggle has not been easy.

The Passfleld "Memorandum on Native Policy In East Africa* of June 1930, reaffirmed that the doctrine of trusteeship and paramountcy of native Interests developed In the 1920*s would also apply to Northern Rhodesia. (See Gray, op. cit.. p. 41).

33

I. THE FIRST SEEDS OF DISCONTENT

The first serious disturbances on the Copperbelt broke out in 1935. Strikes began at Mufulira, spread to Kitwe, and culminated in violence at Luanshya vAiere an infuriated mob stormed the Mine Compound office. Some of the police panicked, firing began, and soon six Africans lay dead and twenty-two lay wounded. The outward cause of the strikes and violence was a proposed increase in the poll tax from 12s. 6d. to 15s., which affected every able-bodied male over sixteen.^ But the real cuases were perhaps deeper, and they began to shake the very foundations of the Colonial Administration.

The Administration since the days of the Charter com­pany was content to let the African run his own affairs with minimum supervision. This applied to the mining companies, which were forced to take the initiative in providing some system of local administration. The companies for the most part set up mining compounds, each with a European compound manager and staff. To maintain discipline and act as agents for the compound management, the companies hired 'Police Boys'. The result was an inadequately trained police force that was detested and a hierarch of officials that was completely

1Ibid. p. 182.

34unable to sense the pulse of the mass of Africans living Inthe compounds.

What management failed to sense and what the ColonialAdministration failed to detect also, were the beginnings ofsocial changes we now know as urbanization and detrIballzatlon.The Government-appointed Commission that Investigated theriots revealed the naivety of the typical assunqptlon on thepart of administrators trained among 'BuahAfricans' that thedominant ties governing compound Africans were still those ofa tribal society. Such administrators saw the African as amember of a kinship group and tribe with blind allegiance toa Tribal Elder who, though chosen by a Chief, may not haveauthority. When asked about the actions of the Elders duringthe riots, one compound manager testified to the Consnission

2that: "They appeared to be refugees as far as I can make out."A. L. Epstein points out that the phenomenon arising

from the 1935 disturbances was the emergence of the African in his role as. a worker as distinct from his role as a tribes­man.^ In points of tribal custom and procedures the Council

^A. L. Epstein, Politics in an Urban African Community (Manchester: The University Press, T55Ô) , pp. ié-z7.

2"Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire Into the Disturbances in the Copperbelt" (Northern Rhodesia Govern­ment Printer, 1935), p. 594.

3Epstein, op. cit., pp. 44-47.

35of Elders could still function to blend all the separate codes representing the different tribal groups on the Copperbelt.The Urban Courts and the Advisory Councils were appointed to represent various African Interests, but all of these groups were creations of the European managers and as such were sus­pect In all cases where the role of the worker was In question. The Elders were after all workers too, and In the mines the boss-laborer relationship was more Important than the relation of chief's son to commoner. Shifts were mixed by tribe, so that though the worker might live and socialize with members of his own tribe, his dally work was with members of other tribes with perhaps different tribal Ideas. His dally work also placed him in greater contact with other races. Thus, talk of marriage and kinship squabbles found common groundamong tribal relationships talk of working conditions, pay,housing and racial discriminations found common ground among work relationships. The pattern for the future that was diffi­cult to see In 1935, was that the Interests of the African In his role as a worker would progressively surpass his In­terests In the role of a tribesman. What was obviously need­ed In 1935 was an organizational set-up, not suspect of col­laboration with Europeans, that could express the worker role. But trade unions for African workers In a white-dominated Government were still many years away but not so far for

36

the Europeans.* * * * * * * *

It began to be apparent to the European workers that company interests and profits In future years would be depen­dent to a great extent on company ability to feed more and more cheap African laborers Into semi-skilled jobs. Euro­pean. job security was in danger. Fears of safety also emer­ged where miner's lives could depend on the knowledge and skill of a responsible foreman. Giving an African such re­sponsibility underground was beyond comprehension.^ There­fore, there was a strong move to form a trade union, which received greater Incentive after the 1935 riots.

In 1936, Charles Harris, the Secretary of the South African Mine Workers Union visited the Copperbelt and estab­lished a branch of the Union. This branch later became the Northern Rhodes la Mine Workers Union (NRMWU) , when It was determined that the South African Union could not establish branches outside of the Union of South Africa. One year later, the NRMfU was recognized by the four copper cooq>anles In operation at the time. Thus, with the support of the European population In Northern Rhodes la and with the acqui­escence of the Colonial Office, the European mlneworker on the

^Gray, o£. cit., p. 243.

37Copperbelt quietly entrenched to await further onslaughts by the African.^

* * * * * * * *

Before 1940, when the European struck for higher war­time wages to offset price Increases, the African gave little thought to a strike for pay. But when the European worker received a pay hike, the Idea of a strike for pay Increase spread to the African. On the sixth day of the African strike violence broke out between the police protecting the Compound Office at Nkana (Kitwe) and three thousand demonstrators. In the riot that followed seventeen Africans were killed and over sixty were wounded. As a result of the strike, wages were raised almost three-fold making average monthly wagesof 35s.6d. and 52s.lid. for surface and underground workers

2respectively. But the strike had more pronounced effects than mere wage hikes.

For the first time Africans gave indications of self­organized cohesion within the compounds. During the strike, upon the advice of the District Commissioner, workers ap­pointed a Committee of Seventeen who were to act as their representatives until the conclusion of the strike. The

^Ibid., pp. 104-105. ^Ibid., p. 209.

38

Committee functioned with great success In Its ability to con­trol and discipline the strikers In the compounds. Perhaps the European miners were not Impressed, but the mine com­panies and Colonial Administration were. There were no rep­etitions of the Nkana riot. In contrast to the Committee's success, the Tribal Elders again suffered loss of confidence of their people. They were caught in the middle between rep­resenting the mine authorities and the Interests of their

2fellow tribesmen.The Forster Commission that was appointed by the Gov­

ernment to Inquire Into the disturbances revealed many griev­ances In addition to pay. Again, the need for a channel of communication between the workers and the mine companies was apparent. Testimony from expert witnesses in industrial re­lations expressed the need for formation of African trade unions as a means of expressing and protecting their Interests. But again the European Government sidestepped on the grounds that Africans were not sufficiently educated to handle the Intricacies of trade unionism. The Tribal Elders were reor­ganized and redesignated as Tribal Representatives and were told to work In close coordination with Government Labor Of­ficers, who would train them to 'become Intelligently familiar

^Epstein, op. cit.. p. 65.

39with all matters relating to Native labour*.^ In 1942, 'Boss

2Boys' Conmlttees were established. The Boss Boys met monthly with the Compound Manager and Labour Officers to discuss griev-

3ances and exchange information.

II. THE AFRICAN TRADE UNION MOVEMENT

In 1947, as part of the Colonial policy of the British Labour Government, a British trade unionist, Mr. W. Comrle, was sent to Northern Rhodesia to help organize an African trade union movement. One of the first tasks was to persuade African workers of the desirability of forming a trade union.To some there was suspicion of European intentions. Why should Comrle have African interests at heart when all of his white brothers were so obviously seeking to restrict their advance­ment? There was an obstacle with the European Mine Workers' Union, which proposed that the African enter that Union. This offer was refused for fear that if they joined, executive con­trol and power to conduct negotiations would remain In white hands. The door was left open for future amalgamation, but only after the African union had gained sufficient power

^Ibld.. p. 89.2A 'Boss Boy' is an African in charge of ten to fifteen

African laborers. He is the intermediary between his crew and the immediate European supervisor.

^Ibld., p. 63.

40and experience In Its own right to Insure equal power.^

In February 1948, the first African Mine Workers* Union was formed at Nkana with Mr. Lawrence Katllungu as Chairman. From Nkana the movement spread to Include branches In the other three mines open at that tlme---Mhfulira, Roan, and Nchanga. In March 1949, the four branches amalgamated to

2form the Northern Rhodes ia African Mine Workers* Union (AMWU).The European miner's case was continually centered on

their fears of being replaced by the African. Thus, shortly after the war an agreement was forced on the companies that provided. In effect, that no job performed by a European as of 1945, would be turned over thereafter to an African (Clause 42) . This represented an obvious barrier to African advance­ment which the Government recognized, so In 1945, the Dal- glelsh Commission was appointed to review the whole problem of African advancement. The Commission noted that certain jobs unavailable to the African because of Clause 42 were In fact within his capabilities without further training. An­other eleven categories of semi-skilled jobs were suitable for him after a short training period and nineteen categories after more Intensive training. The report was filed without

^Ibld, p. 91.^Gray, op. cit.. p. 350.^Ibld. p. 242. Epstein, op. cit.. pp. 104-105.

41action, but Its provisions became guldeposts for later African demands.

In October 1952, the AMWU organized Its first strike. When the companies refused the Union demand for a raise of 2s. 8d. per shift, the miners struck. To avoid being starved into submission Union members had stockpiled food. After three weeks they returned to work and were awarded increases of eighty per cent and fifteen per cent for the lowest and highest paid workers respectively. But the strike gained more for the African miner than just a pay raise. It dem­onstrated the power of unity and discipline. The African miners at Broken Hill voted to levy themselves five shillings per month to support the strikers, so It demonstrated also the power of cooperation. Perhaps most of all it gave valu­able training and confidence to the miners and their leaders.

* * * * * * *

In 1954, the African Union began the next round in thestruggle for advancement a resurrection of the principlesrecommended by the Dalgleish Commission that the African should begin to take over job categories reserved exclusively for Europeans. Many jobs the African was Immediately capable of filling; others required varying degrees of training and

^Jack Woddls, Africa; The Lion Awakes. (London: Lawrence and Wlshart, 1961), pp. 90-97.

42

education. But African advancement In job position would strike at the very heart of European fears. Increasing the level of skills would lead to the breaking of social barriers-- in time even to the appointment of an African boss over a European.

To the mining companies Interested In profits and efficiency, many Europeans with low skills were paid too much. Africans were ready to advance Into some of these jobs, but problems arose as to pay scales. To suddenly pay an African European wages far above African wage levels would have ad­verse social and economic effects on the whole country. What was needed was a gradual acquiring of skills and remunerations by the African.

The African petitions and companies' dilemma led to the appointment by the Northern Rhodes Ian Government of a Board (The Forster Board) to Inquire Into the possibility of African advancement. The Board noted thirty-four job cate­gories for Immediate transfer and additional jobs for later review.^ To the NRMWU this was nothing more than an attempt

^Philip )6won. Year of Dec Is Ion (London: Oxford University Press, 1960) , ppTT.05-107.

^"Report of the Commission of Inquiry Appointed to In­quire Into hhe Advancement of Africans in the Copper Mining Industry of Northern Rhodesia", (The Forster Board) . (Lus^a: The Government Printer, 1954)

43

by the companies to replace existing European labor with cheap African labor.^ They raised the fundamental labor argument of 'the rate for the job*. Where this principle conceded the concept of a single ladder of promotion for all miners from the lowest to the highest jobs with ability the only deciding factor. It also Implied acquiring skills along the way. But In any schemes of apprenticeship and technical training to enable the African to acquire the necessary skills, the com­panies had to have the cooperation of the NRMWU, which was not readily forthcoming. Negotiations continued for about a year between the companies and the European unions. In the meantime African strikes took place throughout the Copperbelt culminating In a 33,000 worker strike from January-March 1955. The strike was not successful but It did have the effect of tempering European intransigence. After polling their mem­bers, the NRMWU conceded twenty-four jobs for African advance­ment together with provisions for a survey of other possible jobs for future advance. Thus, African labor crossed a major

^Thomas M. Franck, Race and Nationalism (NY: Fordham University Press, 1960), pp. 287-288.

2"Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire Into the Unrest In the Mining Industry In Northern Rhodes la In Recent Months" (The Branlgan Report) , (Lusaka: The Government Print­er , 1956).

3Franck, loc cit

44

barrier to advancement. However, this victory was not with­out Its loss.

Earlier In 1953, a split occurred in the ranks of the AMWÜ. Certain of the better educated, more skilled African members formed the Mines African Staff Association (MASA) . Cause of the split was probably the desire on the part of the 'White-Collar' workers to seek their advancement separate from the bulk of manual workers. This strategy was probably also patterned after European unionism whereby European salaried workers had broken from the NRMWU to form the Mines Officials and Salaried Staff Association (MOSS A) The MAS A was not recognized, however, either by the companies or by the AMWU.

By 1955, however, the situation had changed. The agreements for African job advancement had created an upper- crust of African supervisors who, in the companies' viewpoint, should be separated from those they supervised. Otherwise, in an intra-union squabble a supervisor might find himself at the mercy of a worker he normally supervised on the job. To the AMWU, however, the MAS A was an attempt to drain off the best brains of the union and disrupt union solidarity.^ These

P. K. Lomas, "African Trade Unionism on the Copper­belt of Northern Rhodesia", South African Journal of Econom­ics . June 1958.

^Mason, 0£. cit. , pp. 108-111.

45fears were well founded, for as the Branigan Report a year later stated: "The bulk of the advanced Jobs would fall with­in the orbit of the African Staff Association".^ The compan­ies , however, with the backing of the European NRMMU recog­nized the MASA in October 1955. Thus, the AMWU, which had fought so hard for African job advancement, was forced to see most of the advanced jobs go to another union. Almost half of the leaders of the AMWU, the most senior and able men ofthe organization, were asked to join the MASA as a condition

2for job advancement.The bitter struggle for job advancement in 1955 left

bitterness in all parties. The year 1956 saw an intensifica­tion of this friction on the Copperbelt. Members of the MASA were increasingly subjected to attack and intimidation, as were Europeans. Stonings and threats to *Kill the dog of a white man' were prevalent.^ In June 1956, the so-called 'Leg Guard' strikes began over African refusal to wear leg guards in the mines when Europeans were not required to. Thencame the 'Rolling' strikes a series of short strikes timedto occur successively one after the other all over the Copperbelt.

^The Branigan Report, op. cit., p. 17. ^Woddis, op. cit.. p . 107.3Mason, op. cit.. p. 113.

46

On 12 September 1956, the Government declared a State of Emer­gency on the Copperbelt. Thirty-two of the AMfU leaders were arrested including the Deputy to the President. On 25 September, the Branigan Commission was appointed to investigate the causes of the unrest. Though little was accomplished of a tangible nature by the Commission, at least it provided for a cooling- off period between the two African unions. The Emergency ended in January 1957, largely because of the control exerted over the AMWU members by the President, Me. Katilungu.^ For the most part peace reigned over the Copperbelt for the next three years, time which was needed by the AMWU and MASA both for organization and adjustment.

* * * * * * * *

Before discussing the most recent phase in the African labor struggle for advancement, it would be well to review in more detail the system of job advancement established in 1955.By the terms of the 1955 Agreement between the companies and the NRWU, two categories of jobs were set forth. Schedule "A" jobs required high skills, experience, and completion of training tests. Ijtie union had protection of a 'Closed Shop'

Mr. Katilungu had been absent from the Copperbelt during the periods of the most serious incidents. That he escaped arrest and returned to control union members prompted charges of 'Stooge* and 'White Lackey* from the more radical elements of the union.

47arrangement with these jobs, thus requiring that any Schedule "A" jobholder must be a MRMWU member. The twenty-four Schedule "B" jobs required much less job qualification, and it was in these categories that the Agreement afforded opportunities for African advancement for there was no Closed Shop arrangement.

Two other interesting clauses were accepted. In Clause 5: "The Union agrees to accept as a member of the Union any person of whatever race or color who has obtained employment with one of the companies in any of the jobs detailed and de­scribed and included in Schedule "A" to this Agreement." Thus, though for all practical purposes Schedule "A" jobs were for Europeans, at least the racial door was open for the African if he could qualify. Under Clause 11 it was agreed that the Companies and the NRMWU would jointly hire an independent firm of industrial consultants to undertake a detailed job survey of Schedule "A" jobs for the purpose of assessing job content, responsibilities, training and skill required for each job So the door was open for excising further job categories from Schedule "A" to Schedule "B". Little was it realized at the time that such magnanimity would lead to such frictions.

^The Branigan Report, o£. cit.. pp. 74-75. ^Ibid. p. 74 (writer's underlining).Sibid. p. 75.

48

It was not until November 1959, that the companies and the NRMWU were able to discuss African advancement with the industrial consultants. The matter was placed before the Mining Joint Industrial Council, to which African unions were not represented (See Page 29) . After nearly another year of discussions and balloting, the NRMWU presented thirty-eight job categories which could be excised from Schedule "A". To these were later added twenty additional new jobs. Friction developed between the MASA and the AMWU on breakdown of the jobs'. To this was added the mistrust and suspicion on the part of the AMWU toward the companies and the European unions which had agreed to African advancement without discussing such advancement with the Africans themselves. The >femoran- dum of the AMWU submitted to the companies on 22 September 1961, expressed this mistrust:

It is the Union's considered opinion that no plan for African advancement can succeed as a permanent so­lution to the problem unless the African workers them­selves participate in the discussions and are parties to the formulation of any such plan.l

The basic problem, however, lay in differences between the companies and the AMWU on the term 'African advancement*.To the companies and the European unions advancement was a

"Report of the Committee Appointed to Inquire into the Mining Industry in Northern Rhodes la "(The Moris on Report) , (Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1963), p. 8.

49'ladder* that any African could climb, one rung at a time,depending on his ability the rate for the job. To the AMWUwith thirty-some thousand constituents, most of whom having little if any education, this was too much of a barrier. Only a few hundred could qualify past the job requirement to "speak, read, and write English". The African concept was more of an 'escalator' whereby the great majority in the lower pay groups would rise together to higher wages.^

In December 1961, after several months of fruitless negotiations, the AMWU put forward demands for (1) An overall wage increase of 8s. 2d. per shift; (2) An increase in shift differential allowance (i.e. night shifts) from Is. to 10s. 6d. per shift; and (3) An increase in paid annual leave from four­teen to thirty-six days. These demands were quickly rejected by the companies, and there ensued another several months of fruitless negotiations. On 2 May 1962, the AMWU went on strike, which was to last until 22 May. On 8 May, the Northern Rho­des ia Government appointed a Commission (The Moris on Commis­sion) "to inquire into the circumstances which led to the

2breakdown of conciliation proceedings...". The Coomission recommended an immediate increase of an unspecified amount in basic wages, approximately a fifteen per cent increase in

llbid.. p. 11. %Ibid.. p. 17.

50shift differential allowances, and a system of paid travel time to and from tribal reserves in addition to normal leave. Negotiations continued and after near collapse and a threat for another strike call, agreement was reached 31 July 1962. Wage rates were increased by Is. 6d. per shift, and shift differential allowances were increased from Is. to Is. 8d. per shift. The miners got two extra days of paid leave per year, and agreed to a standstill on wage demands until 31 December 1963.^

III. AN ASSESSMENT OF AFRICAN ADVANCEMENT

In order to assess African advancement an analysis of wage structures should be studied. For the purposes of this analysis, the year 1954 is taken as a starting point as being the last year before the Agreement of September 1955, which established the Schedule "B" job categories for African ad­vancement. In 1954, the monthly average wage scales for Euro- peans and Africans were as follows:^

Surface UndergroundAfrican From fc7.3 to L21.0 From L7.8 to b23.3European Average b98 Average bll3

^"Annual Report of the Department of Labor, Northern Rhodesia, 1962", (Lusaka; The Government Printer, 1963),p.18.

2"Colonial Report Northern Rhodesia 1954" (Lusaka:The Government Printer, 1955) , p. 13.

51

In 1961, the wage structure was divided into three cat­egories: (1) Ticket paid jobs extending through twelve groups;(2) Schedule "B" jobs; and (3) Schedule "A" jobs. These rates are listed as follows:^

Approximate Surface Underground Number

Ticket Paid fclO.5 to i.32.7 Lll.O to 132.8 35,000Schedule "B" From fcl8.2 To fc75 1,530Schedule "A" From b83.2 To bll4 4,100From the above listing it can be seen that in 1954,

there was a wide gap between the highest paid African worker and the average European wage. In 1961, this gap had been closed by the addition of the intermediate Schedule "B" jobs open to MASA and AMWU members, and by the opening of Schedule"A" jobs to any race or color (but under Closed Shop condi­tions) . As of August 1962, there were approximately twenty-four Africans idio were employed in Schedule "A" jobs and were

2members of the NRMWU. Thus, though the door had been opened entrance has been slow.

The chief African complaint continues to center around

The Moris on Report, o£. cit. . pp. 12-13. Figures do not include copper bonus(36% in 1961) and other emoluments; nor do they include staff and supervisory jobs, African and European, whose salaries are considerably above the rates listed.

^Conversation with Mr. W. Leslie, General Secretary NRMWU, Kitwe, Northern Rhodesia.

52

the large majority of Africans still making relatively low wages. As of December 1962, of 33,297 ticket paid employees, slightly over a third were in the lowest employment group and were earning a basic rate less than bl6 per month; and slight­ly less than seventy-five per cent were earning less than £.18 per month.^ The African forgets that with copper bonuses and other allowances , even the lowest paid African on the Copper­belt earns more than the highest average African wage in Northern Rhodes ia. He compares his wages only with those other wages around him on the Copperbelt.

* * * * * * * *

With such a premium on merit and trade skills as a measure for job advancement, education and training schemes have become essential. For example, to qualify as an Anode Scaleman with one of the lowest wage rates under Scjhedule "B" jobs, the worker must be able to speak, read and write English; know simple arithmetic, weighing, and recording; have know­ledge of safety regulations ; have a first-aid certificate;

3and pass a mine proficiency test. Standards of education as tabulated in Table 4 on Page 53 give an indication of the problems the African laborer has in meeting educational re-

^The Annual Labor Report 1962, op. cit., p. 65. ^Colonial Report 1961, 0£. cit.. p. 13.^The Morison Report, o£. cit., p. 36.

53quirements for advancement.

TABLE 4AFRICAN EDUCATION IN THE MINESNo Education(%) Less Than 6 Years (%)

Roan Antelope 55.9 81.8Rhokana Corp. 70.6 82.6Mifulira 48.2 84.1Chibuluma ---- 79.8Nchanga 41.6 78.8Bancroft 51.5 83.1

Source: The Morison Report, pp. 44-45.

In addition to the lack of basic education African advancement faces other social barriers. The great bulk of Africans have come from rural areas and have little back­ground that would prepare them for an industrial life of ma­chines , time-tables and responsibility. Coupled with this lack of background has been the lack of cultural and mental factors to prepare the African to work efficiently in organ­ized work systems or to develop cash incentives for greater productivity. One miner interviewed by the author in the Chibuluma Mine stated that he had no desire to attend company courses to learn to read and write, even though he realized

54that this was a prerequisite for advancement. His children were being educated and that was all that counted. This view was represented as being typical.

To overcome these social and cultural deficiencies the mining companies have undertaken extensive educational and vocational training programs. Courses are continually of­fered for qualification for such specialized licences as blasting, hauling, rockbreaking, first-aid and hospital tech­nician. In addition all mines have set-up adult education classes for formal school credit. Technical education of ap­prentices is conducted at centers in Chingola, Kitwe, Luan- shya and Mifulira, plus a technical college at Ndola.^

* * * * * * * *

The past thirty years of African labor advancement on the Copperbelt have seen profound changes. Considering the momentous tasks, for the most part this transition has been accomplished gracefully. The problem was set from the begin­ning when people to whom large cities and an urban way of life are natural phenomena met head-on with a large indig­enous mass of people whose background presented little guid­ance for behavior in such situations. The companies' most immediate problem was to attract and keep the European on the Job. Labor conditions were established that today are classed

^Annual Labor Report 1962, o . cit.. pp. 6-7.

55as 'historical* in that once given are difficult to take away. While the African laborer was migratory there was no serious problem. As was seen, the companies encouraged trib­al ties through recognition of the Tribal Elders. But the final defeat of the Tribal Elders came with the emergence of the African Mine Workers' Union. From this period African advancement has been swift.

As African wages advanced, from the companies' posi­tion it no longer made sense to pay a man to "hand someone else a spanner". With increased technology and higher labor costs a reduction in labor force was obviously necessary.With this reduction skill became more of a premium and the companies had to pursue policies of stabilization. Thus, ambitious programs for housing and welfare services have be­come the order of the day. Where in the early days Africans seldom stayed on the Copperbelt more than a year or two, to­day the average African length of service in the mines is about equal to the European rate.2

The most serious obstacle facing African advancement today is qualification. The requirement to read and write

^MASon, 0£. cit., p. 144.^As of 31 December 1961, 54.7% of the European miners

had been employed in the mines for three years or over versus 52.5% for the Africans. See Chamber of Mines Yearbook 1961, pp. 31 and 37.

56English is not just European trick to hold the African down- --it is a necessary tool for safety and job performance. De­spite the training programs sponsored by the con^anies, the African could not replace the European tomorrow. The mines would have to shut down. Africans have been placed in per­sonnel management, company hospitals and law offices, but no African engineers have been found.

In short, though the past thirty years have seen much progress for the African, there is still much advancement to come. Whether this advancement is evolved 'gracefully* falls perhaps more in the field of politics.

CHAPTER V

THE RISE OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM

But for the Imperialists the victories were pyrrhic, for their short term successes were only won at the cost of a much greater political consciousness and national awareness on the part of the African miners directly involved and on the part of the people as a whole.^

There is no doubt that wage struggles played a key role in giving the African people a deeper feeling for the national struggle. The wage struggles of the Copperbelt be­ginning in 1935 showed the African what could be accomplished against white supremacy through organization and determina­tion. What started as a wage struggle in 1935 branched into a defence of trade unionism, a march against discrimination, and finally a demand for voting power. Happily for the Af­rican in Northern Rhodes ia the atmosphere that permitted such advance to take place in the first place was created long be­fore the economic development of the Copperbelt. Had the white settler from Southern Rhodes ia, or the British Coloni­al Office for that matter, foreseen the wealth of the Copper­belt back in the 1920*s, the story of the rise of African

^Woddis, o£. cit., p. 86.

58nationalism in Northern Rhodes ia might have been much differ­ent .

In 1923, Lord Devonshire formulated his famous doc­trine of 'Paramountcy* which was to guide the British Colo­nial Administration for years to come. This doctrine as in­terpreted through the years meant that the interests of the overwhelming majority of the indigenous population should not be subordinated to those of a minority belonging to another race, however important in itself.^ In 1929, this doctrine received its first real test in Northern Rhodes ia through the appointment of the Hilton-Young Commission to consider 'Closer Union of the Dependencies of Eastern and Central Africa'. The report of this Commission, in addition to viewing that Northern Rhodes ia and Nyasaland represented too small an economic unit to justify any sort of unifiedgovernment, also re-emphasized the morality of trusteeship

2for African interests as set forth by Paramountcy. "It is the end of that period when first a British Colonial Secre­tary (Lord Passfield) took a decisive stand against the amalgamation of Northern Rhodesia or any part of it, with

^Lord Hailey, ^ African Survey, (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 192.

2Ibid., p. 276.

59

white, self-governed Southern Rhodes ia". The British Admin­istrators who came to Northern Rhodes ia in these early years were indoctrinated with this concept of trusteeship, and the thought of grievance committees of humanitarians and mission­aries reaching public opinion in Britain was a continual threat to budding careers.

Thus , when the white population of Northern Rhodesia in the 1930's began to pressure for amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia, the answer was pretty-well established. The Bled- isloe Commission of 1937 heard the appeals from all sides but gave recognition to. African fears of being united with South­ern Rhodesian whites. They expressed fears of pass laws, heavier taxation, police attitudes, lack of opportunity, di­minution in the power of the Chiefs, and most of all in Southern Rhodesia's lack of respect for their own African population. One menmber of the Connaission stated that British responsibility for the welfare and development of the Protec­torates could not be discharged by "handing them over to the European settlers of Southern Rhodes ia". This report was metwith anger by the whites in both Rhodesias, but by that time World War II was in the shadows.

iProfessor R. E. Robinson, as quoted in The Rhodes ian Herald, 1_ June 1963.

2Gray, 0£. cit., pp. 191-193.

60* * * * * * * *

As in the history of political movements in other parts of Africa, the history of modern African nationalism in Northern Rhodes ia had its beginnings in non-political or­ganizations. As early as 1936, Native Welfare Societies be­gan to appear in the Copperbelt and at Broken Hill. One Dis­trict Commissioner described them as "a representative body of educated native opinion".^ Others looked upon them as a kind of debating society which was harmless as long as they debated only non-political matters. Without doubt the appeal of the Societies was to the elite, educated African (and some­times European) who had begun to take an interest in the run­ning of the local community. As such they began to attract the interest of the Mine Management Boards who, as has been pointed out, had become increasingly aware since the surprise strike of 1935, of the need to establish better communication channels with the African laborer in the Compounds.

The composition of the Welfare Societies has signif­icance. Unlike the Tribal Representatives and the Urban Ad­visory Councils, members of the Societies were not appointed or b o m to their positions, but gained recognition through their own capabilities. They belonged to a younger generation

^Epstein, o£. cit., p. 47.

61with new visions and values, and they were not tied to a frame-work of some ancient social order.

In 1946, the many Welfare Societies united to form a Federation of Welfare Societies. Their first conference is significant in that it was the first time that a body of Af­ricans had met to discuss their problems on a territorial level.^ In 1948, the Federation disbanded and re-constituted itself as the Northern Rhodes ian Congress under Mr. Godwin Lewanika. In 1951, Mr. Harry Nkumbula replaced Mr. Lewanika and the name was changed to the African National Congress (ANC) .3

I. THE FEDERATION

The creation of the Federation of Rhodes ia and Nyasa- land in 1953 probably did more to further the advancement of African nationalism in Northern Rhodes ia than did any other event. By imposing Federation against the wishes of the newly formed ANC, the African first began to lose faith in British intentions to hold Northern Rhodes ia 'in trust' for the Afri­can. The term 'Federation' , in effect, became a synbol for everything the African disliked about the European. A brief

^Ibid, p. 77.^Ibid. p. 71.3lbid. pp. 159-160.

62

review of the factors propounding Federation is in order to serve as a background to later developments that have occurred in relatively rapid sequence.

Conditions changed rapidly in Northern Rhodes ia since the Bledisloe Commission of 1937. The copper boom of World War II and the years following had brought a new population surge to Northern Rhodesia. Between 1940 and 1952, the Euro­pean population had tripled to 42,000, mostly concentrated in the Copperbelt and along the Line of Kail. The Southern Rho­des ian white population was approximately three times this amount. To the European population of both Rhodes ias this combination of population forces gave an added feeling of se­curity against being swamped by African numbers — -"We do not want our grandchildren to have as a neighbor a state such as Liberia, which has no European g u i d a n c e " . 2

After World War II Southern Rhodes ia had contracted a large public debt. The country looked forward to development schemes without having sufficient capital to back such schemes Northern Rhodes ia seemed to offer a possible solution. In 1929, Northern Rhodesia's public revenues amounted to only b500,000 and her exports were of approximately the same

^Colonial Report 1961, o£. cit. . p. 124.2Colin Leys and C. Pratt (Editors) , A New Deal in

Central Africa (NY: Praeger, 1961), p. 12.

63amount. By 1953, however, by virtue of the growth of the copper industry, revenues had jumped to b30 million and ex­perts to B95 million. 1 Clearly, Northern Rhodes ia was no longer the poor country cousin she was in 1937.

But perhaps the biggest factor was the fear on thepart of the new British Conservative Government of the newlyemerging threat from the south. In 1948, Dr. Malan's triumphat the polls heralded the re-birth of Afrikaner nationalism.To the Afrikaner the memories of the Boer War were still freshand there was little love for London or liberalism.

...the Afikaans people acknowledge their national desti­nation as embodied in its Voortrekker past.. .accepts the Republican Constitution which follows, to take the place of all existing regulations in law, %diich are in con­flict with it, and especially with the total abolition of the British Kingship over and the British subjects within the republic

To the British Government a strong Federation in Cen­tral Africa seemed like a good bulwark to thiô. threat. There were fears in Whitehall of Afrikaner influence extending into Southern Rhodesia. With Federation, Southern Rhodes ia would be encouraged to develop ties with the north instead of with the south. Surely, Federation made economic good sense, and

^Lord Hailey, o£. cit. , p. 278.^Dr. Hen^ick Verwoerd, as quoted in John Hatch

"South African Crisis in the Commonwealth", Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XV, 1961.

64as the economy developed, racial competition would be reduced for there would be enough jobs for all.

The Preamble to the Federal Constitution promised to "foster partnership and cooperation among all its inhabitants", but the African felt that he had been sold down the river.

II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK THROUGH 1958

Until recent years the political future of the African; in the Territorial Parliament of Northern Rhodesia has hinged on a delicate balance between European elected members repre­senting settler interests on the one hand, and Crown appointed members representing African interests on the other. Tipping the balance in the interests of the Crown was the power of the Colonial Governor to veto or introduce legislation as he saw fit. Again, happily for African interests, this power was applied for the most part 'in the interests of the overwhelm­ing majority of the indigenous population'.

The pattern of the Territorial Government was estab­lished by the Order in Council of 1924, when the Colonial Office took over administration from the Charter Company. By this first Order and Constitution two bodies were established: a Legislative Council and an Executive Council. The latter consisted of appointed Colonial Office officials and func­tioned as a cabinet to the Governor. The Legislative Council

65consisted of nine official members and five elected members, with the Governor acting as Speaker. The elected members were European since for the most part only British subjects could vote-— the African being classed as a 'protected person'.Since the official members were members of the Executive Council plus nominated members, the Governor was assured a- gainst settler takeover. There were six changes to the Con­stitution through the 1953 Constitutional change, but each change maintained this principle whereby the Governor could command a voting majority. By the 1953 Constitution, ordered shortly after Federation, the Legislative Council had grown to twenty-six members plus the Speaker (now appointed by the Governor). The members were broken down as follows :

12 Elected members (European for all prfwtical purposes)4 Elected African representatives (first introduced in 1948)2 Nominated Europeans representing African interests (first

introduced in 1938).4 Nominated Official members committed to vote with the

Government.4 Ex-Officio members (Colonial Civil Servants)Throughout these constitutional changes, the European

had continually pressed for a majority in hope of whittling away the power of the Colonial Office. As his numbers in­creased his voice became stronger. He had continually resisted

1Franck, o£. cit., pp. 25-29.

66

efforts to reduce the franchise to within reach of the African, so that by the 1953 Constitutional elections barely ten Afri­cans could vote.

By 1958, however, settler pressures had forced a radi­cal constitutional change one so complicated that few under­stood its' terms. It provided for a Legislative Council ofa Speaker and thirty members twenty-two elected and eightappointed by the Governor. By an ingenious gerrymander coup­led with a new two-role franchise of Ordinary and Special voters, the settler could control the Legislative Councilfor the first time in the parliamentary history of Northern

2Rhodes ia.In the Executive Council, which was to be drawn en­

tirely from the membership of the Legislative Council, there were to be five Official members appointed by the Governor and six Unofficial members chosen 'after consultation withthe leader of the governing party' i.e. European. Thoughtwo of the Unofficial members were to be African, it is ob­vious that by keying appointment to consultation with the European party leader, the Africans thus selected would be those most moderate in their views and aspirations (i.e. 'stooges' as far as the African nationalist was concerned).

^Mason, o£. cit. , p. 102.^Ibid. , p. 259; Franck, op. cit. , pp. 194-197.

67Thus, in effect, the settler was to control the Executive Council for the first time also.

III. RISING TENSION AND THE MDNCKTON COMMISSION

The discussions and conferences that led up to the 1958 Constitution had two significant results. First, the African found new fuel to fan his hatred for Federation. In lobbying for white-oriented provisions of the new Consti­tution the Federal Government in the personage of Sir Roy Welensky (himself an ex-member of the Northern Rhodes ian Legislative Council) made frequent appeals and visits to London. The United Federal Party (UFP) was organized through­out all three Territories, so that Mt. John Roberts, the Territorial UFP leader, could draw upon the wealth and poli­tical influence of all Europeans in the Federation, especially those from Southern Rhodes ia whose ties with Whitehall were considerable. To the African nationalist of Northern Rho­des ia this was another mark against Federation which com­pletely toppled any fence-sltter naively harboring faith In 'Partnership'. Similarly, the Crown suffered another loss In African confidence---'the Queen has sold us into slavery under the whites of Southern Rhodes la' .

The second major result was the disruptive effect within the African National Congress Itself. The leader of

68the Congress, Mr. Nkumbula, had long been under suspicion for moderation. His attitude to the new Constitution was unclear and not sufficiently condemning. Mr. Katilungu, leader of the African Mlneworkers* Union and second to Nkumbula In the Congress, had also been criticized for 'playing the white man's game' because of his conciliatory actions during the State of Emergency in 1956 (See page 46).

Thus, in October 1958, the more radical leadership elements of the Congress broke away in the crisis of forming a strategy to fight the new Constitution. This group, com­posed of Kenneth Kaunda, Simon Kapwepwe, and Manukayumbwa Slpalo, formed the Zambia African National Congress (ZNC) and began to campaign on the theme 'one man one vote'. Where Nkumbula proposed franchise changes to give Africans parity in the Council, Kaunda advocated boycott. When Nkumbula ran (and won) for a Parliamentary seat under the new Constitution, he was accused of betraying the African cause. Kaunda's star ascended for he more truly represented the spirit of African nationalism.

Tension mounted in Northern Rhodes ia during the Consti­tutional talks and as the elections approached. The ZNC em­barked on a campaign of Intimidating ANC members. On the Copperbelt fifty European cars were stoned, shops were boy­cotted, and short strikes were called. In September 1958,

69eight people were killed and fourteen wounded when the Govern­ment tried to resettle a village of the Gweobe Tonga. 1 Out­breaks were also severe in the Northern and Luapula Provinces-- locale of the well -organized Bemba Tribe. The climax, however, came in Nyas aland where things had also been developing at a feverish rate. In late February 1959, an African riot re­sulted In fifty-two men and women shot dead. An emergency was declared for the whole Federation, and In Northern Rhodesia the ZNC was banned and its leaders jailed. As Nkumbula was not arrested but went on to win a parliamentary seat in the elections two weeks later, his political star was tarnished further.

The events in Nyas aland and throughout the Federation had a resounding effect in Britain. The Conservative Govern­ment under Prime Minister ^bcmlllan was backed to the wall In trying to explain to the Labour Party and to public opinion what had happened to the 'interests of the overwhelming major­ity of the indigenous population'. The Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, was replaced by Mr. Iain Macleod, who was more noted for his liberalism. The Devlin Coomission was appointed to investigate the disturbances in Nyas aland, followed immediately by the Monckton Commission to inquire

MAS on, op. cit., p. 206.

70

Into the whole future of the Federation.^The Monckton Commission represented a significant turn­

ing point in the rise of African nationalism. Though largely a body of conservatives, their findings doomed newly-won set­tler parliamentary supremacy. They concluded that for the Federation to survive it must effect radical democratic re­forms; that Federation could not succeed without the consent of the majority of the inhabitants in each of the Territories; and that the Legislative Council of Northern Rhodesia should rightly have an African majority.% if there are to be any statues along Cairo Road in Lusaka after African independence, there would seem to be a good reason for a statue of Lord Monckton.

IV. AFRICAN ADVANCEMENT THROUOi THE 1962 ELECTIONS

Early in 1960, Mr. Kaunda was released from prison and took over leadership of the newly constituted United National Independence Party (UNIP), the successor to the banned ZNC. Political riots and racial tension remained high on the Copper- belt, including the murder on the streets of a European woman.

^John Hatch, Africa Today and Tomorrow (NY: Praeger, 1962), p. 164.

^Ibid, pp. 165-166.rtCentral African Examiner, July 1961, p. 10.

71In October the Monckton Report was released and the Colonial Office began to draft a new Constitution in keeping with the spirit of the Commission's findings. What emerged in June 1961, was another complex formula designed to confuse every­body and perpetuate European control.

The draft Constitution proposed a new Legislative Council of fifty-one seats---forty-five elected and six appointed officials. The forty-five elected representatives were to be divided equally into an upper roll, a lower roll, and a national roll. The upper roll seats and the lower roll seats of fifteen each would, since they were tied to voting qualifications, be filled by Europeans and Africans, respec­tively. Thus, control of the Council would be determined by the fifteen national seats, and here the Colonial Office's in­genuity shows forth. The concept proposed by the national seats was that any candidate must appeal to both races. Seven constituencies were established, each of which would return two candidates. To qualify, each of the candidates would haveto obtain 12% per cent of the votes cast by each race or 400votes, whichever is less. Thus , an African national seat can­didate would have to obtain 12% per cent of the white votes and vice versa. For an African trying to get white votes, this would be almost impossible. A single constituency would not have more than 3,000 upper roll votes (i.e. white), of which

7212% per cent would be 375 votes an almost insurmountablehurdle for an African candidate. For the white candidate, however, the picture was more encouraging. A constituency would contain about 10,000 lower roll voters. By the 'whichever is less' provision (i.e. between 12% per cent and 400) the white candidate had only to obtain 400 African votes out of 10,000, and not 1,250 (12% per cent). To frustrate African hopes further, the fifteenth national seat was to be reserved for an African or Coloured candidate. Since the majority of the Asians and Coloureds could qualify as upper roll voters , cre­ation of this special seat removed the best chance an African candidate had of getting the necessary upper roll votes.^

The draft Constitution was immediately attacked and African frustrations carried over to physical violence. Mr. Kaunda launched the campaign by publicly burning his reg­istration certificate (situpa) . In the Northern and Luapula Provinces at least fifty burnings were reported. Bridges were destroyed and trees felled across roads. On the Copperbelt twenty cases of attempted arson or dynamiting were reported.UNIP was banned in the Northern Province as was the UNIP Youth Brigade on the Copperbelt.^ In six violent weeks twenty Africans were killed (mostly by the police) and many more were injured.

Central African Examiner. July 1961, p. 11.2Central African Examiner, September 1961, pp. 6-7.

73Two thousand were arrested. 1 To add further fuel to African discontent, the Nyasaland elections brought forth the first African majority there. The Northern Rhodesian African won-

9dered why he was being treated differently.Though the violence was 'publically* condemned by

Kaunda, it served the useful purpose of forcing the Colonial Administration to reconsider the whole constitutional picture. The Colonial Secretary, Mr. Reginald Maudling, went into fre­quent huddles with all parties in late 1961 trying to work out a solution agreeable to all. The task was made more dif­ficult by the realization that upon this decision for Northern Rhodes ia would rest the whole future of the Federation.^

* * * * * * * *

What emerged in early 1962 was another 'Slide Rule Constitution' but with the '400 or whichever is less' pro­vision deleted. Voter qualification again established upper and lower roll seats based on income, property and education. In the forty-five seat Legislative Council the fifteen nation­al seats were again divided into seven double-member constit­uencies. In four of these, voters were required to return one African and one European. A successful candidate must

Central African Examiner. October 1961, p. 7.^Hatch, o£. cit.. p. 171.3lbid. p. 173.

74

obtain-ten per cent of the votes from both rolls and at leasttwenty per cent of the votes from one. The Asian Colouredseat again made up the fifteenth seat, but Asians and Colouredswere allowed to choose whether to vote for the fifteenth seator to register as an upper or lower roll voter.1

Mr. Kaunda rejected the principle of the new Constitu­tion in that it failed to provide for 'one man one vote', but by April 1962, he had indicated that his party (UNIP) would take part in the elections. His reasons were perhaps three­fold all based on his confidence in UNIP strength. First,UNIP had never participated in any Territorial elections, so a test of strength against Mr. Nkumbula's ANC was desirable to show the Colonial Office what Kaunda felt would be an im­pressive majority for UNIP. Secondly, by calling out a large African vote, even under the white man's rules of limited franchise, UNIP would be able to refute "the UFP's conten­tion that African nationalism in Northern Rhodes ia is a great deal of sound and fury signifying nothing"Third, if any national seats were not filled because of the inability of the candidate to get the necessary ten per cent from the op­posite roll, the seat would remain empty and UNIP could point

^Robert I. Rotberg, "Inconclusive Election in Northern Rhodesia", Africa Report. December 1962.

2Central African Examiner. December 1961, p. 7.

75

to the unworkability of the Constitution.^ With this decision made, UNIP commenced an all-out campaign to register African voters, the vast majority of whom had never voted before.

In the General and By-Elections that were held in Oc­tober and December 1962, respectively, 76,313 people voted on the lower roll and 30,560 voted on the upper. An additional 25,000 ballots were spoiled by failure to follow the compli-

9cated voting process. Table 5 on Page 76 gives a final break* down on the election results. The By-Election in December was called to decide the inconclusive results (as predicted by Kaunda) to the national roll seats, where in October the ma­jority of candidates were unable to poll the necessary ten per cent of the opposite race. In December, two additional seats were decided when the Liberal Party and the Independents gave their votes to the ANC. Eight national seats were still

3inconclusive and were not filled.Of the total votes cast in the General Election, UNIP

polled 64,000 votes to 17,000 for the ANC and 22,000 for the UFP. Thus, UNIP with sixty per cent of the vote clearly estab­lished itself as the majority party yet getting only thirty-

^"Spotlight on Northern and Southern Rhodesia", Africa Report. April 1962.

^Rotberg, loc. cit.3Ibid.; Also The Washington Post. 13 December 1962.

76

one per cent of the seats. It is significant that of the fif­teen upper roll seats, eleven represent constituencies on the Copperbelt and Line of Rail-with about seventy-seven per cent of the total votes cast. In the lower roll seats only three of the fifteen are Copperbelt seats, but these three comprise forty-six per cent of the total votes cast on this roll.^The three Copperbelt seats went to UNIP by vast majorities , and of the three electees only Mr. John Chisata has any con­nection with the Copperbelt as President of the African Mine- workers ' Union. The other two, Messrs. Zulu and Sikota Wina, are party dignitaries coming from Broken Hill and Barotseland, respectively .

TABLE 51963 ELECTION RESULTS IN NORTHERN RHODESIA

General Elections(Oct) UFP UNIP ANC

By-Elections (Dec) UFP UÎÎIP ANC

Upper Roll 13 1 1Lower Roll 12 3National Roll 2 1* 2 2

Total for Election*Asian

16 14 7

Source: Robert I. Rotberg, "Inconclusive Election in Northern Rhodesia". Africa Report, December 1962.

^Rotberg, loc. cit.

77On 14 December 1962, the Governor of Northern Rhodesia,

Sir Evelyn Hone, announced the formation of a coalition betweenKaunda's UNIP and Nkumbula's ANC thus giving the African amajority in the Legislative Council. Mr. Kaunda was assigned the Ministry of Local Government and Social Welfare, and Mr. Nkumbula (an ex-schoolteacher himself) became the new Minister of African Education. Prior to this coalition there were rumors that the mutual hatred of both ANC and the UFP for Kaunda would lead to a possible ANC-UFP coalition. But for Nkumbula to align himself with the party representing settler interests and Federation would have been political suicide.The goals of dissolving Federation and gaining independence transcended old party hatreds. Yet, as the new year came, Nkumbula stated that he was "beginning to have second thoughts about coalition".^

* * * * * * * *

In the preceding chapters the writer has attempted to provide the reader with sufficient background to analyze events that have and will take place in the near future. It is real­ized that the Copperbelt cannot be considered separately from Northern Rhodesia as a whole. At the same time the importance of the Copperbelt to Northern Rhodesia has been stressed. In the history and development of Northern Rhodes ia the Copperbelt

^Harry Nkumbula in The Washington Post, 3 January 1963.

78

has served as a catalyst— -in opening rail and road communi­cations, in stimulating investment from abroad, in encoura­ging immigration of technical skills , and finally in prompting a social and political revolution among the Africans.

The African laborer has had a rough road to advance­ment-— having to overcome racial and cultural barriers as well as the more natural laws of economics and politics. As Adam Smith observed many years ago, no group in power will, of its own volution, surrender that power. The white laborers and settlers in Northern Rhodesia have been such a group. A drive from the neat cottages of their residential areas in a Copperbelt town to the African compound across the town pro­vides a graphic illustration of what the white laborer is called upon to surrender. Yet surrender he must. But with surrender comes a resentment and fear that could upset the stability of the entire country.

As one looks at 1963 and 1964, one thing appears cer­tain: Northern Rhodes ia will move toward independence in the near future under African leadership. By virtue of the wealth of the Copperbelt, Northern Rhodes ia has the opportunity to become one of the wealthiest states in Africa. It can also become one of the biggest disappointments, what happens after independence involves a closer analysis of the political, eco­nomic and social factors that exist today which is the sub­ject of the next section.

PART TWO

THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE

CHAPTER VI

THE POLITICAL SCENE

The nature of the minerals in Northern Rhodesia is such that mining will continue to be mainly a task for large companies, who can be expected to finance their own expansion. Their main requirement from the Govern­ment is the maintenance of stable administration...^

I. POLITICAL INTER-PARTY FRICTIONS The year 1963 was ushered in with a looming split in

the coalition between the UNIP and the ANC, which has pro­gressively worsened and which could threaten the whole country.

The first indications of the split came in early Jan­uary when Nkumbula accused Kaunda of failing to live up to coalition agreements on Katanga. According to ANC's version of the conditions of the coalition, UNIP was supposed to adopt a friendly attitude towards Katanga's fight for inde­pendence. Thus, when Kaunda, as Chairman of the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East, Central and South Africa, indicated that Tshombe's resistance to the Central Congo Government must

Thinking Ahead. An Outline of the Northern Rhodes ia Government^s Draft Development Plan for the Four Year Period 1 July 1961 to 30 June 1965 (Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1962), pp. 2-3.

81

cease and that Katanga's army must be destroyed. Nkumbula stated that "If he (Kaunda) is going to disregard the broad principle on which the coalition was formed, 1 will have nothing more to do with him". In March, ANC members walked out of the Legislative Council over an announcement by the British Broadcasting Corporation that Kaunda was the leader of a joint UNIP-ANC delegation to London to discuss the future of Northern Rhodesia. Nkumbula accused the Colonial Office officials of twisting the story to discredit his participation in the Government.^

This suspicion of the other parties' plans and in­tentions Increased in April with the announcement of the re-constitution and splintering of the United Federal Party. On 28 April 1963, Mr. H. J. Roberts, leader of the UFP in Northern Rhodesia, announced that the party would be dissolved in June and would re-emerge as the National Progress Party (NPP). Roberts visualized the position of the party as a third force in the country that would work for stability and economic progress rather than for politi­cal motives---"stability in Government is what we seek and we will not attempt to undermine any African political party

^The Northern News. 3 January 1963.2The Rhodes ian Herald. 21 March 1963.

82capable of supplying that need".^ By picturing the party as a stabilizing force to the Coldnial Office, he hoped to be in a better position to lobby for seats in the coming battle for a new Legislature. To make the parties' position more credible, the ex-lieutenant of Sir Roy welensky stated: "We are on our

9own now with no responsibility to Salisbury".Such last-ditch action did not win the support of

either the African nationalists or the more practical (and perhaps self-seeking) members of the old UFP. Mr. Nkumbula sounded the nationalist's reaction when he said:

There is no future for the UFP, the NPP or any other European minority group in this country. White politicians must realize that the time has come for them to identify themselves with nationalist aspirations in the Territory.3

The first faction to bolt the 'third force' strategy was led by Mr. N. Coates, a member of the Legislative Council, who said:

We believe that the NPP is doomed to a brief and pathetic life. No amount of grand words or windy phrases can alter its true nature---a paltry political raft that will be sunk without trace at the next election.^

Only by aligning themselves with one of the nationalist

^Policy statement as quoted in The Rhodes ia Herald. 9 Mày 1963.

^The Rhodes ia Herald. 29 April 1963.3lbid.^The Rhodes la Herald, I May 1963.

83parties could the European play any sort of role in the new Government. Fearing UNIP's schemes for one party control, the Coates faction aligned themselves with ANC strategy:

Unless a concerted and positive move is made now to align ourselves with the AJkican moderates against the African extremists, then the fate of thousands of peace- loving Africans is sealed for all times.^The second splintering took place a few days later with

a long article in The Rhodesia Herald on 3 May 1963, by Mr.D. A. Sparrow, member of the Federal Parliament from Luanshya.He too expressed the impracticality of European's trying toform a third force and likened such action to the Dodo bird doomed to extinction because it could not change to suitits changed environment. After "agonizing reappraisal", Mr.Sparrow called on all Europeans "to face the true facts...and act realistically by swinging support to the Africanmajority party".^

Such machinations on the part of European interestsare bound to aggravate African suspicions in an already shakycoalition. In the Legislative Council these interests stillrepresent sixteen votes that could be swung either way toform a new coalition. On 6 May, Mr. Kaunda stated that ifsufficient UPP "rebels" formed a coalition with ANC, he would

llbid.

^The Rhodesia Herald, 3 May 1963.

84demand another general election under a new Constitution. He described these rebels as political opportunists who sought power through the back door. The ANC for their part welcomed any UFP member provided allegiance was pledged to the nation­alist cause.^ In the meantime the new NPP took another look in the interests of flexibility and self-preservation. In a significant policy clause they indicated that there would be cooperation with either nationalist party "contributing to-

Owards stable and acceptable political conditions". Recog­nizing a possible entente with the NPP, Kaunda took an oppor­tunity in the Legislative Council to say; "I think they willmake a formidable constructive opposition and not the ANC,who are rotten".

Suspicions between the African parties were also ex­tended to the British Government. Nkumbula had long accused Whitehall of favoring UNIP (e.g. the BBC broadcast). In May, when Kaunda went to the United States to receive an honorary Doctorate of Laws at Fordham University, ANC claimed that the British Government, the Governor of Northern Rhodesia, and the United States were all scheming to build Kaunda's image as the Territorial leader. ANC was especially bitter when Kaunda used

^The Rhodes ia Herald. 7 May 1963. ^The Rhodesia Herald. 11 June 1963. ^The Rhodes ia Herald. 8 July 1963.

85his acceptance speech to launch attacks against the coalition and to discredit the obstructionist policies of the ANC.

In July, Nkumbula threatened to dissolve the coalition over allegations that the Governor and Dr. Kaunda were holding secret meetings to discuss the new Constitution.^

* * * * * * * *

In the goals of dissolving the Federation and gaining independence there is general agreement between UNIP and ANC. Although no final details of the new Constitution have been announced, best indications seem to propose a sixty seat House of representatives elected by universal franchise with another fifteen seats reserved for the European electorate. A House of Chiefs would be established to play a role similar to that of the House of Lords in the British Parliament. The House of Chiefs would pass on all legislation from the Lower House with power to delay such legislation from coming into force for a certain time period depending on the scope of the leg­islation. The new voting procedures would seem as simple as the present system is confusing.

It is in the timing of the elections under a new Con­stitution that has widened the split between the two parties. With the present UNIP majority (estimated to be as high as

^The Rhodesia Herald. 23 May 1963. ^The Rhodesia Herald. 25 July 1963.

86

70-80 per cent), ANC has much to lose from 'one man one vote'. Polling less than one-quarter of the African vote in the 1962 elections, Nkumbula was nevertheless able to gain one-third of the African seats— -with the help of the UFP in the double constituencies . ANC was also given half of the Ministries in exchange for coalition. Under the present conditions it is doubtful that ANC would fare so well after new elections.

Dr. Kaunda is promoting elections in October of 1963. Any time after October would make elections difficult because of the rainy season until April. To the ANC elections this year would be a 'miracle'. In terms of voter registration, UNIP may have played into ANC hands by the UNIP-organized burning of registration certificates ( 's itupas '). Nkumbula, on the other hand, told his followers to keep all documents to prove age and residence. He will demand to know what proof the Colonial Office will have that UNIP is not packing the marginal constituencies with followers from other districts or iaq>orted 'voters' from Tanganyika and Nyas aland. By de­laying elections ANC hopes to rebuild the popularity of the party and especially the personal image of Nkumbula. There is still the white vote and influence to win and election funds to gather. And perhaps most of all, ANC hopes to gain

^Messrs. Nkumbula and Wkjere to author in Lusaka, 29 July 1963.

87more of the African vote through defections from UNIP or a possible split in UNIP itself. But there is danger in delay for ANC as well.

II. THE COPPERBELT RIOTS

On 22 June 1963, the Central African Mail published shocking pictures on the front page of three Africans killedin a riot on the Copperbelt one by spear; one by arrow; andone by club. The caption accompanying the pictures stated: "We pray that these pictures will start a wave of shock and shame. How much longer can the good name and bright future of Northern Rhodes ia be smeared with blood". This riot in the Nchanga North Township on 16 June, vdien seven people were killed and many more were injured, was the culmination of a long build-up of strife since the beginning of the year and continuing to this writing:

At Mufulira.. .was attacked by three men after he re­fused to shout ANC slogans and lost an eye as a result of his injuries. 1

At Nchanga Mine African Township an ANC official... was killed when a group of Africans stoned his house, entered it, attacked him inside and caught him after he had escaped.2

More than thirty Africans were arrested on the Copper-

The Rhodesia Herald, 30 April 1963. 2lbid.

88belt during the weekend on charges of assaults, threaten­ing violence, stoning cars or houses and demanding to see UNIP cards

At Luanshya, an African died when he was allegedly kicked in the stomach.2

After the Nchanga riots, the Northern Rhodesia Govern­ment, upon a demand by the leader of the opposition, Mr. Roberts, appointed a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the disturb­ances. The Commission (Whelan) held hearings in July and early August. Various police officials, party members and Govern­ment administrators were called to give testimony. For example:

Deputy Provincial Cormnissioner: Political provincial leaders had urged their followers to eliminate the oppo­sition by any means possible and push for one-party r u l e . 3

Commanding Officer Chingola Police: There had been a ruthless effort to eliminate ANC by UNIP. In the fore­front were members of the Youth Brigade, the so-called Zambia Workers.4

Bancroft District Commissioner: UNIP had set-up its own district conmissioner and headquarters and had ad­vised all Africans to take their problems to it.5

UNIP Official: Northern Rhodes ia Police had supplied ANC members with bows and arrows, shields and police batons during an inter-party riot. Said the police: "UNIP

^The Rhodes ia Herald. 28 May 1963.2The Rhodesia Herald. 1 June 1963. ^The Rhodesla Herald. 11 July 1963. ^The Rhodesia Herald. 18 July 1963. ^The Rhodes ia Herald. 19 July 1963.

89have caused this trouble; we leave it to ANC to deal with".

It is -significant that UNIP supported a memo submitted to the Commission by the United Church of Central Africa in Rhodesia.2 in the testimony delivered by Reverend Colin Morris attention was called to political frustrations caused by the "pent-up feeling of the African people". There were great hopes that an African government would solve all their problems. When their lives failed to change, there was a lack of understanding. Reverend Morris called attention to the unemployed on the Copperbelt, who were living alongside the well-paid and socially secure employed workers and "often parasitic upon them". There is always an irrational element outside the party leaders' control— -consisting mainly of highly idealistic and over-enthusiastic youth. The police, especially the Mobile Unit, have been the object of intense hatred---being identified more as a political instrument than a necessary agency for law and order. Reverend Morris con­cluded by asking for a concerted drive by all leaders and organizations to develop more local autonomy among the people of the townships. Only by increasing each citizen's personal responsibility for 'Our Town' could the pressure of public

^The Northern News , 1 August 1963. 2The Northern News. 2 August 1963.

90

opinion control the lawless.^There is no doubt that the Copperbelt riots have led

to increased power for UNIP---at the expense of ANC. In many areas according to testimony to the Commission, ANC has prac­tically ceased to exist. Whether the riots were instigated and planned from the UNIP Central Committee is not known. All persons interviewed in Northern Rhodesia by the writer testi­fied as to the difficulties of the Central Body to control local party leaders. When a party has been 'talking tough' for so long, it is difficult to effect an 'about face'. Lo­cal party leaders have established a portrait of 'how to be a good party man' that cannot be easily broken. Any leader who attempts to discipline such elements too soon may lose to the other party.

III. FRICTIONS WITHIN POLITICAL PARTIES AND TRADE UNIONS

The political scene in recent months has shown many indications of party splits within the two African parties.In late July a faction of the ANC announced their dissatis­faction with the leadership of Nkumbula, and a week later formally broke with the party. Said one spokesman: "It is

1 "Memorandum Submitted on Behalf of the United Church of Central Africa in Rhodes ia to the Conmission of Inquiry into Disturbances on the Copperbelt". Undated.

91clear that the ANC cannot hope to win an election. Not after the way its leaders have handled affairs".^ A new party was formed, the Democratic Peoples Congress, under the leadership of Mr. J. Michello, a Parliamentary Secretary and former ANC General Secretary. The apparent dissatisfaction with the ANC centered around the failure of Mr. Nkumbula to keep the party rank-and-file informed of developments, to raise necessary funds, and to pursue a more active policy. Also mentioned were reports of a b75,000 donation from Tshombe to the splin­ter group and claims by Nkumbula of rebel collusion with

2Welensky to establish regionalism in Northern Rhodesia.Certainly, there was basis for the stagnation charge from ANC officials in Barotseland. With elections in the Protec­torate on 15 August, UNIP had been actively campaigning for months placing candidates in all twenty-five contested seats.ANC, on the other hand, has put forth only two candidates--"None of our executives has been in the Protectorate formonths".2

Similarly, there have been tensions within UNIP. Where ANC represents mostly two tribes of the southern part of the country (the Ila and Tonga) , UNIP contains tribal representatives

^The Northern News, 30 July 1963. 2lbid.3The Northern News, 1 August 1963.

92from throughout the country. A listing of the Central Committee will illustrate this heterogeneity:

K. Kaunda President Bemba (Parents bornin Nyasaland)

R. C. Kamanga Dep. President NgoniM. Chona Secretary TongaA. M. Milner Dep. Secretary ColouredS. M. Kapvepwe Treasurer BembaC. P. Mundia Dep. Treasurer Lozi

In addition to these elected Central Committee members other party officials have frequently held high posts espe­cially prominent are M. Sipalo (Lozi) , Silçota and Arthur Wina (both Lozi). Thus, there has been cause for the rumored tribal feud between the Lozi and the Bemba, the two most powerful pre-colonial tribes in Northern Rhodesia. On 21 January 1963, the Central African Post reported a breakaway from UNIP by the Lozi group under the Wina brothers. This was rejected by UNIP headquarters with threats of drastic reprisals against irre­sponsible newspapers. In June, leaflets titled "UNIP Youth League" were circulated in Lusaka calling for the resignation of Kaunda and the appointment of Kapwepwe as party leader.^In December 1962, Me. Sipalo was seriously burned by a group he claimed were UNIP supporters.

It is generally felt that it is with the local politicians

Central African Post, 21 January 1963.2The Rhodesia Herald, 18 June 1963. Central African Examiner. February 1963.

93under the UNIP banner that the main causes of disunity lie.UNIP, as an outlaw party for several years, was not alwaysable to attract the best type at the lower levels especiallyconsidering the rapid growth of the party. With poor com­munications throughout the country and the restrictions placed on UNIP activities during much of the time, local leaders be­came pretty supreme. For example, though a Government offi­cial may work directly for a Government Ministry, orders of­ten come through local politicians who are technically not in the chain of command but without whose cooperation the jobwould not get done or worse.^ On 11 August 1963, the UNIPRegional Secretary for Ndola-Luanshya told five thousand sup­porters that UNIP "has plans for country-wide strikes aimed at paralyzing industries, mass civil disobedience and pulling out of the coalition Government if Britain did not grant elections by 30 October". Mr. Kaunda immediately rejected the statement.2

Perhaps the biggest threat to UNIP unity lies in the trade union field. These pressures are both internal political and.foreign. In 1950, the African unions in Northern Rhodesia formed the Trade Union Congress (TUC). In 1959, a split

^Mr. C. Williams, Native Township Manager, Ft. Jameson, Northern Rhodesia, to writer 26 June 1963.

2The Rhodesia Herald, 12 August 1963.

94developed when two members of the executive made a secret vis­it to Yugoslavia. Mr. Katilungu, the TUC President (and also President of the African Mineworkers' Union), ousted certain members with the charge of bringing communism to Northern Rhodesia. In effect, the non-mining unions withdrew to formthe Reformed Trade Union Congress under Messrs. Chivuga,Mwendapole, Chakulya, and Kalyati. In February 1961, the two groups shakily joined forces as the United Trade Union Con­gress (UTUC) . By December 1962, after another disagreement, the more powerful unions (including the mining unions) hived off to form the Zambia Trade Union Congress (ZTUC) . The re­maining leadership of the UTUC picked up the pieces and applied to the All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF) for member­ship. Formed at the Casablanca Conference in 1961, membership in the AATUF requires severance of ties with international labor organizations such as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).

Such disunity in the trade unions caused alarm in theUNIP Central Committee. In April 1963, Mr. Kapwepwe, one ofthe more powerful party leaders, called a conference to try to unite the UTUC with the breakaway ZTUC. The attempt failed when, in an election to the executive committee of a new body(the United Labour Movement) , the leadership of the UTUC

Africa 63. 31 May 1963.

95gained key positions. Thus, relations between UNIP and the AMU took a turn for the worse.^

The AMÜ is a true trade union movement, and it is too big and powerful to be coerced by UNIP at the present time (1963). Its membership is over half the membership of all other African trade unions combined and about six times thesize of the nearest single African union in strength (The

2Railway African Workers' Union). The President, Mr. John Chisata, is a UNIP member of the Legislative Council, but apparently he is not within the inner party circle. His fights in the past have been wage and job advancement strug­gles rather than political. An authoritative source de­scribed him as an "honest constitutionalist who has an un­canny feel for making the right decisions". As a true trade unionist he feels that the trade unions should not become an industrial arm of the Government or party. On the other hand, the President of the UTUC, b6r. Chivunga, does seem to enjoy party support of certain key members— -to include the Minis­ter of Mines and Labour, Mr. Ramanga.

It is obvious that UNIP would like to control trade unions for political and economic reasons. Apparently it feels that such control could come more readily through the

Central African Examiner, May 1963.2Annual Labour Report, 1962, op. cit.. p. 76.

96UTUC, ^ich seems to fall more in line with party thinking on the role of a trade union in a nationalist struggle Wiich might evolve toward a one-party state. Mr. Chivuga seems to have support among the UNIP Youth League on the Copperbelt and among the thousands of unemployed.^ There is also a growing tendency for the African worker to look more and more to Gov­ernment and party officials to solve problems rather than to the labor unions. The union member who recalls the strikes and difficulties in the long wage and job advancement struggles now looks upon the party and Independence to finish the job in 'one fell swoop'. Most people interviewed on the subject ex­pect UNIP (i.e. the Government) to control the trade unions within two years---and with the approval of the mining com­panies. But this prediction is not without its dangers. The present divisions, if not handled well by party leadership, aould well develop into far more serious political splits than have occurred so far.

IV. THE POSITION OF THE MINING COMPANIES

Throughout these political and labor struggles the major companies have been like first-time expectant fathers---nervously on-call in the waiting room; uncertain of the outcome and fear­ful of the dangers ; and feeling completely helpless to it all.

1 Africa 63, 15 March 1963.

97In tur long wage and job advancement struggles the mining com­panies saw early the need to develop African technical capa­bilities. At the same time there was the businessman's fear of a blanket wage Increase that would cut into company profits and a fear that African advancement would prematurely drive the European with his skills from the Copperbelt. The companies soon found the answer in increased technology requiring more skillful operations but with less manpower.

In the political field, however, the companies were not so quick to learn. In 1961, for example, the Welensky Gov­ernment received a $14 million loan from Anglo-American and another $11 million from the British South Africa Company.^But by 1962, all companies had developed a more pragmatic ap­proach to the füture of African nationalism.

whatever the result of the Northern Rhodesian election, it is to my mind Inevitable that ultimately the wishes of the African people will prevail, and they will move pro­gressively into a position in which they will be the con­trolling force in the government of the country.^

To be closer to this "controlling force" both Anglo and R.S.T. decided to move their headquarters to Northern Rhodesia.

^Keith Irvine, "The Dissolving Federation", current History. December 1962.

^Ronald L. Prain, as quoted by F. Taylor Ostrander in a speech to the Council of Economics at the 92d Annual Meeting of the American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical & Petroleum Engineers; Dallas, Texas, 27 Feb 1963.

The Rhodesia Herald. 22 May 1963.

98One of the darkest clouds hanging over the mining com­

panies is the criticism leveled at the so-called 'interlocking directorates' as being conspiracies that bind all mining con­cerns together in some sort of a sinister plot to control the states in which they operate---the "cape-to-Katanga Miner's Team". Such criticism is for the most part based on the fact that directors of parent companies and subsidiaries are identical. This criticism, however, ignores the historical and economic facts of mining development. Mining is a risky business requiring high initial outlay of capital for drilling, housing, recruiting, etc. Usual practice has been for mining and financial companies to share this expense so as to spread the risk in case the geologists were wrong. Also in the his­torical sense, as in the case of Katanga and the Copperbelt, the initial explorations often result in multiple claims to the same ore belt. Or often cooqpanies combine resources from various sources to get the ore out---technical skills from one source, administrative and financial skills from another. So, indeed, when board directors interlock, it is from a nat­ural development and a natural desire to safegaurd interests ---as any stockholder.

There is little evidence to suggest that the mining companies in Northern Rhodes ia are attempting to control the

^Clarence E. Randall in speech before the African Af­fairs Society of America, 3 April 1963.

99Government. Surely all possible direct and indirect means are used to influence Government decisions (e.g. through develop­ment loans) , but control remàins with the African nationalist. With the power to tax, the power of exchange control, police power, and the threat of nationalization, the initiative is with the emerging independent African Governments. The con­cern of the mining directors today is in the intemperate or hasty misuse of the powers of political sovereignty.

when one thinks of a newly emerging African nation vis-a-vis foreign investment, thoughts turn to nationali­zation. certainly this is one of the biggest fears the min­ing companies have. The charge of 'Neo-Colonialization' is a threat to any industrial empire. However, with the present leadership of the nationalist movement in Northern Rhodesia,fears of nationalization should be unfounded at least for theimmediate future. Dr. Kaunda has made repeated public state­ments against nationalization of the mines. He and other Af­rican leaders have toured the mines (with company encourage­ment) and they realize the complexity of the industry. UNIP policy even contains a statement against nationalization to quiet fears of the companies:

we believe that nationalization of the mines would lead to political and economic upheavals and uncertainties a- broad, but a proper fiscal policy and some control over dividends leaving the country are visualized.

^UNIP Policy (Lusaka: UNIP Press), p. 9.

100

One of the basic economic policies of the new country is to attract capital for development of secondary industries, agricultural developments, and other projects. Any interfer­ence with private capital investment would naturally deter this investment. However, with the British South Africa Com­pany, indications seem to point to an exception. The compa­nies' mineral royalty arrangements were explained in Chap­ter III. Until 1986, twenty per cent of the royalties of the BSAC are paid to the Government; the remaining share is kept by the Company---for the most part shipped out of the coun­try. when questioned about these arrangements, a leading UNIP official smiled and said: Well, Obviously we must make other arrangements."^ Most people interviewed seemed to feel that such "arrangements” would include a shortening of the time frame of payments to perhaps 1966, or(and) an agreement to re-invest a certain portion of the earnings in the country.

The Mining Companies also have an axe to grind on the question of royalties. According to the Agreement, royaltiesare paid on the price of copper on the London market regard*less of whether a mining conq)any is making any profit. The companies have long pushed for a change in these arrangements to tie royalty payments to company profits. Thus, a company

^Mr. A. Milner, Secretary of UNIP, to writer in Lusaka, 29 July 1963.

101

making only marginal profits (e.g. Roan Antelope copper Mines, Ltd.) would be allowed a little advantage over a company where ore content was a little higher and hence a little more pro­fitable to mine.

Unfortunately for the BSAC, their image is not too clear. Being the first administrator of the land, they carry the full brunt of the term 'imperialism'. The present royal­ty agreements were executed under the guiding hand of Sir Roy welensky, which automatically tags them with suspicion by the African. Despite the threat, the Company for its part is participating in the development of the country through ex­ploration, investment in secondary industries, and many other investments. Top on the list is an intensive propaganda cam­paign to appeal to the African conscience and economic good sense:

"llius, over the years the British South Africa Com­panies ' history has been almost inseparable from the history of the country it so largely created... From the early years when it accepted the challenge to undertake the costly administration and opening up of vast unknown terr i tory---c ons is tently ploughed back a large proportion of its profits into constructive development. "2

The question for the future, of course, is whether the companies are plowing back profits fast enough to balance rising expectations.

IMr. H. R. Finn, Vice-President of R. S. T., to writer in Salisbury, 7 August 1963.

Brels ford, og.. cit., p. 795.

CHAPTER VII

COPPER AND THE ECONOMY

There is no doubt that a country which is lucky enough to possess minerals on a scale and of a quality Which can be mined is extremely fortunate, for there is nothing like mining to provide a quick trigger to develop the economy.^

No analysis of the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodes ia would be complete without considering the parts that copper and the copper companies have played and will play in the overall economic development of the country. Copper exports will most likely have a great effect on the balance of trade of the country; will probably generate employment and wage policies far beyond the copper industry itself; and will probably provide wealth and leverage with which to assault the more underdeveloped parts of the economy such as agricul­ture and secondary industry. But the creation of a large-scale mining industry has not been without its unfavorable conse­quences .

The three principal sectors of any economy are usually agriculture, mining and manufacturing. In the Federation in

^Sir Ronald Prain, from address given at Henderson Re­search Station, Salisbury, 25 May 1961.

103the years since 1954, mining has accounted for an average of 23.4 per cent of the Qross Domestic Product compared to 21.2 per cent for agriculture and 9.8 per dent for manufacturing.^Of the figure for the Federation, copper accounted for about 80 per cent of the value of all mining in 1962, which in turn constituted 51 per cent of the value of all domestic merchan­dise exports. The graph on page 104 (Figure 2) portrays the importance mining plays to Northern Rhodesia in relation to other origins of the Gross Domestic Product, and this is com­pared with the same sectors for Southern Rhodesia. Since copper accounts for ninety-five per cent of all mining in Northern Rhodesia, the graph for mining, in effect, is really a graph of copper and its relation to the other sectors. From the graph it is obvious that Northern Rhodes ia is geared solely to a mining economy whereas contribution to the Southern Rho­desia Gross Domestic Product is more evenly divided between agriculture, manufacturing, and to a lesser extent, mining.The very limited part that manufacturing plays in the Northern Rhodes ia economy should also be noted, as this lack of devel­opment in the manufacturing sector has been one of the main

D. S. Pearson and W. L. Taylor, Breakup (Salisbury: The Phoenix Group, 1963, p. 5.

2Economic Report 1963, Federation of Rhodes ia and Nyasaland (Salisbury: Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1963), pp. 33, 34 and 72.

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105complaints by Northern Rhodes ia against Federation: namely, that Southern Rhodesia has been able to attract industries at the expense of her northern partner. Since the copper share of the Gross Domestic Product is produced almost entirely from export, creation of a wider internal market for manufacturing will probably have little effect on the copper industry.

With Federation dissolving the question naturally arises as to where Northern Rhodes ia will stand considering the lop­sided mono-economy gust described. The answer is found to a great extent in an interesting study performed by the Phoenix Group of economists in Salisbury. Based on approximations of distributions of Federal expenditures and inter-territorial transactions,^ it was determined that of a total revenue of h 358.7 million. Southern Rhodes ia and Northern Rhodes ia each contributed about half (Nyasaland making essentially no con­tribution) . Of the total expenditures, however, Southern Rho­desia received sixty-four per cent compared with twenty-eight per cent for Northern Rhodes ia and eight per cent for Nyasaland. These figures indicate that Northern Rhodesia has been largely financing the other two territories. With an end to Federation,

1Inter-territorial transactions were not recorded in official statistics, which the Phoenix Group considers was largely a political decision to avoid inter-territorial com­parisons. Therefore, figures are estimates only. (See General Notes under Table XXI, Breakup. op. cit.. p. 55.)

106

this situation should cease. Northern Rhodesia should thus be able to distribute its tax revenues to serve its own economic development.

* * * * * * * *

There have been many unfavorable economic consequences of the development of the mining industries that should not be overlooked, for these consequences will greatly influence the future actions and policies of the country. Hiough indirectly throu^ taxes the copper industry has provided the principal source of development funds for Northern Rhodesia, the direct beneficial effects on the country have been extremely limited in a geographical sense. After over thirty years of mining development, little progress has taken place in bringing the modern world to the mass of people in the country as a whole. The mass of African people and the country itself outside the Copperbelt and the Line of Rail are still tied to a rural sub­sistence economy.

As an employer the contribution of the mining industry is relatively small, and again, highly localized in a geograph* ical sense. Ihe number in paid employment by the mining com­panies is just over 44,000, which is only seventeen per cent of the total number in paid employment for all industries and services in Northern Rhodesia. Also, as mining becomes more

llbid, pp. 54-55.

107capital intensive, the number of employed per ton of ore mineddecreases. In income the average annual earnings of unskilledlabor in the mines are fa 207 as coaq>ared with fa 146 for the

2country as a whole.The overall effect of the employment picture has thus

been to upset the normal economic balance between the Copper­belt and the rest of the country---what Robert E. Baldwin,Professor of Economics at the University of California, has

3termed a 'dualistic economy'. The forced rise of wages in the mining industry has set the pattern for other industries in the economy, and because of the reliance of the country (and the Federation) on copper revenues, these rates have been driven higher than would have been normal under free mar­ket conditions. Thus, industrial unrest is stimulated as one sector of the economy tries to keep pace with increases gen­erated by another sector of the economy.

The high wages on the copperbelt naturally increased the number of people leaving the rural areas and other forms

^Annual Labor Report 1962, op. cit., p. 41.2Economic Report 1963, op. cit., p. 18; chamber of

Mines Yearbook 1962, op. cit.. p. 31.3Robert E. Baldwin, "Wage Policy in a Dualistic Economy-'

The Case of Northern Rhodesia", Race (Journal of the Ins titute of Race Relations) , Vol. IV, Number 1, November 1962, p. 73.

108of employment to seek Inflated wage rates on the mines, so that today (mld-1963) there are between 30,000-50,000 unemployed on the Copperbelt. Perhaps 'unemployed' is misleading in that many are not completely dependent for their livelihood on wage earnings and have never been employed. However, since they usually live like parasites on friends and relations ^ o are in employment, they thus help to aggravate the unrest on the Copperbelt and contribute to the economic stagnation of the rural areas from whence they came. Particularly hard hit have been the rural areas of the Northern Luapula Provinces from whence most of the African mineworkers come (See Chapter II). One Government official estimated that in the Fort Rosebery area between sixty and seventy per cent of the most dynamic element of the population had left to find industrial employ­ment .

The artifically high wage scale on the Copperbelt has created unemployment in other industrial sectors. As the unionized parts of the industrial sector drive wage costs up, this results in increased efforts by industrial managers to substitute capital equipment for labor (mechanisation). Thus, many jobs that would otherwise be filled by a person trying to break from the traditional subsistence economy are, in fact.

^Mr. John Wilson, Northern Rhodesia Government Publj^ Relations Officer to writer, Fort Jameson, 26 June 1963.

109

never created.According to Professor Baldwin, the most detrimental

effect of the high wage policies forced on the mining industryhas been in retarding the growth of other industry in Northern

2Rhodesia. The attraction of manufacturing industries to Southern Rhodes ia has already been mentioned. In terms of gross fixed capital formation, manufacturing in Northern Rho­desia attracted only fa 12.7 million between 1954 and 1962, as compared with fa 72.4 million for Southern Rhodesia.^ Thus, industry that might have come to Northern Rhodes ia located elsewhere where the labor costs were lower.

With wages for skilled labour above those in the ad­vanced countries and wages for unskilled labour being pushed up rapidly to a level far above one that takes into account the plentiful supply of unskilled labour in the country, it is little wonder that it is difficult to com­pete with foreign-produced goods even in the simple con­sumer durable goods field.4

The mining companies have made a total of about fa 1508 million on the sale of copper through the years. Of this amount fifty-seven per cent was spent on operating costs;

^Baldwin, op. cit., pp. 86-87.^Ibid. p. 83.3Pearson and Taylor, op. cit.. p. 22.

Baldwin, op. cit. , p. 87.

110sixteen per cent paid in taxes; twelve per cent reinvested; and fifteen per cent declared as dividends. The exceptional prosperity of the Copperbelt, especially in the past fifteen years when copper prices have almost doubled, has not been due solely to the sale of copper. In the massive amounts spent on reinvestment and operations, local Jobs were created for thousands of people in addition to the actual miners---those who prospect for new mines, construct or enlarge shafts and surface facilities, build housing, offices, etc. The world has wanted copper and the Copperbelt has been in an expansive state to meet this demand. The question now arises as to the extent this demand will continue, and concomitantly, the price of copper on the world market. From the graph on Page 111, Figure 3, the average prices paid for copper are shown for the past fifteen years. It will be noted that copper prices rose steadily to the boom years of 1955-56, when prices almost tripled the 1948 level. This was followed by the slump years of 1957-58, when high copper costs of previous years resulted in copper customers seeking and using substitutes such as alu­minum. As a result of this slump, all major free world pro­ducers have agreed to varying degrees of voluntary curtailment in mine production or sales which has had the effect of sta-

H. R. Finn, Vice-President of R. S, T. to writer in Salisbury, 7 August 1963,

Ill

bilizlng prices since 1958. For the R.S.T. this curtailment amounted to fifteen per cent in 1961-62.^

(1)h300

2DÛ

too

/(11

f

, J/ < mi mw0

n

(2) i, million SO

20

to

48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62FIGURE 3

(1).^-^ AVERAGE YEARLY COPPER PRICES (PER LONG TON), 1948 TO 1962.

(%)-- - REVENUES FROM INCOME AND PROFITSTAXES, NCmTHERN RHODESIA, 1953 TO 1961.

Source: Chamber of Mines Yearbook, 1962, p. 25; D. S. Pear­son and W. L. Taylor, Breakup, p. 11.

The graph also shows revenues collected in Northern Rhodes ia from income and profits taxes. The effect of the slump years in copper prices on tax revenues is readily appar­ent being fully felt about one year later. When one considersthe dominant part that copper plays in the overall economy, one can realize the precarious position that Northern Rhodes ia

Sir Ronald Prain in statement to acconq>any Director's Report R. S. T. for the year ending 30 June 1962.

112

would find herself in if another, perhaps more protracted slump were to occur.

In 1959, a survey was conducted by the Northern Rho­desia Government to study the probable expansion of the cop­per industry. From an analysis of company plans, it was deter­mined that by 1970, the Copperbelt could produce about double the 1958 rate. Currently known mine reserves indicate supplies lasting from 20-35 years with further extensions disclosed each year by additional drilling and exploration.^ If copper demands follow a normal growth rate (average four per cent per year) , then the demand for primary copper might expandfrom three and a half million tons in 1959, to five million

2tons in 1970. Thus, between supply and demand, if Northern Rhodesia retains her present share of the world copper market, she should be able to count on her future growth through copper.

Two factors, however, may affect this long range 'educated guess'. First, the current costs of selling (as dis­tinguished from producing) a ton of Northern Rhodes ia ore on the world market are actually above the median cost of world

l"First Report of a Regional Survey of the copperbelt, 1959"(Duff Report). (Lusaka: The Government Printer, I960,) pp. 4-7.

2colin Duff, "Copper Areas of the copperbelt". Horizon. October 1960, p. 6.

113production. The distance the ore must travel to markets, roy­alty payments, and the cost of mining deep underground pits all serve to offset the relatively lower wage structure of the copperbelt mines. Secondly, copper can no longer assume its present usages in the face of substitute materials. At the present time, little substitution occurs ttdien copper prices remain below E250 per ton. But as the slump years of 1957-58 showed, substitution occurs rapidly above this price. Once markets are lost to substitute materials, they are sel­dom regained.

The mining companies can meet the predicted world de­mand with very little additional capital expense compared to past years. One new mine at chambishi will be opened in 1967, but nothing like the capital outlay of the past fifteen years will be required for the next ten. when coupled with improved organization and technology, it becomes obvious that the num­ber of persons drawing employment in the mines and neighboring townships per ton of ore marketed will be greatly reduced."The pub cannot expect to remain full of bricklayers once the building down the street has been completed.

* * * * * * * *

with the coming breakup of the Federation and future

ir Ronald Prain, address given to the Rhodes ia Eco­nomic Society, 11 October 1960.

2ouff Report, o£. cit.. p. 7.

114Independence of Northern Rhodesia, the question of Government and mining conçany attitudes vis-a-vis the economy of the ter­ritory become of major importance. From the company viewpoint this relationship has always been pretty straightforward; as a business enterprise they ask only to be allowed to market their product with maximum efficiency and security of invest­ment. with this goal in mind, the major companies have been active in financing certain development projects through loans and grants. To help reduce unenq)loyment, the companies have long supported agricultural development schemes---such as the 1956 interest-free loan by R.S.T. to the Northern Rhodesia Government to initiate the first intensive rural development program.^ The three major companies also provided about one- third of the loan for the construction of the Kariba Dam, and hold b300,000 in voting shares (against the Government's t250,000) in the newly constituted Industrial Development Corporation.

From the actions and policies of the companies and company managers it would appear that great faith has been placed in the future of the country. In addition to the loans and grants perhaps the best indicator of this confidence was the decision by R. S. T. in May 1962, that £7.5 million would

^F. Taylor Ostrander, in address to Council of Econom­ics , loc. cit.

1X5be Invested to develop the chambishi ore body.^ As there is generally a five year time lag between the decision to sink a new shaft and the actual opening, this represented a real move forward during a most uncertain political period.

Prom the viewpoint of the African nationalist, however,several dilemmas must be solved all of which have politicalas well as economic implications. Perhaps foremost is the question of repatriation of funds. Although nationalization of industry is not foreseen (see chapter VI), the United Na­tional Independence Party does plan "some control of dividends leaving the country..."2 xn 1961, Northern Rhodesia had a balance of payments deficit of £5.7 million. In contributing toward this deficit the mining sector alone paid out some £25.5 million to overseas shareholders or holding companies ---or almost one-fifth of visible exports (mostly copper)L Obviously, any significant reduction in this payment to foreign investors would greatly benefit the nation's balance of pay- ments. However, such a move requires utmost caution. Northern Rhodesia, as an underdeveloped country, has little internal capital for investment and must rely on outside sources. If control of repatriated funds becomes too harsh, obviously

1 Africa Report. July 1962, p. 11.^UNIP Policy Handbook, loc. cit.3pearson and Taylor, o£. cit., pp. 40 and 45.

116

additional funds will not come in. The answer seems to be (and which the companies are anticipating) one whereby investors are required to plow back a proportion of dividends as low interest loans to development corporations— most probably in agriculture and manufacturing.^ By this action the repatria­tion of funds hopefully would be delayed only until the devel­opment of the alternate sector permits loan repayment.

Other dilemmas exist in the future status of the infra­structure items of transport and power. From an ideological standpoint the nationalist Government of Northern Rhodesia would like to cut all ties with countries that do not support African nationalist aspirations. From a practical standpoint, however, such action would have most detrimental effects on the economy. Although the mines could again go back to drawing electric power from local sources and from Le Marinel in Ka­tanga (see chapter III) , these power sources would not be ade­quate for future expansion of the mines and the Northern Rho­desia economy as a whole. Northern Rhodes ia during the past fiscal year was the largest consumer of power in the Federation the copper mines accounting for almost ninety-seven per

2cent of the Northern Rhodes ia total. Even though the power control station is on the south bank of the Zambezi, it is

^Mr. HiR. Finn to writer, 7 August 1963. ^The Rhodes ia Herald, 6 July 1963.

117

unlikely that Southern Rhodesia would be allowed to control power distribution. Kariba was built by international funds and the major companies have too much interest in insuring continued power supply from Kariba to permit unilateral action by Southern Rhodesia in the form of economic blackmail.

In railway transport Northern Rhodesia is again eco­nomically dependent on maintaining friendly ties with neigh­boring white-dominated Governments, with no direct access to the sea and world markets, she must rely on rail routes to exit ports. By agreement with the Rhodes ia Railways, coupled with the Katanga crisis, the copper companies have used theports of Beira and Lourenco-Marques most extensively thuscarrying freight revenue through Southern Rhodesia. The only rail route for copper export through an African nationalist country would be the more involved route north to Port Franc- qui, down the Kasai River to Kwamouth, and then by rail again to Matadi.

The answer to the railway dilemma, at least for poli­tical maneuverings, seems to be in constructing a new line from Kapiri %oshi below the Copperbelt to Kilosa, Tanganyika, and then by the Tanganyika line to Dar-es-Salaam. In 1952, a study was made of the project and rejected on the grounds that the projected development of mining and industry in Central Africa was not sufficient to warrant the undertaking.^ The

% e Rhodesia Herald. 5 June 1963.

118

line would have to cross the swamp area of Lake Bangweulu inNorthern Rhodesia and then cross the Great Rift Valley inTanganyika. The project is complicated further in that theTanganyika line is on the meter gauge and the port of Dar-es-Salaam is presently not capable of handling the increasedtraffic. Nevertheless, upon the Instigation of Dr. Kaunda,another study was undertaken and results are expected in late1963 or early 1964. Preliminary estimates give the cost ofthe line at about h 40 million which is a considerable sumfor a country facing economic development problems in other

2sectors.* * * * * * *

In the long term mines are a wasting asset, so that it behooves Government to create alternate sectors which will supplement the contribution of mining to the Gross Domestic Product add eventually take its place. This requirement be­comes especially critical in a mono-economy such as exists in Northern Rhodesia. Copper can continue to provide a stimulus for general development, but only when this stimulus is ac­companied by projects that promise to improve the productivity and efficiency of the people in their normal environment will economic progress be realized in Northern Rhodesia.

^The Rhodesia Herald. 1 July 1963. ^The Rhodes ia Herald, 4 June 1963.

CHAPTER VIII

THE HUMAN SCENE

The key position held by the copper industry for the future of the Territory will make high demands on leaders of the industry. There will be technical problems con­cerned with increasing difficulties in extracting the metal...Then thmmm will also be the problem of disposing of the product.. .The most difficult problems, however, will be those of a human order.^

A few short years ago. Reverend colin Morris wrote ofthe paternalistic attitude of the European on the copperbelt--"...prepared to treat the African kindly, doctor them when sick, feed them when hungry, and even lavish upon them indulgent

2sentimentality. But then I did as much for my well-loved dog." He correctly assessed the African resentment of European un­willingness to consider the sioq)le equation that one African equals one European. Today, these feelings on both sides may still exist, but with political recognition of African as­pirations, the repercussions of past hatreds and resentmentsloom larger. Ttie "well-loved dog" could now bite the former master and in so doing bite the very hand that could feed him.

^L.H. Gann, op. cit.. p. 15.2Colin Morris, op. cit.. p. 34.

120

Caught in the middle the mining companies have had to tread lightly. The African will run the country, but European skills are still needed in quantity to run the mines. One senior official estimated that of the seven thousand or so Europeans employed in the mines, about fifteen hundred were absolutely indispensable and their loss would completely crip­ple the industry. Of the remaining Europeans many could be replaced by Africans after training periods varying from zero to eighteen months. Fears of the mining companies that African intransigence will precipitate a crippling exodus of Europeans was tactfully expressed by Mr. H. L. Oppenheimer, Chairman of the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa:

It is natural that the new Government in Northern Rhodesia should wish to see a greatly increased number of Africans serving in senior positions in the Industry..On the other hand, localisation policies must have regard to efficiency, and should not proceed at the expense of our European employees on whose experience and loyalty we have relied for many years and without whose skills 2 the efficient operation of the mines would be impossible.

The mining companies have continually demonstrated their willingness to support educational schemes to further African advancement. For example, Anglo and R.S.T. have both con­tributed generous funds to the Northern Rhodesia Educational

H. R. Finn to writer, 7 August 1963.2Mr. H.F. Oppenheimer, as quoted from the Central

African Examiner. July 1963, p. 26.

121

Trust— -a body set-up in 1960 to develop African educationprograms on the Copperbelt.^ In the same sense the companieshave been effective in reducing racial discriminations thatonly a few years ago looked so insurmountable. Company housingformerly for 'whites only' has been opened to African familiesbased on the principle that the house goes with the job. Bylaw all public facilities are open to all races and with theMarriage (Amendment) Ordinance of 1963, all restrictions have

2been removed from inter-racial marriages.The African nationalist leaders for the most part have

adopted a spirit of racial cooperation that should allay white fears of possible retaliation for past discriminations. Dr. Kaunda has been especially pronounced in this regard:

I would like to make Northern Rhodesia the Switzerland of Africa, a place ^ere people come to live because they have confidence in the leadership of the country and be happy because they have nothing to fear.*

Similarly, officials have tried to bolster the confidence ofthe mining industry:

We do know that the standards which have been set in industry are of major importance if industry is to con­tinue to function efficiently and to produce the return

^Colonial Reports 1961, op. cit.. p. 33.2The Rhodesia Herald, 26 July 1963.3Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, as quoted in The Rhodesia Herald,

6 August 1963.

122

to investors which they quite legitimately expect.Therefore, I do not think it reasonable that any person Should anticipate that an African Government would take any action to lower the standards on which industry so much depends.

Despite such harmony on the surface, there are never­theless rumblings of fdture conflict, especially at local party levels. The Zambia Pilot, a UNIP publication in Kitwe, warned Europeans "to remember that the Zambia Government will controleverything......and we could as well make it impossible forthem to escape and account for their evil deeds." One church organization planned 'kneel-in' demonstrations in segregated churches along the pattern set by 'sit-in* demonstrations in the United States.^

* * * * * * *

The European in Northern Rhodesia is a different breed from his white brothers in Southern Rhodesia. Except for the seven hundred-odd farmers along the Line of Rail, for the most part he did not come to sink roots— to buy land and stay. On the Copperbelt the companies own the houses. His incentive was cash, the so-called 'cash register idealism'.Nor has he been in the country for such a time that he 'knows

R.C. Kamanga, Minister of Mines and Labour, in address at the Leach Plant opening, 6 March 1963.

2Ihe Rhodesia Herald, 4 June 1963.^The Rhodesia Herald. 7 August 1963.

123no other home*. Most Copperbelt miners are living and working for the day when they pack-up their *nest-eggs* and, with their pension certificate in hand, return to South Africa, Britain, or possibly Southern Rhodesia. As Reverend Morris so aptly described the situation: "The Copperbelt has the in­definable aura of the boarding house about it.^

The fears of the European today rest on two assumptions As the African begins to exercise his political rights, it is assumed (or feared) that he will treat the European as the European has treated him. Secondly, concomitantly with this action, it is assumed that African advancement will doom Western standards or 'White Civilization*. Though he is ap­prehensive about the future, he still has much at stake in terms of hard, cold cash. Obviously, and with good reason, many fear that Africans will take their jobs. Others, whose skills are pretty-much secure from African advancement for some time to come, have other apprehensions. There is ap­prehension over the maintenance of law and order. The recent Commission of Inquiry into the Copperbelt disturbances dis­closed the hatred Africans have for Provincial police. The Commission reported on the "harshness and vindictiveness of some of the officers" and the "deplorable lack of courtesy

1Colin Morris, op. cit.. p. 13.

124and respect towards the public including Members of the Gov­ernment" . The European on the Copperbelt predicts a mass forced elimination (or resignation) of European policemen, replacement by untrained Africans, and a resulting plunge in law and order. Every time he looks across the border into Katanga his apprehensions receive a further jolt.

There are apprehensions over fiscal policies of an independent African Government. Though the economics of de­velopment of the country may forbid blanket wage increases for lower income African miners (See Chapter VII) , there may be attempts to reduce the gap between European and African wage scales by levying heavy taxes on Schedule "A" jobs.Also, Exchange Control is always a threat to a transitory pop­ulation. Recent statements by Dr. Kaunda threaten to revoke passports of the thousands of miners who have continued to carry South African, British, and often dual passports, un- less they file for Northern Rhodesian citizenship. As one miner stated: "I don't see how I could ever swear allegiance and fight for a Black Prime Minister."

The most tolerant class is the intellectual and pro­fessional. For the most part they meet and often socialize with the intellectual cream of Africans, whom they associate

^The Rhodesia Herald. 18 August 1963. 2The Rhodesia Herald. 13 June 1963.

125with on more equal terms. With a higher standard of income they can afford to send their children off for education, or to take themselves abroad for an occasional holiday to 'get away from it all'. Most of all they have the security of profession in knowing that it will be years, if ever, before the African can 'localise' their positions. And if things get too bad, they realize that their professions and skills are readily marketable elsewhere. It is not easy to see the future of the bricklayers and truck drivers, enjoying wages far higher than the average African and protected until in­dependence by his union. The general reaction of the European miner who falls into this social class was one of 'wait and see'. They like the country, certainly make good wages, live well and do not want to leave, but they have little else to hold thmn if the ' sweet-reasonableness ' of the African leaders does not last.

One of the first indications of a possible end to such 'sweet-reasonableness* was the recent decision by the coalition Government to integrate schools. The obvious im­balance in educational facilities between the African and European was one of the most heated sources of African bitter­ness against Federation. By the Federal Constitution of 1953, European education became a Federal responsibility while African education was left to the Territories. The

126obvious result was that all European children were afforded educational opportunities through Federal appropriations a- mounting to &108 per child per year , whereas African child­ren had to fight for education under limited Territorial ex­penditures of only about tlO per child per year.l There was an obvious pyramid in African education as is shown below in Table 6.

TABLE 6STATISTICS ON AFRICAN EDUCATION IN NORTHERN RHODESIA, 1962

Estimated School Age NumberPopulation Enrolled

Lower Primary(Years 1-4) 279,000 258,839

Upper Primary(Years 5-8) 242,000 69,931

Secondary(Years 9-12) 214,000 5,280

Source: Annual Summary African Education 1962 (Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1963), p. 7.

By the new legislation that goes into effect in 1964, two types of schools will be maintained: free schools and fee- paying schools. Either would be open to any race. In the fee- paying schools , essentially the present Federally-run European schools , tuition charges would be made at fc30 per year per child in primary schools and l45 per year per child in secon-

^The Northern News, 2 August 1963

127dary schools. Actually, the decision was a moderate choice between continuing segregated schools , which would be intol­erable to the African, and throwing all schools open to all races on a non-fee-paying basis. The latter course would be most disastrous in terms of facilities and teaching staffs.To continue education for all along the standard set in Euro­pean 8c|kools would involve recurrent costs of about L30 mil­lion apart from a vast capital expenditure.^ By charging fees, at least high standards will be available for those \dio can afford to pay if there is not a mass exodus of the 780 teach­ers in the present European schools.

The European opposition in the Legislative Council im­mediately attacked the legislation. They claimed that the pro­gram was impractical and was evolved without advice of educa­tion experts. Motions to amend the legislation were defeated by twenty-three votes to fifteen. The real effect of the leg­islation must be looked for in reactions from the teachers and from the lower income whites. Obviously, the fees will be a financial burden to some European families, especially those having several children in school. Said one father: "This has made me think seriously about my future here, i'll have to pay about tlOO a year and this plus integration, which may not be very pleasant at first, may force me back to Britain.

^Ibid.^The Northern News , 3 August 1963.

128

There are varying reports on teacher attitudes. Some feel that as many as ninety per cent of the teachers will leave.^ With a world shortage of teachers, they fall in the category of a marketable profession. With any mass teacher exodus school standards will certainly fall, which may pre­cipitate a further exodus of parents. But then, as one educa­tor in Salisbury facetiously said: "Replacements will always come from the Peace Corps or some other 'Give-away* organiza­tion in the S tates.

* * * * * * * *

Unfortunately for the purposes of this analysis there are no statistics on the net migration in Northern Rhodesia. The Central Statistical Office in Salisbury keeps figures only for the Federation as a whole, which are listed in Table 7 on page 129. From these figures it will be noted that net mi­gration out of the Federation during the first seven months of 1963 more than doubled the 1962 rate. However, it is felt that most of the emigration was from Southern Rhodesia.

In conversations with mining officials and people on the Copperbelt there does not seem to be any mass exodus. Surely many have left and there are apprehensions on the part

^The Rhodes ia Herald, 19 March 1963.2Personal conversation between writer and a Professor

of the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

129

of those remaining, but as yet this has not in any way caused any crippling of the industry. There are even occasional re­ports of miners who left a year or so ago and have now re­turned to stay having found that wages, weather, and livingconditions on the Copperbelt could not be matched. Apprehen­sions of Federal civil servants were greatly relieved on 20 August 1963, when the Northern Rhodesia Government offered to accept existing civil servants in their present positionand without salary loss upon assumption of Federal offices by

2the present Territorial Government. Again, Dr. Kaunda has given repeated assurances that the European is needed in the civil service and that the African Government will not jeop­ardize his position.

TABLE 7NET MIGRATION OF NON-AFRICANS

FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALANDNet Migration Net Migration (1963)

1955 11,400 January -1541956 18,500 February -4981957 14,900 March -1901958 5,400 April -5861959 5,292 May -8221960 2,413 June -7311961 -1,241 July -9511962 -1,883

Source: "Migration Report", Federation of Rhodes ia andNyasaland (Central Statistical Office) , July 1963.

The Sunday Mail, 30 June 1963.^The Rhodesia Herald, 21 August 1963

130Thus, the human scene on the surface appears optimistic.

The African leaders have made known that they will not harbor white supremists, but that anyone wishing to work for the good of Northern Rhodes ia in a 'color blind society* will have no fears. But for the majority of Europeans, it is still 'wait and see'.

CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Europeans who first brought freedom and progress to Africa were unable...to carry through to its con­clusion the work they had begun. The question that has to be answered in Africa today is whether the African nationalists are going to prove capable of completing the work of the colonialists.^

From the initial discovery of copper at the turn of the century, the development of the copper industry in Northern Rhodes ia did not really begin until the early 1930's. Prog­ress was slow until the demands of World War II gave a new boost to the use of copper. These demands carried over into the reconstruction period after the War, were given further impetus by the Korean War, and saw a culmination in the years 1955-1956, when stockpiling by the major powers forced copper prices to all-time highs.

The development of Northern Rhodes ia has been greatlyinfluenced by this development of the copper industry bothfor good and for bad. First came the railroad, pushed north by the British South Africa Company to provide an outlet to

H. F. Oppenheimer, The Conditions for Progress in Africa, (Johannesburg: Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, Ltd. , 1962) , p. 11.

132the sea for the newly located mineral deposits. Then came the large mining groups, which brought the technical and managerial skills that were necessary to develop the mines and market the ore The area had to be freed of malaria and made attractive enough in wages and living conditions to entice skilled work­ers from the more hospitable parts of the world. The result today, the Copperbelt, is a two thousand square mile indust­rial complex which, together with the development that sprang up along the connecting railroad, serves as the industrial, agricultural and administrative hub of the entire country.Here are concentrated the most developed infrastructure of the most dense and viable segment of the population. Relatively speaking, the remainder of the country lies untouched and asleep.

The mines acted as a magnet for Africans in the rural areas. At first they came for just long enough to earn tax money or money to buy a few luxuries such as blankets and bi­cycles. Then they returned to tribal areas. As time went by, however, the African's role began to change. He stayed a little longer and he brought his family. He began to look more to worker's organizations rather than to traditional tribal representatives. With the formation of the African Mine Work­ers * Union in 1948, he became more and more an organized, dis­ciplined force to fight for higher standards first for higher

133wage rates and later for job advancement and against any form of discrimination. By 1955, the African miner had cracked job categories reserved 'For Whites Only*.

The impact of the mining industry awakened a new poli­tical consciousness. African miners who returned to trihal areas carried with them new ideas and grievances. He was no longer the docile, obedient tribesman standing in awe of the white man and content sitting quietly in the sun outside his hut. In the trade union he had tasted the success that comes with organization, and he had gained experience. Thus, from labor goals to political goals it became only a matter of changing the objectives. It is significant that many of the political leaders today, especially among local cell leaders, first got their training in the mines and in labor battles. It is significant also that with those people and areas where there is most development, there is most tendency for social and political change. Sir Ronald L. Prain recognized this tdien he said that:

...the early decades of industrialization are always time of troubles, presenting the paradox that, though so­ciety is growing richer, it simultaneously grows angrier and most angry at the points where most development is taking place. 1

* * * * * * * *

As Northern Rhodes ia approaches independence under an

^Sir Ronald L. Prain, Address to the Royal African Society, London, 1 November 1962.

134African government, questions and apprehensions arise as to the roles of this government and the copper industry in the future of the country. Obviously, copper revenues will continue to provide the mainstay for the economy as long as there is no serious fluctuation in world demand. But in the long term cop­per is a wasting asset and Government must create something which will eventually take its place. The industry is a poor employer and threatens to employ even fewer people as mechan­ization increases. The answer for the future is that copper, where it provides the trigger for the economy, should play less and less of a role as agriculture and secondary industry are developed. With the past emphasis on copper, and with Fed­eration shunting most secondary industry to Southern Rhodesia, development in Northern Rhodesia has been lopsided at the ex­pense of the masses of Africans in the rural areas and in the low-paying urban service industries.

Though the doors are open to African advancement, there is still a large gap between skilled and unskilled wages which both Government and the industry are trying to close. To keep the industry competitive requires continuous improvement in mining and metallurgical technology. This demands substantial numbers of highly qualified men, backed up by a supervisory staff of personnel with at least secondary education. At pres­ent, the African does not have these qualifications. There is not one African metallurgical engineer in all of Northern

135Rhodesia. Obviously, for some time to come the industry must look mainly to Europeans for the technical qualifications it needs. Present African leadership seems to recognize this ne­cessity while at the same time working to close the gap by integrating schools and promoting localization wherever pos­sible. This is like walking a tightrope---go too slow and the crowd wants more action; go too fast and suffer a fall.

Having a stake in coming problems and apprehensions are many participants and spectators. Politically, the United National Independence Party under Dr. Kaunda seems to be car­rying the show. However, in the wings are dissident groups within the party itself and with rival African nationalist groups. The writer recalls the feeling of hatred expressed by Mr. Harry Nkumbula when he said: "Kaunda worked for me for six years and never once said Though a new Constitu­tion may reduce political representation of the 75,000 whites in the Copperbelt and along the Line of Rail, their wealth, concentration and experience will continue to represent a po­litical force and influence. However, as was discussed previ­ously, even this force is split into dissident factions. The African Mineworkers* Union has thus far resisted attempts to make it an industrial arm of a political party. It has re­mained essentially a trade union movement fighting for worker

Imt. Harry Nkumbula to writer in Lusaka, 29 July 1963.

136

benefits. But with the formation of the rival United TradeUnion Congress, which has closer political affiliations, therelations of the trade unions vis-a-vis Government could becritical (e. g. the fall of Government in Brazzaville inAugust 1963). Considering the stake of Government projects inrevenues from mining, it would seem that an African governmentwould be progressively intolerant of any prolonged work stop-

1page.The contribution of the mining companies to the devel­

opment of Northern Rhodesia has and will continue to play a most important part. It seems pretty apparent that an African government will begin to tighten controls over the substantial company profits that have been paid each year to overseas in­vestors. This drain, or a portion of it, will no doubt be directed to development projects within Northern Rhodesia it­self. As long as such projects offer possibilities of eventual return, the mining companies should not have too serious a grievance. But if such projects become an 'economic bathtub' with ever-diminishing returns, the copper companies will have much to lose.

Under present African leadership, nationalization of the mines does not appear likely. The mining companies have taken every opportunity to show African leaders that private

^William J. Barber, The Economy of British Central Af­rica (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 234.

137companies can run the industry more efficiently than anyone else. The mines could be a headache for any government to run. The Ministry of Mines would be continually lobbied and if it failed, would be open to all kinds of pressures. Nationali­zation, or too strict control on company profits and activi­ties, would threaten to deter other investment so essential for buildup of secondary industry. Thus, the new African Gov­ernment must walk another tightrope in its relations with out­side capital.

* * * * * * * * *

In research for this thesis , and in visits to the Cop­perbelt and to Northern Rhodesia, the writer could not help but be impressed with events and personalities. Perhaps no country in Africa has ever approached independence more richly endowed with the ingredients for success . African leaders seem moderate and resolved to create a truly multi-racial society. The mining companies, which were so largely responsible for past development in Northern Rhodesia, today are actively par­ticipating in developing other sectors of the economy in the interests of the country as a \diole. There are indeed some whites who will suffer as African advancement continues. Euro­pean ability and 'knowhow' is still appreciated, but the priv­ileged minority without real ability will have to accept a more realistic standard of living or move on.

Similarly the writer, living for six months in Southern

138Rhodesia, could not but be impressed observing the contrasts between Southern Rhodesia and her northern sister. As one businessman stated:" Southern Rhodes ia seems to be waiting for something to happen. Northern Rhodes ia knows it has happened and is determined to go ahead and keep things on a sane footing.'*^ As the economy in Southern Rhodes ia suffers fur­ther stagnation because of political uncertainty, the economy in Northern Rhodes ia seems to be on the verge of a boom. Trade missions are arriving; real estate prices are rising; new con­struction is every^ere.

There is no mass exodus of whites in Northern Rhodesia. Even on the Copperbelt where the population is more transitory and where their origins are closely tied to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, there is a willingness to 'give it a try'. And in Southern Rhodes ia a number of curious spectators are watching with interest to see what develops between the races in Northern Rhodesia. As one member of the Southern Rhodes ia Territorial Parliament said:

Northern Rhodesia appears to be the best hope now for the building of a multi-racial society. More and more people of all races are settling down to live with each other in mutual respect and understanding.^

And yet there is apprehension and a touch of cynicism.

^The Rhodes ia Herald, 8 Pfey 1963.^A. E. Abrahamson. The Rhodesia Herald , 18 August 1963,

139

Said another Southern Rhodesian:They (the African) will shortly have yet another chance

nearer home when European influence is removed from North­ern Rhodesia and the main tribes are at each other's throats with the defenceless European in the middle.^

* * * * * * * * *

Thus , in Northern Rhodesia there seems to be opportu­nity not only to develop as one of the most powerful states in Africa, but also to serve as a model for other states fur­ther south to emulate---or to criticize. The Copperbelt and the Line of Rail, representing the most significant elements of the country politically and economically, should serve as the foundation to develop the rest of the country. It should thus serve as a barometer to judge the future of all Northern Rhodesia, and to a limited extent the future of neighboring states in southern and central Africa.

As of late 1963, the forecast on the barometer looks encouraging. Certainly the sky is not cloudless but neitheris it stormy. As with any forecast it hinges on many *ifs*--if the African leadership remains moderate...; if the price of copper holds...; if the Government is successful in dis­tributing the wealth to the 'wings of the butterfly'...; if the skills of the European are not driven away...; if the cop­per companies and other potential interests continue to find

The Rhodesia Herald, 29 May 1962. (Writer's parentheses)

140opportunity for investment...; if the European does not lose patience or express intolerance with African leadership... ; if the African does not lose patience or tolerance with the European. The darkening of any one of these clouds could spread to all the others like a chain reaction or falling dominoes.

And watching the barometer from the south:The African has, as we see it, one last chance to use

his initiative beneficially, and that is in Northern Rho­desia. There the African now has much, and will soon have all, political power...on his respect for those individuals who do not think exactly as he does will greatly depend the future attitude of Europeans in Southern Rhodesia to­wards the bulk of this country's population.^

Editorial, The Rhodesia Herald, 7 August 1963.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. BOOKS

Barber, William J. The Economy of British Central Africa. London: Oxford University Press, 1961.

Bradley, Kenneth. Copper Venture. London: Max Parrish, 1952.Brelsford, W. V. (Editor). Handbook to the Federation of Rho­

des ia and Nyasaland. London: Cassell and Company, 1960.Epstein, A. L. Politics in an Urban African Community. Man­

chester: Manchester University Press, 1958.Franck, Thomas M. Race and Nationalism. New York City: Ford-

ham University Press, 1960.Gann, L. H. The Birth of a Plural Society. Manchester; The

University Press, 1958.Gray, Richard. The Two Nations. London: Oxford University

Press, 1960.Green, L. P. and Fair, T. J. D. Development in Africa. Johan­

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Press, 1957.Hatch, John. Africa Today and Tomorrow. New York: Praeger ,1962.Leys, 0. and Pratt, C. (Editors). A New Deal in Central Africa.

New York: Praeger, 1961.Mason, Philip. Year of Decision. London: Oxford University

Press, 1960.Morris, Colin. The Hour after Midnight. London: Longmans,

Green, and Company, Ltd., 1961.Pearson, D. S. and Taylor, W. L. Breakup. Salisbury: The

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Thompson, C. H. and Woodruff, H. W. Economie Development in Rhodesia and Nvasaland. London: Oxford University Press,im:------------

Woddis, Jack. Africa; The Lion Awakes. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1961.

Wood, Anthony St. John. Northern Rhodesia: The Human Back­ground . London: The Pall Mall Press, 1961.

B. PUBLICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

Annual Report. Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa,Ltd., 1962 .

Annual Report. Rhodesian Selection Trust, Ltd., 30 June 1962.Annual Report. Department of Labor, Northern Rhodesia, 1962.

Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1963.Chamber of Mines Yearbook 1961. Kitwe: Northern Rhodesia, 1962.Chamber of Mines Yearbook 1962. Kitwe: Northern Rhodesia, 1963.Colonial Report 1954. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1955.Colonial Report 1961. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1962.Economic Report 1963. Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Salisbury: Ministry of Economic Affairs , 1963."First Report of a Regional Survey of the Copperbelt", (Duff

Report) . Lusaka; The Government Printer, 1960."Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Dis­

turbances in the Copperbelt". Northern Rhodesia, 1935."Report of the Commission in Inquiry Appointed to Inquire into

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"Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Unrest in the Mining Industry in Northern Rhodesia in Recent Months "(The Branigan Report). Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1956.

143

"Report of the Committee Appointed to Inquire into the Mining Industry in Northern Rhodesia"(The Morison Report). Lu­saka: The Government Printer, 1963.

Thinking Ahead. An Outline of the Northern Rhodesia Govern- ment's braft Development Plan for the Four Year PeriodI July 1961 to 30 June 1965. Lusaka: The Government Prin­ter, 1962.

Economic Developments in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nvasa- land. Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.C. ESSAYS, SPEECHES, PAMPHLETS, AND PUBLICATIONS

OF LEARNED SOCIETIESGann, L. H. "The Northern Rhodesia Copper Industry and the

World of Copper: 1923-1952". Rhodes-Livingstone Journal Nr. 18. Manchester University Press, 1955.

Kamanga, R. C. Northern Rhodesia Minister of Mines and Labour. Address at Leach Plant opening, 6 March 1963.

"Memorandum Submitted on Behalf of the United Church of Cen­tral Africa in Rhodes ia to the Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances on the Copperbelt". Undated.

Mitchell, J. Clyde. "African Urbanization in Ndola and Luan- shya". Lusaka: Rhodes-Livings tone Communie ation Nr. 6.1954.

Oppenheimer, H. F. The Conditions of Progress in Africa. Jo­hannesburg: Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa,Ltd., 1962.

Ostrander, F. Taylor. Address to Council of Economics at the 92d Annual Meeting of the American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical and petroleum Engineers, Dallas, Texas,27 February 1963.

Prain, Sir Ronald L. Address to the Rhodesian Economic Society,II October 1960.

_______. Address at Henderson Research Station, 26 May 1961. . Statement accompanying Director's Report and Accounts,Rhodes ian Selection Trust, 30 June 1962. • Address to The Royal African Society, London, 1 Nov 62.

144

Randall, Clarence E. Address before the African Affairs Soci­ety of America, 3 April 1963.

UNIP Policy. Lusaka: The United National Independence Party.

D. PERIODICALS

Africa 63. Issues of 15 March 1963 and 31 May 1963.Baldwin, Robert E. "Wage Policy in a Dualistic Society The

Case of Northern Rhodesia". RACE (Journal of the Institute of Race Relations) . Vol. IV. , Nr. 1, November 1962.

Childs, T. W. "U. S. Capital on the Copperbelt". Africa. Spe­cial Report. February 1958.

Central African Examiner. Issues of: July 19^1; September 1961; October l^èl; Deceo^er 1961; February 1963; and MSy 1963.

Duff, Colin. "Copper Areas of the Copperbelt". Horizon. Octo­ber 1960.

Irvine, Keith. "The Dissolving Federation". Current History. December 1962.

Lomas, P. K. "African Trade Unionism on the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia". South African Journal of Economics.June 1958.

"Ndola— Gateway to the Copperbelt". Rhodes ian Recorder. March 1962.

Oppenheimer, H. F. Central African Examiner. July 1963. P. 26.Rotberg, Robert I. "Inconclusive Election in Northern Rhodesia",

Africa Report. December 1962."Spotlight on Northern and Southern Rhodesia". Africa Report,

April 1962.

E. NEWSPAPERS

Lusaka: The Northern News: 3 January 1963; 3 July 1963; 1, 2and 3 August 1963.

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Ndola, Northern Rhodesia: Central African Mall: 22 June 1963.Salisbury: Central African Post: 21 January 1963.Salisbury: The Rhodes la Herald; 19 and 21 March 1963; 29 and

30 April 1963;; 1, 3, 7, 8, 9, 22, 23, 28, and 29 May 1963; 1, 4, 5, 11, 13 and 18 June 1963; 1, 3, 6, 8, 11, 18, 19,25 and 26 July 1963; 6, 7, 12, 18 and 21 August 1963.

Salisbury: The Sunday Mall: 30 June 1963.Washington, D. C. : The Washington Post: 13 December 1963;

3 January 1963.