451

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy A ContingencyApproach to the Convergence of the Wars on Drugs andAgainst Terrorism

Chris J DolanUniversity of Central Florida

Abstract

In recent years terrorist organizations have become increasingly dependent on drug trafficking as oneof several primary sources of revenue to fund terrorist activities In response the United Statesrsquo secu-rity and intelligence efforts against narco-terrorism have increasingly merged into one unified policyapproach Moreover the convergence of United States policy wars against terrorism and illicit drugshave produced complex and dynamic contingency factors As a result a relatively coherent nexus nowexists between the United Statesrsquo antinarcotics and antiterrorist policies The objective of this article isto explain and assess the contingency factors and implications resulting from this convergence and toprovide policy scholars with an analytical perspective into the implications of the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy It is believed that this article is significant to both policy practitioners and policy schol-ars concerned with the domestic impact of the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy

Prevailing research suggests that theories of policy convergence have allowedpolicy studies scholars and analysts to explain the dynamic contingency factors thataccount for similarities and parallels across policies as they evolve over time(Bennett 1991 Haas amp Haas 1995 Rose 1991 Thomas 1980) Given the rise ofdrug-related terrorist attacks against the United States since the late 1970s andearly 1980s increasing political pressures have produced a relative nexus betweenantinarcotics and antiterrorist policies Indeed the relationship between control-ling the trafficking of illegal narcotics and preventing additional terrorist attacksreflects an increasing tendency among United States policymakers to promote theintegration of these issue areas into one unified policy This article hopes to providetentative answers to the following question What are the contingency factors andimplications resulting from the convergence The overall goal of this study is tosupply a conceptual vantage point into the substantive workings and implicationsof the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy variance and program design

In recent years United States policymakers have targeted narco-terrorist groupsin Colombia and Afghanistan in order to reduce Americarsquos demand for cocaine andheroin and to eliminate coco and opium production and distribution the proceedsof which the United States believes support terrorist attacks Therefore UnitedStates policy approaches to narco-terrorist activities in both Colombia andAfghanistan will be major case studies in this article The empirical observationsand findings presented here are significant to policy scholars concerned withrecently emerging consequences ensuing from the convergence of antinarcotics andantiterrorism policies

Literature Review

While scholarly studies of drug issues and terrorism are bountiful there has beena paucity of empirical research and theory on the specific subject of the United

Review of Policy Research Volume 22 Number 4 (2005)copy 2005 by The Policy Studies Organization All rights reserved

Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in the policy studies literature Institutional researchstresses the importance of organizations in the United Statesrsquo narco-terror war suchas the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Drug Enforcement Administra-tion (DEA) William LeoGrandersquos study (1998) of the CIArsquos role in coordinatingpolicy in Central America noted considerable linkages between the United States-backed Contra rebels and CIA operatives in facilitating the illegal drug trade Similarly others critical of United States policy in Central America have also givenrelatively little attention to the ContrandashCIA drug matter In ldquoThe Dual Myths oflsquoNarco-Terrorismrsquo rdquo Miller and Damask (1996 pp 114ndash131) study the problemsthat occur when government agencies most notably the DEA and the Office ofNational Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) are influenced by limited evidence inac-curate perceptions and political myths and stereotypes In some policy and acad-emic circles the interest in arguing that terrorists and drug traffickers were inalliance led to a lack of understanding and bad policy Linkages between terroristsand narcotics traffickers are real but are not part of a simplistic global conspiracyto topple Western institutions they are motivated by convenience and profit

In Cocaine Politics Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall (1998) make fourobservations concerning the roles of the CIA in promoting so-called narco-wars inLatin America First that the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George Bushultimately considered Sandinista Nicaragua more dangerous to United Statesrsquo secu-rity than narcotics Second Scott and Marshall contend that the Reagan and Bushadministrations were willing to use the so-called ldquoWar on Drugsrdquo as a front for theiranti-Sandinista aims in Central America even when it meant weakening drugcontrol efforts Third Scott and Marshall argue that the prosecutions of drug traf-fickers under the Reagan and Bush administrations actually complemented theirtoleration of drug commerce in the name of anti-Communism Fourth Scott andMarshall argue that the United States will have to dismantle the national securitystate if it is to cope effectively with drug issues Scott and Marshall seem content tosee ContrandashCIA drug linkages in Central America as simply business as usual some-thing that the CIA has always routinely done Many of their more hazy connec-tions of the Central American conflict to anti-Castro Cubans Colombian cartelsand Israeli agents are transformed from speculation into evidence (Scott amp Marshall 1998)

Critical populists assume a nonsystemic cultural approach that emphasizes socialforces rather than governmental policy In Funding Evil Rachel Ehrenfeld (2004)contends that Americarsquos image of terrorism is all wrong Rather than shadowy cellsof young religious martyrs the true face of terror she says is an internationalnetwork of corrupt state leaders wealthy contributors and drug and crime king-pins Chepesiuk (1999) claims that without money especially laundered UnitedStates dollars there would be no terror and this lively well-documented primerreveals the sources the amounts and the armed terror organizations they supportBoth studies focus on the irony of the Westrsquos appetite for drugs which terrorgroups exploit for funding arms and recruiting those who would undermine adegenerate Western society (Chepesiuk 1999 Ehrenfeld 2004)

Ehrenfeld presents a similar argument in Narco Terrorism (1992) which contendsthat Soviet client states and various terrorist organizations are the worldrsquos domi-nant narco-terrorists using the ill-gotten gains of drug trafficking to undermine

452 Chris J Dolan

democracies Judging by the evidence she assembles Castro has used narcoticsprofits to arm Colombian and Nicaraguan guerrillas Bulgaria peddles heroin tosupply weapons to the PLO drugs Lebanonrsquos ldquosingle most important exportrdquo fuelthat countryrsquos warring factions and Peru the worldrsquos leading producer of cocamay soon be subverted from within by drug pushers Syria the Sandinistas Boliviaand the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) are among the leading narco-terrorists identified in a stunning expose Ehrenfeld looks at the conflict betweenJamaican drug gangs and the white Mafia in the United States Rebuking both theAmerican left and right for failing to deal adequately with the drug epidemic sheraises important issues that many liberals and conservatives prefer to ignore(Ehrenfeld 1992)

Analytical Framework

Policy contingency is interpreted as the implications and consequences of policyvariance and program design (Ryan 2001 Segal amp Weisbrod 2002) Contingencyfactors resulting from the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy are theoreticallyfar-reaching and significant The working theoretical model presented here sug-gests an array of relevant policy characteristicsmdashspecifically policy complexity orga-nizational differentiation decision points compression of the issues internal andexternal coupling homogeneity resonance and technology and visibilitymdashwillexert a relative influence on both structural attributes and degrees of policy dis-cretion (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003) Within this relationship structural attributesinfluence policy discretion and the political policy resultant Both structural attrib-utes and policy discretion produce unintended consequences which affect narco-terrorism policy (see figure 1 below)

Policy contingency suggests that it is possible to observe the degree to whichpolicy characteristics exist following the convergence of policies in the policymak-ing process as evidence by the extent of policy discretion and unintended conse-quences at play in the policy outcomes As illustrated in the theoretical model thesecharacteristics include complexity organizational differentiation decision points

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 453

Policy Characteristics

sum Complexity sum Org Differentiation sum Decision Points sum Compression of Issues sum DomesticIntl Coupling sum Homogeneity sum Resonance sum Technology amp Visibility

Policy Discretion

Structural Attributes

Unintended Consequences

Political Policy Resultant

Figure 1 Model of Policy Contingency

compression of issues internal and external coupling homogeneity resonanceand technology and visibility (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003)

According to Bouchard and Carroll policy characteristics resulting from theprocess of policy convergence ldquoimpact policy discretion the structural attributes ofpolicies and programs and the number of unintended consequencesrdquo (2003 p 1)Research has shown that scholars are able to envisage to some degree patterns ofdiscretion and draw tentative conclusions as to the extent of the unintended con-sequences and structural attributes that impact policy outcomes (Dexter 1981Desveaux Lindquist amp Toner 1994 Harmon amp Myer 1986) This influences theability of policymakers from a number of different agencies and departments tomanage policy direction (Bouchard amp Carroll 2002)

Since this article applies the theoretical model to the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy each characteristic of the policy is of course expected to varyComplexity involves the extent of policymaker knowledge and expertise and howambiguous the unified policy is to manage (Blau amp Scott 1962 Meitsner 1976)Narco-terrorism is a highly complex issue since it is at the intersection of drugsand violence and is a newly emergent policy area Historically the DEA used a sim-plistic definition of narco-terrorism in terms of Pablo Escobar the Colombiancocaine trafficker who used terrorist tactics against noncombatants to further hispolitical agenda within his country to protect the illegal drug trade (Smith 1992)Since the fall of Escobar United States policymakers find themselves faced withinternational terrorist groups that participate in drug trafficking to further theirpolitical agendas (Chepesiuk 1999) Narco-terrorists are drug traffickers whoemploy terror tactics against civilians police and military personnel and use drugmoney profits to advance their goals (Mabry 1989) Therefore a narco-terroristorganization is an organization that engages in drug trafficking to advance politi-cally motivated violence against combatant and noncombatant targets (DEA Intelligence Division 2002)

Organizational differentiation emphasizes the array of levels or layers in the rel-evant bureaucratic organizations associated with the implementation of the policyOn the one hand bureaucratic politics informs us that government organizationsare independent entities that behave according to certain established standardoperating procedures (Halperin 1974) This prevails when policymakers are unin-volved or unable to dominate the policymaking process due to the presence ofentrenched organizational interests (Allison 1971 Allison amp Halperin 1972Rosati 1981) On the other hand principalndashagent theory suggests that policy-makers can influence organizational behavior by imposing sanctions for negativebehavior and issuing rewards for positive behavior (Moe 1984 1993)

In contrast to such high-profile policy domains as education and criminal justiceorganizational responsibility for narco-terrorism policy is spread over an array ofdomestic and foreign policy-oriented agencies with the White House-based Officeof National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and the National Security Council (NSC)formally designated as the lead coordinating organizations of the narco-terrorismpolicy bureaucracy (Kraska 1993) Currently the ONDCP and NSC are responsi-ble for coordinating the following departments and agencies Departments ofHealth and Human Services (Centers for Disease Control and National Institutesof Health) Justice (Drug Enforcement Administration the Federal Bureau of

454 Chris J Dolan

Investigation United States Marshals United States Attorneys and the Bureau ofPrisons) Treasury (United States Secret Service and the Bureau of AlcoholTobacco and Firearms) Homeland Security (Bureau of Immigration UnitedStates Border Patrol and United States Customs) Education Labor VeteransAffairs Defense and State

Decision points deal mainly with the number of policymakers involved in thepolicymaking processes and resources devoted to the policy area Since most poli-cies involve a considerable number of individuals in and out of government checksand balances or decision points are built into the decision-making process as a wayof managing the policy (Allison 1971 George 1980 Rosati 1981) At presentthere are more than 50 United States agencies with a stake in both drug controland antiterrorism efforts In fiscal year (FY) 2005 President George W Bush allo-cated a $307 billion antidrug spending package for FY 2005 to fund these agen-cies (National Drug Control Strategy 2004) Between FY 1991 and FY 2000 morethan $140 billion was spent to curtail drug abuse (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2000Drug Abuse Policy Office 1982 National Drug Control Strategy 2000)

Compression of the issues is a process by which the length of time between policyactions and their outcomes can be interpreted as responding to the potential devel-opment or emergence of a future policy problem that has yet to surface (Sabatier1988) Compression also has a relative impact on policy discretion since highlycompressed policies are difficult to control and policy performance is difficult toexamine Combating narco-terrorism requires a global network of law enforce-ment military and intelligence officials tackling the issue

Coupling involves interaction within and between policies Internal couplingrefers to the degree of variation impacting the implementation of the policy andhigher levels of dissimilarity require considerably higher levels of flexibility amongpolicymakers in order to adapt to the interactive changes (Baldwin 1991) Exter-nal coupling or ldquohorizontalityrdquo deals with the relationship between the policy andother related policy areas (Sproule-Jones 2000)

Several measures have been taken over the years that involve coupling Accord-ing to the United States Department of State there are 12 major multilateral conventions and protocols on combating terrorism (DEA Intelligence Division2002) International efforts to combat narco-terrorism have focused on assetseizure and control of all funding sources used by terrorist organizations On September 28 2001 the United Nations (UN) Security Council unanimouslyadopted an antiterrorism resolution that called for the suppression of terroristgroup financing and improved international cooperation against terrorists UNSecurity Council Resolution 1373 required all states to prevent and abolish thefinancing of terrorism and to criminalize the willful collection and distribution offunds for such acts

Homogeneity suggests that while there is always a degree of variation within thepolicy the various elements associated within it and its goals are similar to a certainextent (Carroll amp Garkut 1996) Homogeneity tends to reduce policy discretion toa limited extent and decreases unintended consequences as policy formulators aremore able to forecast the behavior of policy enforcers (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003)History has shown that narco-terrorist organizations fall into different categoriesOne includes politically motivated groups that use drug profits to support their

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 455

terrorist activities activities that will confer legitimacy upon them within the stateSuch groups assume measures to establish a legal political party whereby their polit-ical goals are realized through nonviolent legal means An example of a group inthis category is the Kurdistan Workerrsquos Party (PKK [Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan])Another category consists of groups that pursue ideological goals while participat-ing in select aspects of the drug trade for example the Revolutionary ArmedForces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC)Other extremist groups are suspected of drug involvement such as Hezbollah andthe Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS [Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya])Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path) in Peru and the Basque Fatherland andLiberty (ETA [Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna]) in Spain (Barnard 2003)

Resonance deals with the extent to which the most important issues associatedwith unified policy are embraced internalized and deemed critical by citizensIllegal drug production trafficking and consumption are activities not highly tol-erated by the general public Although the United States government has chosento merge its war on terrorism with its decades-long war on illicit drugs it remainsto be seen as to whether or not such efforts appear to have resonated throughoutthe citizenry However high levels of resonance tend to produce policies withambiguous vague and symbolic goals and a high degree of discretion and needfor adjustment (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003) The position of the Bush administra-tion is that the growing link between terrorists and the drug trade contributes toan increased threat to America (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003) Resonance is an impor-tant variable given that Bushrsquos ONDCP is promoting a new reason to continue thispublic effort since it is convinced that the illegal drug trade is linked to the supportof terror groups across the globe

Technology involves the ordering of policy functions The Counterdrug Tech-nology Assessment Center (CTAC) is the central counterdrug enforcement researchand development (RampD) organization of the United States Government that pro-motes advanced technologies related to the enforcement of narco-terrorism policyCTAC was established within the Office of National Drug Control Policy and hasbeen coordinating the counterdrug RampD program for the federal governmentsince 1992 In 1993 CTAC was directed to include drug abuse rehabilitation andaddiction research in the program in addition to law enforcement-related tech-nology CTAC prepares periodic reports to update the national counterdrug RampDprogram This report is the fourth Counterdrug RampD Blueprint Update and provides the status of the national counterdrug RampD program descriptions oftechnology development and infrastructure support projects and plans for future counterdrug RampD initiatives

Visibility deals mainly with whether or not the public is able to witness the oper-ation of policy functions Where visibility involves public attention and awarenessresonance deals with the degree of importance placed on the policy and its rela-tionship with societyrsquos core values (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003) Although violentacts are visible in the mass media the financing associated with drug productionand trafficking may not be visible to the public Since 911 the ONDCP haslaunched media campaigns to educate the public about the link between the illegaldrug trade and terrorism The multipronged attempt is designed to emphasizehow the sales of illicit drugs finance acts of terror The public initiative combines a

456 Chris J Dolan

range of activitiesmdashprint and broadcast advertising in-school programming lessonplans for teachers online information community and news media outreachmdashtoraise awareness about the link between drugs and terror and engage youth andinfluential adults in drug prevention

Whiteout Colombia

In 2000 the Clinton administration moved through Congress a narco-terror aidbill for Colombia At the time President Clinton signed package into law Colombiawas placed at the top of Americarsquos list of international priorities (Pardo 2000)ONDCP Director General Barry McCaffrey predicted that the initial $13 billionmeasure termed ldquoPlan Colombiardquomdash$860 million of it for Colombia three-quarters of that for Colombiarsquos police and militarymdashwould ldquostrengthen democracythe rule of law economic stability and human rights in Colombiardquo (McCaffery2000) In 2004 Plan Colombia ballooned to a $75 billion spending package(United States Department of State 2003) The Colombian governmentrsquos attemptsto negotiate peace with opposition guerrilla groups came to an end in May 2002when Aacutelvaro Uribe was elected president However under his administration illicitdrug production exploded and human rights abuses soared

Policy Discretion

The United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy toward Colombia is marked by two con-tradictory trends While Colombia has become a lower priority the size andpurpose of United States military aid has rapidly expanded Overall military andpolice aid amounts are increasing with new Colombian units getting support tooperate in new parts of the country In effect the United States has broadened itspurpose for providing Colombia with lethal assistancemdashfor years limited to coun-ternarcoticsmdashto include ldquocounterterrorismrdquo The change allows United States-aided units to assume offensive operations against the Revolutionary Armed Forcesof Colombia (FARC) the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the paramilitaryUnited Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) United States Special Forces havealso been deployed to Colombia to guard oil pipelines and eliminate insurgents(Dudley 2000 Jenkins 2001)

When it was initiated Plan Colombia placed much of its attention on Colom-biarsquos security forces largely overlooking the complicated deep-rooted origins of itsinternal conflicts (Pardo 2000) However in a country with far-reaching inequali-ties and abusive and corrupt police Plan Colombia was set to produce grave con-sequences (Sweig 2002 Weymouth 2000 p 45) According to a joint letter issuedin June 2002 by several Colombian government agencies Plan Colombia ldquowill leadto the escalation of the social and armed conflict fail to solve the drug-traffickingproblem endanger the peace process attack indigenous populationsrsquo culture andlife styles seriously hamper the Amazon eco-system worsen the humanitarian andhuman rights crisis promote forced displacement and further worsen the socialand political crisisrdquo (Colombia Program 2000) Overlooking the warnings between1999 and 2002 the United States gave Colombia $204 billion with 83 percentgoing to Colombiarsquos military and police This pattern continued under the Bush

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 457

administration which allocated $654 million in 2003 for Colombiarsquos security forces(Colombia Program 2004)

The United States also provided advanced weaponry to the Colombian militaryincluding helicopters attack aircraft patrol boats communications and intelli-gence-gathering equipment uniforms and small arms and the training of morethan 15000 Colombian military and police Hundreds of United States troops andprivate contractors work in Colombia as trainers intelligence-gatherers spraypilots and mechanics among other duties Since 1996 United States pilots havesprayed herbicides over more than a million acres of Colombian territory Duringthe 1990s Colombiarsquos National Police received nearly all lethal United States aid(Pardo 2000) The Clinton administration shifted the bulk of aid to the military in1999 and 2000 arguing that the guerrillasrsquo and paramilitariesrsquo entry into the drugbusiness made many counternarcotics missions too dangerous for the police toperform alone (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

Though the Colombian armed forces get most of the aid the United Statesrsquo com-mitment to the counternarcotics division (DIRAN [Directorate of Anti-Narcotics])of the Colombian National Police Force (Policiacutea Nacional Direccioacuten Antinarcoacuteticos)remains quite large The unit performs most drug interdiction and works with theDEA to arrest drug traffickers In rural zones where peasants grow illegal drugcrops United States-made DIRAN helicopters protect pilots who spray herbicidesover fields where illegal drug crops are grown risking ground fire from insurgentgroups (United States Senate 2002)

Over the past few years the United States has provided the DIRAN Air Servicewith Blackhawk and Huey Helicopters C-26B reconnaissance planes and con-struction upgrades to several of its bases throughout Colombia The Drug Enforce-ment Administration has created and completely funds four Sensitive Investigativeunits (SIUs) within the Colombian National Police elite units that carry out riskymissions against drug traffickers A worldwide antiterror appropriation thatbecame law in August 2002 adds more funding $4 million to create police unitsto protect construction of reinforced police stations in guerrilla-controlled areasand $25 million for antikidnapping units (shared with the Colombian Army) TheDIRAN came under a cloud of scandal in 2002 when investigators revealed thatseveral high-ranking officers had stolen at least $2 million in United States aidintended for administrative expenses (Bureau of International Narcotics and LawEnforcement Affairs [BINLEA] 2002a)

Joint ColombianndashUnited States military efforts are primarily concentrated in thesouthern provinces of Caquetaacute and Putumayo seen by many as the most produc-tive cocaine regions The regions account for roughly 33 of all coca (used to makecocaine) grown in Colombia and is controlled by FARC (Dudley 2000) The armyrsquosoriginal mission was to attack drug-processing labs to apprehend traffickers andto clear armed groups from areas of drug-crop cultivation (or at least to clear themlong enough for the United Statesrsquo herbicide spray planes to pass through) InAugust 2002 the Counter-Narcotics Brigade began using its equipment and train-ing for counterterrorism as well as for antidrug missions as a result some of thebrigadersquos operations may resemble the United States-led counter-insurgency effortsduring the 1980s in Central America (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

458 Chris J Dolan

Structural Attributes

Colombiarsquos security forces have a close institutional relationship with several UnitedStates agencies especially the National Security Agency (NSA) the Federal Bureauof Investigation (FBI) the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the StateDepartmentrsquos Bureau for International Narcotics (BIN) The Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA) offers their Colombian counterparts equipment and training toimprove their own ability to collect and analyze intelligence The United States alsoshares intelligence on tactical information concerning insurgent groupsrsquo move-ments and locations Furthermore the United States Army trains thousands ofColombian security personnel counterparts in topics ranging from marksmanshipto helicopter repair to human rights

Yet the United Statesrsquo approach to Colombia appears to neglect even these basictenets of counterinsurgency Massive aerial herbicide conducted by the Colombianand United States air forces and the DEA is fueling antigovernment sentiment ina guerrilla-controlled area (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003) Any social or economic effortshave been overshadowed particularly in most Colombiansrsquo perceptions It has alsosuffered from very serious implementation problems Some aid programs partic-ularly emergency humanitarian assistance appear to be reaching target popula-tionsmdashthough as United States Ambassador to Colombia Anne Patterson admitsthey ldquorepresent a drop in the bucket in relation to the real needs of Colombiarsquosdisplaced personsrdquo (qtd in Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

The success of nonmilitary aid programs has been mixed The effort to helpcoca-growing peasants adopt legal alternatives took the form of a series of ldquosocialpactsrdquo in which signers would receive basic assistance followed by technical andinfrastructure support in exchange for eradicating all their coca within twelvemonths after first receipt of aid By July 2001 37000 families in Putumayomdashjustunder half of the departmentrsquos populationmdashhad signed ldquopactsrdquo and waited forassistance that failed to arrive Alternative development money was delayed by theDEA forced to pass through several agencies before reaching the peasants BINthe United States Agency for International Development (USAID) the Colombiangovernmentrsquos Plan Colombia implementing agency the Colombian governmentrsquosalternative-development agency PLANTE and five Colombian nonprofit orga-nizations with no previous ties to Putumayo contracted to deliver the assistance(Dudley 2000)

Unintended Consequences

Since police and fumigation efforts were not accompanied by a credible alternativedevelopment effort in Putumayo thousands of peasants who had their crops erad-icated suddenly found themselves with little or no opportunities (Miller 2001)Putumayo community and church leaders interviewed by the Council of Interna-tional Policy in November 2002 hinted at a humanitarian disaster as sprayingdamaged food crops had contributed to widespread starvation in FARC-controlledrural areas (Dudley 2000) Those who lacked other economic opportunities joinedFARC and other terror groups by the hundreds (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 459

Furthermore the Bush White House does not appear to be progressing towardits goal of a 50 reduction in Colombian coca-growing by 2005 Coca is difficultto estimate According to CIA figures made public in March 2002 there is a pro-jected increase in the percentage of cocoa production over the next decade Theoverall amount of coca grown in Colombia is roughly 150000 hectares or threetimes as much as it was when the United States began large-scale spraying in 1996(Miller 2001) Since satellite measurements occur immediately following theJulyndashOctober fumigation campaign in Putumayo and may not take into accountreplanting and new planting elsewhere the 2002 statistics may show a greaterdecrease than probably exists (Van Dongen 2003) That year only four (perhapsfive) of Colombiarsquos thirty-two departments had 1000 or more hectares of coca In2001 a survey report issued by the UN found significant increases in coca pro-duction in the thirteen largest provinces in Colombia (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

While fumigation has proven able to reduce coca-growing in limited areasgrowers have been far more agile in eluding United States planes (Pardo 2000)New crops keep appearing in previously untouched parts of Colombiarsquos vast savan-nahs jungles and even coffee-growing zones Since at least the late 1980s totalcoca cultivation in South Americamdashperhaps the most meaningful estimate of thedrugrsquos availabilitymdashhas remained remarkably steady at roughly 200000 hectaresand the price of cocaine sold on United States streets remains steady

Clinton and Bush administration officials repeatedly argued that military train-ing and engagement would ease Colombiarsquos human rights crisis and encourage thearmed forces to end collaboration with paramilitary death squads Sadly the humanrights situation shows no signs of improvement The Consultancy for HumanRights and Displacement (CODHES) a widely cited Colombian nongovernmentalorganization estimated that violence forced 353120 people from their homesduring the first nine months of 2002 more than in all of 2001 The ColombianCommission of Jurists (CCJ) reported in September 2002 that political violence waskilling an average of 20 people per day double what the CCJ was reporting in1998 In January 2003 Human Rights Watch reported that ldquothere were numer-ous and credible reports of joint military-paramilitary operations and the sharingof intelligence and propagandardquo for 2002 (see Human Rights Watch World Report2003)

The most dangerous result could be that the United States has directly involveditself in Colombiarsquos civil war between FARC and government security forces underthe banner of ldquocounterterrorismrdquo (Dudley 2000) Unlike other second-tier ldquoWaron Terrorrdquo countries like the Philippines Georgia or Yemen where the terroristenemy is a shadowy group of a few dozen or a few hundred Colombiarsquos ldquoterror-istrdquo groups are established armies A counterterror effort in Colombia then risksevolving into an El Salvador-style counterinsurgency campaignmdashcomplete withUnited States advisors accompanying combat operations (Barnard 2003)

Political Policy Resultant

The advent of the War on Terror has kept the Bush administration from deviat-ing from its steady military approach Even before September 11 2001 the newBush administration had initiated a ldquoreview processrdquo to explore the possibility of

460 Chris J Dolan

going beyond the drug war to help Colombiarsquos government fight the guerrillas andthe paramilitaries Comparisons between FARC and Al Qaeda now began to showup with regularity

The United Statesrsquo approach is also highly contingent upon its dependence onSouth American oil A 2003 Bush administration foreign aid request to Congressincluded the first significant nondrug military aid to Colombia since the Cold War$98 million to help the Colombian Army protect the 480-mile long Cantildeo Limoacuten-Coventildeas oil pipeline A United States oil company Occidental Petroleum of LosAngeles owns 44 of the crude oil that flows through the Cantildeo Limoacuten pipelinewhich Colombian guerrillas dynamited 166 times in 2001 (United States Depart-ment of State 2002) ldquoClearly we have an energy threatrdquo warned CongressmanMark Souder (R-Indiana) in May 2002 ldquoColombia is either our seventh or eighthlargest supplier of oil Our economy depends on that We already have instabilityin the Middle East We have more compelling reasons to be involved in Colombiathan almost anywhere else in the worldrdquo (Souder 2002)

Beyond these initiatives it is not yet clear how the United Statesrsquo activities willexpand to match Washingtonrsquos much more ambitious mission in Colombia Whilethe purpose of United States military aid has expanded remarkably we have notseen a similar expansion in the amount of United States assistance Certainly military aid is risingmdashColombiarsquos security forces received over $100 million morein 2003 than they did in 2002 The pipeline program accounts for most of thatincrease Yet another $100 million would have only marginal impact on the direc-tion of a conflict involving nearly 40000 well-funded insurgents Pressures fordramatically increased military assistance are likely to build (Cala 2001 Pardo2000)

However if the goal of the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in Colombia isto reduce demand in the United States for cocaine then Americarsquos efforts havelargely failed which has been a continuing trend over the past 15 years (Wisotsky1990) During 2001 there were approximately 1160000 new cocaine users in theUnited States The average age of those who first used cocaine during the year was208 years According to the 2002 National Survey on Drug Use and Healthapproximately 339 million Americans ages 12 and older had tried cocaine at leastonce in their lifetimes representing 144 of the population in that age groupApproximately 59 million (25) had used cocaine in the past year and 20 million(09) had used cocaine within the past month (Substance Abuse and MentalHealth Services Administration [SAMHSA] 2004)

Among high school students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the FutureStudy 36 of eighth graders 51 of tenth graders and 77 of twelfth gradersreported using cocaine at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these per-centages were 36 61 and 78 respectively (National Institute on Drug Abuse[NIDA] 2003) Regarding the ease by which one can obtain powder cocaine 216of eighth graders 296 of tenth graders and 374 of twelfth graders surveyedin 2003 reported that powder cocaine was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtainApproximately 23 (225) of eighth graders 296 of tenth graders and 353of twelfth graders reported that crack cocaine was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo toobtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 44 of eighth graders 52 of tenth graders and 46of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reported that using powder cocaine once or

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 461

twice was a ldquogreat riskrdquo Nearly 49 of eighth graders 58 of tenth graders and47 of twelfth graders reported that using crack cocaine once or twice was a ldquogreatriskrdquo (NIDA 2003)

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also conducts a surveyof high school students throughout the United States the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) Among students surveyed in 2003 87 reportedusing some form of cocaine at least one time during their life of those 41reported being current users of cocaine meaning that they had used cocaine atleast once during the past month (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention[CDC] 2004) During 2002 82 of college students and 135 of young adults(ages 19ndash28) reported using cocaine at least once during their lifetimes Approxi-mately 48 of college students and 58 of young adults reported past-year useof cocaine and 16 of college students and 22 of young adults reported past-month use of cocaine (NIDA 2004)

Flower Power Afghanistan

Afghanistan is the worldrsquos leading source country for the cultivation processingand trafficking of opium By 1999 Afghanistan grew more than 4000 tons ofopium a year making it the primary source of roughly 75 of the worldrsquos illegalheroin (Concar 2001) Today narcotics are the largest source of income inAfghanistan due to the decimation of the countryrsquos economic infrastructure causedby years of warfare

Policy Discretion

On July 28 2000 Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar issued a decreebanning future opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan The decree stated that themilitary would eliminate poppy cultivation in the 2001 growing season in areasunder their control At the time the ban applied to any territory seized from theNorthern Alliance In February 2001 the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)declared that the opium poppy cultivation ban was successful and that the 2001crop was expected to be negligible (UNODC 2004a p 70) This marked the firsteffort by Taliban rulers to reduce opium production The eradication effort wasmade in response to an agreement with the UNODC which agreed to fund alter-native development projects on the condition that cultivation would be decreasedin Kandahar

Laboratories in Afghanistan convert opium into morphine base white heroinor one of three grades of brown heroin depending on the order received Largeprocessing labs are located in southern Afghanistan with smaller labs located mainlyin Nangarhar Province In the past many opium processing laboratories werelocated in Pakistan particularly in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) Theselaboratories appear to have relocated to Afghanistan both to be closer to the sourceof opium and to avoid the Pakistani government Morphine base is usually pro-duced for traffickers based in Turkey where it is converted to heroin before ship-ment to Europe and North and South America Chemists in the region are capable

462 Chris J Dolan

of producing heroin hydrochloride with extremely high purity levels (UNODC2004b)

Since Afghanistan is landlocked drug traffickers must rely on land routes tomove morphine base and heroin out of the country Heroin is trafficked to world-wide destinations by many routes Traffickers quickly adjust heroin smugglingroutes based on political and weather-related events (Gannon 2004) Reports ofheroin shipments north from Afghanistan through the Central Asian States toRussia have increased Tajikistan is a frequent destination for both opium andheroin shipments although Tajikistan serves mostly as a transit point and storagelocation rather than a final destination Seizures are frequently reported at Pakistanrsquos international airports (Rashid 1999) Heroin is also smuggled by sea onvessels leaving the port city of Karachi Heroin produced in Afghanistan continuesto be trafficked to the United States although generally in small quantities It isestimated that roughly 90 of opiate products in Europe originate in Afghanistan(Concar 2001 Hersh 2004)

Money laundering is not an issue in Afghanistan The unsophisticated bankingsystem that previously existed has been damaged by the years of war It is likelythat the informal banking system used extensively in the region usually referredto as the hawala or hundi money laundering system is used by drug traffickers(Lehmkuhler 2003) This system is an underground traditional informal networkthat has been used for centuries by businesses and families throughout Asia (StillFlushmdashTerrorist Finance 2002) This system provides a confidential convenientefficient service at a low cost in areas that are not served by traditional bankingfacilities (Hersh 2004)

Prior to the United Statesrsquo invasion of October 2001 the Taliban maintainedeffective control of nearly all of the opium poppy growing areas in the countryeven though they were only recognized as the legitimate government ofAfghanistan by three governments Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the United ArabEmirates Islamic law (Sharirsquoa) has been imposed in territory controlled by theTaliban and local Sharirsquoa courts have been established throughout the country In1997 the Taliban reactivated the State High Commission for Drug Control whichwas originally established in 1990 by the legitimate interim government Before theUNODC reports indicating that implementation of the 2000ndash2001 opium poppycultivation ban has been effective and the release of the United States governmentestimate indicating a dramatic reduction in opium production the Taliban madeonly token gestures toward antidrug law enforcement (BINLEA 2002b) Althoughthey have banned opium poppy cultivation the Taliban itself long relied on drugtrafficking for financial support

Unintended Consequences

As the United States began more rapidly merging its war on drugs with the greaterWar on Terror on a public scale halting opium production had to be as importantas eliminating the Taliban and the Al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan But howserious were Americarsquos efforts in applying its narco-terrorism policy to AfghanistanUnited States military commanders were not going to set opium eradication at thetop of their list of priorities (Schmitt 2002)

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 463

The results were consistent with Americarsquos hands-off approach Afghan opiumproduction in 2002 exploded to near-record levels making the war-ravaged nationagain the worldrsquos leading producer of the drug ( Judis 2003) Efforts by the UnitedStates-backed interim government of Hamid Karzai to eradicate opium productionby paying farmers to destroy their crops have failed because of a lack of moneyand violent demonstrations by farmers fearing their livelihoods were in jeopardy(Pound 2004) The UNrsquos Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated thatAfghanistan produced 3400 metric tons of opium in 2002 (Moreau amp Yousafzai2003 United Nations Information Service 2003)

Immediately after assuming office Karzai issued a decree on January 17 2002not only banning cultivation but also the processing trafficking and abuse ofopiates (Hanley 2002) Last month his government reiterated that positionreasserting the ban on opium poppy planting in the autumn (Hersh 2004) TheUNODC reopened its Kabul office in February 2002 and appointed Mohammad-Reza Amirkhizi as its representative The office has been engaged in a wide rangeof projects which include strengthening the Afghan drug control commissionassistance in law enforcement and the criminal justice sectors and cross-bordercounternarcotics cooperation with neighboring states The office is also working ona pilot social compact with farmers in Kandahar and Badakhshan provinces pro-viding them with small amounts of financial assistance with the understanding thatthey would grow commercial crops other than opium poppy (Gannon 2004)

The new Afghan government has largely failed in its now three-year effort toeradicate the opium poppy crop in Afghanistan which in recent years became theworldrsquos biggest producer of the raw material for heroin (Hanley 2002 Wehrfritz2003) The UN estimated that the 2004 crop could be worth more than $2 billionat the farm level in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004 Pound 2004) The resurgence ofopium production in Afghanistan is a major unintended consequence of the UnitedStates invasion

By 2002 the total opium poppy cultivation averaged 74000 hectares under theKarzai government and the United Statesrsquo military presence up from only 8000hectares in 2001 under the Taliban (UNODC 2004a) While the 2002 levels arestill lower than the record level crop growing 91000 hectares in 1999 and 82000hectares in 2000 the UN report confirms that opium cultivation has resumed topreviously high levels (Moreau amp Yousafzai 2003 UNODC 2004b)

As a result the average yield poppy production in 2002 shot up to 46 kilo-gramshectare from 24 kilogramshectare in 2001 The massive increase is largelydue to more extensive irrigation programs in Eastern and Southern Afghanistanimplemented since the fall of the Taliban in November 2001 along with the end ofa nationwide drought which devastated total agricultural output between 1998 and2001 Thus total opium poppy production in 2002 was 3400 metric tons a sizableincrease compared to 185 metric tons in 2001 (UNODC 2004b) Poppy cultivationthen doubled between 2002 and 2003 The area planted with poppies used tomake heroin and morphine was 152000 hectares in 2003 compared with 74000hectares in 2002 according to the White House ONDCP (UNODC 2004b)According to the State Department ldquoIn Afghanistan poppy cultivationapproached the highest levels ever registered International and United Statessurveys indicate that in 2003 Afghanistan again produced three-quarters of the

464 Chris J Dolan

worldrsquos illicit opium The narcotics situation remains serious despite positiveactions by both the government and international donorsrdquo (BINLEA 2004)

Besides the eradication campaign announced by the new Afghan governmentin 2002 appears to have been doomed to failure due to a lack of United Statesfinancial support Farmers were to be compensated with $500 per acre fordestroyed poppies which is only a fraction of the estimated $6400 per acre of grossincome an Afghani farmer can earn on poppy cultivation The UN Food and Agriculture Organization reported that ldquoAfghani government programs had a verylimited impactrdquo (Hanley 2002) At 2003 price levels and as a result of the explo-sion in poppy cultivation and production total income for Afghani opium farmersreached several hundred million United States dollars by the end of 2003 (Pound2004)

Other more unfortunate factors resulted from the 2002 poppy eradication cam-paign Afghan farmers have been killed and wounded by United States and Afghansecurity forces during protests against the campaign to eradicate their opiumpoppy crops (Wehrfritz 2003 Wyatt 2002) According to the BBC ldquoThe farmersare angered at what they see as derisory compensationrdquo (Wyatt 2002) ManyAfghan farmers direct their anger at the United States for pressuring the Karzaigovernment to institute the poppy ban (Pound 2004) As a result many Afghanfarmers have embraced Al Qaeda for its staunch anti-Americanism (Hersh 2004)

In the war on terrorism in Afghanistan the United States is trying to end theprofits Al Qaeda and the Taliban are making from the greater Central Asian drugtrade (Gannon 2004 Rashid 1999) However this may impact Americarsquos key alliesin the region who have for years reaped the rewards of the Afghanistanrsquos herointrade Nowhere is the problem clearer than along Afghanistanrsquos northern borderwith Tajikistan an ally in the United Statesrsquo antiterrorist efforts and a major conduitfor heroin and opium on its way to Europe and the Americas The United Statesrsquoinvasion even sparked a massive selling of heroin as Al Qaeda and Taliban forcesappeared to have been selling off their narcotic stockpiles for cash to purchase arms(Hersh 2004 Yglesias 2004)

Some Central Asian and Middle Eastern drug traffickers were actually support-ive of the American invasion of Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) According to the WallStreet Journal ldquoacross the Stans and the Caspian Sea in Lebanonrsquos Bekaa Valleysome pray for a speedy United States attack on Afghanistan lsquoItrsquos good for busi-nessrsquo says Muhammed standing in a garage full of cannabis a pistol tucked in hisbelt He is just back from harvesting this yearrsquos cannabis crop lsquoItrsquoll drive up hashishpricesrsquo Muhammed assures a prospective client that transport of 2500 kilograms(5500 pounds) to Amsterdam from the Bekaamdashcontrolled by Syrian troops as wellas Syrian- and Iranian-backed Shiite Muslim Hezbollah fightersmdashcan be arrangedrdquo(qtd in Targeting Terroristsrsquo Drug Money 2001 p 1)

Structural Attributes

Prior to the October 2001 invasion the United States government had no actualpresence in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) Today the most important organizationsresponsible for conducting the narco-terror war in Afghanistan include the FederalBureau of Investigation the Drug Enforcement Administration the Special Forces

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 465

the Department of Statersquos Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforce-ment Affairs (INL) and Pakistan security forces in cooperation with the UN Officeof Drugs and Crime (UNODC) But how successful is the partnership In Febru-ary 2002 the UNODC confirmed that opium poppy cultivation rose to higherlevels than previous years under Taliban rule The UNODC Country Office forAfghanistan and the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme (ICMP) conducted a pre-assessment survey in 208 villages and 42 districts in the traditional opium poppygrowing areas of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan in the provinces of HelmandKandahar Oruzgan Nangarhar and Kunar Those five provinces accounted for84 of the total opium poppy cultivation area in Afghanistan in 2000 (UNODC2004b)

It is estimated that the various security forces currently monitor opium poppycultivation over an area between 45000 hectares and 65000 hectares (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003) This compares to the level of cultivation reached during the mid-1990s but remained lower than those recorded in 1999 (about 95000 hectares)and 2000 (about 82000 hectares) The resulting production of opium harvestedin 2004 could reach between 1900 and 2700 metric tons of opium (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003)

To address these realities the INL the DEA and the FBI have concluded thatwith at least 40 of the Afghan gross domestic product virtually tied to heroin therisks of an untethered narco-economy producing a chain reaction that reverses pastgains made under the Taliban are quite high indeed In response the INL and theDEA have built police training facilities and trained and retrained roughly 20000Afghan police officers in order to implement narco-terror initiatives against Talibanand Al Qaeda holdouts In coordination with United States Special Forces the Bushadministration seeks to place 50000 border guards and Afghan National Police byDecember 2005 in support of the opium eradication campaign The INL the DEAand the FBI are also involved in creating a comprehensive justice sector TheUnited Statesrsquo effort has also resulted in some intriguing bureaucratic alliancesThe Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency one of the main sources ofinformation for the United States-led alliance against the Taliban regime is asso-ciated with political assassinations narcotics trafficking and smuggling of nucleartechnology and missile delivery components with the backing fundamentalistIslamic movements (qtd in Bedi 2001)

Opium cultivation and heroin production in Pakistanrsquos northern tribal belt andadjoining Afghanistan was a vital offshoot of the ISIndashCIA cooperation (Rashid1999) It succeeded in turning some Soviet troops into addicts during the USSRrsquosoccupation of Afghanistan Heroin sales in Europe and the United States carriedout via deceptive means transport networks couriers and pay-offs offset the costof the various wars in Afghanistan (Gannon 2004)

Resultant Political Policy

The initial military victories in Afghanistan are in the process of being lost as thecountry is rapidly disintegrating into a state of narco-terrorism and anarchy TheUnited Statesrsquo efforts may fail unless the link between Al Qaeda Taliban forcesand opium production are finally overcome In 2004 opium farmers and traffick-ers in Afghanistan generated $23 billion in profits with higher estimates for the

466 Chris J Dolan

future The level of opium planting and the subsequent production of opium pastemorphine and heroin in Afghanistan is more than enough to satisfy the demandin Western Europe and the United States (Gannon 2004)

Although Afghanistan represents one source in worldwide opium production inaddition to Mexico South America and Southeast Asia narco-terrorism policytoward Afghanistan has not succeeded in reversing growth trends in heroin con-sumption in the United States According to the 2002 National Survey on DrugUse and Health approximately 37 million Americans ages 12 and older reportedtrying heroin at least once during their lifetimes representing 16 of the popu-lation ages 12 and older Roughly 404000 (02) reported past-year heroin useand 166000 (01) reported past-month heroin use (SAMHSA 2004) Among highschool students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the Future Study 16 ofeighth graders 15 of tenth graders and 15 of twelfth graders reported usingheroin at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these percentages were 1618 and 17 respectively (NIDA 2003)

Regarding the ease by which one can obtain heroin 156 of eighth graders188 of tenth graders and 279 of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reportedthat heroin was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 63 ofeighth graders 71 of tenth graders and 59 of twelfth graders reported thatusing heroin once or twice without a needle was a ldquogreat riskrdquo (NIDA 2003)Nationwide 33 of high school students surveyed in 2003 as part of the YouthRisk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) reported using heroin during theirlifetimes Male students (43) were significantly more likely than female students(20) to report lifetime heroin use Hispanic students (39) were more likely toreport heroin use within their lifetime than white (26) or black (26) students(CDC 2004) During 2002 10 of college students and 18 of young adults (ages19ndash28) reported using heroin at least once during their lifetimes Approximately01 of college students and 02 of young adults reported past year use of heroinand 00 of college students and less than 005 of young adults reported pastmonth use of heroin (NIDA 2004)

According to data from the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) Programa median of 58 of adult male arrestees and 66 of adult female arrestees testedpositive for opiates at arrest in 2003 The adult male samples were compiled from39 United States sites and the adult female samples were compiled from 25 sitesA median of 51 of adult male arrestees and 71 of adult female arresteesreported using heroin at least once in the year before being arrested (NationalInstitute of Justice 2004) Although heroin expenditures were $22 billion in 1990demand decreased to $10 billion in 2000 and whereas in 1990 Americans con-sumed 136 metric tons of heroin estimates remained relatively unchanged in 2000(ABT Associates 2001)

Conclusions

Based on these observations of narco-terrorist activities in Afghanistan and Colom-bia on a substantive level the Bush administration has formulated domestic andinternational drug reduction strategies with an eye on asset seizure and control offunding used by terrorist organizations However important questions remain con-cerning the legitimacy of Americarsquos policy efforts Indeed narco-terrorism as a

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 467

national security threat is not new The 911 attacks simply pushed narco-terror-ism higher on the presidentrsquos national security agenda particularly in light of theconnection between the Afghan drug trade and the Al Qaeda network

On a theoretical level the contingency approach to examining narco-terrorismpolicy highlights several major concerns that have not been adequately addressedFirst as it is conducted today the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy places sig-nificant attention on the increased utilization of American military power Eversince President Richard Nixon proclaimed a war on drugs and President GeorgeW Bush a war on terrorism concern over the use of the military in what have typically been deemed law enforcement and social issues has overshadowed mostother related methods Even if the United States did not introduce troops intoAfghanistan or Colombia we are still left with a highly militarized narco-terrorismpolicy that facilitates human rights abuses by those governments receiving UnitedStates aid Moreover the result has been an increase in the production and con-sumption of illegal drugs that are trafficked by organizations that use profits topromote terrorist attacks

Second the contingency approach used in this study reveals the problems narco-terrorism policy has experienced in targeting so-called weak states Narco-terrorism policy has elevated the potential for the United States to use its diplo-matic weight to force governments to enact stricter antidrug policies This hasencouraged states like Afghanistan and Colombia to further undermine politicaleconomic and social development with undemocratic policies directed at citizensAs a result the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism efforts have in part fueled anti-American resentment thereby increasing the potential for additional terrorist activities by groups such as Al Qaeda or FARC

Third it has become more apparent that narco-terrorism policy has becomelike all other policies highly politicized Americarsquos counterdrug efforts are virtu-ally indistinguishable from counterinsurgency efforts by remnants of the Talibanand Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and FARC and other terror-related groups in Colom-bia Moreover the United States is being rather bold in designating particulargroups as narco-terrorists although conveniently leaving off others such as theNorthern Alliance in Afghanistan This hinders the rule of law in a number of countries

Finally the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in its current form neglectscertain realities Quite simply many critics allege that narco-terrorist connectionsare indirect and for the most part ambiguous In addition critics of prohibitionmaintain that it is the illegalization of drugs that generates the enormous profitsused to support terrorist and insurgent organizations Another concern is thatnarco-terrorism does not address the complexities of terrorism or insurgenciesCan Afghanistan and Colombia continue to be addressed in narrowly defined mil-itary and law enforcement frameworks that neglect political economic and socialconsiderations

About the Author

Chris J Dolan is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Floridawhere he teaches courses on public policy United States Foreign Policy and National Secu-

468 Chris J Dolan

rity the Mass Media and the American presidency He received his PhD from the Univer-sity of South Carolina He is the author of In War We Trust The Political Dimensions and EthicalConsequences of the First Strike Doctrine (Ashgate Press 2005) and co-editor of Striking First ThePreventive Doctrine and the Reshaping of US Foreign Policy (Palgrave-Macmillan 2004) Hisresearch on public policy executive policymaking foreign policy and the mass media appearin Policy Studies Journal Congress and the Presidency Politics and Policy White House Studies andin numerous edited volumes

References

ABT Associates (2001) What Americarsquos users spend on drugs 1988ndash2000 Prepared for the Office of NationalDrug Control Policy Retrieved April 21 2004 from httpwwwwhitehousedrugpolicygovpublicationspdfamerican_users_spend_2002pdf

Allison G T (1971) Essence of decision Boston Little BrownAllison G T amp Halperin M H (1972) Bureaucratic politics A paradigm and and some policy implications

World Politics 24 40ndash79Baldwin E (1991) Why rules donrsquot work Modern Law Review 53 321ndash338Barnard D (2003) Narco-terrorism realities The connection between drugs and terror Journal of Countert-

errorism and Homeland Security International 9(1) 31ndash34Bedi R (2001 September 26) The assassins and drug dealers are now helping us The Daily Telegraph p 1Bennett C J (1991) What is policy convergence What causes it British Journal of Political Science 21(2)

215ndash233Blau P amp Scott R (1962) Formal organizations San Francisco ChandlerBouchard G amp Carroll B (2002) Policy-making and administrative discretion The case of immigration in

Canada Canadian Public Administration 25(2) 239ndash259Bouchard G amp Carroll B (2003) One size does not fit all Annual Meeting of the Canadian Public Service

Administration Halifax Nova ScotiaBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002a) Fiscal year 2003 congres-

sional budget justification Washington DC AuthorBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002b) International narcotics

control strategy Afghanistan (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 from httpusembassystategovafghanistanwwwh02121802html

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2004) International NarcoticsControl Strategy Southwest Asia (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 fromhttpwwwstategovginlrlsnrcrpt2003vol1html29836htm

Bureau of Justice Statistics United States Department of Justice (2000) Sourcebook of criminal justice statisticsWashington DC United States Government Printing Office

Cala A (2001 November 21) Danger of a new Vietnam The Gazette p 1Carroll B amp Garkut D E (1996) Is there an empirical trend toward managerialism Canadian Public Admin-

istration 39(4) 535ndash553Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2004) Youth risk behavior surveillance United States 2003 (May 21)

Retrieved August 2 2004 from httpwwwcdcgovmmwrpreviewmmwrhtmlss5302a1htmChepesiuk R (1999) Hard target The United States war against international drug trafficking 1982ndash1997 Jeffer-

son NC McFarland amp CoColombia Program Center for International Policy (2000) Plan Colombia A plan for peace or a plan for war

( June 20) Retrieved May 1 2004 from httpwwwciponlineorgcolombia062001htmColombia Program Center for International Policy (2004) US Aid to Colombia since 1997 Summary tables

(February 20) Retrieved May 2 2004 from httpciponlineorgcolombiaaidtablehtmConcar D (2001 September 29) Cutting the Talibanrsquos lifeline New Scientist p 77Desveaux J A Lindquist E A amp Toner G (1994) Organizing for policy innovations in public bureaucra-

cies AIDS energy and environmental policy in Canada Canadian Journal of Political Science 27(3)493ndash528

Dexter L (1981) Unintended consequences of purposive legislative action Alternatives to implementationJournal of Public Policy 4(4) 250ndash264

Drug Abuse Policy Office (1982) Federal strategy for prevention of drug abuse and drug trafficking WashingtonDC United States Government Printing Office

Drug Enforcement Administration Intelligence Division (2002) Drugs and terrorism A new perspective RetrievedApril 29 2004 from httpwwwdeagovpubsintel02039f1f1

Dudley S (2000 July 31) The Colombia quagmire The American Prospect p 32

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 469

Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in the policy studies literature Institutional researchstresses the importance of organizations in the United Statesrsquo narco-terror war suchas the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Drug Enforcement Administra-tion (DEA) William LeoGrandersquos study (1998) of the CIArsquos role in coordinatingpolicy in Central America noted considerable linkages between the United States-backed Contra rebels and CIA operatives in facilitating the illegal drug trade Similarly others critical of United States policy in Central America have also givenrelatively little attention to the ContrandashCIA drug matter In ldquoThe Dual Myths oflsquoNarco-Terrorismrsquo rdquo Miller and Damask (1996 pp 114ndash131) study the problemsthat occur when government agencies most notably the DEA and the Office ofNational Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) are influenced by limited evidence inac-curate perceptions and political myths and stereotypes In some policy and acad-emic circles the interest in arguing that terrorists and drug traffickers were inalliance led to a lack of understanding and bad policy Linkages between terroristsand narcotics traffickers are real but are not part of a simplistic global conspiracyto topple Western institutions they are motivated by convenience and profit

In Cocaine Politics Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall (1998) make fourobservations concerning the roles of the CIA in promoting so-called narco-wars inLatin America First that the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George Bushultimately considered Sandinista Nicaragua more dangerous to United Statesrsquo secu-rity than narcotics Second Scott and Marshall contend that the Reagan and Bushadministrations were willing to use the so-called ldquoWar on Drugsrdquo as a front for theiranti-Sandinista aims in Central America even when it meant weakening drugcontrol efforts Third Scott and Marshall argue that the prosecutions of drug traf-fickers under the Reagan and Bush administrations actually complemented theirtoleration of drug commerce in the name of anti-Communism Fourth Scott andMarshall argue that the United States will have to dismantle the national securitystate if it is to cope effectively with drug issues Scott and Marshall seem content tosee ContrandashCIA drug linkages in Central America as simply business as usual some-thing that the CIA has always routinely done Many of their more hazy connec-tions of the Central American conflict to anti-Castro Cubans Colombian cartelsand Israeli agents are transformed from speculation into evidence (Scott amp Marshall 1998)

Critical populists assume a nonsystemic cultural approach that emphasizes socialforces rather than governmental policy In Funding Evil Rachel Ehrenfeld (2004)contends that Americarsquos image of terrorism is all wrong Rather than shadowy cellsof young religious martyrs the true face of terror she says is an internationalnetwork of corrupt state leaders wealthy contributors and drug and crime king-pins Chepesiuk (1999) claims that without money especially laundered UnitedStates dollars there would be no terror and this lively well-documented primerreveals the sources the amounts and the armed terror organizations they supportBoth studies focus on the irony of the Westrsquos appetite for drugs which terrorgroups exploit for funding arms and recruiting those who would undermine adegenerate Western society (Chepesiuk 1999 Ehrenfeld 2004)

Ehrenfeld presents a similar argument in Narco Terrorism (1992) which contendsthat Soviet client states and various terrorist organizations are the worldrsquos domi-nant narco-terrorists using the ill-gotten gains of drug trafficking to undermine

452 Chris J Dolan

democracies Judging by the evidence she assembles Castro has used narcoticsprofits to arm Colombian and Nicaraguan guerrillas Bulgaria peddles heroin tosupply weapons to the PLO drugs Lebanonrsquos ldquosingle most important exportrdquo fuelthat countryrsquos warring factions and Peru the worldrsquos leading producer of cocamay soon be subverted from within by drug pushers Syria the Sandinistas Boliviaand the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) are among the leading narco-terrorists identified in a stunning expose Ehrenfeld looks at the conflict betweenJamaican drug gangs and the white Mafia in the United States Rebuking both theAmerican left and right for failing to deal adequately with the drug epidemic sheraises important issues that many liberals and conservatives prefer to ignore(Ehrenfeld 1992)

Analytical Framework

Policy contingency is interpreted as the implications and consequences of policyvariance and program design (Ryan 2001 Segal amp Weisbrod 2002) Contingencyfactors resulting from the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy are theoreticallyfar-reaching and significant The working theoretical model presented here sug-gests an array of relevant policy characteristicsmdashspecifically policy complexity orga-nizational differentiation decision points compression of the issues internal andexternal coupling homogeneity resonance and technology and visibilitymdashwillexert a relative influence on both structural attributes and degrees of policy dis-cretion (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003) Within this relationship structural attributesinfluence policy discretion and the political policy resultant Both structural attrib-utes and policy discretion produce unintended consequences which affect narco-terrorism policy (see figure 1 below)

Policy contingency suggests that it is possible to observe the degree to whichpolicy characteristics exist following the convergence of policies in the policymak-ing process as evidence by the extent of policy discretion and unintended conse-quences at play in the policy outcomes As illustrated in the theoretical model thesecharacteristics include complexity organizational differentiation decision points

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 453

Policy Characteristics

sum Complexity sum Org Differentiation sum Decision Points sum Compression of Issues sum DomesticIntl Coupling sum Homogeneity sum Resonance sum Technology amp Visibility

Policy Discretion

Structural Attributes

Unintended Consequences

Political Policy Resultant

Figure 1 Model of Policy Contingency

compression of issues internal and external coupling homogeneity resonanceand technology and visibility (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003)

According to Bouchard and Carroll policy characteristics resulting from theprocess of policy convergence ldquoimpact policy discretion the structural attributes ofpolicies and programs and the number of unintended consequencesrdquo (2003 p 1)Research has shown that scholars are able to envisage to some degree patterns ofdiscretion and draw tentative conclusions as to the extent of the unintended con-sequences and structural attributes that impact policy outcomes (Dexter 1981Desveaux Lindquist amp Toner 1994 Harmon amp Myer 1986) This influences theability of policymakers from a number of different agencies and departments tomanage policy direction (Bouchard amp Carroll 2002)

Since this article applies the theoretical model to the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy each characteristic of the policy is of course expected to varyComplexity involves the extent of policymaker knowledge and expertise and howambiguous the unified policy is to manage (Blau amp Scott 1962 Meitsner 1976)Narco-terrorism is a highly complex issue since it is at the intersection of drugsand violence and is a newly emergent policy area Historically the DEA used a sim-plistic definition of narco-terrorism in terms of Pablo Escobar the Colombiancocaine trafficker who used terrorist tactics against noncombatants to further hispolitical agenda within his country to protect the illegal drug trade (Smith 1992)Since the fall of Escobar United States policymakers find themselves faced withinternational terrorist groups that participate in drug trafficking to further theirpolitical agendas (Chepesiuk 1999) Narco-terrorists are drug traffickers whoemploy terror tactics against civilians police and military personnel and use drugmoney profits to advance their goals (Mabry 1989) Therefore a narco-terroristorganization is an organization that engages in drug trafficking to advance politi-cally motivated violence against combatant and noncombatant targets (DEA Intelligence Division 2002)

Organizational differentiation emphasizes the array of levels or layers in the rel-evant bureaucratic organizations associated with the implementation of the policyOn the one hand bureaucratic politics informs us that government organizationsare independent entities that behave according to certain established standardoperating procedures (Halperin 1974) This prevails when policymakers are unin-volved or unable to dominate the policymaking process due to the presence ofentrenched organizational interests (Allison 1971 Allison amp Halperin 1972Rosati 1981) On the other hand principalndashagent theory suggests that policy-makers can influence organizational behavior by imposing sanctions for negativebehavior and issuing rewards for positive behavior (Moe 1984 1993)

In contrast to such high-profile policy domains as education and criminal justiceorganizational responsibility for narco-terrorism policy is spread over an array ofdomestic and foreign policy-oriented agencies with the White House-based Officeof National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and the National Security Council (NSC)formally designated as the lead coordinating organizations of the narco-terrorismpolicy bureaucracy (Kraska 1993) Currently the ONDCP and NSC are responsi-ble for coordinating the following departments and agencies Departments ofHealth and Human Services (Centers for Disease Control and National Institutesof Health) Justice (Drug Enforcement Administration the Federal Bureau of

454 Chris J Dolan

Investigation United States Marshals United States Attorneys and the Bureau ofPrisons) Treasury (United States Secret Service and the Bureau of AlcoholTobacco and Firearms) Homeland Security (Bureau of Immigration UnitedStates Border Patrol and United States Customs) Education Labor VeteransAffairs Defense and State

Decision points deal mainly with the number of policymakers involved in thepolicymaking processes and resources devoted to the policy area Since most poli-cies involve a considerable number of individuals in and out of government checksand balances or decision points are built into the decision-making process as a wayof managing the policy (Allison 1971 George 1980 Rosati 1981) At presentthere are more than 50 United States agencies with a stake in both drug controland antiterrorism efforts In fiscal year (FY) 2005 President George W Bush allo-cated a $307 billion antidrug spending package for FY 2005 to fund these agen-cies (National Drug Control Strategy 2004) Between FY 1991 and FY 2000 morethan $140 billion was spent to curtail drug abuse (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2000Drug Abuse Policy Office 1982 National Drug Control Strategy 2000)

Compression of the issues is a process by which the length of time between policyactions and their outcomes can be interpreted as responding to the potential devel-opment or emergence of a future policy problem that has yet to surface (Sabatier1988) Compression also has a relative impact on policy discretion since highlycompressed policies are difficult to control and policy performance is difficult toexamine Combating narco-terrorism requires a global network of law enforce-ment military and intelligence officials tackling the issue

Coupling involves interaction within and between policies Internal couplingrefers to the degree of variation impacting the implementation of the policy andhigher levels of dissimilarity require considerably higher levels of flexibility amongpolicymakers in order to adapt to the interactive changes (Baldwin 1991) Exter-nal coupling or ldquohorizontalityrdquo deals with the relationship between the policy andother related policy areas (Sproule-Jones 2000)

Several measures have been taken over the years that involve coupling Accord-ing to the United States Department of State there are 12 major multilateral conventions and protocols on combating terrorism (DEA Intelligence Division2002) International efforts to combat narco-terrorism have focused on assetseizure and control of all funding sources used by terrorist organizations On September 28 2001 the United Nations (UN) Security Council unanimouslyadopted an antiterrorism resolution that called for the suppression of terroristgroup financing and improved international cooperation against terrorists UNSecurity Council Resolution 1373 required all states to prevent and abolish thefinancing of terrorism and to criminalize the willful collection and distribution offunds for such acts

Homogeneity suggests that while there is always a degree of variation within thepolicy the various elements associated within it and its goals are similar to a certainextent (Carroll amp Garkut 1996) Homogeneity tends to reduce policy discretion toa limited extent and decreases unintended consequences as policy formulators aremore able to forecast the behavior of policy enforcers (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003)History has shown that narco-terrorist organizations fall into different categoriesOne includes politically motivated groups that use drug profits to support their

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 455

terrorist activities activities that will confer legitimacy upon them within the stateSuch groups assume measures to establish a legal political party whereby their polit-ical goals are realized through nonviolent legal means An example of a group inthis category is the Kurdistan Workerrsquos Party (PKK [Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan])Another category consists of groups that pursue ideological goals while participat-ing in select aspects of the drug trade for example the Revolutionary ArmedForces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC)Other extremist groups are suspected of drug involvement such as Hezbollah andthe Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS [Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya])Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path) in Peru and the Basque Fatherland andLiberty (ETA [Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna]) in Spain (Barnard 2003)

Resonance deals with the extent to which the most important issues associatedwith unified policy are embraced internalized and deemed critical by citizensIllegal drug production trafficking and consumption are activities not highly tol-erated by the general public Although the United States government has chosento merge its war on terrorism with its decades-long war on illicit drugs it remainsto be seen as to whether or not such efforts appear to have resonated throughoutthe citizenry However high levels of resonance tend to produce policies withambiguous vague and symbolic goals and a high degree of discretion and needfor adjustment (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003) The position of the Bush administra-tion is that the growing link between terrorists and the drug trade contributes toan increased threat to America (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003) Resonance is an impor-tant variable given that Bushrsquos ONDCP is promoting a new reason to continue thispublic effort since it is convinced that the illegal drug trade is linked to the supportof terror groups across the globe

Technology involves the ordering of policy functions The Counterdrug Tech-nology Assessment Center (CTAC) is the central counterdrug enforcement researchand development (RampD) organization of the United States Government that pro-motes advanced technologies related to the enforcement of narco-terrorism policyCTAC was established within the Office of National Drug Control Policy and hasbeen coordinating the counterdrug RampD program for the federal governmentsince 1992 In 1993 CTAC was directed to include drug abuse rehabilitation andaddiction research in the program in addition to law enforcement-related tech-nology CTAC prepares periodic reports to update the national counterdrug RampDprogram This report is the fourth Counterdrug RampD Blueprint Update and provides the status of the national counterdrug RampD program descriptions oftechnology development and infrastructure support projects and plans for future counterdrug RampD initiatives

Visibility deals mainly with whether or not the public is able to witness the oper-ation of policy functions Where visibility involves public attention and awarenessresonance deals with the degree of importance placed on the policy and its rela-tionship with societyrsquos core values (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003) Although violentacts are visible in the mass media the financing associated with drug productionand trafficking may not be visible to the public Since 911 the ONDCP haslaunched media campaigns to educate the public about the link between the illegaldrug trade and terrorism The multipronged attempt is designed to emphasizehow the sales of illicit drugs finance acts of terror The public initiative combines a

456 Chris J Dolan

range of activitiesmdashprint and broadcast advertising in-school programming lessonplans for teachers online information community and news media outreachmdashtoraise awareness about the link between drugs and terror and engage youth andinfluential adults in drug prevention

Whiteout Colombia

In 2000 the Clinton administration moved through Congress a narco-terror aidbill for Colombia At the time President Clinton signed package into law Colombiawas placed at the top of Americarsquos list of international priorities (Pardo 2000)ONDCP Director General Barry McCaffrey predicted that the initial $13 billionmeasure termed ldquoPlan Colombiardquomdash$860 million of it for Colombia three-quarters of that for Colombiarsquos police and militarymdashwould ldquostrengthen democracythe rule of law economic stability and human rights in Colombiardquo (McCaffery2000) In 2004 Plan Colombia ballooned to a $75 billion spending package(United States Department of State 2003) The Colombian governmentrsquos attemptsto negotiate peace with opposition guerrilla groups came to an end in May 2002when Aacutelvaro Uribe was elected president However under his administration illicitdrug production exploded and human rights abuses soared

Policy Discretion

The United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy toward Colombia is marked by two con-tradictory trends While Colombia has become a lower priority the size andpurpose of United States military aid has rapidly expanded Overall military andpolice aid amounts are increasing with new Colombian units getting support tooperate in new parts of the country In effect the United States has broadened itspurpose for providing Colombia with lethal assistancemdashfor years limited to coun-ternarcoticsmdashto include ldquocounterterrorismrdquo The change allows United States-aided units to assume offensive operations against the Revolutionary Armed Forcesof Colombia (FARC) the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the paramilitaryUnited Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) United States Special Forces havealso been deployed to Colombia to guard oil pipelines and eliminate insurgents(Dudley 2000 Jenkins 2001)

When it was initiated Plan Colombia placed much of its attention on Colom-biarsquos security forces largely overlooking the complicated deep-rooted origins of itsinternal conflicts (Pardo 2000) However in a country with far-reaching inequali-ties and abusive and corrupt police Plan Colombia was set to produce grave con-sequences (Sweig 2002 Weymouth 2000 p 45) According to a joint letter issuedin June 2002 by several Colombian government agencies Plan Colombia ldquowill leadto the escalation of the social and armed conflict fail to solve the drug-traffickingproblem endanger the peace process attack indigenous populationsrsquo culture andlife styles seriously hamper the Amazon eco-system worsen the humanitarian andhuman rights crisis promote forced displacement and further worsen the socialand political crisisrdquo (Colombia Program 2000) Overlooking the warnings between1999 and 2002 the United States gave Colombia $204 billion with 83 percentgoing to Colombiarsquos military and police This pattern continued under the Bush

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 457

administration which allocated $654 million in 2003 for Colombiarsquos security forces(Colombia Program 2004)

The United States also provided advanced weaponry to the Colombian militaryincluding helicopters attack aircraft patrol boats communications and intelli-gence-gathering equipment uniforms and small arms and the training of morethan 15000 Colombian military and police Hundreds of United States troops andprivate contractors work in Colombia as trainers intelligence-gatherers spraypilots and mechanics among other duties Since 1996 United States pilots havesprayed herbicides over more than a million acres of Colombian territory Duringthe 1990s Colombiarsquos National Police received nearly all lethal United States aid(Pardo 2000) The Clinton administration shifted the bulk of aid to the military in1999 and 2000 arguing that the guerrillasrsquo and paramilitariesrsquo entry into the drugbusiness made many counternarcotics missions too dangerous for the police toperform alone (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

Though the Colombian armed forces get most of the aid the United Statesrsquo com-mitment to the counternarcotics division (DIRAN [Directorate of Anti-Narcotics])of the Colombian National Police Force (Policiacutea Nacional Direccioacuten Antinarcoacuteticos)remains quite large The unit performs most drug interdiction and works with theDEA to arrest drug traffickers In rural zones where peasants grow illegal drugcrops United States-made DIRAN helicopters protect pilots who spray herbicidesover fields where illegal drug crops are grown risking ground fire from insurgentgroups (United States Senate 2002)

Over the past few years the United States has provided the DIRAN Air Servicewith Blackhawk and Huey Helicopters C-26B reconnaissance planes and con-struction upgrades to several of its bases throughout Colombia The Drug Enforce-ment Administration has created and completely funds four Sensitive Investigativeunits (SIUs) within the Colombian National Police elite units that carry out riskymissions against drug traffickers A worldwide antiterror appropriation thatbecame law in August 2002 adds more funding $4 million to create police unitsto protect construction of reinforced police stations in guerrilla-controlled areasand $25 million for antikidnapping units (shared with the Colombian Army) TheDIRAN came under a cloud of scandal in 2002 when investigators revealed thatseveral high-ranking officers had stolen at least $2 million in United States aidintended for administrative expenses (Bureau of International Narcotics and LawEnforcement Affairs [BINLEA] 2002a)

Joint ColombianndashUnited States military efforts are primarily concentrated in thesouthern provinces of Caquetaacute and Putumayo seen by many as the most produc-tive cocaine regions The regions account for roughly 33 of all coca (used to makecocaine) grown in Colombia and is controlled by FARC (Dudley 2000) The armyrsquosoriginal mission was to attack drug-processing labs to apprehend traffickers andto clear armed groups from areas of drug-crop cultivation (or at least to clear themlong enough for the United Statesrsquo herbicide spray planes to pass through) InAugust 2002 the Counter-Narcotics Brigade began using its equipment and train-ing for counterterrorism as well as for antidrug missions as a result some of thebrigadersquos operations may resemble the United States-led counter-insurgency effortsduring the 1980s in Central America (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

458 Chris J Dolan

Structural Attributes

Colombiarsquos security forces have a close institutional relationship with several UnitedStates agencies especially the National Security Agency (NSA) the Federal Bureauof Investigation (FBI) the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the StateDepartmentrsquos Bureau for International Narcotics (BIN) The Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA) offers their Colombian counterparts equipment and training toimprove their own ability to collect and analyze intelligence The United States alsoshares intelligence on tactical information concerning insurgent groupsrsquo move-ments and locations Furthermore the United States Army trains thousands ofColombian security personnel counterparts in topics ranging from marksmanshipto helicopter repair to human rights

Yet the United Statesrsquo approach to Colombia appears to neglect even these basictenets of counterinsurgency Massive aerial herbicide conducted by the Colombianand United States air forces and the DEA is fueling antigovernment sentiment ina guerrilla-controlled area (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003) Any social or economic effortshave been overshadowed particularly in most Colombiansrsquo perceptions It has alsosuffered from very serious implementation problems Some aid programs partic-ularly emergency humanitarian assistance appear to be reaching target popula-tionsmdashthough as United States Ambassador to Colombia Anne Patterson admitsthey ldquorepresent a drop in the bucket in relation to the real needs of Colombiarsquosdisplaced personsrdquo (qtd in Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

The success of nonmilitary aid programs has been mixed The effort to helpcoca-growing peasants adopt legal alternatives took the form of a series of ldquosocialpactsrdquo in which signers would receive basic assistance followed by technical andinfrastructure support in exchange for eradicating all their coca within twelvemonths after first receipt of aid By July 2001 37000 families in Putumayomdashjustunder half of the departmentrsquos populationmdashhad signed ldquopactsrdquo and waited forassistance that failed to arrive Alternative development money was delayed by theDEA forced to pass through several agencies before reaching the peasants BINthe United States Agency for International Development (USAID) the Colombiangovernmentrsquos Plan Colombia implementing agency the Colombian governmentrsquosalternative-development agency PLANTE and five Colombian nonprofit orga-nizations with no previous ties to Putumayo contracted to deliver the assistance(Dudley 2000)

Unintended Consequences

Since police and fumigation efforts were not accompanied by a credible alternativedevelopment effort in Putumayo thousands of peasants who had their crops erad-icated suddenly found themselves with little or no opportunities (Miller 2001)Putumayo community and church leaders interviewed by the Council of Interna-tional Policy in November 2002 hinted at a humanitarian disaster as sprayingdamaged food crops had contributed to widespread starvation in FARC-controlledrural areas (Dudley 2000) Those who lacked other economic opportunities joinedFARC and other terror groups by the hundreds (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 459

Furthermore the Bush White House does not appear to be progressing towardits goal of a 50 reduction in Colombian coca-growing by 2005 Coca is difficultto estimate According to CIA figures made public in March 2002 there is a pro-jected increase in the percentage of cocoa production over the next decade Theoverall amount of coca grown in Colombia is roughly 150000 hectares or threetimes as much as it was when the United States began large-scale spraying in 1996(Miller 2001) Since satellite measurements occur immediately following theJulyndashOctober fumigation campaign in Putumayo and may not take into accountreplanting and new planting elsewhere the 2002 statistics may show a greaterdecrease than probably exists (Van Dongen 2003) That year only four (perhapsfive) of Colombiarsquos thirty-two departments had 1000 or more hectares of coca In2001 a survey report issued by the UN found significant increases in coca pro-duction in the thirteen largest provinces in Colombia (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

While fumigation has proven able to reduce coca-growing in limited areasgrowers have been far more agile in eluding United States planes (Pardo 2000)New crops keep appearing in previously untouched parts of Colombiarsquos vast savan-nahs jungles and even coffee-growing zones Since at least the late 1980s totalcoca cultivation in South Americamdashperhaps the most meaningful estimate of thedrugrsquos availabilitymdashhas remained remarkably steady at roughly 200000 hectaresand the price of cocaine sold on United States streets remains steady

Clinton and Bush administration officials repeatedly argued that military train-ing and engagement would ease Colombiarsquos human rights crisis and encourage thearmed forces to end collaboration with paramilitary death squads Sadly the humanrights situation shows no signs of improvement The Consultancy for HumanRights and Displacement (CODHES) a widely cited Colombian nongovernmentalorganization estimated that violence forced 353120 people from their homesduring the first nine months of 2002 more than in all of 2001 The ColombianCommission of Jurists (CCJ) reported in September 2002 that political violence waskilling an average of 20 people per day double what the CCJ was reporting in1998 In January 2003 Human Rights Watch reported that ldquothere were numer-ous and credible reports of joint military-paramilitary operations and the sharingof intelligence and propagandardquo for 2002 (see Human Rights Watch World Report2003)

The most dangerous result could be that the United States has directly involveditself in Colombiarsquos civil war between FARC and government security forces underthe banner of ldquocounterterrorismrdquo (Dudley 2000) Unlike other second-tier ldquoWaron Terrorrdquo countries like the Philippines Georgia or Yemen where the terroristenemy is a shadowy group of a few dozen or a few hundred Colombiarsquos ldquoterror-istrdquo groups are established armies A counterterror effort in Colombia then risksevolving into an El Salvador-style counterinsurgency campaignmdashcomplete withUnited States advisors accompanying combat operations (Barnard 2003)

Political Policy Resultant

The advent of the War on Terror has kept the Bush administration from deviat-ing from its steady military approach Even before September 11 2001 the newBush administration had initiated a ldquoreview processrdquo to explore the possibility of

460 Chris J Dolan

going beyond the drug war to help Colombiarsquos government fight the guerrillas andthe paramilitaries Comparisons between FARC and Al Qaeda now began to showup with regularity

The United Statesrsquo approach is also highly contingent upon its dependence onSouth American oil A 2003 Bush administration foreign aid request to Congressincluded the first significant nondrug military aid to Colombia since the Cold War$98 million to help the Colombian Army protect the 480-mile long Cantildeo Limoacuten-Coventildeas oil pipeline A United States oil company Occidental Petroleum of LosAngeles owns 44 of the crude oil that flows through the Cantildeo Limoacuten pipelinewhich Colombian guerrillas dynamited 166 times in 2001 (United States Depart-ment of State 2002) ldquoClearly we have an energy threatrdquo warned CongressmanMark Souder (R-Indiana) in May 2002 ldquoColombia is either our seventh or eighthlargest supplier of oil Our economy depends on that We already have instabilityin the Middle East We have more compelling reasons to be involved in Colombiathan almost anywhere else in the worldrdquo (Souder 2002)

Beyond these initiatives it is not yet clear how the United Statesrsquo activities willexpand to match Washingtonrsquos much more ambitious mission in Colombia Whilethe purpose of United States military aid has expanded remarkably we have notseen a similar expansion in the amount of United States assistance Certainly military aid is risingmdashColombiarsquos security forces received over $100 million morein 2003 than they did in 2002 The pipeline program accounts for most of thatincrease Yet another $100 million would have only marginal impact on the direc-tion of a conflict involving nearly 40000 well-funded insurgents Pressures fordramatically increased military assistance are likely to build (Cala 2001 Pardo2000)

However if the goal of the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in Colombia isto reduce demand in the United States for cocaine then Americarsquos efforts havelargely failed which has been a continuing trend over the past 15 years (Wisotsky1990) During 2001 there were approximately 1160000 new cocaine users in theUnited States The average age of those who first used cocaine during the year was208 years According to the 2002 National Survey on Drug Use and Healthapproximately 339 million Americans ages 12 and older had tried cocaine at leastonce in their lifetimes representing 144 of the population in that age groupApproximately 59 million (25) had used cocaine in the past year and 20 million(09) had used cocaine within the past month (Substance Abuse and MentalHealth Services Administration [SAMHSA] 2004)

Among high school students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the FutureStudy 36 of eighth graders 51 of tenth graders and 77 of twelfth gradersreported using cocaine at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these per-centages were 36 61 and 78 respectively (National Institute on Drug Abuse[NIDA] 2003) Regarding the ease by which one can obtain powder cocaine 216of eighth graders 296 of tenth graders and 374 of twelfth graders surveyedin 2003 reported that powder cocaine was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtainApproximately 23 (225) of eighth graders 296 of tenth graders and 353of twelfth graders reported that crack cocaine was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo toobtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 44 of eighth graders 52 of tenth graders and 46of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reported that using powder cocaine once or

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 461

twice was a ldquogreat riskrdquo Nearly 49 of eighth graders 58 of tenth graders and47 of twelfth graders reported that using crack cocaine once or twice was a ldquogreatriskrdquo (NIDA 2003)

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also conducts a surveyof high school students throughout the United States the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) Among students surveyed in 2003 87 reportedusing some form of cocaine at least one time during their life of those 41reported being current users of cocaine meaning that they had used cocaine atleast once during the past month (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention[CDC] 2004) During 2002 82 of college students and 135 of young adults(ages 19ndash28) reported using cocaine at least once during their lifetimes Approxi-mately 48 of college students and 58 of young adults reported past-year useof cocaine and 16 of college students and 22 of young adults reported past-month use of cocaine (NIDA 2004)

Flower Power Afghanistan

Afghanistan is the worldrsquos leading source country for the cultivation processingand trafficking of opium By 1999 Afghanistan grew more than 4000 tons ofopium a year making it the primary source of roughly 75 of the worldrsquos illegalheroin (Concar 2001) Today narcotics are the largest source of income inAfghanistan due to the decimation of the countryrsquos economic infrastructure causedby years of warfare

Policy Discretion

On July 28 2000 Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar issued a decreebanning future opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan The decree stated that themilitary would eliminate poppy cultivation in the 2001 growing season in areasunder their control At the time the ban applied to any territory seized from theNorthern Alliance In February 2001 the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)declared that the opium poppy cultivation ban was successful and that the 2001crop was expected to be negligible (UNODC 2004a p 70) This marked the firsteffort by Taliban rulers to reduce opium production The eradication effort wasmade in response to an agreement with the UNODC which agreed to fund alter-native development projects on the condition that cultivation would be decreasedin Kandahar

Laboratories in Afghanistan convert opium into morphine base white heroinor one of three grades of brown heroin depending on the order received Largeprocessing labs are located in southern Afghanistan with smaller labs located mainlyin Nangarhar Province In the past many opium processing laboratories werelocated in Pakistan particularly in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) Theselaboratories appear to have relocated to Afghanistan both to be closer to the sourceof opium and to avoid the Pakistani government Morphine base is usually pro-duced for traffickers based in Turkey where it is converted to heroin before ship-ment to Europe and North and South America Chemists in the region are capable

462 Chris J Dolan

of producing heroin hydrochloride with extremely high purity levels (UNODC2004b)

Since Afghanistan is landlocked drug traffickers must rely on land routes tomove morphine base and heroin out of the country Heroin is trafficked to world-wide destinations by many routes Traffickers quickly adjust heroin smugglingroutes based on political and weather-related events (Gannon 2004) Reports ofheroin shipments north from Afghanistan through the Central Asian States toRussia have increased Tajikistan is a frequent destination for both opium andheroin shipments although Tajikistan serves mostly as a transit point and storagelocation rather than a final destination Seizures are frequently reported at Pakistanrsquos international airports (Rashid 1999) Heroin is also smuggled by sea onvessels leaving the port city of Karachi Heroin produced in Afghanistan continuesto be trafficked to the United States although generally in small quantities It isestimated that roughly 90 of opiate products in Europe originate in Afghanistan(Concar 2001 Hersh 2004)

Money laundering is not an issue in Afghanistan The unsophisticated bankingsystem that previously existed has been damaged by the years of war It is likelythat the informal banking system used extensively in the region usually referredto as the hawala or hundi money laundering system is used by drug traffickers(Lehmkuhler 2003) This system is an underground traditional informal networkthat has been used for centuries by businesses and families throughout Asia (StillFlushmdashTerrorist Finance 2002) This system provides a confidential convenientefficient service at a low cost in areas that are not served by traditional bankingfacilities (Hersh 2004)

Prior to the United Statesrsquo invasion of October 2001 the Taliban maintainedeffective control of nearly all of the opium poppy growing areas in the countryeven though they were only recognized as the legitimate government ofAfghanistan by three governments Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the United ArabEmirates Islamic law (Sharirsquoa) has been imposed in territory controlled by theTaliban and local Sharirsquoa courts have been established throughout the country In1997 the Taliban reactivated the State High Commission for Drug Control whichwas originally established in 1990 by the legitimate interim government Before theUNODC reports indicating that implementation of the 2000ndash2001 opium poppycultivation ban has been effective and the release of the United States governmentestimate indicating a dramatic reduction in opium production the Taliban madeonly token gestures toward antidrug law enforcement (BINLEA 2002b) Althoughthey have banned opium poppy cultivation the Taliban itself long relied on drugtrafficking for financial support

Unintended Consequences

As the United States began more rapidly merging its war on drugs with the greaterWar on Terror on a public scale halting opium production had to be as importantas eliminating the Taliban and the Al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan But howserious were Americarsquos efforts in applying its narco-terrorism policy to AfghanistanUnited States military commanders were not going to set opium eradication at thetop of their list of priorities (Schmitt 2002)

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 463

The results were consistent with Americarsquos hands-off approach Afghan opiumproduction in 2002 exploded to near-record levels making the war-ravaged nationagain the worldrsquos leading producer of the drug ( Judis 2003) Efforts by the UnitedStates-backed interim government of Hamid Karzai to eradicate opium productionby paying farmers to destroy their crops have failed because of a lack of moneyand violent demonstrations by farmers fearing their livelihoods were in jeopardy(Pound 2004) The UNrsquos Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated thatAfghanistan produced 3400 metric tons of opium in 2002 (Moreau amp Yousafzai2003 United Nations Information Service 2003)

Immediately after assuming office Karzai issued a decree on January 17 2002not only banning cultivation but also the processing trafficking and abuse ofopiates (Hanley 2002) Last month his government reiterated that positionreasserting the ban on opium poppy planting in the autumn (Hersh 2004) TheUNODC reopened its Kabul office in February 2002 and appointed Mohammad-Reza Amirkhizi as its representative The office has been engaged in a wide rangeof projects which include strengthening the Afghan drug control commissionassistance in law enforcement and the criminal justice sectors and cross-bordercounternarcotics cooperation with neighboring states The office is also working ona pilot social compact with farmers in Kandahar and Badakhshan provinces pro-viding them with small amounts of financial assistance with the understanding thatthey would grow commercial crops other than opium poppy (Gannon 2004)

The new Afghan government has largely failed in its now three-year effort toeradicate the opium poppy crop in Afghanistan which in recent years became theworldrsquos biggest producer of the raw material for heroin (Hanley 2002 Wehrfritz2003) The UN estimated that the 2004 crop could be worth more than $2 billionat the farm level in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004 Pound 2004) The resurgence ofopium production in Afghanistan is a major unintended consequence of the UnitedStates invasion

By 2002 the total opium poppy cultivation averaged 74000 hectares under theKarzai government and the United Statesrsquo military presence up from only 8000hectares in 2001 under the Taliban (UNODC 2004a) While the 2002 levels arestill lower than the record level crop growing 91000 hectares in 1999 and 82000hectares in 2000 the UN report confirms that opium cultivation has resumed topreviously high levels (Moreau amp Yousafzai 2003 UNODC 2004b)

As a result the average yield poppy production in 2002 shot up to 46 kilo-gramshectare from 24 kilogramshectare in 2001 The massive increase is largelydue to more extensive irrigation programs in Eastern and Southern Afghanistanimplemented since the fall of the Taliban in November 2001 along with the end ofa nationwide drought which devastated total agricultural output between 1998 and2001 Thus total opium poppy production in 2002 was 3400 metric tons a sizableincrease compared to 185 metric tons in 2001 (UNODC 2004b) Poppy cultivationthen doubled between 2002 and 2003 The area planted with poppies used tomake heroin and morphine was 152000 hectares in 2003 compared with 74000hectares in 2002 according to the White House ONDCP (UNODC 2004b)According to the State Department ldquoIn Afghanistan poppy cultivationapproached the highest levels ever registered International and United Statessurveys indicate that in 2003 Afghanistan again produced three-quarters of the

464 Chris J Dolan

worldrsquos illicit opium The narcotics situation remains serious despite positiveactions by both the government and international donorsrdquo (BINLEA 2004)

Besides the eradication campaign announced by the new Afghan governmentin 2002 appears to have been doomed to failure due to a lack of United Statesfinancial support Farmers were to be compensated with $500 per acre fordestroyed poppies which is only a fraction of the estimated $6400 per acre of grossincome an Afghani farmer can earn on poppy cultivation The UN Food and Agriculture Organization reported that ldquoAfghani government programs had a verylimited impactrdquo (Hanley 2002) At 2003 price levels and as a result of the explo-sion in poppy cultivation and production total income for Afghani opium farmersreached several hundred million United States dollars by the end of 2003 (Pound2004)

Other more unfortunate factors resulted from the 2002 poppy eradication cam-paign Afghan farmers have been killed and wounded by United States and Afghansecurity forces during protests against the campaign to eradicate their opiumpoppy crops (Wehrfritz 2003 Wyatt 2002) According to the BBC ldquoThe farmersare angered at what they see as derisory compensationrdquo (Wyatt 2002) ManyAfghan farmers direct their anger at the United States for pressuring the Karzaigovernment to institute the poppy ban (Pound 2004) As a result many Afghanfarmers have embraced Al Qaeda for its staunch anti-Americanism (Hersh 2004)

In the war on terrorism in Afghanistan the United States is trying to end theprofits Al Qaeda and the Taliban are making from the greater Central Asian drugtrade (Gannon 2004 Rashid 1999) However this may impact Americarsquos key alliesin the region who have for years reaped the rewards of the Afghanistanrsquos herointrade Nowhere is the problem clearer than along Afghanistanrsquos northern borderwith Tajikistan an ally in the United Statesrsquo antiterrorist efforts and a major conduitfor heroin and opium on its way to Europe and the Americas The United Statesrsquoinvasion even sparked a massive selling of heroin as Al Qaeda and Taliban forcesappeared to have been selling off their narcotic stockpiles for cash to purchase arms(Hersh 2004 Yglesias 2004)

Some Central Asian and Middle Eastern drug traffickers were actually support-ive of the American invasion of Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) According to the WallStreet Journal ldquoacross the Stans and the Caspian Sea in Lebanonrsquos Bekaa Valleysome pray for a speedy United States attack on Afghanistan lsquoItrsquos good for busi-nessrsquo says Muhammed standing in a garage full of cannabis a pistol tucked in hisbelt He is just back from harvesting this yearrsquos cannabis crop lsquoItrsquoll drive up hashishpricesrsquo Muhammed assures a prospective client that transport of 2500 kilograms(5500 pounds) to Amsterdam from the Bekaamdashcontrolled by Syrian troops as wellas Syrian- and Iranian-backed Shiite Muslim Hezbollah fightersmdashcan be arrangedrdquo(qtd in Targeting Terroristsrsquo Drug Money 2001 p 1)

Structural Attributes

Prior to the October 2001 invasion the United States government had no actualpresence in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) Today the most important organizationsresponsible for conducting the narco-terror war in Afghanistan include the FederalBureau of Investigation the Drug Enforcement Administration the Special Forces

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 465

the Department of Statersquos Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforce-ment Affairs (INL) and Pakistan security forces in cooperation with the UN Officeof Drugs and Crime (UNODC) But how successful is the partnership In Febru-ary 2002 the UNODC confirmed that opium poppy cultivation rose to higherlevels than previous years under Taliban rule The UNODC Country Office forAfghanistan and the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme (ICMP) conducted a pre-assessment survey in 208 villages and 42 districts in the traditional opium poppygrowing areas of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan in the provinces of HelmandKandahar Oruzgan Nangarhar and Kunar Those five provinces accounted for84 of the total opium poppy cultivation area in Afghanistan in 2000 (UNODC2004b)

It is estimated that the various security forces currently monitor opium poppycultivation over an area between 45000 hectares and 65000 hectares (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003) This compares to the level of cultivation reached during the mid-1990s but remained lower than those recorded in 1999 (about 95000 hectares)and 2000 (about 82000 hectares) The resulting production of opium harvestedin 2004 could reach between 1900 and 2700 metric tons of opium (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003)

To address these realities the INL the DEA and the FBI have concluded thatwith at least 40 of the Afghan gross domestic product virtually tied to heroin therisks of an untethered narco-economy producing a chain reaction that reverses pastgains made under the Taliban are quite high indeed In response the INL and theDEA have built police training facilities and trained and retrained roughly 20000Afghan police officers in order to implement narco-terror initiatives against Talibanand Al Qaeda holdouts In coordination with United States Special Forces the Bushadministration seeks to place 50000 border guards and Afghan National Police byDecember 2005 in support of the opium eradication campaign The INL the DEAand the FBI are also involved in creating a comprehensive justice sector TheUnited Statesrsquo effort has also resulted in some intriguing bureaucratic alliancesThe Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency one of the main sources ofinformation for the United States-led alliance against the Taliban regime is asso-ciated with political assassinations narcotics trafficking and smuggling of nucleartechnology and missile delivery components with the backing fundamentalistIslamic movements (qtd in Bedi 2001)

Opium cultivation and heroin production in Pakistanrsquos northern tribal belt andadjoining Afghanistan was a vital offshoot of the ISIndashCIA cooperation (Rashid1999) It succeeded in turning some Soviet troops into addicts during the USSRrsquosoccupation of Afghanistan Heroin sales in Europe and the United States carriedout via deceptive means transport networks couriers and pay-offs offset the costof the various wars in Afghanistan (Gannon 2004)

Resultant Political Policy

The initial military victories in Afghanistan are in the process of being lost as thecountry is rapidly disintegrating into a state of narco-terrorism and anarchy TheUnited Statesrsquo efforts may fail unless the link between Al Qaeda Taliban forcesand opium production are finally overcome In 2004 opium farmers and traffick-ers in Afghanistan generated $23 billion in profits with higher estimates for the

466 Chris J Dolan

future The level of opium planting and the subsequent production of opium pastemorphine and heroin in Afghanistan is more than enough to satisfy the demandin Western Europe and the United States (Gannon 2004)

Although Afghanistan represents one source in worldwide opium production inaddition to Mexico South America and Southeast Asia narco-terrorism policytoward Afghanistan has not succeeded in reversing growth trends in heroin con-sumption in the United States According to the 2002 National Survey on DrugUse and Health approximately 37 million Americans ages 12 and older reportedtrying heroin at least once during their lifetimes representing 16 of the popu-lation ages 12 and older Roughly 404000 (02) reported past-year heroin useand 166000 (01) reported past-month heroin use (SAMHSA 2004) Among highschool students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the Future Study 16 ofeighth graders 15 of tenth graders and 15 of twelfth graders reported usingheroin at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these percentages were 1618 and 17 respectively (NIDA 2003)

Regarding the ease by which one can obtain heroin 156 of eighth graders188 of tenth graders and 279 of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reportedthat heroin was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 63 ofeighth graders 71 of tenth graders and 59 of twelfth graders reported thatusing heroin once or twice without a needle was a ldquogreat riskrdquo (NIDA 2003)Nationwide 33 of high school students surveyed in 2003 as part of the YouthRisk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) reported using heroin during theirlifetimes Male students (43) were significantly more likely than female students(20) to report lifetime heroin use Hispanic students (39) were more likely toreport heroin use within their lifetime than white (26) or black (26) students(CDC 2004) During 2002 10 of college students and 18 of young adults (ages19ndash28) reported using heroin at least once during their lifetimes Approximately01 of college students and 02 of young adults reported past year use of heroinand 00 of college students and less than 005 of young adults reported pastmonth use of heroin (NIDA 2004)

According to data from the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) Programa median of 58 of adult male arrestees and 66 of adult female arrestees testedpositive for opiates at arrest in 2003 The adult male samples were compiled from39 United States sites and the adult female samples were compiled from 25 sitesA median of 51 of adult male arrestees and 71 of adult female arresteesreported using heroin at least once in the year before being arrested (NationalInstitute of Justice 2004) Although heroin expenditures were $22 billion in 1990demand decreased to $10 billion in 2000 and whereas in 1990 Americans con-sumed 136 metric tons of heroin estimates remained relatively unchanged in 2000(ABT Associates 2001)

Conclusions

Based on these observations of narco-terrorist activities in Afghanistan and Colom-bia on a substantive level the Bush administration has formulated domestic andinternational drug reduction strategies with an eye on asset seizure and control offunding used by terrorist organizations However important questions remain con-cerning the legitimacy of Americarsquos policy efforts Indeed narco-terrorism as a

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 467

national security threat is not new The 911 attacks simply pushed narco-terror-ism higher on the presidentrsquos national security agenda particularly in light of theconnection between the Afghan drug trade and the Al Qaeda network

On a theoretical level the contingency approach to examining narco-terrorismpolicy highlights several major concerns that have not been adequately addressedFirst as it is conducted today the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy places sig-nificant attention on the increased utilization of American military power Eversince President Richard Nixon proclaimed a war on drugs and President GeorgeW Bush a war on terrorism concern over the use of the military in what have typically been deemed law enforcement and social issues has overshadowed mostother related methods Even if the United States did not introduce troops intoAfghanistan or Colombia we are still left with a highly militarized narco-terrorismpolicy that facilitates human rights abuses by those governments receiving UnitedStates aid Moreover the result has been an increase in the production and con-sumption of illegal drugs that are trafficked by organizations that use profits topromote terrorist attacks

Second the contingency approach used in this study reveals the problems narco-terrorism policy has experienced in targeting so-called weak states Narco-terrorism policy has elevated the potential for the United States to use its diplo-matic weight to force governments to enact stricter antidrug policies This hasencouraged states like Afghanistan and Colombia to further undermine politicaleconomic and social development with undemocratic policies directed at citizensAs a result the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism efforts have in part fueled anti-American resentment thereby increasing the potential for additional terrorist activities by groups such as Al Qaeda or FARC

Third it has become more apparent that narco-terrorism policy has becomelike all other policies highly politicized Americarsquos counterdrug efforts are virtu-ally indistinguishable from counterinsurgency efforts by remnants of the Talibanand Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and FARC and other terror-related groups in Colom-bia Moreover the United States is being rather bold in designating particulargroups as narco-terrorists although conveniently leaving off others such as theNorthern Alliance in Afghanistan This hinders the rule of law in a number of countries

Finally the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in its current form neglectscertain realities Quite simply many critics allege that narco-terrorist connectionsare indirect and for the most part ambiguous In addition critics of prohibitionmaintain that it is the illegalization of drugs that generates the enormous profitsused to support terrorist and insurgent organizations Another concern is thatnarco-terrorism does not address the complexities of terrorism or insurgenciesCan Afghanistan and Colombia continue to be addressed in narrowly defined mil-itary and law enforcement frameworks that neglect political economic and socialconsiderations

About the Author

Chris J Dolan is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Floridawhere he teaches courses on public policy United States Foreign Policy and National Secu-

468 Chris J Dolan

rity the Mass Media and the American presidency He received his PhD from the Univer-sity of South Carolina He is the author of In War We Trust The Political Dimensions and EthicalConsequences of the First Strike Doctrine (Ashgate Press 2005) and co-editor of Striking First ThePreventive Doctrine and the Reshaping of US Foreign Policy (Palgrave-Macmillan 2004) Hisresearch on public policy executive policymaking foreign policy and the mass media appearin Policy Studies Journal Congress and the Presidency Politics and Policy White House Studies andin numerous edited volumes

References

ABT Associates (2001) What Americarsquos users spend on drugs 1988ndash2000 Prepared for the Office of NationalDrug Control Policy Retrieved April 21 2004 from httpwwwwhitehousedrugpolicygovpublicationspdfamerican_users_spend_2002pdf

Allison G T (1971) Essence of decision Boston Little BrownAllison G T amp Halperin M H (1972) Bureaucratic politics A paradigm and and some policy implications

World Politics 24 40ndash79Baldwin E (1991) Why rules donrsquot work Modern Law Review 53 321ndash338Barnard D (2003) Narco-terrorism realities The connection between drugs and terror Journal of Countert-

errorism and Homeland Security International 9(1) 31ndash34Bedi R (2001 September 26) The assassins and drug dealers are now helping us The Daily Telegraph p 1Bennett C J (1991) What is policy convergence What causes it British Journal of Political Science 21(2)

215ndash233Blau P amp Scott R (1962) Formal organizations San Francisco ChandlerBouchard G amp Carroll B (2002) Policy-making and administrative discretion The case of immigration in

Canada Canadian Public Administration 25(2) 239ndash259Bouchard G amp Carroll B (2003) One size does not fit all Annual Meeting of the Canadian Public Service

Administration Halifax Nova ScotiaBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002a) Fiscal year 2003 congres-

sional budget justification Washington DC AuthorBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002b) International narcotics

control strategy Afghanistan (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 from httpusembassystategovafghanistanwwwh02121802html

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2004) International NarcoticsControl Strategy Southwest Asia (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 fromhttpwwwstategovginlrlsnrcrpt2003vol1html29836htm

Bureau of Justice Statistics United States Department of Justice (2000) Sourcebook of criminal justice statisticsWashington DC United States Government Printing Office

Cala A (2001 November 21) Danger of a new Vietnam The Gazette p 1Carroll B amp Garkut D E (1996) Is there an empirical trend toward managerialism Canadian Public Admin-

istration 39(4) 535ndash553Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2004) Youth risk behavior surveillance United States 2003 (May 21)

Retrieved August 2 2004 from httpwwwcdcgovmmwrpreviewmmwrhtmlss5302a1htmChepesiuk R (1999) Hard target The United States war against international drug trafficking 1982ndash1997 Jeffer-

son NC McFarland amp CoColombia Program Center for International Policy (2000) Plan Colombia A plan for peace or a plan for war

( June 20) Retrieved May 1 2004 from httpwwwciponlineorgcolombia062001htmColombia Program Center for International Policy (2004) US Aid to Colombia since 1997 Summary tables

(February 20) Retrieved May 2 2004 from httpciponlineorgcolombiaaidtablehtmConcar D (2001 September 29) Cutting the Talibanrsquos lifeline New Scientist p 77Desveaux J A Lindquist E A amp Toner G (1994) Organizing for policy innovations in public bureaucra-

cies AIDS energy and environmental policy in Canada Canadian Journal of Political Science 27(3)493ndash528

Dexter L (1981) Unintended consequences of purposive legislative action Alternatives to implementationJournal of Public Policy 4(4) 250ndash264

Drug Abuse Policy Office (1982) Federal strategy for prevention of drug abuse and drug trafficking WashingtonDC United States Government Printing Office

Drug Enforcement Administration Intelligence Division (2002) Drugs and terrorism A new perspective RetrievedApril 29 2004 from httpwwwdeagovpubsintel02039f1f1

Dudley S (2000 July 31) The Colombia quagmire The American Prospect p 32

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 469

democracies Judging by the evidence she assembles Castro has used narcoticsprofits to arm Colombian and Nicaraguan guerrillas Bulgaria peddles heroin tosupply weapons to the PLO drugs Lebanonrsquos ldquosingle most important exportrdquo fuelthat countryrsquos warring factions and Peru the worldrsquos leading producer of cocamay soon be subverted from within by drug pushers Syria the Sandinistas Boliviaand the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) are among the leading narco-terrorists identified in a stunning expose Ehrenfeld looks at the conflict betweenJamaican drug gangs and the white Mafia in the United States Rebuking both theAmerican left and right for failing to deal adequately with the drug epidemic sheraises important issues that many liberals and conservatives prefer to ignore(Ehrenfeld 1992)

Analytical Framework

Policy contingency is interpreted as the implications and consequences of policyvariance and program design (Ryan 2001 Segal amp Weisbrod 2002) Contingencyfactors resulting from the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy are theoreticallyfar-reaching and significant The working theoretical model presented here sug-gests an array of relevant policy characteristicsmdashspecifically policy complexity orga-nizational differentiation decision points compression of the issues internal andexternal coupling homogeneity resonance and technology and visibilitymdashwillexert a relative influence on both structural attributes and degrees of policy dis-cretion (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003) Within this relationship structural attributesinfluence policy discretion and the political policy resultant Both structural attrib-utes and policy discretion produce unintended consequences which affect narco-terrorism policy (see figure 1 below)

Policy contingency suggests that it is possible to observe the degree to whichpolicy characteristics exist following the convergence of policies in the policymak-ing process as evidence by the extent of policy discretion and unintended conse-quences at play in the policy outcomes As illustrated in the theoretical model thesecharacteristics include complexity organizational differentiation decision points

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 453

Policy Characteristics

sum Complexity sum Org Differentiation sum Decision Points sum Compression of Issues sum DomesticIntl Coupling sum Homogeneity sum Resonance sum Technology amp Visibility

Policy Discretion

Structural Attributes

Unintended Consequences

Political Policy Resultant

Figure 1 Model of Policy Contingency

compression of issues internal and external coupling homogeneity resonanceand technology and visibility (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003)

According to Bouchard and Carroll policy characteristics resulting from theprocess of policy convergence ldquoimpact policy discretion the structural attributes ofpolicies and programs and the number of unintended consequencesrdquo (2003 p 1)Research has shown that scholars are able to envisage to some degree patterns ofdiscretion and draw tentative conclusions as to the extent of the unintended con-sequences and structural attributes that impact policy outcomes (Dexter 1981Desveaux Lindquist amp Toner 1994 Harmon amp Myer 1986) This influences theability of policymakers from a number of different agencies and departments tomanage policy direction (Bouchard amp Carroll 2002)

Since this article applies the theoretical model to the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy each characteristic of the policy is of course expected to varyComplexity involves the extent of policymaker knowledge and expertise and howambiguous the unified policy is to manage (Blau amp Scott 1962 Meitsner 1976)Narco-terrorism is a highly complex issue since it is at the intersection of drugsand violence and is a newly emergent policy area Historically the DEA used a sim-plistic definition of narco-terrorism in terms of Pablo Escobar the Colombiancocaine trafficker who used terrorist tactics against noncombatants to further hispolitical agenda within his country to protect the illegal drug trade (Smith 1992)Since the fall of Escobar United States policymakers find themselves faced withinternational terrorist groups that participate in drug trafficking to further theirpolitical agendas (Chepesiuk 1999) Narco-terrorists are drug traffickers whoemploy terror tactics against civilians police and military personnel and use drugmoney profits to advance their goals (Mabry 1989) Therefore a narco-terroristorganization is an organization that engages in drug trafficking to advance politi-cally motivated violence against combatant and noncombatant targets (DEA Intelligence Division 2002)

Organizational differentiation emphasizes the array of levels or layers in the rel-evant bureaucratic organizations associated with the implementation of the policyOn the one hand bureaucratic politics informs us that government organizationsare independent entities that behave according to certain established standardoperating procedures (Halperin 1974) This prevails when policymakers are unin-volved or unable to dominate the policymaking process due to the presence ofentrenched organizational interests (Allison 1971 Allison amp Halperin 1972Rosati 1981) On the other hand principalndashagent theory suggests that policy-makers can influence organizational behavior by imposing sanctions for negativebehavior and issuing rewards for positive behavior (Moe 1984 1993)

In contrast to such high-profile policy domains as education and criminal justiceorganizational responsibility for narco-terrorism policy is spread over an array ofdomestic and foreign policy-oriented agencies with the White House-based Officeof National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and the National Security Council (NSC)formally designated as the lead coordinating organizations of the narco-terrorismpolicy bureaucracy (Kraska 1993) Currently the ONDCP and NSC are responsi-ble for coordinating the following departments and agencies Departments ofHealth and Human Services (Centers for Disease Control and National Institutesof Health) Justice (Drug Enforcement Administration the Federal Bureau of

454 Chris J Dolan

Investigation United States Marshals United States Attorneys and the Bureau ofPrisons) Treasury (United States Secret Service and the Bureau of AlcoholTobacco and Firearms) Homeland Security (Bureau of Immigration UnitedStates Border Patrol and United States Customs) Education Labor VeteransAffairs Defense and State

Decision points deal mainly with the number of policymakers involved in thepolicymaking processes and resources devoted to the policy area Since most poli-cies involve a considerable number of individuals in and out of government checksand balances or decision points are built into the decision-making process as a wayof managing the policy (Allison 1971 George 1980 Rosati 1981) At presentthere are more than 50 United States agencies with a stake in both drug controland antiterrorism efforts In fiscal year (FY) 2005 President George W Bush allo-cated a $307 billion antidrug spending package for FY 2005 to fund these agen-cies (National Drug Control Strategy 2004) Between FY 1991 and FY 2000 morethan $140 billion was spent to curtail drug abuse (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2000Drug Abuse Policy Office 1982 National Drug Control Strategy 2000)

Compression of the issues is a process by which the length of time between policyactions and their outcomes can be interpreted as responding to the potential devel-opment or emergence of a future policy problem that has yet to surface (Sabatier1988) Compression also has a relative impact on policy discretion since highlycompressed policies are difficult to control and policy performance is difficult toexamine Combating narco-terrorism requires a global network of law enforce-ment military and intelligence officials tackling the issue

Coupling involves interaction within and between policies Internal couplingrefers to the degree of variation impacting the implementation of the policy andhigher levels of dissimilarity require considerably higher levels of flexibility amongpolicymakers in order to adapt to the interactive changes (Baldwin 1991) Exter-nal coupling or ldquohorizontalityrdquo deals with the relationship between the policy andother related policy areas (Sproule-Jones 2000)

Several measures have been taken over the years that involve coupling Accord-ing to the United States Department of State there are 12 major multilateral conventions and protocols on combating terrorism (DEA Intelligence Division2002) International efforts to combat narco-terrorism have focused on assetseizure and control of all funding sources used by terrorist organizations On September 28 2001 the United Nations (UN) Security Council unanimouslyadopted an antiterrorism resolution that called for the suppression of terroristgroup financing and improved international cooperation against terrorists UNSecurity Council Resolution 1373 required all states to prevent and abolish thefinancing of terrorism and to criminalize the willful collection and distribution offunds for such acts

Homogeneity suggests that while there is always a degree of variation within thepolicy the various elements associated within it and its goals are similar to a certainextent (Carroll amp Garkut 1996) Homogeneity tends to reduce policy discretion toa limited extent and decreases unintended consequences as policy formulators aremore able to forecast the behavior of policy enforcers (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003)History has shown that narco-terrorist organizations fall into different categoriesOne includes politically motivated groups that use drug profits to support their

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 455

terrorist activities activities that will confer legitimacy upon them within the stateSuch groups assume measures to establish a legal political party whereby their polit-ical goals are realized through nonviolent legal means An example of a group inthis category is the Kurdistan Workerrsquos Party (PKK [Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan])Another category consists of groups that pursue ideological goals while participat-ing in select aspects of the drug trade for example the Revolutionary ArmedForces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC)Other extremist groups are suspected of drug involvement such as Hezbollah andthe Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS [Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya])Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path) in Peru and the Basque Fatherland andLiberty (ETA [Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna]) in Spain (Barnard 2003)

Resonance deals with the extent to which the most important issues associatedwith unified policy are embraced internalized and deemed critical by citizensIllegal drug production trafficking and consumption are activities not highly tol-erated by the general public Although the United States government has chosento merge its war on terrorism with its decades-long war on illicit drugs it remainsto be seen as to whether or not such efforts appear to have resonated throughoutthe citizenry However high levels of resonance tend to produce policies withambiguous vague and symbolic goals and a high degree of discretion and needfor adjustment (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003) The position of the Bush administra-tion is that the growing link between terrorists and the drug trade contributes toan increased threat to America (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003) Resonance is an impor-tant variable given that Bushrsquos ONDCP is promoting a new reason to continue thispublic effort since it is convinced that the illegal drug trade is linked to the supportof terror groups across the globe

Technology involves the ordering of policy functions The Counterdrug Tech-nology Assessment Center (CTAC) is the central counterdrug enforcement researchand development (RampD) organization of the United States Government that pro-motes advanced technologies related to the enforcement of narco-terrorism policyCTAC was established within the Office of National Drug Control Policy and hasbeen coordinating the counterdrug RampD program for the federal governmentsince 1992 In 1993 CTAC was directed to include drug abuse rehabilitation andaddiction research in the program in addition to law enforcement-related tech-nology CTAC prepares periodic reports to update the national counterdrug RampDprogram This report is the fourth Counterdrug RampD Blueprint Update and provides the status of the national counterdrug RampD program descriptions oftechnology development and infrastructure support projects and plans for future counterdrug RampD initiatives

Visibility deals mainly with whether or not the public is able to witness the oper-ation of policy functions Where visibility involves public attention and awarenessresonance deals with the degree of importance placed on the policy and its rela-tionship with societyrsquos core values (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003) Although violentacts are visible in the mass media the financing associated with drug productionand trafficking may not be visible to the public Since 911 the ONDCP haslaunched media campaigns to educate the public about the link between the illegaldrug trade and terrorism The multipronged attempt is designed to emphasizehow the sales of illicit drugs finance acts of terror The public initiative combines a

456 Chris J Dolan

range of activitiesmdashprint and broadcast advertising in-school programming lessonplans for teachers online information community and news media outreachmdashtoraise awareness about the link between drugs and terror and engage youth andinfluential adults in drug prevention

Whiteout Colombia

In 2000 the Clinton administration moved through Congress a narco-terror aidbill for Colombia At the time President Clinton signed package into law Colombiawas placed at the top of Americarsquos list of international priorities (Pardo 2000)ONDCP Director General Barry McCaffrey predicted that the initial $13 billionmeasure termed ldquoPlan Colombiardquomdash$860 million of it for Colombia three-quarters of that for Colombiarsquos police and militarymdashwould ldquostrengthen democracythe rule of law economic stability and human rights in Colombiardquo (McCaffery2000) In 2004 Plan Colombia ballooned to a $75 billion spending package(United States Department of State 2003) The Colombian governmentrsquos attemptsto negotiate peace with opposition guerrilla groups came to an end in May 2002when Aacutelvaro Uribe was elected president However under his administration illicitdrug production exploded and human rights abuses soared

Policy Discretion

The United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy toward Colombia is marked by two con-tradictory trends While Colombia has become a lower priority the size andpurpose of United States military aid has rapidly expanded Overall military andpolice aid amounts are increasing with new Colombian units getting support tooperate in new parts of the country In effect the United States has broadened itspurpose for providing Colombia with lethal assistancemdashfor years limited to coun-ternarcoticsmdashto include ldquocounterterrorismrdquo The change allows United States-aided units to assume offensive operations against the Revolutionary Armed Forcesof Colombia (FARC) the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the paramilitaryUnited Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) United States Special Forces havealso been deployed to Colombia to guard oil pipelines and eliminate insurgents(Dudley 2000 Jenkins 2001)

When it was initiated Plan Colombia placed much of its attention on Colom-biarsquos security forces largely overlooking the complicated deep-rooted origins of itsinternal conflicts (Pardo 2000) However in a country with far-reaching inequali-ties and abusive and corrupt police Plan Colombia was set to produce grave con-sequences (Sweig 2002 Weymouth 2000 p 45) According to a joint letter issuedin June 2002 by several Colombian government agencies Plan Colombia ldquowill leadto the escalation of the social and armed conflict fail to solve the drug-traffickingproblem endanger the peace process attack indigenous populationsrsquo culture andlife styles seriously hamper the Amazon eco-system worsen the humanitarian andhuman rights crisis promote forced displacement and further worsen the socialand political crisisrdquo (Colombia Program 2000) Overlooking the warnings between1999 and 2002 the United States gave Colombia $204 billion with 83 percentgoing to Colombiarsquos military and police This pattern continued under the Bush

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 457

administration which allocated $654 million in 2003 for Colombiarsquos security forces(Colombia Program 2004)

The United States also provided advanced weaponry to the Colombian militaryincluding helicopters attack aircraft patrol boats communications and intelli-gence-gathering equipment uniforms and small arms and the training of morethan 15000 Colombian military and police Hundreds of United States troops andprivate contractors work in Colombia as trainers intelligence-gatherers spraypilots and mechanics among other duties Since 1996 United States pilots havesprayed herbicides over more than a million acres of Colombian territory Duringthe 1990s Colombiarsquos National Police received nearly all lethal United States aid(Pardo 2000) The Clinton administration shifted the bulk of aid to the military in1999 and 2000 arguing that the guerrillasrsquo and paramilitariesrsquo entry into the drugbusiness made many counternarcotics missions too dangerous for the police toperform alone (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

Though the Colombian armed forces get most of the aid the United Statesrsquo com-mitment to the counternarcotics division (DIRAN [Directorate of Anti-Narcotics])of the Colombian National Police Force (Policiacutea Nacional Direccioacuten Antinarcoacuteticos)remains quite large The unit performs most drug interdiction and works with theDEA to arrest drug traffickers In rural zones where peasants grow illegal drugcrops United States-made DIRAN helicopters protect pilots who spray herbicidesover fields where illegal drug crops are grown risking ground fire from insurgentgroups (United States Senate 2002)

Over the past few years the United States has provided the DIRAN Air Servicewith Blackhawk and Huey Helicopters C-26B reconnaissance planes and con-struction upgrades to several of its bases throughout Colombia The Drug Enforce-ment Administration has created and completely funds four Sensitive Investigativeunits (SIUs) within the Colombian National Police elite units that carry out riskymissions against drug traffickers A worldwide antiterror appropriation thatbecame law in August 2002 adds more funding $4 million to create police unitsto protect construction of reinforced police stations in guerrilla-controlled areasand $25 million for antikidnapping units (shared with the Colombian Army) TheDIRAN came under a cloud of scandal in 2002 when investigators revealed thatseveral high-ranking officers had stolen at least $2 million in United States aidintended for administrative expenses (Bureau of International Narcotics and LawEnforcement Affairs [BINLEA] 2002a)

Joint ColombianndashUnited States military efforts are primarily concentrated in thesouthern provinces of Caquetaacute and Putumayo seen by many as the most produc-tive cocaine regions The regions account for roughly 33 of all coca (used to makecocaine) grown in Colombia and is controlled by FARC (Dudley 2000) The armyrsquosoriginal mission was to attack drug-processing labs to apprehend traffickers andto clear armed groups from areas of drug-crop cultivation (or at least to clear themlong enough for the United Statesrsquo herbicide spray planes to pass through) InAugust 2002 the Counter-Narcotics Brigade began using its equipment and train-ing for counterterrorism as well as for antidrug missions as a result some of thebrigadersquos operations may resemble the United States-led counter-insurgency effortsduring the 1980s in Central America (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

458 Chris J Dolan

Structural Attributes

Colombiarsquos security forces have a close institutional relationship with several UnitedStates agencies especially the National Security Agency (NSA) the Federal Bureauof Investigation (FBI) the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the StateDepartmentrsquos Bureau for International Narcotics (BIN) The Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA) offers their Colombian counterparts equipment and training toimprove their own ability to collect and analyze intelligence The United States alsoshares intelligence on tactical information concerning insurgent groupsrsquo move-ments and locations Furthermore the United States Army trains thousands ofColombian security personnel counterparts in topics ranging from marksmanshipto helicopter repair to human rights

Yet the United Statesrsquo approach to Colombia appears to neglect even these basictenets of counterinsurgency Massive aerial herbicide conducted by the Colombianand United States air forces and the DEA is fueling antigovernment sentiment ina guerrilla-controlled area (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003) Any social or economic effortshave been overshadowed particularly in most Colombiansrsquo perceptions It has alsosuffered from very serious implementation problems Some aid programs partic-ularly emergency humanitarian assistance appear to be reaching target popula-tionsmdashthough as United States Ambassador to Colombia Anne Patterson admitsthey ldquorepresent a drop in the bucket in relation to the real needs of Colombiarsquosdisplaced personsrdquo (qtd in Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

The success of nonmilitary aid programs has been mixed The effort to helpcoca-growing peasants adopt legal alternatives took the form of a series of ldquosocialpactsrdquo in which signers would receive basic assistance followed by technical andinfrastructure support in exchange for eradicating all their coca within twelvemonths after first receipt of aid By July 2001 37000 families in Putumayomdashjustunder half of the departmentrsquos populationmdashhad signed ldquopactsrdquo and waited forassistance that failed to arrive Alternative development money was delayed by theDEA forced to pass through several agencies before reaching the peasants BINthe United States Agency for International Development (USAID) the Colombiangovernmentrsquos Plan Colombia implementing agency the Colombian governmentrsquosalternative-development agency PLANTE and five Colombian nonprofit orga-nizations with no previous ties to Putumayo contracted to deliver the assistance(Dudley 2000)

Unintended Consequences

Since police and fumigation efforts were not accompanied by a credible alternativedevelopment effort in Putumayo thousands of peasants who had their crops erad-icated suddenly found themselves with little or no opportunities (Miller 2001)Putumayo community and church leaders interviewed by the Council of Interna-tional Policy in November 2002 hinted at a humanitarian disaster as sprayingdamaged food crops had contributed to widespread starvation in FARC-controlledrural areas (Dudley 2000) Those who lacked other economic opportunities joinedFARC and other terror groups by the hundreds (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 459

Furthermore the Bush White House does not appear to be progressing towardits goal of a 50 reduction in Colombian coca-growing by 2005 Coca is difficultto estimate According to CIA figures made public in March 2002 there is a pro-jected increase in the percentage of cocoa production over the next decade Theoverall amount of coca grown in Colombia is roughly 150000 hectares or threetimes as much as it was when the United States began large-scale spraying in 1996(Miller 2001) Since satellite measurements occur immediately following theJulyndashOctober fumigation campaign in Putumayo and may not take into accountreplanting and new planting elsewhere the 2002 statistics may show a greaterdecrease than probably exists (Van Dongen 2003) That year only four (perhapsfive) of Colombiarsquos thirty-two departments had 1000 or more hectares of coca In2001 a survey report issued by the UN found significant increases in coca pro-duction in the thirteen largest provinces in Colombia (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

While fumigation has proven able to reduce coca-growing in limited areasgrowers have been far more agile in eluding United States planes (Pardo 2000)New crops keep appearing in previously untouched parts of Colombiarsquos vast savan-nahs jungles and even coffee-growing zones Since at least the late 1980s totalcoca cultivation in South Americamdashperhaps the most meaningful estimate of thedrugrsquos availabilitymdashhas remained remarkably steady at roughly 200000 hectaresand the price of cocaine sold on United States streets remains steady

Clinton and Bush administration officials repeatedly argued that military train-ing and engagement would ease Colombiarsquos human rights crisis and encourage thearmed forces to end collaboration with paramilitary death squads Sadly the humanrights situation shows no signs of improvement The Consultancy for HumanRights and Displacement (CODHES) a widely cited Colombian nongovernmentalorganization estimated that violence forced 353120 people from their homesduring the first nine months of 2002 more than in all of 2001 The ColombianCommission of Jurists (CCJ) reported in September 2002 that political violence waskilling an average of 20 people per day double what the CCJ was reporting in1998 In January 2003 Human Rights Watch reported that ldquothere were numer-ous and credible reports of joint military-paramilitary operations and the sharingof intelligence and propagandardquo for 2002 (see Human Rights Watch World Report2003)

The most dangerous result could be that the United States has directly involveditself in Colombiarsquos civil war between FARC and government security forces underthe banner of ldquocounterterrorismrdquo (Dudley 2000) Unlike other second-tier ldquoWaron Terrorrdquo countries like the Philippines Georgia or Yemen where the terroristenemy is a shadowy group of a few dozen or a few hundred Colombiarsquos ldquoterror-istrdquo groups are established armies A counterterror effort in Colombia then risksevolving into an El Salvador-style counterinsurgency campaignmdashcomplete withUnited States advisors accompanying combat operations (Barnard 2003)

Political Policy Resultant

The advent of the War on Terror has kept the Bush administration from deviat-ing from its steady military approach Even before September 11 2001 the newBush administration had initiated a ldquoreview processrdquo to explore the possibility of

460 Chris J Dolan

going beyond the drug war to help Colombiarsquos government fight the guerrillas andthe paramilitaries Comparisons between FARC and Al Qaeda now began to showup with regularity

The United Statesrsquo approach is also highly contingent upon its dependence onSouth American oil A 2003 Bush administration foreign aid request to Congressincluded the first significant nondrug military aid to Colombia since the Cold War$98 million to help the Colombian Army protect the 480-mile long Cantildeo Limoacuten-Coventildeas oil pipeline A United States oil company Occidental Petroleum of LosAngeles owns 44 of the crude oil that flows through the Cantildeo Limoacuten pipelinewhich Colombian guerrillas dynamited 166 times in 2001 (United States Depart-ment of State 2002) ldquoClearly we have an energy threatrdquo warned CongressmanMark Souder (R-Indiana) in May 2002 ldquoColombia is either our seventh or eighthlargest supplier of oil Our economy depends on that We already have instabilityin the Middle East We have more compelling reasons to be involved in Colombiathan almost anywhere else in the worldrdquo (Souder 2002)

Beyond these initiatives it is not yet clear how the United Statesrsquo activities willexpand to match Washingtonrsquos much more ambitious mission in Colombia Whilethe purpose of United States military aid has expanded remarkably we have notseen a similar expansion in the amount of United States assistance Certainly military aid is risingmdashColombiarsquos security forces received over $100 million morein 2003 than they did in 2002 The pipeline program accounts for most of thatincrease Yet another $100 million would have only marginal impact on the direc-tion of a conflict involving nearly 40000 well-funded insurgents Pressures fordramatically increased military assistance are likely to build (Cala 2001 Pardo2000)

However if the goal of the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in Colombia isto reduce demand in the United States for cocaine then Americarsquos efforts havelargely failed which has been a continuing trend over the past 15 years (Wisotsky1990) During 2001 there were approximately 1160000 new cocaine users in theUnited States The average age of those who first used cocaine during the year was208 years According to the 2002 National Survey on Drug Use and Healthapproximately 339 million Americans ages 12 and older had tried cocaine at leastonce in their lifetimes representing 144 of the population in that age groupApproximately 59 million (25) had used cocaine in the past year and 20 million(09) had used cocaine within the past month (Substance Abuse and MentalHealth Services Administration [SAMHSA] 2004)

Among high school students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the FutureStudy 36 of eighth graders 51 of tenth graders and 77 of twelfth gradersreported using cocaine at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these per-centages were 36 61 and 78 respectively (National Institute on Drug Abuse[NIDA] 2003) Regarding the ease by which one can obtain powder cocaine 216of eighth graders 296 of tenth graders and 374 of twelfth graders surveyedin 2003 reported that powder cocaine was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtainApproximately 23 (225) of eighth graders 296 of tenth graders and 353of twelfth graders reported that crack cocaine was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo toobtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 44 of eighth graders 52 of tenth graders and 46of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reported that using powder cocaine once or

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 461

twice was a ldquogreat riskrdquo Nearly 49 of eighth graders 58 of tenth graders and47 of twelfth graders reported that using crack cocaine once or twice was a ldquogreatriskrdquo (NIDA 2003)

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also conducts a surveyof high school students throughout the United States the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) Among students surveyed in 2003 87 reportedusing some form of cocaine at least one time during their life of those 41reported being current users of cocaine meaning that they had used cocaine atleast once during the past month (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention[CDC] 2004) During 2002 82 of college students and 135 of young adults(ages 19ndash28) reported using cocaine at least once during their lifetimes Approxi-mately 48 of college students and 58 of young adults reported past-year useof cocaine and 16 of college students and 22 of young adults reported past-month use of cocaine (NIDA 2004)

Flower Power Afghanistan

Afghanistan is the worldrsquos leading source country for the cultivation processingand trafficking of opium By 1999 Afghanistan grew more than 4000 tons ofopium a year making it the primary source of roughly 75 of the worldrsquos illegalheroin (Concar 2001) Today narcotics are the largest source of income inAfghanistan due to the decimation of the countryrsquos economic infrastructure causedby years of warfare

Policy Discretion

On July 28 2000 Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar issued a decreebanning future opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan The decree stated that themilitary would eliminate poppy cultivation in the 2001 growing season in areasunder their control At the time the ban applied to any territory seized from theNorthern Alliance In February 2001 the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)declared that the opium poppy cultivation ban was successful and that the 2001crop was expected to be negligible (UNODC 2004a p 70) This marked the firsteffort by Taliban rulers to reduce opium production The eradication effort wasmade in response to an agreement with the UNODC which agreed to fund alter-native development projects on the condition that cultivation would be decreasedin Kandahar

Laboratories in Afghanistan convert opium into morphine base white heroinor one of three grades of brown heroin depending on the order received Largeprocessing labs are located in southern Afghanistan with smaller labs located mainlyin Nangarhar Province In the past many opium processing laboratories werelocated in Pakistan particularly in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) Theselaboratories appear to have relocated to Afghanistan both to be closer to the sourceof opium and to avoid the Pakistani government Morphine base is usually pro-duced for traffickers based in Turkey where it is converted to heroin before ship-ment to Europe and North and South America Chemists in the region are capable

462 Chris J Dolan

of producing heroin hydrochloride with extremely high purity levels (UNODC2004b)

Since Afghanistan is landlocked drug traffickers must rely on land routes tomove morphine base and heroin out of the country Heroin is trafficked to world-wide destinations by many routes Traffickers quickly adjust heroin smugglingroutes based on political and weather-related events (Gannon 2004) Reports ofheroin shipments north from Afghanistan through the Central Asian States toRussia have increased Tajikistan is a frequent destination for both opium andheroin shipments although Tajikistan serves mostly as a transit point and storagelocation rather than a final destination Seizures are frequently reported at Pakistanrsquos international airports (Rashid 1999) Heroin is also smuggled by sea onvessels leaving the port city of Karachi Heroin produced in Afghanistan continuesto be trafficked to the United States although generally in small quantities It isestimated that roughly 90 of opiate products in Europe originate in Afghanistan(Concar 2001 Hersh 2004)

Money laundering is not an issue in Afghanistan The unsophisticated bankingsystem that previously existed has been damaged by the years of war It is likelythat the informal banking system used extensively in the region usually referredto as the hawala or hundi money laundering system is used by drug traffickers(Lehmkuhler 2003) This system is an underground traditional informal networkthat has been used for centuries by businesses and families throughout Asia (StillFlushmdashTerrorist Finance 2002) This system provides a confidential convenientefficient service at a low cost in areas that are not served by traditional bankingfacilities (Hersh 2004)

Prior to the United Statesrsquo invasion of October 2001 the Taliban maintainedeffective control of nearly all of the opium poppy growing areas in the countryeven though they were only recognized as the legitimate government ofAfghanistan by three governments Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the United ArabEmirates Islamic law (Sharirsquoa) has been imposed in territory controlled by theTaliban and local Sharirsquoa courts have been established throughout the country In1997 the Taliban reactivated the State High Commission for Drug Control whichwas originally established in 1990 by the legitimate interim government Before theUNODC reports indicating that implementation of the 2000ndash2001 opium poppycultivation ban has been effective and the release of the United States governmentestimate indicating a dramatic reduction in opium production the Taliban madeonly token gestures toward antidrug law enforcement (BINLEA 2002b) Althoughthey have banned opium poppy cultivation the Taliban itself long relied on drugtrafficking for financial support

Unintended Consequences

As the United States began more rapidly merging its war on drugs with the greaterWar on Terror on a public scale halting opium production had to be as importantas eliminating the Taliban and the Al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan But howserious were Americarsquos efforts in applying its narco-terrorism policy to AfghanistanUnited States military commanders were not going to set opium eradication at thetop of their list of priorities (Schmitt 2002)

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 463

The results were consistent with Americarsquos hands-off approach Afghan opiumproduction in 2002 exploded to near-record levels making the war-ravaged nationagain the worldrsquos leading producer of the drug ( Judis 2003) Efforts by the UnitedStates-backed interim government of Hamid Karzai to eradicate opium productionby paying farmers to destroy their crops have failed because of a lack of moneyand violent demonstrations by farmers fearing their livelihoods were in jeopardy(Pound 2004) The UNrsquos Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated thatAfghanistan produced 3400 metric tons of opium in 2002 (Moreau amp Yousafzai2003 United Nations Information Service 2003)

Immediately after assuming office Karzai issued a decree on January 17 2002not only banning cultivation but also the processing trafficking and abuse ofopiates (Hanley 2002) Last month his government reiterated that positionreasserting the ban on opium poppy planting in the autumn (Hersh 2004) TheUNODC reopened its Kabul office in February 2002 and appointed Mohammad-Reza Amirkhizi as its representative The office has been engaged in a wide rangeof projects which include strengthening the Afghan drug control commissionassistance in law enforcement and the criminal justice sectors and cross-bordercounternarcotics cooperation with neighboring states The office is also working ona pilot social compact with farmers in Kandahar and Badakhshan provinces pro-viding them with small amounts of financial assistance with the understanding thatthey would grow commercial crops other than opium poppy (Gannon 2004)

The new Afghan government has largely failed in its now three-year effort toeradicate the opium poppy crop in Afghanistan which in recent years became theworldrsquos biggest producer of the raw material for heroin (Hanley 2002 Wehrfritz2003) The UN estimated that the 2004 crop could be worth more than $2 billionat the farm level in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004 Pound 2004) The resurgence ofopium production in Afghanistan is a major unintended consequence of the UnitedStates invasion

By 2002 the total opium poppy cultivation averaged 74000 hectares under theKarzai government and the United Statesrsquo military presence up from only 8000hectares in 2001 under the Taliban (UNODC 2004a) While the 2002 levels arestill lower than the record level crop growing 91000 hectares in 1999 and 82000hectares in 2000 the UN report confirms that opium cultivation has resumed topreviously high levels (Moreau amp Yousafzai 2003 UNODC 2004b)

As a result the average yield poppy production in 2002 shot up to 46 kilo-gramshectare from 24 kilogramshectare in 2001 The massive increase is largelydue to more extensive irrigation programs in Eastern and Southern Afghanistanimplemented since the fall of the Taliban in November 2001 along with the end ofa nationwide drought which devastated total agricultural output between 1998 and2001 Thus total opium poppy production in 2002 was 3400 metric tons a sizableincrease compared to 185 metric tons in 2001 (UNODC 2004b) Poppy cultivationthen doubled between 2002 and 2003 The area planted with poppies used tomake heroin and morphine was 152000 hectares in 2003 compared with 74000hectares in 2002 according to the White House ONDCP (UNODC 2004b)According to the State Department ldquoIn Afghanistan poppy cultivationapproached the highest levels ever registered International and United Statessurveys indicate that in 2003 Afghanistan again produced three-quarters of the

464 Chris J Dolan

worldrsquos illicit opium The narcotics situation remains serious despite positiveactions by both the government and international donorsrdquo (BINLEA 2004)

Besides the eradication campaign announced by the new Afghan governmentin 2002 appears to have been doomed to failure due to a lack of United Statesfinancial support Farmers were to be compensated with $500 per acre fordestroyed poppies which is only a fraction of the estimated $6400 per acre of grossincome an Afghani farmer can earn on poppy cultivation The UN Food and Agriculture Organization reported that ldquoAfghani government programs had a verylimited impactrdquo (Hanley 2002) At 2003 price levels and as a result of the explo-sion in poppy cultivation and production total income for Afghani opium farmersreached several hundred million United States dollars by the end of 2003 (Pound2004)

Other more unfortunate factors resulted from the 2002 poppy eradication cam-paign Afghan farmers have been killed and wounded by United States and Afghansecurity forces during protests against the campaign to eradicate their opiumpoppy crops (Wehrfritz 2003 Wyatt 2002) According to the BBC ldquoThe farmersare angered at what they see as derisory compensationrdquo (Wyatt 2002) ManyAfghan farmers direct their anger at the United States for pressuring the Karzaigovernment to institute the poppy ban (Pound 2004) As a result many Afghanfarmers have embraced Al Qaeda for its staunch anti-Americanism (Hersh 2004)

In the war on terrorism in Afghanistan the United States is trying to end theprofits Al Qaeda and the Taliban are making from the greater Central Asian drugtrade (Gannon 2004 Rashid 1999) However this may impact Americarsquos key alliesin the region who have for years reaped the rewards of the Afghanistanrsquos herointrade Nowhere is the problem clearer than along Afghanistanrsquos northern borderwith Tajikistan an ally in the United Statesrsquo antiterrorist efforts and a major conduitfor heroin and opium on its way to Europe and the Americas The United Statesrsquoinvasion even sparked a massive selling of heroin as Al Qaeda and Taliban forcesappeared to have been selling off their narcotic stockpiles for cash to purchase arms(Hersh 2004 Yglesias 2004)

Some Central Asian and Middle Eastern drug traffickers were actually support-ive of the American invasion of Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) According to the WallStreet Journal ldquoacross the Stans and the Caspian Sea in Lebanonrsquos Bekaa Valleysome pray for a speedy United States attack on Afghanistan lsquoItrsquos good for busi-nessrsquo says Muhammed standing in a garage full of cannabis a pistol tucked in hisbelt He is just back from harvesting this yearrsquos cannabis crop lsquoItrsquoll drive up hashishpricesrsquo Muhammed assures a prospective client that transport of 2500 kilograms(5500 pounds) to Amsterdam from the Bekaamdashcontrolled by Syrian troops as wellas Syrian- and Iranian-backed Shiite Muslim Hezbollah fightersmdashcan be arrangedrdquo(qtd in Targeting Terroristsrsquo Drug Money 2001 p 1)

Structural Attributes

Prior to the October 2001 invasion the United States government had no actualpresence in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) Today the most important organizationsresponsible for conducting the narco-terror war in Afghanistan include the FederalBureau of Investigation the Drug Enforcement Administration the Special Forces

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 465

the Department of Statersquos Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforce-ment Affairs (INL) and Pakistan security forces in cooperation with the UN Officeof Drugs and Crime (UNODC) But how successful is the partnership In Febru-ary 2002 the UNODC confirmed that opium poppy cultivation rose to higherlevels than previous years under Taliban rule The UNODC Country Office forAfghanistan and the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme (ICMP) conducted a pre-assessment survey in 208 villages and 42 districts in the traditional opium poppygrowing areas of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan in the provinces of HelmandKandahar Oruzgan Nangarhar and Kunar Those five provinces accounted for84 of the total opium poppy cultivation area in Afghanistan in 2000 (UNODC2004b)

It is estimated that the various security forces currently monitor opium poppycultivation over an area between 45000 hectares and 65000 hectares (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003) This compares to the level of cultivation reached during the mid-1990s but remained lower than those recorded in 1999 (about 95000 hectares)and 2000 (about 82000 hectares) The resulting production of opium harvestedin 2004 could reach between 1900 and 2700 metric tons of opium (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003)

To address these realities the INL the DEA and the FBI have concluded thatwith at least 40 of the Afghan gross domestic product virtually tied to heroin therisks of an untethered narco-economy producing a chain reaction that reverses pastgains made under the Taliban are quite high indeed In response the INL and theDEA have built police training facilities and trained and retrained roughly 20000Afghan police officers in order to implement narco-terror initiatives against Talibanand Al Qaeda holdouts In coordination with United States Special Forces the Bushadministration seeks to place 50000 border guards and Afghan National Police byDecember 2005 in support of the opium eradication campaign The INL the DEAand the FBI are also involved in creating a comprehensive justice sector TheUnited Statesrsquo effort has also resulted in some intriguing bureaucratic alliancesThe Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency one of the main sources ofinformation for the United States-led alliance against the Taliban regime is asso-ciated with political assassinations narcotics trafficking and smuggling of nucleartechnology and missile delivery components with the backing fundamentalistIslamic movements (qtd in Bedi 2001)

Opium cultivation and heroin production in Pakistanrsquos northern tribal belt andadjoining Afghanistan was a vital offshoot of the ISIndashCIA cooperation (Rashid1999) It succeeded in turning some Soviet troops into addicts during the USSRrsquosoccupation of Afghanistan Heroin sales in Europe and the United States carriedout via deceptive means transport networks couriers and pay-offs offset the costof the various wars in Afghanistan (Gannon 2004)

Resultant Political Policy

The initial military victories in Afghanistan are in the process of being lost as thecountry is rapidly disintegrating into a state of narco-terrorism and anarchy TheUnited Statesrsquo efforts may fail unless the link between Al Qaeda Taliban forcesand opium production are finally overcome In 2004 opium farmers and traffick-ers in Afghanistan generated $23 billion in profits with higher estimates for the

466 Chris J Dolan

future The level of opium planting and the subsequent production of opium pastemorphine and heroin in Afghanistan is more than enough to satisfy the demandin Western Europe and the United States (Gannon 2004)

Although Afghanistan represents one source in worldwide opium production inaddition to Mexico South America and Southeast Asia narco-terrorism policytoward Afghanistan has not succeeded in reversing growth trends in heroin con-sumption in the United States According to the 2002 National Survey on DrugUse and Health approximately 37 million Americans ages 12 and older reportedtrying heroin at least once during their lifetimes representing 16 of the popu-lation ages 12 and older Roughly 404000 (02) reported past-year heroin useand 166000 (01) reported past-month heroin use (SAMHSA 2004) Among highschool students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the Future Study 16 ofeighth graders 15 of tenth graders and 15 of twelfth graders reported usingheroin at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these percentages were 1618 and 17 respectively (NIDA 2003)

Regarding the ease by which one can obtain heroin 156 of eighth graders188 of tenth graders and 279 of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reportedthat heroin was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 63 ofeighth graders 71 of tenth graders and 59 of twelfth graders reported thatusing heroin once or twice without a needle was a ldquogreat riskrdquo (NIDA 2003)Nationwide 33 of high school students surveyed in 2003 as part of the YouthRisk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) reported using heroin during theirlifetimes Male students (43) were significantly more likely than female students(20) to report lifetime heroin use Hispanic students (39) were more likely toreport heroin use within their lifetime than white (26) or black (26) students(CDC 2004) During 2002 10 of college students and 18 of young adults (ages19ndash28) reported using heroin at least once during their lifetimes Approximately01 of college students and 02 of young adults reported past year use of heroinand 00 of college students and less than 005 of young adults reported pastmonth use of heroin (NIDA 2004)

According to data from the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) Programa median of 58 of adult male arrestees and 66 of adult female arrestees testedpositive for opiates at arrest in 2003 The adult male samples were compiled from39 United States sites and the adult female samples were compiled from 25 sitesA median of 51 of adult male arrestees and 71 of adult female arresteesreported using heroin at least once in the year before being arrested (NationalInstitute of Justice 2004) Although heroin expenditures were $22 billion in 1990demand decreased to $10 billion in 2000 and whereas in 1990 Americans con-sumed 136 metric tons of heroin estimates remained relatively unchanged in 2000(ABT Associates 2001)

Conclusions

Based on these observations of narco-terrorist activities in Afghanistan and Colom-bia on a substantive level the Bush administration has formulated domestic andinternational drug reduction strategies with an eye on asset seizure and control offunding used by terrorist organizations However important questions remain con-cerning the legitimacy of Americarsquos policy efforts Indeed narco-terrorism as a

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 467

national security threat is not new The 911 attacks simply pushed narco-terror-ism higher on the presidentrsquos national security agenda particularly in light of theconnection between the Afghan drug trade and the Al Qaeda network

On a theoretical level the contingency approach to examining narco-terrorismpolicy highlights several major concerns that have not been adequately addressedFirst as it is conducted today the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy places sig-nificant attention on the increased utilization of American military power Eversince President Richard Nixon proclaimed a war on drugs and President GeorgeW Bush a war on terrorism concern over the use of the military in what have typically been deemed law enforcement and social issues has overshadowed mostother related methods Even if the United States did not introduce troops intoAfghanistan or Colombia we are still left with a highly militarized narco-terrorismpolicy that facilitates human rights abuses by those governments receiving UnitedStates aid Moreover the result has been an increase in the production and con-sumption of illegal drugs that are trafficked by organizations that use profits topromote terrorist attacks

Second the contingency approach used in this study reveals the problems narco-terrorism policy has experienced in targeting so-called weak states Narco-terrorism policy has elevated the potential for the United States to use its diplo-matic weight to force governments to enact stricter antidrug policies This hasencouraged states like Afghanistan and Colombia to further undermine politicaleconomic and social development with undemocratic policies directed at citizensAs a result the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism efforts have in part fueled anti-American resentment thereby increasing the potential for additional terrorist activities by groups such as Al Qaeda or FARC

Third it has become more apparent that narco-terrorism policy has becomelike all other policies highly politicized Americarsquos counterdrug efforts are virtu-ally indistinguishable from counterinsurgency efforts by remnants of the Talibanand Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and FARC and other terror-related groups in Colom-bia Moreover the United States is being rather bold in designating particulargroups as narco-terrorists although conveniently leaving off others such as theNorthern Alliance in Afghanistan This hinders the rule of law in a number of countries

Finally the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in its current form neglectscertain realities Quite simply many critics allege that narco-terrorist connectionsare indirect and for the most part ambiguous In addition critics of prohibitionmaintain that it is the illegalization of drugs that generates the enormous profitsused to support terrorist and insurgent organizations Another concern is thatnarco-terrorism does not address the complexities of terrorism or insurgenciesCan Afghanistan and Colombia continue to be addressed in narrowly defined mil-itary and law enforcement frameworks that neglect political economic and socialconsiderations

About the Author

Chris J Dolan is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Floridawhere he teaches courses on public policy United States Foreign Policy and National Secu-

468 Chris J Dolan

rity the Mass Media and the American presidency He received his PhD from the Univer-sity of South Carolina He is the author of In War We Trust The Political Dimensions and EthicalConsequences of the First Strike Doctrine (Ashgate Press 2005) and co-editor of Striking First ThePreventive Doctrine and the Reshaping of US Foreign Policy (Palgrave-Macmillan 2004) Hisresearch on public policy executive policymaking foreign policy and the mass media appearin Policy Studies Journal Congress and the Presidency Politics and Policy White House Studies andin numerous edited volumes

References

ABT Associates (2001) What Americarsquos users spend on drugs 1988ndash2000 Prepared for the Office of NationalDrug Control Policy Retrieved April 21 2004 from httpwwwwhitehousedrugpolicygovpublicationspdfamerican_users_spend_2002pdf

Allison G T (1971) Essence of decision Boston Little BrownAllison G T amp Halperin M H (1972) Bureaucratic politics A paradigm and and some policy implications

World Politics 24 40ndash79Baldwin E (1991) Why rules donrsquot work Modern Law Review 53 321ndash338Barnard D (2003) Narco-terrorism realities The connection between drugs and terror Journal of Countert-

errorism and Homeland Security International 9(1) 31ndash34Bedi R (2001 September 26) The assassins and drug dealers are now helping us The Daily Telegraph p 1Bennett C J (1991) What is policy convergence What causes it British Journal of Political Science 21(2)

215ndash233Blau P amp Scott R (1962) Formal organizations San Francisco ChandlerBouchard G amp Carroll B (2002) Policy-making and administrative discretion The case of immigration in

Canada Canadian Public Administration 25(2) 239ndash259Bouchard G amp Carroll B (2003) One size does not fit all Annual Meeting of the Canadian Public Service

Administration Halifax Nova ScotiaBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002a) Fiscal year 2003 congres-

sional budget justification Washington DC AuthorBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002b) International narcotics

control strategy Afghanistan (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 from httpusembassystategovafghanistanwwwh02121802html

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2004) International NarcoticsControl Strategy Southwest Asia (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 fromhttpwwwstategovginlrlsnrcrpt2003vol1html29836htm

Bureau of Justice Statistics United States Department of Justice (2000) Sourcebook of criminal justice statisticsWashington DC United States Government Printing Office

Cala A (2001 November 21) Danger of a new Vietnam The Gazette p 1Carroll B amp Garkut D E (1996) Is there an empirical trend toward managerialism Canadian Public Admin-

istration 39(4) 535ndash553Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2004) Youth risk behavior surveillance United States 2003 (May 21)

Retrieved August 2 2004 from httpwwwcdcgovmmwrpreviewmmwrhtmlss5302a1htmChepesiuk R (1999) Hard target The United States war against international drug trafficking 1982ndash1997 Jeffer-

son NC McFarland amp CoColombia Program Center for International Policy (2000) Plan Colombia A plan for peace or a plan for war

( June 20) Retrieved May 1 2004 from httpwwwciponlineorgcolombia062001htmColombia Program Center for International Policy (2004) US Aid to Colombia since 1997 Summary tables

(February 20) Retrieved May 2 2004 from httpciponlineorgcolombiaaidtablehtmConcar D (2001 September 29) Cutting the Talibanrsquos lifeline New Scientist p 77Desveaux J A Lindquist E A amp Toner G (1994) Organizing for policy innovations in public bureaucra-

cies AIDS energy and environmental policy in Canada Canadian Journal of Political Science 27(3)493ndash528

Dexter L (1981) Unintended consequences of purposive legislative action Alternatives to implementationJournal of Public Policy 4(4) 250ndash264

Drug Abuse Policy Office (1982) Federal strategy for prevention of drug abuse and drug trafficking WashingtonDC United States Government Printing Office

Drug Enforcement Administration Intelligence Division (2002) Drugs and terrorism A new perspective RetrievedApril 29 2004 from httpwwwdeagovpubsintel02039f1f1

Dudley S (2000 July 31) The Colombia quagmire The American Prospect p 32

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 469

compression of issues internal and external coupling homogeneity resonanceand technology and visibility (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003)

According to Bouchard and Carroll policy characteristics resulting from theprocess of policy convergence ldquoimpact policy discretion the structural attributes ofpolicies and programs and the number of unintended consequencesrdquo (2003 p 1)Research has shown that scholars are able to envisage to some degree patterns ofdiscretion and draw tentative conclusions as to the extent of the unintended con-sequences and structural attributes that impact policy outcomes (Dexter 1981Desveaux Lindquist amp Toner 1994 Harmon amp Myer 1986) This influences theability of policymakers from a number of different agencies and departments tomanage policy direction (Bouchard amp Carroll 2002)

Since this article applies the theoretical model to the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy each characteristic of the policy is of course expected to varyComplexity involves the extent of policymaker knowledge and expertise and howambiguous the unified policy is to manage (Blau amp Scott 1962 Meitsner 1976)Narco-terrorism is a highly complex issue since it is at the intersection of drugsand violence and is a newly emergent policy area Historically the DEA used a sim-plistic definition of narco-terrorism in terms of Pablo Escobar the Colombiancocaine trafficker who used terrorist tactics against noncombatants to further hispolitical agenda within his country to protect the illegal drug trade (Smith 1992)Since the fall of Escobar United States policymakers find themselves faced withinternational terrorist groups that participate in drug trafficking to further theirpolitical agendas (Chepesiuk 1999) Narco-terrorists are drug traffickers whoemploy terror tactics against civilians police and military personnel and use drugmoney profits to advance their goals (Mabry 1989) Therefore a narco-terroristorganization is an organization that engages in drug trafficking to advance politi-cally motivated violence against combatant and noncombatant targets (DEA Intelligence Division 2002)

Organizational differentiation emphasizes the array of levels or layers in the rel-evant bureaucratic organizations associated with the implementation of the policyOn the one hand bureaucratic politics informs us that government organizationsare independent entities that behave according to certain established standardoperating procedures (Halperin 1974) This prevails when policymakers are unin-volved or unable to dominate the policymaking process due to the presence ofentrenched organizational interests (Allison 1971 Allison amp Halperin 1972Rosati 1981) On the other hand principalndashagent theory suggests that policy-makers can influence organizational behavior by imposing sanctions for negativebehavior and issuing rewards for positive behavior (Moe 1984 1993)

In contrast to such high-profile policy domains as education and criminal justiceorganizational responsibility for narco-terrorism policy is spread over an array ofdomestic and foreign policy-oriented agencies with the White House-based Officeof National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and the National Security Council (NSC)formally designated as the lead coordinating organizations of the narco-terrorismpolicy bureaucracy (Kraska 1993) Currently the ONDCP and NSC are responsi-ble for coordinating the following departments and agencies Departments ofHealth and Human Services (Centers for Disease Control and National Institutesof Health) Justice (Drug Enforcement Administration the Federal Bureau of

454 Chris J Dolan

Investigation United States Marshals United States Attorneys and the Bureau ofPrisons) Treasury (United States Secret Service and the Bureau of AlcoholTobacco and Firearms) Homeland Security (Bureau of Immigration UnitedStates Border Patrol and United States Customs) Education Labor VeteransAffairs Defense and State

Decision points deal mainly with the number of policymakers involved in thepolicymaking processes and resources devoted to the policy area Since most poli-cies involve a considerable number of individuals in and out of government checksand balances or decision points are built into the decision-making process as a wayof managing the policy (Allison 1971 George 1980 Rosati 1981) At presentthere are more than 50 United States agencies with a stake in both drug controland antiterrorism efforts In fiscal year (FY) 2005 President George W Bush allo-cated a $307 billion antidrug spending package for FY 2005 to fund these agen-cies (National Drug Control Strategy 2004) Between FY 1991 and FY 2000 morethan $140 billion was spent to curtail drug abuse (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2000Drug Abuse Policy Office 1982 National Drug Control Strategy 2000)

Compression of the issues is a process by which the length of time between policyactions and their outcomes can be interpreted as responding to the potential devel-opment or emergence of a future policy problem that has yet to surface (Sabatier1988) Compression also has a relative impact on policy discretion since highlycompressed policies are difficult to control and policy performance is difficult toexamine Combating narco-terrorism requires a global network of law enforce-ment military and intelligence officials tackling the issue

Coupling involves interaction within and between policies Internal couplingrefers to the degree of variation impacting the implementation of the policy andhigher levels of dissimilarity require considerably higher levels of flexibility amongpolicymakers in order to adapt to the interactive changes (Baldwin 1991) Exter-nal coupling or ldquohorizontalityrdquo deals with the relationship between the policy andother related policy areas (Sproule-Jones 2000)

Several measures have been taken over the years that involve coupling Accord-ing to the United States Department of State there are 12 major multilateral conventions and protocols on combating terrorism (DEA Intelligence Division2002) International efforts to combat narco-terrorism have focused on assetseizure and control of all funding sources used by terrorist organizations On September 28 2001 the United Nations (UN) Security Council unanimouslyadopted an antiterrorism resolution that called for the suppression of terroristgroup financing and improved international cooperation against terrorists UNSecurity Council Resolution 1373 required all states to prevent and abolish thefinancing of terrorism and to criminalize the willful collection and distribution offunds for such acts

Homogeneity suggests that while there is always a degree of variation within thepolicy the various elements associated within it and its goals are similar to a certainextent (Carroll amp Garkut 1996) Homogeneity tends to reduce policy discretion toa limited extent and decreases unintended consequences as policy formulators aremore able to forecast the behavior of policy enforcers (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003)History has shown that narco-terrorist organizations fall into different categoriesOne includes politically motivated groups that use drug profits to support their

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 455

terrorist activities activities that will confer legitimacy upon them within the stateSuch groups assume measures to establish a legal political party whereby their polit-ical goals are realized through nonviolent legal means An example of a group inthis category is the Kurdistan Workerrsquos Party (PKK [Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan])Another category consists of groups that pursue ideological goals while participat-ing in select aspects of the drug trade for example the Revolutionary ArmedForces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC)Other extremist groups are suspected of drug involvement such as Hezbollah andthe Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS [Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya])Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path) in Peru and the Basque Fatherland andLiberty (ETA [Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna]) in Spain (Barnard 2003)

Resonance deals with the extent to which the most important issues associatedwith unified policy are embraced internalized and deemed critical by citizensIllegal drug production trafficking and consumption are activities not highly tol-erated by the general public Although the United States government has chosento merge its war on terrorism with its decades-long war on illicit drugs it remainsto be seen as to whether or not such efforts appear to have resonated throughoutthe citizenry However high levels of resonance tend to produce policies withambiguous vague and symbolic goals and a high degree of discretion and needfor adjustment (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003) The position of the Bush administra-tion is that the growing link between terrorists and the drug trade contributes toan increased threat to America (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003) Resonance is an impor-tant variable given that Bushrsquos ONDCP is promoting a new reason to continue thispublic effort since it is convinced that the illegal drug trade is linked to the supportof terror groups across the globe

Technology involves the ordering of policy functions The Counterdrug Tech-nology Assessment Center (CTAC) is the central counterdrug enforcement researchand development (RampD) organization of the United States Government that pro-motes advanced technologies related to the enforcement of narco-terrorism policyCTAC was established within the Office of National Drug Control Policy and hasbeen coordinating the counterdrug RampD program for the federal governmentsince 1992 In 1993 CTAC was directed to include drug abuse rehabilitation andaddiction research in the program in addition to law enforcement-related tech-nology CTAC prepares periodic reports to update the national counterdrug RampDprogram This report is the fourth Counterdrug RampD Blueprint Update and provides the status of the national counterdrug RampD program descriptions oftechnology development and infrastructure support projects and plans for future counterdrug RampD initiatives

Visibility deals mainly with whether or not the public is able to witness the oper-ation of policy functions Where visibility involves public attention and awarenessresonance deals with the degree of importance placed on the policy and its rela-tionship with societyrsquos core values (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003) Although violentacts are visible in the mass media the financing associated with drug productionand trafficking may not be visible to the public Since 911 the ONDCP haslaunched media campaigns to educate the public about the link between the illegaldrug trade and terrorism The multipronged attempt is designed to emphasizehow the sales of illicit drugs finance acts of terror The public initiative combines a

456 Chris J Dolan

range of activitiesmdashprint and broadcast advertising in-school programming lessonplans for teachers online information community and news media outreachmdashtoraise awareness about the link between drugs and terror and engage youth andinfluential adults in drug prevention

Whiteout Colombia

In 2000 the Clinton administration moved through Congress a narco-terror aidbill for Colombia At the time President Clinton signed package into law Colombiawas placed at the top of Americarsquos list of international priorities (Pardo 2000)ONDCP Director General Barry McCaffrey predicted that the initial $13 billionmeasure termed ldquoPlan Colombiardquomdash$860 million of it for Colombia three-quarters of that for Colombiarsquos police and militarymdashwould ldquostrengthen democracythe rule of law economic stability and human rights in Colombiardquo (McCaffery2000) In 2004 Plan Colombia ballooned to a $75 billion spending package(United States Department of State 2003) The Colombian governmentrsquos attemptsto negotiate peace with opposition guerrilla groups came to an end in May 2002when Aacutelvaro Uribe was elected president However under his administration illicitdrug production exploded and human rights abuses soared

Policy Discretion

The United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy toward Colombia is marked by two con-tradictory trends While Colombia has become a lower priority the size andpurpose of United States military aid has rapidly expanded Overall military andpolice aid amounts are increasing with new Colombian units getting support tooperate in new parts of the country In effect the United States has broadened itspurpose for providing Colombia with lethal assistancemdashfor years limited to coun-ternarcoticsmdashto include ldquocounterterrorismrdquo The change allows United States-aided units to assume offensive operations against the Revolutionary Armed Forcesof Colombia (FARC) the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the paramilitaryUnited Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) United States Special Forces havealso been deployed to Colombia to guard oil pipelines and eliminate insurgents(Dudley 2000 Jenkins 2001)

When it was initiated Plan Colombia placed much of its attention on Colom-biarsquos security forces largely overlooking the complicated deep-rooted origins of itsinternal conflicts (Pardo 2000) However in a country with far-reaching inequali-ties and abusive and corrupt police Plan Colombia was set to produce grave con-sequences (Sweig 2002 Weymouth 2000 p 45) According to a joint letter issuedin June 2002 by several Colombian government agencies Plan Colombia ldquowill leadto the escalation of the social and armed conflict fail to solve the drug-traffickingproblem endanger the peace process attack indigenous populationsrsquo culture andlife styles seriously hamper the Amazon eco-system worsen the humanitarian andhuman rights crisis promote forced displacement and further worsen the socialand political crisisrdquo (Colombia Program 2000) Overlooking the warnings between1999 and 2002 the United States gave Colombia $204 billion with 83 percentgoing to Colombiarsquos military and police This pattern continued under the Bush

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 457

administration which allocated $654 million in 2003 for Colombiarsquos security forces(Colombia Program 2004)

The United States also provided advanced weaponry to the Colombian militaryincluding helicopters attack aircraft patrol boats communications and intelli-gence-gathering equipment uniforms and small arms and the training of morethan 15000 Colombian military and police Hundreds of United States troops andprivate contractors work in Colombia as trainers intelligence-gatherers spraypilots and mechanics among other duties Since 1996 United States pilots havesprayed herbicides over more than a million acres of Colombian territory Duringthe 1990s Colombiarsquos National Police received nearly all lethal United States aid(Pardo 2000) The Clinton administration shifted the bulk of aid to the military in1999 and 2000 arguing that the guerrillasrsquo and paramilitariesrsquo entry into the drugbusiness made many counternarcotics missions too dangerous for the police toperform alone (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

Though the Colombian armed forces get most of the aid the United Statesrsquo com-mitment to the counternarcotics division (DIRAN [Directorate of Anti-Narcotics])of the Colombian National Police Force (Policiacutea Nacional Direccioacuten Antinarcoacuteticos)remains quite large The unit performs most drug interdiction and works with theDEA to arrest drug traffickers In rural zones where peasants grow illegal drugcrops United States-made DIRAN helicopters protect pilots who spray herbicidesover fields where illegal drug crops are grown risking ground fire from insurgentgroups (United States Senate 2002)

Over the past few years the United States has provided the DIRAN Air Servicewith Blackhawk and Huey Helicopters C-26B reconnaissance planes and con-struction upgrades to several of its bases throughout Colombia The Drug Enforce-ment Administration has created and completely funds four Sensitive Investigativeunits (SIUs) within the Colombian National Police elite units that carry out riskymissions against drug traffickers A worldwide antiterror appropriation thatbecame law in August 2002 adds more funding $4 million to create police unitsto protect construction of reinforced police stations in guerrilla-controlled areasand $25 million for antikidnapping units (shared with the Colombian Army) TheDIRAN came under a cloud of scandal in 2002 when investigators revealed thatseveral high-ranking officers had stolen at least $2 million in United States aidintended for administrative expenses (Bureau of International Narcotics and LawEnforcement Affairs [BINLEA] 2002a)

Joint ColombianndashUnited States military efforts are primarily concentrated in thesouthern provinces of Caquetaacute and Putumayo seen by many as the most produc-tive cocaine regions The regions account for roughly 33 of all coca (used to makecocaine) grown in Colombia and is controlled by FARC (Dudley 2000) The armyrsquosoriginal mission was to attack drug-processing labs to apprehend traffickers andto clear armed groups from areas of drug-crop cultivation (or at least to clear themlong enough for the United Statesrsquo herbicide spray planes to pass through) InAugust 2002 the Counter-Narcotics Brigade began using its equipment and train-ing for counterterrorism as well as for antidrug missions as a result some of thebrigadersquos operations may resemble the United States-led counter-insurgency effortsduring the 1980s in Central America (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

458 Chris J Dolan

Structural Attributes

Colombiarsquos security forces have a close institutional relationship with several UnitedStates agencies especially the National Security Agency (NSA) the Federal Bureauof Investigation (FBI) the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the StateDepartmentrsquos Bureau for International Narcotics (BIN) The Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA) offers their Colombian counterparts equipment and training toimprove their own ability to collect and analyze intelligence The United States alsoshares intelligence on tactical information concerning insurgent groupsrsquo move-ments and locations Furthermore the United States Army trains thousands ofColombian security personnel counterparts in topics ranging from marksmanshipto helicopter repair to human rights

Yet the United Statesrsquo approach to Colombia appears to neglect even these basictenets of counterinsurgency Massive aerial herbicide conducted by the Colombianand United States air forces and the DEA is fueling antigovernment sentiment ina guerrilla-controlled area (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003) Any social or economic effortshave been overshadowed particularly in most Colombiansrsquo perceptions It has alsosuffered from very serious implementation problems Some aid programs partic-ularly emergency humanitarian assistance appear to be reaching target popula-tionsmdashthough as United States Ambassador to Colombia Anne Patterson admitsthey ldquorepresent a drop in the bucket in relation to the real needs of Colombiarsquosdisplaced personsrdquo (qtd in Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

The success of nonmilitary aid programs has been mixed The effort to helpcoca-growing peasants adopt legal alternatives took the form of a series of ldquosocialpactsrdquo in which signers would receive basic assistance followed by technical andinfrastructure support in exchange for eradicating all their coca within twelvemonths after first receipt of aid By July 2001 37000 families in Putumayomdashjustunder half of the departmentrsquos populationmdashhad signed ldquopactsrdquo and waited forassistance that failed to arrive Alternative development money was delayed by theDEA forced to pass through several agencies before reaching the peasants BINthe United States Agency for International Development (USAID) the Colombiangovernmentrsquos Plan Colombia implementing agency the Colombian governmentrsquosalternative-development agency PLANTE and five Colombian nonprofit orga-nizations with no previous ties to Putumayo contracted to deliver the assistance(Dudley 2000)

Unintended Consequences

Since police and fumigation efforts were not accompanied by a credible alternativedevelopment effort in Putumayo thousands of peasants who had their crops erad-icated suddenly found themselves with little or no opportunities (Miller 2001)Putumayo community and church leaders interviewed by the Council of Interna-tional Policy in November 2002 hinted at a humanitarian disaster as sprayingdamaged food crops had contributed to widespread starvation in FARC-controlledrural areas (Dudley 2000) Those who lacked other economic opportunities joinedFARC and other terror groups by the hundreds (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 459

Furthermore the Bush White House does not appear to be progressing towardits goal of a 50 reduction in Colombian coca-growing by 2005 Coca is difficultto estimate According to CIA figures made public in March 2002 there is a pro-jected increase in the percentage of cocoa production over the next decade Theoverall amount of coca grown in Colombia is roughly 150000 hectares or threetimes as much as it was when the United States began large-scale spraying in 1996(Miller 2001) Since satellite measurements occur immediately following theJulyndashOctober fumigation campaign in Putumayo and may not take into accountreplanting and new planting elsewhere the 2002 statistics may show a greaterdecrease than probably exists (Van Dongen 2003) That year only four (perhapsfive) of Colombiarsquos thirty-two departments had 1000 or more hectares of coca In2001 a survey report issued by the UN found significant increases in coca pro-duction in the thirteen largest provinces in Colombia (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

While fumigation has proven able to reduce coca-growing in limited areasgrowers have been far more agile in eluding United States planes (Pardo 2000)New crops keep appearing in previously untouched parts of Colombiarsquos vast savan-nahs jungles and even coffee-growing zones Since at least the late 1980s totalcoca cultivation in South Americamdashperhaps the most meaningful estimate of thedrugrsquos availabilitymdashhas remained remarkably steady at roughly 200000 hectaresand the price of cocaine sold on United States streets remains steady

Clinton and Bush administration officials repeatedly argued that military train-ing and engagement would ease Colombiarsquos human rights crisis and encourage thearmed forces to end collaboration with paramilitary death squads Sadly the humanrights situation shows no signs of improvement The Consultancy for HumanRights and Displacement (CODHES) a widely cited Colombian nongovernmentalorganization estimated that violence forced 353120 people from their homesduring the first nine months of 2002 more than in all of 2001 The ColombianCommission of Jurists (CCJ) reported in September 2002 that political violence waskilling an average of 20 people per day double what the CCJ was reporting in1998 In January 2003 Human Rights Watch reported that ldquothere were numer-ous and credible reports of joint military-paramilitary operations and the sharingof intelligence and propagandardquo for 2002 (see Human Rights Watch World Report2003)

The most dangerous result could be that the United States has directly involveditself in Colombiarsquos civil war between FARC and government security forces underthe banner of ldquocounterterrorismrdquo (Dudley 2000) Unlike other second-tier ldquoWaron Terrorrdquo countries like the Philippines Georgia or Yemen where the terroristenemy is a shadowy group of a few dozen or a few hundred Colombiarsquos ldquoterror-istrdquo groups are established armies A counterterror effort in Colombia then risksevolving into an El Salvador-style counterinsurgency campaignmdashcomplete withUnited States advisors accompanying combat operations (Barnard 2003)

Political Policy Resultant

The advent of the War on Terror has kept the Bush administration from deviat-ing from its steady military approach Even before September 11 2001 the newBush administration had initiated a ldquoreview processrdquo to explore the possibility of

460 Chris J Dolan

going beyond the drug war to help Colombiarsquos government fight the guerrillas andthe paramilitaries Comparisons between FARC and Al Qaeda now began to showup with regularity

The United Statesrsquo approach is also highly contingent upon its dependence onSouth American oil A 2003 Bush administration foreign aid request to Congressincluded the first significant nondrug military aid to Colombia since the Cold War$98 million to help the Colombian Army protect the 480-mile long Cantildeo Limoacuten-Coventildeas oil pipeline A United States oil company Occidental Petroleum of LosAngeles owns 44 of the crude oil that flows through the Cantildeo Limoacuten pipelinewhich Colombian guerrillas dynamited 166 times in 2001 (United States Depart-ment of State 2002) ldquoClearly we have an energy threatrdquo warned CongressmanMark Souder (R-Indiana) in May 2002 ldquoColombia is either our seventh or eighthlargest supplier of oil Our economy depends on that We already have instabilityin the Middle East We have more compelling reasons to be involved in Colombiathan almost anywhere else in the worldrdquo (Souder 2002)

Beyond these initiatives it is not yet clear how the United Statesrsquo activities willexpand to match Washingtonrsquos much more ambitious mission in Colombia Whilethe purpose of United States military aid has expanded remarkably we have notseen a similar expansion in the amount of United States assistance Certainly military aid is risingmdashColombiarsquos security forces received over $100 million morein 2003 than they did in 2002 The pipeline program accounts for most of thatincrease Yet another $100 million would have only marginal impact on the direc-tion of a conflict involving nearly 40000 well-funded insurgents Pressures fordramatically increased military assistance are likely to build (Cala 2001 Pardo2000)

However if the goal of the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in Colombia isto reduce demand in the United States for cocaine then Americarsquos efforts havelargely failed which has been a continuing trend over the past 15 years (Wisotsky1990) During 2001 there were approximately 1160000 new cocaine users in theUnited States The average age of those who first used cocaine during the year was208 years According to the 2002 National Survey on Drug Use and Healthapproximately 339 million Americans ages 12 and older had tried cocaine at leastonce in their lifetimes representing 144 of the population in that age groupApproximately 59 million (25) had used cocaine in the past year and 20 million(09) had used cocaine within the past month (Substance Abuse and MentalHealth Services Administration [SAMHSA] 2004)

Among high school students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the FutureStudy 36 of eighth graders 51 of tenth graders and 77 of twelfth gradersreported using cocaine at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these per-centages were 36 61 and 78 respectively (National Institute on Drug Abuse[NIDA] 2003) Regarding the ease by which one can obtain powder cocaine 216of eighth graders 296 of tenth graders and 374 of twelfth graders surveyedin 2003 reported that powder cocaine was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtainApproximately 23 (225) of eighth graders 296 of tenth graders and 353of twelfth graders reported that crack cocaine was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo toobtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 44 of eighth graders 52 of tenth graders and 46of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reported that using powder cocaine once or

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 461

twice was a ldquogreat riskrdquo Nearly 49 of eighth graders 58 of tenth graders and47 of twelfth graders reported that using crack cocaine once or twice was a ldquogreatriskrdquo (NIDA 2003)

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also conducts a surveyof high school students throughout the United States the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) Among students surveyed in 2003 87 reportedusing some form of cocaine at least one time during their life of those 41reported being current users of cocaine meaning that they had used cocaine atleast once during the past month (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention[CDC] 2004) During 2002 82 of college students and 135 of young adults(ages 19ndash28) reported using cocaine at least once during their lifetimes Approxi-mately 48 of college students and 58 of young adults reported past-year useof cocaine and 16 of college students and 22 of young adults reported past-month use of cocaine (NIDA 2004)

Flower Power Afghanistan

Afghanistan is the worldrsquos leading source country for the cultivation processingand trafficking of opium By 1999 Afghanistan grew more than 4000 tons ofopium a year making it the primary source of roughly 75 of the worldrsquos illegalheroin (Concar 2001) Today narcotics are the largest source of income inAfghanistan due to the decimation of the countryrsquos economic infrastructure causedby years of warfare

Policy Discretion

On July 28 2000 Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar issued a decreebanning future opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan The decree stated that themilitary would eliminate poppy cultivation in the 2001 growing season in areasunder their control At the time the ban applied to any territory seized from theNorthern Alliance In February 2001 the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)declared that the opium poppy cultivation ban was successful and that the 2001crop was expected to be negligible (UNODC 2004a p 70) This marked the firsteffort by Taliban rulers to reduce opium production The eradication effort wasmade in response to an agreement with the UNODC which agreed to fund alter-native development projects on the condition that cultivation would be decreasedin Kandahar

Laboratories in Afghanistan convert opium into morphine base white heroinor one of three grades of brown heroin depending on the order received Largeprocessing labs are located in southern Afghanistan with smaller labs located mainlyin Nangarhar Province In the past many opium processing laboratories werelocated in Pakistan particularly in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) Theselaboratories appear to have relocated to Afghanistan both to be closer to the sourceof opium and to avoid the Pakistani government Morphine base is usually pro-duced for traffickers based in Turkey where it is converted to heroin before ship-ment to Europe and North and South America Chemists in the region are capable

462 Chris J Dolan

of producing heroin hydrochloride with extremely high purity levels (UNODC2004b)

Since Afghanistan is landlocked drug traffickers must rely on land routes tomove morphine base and heroin out of the country Heroin is trafficked to world-wide destinations by many routes Traffickers quickly adjust heroin smugglingroutes based on political and weather-related events (Gannon 2004) Reports ofheroin shipments north from Afghanistan through the Central Asian States toRussia have increased Tajikistan is a frequent destination for both opium andheroin shipments although Tajikistan serves mostly as a transit point and storagelocation rather than a final destination Seizures are frequently reported at Pakistanrsquos international airports (Rashid 1999) Heroin is also smuggled by sea onvessels leaving the port city of Karachi Heroin produced in Afghanistan continuesto be trafficked to the United States although generally in small quantities It isestimated that roughly 90 of opiate products in Europe originate in Afghanistan(Concar 2001 Hersh 2004)

Money laundering is not an issue in Afghanistan The unsophisticated bankingsystem that previously existed has been damaged by the years of war It is likelythat the informal banking system used extensively in the region usually referredto as the hawala or hundi money laundering system is used by drug traffickers(Lehmkuhler 2003) This system is an underground traditional informal networkthat has been used for centuries by businesses and families throughout Asia (StillFlushmdashTerrorist Finance 2002) This system provides a confidential convenientefficient service at a low cost in areas that are not served by traditional bankingfacilities (Hersh 2004)

Prior to the United Statesrsquo invasion of October 2001 the Taliban maintainedeffective control of nearly all of the opium poppy growing areas in the countryeven though they were only recognized as the legitimate government ofAfghanistan by three governments Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the United ArabEmirates Islamic law (Sharirsquoa) has been imposed in territory controlled by theTaliban and local Sharirsquoa courts have been established throughout the country In1997 the Taliban reactivated the State High Commission for Drug Control whichwas originally established in 1990 by the legitimate interim government Before theUNODC reports indicating that implementation of the 2000ndash2001 opium poppycultivation ban has been effective and the release of the United States governmentestimate indicating a dramatic reduction in opium production the Taliban madeonly token gestures toward antidrug law enforcement (BINLEA 2002b) Althoughthey have banned opium poppy cultivation the Taliban itself long relied on drugtrafficking for financial support

Unintended Consequences

As the United States began more rapidly merging its war on drugs with the greaterWar on Terror on a public scale halting opium production had to be as importantas eliminating the Taliban and the Al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan But howserious were Americarsquos efforts in applying its narco-terrorism policy to AfghanistanUnited States military commanders were not going to set opium eradication at thetop of their list of priorities (Schmitt 2002)

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 463

The results were consistent with Americarsquos hands-off approach Afghan opiumproduction in 2002 exploded to near-record levels making the war-ravaged nationagain the worldrsquos leading producer of the drug ( Judis 2003) Efforts by the UnitedStates-backed interim government of Hamid Karzai to eradicate opium productionby paying farmers to destroy their crops have failed because of a lack of moneyand violent demonstrations by farmers fearing their livelihoods were in jeopardy(Pound 2004) The UNrsquos Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated thatAfghanistan produced 3400 metric tons of opium in 2002 (Moreau amp Yousafzai2003 United Nations Information Service 2003)

Immediately after assuming office Karzai issued a decree on January 17 2002not only banning cultivation but also the processing trafficking and abuse ofopiates (Hanley 2002) Last month his government reiterated that positionreasserting the ban on opium poppy planting in the autumn (Hersh 2004) TheUNODC reopened its Kabul office in February 2002 and appointed Mohammad-Reza Amirkhizi as its representative The office has been engaged in a wide rangeof projects which include strengthening the Afghan drug control commissionassistance in law enforcement and the criminal justice sectors and cross-bordercounternarcotics cooperation with neighboring states The office is also working ona pilot social compact with farmers in Kandahar and Badakhshan provinces pro-viding them with small amounts of financial assistance with the understanding thatthey would grow commercial crops other than opium poppy (Gannon 2004)

The new Afghan government has largely failed in its now three-year effort toeradicate the opium poppy crop in Afghanistan which in recent years became theworldrsquos biggest producer of the raw material for heroin (Hanley 2002 Wehrfritz2003) The UN estimated that the 2004 crop could be worth more than $2 billionat the farm level in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004 Pound 2004) The resurgence ofopium production in Afghanistan is a major unintended consequence of the UnitedStates invasion

By 2002 the total opium poppy cultivation averaged 74000 hectares under theKarzai government and the United Statesrsquo military presence up from only 8000hectares in 2001 under the Taliban (UNODC 2004a) While the 2002 levels arestill lower than the record level crop growing 91000 hectares in 1999 and 82000hectares in 2000 the UN report confirms that opium cultivation has resumed topreviously high levels (Moreau amp Yousafzai 2003 UNODC 2004b)

As a result the average yield poppy production in 2002 shot up to 46 kilo-gramshectare from 24 kilogramshectare in 2001 The massive increase is largelydue to more extensive irrigation programs in Eastern and Southern Afghanistanimplemented since the fall of the Taliban in November 2001 along with the end ofa nationwide drought which devastated total agricultural output between 1998 and2001 Thus total opium poppy production in 2002 was 3400 metric tons a sizableincrease compared to 185 metric tons in 2001 (UNODC 2004b) Poppy cultivationthen doubled between 2002 and 2003 The area planted with poppies used tomake heroin and morphine was 152000 hectares in 2003 compared with 74000hectares in 2002 according to the White House ONDCP (UNODC 2004b)According to the State Department ldquoIn Afghanistan poppy cultivationapproached the highest levels ever registered International and United Statessurveys indicate that in 2003 Afghanistan again produced three-quarters of the

464 Chris J Dolan

worldrsquos illicit opium The narcotics situation remains serious despite positiveactions by both the government and international donorsrdquo (BINLEA 2004)

Besides the eradication campaign announced by the new Afghan governmentin 2002 appears to have been doomed to failure due to a lack of United Statesfinancial support Farmers were to be compensated with $500 per acre fordestroyed poppies which is only a fraction of the estimated $6400 per acre of grossincome an Afghani farmer can earn on poppy cultivation The UN Food and Agriculture Organization reported that ldquoAfghani government programs had a verylimited impactrdquo (Hanley 2002) At 2003 price levels and as a result of the explo-sion in poppy cultivation and production total income for Afghani opium farmersreached several hundred million United States dollars by the end of 2003 (Pound2004)

Other more unfortunate factors resulted from the 2002 poppy eradication cam-paign Afghan farmers have been killed and wounded by United States and Afghansecurity forces during protests against the campaign to eradicate their opiumpoppy crops (Wehrfritz 2003 Wyatt 2002) According to the BBC ldquoThe farmersare angered at what they see as derisory compensationrdquo (Wyatt 2002) ManyAfghan farmers direct their anger at the United States for pressuring the Karzaigovernment to institute the poppy ban (Pound 2004) As a result many Afghanfarmers have embraced Al Qaeda for its staunch anti-Americanism (Hersh 2004)

In the war on terrorism in Afghanistan the United States is trying to end theprofits Al Qaeda and the Taliban are making from the greater Central Asian drugtrade (Gannon 2004 Rashid 1999) However this may impact Americarsquos key alliesin the region who have for years reaped the rewards of the Afghanistanrsquos herointrade Nowhere is the problem clearer than along Afghanistanrsquos northern borderwith Tajikistan an ally in the United Statesrsquo antiterrorist efforts and a major conduitfor heroin and opium on its way to Europe and the Americas The United Statesrsquoinvasion even sparked a massive selling of heroin as Al Qaeda and Taliban forcesappeared to have been selling off their narcotic stockpiles for cash to purchase arms(Hersh 2004 Yglesias 2004)

Some Central Asian and Middle Eastern drug traffickers were actually support-ive of the American invasion of Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) According to the WallStreet Journal ldquoacross the Stans and the Caspian Sea in Lebanonrsquos Bekaa Valleysome pray for a speedy United States attack on Afghanistan lsquoItrsquos good for busi-nessrsquo says Muhammed standing in a garage full of cannabis a pistol tucked in hisbelt He is just back from harvesting this yearrsquos cannabis crop lsquoItrsquoll drive up hashishpricesrsquo Muhammed assures a prospective client that transport of 2500 kilograms(5500 pounds) to Amsterdam from the Bekaamdashcontrolled by Syrian troops as wellas Syrian- and Iranian-backed Shiite Muslim Hezbollah fightersmdashcan be arrangedrdquo(qtd in Targeting Terroristsrsquo Drug Money 2001 p 1)

Structural Attributes

Prior to the October 2001 invasion the United States government had no actualpresence in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) Today the most important organizationsresponsible for conducting the narco-terror war in Afghanistan include the FederalBureau of Investigation the Drug Enforcement Administration the Special Forces

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 465

the Department of Statersquos Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforce-ment Affairs (INL) and Pakistan security forces in cooperation with the UN Officeof Drugs and Crime (UNODC) But how successful is the partnership In Febru-ary 2002 the UNODC confirmed that opium poppy cultivation rose to higherlevels than previous years under Taliban rule The UNODC Country Office forAfghanistan and the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme (ICMP) conducted a pre-assessment survey in 208 villages and 42 districts in the traditional opium poppygrowing areas of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan in the provinces of HelmandKandahar Oruzgan Nangarhar and Kunar Those five provinces accounted for84 of the total opium poppy cultivation area in Afghanistan in 2000 (UNODC2004b)

It is estimated that the various security forces currently monitor opium poppycultivation over an area between 45000 hectares and 65000 hectares (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003) This compares to the level of cultivation reached during the mid-1990s but remained lower than those recorded in 1999 (about 95000 hectares)and 2000 (about 82000 hectares) The resulting production of opium harvestedin 2004 could reach between 1900 and 2700 metric tons of opium (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003)

To address these realities the INL the DEA and the FBI have concluded thatwith at least 40 of the Afghan gross domestic product virtually tied to heroin therisks of an untethered narco-economy producing a chain reaction that reverses pastgains made under the Taliban are quite high indeed In response the INL and theDEA have built police training facilities and trained and retrained roughly 20000Afghan police officers in order to implement narco-terror initiatives against Talibanand Al Qaeda holdouts In coordination with United States Special Forces the Bushadministration seeks to place 50000 border guards and Afghan National Police byDecember 2005 in support of the opium eradication campaign The INL the DEAand the FBI are also involved in creating a comprehensive justice sector TheUnited Statesrsquo effort has also resulted in some intriguing bureaucratic alliancesThe Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency one of the main sources ofinformation for the United States-led alliance against the Taliban regime is asso-ciated with political assassinations narcotics trafficking and smuggling of nucleartechnology and missile delivery components with the backing fundamentalistIslamic movements (qtd in Bedi 2001)

Opium cultivation and heroin production in Pakistanrsquos northern tribal belt andadjoining Afghanistan was a vital offshoot of the ISIndashCIA cooperation (Rashid1999) It succeeded in turning some Soviet troops into addicts during the USSRrsquosoccupation of Afghanistan Heroin sales in Europe and the United States carriedout via deceptive means transport networks couriers and pay-offs offset the costof the various wars in Afghanistan (Gannon 2004)

Resultant Political Policy

The initial military victories in Afghanistan are in the process of being lost as thecountry is rapidly disintegrating into a state of narco-terrorism and anarchy TheUnited Statesrsquo efforts may fail unless the link between Al Qaeda Taliban forcesand opium production are finally overcome In 2004 opium farmers and traffick-ers in Afghanistan generated $23 billion in profits with higher estimates for the

466 Chris J Dolan

future The level of opium planting and the subsequent production of opium pastemorphine and heroin in Afghanistan is more than enough to satisfy the demandin Western Europe and the United States (Gannon 2004)

Although Afghanistan represents one source in worldwide opium production inaddition to Mexico South America and Southeast Asia narco-terrorism policytoward Afghanistan has not succeeded in reversing growth trends in heroin con-sumption in the United States According to the 2002 National Survey on DrugUse and Health approximately 37 million Americans ages 12 and older reportedtrying heroin at least once during their lifetimes representing 16 of the popu-lation ages 12 and older Roughly 404000 (02) reported past-year heroin useand 166000 (01) reported past-month heroin use (SAMHSA 2004) Among highschool students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the Future Study 16 ofeighth graders 15 of tenth graders and 15 of twelfth graders reported usingheroin at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these percentages were 1618 and 17 respectively (NIDA 2003)

Regarding the ease by which one can obtain heroin 156 of eighth graders188 of tenth graders and 279 of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reportedthat heroin was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 63 ofeighth graders 71 of tenth graders and 59 of twelfth graders reported thatusing heroin once or twice without a needle was a ldquogreat riskrdquo (NIDA 2003)Nationwide 33 of high school students surveyed in 2003 as part of the YouthRisk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) reported using heroin during theirlifetimes Male students (43) were significantly more likely than female students(20) to report lifetime heroin use Hispanic students (39) were more likely toreport heroin use within their lifetime than white (26) or black (26) students(CDC 2004) During 2002 10 of college students and 18 of young adults (ages19ndash28) reported using heroin at least once during their lifetimes Approximately01 of college students and 02 of young adults reported past year use of heroinand 00 of college students and less than 005 of young adults reported pastmonth use of heroin (NIDA 2004)

According to data from the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) Programa median of 58 of adult male arrestees and 66 of adult female arrestees testedpositive for opiates at arrest in 2003 The adult male samples were compiled from39 United States sites and the adult female samples were compiled from 25 sitesA median of 51 of adult male arrestees and 71 of adult female arresteesreported using heroin at least once in the year before being arrested (NationalInstitute of Justice 2004) Although heroin expenditures were $22 billion in 1990demand decreased to $10 billion in 2000 and whereas in 1990 Americans con-sumed 136 metric tons of heroin estimates remained relatively unchanged in 2000(ABT Associates 2001)

Conclusions

Based on these observations of narco-terrorist activities in Afghanistan and Colom-bia on a substantive level the Bush administration has formulated domestic andinternational drug reduction strategies with an eye on asset seizure and control offunding used by terrorist organizations However important questions remain con-cerning the legitimacy of Americarsquos policy efforts Indeed narco-terrorism as a

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 467

national security threat is not new The 911 attacks simply pushed narco-terror-ism higher on the presidentrsquos national security agenda particularly in light of theconnection between the Afghan drug trade and the Al Qaeda network

On a theoretical level the contingency approach to examining narco-terrorismpolicy highlights several major concerns that have not been adequately addressedFirst as it is conducted today the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy places sig-nificant attention on the increased utilization of American military power Eversince President Richard Nixon proclaimed a war on drugs and President GeorgeW Bush a war on terrorism concern over the use of the military in what have typically been deemed law enforcement and social issues has overshadowed mostother related methods Even if the United States did not introduce troops intoAfghanistan or Colombia we are still left with a highly militarized narco-terrorismpolicy that facilitates human rights abuses by those governments receiving UnitedStates aid Moreover the result has been an increase in the production and con-sumption of illegal drugs that are trafficked by organizations that use profits topromote terrorist attacks

Second the contingency approach used in this study reveals the problems narco-terrorism policy has experienced in targeting so-called weak states Narco-terrorism policy has elevated the potential for the United States to use its diplo-matic weight to force governments to enact stricter antidrug policies This hasencouraged states like Afghanistan and Colombia to further undermine politicaleconomic and social development with undemocratic policies directed at citizensAs a result the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism efforts have in part fueled anti-American resentment thereby increasing the potential for additional terrorist activities by groups such as Al Qaeda or FARC

Third it has become more apparent that narco-terrorism policy has becomelike all other policies highly politicized Americarsquos counterdrug efforts are virtu-ally indistinguishable from counterinsurgency efforts by remnants of the Talibanand Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and FARC and other terror-related groups in Colom-bia Moreover the United States is being rather bold in designating particulargroups as narco-terrorists although conveniently leaving off others such as theNorthern Alliance in Afghanistan This hinders the rule of law in a number of countries

Finally the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in its current form neglectscertain realities Quite simply many critics allege that narco-terrorist connectionsare indirect and for the most part ambiguous In addition critics of prohibitionmaintain that it is the illegalization of drugs that generates the enormous profitsused to support terrorist and insurgent organizations Another concern is thatnarco-terrorism does not address the complexities of terrorism or insurgenciesCan Afghanistan and Colombia continue to be addressed in narrowly defined mil-itary and law enforcement frameworks that neglect political economic and socialconsiderations

About the Author

Chris J Dolan is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Floridawhere he teaches courses on public policy United States Foreign Policy and National Secu-

468 Chris J Dolan

rity the Mass Media and the American presidency He received his PhD from the Univer-sity of South Carolina He is the author of In War We Trust The Political Dimensions and EthicalConsequences of the First Strike Doctrine (Ashgate Press 2005) and co-editor of Striking First ThePreventive Doctrine and the Reshaping of US Foreign Policy (Palgrave-Macmillan 2004) Hisresearch on public policy executive policymaking foreign policy and the mass media appearin Policy Studies Journal Congress and the Presidency Politics and Policy White House Studies andin numerous edited volumes

References

ABT Associates (2001) What Americarsquos users spend on drugs 1988ndash2000 Prepared for the Office of NationalDrug Control Policy Retrieved April 21 2004 from httpwwwwhitehousedrugpolicygovpublicationspdfamerican_users_spend_2002pdf

Allison G T (1971) Essence of decision Boston Little BrownAllison G T amp Halperin M H (1972) Bureaucratic politics A paradigm and and some policy implications

World Politics 24 40ndash79Baldwin E (1991) Why rules donrsquot work Modern Law Review 53 321ndash338Barnard D (2003) Narco-terrorism realities The connection between drugs and terror Journal of Countert-

errorism and Homeland Security International 9(1) 31ndash34Bedi R (2001 September 26) The assassins and drug dealers are now helping us The Daily Telegraph p 1Bennett C J (1991) What is policy convergence What causes it British Journal of Political Science 21(2)

215ndash233Blau P amp Scott R (1962) Formal organizations San Francisco ChandlerBouchard G amp Carroll B (2002) Policy-making and administrative discretion The case of immigration in

Canada Canadian Public Administration 25(2) 239ndash259Bouchard G amp Carroll B (2003) One size does not fit all Annual Meeting of the Canadian Public Service

Administration Halifax Nova ScotiaBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002a) Fiscal year 2003 congres-

sional budget justification Washington DC AuthorBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002b) International narcotics

control strategy Afghanistan (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 from httpusembassystategovafghanistanwwwh02121802html

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2004) International NarcoticsControl Strategy Southwest Asia (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 fromhttpwwwstategovginlrlsnrcrpt2003vol1html29836htm

Bureau of Justice Statistics United States Department of Justice (2000) Sourcebook of criminal justice statisticsWashington DC United States Government Printing Office

Cala A (2001 November 21) Danger of a new Vietnam The Gazette p 1Carroll B amp Garkut D E (1996) Is there an empirical trend toward managerialism Canadian Public Admin-

istration 39(4) 535ndash553Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2004) Youth risk behavior surveillance United States 2003 (May 21)

Retrieved August 2 2004 from httpwwwcdcgovmmwrpreviewmmwrhtmlss5302a1htmChepesiuk R (1999) Hard target The United States war against international drug trafficking 1982ndash1997 Jeffer-

son NC McFarland amp CoColombia Program Center for International Policy (2000) Plan Colombia A plan for peace or a plan for war

( June 20) Retrieved May 1 2004 from httpwwwciponlineorgcolombia062001htmColombia Program Center for International Policy (2004) US Aid to Colombia since 1997 Summary tables

(February 20) Retrieved May 2 2004 from httpciponlineorgcolombiaaidtablehtmConcar D (2001 September 29) Cutting the Talibanrsquos lifeline New Scientist p 77Desveaux J A Lindquist E A amp Toner G (1994) Organizing for policy innovations in public bureaucra-

cies AIDS energy and environmental policy in Canada Canadian Journal of Political Science 27(3)493ndash528

Dexter L (1981) Unintended consequences of purposive legislative action Alternatives to implementationJournal of Public Policy 4(4) 250ndash264

Drug Abuse Policy Office (1982) Federal strategy for prevention of drug abuse and drug trafficking WashingtonDC United States Government Printing Office

Drug Enforcement Administration Intelligence Division (2002) Drugs and terrorism A new perspective RetrievedApril 29 2004 from httpwwwdeagovpubsintel02039f1f1

Dudley S (2000 July 31) The Colombia quagmire The American Prospect p 32

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 469

Investigation United States Marshals United States Attorneys and the Bureau ofPrisons) Treasury (United States Secret Service and the Bureau of AlcoholTobacco and Firearms) Homeland Security (Bureau of Immigration UnitedStates Border Patrol and United States Customs) Education Labor VeteransAffairs Defense and State

Decision points deal mainly with the number of policymakers involved in thepolicymaking processes and resources devoted to the policy area Since most poli-cies involve a considerable number of individuals in and out of government checksand balances or decision points are built into the decision-making process as a wayof managing the policy (Allison 1971 George 1980 Rosati 1981) At presentthere are more than 50 United States agencies with a stake in both drug controland antiterrorism efforts In fiscal year (FY) 2005 President George W Bush allo-cated a $307 billion antidrug spending package for FY 2005 to fund these agen-cies (National Drug Control Strategy 2004) Between FY 1991 and FY 2000 morethan $140 billion was spent to curtail drug abuse (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2000Drug Abuse Policy Office 1982 National Drug Control Strategy 2000)

Compression of the issues is a process by which the length of time between policyactions and their outcomes can be interpreted as responding to the potential devel-opment or emergence of a future policy problem that has yet to surface (Sabatier1988) Compression also has a relative impact on policy discretion since highlycompressed policies are difficult to control and policy performance is difficult toexamine Combating narco-terrorism requires a global network of law enforce-ment military and intelligence officials tackling the issue

Coupling involves interaction within and between policies Internal couplingrefers to the degree of variation impacting the implementation of the policy andhigher levels of dissimilarity require considerably higher levels of flexibility amongpolicymakers in order to adapt to the interactive changes (Baldwin 1991) Exter-nal coupling or ldquohorizontalityrdquo deals with the relationship between the policy andother related policy areas (Sproule-Jones 2000)

Several measures have been taken over the years that involve coupling Accord-ing to the United States Department of State there are 12 major multilateral conventions and protocols on combating terrorism (DEA Intelligence Division2002) International efforts to combat narco-terrorism have focused on assetseizure and control of all funding sources used by terrorist organizations On September 28 2001 the United Nations (UN) Security Council unanimouslyadopted an antiterrorism resolution that called for the suppression of terroristgroup financing and improved international cooperation against terrorists UNSecurity Council Resolution 1373 required all states to prevent and abolish thefinancing of terrorism and to criminalize the willful collection and distribution offunds for such acts

Homogeneity suggests that while there is always a degree of variation within thepolicy the various elements associated within it and its goals are similar to a certainextent (Carroll amp Garkut 1996) Homogeneity tends to reduce policy discretion toa limited extent and decreases unintended consequences as policy formulators aremore able to forecast the behavior of policy enforcers (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003)History has shown that narco-terrorist organizations fall into different categoriesOne includes politically motivated groups that use drug profits to support their

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 455

terrorist activities activities that will confer legitimacy upon them within the stateSuch groups assume measures to establish a legal political party whereby their polit-ical goals are realized through nonviolent legal means An example of a group inthis category is the Kurdistan Workerrsquos Party (PKK [Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan])Another category consists of groups that pursue ideological goals while participat-ing in select aspects of the drug trade for example the Revolutionary ArmedForces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC)Other extremist groups are suspected of drug involvement such as Hezbollah andthe Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS [Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya])Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path) in Peru and the Basque Fatherland andLiberty (ETA [Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna]) in Spain (Barnard 2003)

Resonance deals with the extent to which the most important issues associatedwith unified policy are embraced internalized and deemed critical by citizensIllegal drug production trafficking and consumption are activities not highly tol-erated by the general public Although the United States government has chosento merge its war on terrorism with its decades-long war on illicit drugs it remainsto be seen as to whether or not such efforts appear to have resonated throughoutthe citizenry However high levels of resonance tend to produce policies withambiguous vague and symbolic goals and a high degree of discretion and needfor adjustment (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003) The position of the Bush administra-tion is that the growing link between terrorists and the drug trade contributes toan increased threat to America (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003) Resonance is an impor-tant variable given that Bushrsquos ONDCP is promoting a new reason to continue thispublic effort since it is convinced that the illegal drug trade is linked to the supportof terror groups across the globe

Technology involves the ordering of policy functions The Counterdrug Tech-nology Assessment Center (CTAC) is the central counterdrug enforcement researchand development (RampD) organization of the United States Government that pro-motes advanced technologies related to the enforcement of narco-terrorism policyCTAC was established within the Office of National Drug Control Policy and hasbeen coordinating the counterdrug RampD program for the federal governmentsince 1992 In 1993 CTAC was directed to include drug abuse rehabilitation andaddiction research in the program in addition to law enforcement-related tech-nology CTAC prepares periodic reports to update the national counterdrug RampDprogram This report is the fourth Counterdrug RampD Blueprint Update and provides the status of the national counterdrug RampD program descriptions oftechnology development and infrastructure support projects and plans for future counterdrug RampD initiatives

Visibility deals mainly with whether or not the public is able to witness the oper-ation of policy functions Where visibility involves public attention and awarenessresonance deals with the degree of importance placed on the policy and its rela-tionship with societyrsquos core values (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003) Although violentacts are visible in the mass media the financing associated with drug productionand trafficking may not be visible to the public Since 911 the ONDCP haslaunched media campaigns to educate the public about the link between the illegaldrug trade and terrorism The multipronged attempt is designed to emphasizehow the sales of illicit drugs finance acts of terror The public initiative combines a

456 Chris J Dolan

range of activitiesmdashprint and broadcast advertising in-school programming lessonplans for teachers online information community and news media outreachmdashtoraise awareness about the link between drugs and terror and engage youth andinfluential adults in drug prevention

Whiteout Colombia

In 2000 the Clinton administration moved through Congress a narco-terror aidbill for Colombia At the time President Clinton signed package into law Colombiawas placed at the top of Americarsquos list of international priorities (Pardo 2000)ONDCP Director General Barry McCaffrey predicted that the initial $13 billionmeasure termed ldquoPlan Colombiardquomdash$860 million of it for Colombia three-quarters of that for Colombiarsquos police and militarymdashwould ldquostrengthen democracythe rule of law economic stability and human rights in Colombiardquo (McCaffery2000) In 2004 Plan Colombia ballooned to a $75 billion spending package(United States Department of State 2003) The Colombian governmentrsquos attemptsto negotiate peace with opposition guerrilla groups came to an end in May 2002when Aacutelvaro Uribe was elected president However under his administration illicitdrug production exploded and human rights abuses soared

Policy Discretion

The United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy toward Colombia is marked by two con-tradictory trends While Colombia has become a lower priority the size andpurpose of United States military aid has rapidly expanded Overall military andpolice aid amounts are increasing with new Colombian units getting support tooperate in new parts of the country In effect the United States has broadened itspurpose for providing Colombia with lethal assistancemdashfor years limited to coun-ternarcoticsmdashto include ldquocounterterrorismrdquo The change allows United States-aided units to assume offensive operations against the Revolutionary Armed Forcesof Colombia (FARC) the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the paramilitaryUnited Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) United States Special Forces havealso been deployed to Colombia to guard oil pipelines and eliminate insurgents(Dudley 2000 Jenkins 2001)

When it was initiated Plan Colombia placed much of its attention on Colom-biarsquos security forces largely overlooking the complicated deep-rooted origins of itsinternal conflicts (Pardo 2000) However in a country with far-reaching inequali-ties and abusive and corrupt police Plan Colombia was set to produce grave con-sequences (Sweig 2002 Weymouth 2000 p 45) According to a joint letter issuedin June 2002 by several Colombian government agencies Plan Colombia ldquowill leadto the escalation of the social and armed conflict fail to solve the drug-traffickingproblem endanger the peace process attack indigenous populationsrsquo culture andlife styles seriously hamper the Amazon eco-system worsen the humanitarian andhuman rights crisis promote forced displacement and further worsen the socialand political crisisrdquo (Colombia Program 2000) Overlooking the warnings between1999 and 2002 the United States gave Colombia $204 billion with 83 percentgoing to Colombiarsquos military and police This pattern continued under the Bush

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 457

administration which allocated $654 million in 2003 for Colombiarsquos security forces(Colombia Program 2004)

The United States also provided advanced weaponry to the Colombian militaryincluding helicopters attack aircraft patrol boats communications and intelli-gence-gathering equipment uniforms and small arms and the training of morethan 15000 Colombian military and police Hundreds of United States troops andprivate contractors work in Colombia as trainers intelligence-gatherers spraypilots and mechanics among other duties Since 1996 United States pilots havesprayed herbicides over more than a million acres of Colombian territory Duringthe 1990s Colombiarsquos National Police received nearly all lethal United States aid(Pardo 2000) The Clinton administration shifted the bulk of aid to the military in1999 and 2000 arguing that the guerrillasrsquo and paramilitariesrsquo entry into the drugbusiness made many counternarcotics missions too dangerous for the police toperform alone (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

Though the Colombian armed forces get most of the aid the United Statesrsquo com-mitment to the counternarcotics division (DIRAN [Directorate of Anti-Narcotics])of the Colombian National Police Force (Policiacutea Nacional Direccioacuten Antinarcoacuteticos)remains quite large The unit performs most drug interdiction and works with theDEA to arrest drug traffickers In rural zones where peasants grow illegal drugcrops United States-made DIRAN helicopters protect pilots who spray herbicidesover fields where illegal drug crops are grown risking ground fire from insurgentgroups (United States Senate 2002)

Over the past few years the United States has provided the DIRAN Air Servicewith Blackhawk and Huey Helicopters C-26B reconnaissance planes and con-struction upgrades to several of its bases throughout Colombia The Drug Enforce-ment Administration has created and completely funds four Sensitive Investigativeunits (SIUs) within the Colombian National Police elite units that carry out riskymissions against drug traffickers A worldwide antiterror appropriation thatbecame law in August 2002 adds more funding $4 million to create police unitsto protect construction of reinforced police stations in guerrilla-controlled areasand $25 million for antikidnapping units (shared with the Colombian Army) TheDIRAN came under a cloud of scandal in 2002 when investigators revealed thatseveral high-ranking officers had stolen at least $2 million in United States aidintended for administrative expenses (Bureau of International Narcotics and LawEnforcement Affairs [BINLEA] 2002a)

Joint ColombianndashUnited States military efforts are primarily concentrated in thesouthern provinces of Caquetaacute and Putumayo seen by many as the most produc-tive cocaine regions The regions account for roughly 33 of all coca (used to makecocaine) grown in Colombia and is controlled by FARC (Dudley 2000) The armyrsquosoriginal mission was to attack drug-processing labs to apprehend traffickers andto clear armed groups from areas of drug-crop cultivation (or at least to clear themlong enough for the United Statesrsquo herbicide spray planes to pass through) InAugust 2002 the Counter-Narcotics Brigade began using its equipment and train-ing for counterterrorism as well as for antidrug missions as a result some of thebrigadersquos operations may resemble the United States-led counter-insurgency effortsduring the 1980s in Central America (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

458 Chris J Dolan

Structural Attributes

Colombiarsquos security forces have a close institutional relationship with several UnitedStates agencies especially the National Security Agency (NSA) the Federal Bureauof Investigation (FBI) the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the StateDepartmentrsquos Bureau for International Narcotics (BIN) The Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA) offers their Colombian counterparts equipment and training toimprove their own ability to collect and analyze intelligence The United States alsoshares intelligence on tactical information concerning insurgent groupsrsquo move-ments and locations Furthermore the United States Army trains thousands ofColombian security personnel counterparts in topics ranging from marksmanshipto helicopter repair to human rights

Yet the United Statesrsquo approach to Colombia appears to neglect even these basictenets of counterinsurgency Massive aerial herbicide conducted by the Colombianand United States air forces and the DEA is fueling antigovernment sentiment ina guerrilla-controlled area (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003) Any social or economic effortshave been overshadowed particularly in most Colombiansrsquo perceptions It has alsosuffered from very serious implementation problems Some aid programs partic-ularly emergency humanitarian assistance appear to be reaching target popula-tionsmdashthough as United States Ambassador to Colombia Anne Patterson admitsthey ldquorepresent a drop in the bucket in relation to the real needs of Colombiarsquosdisplaced personsrdquo (qtd in Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

The success of nonmilitary aid programs has been mixed The effort to helpcoca-growing peasants adopt legal alternatives took the form of a series of ldquosocialpactsrdquo in which signers would receive basic assistance followed by technical andinfrastructure support in exchange for eradicating all their coca within twelvemonths after first receipt of aid By July 2001 37000 families in Putumayomdashjustunder half of the departmentrsquos populationmdashhad signed ldquopactsrdquo and waited forassistance that failed to arrive Alternative development money was delayed by theDEA forced to pass through several agencies before reaching the peasants BINthe United States Agency for International Development (USAID) the Colombiangovernmentrsquos Plan Colombia implementing agency the Colombian governmentrsquosalternative-development agency PLANTE and five Colombian nonprofit orga-nizations with no previous ties to Putumayo contracted to deliver the assistance(Dudley 2000)

Unintended Consequences

Since police and fumigation efforts were not accompanied by a credible alternativedevelopment effort in Putumayo thousands of peasants who had their crops erad-icated suddenly found themselves with little or no opportunities (Miller 2001)Putumayo community and church leaders interviewed by the Council of Interna-tional Policy in November 2002 hinted at a humanitarian disaster as sprayingdamaged food crops had contributed to widespread starvation in FARC-controlledrural areas (Dudley 2000) Those who lacked other economic opportunities joinedFARC and other terror groups by the hundreds (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 459

Furthermore the Bush White House does not appear to be progressing towardits goal of a 50 reduction in Colombian coca-growing by 2005 Coca is difficultto estimate According to CIA figures made public in March 2002 there is a pro-jected increase in the percentage of cocoa production over the next decade Theoverall amount of coca grown in Colombia is roughly 150000 hectares or threetimes as much as it was when the United States began large-scale spraying in 1996(Miller 2001) Since satellite measurements occur immediately following theJulyndashOctober fumigation campaign in Putumayo and may not take into accountreplanting and new planting elsewhere the 2002 statistics may show a greaterdecrease than probably exists (Van Dongen 2003) That year only four (perhapsfive) of Colombiarsquos thirty-two departments had 1000 or more hectares of coca In2001 a survey report issued by the UN found significant increases in coca pro-duction in the thirteen largest provinces in Colombia (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

While fumigation has proven able to reduce coca-growing in limited areasgrowers have been far more agile in eluding United States planes (Pardo 2000)New crops keep appearing in previously untouched parts of Colombiarsquos vast savan-nahs jungles and even coffee-growing zones Since at least the late 1980s totalcoca cultivation in South Americamdashperhaps the most meaningful estimate of thedrugrsquos availabilitymdashhas remained remarkably steady at roughly 200000 hectaresand the price of cocaine sold on United States streets remains steady

Clinton and Bush administration officials repeatedly argued that military train-ing and engagement would ease Colombiarsquos human rights crisis and encourage thearmed forces to end collaboration with paramilitary death squads Sadly the humanrights situation shows no signs of improvement The Consultancy for HumanRights and Displacement (CODHES) a widely cited Colombian nongovernmentalorganization estimated that violence forced 353120 people from their homesduring the first nine months of 2002 more than in all of 2001 The ColombianCommission of Jurists (CCJ) reported in September 2002 that political violence waskilling an average of 20 people per day double what the CCJ was reporting in1998 In January 2003 Human Rights Watch reported that ldquothere were numer-ous and credible reports of joint military-paramilitary operations and the sharingof intelligence and propagandardquo for 2002 (see Human Rights Watch World Report2003)

The most dangerous result could be that the United States has directly involveditself in Colombiarsquos civil war between FARC and government security forces underthe banner of ldquocounterterrorismrdquo (Dudley 2000) Unlike other second-tier ldquoWaron Terrorrdquo countries like the Philippines Georgia or Yemen where the terroristenemy is a shadowy group of a few dozen or a few hundred Colombiarsquos ldquoterror-istrdquo groups are established armies A counterterror effort in Colombia then risksevolving into an El Salvador-style counterinsurgency campaignmdashcomplete withUnited States advisors accompanying combat operations (Barnard 2003)

Political Policy Resultant

The advent of the War on Terror has kept the Bush administration from deviat-ing from its steady military approach Even before September 11 2001 the newBush administration had initiated a ldquoreview processrdquo to explore the possibility of

460 Chris J Dolan

going beyond the drug war to help Colombiarsquos government fight the guerrillas andthe paramilitaries Comparisons between FARC and Al Qaeda now began to showup with regularity

The United Statesrsquo approach is also highly contingent upon its dependence onSouth American oil A 2003 Bush administration foreign aid request to Congressincluded the first significant nondrug military aid to Colombia since the Cold War$98 million to help the Colombian Army protect the 480-mile long Cantildeo Limoacuten-Coventildeas oil pipeline A United States oil company Occidental Petroleum of LosAngeles owns 44 of the crude oil that flows through the Cantildeo Limoacuten pipelinewhich Colombian guerrillas dynamited 166 times in 2001 (United States Depart-ment of State 2002) ldquoClearly we have an energy threatrdquo warned CongressmanMark Souder (R-Indiana) in May 2002 ldquoColombia is either our seventh or eighthlargest supplier of oil Our economy depends on that We already have instabilityin the Middle East We have more compelling reasons to be involved in Colombiathan almost anywhere else in the worldrdquo (Souder 2002)

Beyond these initiatives it is not yet clear how the United Statesrsquo activities willexpand to match Washingtonrsquos much more ambitious mission in Colombia Whilethe purpose of United States military aid has expanded remarkably we have notseen a similar expansion in the amount of United States assistance Certainly military aid is risingmdashColombiarsquos security forces received over $100 million morein 2003 than they did in 2002 The pipeline program accounts for most of thatincrease Yet another $100 million would have only marginal impact on the direc-tion of a conflict involving nearly 40000 well-funded insurgents Pressures fordramatically increased military assistance are likely to build (Cala 2001 Pardo2000)

However if the goal of the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in Colombia isto reduce demand in the United States for cocaine then Americarsquos efforts havelargely failed which has been a continuing trend over the past 15 years (Wisotsky1990) During 2001 there were approximately 1160000 new cocaine users in theUnited States The average age of those who first used cocaine during the year was208 years According to the 2002 National Survey on Drug Use and Healthapproximately 339 million Americans ages 12 and older had tried cocaine at leastonce in their lifetimes representing 144 of the population in that age groupApproximately 59 million (25) had used cocaine in the past year and 20 million(09) had used cocaine within the past month (Substance Abuse and MentalHealth Services Administration [SAMHSA] 2004)

Among high school students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the FutureStudy 36 of eighth graders 51 of tenth graders and 77 of twelfth gradersreported using cocaine at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these per-centages were 36 61 and 78 respectively (National Institute on Drug Abuse[NIDA] 2003) Regarding the ease by which one can obtain powder cocaine 216of eighth graders 296 of tenth graders and 374 of twelfth graders surveyedin 2003 reported that powder cocaine was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtainApproximately 23 (225) of eighth graders 296 of tenth graders and 353of twelfth graders reported that crack cocaine was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo toobtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 44 of eighth graders 52 of tenth graders and 46of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reported that using powder cocaine once or

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 461

twice was a ldquogreat riskrdquo Nearly 49 of eighth graders 58 of tenth graders and47 of twelfth graders reported that using crack cocaine once or twice was a ldquogreatriskrdquo (NIDA 2003)

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also conducts a surveyof high school students throughout the United States the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) Among students surveyed in 2003 87 reportedusing some form of cocaine at least one time during their life of those 41reported being current users of cocaine meaning that they had used cocaine atleast once during the past month (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention[CDC] 2004) During 2002 82 of college students and 135 of young adults(ages 19ndash28) reported using cocaine at least once during their lifetimes Approxi-mately 48 of college students and 58 of young adults reported past-year useof cocaine and 16 of college students and 22 of young adults reported past-month use of cocaine (NIDA 2004)

Flower Power Afghanistan

Afghanistan is the worldrsquos leading source country for the cultivation processingand trafficking of opium By 1999 Afghanistan grew more than 4000 tons ofopium a year making it the primary source of roughly 75 of the worldrsquos illegalheroin (Concar 2001) Today narcotics are the largest source of income inAfghanistan due to the decimation of the countryrsquos economic infrastructure causedby years of warfare

Policy Discretion

On July 28 2000 Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar issued a decreebanning future opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan The decree stated that themilitary would eliminate poppy cultivation in the 2001 growing season in areasunder their control At the time the ban applied to any territory seized from theNorthern Alliance In February 2001 the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)declared that the opium poppy cultivation ban was successful and that the 2001crop was expected to be negligible (UNODC 2004a p 70) This marked the firsteffort by Taliban rulers to reduce opium production The eradication effort wasmade in response to an agreement with the UNODC which agreed to fund alter-native development projects on the condition that cultivation would be decreasedin Kandahar

Laboratories in Afghanistan convert opium into morphine base white heroinor one of three grades of brown heroin depending on the order received Largeprocessing labs are located in southern Afghanistan with smaller labs located mainlyin Nangarhar Province In the past many opium processing laboratories werelocated in Pakistan particularly in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) Theselaboratories appear to have relocated to Afghanistan both to be closer to the sourceof opium and to avoid the Pakistani government Morphine base is usually pro-duced for traffickers based in Turkey where it is converted to heroin before ship-ment to Europe and North and South America Chemists in the region are capable

462 Chris J Dolan

of producing heroin hydrochloride with extremely high purity levels (UNODC2004b)

Since Afghanistan is landlocked drug traffickers must rely on land routes tomove morphine base and heroin out of the country Heroin is trafficked to world-wide destinations by many routes Traffickers quickly adjust heroin smugglingroutes based on political and weather-related events (Gannon 2004) Reports ofheroin shipments north from Afghanistan through the Central Asian States toRussia have increased Tajikistan is a frequent destination for both opium andheroin shipments although Tajikistan serves mostly as a transit point and storagelocation rather than a final destination Seizures are frequently reported at Pakistanrsquos international airports (Rashid 1999) Heroin is also smuggled by sea onvessels leaving the port city of Karachi Heroin produced in Afghanistan continuesto be trafficked to the United States although generally in small quantities It isestimated that roughly 90 of opiate products in Europe originate in Afghanistan(Concar 2001 Hersh 2004)

Money laundering is not an issue in Afghanistan The unsophisticated bankingsystem that previously existed has been damaged by the years of war It is likelythat the informal banking system used extensively in the region usually referredto as the hawala or hundi money laundering system is used by drug traffickers(Lehmkuhler 2003) This system is an underground traditional informal networkthat has been used for centuries by businesses and families throughout Asia (StillFlushmdashTerrorist Finance 2002) This system provides a confidential convenientefficient service at a low cost in areas that are not served by traditional bankingfacilities (Hersh 2004)

Prior to the United Statesrsquo invasion of October 2001 the Taliban maintainedeffective control of nearly all of the opium poppy growing areas in the countryeven though they were only recognized as the legitimate government ofAfghanistan by three governments Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the United ArabEmirates Islamic law (Sharirsquoa) has been imposed in territory controlled by theTaliban and local Sharirsquoa courts have been established throughout the country In1997 the Taliban reactivated the State High Commission for Drug Control whichwas originally established in 1990 by the legitimate interim government Before theUNODC reports indicating that implementation of the 2000ndash2001 opium poppycultivation ban has been effective and the release of the United States governmentestimate indicating a dramatic reduction in opium production the Taliban madeonly token gestures toward antidrug law enforcement (BINLEA 2002b) Althoughthey have banned opium poppy cultivation the Taliban itself long relied on drugtrafficking for financial support

Unintended Consequences

As the United States began more rapidly merging its war on drugs with the greaterWar on Terror on a public scale halting opium production had to be as importantas eliminating the Taliban and the Al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan But howserious were Americarsquos efforts in applying its narco-terrorism policy to AfghanistanUnited States military commanders were not going to set opium eradication at thetop of their list of priorities (Schmitt 2002)

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 463

The results were consistent with Americarsquos hands-off approach Afghan opiumproduction in 2002 exploded to near-record levels making the war-ravaged nationagain the worldrsquos leading producer of the drug ( Judis 2003) Efforts by the UnitedStates-backed interim government of Hamid Karzai to eradicate opium productionby paying farmers to destroy their crops have failed because of a lack of moneyand violent demonstrations by farmers fearing their livelihoods were in jeopardy(Pound 2004) The UNrsquos Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated thatAfghanistan produced 3400 metric tons of opium in 2002 (Moreau amp Yousafzai2003 United Nations Information Service 2003)

Immediately after assuming office Karzai issued a decree on January 17 2002not only banning cultivation but also the processing trafficking and abuse ofopiates (Hanley 2002) Last month his government reiterated that positionreasserting the ban on opium poppy planting in the autumn (Hersh 2004) TheUNODC reopened its Kabul office in February 2002 and appointed Mohammad-Reza Amirkhizi as its representative The office has been engaged in a wide rangeof projects which include strengthening the Afghan drug control commissionassistance in law enforcement and the criminal justice sectors and cross-bordercounternarcotics cooperation with neighboring states The office is also working ona pilot social compact with farmers in Kandahar and Badakhshan provinces pro-viding them with small amounts of financial assistance with the understanding thatthey would grow commercial crops other than opium poppy (Gannon 2004)

The new Afghan government has largely failed in its now three-year effort toeradicate the opium poppy crop in Afghanistan which in recent years became theworldrsquos biggest producer of the raw material for heroin (Hanley 2002 Wehrfritz2003) The UN estimated that the 2004 crop could be worth more than $2 billionat the farm level in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004 Pound 2004) The resurgence ofopium production in Afghanistan is a major unintended consequence of the UnitedStates invasion

By 2002 the total opium poppy cultivation averaged 74000 hectares under theKarzai government and the United Statesrsquo military presence up from only 8000hectares in 2001 under the Taliban (UNODC 2004a) While the 2002 levels arestill lower than the record level crop growing 91000 hectares in 1999 and 82000hectares in 2000 the UN report confirms that opium cultivation has resumed topreviously high levels (Moreau amp Yousafzai 2003 UNODC 2004b)

As a result the average yield poppy production in 2002 shot up to 46 kilo-gramshectare from 24 kilogramshectare in 2001 The massive increase is largelydue to more extensive irrigation programs in Eastern and Southern Afghanistanimplemented since the fall of the Taliban in November 2001 along with the end ofa nationwide drought which devastated total agricultural output between 1998 and2001 Thus total opium poppy production in 2002 was 3400 metric tons a sizableincrease compared to 185 metric tons in 2001 (UNODC 2004b) Poppy cultivationthen doubled between 2002 and 2003 The area planted with poppies used tomake heroin and morphine was 152000 hectares in 2003 compared with 74000hectares in 2002 according to the White House ONDCP (UNODC 2004b)According to the State Department ldquoIn Afghanistan poppy cultivationapproached the highest levels ever registered International and United Statessurveys indicate that in 2003 Afghanistan again produced three-quarters of the

464 Chris J Dolan

worldrsquos illicit opium The narcotics situation remains serious despite positiveactions by both the government and international donorsrdquo (BINLEA 2004)

Besides the eradication campaign announced by the new Afghan governmentin 2002 appears to have been doomed to failure due to a lack of United Statesfinancial support Farmers were to be compensated with $500 per acre fordestroyed poppies which is only a fraction of the estimated $6400 per acre of grossincome an Afghani farmer can earn on poppy cultivation The UN Food and Agriculture Organization reported that ldquoAfghani government programs had a verylimited impactrdquo (Hanley 2002) At 2003 price levels and as a result of the explo-sion in poppy cultivation and production total income for Afghani opium farmersreached several hundred million United States dollars by the end of 2003 (Pound2004)

Other more unfortunate factors resulted from the 2002 poppy eradication cam-paign Afghan farmers have been killed and wounded by United States and Afghansecurity forces during protests against the campaign to eradicate their opiumpoppy crops (Wehrfritz 2003 Wyatt 2002) According to the BBC ldquoThe farmersare angered at what they see as derisory compensationrdquo (Wyatt 2002) ManyAfghan farmers direct their anger at the United States for pressuring the Karzaigovernment to institute the poppy ban (Pound 2004) As a result many Afghanfarmers have embraced Al Qaeda for its staunch anti-Americanism (Hersh 2004)

In the war on terrorism in Afghanistan the United States is trying to end theprofits Al Qaeda and the Taliban are making from the greater Central Asian drugtrade (Gannon 2004 Rashid 1999) However this may impact Americarsquos key alliesin the region who have for years reaped the rewards of the Afghanistanrsquos herointrade Nowhere is the problem clearer than along Afghanistanrsquos northern borderwith Tajikistan an ally in the United Statesrsquo antiterrorist efforts and a major conduitfor heroin and opium on its way to Europe and the Americas The United Statesrsquoinvasion even sparked a massive selling of heroin as Al Qaeda and Taliban forcesappeared to have been selling off their narcotic stockpiles for cash to purchase arms(Hersh 2004 Yglesias 2004)

Some Central Asian and Middle Eastern drug traffickers were actually support-ive of the American invasion of Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) According to the WallStreet Journal ldquoacross the Stans and the Caspian Sea in Lebanonrsquos Bekaa Valleysome pray for a speedy United States attack on Afghanistan lsquoItrsquos good for busi-nessrsquo says Muhammed standing in a garage full of cannabis a pistol tucked in hisbelt He is just back from harvesting this yearrsquos cannabis crop lsquoItrsquoll drive up hashishpricesrsquo Muhammed assures a prospective client that transport of 2500 kilograms(5500 pounds) to Amsterdam from the Bekaamdashcontrolled by Syrian troops as wellas Syrian- and Iranian-backed Shiite Muslim Hezbollah fightersmdashcan be arrangedrdquo(qtd in Targeting Terroristsrsquo Drug Money 2001 p 1)

Structural Attributes

Prior to the October 2001 invasion the United States government had no actualpresence in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) Today the most important organizationsresponsible for conducting the narco-terror war in Afghanistan include the FederalBureau of Investigation the Drug Enforcement Administration the Special Forces

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 465

the Department of Statersquos Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforce-ment Affairs (INL) and Pakistan security forces in cooperation with the UN Officeof Drugs and Crime (UNODC) But how successful is the partnership In Febru-ary 2002 the UNODC confirmed that opium poppy cultivation rose to higherlevels than previous years under Taliban rule The UNODC Country Office forAfghanistan and the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme (ICMP) conducted a pre-assessment survey in 208 villages and 42 districts in the traditional opium poppygrowing areas of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan in the provinces of HelmandKandahar Oruzgan Nangarhar and Kunar Those five provinces accounted for84 of the total opium poppy cultivation area in Afghanistan in 2000 (UNODC2004b)

It is estimated that the various security forces currently monitor opium poppycultivation over an area between 45000 hectares and 65000 hectares (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003) This compares to the level of cultivation reached during the mid-1990s but remained lower than those recorded in 1999 (about 95000 hectares)and 2000 (about 82000 hectares) The resulting production of opium harvestedin 2004 could reach between 1900 and 2700 metric tons of opium (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003)

To address these realities the INL the DEA and the FBI have concluded thatwith at least 40 of the Afghan gross domestic product virtually tied to heroin therisks of an untethered narco-economy producing a chain reaction that reverses pastgains made under the Taliban are quite high indeed In response the INL and theDEA have built police training facilities and trained and retrained roughly 20000Afghan police officers in order to implement narco-terror initiatives against Talibanand Al Qaeda holdouts In coordination with United States Special Forces the Bushadministration seeks to place 50000 border guards and Afghan National Police byDecember 2005 in support of the opium eradication campaign The INL the DEAand the FBI are also involved in creating a comprehensive justice sector TheUnited Statesrsquo effort has also resulted in some intriguing bureaucratic alliancesThe Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency one of the main sources ofinformation for the United States-led alliance against the Taliban regime is asso-ciated with political assassinations narcotics trafficking and smuggling of nucleartechnology and missile delivery components with the backing fundamentalistIslamic movements (qtd in Bedi 2001)

Opium cultivation and heroin production in Pakistanrsquos northern tribal belt andadjoining Afghanistan was a vital offshoot of the ISIndashCIA cooperation (Rashid1999) It succeeded in turning some Soviet troops into addicts during the USSRrsquosoccupation of Afghanistan Heroin sales in Europe and the United States carriedout via deceptive means transport networks couriers and pay-offs offset the costof the various wars in Afghanistan (Gannon 2004)

Resultant Political Policy

The initial military victories in Afghanistan are in the process of being lost as thecountry is rapidly disintegrating into a state of narco-terrorism and anarchy TheUnited Statesrsquo efforts may fail unless the link between Al Qaeda Taliban forcesand opium production are finally overcome In 2004 opium farmers and traffick-ers in Afghanistan generated $23 billion in profits with higher estimates for the

466 Chris J Dolan

future The level of opium planting and the subsequent production of opium pastemorphine and heroin in Afghanistan is more than enough to satisfy the demandin Western Europe and the United States (Gannon 2004)

Although Afghanistan represents one source in worldwide opium production inaddition to Mexico South America and Southeast Asia narco-terrorism policytoward Afghanistan has not succeeded in reversing growth trends in heroin con-sumption in the United States According to the 2002 National Survey on DrugUse and Health approximately 37 million Americans ages 12 and older reportedtrying heroin at least once during their lifetimes representing 16 of the popu-lation ages 12 and older Roughly 404000 (02) reported past-year heroin useand 166000 (01) reported past-month heroin use (SAMHSA 2004) Among highschool students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the Future Study 16 ofeighth graders 15 of tenth graders and 15 of twelfth graders reported usingheroin at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these percentages were 1618 and 17 respectively (NIDA 2003)

Regarding the ease by which one can obtain heroin 156 of eighth graders188 of tenth graders and 279 of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reportedthat heroin was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 63 ofeighth graders 71 of tenth graders and 59 of twelfth graders reported thatusing heroin once or twice without a needle was a ldquogreat riskrdquo (NIDA 2003)Nationwide 33 of high school students surveyed in 2003 as part of the YouthRisk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) reported using heroin during theirlifetimes Male students (43) were significantly more likely than female students(20) to report lifetime heroin use Hispanic students (39) were more likely toreport heroin use within their lifetime than white (26) or black (26) students(CDC 2004) During 2002 10 of college students and 18 of young adults (ages19ndash28) reported using heroin at least once during their lifetimes Approximately01 of college students and 02 of young adults reported past year use of heroinand 00 of college students and less than 005 of young adults reported pastmonth use of heroin (NIDA 2004)

According to data from the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) Programa median of 58 of adult male arrestees and 66 of adult female arrestees testedpositive for opiates at arrest in 2003 The adult male samples were compiled from39 United States sites and the adult female samples were compiled from 25 sitesA median of 51 of adult male arrestees and 71 of adult female arresteesreported using heroin at least once in the year before being arrested (NationalInstitute of Justice 2004) Although heroin expenditures were $22 billion in 1990demand decreased to $10 billion in 2000 and whereas in 1990 Americans con-sumed 136 metric tons of heroin estimates remained relatively unchanged in 2000(ABT Associates 2001)

Conclusions

Based on these observations of narco-terrorist activities in Afghanistan and Colom-bia on a substantive level the Bush administration has formulated domestic andinternational drug reduction strategies with an eye on asset seizure and control offunding used by terrorist organizations However important questions remain con-cerning the legitimacy of Americarsquos policy efforts Indeed narco-terrorism as a

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 467

national security threat is not new The 911 attacks simply pushed narco-terror-ism higher on the presidentrsquos national security agenda particularly in light of theconnection between the Afghan drug trade and the Al Qaeda network

On a theoretical level the contingency approach to examining narco-terrorismpolicy highlights several major concerns that have not been adequately addressedFirst as it is conducted today the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy places sig-nificant attention on the increased utilization of American military power Eversince President Richard Nixon proclaimed a war on drugs and President GeorgeW Bush a war on terrorism concern over the use of the military in what have typically been deemed law enforcement and social issues has overshadowed mostother related methods Even if the United States did not introduce troops intoAfghanistan or Colombia we are still left with a highly militarized narco-terrorismpolicy that facilitates human rights abuses by those governments receiving UnitedStates aid Moreover the result has been an increase in the production and con-sumption of illegal drugs that are trafficked by organizations that use profits topromote terrorist attacks

Second the contingency approach used in this study reveals the problems narco-terrorism policy has experienced in targeting so-called weak states Narco-terrorism policy has elevated the potential for the United States to use its diplo-matic weight to force governments to enact stricter antidrug policies This hasencouraged states like Afghanistan and Colombia to further undermine politicaleconomic and social development with undemocratic policies directed at citizensAs a result the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism efforts have in part fueled anti-American resentment thereby increasing the potential for additional terrorist activities by groups such as Al Qaeda or FARC

Third it has become more apparent that narco-terrorism policy has becomelike all other policies highly politicized Americarsquos counterdrug efforts are virtu-ally indistinguishable from counterinsurgency efforts by remnants of the Talibanand Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and FARC and other terror-related groups in Colom-bia Moreover the United States is being rather bold in designating particulargroups as narco-terrorists although conveniently leaving off others such as theNorthern Alliance in Afghanistan This hinders the rule of law in a number of countries

Finally the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in its current form neglectscertain realities Quite simply many critics allege that narco-terrorist connectionsare indirect and for the most part ambiguous In addition critics of prohibitionmaintain that it is the illegalization of drugs that generates the enormous profitsused to support terrorist and insurgent organizations Another concern is thatnarco-terrorism does not address the complexities of terrorism or insurgenciesCan Afghanistan and Colombia continue to be addressed in narrowly defined mil-itary and law enforcement frameworks that neglect political economic and socialconsiderations

About the Author

Chris J Dolan is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Floridawhere he teaches courses on public policy United States Foreign Policy and National Secu-

468 Chris J Dolan

rity the Mass Media and the American presidency He received his PhD from the Univer-sity of South Carolina He is the author of In War We Trust The Political Dimensions and EthicalConsequences of the First Strike Doctrine (Ashgate Press 2005) and co-editor of Striking First ThePreventive Doctrine and the Reshaping of US Foreign Policy (Palgrave-Macmillan 2004) Hisresearch on public policy executive policymaking foreign policy and the mass media appearin Policy Studies Journal Congress and the Presidency Politics and Policy White House Studies andin numerous edited volumes

References

ABT Associates (2001) What Americarsquos users spend on drugs 1988ndash2000 Prepared for the Office of NationalDrug Control Policy Retrieved April 21 2004 from httpwwwwhitehousedrugpolicygovpublicationspdfamerican_users_spend_2002pdf

Allison G T (1971) Essence of decision Boston Little BrownAllison G T amp Halperin M H (1972) Bureaucratic politics A paradigm and and some policy implications

World Politics 24 40ndash79Baldwin E (1991) Why rules donrsquot work Modern Law Review 53 321ndash338Barnard D (2003) Narco-terrorism realities The connection between drugs and terror Journal of Countert-

errorism and Homeland Security International 9(1) 31ndash34Bedi R (2001 September 26) The assassins and drug dealers are now helping us The Daily Telegraph p 1Bennett C J (1991) What is policy convergence What causes it British Journal of Political Science 21(2)

215ndash233Blau P amp Scott R (1962) Formal organizations San Francisco ChandlerBouchard G amp Carroll B (2002) Policy-making and administrative discretion The case of immigration in

Canada Canadian Public Administration 25(2) 239ndash259Bouchard G amp Carroll B (2003) One size does not fit all Annual Meeting of the Canadian Public Service

Administration Halifax Nova ScotiaBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002a) Fiscal year 2003 congres-

sional budget justification Washington DC AuthorBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002b) International narcotics

control strategy Afghanistan (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 from httpusembassystategovafghanistanwwwh02121802html

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2004) International NarcoticsControl Strategy Southwest Asia (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 fromhttpwwwstategovginlrlsnrcrpt2003vol1html29836htm

Bureau of Justice Statistics United States Department of Justice (2000) Sourcebook of criminal justice statisticsWashington DC United States Government Printing Office

Cala A (2001 November 21) Danger of a new Vietnam The Gazette p 1Carroll B amp Garkut D E (1996) Is there an empirical trend toward managerialism Canadian Public Admin-

istration 39(4) 535ndash553Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2004) Youth risk behavior surveillance United States 2003 (May 21)

Retrieved August 2 2004 from httpwwwcdcgovmmwrpreviewmmwrhtmlss5302a1htmChepesiuk R (1999) Hard target The United States war against international drug trafficking 1982ndash1997 Jeffer-

son NC McFarland amp CoColombia Program Center for International Policy (2000) Plan Colombia A plan for peace or a plan for war

( June 20) Retrieved May 1 2004 from httpwwwciponlineorgcolombia062001htmColombia Program Center for International Policy (2004) US Aid to Colombia since 1997 Summary tables

(February 20) Retrieved May 2 2004 from httpciponlineorgcolombiaaidtablehtmConcar D (2001 September 29) Cutting the Talibanrsquos lifeline New Scientist p 77Desveaux J A Lindquist E A amp Toner G (1994) Organizing for policy innovations in public bureaucra-

cies AIDS energy and environmental policy in Canada Canadian Journal of Political Science 27(3)493ndash528

Dexter L (1981) Unintended consequences of purposive legislative action Alternatives to implementationJournal of Public Policy 4(4) 250ndash264

Drug Abuse Policy Office (1982) Federal strategy for prevention of drug abuse and drug trafficking WashingtonDC United States Government Printing Office

Drug Enforcement Administration Intelligence Division (2002) Drugs and terrorism A new perspective RetrievedApril 29 2004 from httpwwwdeagovpubsintel02039f1f1

Dudley S (2000 July 31) The Colombia quagmire The American Prospect p 32

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 469

terrorist activities activities that will confer legitimacy upon them within the stateSuch groups assume measures to establish a legal political party whereby their polit-ical goals are realized through nonviolent legal means An example of a group inthis category is the Kurdistan Workerrsquos Party (PKK [Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan])Another category consists of groups that pursue ideological goals while participat-ing in select aspects of the drug trade for example the Revolutionary ArmedForces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC)Other extremist groups are suspected of drug involvement such as Hezbollah andthe Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS [Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya])Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path) in Peru and the Basque Fatherland andLiberty (ETA [Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna]) in Spain (Barnard 2003)

Resonance deals with the extent to which the most important issues associatedwith unified policy are embraced internalized and deemed critical by citizensIllegal drug production trafficking and consumption are activities not highly tol-erated by the general public Although the United States government has chosento merge its war on terrorism with its decades-long war on illicit drugs it remainsto be seen as to whether or not such efforts appear to have resonated throughoutthe citizenry However high levels of resonance tend to produce policies withambiguous vague and symbolic goals and a high degree of discretion and needfor adjustment (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003) The position of the Bush administra-tion is that the growing link between terrorists and the drug trade contributes toan increased threat to America (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003) Resonance is an impor-tant variable given that Bushrsquos ONDCP is promoting a new reason to continue thispublic effort since it is convinced that the illegal drug trade is linked to the supportof terror groups across the globe

Technology involves the ordering of policy functions The Counterdrug Tech-nology Assessment Center (CTAC) is the central counterdrug enforcement researchand development (RampD) organization of the United States Government that pro-motes advanced technologies related to the enforcement of narco-terrorism policyCTAC was established within the Office of National Drug Control Policy and hasbeen coordinating the counterdrug RampD program for the federal governmentsince 1992 In 1993 CTAC was directed to include drug abuse rehabilitation andaddiction research in the program in addition to law enforcement-related tech-nology CTAC prepares periodic reports to update the national counterdrug RampDprogram This report is the fourth Counterdrug RampD Blueprint Update and provides the status of the national counterdrug RampD program descriptions oftechnology development and infrastructure support projects and plans for future counterdrug RampD initiatives

Visibility deals mainly with whether or not the public is able to witness the oper-ation of policy functions Where visibility involves public attention and awarenessresonance deals with the degree of importance placed on the policy and its rela-tionship with societyrsquos core values (Bouchard amp Carroll 2003) Although violentacts are visible in the mass media the financing associated with drug productionand trafficking may not be visible to the public Since 911 the ONDCP haslaunched media campaigns to educate the public about the link between the illegaldrug trade and terrorism The multipronged attempt is designed to emphasizehow the sales of illicit drugs finance acts of terror The public initiative combines a

456 Chris J Dolan

range of activitiesmdashprint and broadcast advertising in-school programming lessonplans for teachers online information community and news media outreachmdashtoraise awareness about the link between drugs and terror and engage youth andinfluential adults in drug prevention

Whiteout Colombia

In 2000 the Clinton administration moved through Congress a narco-terror aidbill for Colombia At the time President Clinton signed package into law Colombiawas placed at the top of Americarsquos list of international priorities (Pardo 2000)ONDCP Director General Barry McCaffrey predicted that the initial $13 billionmeasure termed ldquoPlan Colombiardquomdash$860 million of it for Colombia three-quarters of that for Colombiarsquos police and militarymdashwould ldquostrengthen democracythe rule of law economic stability and human rights in Colombiardquo (McCaffery2000) In 2004 Plan Colombia ballooned to a $75 billion spending package(United States Department of State 2003) The Colombian governmentrsquos attemptsto negotiate peace with opposition guerrilla groups came to an end in May 2002when Aacutelvaro Uribe was elected president However under his administration illicitdrug production exploded and human rights abuses soared

Policy Discretion

The United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy toward Colombia is marked by two con-tradictory trends While Colombia has become a lower priority the size andpurpose of United States military aid has rapidly expanded Overall military andpolice aid amounts are increasing with new Colombian units getting support tooperate in new parts of the country In effect the United States has broadened itspurpose for providing Colombia with lethal assistancemdashfor years limited to coun-ternarcoticsmdashto include ldquocounterterrorismrdquo The change allows United States-aided units to assume offensive operations against the Revolutionary Armed Forcesof Colombia (FARC) the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the paramilitaryUnited Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) United States Special Forces havealso been deployed to Colombia to guard oil pipelines and eliminate insurgents(Dudley 2000 Jenkins 2001)

When it was initiated Plan Colombia placed much of its attention on Colom-biarsquos security forces largely overlooking the complicated deep-rooted origins of itsinternal conflicts (Pardo 2000) However in a country with far-reaching inequali-ties and abusive and corrupt police Plan Colombia was set to produce grave con-sequences (Sweig 2002 Weymouth 2000 p 45) According to a joint letter issuedin June 2002 by several Colombian government agencies Plan Colombia ldquowill leadto the escalation of the social and armed conflict fail to solve the drug-traffickingproblem endanger the peace process attack indigenous populationsrsquo culture andlife styles seriously hamper the Amazon eco-system worsen the humanitarian andhuman rights crisis promote forced displacement and further worsen the socialand political crisisrdquo (Colombia Program 2000) Overlooking the warnings between1999 and 2002 the United States gave Colombia $204 billion with 83 percentgoing to Colombiarsquos military and police This pattern continued under the Bush

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 457

administration which allocated $654 million in 2003 for Colombiarsquos security forces(Colombia Program 2004)

The United States also provided advanced weaponry to the Colombian militaryincluding helicopters attack aircraft patrol boats communications and intelli-gence-gathering equipment uniforms and small arms and the training of morethan 15000 Colombian military and police Hundreds of United States troops andprivate contractors work in Colombia as trainers intelligence-gatherers spraypilots and mechanics among other duties Since 1996 United States pilots havesprayed herbicides over more than a million acres of Colombian territory Duringthe 1990s Colombiarsquos National Police received nearly all lethal United States aid(Pardo 2000) The Clinton administration shifted the bulk of aid to the military in1999 and 2000 arguing that the guerrillasrsquo and paramilitariesrsquo entry into the drugbusiness made many counternarcotics missions too dangerous for the police toperform alone (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

Though the Colombian armed forces get most of the aid the United Statesrsquo com-mitment to the counternarcotics division (DIRAN [Directorate of Anti-Narcotics])of the Colombian National Police Force (Policiacutea Nacional Direccioacuten Antinarcoacuteticos)remains quite large The unit performs most drug interdiction and works with theDEA to arrest drug traffickers In rural zones where peasants grow illegal drugcrops United States-made DIRAN helicopters protect pilots who spray herbicidesover fields where illegal drug crops are grown risking ground fire from insurgentgroups (United States Senate 2002)

Over the past few years the United States has provided the DIRAN Air Servicewith Blackhawk and Huey Helicopters C-26B reconnaissance planes and con-struction upgrades to several of its bases throughout Colombia The Drug Enforce-ment Administration has created and completely funds four Sensitive Investigativeunits (SIUs) within the Colombian National Police elite units that carry out riskymissions against drug traffickers A worldwide antiterror appropriation thatbecame law in August 2002 adds more funding $4 million to create police unitsto protect construction of reinforced police stations in guerrilla-controlled areasand $25 million for antikidnapping units (shared with the Colombian Army) TheDIRAN came under a cloud of scandal in 2002 when investigators revealed thatseveral high-ranking officers had stolen at least $2 million in United States aidintended for administrative expenses (Bureau of International Narcotics and LawEnforcement Affairs [BINLEA] 2002a)

Joint ColombianndashUnited States military efforts are primarily concentrated in thesouthern provinces of Caquetaacute and Putumayo seen by many as the most produc-tive cocaine regions The regions account for roughly 33 of all coca (used to makecocaine) grown in Colombia and is controlled by FARC (Dudley 2000) The armyrsquosoriginal mission was to attack drug-processing labs to apprehend traffickers andto clear armed groups from areas of drug-crop cultivation (or at least to clear themlong enough for the United Statesrsquo herbicide spray planes to pass through) InAugust 2002 the Counter-Narcotics Brigade began using its equipment and train-ing for counterterrorism as well as for antidrug missions as a result some of thebrigadersquos operations may resemble the United States-led counter-insurgency effortsduring the 1980s in Central America (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

458 Chris J Dolan

Structural Attributes

Colombiarsquos security forces have a close institutional relationship with several UnitedStates agencies especially the National Security Agency (NSA) the Federal Bureauof Investigation (FBI) the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the StateDepartmentrsquos Bureau for International Narcotics (BIN) The Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA) offers their Colombian counterparts equipment and training toimprove their own ability to collect and analyze intelligence The United States alsoshares intelligence on tactical information concerning insurgent groupsrsquo move-ments and locations Furthermore the United States Army trains thousands ofColombian security personnel counterparts in topics ranging from marksmanshipto helicopter repair to human rights

Yet the United Statesrsquo approach to Colombia appears to neglect even these basictenets of counterinsurgency Massive aerial herbicide conducted by the Colombianand United States air forces and the DEA is fueling antigovernment sentiment ina guerrilla-controlled area (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003) Any social or economic effortshave been overshadowed particularly in most Colombiansrsquo perceptions It has alsosuffered from very serious implementation problems Some aid programs partic-ularly emergency humanitarian assistance appear to be reaching target popula-tionsmdashthough as United States Ambassador to Colombia Anne Patterson admitsthey ldquorepresent a drop in the bucket in relation to the real needs of Colombiarsquosdisplaced personsrdquo (qtd in Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

The success of nonmilitary aid programs has been mixed The effort to helpcoca-growing peasants adopt legal alternatives took the form of a series of ldquosocialpactsrdquo in which signers would receive basic assistance followed by technical andinfrastructure support in exchange for eradicating all their coca within twelvemonths after first receipt of aid By July 2001 37000 families in Putumayomdashjustunder half of the departmentrsquos populationmdashhad signed ldquopactsrdquo and waited forassistance that failed to arrive Alternative development money was delayed by theDEA forced to pass through several agencies before reaching the peasants BINthe United States Agency for International Development (USAID) the Colombiangovernmentrsquos Plan Colombia implementing agency the Colombian governmentrsquosalternative-development agency PLANTE and five Colombian nonprofit orga-nizations with no previous ties to Putumayo contracted to deliver the assistance(Dudley 2000)

Unintended Consequences

Since police and fumigation efforts were not accompanied by a credible alternativedevelopment effort in Putumayo thousands of peasants who had their crops erad-icated suddenly found themselves with little or no opportunities (Miller 2001)Putumayo community and church leaders interviewed by the Council of Interna-tional Policy in November 2002 hinted at a humanitarian disaster as sprayingdamaged food crops had contributed to widespread starvation in FARC-controlledrural areas (Dudley 2000) Those who lacked other economic opportunities joinedFARC and other terror groups by the hundreds (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 459

Furthermore the Bush White House does not appear to be progressing towardits goal of a 50 reduction in Colombian coca-growing by 2005 Coca is difficultto estimate According to CIA figures made public in March 2002 there is a pro-jected increase in the percentage of cocoa production over the next decade Theoverall amount of coca grown in Colombia is roughly 150000 hectares or threetimes as much as it was when the United States began large-scale spraying in 1996(Miller 2001) Since satellite measurements occur immediately following theJulyndashOctober fumigation campaign in Putumayo and may not take into accountreplanting and new planting elsewhere the 2002 statistics may show a greaterdecrease than probably exists (Van Dongen 2003) That year only four (perhapsfive) of Colombiarsquos thirty-two departments had 1000 or more hectares of coca In2001 a survey report issued by the UN found significant increases in coca pro-duction in the thirteen largest provinces in Colombia (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

While fumigation has proven able to reduce coca-growing in limited areasgrowers have been far more agile in eluding United States planes (Pardo 2000)New crops keep appearing in previously untouched parts of Colombiarsquos vast savan-nahs jungles and even coffee-growing zones Since at least the late 1980s totalcoca cultivation in South Americamdashperhaps the most meaningful estimate of thedrugrsquos availabilitymdashhas remained remarkably steady at roughly 200000 hectaresand the price of cocaine sold on United States streets remains steady

Clinton and Bush administration officials repeatedly argued that military train-ing and engagement would ease Colombiarsquos human rights crisis and encourage thearmed forces to end collaboration with paramilitary death squads Sadly the humanrights situation shows no signs of improvement The Consultancy for HumanRights and Displacement (CODHES) a widely cited Colombian nongovernmentalorganization estimated that violence forced 353120 people from their homesduring the first nine months of 2002 more than in all of 2001 The ColombianCommission of Jurists (CCJ) reported in September 2002 that political violence waskilling an average of 20 people per day double what the CCJ was reporting in1998 In January 2003 Human Rights Watch reported that ldquothere were numer-ous and credible reports of joint military-paramilitary operations and the sharingof intelligence and propagandardquo for 2002 (see Human Rights Watch World Report2003)

The most dangerous result could be that the United States has directly involveditself in Colombiarsquos civil war between FARC and government security forces underthe banner of ldquocounterterrorismrdquo (Dudley 2000) Unlike other second-tier ldquoWaron Terrorrdquo countries like the Philippines Georgia or Yemen where the terroristenemy is a shadowy group of a few dozen or a few hundred Colombiarsquos ldquoterror-istrdquo groups are established armies A counterterror effort in Colombia then risksevolving into an El Salvador-style counterinsurgency campaignmdashcomplete withUnited States advisors accompanying combat operations (Barnard 2003)

Political Policy Resultant

The advent of the War on Terror has kept the Bush administration from deviat-ing from its steady military approach Even before September 11 2001 the newBush administration had initiated a ldquoreview processrdquo to explore the possibility of

460 Chris J Dolan

going beyond the drug war to help Colombiarsquos government fight the guerrillas andthe paramilitaries Comparisons between FARC and Al Qaeda now began to showup with regularity

The United Statesrsquo approach is also highly contingent upon its dependence onSouth American oil A 2003 Bush administration foreign aid request to Congressincluded the first significant nondrug military aid to Colombia since the Cold War$98 million to help the Colombian Army protect the 480-mile long Cantildeo Limoacuten-Coventildeas oil pipeline A United States oil company Occidental Petroleum of LosAngeles owns 44 of the crude oil that flows through the Cantildeo Limoacuten pipelinewhich Colombian guerrillas dynamited 166 times in 2001 (United States Depart-ment of State 2002) ldquoClearly we have an energy threatrdquo warned CongressmanMark Souder (R-Indiana) in May 2002 ldquoColombia is either our seventh or eighthlargest supplier of oil Our economy depends on that We already have instabilityin the Middle East We have more compelling reasons to be involved in Colombiathan almost anywhere else in the worldrdquo (Souder 2002)

Beyond these initiatives it is not yet clear how the United Statesrsquo activities willexpand to match Washingtonrsquos much more ambitious mission in Colombia Whilethe purpose of United States military aid has expanded remarkably we have notseen a similar expansion in the amount of United States assistance Certainly military aid is risingmdashColombiarsquos security forces received over $100 million morein 2003 than they did in 2002 The pipeline program accounts for most of thatincrease Yet another $100 million would have only marginal impact on the direc-tion of a conflict involving nearly 40000 well-funded insurgents Pressures fordramatically increased military assistance are likely to build (Cala 2001 Pardo2000)

However if the goal of the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in Colombia isto reduce demand in the United States for cocaine then Americarsquos efforts havelargely failed which has been a continuing trend over the past 15 years (Wisotsky1990) During 2001 there were approximately 1160000 new cocaine users in theUnited States The average age of those who first used cocaine during the year was208 years According to the 2002 National Survey on Drug Use and Healthapproximately 339 million Americans ages 12 and older had tried cocaine at leastonce in their lifetimes representing 144 of the population in that age groupApproximately 59 million (25) had used cocaine in the past year and 20 million(09) had used cocaine within the past month (Substance Abuse and MentalHealth Services Administration [SAMHSA] 2004)

Among high school students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the FutureStudy 36 of eighth graders 51 of tenth graders and 77 of twelfth gradersreported using cocaine at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these per-centages were 36 61 and 78 respectively (National Institute on Drug Abuse[NIDA] 2003) Regarding the ease by which one can obtain powder cocaine 216of eighth graders 296 of tenth graders and 374 of twelfth graders surveyedin 2003 reported that powder cocaine was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtainApproximately 23 (225) of eighth graders 296 of tenth graders and 353of twelfth graders reported that crack cocaine was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo toobtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 44 of eighth graders 52 of tenth graders and 46of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reported that using powder cocaine once or

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 461

twice was a ldquogreat riskrdquo Nearly 49 of eighth graders 58 of tenth graders and47 of twelfth graders reported that using crack cocaine once or twice was a ldquogreatriskrdquo (NIDA 2003)

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also conducts a surveyof high school students throughout the United States the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) Among students surveyed in 2003 87 reportedusing some form of cocaine at least one time during their life of those 41reported being current users of cocaine meaning that they had used cocaine atleast once during the past month (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention[CDC] 2004) During 2002 82 of college students and 135 of young adults(ages 19ndash28) reported using cocaine at least once during their lifetimes Approxi-mately 48 of college students and 58 of young adults reported past-year useof cocaine and 16 of college students and 22 of young adults reported past-month use of cocaine (NIDA 2004)

Flower Power Afghanistan

Afghanistan is the worldrsquos leading source country for the cultivation processingand trafficking of opium By 1999 Afghanistan grew more than 4000 tons ofopium a year making it the primary source of roughly 75 of the worldrsquos illegalheroin (Concar 2001) Today narcotics are the largest source of income inAfghanistan due to the decimation of the countryrsquos economic infrastructure causedby years of warfare

Policy Discretion

On July 28 2000 Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar issued a decreebanning future opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan The decree stated that themilitary would eliminate poppy cultivation in the 2001 growing season in areasunder their control At the time the ban applied to any territory seized from theNorthern Alliance In February 2001 the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)declared that the opium poppy cultivation ban was successful and that the 2001crop was expected to be negligible (UNODC 2004a p 70) This marked the firsteffort by Taliban rulers to reduce opium production The eradication effort wasmade in response to an agreement with the UNODC which agreed to fund alter-native development projects on the condition that cultivation would be decreasedin Kandahar

Laboratories in Afghanistan convert opium into morphine base white heroinor one of three grades of brown heroin depending on the order received Largeprocessing labs are located in southern Afghanistan with smaller labs located mainlyin Nangarhar Province In the past many opium processing laboratories werelocated in Pakistan particularly in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) Theselaboratories appear to have relocated to Afghanistan both to be closer to the sourceof opium and to avoid the Pakistani government Morphine base is usually pro-duced for traffickers based in Turkey where it is converted to heroin before ship-ment to Europe and North and South America Chemists in the region are capable

462 Chris J Dolan

of producing heroin hydrochloride with extremely high purity levels (UNODC2004b)

Since Afghanistan is landlocked drug traffickers must rely on land routes tomove morphine base and heroin out of the country Heroin is trafficked to world-wide destinations by many routes Traffickers quickly adjust heroin smugglingroutes based on political and weather-related events (Gannon 2004) Reports ofheroin shipments north from Afghanistan through the Central Asian States toRussia have increased Tajikistan is a frequent destination for both opium andheroin shipments although Tajikistan serves mostly as a transit point and storagelocation rather than a final destination Seizures are frequently reported at Pakistanrsquos international airports (Rashid 1999) Heroin is also smuggled by sea onvessels leaving the port city of Karachi Heroin produced in Afghanistan continuesto be trafficked to the United States although generally in small quantities It isestimated that roughly 90 of opiate products in Europe originate in Afghanistan(Concar 2001 Hersh 2004)

Money laundering is not an issue in Afghanistan The unsophisticated bankingsystem that previously existed has been damaged by the years of war It is likelythat the informal banking system used extensively in the region usually referredto as the hawala or hundi money laundering system is used by drug traffickers(Lehmkuhler 2003) This system is an underground traditional informal networkthat has been used for centuries by businesses and families throughout Asia (StillFlushmdashTerrorist Finance 2002) This system provides a confidential convenientefficient service at a low cost in areas that are not served by traditional bankingfacilities (Hersh 2004)

Prior to the United Statesrsquo invasion of October 2001 the Taliban maintainedeffective control of nearly all of the opium poppy growing areas in the countryeven though they were only recognized as the legitimate government ofAfghanistan by three governments Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the United ArabEmirates Islamic law (Sharirsquoa) has been imposed in territory controlled by theTaliban and local Sharirsquoa courts have been established throughout the country In1997 the Taliban reactivated the State High Commission for Drug Control whichwas originally established in 1990 by the legitimate interim government Before theUNODC reports indicating that implementation of the 2000ndash2001 opium poppycultivation ban has been effective and the release of the United States governmentestimate indicating a dramatic reduction in opium production the Taliban madeonly token gestures toward antidrug law enforcement (BINLEA 2002b) Althoughthey have banned opium poppy cultivation the Taliban itself long relied on drugtrafficking for financial support

Unintended Consequences

As the United States began more rapidly merging its war on drugs with the greaterWar on Terror on a public scale halting opium production had to be as importantas eliminating the Taliban and the Al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan But howserious were Americarsquos efforts in applying its narco-terrorism policy to AfghanistanUnited States military commanders were not going to set opium eradication at thetop of their list of priorities (Schmitt 2002)

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 463

The results were consistent with Americarsquos hands-off approach Afghan opiumproduction in 2002 exploded to near-record levels making the war-ravaged nationagain the worldrsquos leading producer of the drug ( Judis 2003) Efforts by the UnitedStates-backed interim government of Hamid Karzai to eradicate opium productionby paying farmers to destroy their crops have failed because of a lack of moneyand violent demonstrations by farmers fearing their livelihoods were in jeopardy(Pound 2004) The UNrsquos Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated thatAfghanistan produced 3400 metric tons of opium in 2002 (Moreau amp Yousafzai2003 United Nations Information Service 2003)

Immediately after assuming office Karzai issued a decree on January 17 2002not only banning cultivation but also the processing trafficking and abuse ofopiates (Hanley 2002) Last month his government reiterated that positionreasserting the ban on opium poppy planting in the autumn (Hersh 2004) TheUNODC reopened its Kabul office in February 2002 and appointed Mohammad-Reza Amirkhizi as its representative The office has been engaged in a wide rangeof projects which include strengthening the Afghan drug control commissionassistance in law enforcement and the criminal justice sectors and cross-bordercounternarcotics cooperation with neighboring states The office is also working ona pilot social compact with farmers in Kandahar and Badakhshan provinces pro-viding them with small amounts of financial assistance with the understanding thatthey would grow commercial crops other than opium poppy (Gannon 2004)

The new Afghan government has largely failed in its now three-year effort toeradicate the opium poppy crop in Afghanistan which in recent years became theworldrsquos biggest producer of the raw material for heroin (Hanley 2002 Wehrfritz2003) The UN estimated that the 2004 crop could be worth more than $2 billionat the farm level in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004 Pound 2004) The resurgence ofopium production in Afghanistan is a major unintended consequence of the UnitedStates invasion

By 2002 the total opium poppy cultivation averaged 74000 hectares under theKarzai government and the United Statesrsquo military presence up from only 8000hectares in 2001 under the Taliban (UNODC 2004a) While the 2002 levels arestill lower than the record level crop growing 91000 hectares in 1999 and 82000hectares in 2000 the UN report confirms that opium cultivation has resumed topreviously high levels (Moreau amp Yousafzai 2003 UNODC 2004b)

As a result the average yield poppy production in 2002 shot up to 46 kilo-gramshectare from 24 kilogramshectare in 2001 The massive increase is largelydue to more extensive irrigation programs in Eastern and Southern Afghanistanimplemented since the fall of the Taliban in November 2001 along with the end ofa nationwide drought which devastated total agricultural output between 1998 and2001 Thus total opium poppy production in 2002 was 3400 metric tons a sizableincrease compared to 185 metric tons in 2001 (UNODC 2004b) Poppy cultivationthen doubled between 2002 and 2003 The area planted with poppies used tomake heroin and morphine was 152000 hectares in 2003 compared with 74000hectares in 2002 according to the White House ONDCP (UNODC 2004b)According to the State Department ldquoIn Afghanistan poppy cultivationapproached the highest levels ever registered International and United Statessurveys indicate that in 2003 Afghanistan again produced three-quarters of the

464 Chris J Dolan

worldrsquos illicit opium The narcotics situation remains serious despite positiveactions by both the government and international donorsrdquo (BINLEA 2004)

Besides the eradication campaign announced by the new Afghan governmentin 2002 appears to have been doomed to failure due to a lack of United Statesfinancial support Farmers were to be compensated with $500 per acre fordestroyed poppies which is only a fraction of the estimated $6400 per acre of grossincome an Afghani farmer can earn on poppy cultivation The UN Food and Agriculture Organization reported that ldquoAfghani government programs had a verylimited impactrdquo (Hanley 2002) At 2003 price levels and as a result of the explo-sion in poppy cultivation and production total income for Afghani opium farmersreached several hundred million United States dollars by the end of 2003 (Pound2004)

Other more unfortunate factors resulted from the 2002 poppy eradication cam-paign Afghan farmers have been killed and wounded by United States and Afghansecurity forces during protests against the campaign to eradicate their opiumpoppy crops (Wehrfritz 2003 Wyatt 2002) According to the BBC ldquoThe farmersare angered at what they see as derisory compensationrdquo (Wyatt 2002) ManyAfghan farmers direct their anger at the United States for pressuring the Karzaigovernment to institute the poppy ban (Pound 2004) As a result many Afghanfarmers have embraced Al Qaeda for its staunch anti-Americanism (Hersh 2004)

In the war on terrorism in Afghanistan the United States is trying to end theprofits Al Qaeda and the Taliban are making from the greater Central Asian drugtrade (Gannon 2004 Rashid 1999) However this may impact Americarsquos key alliesin the region who have for years reaped the rewards of the Afghanistanrsquos herointrade Nowhere is the problem clearer than along Afghanistanrsquos northern borderwith Tajikistan an ally in the United Statesrsquo antiterrorist efforts and a major conduitfor heroin and opium on its way to Europe and the Americas The United Statesrsquoinvasion even sparked a massive selling of heroin as Al Qaeda and Taliban forcesappeared to have been selling off their narcotic stockpiles for cash to purchase arms(Hersh 2004 Yglesias 2004)

Some Central Asian and Middle Eastern drug traffickers were actually support-ive of the American invasion of Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) According to the WallStreet Journal ldquoacross the Stans and the Caspian Sea in Lebanonrsquos Bekaa Valleysome pray for a speedy United States attack on Afghanistan lsquoItrsquos good for busi-nessrsquo says Muhammed standing in a garage full of cannabis a pistol tucked in hisbelt He is just back from harvesting this yearrsquos cannabis crop lsquoItrsquoll drive up hashishpricesrsquo Muhammed assures a prospective client that transport of 2500 kilograms(5500 pounds) to Amsterdam from the Bekaamdashcontrolled by Syrian troops as wellas Syrian- and Iranian-backed Shiite Muslim Hezbollah fightersmdashcan be arrangedrdquo(qtd in Targeting Terroristsrsquo Drug Money 2001 p 1)

Structural Attributes

Prior to the October 2001 invasion the United States government had no actualpresence in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) Today the most important organizationsresponsible for conducting the narco-terror war in Afghanistan include the FederalBureau of Investigation the Drug Enforcement Administration the Special Forces

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 465

the Department of Statersquos Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforce-ment Affairs (INL) and Pakistan security forces in cooperation with the UN Officeof Drugs and Crime (UNODC) But how successful is the partnership In Febru-ary 2002 the UNODC confirmed that opium poppy cultivation rose to higherlevels than previous years under Taliban rule The UNODC Country Office forAfghanistan and the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme (ICMP) conducted a pre-assessment survey in 208 villages and 42 districts in the traditional opium poppygrowing areas of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan in the provinces of HelmandKandahar Oruzgan Nangarhar and Kunar Those five provinces accounted for84 of the total opium poppy cultivation area in Afghanistan in 2000 (UNODC2004b)

It is estimated that the various security forces currently monitor opium poppycultivation over an area between 45000 hectares and 65000 hectares (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003) This compares to the level of cultivation reached during the mid-1990s but remained lower than those recorded in 1999 (about 95000 hectares)and 2000 (about 82000 hectares) The resulting production of opium harvestedin 2004 could reach between 1900 and 2700 metric tons of opium (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003)

To address these realities the INL the DEA and the FBI have concluded thatwith at least 40 of the Afghan gross domestic product virtually tied to heroin therisks of an untethered narco-economy producing a chain reaction that reverses pastgains made under the Taliban are quite high indeed In response the INL and theDEA have built police training facilities and trained and retrained roughly 20000Afghan police officers in order to implement narco-terror initiatives against Talibanand Al Qaeda holdouts In coordination with United States Special Forces the Bushadministration seeks to place 50000 border guards and Afghan National Police byDecember 2005 in support of the opium eradication campaign The INL the DEAand the FBI are also involved in creating a comprehensive justice sector TheUnited Statesrsquo effort has also resulted in some intriguing bureaucratic alliancesThe Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency one of the main sources ofinformation for the United States-led alliance against the Taliban regime is asso-ciated with political assassinations narcotics trafficking and smuggling of nucleartechnology and missile delivery components with the backing fundamentalistIslamic movements (qtd in Bedi 2001)

Opium cultivation and heroin production in Pakistanrsquos northern tribal belt andadjoining Afghanistan was a vital offshoot of the ISIndashCIA cooperation (Rashid1999) It succeeded in turning some Soviet troops into addicts during the USSRrsquosoccupation of Afghanistan Heroin sales in Europe and the United States carriedout via deceptive means transport networks couriers and pay-offs offset the costof the various wars in Afghanistan (Gannon 2004)

Resultant Political Policy

The initial military victories in Afghanistan are in the process of being lost as thecountry is rapidly disintegrating into a state of narco-terrorism and anarchy TheUnited Statesrsquo efforts may fail unless the link between Al Qaeda Taliban forcesand opium production are finally overcome In 2004 opium farmers and traffick-ers in Afghanistan generated $23 billion in profits with higher estimates for the

466 Chris J Dolan

future The level of opium planting and the subsequent production of opium pastemorphine and heroin in Afghanistan is more than enough to satisfy the demandin Western Europe and the United States (Gannon 2004)

Although Afghanistan represents one source in worldwide opium production inaddition to Mexico South America and Southeast Asia narco-terrorism policytoward Afghanistan has not succeeded in reversing growth trends in heroin con-sumption in the United States According to the 2002 National Survey on DrugUse and Health approximately 37 million Americans ages 12 and older reportedtrying heroin at least once during their lifetimes representing 16 of the popu-lation ages 12 and older Roughly 404000 (02) reported past-year heroin useand 166000 (01) reported past-month heroin use (SAMHSA 2004) Among highschool students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the Future Study 16 ofeighth graders 15 of tenth graders and 15 of twelfth graders reported usingheroin at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these percentages were 1618 and 17 respectively (NIDA 2003)

Regarding the ease by which one can obtain heroin 156 of eighth graders188 of tenth graders and 279 of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reportedthat heroin was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 63 ofeighth graders 71 of tenth graders and 59 of twelfth graders reported thatusing heroin once or twice without a needle was a ldquogreat riskrdquo (NIDA 2003)Nationwide 33 of high school students surveyed in 2003 as part of the YouthRisk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) reported using heroin during theirlifetimes Male students (43) were significantly more likely than female students(20) to report lifetime heroin use Hispanic students (39) were more likely toreport heroin use within their lifetime than white (26) or black (26) students(CDC 2004) During 2002 10 of college students and 18 of young adults (ages19ndash28) reported using heroin at least once during their lifetimes Approximately01 of college students and 02 of young adults reported past year use of heroinand 00 of college students and less than 005 of young adults reported pastmonth use of heroin (NIDA 2004)

According to data from the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) Programa median of 58 of adult male arrestees and 66 of adult female arrestees testedpositive for opiates at arrest in 2003 The adult male samples were compiled from39 United States sites and the adult female samples were compiled from 25 sitesA median of 51 of adult male arrestees and 71 of adult female arresteesreported using heroin at least once in the year before being arrested (NationalInstitute of Justice 2004) Although heroin expenditures were $22 billion in 1990demand decreased to $10 billion in 2000 and whereas in 1990 Americans con-sumed 136 metric tons of heroin estimates remained relatively unchanged in 2000(ABT Associates 2001)

Conclusions

Based on these observations of narco-terrorist activities in Afghanistan and Colom-bia on a substantive level the Bush administration has formulated domestic andinternational drug reduction strategies with an eye on asset seizure and control offunding used by terrorist organizations However important questions remain con-cerning the legitimacy of Americarsquos policy efforts Indeed narco-terrorism as a

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 467

national security threat is not new The 911 attacks simply pushed narco-terror-ism higher on the presidentrsquos national security agenda particularly in light of theconnection between the Afghan drug trade and the Al Qaeda network

On a theoretical level the contingency approach to examining narco-terrorismpolicy highlights several major concerns that have not been adequately addressedFirst as it is conducted today the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy places sig-nificant attention on the increased utilization of American military power Eversince President Richard Nixon proclaimed a war on drugs and President GeorgeW Bush a war on terrorism concern over the use of the military in what have typically been deemed law enforcement and social issues has overshadowed mostother related methods Even if the United States did not introduce troops intoAfghanistan or Colombia we are still left with a highly militarized narco-terrorismpolicy that facilitates human rights abuses by those governments receiving UnitedStates aid Moreover the result has been an increase in the production and con-sumption of illegal drugs that are trafficked by organizations that use profits topromote terrorist attacks

Second the contingency approach used in this study reveals the problems narco-terrorism policy has experienced in targeting so-called weak states Narco-terrorism policy has elevated the potential for the United States to use its diplo-matic weight to force governments to enact stricter antidrug policies This hasencouraged states like Afghanistan and Colombia to further undermine politicaleconomic and social development with undemocratic policies directed at citizensAs a result the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism efforts have in part fueled anti-American resentment thereby increasing the potential for additional terrorist activities by groups such as Al Qaeda or FARC

Third it has become more apparent that narco-terrorism policy has becomelike all other policies highly politicized Americarsquos counterdrug efforts are virtu-ally indistinguishable from counterinsurgency efforts by remnants of the Talibanand Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and FARC and other terror-related groups in Colom-bia Moreover the United States is being rather bold in designating particulargroups as narco-terrorists although conveniently leaving off others such as theNorthern Alliance in Afghanistan This hinders the rule of law in a number of countries

Finally the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in its current form neglectscertain realities Quite simply many critics allege that narco-terrorist connectionsare indirect and for the most part ambiguous In addition critics of prohibitionmaintain that it is the illegalization of drugs that generates the enormous profitsused to support terrorist and insurgent organizations Another concern is thatnarco-terrorism does not address the complexities of terrorism or insurgenciesCan Afghanistan and Colombia continue to be addressed in narrowly defined mil-itary and law enforcement frameworks that neglect political economic and socialconsiderations

About the Author

Chris J Dolan is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Floridawhere he teaches courses on public policy United States Foreign Policy and National Secu-

468 Chris J Dolan

rity the Mass Media and the American presidency He received his PhD from the Univer-sity of South Carolina He is the author of In War We Trust The Political Dimensions and EthicalConsequences of the First Strike Doctrine (Ashgate Press 2005) and co-editor of Striking First ThePreventive Doctrine and the Reshaping of US Foreign Policy (Palgrave-Macmillan 2004) Hisresearch on public policy executive policymaking foreign policy and the mass media appearin Policy Studies Journal Congress and the Presidency Politics and Policy White House Studies andin numerous edited volumes

References

ABT Associates (2001) What Americarsquos users spend on drugs 1988ndash2000 Prepared for the Office of NationalDrug Control Policy Retrieved April 21 2004 from httpwwwwhitehousedrugpolicygovpublicationspdfamerican_users_spend_2002pdf

Allison G T (1971) Essence of decision Boston Little BrownAllison G T amp Halperin M H (1972) Bureaucratic politics A paradigm and and some policy implications

World Politics 24 40ndash79Baldwin E (1991) Why rules donrsquot work Modern Law Review 53 321ndash338Barnard D (2003) Narco-terrorism realities The connection between drugs and terror Journal of Countert-

errorism and Homeland Security International 9(1) 31ndash34Bedi R (2001 September 26) The assassins and drug dealers are now helping us The Daily Telegraph p 1Bennett C J (1991) What is policy convergence What causes it British Journal of Political Science 21(2)

215ndash233Blau P amp Scott R (1962) Formal organizations San Francisco ChandlerBouchard G amp Carroll B (2002) Policy-making and administrative discretion The case of immigration in

Canada Canadian Public Administration 25(2) 239ndash259Bouchard G amp Carroll B (2003) One size does not fit all Annual Meeting of the Canadian Public Service

Administration Halifax Nova ScotiaBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002a) Fiscal year 2003 congres-

sional budget justification Washington DC AuthorBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002b) International narcotics

control strategy Afghanistan (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 from httpusembassystategovafghanistanwwwh02121802html

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2004) International NarcoticsControl Strategy Southwest Asia (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 fromhttpwwwstategovginlrlsnrcrpt2003vol1html29836htm

Bureau of Justice Statistics United States Department of Justice (2000) Sourcebook of criminal justice statisticsWashington DC United States Government Printing Office

Cala A (2001 November 21) Danger of a new Vietnam The Gazette p 1Carroll B amp Garkut D E (1996) Is there an empirical trend toward managerialism Canadian Public Admin-

istration 39(4) 535ndash553Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2004) Youth risk behavior surveillance United States 2003 (May 21)

Retrieved August 2 2004 from httpwwwcdcgovmmwrpreviewmmwrhtmlss5302a1htmChepesiuk R (1999) Hard target The United States war against international drug trafficking 1982ndash1997 Jeffer-

son NC McFarland amp CoColombia Program Center for International Policy (2000) Plan Colombia A plan for peace or a plan for war

( June 20) Retrieved May 1 2004 from httpwwwciponlineorgcolombia062001htmColombia Program Center for International Policy (2004) US Aid to Colombia since 1997 Summary tables

(February 20) Retrieved May 2 2004 from httpciponlineorgcolombiaaidtablehtmConcar D (2001 September 29) Cutting the Talibanrsquos lifeline New Scientist p 77Desveaux J A Lindquist E A amp Toner G (1994) Organizing for policy innovations in public bureaucra-

cies AIDS energy and environmental policy in Canada Canadian Journal of Political Science 27(3)493ndash528

Dexter L (1981) Unintended consequences of purposive legislative action Alternatives to implementationJournal of Public Policy 4(4) 250ndash264

Drug Abuse Policy Office (1982) Federal strategy for prevention of drug abuse and drug trafficking WashingtonDC United States Government Printing Office

Drug Enforcement Administration Intelligence Division (2002) Drugs and terrorism A new perspective RetrievedApril 29 2004 from httpwwwdeagovpubsintel02039f1f1

Dudley S (2000 July 31) The Colombia quagmire The American Prospect p 32

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 469

range of activitiesmdashprint and broadcast advertising in-school programming lessonplans for teachers online information community and news media outreachmdashtoraise awareness about the link between drugs and terror and engage youth andinfluential adults in drug prevention

Whiteout Colombia

In 2000 the Clinton administration moved through Congress a narco-terror aidbill for Colombia At the time President Clinton signed package into law Colombiawas placed at the top of Americarsquos list of international priorities (Pardo 2000)ONDCP Director General Barry McCaffrey predicted that the initial $13 billionmeasure termed ldquoPlan Colombiardquomdash$860 million of it for Colombia three-quarters of that for Colombiarsquos police and militarymdashwould ldquostrengthen democracythe rule of law economic stability and human rights in Colombiardquo (McCaffery2000) In 2004 Plan Colombia ballooned to a $75 billion spending package(United States Department of State 2003) The Colombian governmentrsquos attemptsto negotiate peace with opposition guerrilla groups came to an end in May 2002when Aacutelvaro Uribe was elected president However under his administration illicitdrug production exploded and human rights abuses soared

Policy Discretion

The United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy toward Colombia is marked by two con-tradictory trends While Colombia has become a lower priority the size andpurpose of United States military aid has rapidly expanded Overall military andpolice aid amounts are increasing with new Colombian units getting support tooperate in new parts of the country In effect the United States has broadened itspurpose for providing Colombia with lethal assistancemdashfor years limited to coun-ternarcoticsmdashto include ldquocounterterrorismrdquo The change allows United States-aided units to assume offensive operations against the Revolutionary Armed Forcesof Colombia (FARC) the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the paramilitaryUnited Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) United States Special Forces havealso been deployed to Colombia to guard oil pipelines and eliminate insurgents(Dudley 2000 Jenkins 2001)

When it was initiated Plan Colombia placed much of its attention on Colom-biarsquos security forces largely overlooking the complicated deep-rooted origins of itsinternal conflicts (Pardo 2000) However in a country with far-reaching inequali-ties and abusive and corrupt police Plan Colombia was set to produce grave con-sequences (Sweig 2002 Weymouth 2000 p 45) According to a joint letter issuedin June 2002 by several Colombian government agencies Plan Colombia ldquowill leadto the escalation of the social and armed conflict fail to solve the drug-traffickingproblem endanger the peace process attack indigenous populationsrsquo culture andlife styles seriously hamper the Amazon eco-system worsen the humanitarian andhuman rights crisis promote forced displacement and further worsen the socialand political crisisrdquo (Colombia Program 2000) Overlooking the warnings between1999 and 2002 the United States gave Colombia $204 billion with 83 percentgoing to Colombiarsquos military and police This pattern continued under the Bush

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 457

administration which allocated $654 million in 2003 for Colombiarsquos security forces(Colombia Program 2004)

The United States also provided advanced weaponry to the Colombian militaryincluding helicopters attack aircraft patrol boats communications and intelli-gence-gathering equipment uniforms and small arms and the training of morethan 15000 Colombian military and police Hundreds of United States troops andprivate contractors work in Colombia as trainers intelligence-gatherers spraypilots and mechanics among other duties Since 1996 United States pilots havesprayed herbicides over more than a million acres of Colombian territory Duringthe 1990s Colombiarsquos National Police received nearly all lethal United States aid(Pardo 2000) The Clinton administration shifted the bulk of aid to the military in1999 and 2000 arguing that the guerrillasrsquo and paramilitariesrsquo entry into the drugbusiness made many counternarcotics missions too dangerous for the police toperform alone (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

Though the Colombian armed forces get most of the aid the United Statesrsquo com-mitment to the counternarcotics division (DIRAN [Directorate of Anti-Narcotics])of the Colombian National Police Force (Policiacutea Nacional Direccioacuten Antinarcoacuteticos)remains quite large The unit performs most drug interdiction and works with theDEA to arrest drug traffickers In rural zones where peasants grow illegal drugcrops United States-made DIRAN helicopters protect pilots who spray herbicidesover fields where illegal drug crops are grown risking ground fire from insurgentgroups (United States Senate 2002)

Over the past few years the United States has provided the DIRAN Air Servicewith Blackhawk and Huey Helicopters C-26B reconnaissance planes and con-struction upgrades to several of its bases throughout Colombia The Drug Enforce-ment Administration has created and completely funds four Sensitive Investigativeunits (SIUs) within the Colombian National Police elite units that carry out riskymissions against drug traffickers A worldwide antiterror appropriation thatbecame law in August 2002 adds more funding $4 million to create police unitsto protect construction of reinforced police stations in guerrilla-controlled areasand $25 million for antikidnapping units (shared with the Colombian Army) TheDIRAN came under a cloud of scandal in 2002 when investigators revealed thatseveral high-ranking officers had stolen at least $2 million in United States aidintended for administrative expenses (Bureau of International Narcotics and LawEnforcement Affairs [BINLEA] 2002a)

Joint ColombianndashUnited States military efforts are primarily concentrated in thesouthern provinces of Caquetaacute and Putumayo seen by many as the most produc-tive cocaine regions The regions account for roughly 33 of all coca (used to makecocaine) grown in Colombia and is controlled by FARC (Dudley 2000) The armyrsquosoriginal mission was to attack drug-processing labs to apprehend traffickers andto clear armed groups from areas of drug-crop cultivation (or at least to clear themlong enough for the United Statesrsquo herbicide spray planes to pass through) InAugust 2002 the Counter-Narcotics Brigade began using its equipment and train-ing for counterterrorism as well as for antidrug missions as a result some of thebrigadersquos operations may resemble the United States-led counter-insurgency effortsduring the 1980s in Central America (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

458 Chris J Dolan

Structural Attributes

Colombiarsquos security forces have a close institutional relationship with several UnitedStates agencies especially the National Security Agency (NSA) the Federal Bureauof Investigation (FBI) the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the StateDepartmentrsquos Bureau for International Narcotics (BIN) The Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA) offers their Colombian counterparts equipment and training toimprove their own ability to collect and analyze intelligence The United States alsoshares intelligence on tactical information concerning insurgent groupsrsquo move-ments and locations Furthermore the United States Army trains thousands ofColombian security personnel counterparts in topics ranging from marksmanshipto helicopter repair to human rights

Yet the United Statesrsquo approach to Colombia appears to neglect even these basictenets of counterinsurgency Massive aerial herbicide conducted by the Colombianand United States air forces and the DEA is fueling antigovernment sentiment ina guerrilla-controlled area (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003) Any social or economic effortshave been overshadowed particularly in most Colombiansrsquo perceptions It has alsosuffered from very serious implementation problems Some aid programs partic-ularly emergency humanitarian assistance appear to be reaching target popula-tionsmdashthough as United States Ambassador to Colombia Anne Patterson admitsthey ldquorepresent a drop in the bucket in relation to the real needs of Colombiarsquosdisplaced personsrdquo (qtd in Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

The success of nonmilitary aid programs has been mixed The effort to helpcoca-growing peasants adopt legal alternatives took the form of a series of ldquosocialpactsrdquo in which signers would receive basic assistance followed by technical andinfrastructure support in exchange for eradicating all their coca within twelvemonths after first receipt of aid By July 2001 37000 families in Putumayomdashjustunder half of the departmentrsquos populationmdashhad signed ldquopactsrdquo and waited forassistance that failed to arrive Alternative development money was delayed by theDEA forced to pass through several agencies before reaching the peasants BINthe United States Agency for International Development (USAID) the Colombiangovernmentrsquos Plan Colombia implementing agency the Colombian governmentrsquosalternative-development agency PLANTE and five Colombian nonprofit orga-nizations with no previous ties to Putumayo contracted to deliver the assistance(Dudley 2000)

Unintended Consequences

Since police and fumigation efforts were not accompanied by a credible alternativedevelopment effort in Putumayo thousands of peasants who had their crops erad-icated suddenly found themselves with little or no opportunities (Miller 2001)Putumayo community and church leaders interviewed by the Council of Interna-tional Policy in November 2002 hinted at a humanitarian disaster as sprayingdamaged food crops had contributed to widespread starvation in FARC-controlledrural areas (Dudley 2000) Those who lacked other economic opportunities joinedFARC and other terror groups by the hundreds (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 459

Furthermore the Bush White House does not appear to be progressing towardits goal of a 50 reduction in Colombian coca-growing by 2005 Coca is difficultto estimate According to CIA figures made public in March 2002 there is a pro-jected increase in the percentage of cocoa production over the next decade Theoverall amount of coca grown in Colombia is roughly 150000 hectares or threetimes as much as it was when the United States began large-scale spraying in 1996(Miller 2001) Since satellite measurements occur immediately following theJulyndashOctober fumigation campaign in Putumayo and may not take into accountreplanting and new planting elsewhere the 2002 statistics may show a greaterdecrease than probably exists (Van Dongen 2003) That year only four (perhapsfive) of Colombiarsquos thirty-two departments had 1000 or more hectares of coca In2001 a survey report issued by the UN found significant increases in coca pro-duction in the thirteen largest provinces in Colombia (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

While fumigation has proven able to reduce coca-growing in limited areasgrowers have been far more agile in eluding United States planes (Pardo 2000)New crops keep appearing in previously untouched parts of Colombiarsquos vast savan-nahs jungles and even coffee-growing zones Since at least the late 1980s totalcoca cultivation in South Americamdashperhaps the most meaningful estimate of thedrugrsquos availabilitymdashhas remained remarkably steady at roughly 200000 hectaresand the price of cocaine sold on United States streets remains steady

Clinton and Bush administration officials repeatedly argued that military train-ing and engagement would ease Colombiarsquos human rights crisis and encourage thearmed forces to end collaboration with paramilitary death squads Sadly the humanrights situation shows no signs of improvement The Consultancy for HumanRights and Displacement (CODHES) a widely cited Colombian nongovernmentalorganization estimated that violence forced 353120 people from their homesduring the first nine months of 2002 more than in all of 2001 The ColombianCommission of Jurists (CCJ) reported in September 2002 that political violence waskilling an average of 20 people per day double what the CCJ was reporting in1998 In January 2003 Human Rights Watch reported that ldquothere were numer-ous and credible reports of joint military-paramilitary operations and the sharingof intelligence and propagandardquo for 2002 (see Human Rights Watch World Report2003)

The most dangerous result could be that the United States has directly involveditself in Colombiarsquos civil war between FARC and government security forces underthe banner of ldquocounterterrorismrdquo (Dudley 2000) Unlike other second-tier ldquoWaron Terrorrdquo countries like the Philippines Georgia or Yemen where the terroristenemy is a shadowy group of a few dozen or a few hundred Colombiarsquos ldquoterror-istrdquo groups are established armies A counterterror effort in Colombia then risksevolving into an El Salvador-style counterinsurgency campaignmdashcomplete withUnited States advisors accompanying combat operations (Barnard 2003)

Political Policy Resultant

The advent of the War on Terror has kept the Bush administration from deviat-ing from its steady military approach Even before September 11 2001 the newBush administration had initiated a ldquoreview processrdquo to explore the possibility of

460 Chris J Dolan

going beyond the drug war to help Colombiarsquos government fight the guerrillas andthe paramilitaries Comparisons between FARC and Al Qaeda now began to showup with regularity

The United Statesrsquo approach is also highly contingent upon its dependence onSouth American oil A 2003 Bush administration foreign aid request to Congressincluded the first significant nondrug military aid to Colombia since the Cold War$98 million to help the Colombian Army protect the 480-mile long Cantildeo Limoacuten-Coventildeas oil pipeline A United States oil company Occidental Petroleum of LosAngeles owns 44 of the crude oil that flows through the Cantildeo Limoacuten pipelinewhich Colombian guerrillas dynamited 166 times in 2001 (United States Depart-ment of State 2002) ldquoClearly we have an energy threatrdquo warned CongressmanMark Souder (R-Indiana) in May 2002 ldquoColombia is either our seventh or eighthlargest supplier of oil Our economy depends on that We already have instabilityin the Middle East We have more compelling reasons to be involved in Colombiathan almost anywhere else in the worldrdquo (Souder 2002)

Beyond these initiatives it is not yet clear how the United Statesrsquo activities willexpand to match Washingtonrsquos much more ambitious mission in Colombia Whilethe purpose of United States military aid has expanded remarkably we have notseen a similar expansion in the amount of United States assistance Certainly military aid is risingmdashColombiarsquos security forces received over $100 million morein 2003 than they did in 2002 The pipeline program accounts for most of thatincrease Yet another $100 million would have only marginal impact on the direc-tion of a conflict involving nearly 40000 well-funded insurgents Pressures fordramatically increased military assistance are likely to build (Cala 2001 Pardo2000)

However if the goal of the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in Colombia isto reduce demand in the United States for cocaine then Americarsquos efforts havelargely failed which has been a continuing trend over the past 15 years (Wisotsky1990) During 2001 there were approximately 1160000 new cocaine users in theUnited States The average age of those who first used cocaine during the year was208 years According to the 2002 National Survey on Drug Use and Healthapproximately 339 million Americans ages 12 and older had tried cocaine at leastonce in their lifetimes representing 144 of the population in that age groupApproximately 59 million (25) had used cocaine in the past year and 20 million(09) had used cocaine within the past month (Substance Abuse and MentalHealth Services Administration [SAMHSA] 2004)

Among high school students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the FutureStudy 36 of eighth graders 51 of tenth graders and 77 of twelfth gradersreported using cocaine at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these per-centages were 36 61 and 78 respectively (National Institute on Drug Abuse[NIDA] 2003) Regarding the ease by which one can obtain powder cocaine 216of eighth graders 296 of tenth graders and 374 of twelfth graders surveyedin 2003 reported that powder cocaine was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtainApproximately 23 (225) of eighth graders 296 of tenth graders and 353of twelfth graders reported that crack cocaine was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo toobtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 44 of eighth graders 52 of tenth graders and 46of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reported that using powder cocaine once or

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 461

twice was a ldquogreat riskrdquo Nearly 49 of eighth graders 58 of tenth graders and47 of twelfth graders reported that using crack cocaine once or twice was a ldquogreatriskrdquo (NIDA 2003)

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also conducts a surveyof high school students throughout the United States the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) Among students surveyed in 2003 87 reportedusing some form of cocaine at least one time during their life of those 41reported being current users of cocaine meaning that they had used cocaine atleast once during the past month (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention[CDC] 2004) During 2002 82 of college students and 135 of young adults(ages 19ndash28) reported using cocaine at least once during their lifetimes Approxi-mately 48 of college students and 58 of young adults reported past-year useof cocaine and 16 of college students and 22 of young adults reported past-month use of cocaine (NIDA 2004)

Flower Power Afghanistan

Afghanistan is the worldrsquos leading source country for the cultivation processingand trafficking of opium By 1999 Afghanistan grew more than 4000 tons ofopium a year making it the primary source of roughly 75 of the worldrsquos illegalheroin (Concar 2001) Today narcotics are the largest source of income inAfghanistan due to the decimation of the countryrsquos economic infrastructure causedby years of warfare

Policy Discretion

On July 28 2000 Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar issued a decreebanning future opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan The decree stated that themilitary would eliminate poppy cultivation in the 2001 growing season in areasunder their control At the time the ban applied to any territory seized from theNorthern Alliance In February 2001 the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)declared that the opium poppy cultivation ban was successful and that the 2001crop was expected to be negligible (UNODC 2004a p 70) This marked the firsteffort by Taliban rulers to reduce opium production The eradication effort wasmade in response to an agreement with the UNODC which agreed to fund alter-native development projects on the condition that cultivation would be decreasedin Kandahar

Laboratories in Afghanistan convert opium into morphine base white heroinor one of three grades of brown heroin depending on the order received Largeprocessing labs are located in southern Afghanistan with smaller labs located mainlyin Nangarhar Province In the past many opium processing laboratories werelocated in Pakistan particularly in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) Theselaboratories appear to have relocated to Afghanistan both to be closer to the sourceof opium and to avoid the Pakistani government Morphine base is usually pro-duced for traffickers based in Turkey where it is converted to heroin before ship-ment to Europe and North and South America Chemists in the region are capable

462 Chris J Dolan

of producing heroin hydrochloride with extremely high purity levels (UNODC2004b)

Since Afghanistan is landlocked drug traffickers must rely on land routes tomove morphine base and heroin out of the country Heroin is trafficked to world-wide destinations by many routes Traffickers quickly adjust heroin smugglingroutes based on political and weather-related events (Gannon 2004) Reports ofheroin shipments north from Afghanistan through the Central Asian States toRussia have increased Tajikistan is a frequent destination for both opium andheroin shipments although Tajikistan serves mostly as a transit point and storagelocation rather than a final destination Seizures are frequently reported at Pakistanrsquos international airports (Rashid 1999) Heroin is also smuggled by sea onvessels leaving the port city of Karachi Heroin produced in Afghanistan continuesto be trafficked to the United States although generally in small quantities It isestimated that roughly 90 of opiate products in Europe originate in Afghanistan(Concar 2001 Hersh 2004)

Money laundering is not an issue in Afghanistan The unsophisticated bankingsystem that previously existed has been damaged by the years of war It is likelythat the informal banking system used extensively in the region usually referredto as the hawala or hundi money laundering system is used by drug traffickers(Lehmkuhler 2003) This system is an underground traditional informal networkthat has been used for centuries by businesses and families throughout Asia (StillFlushmdashTerrorist Finance 2002) This system provides a confidential convenientefficient service at a low cost in areas that are not served by traditional bankingfacilities (Hersh 2004)

Prior to the United Statesrsquo invasion of October 2001 the Taliban maintainedeffective control of nearly all of the opium poppy growing areas in the countryeven though they were only recognized as the legitimate government ofAfghanistan by three governments Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the United ArabEmirates Islamic law (Sharirsquoa) has been imposed in territory controlled by theTaliban and local Sharirsquoa courts have been established throughout the country In1997 the Taliban reactivated the State High Commission for Drug Control whichwas originally established in 1990 by the legitimate interim government Before theUNODC reports indicating that implementation of the 2000ndash2001 opium poppycultivation ban has been effective and the release of the United States governmentestimate indicating a dramatic reduction in opium production the Taliban madeonly token gestures toward antidrug law enforcement (BINLEA 2002b) Althoughthey have banned opium poppy cultivation the Taliban itself long relied on drugtrafficking for financial support

Unintended Consequences

As the United States began more rapidly merging its war on drugs with the greaterWar on Terror on a public scale halting opium production had to be as importantas eliminating the Taliban and the Al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan But howserious were Americarsquos efforts in applying its narco-terrorism policy to AfghanistanUnited States military commanders were not going to set opium eradication at thetop of their list of priorities (Schmitt 2002)

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 463

The results were consistent with Americarsquos hands-off approach Afghan opiumproduction in 2002 exploded to near-record levels making the war-ravaged nationagain the worldrsquos leading producer of the drug ( Judis 2003) Efforts by the UnitedStates-backed interim government of Hamid Karzai to eradicate opium productionby paying farmers to destroy their crops have failed because of a lack of moneyand violent demonstrations by farmers fearing their livelihoods were in jeopardy(Pound 2004) The UNrsquos Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated thatAfghanistan produced 3400 metric tons of opium in 2002 (Moreau amp Yousafzai2003 United Nations Information Service 2003)

Immediately after assuming office Karzai issued a decree on January 17 2002not only banning cultivation but also the processing trafficking and abuse ofopiates (Hanley 2002) Last month his government reiterated that positionreasserting the ban on opium poppy planting in the autumn (Hersh 2004) TheUNODC reopened its Kabul office in February 2002 and appointed Mohammad-Reza Amirkhizi as its representative The office has been engaged in a wide rangeof projects which include strengthening the Afghan drug control commissionassistance in law enforcement and the criminal justice sectors and cross-bordercounternarcotics cooperation with neighboring states The office is also working ona pilot social compact with farmers in Kandahar and Badakhshan provinces pro-viding them with small amounts of financial assistance with the understanding thatthey would grow commercial crops other than opium poppy (Gannon 2004)

The new Afghan government has largely failed in its now three-year effort toeradicate the opium poppy crop in Afghanistan which in recent years became theworldrsquos biggest producer of the raw material for heroin (Hanley 2002 Wehrfritz2003) The UN estimated that the 2004 crop could be worth more than $2 billionat the farm level in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004 Pound 2004) The resurgence ofopium production in Afghanistan is a major unintended consequence of the UnitedStates invasion

By 2002 the total opium poppy cultivation averaged 74000 hectares under theKarzai government and the United Statesrsquo military presence up from only 8000hectares in 2001 under the Taliban (UNODC 2004a) While the 2002 levels arestill lower than the record level crop growing 91000 hectares in 1999 and 82000hectares in 2000 the UN report confirms that opium cultivation has resumed topreviously high levels (Moreau amp Yousafzai 2003 UNODC 2004b)

As a result the average yield poppy production in 2002 shot up to 46 kilo-gramshectare from 24 kilogramshectare in 2001 The massive increase is largelydue to more extensive irrigation programs in Eastern and Southern Afghanistanimplemented since the fall of the Taliban in November 2001 along with the end ofa nationwide drought which devastated total agricultural output between 1998 and2001 Thus total opium poppy production in 2002 was 3400 metric tons a sizableincrease compared to 185 metric tons in 2001 (UNODC 2004b) Poppy cultivationthen doubled between 2002 and 2003 The area planted with poppies used tomake heroin and morphine was 152000 hectares in 2003 compared with 74000hectares in 2002 according to the White House ONDCP (UNODC 2004b)According to the State Department ldquoIn Afghanistan poppy cultivationapproached the highest levels ever registered International and United Statessurveys indicate that in 2003 Afghanistan again produced three-quarters of the

464 Chris J Dolan

worldrsquos illicit opium The narcotics situation remains serious despite positiveactions by both the government and international donorsrdquo (BINLEA 2004)

Besides the eradication campaign announced by the new Afghan governmentin 2002 appears to have been doomed to failure due to a lack of United Statesfinancial support Farmers were to be compensated with $500 per acre fordestroyed poppies which is only a fraction of the estimated $6400 per acre of grossincome an Afghani farmer can earn on poppy cultivation The UN Food and Agriculture Organization reported that ldquoAfghani government programs had a verylimited impactrdquo (Hanley 2002) At 2003 price levels and as a result of the explo-sion in poppy cultivation and production total income for Afghani opium farmersreached several hundred million United States dollars by the end of 2003 (Pound2004)

Other more unfortunate factors resulted from the 2002 poppy eradication cam-paign Afghan farmers have been killed and wounded by United States and Afghansecurity forces during protests against the campaign to eradicate their opiumpoppy crops (Wehrfritz 2003 Wyatt 2002) According to the BBC ldquoThe farmersare angered at what they see as derisory compensationrdquo (Wyatt 2002) ManyAfghan farmers direct their anger at the United States for pressuring the Karzaigovernment to institute the poppy ban (Pound 2004) As a result many Afghanfarmers have embraced Al Qaeda for its staunch anti-Americanism (Hersh 2004)

In the war on terrorism in Afghanistan the United States is trying to end theprofits Al Qaeda and the Taliban are making from the greater Central Asian drugtrade (Gannon 2004 Rashid 1999) However this may impact Americarsquos key alliesin the region who have for years reaped the rewards of the Afghanistanrsquos herointrade Nowhere is the problem clearer than along Afghanistanrsquos northern borderwith Tajikistan an ally in the United Statesrsquo antiterrorist efforts and a major conduitfor heroin and opium on its way to Europe and the Americas The United Statesrsquoinvasion even sparked a massive selling of heroin as Al Qaeda and Taliban forcesappeared to have been selling off their narcotic stockpiles for cash to purchase arms(Hersh 2004 Yglesias 2004)

Some Central Asian and Middle Eastern drug traffickers were actually support-ive of the American invasion of Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) According to the WallStreet Journal ldquoacross the Stans and the Caspian Sea in Lebanonrsquos Bekaa Valleysome pray for a speedy United States attack on Afghanistan lsquoItrsquos good for busi-nessrsquo says Muhammed standing in a garage full of cannabis a pistol tucked in hisbelt He is just back from harvesting this yearrsquos cannabis crop lsquoItrsquoll drive up hashishpricesrsquo Muhammed assures a prospective client that transport of 2500 kilograms(5500 pounds) to Amsterdam from the Bekaamdashcontrolled by Syrian troops as wellas Syrian- and Iranian-backed Shiite Muslim Hezbollah fightersmdashcan be arrangedrdquo(qtd in Targeting Terroristsrsquo Drug Money 2001 p 1)

Structural Attributes

Prior to the October 2001 invasion the United States government had no actualpresence in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) Today the most important organizationsresponsible for conducting the narco-terror war in Afghanistan include the FederalBureau of Investigation the Drug Enforcement Administration the Special Forces

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 465

the Department of Statersquos Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforce-ment Affairs (INL) and Pakistan security forces in cooperation with the UN Officeof Drugs and Crime (UNODC) But how successful is the partnership In Febru-ary 2002 the UNODC confirmed that opium poppy cultivation rose to higherlevels than previous years under Taliban rule The UNODC Country Office forAfghanistan and the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme (ICMP) conducted a pre-assessment survey in 208 villages and 42 districts in the traditional opium poppygrowing areas of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan in the provinces of HelmandKandahar Oruzgan Nangarhar and Kunar Those five provinces accounted for84 of the total opium poppy cultivation area in Afghanistan in 2000 (UNODC2004b)

It is estimated that the various security forces currently monitor opium poppycultivation over an area between 45000 hectares and 65000 hectares (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003) This compares to the level of cultivation reached during the mid-1990s but remained lower than those recorded in 1999 (about 95000 hectares)and 2000 (about 82000 hectares) The resulting production of opium harvestedin 2004 could reach between 1900 and 2700 metric tons of opium (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003)

To address these realities the INL the DEA and the FBI have concluded thatwith at least 40 of the Afghan gross domestic product virtually tied to heroin therisks of an untethered narco-economy producing a chain reaction that reverses pastgains made under the Taliban are quite high indeed In response the INL and theDEA have built police training facilities and trained and retrained roughly 20000Afghan police officers in order to implement narco-terror initiatives against Talibanand Al Qaeda holdouts In coordination with United States Special Forces the Bushadministration seeks to place 50000 border guards and Afghan National Police byDecember 2005 in support of the opium eradication campaign The INL the DEAand the FBI are also involved in creating a comprehensive justice sector TheUnited Statesrsquo effort has also resulted in some intriguing bureaucratic alliancesThe Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency one of the main sources ofinformation for the United States-led alliance against the Taliban regime is asso-ciated with political assassinations narcotics trafficking and smuggling of nucleartechnology and missile delivery components with the backing fundamentalistIslamic movements (qtd in Bedi 2001)

Opium cultivation and heroin production in Pakistanrsquos northern tribal belt andadjoining Afghanistan was a vital offshoot of the ISIndashCIA cooperation (Rashid1999) It succeeded in turning some Soviet troops into addicts during the USSRrsquosoccupation of Afghanistan Heroin sales in Europe and the United States carriedout via deceptive means transport networks couriers and pay-offs offset the costof the various wars in Afghanistan (Gannon 2004)

Resultant Political Policy

The initial military victories in Afghanistan are in the process of being lost as thecountry is rapidly disintegrating into a state of narco-terrorism and anarchy TheUnited Statesrsquo efforts may fail unless the link between Al Qaeda Taliban forcesand opium production are finally overcome In 2004 opium farmers and traffick-ers in Afghanistan generated $23 billion in profits with higher estimates for the

466 Chris J Dolan

future The level of opium planting and the subsequent production of opium pastemorphine and heroin in Afghanistan is more than enough to satisfy the demandin Western Europe and the United States (Gannon 2004)

Although Afghanistan represents one source in worldwide opium production inaddition to Mexico South America and Southeast Asia narco-terrorism policytoward Afghanistan has not succeeded in reversing growth trends in heroin con-sumption in the United States According to the 2002 National Survey on DrugUse and Health approximately 37 million Americans ages 12 and older reportedtrying heroin at least once during their lifetimes representing 16 of the popu-lation ages 12 and older Roughly 404000 (02) reported past-year heroin useand 166000 (01) reported past-month heroin use (SAMHSA 2004) Among highschool students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the Future Study 16 ofeighth graders 15 of tenth graders and 15 of twelfth graders reported usingheroin at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these percentages were 1618 and 17 respectively (NIDA 2003)

Regarding the ease by which one can obtain heroin 156 of eighth graders188 of tenth graders and 279 of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reportedthat heroin was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 63 ofeighth graders 71 of tenth graders and 59 of twelfth graders reported thatusing heroin once or twice without a needle was a ldquogreat riskrdquo (NIDA 2003)Nationwide 33 of high school students surveyed in 2003 as part of the YouthRisk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) reported using heroin during theirlifetimes Male students (43) were significantly more likely than female students(20) to report lifetime heroin use Hispanic students (39) were more likely toreport heroin use within their lifetime than white (26) or black (26) students(CDC 2004) During 2002 10 of college students and 18 of young adults (ages19ndash28) reported using heroin at least once during their lifetimes Approximately01 of college students and 02 of young adults reported past year use of heroinand 00 of college students and less than 005 of young adults reported pastmonth use of heroin (NIDA 2004)

According to data from the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) Programa median of 58 of adult male arrestees and 66 of adult female arrestees testedpositive for opiates at arrest in 2003 The adult male samples were compiled from39 United States sites and the adult female samples were compiled from 25 sitesA median of 51 of adult male arrestees and 71 of adult female arresteesreported using heroin at least once in the year before being arrested (NationalInstitute of Justice 2004) Although heroin expenditures were $22 billion in 1990demand decreased to $10 billion in 2000 and whereas in 1990 Americans con-sumed 136 metric tons of heroin estimates remained relatively unchanged in 2000(ABT Associates 2001)

Conclusions

Based on these observations of narco-terrorist activities in Afghanistan and Colom-bia on a substantive level the Bush administration has formulated domestic andinternational drug reduction strategies with an eye on asset seizure and control offunding used by terrorist organizations However important questions remain con-cerning the legitimacy of Americarsquos policy efforts Indeed narco-terrorism as a

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 467

national security threat is not new The 911 attacks simply pushed narco-terror-ism higher on the presidentrsquos national security agenda particularly in light of theconnection between the Afghan drug trade and the Al Qaeda network

On a theoretical level the contingency approach to examining narco-terrorismpolicy highlights several major concerns that have not been adequately addressedFirst as it is conducted today the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy places sig-nificant attention on the increased utilization of American military power Eversince President Richard Nixon proclaimed a war on drugs and President GeorgeW Bush a war on terrorism concern over the use of the military in what have typically been deemed law enforcement and social issues has overshadowed mostother related methods Even if the United States did not introduce troops intoAfghanistan or Colombia we are still left with a highly militarized narco-terrorismpolicy that facilitates human rights abuses by those governments receiving UnitedStates aid Moreover the result has been an increase in the production and con-sumption of illegal drugs that are trafficked by organizations that use profits topromote terrorist attacks

Second the contingency approach used in this study reveals the problems narco-terrorism policy has experienced in targeting so-called weak states Narco-terrorism policy has elevated the potential for the United States to use its diplo-matic weight to force governments to enact stricter antidrug policies This hasencouraged states like Afghanistan and Colombia to further undermine politicaleconomic and social development with undemocratic policies directed at citizensAs a result the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism efforts have in part fueled anti-American resentment thereby increasing the potential for additional terrorist activities by groups such as Al Qaeda or FARC

Third it has become more apparent that narco-terrorism policy has becomelike all other policies highly politicized Americarsquos counterdrug efforts are virtu-ally indistinguishable from counterinsurgency efforts by remnants of the Talibanand Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and FARC and other terror-related groups in Colom-bia Moreover the United States is being rather bold in designating particulargroups as narco-terrorists although conveniently leaving off others such as theNorthern Alliance in Afghanistan This hinders the rule of law in a number of countries

Finally the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in its current form neglectscertain realities Quite simply many critics allege that narco-terrorist connectionsare indirect and for the most part ambiguous In addition critics of prohibitionmaintain that it is the illegalization of drugs that generates the enormous profitsused to support terrorist and insurgent organizations Another concern is thatnarco-terrorism does not address the complexities of terrorism or insurgenciesCan Afghanistan and Colombia continue to be addressed in narrowly defined mil-itary and law enforcement frameworks that neglect political economic and socialconsiderations

About the Author

Chris J Dolan is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Floridawhere he teaches courses on public policy United States Foreign Policy and National Secu-

468 Chris J Dolan

rity the Mass Media and the American presidency He received his PhD from the Univer-sity of South Carolina He is the author of In War We Trust The Political Dimensions and EthicalConsequences of the First Strike Doctrine (Ashgate Press 2005) and co-editor of Striking First ThePreventive Doctrine and the Reshaping of US Foreign Policy (Palgrave-Macmillan 2004) Hisresearch on public policy executive policymaking foreign policy and the mass media appearin Policy Studies Journal Congress and the Presidency Politics and Policy White House Studies andin numerous edited volumes

References

ABT Associates (2001) What Americarsquos users spend on drugs 1988ndash2000 Prepared for the Office of NationalDrug Control Policy Retrieved April 21 2004 from httpwwwwhitehousedrugpolicygovpublicationspdfamerican_users_spend_2002pdf

Allison G T (1971) Essence of decision Boston Little BrownAllison G T amp Halperin M H (1972) Bureaucratic politics A paradigm and and some policy implications

World Politics 24 40ndash79Baldwin E (1991) Why rules donrsquot work Modern Law Review 53 321ndash338Barnard D (2003) Narco-terrorism realities The connection between drugs and terror Journal of Countert-

errorism and Homeland Security International 9(1) 31ndash34Bedi R (2001 September 26) The assassins and drug dealers are now helping us The Daily Telegraph p 1Bennett C J (1991) What is policy convergence What causes it British Journal of Political Science 21(2)

215ndash233Blau P amp Scott R (1962) Formal organizations San Francisco ChandlerBouchard G amp Carroll B (2002) Policy-making and administrative discretion The case of immigration in

Canada Canadian Public Administration 25(2) 239ndash259Bouchard G amp Carroll B (2003) One size does not fit all Annual Meeting of the Canadian Public Service

Administration Halifax Nova ScotiaBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002a) Fiscal year 2003 congres-

sional budget justification Washington DC AuthorBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002b) International narcotics

control strategy Afghanistan (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 from httpusembassystategovafghanistanwwwh02121802html

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2004) International NarcoticsControl Strategy Southwest Asia (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 fromhttpwwwstategovginlrlsnrcrpt2003vol1html29836htm

Bureau of Justice Statistics United States Department of Justice (2000) Sourcebook of criminal justice statisticsWashington DC United States Government Printing Office

Cala A (2001 November 21) Danger of a new Vietnam The Gazette p 1Carroll B amp Garkut D E (1996) Is there an empirical trend toward managerialism Canadian Public Admin-

istration 39(4) 535ndash553Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2004) Youth risk behavior surveillance United States 2003 (May 21)

Retrieved August 2 2004 from httpwwwcdcgovmmwrpreviewmmwrhtmlss5302a1htmChepesiuk R (1999) Hard target The United States war against international drug trafficking 1982ndash1997 Jeffer-

son NC McFarland amp CoColombia Program Center for International Policy (2000) Plan Colombia A plan for peace or a plan for war

( June 20) Retrieved May 1 2004 from httpwwwciponlineorgcolombia062001htmColombia Program Center for International Policy (2004) US Aid to Colombia since 1997 Summary tables

(February 20) Retrieved May 2 2004 from httpciponlineorgcolombiaaidtablehtmConcar D (2001 September 29) Cutting the Talibanrsquos lifeline New Scientist p 77Desveaux J A Lindquist E A amp Toner G (1994) Organizing for policy innovations in public bureaucra-

cies AIDS energy and environmental policy in Canada Canadian Journal of Political Science 27(3)493ndash528

Dexter L (1981) Unintended consequences of purposive legislative action Alternatives to implementationJournal of Public Policy 4(4) 250ndash264

Drug Abuse Policy Office (1982) Federal strategy for prevention of drug abuse and drug trafficking WashingtonDC United States Government Printing Office

Drug Enforcement Administration Intelligence Division (2002) Drugs and terrorism A new perspective RetrievedApril 29 2004 from httpwwwdeagovpubsintel02039f1f1

Dudley S (2000 July 31) The Colombia quagmire The American Prospect p 32

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 469

administration which allocated $654 million in 2003 for Colombiarsquos security forces(Colombia Program 2004)

The United States also provided advanced weaponry to the Colombian militaryincluding helicopters attack aircraft patrol boats communications and intelli-gence-gathering equipment uniforms and small arms and the training of morethan 15000 Colombian military and police Hundreds of United States troops andprivate contractors work in Colombia as trainers intelligence-gatherers spraypilots and mechanics among other duties Since 1996 United States pilots havesprayed herbicides over more than a million acres of Colombian territory Duringthe 1990s Colombiarsquos National Police received nearly all lethal United States aid(Pardo 2000) The Clinton administration shifted the bulk of aid to the military in1999 and 2000 arguing that the guerrillasrsquo and paramilitariesrsquo entry into the drugbusiness made many counternarcotics missions too dangerous for the police toperform alone (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

Though the Colombian armed forces get most of the aid the United Statesrsquo com-mitment to the counternarcotics division (DIRAN [Directorate of Anti-Narcotics])of the Colombian National Police Force (Policiacutea Nacional Direccioacuten Antinarcoacuteticos)remains quite large The unit performs most drug interdiction and works with theDEA to arrest drug traffickers In rural zones where peasants grow illegal drugcrops United States-made DIRAN helicopters protect pilots who spray herbicidesover fields where illegal drug crops are grown risking ground fire from insurgentgroups (United States Senate 2002)

Over the past few years the United States has provided the DIRAN Air Servicewith Blackhawk and Huey Helicopters C-26B reconnaissance planes and con-struction upgrades to several of its bases throughout Colombia The Drug Enforce-ment Administration has created and completely funds four Sensitive Investigativeunits (SIUs) within the Colombian National Police elite units that carry out riskymissions against drug traffickers A worldwide antiterror appropriation thatbecame law in August 2002 adds more funding $4 million to create police unitsto protect construction of reinforced police stations in guerrilla-controlled areasand $25 million for antikidnapping units (shared with the Colombian Army) TheDIRAN came under a cloud of scandal in 2002 when investigators revealed thatseveral high-ranking officers had stolen at least $2 million in United States aidintended for administrative expenses (Bureau of International Narcotics and LawEnforcement Affairs [BINLEA] 2002a)

Joint ColombianndashUnited States military efforts are primarily concentrated in thesouthern provinces of Caquetaacute and Putumayo seen by many as the most produc-tive cocaine regions The regions account for roughly 33 of all coca (used to makecocaine) grown in Colombia and is controlled by FARC (Dudley 2000) The armyrsquosoriginal mission was to attack drug-processing labs to apprehend traffickers andto clear armed groups from areas of drug-crop cultivation (or at least to clear themlong enough for the United Statesrsquo herbicide spray planes to pass through) InAugust 2002 the Counter-Narcotics Brigade began using its equipment and train-ing for counterterrorism as well as for antidrug missions as a result some of thebrigadersquos operations may resemble the United States-led counter-insurgency effortsduring the 1980s in Central America (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

458 Chris J Dolan

Structural Attributes

Colombiarsquos security forces have a close institutional relationship with several UnitedStates agencies especially the National Security Agency (NSA) the Federal Bureauof Investigation (FBI) the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the StateDepartmentrsquos Bureau for International Narcotics (BIN) The Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA) offers their Colombian counterparts equipment and training toimprove their own ability to collect and analyze intelligence The United States alsoshares intelligence on tactical information concerning insurgent groupsrsquo move-ments and locations Furthermore the United States Army trains thousands ofColombian security personnel counterparts in topics ranging from marksmanshipto helicopter repair to human rights

Yet the United Statesrsquo approach to Colombia appears to neglect even these basictenets of counterinsurgency Massive aerial herbicide conducted by the Colombianand United States air forces and the DEA is fueling antigovernment sentiment ina guerrilla-controlled area (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003) Any social or economic effortshave been overshadowed particularly in most Colombiansrsquo perceptions It has alsosuffered from very serious implementation problems Some aid programs partic-ularly emergency humanitarian assistance appear to be reaching target popula-tionsmdashthough as United States Ambassador to Colombia Anne Patterson admitsthey ldquorepresent a drop in the bucket in relation to the real needs of Colombiarsquosdisplaced personsrdquo (qtd in Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

The success of nonmilitary aid programs has been mixed The effort to helpcoca-growing peasants adopt legal alternatives took the form of a series of ldquosocialpactsrdquo in which signers would receive basic assistance followed by technical andinfrastructure support in exchange for eradicating all their coca within twelvemonths after first receipt of aid By July 2001 37000 families in Putumayomdashjustunder half of the departmentrsquos populationmdashhad signed ldquopactsrdquo and waited forassistance that failed to arrive Alternative development money was delayed by theDEA forced to pass through several agencies before reaching the peasants BINthe United States Agency for International Development (USAID) the Colombiangovernmentrsquos Plan Colombia implementing agency the Colombian governmentrsquosalternative-development agency PLANTE and five Colombian nonprofit orga-nizations with no previous ties to Putumayo contracted to deliver the assistance(Dudley 2000)

Unintended Consequences

Since police and fumigation efforts were not accompanied by a credible alternativedevelopment effort in Putumayo thousands of peasants who had their crops erad-icated suddenly found themselves with little or no opportunities (Miller 2001)Putumayo community and church leaders interviewed by the Council of Interna-tional Policy in November 2002 hinted at a humanitarian disaster as sprayingdamaged food crops had contributed to widespread starvation in FARC-controlledrural areas (Dudley 2000) Those who lacked other economic opportunities joinedFARC and other terror groups by the hundreds (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 459

Furthermore the Bush White House does not appear to be progressing towardits goal of a 50 reduction in Colombian coca-growing by 2005 Coca is difficultto estimate According to CIA figures made public in March 2002 there is a pro-jected increase in the percentage of cocoa production over the next decade Theoverall amount of coca grown in Colombia is roughly 150000 hectares or threetimes as much as it was when the United States began large-scale spraying in 1996(Miller 2001) Since satellite measurements occur immediately following theJulyndashOctober fumigation campaign in Putumayo and may not take into accountreplanting and new planting elsewhere the 2002 statistics may show a greaterdecrease than probably exists (Van Dongen 2003) That year only four (perhapsfive) of Colombiarsquos thirty-two departments had 1000 or more hectares of coca In2001 a survey report issued by the UN found significant increases in coca pro-duction in the thirteen largest provinces in Colombia (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

While fumigation has proven able to reduce coca-growing in limited areasgrowers have been far more agile in eluding United States planes (Pardo 2000)New crops keep appearing in previously untouched parts of Colombiarsquos vast savan-nahs jungles and even coffee-growing zones Since at least the late 1980s totalcoca cultivation in South Americamdashperhaps the most meaningful estimate of thedrugrsquos availabilitymdashhas remained remarkably steady at roughly 200000 hectaresand the price of cocaine sold on United States streets remains steady

Clinton and Bush administration officials repeatedly argued that military train-ing and engagement would ease Colombiarsquos human rights crisis and encourage thearmed forces to end collaboration with paramilitary death squads Sadly the humanrights situation shows no signs of improvement The Consultancy for HumanRights and Displacement (CODHES) a widely cited Colombian nongovernmentalorganization estimated that violence forced 353120 people from their homesduring the first nine months of 2002 more than in all of 2001 The ColombianCommission of Jurists (CCJ) reported in September 2002 that political violence waskilling an average of 20 people per day double what the CCJ was reporting in1998 In January 2003 Human Rights Watch reported that ldquothere were numer-ous and credible reports of joint military-paramilitary operations and the sharingof intelligence and propagandardquo for 2002 (see Human Rights Watch World Report2003)

The most dangerous result could be that the United States has directly involveditself in Colombiarsquos civil war between FARC and government security forces underthe banner of ldquocounterterrorismrdquo (Dudley 2000) Unlike other second-tier ldquoWaron Terrorrdquo countries like the Philippines Georgia or Yemen where the terroristenemy is a shadowy group of a few dozen or a few hundred Colombiarsquos ldquoterror-istrdquo groups are established armies A counterterror effort in Colombia then risksevolving into an El Salvador-style counterinsurgency campaignmdashcomplete withUnited States advisors accompanying combat operations (Barnard 2003)

Political Policy Resultant

The advent of the War on Terror has kept the Bush administration from deviat-ing from its steady military approach Even before September 11 2001 the newBush administration had initiated a ldquoreview processrdquo to explore the possibility of

460 Chris J Dolan

going beyond the drug war to help Colombiarsquos government fight the guerrillas andthe paramilitaries Comparisons between FARC and Al Qaeda now began to showup with regularity

The United Statesrsquo approach is also highly contingent upon its dependence onSouth American oil A 2003 Bush administration foreign aid request to Congressincluded the first significant nondrug military aid to Colombia since the Cold War$98 million to help the Colombian Army protect the 480-mile long Cantildeo Limoacuten-Coventildeas oil pipeline A United States oil company Occidental Petroleum of LosAngeles owns 44 of the crude oil that flows through the Cantildeo Limoacuten pipelinewhich Colombian guerrillas dynamited 166 times in 2001 (United States Depart-ment of State 2002) ldquoClearly we have an energy threatrdquo warned CongressmanMark Souder (R-Indiana) in May 2002 ldquoColombia is either our seventh or eighthlargest supplier of oil Our economy depends on that We already have instabilityin the Middle East We have more compelling reasons to be involved in Colombiathan almost anywhere else in the worldrdquo (Souder 2002)

Beyond these initiatives it is not yet clear how the United Statesrsquo activities willexpand to match Washingtonrsquos much more ambitious mission in Colombia Whilethe purpose of United States military aid has expanded remarkably we have notseen a similar expansion in the amount of United States assistance Certainly military aid is risingmdashColombiarsquos security forces received over $100 million morein 2003 than they did in 2002 The pipeline program accounts for most of thatincrease Yet another $100 million would have only marginal impact on the direc-tion of a conflict involving nearly 40000 well-funded insurgents Pressures fordramatically increased military assistance are likely to build (Cala 2001 Pardo2000)

However if the goal of the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in Colombia isto reduce demand in the United States for cocaine then Americarsquos efforts havelargely failed which has been a continuing trend over the past 15 years (Wisotsky1990) During 2001 there were approximately 1160000 new cocaine users in theUnited States The average age of those who first used cocaine during the year was208 years According to the 2002 National Survey on Drug Use and Healthapproximately 339 million Americans ages 12 and older had tried cocaine at leastonce in their lifetimes representing 144 of the population in that age groupApproximately 59 million (25) had used cocaine in the past year and 20 million(09) had used cocaine within the past month (Substance Abuse and MentalHealth Services Administration [SAMHSA] 2004)

Among high school students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the FutureStudy 36 of eighth graders 51 of tenth graders and 77 of twelfth gradersreported using cocaine at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these per-centages were 36 61 and 78 respectively (National Institute on Drug Abuse[NIDA] 2003) Regarding the ease by which one can obtain powder cocaine 216of eighth graders 296 of tenth graders and 374 of twelfth graders surveyedin 2003 reported that powder cocaine was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtainApproximately 23 (225) of eighth graders 296 of tenth graders and 353of twelfth graders reported that crack cocaine was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo toobtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 44 of eighth graders 52 of tenth graders and 46of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reported that using powder cocaine once or

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 461

twice was a ldquogreat riskrdquo Nearly 49 of eighth graders 58 of tenth graders and47 of twelfth graders reported that using crack cocaine once or twice was a ldquogreatriskrdquo (NIDA 2003)

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also conducts a surveyof high school students throughout the United States the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) Among students surveyed in 2003 87 reportedusing some form of cocaine at least one time during their life of those 41reported being current users of cocaine meaning that they had used cocaine atleast once during the past month (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention[CDC] 2004) During 2002 82 of college students and 135 of young adults(ages 19ndash28) reported using cocaine at least once during their lifetimes Approxi-mately 48 of college students and 58 of young adults reported past-year useof cocaine and 16 of college students and 22 of young adults reported past-month use of cocaine (NIDA 2004)

Flower Power Afghanistan

Afghanistan is the worldrsquos leading source country for the cultivation processingand trafficking of opium By 1999 Afghanistan grew more than 4000 tons ofopium a year making it the primary source of roughly 75 of the worldrsquos illegalheroin (Concar 2001) Today narcotics are the largest source of income inAfghanistan due to the decimation of the countryrsquos economic infrastructure causedby years of warfare

Policy Discretion

On July 28 2000 Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar issued a decreebanning future opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan The decree stated that themilitary would eliminate poppy cultivation in the 2001 growing season in areasunder their control At the time the ban applied to any territory seized from theNorthern Alliance In February 2001 the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)declared that the opium poppy cultivation ban was successful and that the 2001crop was expected to be negligible (UNODC 2004a p 70) This marked the firsteffort by Taliban rulers to reduce opium production The eradication effort wasmade in response to an agreement with the UNODC which agreed to fund alter-native development projects on the condition that cultivation would be decreasedin Kandahar

Laboratories in Afghanistan convert opium into morphine base white heroinor one of three grades of brown heroin depending on the order received Largeprocessing labs are located in southern Afghanistan with smaller labs located mainlyin Nangarhar Province In the past many opium processing laboratories werelocated in Pakistan particularly in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) Theselaboratories appear to have relocated to Afghanistan both to be closer to the sourceof opium and to avoid the Pakistani government Morphine base is usually pro-duced for traffickers based in Turkey where it is converted to heroin before ship-ment to Europe and North and South America Chemists in the region are capable

462 Chris J Dolan

of producing heroin hydrochloride with extremely high purity levels (UNODC2004b)

Since Afghanistan is landlocked drug traffickers must rely on land routes tomove morphine base and heroin out of the country Heroin is trafficked to world-wide destinations by many routes Traffickers quickly adjust heroin smugglingroutes based on political and weather-related events (Gannon 2004) Reports ofheroin shipments north from Afghanistan through the Central Asian States toRussia have increased Tajikistan is a frequent destination for both opium andheroin shipments although Tajikistan serves mostly as a transit point and storagelocation rather than a final destination Seizures are frequently reported at Pakistanrsquos international airports (Rashid 1999) Heroin is also smuggled by sea onvessels leaving the port city of Karachi Heroin produced in Afghanistan continuesto be trafficked to the United States although generally in small quantities It isestimated that roughly 90 of opiate products in Europe originate in Afghanistan(Concar 2001 Hersh 2004)

Money laundering is not an issue in Afghanistan The unsophisticated bankingsystem that previously existed has been damaged by the years of war It is likelythat the informal banking system used extensively in the region usually referredto as the hawala or hundi money laundering system is used by drug traffickers(Lehmkuhler 2003) This system is an underground traditional informal networkthat has been used for centuries by businesses and families throughout Asia (StillFlushmdashTerrorist Finance 2002) This system provides a confidential convenientefficient service at a low cost in areas that are not served by traditional bankingfacilities (Hersh 2004)

Prior to the United Statesrsquo invasion of October 2001 the Taliban maintainedeffective control of nearly all of the opium poppy growing areas in the countryeven though they were only recognized as the legitimate government ofAfghanistan by three governments Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the United ArabEmirates Islamic law (Sharirsquoa) has been imposed in territory controlled by theTaliban and local Sharirsquoa courts have been established throughout the country In1997 the Taliban reactivated the State High Commission for Drug Control whichwas originally established in 1990 by the legitimate interim government Before theUNODC reports indicating that implementation of the 2000ndash2001 opium poppycultivation ban has been effective and the release of the United States governmentestimate indicating a dramatic reduction in opium production the Taliban madeonly token gestures toward antidrug law enforcement (BINLEA 2002b) Althoughthey have banned opium poppy cultivation the Taliban itself long relied on drugtrafficking for financial support

Unintended Consequences

As the United States began more rapidly merging its war on drugs with the greaterWar on Terror on a public scale halting opium production had to be as importantas eliminating the Taliban and the Al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan But howserious were Americarsquos efforts in applying its narco-terrorism policy to AfghanistanUnited States military commanders were not going to set opium eradication at thetop of their list of priorities (Schmitt 2002)

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 463

The results were consistent with Americarsquos hands-off approach Afghan opiumproduction in 2002 exploded to near-record levels making the war-ravaged nationagain the worldrsquos leading producer of the drug ( Judis 2003) Efforts by the UnitedStates-backed interim government of Hamid Karzai to eradicate opium productionby paying farmers to destroy their crops have failed because of a lack of moneyand violent demonstrations by farmers fearing their livelihoods were in jeopardy(Pound 2004) The UNrsquos Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated thatAfghanistan produced 3400 metric tons of opium in 2002 (Moreau amp Yousafzai2003 United Nations Information Service 2003)

Immediately after assuming office Karzai issued a decree on January 17 2002not only banning cultivation but also the processing trafficking and abuse ofopiates (Hanley 2002) Last month his government reiterated that positionreasserting the ban on opium poppy planting in the autumn (Hersh 2004) TheUNODC reopened its Kabul office in February 2002 and appointed Mohammad-Reza Amirkhizi as its representative The office has been engaged in a wide rangeof projects which include strengthening the Afghan drug control commissionassistance in law enforcement and the criminal justice sectors and cross-bordercounternarcotics cooperation with neighboring states The office is also working ona pilot social compact with farmers in Kandahar and Badakhshan provinces pro-viding them with small amounts of financial assistance with the understanding thatthey would grow commercial crops other than opium poppy (Gannon 2004)

The new Afghan government has largely failed in its now three-year effort toeradicate the opium poppy crop in Afghanistan which in recent years became theworldrsquos biggest producer of the raw material for heroin (Hanley 2002 Wehrfritz2003) The UN estimated that the 2004 crop could be worth more than $2 billionat the farm level in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004 Pound 2004) The resurgence ofopium production in Afghanistan is a major unintended consequence of the UnitedStates invasion

By 2002 the total opium poppy cultivation averaged 74000 hectares under theKarzai government and the United Statesrsquo military presence up from only 8000hectares in 2001 under the Taliban (UNODC 2004a) While the 2002 levels arestill lower than the record level crop growing 91000 hectares in 1999 and 82000hectares in 2000 the UN report confirms that opium cultivation has resumed topreviously high levels (Moreau amp Yousafzai 2003 UNODC 2004b)

As a result the average yield poppy production in 2002 shot up to 46 kilo-gramshectare from 24 kilogramshectare in 2001 The massive increase is largelydue to more extensive irrigation programs in Eastern and Southern Afghanistanimplemented since the fall of the Taliban in November 2001 along with the end ofa nationwide drought which devastated total agricultural output between 1998 and2001 Thus total opium poppy production in 2002 was 3400 metric tons a sizableincrease compared to 185 metric tons in 2001 (UNODC 2004b) Poppy cultivationthen doubled between 2002 and 2003 The area planted with poppies used tomake heroin and morphine was 152000 hectares in 2003 compared with 74000hectares in 2002 according to the White House ONDCP (UNODC 2004b)According to the State Department ldquoIn Afghanistan poppy cultivationapproached the highest levels ever registered International and United Statessurveys indicate that in 2003 Afghanistan again produced three-quarters of the

464 Chris J Dolan

worldrsquos illicit opium The narcotics situation remains serious despite positiveactions by both the government and international donorsrdquo (BINLEA 2004)

Besides the eradication campaign announced by the new Afghan governmentin 2002 appears to have been doomed to failure due to a lack of United Statesfinancial support Farmers were to be compensated with $500 per acre fordestroyed poppies which is only a fraction of the estimated $6400 per acre of grossincome an Afghani farmer can earn on poppy cultivation The UN Food and Agriculture Organization reported that ldquoAfghani government programs had a verylimited impactrdquo (Hanley 2002) At 2003 price levels and as a result of the explo-sion in poppy cultivation and production total income for Afghani opium farmersreached several hundred million United States dollars by the end of 2003 (Pound2004)

Other more unfortunate factors resulted from the 2002 poppy eradication cam-paign Afghan farmers have been killed and wounded by United States and Afghansecurity forces during protests against the campaign to eradicate their opiumpoppy crops (Wehrfritz 2003 Wyatt 2002) According to the BBC ldquoThe farmersare angered at what they see as derisory compensationrdquo (Wyatt 2002) ManyAfghan farmers direct their anger at the United States for pressuring the Karzaigovernment to institute the poppy ban (Pound 2004) As a result many Afghanfarmers have embraced Al Qaeda for its staunch anti-Americanism (Hersh 2004)

In the war on terrorism in Afghanistan the United States is trying to end theprofits Al Qaeda and the Taliban are making from the greater Central Asian drugtrade (Gannon 2004 Rashid 1999) However this may impact Americarsquos key alliesin the region who have for years reaped the rewards of the Afghanistanrsquos herointrade Nowhere is the problem clearer than along Afghanistanrsquos northern borderwith Tajikistan an ally in the United Statesrsquo antiterrorist efforts and a major conduitfor heroin and opium on its way to Europe and the Americas The United Statesrsquoinvasion even sparked a massive selling of heroin as Al Qaeda and Taliban forcesappeared to have been selling off their narcotic stockpiles for cash to purchase arms(Hersh 2004 Yglesias 2004)

Some Central Asian and Middle Eastern drug traffickers were actually support-ive of the American invasion of Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) According to the WallStreet Journal ldquoacross the Stans and the Caspian Sea in Lebanonrsquos Bekaa Valleysome pray for a speedy United States attack on Afghanistan lsquoItrsquos good for busi-nessrsquo says Muhammed standing in a garage full of cannabis a pistol tucked in hisbelt He is just back from harvesting this yearrsquos cannabis crop lsquoItrsquoll drive up hashishpricesrsquo Muhammed assures a prospective client that transport of 2500 kilograms(5500 pounds) to Amsterdam from the Bekaamdashcontrolled by Syrian troops as wellas Syrian- and Iranian-backed Shiite Muslim Hezbollah fightersmdashcan be arrangedrdquo(qtd in Targeting Terroristsrsquo Drug Money 2001 p 1)

Structural Attributes

Prior to the October 2001 invasion the United States government had no actualpresence in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) Today the most important organizationsresponsible for conducting the narco-terror war in Afghanistan include the FederalBureau of Investigation the Drug Enforcement Administration the Special Forces

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 465

the Department of Statersquos Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforce-ment Affairs (INL) and Pakistan security forces in cooperation with the UN Officeof Drugs and Crime (UNODC) But how successful is the partnership In Febru-ary 2002 the UNODC confirmed that opium poppy cultivation rose to higherlevels than previous years under Taliban rule The UNODC Country Office forAfghanistan and the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme (ICMP) conducted a pre-assessment survey in 208 villages and 42 districts in the traditional opium poppygrowing areas of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan in the provinces of HelmandKandahar Oruzgan Nangarhar and Kunar Those five provinces accounted for84 of the total opium poppy cultivation area in Afghanistan in 2000 (UNODC2004b)

It is estimated that the various security forces currently monitor opium poppycultivation over an area between 45000 hectares and 65000 hectares (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003) This compares to the level of cultivation reached during the mid-1990s but remained lower than those recorded in 1999 (about 95000 hectares)and 2000 (about 82000 hectares) The resulting production of opium harvestedin 2004 could reach between 1900 and 2700 metric tons of opium (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003)

To address these realities the INL the DEA and the FBI have concluded thatwith at least 40 of the Afghan gross domestic product virtually tied to heroin therisks of an untethered narco-economy producing a chain reaction that reverses pastgains made under the Taliban are quite high indeed In response the INL and theDEA have built police training facilities and trained and retrained roughly 20000Afghan police officers in order to implement narco-terror initiatives against Talibanand Al Qaeda holdouts In coordination with United States Special Forces the Bushadministration seeks to place 50000 border guards and Afghan National Police byDecember 2005 in support of the opium eradication campaign The INL the DEAand the FBI are also involved in creating a comprehensive justice sector TheUnited Statesrsquo effort has also resulted in some intriguing bureaucratic alliancesThe Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency one of the main sources ofinformation for the United States-led alliance against the Taliban regime is asso-ciated with political assassinations narcotics trafficking and smuggling of nucleartechnology and missile delivery components with the backing fundamentalistIslamic movements (qtd in Bedi 2001)

Opium cultivation and heroin production in Pakistanrsquos northern tribal belt andadjoining Afghanistan was a vital offshoot of the ISIndashCIA cooperation (Rashid1999) It succeeded in turning some Soviet troops into addicts during the USSRrsquosoccupation of Afghanistan Heroin sales in Europe and the United States carriedout via deceptive means transport networks couriers and pay-offs offset the costof the various wars in Afghanistan (Gannon 2004)

Resultant Political Policy

The initial military victories in Afghanistan are in the process of being lost as thecountry is rapidly disintegrating into a state of narco-terrorism and anarchy TheUnited Statesrsquo efforts may fail unless the link between Al Qaeda Taliban forcesand opium production are finally overcome In 2004 opium farmers and traffick-ers in Afghanistan generated $23 billion in profits with higher estimates for the

466 Chris J Dolan

future The level of opium planting and the subsequent production of opium pastemorphine and heroin in Afghanistan is more than enough to satisfy the demandin Western Europe and the United States (Gannon 2004)

Although Afghanistan represents one source in worldwide opium production inaddition to Mexico South America and Southeast Asia narco-terrorism policytoward Afghanistan has not succeeded in reversing growth trends in heroin con-sumption in the United States According to the 2002 National Survey on DrugUse and Health approximately 37 million Americans ages 12 and older reportedtrying heroin at least once during their lifetimes representing 16 of the popu-lation ages 12 and older Roughly 404000 (02) reported past-year heroin useand 166000 (01) reported past-month heroin use (SAMHSA 2004) Among highschool students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the Future Study 16 ofeighth graders 15 of tenth graders and 15 of twelfth graders reported usingheroin at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these percentages were 1618 and 17 respectively (NIDA 2003)

Regarding the ease by which one can obtain heroin 156 of eighth graders188 of tenth graders and 279 of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reportedthat heroin was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 63 ofeighth graders 71 of tenth graders and 59 of twelfth graders reported thatusing heroin once or twice without a needle was a ldquogreat riskrdquo (NIDA 2003)Nationwide 33 of high school students surveyed in 2003 as part of the YouthRisk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) reported using heroin during theirlifetimes Male students (43) were significantly more likely than female students(20) to report lifetime heroin use Hispanic students (39) were more likely toreport heroin use within their lifetime than white (26) or black (26) students(CDC 2004) During 2002 10 of college students and 18 of young adults (ages19ndash28) reported using heroin at least once during their lifetimes Approximately01 of college students and 02 of young adults reported past year use of heroinand 00 of college students and less than 005 of young adults reported pastmonth use of heroin (NIDA 2004)

According to data from the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) Programa median of 58 of adult male arrestees and 66 of adult female arrestees testedpositive for opiates at arrest in 2003 The adult male samples were compiled from39 United States sites and the adult female samples were compiled from 25 sitesA median of 51 of adult male arrestees and 71 of adult female arresteesreported using heroin at least once in the year before being arrested (NationalInstitute of Justice 2004) Although heroin expenditures were $22 billion in 1990demand decreased to $10 billion in 2000 and whereas in 1990 Americans con-sumed 136 metric tons of heroin estimates remained relatively unchanged in 2000(ABT Associates 2001)

Conclusions

Based on these observations of narco-terrorist activities in Afghanistan and Colom-bia on a substantive level the Bush administration has formulated domestic andinternational drug reduction strategies with an eye on asset seizure and control offunding used by terrorist organizations However important questions remain con-cerning the legitimacy of Americarsquos policy efforts Indeed narco-terrorism as a

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 467

national security threat is not new The 911 attacks simply pushed narco-terror-ism higher on the presidentrsquos national security agenda particularly in light of theconnection between the Afghan drug trade and the Al Qaeda network

On a theoretical level the contingency approach to examining narco-terrorismpolicy highlights several major concerns that have not been adequately addressedFirst as it is conducted today the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy places sig-nificant attention on the increased utilization of American military power Eversince President Richard Nixon proclaimed a war on drugs and President GeorgeW Bush a war on terrorism concern over the use of the military in what have typically been deemed law enforcement and social issues has overshadowed mostother related methods Even if the United States did not introduce troops intoAfghanistan or Colombia we are still left with a highly militarized narco-terrorismpolicy that facilitates human rights abuses by those governments receiving UnitedStates aid Moreover the result has been an increase in the production and con-sumption of illegal drugs that are trafficked by organizations that use profits topromote terrorist attacks

Second the contingency approach used in this study reveals the problems narco-terrorism policy has experienced in targeting so-called weak states Narco-terrorism policy has elevated the potential for the United States to use its diplo-matic weight to force governments to enact stricter antidrug policies This hasencouraged states like Afghanistan and Colombia to further undermine politicaleconomic and social development with undemocratic policies directed at citizensAs a result the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism efforts have in part fueled anti-American resentment thereby increasing the potential for additional terrorist activities by groups such as Al Qaeda or FARC

Third it has become more apparent that narco-terrorism policy has becomelike all other policies highly politicized Americarsquos counterdrug efforts are virtu-ally indistinguishable from counterinsurgency efforts by remnants of the Talibanand Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and FARC and other terror-related groups in Colom-bia Moreover the United States is being rather bold in designating particulargroups as narco-terrorists although conveniently leaving off others such as theNorthern Alliance in Afghanistan This hinders the rule of law in a number of countries

Finally the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in its current form neglectscertain realities Quite simply many critics allege that narco-terrorist connectionsare indirect and for the most part ambiguous In addition critics of prohibitionmaintain that it is the illegalization of drugs that generates the enormous profitsused to support terrorist and insurgent organizations Another concern is thatnarco-terrorism does not address the complexities of terrorism or insurgenciesCan Afghanistan and Colombia continue to be addressed in narrowly defined mil-itary and law enforcement frameworks that neglect political economic and socialconsiderations

About the Author

Chris J Dolan is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Floridawhere he teaches courses on public policy United States Foreign Policy and National Secu-

468 Chris J Dolan

rity the Mass Media and the American presidency He received his PhD from the Univer-sity of South Carolina He is the author of In War We Trust The Political Dimensions and EthicalConsequences of the First Strike Doctrine (Ashgate Press 2005) and co-editor of Striking First ThePreventive Doctrine and the Reshaping of US Foreign Policy (Palgrave-Macmillan 2004) Hisresearch on public policy executive policymaking foreign policy and the mass media appearin Policy Studies Journal Congress and the Presidency Politics and Policy White House Studies andin numerous edited volumes

References

ABT Associates (2001) What Americarsquos users spend on drugs 1988ndash2000 Prepared for the Office of NationalDrug Control Policy Retrieved April 21 2004 from httpwwwwhitehousedrugpolicygovpublicationspdfamerican_users_spend_2002pdf

Allison G T (1971) Essence of decision Boston Little BrownAllison G T amp Halperin M H (1972) Bureaucratic politics A paradigm and and some policy implications

World Politics 24 40ndash79Baldwin E (1991) Why rules donrsquot work Modern Law Review 53 321ndash338Barnard D (2003) Narco-terrorism realities The connection between drugs and terror Journal of Countert-

errorism and Homeland Security International 9(1) 31ndash34Bedi R (2001 September 26) The assassins and drug dealers are now helping us The Daily Telegraph p 1Bennett C J (1991) What is policy convergence What causes it British Journal of Political Science 21(2)

215ndash233Blau P amp Scott R (1962) Formal organizations San Francisco ChandlerBouchard G amp Carroll B (2002) Policy-making and administrative discretion The case of immigration in

Canada Canadian Public Administration 25(2) 239ndash259Bouchard G amp Carroll B (2003) One size does not fit all Annual Meeting of the Canadian Public Service

Administration Halifax Nova ScotiaBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002a) Fiscal year 2003 congres-

sional budget justification Washington DC AuthorBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002b) International narcotics

control strategy Afghanistan (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 from httpusembassystategovafghanistanwwwh02121802html

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2004) International NarcoticsControl Strategy Southwest Asia (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 fromhttpwwwstategovginlrlsnrcrpt2003vol1html29836htm

Bureau of Justice Statistics United States Department of Justice (2000) Sourcebook of criminal justice statisticsWashington DC United States Government Printing Office

Cala A (2001 November 21) Danger of a new Vietnam The Gazette p 1Carroll B amp Garkut D E (1996) Is there an empirical trend toward managerialism Canadian Public Admin-

istration 39(4) 535ndash553Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2004) Youth risk behavior surveillance United States 2003 (May 21)

Retrieved August 2 2004 from httpwwwcdcgovmmwrpreviewmmwrhtmlss5302a1htmChepesiuk R (1999) Hard target The United States war against international drug trafficking 1982ndash1997 Jeffer-

son NC McFarland amp CoColombia Program Center for International Policy (2000) Plan Colombia A plan for peace or a plan for war

( June 20) Retrieved May 1 2004 from httpwwwciponlineorgcolombia062001htmColombia Program Center for International Policy (2004) US Aid to Colombia since 1997 Summary tables

(February 20) Retrieved May 2 2004 from httpciponlineorgcolombiaaidtablehtmConcar D (2001 September 29) Cutting the Talibanrsquos lifeline New Scientist p 77Desveaux J A Lindquist E A amp Toner G (1994) Organizing for policy innovations in public bureaucra-

cies AIDS energy and environmental policy in Canada Canadian Journal of Political Science 27(3)493ndash528

Dexter L (1981) Unintended consequences of purposive legislative action Alternatives to implementationJournal of Public Policy 4(4) 250ndash264

Drug Abuse Policy Office (1982) Federal strategy for prevention of drug abuse and drug trafficking WashingtonDC United States Government Printing Office

Drug Enforcement Administration Intelligence Division (2002) Drugs and terrorism A new perspective RetrievedApril 29 2004 from httpwwwdeagovpubsintel02039f1f1

Dudley S (2000 July 31) The Colombia quagmire The American Prospect p 32

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 469

Structural Attributes

Colombiarsquos security forces have a close institutional relationship with several UnitedStates agencies especially the National Security Agency (NSA) the Federal Bureauof Investigation (FBI) the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the StateDepartmentrsquos Bureau for International Narcotics (BIN) The Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA) offers their Colombian counterparts equipment and training toimprove their own ability to collect and analyze intelligence The United States alsoshares intelligence on tactical information concerning insurgent groupsrsquo move-ments and locations Furthermore the United States Army trains thousands ofColombian security personnel counterparts in topics ranging from marksmanshipto helicopter repair to human rights

Yet the United Statesrsquo approach to Colombia appears to neglect even these basictenets of counterinsurgency Massive aerial herbicide conducted by the Colombianand United States air forces and the DEA is fueling antigovernment sentiment ina guerrilla-controlled area (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003) Any social or economic effortshave been overshadowed particularly in most Colombiansrsquo perceptions It has alsosuffered from very serious implementation problems Some aid programs partic-ularly emergency humanitarian assistance appear to be reaching target popula-tionsmdashthough as United States Ambassador to Colombia Anne Patterson admitsthey ldquorepresent a drop in the bucket in relation to the real needs of Colombiarsquosdisplaced personsrdquo (qtd in Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

The success of nonmilitary aid programs has been mixed The effort to helpcoca-growing peasants adopt legal alternatives took the form of a series of ldquosocialpactsrdquo in which signers would receive basic assistance followed by technical andinfrastructure support in exchange for eradicating all their coca within twelvemonths after first receipt of aid By July 2001 37000 families in Putumayomdashjustunder half of the departmentrsquos populationmdashhad signed ldquopactsrdquo and waited forassistance that failed to arrive Alternative development money was delayed by theDEA forced to pass through several agencies before reaching the peasants BINthe United States Agency for International Development (USAID) the Colombiangovernmentrsquos Plan Colombia implementing agency the Colombian governmentrsquosalternative-development agency PLANTE and five Colombian nonprofit orga-nizations with no previous ties to Putumayo contracted to deliver the assistance(Dudley 2000)

Unintended Consequences

Since police and fumigation efforts were not accompanied by a credible alternativedevelopment effort in Putumayo thousands of peasants who had their crops erad-icated suddenly found themselves with little or no opportunities (Miller 2001)Putumayo community and church leaders interviewed by the Council of Interna-tional Policy in November 2002 hinted at a humanitarian disaster as sprayingdamaged food crops had contributed to widespread starvation in FARC-controlledrural areas (Dudley 2000) Those who lacked other economic opportunities joinedFARC and other terror groups by the hundreds (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 459

Furthermore the Bush White House does not appear to be progressing towardits goal of a 50 reduction in Colombian coca-growing by 2005 Coca is difficultto estimate According to CIA figures made public in March 2002 there is a pro-jected increase in the percentage of cocoa production over the next decade Theoverall amount of coca grown in Colombia is roughly 150000 hectares or threetimes as much as it was when the United States began large-scale spraying in 1996(Miller 2001) Since satellite measurements occur immediately following theJulyndashOctober fumigation campaign in Putumayo and may not take into accountreplanting and new planting elsewhere the 2002 statistics may show a greaterdecrease than probably exists (Van Dongen 2003) That year only four (perhapsfive) of Colombiarsquos thirty-two departments had 1000 or more hectares of coca In2001 a survey report issued by the UN found significant increases in coca pro-duction in the thirteen largest provinces in Colombia (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

While fumigation has proven able to reduce coca-growing in limited areasgrowers have been far more agile in eluding United States planes (Pardo 2000)New crops keep appearing in previously untouched parts of Colombiarsquos vast savan-nahs jungles and even coffee-growing zones Since at least the late 1980s totalcoca cultivation in South Americamdashperhaps the most meaningful estimate of thedrugrsquos availabilitymdashhas remained remarkably steady at roughly 200000 hectaresand the price of cocaine sold on United States streets remains steady

Clinton and Bush administration officials repeatedly argued that military train-ing and engagement would ease Colombiarsquos human rights crisis and encourage thearmed forces to end collaboration with paramilitary death squads Sadly the humanrights situation shows no signs of improvement The Consultancy for HumanRights and Displacement (CODHES) a widely cited Colombian nongovernmentalorganization estimated that violence forced 353120 people from their homesduring the first nine months of 2002 more than in all of 2001 The ColombianCommission of Jurists (CCJ) reported in September 2002 that political violence waskilling an average of 20 people per day double what the CCJ was reporting in1998 In January 2003 Human Rights Watch reported that ldquothere were numer-ous and credible reports of joint military-paramilitary operations and the sharingof intelligence and propagandardquo for 2002 (see Human Rights Watch World Report2003)

The most dangerous result could be that the United States has directly involveditself in Colombiarsquos civil war between FARC and government security forces underthe banner of ldquocounterterrorismrdquo (Dudley 2000) Unlike other second-tier ldquoWaron Terrorrdquo countries like the Philippines Georgia or Yemen where the terroristenemy is a shadowy group of a few dozen or a few hundred Colombiarsquos ldquoterror-istrdquo groups are established armies A counterterror effort in Colombia then risksevolving into an El Salvador-style counterinsurgency campaignmdashcomplete withUnited States advisors accompanying combat operations (Barnard 2003)

Political Policy Resultant

The advent of the War on Terror has kept the Bush administration from deviat-ing from its steady military approach Even before September 11 2001 the newBush administration had initiated a ldquoreview processrdquo to explore the possibility of

460 Chris J Dolan

going beyond the drug war to help Colombiarsquos government fight the guerrillas andthe paramilitaries Comparisons between FARC and Al Qaeda now began to showup with regularity

The United Statesrsquo approach is also highly contingent upon its dependence onSouth American oil A 2003 Bush administration foreign aid request to Congressincluded the first significant nondrug military aid to Colombia since the Cold War$98 million to help the Colombian Army protect the 480-mile long Cantildeo Limoacuten-Coventildeas oil pipeline A United States oil company Occidental Petroleum of LosAngeles owns 44 of the crude oil that flows through the Cantildeo Limoacuten pipelinewhich Colombian guerrillas dynamited 166 times in 2001 (United States Depart-ment of State 2002) ldquoClearly we have an energy threatrdquo warned CongressmanMark Souder (R-Indiana) in May 2002 ldquoColombia is either our seventh or eighthlargest supplier of oil Our economy depends on that We already have instabilityin the Middle East We have more compelling reasons to be involved in Colombiathan almost anywhere else in the worldrdquo (Souder 2002)

Beyond these initiatives it is not yet clear how the United Statesrsquo activities willexpand to match Washingtonrsquos much more ambitious mission in Colombia Whilethe purpose of United States military aid has expanded remarkably we have notseen a similar expansion in the amount of United States assistance Certainly military aid is risingmdashColombiarsquos security forces received over $100 million morein 2003 than they did in 2002 The pipeline program accounts for most of thatincrease Yet another $100 million would have only marginal impact on the direc-tion of a conflict involving nearly 40000 well-funded insurgents Pressures fordramatically increased military assistance are likely to build (Cala 2001 Pardo2000)

However if the goal of the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in Colombia isto reduce demand in the United States for cocaine then Americarsquos efforts havelargely failed which has been a continuing trend over the past 15 years (Wisotsky1990) During 2001 there were approximately 1160000 new cocaine users in theUnited States The average age of those who first used cocaine during the year was208 years According to the 2002 National Survey on Drug Use and Healthapproximately 339 million Americans ages 12 and older had tried cocaine at leastonce in their lifetimes representing 144 of the population in that age groupApproximately 59 million (25) had used cocaine in the past year and 20 million(09) had used cocaine within the past month (Substance Abuse and MentalHealth Services Administration [SAMHSA] 2004)

Among high school students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the FutureStudy 36 of eighth graders 51 of tenth graders and 77 of twelfth gradersreported using cocaine at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these per-centages were 36 61 and 78 respectively (National Institute on Drug Abuse[NIDA] 2003) Regarding the ease by which one can obtain powder cocaine 216of eighth graders 296 of tenth graders and 374 of twelfth graders surveyedin 2003 reported that powder cocaine was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtainApproximately 23 (225) of eighth graders 296 of tenth graders and 353of twelfth graders reported that crack cocaine was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo toobtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 44 of eighth graders 52 of tenth graders and 46of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reported that using powder cocaine once or

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 461

twice was a ldquogreat riskrdquo Nearly 49 of eighth graders 58 of tenth graders and47 of twelfth graders reported that using crack cocaine once or twice was a ldquogreatriskrdquo (NIDA 2003)

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also conducts a surveyof high school students throughout the United States the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) Among students surveyed in 2003 87 reportedusing some form of cocaine at least one time during their life of those 41reported being current users of cocaine meaning that they had used cocaine atleast once during the past month (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention[CDC] 2004) During 2002 82 of college students and 135 of young adults(ages 19ndash28) reported using cocaine at least once during their lifetimes Approxi-mately 48 of college students and 58 of young adults reported past-year useof cocaine and 16 of college students and 22 of young adults reported past-month use of cocaine (NIDA 2004)

Flower Power Afghanistan

Afghanistan is the worldrsquos leading source country for the cultivation processingand trafficking of opium By 1999 Afghanistan grew more than 4000 tons ofopium a year making it the primary source of roughly 75 of the worldrsquos illegalheroin (Concar 2001) Today narcotics are the largest source of income inAfghanistan due to the decimation of the countryrsquos economic infrastructure causedby years of warfare

Policy Discretion

On July 28 2000 Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar issued a decreebanning future opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan The decree stated that themilitary would eliminate poppy cultivation in the 2001 growing season in areasunder their control At the time the ban applied to any territory seized from theNorthern Alliance In February 2001 the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)declared that the opium poppy cultivation ban was successful and that the 2001crop was expected to be negligible (UNODC 2004a p 70) This marked the firsteffort by Taliban rulers to reduce opium production The eradication effort wasmade in response to an agreement with the UNODC which agreed to fund alter-native development projects on the condition that cultivation would be decreasedin Kandahar

Laboratories in Afghanistan convert opium into morphine base white heroinor one of three grades of brown heroin depending on the order received Largeprocessing labs are located in southern Afghanistan with smaller labs located mainlyin Nangarhar Province In the past many opium processing laboratories werelocated in Pakistan particularly in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) Theselaboratories appear to have relocated to Afghanistan both to be closer to the sourceof opium and to avoid the Pakistani government Morphine base is usually pro-duced for traffickers based in Turkey where it is converted to heroin before ship-ment to Europe and North and South America Chemists in the region are capable

462 Chris J Dolan

of producing heroin hydrochloride with extremely high purity levels (UNODC2004b)

Since Afghanistan is landlocked drug traffickers must rely on land routes tomove morphine base and heroin out of the country Heroin is trafficked to world-wide destinations by many routes Traffickers quickly adjust heroin smugglingroutes based on political and weather-related events (Gannon 2004) Reports ofheroin shipments north from Afghanistan through the Central Asian States toRussia have increased Tajikistan is a frequent destination for both opium andheroin shipments although Tajikistan serves mostly as a transit point and storagelocation rather than a final destination Seizures are frequently reported at Pakistanrsquos international airports (Rashid 1999) Heroin is also smuggled by sea onvessels leaving the port city of Karachi Heroin produced in Afghanistan continuesto be trafficked to the United States although generally in small quantities It isestimated that roughly 90 of opiate products in Europe originate in Afghanistan(Concar 2001 Hersh 2004)

Money laundering is not an issue in Afghanistan The unsophisticated bankingsystem that previously existed has been damaged by the years of war It is likelythat the informal banking system used extensively in the region usually referredto as the hawala or hundi money laundering system is used by drug traffickers(Lehmkuhler 2003) This system is an underground traditional informal networkthat has been used for centuries by businesses and families throughout Asia (StillFlushmdashTerrorist Finance 2002) This system provides a confidential convenientefficient service at a low cost in areas that are not served by traditional bankingfacilities (Hersh 2004)

Prior to the United Statesrsquo invasion of October 2001 the Taliban maintainedeffective control of nearly all of the opium poppy growing areas in the countryeven though they were only recognized as the legitimate government ofAfghanistan by three governments Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the United ArabEmirates Islamic law (Sharirsquoa) has been imposed in territory controlled by theTaliban and local Sharirsquoa courts have been established throughout the country In1997 the Taliban reactivated the State High Commission for Drug Control whichwas originally established in 1990 by the legitimate interim government Before theUNODC reports indicating that implementation of the 2000ndash2001 opium poppycultivation ban has been effective and the release of the United States governmentestimate indicating a dramatic reduction in opium production the Taliban madeonly token gestures toward antidrug law enforcement (BINLEA 2002b) Althoughthey have banned opium poppy cultivation the Taliban itself long relied on drugtrafficking for financial support

Unintended Consequences

As the United States began more rapidly merging its war on drugs with the greaterWar on Terror on a public scale halting opium production had to be as importantas eliminating the Taliban and the Al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan But howserious were Americarsquos efforts in applying its narco-terrorism policy to AfghanistanUnited States military commanders were not going to set opium eradication at thetop of their list of priorities (Schmitt 2002)

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 463

The results were consistent with Americarsquos hands-off approach Afghan opiumproduction in 2002 exploded to near-record levels making the war-ravaged nationagain the worldrsquos leading producer of the drug ( Judis 2003) Efforts by the UnitedStates-backed interim government of Hamid Karzai to eradicate opium productionby paying farmers to destroy their crops have failed because of a lack of moneyand violent demonstrations by farmers fearing their livelihoods were in jeopardy(Pound 2004) The UNrsquos Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated thatAfghanistan produced 3400 metric tons of opium in 2002 (Moreau amp Yousafzai2003 United Nations Information Service 2003)

Immediately after assuming office Karzai issued a decree on January 17 2002not only banning cultivation but also the processing trafficking and abuse ofopiates (Hanley 2002) Last month his government reiterated that positionreasserting the ban on opium poppy planting in the autumn (Hersh 2004) TheUNODC reopened its Kabul office in February 2002 and appointed Mohammad-Reza Amirkhizi as its representative The office has been engaged in a wide rangeof projects which include strengthening the Afghan drug control commissionassistance in law enforcement and the criminal justice sectors and cross-bordercounternarcotics cooperation with neighboring states The office is also working ona pilot social compact with farmers in Kandahar and Badakhshan provinces pro-viding them with small amounts of financial assistance with the understanding thatthey would grow commercial crops other than opium poppy (Gannon 2004)

The new Afghan government has largely failed in its now three-year effort toeradicate the opium poppy crop in Afghanistan which in recent years became theworldrsquos biggest producer of the raw material for heroin (Hanley 2002 Wehrfritz2003) The UN estimated that the 2004 crop could be worth more than $2 billionat the farm level in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004 Pound 2004) The resurgence ofopium production in Afghanistan is a major unintended consequence of the UnitedStates invasion

By 2002 the total opium poppy cultivation averaged 74000 hectares under theKarzai government and the United Statesrsquo military presence up from only 8000hectares in 2001 under the Taliban (UNODC 2004a) While the 2002 levels arestill lower than the record level crop growing 91000 hectares in 1999 and 82000hectares in 2000 the UN report confirms that opium cultivation has resumed topreviously high levels (Moreau amp Yousafzai 2003 UNODC 2004b)

As a result the average yield poppy production in 2002 shot up to 46 kilo-gramshectare from 24 kilogramshectare in 2001 The massive increase is largelydue to more extensive irrigation programs in Eastern and Southern Afghanistanimplemented since the fall of the Taliban in November 2001 along with the end ofa nationwide drought which devastated total agricultural output between 1998 and2001 Thus total opium poppy production in 2002 was 3400 metric tons a sizableincrease compared to 185 metric tons in 2001 (UNODC 2004b) Poppy cultivationthen doubled between 2002 and 2003 The area planted with poppies used tomake heroin and morphine was 152000 hectares in 2003 compared with 74000hectares in 2002 according to the White House ONDCP (UNODC 2004b)According to the State Department ldquoIn Afghanistan poppy cultivationapproached the highest levels ever registered International and United Statessurveys indicate that in 2003 Afghanistan again produced three-quarters of the

464 Chris J Dolan

worldrsquos illicit opium The narcotics situation remains serious despite positiveactions by both the government and international donorsrdquo (BINLEA 2004)

Besides the eradication campaign announced by the new Afghan governmentin 2002 appears to have been doomed to failure due to a lack of United Statesfinancial support Farmers were to be compensated with $500 per acre fordestroyed poppies which is only a fraction of the estimated $6400 per acre of grossincome an Afghani farmer can earn on poppy cultivation The UN Food and Agriculture Organization reported that ldquoAfghani government programs had a verylimited impactrdquo (Hanley 2002) At 2003 price levels and as a result of the explo-sion in poppy cultivation and production total income for Afghani opium farmersreached several hundred million United States dollars by the end of 2003 (Pound2004)

Other more unfortunate factors resulted from the 2002 poppy eradication cam-paign Afghan farmers have been killed and wounded by United States and Afghansecurity forces during protests against the campaign to eradicate their opiumpoppy crops (Wehrfritz 2003 Wyatt 2002) According to the BBC ldquoThe farmersare angered at what they see as derisory compensationrdquo (Wyatt 2002) ManyAfghan farmers direct their anger at the United States for pressuring the Karzaigovernment to institute the poppy ban (Pound 2004) As a result many Afghanfarmers have embraced Al Qaeda for its staunch anti-Americanism (Hersh 2004)

In the war on terrorism in Afghanistan the United States is trying to end theprofits Al Qaeda and the Taliban are making from the greater Central Asian drugtrade (Gannon 2004 Rashid 1999) However this may impact Americarsquos key alliesin the region who have for years reaped the rewards of the Afghanistanrsquos herointrade Nowhere is the problem clearer than along Afghanistanrsquos northern borderwith Tajikistan an ally in the United Statesrsquo antiterrorist efforts and a major conduitfor heroin and opium on its way to Europe and the Americas The United Statesrsquoinvasion even sparked a massive selling of heroin as Al Qaeda and Taliban forcesappeared to have been selling off their narcotic stockpiles for cash to purchase arms(Hersh 2004 Yglesias 2004)

Some Central Asian and Middle Eastern drug traffickers were actually support-ive of the American invasion of Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) According to the WallStreet Journal ldquoacross the Stans and the Caspian Sea in Lebanonrsquos Bekaa Valleysome pray for a speedy United States attack on Afghanistan lsquoItrsquos good for busi-nessrsquo says Muhammed standing in a garage full of cannabis a pistol tucked in hisbelt He is just back from harvesting this yearrsquos cannabis crop lsquoItrsquoll drive up hashishpricesrsquo Muhammed assures a prospective client that transport of 2500 kilograms(5500 pounds) to Amsterdam from the Bekaamdashcontrolled by Syrian troops as wellas Syrian- and Iranian-backed Shiite Muslim Hezbollah fightersmdashcan be arrangedrdquo(qtd in Targeting Terroristsrsquo Drug Money 2001 p 1)

Structural Attributes

Prior to the October 2001 invasion the United States government had no actualpresence in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) Today the most important organizationsresponsible for conducting the narco-terror war in Afghanistan include the FederalBureau of Investigation the Drug Enforcement Administration the Special Forces

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 465

the Department of Statersquos Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforce-ment Affairs (INL) and Pakistan security forces in cooperation with the UN Officeof Drugs and Crime (UNODC) But how successful is the partnership In Febru-ary 2002 the UNODC confirmed that opium poppy cultivation rose to higherlevels than previous years under Taliban rule The UNODC Country Office forAfghanistan and the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme (ICMP) conducted a pre-assessment survey in 208 villages and 42 districts in the traditional opium poppygrowing areas of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan in the provinces of HelmandKandahar Oruzgan Nangarhar and Kunar Those five provinces accounted for84 of the total opium poppy cultivation area in Afghanistan in 2000 (UNODC2004b)

It is estimated that the various security forces currently monitor opium poppycultivation over an area between 45000 hectares and 65000 hectares (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003) This compares to the level of cultivation reached during the mid-1990s but remained lower than those recorded in 1999 (about 95000 hectares)and 2000 (about 82000 hectares) The resulting production of opium harvestedin 2004 could reach between 1900 and 2700 metric tons of opium (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003)

To address these realities the INL the DEA and the FBI have concluded thatwith at least 40 of the Afghan gross domestic product virtually tied to heroin therisks of an untethered narco-economy producing a chain reaction that reverses pastgains made under the Taliban are quite high indeed In response the INL and theDEA have built police training facilities and trained and retrained roughly 20000Afghan police officers in order to implement narco-terror initiatives against Talibanand Al Qaeda holdouts In coordination with United States Special Forces the Bushadministration seeks to place 50000 border guards and Afghan National Police byDecember 2005 in support of the opium eradication campaign The INL the DEAand the FBI are also involved in creating a comprehensive justice sector TheUnited Statesrsquo effort has also resulted in some intriguing bureaucratic alliancesThe Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency one of the main sources ofinformation for the United States-led alliance against the Taliban regime is asso-ciated with political assassinations narcotics trafficking and smuggling of nucleartechnology and missile delivery components with the backing fundamentalistIslamic movements (qtd in Bedi 2001)

Opium cultivation and heroin production in Pakistanrsquos northern tribal belt andadjoining Afghanistan was a vital offshoot of the ISIndashCIA cooperation (Rashid1999) It succeeded in turning some Soviet troops into addicts during the USSRrsquosoccupation of Afghanistan Heroin sales in Europe and the United States carriedout via deceptive means transport networks couriers and pay-offs offset the costof the various wars in Afghanistan (Gannon 2004)

Resultant Political Policy

The initial military victories in Afghanistan are in the process of being lost as thecountry is rapidly disintegrating into a state of narco-terrorism and anarchy TheUnited Statesrsquo efforts may fail unless the link between Al Qaeda Taliban forcesand opium production are finally overcome In 2004 opium farmers and traffick-ers in Afghanistan generated $23 billion in profits with higher estimates for the

466 Chris J Dolan

future The level of opium planting and the subsequent production of opium pastemorphine and heroin in Afghanistan is more than enough to satisfy the demandin Western Europe and the United States (Gannon 2004)

Although Afghanistan represents one source in worldwide opium production inaddition to Mexico South America and Southeast Asia narco-terrorism policytoward Afghanistan has not succeeded in reversing growth trends in heroin con-sumption in the United States According to the 2002 National Survey on DrugUse and Health approximately 37 million Americans ages 12 and older reportedtrying heroin at least once during their lifetimes representing 16 of the popu-lation ages 12 and older Roughly 404000 (02) reported past-year heroin useand 166000 (01) reported past-month heroin use (SAMHSA 2004) Among highschool students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the Future Study 16 ofeighth graders 15 of tenth graders and 15 of twelfth graders reported usingheroin at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these percentages were 1618 and 17 respectively (NIDA 2003)

Regarding the ease by which one can obtain heroin 156 of eighth graders188 of tenth graders and 279 of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reportedthat heroin was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 63 ofeighth graders 71 of tenth graders and 59 of twelfth graders reported thatusing heroin once or twice without a needle was a ldquogreat riskrdquo (NIDA 2003)Nationwide 33 of high school students surveyed in 2003 as part of the YouthRisk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) reported using heroin during theirlifetimes Male students (43) were significantly more likely than female students(20) to report lifetime heroin use Hispanic students (39) were more likely toreport heroin use within their lifetime than white (26) or black (26) students(CDC 2004) During 2002 10 of college students and 18 of young adults (ages19ndash28) reported using heroin at least once during their lifetimes Approximately01 of college students and 02 of young adults reported past year use of heroinand 00 of college students and less than 005 of young adults reported pastmonth use of heroin (NIDA 2004)

According to data from the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) Programa median of 58 of adult male arrestees and 66 of adult female arrestees testedpositive for opiates at arrest in 2003 The adult male samples were compiled from39 United States sites and the adult female samples were compiled from 25 sitesA median of 51 of adult male arrestees and 71 of adult female arresteesreported using heroin at least once in the year before being arrested (NationalInstitute of Justice 2004) Although heroin expenditures were $22 billion in 1990demand decreased to $10 billion in 2000 and whereas in 1990 Americans con-sumed 136 metric tons of heroin estimates remained relatively unchanged in 2000(ABT Associates 2001)

Conclusions

Based on these observations of narco-terrorist activities in Afghanistan and Colom-bia on a substantive level the Bush administration has formulated domestic andinternational drug reduction strategies with an eye on asset seizure and control offunding used by terrorist organizations However important questions remain con-cerning the legitimacy of Americarsquos policy efforts Indeed narco-terrorism as a

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 467

national security threat is not new The 911 attacks simply pushed narco-terror-ism higher on the presidentrsquos national security agenda particularly in light of theconnection between the Afghan drug trade and the Al Qaeda network

On a theoretical level the contingency approach to examining narco-terrorismpolicy highlights several major concerns that have not been adequately addressedFirst as it is conducted today the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy places sig-nificant attention on the increased utilization of American military power Eversince President Richard Nixon proclaimed a war on drugs and President GeorgeW Bush a war on terrorism concern over the use of the military in what have typically been deemed law enforcement and social issues has overshadowed mostother related methods Even if the United States did not introduce troops intoAfghanistan or Colombia we are still left with a highly militarized narco-terrorismpolicy that facilitates human rights abuses by those governments receiving UnitedStates aid Moreover the result has been an increase in the production and con-sumption of illegal drugs that are trafficked by organizations that use profits topromote terrorist attacks

Second the contingency approach used in this study reveals the problems narco-terrorism policy has experienced in targeting so-called weak states Narco-terrorism policy has elevated the potential for the United States to use its diplo-matic weight to force governments to enact stricter antidrug policies This hasencouraged states like Afghanistan and Colombia to further undermine politicaleconomic and social development with undemocratic policies directed at citizensAs a result the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism efforts have in part fueled anti-American resentment thereby increasing the potential for additional terrorist activities by groups such as Al Qaeda or FARC

Third it has become more apparent that narco-terrorism policy has becomelike all other policies highly politicized Americarsquos counterdrug efforts are virtu-ally indistinguishable from counterinsurgency efforts by remnants of the Talibanand Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and FARC and other terror-related groups in Colom-bia Moreover the United States is being rather bold in designating particulargroups as narco-terrorists although conveniently leaving off others such as theNorthern Alliance in Afghanistan This hinders the rule of law in a number of countries

Finally the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in its current form neglectscertain realities Quite simply many critics allege that narco-terrorist connectionsare indirect and for the most part ambiguous In addition critics of prohibitionmaintain that it is the illegalization of drugs that generates the enormous profitsused to support terrorist and insurgent organizations Another concern is thatnarco-terrorism does not address the complexities of terrorism or insurgenciesCan Afghanistan and Colombia continue to be addressed in narrowly defined mil-itary and law enforcement frameworks that neglect political economic and socialconsiderations

About the Author

Chris J Dolan is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Floridawhere he teaches courses on public policy United States Foreign Policy and National Secu-

468 Chris J Dolan

rity the Mass Media and the American presidency He received his PhD from the Univer-sity of South Carolina He is the author of In War We Trust The Political Dimensions and EthicalConsequences of the First Strike Doctrine (Ashgate Press 2005) and co-editor of Striking First ThePreventive Doctrine and the Reshaping of US Foreign Policy (Palgrave-Macmillan 2004) Hisresearch on public policy executive policymaking foreign policy and the mass media appearin Policy Studies Journal Congress and the Presidency Politics and Policy White House Studies andin numerous edited volumes

References

ABT Associates (2001) What Americarsquos users spend on drugs 1988ndash2000 Prepared for the Office of NationalDrug Control Policy Retrieved April 21 2004 from httpwwwwhitehousedrugpolicygovpublicationspdfamerican_users_spend_2002pdf

Allison G T (1971) Essence of decision Boston Little BrownAllison G T amp Halperin M H (1972) Bureaucratic politics A paradigm and and some policy implications

World Politics 24 40ndash79Baldwin E (1991) Why rules donrsquot work Modern Law Review 53 321ndash338Barnard D (2003) Narco-terrorism realities The connection between drugs and terror Journal of Countert-

errorism and Homeland Security International 9(1) 31ndash34Bedi R (2001 September 26) The assassins and drug dealers are now helping us The Daily Telegraph p 1Bennett C J (1991) What is policy convergence What causes it British Journal of Political Science 21(2)

215ndash233Blau P amp Scott R (1962) Formal organizations San Francisco ChandlerBouchard G amp Carroll B (2002) Policy-making and administrative discretion The case of immigration in

Canada Canadian Public Administration 25(2) 239ndash259Bouchard G amp Carroll B (2003) One size does not fit all Annual Meeting of the Canadian Public Service

Administration Halifax Nova ScotiaBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002a) Fiscal year 2003 congres-

sional budget justification Washington DC AuthorBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002b) International narcotics

control strategy Afghanistan (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 from httpusembassystategovafghanistanwwwh02121802html

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2004) International NarcoticsControl Strategy Southwest Asia (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 fromhttpwwwstategovginlrlsnrcrpt2003vol1html29836htm

Bureau of Justice Statistics United States Department of Justice (2000) Sourcebook of criminal justice statisticsWashington DC United States Government Printing Office

Cala A (2001 November 21) Danger of a new Vietnam The Gazette p 1Carroll B amp Garkut D E (1996) Is there an empirical trend toward managerialism Canadian Public Admin-

istration 39(4) 535ndash553Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2004) Youth risk behavior surveillance United States 2003 (May 21)

Retrieved August 2 2004 from httpwwwcdcgovmmwrpreviewmmwrhtmlss5302a1htmChepesiuk R (1999) Hard target The United States war against international drug trafficking 1982ndash1997 Jeffer-

son NC McFarland amp CoColombia Program Center for International Policy (2000) Plan Colombia A plan for peace or a plan for war

( June 20) Retrieved May 1 2004 from httpwwwciponlineorgcolombia062001htmColombia Program Center for International Policy (2004) US Aid to Colombia since 1997 Summary tables

(February 20) Retrieved May 2 2004 from httpciponlineorgcolombiaaidtablehtmConcar D (2001 September 29) Cutting the Talibanrsquos lifeline New Scientist p 77Desveaux J A Lindquist E A amp Toner G (1994) Organizing for policy innovations in public bureaucra-

cies AIDS energy and environmental policy in Canada Canadian Journal of Political Science 27(3)493ndash528

Dexter L (1981) Unintended consequences of purposive legislative action Alternatives to implementationJournal of Public Policy 4(4) 250ndash264

Drug Abuse Policy Office (1982) Federal strategy for prevention of drug abuse and drug trafficking WashingtonDC United States Government Printing Office

Drug Enforcement Administration Intelligence Division (2002) Drugs and terrorism A new perspective RetrievedApril 29 2004 from httpwwwdeagovpubsintel02039f1f1

Dudley S (2000 July 31) The Colombia quagmire The American Prospect p 32

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 469

Furthermore the Bush White House does not appear to be progressing towardits goal of a 50 reduction in Colombian coca-growing by 2005 Coca is difficultto estimate According to CIA figures made public in March 2002 there is a pro-jected increase in the percentage of cocoa production over the next decade Theoverall amount of coca grown in Colombia is roughly 150000 hectares or threetimes as much as it was when the United States began large-scale spraying in 1996(Miller 2001) Since satellite measurements occur immediately following theJulyndashOctober fumigation campaign in Putumayo and may not take into accountreplanting and new planting elsewhere the 2002 statistics may show a greaterdecrease than probably exists (Van Dongen 2003) That year only four (perhapsfive) of Colombiarsquos thirty-two departments had 1000 or more hectares of coca In2001 a survey report issued by the UN found significant increases in coca pro-duction in the thirteen largest provinces in Colombia (Vaicius amp Isacson 2003)

While fumigation has proven able to reduce coca-growing in limited areasgrowers have been far more agile in eluding United States planes (Pardo 2000)New crops keep appearing in previously untouched parts of Colombiarsquos vast savan-nahs jungles and even coffee-growing zones Since at least the late 1980s totalcoca cultivation in South Americamdashperhaps the most meaningful estimate of thedrugrsquos availabilitymdashhas remained remarkably steady at roughly 200000 hectaresand the price of cocaine sold on United States streets remains steady

Clinton and Bush administration officials repeatedly argued that military train-ing and engagement would ease Colombiarsquos human rights crisis and encourage thearmed forces to end collaboration with paramilitary death squads Sadly the humanrights situation shows no signs of improvement The Consultancy for HumanRights and Displacement (CODHES) a widely cited Colombian nongovernmentalorganization estimated that violence forced 353120 people from their homesduring the first nine months of 2002 more than in all of 2001 The ColombianCommission of Jurists (CCJ) reported in September 2002 that political violence waskilling an average of 20 people per day double what the CCJ was reporting in1998 In January 2003 Human Rights Watch reported that ldquothere were numer-ous and credible reports of joint military-paramilitary operations and the sharingof intelligence and propagandardquo for 2002 (see Human Rights Watch World Report2003)

The most dangerous result could be that the United States has directly involveditself in Colombiarsquos civil war between FARC and government security forces underthe banner of ldquocounterterrorismrdquo (Dudley 2000) Unlike other second-tier ldquoWaron Terrorrdquo countries like the Philippines Georgia or Yemen where the terroristenemy is a shadowy group of a few dozen or a few hundred Colombiarsquos ldquoterror-istrdquo groups are established armies A counterterror effort in Colombia then risksevolving into an El Salvador-style counterinsurgency campaignmdashcomplete withUnited States advisors accompanying combat operations (Barnard 2003)

Political Policy Resultant

The advent of the War on Terror has kept the Bush administration from deviat-ing from its steady military approach Even before September 11 2001 the newBush administration had initiated a ldquoreview processrdquo to explore the possibility of

460 Chris J Dolan

going beyond the drug war to help Colombiarsquos government fight the guerrillas andthe paramilitaries Comparisons between FARC and Al Qaeda now began to showup with regularity

The United Statesrsquo approach is also highly contingent upon its dependence onSouth American oil A 2003 Bush administration foreign aid request to Congressincluded the first significant nondrug military aid to Colombia since the Cold War$98 million to help the Colombian Army protect the 480-mile long Cantildeo Limoacuten-Coventildeas oil pipeline A United States oil company Occidental Petroleum of LosAngeles owns 44 of the crude oil that flows through the Cantildeo Limoacuten pipelinewhich Colombian guerrillas dynamited 166 times in 2001 (United States Depart-ment of State 2002) ldquoClearly we have an energy threatrdquo warned CongressmanMark Souder (R-Indiana) in May 2002 ldquoColombia is either our seventh or eighthlargest supplier of oil Our economy depends on that We already have instabilityin the Middle East We have more compelling reasons to be involved in Colombiathan almost anywhere else in the worldrdquo (Souder 2002)

Beyond these initiatives it is not yet clear how the United Statesrsquo activities willexpand to match Washingtonrsquos much more ambitious mission in Colombia Whilethe purpose of United States military aid has expanded remarkably we have notseen a similar expansion in the amount of United States assistance Certainly military aid is risingmdashColombiarsquos security forces received over $100 million morein 2003 than they did in 2002 The pipeline program accounts for most of thatincrease Yet another $100 million would have only marginal impact on the direc-tion of a conflict involving nearly 40000 well-funded insurgents Pressures fordramatically increased military assistance are likely to build (Cala 2001 Pardo2000)

However if the goal of the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in Colombia isto reduce demand in the United States for cocaine then Americarsquos efforts havelargely failed which has been a continuing trend over the past 15 years (Wisotsky1990) During 2001 there were approximately 1160000 new cocaine users in theUnited States The average age of those who first used cocaine during the year was208 years According to the 2002 National Survey on Drug Use and Healthapproximately 339 million Americans ages 12 and older had tried cocaine at leastonce in their lifetimes representing 144 of the population in that age groupApproximately 59 million (25) had used cocaine in the past year and 20 million(09) had used cocaine within the past month (Substance Abuse and MentalHealth Services Administration [SAMHSA] 2004)

Among high school students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the FutureStudy 36 of eighth graders 51 of tenth graders and 77 of twelfth gradersreported using cocaine at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these per-centages were 36 61 and 78 respectively (National Institute on Drug Abuse[NIDA] 2003) Regarding the ease by which one can obtain powder cocaine 216of eighth graders 296 of tenth graders and 374 of twelfth graders surveyedin 2003 reported that powder cocaine was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtainApproximately 23 (225) of eighth graders 296 of tenth graders and 353of twelfth graders reported that crack cocaine was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo toobtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 44 of eighth graders 52 of tenth graders and 46of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reported that using powder cocaine once or

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 461

twice was a ldquogreat riskrdquo Nearly 49 of eighth graders 58 of tenth graders and47 of twelfth graders reported that using crack cocaine once or twice was a ldquogreatriskrdquo (NIDA 2003)

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also conducts a surveyof high school students throughout the United States the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) Among students surveyed in 2003 87 reportedusing some form of cocaine at least one time during their life of those 41reported being current users of cocaine meaning that they had used cocaine atleast once during the past month (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention[CDC] 2004) During 2002 82 of college students and 135 of young adults(ages 19ndash28) reported using cocaine at least once during their lifetimes Approxi-mately 48 of college students and 58 of young adults reported past-year useof cocaine and 16 of college students and 22 of young adults reported past-month use of cocaine (NIDA 2004)

Flower Power Afghanistan

Afghanistan is the worldrsquos leading source country for the cultivation processingand trafficking of opium By 1999 Afghanistan grew more than 4000 tons ofopium a year making it the primary source of roughly 75 of the worldrsquos illegalheroin (Concar 2001) Today narcotics are the largest source of income inAfghanistan due to the decimation of the countryrsquos economic infrastructure causedby years of warfare

Policy Discretion

On July 28 2000 Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar issued a decreebanning future opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan The decree stated that themilitary would eliminate poppy cultivation in the 2001 growing season in areasunder their control At the time the ban applied to any territory seized from theNorthern Alliance In February 2001 the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)declared that the opium poppy cultivation ban was successful and that the 2001crop was expected to be negligible (UNODC 2004a p 70) This marked the firsteffort by Taliban rulers to reduce opium production The eradication effort wasmade in response to an agreement with the UNODC which agreed to fund alter-native development projects on the condition that cultivation would be decreasedin Kandahar

Laboratories in Afghanistan convert opium into morphine base white heroinor one of three grades of brown heroin depending on the order received Largeprocessing labs are located in southern Afghanistan with smaller labs located mainlyin Nangarhar Province In the past many opium processing laboratories werelocated in Pakistan particularly in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) Theselaboratories appear to have relocated to Afghanistan both to be closer to the sourceof opium and to avoid the Pakistani government Morphine base is usually pro-duced for traffickers based in Turkey where it is converted to heroin before ship-ment to Europe and North and South America Chemists in the region are capable

462 Chris J Dolan

of producing heroin hydrochloride with extremely high purity levels (UNODC2004b)

Since Afghanistan is landlocked drug traffickers must rely on land routes tomove morphine base and heroin out of the country Heroin is trafficked to world-wide destinations by many routes Traffickers quickly adjust heroin smugglingroutes based on political and weather-related events (Gannon 2004) Reports ofheroin shipments north from Afghanistan through the Central Asian States toRussia have increased Tajikistan is a frequent destination for both opium andheroin shipments although Tajikistan serves mostly as a transit point and storagelocation rather than a final destination Seizures are frequently reported at Pakistanrsquos international airports (Rashid 1999) Heroin is also smuggled by sea onvessels leaving the port city of Karachi Heroin produced in Afghanistan continuesto be trafficked to the United States although generally in small quantities It isestimated that roughly 90 of opiate products in Europe originate in Afghanistan(Concar 2001 Hersh 2004)

Money laundering is not an issue in Afghanistan The unsophisticated bankingsystem that previously existed has been damaged by the years of war It is likelythat the informal banking system used extensively in the region usually referredto as the hawala or hundi money laundering system is used by drug traffickers(Lehmkuhler 2003) This system is an underground traditional informal networkthat has been used for centuries by businesses and families throughout Asia (StillFlushmdashTerrorist Finance 2002) This system provides a confidential convenientefficient service at a low cost in areas that are not served by traditional bankingfacilities (Hersh 2004)

Prior to the United Statesrsquo invasion of October 2001 the Taliban maintainedeffective control of nearly all of the opium poppy growing areas in the countryeven though they were only recognized as the legitimate government ofAfghanistan by three governments Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the United ArabEmirates Islamic law (Sharirsquoa) has been imposed in territory controlled by theTaliban and local Sharirsquoa courts have been established throughout the country In1997 the Taliban reactivated the State High Commission for Drug Control whichwas originally established in 1990 by the legitimate interim government Before theUNODC reports indicating that implementation of the 2000ndash2001 opium poppycultivation ban has been effective and the release of the United States governmentestimate indicating a dramatic reduction in opium production the Taliban madeonly token gestures toward antidrug law enforcement (BINLEA 2002b) Althoughthey have banned opium poppy cultivation the Taliban itself long relied on drugtrafficking for financial support

Unintended Consequences

As the United States began more rapidly merging its war on drugs with the greaterWar on Terror on a public scale halting opium production had to be as importantas eliminating the Taliban and the Al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan But howserious were Americarsquos efforts in applying its narco-terrorism policy to AfghanistanUnited States military commanders were not going to set opium eradication at thetop of their list of priorities (Schmitt 2002)

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 463

The results were consistent with Americarsquos hands-off approach Afghan opiumproduction in 2002 exploded to near-record levels making the war-ravaged nationagain the worldrsquos leading producer of the drug ( Judis 2003) Efforts by the UnitedStates-backed interim government of Hamid Karzai to eradicate opium productionby paying farmers to destroy their crops have failed because of a lack of moneyand violent demonstrations by farmers fearing their livelihoods were in jeopardy(Pound 2004) The UNrsquos Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated thatAfghanistan produced 3400 metric tons of opium in 2002 (Moreau amp Yousafzai2003 United Nations Information Service 2003)

Immediately after assuming office Karzai issued a decree on January 17 2002not only banning cultivation but also the processing trafficking and abuse ofopiates (Hanley 2002) Last month his government reiterated that positionreasserting the ban on opium poppy planting in the autumn (Hersh 2004) TheUNODC reopened its Kabul office in February 2002 and appointed Mohammad-Reza Amirkhizi as its representative The office has been engaged in a wide rangeof projects which include strengthening the Afghan drug control commissionassistance in law enforcement and the criminal justice sectors and cross-bordercounternarcotics cooperation with neighboring states The office is also working ona pilot social compact with farmers in Kandahar and Badakhshan provinces pro-viding them with small amounts of financial assistance with the understanding thatthey would grow commercial crops other than opium poppy (Gannon 2004)

The new Afghan government has largely failed in its now three-year effort toeradicate the opium poppy crop in Afghanistan which in recent years became theworldrsquos biggest producer of the raw material for heroin (Hanley 2002 Wehrfritz2003) The UN estimated that the 2004 crop could be worth more than $2 billionat the farm level in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004 Pound 2004) The resurgence ofopium production in Afghanistan is a major unintended consequence of the UnitedStates invasion

By 2002 the total opium poppy cultivation averaged 74000 hectares under theKarzai government and the United Statesrsquo military presence up from only 8000hectares in 2001 under the Taliban (UNODC 2004a) While the 2002 levels arestill lower than the record level crop growing 91000 hectares in 1999 and 82000hectares in 2000 the UN report confirms that opium cultivation has resumed topreviously high levels (Moreau amp Yousafzai 2003 UNODC 2004b)

As a result the average yield poppy production in 2002 shot up to 46 kilo-gramshectare from 24 kilogramshectare in 2001 The massive increase is largelydue to more extensive irrigation programs in Eastern and Southern Afghanistanimplemented since the fall of the Taliban in November 2001 along with the end ofa nationwide drought which devastated total agricultural output between 1998 and2001 Thus total opium poppy production in 2002 was 3400 metric tons a sizableincrease compared to 185 metric tons in 2001 (UNODC 2004b) Poppy cultivationthen doubled between 2002 and 2003 The area planted with poppies used tomake heroin and morphine was 152000 hectares in 2003 compared with 74000hectares in 2002 according to the White House ONDCP (UNODC 2004b)According to the State Department ldquoIn Afghanistan poppy cultivationapproached the highest levels ever registered International and United Statessurveys indicate that in 2003 Afghanistan again produced three-quarters of the

464 Chris J Dolan

worldrsquos illicit opium The narcotics situation remains serious despite positiveactions by both the government and international donorsrdquo (BINLEA 2004)

Besides the eradication campaign announced by the new Afghan governmentin 2002 appears to have been doomed to failure due to a lack of United Statesfinancial support Farmers were to be compensated with $500 per acre fordestroyed poppies which is only a fraction of the estimated $6400 per acre of grossincome an Afghani farmer can earn on poppy cultivation The UN Food and Agriculture Organization reported that ldquoAfghani government programs had a verylimited impactrdquo (Hanley 2002) At 2003 price levels and as a result of the explo-sion in poppy cultivation and production total income for Afghani opium farmersreached several hundred million United States dollars by the end of 2003 (Pound2004)

Other more unfortunate factors resulted from the 2002 poppy eradication cam-paign Afghan farmers have been killed and wounded by United States and Afghansecurity forces during protests against the campaign to eradicate their opiumpoppy crops (Wehrfritz 2003 Wyatt 2002) According to the BBC ldquoThe farmersare angered at what they see as derisory compensationrdquo (Wyatt 2002) ManyAfghan farmers direct their anger at the United States for pressuring the Karzaigovernment to institute the poppy ban (Pound 2004) As a result many Afghanfarmers have embraced Al Qaeda for its staunch anti-Americanism (Hersh 2004)

In the war on terrorism in Afghanistan the United States is trying to end theprofits Al Qaeda and the Taliban are making from the greater Central Asian drugtrade (Gannon 2004 Rashid 1999) However this may impact Americarsquos key alliesin the region who have for years reaped the rewards of the Afghanistanrsquos herointrade Nowhere is the problem clearer than along Afghanistanrsquos northern borderwith Tajikistan an ally in the United Statesrsquo antiterrorist efforts and a major conduitfor heroin and opium on its way to Europe and the Americas The United Statesrsquoinvasion even sparked a massive selling of heroin as Al Qaeda and Taliban forcesappeared to have been selling off their narcotic stockpiles for cash to purchase arms(Hersh 2004 Yglesias 2004)

Some Central Asian and Middle Eastern drug traffickers were actually support-ive of the American invasion of Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) According to the WallStreet Journal ldquoacross the Stans and the Caspian Sea in Lebanonrsquos Bekaa Valleysome pray for a speedy United States attack on Afghanistan lsquoItrsquos good for busi-nessrsquo says Muhammed standing in a garage full of cannabis a pistol tucked in hisbelt He is just back from harvesting this yearrsquos cannabis crop lsquoItrsquoll drive up hashishpricesrsquo Muhammed assures a prospective client that transport of 2500 kilograms(5500 pounds) to Amsterdam from the Bekaamdashcontrolled by Syrian troops as wellas Syrian- and Iranian-backed Shiite Muslim Hezbollah fightersmdashcan be arrangedrdquo(qtd in Targeting Terroristsrsquo Drug Money 2001 p 1)

Structural Attributes

Prior to the October 2001 invasion the United States government had no actualpresence in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) Today the most important organizationsresponsible for conducting the narco-terror war in Afghanistan include the FederalBureau of Investigation the Drug Enforcement Administration the Special Forces

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 465

the Department of Statersquos Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforce-ment Affairs (INL) and Pakistan security forces in cooperation with the UN Officeof Drugs and Crime (UNODC) But how successful is the partnership In Febru-ary 2002 the UNODC confirmed that opium poppy cultivation rose to higherlevels than previous years under Taliban rule The UNODC Country Office forAfghanistan and the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme (ICMP) conducted a pre-assessment survey in 208 villages and 42 districts in the traditional opium poppygrowing areas of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan in the provinces of HelmandKandahar Oruzgan Nangarhar and Kunar Those five provinces accounted for84 of the total opium poppy cultivation area in Afghanistan in 2000 (UNODC2004b)

It is estimated that the various security forces currently monitor opium poppycultivation over an area between 45000 hectares and 65000 hectares (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003) This compares to the level of cultivation reached during the mid-1990s but remained lower than those recorded in 1999 (about 95000 hectares)and 2000 (about 82000 hectares) The resulting production of opium harvestedin 2004 could reach between 1900 and 2700 metric tons of opium (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003)

To address these realities the INL the DEA and the FBI have concluded thatwith at least 40 of the Afghan gross domestic product virtually tied to heroin therisks of an untethered narco-economy producing a chain reaction that reverses pastgains made under the Taliban are quite high indeed In response the INL and theDEA have built police training facilities and trained and retrained roughly 20000Afghan police officers in order to implement narco-terror initiatives against Talibanand Al Qaeda holdouts In coordination with United States Special Forces the Bushadministration seeks to place 50000 border guards and Afghan National Police byDecember 2005 in support of the opium eradication campaign The INL the DEAand the FBI are also involved in creating a comprehensive justice sector TheUnited Statesrsquo effort has also resulted in some intriguing bureaucratic alliancesThe Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency one of the main sources ofinformation for the United States-led alliance against the Taliban regime is asso-ciated with political assassinations narcotics trafficking and smuggling of nucleartechnology and missile delivery components with the backing fundamentalistIslamic movements (qtd in Bedi 2001)

Opium cultivation and heroin production in Pakistanrsquos northern tribal belt andadjoining Afghanistan was a vital offshoot of the ISIndashCIA cooperation (Rashid1999) It succeeded in turning some Soviet troops into addicts during the USSRrsquosoccupation of Afghanistan Heroin sales in Europe and the United States carriedout via deceptive means transport networks couriers and pay-offs offset the costof the various wars in Afghanistan (Gannon 2004)

Resultant Political Policy

The initial military victories in Afghanistan are in the process of being lost as thecountry is rapidly disintegrating into a state of narco-terrorism and anarchy TheUnited Statesrsquo efforts may fail unless the link between Al Qaeda Taliban forcesand opium production are finally overcome In 2004 opium farmers and traffick-ers in Afghanistan generated $23 billion in profits with higher estimates for the

466 Chris J Dolan

future The level of opium planting and the subsequent production of opium pastemorphine and heroin in Afghanistan is more than enough to satisfy the demandin Western Europe and the United States (Gannon 2004)

Although Afghanistan represents one source in worldwide opium production inaddition to Mexico South America and Southeast Asia narco-terrorism policytoward Afghanistan has not succeeded in reversing growth trends in heroin con-sumption in the United States According to the 2002 National Survey on DrugUse and Health approximately 37 million Americans ages 12 and older reportedtrying heroin at least once during their lifetimes representing 16 of the popu-lation ages 12 and older Roughly 404000 (02) reported past-year heroin useand 166000 (01) reported past-month heroin use (SAMHSA 2004) Among highschool students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the Future Study 16 ofeighth graders 15 of tenth graders and 15 of twelfth graders reported usingheroin at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these percentages were 1618 and 17 respectively (NIDA 2003)

Regarding the ease by which one can obtain heroin 156 of eighth graders188 of tenth graders and 279 of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reportedthat heroin was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 63 ofeighth graders 71 of tenth graders and 59 of twelfth graders reported thatusing heroin once or twice without a needle was a ldquogreat riskrdquo (NIDA 2003)Nationwide 33 of high school students surveyed in 2003 as part of the YouthRisk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) reported using heroin during theirlifetimes Male students (43) were significantly more likely than female students(20) to report lifetime heroin use Hispanic students (39) were more likely toreport heroin use within their lifetime than white (26) or black (26) students(CDC 2004) During 2002 10 of college students and 18 of young adults (ages19ndash28) reported using heroin at least once during their lifetimes Approximately01 of college students and 02 of young adults reported past year use of heroinand 00 of college students and less than 005 of young adults reported pastmonth use of heroin (NIDA 2004)

According to data from the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) Programa median of 58 of adult male arrestees and 66 of adult female arrestees testedpositive for opiates at arrest in 2003 The adult male samples were compiled from39 United States sites and the adult female samples were compiled from 25 sitesA median of 51 of adult male arrestees and 71 of adult female arresteesreported using heroin at least once in the year before being arrested (NationalInstitute of Justice 2004) Although heroin expenditures were $22 billion in 1990demand decreased to $10 billion in 2000 and whereas in 1990 Americans con-sumed 136 metric tons of heroin estimates remained relatively unchanged in 2000(ABT Associates 2001)

Conclusions

Based on these observations of narco-terrorist activities in Afghanistan and Colom-bia on a substantive level the Bush administration has formulated domestic andinternational drug reduction strategies with an eye on asset seizure and control offunding used by terrorist organizations However important questions remain con-cerning the legitimacy of Americarsquos policy efforts Indeed narco-terrorism as a

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 467

national security threat is not new The 911 attacks simply pushed narco-terror-ism higher on the presidentrsquos national security agenda particularly in light of theconnection between the Afghan drug trade and the Al Qaeda network

On a theoretical level the contingency approach to examining narco-terrorismpolicy highlights several major concerns that have not been adequately addressedFirst as it is conducted today the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy places sig-nificant attention on the increased utilization of American military power Eversince President Richard Nixon proclaimed a war on drugs and President GeorgeW Bush a war on terrorism concern over the use of the military in what have typically been deemed law enforcement and social issues has overshadowed mostother related methods Even if the United States did not introduce troops intoAfghanistan or Colombia we are still left with a highly militarized narco-terrorismpolicy that facilitates human rights abuses by those governments receiving UnitedStates aid Moreover the result has been an increase in the production and con-sumption of illegal drugs that are trafficked by organizations that use profits topromote terrorist attacks

Second the contingency approach used in this study reveals the problems narco-terrorism policy has experienced in targeting so-called weak states Narco-terrorism policy has elevated the potential for the United States to use its diplo-matic weight to force governments to enact stricter antidrug policies This hasencouraged states like Afghanistan and Colombia to further undermine politicaleconomic and social development with undemocratic policies directed at citizensAs a result the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism efforts have in part fueled anti-American resentment thereby increasing the potential for additional terrorist activities by groups such as Al Qaeda or FARC

Third it has become more apparent that narco-terrorism policy has becomelike all other policies highly politicized Americarsquos counterdrug efforts are virtu-ally indistinguishable from counterinsurgency efforts by remnants of the Talibanand Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and FARC and other terror-related groups in Colom-bia Moreover the United States is being rather bold in designating particulargroups as narco-terrorists although conveniently leaving off others such as theNorthern Alliance in Afghanistan This hinders the rule of law in a number of countries

Finally the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in its current form neglectscertain realities Quite simply many critics allege that narco-terrorist connectionsare indirect and for the most part ambiguous In addition critics of prohibitionmaintain that it is the illegalization of drugs that generates the enormous profitsused to support terrorist and insurgent organizations Another concern is thatnarco-terrorism does not address the complexities of terrorism or insurgenciesCan Afghanistan and Colombia continue to be addressed in narrowly defined mil-itary and law enforcement frameworks that neglect political economic and socialconsiderations

About the Author

Chris J Dolan is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Floridawhere he teaches courses on public policy United States Foreign Policy and National Secu-

468 Chris J Dolan

rity the Mass Media and the American presidency He received his PhD from the Univer-sity of South Carolina He is the author of In War We Trust The Political Dimensions and EthicalConsequences of the First Strike Doctrine (Ashgate Press 2005) and co-editor of Striking First ThePreventive Doctrine and the Reshaping of US Foreign Policy (Palgrave-Macmillan 2004) Hisresearch on public policy executive policymaking foreign policy and the mass media appearin Policy Studies Journal Congress and the Presidency Politics and Policy White House Studies andin numerous edited volumes

References

ABT Associates (2001) What Americarsquos users spend on drugs 1988ndash2000 Prepared for the Office of NationalDrug Control Policy Retrieved April 21 2004 from httpwwwwhitehousedrugpolicygovpublicationspdfamerican_users_spend_2002pdf

Allison G T (1971) Essence of decision Boston Little BrownAllison G T amp Halperin M H (1972) Bureaucratic politics A paradigm and and some policy implications

World Politics 24 40ndash79Baldwin E (1991) Why rules donrsquot work Modern Law Review 53 321ndash338Barnard D (2003) Narco-terrorism realities The connection between drugs and terror Journal of Countert-

errorism and Homeland Security International 9(1) 31ndash34Bedi R (2001 September 26) The assassins and drug dealers are now helping us The Daily Telegraph p 1Bennett C J (1991) What is policy convergence What causes it British Journal of Political Science 21(2)

215ndash233Blau P amp Scott R (1962) Formal organizations San Francisco ChandlerBouchard G amp Carroll B (2002) Policy-making and administrative discretion The case of immigration in

Canada Canadian Public Administration 25(2) 239ndash259Bouchard G amp Carroll B (2003) One size does not fit all Annual Meeting of the Canadian Public Service

Administration Halifax Nova ScotiaBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002a) Fiscal year 2003 congres-

sional budget justification Washington DC AuthorBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002b) International narcotics

control strategy Afghanistan (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 from httpusembassystategovafghanistanwwwh02121802html

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2004) International NarcoticsControl Strategy Southwest Asia (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 fromhttpwwwstategovginlrlsnrcrpt2003vol1html29836htm

Bureau of Justice Statistics United States Department of Justice (2000) Sourcebook of criminal justice statisticsWashington DC United States Government Printing Office

Cala A (2001 November 21) Danger of a new Vietnam The Gazette p 1Carroll B amp Garkut D E (1996) Is there an empirical trend toward managerialism Canadian Public Admin-

istration 39(4) 535ndash553Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2004) Youth risk behavior surveillance United States 2003 (May 21)

Retrieved August 2 2004 from httpwwwcdcgovmmwrpreviewmmwrhtmlss5302a1htmChepesiuk R (1999) Hard target The United States war against international drug trafficking 1982ndash1997 Jeffer-

son NC McFarland amp CoColombia Program Center for International Policy (2000) Plan Colombia A plan for peace or a plan for war

( June 20) Retrieved May 1 2004 from httpwwwciponlineorgcolombia062001htmColombia Program Center for International Policy (2004) US Aid to Colombia since 1997 Summary tables

(February 20) Retrieved May 2 2004 from httpciponlineorgcolombiaaidtablehtmConcar D (2001 September 29) Cutting the Talibanrsquos lifeline New Scientist p 77Desveaux J A Lindquist E A amp Toner G (1994) Organizing for policy innovations in public bureaucra-

cies AIDS energy and environmental policy in Canada Canadian Journal of Political Science 27(3)493ndash528

Dexter L (1981) Unintended consequences of purposive legislative action Alternatives to implementationJournal of Public Policy 4(4) 250ndash264

Drug Abuse Policy Office (1982) Federal strategy for prevention of drug abuse and drug trafficking WashingtonDC United States Government Printing Office

Drug Enforcement Administration Intelligence Division (2002) Drugs and terrorism A new perspective RetrievedApril 29 2004 from httpwwwdeagovpubsintel02039f1f1

Dudley S (2000 July 31) The Colombia quagmire The American Prospect p 32

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 469

going beyond the drug war to help Colombiarsquos government fight the guerrillas andthe paramilitaries Comparisons between FARC and Al Qaeda now began to showup with regularity

The United Statesrsquo approach is also highly contingent upon its dependence onSouth American oil A 2003 Bush administration foreign aid request to Congressincluded the first significant nondrug military aid to Colombia since the Cold War$98 million to help the Colombian Army protect the 480-mile long Cantildeo Limoacuten-Coventildeas oil pipeline A United States oil company Occidental Petroleum of LosAngeles owns 44 of the crude oil that flows through the Cantildeo Limoacuten pipelinewhich Colombian guerrillas dynamited 166 times in 2001 (United States Depart-ment of State 2002) ldquoClearly we have an energy threatrdquo warned CongressmanMark Souder (R-Indiana) in May 2002 ldquoColombia is either our seventh or eighthlargest supplier of oil Our economy depends on that We already have instabilityin the Middle East We have more compelling reasons to be involved in Colombiathan almost anywhere else in the worldrdquo (Souder 2002)

Beyond these initiatives it is not yet clear how the United Statesrsquo activities willexpand to match Washingtonrsquos much more ambitious mission in Colombia Whilethe purpose of United States military aid has expanded remarkably we have notseen a similar expansion in the amount of United States assistance Certainly military aid is risingmdashColombiarsquos security forces received over $100 million morein 2003 than they did in 2002 The pipeline program accounts for most of thatincrease Yet another $100 million would have only marginal impact on the direc-tion of a conflict involving nearly 40000 well-funded insurgents Pressures fordramatically increased military assistance are likely to build (Cala 2001 Pardo2000)

However if the goal of the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in Colombia isto reduce demand in the United States for cocaine then Americarsquos efforts havelargely failed which has been a continuing trend over the past 15 years (Wisotsky1990) During 2001 there were approximately 1160000 new cocaine users in theUnited States The average age of those who first used cocaine during the year was208 years According to the 2002 National Survey on Drug Use and Healthapproximately 339 million Americans ages 12 and older had tried cocaine at leastonce in their lifetimes representing 144 of the population in that age groupApproximately 59 million (25) had used cocaine in the past year and 20 million(09) had used cocaine within the past month (Substance Abuse and MentalHealth Services Administration [SAMHSA] 2004)

Among high school students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the FutureStudy 36 of eighth graders 51 of tenth graders and 77 of twelfth gradersreported using cocaine at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these per-centages were 36 61 and 78 respectively (National Institute on Drug Abuse[NIDA] 2003) Regarding the ease by which one can obtain powder cocaine 216of eighth graders 296 of tenth graders and 374 of twelfth graders surveyedin 2003 reported that powder cocaine was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtainApproximately 23 (225) of eighth graders 296 of tenth graders and 353of twelfth graders reported that crack cocaine was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo toobtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 44 of eighth graders 52 of tenth graders and 46of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reported that using powder cocaine once or

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 461

twice was a ldquogreat riskrdquo Nearly 49 of eighth graders 58 of tenth graders and47 of twelfth graders reported that using crack cocaine once or twice was a ldquogreatriskrdquo (NIDA 2003)

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also conducts a surveyof high school students throughout the United States the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) Among students surveyed in 2003 87 reportedusing some form of cocaine at least one time during their life of those 41reported being current users of cocaine meaning that they had used cocaine atleast once during the past month (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention[CDC] 2004) During 2002 82 of college students and 135 of young adults(ages 19ndash28) reported using cocaine at least once during their lifetimes Approxi-mately 48 of college students and 58 of young adults reported past-year useof cocaine and 16 of college students and 22 of young adults reported past-month use of cocaine (NIDA 2004)

Flower Power Afghanistan

Afghanistan is the worldrsquos leading source country for the cultivation processingand trafficking of opium By 1999 Afghanistan grew more than 4000 tons ofopium a year making it the primary source of roughly 75 of the worldrsquos illegalheroin (Concar 2001) Today narcotics are the largest source of income inAfghanistan due to the decimation of the countryrsquos economic infrastructure causedby years of warfare

Policy Discretion

On July 28 2000 Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar issued a decreebanning future opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan The decree stated that themilitary would eliminate poppy cultivation in the 2001 growing season in areasunder their control At the time the ban applied to any territory seized from theNorthern Alliance In February 2001 the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)declared that the opium poppy cultivation ban was successful and that the 2001crop was expected to be negligible (UNODC 2004a p 70) This marked the firsteffort by Taliban rulers to reduce opium production The eradication effort wasmade in response to an agreement with the UNODC which agreed to fund alter-native development projects on the condition that cultivation would be decreasedin Kandahar

Laboratories in Afghanistan convert opium into morphine base white heroinor one of three grades of brown heroin depending on the order received Largeprocessing labs are located in southern Afghanistan with smaller labs located mainlyin Nangarhar Province In the past many opium processing laboratories werelocated in Pakistan particularly in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) Theselaboratories appear to have relocated to Afghanistan both to be closer to the sourceof opium and to avoid the Pakistani government Morphine base is usually pro-duced for traffickers based in Turkey where it is converted to heroin before ship-ment to Europe and North and South America Chemists in the region are capable

462 Chris J Dolan

of producing heroin hydrochloride with extremely high purity levels (UNODC2004b)

Since Afghanistan is landlocked drug traffickers must rely on land routes tomove morphine base and heroin out of the country Heroin is trafficked to world-wide destinations by many routes Traffickers quickly adjust heroin smugglingroutes based on political and weather-related events (Gannon 2004) Reports ofheroin shipments north from Afghanistan through the Central Asian States toRussia have increased Tajikistan is a frequent destination for both opium andheroin shipments although Tajikistan serves mostly as a transit point and storagelocation rather than a final destination Seizures are frequently reported at Pakistanrsquos international airports (Rashid 1999) Heroin is also smuggled by sea onvessels leaving the port city of Karachi Heroin produced in Afghanistan continuesto be trafficked to the United States although generally in small quantities It isestimated that roughly 90 of opiate products in Europe originate in Afghanistan(Concar 2001 Hersh 2004)

Money laundering is not an issue in Afghanistan The unsophisticated bankingsystem that previously existed has been damaged by the years of war It is likelythat the informal banking system used extensively in the region usually referredto as the hawala or hundi money laundering system is used by drug traffickers(Lehmkuhler 2003) This system is an underground traditional informal networkthat has been used for centuries by businesses and families throughout Asia (StillFlushmdashTerrorist Finance 2002) This system provides a confidential convenientefficient service at a low cost in areas that are not served by traditional bankingfacilities (Hersh 2004)

Prior to the United Statesrsquo invasion of October 2001 the Taliban maintainedeffective control of nearly all of the opium poppy growing areas in the countryeven though they were only recognized as the legitimate government ofAfghanistan by three governments Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the United ArabEmirates Islamic law (Sharirsquoa) has been imposed in territory controlled by theTaliban and local Sharirsquoa courts have been established throughout the country In1997 the Taliban reactivated the State High Commission for Drug Control whichwas originally established in 1990 by the legitimate interim government Before theUNODC reports indicating that implementation of the 2000ndash2001 opium poppycultivation ban has been effective and the release of the United States governmentestimate indicating a dramatic reduction in opium production the Taliban madeonly token gestures toward antidrug law enforcement (BINLEA 2002b) Althoughthey have banned opium poppy cultivation the Taliban itself long relied on drugtrafficking for financial support

Unintended Consequences

As the United States began more rapidly merging its war on drugs with the greaterWar on Terror on a public scale halting opium production had to be as importantas eliminating the Taliban and the Al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan But howserious were Americarsquos efforts in applying its narco-terrorism policy to AfghanistanUnited States military commanders were not going to set opium eradication at thetop of their list of priorities (Schmitt 2002)

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 463

The results were consistent with Americarsquos hands-off approach Afghan opiumproduction in 2002 exploded to near-record levels making the war-ravaged nationagain the worldrsquos leading producer of the drug ( Judis 2003) Efforts by the UnitedStates-backed interim government of Hamid Karzai to eradicate opium productionby paying farmers to destroy their crops have failed because of a lack of moneyand violent demonstrations by farmers fearing their livelihoods were in jeopardy(Pound 2004) The UNrsquos Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated thatAfghanistan produced 3400 metric tons of opium in 2002 (Moreau amp Yousafzai2003 United Nations Information Service 2003)

Immediately after assuming office Karzai issued a decree on January 17 2002not only banning cultivation but also the processing trafficking and abuse ofopiates (Hanley 2002) Last month his government reiterated that positionreasserting the ban on opium poppy planting in the autumn (Hersh 2004) TheUNODC reopened its Kabul office in February 2002 and appointed Mohammad-Reza Amirkhizi as its representative The office has been engaged in a wide rangeof projects which include strengthening the Afghan drug control commissionassistance in law enforcement and the criminal justice sectors and cross-bordercounternarcotics cooperation with neighboring states The office is also working ona pilot social compact with farmers in Kandahar and Badakhshan provinces pro-viding them with small amounts of financial assistance with the understanding thatthey would grow commercial crops other than opium poppy (Gannon 2004)

The new Afghan government has largely failed in its now three-year effort toeradicate the opium poppy crop in Afghanistan which in recent years became theworldrsquos biggest producer of the raw material for heroin (Hanley 2002 Wehrfritz2003) The UN estimated that the 2004 crop could be worth more than $2 billionat the farm level in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004 Pound 2004) The resurgence ofopium production in Afghanistan is a major unintended consequence of the UnitedStates invasion

By 2002 the total opium poppy cultivation averaged 74000 hectares under theKarzai government and the United Statesrsquo military presence up from only 8000hectares in 2001 under the Taliban (UNODC 2004a) While the 2002 levels arestill lower than the record level crop growing 91000 hectares in 1999 and 82000hectares in 2000 the UN report confirms that opium cultivation has resumed topreviously high levels (Moreau amp Yousafzai 2003 UNODC 2004b)

As a result the average yield poppy production in 2002 shot up to 46 kilo-gramshectare from 24 kilogramshectare in 2001 The massive increase is largelydue to more extensive irrigation programs in Eastern and Southern Afghanistanimplemented since the fall of the Taliban in November 2001 along with the end ofa nationwide drought which devastated total agricultural output between 1998 and2001 Thus total opium poppy production in 2002 was 3400 metric tons a sizableincrease compared to 185 metric tons in 2001 (UNODC 2004b) Poppy cultivationthen doubled between 2002 and 2003 The area planted with poppies used tomake heroin and morphine was 152000 hectares in 2003 compared with 74000hectares in 2002 according to the White House ONDCP (UNODC 2004b)According to the State Department ldquoIn Afghanistan poppy cultivationapproached the highest levels ever registered International and United Statessurveys indicate that in 2003 Afghanistan again produced three-quarters of the

464 Chris J Dolan

worldrsquos illicit opium The narcotics situation remains serious despite positiveactions by both the government and international donorsrdquo (BINLEA 2004)

Besides the eradication campaign announced by the new Afghan governmentin 2002 appears to have been doomed to failure due to a lack of United Statesfinancial support Farmers were to be compensated with $500 per acre fordestroyed poppies which is only a fraction of the estimated $6400 per acre of grossincome an Afghani farmer can earn on poppy cultivation The UN Food and Agriculture Organization reported that ldquoAfghani government programs had a verylimited impactrdquo (Hanley 2002) At 2003 price levels and as a result of the explo-sion in poppy cultivation and production total income for Afghani opium farmersreached several hundred million United States dollars by the end of 2003 (Pound2004)

Other more unfortunate factors resulted from the 2002 poppy eradication cam-paign Afghan farmers have been killed and wounded by United States and Afghansecurity forces during protests against the campaign to eradicate their opiumpoppy crops (Wehrfritz 2003 Wyatt 2002) According to the BBC ldquoThe farmersare angered at what they see as derisory compensationrdquo (Wyatt 2002) ManyAfghan farmers direct their anger at the United States for pressuring the Karzaigovernment to institute the poppy ban (Pound 2004) As a result many Afghanfarmers have embraced Al Qaeda for its staunch anti-Americanism (Hersh 2004)

In the war on terrorism in Afghanistan the United States is trying to end theprofits Al Qaeda and the Taliban are making from the greater Central Asian drugtrade (Gannon 2004 Rashid 1999) However this may impact Americarsquos key alliesin the region who have for years reaped the rewards of the Afghanistanrsquos herointrade Nowhere is the problem clearer than along Afghanistanrsquos northern borderwith Tajikistan an ally in the United Statesrsquo antiterrorist efforts and a major conduitfor heroin and opium on its way to Europe and the Americas The United Statesrsquoinvasion even sparked a massive selling of heroin as Al Qaeda and Taliban forcesappeared to have been selling off their narcotic stockpiles for cash to purchase arms(Hersh 2004 Yglesias 2004)

Some Central Asian and Middle Eastern drug traffickers were actually support-ive of the American invasion of Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) According to the WallStreet Journal ldquoacross the Stans and the Caspian Sea in Lebanonrsquos Bekaa Valleysome pray for a speedy United States attack on Afghanistan lsquoItrsquos good for busi-nessrsquo says Muhammed standing in a garage full of cannabis a pistol tucked in hisbelt He is just back from harvesting this yearrsquos cannabis crop lsquoItrsquoll drive up hashishpricesrsquo Muhammed assures a prospective client that transport of 2500 kilograms(5500 pounds) to Amsterdam from the Bekaamdashcontrolled by Syrian troops as wellas Syrian- and Iranian-backed Shiite Muslim Hezbollah fightersmdashcan be arrangedrdquo(qtd in Targeting Terroristsrsquo Drug Money 2001 p 1)

Structural Attributes

Prior to the October 2001 invasion the United States government had no actualpresence in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) Today the most important organizationsresponsible for conducting the narco-terror war in Afghanistan include the FederalBureau of Investigation the Drug Enforcement Administration the Special Forces

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 465

the Department of Statersquos Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforce-ment Affairs (INL) and Pakistan security forces in cooperation with the UN Officeof Drugs and Crime (UNODC) But how successful is the partnership In Febru-ary 2002 the UNODC confirmed that opium poppy cultivation rose to higherlevels than previous years under Taliban rule The UNODC Country Office forAfghanistan and the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme (ICMP) conducted a pre-assessment survey in 208 villages and 42 districts in the traditional opium poppygrowing areas of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan in the provinces of HelmandKandahar Oruzgan Nangarhar and Kunar Those five provinces accounted for84 of the total opium poppy cultivation area in Afghanistan in 2000 (UNODC2004b)

It is estimated that the various security forces currently monitor opium poppycultivation over an area between 45000 hectares and 65000 hectares (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003) This compares to the level of cultivation reached during the mid-1990s but remained lower than those recorded in 1999 (about 95000 hectares)and 2000 (about 82000 hectares) The resulting production of opium harvestedin 2004 could reach between 1900 and 2700 metric tons of opium (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003)

To address these realities the INL the DEA and the FBI have concluded thatwith at least 40 of the Afghan gross domestic product virtually tied to heroin therisks of an untethered narco-economy producing a chain reaction that reverses pastgains made under the Taliban are quite high indeed In response the INL and theDEA have built police training facilities and trained and retrained roughly 20000Afghan police officers in order to implement narco-terror initiatives against Talibanand Al Qaeda holdouts In coordination with United States Special Forces the Bushadministration seeks to place 50000 border guards and Afghan National Police byDecember 2005 in support of the opium eradication campaign The INL the DEAand the FBI are also involved in creating a comprehensive justice sector TheUnited Statesrsquo effort has also resulted in some intriguing bureaucratic alliancesThe Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency one of the main sources ofinformation for the United States-led alliance against the Taliban regime is asso-ciated with political assassinations narcotics trafficking and smuggling of nucleartechnology and missile delivery components with the backing fundamentalistIslamic movements (qtd in Bedi 2001)

Opium cultivation and heroin production in Pakistanrsquos northern tribal belt andadjoining Afghanistan was a vital offshoot of the ISIndashCIA cooperation (Rashid1999) It succeeded in turning some Soviet troops into addicts during the USSRrsquosoccupation of Afghanistan Heroin sales in Europe and the United States carriedout via deceptive means transport networks couriers and pay-offs offset the costof the various wars in Afghanistan (Gannon 2004)

Resultant Political Policy

The initial military victories in Afghanistan are in the process of being lost as thecountry is rapidly disintegrating into a state of narco-terrorism and anarchy TheUnited Statesrsquo efforts may fail unless the link between Al Qaeda Taliban forcesand opium production are finally overcome In 2004 opium farmers and traffick-ers in Afghanistan generated $23 billion in profits with higher estimates for the

466 Chris J Dolan

future The level of opium planting and the subsequent production of opium pastemorphine and heroin in Afghanistan is more than enough to satisfy the demandin Western Europe and the United States (Gannon 2004)

Although Afghanistan represents one source in worldwide opium production inaddition to Mexico South America and Southeast Asia narco-terrorism policytoward Afghanistan has not succeeded in reversing growth trends in heroin con-sumption in the United States According to the 2002 National Survey on DrugUse and Health approximately 37 million Americans ages 12 and older reportedtrying heroin at least once during their lifetimes representing 16 of the popu-lation ages 12 and older Roughly 404000 (02) reported past-year heroin useand 166000 (01) reported past-month heroin use (SAMHSA 2004) Among highschool students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the Future Study 16 ofeighth graders 15 of tenth graders and 15 of twelfth graders reported usingheroin at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these percentages were 1618 and 17 respectively (NIDA 2003)

Regarding the ease by which one can obtain heroin 156 of eighth graders188 of tenth graders and 279 of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reportedthat heroin was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 63 ofeighth graders 71 of tenth graders and 59 of twelfth graders reported thatusing heroin once or twice without a needle was a ldquogreat riskrdquo (NIDA 2003)Nationwide 33 of high school students surveyed in 2003 as part of the YouthRisk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) reported using heroin during theirlifetimes Male students (43) were significantly more likely than female students(20) to report lifetime heroin use Hispanic students (39) were more likely toreport heroin use within their lifetime than white (26) or black (26) students(CDC 2004) During 2002 10 of college students and 18 of young adults (ages19ndash28) reported using heroin at least once during their lifetimes Approximately01 of college students and 02 of young adults reported past year use of heroinand 00 of college students and less than 005 of young adults reported pastmonth use of heroin (NIDA 2004)

According to data from the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) Programa median of 58 of adult male arrestees and 66 of adult female arrestees testedpositive for opiates at arrest in 2003 The adult male samples were compiled from39 United States sites and the adult female samples were compiled from 25 sitesA median of 51 of adult male arrestees and 71 of adult female arresteesreported using heroin at least once in the year before being arrested (NationalInstitute of Justice 2004) Although heroin expenditures were $22 billion in 1990demand decreased to $10 billion in 2000 and whereas in 1990 Americans con-sumed 136 metric tons of heroin estimates remained relatively unchanged in 2000(ABT Associates 2001)

Conclusions

Based on these observations of narco-terrorist activities in Afghanistan and Colom-bia on a substantive level the Bush administration has formulated domestic andinternational drug reduction strategies with an eye on asset seizure and control offunding used by terrorist organizations However important questions remain con-cerning the legitimacy of Americarsquos policy efforts Indeed narco-terrorism as a

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 467

national security threat is not new The 911 attacks simply pushed narco-terror-ism higher on the presidentrsquos national security agenda particularly in light of theconnection between the Afghan drug trade and the Al Qaeda network

On a theoretical level the contingency approach to examining narco-terrorismpolicy highlights several major concerns that have not been adequately addressedFirst as it is conducted today the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy places sig-nificant attention on the increased utilization of American military power Eversince President Richard Nixon proclaimed a war on drugs and President GeorgeW Bush a war on terrorism concern over the use of the military in what have typically been deemed law enforcement and social issues has overshadowed mostother related methods Even if the United States did not introduce troops intoAfghanistan or Colombia we are still left with a highly militarized narco-terrorismpolicy that facilitates human rights abuses by those governments receiving UnitedStates aid Moreover the result has been an increase in the production and con-sumption of illegal drugs that are trafficked by organizations that use profits topromote terrorist attacks

Second the contingency approach used in this study reveals the problems narco-terrorism policy has experienced in targeting so-called weak states Narco-terrorism policy has elevated the potential for the United States to use its diplo-matic weight to force governments to enact stricter antidrug policies This hasencouraged states like Afghanistan and Colombia to further undermine politicaleconomic and social development with undemocratic policies directed at citizensAs a result the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism efforts have in part fueled anti-American resentment thereby increasing the potential for additional terrorist activities by groups such as Al Qaeda or FARC

Third it has become more apparent that narco-terrorism policy has becomelike all other policies highly politicized Americarsquos counterdrug efforts are virtu-ally indistinguishable from counterinsurgency efforts by remnants of the Talibanand Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and FARC and other terror-related groups in Colom-bia Moreover the United States is being rather bold in designating particulargroups as narco-terrorists although conveniently leaving off others such as theNorthern Alliance in Afghanistan This hinders the rule of law in a number of countries

Finally the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in its current form neglectscertain realities Quite simply many critics allege that narco-terrorist connectionsare indirect and for the most part ambiguous In addition critics of prohibitionmaintain that it is the illegalization of drugs that generates the enormous profitsused to support terrorist and insurgent organizations Another concern is thatnarco-terrorism does not address the complexities of terrorism or insurgenciesCan Afghanistan and Colombia continue to be addressed in narrowly defined mil-itary and law enforcement frameworks that neglect political economic and socialconsiderations

About the Author

Chris J Dolan is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Floridawhere he teaches courses on public policy United States Foreign Policy and National Secu-

468 Chris J Dolan

rity the Mass Media and the American presidency He received his PhD from the Univer-sity of South Carolina He is the author of In War We Trust The Political Dimensions and EthicalConsequences of the First Strike Doctrine (Ashgate Press 2005) and co-editor of Striking First ThePreventive Doctrine and the Reshaping of US Foreign Policy (Palgrave-Macmillan 2004) Hisresearch on public policy executive policymaking foreign policy and the mass media appearin Policy Studies Journal Congress and the Presidency Politics and Policy White House Studies andin numerous edited volumes

References

ABT Associates (2001) What Americarsquos users spend on drugs 1988ndash2000 Prepared for the Office of NationalDrug Control Policy Retrieved April 21 2004 from httpwwwwhitehousedrugpolicygovpublicationspdfamerican_users_spend_2002pdf

Allison G T (1971) Essence of decision Boston Little BrownAllison G T amp Halperin M H (1972) Bureaucratic politics A paradigm and and some policy implications

World Politics 24 40ndash79Baldwin E (1991) Why rules donrsquot work Modern Law Review 53 321ndash338Barnard D (2003) Narco-terrorism realities The connection between drugs and terror Journal of Countert-

errorism and Homeland Security International 9(1) 31ndash34Bedi R (2001 September 26) The assassins and drug dealers are now helping us The Daily Telegraph p 1Bennett C J (1991) What is policy convergence What causes it British Journal of Political Science 21(2)

215ndash233Blau P amp Scott R (1962) Formal organizations San Francisco ChandlerBouchard G amp Carroll B (2002) Policy-making and administrative discretion The case of immigration in

Canada Canadian Public Administration 25(2) 239ndash259Bouchard G amp Carroll B (2003) One size does not fit all Annual Meeting of the Canadian Public Service

Administration Halifax Nova ScotiaBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002a) Fiscal year 2003 congres-

sional budget justification Washington DC AuthorBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002b) International narcotics

control strategy Afghanistan (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 from httpusembassystategovafghanistanwwwh02121802html

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2004) International NarcoticsControl Strategy Southwest Asia (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 fromhttpwwwstategovginlrlsnrcrpt2003vol1html29836htm

Bureau of Justice Statistics United States Department of Justice (2000) Sourcebook of criminal justice statisticsWashington DC United States Government Printing Office

Cala A (2001 November 21) Danger of a new Vietnam The Gazette p 1Carroll B amp Garkut D E (1996) Is there an empirical trend toward managerialism Canadian Public Admin-

istration 39(4) 535ndash553Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2004) Youth risk behavior surveillance United States 2003 (May 21)

Retrieved August 2 2004 from httpwwwcdcgovmmwrpreviewmmwrhtmlss5302a1htmChepesiuk R (1999) Hard target The United States war against international drug trafficking 1982ndash1997 Jeffer-

son NC McFarland amp CoColombia Program Center for International Policy (2000) Plan Colombia A plan for peace or a plan for war

( June 20) Retrieved May 1 2004 from httpwwwciponlineorgcolombia062001htmColombia Program Center for International Policy (2004) US Aid to Colombia since 1997 Summary tables

(February 20) Retrieved May 2 2004 from httpciponlineorgcolombiaaidtablehtmConcar D (2001 September 29) Cutting the Talibanrsquos lifeline New Scientist p 77Desveaux J A Lindquist E A amp Toner G (1994) Organizing for policy innovations in public bureaucra-

cies AIDS energy and environmental policy in Canada Canadian Journal of Political Science 27(3)493ndash528

Dexter L (1981) Unintended consequences of purposive legislative action Alternatives to implementationJournal of Public Policy 4(4) 250ndash264

Drug Abuse Policy Office (1982) Federal strategy for prevention of drug abuse and drug trafficking WashingtonDC United States Government Printing Office

Drug Enforcement Administration Intelligence Division (2002) Drugs and terrorism A new perspective RetrievedApril 29 2004 from httpwwwdeagovpubsintel02039f1f1

Dudley S (2000 July 31) The Colombia quagmire The American Prospect p 32

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 469

twice was a ldquogreat riskrdquo Nearly 49 of eighth graders 58 of tenth graders and47 of twelfth graders reported that using crack cocaine once or twice was a ldquogreatriskrdquo (NIDA 2003)

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also conducts a surveyof high school students throughout the United States the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) Among students surveyed in 2003 87 reportedusing some form of cocaine at least one time during their life of those 41reported being current users of cocaine meaning that they had used cocaine atleast once during the past month (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention[CDC] 2004) During 2002 82 of college students and 135 of young adults(ages 19ndash28) reported using cocaine at least once during their lifetimes Approxi-mately 48 of college students and 58 of young adults reported past-year useof cocaine and 16 of college students and 22 of young adults reported past-month use of cocaine (NIDA 2004)

Flower Power Afghanistan

Afghanistan is the worldrsquos leading source country for the cultivation processingand trafficking of opium By 1999 Afghanistan grew more than 4000 tons ofopium a year making it the primary source of roughly 75 of the worldrsquos illegalheroin (Concar 2001) Today narcotics are the largest source of income inAfghanistan due to the decimation of the countryrsquos economic infrastructure causedby years of warfare

Policy Discretion

On July 28 2000 Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar issued a decreebanning future opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan The decree stated that themilitary would eliminate poppy cultivation in the 2001 growing season in areasunder their control At the time the ban applied to any territory seized from theNorthern Alliance In February 2001 the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)declared that the opium poppy cultivation ban was successful and that the 2001crop was expected to be negligible (UNODC 2004a p 70) This marked the firsteffort by Taliban rulers to reduce opium production The eradication effort wasmade in response to an agreement with the UNODC which agreed to fund alter-native development projects on the condition that cultivation would be decreasedin Kandahar

Laboratories in Afghanistan convert opium into morphine base white heroinor one of three grades of brown heroin depending on the order received Largeprocessing labs are located in southern Afghanistan with smaller labs located mainlyin Nangarhar Province In the past many opium processing laboratories werelocated in Pakistan particularly in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) Theselaboratories appear to have relocated to Afghanistan both to be closer to the sourceof opium and to avoid the Pakistani government Morphine base is usually pro-duced for traffickers based in Turkey where it is converted to heroin before ship-ment to Europe and North and South America Chemists in the region are capable

462 Chris J Dolan

of producing heroin hydrochloride with extremely high purity levels (UNODC2004b)

Since Afghanistan is landlocked drug traffickers must rely on land routes tomove morphine base and heroin out of the country Heroin is trafficked to world-wide destinations by many routes Traffickers quickly adjust heroin smugglingroutes based on political and weather-related events (Gannon 2004) Reports ofheroin shipments north from Afghanistan through the Central Asian States toRussia have increased Tajikistan is a frequent destination for both opium andheroin shipments although Tajikistan serves mostly as a transit point and storagelocation rather than a final destination Seizures are frequently reported at Pakistanrsquos international airports (Rashid 1999) Heroin is also smuggled by sea onvessels leaving the port city of Karachi Heroin produced in Afghanistan continuesto be trafficked to the United States although generally in small quantities It isestimated that roughly 90 of opiate products in Europe originate in Afghanistan(Concar 2001 Hersh 2004)

Money laundering is not an issue in Afghanistan The unsophisticated bankingsystem that previously existed has been damaged by the years of war It is likelythat the informal banking system used extensively in the region usually referredto as the hawala or hundi money laundering system is used by drug traffickers(Lehmkuhler 2003) This system is an underground traditional informal networkthat has been used for centuries by businesses and families throughout Asia (StillFlushmdashTerrorist Finance 2002) This system provides a confidential convenientefficient service at a low cost in areas that are not served by traditional bankingfacilities (Hersh 2004)

Prior to the United Statesrsquo invasion of October 2001 the Taliban maintainedeffective control of nearly all of the opium poppy growing areas in the countryeven though they were only recognized as the legitimate government ofAfghanistan by three governments Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the United ArabEmirates Islamic law (Sharirsquoa) has been imposed in territory controlled by theTaliban and local Sharirsquoa courts have been established throughout the country In1997 the Taliban reactivated the State High Commission for Drug Control whichwas originally established in 1990 by the legitimate interim government Before theUNODC reports indicating that implementation of the 2000ndash2001 opium poppycultivation ban has been effective and the release of the United States governmentestimate indicating a dramatic reduction in opium production the Taliban madeonly token gestures toward antidrug law enforcement (BINLEA 2002b) Althoughthey have banned opium poppy cultivation the Taliban itself long relied on drugtrafficking for financial support

Unintended Consequences

As the United States began more rapidly merging its war on drugs with the greaterWar on Terror on a public scale halting opium production had to be as importantas eliminating the Taliban and the Al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan But howserious were Americarsquos efforts in applying its narco-terrorism policy to AfghanistanUnited States military commanders were not going to set opium eradication at thetop of their list of priorities (Schmitt 2002)

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 463

The results were consistent with Americarsquos hands-off approach Afghan opiumproduction in 2002 exploded to near-record levels making the war-ravaged nationagain the worldrsquos leading producer of the drug ( Judis 2003) Efforts by the UnitedStates-backed interim government of Hamid Karzai to eradicate opium productionby paying farmers to destroy their crops have failed because of a lack of moneyand violent demonstrations by farmers fearing their livelihoods were in jeopardy(Pound 2004) The UNrsquos Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated thatAfghanistan produced 3400 metric tons of opium in 2002 (Moreau amp Yousafzai2003 United Nations Information Service 2003)

Immediately after assuming office Karzai issued a decree on January 17 2002not only banning cultivation but also the processing trafficking and abuse ofopiates (Hanley 2002) Last month his government reiterated that positionreasserting the ban on opium poppy planting in the autumn (Hersh 2004) TheUNODC reopened its Kabul office in February 2002 and appointed Mohammad-Reza Amirkhizi as its representative The office has been engaged in a wide rangeof projects which include strengthening the Afghan drug control commissionassistance in law enforcement and the criminal justice sectors and cross-bordercounternarcotics cooperation with neighboring states The office is also working ona pilot social compact with farmers in Kandahar and Badakhshan provinces pro-viding them with small amounts of financial assistance with the understanding thatthey would grow commercial crops other than opium poppy (Gannon 2004)

The new Afghan government has largely failed in its now three-year effort toeradicate the opium poppy crop in Afghanistan which in recent years became theworldrsquos biggest producer of the raw material for heroin (Hanley 2002 Wehrfritz2003) The UN estimated that the 2004 crop could be worth more than $2 billionat the farm level in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004 Pound 2004) The resurgence ofopium production in Afghanistan is a major unintended consequence of the UnitedStates invasion

By 2002 the total opium poppy cultivation averaged 74000 hectares under theKarzai government and the United Statesrsquo military presence up from only 8000hectares in 2001 under the Taliban (UNODC 2004a) While the 2002 levels arestill lower than the record level crop growing 91000 hectares in 1999 and 82000hectares in 2000 the UN report confirms that opium cultivation has resumed topreviously high levels (Moreau amp Yousafzai 2003 UNODC 2004b)

As a result the average yield poppy production in 2002 shot up to 46 kilo-gramshectare from 24 kilogramshectare in 2001 The massive increase is largelydue to more extensive irrigation programs in Eastern and Southern Afghanistanimplemented since the fall of the Taliban in November 2001 along with the end ofa nationwide drought which devastated total agricultural output between 1998 and2001 Thus total opium poppy production in 2002 was 3400 metric tons a sizableincrease compared to 185 metric tons in 2001 (UNODC 2004b) Poppy cultivationthen doubled between 2002 and 2003 The area planted with poppies used tomake heroin and morphine was 152000 hectares in 2003 compared with 74000hectares in 2002 according to the White House ONDCP (UNODC 2004b)According to the State Department ldquoIn Afghanistan poppy cultivationapproached the highest levels ever registered International and United Statessurveys indicate that in 2003 Afghanistan again produced three-quarters of the

464 Chris J Dolan

worldrsquos illicit opium The narcotics situation remains serious despite positiveactions by both the government and international donorsrdquo (BINLEA 2004)

Besides the eradication campaign announced by the new Afghan governmentin 2002 appears to have been doomed to failure due to a lack of United Statesfinancial support Farmers were to be compensated with $500 per acre fordestroyed poppies which is only a fraction of the estimated $6400 per acre of grossincome an Afghani farmer can earn on poppy cultivation The UN Food and Agriculture Organization reported that ldquoAfghani government programs had a verylimited impactrdquo (Hanley 2002) At 2003 price levels and as a result of the explo-sion in poppy cultivation and production total income for Afghani opium farmersreached several hundred million United States dollars by the end of 2003 (Pound2004)

Other more unfortunate factors resulted from the 2002 poppy eradication cam-paign Afghan farmers have been killed and wounded by United States and Afghansecurity forces during protests against the campaign to eradicate their opiumpoppy crops (Wehrfritz 2003 Wyatt 2002) According to the BBC ldquoThe farmersare angered at what they see as derisory compensationrdquo (Wyatt 2002) ManyAfghan farmers direct their anger at the United States for pressuring the Karzaigovernment to institute the poppy ban (Pound 2004) As a result many Afghanfarmers have embraced Al Qaeda for its staunch anti-Americanism (Hersh 2004)

In the war on terrorism in Afghanistan the United States is trying to end theprofits Al Qaeda and the Taliban are making from the greater Central Asian drugtrade (Gannon 2004 Rashid 1999) However this may impact Americarsquos key alliesin the region who have for years reaped the rewards of the Afghanistanrsquos herointrade Nowhere is the problem clearer than along Afghanistanrsquos northern borderwith Tajikistan an ally in the United Statesrsquo antiterrorist efforts and a major conduitfor heroin and opium on its way to Europe and the Americas The United Statesrsquoinvasion even sparked a massive selling of heroin as Al Qaeda and Taliban forcesappeared to have been selling off their narcotic stockpiles for cash to purchase arms(Hersh 2004 Yglesias 2004)

Some Central Asian and Middle Eastern drug traffickers were actually support-ive of the American invasion of Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) According to the WallStreet Journal ldquoacross the Stans and the Caspian Sea in Lebanonrsquos Bekaa Valleysome pray for a speedy United States attack on Afghanistan lsquoItrsquos good for busi-nessrsquo says Muhammed standing in a garage full of cannabis a pistol tucked in hisbelt He is just back from harvesting this yearrsquos cannabis crop lsquoItrsquoll drive up hashishpricesrsquo Muhammed assures a prospective client that transport of 2500 kilograms(5500 pounds) to Amsterdam from the Bekaamdashcontrolled by Syrian troops as wellas Syrian- and Iranian-backed Shiite Muslim Hezbollah fightersmdashcan be arrangedrdquo(qtd in Targeting Terroristsrsquo Drug Money 2001 p 1)

Structural Attributes

Prior to the October 2001 invasion the United States government had no actualpresence in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) Today the most important organizationsresponsible for conducting the narco-terror war in Afghanistan include the FederalBureau of Investigation the Drug Enforcement Administration the Special Forces

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 465

the Department of Statersquos Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforce-ment Affairs (INL) and Pakistan security forces in cooperation with the UN Officeof Drugs and Crime (UNODC) But how successful is the partnership In Febru-ary 2002 the UNODC confirmed that opium poppy cultivation rose to higherlevels than previous years under Taliban rule The UNODC Country Office forAfghanistan and the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme (ICMP) conducted a pre-assessment survey in 208 villages and 42 districts in the traditional opium poppygrowing areas of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan in the provinces of HelmandKandahar Oruzgan Nangarhar and Kunar Those five provinces accounted for84 of the total opium poppy cultivation area in Afghanistan in 2000 (UNODC2004b)

It is estimated that the various security forces currently monitor opium poppycultivation over an area between 45000 hectares and 65000 hectares (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003) This compares to the level of cultivation reached during the mid-1990s but remained lower than those recorded in 1999 (about 95000 hectares)and 2000 (about 82000 hectares) The resulting production of opium harvestedin 2004 could reach between 1900 and 2700 metric tons of opium (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003)

To address these realities the INL the DEA and the FBI have concluded thatwith at least 40 of the Afghan gross domestic product virtually tied to heroin therisks of an untethered narco-economy producing a chain reaction that reverses pastgains made under the Taliban are quite high indeed In response the INL and theDEA have built police training facilities and trained and retrained roughly 20000Afghan police officers in order to implement narco-terror initiatives against Talibanand Al Qaeda holdouts In coordination with United States Special Forces the Bushadministration seeks to place 50000 border guards and Afghan National Police byDecember 2005 in support of the opium eradication campaign The INL the DEAand the FBI are also involved in creating a comprehensive justice sector TheUnited Statesrsquo effort has also resulted in some intriguing bureaucratic alliancesThe Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency one of the main sources ofinformation for the United States-led alliance against the Taliban regime is asso-ciated with political assassinations narcotics trafficking and smuggling of nucleartechnology and missile delivery components with the backing fundamentalistIslamic movements (qtd in Bedi 2001)

Opium cultivation and heroin production in Pakistanrsquos northern tribal belt andadjoining Afghanistan was a vital offshoot of the ISIndashCIA cooperation (Rashid1999) It succeeded in turning some Soviet troops into addicts during the USSRrsquosoccupation of Afghanistan Heroin sales in Europe and the United States carriedout via deceptive means transport networks couriers and pay-offs offset the costof the various wars in Afghanistan (Gannon 2004)

Resultant Political Policy

The initial military victories in Afghanistan are in the process of being lost as thecountry is rapidly disintegrating into a state of narco-terrorism and anarchy TheUnited Statesrsquo efforts may fail unless the link between Al Qaeda Taliban forcesand opium production are finally overcome In 2004 opium farmers and traffick-ers in Afghanistan generated $23 billion in profits with higher estimates for the

466 Chris J Dolan

future The level of opium planting and the subsequent production of opium pastemorphine and heroin in Afghanistan is more than enough to satisfy the demandin Western Europe and the United States (Gannon 2004)

Although Afghanistan represents one source in worldwide opium production inaddition to Mexico South America and Southeast Asia narco-terrorism policytoward Afghanistan has not succeeded in reversing growth trends in heroin con-sumption in the United States According to the 2002 National Survey on DrugUse and Health approximately 37 million Americans ages 12 and older reportedtrying heroin at least once during their lifetimes representing 16 of the popu-lation ages 12 and older Roughly 404000 (02) reported past-year heroin useand 166000 (01) reported past-month heroin use (SAMHSA 2004) Among highschool students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the Future Study 16 ofeighth graders 15 of tenth graders and 15 of twelfth graders reported usingheroin at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these percentages were 1618 and 17 respectively (NIDA 2003)

Regarding the ease by which one can obtain heroin 156 of eighth graders188 of tenth graders and 279 of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reportedthat heroin was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 63 ofeighth graders 71 of tenth graders and 59 of twelfth graders reported thatusing heroin once or twice without a needle was a ldquogreat riskrdquo (NIDA 2003)Nationwide 33 of high school students surveyed in 2003 as part of the YouthRisk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) reported using heroin during theirlifetimes Male students (43) were significantly more likely than female students(20) to report lifetime heroin use Hispanic students (39) were more likely toreport heroin use within their lifetime than white (26) or black (26) students(CDC 2004) During 2002 10 of college students and 18 of young adults (ages19ndash28) reported using heroin at least once during their lifetimes Approximately01 of college students and 02 of young adults reported past year use of heroinand 00 of college students and less than 005 of young adults reported pastmonth use of heroin (NIDA 2004)

According to data from the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) Programa median of 58 of adult male arrestees and 66 of adult female arrestees testedpositive for opiates at arrest in 2003 The adult male samples were compiled from39 United States sites and the adult female samples were compiled from 25 sitesA median of 51 of adult male arrestees and 71 of adult female arresteesreported using heroin at least once in the year before being arrested (NationalInstitute of Justice 2004) Although heroin expenditures were $22 billion in 1990demand decreased to $10 billion in 2000 and whereas in 1990 Americans con-sumed 136 metric tons of heroin estimates remained relatively unchanged in 2000(ABT Associates 2001)

Conclusions

Based on these observations of narco-terrorist activities in Afghanistan and Colom-bia on a substantive level the Bush administration has formulated domestic andinternational drug reduction strategies with an eye on asset seizure and control offunding used by terrorist organizations However important questions remain con-cerning the legitimacy of Americarsquos policy efforts Indeed narco-terrorism as a

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 467

national security threat is not new The 911 attacks simply pushed narco-terror-ism higher on the presidentrsquos national security agenda particularly in light of theconnection between the Afghan drug trade and the Al Qaeda network

On a theoretical level the contingency approach to examining narco-terrorismpolicy highlights several major concerns that have not been adequately addressedFirst as it is conducted today the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy places sig-nificant attention on the increased utilization of American military power Eversince President Richard Nixon proclaimed a war on drugs and President GeorgeW Bush a war on terrorism concern over the use of the military in what have typically been deemed law enforcement and social issues has overshadowed mostother related methods Even if the United States did not introduce troops intoAfghanistan or Colombia we are still left with a highly militarized narco-terrorismpolicy that facilitates human rights abuses by those governments receiving UnitedStates aid Moreover the result has been an increase in the production and con-sumption of illegal drugs that are trafficked by organizations that use profits topromote terrorist attacks

Second the contingency approach used in this study reveals the problems narco-terrorism policy has experienced in targeting so-called weak states Narco-terrorism policy has elevated the potential for the United States to use its diplo-matic weight to force governments to enact stricter antidrug policies This hasencouraged states like Afghanistan and Colombia to further undermine politicaleconomic and social development with undemocratic policies directed at citizensAs a result the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism efforts have in part fueled anti-American resentment thereby increasing the potential for additional terrorist activities by groups such as Al Qaeda or FARC

Third it has become more apparent that narco-terrorism policy has becomelike all other policies highly politicized Americarsquos counterdrug efforts are virtu-ally indistinguishable from counterinsurgency efforts by remnants of the Talibanand Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and FARC and other terror-related groups in Colom-bia Moreover the United States is being rather bold in designating particulargroups as narco-terrorists although conveniently leaving off others such as theNorthern Alliance in Afghanistan This hinders the rule of law in a number of countries

Finally the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in its current form neglectscertain realities Quite simply many critics allege that narco-terrorist connectionsare indirect and for the most part ambiguous In addition critics of prohibitionmaintain that it is the illegalization of drugs that generates the enormous profitsused to support terrorist and insurgent organizations Another concern is thatnarco-terrorism does not address the complexities of terrorism or insurgenciesCan Afghanistan and Colombia continue to be addressed in narrowly defined mil-itary and law enforcement frameworks that neglect political economic and socialconsiderations

About the Author

Chris J Dolan is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Floridawhere he teaches courses on public policy United States Foreign Policy and National Secu-

468 Chris J Dolan

rity the Mass Media and the American presidency He received his PhD from the Univer-sity of South Carolina He is the author of In War We Trust The Political Dimensions and EthicalConsequences of the First Strike Doctrine (Ashgate Press 2005) and co-editor of Striking First ThePreventive Doctrine and the Reshaping of US Foreign Policy (Palgrave-Macmillan 2004) Hisresearch on public policy executive policymaking foreign policy and the mass media appearin Policy Studies Journal Congress and the Presidency Politics and Policy White House Studies andin numerous edited volumes

References

ABT Associates (2001) What Americarsquos users spend on drugs 1988ndash2000 Prepared for the Office of NationalDrug Control Policy Retrieved April 21 2004 from httpwwwwhitehousedrugpolicygovpublicationspdfamerican_users_spend_2002pdf

Allison G T (1971) Essence of decision Boston Little BrownAllison G T amp Halperin M H (1972) Bureaucratic politics A paradigm and and some policy implications

World Politics 24 40ndash79Baldwin E (1991) Why rules donrsquot work Modern Law Review 53 321ndash338Barnard D (2003) Narco-terrorism realities The connection between drugs and terror Journal of Countert-

errorism and Homeland Security International 9(1) 31ndash34Bedi R (2001 September 26) The assassins and drug dealers are now helping us The Daily Telegraph p 1Bennett C J (1991) What is policy convergence What causes it British Journal of Political Science 21(2)

215ndash233Blau P amp Scott R (1962) Formal organizations San Francisco ChandlerBouchard G amp Carroll B (2002) Policy-making and administrative discretion The case of immigration in

Canada Canadian Public Administration 25(2) 239ndash259Bouchard G amp Carroll B (2003) One size does not fit all Annual Meeting of the Canadian Public Service

Administration Halifax Nova ScotiaBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002a) Fiscal year 2003 congres-

sional budget justification Washington DC AuthorBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002b) International narcotics

control strategy Afghanistan (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 from httpusembassystategovafghanistanwwwh02121802html

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2004) International NarcoticsControl Strategy Southwest Asia (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 fromhttpwwwstategovginlrlsnrcrpt2003vol1html29836htm

Bureau of Justice Statistics United States Department of Justice (2000) Sourcebook of criminal justice statisticsWashington DC United States Government Printing Office

Cala A (2001 November 21) Danger of a new Vietnam The Gazette p 1Carroll B amp Garkut D E (1996) Is there an empirical trend toward managerialism Canadian Public Admin-

istration 39(4) 535ndash553Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2004) Youth risk behavior surveillance United States 2003 (May 21)

Retrieved August 2 2004 from httpwwwcdcgovmmwrpreviewmmwrhtmlss5302a1htmChepesiuk R (1999) Hard target The United States war against international drug trafficking 1982ndash1997 Jeffer-

son NC McFarland amp CoColombia Program Center for International Policy (2000) Plan Colombia A plan for peace or a plan for war

( June 20) Retrieved May 1 2004 from httpwwwciponlineorgcolombia062001htmColombia Program Center for International Policy (2004) US Aid to Colombia since 1997 Summary tables

(February 20) Retrieved May 2 2004 from httpciponlineorgcolombiaaidtablehtmConcar D (2001 September 29) Cutting the Talibanrsquos lifeline New Scientist p 77Desveaux J A Lindquist E A amp Toner G (1994) Organizing for policy innovations in public bureaucra-

cies AIDS energy and environmental policy in Canada Canadian Journal of Political Science 27(3)493ndash528

Dexter L (1981) Unintended consequences of purposive legislative action Alternatives to implementationJournal of Public Policy 4(4) 250ndash264

Drug Abuse Policy Office (1982) Federal strategy for prevention of drug abuse and drug trafficking WashingtonDC United States Government Printing Office

Drug Enforcement Administration Intelligence Division (2002) Drugs and terrorism A new perspective RetrievedApril 29 2004 from httpwwwdeagovpubsintel02039f1f1

Dudley S (2000 July 31) The Colombia quagmire The American Prospect p 32

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 469

of producing heroin hydrochloride with extremely high purity levels (UNODC2004b)

Since Afghanistan is landlocked drug traffickers must rely on land routes tomove morphine base and heroin out of the country Heroin is trafficked to world-wide destinations by many routes Traffickers quickly adjust heroin smugglingroutes based on political and weather-related events (Gannon 2004) Reports ofheroin shipments north from Afghanistan through the Central Asian States toRussia have increased Tajikistan is a frequent destination for both opium andheroin shipments although Tajikistan serves mostly as a transit point and storagelocation rather than a final destination Seizures are frequently reported at Pakistanrsquos international airports (Rashid 1999) Heroin is also smuggled by sea onvessels leaving the port city of Karachi Heroin produced in Afghanistan continuesto be trafficked to the United States although generally in small quantities It isestimated that roughly 90 of opiate products in Europe originate in Afghanistan(Concar 2001 Hersh 2004)

Money laundering is not an issue in Afghanistan The unsophisticated bankingsystem that previously existed has been damaged by the years of war It is likelythat the informal banking system used extensively in the region usually referredto as the hawala or hundi money laundering system is used by drug traffickers(Lehmkuhler 2003) This system is an underground traditional informal networkthat has been used for centuries by businesses and families throughout Asia (StillFlushmdashTerrorist Finance 2002) This system provides a confidential convenientefficient service at a low cost in areas that are not served by traditional bankingfacilities (Hersh 2004)

Prior to the United Statesrsquo invasion of October 2001 the Taliban maintainedeffective control of nearly all of the opium poppy growing areas in the countryeven though they were only recognized as the legitimate government ofAfghanistan by three governments Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the United ArabEmirates Islamic law (Sharirsquoa) has been imposed in territory controlled by theTaliban and local Sharirsquoa courts have been established throughout the country In1997 the Taliban reactivated the State High Commission for Drug Control whichwas originally established in 1990 by the legitimate interim government Before theUNODC reports indicating that implementation of the 2000ndash2001 opium poppycultivation ban has been effective and the release of the United States governmentestimate indicating a dramatic reduction in opium production the Taliban madeonly token gestures toward antidrug law enforcement (BINLEA 2002b) Althoughthey have banned opium poppy cultivation the Taliban itself long relied on drugtrafficking for financial support

Unintended Consequences

As the United States began more rapidly merging its war on drugs with the greaterWar on Terror on a public scale halting opium production had to be as importantas eliminating the Taliban and the Al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan But howserious were Americarsquos efforts in applying its narco-terrorism policy to AfghanistanUnited States military commanders were not going to set opium eradication at thetop of their list of priorities (Schmitt 2002)

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 463

The results were consistent with Americarsquos hands-off approach Afghan opiumproduction in 2002 exploded to near-record levels making the war-ravaged nationagain the worldrsquos leading producer of the drug ( Judis 2003) Efforts by the UnitedStates-backed interim government of Hamid Karzai to eradicate opium productionby paying farmers to destroy their crops have failed because of a lack of moneyand violent demonstrations by farmers fearing their livelihoods were in jeopardy(Pound 2004) The UNrsquos Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated thatAfghanistan produced 3400 metric tons of opium in 2002 (Moreau amp Yousafzai2003 United Nations Information Service 2003)

Immediately after assuming office Karzai issued a decree on January 17 2002not only banning cultivation but also the processing trafficking and abuse ofopiates (Hanley 2002) Last month his government reiterated that positionreasserting the ban on opium poppy planting in the autumn (Hersh 2004) TheUNODC reopened its Kabul office in February 2002 and appointed Mohammad-Reza Amirkhizi as its representative The office has been engaged in a wide rangeof projects which include strengthening the Afghan drug control commissionassistance in law enforcement and the criminal justice sectors and cross-bordercounternarcotics cooperation with neighboring states The office is also working ona pilot social compact with farmers in Kandahar and Badakhshan provinces pro-viding them with small amounts of financial assistance with the understanding thatthey would grow commercial crops other than opium poppy (Gannon 2004)

The new Afghan government has largely failed in its now three-year effort toeradicate the opium poppy crop in Afghanistan which in recent years became theworldrsquos biggest producer of the raw material for heroin (Hanley 2002 Wehrfritz2003) The UN estimated that the 2004 crop could be worth more than $2 billionat the farm level in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004 Pound 2004) The resurgence ofopium production in Afghanistan is a major unintended consequence of the UnitedStates invasion

By 2002 the total opium poppy cultivation averaged 74000 hectares under theKarzai government and the United Statesrsquo military presence up from only 8000hectares in 2001 under the Taliban (UNODC 2004a) While the 2002 levels arestill lower than the record level crop growing 91000 hectares in 1999 and 82000hectares in 2000 the UN report confirms that opium cultivation has resumed topreviously high levels (Moreau amp Yousafzai 2003 UNODC 2004b)

As a result the average yield poppy production in 2002 shot up to 46 kilo-gramshectare from 24 kilogramshectare in 2001 The massive increase is largelydue to more extensive irrigation programs in Eastern and Southern Afghanistanimplemented since the fall of the Taliban in November 2001 along with the end ofa nationwide drought which devastated total agricultural output between 1998 and2001 Thus total opium poppy production in 2002 was 3400 metric tons a sizableincrease compared to 185 metric tons in 2001 (UNODC 2004b) Poppy cultivationthen doubled between 2002 and 2003 The area planted with poppies used tomake heroin and morphine was 152000 hectares in 2003 compared with 74000hectares in 2002 according to the White House ONDCP (UNODC 2004b)According to the State Department ldquoIn Afghanistan poppy cultivationapproached the highest levels ever registered International and United Statessurveys indicate that in 2003 Afghanistan again produced three-quarters of the

464 Chris J Dolan

worldrsquos illicit opium The narcotics situation remains serious despite positiveactions by both the government and international donorsrdquo (BINLEA 2004)

Besides the eradication campaign announced by the new Afghan governmentin 2002 appears to have been doomed to failure due to a lack of United Statesfinancial support Farmers were to be compensated with $500 per acre fordestroyed poppies which is only a fraction of the estimated $6400 per acre of grossincome an Afghani farmer can earn on poppy cultivation The UN Food and Agriculture Organization reported that ldquoAfghani government programs had a verylimited impactrdquo (Hanley 2002) At 2003 price levels and as a result of the explo-sion in poppy cultivation and production total income for Afghani opium farmersreached several hundred million United States dollars by the end of 2003 (Pound2004)

Other more unfortunate factors resulted from the 2002 poppy eradication cam-paign Afghan farmers have been killed and wounded by United States and Afghansecurity forces during protests against the campaign to eradicate their opiumpoppy crops (Wehrfritz 2003 Wyatt 2002) According to the BBC ldquoThe farmersare angered at what they see as derisory compensationrdquo (Wyatt 2002) ManyAfghan farmers direct their anger at the United States for pressuring the Karzaigovernment to institute the poppy ban (Pound 2004) As a result many Afghanfarmers have embraced Al Qaeda for its staunch anti-Americanism (Hersh 2004)

In the war on terrorism in Afghanistan the United States is trying to end theprofits Al Qaeda and the Taliban are making from the greater Central Asian drugtrade (Gannon 2004 Rashid 1999) However this may impact Americarsquos key alliesin the region who have for years reaped the rewards of the Afghanistanrsquos herointrade Nowhere is the problem clearer than along Afghanistanrsquos northern borderwith Tajikistan an ally in the United Statesrsquo antiterrorist efforts and a major conduitfor heroin and opium on its way to Europe and the Americas The United Statesrsquoinvasion even sparked a massive selling of heroin as Al Qaeda and Taliban forcesappeared to have been selling off their narcotic stockpiles for cash to purchase arms(Hersh 2004 Yglesias 2004)

Some Central Asian and Middle Eastern drug traffickers were actually support-ive of the American invasion of Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) According to the WallStreet Journal ldquoacross the Stans and the Caspian Sea in Lebanonrsquos Bekaa Valleysome pray for a speedy United States attack on Afghanistan lsquoItrsquos good for busi-nessrsquo says Muhammed standing in a garage full of cannabis a pistol tucked in hisbelt He is just back from harvesting this yearrsquos cannabis crop lsquoItrsquoll drive up hashishpricesrsquo Muhammed assures a prospective client that transport of 2500 kilograms(5500 pounds) to Amsterdam from the Bekaamdashcontrolled by Syrian troops as wellas Syrian- and Iranian-backed Shiite Muslim Hezbollah fightersmdashcan be arrangedrdquo(qtd in Targeting Terroristsrsquo Drug Money 2001 p 1)

Structural Attributes

Prior to the October 2001 invasion the United States government had no actualpresence in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) Today the most important organizationsresponsible for conducting the narco-terror war in Afghanistan include the FederalBureau of Investigation the Drug Enforcement Administration the Special Forces

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 465

the Department of Statersquos Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforce-ment Affairs (INL) and Pakistan security forces in cooperation with the UN Officeof Drugs and Crime (UNODC) But how successful is the partnership In Febru-ary 2002 the UNODC confirmed that opium poppy cultivation rose to higherlevels than previous years under Taliban rule The UNODC Country Office forAfghanistan and the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme (ICMP) conducted a pre-assessment survey in 208 villages and 42 districts in the traditional opium poppygrowing areas of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan in the provinces of HelmandKandahar Oruzgan Nangarhar and Kunar Those five provinces accounted for84 of the total opium poppy cultivation area in Afghanistan in 2000 (UNODC2004b)

It is estimated that the various security forces currently monitor opium poppycultivation over an area between 45000 hectares and 65000 hectares (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003) This compares to the level of cultivation reached during the mid-1990s but remained lower than those recorded in 1999 (about 95000 hectares)and 2000 (about 82000 hectares) The resulting production of opium harvestedin 2004 could reach between 1900 and 2700 metric tons of opium (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003)

To address these realities the INL the DEA and the FBI have concluded thatwith at least 40 of the Afghan gross domestic product virtually tied to heroin therisks of an untethered narco-economy producing a chain reaction that reverses pastgains made under the Taliban are quite high indeed In response the INL and theDEA have built police training facilities and trained and retrained roughly 20000Afghan police officers in order to implement narco-terror initiatives against Talibanand Al Qaeda holdouts In coordination with United States Special Forces the Bushadministration seeks to place 50000 border guards and Afghan National Police byDecember 2005 in support of the opium eradication campaign The INL the DEAand the FBI are also involved in creating a comprehensive justice sector TheUnited Statesrsquo effort has also resulted in some intriguing bureaucratic alliancesThe Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency one of the main sources ofinformation for the United States-led alliance against the Taliban regime is asso-ciated with political assassinations narcotics trafficking and smuggling of nucleartechnology and missile delivery components with the backing fundamentalistIslamic movements (qtd in Bedi 2001)

Opium cultivation and heroin production in Pakistanrsquos northern tribal belt andadjoining Afghanistan was a vital offshoot of the ISIndashCIA cooperation (Rashid1999) It succeeded in turning some Soviet troops into addicts during the USSRrsquosoccupation of Afghanistan Heroin sales in Europe and the United States carriedout via deceptive means transport networks couriers and pay-offs offset the costof the various wars in Afghanistan (Gannon 2004)

Resultant Political Policy

The initial military victories in Afghanistan are in the process of being lost as thecountry is rapidly disintegrating into a state of narco-terrorism and anarchy TheUnited Statesrsquo efforts may fail unless the link between Al Qaeda Taliban forcesand opium production are finally overcome In 2004 opium farmers and traffick-ers in Afghanistan generated $23 billion in profits with higher estimates for the

466 Chris J Dolan

future The level of opium planting and the subsequent production of opium pastemorphine and heroin in Afghanistan is more than enough to satisfy the demandin Western Europe and the United States (Gannon 2004)

Although Afghanistan represents one source in worldwide opium production inaddition to Mexico South America and Southeast Asia narco-terrorism policytoward Afghanistan has not succeeded in reversing growth trends in heroin con-sumption in the United States According to the 2002 National Survey on DrugUse and Health approximately 37 million Americans ages 12 and older reportedtrying heroin at least once during their lifetimes representing 16 of the popu-lation ages 12 and older Roughly 404000 (02) reported past-year heroin useand 166000 (01) reported past-month heroin use (SAMHSA 2004) Among highschool students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the Future Study 16 ofeighth graders 15 of tenth graders and 15 of twelfth graders reported usingheroin at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these percentages were 1618 and 17 respectively (NIDA 2003)

Regarding the ease by which one can obtain heroin 156 of eighth graders188 of tenth graders and 279 of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reportedthat heroin was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 63 ofeighth graders 71 of tenth graders and 59 of twelfth graders reported thatusing heroin once or twice without a needle was a ldquogreat riskrdquo (NIDA 2003)Nationwide 33 of high school students surveyed in 2003 as part of the YouthRisk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) reported using heroin during theirlifetimes Male students (43) were significantly more likely than female students(20) to report lifetime heroin use Hispanic students (39) were more likely toreport heroin use within their lifetime than white (26) or black (26) students(CDC 2004) During 2002 10 of college students and 18 of young adults (ages19ndash28) reported using heroin at least once during their lifetimes Approximately01 of college students and 02 of young adults reported past year use of heroinand 00 of college students and less than 005 of young adults reported pastmonth use of heroin (NIDA 2004)

According to data from the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) Programa median of 58 of adult male arrestees and 66 of adult female arrestees testedpositive for opiates at arrest in 2003 The adult male samples were compiled from39 United States sites and the adult female samples were compiled from 25 sitesA median of 51 of adult male arrestees and 71 of adult female arresteesreported using heroin at least once in the year before being arrested (NationalInstitute of Justice 2004) Although heroin expenditures were $22 billion in 1990demand decreased to $10 billion in 2000 and whereas in 1990 Americans con-sumed 136 metric tons of heroin estimates remained relatively unchanged in 2000(ABT Associates 2001)

Conclusions

Based on these observations of narco-terrorist activities in Afghanistan and Colom-bia on a substantive level the Bush administration has formulated domestic andinternational drug reduction strategies with an eye on asset seizure and control offunding used by terrorist organizations However important questions remain con-cerning the legitimacy of Americarsquos policy efforts Indeed narco-terrorism as a

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 467

national security threat is not new The 911 attacks simply pushed narco-terror-ism higher on the presidentrsquos national security agenda particularly in light of theconnection between the Afghan drug trade and the Al Qaeda network

On a theoretical level the contingency approach to examining narco-terrorismpolicy highlights several major concerns that have not been adequately addressedFirst as it is conducted today the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy places sig-nificant attention on the increased utilization of American military power Eversince President Richard Nixon proclaimed a war on drugs and President GeorgeW Bush a war on terrorism concern over the use of the military in what have typically been deemed law enforcement and social issues has overshadowed mostother related methods Even if the United States did not introduce troops intoAfghanistan or Colombia we are still left with a highly militarized narco-terrorismpolicy that facilitates human rights abuses by those governments receiving UnitedStates aid Moreover the result has been an increase in the production and con-sumption of illegal drugs that are trafficked by organizations that use profits topromote terrorist attacks

Second the contingency approach used in this study reveals the problems narco-terrorism policy has experienced in targeting so-called weak states Narco-terrorism policy has elevated the potential for the United States to use its diplo-matic weight to force governments to enact stricter antidrug policies This hasencouraged states like Afghanistan and Colombia to further undermine politicaleconomic and social development with undemocratic policies directed at citizensAs a result the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism efforts have in part fueled anti-American resentment thereby increasing the potential for additional terrorist activities by groups such as Al Qaeda or FARC

Third it has become more apparent that narco-terrorism policy has becomelike all other policies highly politicized Americarsquos counterdrug efforts are virtu-ally indistinguishable from counterinsurgency efforts by remnants of the Talibanand Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and FARC and other terror-related groups in Colom-bia Moreover the United States is being rather bold in designating particulargroups as narco-terrorists although conveniently leaving off others such as theNorthern Alliance in Afghanistan This hinders the rule of law in a number of countries

Finally the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in its current form neglectscertain realities Quite simply many critics allege that narco-terrorist connectionsare indirect and for the most part ambiguous In addition critics of prohibitionmaintain that it is the illegalization of drugs that generates the enormous profitsused to support terrorist and insurgent organizations Another concern is thatnarco-terrorism does not address the complexities of terrorism or insurgenciesCan Afghanistan and Colombia continue to be addressed in narrowly defined mil-itary and law enforcement frameworks that neglect political economic and socialconsiderations

About the Author

Chris J Dolan is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Floridawhere he teaches courses on public policy United States Foreign Policy and National Secu-

468 Chris J Dolan

rity the Mass Media and the American presidency He received his PhD from the Univer-sity of South Carolina He is the author of In War We Trust The Political Dimensions and EthicalConsequences of the First Strike Doctrine (Ashgate Press 2005) and co-editor of Striking First ThePreventive Doctrine and the Reshaping of US Foreign Policy (Palgrave-Macmillan 2004) Hisresearch on public policy executive policymaking foreign policy and the mass media appearin Policy Studies Journal Congress and the Presidency Politics and Policy White House Studies andin numerous edited volumes

References

ABT Associates (2001) What Americarsquos users spend on drugs 1988ndash2000 Prepared for the Office of NationalDrug Control Policy Retrieved April 21 2004 from httpwwwwhitehousedrugpolicygovpublicationspdfamerican_users_spend_2002pdf

Allison G T (1971) Essence of decision Boston Little BrownAllison G T amp Halperin M H (1972) Bureaucratic politics A paradigm and and some policy implications

World Politics 24 40ndash79Baldwin E (1991) Why rules donrsquot work Modern Law Review 53 321ndash338Barnard D (2003) Narco-terrorism realities The connection between drugs and terror Journal of Countert-

errorism and Homeland Security International 9(1) 31ndash34Bedi R (2001 September 26) The assassins and drug dealers are now helping us The Daily Telegraph p 1Bennett C J (1991) What is policy convergence What causes it British Journal of Political Science 21(2)

215ndash233Blau P amp Scott R (1962) Formal organizations San Francisco ChandlerBouchard G amp Carroll B (2002) Policy-making and administrative discretion The case of immigration in

Canada Canadian Public Administration 25(2) 239ndash259Bouchard G amp Carroll B (2003) One size does not fit all Annual Meeting of the Canadian Public Service

Administration Halifax Nova ScotiaBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002a) Fiscal year 2003 congres-

sional budget justification Washington DC AuthorBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002b) International narcotics

control strategy Afghanistan (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 from httpusembassystategovafghanistanwwwh02121802html

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2004) International NarcoticsControl Strategy Southwest Asia (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 fromhttpwwwstategovginlrlsnrcrpt2003vol1html29836htm

Bureau of Justice Statistics United States Department of Justice (2000) Sourcebook of criminal justice statisticsWashington DC United States Government Printing Office

Cala A (2001 November 21) Danger of a new Vietnam The Gazette p 1Carroll B amp Garkut D E (1996) Is there an empirical trend toward managerialism Canadian Public Admin-

istration 39(4) 535ndash553Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2004) Youth risk behavior surveillance United States 2003 (May 21)

Retrieved August 2 2004 from httpwwwcdcgovmmwrpreviewmmwrhtmlss5302a1htmChepesiuk R (1999) Hard target The United States war against international drug trafficking 1982ndash1997 Jeffer-

son NC McFarland amp CoColombia Program Center for International Policy (2000) Plan Colombia A plan for peace or a plan for war

( June 20) Retrieved May 1 2004 from httpwwwciponlineorgcolombia062001htmColombia Program Center for International Policy (2004) US Aid to Colombia since 1997 Summary tables

(February 20) Retrieved May 2 2004 from httpciponlineorgcolombiaaidtablehtmConcar D (2001 September 29) Cutting the Talibanrsquos lifeline New Scientist p 77Desveaux J A Lindquist E A amp Toner G (1994) Organizing for policy innovations in public bureaucra-

cies AIDS energy and environmental policy in Canada Canadian Journal of Political Science 27(3)493ndash528

Dexter L (1981) Unintended consequences of purposive legislative action Alternatives to implementationJournal of Public Policy 4(4) 250ndash264

Drug Abuse Policy Office (1982) Federal strategy for prevention of drug abuse and drug trafficking WashingtonDC United States Government Printing Office

Drug Enforcement Administration Intelligence Division (2002) Drugs and terrorism A new perspective RetrievedApril 29 2004 from httpwwwdeagovpubsintel02039f1f1

Dudley S (2000 July 31) The Colombia quagmire The American Prospect p 32

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 469

The results were consistent with Americarsquos hands-off approach Afghan opiumproduction in 2002 exploded to near-record levels making the war-ravaged nationagain the worldrsquos leading producer of the drug ( Judis 2003) Efforts by the UnitedStates-backed interim government of Hamid Karzai to eradicate opium productionby paying farmers to destroy their crops have failed because of a lack of moneyand violent demonstrations by farmers fearing their livelihoods were in jeopardy(Pound 2004) The UNrsquos Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated thatAfghanistan produced 3400 metric tons of opium in 2002 (Moreau amp Yousafzai2003 United Nations Information Service 2003)

Immediately after assuming office Karzai issued a decree on January 17 2002not only banning cultivation but also the processing trafficking and abuse ofopiates (Hanley 2002) Last month his government reiterated that positionreasserting the ban on opium poppy planting in the autumn (Hersh 2004) TheUNODC reopened its Kabul office in February 2002 and appointed Mohammad-Reza Amirkhizi as its representative The office has been engaged in a wide rangeof projects which include strengthening the Afghan drug control commissionassistance in law enforcement and the criminal justice sectors and cross-bordercounternarcotics cooperation with neighboring states The office is also working ona pilot social compact with farmers in Kandahar and Badakhshan provinces pro-viding them with small amounts of financial assistance with the understanding thatthey would grow commercial crops other than opium poppy (Gannon 2004)

The new Afghan government has largely failed in its now three-year effort toeradicate the opium poppy crop in Afghanistan which in recent years became theworldrsquos biggest producer of the raw material for heroin (Hanley 2002 Wehrfritz2003) The UN estimated that the 2004 crop could be worth more than $2 billionat the farm level in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004 Pound 2004) The resurgence ofopium production in Afghanistan is a major unintended consequence of the UnitedStates invasion

By 2002 the total opium poppy cultivation averaged 74000 hectares under theKarzai government and the United Statesrsquo military presence up from only 8000hectares in 2001 under the Taliban (UNODC 2004a) While the 2002 levels arestill lower than the record level crop growing 91000 hectares in 1999 and 82000hectares in 2000 the UN report confirms that opium cultivation has resumed topreviously high levels (Moreau amp Yousafzai 2003 UNODC 2004b)

As a result the average yield poppy production in 2002 shot up to 46 kilo-gramshectare from 24 kilogramshectare in 2001 The massive increase is largelydue to more extensive irrigation programs in Eastern and Southern Afghanistanimplemented since the fall of the Taliban in November 2001 along with the end ofa nationwide drought which devastated total agricultural output between 1998 and2001 Thus total opium poppy production in 2002 was 3400 metric tons a sizableincrease compared to 185 metric tons in 2001 (UNODC 2004b) Poppy cultivationthen doubled between 2002 and 2003 The area planted with poppies used tomake heroin and morphine was 152000 hectares in 2003 compared with 74000hectares in 2002 according to the White House ONDCP (UNODC 2004b)According to the State Department ldquoIn Afghanistan poppy cultivationapproached the highest levels ever registered International and United Statessurveys indicate that in 2003 Afghanistan again produced three-quarters of the

464 Chris J Dolan

worldrsquos illicit opium The narcotics situation remains serious despite positiveactions by both the government and international donorsrdquo (BINLEA 2004)

Besides the eradication campaign announced by the new Afghan governmentin 2002 appears to have been doomed to failure due to a lack of United Statesfinancial support Farmers were to be compensated with $500 per acre fordestroyed poppies which is only a fraction of the estimated $6400 per acre of grossincome an Afghani farmer can earn on poppy cultivation The UN Food and Agriculture Organization reported that ldquoAfghani government programs had a verylimited impactrdquo (Hanley 2002) At 2003 price levels and as a result of the explo-sion in poppy cultivation and production total income for Afghani opium farmersreached several hundred million United States dollars by the end of 2003 (Pound2004)

Other more unfortunate factors resulted from the 2002 poppy eradication cam-paign Afghan farmers have been killed and wounded by United States and Afghansecurity forces during protests against the campaign to eradicate their opiumpoppy crops (Wehrfritz 2003 Wyatt 2002) According to the BBC ldquoThe farmersare angered at what they see as derisory compensationrdquo (Wyatt 2002) ManyAfghan farmers direct their anger at the United States for pressuring the Karzaigovernment to institute the poppy ban (Pound 2004) As a result many Afghanfarmers have embraced Al Qaeda for its staunch anti-Americanism (Hersh 2004)

In the war on terrorism in Afghanistan the United States is trying to end theprofits Al Qaeda and the Taliban are making from the greater Central Asian drugtrade (Gannon 2004 Rashid 1999) However this may impact Americarsquos key alliesin the region who have for years reaped the rewards of the Afghanistanrsquos herointrade Nowhere is the problem clearer than along Afghanistanrsquos northern borderwith Tajikistan an ally in the United Statesrsquo antiterrorist efforts and a major conduitfor heroin and opium on its way to Europe and the Americas The United Statesrsquoinvasion even sparked a massive selling of heroin as Al Qaeda and Taliban forcesappeared to have been selling off their narcotic stockpiles for cash to purchase arms(Hersh 2004 Yglesias 2004)

Some Central Asian and Middle Eastern drug traffickers were actually support-ive of the American invasion of Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) According to the WallStreet Journal ldquoacross the Stans and the Caspian Sea in Lebanonrsquos Bekaa Valleysome pray for a speedy United States attack on Afghanistan lsquoItrsquos good for busi-nessrsquo says Muhammed standing in a garage full of cannabis a pistol tucked in hisbelt He is just back from harvesting this yearrsquos cannabis crop lsquoItrsquoll drive up hashishpricesrsquo Muhammed assures a prospective client that transport of 2500 kilograms(5500 pounds) to Amsterdam from the Bekaamdashcontrolled by Syrian troops as wellas Syrian- and Iranian-backed Shiite Muslim Hezbollah fightersmdashcan be arrangedrdquo(qtd in Targeting Terroristsrsquo Drug Money 2001 p 1)

Structural Attributes

Prior to the October 2001 invasion the United States government had no actualpresence in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) Today the most important organizationsresponsible for conducting the narco-terror war in Afghanistan include the FederalBureau of Investigation the Drug Enforcement Administration the Special Forces

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 465

the Department of Statersquos Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforce-ment Affairs (INL) and Pakistan security forces in cooperation with the UN Officeof Drugs and Crime (UNODC) But how successful is the partnership In Febru-ary 2002 the UNODC confirmed that opium poppy cultivation rose to higherlevels than previous years under Taliban rule The UNODC Country Office forAfghanistan and the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme (ICMP) conducted a pre-assessment survey in 208 villages and 42 districts in the traditional opium poppygrowing areas of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan in the provinces of HelmandKandahar Oruzgan Nangarhar and Kunar Those five provinces accounted for84 of the total opium poppy cultivation area in Afghanistan in 2000 (UNODC2004b)

It is estimated that the various security forces currently monitor opium poppycultivation over an area between 45000 hectares and 65000 hectares (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003) This compares to the level of cultivation reached during the mid-1990s but remained lower than those recorded in 1999 (about 95000 hectares)and 2000 (about 82000 hectares) The resulting production of opium harvestedin 2004 could reach between 1900 and 2700 metric tons of opium (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003)

To address these realities the INL the DEA and the FBI have concluded thatwith at least 40 of the Afghan gross domestic product virtually tied to heroin therisks of an untethered narco-economy producing a chain reaction that reverses pastgains made under the Taliban are quite high indeed In response the INL and theDEA have built police training facilities and trained and retrained roughly 20000Afghan police officers in order to implement narco-terror initiatives against Talibanand Al Qaeda holdouts In coordination with United States Special Forces the Bushadministration seeks to place 50000 border guards and Afghan National Police byDecember 2005 in support of the opium eradication campaign The INL the DEAand the FBI are also involved in creating a comprehensive justice sector TheUnited Statesrsquo effort has also resulted in some intriguing bureaucratic alliancesThe Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency one of the main sources ofinformation for the United States-led alliance against the Taliban regime is asso-ciated with political assassinations narcotics trafficking and smuggling of nucleartechnology and missile delivery components with the backing fundamentalistIslamic movements (qtd in Bedi 2001)

Opium cultivation and heroin production in Pakistanrsquos northern tribal belt andadjoining Afghanistan was a vital offshoot of the ISIndashCIA cooperation (Rashid1999) It succeeded in turning some Soviet troops into addicts during the USSRrsquosoccupation of Afghanistan Heroin sales in Europe and the United States carriedout via deceptive means transport networks couriers and pay-offs offset the costof the various wars in Afghanistan (Gannon 2004)

Resultant Political Policy

The initial military victories in Afghanistan are in the process of being lost as thecountry is rapidly disintegrating into a state of narco-terrorism and anarchy TheUnited Statesrsquo efforts may fail unless the link between Al Qaeda Taliban forcesand opium production are finally overcome In 2004 opium farmers and traffick-ers in Afghanistan generated $23 billion in profits with higher estimates for the

466 Chris J Dolan

future The level of opium planting and the subsequent production of opium pastemorphine and heroin in Afghanistan is more than enough to satisfy the demandin Western Europe and the United States (Gannon 2004)

Although Afghanistan represents one source in worldwide opium production inaddition to Mexico South America and Southeast Asia narco-terrorism policytoward Afghanistan has not succeeded in reversing growth trends in heroin con-sumption in the United States According to the 2002 National Survey on DrugUse and Health approximately 37 million Americans ages 12 and older reportedtrying heroin at least once during their lifetimes representing 16 of the popu-lation ages 12 and older Roughly 404000 (02) reported past-year heroin useand 166000 (01) reported past-month heroin use (SAMHSA 2004) Among highschool students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the Future Study 16 ofeighth graders 15 of tenth graders and 15 of twelfth graders reported usingheroin at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these percentages were 1618 and 17 respectively (NIDA 2003)

Regarding the ease by which one can obtain heroin 156 of eighth graders188 of tenth graders and 279 of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reportedthat heroin was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 63 ofeighth graders 71 of tenth graders and 59 of twelfth graders reported thatusing heroin once or twice without a needle was a ldquogreat riskrdquo (NIDA 2003)Nationwide 33 of high school students surveyed in 2003 as part of the YouthRisk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) reported using heroin during theirlifetimes Male students (43) were significantly more likely than female students(20) to report lifetime heroin use Hispanic students (39) were more likely toreport heroin use within their lifetime than white (26) or black (26) students(CDC 2004) During 2002 10 of college students and 18 of young adults (ages19ndash28) reported using heroin at least once during their lifetimes Approximately01 of college students and 02 of young adults reported past year use of heroinand 00 of college students and less than 005 of young adults reported pastmonth use of heroin (NIDA 2004)

According to data from the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) Programa median of 58 of adult male arrestees and 66 of adult female arrestees testedpositive for opiates at arrest in 2003 The adult male samples were compiled from39 United States sites and the adult female samples were compiled from 25 sitesA median of 51 of adult male arrestees and 71 of adult female arresteesreported using heroin at least once in the year before being arrested (NationalInstitute of Justice 2004) Although heroin expenditures were $22 billion in 1990demand decreased to $10 billion in 2000 and whereas in 1990 Americans con-sumed 136 metric tons of heroin estimates remained relatively unchanged in 2000(ABT Associates 2001)

Conclusions

Based on these observations of narco-terrorist activities in Afghanistan and Colom-bia on a substantive level the Bush administration has formulated domestic andinternational drug reduction strategies with an eye on asset seizure and control offunding used by terrorist organizations However important questions remain con-cerning the legitimacy of Americarsquos policy efforts Indeed narco-terrorism as a

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 467

national security threat is not new The 911 attacks simply pushed narco-terror-ism higher on the presidentrsquos national security agenda particularly in light of theconnection between the Afghan drug trade and the Al Qaeda network

On a theoretical level the contingency approach to examining narco-terrorismpolicy highlights several major concerns that have not been adequately addressedFirst as it is conducted today the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy places sig-nificant attention on the increased utilization of American military power Eversince President Richard Nixon proclaimed a war on drugs and President GeorgeW Bush a war on terrorism concern over the use of the military in what have typically been deemed law enforcement and social issues has overshadowed mostother related methods Even if the United States did not introduce troops intoAfghanistan or Colombia we are still left with a highly militarized narco-terrorismpolicy that facilitates human rights abuses by those governments receiving UnitedStates aid Moreover the result has been an increase in the production and con-sumption of illegal drugs that are trafficked by organizations that use profits topromote terrorist attacks

Second the contingency approach used in this study reveals the problems narco-terrorism policy has experienced in targeting so-called weak states Narco-terrorism policy has elevated the potential for the United States to use its diplo-matic weight to force governments to enact stricter antidrug policies This hasencouraged states like Afghanistan and Colombia to further undermine politicaleconomic and social development with undemocratic policies directed at citizensAs a result the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism efforts have in part fueled anti-American resentment thereby increasing the potential for additional terrorist activities by groups such as Al Qaeda or FARC

Third it has become more apparent that narco-terrorism policy has becomelike all other policies highly politicized Americarsquos counterdrug efforts are virtu-ally indistinguishable from counterinsurgency efforts by remnants of the Talibanand Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and FARC and other terror-related groups in Colom-bia Moreover the United States is being rather bold in designating particulargroups as narco-terrorists although conveniently leaving off others such as theNorthern Alliance in Afghanistan This hinders the rule of law in a number of countries

Finally the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in its current form neglectscertain realities Quite simply many critics allege that narco-terrorist connectionsare indirect and for the most part ambiguous In addition critics of prohibitionmaintain that it is the illegalization of drugs that generates the enormous profitsused to support terrorist and insurgent organizations Another concern is thatnarco-terrorism does not address the complexities of terrorism or insurgenciesCan Afghanistan and Colombia continue to be addressed in narrowly defined mil-itary and law enforcement frameworks that neglect political economic and socialconsiderations

About the Author

Chris J Dolan is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Floridawhere he teaches courses on public policy United States Foreign Policy and National Secu-

468 Chris J Dolan

rity the Mass Media and the American presidency He received his PhD from the Univer-sity of South Carolina He is the author of In War We Trust The Political Dimensions and EthicalConsequences of the First Strike Doctrine (Ashgate Press 2005) and co-editor of Striking First ThePreventive Doctrine and the Reshaping of US Foreign Policy (Palgrave-Macmillan 2004) Hisresearch on public policy executive policymaking foreign policy and the mass media appearin Policy Studies Journal Congress and the Presidency Politics and Policy White House Studies andin numerous edited volumes

References

ABT Associates (2001) What Americarsquos users spend on drugs 1988ndash2000 Prepared for the Office of NationalDrug Control Policy Retrieved April 21 2004 from httpwwwwhitehousedrugpolicygovpublicationspdfamerican_users_spend_2002pdf

Allison G T (1971) Essence of decision Boston Little BrownAllison G T amp Halperin M H (1972) Bureaucratic politics A paradigm and and some policy implications

World Politics 24 40ndash79Baldwin E (1991) Why rules donrsquot work Modern Law Review 53 321ndash338Barnard D (2003) Narco-terrorism realities The connection between drugs and terror Journal of Countert-

errorism and Homeland Security International 9(1) 31ndash34Bedi R (2001 September 26) The assassins and drug dealers are now helping us The Daily Telegraph p 1Bennett C J (1991) What is policy convergence What causes it British Journal of Political Science 21(2)

215ndash233Blau P amp Scott R (1962) Formal organizations San Francisco ChandlerBouchard G amp Carroll B (2002) Policy-making and administrative discretion The case of immigration in

Canada Canadian Public Administration 25(2) 239ndash259Bouchard G amp Carroll B (2003) One size does not fit all Annual Meeting of the Canadian Public Service

Administration Halifax Nova ScotiaBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002a) Fiscal year 2003 congres-

sional budget justification Washington DC AuthorBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002b) International narcotics

control strategy Afghanistan (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 from httpusembassystategovafghanistanwwwh02121802html

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2004) International NarcoticsControl Strategy Southwest Asia (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 fromhttpwwwstategovginlrlsnrcrpt2003vol1html29836htm

Bureau of Justice Statistics United States Department of Justice (2000) Sourcebook of criminal justice statisticsWashington DC United States Government Printing Office

Cala A (2001 November 21) Danger of a new Vietnam The Gazette p 1Carroll B amp Garkut D E (1996) Is there an empirical trend toward managerialism Canadian Public Admin-

istration 39(4) 535ndash553Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2004) Youth risk behavior surveillance United States 2003 (May 21)

Retrieved August 2 2004 from httpwwwcdcgovmmwrpreviewmmwrhtmlss5302a1htmChepesiuk R (1999) Hard target The United States war against international drug trafficking 1982ndash1997 Jeffer-

son NC McFarland amp CoColombia Program Center for International Policy (2000) Plan Colombia A plan for peace or a plan for war

( June 20) Retrieved May 1 2004 from httpwwwciponlineorgcolombia062001htmColombia Program Center for International Policy (2004) US Aid to Colombia since 1997 Summary tables

(February 20) Retrieved May 2 2004 from httpciponlineorgcolombiaaidtablehtmConcar D (2001 September 29) Cutting the Talibanrsquos lifeline New Scientist p 77Desveaux J A Lindquist E A amp Toner G (1994) Organizing for policy innovations in public bureaucra-

cies AIDS energy and environmental policy in Canada Canadian Journal of Political Science 27(3)493ndash528

Dexter L (1981) Unintended consequences of purposive legislative action Alternatives to implementationJournal of Public Policy 4(4) 250ndash264

Drug Abuse Policy Office (1982) Federal strategy for prevention of drug abuse and drug trafficking WashingtonDC United States Government Printing Office

Drug Enforcement Administration Intelligence Division (2002) Drugs and terrorism A new perspective RetrievedApril 29 2004 from httpwwwdeagovpubsintel02039f1f1

Dudley S (2000 July 31) The Colombia quagmire The American Prospect p 32

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 469

worldrsquos illicit opium The narcotics situation remains serious despite positiveactions by both the government and international donorsrdquo (BINLEA 2004)

Besides the eradication campaign announced by the new Afghan governmentin 2002 appears to have been doomed to failure due to a lack of United Statesfinancial support Farmers were to be compensated with $500 per acre fordestroyed poppies which is only a fraction of the estimated $6400 per acre of grossincome an Afghani farmer can earn on poppy cultivation The UN Food and Agriculture Organization reported that ldquoAfghani government programs had a verylimited impactrdquo (Hanley 2002) At 2003 price levels and as a result of the explo-sion in poppy cultivation and production total income for Afghani opium farmersreached several hundred million United States dollars by the end of 2003 (Pound2004)

Other more unfortunate factors resulted from the 2002 poppy eradication cam-paign Afghan farmers have been killed and wounded by United States and Afghansecurity forces during protests against the campaign to eradicate their opiumpoppy crops (Wehrfritz 2003 Wyatt 2002) According to the BBC ldquoThe farmersare angered at what they see as derisory compensationrdquo (Wyatt 2002) ManyAfghan farmers direct their anger at the United States for pressuring the Karzaigovernment to institute the poppy ban (Pound 2004) As a result many Afghanfarmers have embraced Al Qaeda for its staunch anti-Americanism (Hersh 2004)

In the war on terrorism in Afghanistan the United States is trying to end theprofits Al Qaeda and the Taliban are making from the greater Central Asian drugtrade (Gannon 2004 Rashid 1999) However this may impact Americarsquos key alliesin the region who have for years reaped the rewards of the Afghanistanrsquos herointrade Nowhere is the problem clearer than along Afghanistanrsquos northern borderwith Tajikistan an ally in the United Statesrsquo antiterrorist efforts and a major conduitfor heroin and opium on its way to Europe and the Americas The United Statesrsquoinvasion even sparked a massive selling of heroin as Al Qaeda and Taliban forcesappeared to have been selling off their narcotic stockpiles for cash to purchase arms(Hersh 2004 Yglesias 2004)

Some Central Asian and Middle Eastern drug traffickers were actually support-ive of the American invasion of Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) According to the WallStreet Journal ldquoacross the Stans and the Caspian Sea in Lebanonrsquos Bekaa Valleysome pray for a speedy United States attack on Afghanistan lsquoItrsquos good for busi-nessrsquo says Muhammed standing in a garage full of cannabis a pistol tucked in hisbelt He is just back from harvesting this yearrsquos cannabis crop lsquoItrsquoll drive up hashishpricesrsquo Muhammed assures a prospective client that transport of 2500 kilograms(5500 pounds) to Amsterdam from the Bekaamdashcontrolled by Syrian troops as wellas Syrian- and Iranian-backed Shiite Muslim Hezbollah fightersmdashcan be arrangedrdquo(qtd in Targeting Terroristsrsquo Drug Money 2001 p 1)

Structural Attributes

Prior to the October 2001 invasion the United States government had no actualpresence in Afghanistan (Hersh 2004) Today the most important organizationsresponsible for conducting the narco-terror war in Afghanistan include the FederalBureau of Investigation the Drug Enforcement Administration the Special Forces

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 465

the Department of Statersquos Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforce-ment Affairs (INL) and Pakistan security forces in cooperation with the UN Officeof Drugs and Crime (UNODC) But how successful is the partnership In Febru-ary 2002 the UNODC confirmed that opium poppy cultivation rose to higherlevels than previous years under Taliban rule The UNODC Country Office forAfghanistan and the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme (ICMP) conducted a pre-assessment survey in 208 villages and 42 districts in the traditional opium poppygrowing areas of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan in the provinces of HelmandKandahar Oruzgan Nangarhar and Kunar Those five provinces accounted for84 of the total opium poppy cultivation area in Afghanistan in 2000 (UNODC2004b)

It is estimated that the various security forces currently monitor opium poppycultivation over an area between 45000 hectares and 65000 hectares (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003) This compares to the level of cultivation reached during the mid-1990s but remained lower than those recorded in 1999 (about 95000 hectares)and 2000 (about 82000 hectares) The resulting production of opium harvestedin 2004 could reach between 1900 and 2700 metric tons of opium (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003)

To address these realities the INL the DEA and the FBI have concluded thatwith at least 40 of the Afghan gross domestic product virtually tied to heroin therisks of an untethered narco-economy producing a chain reaction that reverses pastgains made under the Taliban are quite high indeed In response the INL and theDEA have built police training facilities and trained and retrained roughly 20000Afghan police officers in order to implement narco-terror initiatives against Talibanand Al Qaeda holdouts In coordination with United States Special Forces the Bushadministration seeks to place 50000 border guards and Afghan National Police byDecember 2005 in support of the opium eradication campaign The INL the DEAand the FBI are also involved in creating a comprehensive justice sector TheUnited Statesrsquo effort has also resulted in some intriguing bureaucratic alliancesThe Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency one of the main sources ofinformation for the United States-led alliance against the Taliban regime is asso-ciated with political assassinations narcotics trafficking and smuggling of nucleartechnology and missile delivery components with the backing fundamentalistIslamic movements (qtd in Bedi 2001)

Opium cultivation and heroin production in Pakistanrsquos northern tribal belt andadjoining Afghanistan was a vital offshoot of the ISIndashCIA cooperation (Rashid1999) It succeeded in turning some Soviet troops into addicts during the USSRrsquosoccupation of Afghanistan Heroin sales in Europe and the United States carriedout via deceptive means transport networks couriers and pay-offs offset the costof the various wars in Afghanistan (Gannon 2004)

Resultant Political Policy

The initial military victories in Afghanistan are in the process of being lost as thecountry is rapidly disintegrating into a state of narco-terrorism and anarchy TheUnited Statesrsquo efforts may fail unless the link between Al Qaeda Taliban forcesand opium production are finally overcome In 2004 opium farmers and traffick-ers in Afghanistan generated $23 billion in profits with higher estimates for the

466 Chris J Dolan

future The level of opium planting and the subsequent production of opium pastemorphine and heroin in Afghanistan is more than enough to satisfy the demandin Western Europe and the United States (Gannon 2004)

Although Afghanistan represents one source in worldwide opium production inaddition to Mexico South America and Southeast Asia narco-terrorism policytoward Afghanistan has not succeeded in reversing growth trends in heroin con-sumption in the United States According to the 2002 National Survey on DrugUse and Health approximately 37 million Americans ages 12 and older reportedtrying heroin at least once during their lifetimes representing 16 of the popu-lation ages 12 and older Roughly 404000 (02) reported past-year heroin useand 166000 (01) reported past-month heroin use (SAMHSA 2004) Among highschool students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the Future Study 16 ofeighth graders 15 of tenth graders and 15 of twelfth graders reported usingheroin at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these percentages were 1618 and 17 respectively (NIDA 2003)

Regarding the ease by which one can obtain heroin 156 of eighth graders188 of tenth graders and 279 of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reportedthat heroin was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 63 ofeighth graders 71 of tenth graders and 59 of twelfth graders reported thatusing heroin once or twice without a needle was a ldquogreat riskrdquo (NIDA 2003)Nationwide 33 of high school students surveyed in 2003 as part of the YouthRisk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) reported using heroin during theirlifetimes Male students (43) were significantly more likely than female students(20) to report lifetime heroin use Hispanic students (39) were more likely toreport heroin use within their lifetime than white (26) or black (26) students(CDC 2004) During 2002 10 of college students and 18 of young adults (ages19ndash28) reported using heroin at least once during their lifetimes Approximately01 of college students and 02 of young adults reported past year use of heroinand 00 of college students and less than 005 of young adults reported pastmonth use of heroin (NIDA 2004)

According to data from the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) Programa median of 58 of adult male arrestees and 66 of adult female arrestees testedpositive for opiates at arrest in 2003 The adult male samples were compiled from39 United States sites and the adult female samples were compiled from 25 sitesA median of 51 of adult male arrestees and 71 of adult female arresteesreported using heroin at least once in the year before being arrested (NationalInstitute of Justice 2004) Although heroin expenditures were $22 billion in 1990demand decreased to $10 billion in 2000 and whereas in 1990 Americans con-sumed 136 metric tons of heroin estimates remained relatively unchanged in 2000(ABT Associates 2001)

Conclusions

Based on these observations of narco-terrorist activities in Afghanistan and Colom-bia on a substantive level the Bush administration has formulated domestic andinternational drug reduction strategies with an eye on asset seizure and control offunding used by terrorist organizations However important questions remain con-cerning the legitimacy of Americarsquos policy efforts Indeed narco-terrorism as a

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 467

national security threat is not new The 911 attacks simply pushed narco-terror-ism higher on the presidentrsquos national security agenda particularly in light of theconnection between the Afghan drug trade and the Al Qaeda network

On a theoretical level the contingency approach to examining narco-terrorismpolicy highlights several major concerns that have not been adequately addressedFirst as it is conducted today the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy places sig-nificant attention on the increased utilization of American military power Eversince President Richard Nixon proclaimed a war on drugs and President GeorgeW Bush a war on terrorism concern over the use of the military in what have typically been deemed law enforcement and social issues has overshadowed mostother related methods Even if the United States did not introduce troops intoAfghanistan or Colombia we are still left with a highly militarized narco-terrorismpolicy that facilitates human rights abuses by those governments receiving UnitedStates aid Moreover the result has been an increase in the production and con-sumption of illegal drugs that are trafficked by organizations that use profits topromote terrorist attacks

Second the contingency approach used in this study reveals the problems narco-terrorism policy has experienced in targeting so-called weak states Narco-terrorism policy has elevated the potential for the United States to use its diplo-matic weight to force governments to enact stricter antidrug policies This hasencouraged states like Afghanistan and Colombia to further undermine politicaleconomic and social development with undemocratic policies directed at citizensAs a result the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism efforts have in part fueled anti-American resentment thereby increasing the potential for additional terrorist activities by groups such as Al Qaeda or FARC

Third it has become more apparent that narco-terrorism policy has becomelike all other policies highly politicized Americarsquos counterdrug efforts are virtu-ally indistinguishable from counterinsurgency efforts by remnants of the Talibanand Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and FARC and other terror-related groups in Colom-bia Moreover the United States is being rather bold in designating particulargroups as narco-terrorists although conveniently leaving off others such as theNorthern Alliance in Afghanistan This hinders the rule of law in a number of countries

Finally the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in its current form neglectscertain realities Quite simply many critics allege that narco-terrorist connectionsare indirect and for the most part ambiguous In addition critics of prohibitionmaintain that it is the illegalization of drugs that generates the enormous profitsused to support terrorist and insurgent organizations Another concern is thatnarco-terrorism does not address the complexities of terrorism or insurgenciesCan Afghanistan and Colombia continue to be addressed in narrowly defined mil-itary and law enforcement frameworks that neglect political economic and socialconsiderations

About the Author

Chris J Dolan is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Floridawhere he teaches courses on public policy United States Foreign Policy and National Secu-

468 Chris J Dolan

rity the Mass Media and the American presidency He received his PhD from the Univer-sity of South Carolina He is the author of In War We Trust The Political Dimensions and EthicalConsequences of the First Strike Doctrine (Ashgate Press 2005) and co-editor of Striking First ThePreventive Doctrine and the Reshaping of US Foreign Policy (Palgrave-Macmillan 2004) Hisresearch on public policy executive policymaking foreign policy and the mass media appearin Policy Studies Journal Congress and the Presidency Politics and Policy White House Studies andin numerous edited volumes

References

ABT Associates (2001) What Americarsquos users spend on drugs 1988ndash2000 Prepared for the Office of NationalDrug Control Policy Retrieved April 21 2004 from httpwwwwhitehousedrugpolicygovpublicationspdfamerican_users_spend_2002pdf

Allison G T (1971) Essence of decision Boston Little BrownAllison G T amp Halperin M H (1972) Bureaucratic politics A paradigm and and some policy implications

World Politics 24 40ndash79Baldwin E (1991) Why rules donrsquot work Modern Law Review 53 321ndash338Barnard D (2003) Narco-terrorism realities The connection between drugs and terror Journal of Countert-

errorism and Homeland Security International 9(1) 31ndash34Bedi R (2001 September 26) The assassins and drug dealers are now helping us The Daily Telegraph p 1Bennett C J (1991) What is policy convergence What causes it British Journal of Political Science 21(2)

215ndash233Blau P amp Scott R (1962) Formal organizations San Francisco ChandlerBouchard G amp Carroll B (2002) Policy-making and administrative discretion The case of immigration in

Canada Canadian Public Administration 25(2) 239ndash259Bouchard G amp Carroll B (2003) One size does not fit all Annual Meeting of the Canadian Public Service

Administration Halifax Nova ScotiaBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002a) Fiscal year 2003 congres-

sional budget justification Washington DC AuthorBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002b) International narcotics

control strategy Afghanistan (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 from httpusembassystategovafghanistanwwwh02121802html

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2004) International NarcoticsControl Strategy Southwest Asia (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 fromhttpwwwstategovginlrlsnrcrpt2003vol1html29836htm

Bureau of Justice Statistics United States Department of Justice (2000) Sourcebook of criminal justice statisticsWashington DC United States Government Printing Office

Cala A (2001 November 21) Danger of a new Vietnam The Gazette p 1Carroll B amp Garkut D E (1996) Is there an empirical trend toward managerialism Canadian Public Admin-

istration 39(4) 535ndash553Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2004) Youth risk behavior surveillance United States 2003 (May 21)

Retrieved August 2 2004 from httpwwwcdcgovmmwrpreviewmmwrhtmlss5302a1htmChepesiuk R (1999) Hard target The United States war against international drug trafficking 1982ndash1997 Jeffer-

son NC McFarland amp CoColombia Program Center for International Policy (2000) Plan Colombia A plan for peace or a plan for war

( June 20) Retrieved May 1 2004 from httpwwwciponlineorgcolombia062001htmColombia Program Center for International Policy (2004) US Aid to Colombia since 1997 Summary tables

(February 20) Retrieved May 2 2004 from httpciponlineorgcolombiaaidtablehtmConcar D (2001 September 29) Cutting the Talibanrsquos lifeline New Scientist p 77Desveaux J A Lindquist E A amp Toner G (1994) Organizing for policy innovations in public bureaucra-

cies AIDS energy and environmental policy in Canada Canadian Journal of Political Science 27(3)493ndash528

Dexter L (1981) Unintended consequences of purposive legislative action Alternatives to implementationJournal of Public Policy 4(4) 250ndash264

Drug Abuse Policy Office (1982) Federal strategy for prevention of drug abuse and drug trafficking WashingtonDC United States Government Printing Office

Drug Enforcement Administration Intelligence Division (2002) Drugs and terrorism A new perspective RetrievedApril 29 2004 from httpwwwdeagovpubsintel02039f1f1

Dudley S (2000 July 31) The Colombia quagmire The American Prospect p 32

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 469

the Department of Statersquos Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforce-ment Affairs (INL) and Pakistan security forces in cooperation with the UN Officeof Drugs and Crime (UNODC) But how successful is the partnership In Febru-ary 2002 the UNODC confirmed that opium poppy cultivation rose to higherlevels than previous years under Taliban rule The UNODC Country Office forAfghanistan and the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme (ICMP) conducted a pre-assessment survey in 208 villages and 42 districts in the traditional opium poppygrowing areas of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan in the provinces of HelmandKandahar Oruzgan Nangarhar and Kunar Those five provinces accounted for84 of the total opium poppy cultivation area in Afghanistan in 2000 (UNODC2004b)

It is estimated that the various security forces currently monitor opium poppycultivation over an area between 45000 hectares and 65000 hectares (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003) This compares to the level of cultivation reached during the mid-1990s but remained lower than those recorded in 1999 (about 95000 hectares)and 2000 (about 82000 hectares) The resulting production of opium harvestedin 2004 could reach between 1900 and 2700 metric tons of opium (Moreau ampYousafzai 2003)

To address these realities the INL the DEA and the FBI have concluded thatwith at least 40 of the Afghan gross domestic product virtually tied to heroin therisks of an untethered narco-economy producing a chain reaction that reverses pastgains made under the Taliban are quite high indeed In response the INL and theDEA have built police training facilities and trained and retrained roughly 20000Afghan police officers in order to implement narco-terror initiatives against Talibanand Al Qaeda holdouts In coordination with United States Special Forces the Bushadministration seeks to place 50000 border guards and Afghan National Police byDecember 2005 in support of the opium eradication campaign The INL the DEAand the FBI are also involved in creating a comprehensive justice sector TheUnited Statesrsquo effort has also resulted in some intriguing bureaucratic alliancesThe Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency one of the main sources ofinformation for the United States-led alliance against the Taliban regime is asso-ciated with political assassinations narcotics trafficking and smuggling of nucleartechnology and missile delivery components with the backing fundamentalistIslamic movements (qtd in Bedi 2001)

Opium cultivation and heroin production in Pakistanrsquos northern tribal belt andadjoining Afghanistan was a vital offshoot of the ISIndashCIA cooperation (Rashid1999) It succeeded in turning some Soviet troops into addicts during the USSRrsquosoccupation of Afghanistan Heroin sales in Europe and the United States carriedout via deceptive means transport networks couriers and pay-offs offset the costof the various wars in Afghanistan (Gannon 2004)

Resultant Political Policy

The initial military victories in Afghanistan are in the process of being lost as thecountry is rapidly disintegrating into a state of narco-terrorism and anarchy TheUnited Statesrsquo efforts may fail unless the link between Al Qaeda Taliban forcesand opium production are finally overcome In 2004 opium farmers and traffick-ers in Afghanistan generated $23 billion in profits with higher estimates for the

466 Chris J Dolan

future The level of opium planting and the subsequent production of opium pastemorphine and heroin in Afghanistan is more than enough to satisfy the demandin Western Europe and the United States (Gannon 2004)

Although Afghanistan represents one source in worldwide opium production inaddition to Mexico South America and Southeast Asia narco-terrorism policytoward Afghanistan has not succeeded in reversing growth trends in heroin con-sumption in the United States According to the 2002 National Survey on DrugUse and Health approximately 37 million Americans ages 12 and older reportedtrying heroin at least once during their lifetimes representing 16 of the popu-lation ages 12 and older Roughly 404000 (02) reported past-year heroin useand 166000 (01) reported past-month heroin use (SAMHSA 2004) Among highschool students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the Future Study 16 ofeighth graders 15 of tenth graders and 15 of twelfth graders reported usingheroin at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these percentages were 1618 and 17 respectively (NIDA 2003)

Regarding the ease by which one can obtain heroin 156 of eighth graders188 of tenth graders and 279 of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reportedthat heroin was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 63 ofeighth graders 71 of tenth graders and 59 of twelfth graders reported thatusing heroin once or twice without a needle was a ldquogreat riskrdquo (NIDA 2003)Nationwide 33 of high school students surveyed in 2003 as part of the YouthRisk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) reported using heroin during theirlifetimes Male students (43) were significantly more likely than female students(20) to report lifetime heroin use Hispanic students (39) were more likely toreport heroin use within their lifetime than white (26) or black (26) students(CDC 2004) During 2002 10 of college students and 18 of young adults (ages19ndash28) reported using heroin at least once during their lifetimes Approximately01 of college students and 02 of young adults reported past year use of heroinand 00 of college students and less than 005 of young adults reported pastmonth use of heroin (NIDA 2004)

According to data from the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) Programa median of 58 of adult male arrestees and 66 of adult female arrestees testedpositive for opiates at arrest in 2003 The adult male samples were compiled from39 United States sites and the adult female samples were compiled from 25 sitesA median of 51 of adult male arrestees and 71 of adult female arresteesreported using heroin at least once in the year before being arrested (NationalInstitute of Justice 2004) Although heroin expenditures were $22 billion in 1990demand decreased to $10 billion in 2000 and whereas in 1990 Americans con-sumed 136 metric tons of heroin estimates remained relatively unchanged in 2000(ABT Associates 2001)

Conclusions

Based on these observations of narco-terrorist activities in Afghanistan and Colom-bia on a substantive level the Bush administration has formulated domestic andinternational drug reduction strategies with an eye on asset seizure and control offunding used by terrorist organizations However important questions remain con-cerning the legitimacy of Americarsquos policy efforts Indeed narco-terrorism as a

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 467

national security threat is not new The 911 attacks simply pushed narco-terror-ism higher on the presidentrsquos national security agenda particularly in light of theconnection between the Afghan drug trade and the Al Qaeda network

On a theoretical level the contingency approach to examining narco-terrorismpolicy highlights several major concerns that have not been adequately addressedFirst as it is conducted today the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy places sig-nificant attention on the increased utilization of American military power Eversince President Richard Nixon proclaimed a war on drugs and President GeorgeW Bush a war on terrorism concern over the use of the military in what have typically been deemed law enforcement and social issues has overshadowed mostother related methods Even if the United States did not introduce troops intoAfghanistan or Colombia we are still left with a highly militarized narco-terrorismpolicy that facilitates human rights abuses by those governments receiving UnitedStates aid Moreover the result has been an increase in the production and con-sumption of illegal drugs that are trafficked by organizations that use profits topromote terrorist attacks

Second the contingency approach used in this study reveals the problems narco-terrorism policy has experienced in targeting so-called weak states Narco-terrorism policy has elevated the potential for the United States to use its diplo-matic weight to force governments to enact stricter antidrug policies This hasencouraged states like Afghanistan and Colombia to further undermine politicaleconomic and social development with undemocratic policies directed at citizensAs a result the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism efforts have in part fueled anti-American resentment thereby increasing the potential for additional terrorist activities by groups such as Al Qaeda or FARC

Third it has become more apparent that narco-terrorism policy has becomelike all other policies highly politicized Americarsquos counterdrug efforts are virtu-ally indistinguishable from counterinsurgency efforts by remnants of the Talibanand Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and FARC and other terror-related groups in Colom-bia Moreover the United States is being rather bold in designating particulargroups as narco-terrorists although conveniently leaving off others such as theNorthern Alliance in Afghanistan This hinders the rule of law in a number of countries

Finally the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in its current form neglectscertain realities Quite simply many critics allege that narco-terrorist connectionsare indirect and for the most part ambiguous In addition critics of prohibitionmaintain that it is the illegalization of drugs that generates the enormous profitsused to support terrorist and insurgent organizations Another concern is thatnarco-terrorism does not address the complexities of terrorism or insurgenciesCan Afghanistan and Colombia continue to be addressed in narrowly defined mil-itary and law enforcement frameworks that neglect political economic and socialconsiderations

About the Author

Chris J Dolan is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Floridawhere he teaches courses on public policy United States Foreign Policy and National Secu-

468 Chris J Dolan

rity the Mass Media and the American presidency He received his PhD from the Univer-sity of South Carolina He is the author of In War We Trust The Political Dimensions and EthicalConsequences of the First Strike Doctrine (Ashgate Press 2005) and co-editor of Striking First ThePreventive Doctrine and the Reshaping of US Foreign Policy (Palgrave-Macmillan 2004) Hisresearch on public policy executive policymaking foreign policy and the mass media appearin Policy Studies Journal Congress and the Presidency Politics and Policy White House Studies andin numerous edited volumes

References

ABT Associates (2001) What Americarsquos users spend on drugs 1988ndash2000 Prepared for the Office of NationalDrug Control Policy Retrieved April 21 2004 from httpwwwwhitehousedrugpolicygovpublicationspdfamerican_users_spend_2002pdf

Allison G T (1971) Essence of decision Boston Little BrownAllison G T amp Halperin M H (1972) Bureaucratic politics A paradigm and and some policy implications

World Politics 24 40ndash79Baldwin E (1991) Why rules donrsquot work Modern Law Review 53 321ndash338Barnard D (2003) Narco-terrorism realities The connection between drugs and terror Journal of Countert-

errorism and Homeland Security International 9(1) 31ndash34Bedi R (2001 September 26) The assassins and drug dealers are now helping us The Daily Telegraph p 1Bennett C J (1991) What is policy convergence What causes it British Journal of Political Science 21(2)

215ndash233Blau P amp Scott R (1962) Formal organizations San Francisco ChandlerBouchard G amp Carroll B (2002) Policy-making and administrative discretion The case of immigration in

Canada Canadian Public Administration 25(2) 239ndash259Bouchard G amp Carroll B (2003) One size does not fit all Annual Meeting of the Canadian Public Service

Administration Halifax Nova ScotiaBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002a) Fiscal year 2003 congres-

sional budget justification Washington DC AuthorBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002b) International narcotics

control strategy Afghanistan (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 from httpusembassystategovafghanistanwwwh02121802html

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2004) International NarcoticsControl Strategy Southwest Asia (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 fromhttpwwwstategovginlrlsnrcrpt2003vol1html29836htm

Bureau of Justice Statistics United States Department of Justice (2000) Sourcebook of criminal justice statisticsWashington DC United States Government Printing Office

Cala A (2001 November 21) Danger of a new Vietnam The Gazette p 1Carroll B amp Garkut D E (1996) Is there an empirical trend toward managerialism Canadian Public Admin-

istration 39(4) 535ndash553Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2004) Youth risk behavior surveillance United States 2003 (May 21)

Retrieved August 2 2004 from httpwwwcdcgovmmwrpreviewmmwrhtmlss5302a1htmChepesiuk R (1999) Hard target The United States war against international drug trafficking 1982ndash1997 Jeffer-

son NC McFarland amp CoColombia Program Center for International Policy (2000) Plan Colombia A plan for peace or a plan for war

( June 20) Retrieved May 1 2004 from httpwwwciponlineorgcolombia062001htmColombia Program Center for International Policy (2004) US Aid to Colombia since 1997 Summary tables

(February 20) Retrieved May 2 2004 from httpciponlineorgcolombiaaidtablehtmConcar D (2001 September 29) Cutting the Talibanrsquos lifeline New Scientist p 77Desveaux J A Lindquist E A amp Toner G (1994) Organizing for policy innovations in public bureaucra-

cies AIDS energy and environmental policy in Canada Canadian Journal of Political Science 27(3)493ndash528

Dexter L (1981) Unintended consequences of purposive legislative action Alternatives to implementationJournal of Public Policy 4(4) 250ndash264

Drug Abuse Policy Office (1982) Federal strategy for prevention of drug abuse and drug trafficking WashingtonDC United States Government Printing Office

Drug Enforcement Administration Intelligence Division (2002) Drugs and terrorism A new perspective RetrievedApril 29 2004 from httpwwwdeagovpubsintel02039f1f1

Dudley S (2000 July 31) The Colombia quagmire The American Prospect p 32

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 469

future The level of opium planting and the subsequent production of opium pastemorphine and heroin in Afghanistan is more than enough to satisfy the demandin Western Europe and the United States (Gannon 2004)

Although Afghanistan represents one source in worldwide opium production inaddition to Mexico South America and Southeast Asia narco-terrorism policytoward Afghanistan has not succeeded in reversing growth trends in heroin con-sumption in the United States According to the 2002 National Survey on DrugUse and Health approximately 37 million Americans ages 12 and older reportedtrying heroin at least once during their lifetimes representing 16 of the popu-lation ages 12 and older Roughly 404000 (02) reported past-year heroin useand 166000 (01) reported past-month heroin use (SAMHSA 2004) Among highschool students surveyed as part of the 2003 Monitoring the Future Study 16 ofeighth graders 15 of tenth graders and 15 of twelfth graders reported usingheroin at least once during their lifetimes In 2002 these percentages were 1618 and 17 respectively (NIDA 2003)

Regarding the ease by which one can obtain heroin 156 of eighth graders188 of tenth graders and 279 of twelfth graders surveyed in 2003 reportedthat heroin was ldquofairly easyrdquo or ldquovery easyrdquo to obtain (NIDA 2003) Nearly 63 ofeighth graders 71 of tenth graders and 59 of twelfth graders reported thatusing heroin once or twice without a needle was a ldquogreat riskrdquo (NIDA 2003)Nationwide 33 of high school students surveyed in 2003 as part of the YouthRisk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) reported using heroin during theirlifetimes Male students (43) were significantly more likely than female students(20) to report lifetime heroin use Hispanic students (39) were more likely toreport heroin use within their lifetime than white (26) or black (26) students(CDC 2004) During 2002 10 of college students and 18 of young adults (ages19ndash28) reported using heroin at least once during their lifetimes Approximately01 of college students and 02 of young adults reported past year use of heroinand 00 of college students and less than 005 of young adults reported pastmonth use of heroin (NIDA 2004)

According to data from the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) Programa median of 58 of adult male arrestees and 66 of adult female arrestees testedpositive for opiates at arrest in 2003 The adult male samples were compiled from39 United States sites and the adult female samples were compiled from 25 sitesA median of 51 of adult male arrestees and 71 of adult female arresteesreported using heroin at least once in the year before being arrested (NationalInstitute of Justice 2004) Although heroin expenditures were $22 billion in 1990demand decreased to $10 billion in 2000 and whereas in 1990 Americans con-sumed 136 metric tons of heroin estimates remained relatively unchanged in 2000(ABT Associates 2001)

Conclusions

Based on these observations of narco-terrorist activities in Afghanistan and Colom-bia on a substantive level the Bush administration has formulated domestic andinternational drug reduction strategies with an eye on asset seizure and control offunding used by terrorist organizations However important questions remain con-cerning the legitimacy of Americarsquos policy efforts Indeed narco-terrorism as a

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 467

national security threat is not new The 911 attacks simply pushed narco-terror-ism higher on the presidentrsquos national security agenda particularly in light of theconnection between the Afghan drug trade and the Al Qaeda network

On a theoretical level the contingency approach to examining narco-terrorismpolicy highlights several major concerns that have not been adequately addressedFirst as it is conducted today the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy places sig-nificant attention on the increased utilization of American military power Eversince President Richard Nixon proclaimed a war on drugs and President GeorgeW Bush a war on terrorism concern over the use of the military in what have typically been deemed law enforcement and social issues has overshadowed mostother related methods Even if the United States did not introduce troops intoAfghanistan or Colombia we are still left with a highly militarized narco-terrorismpolicy that facilitates human rights abuses by those governments receiving UnitedStates aid Moreover the result has been an increase in the production and con-sumption of illegal drugs that are trafficked by organizations that use profits topromote terrorist attacks

Second the contingency approach used in this study reveals the problems narco-terrorism policy has experienced in targeting so-called weak states Narco-terrorism policy has elevated the potential for the United States to use its diplo-matic weight to force governments to enact stricter antidrug policies This hasencouraged states like Afghanistan and Colombia to further undermine politicaleconomic and social development with undemocratic policies directed at citizensAs a result the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism efforts have in part fueled anti-American resentment thereby increasing the potential for additional terrorist activities by groups such as Al Qaeda or FARC

Third it has become more apparent that narco-terrorism policy has becomelike all other policies highly politicized Americarsquos counterdrug efforts are virtu-ally indistinguishable from counterinsurgency efforts by remnants of the Talibanand Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and FARC and other terror-related groups in Colom-bia Moreover the United States is being rather bold in designating particulargroups as narco-terrorists although conveniently leaving off others such as theNorthern Alliance in Afghanistan This hinders the rule of law in a number of countries

Finally the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in its current form neglectscertain realities Quite simply many critics allege that narco-terrorist connectionsare indirect and for the most part ambiguous In addition critics of prohibitionmaintain that it is the illegalization of drugs that generates the enormous profitsused to support terrorist and insurgent organizations Another concern is thatnarco-terrorism does not address the complexities of terrorism or insurgenciesCan Afghanistan and Colombia continue to be addressed in narrowly defined mil-itary and law enforcement frameworks that neglect political economic and socialconsiderations

About the Author

Chris J Dolan is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Floridawhere he teaches courses on public policy United States Foreign Policy and National Secu-

468 Chris J Dolan

rity the Mass Media and the American presidency He received his PhD from the Univer-sity of South Carolina He is the author of In War We Trust The Political Dimensions and EthicalConsequences of the First Strike Doctrine (Ashgate Press 2005) and co-editor of Striking First ThePreventive Doctrine and the Reshaping of US Foreign Policy (Palgrave-Macmillan 2004) Hisresearch on public policy executive policymaking foreign policy and the mass media appearin Policy Studies Journal Congress and the Presidency Politics and Policy White House Studies andin numerous edited volumes

References

ABT Associates (2001) What Americarsquos users spend on drugs 1988ndash2000 Prepared for the Office of NationalDrug Control Policy Retrieved April 21 2004 from httpwwwwhitehousedrugpolicygovpublicationspdfamerican_users_spend_2002pdf

Allison G T (1971) Essence of decision Boston Little BrownAllison G T amp Halperin M H (1972) Bureaucratic politics A paradigm and and some policy implications

World Politics 24 40ndash79Baldwin E (1991) Why rules donrsquot work Modern Law Review 53 321ndash338Barnard D (2003) Narco-terrorism realities The connection between drugs and terror Journal of Countert-

errorism and Homeland Security International 9(1) 31ndash34Bedi R (2001 September 26) The assassins and drug dealers are now helping us The Daily Telegraph p 1Bennett C J (1991) What is policy convergence What causes it British Journal of Political Science 21(2)

215ndash233Blau P amp Scott R (1962) Formal organizations San Francisco ChandlerBouchard G amp Carroll B (2002) Policy-making and administrative discretion The case of immigration in

Canada Canadian Public Administration 25(2) 239ndash259Bouchard G amp Carroll B (2003) One size does not fit all Annual Meeting of the Canadian Public Service

Administration Halifax Nova ScotiaBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002a) Fiscal year 2003 congres-

sional budget justification Washington DC AuthorBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002b) International narcotics

control strategy Afghanistan (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 from httpusembassystategovafghanistanwwwh02121802html

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2004) International NarcoticsControl Strategy Southwest Asia (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 fromhttpwwwstategovginlrlsnrcrpt2003vol1html29836htm

Bureau of Justice Statistics United States Department of Justice (2000) Sourcebook of criminal justice statisticsWashington DC United States Government Printing Office

Cala A (2001 November 21) Danger of a new Vietnam The Gazette p 1Carroll B amp Garkut D E (1996) Is there an empirical trend toward managerialism Canadian Public Admin-

istration 39(4) 535ndash553Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2004) Youth risk behavior surveillance United States 2003 (May 21)

Retrieved August 2 2004 from httpwwwcdcgovmmwrpreviewmmwrhtmlss5302a1htmChepesiuk R (1999) Hard target The United States war against international drug trafficking 1982ndash1997 Jeffer-

son NC McFarland amp CoColombia Program Center for International Policy (2000) Plan Colombia A plan for peace or a plan for war

( June 20) Retrieved May 1 2004 from httpwwwciponlineorgcolombia062001htmColombia Program Center for International Policy (2004) US Aid to Colombia since 1997 Summary tables

(February 20) Retrieved May 2 2004 from httpciponlineorgcolombiaaidtablehtmConcar D (2001 September 29) Cutting the Talibanrsquos lifeline New Scientist p 77Desveaux J A Lindquist E A amp Toner G (1994) Organizing for policy innovations in public bureaucra-

cies AIDS energy and environmental policy in Canada Canadian Journal of Political Science 27(3)493ndash528

Dexter L (1981) Unintended consequences of purposive legislative action Alternatives to implementationJournal of Public Policy 4(4) 250ndash264

Drug Abuse Policy Office (1982) Federal strategy for prevention of drug abuse and drug trafficking WashingtonDC United States Government Printing Office

Drug Enforcement Administration Intelligence Division (2002) Drugs and terrorism A new perspective RetrievedApril 29 2004 from httpwwwdeagovpubsintel02039f1f1

Dudley S (2000 July 31) The Colombia quagmire The American Prospect p 32

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 469

national security threat is not new The 911 attacks simply pushed narco-terror-ism higher on the presidentrsquos national security agenda particularly in light of theconnection between the Afghan drug trade and the Al Qaeda network

On a theoretical level the contingency approach to examining narco-terrorismpolicy highlights several major concerns that have not been adequately addressedFirst as it is conducted today the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy places sig-nificant attention on the increased utilization of American military power Eversince President Richard Nixon proclaimed a war on drugs and President GeorgeW Bush a war on terrorism concern over the use of the military in what have typically been deemed law enforcement and social issues has overshadowed mostother related methods Even if the United States did not introduce troops intoAfghanistan or Colombia we are still left with a highly militarized narco-terrorismpolicy that facilitates human rights abuses by those governments receiving UnitedStates aid Moreover the result has been an increase in the production and con-sumption of illegal drugs that are trafficked by organizations that use profits topromote terrorist attacks

Second the contingency approach used in this study reveals the problems narco-terrorism policy has experienced in targeting so-called weak states Narco-terrorism policy has elevated the potential for the United States to use its diplo-matic weight to force governments to enact stricter antidrug policies This hasencouraged states like Afghanistan and Colombia to further undermine politicaleconomic and social development with undemocratic policies directed at citizensAs a result the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism efforts have in part fueled anti-American resentment thereby increasing the potential for additional terrorist activities by groups such as Al Qaeda or FARC

Third it has become more apparent that narco-terrorism policy has becomelike all other policies highly politicized Americarsquos counterdrug efforts are virtu-ally indistinguishable from counterinsurgency efforts by remnants of the Talibanand Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and FARC and other terror-related groups in Colom-bia Moreover the United States is being rather bold in designating particulargroups as narco-terrorists although conveniently leaving off others such as theNorthern Alliance in Afghanistan This hinders the rule of law in a number of countries

Finally the United Statesrsquo narco-terrorism policy in its current form neglectscertain realities Quite simply many critics allege that narco-terrorist connectionsare indirect and for the most part ambiguous In addition critics of prohibitionmaintain that it is the illegalization of drugs that generates the enormous profitsused to support terrorist and insurgent organizations Another concern is thatnarco-terrorism does not address the complexities of terrorism or insurgenciesCan Afghanistan and Colombia continue to be addressed in narrowly defined mil-itary and law enforcement frameworks that neglect political economic and socialconsiderations

About the Author

Chris J Dolan is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Floridawhere he teaches courses on public policy United States Foreign Policy and National Secu-

468 Chris J Dolan

rity the Mass Media and the American presidency He received his PhD from the Univer-sity of South Carolina He is the author of In War We Trust The Political Dimensions and EthicalConsequences of the First Strike Doctrine (Ashgate Press 2005) and co-editor of Striking First ThePreventive Doctrine and the Reshaping of US Foreign Policy (Palgrave-Macmillan 2004) Hisresearch on public policy executive policymaking foreign policy and the mass media appearin Policy Studies Journal Congress and the Presidency Politics and Policy White House Studies andin numerous edited volumes

References

ABT Associates (2001) What Americarsquos users spend on drugs 1988ndash2000 Prepared for the Office of NationalDrug Control Policy Retrieved April 21 2004 from httpwwwwhitehousedrugpolicygovpublicationspdfamerican_users_spend_2002pdf

Allison G T (1971) Essence of decision Boston Little BrownAllison G T amp Halperin M H (1972) Bureaucratic politics A paradigm and and some policy implications

World Politics 24 40ndash79Baldwin E (1991) Why rules donrsquot work Modern Law Review 53 321ndash338Barnard D (2003) Narco-terrorism realities The connection between drugs and terror Journal of Countert-

errorism and Homeland Security International 9(1) 31ndash34Bedi R (2001 September 26) The assassins and drug dealers are now helping us The Daily Telegraph p 1Bennett C J (1991) What is policy convergence What causes it British Journal of Political Science 21(2)

215ndash233Blau P amp Scott R (1962) Formal organizations San Francisco ChandlerBouchard G amp Carroll B (2002) Policy-making and administrative discretion The case of immigration in

Canada Canadian Public Administration 25(2) 239ndash259Bouchard G amp Carroll B (2003) One size does not fit all Annual Meeting of the Canadian Public Service

Administration Halifax Nova ScotiaBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002a) Fiscal year 2003 congres-

sional budget justification Washington DC AuthorBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002b) International narcotics

control strategy Afghanistan (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 from httpusembassystategovafghanistanwwwh02121802html

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2004) International NarcoticsControl Strategy Southwest Asia (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 fromhttpwwwstategovginlrlsnrcrpt2003vol1html29836htm

Bureau of Justice Statistics United States Department of Justice (2000) Sourcebook of criminal justice statisticsWashington DC United States Government Printing Office

Cala A (2001 November 21) Danger of a new Vietnam The Gazette p 1Carroll B amp Garkut D E (1996) Is there an empirical trend toward managerialism Canadian Public Admin-

istration 39(4) 535ndash553Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2004) Youth risk behavior surveillance United States 2003 (May 21)

Retrieved August 2 2004 from httpwwwcdcgovmmwrpreviewmmwrhtmlss5302a1htmChepesiuk R (1999) Hard target The United States war against international drug trafficking 1982ndash1997 Jeffer-

son NC McFarland amp CoColombia Program Center for International Policy (2000) Plan Colombia A plan for peace or a plan for war

( June 20) Retrieved May 1 2004 from httpwwwciponlineorgcolombia062001htmColombia Program Center for International Policy (2004) US Aid to Colombia since 1997 Summary tables

(February 20) Retrieved May 2 2004 from httpciponlineorgcolombiaaidtablehtmConcar D (2001 September 29) Cutting the Talibanrsquos lifeline New Scientist p 77Desveaux J A Lindquist E A amp Toner G (1994) Organizing for policy innovations in public bureaucra-

cies AIDS energy and environmental policy in Canada Canadian Journal of Political Science 27(3)493ndash528

Dexter L (1981) Unintended consequences of purposive legislative action Alternatives to implementationJournal of Public Policy 4(4) 250ndash264

Drug Abuse Policy Office (1982) Federal strategy for prevention of drug abuse and drug trafficking WashingtonDC United States Government Printing Office

Drug Enforcement Administration Intelligence Division (2002) Drugs and terrorism A new perspective RetrievedApril 29 2004 from httpwwwdeagovpubsintel02039f1f1

Dudley S (2000 July 31) The Colombia quagmire The American Prospect p 32

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 469

rity the Mass Media and the American presidency He received his PhD from the Univer-sity of South Carolina He is the author of In War We Trust The Political Dimensions and EthicalConsequences of the First Strike Doctrine (Ashgate Press 2005) and co-editor of Striking First ThePreventive Doctrine and the Reshaping of US Foreign Policy (Palgrave-Macmillan 2004) Hisresearch on public policy executive policymaking foreign policy and the mass media appearin Policy Studies Journal Congress and the Presidency Politics and Policy White House Studies andin numerous edited volumes

References

ABT Associates (2001) What Americarsquos users spend on drugs 1988ndash2000 Prepared for the Office of NationalDrug Control Policy Retrieved April 21 2004 from httpwwwwhitehousedrugpolicygovpublicationspdfamerican_users_spend_2002pdf

Allison G T (1971) Essence of decision Boston Little BrownAllison G T amp Halperin M H (1972) Bureaucratic politics A paradigm and and some policy implications

World Politics 24 40ndash79Baldwin E (1991) Why rules donrsquot work Modern Law Review 53 321ndash338Barnard D (2003) Narco-terrorism realities The connection between drugs and terror Journal of Countert-

errorism and Homeland Security International 9(1) 31ndash34Bedi R (2001 September 26) The assassins and drug dealers are now helping us The Daily Telegraph p 1Bennett C J (1991) What is policy convergence What causes it British Journal of Political Science 21(2)

215ndash233Blau P amp Scott R (1962) Formal organizations San Francisco ChandlerBouchard G amp Carroll B (2002) Policy-making and administrative discretion The case of immigration in

Canada Canadian Public Administration 25(2) 239ndash259Bouchard G amp Carroll B (2003) One size does not fit all Annual Meeting of the Canadian Public Service

Administration Halifax Nova ScotiaBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002a) Fiscal year 2003 congres-

sional budget justification Washington DC AuthorBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2002b) International narcotics

control strategy Afghanistan (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 from httpusembassystategovafghanistanwwwh02121802html

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) (2004) International NarcoticsControl Strategy Southwest Asia (March) Washington DC Author Retrieved April 29 2004 fromhttpwwwstategovginlrlsnrcrpt2003vol1html29836htm

Bureau of Justice Statistics United States Department of Justice (2000) Sourcebook of criminal justice statisticsWashington DC United States Government Printing Office

Cala A (2001 November 21) Danger of a new Vietnam The Gazette p 1Carroll B amp Garkut D E (1996) Is there an empirical trend toward managerialism Canadian Public Admin-

istration 39(4) 535ndash553Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2004) Youth risk behavior surveillance United States 2003 (May 21)

Retrieved August 2 2004 from httpwwwcdcgovmmwrpreviewmmwrhtmlss5302a1htmChepesiuk R (1999) Hard target The United States war against international drug trafficking 1982ndash1997 Jeffer-

son NC McFarland amp CoColombia Program Center for International Policy (2000) Plan Colombia A plan for peace or a plan for war

( June 20) Retrieved May 1 2004 from httpwwwciponlineorgcolombia062001htmColombia Program Center for International Policy (2004) US Aid to Colombia since 1997 Summary tables

(February 20) Retrieved May 2 2004 from httpciponlineorgcolombiaaidtablehtmConcar D (2001 September 29) Cutting the Talibanrsquos lifeline New Scientist p 77Desveaux J A Lindquist E A amp Toner G (1994) Organizing for policy innovations in public bureaucra-

cies AIDS energy and environmental policy in Canada Canadian Journal of Political Science 27(3)493ndash528

Dexter L (1981) Unintended consequences of purposive legislative action Alternatives to implementationJournal of Public Policy 4(4) 250ndash264

Drug Abuse Policy Office (1982) Federal strategy for prevention of drug abuse and drug trafficking WashingtonDC United States Government Printing Office

Drug Enforcement Administration Intelligence Division (2002) Drugs and terrorism A new perspective RetrievedApril 29 2004 from httpwwwdeagovpubsintel02039f1f1

Dudley S (2000 July 31) The Colombia quagmire The American Prospect p 32

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 469

Ehrenfeld R (2004) Funding evil How terrorism is financed and how to stop it New York Bonus BooksEhrenfeld R (1992) Narco terrorism New York Basic BooksGannon K (2004 March 22) Road rage The New Yorker p 40George A L (1980) Presidential decisionmaking in foreign policy The effective use of information and advice Boulder

CO WestviewHaas P M amp Haas E B (1995) Learning to learn Improving international governance Global Governance

1(3) 255ndash284Halperin M H (1974) Bureaucratic politics and foreign policy Washington DC BrookingsHanley C (2002 August 19) UN cites failure to uproot opium The Boston Globe p 1Harmon M M amp Myer R (1986) Organization theory for public administration Boston Little Brown and CoHersh S (2004 April 12) The other war The New Yorker p 40Human Rights Watch World Report (2003) Colombia New York Human Rights Watch Retrieved May 1 2004

from httpwwwhrworgwr2k3americas4htmlJenkins B M (2001) Colombia Crossing a dangerous threshold The National Interest 62 47ndash56Judis J B (2003 October 23) Sifting through the rubble The American Prospect p 12Kraska P B (1993) Altered states of mind Critical observations of the drug war New York Garland PublishingLehmkuhler S (2003) Need a long-term prioritizing strategy Journal of Homeland Security (April) Retrieved

April 22 2004 from httpwwwhomelandsecurityorgjournalarticlesdisplayArticleasparticle=87LeoGrande W (1998) Our own backyard The United States in Central America 1977ndash1992 Chapel Hill Uni-

versity of North Carolina PressMabry D J (1989) The Latin American narcotics trade and US national security Westport CT Greenwood PressMcCaffery B (2000) Statement by General Barry R McCaffrey Colombian and Andean region counterdrug

efforts February 17 House Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice DrugPolicy and Human Resources 106th Congress 1st Sess

Meitsner A (1976) Policy analysis in the bureaucracy Berkeley University of California PressMiller A amp Damask N A (1996) The dual myths of narco-terrorism How myths drive policy Terrorism amp

Political Violence 8 114ndash131Miller T C (2001 August 18) Foreign pilots hired to boost US drug war The Los Angeles Times 1Moe T (1984) The new economics of organization American Journal of Political Science 28 739ndash777Moe T (1993) Presidents institutions and theory In G C Edwards III J H Kessel amp B A Rockman

(Eds) Researching the presidency Vital questions new approaches (pp 337ndash356) Pittsburgh PA University ofPittsburgh Press

Moreau R amp Yousafzai S (2003 July 14) Flowers of destruction Newsweek p 33National Drug Control Strategy Office of National Drug Control Policy (2000) Fiscal year 2001 budget summary

Washington DC White HouseNational Drug Control Strategy Office of National Drug Control Policy (2004) Fiscal year 2005 budget summary

Washington DC White HouseNational Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) (2003) Monitoring the future 2003 Data from in-school

surveys of 8th 10th and 12th grade students (December 19) Retrieved July 2 2004 from httpmonitoringthefutureorgdata03datahtml2003data-drugs

National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) (2004) Monitoring the future National survey results on drug use1975ndash2003 Vol 2 College students and adults ages 19ndash45 Retrieved August 2 2004 from httpmonitoringthefutureorgpubsmonographsvol2_2003pdf

National Institute of Justice (NIJ) (2004) Drug and Alcohol use and related matters among arresteesRetrieved August 2 2004 from httpwwwojpusdojgovnijadamADAM2003pdf

Pardo R (2000) Colombiarsquos two front war Foreign Affairs 79(4) 64ndash73Pound E T (2004 February 16) The terror-heroin nexus US News and World Report p 12Rashid A (1999) The Taliban Exporting extremism Foreign Affairs 78(6) 49ndash51Rosati J A (1981) Developing a systematic decision-making framework Bureaucratic politics in perspective

World Politics 33 234ndash252Rose R (1991) What is lesson drawing Journal of Public Policy 11(1) 3ndash30Ryan C M (2001) Leadership in collaborative policy-making An analysis of agency roles in regulatory nego-

tiations Policy Sciences 34 221ndash245Sabatier P (1988) An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policy-oriented learning

therein Policy Sciences 21 129ndash168Schmitt E (2002 October 30) US to add forces to Horn of Africa New York Times p 1Scott P D amp Marshall J (1998) Cocaine politics Drugs armies and the CIA in Central America Berkley Uni-

versity of California PressSegal L M amp Weisbrod B A (2002) Volunteer labor sorting across industries Journal of Policy Analysis and

Management 21(3) 427ndash447Smith P H (1992) Drug policy in the Americas Boulder CO Westview Press

470 Chris J Dolan

Souder M (2002) Speech by Representative Mark Souder United States House of Representatives 107th

Congress 1st Sess May 22Sproule-Jones M (2000) Horizontal management Implementing programs across interdependent organiza-

tions Canadian Public Administration 43(1) 93ndash109Still flushmdashTerrorist finance Islamic charities commodities and Hawala are the key to al-Qaedarsquos money

(2002 September 7) The Economist p 86Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) United States Department of

Health and Human Services (2004) Results from the 2003 National Survey on Drug Use and Health National findings Retrieved August 2 2004 from httpwwwoassamhsagovnhsda2k3nsduh2k3Resultshtmtoc

Sweig J E (2002) What kind of war for Colombia Foreign Affairs 81(5) 122ndash141Targeting terroristsrsquo drug money US puts itself in an awkward situation (2001 October 2) The Wall Street

Journal p 1Thomas J C (1980) Policy convergence among political parties and societies in developed nations A syn-

thesis and partial testing of two theories Western Political Quarterly 33(2) 233ndash246United Nations Information Service (UNIS) (2003) United Nations calls for greater assistance to Afghans

in fight against opium cultivation (October 24) Retrieved August 2 2004 from httpwwwunodcorgunodcpress_release_2002-10-24_1html

United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2004a) World drug report Vol 1 Analysis New YorkUnited Nations

United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2004b) World drug report Vol 2 Statistics New YorkUnited Nations

United States Department of State (2002) Report to Congress Cano Limon Pipeline (December) RetrievedAugust 2 2004 from httpciponlineorgcolombia02120001htm

United States Department of State (2003) Support for plan Colombia Retrieved August 2 2004 fromhttpwwwstategovpwhartplncol

United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control (2002) Hearing on US policy in the Andeanregion (September 17) 107th Congress 1st Sess Retrieved August 2 2004 from httpdrugcaucussenategovhearings_eventshtm

Vaicius I amp Isacson A (2003) ldquoThe War on Drugsrdquo meets the ldquoWar on Terrorrdquo International Policy Report(February) Retrieved May 1 2004 from httpciponlineorgcolombia0302iprhtm2

Van Dongen R (2003 July 16) The right man The New Republic p 12Wehrfritz G (2003 March 31) International periscope Newsweek p 4Weymouth L (2000 October 23) The battle we are waging Newsweek p 45Wisotsky S (1990) Beyond the war on drugs Overcoming a failed public policy Buffalo NY Prometheus BooksWyatt C (2002 April 8) Afghan farmers die in poppy protest BBC News Retrieved May 2 2004 from

httpnewsbbccouk1hiworldsouth_asia1916373stmYglesias M (2004 May) Freedom fraud The American Prospect p 22

United Statesrsquo Narco-Terrorism Policy 471