Undercover and Informant Handling Tactics Training Manual

State of New York Eliot L. Spib.er Governor

Den.~ E. O'Donnell ommissioner

Dhisiou of Criminal Justice Services

JohnBUi(h Depwy Commissioner

ffice of Public Safety

Undercover Operations and Informant Handling

Student Manual

NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTU~E. SERVICES 4 Tower Place

Albany, New York 12203-3764

www.crimin aljustica.state.ny.us


Student Manual

STATE OF NEW YORK Division of Criminal Justice Services

Office of Public Safety

Copyright Notice

Copyright © 2007 by the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services. This publication may be reproduced without the express written permission of the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services provided that this copyright notice appears on

all copies or segments of the publication.

THE 2007 EDITION IS PUBLISHED BY THE:

New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services Office of Public Safety

4 Tower Place Albany, New York 12203

http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us

VERSION December 2007

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

- ·

Undercover Operations Michael Levine

1th over 40 years of intensive hands-on, award-winning experience on streets and in the courtrooms, Michael Levine has acquired the vast

knowledge and razor sharp eye for details that are vital to expert . The details that underlie and support his resume have stood up

the rigorous cross-examination of some of the best prosecutors and in the nation. One of the most decorated supervisory agents in

history of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Mr. Levine has also served with great distinction with the U.S . Customs Service, BATF, IRS (Criminal Investigations Division) and the FBIIDEA Task Force. Trained and licensed as a police instructor by DEA, his career in police training, now numbering more than 30 years, continues to this day. Mr. Levine's expert testimony (as regards all areas of expertise listed) has been accepted on more then 300 occasions in federal anp state courts (both criminal and civil) in 17 states as well as Puerto Rico. He is a widely published, highly skilled professional writer, well known for the effectiveness of his reports and affidavits. His training and experience as a supervisory officer, inspector of operations and police instructor, combined with his insider's anatomical knowledge of law enforcement operations, make him an invaluable asset in a number of important services. As a trial consultant and expert witness commencing with his DOJ retirement in 1990, Mr. Levine has reviewed and commented upon in excess of 200 full case files, relating to both civil and criminal matters, and involving a wide array of areas of expertise. This involves exhaustive and lengthy reviews of the investigative and law enforcement practices of many local and federal agencies, including but not limited to FBI, DEA, Customs, Homeland Security, BATF, IMNS and more than 30 local, state and city police agencies throughout the U.S. This ongoing experience keeps Mr. Levine current and up-to-date on policies, procedures and standards of U.S law enforcement. A licensed Private Investigator, Mr. Levine is also active as a law enforcement instructor, journalist and investigative researcher. He maintains an extensive and continually updated database of · information that relates to each area of his expertise. An important part of this database involves direct contact with more than 200 court-qualified law enforcement experts worldwide, colleagues with whom he consults on a case-by-case basis. Michael Levine has appeared as a guest/expert on dozens of nationally televised shows, including 60 Minutes, Good Morning America, NBC & CBS Morning Shows, MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour, 20/20 and many others. He has also been retained as a technical consultant for multiple television series, and has appeared as an expert on various law enforcement related topics on numerous local television shows around the country. He has made guest appearances on hundreds of local and national radio shows around the country.

Preface

In Spanish there is an old axiom, Hay que escarmentar de cabeza ajena, [One must learn from the mistakes of others]. This is an axiom that could be printed on the tombstone of every undercover agent who died in the line of duty, or on the cell wall of every wellmeaning Undercover whose work terminated with a jail sentence, or on the personal checks written by undercover officers to lawyers hired to defend them from civil or criminal accusations emanating from his UC work, or on the termination papers received by well meaning undercover officers for violation of the Rules of Conduct, or on the divorce and separation papers that symbolize the well-meaning Undercover's family destruction . Every commandment, rule and axiom found in these pages came directly from the mistakes of others, and are set forth herein with the hope that those who follow them will not repeat the mistakes that at best resulted in ruined prosecution cases and law suits, and at worst serious injuries and death.

While this manual was prepared as a companion piece for the class on Undercover Tactics, it is also intended as a stand-alone reference document, to be used and/or consulted whenever needed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section I: Fifteen Commandments of Undercover Survival .. ... . Pages 1.1-1.6

Objectives and Goals .............................................................................. ........ 1.1

Fifteen Commandments ................................................................................. 1.2-1.5

Section II: Informant Handling Tactics and Procedures ..... Pages 2.2-2.18

Objectives and Goals ... ...... .............. . ..... . .... ... ....... . ...... ..... ..... .. .......... .. ......... .. 2.2

Rules of Informant Handling ........... ... ... .. ................................................. . 2.3-2.15

Working Undercover with Informants ......................................................... 2.15-2.18

Section III: Undercover Operations: Tactics and Procedures .. Pages 3.2-3.13

Objectives and Goals ..... ...... ...................... ........ . ..... . ........ .... ..... .................. .... 3.2

Planning the Undercover Operation ................................................................... 3.3

The Controlled Buy ................................ ... ............. ........... . ......................... 3.5-3.7

Reverse Sting ........................................................................................... 3.8-3.10

Issues of Entrapment ..... ... ......... . ... .................................... .................... ........ . 3.1 0

Deep Cover Operations ............ ............ .... ............ ............. . ...... .............. .. ..... 3.11

Undercover and/or Informant in Court ...... ........................................................ .. .3.13

Section IV: Reference Materials ........... ........................... ... Pages 4.2-4.15

Fifteen Commandments of Undercover .................................................... .4.2- 4.3

Rules of Informant Handling ............ .. ......................... ..... ....... ... ................. 4.4-4.15

Informant Agreement ... ........................ .... .. . .......... .... ..................... .. .4.16-4.17

Appendix

SECTION 1

FIFTEEN COMMANDMENTS OF UNDERCOVER SURVIVAL

Undercover Operations and Informant Handling 1.1

FIFTEEN COMMANDMENTS OF UNDERCOVER SURVIVAL

Section Objectives

Upon completion of this section the student will, without reference to notes, be able to:

1. List and explain the fifteen commandments of undercover survival according to Michael Levine.

Section Goals

1. Describe the vital mechanics of running a safe and successful undercover operation in accordance with the team concept.

2. Identify the roles of the Undercover Officer and/or Undercover Informant in accordance with the team concept of undercover tactics and procedures.

3. List the vital roles and principals ofleadership in all facets of Undercover Operations.

4. Understand the principals, procedures and standards of informant handling, documentation, and corroboration as they relate to Undercover Operations.

5 Recognize the violations listed in the "commandments" that are Red Flag Indicators of an undercover operation that is about to go bad, i.e. result in death, and/or, injury, and/or, lost careers, and/or law suits.

NYS Division of Criminal Justice Services, Office of Public Safety: Copyright 2007 (August 2007)


Fifteen Commandments of Undercover Survival

Commandment #1:

No case is worth my life, my job or my family.

This does not mean that the undercover should avoid ALL risks. The nature of the work is inherently risky; however, it does mean that the undercover and the supervisor have time to consider the logic of the assignment versus the gains. Ways to reduce the risks should be considered and discussed before taking the long dark walk.

This consideration will be discussed, during the class, in reference to real life situations resulting in tragic outcomes.

Commandment #2:

The undercover agent must be a team plaver- not the manager.

The undercover operation must NEVER be planned with the undercover calling the shots. The "healthiest" undercover is the one who considers him/herself a MEMBER of a team and NOT its Director.

The importance of character, intelligence and stability of undercover operatives will be discussed 't.J.'~it'li'g. i'C'a\ \;ii'C ~a?Se. 'CX~i'i.'i'l}A'C'.:. 't.'.:. \l\1.1'6t.!~i;i.'0\\£. tc'0 1,~, "frQW..

Commandment #3:

The undercover squad supervisor should have extensive experience as an undercover himself and/or the open-mindedness to consult with experienced undercover officers.

Most cases involving tragic outcomes are the result of inexperienced management and/or lack of training in undercover tactics and/or a l_ack of leadership skills. This will be discussed in class using documented case histories.

Commandment #4:

Learn everything possible about your target from your informant, with a particular focus on his/her propensity for violence. Consult with officers with a demonstrable talent for informant handling.



Commandment #5:

1.3

Never trust an informant-listen and verify everything that is possible to verify, and above all: control the informant. Keep in mind that there are circumstances wherein the death of the undercover will work to the benefit of the informant.

For an informant to be effective he/she must be a criminal, a two-faced, duplicitous traitor and a professional liar. You should act as thought you trust the informant but you must verify everything that is possible to verify. A high percentage of undercover tragedies, civil law suits and ended careers emanate from the mishandling of informants and/or trusting of informants. The tactics involved in informant handling, debriefmg, corroboration and utilization in an undercover capacity are set forth with specificity in the body of this manual for east reference, and will be discussed utilizing documented case histories as examples.

Commandment #6:

Always have a game plan in written form BEFORE going on to the "set". It should be arrived at by a group planning session full of as many "what if's" as the group can think of.

The undercover operation plan should be in written form and given to every officer who will be taking part. The group of officers who will be involved in the planning of the operation should include all officers who will play a role in the operation as well as other experienced undercovers to provide input. Every officer taking part in an operation MUST know the undercover and the informant by sight. The informant, however, should only see those whom he/she NEEDS to see.

Case histories involving the death and /or serious injury of undercqver officers and/or innocent "vilians, in which failure to appropriately plan played significant role in the tragic outcome, will

discussed.

ommandment #7:

Always discuss and/or rehearse the takedown ensuring that each officer knows and early understands his/her assignment at that critical moment.

nfusion about your own assignment as well as the assignments of others has caused the death : and/or serious injury to law enforcement and perpetrators alike.

~ histories to be discussed during class.

mmandment #8:

The team leader should always end an operation the instant the game plan is a ted.

' 5 Division of Criminal Justice Services, Office of Public Safety: Copyright 2007 (August 2007)


Failing to terminate the operation once the game plan has been violated has contributed to the deaths of undercover officers in the past. This possibility MUST be discussed during the planning stages of every operation.

Case histories to be discussed during class.

Commandment# 9:

An undercover must never operate on an extended assignment without close supervision, contact and control of a manager who has a demonstrable record of experience in the undercover arena.

Case histories to be discussed during class

Commandment #10:

An undercover agent must always think "safety"- his safety and the safety of the agents/officers covering him.

While operating as an undercover you should take note of potential hazards that you and your team may encounter such as weapons, traps, hazardous chemicals, attack dogs, hidden rooms and escape hatches.

Commandment #11:

An undercover agent must always think "testimony"- anyone can "get over," but unless you are prepared to win in court, the whole exercise is pointless.

The use of both undercover officers and informants must be done keeping, at all times, keeping in mind courtroom presentation. The primary method of defense against an undercover agent is an attack on his character and/or his tactics.

During class and in the continuation of this easy reference manual, suggestions as to preparation and methods and tactics to be avoided, keeping in mind courtroom presentation, will be discussed using true life examples.

Commandment #12:

An undercover agent must alwavs measure every action and statement against the question: Would I do or say what I am about to ifl were a real criminal?

Acting or reacting like ANYTHING BUT what the bad guy thinks you are is a factor found in EVERY case of an undercover's cover being blown and ALMOST EVERY case that ended in an undercover being murdered. Acting your role has been the key factor in the successful outcome of some of the most important undercover cases in our nation's history. A good act can even overcome an unrealistic scenario.



During class and in the continuation of these easy reference manual, suggestions as to preparation, procedures and tactics in this critical area will be discussed utilizing documented case histories

Commandment #13:

Never use equipment (all equipment, from weapons to electronic devices), unless you are thoroughly familiar and well practiced in its use, and certain that it will work under the conditions in which you are about to risk lives. Above all, never go into the arena depending solely on an electronic device for your safety.

This is another commandment that has been directly linked to tragic outcomes including but not limited to the death of undercover officers.

During class and in the continuation of these easy reference manual, suggestions as to preparation, proc~dures and tactics in this critical area will be discussed utilizing documented case histories.

Commandment #14:

Always do pre-operation surveillance, particularly in a buy/bust operation. Sooner or later it will save a life. It saved mine.

This commandment is critical to the extent that in spite of it being covered in the section herein devoted to Planning Undercover Operations, it merits an emphatic mention.

During class real-life examples of its vital need will be discussed

Commandment #15:

It is better to be tried by twelve than carried by six.

This commandment is NOT to be taken as a license for undercover officers to commit crimes, and it should be considered as part of Commandment 1, ''No case is worth my life, my job or my family." However, it is set forth here separately due to the entirely unpredictable nature of undercover work. The only constant is that if you do it long enough, the undercover officer is a lot more likely than the average law enforcement officer, to confront situations where an instant decision in a very unconventional situation wherein the "bad guys" do NOT know he is a law enforcement officer may mean his life. Situations, during which undercover officers in the past have made choices to avoid problems at their jobs that resulted in them sacrificing their lives.

This will be discussed using documented case examples during class


SECTION 2

INFORMANT HANDLING TACTICS & PROCEDURES AS THEY RELATE TO UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS


INFORMANT HANDLING

Section Objectives


1. Name four things the officer MUST do when working with an undercover "partner."

2. List and explain three tactics of informant debriefings and their importance to a safe and successful undercover operation.

Section Goals

1. Recognize the basic principals, strategies and standards of Informant Handling, as they pertain to Undercover Operations. (General)

2. List the specific tactics and principles that an informant acting as an undercover for law enforcement should follow.

3. Know and understand the specific tactics oflnformant Handling as they pertain to exercising law enforcement control of informant activities and actions and/or prevention of informant criminality such as entrapment, double-dealing and/or other crimes committed while representing law enforcement as an undercover informant.

4. Have a heightened awareness of signs and/or indications oflnformant handling situations about to go redline. (result in serious problems).

NYS Division of Criminal Justice Services, Office of Public Safety: Copyright 2007 (November 2007)


Informant Handling

The old adage, used ad-nauseum by law enforcement "experts" is: "A cop is only as good as his informants." The purpose of this section is to help produce law enforcement officers [informant handlers], supervisors and administrators who are a lot better and savvier than the informants under their control; professional law enforcement officers and administrators who effectively use criminal informants (CI) to apprehend and convict serious criminals with solid prosecution cases. Too often law enforcement officers are used by their confidential informants as protection from prosecution and/or to steal taxpayer dollars in the form of reward payments, while they [the informants] commit serious crimes against the people whom we 've sworn to serve and protect.

Sub-standard informant handling by the undercover officer has led to a number of undesired outcomes including, false arrests and convictions, planting evidence (flaking), criminal charges filed against the undercover officer and their respective department, civil law suits, and the prosecution of police and prosecutors.

Undercovers who allow the informant to control the operation risk everything. Informants who are poorly handled invite rip-offs by presenting bait that would tempt any criminal. If the informant acts like raw meat, any nearby shark is going to go for him/her and the undercover officer.

The rules and standards set forth in this guide are the product of tragedy and failure, and are set forth herein, again, with the hope that history will not repeat itself

Rules of Informant Handling 1

RULE #1.

RULE #2.

From the first contact with an informant, of any category, the inviolable rule is, observe closely, assess reactions and control tightly at all times. Note: While you are observing and assessing the informant, be/she is definitely observing and assessing YOU. The methods of observation, checks and controls will be covered in great detail, as they pertain to each of the Rules. Never forget that an informant is a criminal, who, for the moment is working for you. Violate the rules and he will be working against you.

Attempt to learn and document everything you can about your informant's character, intelligence and personality that would influence their performance before using him/her for any purpose. [*Particularly important in exigent circumstances and for supervisory officers and/or administrators as to each and every informant assigned to your unit and/or department, for purpose of ensuring an appropriate informant-handler match]:

1 Adapted directly from the DEA two-week training school lesson plan



Areas of immediate concern to Handlers, Supervisors and Administrators are:

a. His/her criminal record. Speak to officers/investigators involved in any and all cases resulting in the arrest of your informant. Ifyou don't some defense attorney will.

b. What the informant has shown him/herself to be capable of: level of treachery; implication in homicides etc ... Whatever he/she has done unto others, don't believe for a second that your badge will prevent him/her from doing unto you.

c. What is the CI' s record as an informant? You WANT to speak to prior handler and/or prosecutors who used this informant! This information is a must!

d. CI's level of intelligence and education. Important to know and assess in matching informant to handler. You NEVER want too much of an imbalance with the "weight" of intelligence going toward the informant1 Critical area for Supervisory Officers and Managers

e. The CI must be aware that his operations are being watched, not only by his handler, but by supervisors as well. CI cannot be allowed to be in a position wherein, he/she believes that if the informant "gets over" (seduces the handler); he/she can maintain control of his/her own activities. Critical area for Supervisory Officers and Managers.

f. "Success" in crime. [acquired assets, total jail time, length of time in crime, level of crime activity reached]. Does crime pay for this informant, and why?

g. How does your informant earn an income? Does his/her explanation for income match his/her life style? If you don't ask these questions, a sharp defense attorney will! The inference is that you looked the other way at your informant's criminality!

h. His/her presentation dUring interview: Do they seem deceptive? (Supervisor should be present during initial interview and during periodic debriefings).

1. Assertive personality? Does he/she seem to control the direction of the conversation during interview with handler? Critical area for Supervisors and Administrators, as well as handlers.

J. Does he/she attempt to evade questions?-any questions whatsoever, no matter how seemingly inconsequential.

k. Is there evidence unearthed during the initial inquiry that is indicative of this informant "shopping" cases-playing one agency against another for his/her own gain/protection?

1. Is there evidence in the record of this informant "double dealing"-using informant status as protection for criminal activities?



RULE#3.

RULE #4.

[Critical for supervisors]: BEWARE OF INFORMANTS WHO CONTROL THEIR HANDLERS-NEVER FORGET: INFORMANTS ARE CRIMINALS NOT COPS.

NOTE: From the first interaction between informant and any officers under your command, you must, at all times, observe and assess the relationship between informant and handler, particularly as to who is running whom!

Clever informants often play dumb; however, over time a supervisor must be alert for signs of the following:

a. Is informant more streetwise than his handler[ s ]? b. Does the informant's personality dominate the

officer's? c. Does the informant easily evade or avoid probing

questions ofhis handler? d. Is the informant significantly more experienced than

the officer? e. Is the officer too insecure in his/her own abilities

and job performance to handle informants? [Possibly ''too dependent" on informant for job production].

f. Is the informant able to become too "personal" in any manner with the handler[s]?

g. Does the informant seem to know too much about the handler (s) personal life? [Family names, personal problems, personal gripes, etc].

h. Does the handler have a tendency to take the informant's side and/or defend the informant when the informant is clearly in the wrong?

1. Does the informant seem to be in constant control of the direction of investigations?

J. Does the informant seek to control the direction of his debriefmgs at ANY time?

k. Does the informant often claim that close surveillance will "bum" his activities, particularly controlled buy operations?

Debrief an active informant periodically [NO LONGER THAN 30 DAY INTERVALS WHILE ACTIVE], whether he/she claims to have information or not. You may forget that he/she is your informant, but when he/she does wrong, he/she will NOT forget that he/she works for you and/or your department! And if your informant inflicts damage on some unsuspecting party while he/she is worldngfor you, you can count on being named in a law suit.



RULE #5.

a. The debriefing should cover ALL criminal knowledge. You want to impress on hirniher that you want to know everything he/she has even heard rumors of.

b. The debriefmg should be witnessed, as should all contacts with the CI.

c. The debriefmg should cover ALL contacts made by the informant-whether the or not the informant thinks they were productive or not- that were with anyone who might be considered a potential violator and/or a person(s) with criminal records.

d. The debriefmg should cover ALL contacts this informant has made with other police agencies. [Shopping cases].

e. How has the informant been earning a living? f. Be alert for signs of deception. g. Be alert for «sensitive" areas. h. When the informant seems shy of a subject - that is the

subject you want to probe. 1. The debriefmg should be attended by a supervisor, at

least periodically, and should-unless there are documented, extenuating circumstances-always be witnessed by another officer.

J. When the informant supplies actionable information [information that may result in a full investigation, warrant, etc.] be prepared to follow some or all the tactics referred to in RULE 10.

Have the informant read and sign an "INFORMANT AGREEMENT" acknowledging that during the informant's association with you and/or your department the following areas will be agreed to:

a. I (the informant] acknowledge that I have no police powers under the laws of (state) or any local governmental subdivisions and has no authority to carry a weapon while performing active duty as an informant.

b. I acknowledge that I am associated with the ____ ____ Police Department as an informant on a case or time basis as an independent contractor and that any payment received is not subject to Federal or State Income Tax Withholding or Social Security. All reporting of that income is mandatory under the law and is my responsibility.

c. I acknowledge that as an informant I am not entitled to Workman's Compensation from the state of

and that I shall not hold -------- - -----responsible for any injuries or



damage incurred by reason of [the informant's] association with the police department.

d. I agree to not engage in entrapment activities and acknowledge that these activities have been fully explained to me by officer/prosecutor _______ and that I fully understand these instructions.

e. I agree not to divulge to any person, except the investigator[s] with whom I am associated with, my status as an informant for the --------police department unless required to do so in court and that I shall not represent myself to others as an employee or representative of the police department.

f. I agree not to use the police department or any of its officers as credit or employment references unless prior approval is obtained from the investigator[s] with whom I am associated.

g. I agree that my association with the _____ _ police department does not afford me any special privileges whatsoever.

h. I agree that I will perform my duties as an informant without any official identification as such and that I will not create and/or attempt to create any "identification" documents that in any way give the impression that I am officially associated with the police department, and that I am aware that any attempt to do so may be a violation of State and/or Federal law.

1. I agree that I will not plan and/or engage in any criminal activity and/or make any criminal contacts that may result in criminal activity without first notifying my controlling officer[ s] for approval and instructions.

J. I acknowledge that, in reference to (i) above, I have been furnished with emergency contact methods and have discussed delaying tactics to be utilized during possibly exigent circumstances.

k. I agree that should I, in any manner, come into possession of criminal evidence of any kind, that I will immediately contact my handler[ s] for instructions.

1. I agree to maintain a strict accounting of all funds provided to me by the police department as part of my activity as an informant. I understand that misuse of department funds could be grounds for criminal prosecution against me.



RULE #6.

RULE#7.

m. Finally, I agree that a violation of any of the aboveenumerated provisions will be grounds for immediate termination and probable criminal charges.

Create an·informant file in which you document the informant's history, performance and all your interactions with him/her. This may, indeed, depending on Discovery rulings in each case, furnish defense attorneys with cross-examination materials that may or may not jeopardize a prosecution; however, it may also save your job, your career and the lives of all officers who eventually utilize this informant, as well as the unsuspecting public. The general rule is that "the proper documentation of an informant is essential if the informant is to be effectively utilized. Failures at this critical stage can result in defense claims of prosecutorial misconduct and allegations of Brady violations for failure to disclose evidence that would erode an informant's credibility at trial." 2 The informant file is also a vital source of information and protection for any future handlers of your informant. The Informant File, at a minimum, should reflect:

a. Full identifying data: name, aliases, physical descriptions, date of birth, fingerprints, current photo, phone numbers, addresses, and Social Security Number.

b. Criminal Record. c. Criminal Reputation and Known Associates. [up to

date]. d. Copies of all debriefing reports. e. Records of all payments. f. Comments that would be useful to other potential

handlers.

Keep your finger on the pulse of your informant's motivation. Ifyou know your informant's "true" motivation-why he/she does what they do-then you will know what the real intentions are, which, by the way, are rarely what he/she says they are. Criminal informants' motivations are complicated, multiple and change rapidly without warning. In general they are a combination of the following:

a. Fear of incarceration. b. Mercenary. c. Fear of reprisal against himself and/or his family. d. Destroy competition e. Vengeance f. Eliminate creditors g. Eliminate competing criminals

2 Informant Law Desk Book, by Dennis G. Fitzgerald



RULE #8.

h. Protect his own drug trafficking or other criminal activity

1. Reduction in sentence and/or release. J. Police buffs and Wannabes. k. Unwitting informants. 1. Brokered. m. Excitement: Thrill or it all. n. Perverse. o. Good Samaritan p. Repentance

JAIL HOUSE INFORMANTS: q. Special Privileges r. Early release s. Informant fees paid to others

Handlers must always seek to maintain control of informants through proper balance of motivation, fear and reward factors. This means that, as in dog training, the informant must both fear and respect that handler enough that the "reward" (primary motivation) must come through that handler(s) and only that handler(s). Motivation to "please" the handler and/or adhere to the Informant Agreement, must, at all times, overcome all other fears , needs, drives and urges.

To keep your informant "properly" motivated you MUST be constantly aware of his/her true motivation, which, as stated above, is always changing. If the informant's motivation, secretly and/or unnoticed by the handler(s), switches to seeking a "reward" from some source, the informant WILL ALWAYS engage in one or more of the following:

a. Criminal acts [double-dealing], using his informant status for protection from arrest and prosecution ..

b. Entrapment. Conning "dupes" into the commission of crimes and then "selling" them to his/her handler[s] as "information" and/or criminal cases.

c. False testimony. Jail House informants are notorious for this. "Montate en la gua gua! - Getting on the bus."

I. Cases: US v Noriega. Crown v Mihaylov. (other cases from personal files) .

II. Falsification of evidence [i.e. doctored and/or selective tape-recordings]. Carslon v US.

III. Planting of evidence. US v MA TI. d. Falsification of evidence [i.e. doctored and/or selective

tape-recordings]. Carslon v US e. Planting of evidence. US v MATI f. Reverse undercover: Setting up the handler(s) and

"selling" them to Internal Affairs, with information gleaned from his close association. (US v Sante Baric)



g. Entrapping his handler(s) into misconduct and/or criminal acts. (US v Sante Bario)

h. "Shopping" bad cases; playing one agency off against the other in search of"easy" handlers. (Carlson v US).

1. "Down trading"- flipped drug traffickers who turn in lower echelon dealers and users as "big fish" to satisfy cooperation agreements.

RULE #9. Be ever alert to "SIGNS" of informant" duplicity. a. Refusal and/or reticence at making tape-recorded

conversations with alleged targets, to corroborate informant information in the presence of controlling officers [vital with "flipped" informants].

b. Vague and!or deceptive answers to questions dming debriefmgs.

c. Unexplained and! or vague explanation for anything. d. Unreported contacts with criminal associates. e. Failure to contact handler[s] through prearranged

methods [pagers, cell phones, headquarters, etc.] with any excuse.

f. Reported contacts with criminal associates wherein "no criminal conversation" is reported.

g. Unexplained signs of income or enrichment [cars, jewelry, cash].

h. Indications of drug use. 1. Usually tries to convince handlers that the use of

transmitting and! or recording devices would be dangerous.

J. Usually tries to convince handlers that surveillance of his activities will "burn" the investigation and/or expose him

k. Fails to make regularly scheduled contact with vague and!or questionable excuse.

1. Too many "unplanned" meetings with criminal associates.

m. Attempts to get personal with handlers. n. Attempts to learn information and/or tactics and/or

identities that he has no "need" for to fulfill his assignment and!or agreement.

o. The ability to continue to function as an informant in areas where he/she, by virtue of past performance, is well known as an informant.

p. Past record of the informant for duplicity (other agency Informant File).



q. Notification by another law enforcement agency of an informant's arrest and/or criminal activities.

r. "Sudden" or "new" criminal information about an individual with whom the informant has had an ongoing and unreported relationship of any type.

I. Cases: CROWN V MIHA YLOV(Papo case) ... CARLSON v US.

JAIL HOUSE INFORMANTS: s. Access to "criminal information" via purchase and/or

grapevine and/or news and Internet. t. Uncorroborated [by prison records and/or personnel]

access to alleged target[s]. u. Use of publicly and/or widely available information to

"sell" to authorities. v. Use of outside contacts to obtain information that he

may falsify as having been "told" to him/her directly by a target [false confessions].

RULE #10: NEVER, NEVER, NEVER take an informant's word for anything without independent corroboration. In the words of the KGB [Russian version of CIA, who ran rings around CIA in the management of informants] "TRUST BUT VERIFY."

Keeping your informant honest. Recommended tactics: a. Initiate tape-recorded corroborating conversations

whenever possible (vital tactic with "flipped" informants.)

b. Surveillance of informant, with and without his/her knowledge.

c. Have the informant introduce the nndercover agent. d. Use other informants whenever possible to crosscheck

and corroborate. (John Miller "in Atlanta" case.) e. Full investigative effort at independent corroboration of

everything told to you-who, what, when and where, and what documents prove same.

RULE #11: NEVER, NEVER, NEVER trust an informant with information that you would not want published on the front page of the New York Times. It may end up there!

a. When you are with your informant, you MUST imagine him/her as a video-recorder, taking in and recording EVERYTHING he/she is exposed to, for future use.

b. Lucy in (US v Roberto Suarez et al-The Big White Lie), details and embellishes everything she has been



Rule #12:

exposed to in the lives of the agents and officers she has been exposed to, giving all a sinister and illegal twist.

c. Fatal Dreams. US v [DEA agent] Sante Baric, the informant in the Sante Baric case created a falsified case against the unsuspecting DEA agent, who was arrested and died in prison as a result-Baric was exonerated posthumously.

d. Case: Deep Cover- Wheeler in Customs office. Ends up in bed with the lead customs agent. Played the usual informant-baits-cop game, with involvement in worldclass case that would be good for her career.

Handlers of flipped informants, under exigent circumstances, must carry and use technical equipment (i.e. tape recorder) at every opportunity.

a. Recorders are used to "ice" the decision to be an informant, as we\\ as to corroborate statements that contain certain likelihood to be false and deceptive! (taken from the D EA. "Informant Handling" training syllabus)

b. Failure to tape-record calls with alleged coconspirators, as an example, may be attacked by defense attorneys.

Example Discussion: Expert testimony during SAN DIEGO, Russian Crew case.

c. INFORMANT CONTROLLED TAPE-RECORDINGS OF TARGETS, from US v "DUPES", [name changed] Expert Witness Report:

"Informants are often provided equipment to record unsupervised incoming telephone calls from the target[ s]. They should be instructed by their control agent to record all calls [emphasis mine] received that pertain to the investigation." 3 "CI's [informants] should not initiate telephone calls to the target unless directed to do so by the control agent. This practice avoids the selectively taped argument by the defense and allows the agent to maintain control over the investigation. [emphasis

. ] 4 mme.

3 Informant Law Desk Book, Also see: On Lee v Unites States, 343 U.S. 747, reh'g denied, 344 U.S. 848 (1952); Lopez v united States, 3 73 U.S. 427 reh 'g denied, 3 75 U.S. 870 (1963); United States v White, 401 U.S.745, reh 'g denied, 402 U.S.99, on remand, 454 F.2d 435 (7th Cir. 1971), cert denied, 406 U.S. 962, (1972); United States v Caceres! 440 U..C. 71, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas (CCH)C 9294,43 A.F.T.R 2d (P-H) V79-872 (endorsing White, plurality

Id



Here again, it is important to point out that the substandard permitting of criminal informants to tape their own conversations has resulted in numerous well-documented cases of entrapment and/or enhancement entrapment and/or other criminality, including, but not limited to the submission of "doctored" and/or otherwise falsified tape-recordings to handlers as "evidence. 5

RULE #13: Handler's of flipped informants, under exigent circumstances, MUST consult with prosecutor for approval.

Rule #14: Undercover Operations resulting from an informant introduction, and/or with an informant as the undercover "partner" of an officer, MUST address the following issues:

a. The mental stability of the informant at that moment. b. Thorough debriefing of informant with an undercover

operation in mind. c. The reputation of the informant with the target. d. The Informant's past history with, knowledge of and

relationship with the target. e. The target's propensity for violence. f. The undercover officer' s ability to control the

informant. g. Rehearsal. h. What if? Scenario-WITH informant-is vital.

CASES: Deep Cover-Wheeler playing Customs against DEA and controlling the operation, as to control issues. Tumillo Killing. Hatcher killing.

Example of failure to adhere to this rule occurred when DEA Agent Jay Sylvestro entered the apartment of target Nick Caturrano with an informant who was going to make an introduction. Sylvestro found himself facing a gun in the shaking hand of an enraged Caturrano who wanted to ldll the informant, and Sylvestro, the only witness

RULE #15: Informant "controlled buy" situation means "airtight" control by the handler. The less "control" exercised by the handler, the more likely it is that the informant will take personal and/or financial advantage ofthe situation. (Critical area for supervisory and administrative levels).

a. FULL debriefing. Do NOT take the CI's word for why he must make the buy and not an undercover officer.

b. Use transmitting and/or recording device whenever possible. Do NOT take the informant' s word that he will be searched, without testing him. [Discuss in class].

5 Carlson v U.S. (as one of many examples).



c. REALLY search the informant and whatever vehicle he might use, BEFORE and AFTER the buy.

d. A full debriefing and signed statement AFTER the buy is mandatory.

e. Surveillance BEFORE and AFTER CI leaves the premises of the buy should be mandatory.

f. If possible take videos during the pre and post buy surveillance, and have the CI identify the people on video as to involvement.

g. ROis should reflect, by-the-book, Controlled Buy procedures.

h. Supervisory officers should -whenever possiblemake personal observations of Controlled Buys, particularly with officers and informants who use the tactic with frequency.

CLASS DISCUSSION: CASE: US V JOHN MULL

RULE #16: Know the signs of informant entrapment. a. What is entrapment? b. What is informant entrapment? c. What is enhancement entrapment? d. What is the difference between "unwitting" and

entrapped? I. What is predisposition? II. Informants of long duration almost always, if

allowed, engage in entrapment. Why?

e. Informants who push to have the freedom engage in and/or, to tape-record criminal conversations with little or no control of handlers.

Why is this a sign of entrapment activity? f. Targets who are gainfully employed and who have little

or no records and/or reputations as criminals. g. Targets that have records of violence and/or mental

instability and/or robbery, can be easily entrapped into a very deadly drug deal.

h. Targets that know drug dealers, but never seem to have drugs.

RULE #17: NEVER, NEVER allow a flipped informant to "down trade" in a cooperation deal. The following is excerpted from a Department of Justice Mandate: COOPERATION AGREEMENTS: US PROSECUTORS, DUTY TO BE COGNIZANT OF COOPERATING DEFENDANT WITNESSES "TRADING DOWN." "Make [cooperation] agreements only with 'little fish' to get 'big fish.' .. . The integrity of government-



RULE#l8:

indeed our very way oflife---demands it."- Stephen Trott, Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of Justice. 6

If you allow an informant to protect the Big Fish he knows, while he delivers all the Small Fries-that informant is running you, and there is no telling how far he will run.

All money transactions with an informant MUST BE WITNESSED & DOCUMENTED. Critical area for supervisory and administrative officers.

RULE #19: When in serious doubt, Polygraph your informant. Critical area for supervisory and administrative officers.

RULE #20: Never hesitate in terminating (firing) and blackballing an uncontrollable criminal informant.

This is a true expression of the phrase, "To Protect and Serve" and you may be doing some other cop and his family and the unsuspecting public a huge favor as well.

Working Undercover with Informants

Working with confidential informant's can be a very useful tool in undercover work; however, it is never without its risks. Knowing and understanding the risks could potentially save your life and/or your career and may make the daunting task of handling informants a bit less challenging. Despite this knowledge, there are a number of precautions that need to be taken each and every time you work with informants. Even for the shortest of undercover bits, an undercover partnering with an informant must rehearse the role with the informant paying close attention to the informants claimed history as an informant, the manner with which each of you addresses the other, and the knowledge each has of the other's life etc . .If the act is bad- the audience might kill you!

Debriefing In(ormants

Debriefing an informant can provide you with very valuable and at times life-saving information about the target( s ), the location or set where you intend to set the sting operation up, other individuals who may need to be controlled on the set, and so forth. Keep in mind, however, as was

6 StephenS. Trott, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S.Department of Justice. "The Successful Use of Snitches, Informants, Co-conspirators and Accomplices as Witnesses for the Prosecution in a Criminal Case; January 1984 Revision FOIA Request #CRM-960224F. The Ron. StephenS. Trott is currently serving as a Federal Judge in the 9th District. Excerpted from Informant Law Desk Book



detailed in the Rules of Informant Handling, all information obtained from an informant MUST be verified to the extent that it is possible to do so. Also important to keep in mind throughout the debriefing process is that the moment you sense resistance to questions in a particular area; that is the area to probe deeply. The areas to be covered in debriefmg an informant are:

a. ALL criminal activity in which the informant and target had been associated (in great detail)

b. Target's propensity toward violence (temper/paranoia). c. Prejudices (Killing of DEA Agent Hatcher) d. Drug and/or alcohol use. e. Weapons preferred by the target. f. Where the weapons or other contraband are kept. g. Associates who might be on the set (with all identifying

data known for each). h. Record and reputation of each possible associate, as

well as ALL criminal activity in which informant participated

1. Layout of the set-backrooms, stashes, exits etc ... J. Terms used and meanings of the lingo the undercover

should be familiar with. k. Description of a typical deal from the informant's

personal experience. 1. Probability of target frisking for electronic devices. m. Use of counter-electronic technical measures. n. Use of CCTV, prior to allowing entry of undercover.

Ascertain as much information as is possible from the informant about his or her history with this target keeping in mind that no detail is too small. This is an area in which you can expect resistance to which the handlers MUST NOT acquiesce. When possible get a complete statistical and psychological profile and family history of the target. Details from this information may prove helpful at any moment. As with all information received from an informant, the undercover will attempt to verify by conducting an independent collateral investigation.

The undercover should also document the criminal history of the informant for his or her own protection as well as for the protection of other law enforcement officials. Beware of informants who play one agency against another. This is a common practice for informants and can have horrific consequences. Undercovers should also be aware of:

· Informants whose claims are inconsistent with ... a. Their criminal history. b. Their cultural background. c. Their linguistic capabilities. d. Their intelligence.



e. Their personalities. £ Common sense.

There are literally volumes of documented material that outline how an undercover can tactically and effectively corroborate informant-supplied information. Below is a list of the most effective.

Informant Corroboration Tactics

a. Record staged telephone calls between the informant and the target, prior to the undercover meet.

b. Conversation should be choreographed in a manner that would establish that the relationship between the informant and the target is consistent with the informant's claims and allegations.

c. Indices checks of the target and all known associates. (NADDIS etc .. )

d. Independent (spot-check) surveillance of the target and informant (without knowledge of informant)

e. Telephone tolls (informant and target) and other communications for contact between target and known violators and/or unreported contact with informant.

f. Corroborate "new" information with choreographed and recorded telephone call .

g. Wire informant for unannounced meeting with the target.

h. Use of a second informant to corroborate the first. 1. Best: have the informant "duke" in an undercover.

Supervisory Traits Linked to Tragic Outcomes

a. Lack of knowledge, training and experience in undercover operations.

b. Egotistical. Unwilling to listen to contrasting opinion on operational tactics.

c. Lack of"street smarts". (Been there, done that-but really hasn't)

d. Bureaucratic and/or inflexible (unable to think outside ofthe box; more concerned with regulations than lives).

e. Tentative leadership: wants to be "one ofthe boys" at all costs. Reluctant to take charge.

Use o(Electronic Equipment

An undercover should NEVER rely on any piece of electronic equipment as the sole basis for his or her safety. A secondary plan should be drawn

NYS Division of Criminal Justice Services, Office of Public Safety: Copyright 2007 (November 2007}


up in the event the equipment fails. You should know the equipment you are using and its limitations. The worst time to test your equipment for the first time is during the actual operation so make the time to do a test run of the operation as close to the actual area as is possible so you know that your equipment will function properly in that location. Signals should be worked out ahead of time between the undercover and the back-up team if the equipment becomes non-functional. There should also be a signal (electronic and/or visual) indicating the need to break off the operation entirely. Make sure that the informant cannot intentionally render the equipment in-operable and explain possible consequences to the informant should he or she attempt to do so.


SECTION 3

UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS- TACTICS & PROCEDURES


UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS

Section Objectives


1. List the nine basic modes (types) of undercover operations.

2. Identify six basic principles involved in planning and executing a successful undercover operation.

Section Goals

3. Identify the "Red Flag" indicators of an undercover operation about to go bad.



Planning the Undercover Operation - General

Quite possibly one of the most important duties in law enforcement affecting both the Undercover Officer and his/her Supervisory Officer is setting up and executing an operational plan. The cold, hard truth of the matter is that people die in this business because of a lack of planning. Naturally that is the extreme result; let us not forget about lost careers, civil and criminal law suits and perhaps even the loss of family and friends. Careful and meticulous planning reduces the risk of any or all of these outcomes from occurring and MUST become an integral part of any undercover operation.

Operational Plan should be in written form and should include and/or consider the following elements:

a. An Undercover Team group briefing during which it is made clear who is in charge, and the actual undercover officers and/or informants are "seen" by all members of the team.

b. Radio call sign of all team members. c. Individualized assignments. d. Specialized Units (SWAT, helicopter etc .. . ), call signs

and precise rolls to be played by each unit. e. Map ofthe operational area. f. Schematic of the undercover premises (if indoors). g. Description and/or photos of the undercover and/or the

informant to ensure that EVERYONE on site knows who they are.

h. Notification of local police on patrol. 1. Synopsis of the investigation. J. Description and/or photos of targets. k. Criminal history oftargets. 1. History of and/or propensity for violence of each target

(including weapons of preference). m. Medical aid notified and on standby. n. Prisoner handling, transportation, booking and

interrogation assignments o. A "bust" signal to call in the arrest. p. A "rip" signal to alert the back-up team when the

undercover is in trouble. q. Precise and understandable duties of each member of

the UC team, in the event of a "rip" signal being given. This should be discussed and rehearsed if possible.

r. A "person of interest" signal to indicate someone to be followed and identified and/or arrested. (May be two separate signals).



The Undercover Bust- Red Flag of Danger

When the stage is set and the show is ready to roll, the risks also begin to increase tremendous! y. The bust is, after all, what all of the planning has been for. Whether the undercover assignment has been days, weeks months or even years, the fmal result, it is hoped, is the moment when the target(s) are taken down. When the whistle blows, EVERY member of the undercover team MUST know his/her first move and every move thereafter. The back-up surveillance teams must never forget that they too are undercover and must seek to be almost invisible while maintaining a close enough distance to the set to be of value. The actual arrest should be pre-choreographed as much as is possible right down to signals and weapons assignments. No detail is too small to rehearse! The undercover him or herself should NOT make the arrest. One of the most common defenses given for murdering an undercover is "I didn't know he (or they) were cops."

Undercover Operation Specialized -The controlled delivery

Definition: The Undercover Officer (s) aid and/or become involved in the in-transit handling and/or delivery of packages and/or vehicles that have been intercepted carrying contraband (i.e. drugs, precursor chemicals, weapons, etc).

Standards: What vou will be cross-examined on during a trial:

a. Conducting a due-diligence investigation before attempting an undercover delivery in order to establish a record and/or reputation and/or predisposition toward cnme.

b. Identify and complete a background inquiry of the addressee.

c. Seek latent prints on and/or inside package if possible. d. Substitute contraband if possible, prior to delivery. e. Conducting undercover surveillance of destination. f. Completing telephone, communications and indices

investigation prior to delivery to establish communications between suspected sender and/or location of origin of contraband ..

g. Undercover recorded telephone call to addressee (destination) if possible.

h. Undercover posing as a mail man/woman, or other delivery personnel, should be wired to record incriminating conversation.

1. Undercover officer accompanies flipped mule, if possible.

J. Undercover officer replaces flipped mule if possible.

illlll''S: · ·sian of Criminal Justice Services, Office of Public Safety: Copyright 2007 (August 2007)


The controlled buy

3.5

k. Prepare and rehearse undercover conversation. 1. Wire "bug" package.

Use of a Criminal Informant, under strict control of law enforcement, to make undercover purchases of contraband, including but not limited to drugs, weapons, illegal chemicals, stolen goods. The standards listed, as follows, are the ones that a good defense attorney will test in court, and should be documented in the form of ROis in the case file to demonstrate efforts at preventing down-trading, flaking, double-dealing and entrapment as well as overall control of the buy operation by law enforcement.

a. Always make Xerox copies of the buy money before you use it-you never know when or where it might tum up again, and it acts as a hedge against the Informant taking some for him/herself.

b. Keep it real! ALWAYS think of the money as . YOURS, not the taxpayers, when negotiating with bad guys, through the informant.

c. Keep asking yourself, "Would I treat my own money this way or am I acting like a cop"? -Transmit your answer to the Informant as an "order."

d. Pre-buy monitored & recorded phone calls with target. e. Detail briefmg of informant re: history of ALL dealings

with target. a. Indices (NADDIS etc ... ) check on target before buy. b. Pre-buy surveillance to identify possible sources and

co-conspirators c. Pre-buy test run of electronic equipment. d. Officer places "bug" on informant in a manner that

prevents informant tampering. e. Pre-buy body and vehicle search. f. Search just prior to entry. g. Visual surveillance of entry and exit. h. Maintain surveillance until CI is picked up by officers. 1. Post-buy search of Cl and/or their vehicle. (Don't

forget to check the money in your informant's pockets against the buy money list).

J. Post-buy surveillance of target. k. Recovery of evidence and/or recording device. 1. Chain of custody documentation. m. Post-buy debriefing and signed statement by CI n. Post-buy surveillance of Target to identify co

conspirators.



Pre-buv Informant Debriefing should be "itnessed and should include:

a. Drawing (schematic) of interior locations, in as much detail as possible.

b. Detailed Method of Operation of Target. c. Target' s safety precautions (paranoia). Does he frisk

for weapons and bugging devices, etc? d. Bugging Device: If used, take measures to ensure that

Informant cannot deactivate. e. CCTV, dogs, weapons, street lookouts, and other

security devices utilized by target. f. Terms used-lingo-( i.e. perico for cocaine; canones

for guns, etc) g. Signed statement by CI to both impress him on the

severity of lying and to cover yourself and your department lega1ly and for trial.

Post-buy Informant Debriefing, should be mtnessed and should include:

a. Done ASAP b. A written, signed and witnessed statement as to what

had transpired. c. Details of conversations. d. Identification and descriptions of all targets. e. Indications of weapons and contraband stashes. f. Transcription of recorded conversations with the aid of

the informant. g. Interior map of location for future raid, if one has not

already been prepared. h. Consider controlled and recorded call to target to

confirm informant statements.

Undercover Operations Specialized- the Buv-Walk Definition: - The undercover purchase of contraband by an Undercover Officer and/or Informant, wherein there is no arrest, and the purpose of the buy is to further the investigation and/or to gain credibility of the Undercover. All general Undercover Operations Procedures are applicable with a special focus on the following:

a. The purpose of "buying" contraband should be specified and generally must be done with the intent of: Gaining intelligence and/or identification of other coconspirators. Building trust and credibility of the Undercover Officer and/or Informant



Transferring the undercover duties from an Informant to a Undercover Law Enforcement Officer. Gaining PC that is not available in any other manner.

b. The tactics accompanying a buy-walk should include: Pre and post buy surveillance to identify sources and coconspirators. Trap and Trace, and/or wiretap. Databank checks of all surveillance results.

c. The buy-walk tactic should NOT be utilized in a manner that would give the defense a claim of Sentence Enhancement Entrapment; that is the purchasing additional drugs for no purpose other than increasing a possible sentence.

Undercover Operations Specialized- The Buv-Bust Operations: Definition: - The Undercover "baits " the pe1p into delivering contraband 1-vith the promise of something of value (i.e.cash, stolen goods, drugs, etc.), at which time the perp is arrested.

Buy-bust operations are the highest risk sting operation in undercover work; that is, the buy-bust is the operation that accounts for a high percentage of death and injury. The bad guys will expect the undercover to have money and/or drugs. Mixing money, drugs, guns and adrenaline in one small place makes for an extremely volatile situation in which anything could happen. Without close attention to all of the commandments and rules, bad things are almost guaranteed to occur. Thus, the Commandments of Undercover Survival, plus the general standards of planning and executing an undercover operation must be strictly adhered to with a special focus on:

a. Game plan MUST be in written form, and strictly adhered to. b. The Supervisor must maintain rigid control of the overall

operation at all times. c. If the undercover operative and/or informant violates the game

plan, in most cases, this should be considered a "rip" signal, and/or should signal an abrupt end to the operation.

d. The measure of keeping it "real" should be adhered to throughout the operation.

e. The Undercover Officer and/or Informant, during the undercover scenario itself, MUST call the logistic shots, and NOT allow the Target to take control.

f. The UNDERCOVER must NEVER violate the undercover plan, and if he/she does, the street commander MUST consider that violation tantamount to a "RIP" signal.



Note:

Undercover Operation Specialized- Reverse Sting.

Undercover's pose as terrorists, hit, men, organized crime figures, drug dealers, etc. to invite targets with a predisposition toward crime suspected to join the Undercovers in a conspiracy generated by the Undercovers. , (i.e. contract murder, act of terror, stolen cars, narcotics trafficking, money laundering etc.).

In this type of operation, the undercover plays the role of the criminal in order to con a true criminal into joining the undercover in a criminal act and/or enterprise. Undercover officers are permitted, within strict guidelines, to violate laws while in this role. Authorization should be obtained by the prosecutor and/or the Court before the operation is implemented and this authorization should be documented. Some of the ways an Undercover and/or the Undercover Informant (working under strict control of law enforcement) can bait a target into believing that he/she is the "real" thing are as follows:

a. Undercover sells drugs (real or sham). b. Undercover offers and actually performs criminal services for

the target, including but not limited to that of a money launderer, corrupt police or customs official, fence or barterer of stolen goods and other contraband.

c. Undercover provides real drugs for personal use of target. d. Undercover provides other contraband (i.e. counterfeit money,

stolen goods etc .. . ) for the target. ·e. Undercover simulates providing illegal services, such as that

of a hired killer f. Undercover provides prostitutes.

The New York State Constitution may impose higher standards regarding the conduct of its law enforcement officers than the Federal Constitution deems necessary. In order to violate the Federal Constitution, the conduct of the law enforcement agents must be so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction (United States v Russell, 411 U.S. 423 [1973]). The factors to be considered in determining whether police conduct violates the State Constitution are: (1) whether the police manufactured a crime which otherwise would not likely have occurred, or merely involved themselves in an ongoing criminal activity; (2) whether the police themselves engaged in criminal or improper conduct repugnant to a sense of justice; (3) whether the defendant's reluctance to commit the crime is overcome by appeals to humanitarian instincts such as sympathy or past friendship, by temptation of exorbitant gain, or by persistent solicitation in the face of unwillingness; and (4) whether the record reveals simply a desire to obtain a conviction with no reading that the police motive is to prevent further crime or protect the populace. (People v Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511 [1978]). New York State law enforcement officers must act with the strictures ofthe State Constitution.



Undercover Reverse Sting Operation Tactics and Procedures- General Precautions: All standards and tactics pertaining to Undercover Operations and Informant Handling are applicable here, as they apply. However the following special precautions should be considered, keeping in mind that the Undercovers are posing as criminals in a criminal environment.

a. If possible, record ALL undercover conversations and dealings, on video and/or audio.

b. A void possible Entrapment Claims. (See below). c. Prepare and rehearse backup team's reactions to rip-offs,

and/or armed confrontations. d. Prepare and rehearse Undercover(s) reaction to rip-offs and/or

armed confrontations. e. Prepare and pre-plan reaction of Undercover Team to the

potential of the Undercover Officers becoming involved in, and/or learning of, imminent crimes of violence.

f. Avoid, if at all possible, the Undercover Officer(s) taking part in the arrest.

Undercover Sting Claims of Entrapment Entrapment is probably the most common defenses that a defendant will use when he or she has been arrested as the result of an undercover ·sting operation. The simple test of entrapment is: "Would the crime have been committed by the target were it not for the behavior of the Undercover Operatives?" Accompanying this manual is an article on Entrapment taken from the FBI Bulletin that is recommended reading. The following is a summation of investigative tactics and procedures that are recommended to accompany a reverse sting operation, in anticipation of the inevitable defense claim of entrapment:

a. Show by investigative process that the Perp has a record and/or reputation for the crime committed during the sting operation.

b. Show by undercover recorded conversations, that the Perp has a "predisposition" to commit the crime and that he was not merely enticed into doing something he/she ordinarily would not do, were it not for the sting scenario and/or the enticements of the Undercover Officer and/or Informants.

c. Show by virtue of your exercising good Informant Handling · practices, that everything possible has been done to preclude an Informant engaging in entrapment activities to entice a target into the sting scenario.

Dangers of Utilization of Criminal Informant in a Reverse Sting Operation The utilization of a Criminal Informant as an undercover operative working under the imprimatur of a law enforcement agencies is never without risk; however those risks as they relate to a reverse sting operation are significantly magnified as follows:



a. Informant perceives the operation as a license (justification) to commit crimes.

b. Informant feels that he/she is a "partner in crime" with the undercover and/or the pretext to act, on his own, in a criminal manner.

c. Informant is encouraged and/or enabled to entrap "anyone" who goes for the bait.

d. Undercover is made vulnerable to false accusations by the informant.

e. Officers and their departments can be held personally liable for an informant's criminal actions.

Review Attached Article on Entrapment.

Signs of Informant Entrapment and/or Double Dealing

a. Unsubstantiated and/or Unjustified Claims that he/she cannot wear a wire to corroborate informant claims.

b. Unsubstantiated and/or Unjustified Claims made by Informant(s) that he/she cannot be placed under surveillance without burning the case.

c. Informant Wants freedom to tape record his/her own phone calls with targets, and (for ANY reason) resists making recorded calls that are controlled and/or monitored by law enforcement.

d. Has a long history of contact with the target that he does not disclose prior to dropping the dime,

e. Has un-reported contact with the target during the ongoing investigation. Is vague about the nature of prior contact with the target.

f. Is vague about details of his/her relationship with target.

_ ,-OTE: All unreported and/or uncontrolled contact between an Informant and the Target(s) of .:.. investigation MUST be substantiated by choreographed and recorded conversations between :~e Informant and Target(s), made under the control of the law enforcement handler.

Highlights of Informant Entrapment Defense

a. Target has no record and/or reputation for crime alleged by informant.

b. Informant has significant undocumented contact with the target before dropping the dime.

c. Informant has been given the opportunity to tape-record calls with the target at will, however, does not record significant telephone calls.

d. Informant is caught lying about contact with target.

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1111


Deep Cover Operation

3.11

e. Informant is caught exaggerating the criminal intent and capabilities of the intended target.

f. Informant has a history of being a source of drugs for target.

Undercover officer(s) and/or Informant(s) changing identities and "living" the undercover role. This may necessitate the creation of a "new identity," as well as a radical change ofliving situation. All tactics and procedures listed above must be considered, how ever special consideration must be paid to the following:

a. Intelligence and Emotional Stability of Undercover Officer. Note: The stresses of a deep cover assignment are enormous and not to be underestimated; too many tragedies evolving from the inappropriate choice of a Deep Cover operative had already been documented. Thus, the emotional stability, family situation and intelligence of any prospective deep cover operative must be carefully considered.

b. Proven Reliability, Intelligence and Stability oflnformant. Note: Informant's working long term deep cover assignments for law enforcement agencies have, too often, gone bad-while under the responsibility and control of a law enforcement agency-committing every crime known to man, from the rape of children and drug trafficking, to mass murder.

c. A documented system of constant contact and control between . Undercover Operative(s) and the responsible law enforcement agency.

d. Written contingency plans for ALL emergency situations imaginable. I. e. Undercover's family needs him/her; Undercover needs to appear in court; Undercover and/or Informant are arrested by an unwitting law enforcement agency; crimes of violence planned or committed in presence a/Undercover Operative(s); Undercover needs help!

e. Officers assigned to Backup Teams, must have specific assignments that support the deep cover assignment, such as the surveillance, identification and photographing and/or video-taping of potential targets, the investigative inquiries relating to information learned by the Undercover Operative(s)

Undercover Patrol-Specialized Plainclothes Officers assigned to specialized patrol anti-crime units, are specialized units that attempt to blend into street scenes in order to observe any and all criminal activity, including but not limited to street drug sales and/or possession, mugging, robbery (all types), gang activity, vandalism, rape, etc., usually with the purpose of making an immediate arrest. This type of undercover patrol, while not strictly an undercover assignment, is replete with hazards not normally encountered in uniform patrol situations, has the following considerations that should be considered:



Flash roll Management:

3.12

a. Written SOPS for the Unit or detail, detailing actions and procedures expected of each member under every foreseeable circumstance.

b. Each member should be trained and experienced in Undercover Surveillance Tactics.

c. Each member should have a RAID JACKET and HAT and/or OTHER GARMENT readily available that visually identifies its wearer as a law enforcement officer.

d. All uniform patrol officers MUST be aware ofthe presence of the UNDERCOVER PATROL, to avoid friendly fire incidents.

e. Each member should be trained in plainclothes arrest tactics that focus on Use of Force problems emanating out of the fact that the Undercover is projecting the image of his/her being a "criminal" and/or a "criminal type." These should include, quick and effective identification as a law enforcement officer, and less than lethal arrest tactics that take into consideration the protection of your gun.

The misuse of "flash rolls" has led to tragic outcomes. When utilizing a "flash" it is recommended that the following tactics, cautions and procedures be considered:

a. The flash roll should be thought of as the possession of the undercover- would you use your own money the way you are about to?

b. Being eager to show money does NOT "convince" true criminals to do anything but rob you.

c. Some informants will think that they have been given dynamite to fish in a pond-BEWARE!

d. Use "old" (well circulated) bills-not stacks of new bills from the bank.

e. Only flash money when the bad guys insist on it. A "surprise · flash" runs the risk of freaking out a true career criminal. True criminals just do not do this.

f. A flash with hardcore, potentially violent criminals is an invitation for a rip-off.

g. If a flash of money is used to "convince" a target with little or no criminal history to do the deal, you open the door to an entrapment defense.

h. Being too anxious to "show" your money marks you as either a sucker or a cop.

The Undercover Officer and/or Informant in Court The talent of"getting over" on criminals is 180 degrees antithetical to a professional presentation in court. In essence, the image that criminals tend to believe is the opposite ofwhatjudges and



juries want to see in a law enforcement officer. Or: What a shame it is to risk your life and spend all that time and taxpayer money, only to have a defense lawyer humiliate you and the perp walk out of court with a big grin on his/her face. To avoid this, the following is suggested:

a. As the undercover action is happening, visualize your testimony describing the action and statements.

b. Imagine a jury of citizens judging your performance. Be prepared to explain and justify all statements and actions.

c. Do not take for granted that the judge and jury will understand your tactics because they are in the movies

d. Employ memory tricks and devices and be prepared to testify about them.

e. Write your report or notes immediately after the action. f. At pre-trail: DO NOT take for granted that any prosecutor

understands the undercover process. When his/her eyes cloud over--explain!

g. Look professional in Court. h. By being a well spoken professional on the witness stand, is

the best display of your acting ability. 1. Be prepared for attacks on your character and morality.

Preparing the Informant to testifY:

a. Get signed or witnessed statements from the informant immediately after each undercover assignment. These are what are used to prepare him/her for trial-DO NOT rely on an informants memoryl

b. Make certain that the informant is available for trial. c. Be present while the prosecutor is prepping the informant for

trial. You do not want any surprises in testimony. d. Dress the informant up if possible. e. Debrief the informant once again, immediately prior to trial, to

determine whether there is some late occurring event that might affect testimony-you and the prosecutor do not want surpnses.


SECTION 4

REFERENCE MATERIALS

Reference Materials 4.2

15 Commandments of Undercover Survival (© Michael Levine, P.O.Box 533, Stone Ridge, New York, 12484)

Contact: [email protected] Web site: www. Policetrialexpert.com

1. No case is worth my life, my job or my family.

2. The Undercover Agent must be a team player-not the manager.

3. The undercover squad supervisor should have extensive experience as an undercover himself and/or the open-mindedness to consult with experienced undercover officers.

4. Learn everything possible about your target from your informant, with a particular focus on his/her propensity for violence. Consult with officers with a demonstrable talent for Informant Handling.

5. Never trust an informer-listen, verify everyihing that is possible to verify, and above all: control. Keep in mind that there are circumstances wherein the death of the undercover will work to the benefit of the informant.

6. Always have a game plan in written form, before going onto the "set." It should be arrived at by a group planning session, full of as many "what ifs" as the group can think of.

7. Always discuss and/or rehearse the takedown, ensuring that each officer knows and clearly understands his/her assignment at that critical moment.

8. The team leader should always end an operation the instant that game plan is violated.

9. An undercover must never operate on an extended assignment without close supervision, contact and control of a manager, with a demonstrable record of experience in the undercover arena.

10. An undercover agent must always think 11safety"-his safety and the safety of the agents/officers covering him.

11. An undercover agent must always think 11testimony"- anyone can 11 get over, 11 but unless you are prepared to win in court, the whole exercise is pointless.

12. An undercover agent must always measure every action and statement against the question: Would I do or say what I am about to, ifl were a real criminal?

13 . Never use equipment (all equipment, from weapons to electronic devices), unless you are thoroughly familiar and well practiced in its use, and certain that it will work under the conditions in which you are about to risk lives. Above all , never go into the arena depending solely on an electronic device for your safety.

14. Always do pre-operation surveillance, particularly in a buy/bust operation. Sooner or later it will save a life. It saved mine.

15: It is better to be tried by twelve than carried by six.



Background of Michael Levine: 3 years military police; 25 years undercover work for four federal agencies-IRS, Organized Crime Intelligence Division (1 yr); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms (3 yrs); Hard narcotics Smuggling Division ofUS Customs (3 yrs); Drug Enforcement Administration (17yrs); Chief of Drug Bureau, Sheriffs Dept. Barnstable County (1 yr); Police Instructor, Undercover Survival, Informant handling, Narcotics Investigations, etc ( 33 years and still counting). Recommended as Text/Reference Books: 1. Deep Cover, (NY Times best seller) by Michael Levine. Used as an Undercover Text reference by police agencies and is required reading in various Criminal Justice courses around the nation. (available (on-line) at Amazon. com, or at expertwitnessradio.org 2. The Big White Lie, by Michael Levine and Laura Kavanau-Levine. The inside story of how the CIA thwarted a DEA deep cover operation to aid in the setup of what became the 11 General Motors of cocaine," in south America. (out of print, but not difficult to find). 3. Undercover, by Donald Goddard, Times Books, March, 1988 (out of print)



Rules of Informant Handling 1

RULE#l.

RULE#2.

From the first contact with an informant, of any category, the inviolable rule is, observe closely, assess reactions and control tightly at all times. Note: While you are observing and assessing the infonnant, he/she is definitely observing and assessing YOU. The methods of observation, checks and controls will be covered in great detail, as they pertain to each of the Rules. Never forget that an informant is a criminal, who, for the moment is working for you. Violate the rules and he will be working against you.

Attempt to learn and document everything you can about your infonnant's character, intelligence and personality that would influence their performance before using him/her for any purpose. [*Particularly important in exigent circumstances and for supervisory officers and/or administrators as to each and every informant assigned to your unit and/or department, for purpose of ensuring an appropriate informant-handler match]:

Areas of immediate concern to Handlers, Supervisors and Administrators are:

a. His/her criminal record. Speak to officers/investigators involved in any and all cases resulting in the arrest of your informant. If you don't some defense attorney will.

b. What the informant has shown him/herself to be capable of: level of treachery; implication"in homicides etc ... Whatever he/she has done unto others, don't believe for a second that your badge will prevent him/her from doing unto you.

c. What is the CI' s record as an informant? You WANT to speak to prior handler and/or prosecutors who used this informant! This information is a must!

d. CI's level of intelligence and education. Important to know and assess in matching informant to handler. You NEVER want too much of an imbalance with the "weight" of intelligence going toward the informant! Critical area for Supervisory Officers and Managers

e. The CI must be aware that his operations are being watched, not only by his handler, but by supervisors as well. CI cannot be allowed to be in a position wherein, he/she believes that if the informant "gets over" (seduces the handler); he/she can maintain control of his/her own activities. Critical area for Supervisory Officers and Managers.

1 Adapted directly from the DEA two-week training school lesson plan


Reference Materials

RULE#3.

4.5

f. "Success" in crime. [acquired assets, total jail time, length of time in crime, level of crime activity reached]. Does crime pay for this informant, and why?

g. How does your informant earn an income? Does his/her explanation for income match his/her life style? If you don't ask these questions, a sharp defense attorney will! The inference is that you looked the other way at your informant's criminality!

h. His/her presentation during interview: Do they seem deceptive? (Supervisor should be present during initial interview and during periodic debriefings).

1. Assertive personality? Does he/she seem to control the direction ofthe conversation during interview with handler? Critical area for Supervisors and Administrators, as well as handlers.

J. Does he/she attempt to evade questions?-any questions whatsoever, no matter how seemingly inconsequential.

k. Is there evidence unearthed during the initial inquiry that is indicative of this informant "shopping" cases-playing one agency against another for his/her own gain/protection?

1. Is there evidence in the record of this informant "double dealing"-using informant status as protection for criminal activities?

[Critical for supervisors]: BEWARE OF INFORMANTS WHO CONTROL THEIR HANDLERS-NEVER FORGET: INFORMANTS ARE CRIMINALS NOT COPS.

NOTE: From the first interaction between informant and any officers under your command, you must, at all times, observe and assess the relationship between informant and handler, particularly as to who is running whom!

Clever informants often play dumb; however, over time a supervisor must be alert for signs of the following:

a. Is informant more streetwise than his handler[ s ]? b. Does the informant's personality dominate the

officer's? c. Does the informant easily evade or avoid probing

questions of his handler?. d. Is the informant significantly more experienced than

the officer? e. Is the officer too insecure in his/her own abilities

and job performance to handle informants? [Possibly "too dependent" on informant for job production].

f. Is the informant able to become too "personal" in any mam1er with the handler[s]?


Reference Materials

RULE #4.

g.

h.

l.

j.

k.

4.6

Does the informant seem to know too much about the handler (s) personal life? [Family names, personal problems, personal gripes, etc]. Does the handler have a tendency to take the informant's side and/or defend the informant when the informant is clearly in the wrong? Does the informant seem to be in constant control of the direction of investigations? Does the informant seek to control the direction of his debriefings at ANY time? Does the informant often claim that close surveillance will "burn" his activities, particularly controlled buy operations?

Debrief an active informant periodically [NO LONGER THAN 30 DAY INTERVALS WHILE ACTIVE], whether he/she claims to have information or not. You may forget that he/she is your informant, but when he/she does wrong, he/she will NOT forget that he/she works for you and/or your department! And if your informant inflicts damage on some unsuspecting party while he/she is working for you, you can count on being named in a law suit.

a. The debriefing should cover ALL criminal knowledge. You want to impress · on him/her that you want to know everything he/she has even heard rumors of.

b. The debriefing should be witnessed, as should all contacts with the CI.

c. The debriefing should cover ALL contacts made by the informant- whether the or not the informant thinks they were productive or not-that were with anyone who might be considered a potential violator and/or a person( s) with criminal records.

d. The debriefing should cover ALL contacts this informant has made with other police agencies. [Shopping cases].

e. How has the informant been earning a living? f. · Be alert for signs of deception. g. Be alert for "sensitive" areas. h. When the informant seems shy of a subject - that is the

subject you want to probe. 1. The debriefing should be attended by a supervisor, at

least periodically, and should- unless there are documented, extenuating circumstances-always be witnessed by another officer.

J. When the informant supplies actionable information [information that may result in a full investigation,


Reference Materials

RULE#5.

4.7

warrant, etc.] be prepared to follow some or all the tactics referred to in RULE 10.

Have the informant read and sign an "INFORMANT AGREEMENT" acknowledging that during the informant's association with you and/or your department the following areas will be agreed to:

a. I (the informant] acknowledge that I have no police powers under the laws of (state) or any local governmental subdivisions and has no authority to carry a weapon while performing active duty as an informant.

b. I acknowledge that I am associated with the ________ Police Department as an informant on a case or time basis as an independent contractor and that any payment received is not subject to Federal or State Income Tax Withholding or Social Security. All reporting of that income is mandatory under the law and is my responsibility.

c. I acknowledge that as an informant I am not entitled to Workman's Compensation from the state of

and that I shall not hold --------------responsible for any injuries or damage incurred by reason of [the informant's] association with the police department.

d. I agree to not engage in entrapment activities and acknowledge that these activities have been fully explained to me by officer/prosecutor ______ and that I fully understand these instructions.

e. I agree not to divulge to any person, except the investigator[s] with whom I am associated with, my status as an informant for the --------police department unless required to do so in court and that I shall not represent myself to others as an employee or representative of the police department.

f. I agree not to use the police department or any of its officers as credit or employment references unless prior approval is obtained from the investigator[ s] with whom I am associated.

g. I agree that my association with the _____ _ police department does not afford me any special privileges whatsoever.

h. I agree that I will perfonn my duties as an informant without any official identification as such and that I will


Reference Materials

RULE#6.

4.8

not create and/or attempt to create any "identification" documents that in any way give the impression that I am officially associated with the police department, and that I am aware that any attempt to do so may be a violation of State and/or Federal law.

1. I agree that I will not plan and/or engage in any criminal activity and/or make any criminal contacts that may result in criminal activity without first notifying my controlling officer[ s] for approval and instructions.

J. I acknowledge that, in reference to (i) above, I have been furnished with emergency contact methods and have discussed delaying tactics to be utilized during possibly exigent circumstances.

k. I agree that should I, in any manner, come into possession of criminal evidence of any kind, that I will immediately contact my handler[ s] for instructions.

1. I agree to maintain a strict accounting of all funds provided to me by the police department as part of my activity as an informant. I understand that misuse of department funds could be grounds for criminal prosecution against me.

m. Finally, I agree that a violation of any of the aboveenumerated provisions will be grounds for immediate termination and probable criminal charges.

Create an informant file in which you document the informant's history, performance and all your interactions with him/her. This may, indeed, depending on Discovery rulings in each case, furnish defense attorneys with cross-examination materials that may or may not jeopardize a prosecution; however, it may also save your job, your career and the lives of all officers who eventually utilize this informant, as well as the unsuspecting public. The general rule is that "the proper documentation of an informant is essential if the informant is to be effectively utilized. Failures at this critical stage can result in defense claims ofprosecutorial misconduct and allegations of Brady violations for failure to disclose evidence that would erode an informant's credibility at trial." 2 The informant file is also a vital source of information and protection for any future handlers of your informant. The Informant File, at a minimum, should reflect:

a. Full identifying data: name, aliases, physical descriptions, date of birth, fingerprints, current photo, phone numbers, addresses, and Social Security Number.

b. Criminal Record.

2 Informant Law Desk Book, by Demris G. Fitzgerald


Reference Materials

RULE #7.

RULE #8.

4.9

c. Criminal Reputation and Known Associates. [up to date].

d. Copies of all debriefing reports. e. Records of all payments. f Comments that would be useful to other potential

handlers.

Keep your finger on the pulse of your informant's motivation. If you know your informant's "true" motivation-why he/she does what they · do-then you will know what the real intentions are, which, by the way, are rarely what he/she says they are. Criminal informants' motivations are complicated, multiple and change rapidly without warning. In general they are a combination of the following:

a. Fear of incarceration. b. Mercenary. c. Fear of reprisal against himself and/or his family. d. Destroy competition e. Vengeance f. Eliminate creditors g. Eliminate competing criminals h. Protect his own drug trafficking or other criminal

activity 1. Reduction in sentence and/or release. J. Police buffs and Wam1abes. k. Unwitting informants. 1. Brokered. m. Excitement: Thrill or it all. n. Perverse. o. Good Samaritan p. Repentance

JAIL HOUSE INFORMANTS: q. Special Privileges r. Early release s. Informant fees paid to others

Handlers must always seek to maintain control of informants through proper balance of motivation, fear and reward factors. This means that, as in dog training, the informant must both fear and respect that handler enough that the "reward" (primary motivation) must come through that handler(s) and only that handler(s). Motivation to "please" the handler and/or adhere to the Informant Agreement, must, at all times, overcome all other fears, needs, drives and urges.

To keep your informant "properly" motivated you MUST be constantly aware of his/her true motivation, which, as stated above, is always changing. If the informant ' s motivation, secretly and/or unnoticed by the

•NS Division of Criminal Justice Services, Office of Public Safety: Copyright 2007 (November 2007)

Reference Materials

RULE#9.

4.10

handler(s), switches to seeking a "reward" from some source, the infonnant WILL ALWAYS engage in one or more of the following:

a. Criminal acts [double-dealing] , using his informant status for protection from arrest and prosecution ..

b. Entrapment. Conning "dupes" into the commission of crimes and then "selling" them to his/her handler[ s] as "information" and/or criminal cases.

c. False testimony. Jail House informants are notorious for this. "Montate en la gua gua! -Getting on the bus."

I. Cases: US v Noriega. Crown v Mihaylov. (other cases from personal files).

II. Falsification of evidence [i.e. doctored and/or selective tape-recordings]. Carslon v US.

III. Planting of evidence. US v MA TI. d. Falsification of evidence [i.e. doctored and/or selective

tape-recordings]. Carslon v US e. Planting of evidence. US v MA TI f. Reverse undercover: Setting up the handler(s) and

"selling" them to Internal Affairs, with information gleaned from his close association. (US v Sante Bario)

g. Entrapping his handler(s) into misconduct and/or criminal acts. (US v Sante Bario)

h. "Shopping" bad cases; playing one agency off against the other in search of"easy" handlers. (Carlson v US).

1. "Down trading"- flipped drug traffickers who turn in lower echelon dealers and users as "big fish" to satisfy cooperation agreements.

Be ever alert to "SIGNS" of informant duplicity. a. Refusal and/or reticence at making tape-recorded

conversations with alleged targets, to corroborate informant information in the presence of controlling officers [vital with "flipped" informants].

b. Vague and/or deceptive answers to questions during de briefings.

c. Unexplained and/or vague explanation for anything. d. Umeported contacts with criminal associates. e. Failure to contact handler[s] through prearranged

methods [pagers, cell phones, headquarters, etc.] with any excuse.

f. Reported contacts with criminal associates wherein "no criminal conversation" is reported.

g. Unexplained signs of income or enrichment [cars, jewelry, cash].

h. Indications of drug use.



1. Usually tries to convince handlers that the use of transmitting and/or recording devices would be dangerous.

J. Usually tries to convince handlers that surveillance of his activities will "burn" the investigation and/or expose him

k. Fails to make regularly scheduled contact with vague and/or questionable excuse.

1. Too many "unplanned" meetings with criminal associates.

m. Attempts to get personal with handlers. n. Attempts to learn information and/or tactics ap.d/or

identities that he has no "need" for to fulfill his assignment and/or agreement.

o. The ability to continue to function as an informant in areas where he/she, by virtue of past performance, is well known as an informant.

p. Past record of the informant for duplicity (other agency Informant File).

q. Notification by another law enforcement agency of an informant's arrest and/or criminal activities.

r. "Sudden" or "new" criminal information about an individual with whom the informant has had an ongoing and unreported relationship of any type.

I. Cases: CROWN V MIRA YLOV(Papo case) ... CARLSON v US.

JAIL HOUSE INFORMANTS: s. Access to "criminal information" via purchase and/or

grapevine and/or news and Internet. t. Uncorroborated [by prison records and/or personnel]

access to alleged target[ s]. u. Use of publicly and/or widely available information to

"sell" to authorities. v. Use of outside contacts to obtain information that he

may falsify as having been "told" to him/her directly by . a target [false confessions].

RULE #10: NEVER, NEVER, NEVER take an informant's word for anything without independent corroboration. In the words of the KGB [Russian version of CIA, who ran rings around CIA in the management of informants] "TRUST BUT VERIFY."

Keeping your informant honest. Recommended tactics:

' S Division of Criminal Justice Services, Office of Public Safety: Copyright 2007 (November 2007)


a. Initiate tape-recorded corroborating conversations whenever possible (vital tactic with "flipped" informants.)

b. Surveillance of informant, with and without his/her knowledge.

c. Have the informant introduce the undercover agent. d. Use other informants whenever possible to crosscheck

and corroborate. (Jolm Miller "in Atlanta" case.) e. Full investigative effort at independent corroboration of

everything told to you-who, what, when and where, and what documents prove same.

RULE # 11: NEVER, NEVER, NEVER trust an informant with information that you would not want published on the front page of the New York Times. It may end up there!

Rule #12:

a. When you are with your informant, you MUST imagine him/her as a video-recorder, taking in and recording EVERYTHING he/she is exposed to, for future use.

b. Lucy in (US v Roberto Suarez et al-The Big White Lie), details and embellishes everything she has been exposed to in the lives of the agents and officers she has been exposed to, giving all a sinister and illegal twist.

c. Fatal Dreams. US v [DEA agent] Sante Bario, the informant in the Sante Bario case created a falsified case against the unsuspecting DEA agent, who was arrested and died in prison as a result- Bario was exonerated posthumously.

d. Case: Deep Cover - Wheeler in Customs office. Ends up in bed with the lead customs agent. Played the usual informant-baits-cop game, with involvement in worldclass case that would be good for her career.

Handlers of flipped informants, under exigent circumstances, must carry and use teclmical equipment (i.e. tape recorder) at every opportunity.

a. ·· Recorders are used to "ice" the decision to be an informant, as well as to corroborate statements that contain certain likelihood to be false and deceptive! (taken from the DEA. "Informant Handling" training syllabus)

b. Failure to tape-record calls with alleged coconspirators, as an example, may be attacked by defense attorneys.

Example Discussion: Expert testimony during SAN DIEGO, Russian Crew case.



c. INFORMANT CONTROLLED TAPE-RECORDINGS OF TARGETS, from US v "DUPES", [name changed] Expert Witness Report:

"Informants are often provided equipment to record unsupervised incoming telephone calls from the target[ s]. They should be instructed by their control agent to record all calls [emphasis mine] received that pertain to the investigation." 3 "CI's [informants] should not initiate telephone calls to the target unless directed to do so by the control agent. This practice avoids the selectively taped argument by the defense and allows the agent to maintain control over the investigation. [emphasis

0 J 4 mme. Here again, it is important to point out that the substandard permitting of criminal informants to tape their own conversations has resulted in numerous well-documented cases of entrapment and/or enhancement entrapment and/or other criminality, including, but not limited to the submission of"doctored" and/or otherwise falsified tape-recordings to handlers as "evidence. 5

RULE # 13: Handler' s of flipped informants, under exigent circumstances, MUST consult with prosecutor for approval.

Rule #14: Undercover Operations resulting from an informant introduction, and/or with an informant as the undercover "partner" of an officer, MUST address the following issues:

a. The mental stability of the informant at that moment. b. Thorough debriefing of informant with an undercover

operation in mind. c. The reputation of the informant with the target. d. The Informant's past history with, knowledge of and

relationship with the target. e. The target's propensity for violence. f. The undercover officer's ability to control the

informant. g. Rehearsal.

3 Informant Law Desk Book, Also see: On Lee v Unites States, 343 U.S. 747, reh'g denied, 344 U.S. 848 (1952); Lopez v united States, 373 U.S. 427 reh 'g denied, 375 U.S. 870 (1963); United States v White, 401 U.S .745, reh 'g denied, 402 U.S.99, on remand, 454 F.2d 435 (71

h Cir. 1971), cert denied, 406 U.S . 962, (1972); United States v Caceres! 440 U.C. 71, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas (CCH)C 9294,43 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) V79-872 (endorsing White, plurality ~ Id 5 Carlson v U.S. (as one of many examples).

'YS Division of Criminal Justice Services, Office of Public Safety: Copyright 2007 (November 2007)


h. What if? Scenario-WITH informant-is vital. CASES: Deep Cover-Wheeler playing Customs against DEA and controlling the operation, as to control issues. Tumillo Killing. Hatcher killing.

Example of failure to adhere to this rule occurred when DEA Agent Jay Sylvestro entered the apartment of target Nick Caturrano with an informant who was going to make an introduction. Sylvestro found himself facing a gun in the shaking hand of an enraged Caturrano who wanted to kill the informant, and Sylvestro, the only witness

RULE #15: Informant "controlled buy" situation means "airtight" control by the handler. The less "control" exercised by the handler, the more likely it is that the informant will take personal and/or fmancial advantage of the situation. (Critical area for supervisory and administrative levels).

a. FULL debriefmg. Do NOT take the CI' s word for why he must make the buy and not an undercover officer.

b. Use transmitting and/or recording device whenever possible. Do NOT take the informant's word that he will be searched, without testing him. [Discuss in class].

c. REALLY search the informant and whatever vehicle he might use, BEFORE and AFTER the buy.

d. A full debriefing and signed statement AFTER the buy is mandatory.

e. Surveillance BEFORE and AFTER CI leaves the premises of the buy should be mandatory.

f. If possible take videos during the pre and post buy surveillance, and have the CI identify the people on video as to involvement.

g. ROis should reflect, by-the-book, Controlled Buy procedures.

h. Supervisory officers should -whenever possiblemake personal observations of Controlled Buys, particularly with officers and infom1ants who use the tactic with frequency.

CLASS DISCUSSION: CASE: US V JOHN MULL

RULE #16: Know the signs of informant entrapment. a. What is entrapment? b. What is informant entrapment? c. What is enhancement entrapment? d. What is the difference between "unwitting" and

entrapped? I. What is predisposition?



II. Informants oflong duration almost always, if allowed, engage in entrapment.

Why? e. Informants who push to have the freedom engage in

and/or, to tape-record criminal conversations with little or no control of handlers.

Why is this a sign of entrapment activity? f. Targets who are gainfully employed and who have little

or no records and/or reputations as criminals. g. Targets that have records of violence and/or mental

instability and/or robbery, can be easily entrapped into a very deadly drug deal.

h. Targets that know drug dealers, but never seem to have drugs.

RULE #17: NEVER, NEVER allow a flipped informant to "down trade" in a cooperation deal. The following is excerpted from a Department of Justice Mandate: COOPERATION AGREEMENTS: US PROSECUTORS, DUTY TO BE COGNIZANT OF COOPERATING DEFENDANT WITNESSES "TRADING DOWN." "Make [cooperation] agreements only with 'little fish' to get 'big fish.' ... The integrity of governmentindeed our very way of life--demands it."- Stephen Trott, Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of Justice. 6

RULE#J8:

If you allow an informant to protect the Big Fish he knows, while he delivers all the Small Fries-that informant is running you, and there is no telling how far he will run.

All money transactions with an informant MUST BE WITNESSED & DOCUMENTED. Critical area for supervisory and administrative officers.

RULE #19: When in serious doubt, Polygraph your informant. Critical area for supervisory and administrative officers.

RULE #20: Never hesitate in terminating (firing) and blackballing an uncontrollable criminal informant.

This is a true expression of the phrase, "To Protect and Serve" and you may be doing some other cop and his family and the unsuspecting public a huge favor as well.

6 StephenS. Trott, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S.Departrnent of Justice. "The Successful Use of Snitches, Infonnants, Co-conspirators and Accomplices as Witnesses for the Prosecution in a Criminal Case; January 1984 Revision FOIA Request #CRM-960224F. The Hon. StephenS. Trott is currently serving as a Federal Judge in the 9th District. Excerpted from Informant Law Desk Book

YS Division of Criminal Justice Services, Office of Publ ic Safety: Copyright 2007 (November 2007)


- - ---- ---- --··----------··- -. -----·--- ----------·-----------------------

U.S. Department of Justice DrugEnforcemi:nt Administration CO"N'"FIDENTIAL SOURCE AGREEMENT

' --" I. Instructions (To be completed by the Controlling Investigators and the Confidential Source (CS)). . . . . .

I have been r:equestedby the Drug Enfotc~ment Adrrllnistration (DEA} to provide assiStance in the . investigation of Violations of the Controlled Substances Act I understand .that I am authorized, willie under the direct supervision cir tori.trol ofDEA Controlling Investigators; to perform activities that include the foUowing:

1. The controlled purcha,se of controlled substances in an undercover capacity under the direction and controi of DEA .CoritroUin~ Jnyestigators. ··

2. The introduction of an ·undercover agent to a violator. . .

3, The i.Iifiltration of a diug"trafficking organization.

4. To pose as a person engaged in the illi.cit sale or di_stribution of controlled substances.

5. To assist ip. the controlled delivery of controlled substances to a violator.

6, The consensual wea.ring of a recording or transmitting device in furtherance of these activities. ·

7. The taping oftelephone conversations between myself and drug violators in furtherance of these actiVities.

8. Oili~(~ecizy) __________________________ ~~----------------------

II. Acknowledgements:

In performing the investigative functions de.tailed above, I understand and agree to the following:

I. 1 understand that my assistance to the DEA and any statements that I may make to m'y Controlling Investigators are entirely voluntary.

2. 1 wil1 provide truthful information at all times.

3. The United States Governmentand the DEA will strive to protect my identity, but cannot guarantee that my identity will not be divulged as a result oflegal or other compelling considerations, or that I will not be called to testizy in court as a witness. ·

4. The DEA does not promise or agree to. any consideration by a prosecutor or a court in exchange for my cooperation, since any decision to confer any such benefitlies w ithin the exclusive.· discretion of the appropriate prosecutor arid court. However, DEA will consider (but not necessarily act upon) a request to adyjse the approp!iate prosecutor's office ar court of the nature and extent of my cooperation with DEA.. 1 voluntarily waive any privacy." requirement in the event that in DEA's discretion they may be legally required to dis. close mY identity to ·the court.

5. I understand that I have no immunity or protection from investigation, arrest, or prosecution for anything .that I say or do,. except for activities specifically authorized by my Controlling Investigators pursuant to my cooperation with DEA. I agree to abide by the instructions of my Controlling Inve~tigators and will not take any-independent action on behalfofDEA or the United States Govetrunent.

FORM DEA-473 (3-021 Previous ediiions .obsolete Eiectror.:c Form Ver~:on D.e:;:igned. i:; JetForm.5.2 Ve~Sir:;m



-~· · - ·- - -·· · ·· ·- -------.. --.. -·--------- --~---~~---·------·- "" ____ .......,

... ....../'

6:

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

~·

I h?ve not been authorized to participate in allY criminal activity', e~cept as speCifically " . authorized in writing by a prosecutonmd/cir my Controlling Investigators. llmd~rstandthat I may be prosecuted for any unlawful conduct that I may have corturiitted in the ,pa.st or may comin1t in the .future. ·

I underStand that1 ani not an employee of the DEAor the United States GoV'ernrneri(arid may not represent myself as such. ·

I understand that I may not enter into any contract or incur: any obligation on pehaJ:f ofthe United States Gover:nment or DEA, except as specificall)' instructed andappr6Ved:b)'theDEA.

! understand that although I may be eligible for compensatioil tor my se;rv-ices; nieDEA reserves the exclusive right to determine whether I \vill receive any payment or compensation and to ~eterrnine the amourit oJ such paymerit or compensation. · · ·

I understand that I am liable for any taxes that may be due on any compensation or payments provided by DEA. · · _ .

I understand that no promises may be made;:, other than by th~ Immigration and Naturalizati.on Serv1ce (U<iS), regaramg my imm'tgrati.on status or Tight tO enter or remain in the United States.

12. lunders.tand that I ani oniy authorized to participate or engage in the specific .... conduct set forth · above, and that I may not participate or engage in any·other illegal ac~ivity. · ·

·13. I underitarid that this agreement is in.force from ______ _ . until ______ _ (not to exceed one year). .

J 4. I understand that I may not, under any circumstances, participate in an act of violence; pa;rtieipate in any act that constitUtes obstruction of justice (e.g.; perjury, witness tampering, witness intimidation, entrapment, or the f.abrication, alteration, or destruction of evidence); participate in any activity designed to obtain information by an unlawful method (e.g., breaking and entering, illegal wiretap¢ng, illegal opening ofthe mail, trespass amounting to illegal search, etc.); initiate or instigate a plan or strategy to commit a federal, state, or local offense.

15 . .I understand that ifi am aSked by any person to participate- in any ofthe prohibited conduct listed 1n·(14) above, or iJI-learn of plans to engage in such conduct, I must immedia,tely contact my Controlling Investigators.

I fully W1derstand and agree to the aboye. . . . ..

Confidential .Source:

Signature Date

Confidential Source No.

Controllin$ Investigator: ·. Sign attire bate

Controlling Investigator:

Signature Date - -. .. .. r

) 1.) ... , . J


APPENDIX

ARTICLES OF INTEREST TO THE INSTRUCTOR

• UNDERCOVER l by DOnald Goddard I i The subject of this absorbing, intense bi-1 ography, Michael Levine, spent 23 years . of his life buying and selling drugs. His · business took him from cash-for-the-stash

New York ghettos to the multimillion-

dollar white-powder capitals of Asia and South America. He handled each transac- 1 , tion with a dealer's swagger, bags and f l pockets weighed down with money, eyes · . filled with suspicion, manner cool and dis- ·I tant. The drug deals would take months, ~ 1

sometimes years, to set up. The payoffs- I loads of cash or a gun to the head-would 1 be decided in moments. Levine proved l over those 23 years that he was one of the best dealers in operation. Street hustlers ~ swore by him, international buyers trust- ! l ed his instincts and valued his drug I i judgment. It wasn't until Levine flashed · ll

Undercover

his badge that the dealers even had a hint 1 that they had been working with an under- i cover agent of the Drug Enforcement Ad- ~ ; ministration. Levine's strength was his 1 ! ability to mold himself into different char- l r acters. At various times in his career (he 1 i retired in May 1988 because of a back injury sustained during a crack raid), Levine posed as a priest, a mobster, a Puerto Ri- Michael Levine as he is today, left, and undercover as a New York heroin dealer

f can dealer (he speaks fluent Spanish) and a I J Colombian drug merchant. A martial.ar~s

1 · master, he bagged more than 3,000 cnm1- ! , nals during his years on the street and con- H

fiscated uncounted millions in pure and "danced on" (di!uted) drugs. He withstood I he psychologicfll pressures of the .,j,q \~i" IJ !I• lli P ii' lll('l ll li "ll l ll br/t iPild

ther of these burdens was difficult for Levine since he was driven by more lh<m the desire to be a good cop: His only brother, David, killed himself in 1977 after losing a battle with heroin. The book moves like a lliplt '• P~'t' rl !'n r d ut'it', t 'II ~C lt 'irl'n<' whi77 in

·II §l d

Author Goddard, who also wrote Joey, a biography of Malia chieftain Joey Gallo, knows the territory Levine roams well enough to make the dialogue and settings seem as near and as frightening as a orner c rac k buy. The sec t ions on Lc-

• Jilt•\ o !J~It ll tno od (l lo !II<'W liP It lt•wi•. /1 l.i d

I I~ (8 : f~')[;~ (~, \\ f~'J I

L i : -PAllS-

! in a tire-iron-tough Hispanic neighbor-. hood in the Bronx) help exp lain the deter

mined man he became. The breakdown of Levine's personal life (DEA agents refer to themselves as the Alimony Boys) reflects the round-the-clock demands of

; buys, busts and court appearances. ' Through it all, anger at the results of drug

use sustains Levine, and the belief that he :· can, despite all the obstacles, wipe out ' the dealers, fuels his convictions. Add to ; that mix the fact that Levine loved the ac! tion, loved the feel of the edge, of being · one second, one squeeze of a trigger away

from death. (Even now, when Levine spends most or his time lecturing, he nev~r goes anywhere without a weapon.) Unfercover brings the reader close toLe-'ine's edge, offering a convincing and >rutal glimpse into the ever-expanding I rug world.! tis a world in which 25 mi lion Americans, in one form or another, >articipate every day. It is a world of very ·ew heroes. Michael Levine is one of hr m (Tirn c·" Rooks, $ 19.95)

Special Agent GARY E. WADE, Drug -l.nrroOn'\o•nt Administration, Office of

FBI Academy, Quantico, Virginia

an undercover narcotics officer is injured or killed in the line of duty, it is typicaUy be

the flashroU was mismanaged. The of any drug trafficker's affection

he buyer's money. If he can acquire money through negotiation. fine.

-..,,.,1 "• if the buyer makes it easy to off that money, he is exposing

to tremendous danger. arcotics officers realize that "buy!

scenarios are among the most danin drug law enforcement; there

such thing as a "simple" buy/bust. most dangerous time during the

is when the drugs and money · the same place.

0

FREEDOM

traditional triangle used in tactical has been adopted by DEA in its

-"rnuar training to graphically depict facing undercover agents. This

shown above, represents the "dynamic balance." He will be either to keep the drugs cur

in his possession or to exchange for a fairly negotiated sum of . Whichever course is chosen, the demands his freedom. The "0" in

THE POLICE CHIEF/NOVEMBER 1990

the middle represents the undercover officer, ·located at the vortex of the potential violence. When the drugs and money are present, the dealer is at the greatest risk of losing his freedom (if the purchaser is a law enforcement officer) or his drugs (if the purported purchaser is a rip-off artist). Research in this area_ has disclosed very few incidents where a rip-off was att m ted when both the'

ru s an one were resent. This model of the dea er's dynamic

balance portrays the undercover agent (UC) at the pinnacle of the risk curve when the drugs and money are together. However, the agent may well be at equal or greater risk just prior to that point. The dealer may be at his wariest when he has displayed the drugs but has not seen the buyer's money. Remember, the dealer has accepted the UC as a trafficker at this point; what he fs unsure about is the agent/buyer's ability to pay the negotiated amount. The UC is just another criminal who has not displayed his wherewithal to purchase the drugs being negotiated.

This situation causes the dealer to assume a fully alert, aggressive posture prior to the money arriving. Unfortu· nately, when a flashroU is not present, UCs often presume a low danger level and tend to show signs of complacency. In most situations, it is a sound tactical decision to flash money when it is beneficial to the agent, ie., early in the negotiations as opposed to an "on demand" or "on request" situation. The critical factor in an early flash is that the money must be displayed to the correct individual. It serves no purpose to dis· play money to a flunkie, since that only forces the UC into having to show the money twice.

Many agents are reluctant to let dealers put their hands on the flashroll and actually count the money. However, ~here is little-if any-reason to displa~ money to a drug trafficker if he canno count it., Indeed. ~his actuaOy creates if weaker negotiating position for the UC,

'

since the dealer'is more likely to demand to see the money again.

If the investigation substantiates the dealer's ability to produce the negotiated quantity of narcotics, there is a sound reason to flash the money; if the flash is arranged safely, there is no reason not to let him count the money. After aiL the UC demands to test the drugs. From the trafficker's point of view, the two are the same. Additionally, few real drug dealers would be so squeamish as to refuse to let the supplier count the buy money. The key is to arrange the flash safely, in a manner consistent with methods used in the drug underworld.

Because many departments find it difficult to produce the large flashroUs necessary when dealing with significant traffickers, UCs may occasionally resort to using "short" flashroUs-stacks ofSlOs and $20s with $100 bills on the top and bottom of each stack. This practice can be suicidal for the UC. If the supplier insists on counting the money, the UC has no choice but to refuse, thus creating unnecessary distrust in an already volatile situation. If the dealer somehow discovers the ruse, the obvious assumption is that he is being ripped off. And if this discovery goes unnoticed by the UC, he is in the worst of aU possible situations: He is at an inordinately high risk level and doesn't realize it.

There are simple remedies if a flashroU in the required amount is not available. First, since the UC has been shown no drugs in quantity to this poin~, he can easily say he is willing to display only a portion of the money until the trafficker produces aU of the product. The agent can also reduce the amount of drugs under negotiation. Actually, this is an excellent ruse since traffickers are con· vinced that the police have all the money in the world. and that no undercover police officer would ever admit to having insufficient funds to make the purchase. ·, Thus, admission of insufficient funds, if "; not done too close to the time of delivery, · l ·

can serve to solldify the officer's cover.

. 1 ~e tru1n 1s 1nat n ooesn t reauy mau~t · ., .... ··-- ,.-··· ·,-·- r---. --· --.. ·-··-

.what the uc does with the nashrol~ what ": The best way for a new urlriclRs following I he smmd officer and matters is what the dealer lhinks he is · · tl1e {l0$,hroll away from the IOCDtion doing fvilh it. The agent must never let . undercover agent to learn observe a countersurvril/ance car also the dealer know-or think he knows- to handle flashrolls is to following the second officer. T1re second the location of the flashroll. For example, UC makes two or II•~ tunrs and tile an agent who has $20,000 lucked in his watch how a streetwise "counter" car is still follawillg. boot but has convinced the dealer thai dr aff" k h dJ Wl1at decision sl•ould tile slrr.rl su-a second party is holding the money is___ .• ug lr . lC er an es peroisor make regarding the {la5h car almos~as safe as·i~ he liad no money his product. The dealer and rourrtersurvei/lan.ct? Some agrnts. at all. Conversely, if the agent does not , , a11d aperienced poliCe .officers reply that' have the Oashroll but the dealer believe.s contmually stnves to the surveilla11ce should be continued he does, he is in as ':"uc~ danger ~s if keep purchasers -off bal _ until a clear indication of the violator's he had the money; tn hrs ·,possess•on. . .. ... . - · .- . ... .- .- ini~IJicms arr rrreh¢ so as not ·lo jeop-. lndWJ, :he may -even be at greal~r ~ • ance, never-letting th~ffi --· . ., ~.fl':'fl~ the investigation UnnectSS(!rily." . since hiS guard may be down tn the kn h th dr HOWf"'.i;r, any time felons begin M follow absence of money. . ow w ere e ugs . a car brawn to contain significanl sums

A few years~go, two undercover poli~e are until the last min- of purported dmg funds, a clear indi-officers met wtlh two drug traffickers tn cation has been recrioo1 as to thrir a hotel room and negotiated the delivery ute-often after the intentions. For the Sflfefy of the seco11d of one kilogram of heroin for $150,CXXJ. h b b UC. the subjects in the counlersuroeii-Near the conclusion of the negotiations, money as een 0 - lance cor musl ~ arrrsled as soon as the officers displayed $150,CXXJ in cash- served. It is commonplace tactically feasible. Altlrough there arr stored in a briefcase under the bed-to • alternatives slrorl of arrrsl !hal may the subjects, who counted the money and for traffickerS to USe flash f11SUI"f the offiCer'S safefy, tltere is clearly agreed to return to the hotel room in two d • l no purpose in pursui11g an undercover hours with the kilo of heroin. The officers cars an co-consprra ors imJfStigalion when every sign points to declined, suggesting instead that they to hold the drugs. a rip-off. It is incumbent upon the me-et the subjects in the restaurant next manager, c~agrnt and street supervisor to the hotel. Alter testing the drugs, they ro accurately assess thest signs rather would then aU return lo the hotel room than ignore them for the sa~ of a seizurr. to collect the money. 3. A second UC aniving on foot at the

Of course, as soon as the subjects left mous risk. When the line is oblique- that meeting spot and departing immediately the hotel room, the money was passed is, nothing the dealer does to the UC will after the flash. This is especiaUy effective to surveillance officers in an adjoining put him in possession of the money- when smaUer sums of money are being room. When the subjects returned 20 the agent's risk is significantly reduced. _ flashed and the flash is done in a public minutes later, intent on stealing the One thing is certain: An undercover place. · · money, a shooloul ensued during which officer who continues lo operate without 4. Using a cellular telephone to call for one officer was wounded and both regard to the length of lime a subject has the OashroU to be brought to his location traffickers killed. While the UCs had access-or thinks he has access-to the once the UC is ready to display the ensured the safety of the flashroU by llashroU is likely to die for a few kilograms money. changing its location, they failed to of powder. 5. Having two UCs drive the subject ensure their own safety by advising the A "su_rprise flash" is often used lo dis- to a location where the money is shown subjects that the money would not be play money while limiting the UC's ex- by a third UC. This method is frequently . in the hotel room when they returned. posure. With this technique, the money used in reverse undercover investiga-

The best way for a new undercover is displayed to the subject when he is lions when significant amounts of con-agent to learn to handle flashroUs is to not expecting it, such as at a meeting trolled substances are being flashed. watch how a slreetwise drug trafficker ostensibly set up to continue or clarify 6. Placing the flashroU in a safe-deposit handles his product. The dealer con tin- negotiations. If he has the slightest idea box-a particularly secure method to ually strives to keep purchasers off the money is lo be shown, it is nol a !lash large sums of money. balance, never letting them know where surprise !lash. If the subject is inclined 7. Using an airplane to fly the money the drugs are until the last minute-often to steal the flash rolL any advance notice into a remote airstrip and having the after the money has been observed. It of its appearance will give him an op- subject driven there with no advance is commonplace for traffickers to use flash port unity to devise a plan lo carry out notice as to the location. The subject can cars and co-conspirators to hold the a robbery. also be flown to a remote airstrip and drugs for them. · Among the methods commonly used the money displayed out of a car or yet

Obviously, in most undercover scenar- to flash money are the foUowing: another airplane. ios, the money is displayed at some point 1. A flash car driven by a second B. Using a boat in much the same in the negotiations. What is the safest way undercover agent. manner as an airplane. to accomplish the flash 1 First and fore- 2. An unoccupied flash car placed in The advantage of the last two methods most, the dealer must not be told when a parking lot. In this case, a second UC is the display of wealth, a proven suspect the money· will be displayed and should should move the flash car once the molivator.lt is commonplace in the drug not be aware of the actual location of the money has been displayed to the dealer. underworld to go to extraordinary melh· money any longer than is necessary. More importantly, the dealer must be · ods to ensure the safely of one's product

A simple way to portray the risk factor made aware the car has been moved. An and one's money. Undercover officers is to draw an imaginary line extending interesting case study along this line is should not hesitate to employ similar from the dealer through the UC to the being utilized in OEA's advanced under- methods. flashroll. While that line remains cover training. The problem presented is straight-in other words, while the dealer as foUows: can take some action against the UC to An unducrrou ogrnl {lizshes $50,000 access the flashroU-the agent is at enor- roadeakr, utilizinga~offiardriv-

Summary The key to maxmuztng undercover

agent safety is to foUow the basic axiom5

11-IE POUCE GDEF/NOVEMBER 1990 49

When deeply involved in an investigation, it is easy for a UC to develop tunnel vision and lose sight of the importance of employing sound undercover tactics. The supervisor cannot fall prey to the same tunnel vision, sacrificing safety for the r success of the case.

of careful flashroll management: 1. Never flash the money twice unless

absolutely necessary. Hit is unavoidable, do not flash it the same way the second time, since it will no longer be a surprise. Don't hesitate to use an extraordinary "method to ensure the UC's safety.

2. Always move the flashroU as soon · as possible after it has been displayed, thereby severely limiting the subject's access to the money. As the earlier example iUustrates, it serves little purpose to move the flashroll unless the dealer is made aware it has been moved.

3. Never move to a second location with the flashroU in your possessionno matter what enticement is offered by the dealer.

4. Take pains to ensure that the dealer is not inadvertently tipped that the money will be flashed. It is better to remove aU doubt by teUing the dealer directly, '1 won't have the money with me. I will show it to you another time." The UC is not fostering suspicion by doing this; he is merely portraying himself as a streetwise drug dealer. Undercover agents are often reluctant to lie to a subject about such matters for fear of angering him. In fact, the UC is probably the only person the subject deals with who doesn'l lie about the whereabouts of money and drugs; it is simply expected in drug negotiations.

The supervisor plays a key role in flashroll management. Undercover officers sometimes develop a false sense of security. possibly disregarding danger signals and ihe basic tenets of undercover safety. When deeply involved in an investigation, it is easy for .a UC to develop tunnel vision and lose sight of the importance of employing sound undercover tactics. The supervisor cannot faU prey to the same tunnel vision, sacrificing safety for the success of the case. He must be prepared to take any steps necessary to enforce his policies regarding flashroU management. *

~~~ J .. ~s.o ..... " Make the Honor Roll

,t;{ ~J\ In support of President Bush's objective to ~~f~~ ~~\. \z 7, 6J reach a national safety belt use rate of 70% ~\ plus '~$ by the year 1992, the National Highway Traffic ~~ ~ Safety Administration (NHTSA) is conducting '"~~ a National Safety Belt Awards Program.

NHTSA officials will formally present a 70%+ Honor Roll plaque to honor states, organizations,

cities, counties, companies, military bases and schools that have reached 70% and higher driver safety belt use, as recommended by the Governor's Highway Safety Representative and approved by the NHTSA regional o£fice.

A police agency may qualify for an award under one of the following categories:

• As the official applicant of the qualifying jurisdiction, whereby the agency had a leadership role in attaining 70%+

• As a worksite entity achieving 70%+ among its own officers and civilian employees

• As a supporting agency to the applicant, whereby the police agency was instrumental in contributing to the success of achieving 70%+

IACP encourages all police departments to make application for this award. For a free brochure complete with information on how to apply, an entry form and listing of state highway safety agencies, contact Chuck Peltier, Program Manager, lACP, 1110 N. Glebe Rd .•. Suite 200, Arlingto11, VA 22201; 7031243-6500.

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• Many Types and deceplion by analysis of the subject's v.urds, spoken or written. Services Available The L.S.I. course on SCAN (formerly: Additionally. Global offers: the "Productive lnterrogalion" course) Dog and Certification of Team will be taught in major cities In the Supervisory Training United Stales, Canada and Australia. Annual Evaluations/Certifications

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Cirde no. 21 on Ruder Service Cud Cirde no. U on Ruder Senice Card

THE POUCE OllEF/NOVEMBER 1990 51

THE BLEACH "LOX" 1EST FOR ())CAINE

THIS SIMPLE TEST DETECTS THE PRESENCE OF ANY OF THE SYNTHETIC ANESTHETI C

PROCAINE, LIDOCAINE, BlffACAINE, BENZOCAINE, TETRACAINE, ETC,

To CONDUCT THE "loX" TEST, JUST FILL A CLEAR DRINKING GLASS \'liTH

CLOROX, THE LIQUID LAUNDRY BLEACH, SPRINKLE A Sfv'ALL PJIOUNT OF YOUR SAMPLE

COCAINE ONTO THE SURFACE OF THE BLEACH. fls IT SUBfVERGES IN THE LIQUID,

MN ANESTHETIC Clff WILL TURN RUST ORANGE, HYDROCHLORIDES AND OTHER WATER-

SOLUBLE SALTS OF THESE ANESTHETICS WILL SUBMERGE RAPIDLY, TURN DEEP RUST

IMMEDIATELY, AND LEAVE PALE MILKY-RUST TRAILS BEHIND THE DESCENDING

PARTICLES, SUMRGING COCAINE PARTICLES WILL BE FOLLOt/ED BY MILKY-WHITE

TRAILS AND AN OIL LIKE SLICK WILL R~IN ON THE SURFACE. A ROUGH QUANTI-

TATIVE ESTIMATE CAN BE MADE BY CAREFULLY OBSERVING THE PROPORTION OF

COCAINE TRAILS, SOME TESTERS USE THE BLEACH TEST TO DETECT THE PRESENCE

oF oTHER curs,

* r1A.NNITOL DROPS TO THE BOTIQ\1 AND REJv\A.INS THERE,

* lACTOSE SINKS QUICKLY AND LAYS ON THE BOTIOM IN TINY

GRAINS,

* INOSITOL DESCENDS AS PARTICLES GLISTEN LIKE RAIN DROPS,

1

(.::.ee 1ex1 1or oeuuea e:o;p tanatton 01 tn1s test.J

Very pure cocaine, well chopped: dissolves smoothly and slowly in delicate milky trails . A tiny dot of amber-colored natural oil will remain on surface.

Relatively pure cocaine-not well chopped : chunks leave milky trails, but do not dissolve completely before they hit bottom. Will also leave oil spot.

- . . . . -- - -------------------------------4- ·-----~

Cocaine cut with manni tol: the coke dissolves, chunks of mannitol fall to bot tom of glass.

..

This cocaine was .recrystalized with mannitol which pulls the dissolving cocaine to bottom of glass-chunks bounce on bottom , coke continues trailing as it dissolves.

I I II... 1111\J....L.. I I I '-"" VI '-'VI V VVI.....LI ~I 1 \AI'-"

I . THE AcTIVE Cl1T:

A SUBSTANCE THAT HAS SOME OF STIMULATING OR MOOD ALTERING PROPERTIES

OF COCAINE,

Ex.APPLE:

1, fv'EnwvipHET.AMINE

2. PooLINE

I I • THE MESTI-IETI c CUT

A SUBSTANCE TI-lAT PRODUCES 11-iE LOCAL NUMBING EFFECT OF COCAINE, 11-iUS

G IV I NG 11-iE IMv'ED I ATE IMPRESS I ON OF BEING 11-iE REAL THING ,

Ex.AMPLE:

1. PRoCAINE

2. TETRACAINE

3. BENZOCAINE

III. THE INERT OUT: A SUBSTANCE THAT 1-\A.S THE APPEARANCE OF COCAINE, BUT NEITHER Nl11BS

NOR STIMULATES,

ExAMPLE:

1. ~ITOL

2. lACTOSE

3. INOSITOL

WHATEVER CATEGORY A CUT BELONGS TO, IT SI-OULD l"EET THE FOLLCMING

PRIMARY QUALIFICAITONS.

1. VISUAL SIMILARI1Y TO COCAINE - WHITE.~ PREFERABLY Willi A

SPARKLING CRYSTALLINE APPEARANCE.

2. No OBVIOUS TASTE OR ODOR.

3, No TOXIC: CAUSING NO UNDESIRABLE SIDE EFFECTS,

.( - ------

i

l COCAINE REACTION REFERENCE CHART. I

Substance Melting Point U(Jillary Reaction Clorox Results Comments

Pharm~ccuticJI l97"C. 1\ldts clun-no Hc:siLltcs on surl;a~c for 15 sccon<h-lhen ,Biuc:l'':utin~ d~rtv~tivc of coc~ pbnl. Crysl;al· Coc:~inc rcsio.lu~ lulls towud bollom-lr~ils ~ppcar milky !inc f,tHm, Sltmul:llm¥ elf eel, numus on con·

-di,.;appc;ars complc:l~ly . U~l j,n Jboul ] mtnut~s

IUicil varies Mdu.:lc:an-no Hcutalcs S-10 s~conlls on swf~cc-rhcn lOu~ 1o_ diffc:rc:nccs in iUio:l cocJinc, ruction will Coc;ainc with rcsillu~ u;ails toward bollom-tnlls appc.1r milky vJry fhghrly . Rough unllc:r~ound .:oc. llcriYJ•

purity -oil spot rc:m;ains on iurf;acc. live, fl~om mJu;hc:s ph.um~ccutx::JI in qu:~lny. S:~mc crfc:cu.

~bnnilol l611"C. ~tdts .:I~Jn-no Drops immco.li.udy to bollom-llocs nol Also ~,nown JS mannnc, ~cnil, me: nita. White rcsilluc llissolvc-rcm;ains on bollom ;anll rc- L'fyst!Umc appcauncc, sli~lly sweet to r.:urc.

~o:mblcs layer of powllcr . llumlc:n.

Licto~.e 222"C. Blad.cns .:;aptllancs Drops ammcllillcly 10 bollom-do.:s not Also tnown u molk w~. \lt1oitc crysullinc: at Ul2" dis!Divc-rcmains on bollom ami ~ppcars appdllncc. ~ollcr:~tcly s~¥cct l.lSIC. lbrmlcu.

g:nmy.

Do:KllOSCI I49"C. Bbckcns c:lptll~rics 5Jmc n l.lcto.c Sug:~r malic from u.uch. ~lollcraldy s~¥cc:l to :11 149" Lute. llarmk<i · -

Su"ose l8S"C. UI:Jd.:cns 'c:~pill;~.uo:s Trails llown anll bys on bollom. Sugar malic from beets, cane Jn<l m~plc.

at l8S" lt~rm 1c~

Inositol 250"C. Turns Jmbo:r :11 17 l" Orops >p:uklin~~: gums immn.li:.t.:ly ~¥hi~h Vit~tllon U compouno.l, >lloCCI 10 IJ,IC. lli101ppcar hallw;ay lluwn ~bu-~aony r~-..-lluo: on both >urf~cc of cloroA ;anll bonom of tcla•s.

Quinine 95°C. Sllctchcs mcll point UuniS J~ron ,uriJco: of doroA woth filL· Shoulll be ~Vu10Jcd-sco: Jllult.:r~nh. Ocrivcll 25-JlJ0 who:n IOL,cll int~ ;u:loon -llraw. lug.: I her on surr.~o: on- from cmdton~ b•rl>. lltllcr 1:1\lc, nccllk ~ry•t~h.

lo ~ r.:ll >POl al'r.:r fo:w miooulc>..

Prooino: 161· Mclh d.:~n. Orop~ >ll.til;hl 10 bonum •nJ bur.rs tnru . .\I:\O f-nuwn .J'* II.Jct~Jim: ur ·'Y11.)4..:ainl.!. !:ihuuiJ 16'J°C, r.:ol or ur •otgc cul"r. ho: ""liJc,l--...:o: JJullcr~nl\. :"luutlh tjukLiy Jllll

thoro"~loly

Aonpho:IJntincs lOO"C. D!.!t.:ompo-...:' in- LcJv<'s 1unk UJoh 11 cav)· \I unu I.1C ut~ dt'cl t. wcry luu..:r lu r:r"h:.

slc~J ul md 1 ~ ShuuJ'' h .. : J'tut.J..:tl.

llcruon . ll0°C. Mclh ..:&.:an. llaluc:J~orinme:. anurphuat.· d-."ti'III.JII..,L'. ""' tlo~liW't! ...:f• t''-"..:h . C Jll he fJl.a( utg..:,h:ll au "''n..: .. uuuunt as nurtn.llt..:u~:..auc Ju·.c.

~

I· I

Common an·d Uncommon Cocaine Adulterants ascorbic acid (vitamin .C) 190-192 sharp acidic taste -----·-Substance Melting Point (0 C} on the Hot Box morphine 197 columnar prisms

mescaline base 35-36 slightly soluble in cold water quinine sulfate browns at 210. biller. brown 1n Jighl procaine base 51 slight biller taste and numbness ephedrine hydrochloride 21.6-220 needle-like crystals lidocaine 68-69 insoluble in water " lactose 220-222 faintly sweet taste borax 75 hard, odorless crystals or powder

' inositol 225-227 sweet taste, much sparkle dextrose (glucose) 83 not as sweet as cane sugar flour 230- browns at this temperature, no mer· .. benzocaine 88-90 slight numbness point lidocaine hydrochloride 127-129 freely soluble in water saccharine 228-229 sweeter than cane sugar salicylamide 140 biller taste. slightly pink yohimbine . -~· 234 poor solubility in water tetracaine hydrochloride 147-150 faint bitter taste & numbness methadone hydrochloride 235 bitter taste citric acid 153 sour taste caffeine 238 only slightly soluble in water procaine hydrochloride 153-156 benumbing effect phencyclidine hydrochloride 243-244 butacaine hydrochloride 157-159 numbness on tongue ephedrine sulfate 245 needle-like crystals boric acid 160 oily to touch, odorless crystals morphine sulfate 250 odorless. fine crystals sucrose (cane sugar) 160-186 carmel color & charring • ketamine hydrochloride 262-263 called ·green· or ·mauve" on the sire -mannitol ~ 166-168 sweetish taste caffeine citrated 275 slightly soluble acetaminophen 169-170 slightly soluble in cold water • caffeine-sodium benzoate 275 slightly b•tter taste methamphetamine 170-175 bitter taste amphetamme sulfate heroin 173 poor solubility in water d-amphetam•ne sulfate 300 slight b1tter taste & numbness brucine 178 very biller taste pemoline magnesium 300 •nsoluble •n water mescaline hydrochloride 183-185 very soluble in water talcum powder no melt; 01ly or greasy feel PABA 187-188 may yellow in light and air baking soda no melt, wh11e powder or granules

.'".-· ·

on·tcER s,w~:r~: · · covER ··JOB_!,_ covEl\ RES lDENc£s, · /\NU GOUNTER•SURVElLt.ANCF. . . : . . .. '•. 1

. . . . .

In Sflllll' 111'1'1' umh·n·nvl•r npcnnl ions, for example, those involving lone-tertn. ' ' . inv•·:;l i n:it imt!; ,;r orgnn izt'

1 d c:.r im~ or terr~r 1ist ~~o\J_ps, ·it .'dnny . b~.b.· imt. perln~ ive , -~.

tu •·rp;JI c• n cnvc.•r Rlury. r tul ;emp~nys JlOt ~ o~ y ,. : .. ~C)"e ;r, r~u. C!nce ·• u · n sn .n : ~t ,.,,v .. r jnh. 1-'c•w tmtlc.•n·c.;ver OJ1l•rnt i()tis . .. Jectt.Jlre q.1J~;._~~-vc!lop~cnt . of RO d(~se .:n . .. i .. n·lalinushir iu'lwl·t'it _lh(! ,·urJic<'r ~u.d : vJQl.~or<. (c;,e:l1~'ia.Uy, 'personnl que~~J~n!J L· •:.;1 :::.~.~~·~·:.: •• ~ r !:.~::·; ~zd nr~ · a!::r~~,i,~·~~~tra~~~~tt1~~:·~--~:~~·~M1;:!~~eb~t r.~:~~!~~t;:i~ 8 : . · 1:: . .-j}L 1'ht• v icd atnr mny .Wllttl ~Q ci!LJ '·or -~Jsit;. : ~he · :o.~Ji~''{ .at. tiJs job or residence to ' [. 't.:. ~ l'lll'c·k hbr.~i.nry •· nr to :do bus~t\eii~. ·~ ·.;. ·'~.(. '.:;; ;_' ···'\Y '> ., · · .·. · :·l· : .'); 1

t:<>vo· r j ••I>• mo y · b. e i t h~ r r~a( .;,~ f .. ~gi~O,ry. > J~~~1Ji~~~ ~§v ~/ of~ i ~e r rna y .. ·' . f:'~ l,'}l ·1:::, 11 ~111 ~ ;.lt. t ~~~iii~~~ l ~;,:: r!t()bl~ ii~·iil~;ti;~~:i'tci~:.: ;··~~~ ~~·~~"~;~-~~-:f~Yt'~:i lt':~l: • P~ ~ s: ~~~·I: e r. . .. · .. t};h~~~-~1 ~::·;·; .;;::·~····A::·!!..;r~:;~~ ~~:.::~J~~i¥;~;{~~~f tffJ~~~~tSf~U~it~~f~4 1~o::! 1 ~~~~·:~ ·• •• r;: )i~-1 rnt· t'lC"IIIIJll t' lll rneorgy-saving dev U'CS . · ' < .• .. , . - . ' ' · ·· ·· o: , . · ,., !. .. · ' f

, . • . . I . : . . . . . ~ . ·' . • . ':. I .-_. .. : · :::~ ·· ::• .. · ··/. : ,\:~·.· ' ~ ' :~· . :~ t,·:·{~ .. ~ ·i. ~· .. ·.:." ·.·~ .. ( _ . . · :: .. ·. - ~ -- V. :::~:;)~~ _:i· . .- ·.:: .:- ~-~f~:,>.~·.:i· .; :~:>.: .. ,· :;· :. · ·

:;uuw i•1r i Hd ict iuit:; l)tay s.eleocl undl'rc;ov~r Operotqt~?.;H·,e,fu~;,p~ipJlfff'p ,(~-.-"~ppointetl ·j ' .. ::;: , , 1m I in ; I i:H s iitiii:.requ~h ' thiat :l hr~y : m~fnt·ain );tliJlf;~~uf:r~i~tc1~·mp}'o'ymenf'"'l:l8 · n . i1r ' :.~.:::'}· : .• _' ... ~l · ~~~;:~~ ::i::::!;;~"1;~~\f.~~->,~. ~~:!(:~,{r,~~~rw:~. ~~:~~}t~~Jti~*~~i,~~-({~.k~~tJ"j

1

,,_~·-;;ti~t~\-.~-l~~~·~! ,;;:,c:y · · · r ··. · kunw.J i·1l tt'. Tl!c:+ · d iliZ.dvalit~· · e·IVo£ . i:ln ''.i'ne~' e;rlihic~ ''' ~i·et-·n '~or , j'·:

. I ' ( .-

·!· ... . .. ~ :

··!:-·~;· ; r .· - .)~.-.

\·!lu·rt• dt•r•tJ penr:Lratlon r~·qu'i~~s· { .c~~e~;,·~te~iden~~·.-·:iin'o:·r·~· ~t~:· iriv.~t·v.~d th;m a l, . ~i::<::~ r; ~·• i ~ i 111.1~ nddr~·as ... t;~5=:~J)I~·~ ~~.t<t.i~.i~!~~-~l!~~X~~~:~.#;i~g;~:£'-:~l1i.~ih~~~~~~-.. :~af: apa~~~~nts ._-,·)~~ .... l'' m:11nt:11n :t!; c:ovl•r rt'sdleltl't'.ll. -., .·!llfC!·'· .. undorcoverrrO ern.tor.;:.cma.·J, rcnt ,the npnrt- .L::-·::' ... i .

• ' · • -' • ~· 1t ;, ; t~, - ' ,,:i:.(". -:~.'J' , '-...·,""'-:.·,...\·-;,.-.t~ .:-'lt-"':~1_:···, .~l~y;_~i 'J.t~"."~ ~il~ ' ·'7>~ ~~,.JI;.._.,.;, ,,:' ~ ·• "'~ - • , \ ! j, ... · :~: · ·...._

'"''" 1 h 11111w I f, ut 1.1 h: 1 nr, lu s ep:Vc.• t .:·rucntttt, ~·1 :~·R·e s-. · · S{'.sl)ou fd~ib'e . mn i ntn 1 netl · T.-.~~ · • · , . ~ - ,.~ ~ : _ .~ • ..:~ . ~.::~·-... ;;· _. y'H·4r; , .... '!.:.!f.:.::.:.:-n..fi:t:$.r.·" i ·-..:..,·({~ ·J.' : Fl.\ .... ..... ~.:r'::?.·'L7-:n ... :. ~- .:.:":- ~ ·.~ . , .. ~-. ~ . - ~ , . i .. !! --

'""''"':', y t u. JP Vl' ;'I _ ~ •Y-r.~-:!'.1 :~J~Pt!l:~?.JJSJ~~~~t,,~t~-7- , ~~,~;}b~ar~~~t~-~.!t•··pd P'"«';_Pcrl )' .: t:;:<~Y In J•.tvr· 11 ltvNI-. in :ll'l't':lrnncc', .. ·~· l:Jnclj'eJ:rj'sliould~. n·,£.the,···c:Joset · anc.l ·dresser · .h ' ·:;> wh i 1'11 :mttJinrL t)it• · ~~~·i~f:~1~-~~;:~-cl~{ .;:~~_t1:~~~t~9~~. Jri~,\l .. ~- -·~;~i~~~::~{h~I'if~'{H·g'~_'~~i~r, , · .. . · k~j~~:~'~i. ,, i :;lu• :; iII till~ ·.\'~- ~~ i n:~J~t,/~,.~ o:: :·' ·· ,:!Ff;f-:uq;~~.~,';!f.;~~:! .. ' i;~i~f~~,:~~ti;~t··· t~~~~·~y u_~ld:e rcove r ' ' :. ·. t;:>;t:j;::_, '''."'r:•~ r.,r" :~rt· :: · ~·?P.s:~~\:~1.1 '·!~~ ~~;-~;!.!.~· '' :t::- · ~ '~,~~rte~:S:t{~~j!~~U,t ~~~ -:.~~,~ - ~-~~:~;ri~ ·ain ··~t,at ; .. , ~ . , ltvt•cl-•n lnofc. !'-:-G"~'9·~1:1.·:~'!'~:L .~: .. .... !l~h ~ ... ... ; .. tf;:f'oQ~.'{ in; ' ~he .-r~(rigerato· r ·are .lieU~ · .. ·:' l a It• Hi J~itH · qi;!_ ~: :~~ ~~·~_fcff fl~~f.1~~1~ :_: tttq , .... V.~~~~.:~~~.i'e. \.{: tl\Js; c·~u ttl ::j~-~~)itrd:izei b()tlt ·.:~he,~ ) ; -"'"''' ri·n~l·r . !~t q~~~~·r,:~f:~;?l,~~W-:~!~kH•~:!(~l~~ i,s~it i .a··~ · ~.:-- : ~ · ._ pli~~~ --:~. ~e:":· :~'hJ 1_.~ :~<,-r=~n~~ -i~'~ · :~ · t;~,·-;.~i~ C'llll ·Ill' IIIN lall .. ~:d ,: ~h· ~·c.~ t\. ~5(J;I :t·:.\'Jng--.!l( _; t~J: ·.O_ff;l~er-~ ~ . t r~e r~~ Lde(lce. . ,Whenev.er ·~n : .;,:, f ~ :<,~;-~; :

~\~~~l~Ui:.r.~~:i~,~~f;Ji~~?1~=~~tl:t;~i1~!:~1:~l~lg~h;t~::~;~~1~~~i~ti~.~~f;~if'11~! nr1 j,.,. ur rt'nl n~Rid~tice ~Hhouf 'Hrst~ beLng .-:sut.ethat tiley ·. ~re : not ; befngtati~~:~::~~: f.~K -:0f)~,

. .· . . ~ : .· ~ . ~. ~: ~ :· :_. : · · . ·.:';.·. . : <_>.<:· -·; ·:.·-~<:~> ,: · : · \~ ... :.·J:: f":"~}~:~}-):

t:mml t·r~Hurvts i 1,1 :mt·t- i's impo-rtnnt il'\ ary undercover_ ope rat iC)n .li,ut of crlt)df :· ; · [ ;:)!:', ' l'"'wc.•rn iu deE'p ' Pc. ntr~t:ion. 1 r the ~ndetcover ofUc,r l~a·s :hee~ qi.ae·stiuiied by · '!t;;: , lin• V iul ;1( Or llT fct> l fJ . ~ny SUSpicic)O .haS', be,fln arOUSed regnfdins· the id·e~_dty< or . • · ;. :,·. :' rnl••, :lHsume th.l•/.f! is s~rvcillanco on you. · · · '!:L.: ,,

.. ' .. ! .. ·"

. -~ -:~:'

I I. 1111 ir•· '''''l'll'lltly, Hlltl<.•rcov<.>r offin•rs, nre required to report to their .. · ,: .. , 1,, . 1·1 ivt• hPatlqu;Jrlt•rs, division, o(Cice or Sllltion, lo attt'nd bricrinr.~

nr !111'1'' i n 1 ·.~:, t u t·mnplt•C c n•port s, nr to per Conn other dut' ics. They aLso

: : : . ..

1: ;u;~; lrl''l"t'lllly n•quirl.'d to n•turu nn und<.•rcover vehicle to the stCJrage . l:•~·ilitv :~flt•r making Rn undcrcoVL'r contact. Quite possibly, they ilre rc

'l'tirt·d io t1r:c nffidal vehides for transportation to_or from their rt•siul'llce.

I I

'lilt· uiHit•rt·ovt'r ofriccr should hL• very cautious when chnnginr, from one vt·hit·l•· In nnotht.'r. \"ht'rc mH.I how the v(!hicle cxchnnr,es take place should ,,. a ,·onsidt•r:ll ion during the? plnnning phase of the undcrcovt!r opP.ration; hrth'I'Vt•r, l hl' tiiiUl'r('OV<.'r Of ( ict>r ~hould always be sen sit ivc to this b;~ue 1 1!1 .... , •. hout t hP OJ>l' ral ion.

I. t\sidt· rrnm Lh<• t'Oiu:~.•rn when switching vehicles, the undercover officer ._ mw;t nhst•rvl.' f':JULion when riclinr; in nfficial police vehicles, marked cr

I uwn:nl<t•tl. two i d rntlll'S or nn.•as wlrt'r" the off ir.er 'might be sat'n :tnd iuent ilit•tl h>· tht' viul:ttnrs or their · associates. ll.ny time the officer et1tl!r!'l or ft':tV!'~ :1 pnlit'l' f,1ciJity, bE.• particularly alert tO any pOSSibility Of being nhs,•rvt•tl or t:lilcu. The cover is burned as soon as the violntor associates

ltht• umlt•rcuver officer with tlw la\-1.

Fnr tlu• unucn·nvC'r officer returning to his or her re~L residence, it is ;•h~wllltt•ly imp<·rntive to shnke nny tail. If the officer is l.leiug surveilled, l i:: unt :1w:Jrc• of it, nnd goes directly home, v:~Lue as an undercover officer is JHPhnhly lost. If th<.> undercover officer told the violator they live dC'Iwn-tn\o~n :111d rrot'('t•us to an aduresR in a western suburb, the cover· is burned.

I IIII! l'V€'11 if the officer hasn't been spe.c:ifiC about an addreSS and the 'violator dot•!; 1111L suspC't'l the officer's real identity, the investigatirm is still jc·npardi7.t•d. ht•(·nuse the officer has compromised his or her family's security.

I Vn[cwrahility to lhn•atR ·ngniu::l the family is generally n vnlid reason to su:-:pt•lld :Ill ofrir<'r's performancc.> ill an undercover role.

I I I I I t I.

-

Undercover SUrvival

By; Graham KnCMles

Ft. 2 Tactics

Undercover fOlice work with few weapons, often with no radio cormn.lnications, and usually far distant from support. SUrvival tactics have to be different fran those developed for well supported "routine" patrol operations. Undercover officers must learn new teclmiques of marksmanship, self-defense and tactics. It takes rrore than a set of street clothes to make a surviving undercover cop.

In the first part of this article I ran through sorre of the survival equiprrent available for covert operations, such as a.mor vests, miniaturized carmn.mications, concealed weapons etc. Now, we mst look at hCM these law enforcerrent tools can be utilized in the field.

'2\e first essential of covert ops is to fo et that ou are a co , and .... to o your street survl val tactic_s. In basic training you learned hCM tO safely exit from your patrol car, how to stand ready for defense in a street confrontation, how to question suspects etc. 'Ihese J;XJlice procedures · soon bec::or.e second nature, and they stand out like a sore thumb.

Likewise you mst unlearn the attitudes of observation and alertness you learned to use on street patrols. IUiitead, you mst learn to be

alert wh · antly lost to the world with l:x:x::>ze and ~ t or sat relaxed over a bar-rCXJm ink.

'1\o.:o linportant parts of acting the covert role are to display a new ~ l::ody language, and to control your eye rroverrents. These two features of your l:ody are often unconciousl y received by an observer ' s eye. They are difficult to disguise features which make the experienced villians smell a cop a mile away.

~ge is quite easy to m:xlify, providing you study the walk Ed l::ody positions of the " actors~ ITUlSt imit~. P~id are the cop stances and rrovements__you ~ve dev.elo~ through patrol e'Xperlence. Examoles of these include standing in a ready karate stance when talking to Strangers 1 ana keeepl!lg YOlJI Strong hand near your holster. EYe novement is not conclousl y recorded by an observer, but it is a very important sub-concious display of your rrood and intentions. Although not really a visable clue, eye rroverrent and control is a critical part of your covert act. Y · · to control your eye

can make ou blend into the back r scr zz. undercover v.ork ou mst avoid the techniques of direct e e contact vou J,t;arnec3. to nse on .,greet patrols. ou mst so cut down on our e e

ts and act less alert and observant than you really are. The best technique in covert ops ls o evelop the aeu1.ty o your peripheral Vlslon. In fact, the vision from the side of your eyes is rrore acute than that of the center , especially in dangerous or dark situations.

The usual standing position of street patrols allows officers to use a variety of self defense techniques. P~y police defensive techniques

are based upon the 11 angular " techniques of karate and tai -kv..Dn-do . However the varied starting positions of covert ops lend themselves better to the rrore 11 flowing II techniques is chosen, it is essential that it is practiced in practical situations. Rather than starting in traditional fighting stances, you should practice frcxn the positions you will l::e 'i.Qrking in. 'Ihese include sitting at a bar, ·sitting in cars, lying on the ground pretending to be a wino etc.

As we rrentioned in Part 1 of this article, weapons for covert ops should be as familiar to you as your service revolver. All too often officers cannot fire their off-duty or covert weapons effectively. For covert ops your pistol training should be like your self defense training; orientated towards the practical operating conditions. One of the first essentials is to teach your hand the position of your covert pistol; which IIIElY be in a hip, shoulder, concealed waist or ankle holster. After lengthy unifollt'ed p::>lice training, and especially if you are a pistol shooting enthusiast, you will probably reach for your right hip holster if startled. If you wear a shoulder holster for plain clothes ~rk, this fast reaction . will not help you much -grabbing a handful of pocket ! I wear a right hip holster for rrost covert work, not because this is really the fastest holster for the condition of 'i.Qrk, but because that is where my hand autoroatically goes if a shot sounds. Just as with self defense training, pistol practice must take place from the varied position you will have to start your draw in 11 on-the-spot 11 confrontations. Equally important you must practice techniques of firing a shot and aa:ruiring cover from the varied starting positions of a covert situation.

y·hile on the subject of firearms and weapon tactics, we should take a close look at those situations where an undercover cop confronts his uniforrred counterpart. These sudden confrontations have left both sides dead - an avoidable tragedy. Standard operating procedures exist to prevent such tragedies; such as the challenging officer remaining behind concealment while the challenged officer shows his badge or I. D. with his weak hand, still keeping his weapon pointed at the suspect. During precovert assignrrent training, undercover officers should practice responding to these challenge situations, so that they avoid the natural but deadly tendancy to turn round and race the uniforrred officer. Problems of course, arise when the undercover cop carries no badge or I. D. , and the best procedure here is to follow the challenging officers instructions, and confirm your identity later by personal recognition or using a code.

Undercover survival requires e:ru:Lpnent, plarming, situation analysis and task optimized training. v~ith these five ingredients in your rrenu, you can make a hazardous operation into a reasonably safe proposition.

QUALIFICATIONS OF THE UNDERCOVER OFFICER

To np<•rnte eff<.'ctively and successfully, an undercover officer must havt• !Ia• ability to control his/her temperament. When you must operate undl·r ha1.ardous r.onditions, or when you observe outrageous illegAL nctivitie.s pC'rfonncd hy t!u.> violators, you mur.t not betray your emotions. Knowledge of the violator, or the violations, and of the laws you are enforcing will huilcJ your Rerf-<'onfidence, help you adapt more easily to any situ:~tion, and maintain the violntor's trust. You must be willing to spend long hours· mo~ny r rom home nnd fmnily. Patien<.'e is also essential, as you will spend time \vail inp, for tl1e violntor to do business or making arrangements to meet with informants nnd violators . The undercover officer must possess the ability to nhs~·rye surroundin~ activities and later. recnll thos.e. activities nccuratcly ancl in cl<>tnil, both when preparing a written account and when testifying in (.'OUt"( •

\.Jh<•n th<' undercover officer uses technical equipment, such as camerns, rt'l'tlrdiup, dC'vi<·t!~, or trncking tlt•vices, be aware of the limitations of that t•quipml·nt, 1\ Lu·k of knowledge of equipment could destroy its usefulness, ns in t h(> £'X:1mpl e of nn officer using a recorder or body transmitter 1-1here m1t~id,· noises ar<:> so Joutl that conversiltion being I"ecorded c:1nnot be untler!; ( , (l(ld.

1\11 tllli!C'rrover op<•rntion mny rl'quire that the offi<'f'r possess ~;pecific

'l''a! if il'ations, ~:u<'11 aH n !l<.'l'Oild languilge, knowledge of ·n pnrticulnr nrea •111d il s pcllp!c nr cu~;torn~, :~ tr:1clc or occupation, and the lerm!i used by the 1· riminal l'lemcnl which hns been te~rgeted. An example of the importance of I:HIJ',IIaf'.'' as n r,lH'<:ial qunlifi<'ntion would involve an operation where Spnnish i:; t' f lnmulllly !'lpokcn, hy the violntnrs or by many of the an:!n's natives. 1\n und, · n ·•,vl'r offi(·<.>r who tloes not . spt>ak Spanish, who understands only those t r:lllSiid ions carri<'d on in ~nglish, is not as likely to gain acceptance or tn disl'"ver the .l'Xtent of criniinn! ::~ctivity as a Sp;tnish-spcaking officer.

l l

l l l l I

l:!;~_!·: RAL qLJAI.l F L Ci\T IONS OF THE UNUERCOVER OFFICER

I. Self-confidE>nr.:e

2. l~ven tempe rntent

1. Ability to dissimulate or pretend

'•· Ad<tptnbility

5. F;uui I iarity with criminnl rackets and experience in dealing with I he criminnl element

h. Initiative and good judgment

7. Krwwl<'dge of technical skills And equipment

H. l'atience

9. Courage nnd tcnac ity

I o . Cond llll'nlll r y

II. \.JPII-devt>lopl·d P''wE'r of observation

12. Ability lo record hAppenings accurately

I J. Hill ingne5s

14 . l'hys icaL slamina

15. Self-control and discipline

38.1-Annual

International ConfirenceRef!IP

UNDERC VER OPERATIONS

Course: Undercover Operations: Topics: How to Eliminate Unnecessary Risks and

Curtail Violence in the Undercover Officer's Line of Duty and. (he Proper Selection 9! Undercove~f}.fficers .

Learhing Goai: ·. ·· .. _;;.~ This block of instruction Wiil focus on theim-

. -· portance. of employing proper practic~ -when organizing covert operations, in order to elimi~ nate u,nriece~sary risks and to encourage proper selection of undercover offi~ers.

DEA RESEARCH

by Eladio M. Paez, Detective Miami Police Department

Miami, Florida

"MURDERED WH1LE ACTING IN AN UNDERCOVER CAPACITY" After such a tragic occurrence, the first question immediately asked is, " What did they do wrong?" "Nothing, ·

were murdered by dr·ug traffickers," or" The undercover officer played the role too well and the violators had no idea e; • cops." While this may be true, a DEA study o,f undercover shooting incidents suggests that more specific factors or pra- .:: may contribute to the incidents of violence dtii:irig undercover scenarios.

BEHIND THE VIOLENCE WE FIND: • An added incentive on the part of the suspect to fight and flee • Increased paranoia from the use of crack cocaine and other

mind altering drugs • Increased mandatory prison sentences • The mentality of certain foreign nationals toward law en

• The tendency for violence of some foreign nati • The high degree of anonymous identity of illeg21 : ....:..:

criminals • The frequency of violence related to the drug trW=:

forcement officials.

Continuous research and analysis of undercover shootings conducted by the DEA reveal six critical factors a p; o undercover shootings. Problems associated with at least one of the following factors were found in every shooting in. ·-a

1. The operational plan 2. Effecting an arrest from an undercover posture 3. Management of the flashroll and/or other drugs 4. Communication with the undercover agent. 5. Complacency on the pax:t of the undercover·oficer 6. Accessibility of undercover wea{Xln

January/February 1998 • THE NARC0FFICt:

In!e~vaii~-n~lWP'DPmfRt1'[!P'IJ ; ' · .: ·.· . .. : . ' . . :: ;·t·· - •· .. . ..... -... .

. : .:,· , ·, IJ~I t) m ttltll m tlcontinued

.. · .-< reduce.th~{iossibility of violence, there are a few basic-rules to ·· · foilow. reg~ ding the flashroll. First, never let the violator know

OPERATIONAL PLAN

. or, mo~e important, assume where the money or drugs are being kept prior to the deal. Understand this concept; itj~ not important what the undercover officer does with the money but what the violator thinks he is doing with it. Second, once shown,

For years, developing the operational plan for an undercover operation consisted of officers brainstorming the options and asking such questions as where the undercover meeting would take place, how the flashroll or drugs would be handled, and what the trouble and bust signals would be. Some departments' operational plans were more informal and not all of the essential personnel involved in the operation were present when the pian was explained. As can be expected, a poorly structured operational plan can be a detriment to the success of the operation and to the safety of the undercover officer.

A complete , written operational plan should be mandatory. The details of the operational plan should reflect the risk level of the undercover operation. It should also cover pre-buy surveillance of the suspect and meet location, surveillance of the undercover officer, alternate meet spots, trouble signals, arrest signals, and arrest plan among others. The undercover officer should know as much as possible about the w ... \.cg.-vwd. rif.. tJ2rv 'at..'g'J •. l!t"Jl?f.•!}. inf..w.rna.thm. ~ovud. inrJnflt> ... propensity of violence, weapons used, physical skills in fighting, associates, mental stability etc. A check and balance system such as NINJAS should be a must. With more than thirtyfive local, state and federal law enforcement agencies conducting drug enforcement operations in Dade County alone , the need for automated rapid inter-agency communication concerning drug operations was critical. The Narcotics Information Network Joint Agency System(NINJAS) was developed approximately five years ago with the intent of establishing an operation clearing house through which participating agencies could be alerted to the possibility that their operations had a conflict with another agency.

MAKING AN ARREST One of the most dangerous actions an undercover

officer can attempt is to arrest a violator. At this stage in the operation, the violator is sold on the officer's cover. Therefore, any action the officer takes to subdue or arrest the violator may well be perceived as simply drug violence. It is important to realize that a drug dealer may be most concerned just prior to the arrest, when he has displayed the drugs but has not seen the buyer's money. Remember that the violator has accepted the undercover officer as a trafficker and what he is unsure about is the intention to pay or rip. For this reason, the undercover officer should whenever possible be as far removed as feasible from the arrest scene. If circumstances call for the undercover officer to be present during the planned takedown or arrest, he or she should maneuver to the best available defense position and prepare for any level of violence.

FLASH ROLL The single issue causing most violence in undercover

operations is the mismanagement of the flash roll or drugs. The object of any drug dealer's affection is the buyer's money. If he can acquire that money through negotiation, fine. How-

36 THE NARC0FFICER

the money or drugs should not be returned to the same place or at least the suspect must believe that it is being put elsewhere. Third, money or drugs should very rarely be displayed a second time during the negotiations. If it has to be displayed a second time, extraordinary measures should be taken to ensure its security. Obviously, there are several variables that dictate the level of caution, including the amount of the flashroll or drugs and the criminal history of the violator. These rules are necessary because without careful handling, the suspect may attempt to steal rather than deal. ·

The safest way to show money or drugs is commonly referred to as a "surprise flash". This method is used to display the goods while limiting the undercover officer's exposure, at a time when the subject is not expecting it; never upon request or demand. The tricky part of this method is to surprise the correct individual and not some flunky, since that only forces the undercover officer to show the money twice. We must emphasize that an undercover officer who operates without regard to the length of time a sublect has access or thinks he has access to the goods is likely to die for a few kilograms of powder.

COMMUNICATION Today it is inconceivable that any police officer or agent

would be in an undercover capacity without ready access to a communication device, such as a beeper or cellular telephone. Because beepers and cellular telephones are no longer cost pro- · hibitive, even the smallest drug team can afford them. The value of this technology is its capability to warn undercover officers of impending danger and/or to direct them to end negotiations and withdraw immediately. The officers' safety is the most important element, and without a means of communication, their safety is put in even more jeopardy. However, undercover agents should realize that while important, communication devices can fail and may, in fact, put the operation in even greater risk. For this reason a good undercover officer should always check the equipment for malfunctions; a good practice is to make contact with one of the surveillance units and ask the officer to scratch his head if the "bug" is coming in loud and clear. This obviously can not be done in the presence of the violator but may be prior to his arrival at the meeting location while the undercover officer is waiting.

COMPLACENCY Usually, it is not difficult to keep new and inexperienced

undercover officers from becoming complacent, good undercover work, excellent surveillance, teamwork on the part of the unit, and/or using sound investigative techniques. Another factor causing complacency is repetitiveness of undercover contacts. Over the co_urse of an investigation, undercover agents will have many contacts with the violator. Some, but not all, involve a drug transaction . Once the undercover agents believe that they have been accepted by the violator, there is a tendency to relax, to not read the suspect's body language for trouble signals, or merely to ignore the signals.

. ' ·' --~ · .. ·

.-• .o; -1 IJ~I I) m [(Ill m ft continued -.:.- : ..

As a result, all too often, violators are underestimated. . Street-wise violators do not tip their hands when they become suspicious of undercover officers. Therefore, the slightest change in the suspect's behavior should put undercover officers on guard. A good method to reduce complacency is to take a moment prior to a transaction and get in the frame of mind to "hope for the best but expect the worst". In other words, the undercover officer should visualize the deal going bad in order to prepare his mind to take appropriate action and reduce or eliminate the threat.

ACCESSIBILITY OF THE UNDERCOVER WEAPON Weapons are common in the drug underworld; yet crimi

nals should not be made aware that the undercover officer is armed. However, if the criminal does see a weapon, the officer has a ready-made explanation for having it. Even so, some officers feel uncomfortable and believe that a weapon restricts them in what they can do and where they can go. It's inconceivable that an undercover officer would go to a drug . deal without his gun, only to assure that the offender does not get frightened and for 1he transaction to go through. It's funny how we joke and laugh about the subject that goes to a gunfight with a knife; however, the undercover officer that goes to a dope deal unarmed does worse. In my opinion the unarmed undercover officer endangers not only his life but that of the entire team. Most sound undercover officers have a firearm that they are comfortable with and practice drawing and firing from wherever they choose to conceal it.

THE UNDERCOVER CANDIDATE Undercover officers must be able to think on their feet.

They should use good judgement and avoid placing themselves in uncomfortable and unsafe predicaments . Undercover officers must know their roles well; they are similar to actors, except one bad performance may endanger his life and that of his teammates. Undercover officers should try to fit roles that parallel their own capacities; street smart officers will instinctively know how to conduct themselves by doing more listening than talking, and by being cautiously observant.

We must comprehend that not everyone can work in an undercover capacity and not everyone can assume different roles; therefore undercover officers should be carefully selected and trained for their task.

Undercover work is an investigative technique in which disguises and pretexts are used to gain the confidence of criminals in order to determine the extent of criminal activity which is being planned or committed. It is one of the best techniques within the framework of the criminal justice system to get the job done, a major investigative aid and effective alternative to traditional investigative approaches. Clearly undercover assignments should be appointed to individuals who possess the right attitude and qualifications for the job. The properly selected of-cer will be tasked with collecting information and evidence · hich would normally be unobtainable. At a later date, his testimony in court will carry great weight because the officer is a professional trained to work within the legal framework and carries an exceptional. background. On the contrary, operations in

__ wh~h..IDl i_nformant perfonns as an.undercover, run the risk col-

38~ 1Annual

International ConfprellceRecap

lapsing in court, wasting valuable resources and freeing a violator who otherwise would be punished.

PROPER SELECTION OF UNDERCOVER PERSONNEL Given the importance and sensitivity of an undercover

operation, it is imperative to use a screening system to identify the right person for the job; it is of utmost importance that the officers considered for the assignment are volunteers. The officer's work background is a critical element of selection. A good undercover must first be a good law enforcement offi.cer with. at least three years of experience, depending on previous assignment and department size. Important characteristics to be considered should be maturity, stability, resourcefulness, manipulative, and excellent work habits.

A screening or assessment board currently used to select SWAT team members should be effective in the selection of undercover officers. The board members should possess practical knowledge of undercover responsibilities; for example, a former undercover officer will most likely recognize an applicant with potential, as well as the one without the necessary skills.

The board should focus on the reasons why an individual applies to be an undercover officer. Ideally the applicant is highly motivated, enjoys challenging assignments and believes to be qualified due to his or her talents and/or background. There should be an emphasis in disqualifying the applicants who want to participate for all the wrong reasons. They may have fantasies derived from the entertainment industry, or the assignment appears to offer an adventure.

TRAINING THE NEW UNDERCOVER OFFICER After proper selection of an undercover officer, the next

step should be preparation through specialized training. The curriculum requires legal training in the following categories: Rules of evidence; Entrapment implications; Effective court Testimony; Reports and documentation ofintell~ence and informanis; Stress management; Ethics; Undercover concepts; Role playing. Finally the classroom training should be complemented by a probationary period monitored by experienced undercover officers and supervisors. •

January/February 1998 • THE NARC0FFICER 37

.............. ~==~--· ...

DEA INTERNATIONAL NARCOTIC COMMANDER'S CLASS REVERSE NARCOTIC INVESTIGATIONS

PART A

1. OBJECTIVES FOR REVERSE ROLE UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS

A. Focuses on 9roups or control and activities.

known, identified traffickers, organizations that organize,

finance the drug trafficking

B. Focus on known violators.

1. Enforcement activities center on the immobilization of major trafficking organizations.

2. Reduces the probability of rip-offs and robbery attempts. '

3. Reduces adverse court rulings and operating at cross purposes with other law enforcement agencies.

4. Entrapment issue is considered.

5. Due process defense.

a. Outrageous police conduct. b. Shocking Activity Judicial

Fairness, Questions.

c. Removal of assets.

1. Reverse undercover is generally productive in the removal of assets or asset seizures.

2. Asset seizures per se are not grounds for the use of reverse undercover.

3. Main qbjective is to immobilize major violators . .

4. Asset seizures should only be one facet of this immobilization.

D. Significant Intelligence.

1. Substantial assistance.

2. Method of the drug operation •

. 3, Smuggling routes .

I

E.

F.

4.

6.

Identify other targets.

To determine the quality and volume of drugs in your community.

To identify all the players.

a. Moneyman (investors). b. Brokers (set-up). c. Launderers. d. Runners.

7. To get the big picture on narcotics.

a. Corruption of public officials. b. Concealment of assets. c. Concealment of other crimes. d. Destroy "trust" bond relationship

of "broker" . role. e. Foster inter-agency co-operation.

1. Sharing of information. 2. Sharing of equipment. J .• Sharing of manpower. 4. Sharing of forfeiture actions.

Example of Reverse Undercover Operation (Oliver Todd Video).

The following covered in understanding operation.

are order for

the major areas to be to give a better

reverse role undercover

1. Formulation of investigative plan for reverse narcotic investigations.

2. The control and use of informants in narcotic reverse investigations.

3. Training for narcotic reverse investigations.

4. Legal aspects of narcotic reverses.

5. The use of, and necessity of, technical support in narcotic reverse investigations.

6. Counter means that can be used in reverse narcotic investigations.

7.

8.

Dealing with the media in investigations.

reverse

Review of discussion.

Class. Questions and

USE OF COUNTER-MEASURES IN REVERSE NARCOTIC

PART G

A. Maintaining control of the situation and maintenance of cover and credibility.

..

1. Maintenance of the "psychological edge".

a. Use of misinformation and misdirection, limited news release.

b. Controlling of news media in reference to reverse investigations.

c. Use of diversion.

1. 2. 3.

4.

Bogus narcotic deal. Rumor movement. Bogus arrests (informant maintain credibility). Notice of official action.

to

d. Accentuate faults of suspects.

1. Arrestjseizure ~f suspects or their drugs, conveyances in their area of responsibility.

e. Use traffickers measures or modus operandi against them.

1. Knowledge of drugs ana distribution lines.

2. Value of drugs.

3. Methods of drug trafficking.

a. Off-load operation. b. Tally sheets. c. Co-conspirators

recognition.

1. Half dollar example.

2. Beeper codes.

bill

B. Post arrest and follow-up investigations.

1. Video and audio of subjects pos~ miranda statements.

2. Photographs of flash money, drugs, subjects, all evidence seized.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Fingerprints of evidence seized.

Use of K-9 narcotics dog, "search".

Inventory of all ~ersonal property, as well as vehicles.

Follow-up search warrants and waivers.

search

c. Case control for courtroom presentation.

D.

1. Best evidence rule.

2. Better case review by prosecutors.

3. Less informant involvement.

4. More police witnesses.

5. More physical evidence.

6. Higher degree of professionalism when testifying.\

Media relations investigations.

and

1. "Pichardo video".

reverse

2. Make a professional impression.

3. Stirs community awareness.

4. Promotes better media relations.

OVERVIEW/CONCLUSIONS

narcotic

1. Reverse narcotic investigations are a tool to better identify, prosecute and deter criminal activity.

2. Reverse . narcotic investigations should be conducted in. the same manner as any other narcotic investigations using the same safeguards, manpower, and techniques.

3. Reverse narcotic investigations should never be done without proper evaluation and identification of the individuals involved and maintaining strict controls on the actions of informants, officers and movement of drugs and money.

Reverse undercover is an investigative tool available to l~w &nforcement, which h~c been &round for ~~ny years. However, it has only been in the 19Bo•s, with the r~~lization of tha drug epidemic in this country that it has received e~tensive usage and attention (both positivw and negative). It iB an inv•ctigative technique, which if used Rr~~grlY and ~~l~~~j~§jy, can be eKtr•m~ly successful and ~reductive, both from a criminal prosecution standpoint and a civil asset forfeiture standpoint.

II. DEFINITIDNSI

A. STINGt A situation in which law •nforc•ment 2~~~iq~~ ~b~ 9~P9r~~Dj~y for a criminally predisposed individual to commit a criminal act, with the intent of immediate apprehension.

B. REVERSE1 A situation in which law enforcDment provides both the opportunity and the contraband for a criminally predispo~ed individual to commit a criminal act.

C. REVERSE STING <Fla. Bar Assoc.)& "An operation in which law enforcement offers or att•mpts to deliver or sell, ~r actually delivers or sells, alledged contraband."

III. LEGALITY OF ~STING OPI:RATIDNS~:

A. CANTWELL v. UNITED STATES, 81 F.2d 31 (9th Cir. 1q35)

1. First legal challenge to p~lice sting operati~n.

2. Upheld police use of informants to solicit contraband.

B. WILLIAMSON v. UNITED STATES, 311 F.2d 441,reh•g denied, 340 F.2d 612 (5th Cir), •rt.denied, 381 U.S. 950 (19bS>

1. Defen5es to Police Stings/Reversest ·

a. g!'!r~.R.£!1~.!'~: must show •predisposition" based on pr~bable cause.

1

c. HAMPTON v. UNITED STATES, 425 U.S. 494 (1976)

1. ~~~~~t~~~ t~~n~~~t~~n ~~q~n ~n~ ~n~€~ ~ltQ q~~€~Q~€U! in~~l~€m€n! <H~mpton was prosecuted for the distribution of heroin which he obtQined from a police inform~nt and subsequently sold to an undercover police o~ficer).

D. STATE v. SOKOS <Fla.> 426 So.2d at 1045

1. Set prec•d•nt for r•varses involving unknown suspects.

2. READY ACmJI~

3. Upheld random solicitation.

IV. El..Et1ENTS DF A DEN... I

A. BUYER

B. SELLER . . C.. PRODUCT

1. TRADITIONAL POLICE ROLE IN DEAL •BUYERP: Attempt to purchase contraband, narcotics, sex, etc.

2. POLICE ROLE IN REVERSE DEAL- ~sELLERP/~PROVIOER'a

Sells or offers for sale contraband, narcotics, etc.

a. Works extremely well in areas where has not been previously used.

b. Can be worked at high or low levels.

V. 11-flEE TYPES DF ~STINS OPERATIONS:

A. PROPRIETARY1

Selling or .buying of stolen property, drugs, zex, etc. <Involve$ some type of property)

B. SERVICES:

Money laundering, debugging services, etc.

C. CONVOY/ESCORT SERViCES:

Off-loading operations, transporting drugs, mon@y, etc.

2

\

•

. .

VI. AOYANTASESflllSADVANTABEB OF REVERSE lNlERCOVERc

A. ADVANTAGESs

1. I.D. Speci~ic Targets~ Locmtions

2. Focus on Known Violators/Major Traffickers

3. Seizure/Forfeiture of Assets

It •.

s.

B. DISADVANTAG£S: ·

1. Legal Defenses/Suppression Hearings

2. Negative Public L Media Reaction

3. Prosecutor& ~ Judges Unfamiliar and/Dr Unreceptive

lt. RIP-OFFS (Offic@r SAfety)

5. COPS on COPS

7.

VII. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS:

A. INDICATIONS OF A RIP:

1 • Price too Low

2. Availility of Drug

3. Too An~ious to do Deal

lt. Uping the Antee

s. Nervousness

6. Doetsn•t fit Prior M/0

7.

a.

9.

B. TYPE OF DRUG INVOLVED/LIKELIHOOD OF HITTING STREET

C. AMOUNT OF DEAL

D. MANPOWER/RESOURCES AVAILABLE

E. CONTINGENCY PLANNING

F. OBTAINING DRUG FOR REVERSE/STING·:

1. Wh~i!re

2. How

3. When

4. By Whom

G. lMI~~~l~~~~~ lq I~~ ~~~ H.

I •

::r.

4

SLEEP DEPRIVATION AND DECISION MAKING

Force Science News #70 April 20, 2007

======================================= The Force Science News is provided by The Force Science Research Center, a non-profit institution based at Minnesota State University, Mankato. Subscriptions are free and sent via e-mail. To register for your free, direct-delivery subscription, please visit www.forcesciencenews.com and click on the registration button. For reprint clearance, please e-mail: [email protected]. ===============================~=======

In this issue

I. SNOOZE YOU LOSE? ACTUALLY, THE OPPOSITE MAY BE TRUE II. FATIGUE LINKED TO FAULTY JUDGMENT, FEDERAL AGENCY SAYS

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[NOTE: We'd like to hear your reaction to the observations and proposals made by Trainer Tom Aveni in the report below. Please E-MAIL US at: [email protected]. We'll print a representative sampling of responses in a future edition of Force Science News.]

I. SNOOZE YOU LOSE? ACTUALLY, THE OPPOSITE MAY BE TRUE

Does your agency encourage you to nap on duty?

Probably not. But your department might get better performance and you might be safer if regulated snoozing was permitted, according to wellknown trainer and consultant Tom Aveni, head of the Police Policy Studies Council and a Technical Advisory Board member of the Force Science Research Center at Minnesota State University-Mankato.

Recent research reports offer some impressive support for Aveni's unconventional position by documenting the health and judgment benefits of limited workplace dozing.

"Most of the egregious errors committed in law enforcement occur when

1


officers are fatigued or dealing with low-light conditions," Aveni pointed out in a presentation on "Surviving the Night Shift" at a conference of the International Law Enforcement Educators. and Trainers Assn. (ILEETA). And the rotating, irregular, or extended shifts common in policing contribute significantly to officer fatigue, he declared.

"Those working rotating shifts, for example, average 5.5 hours of sleep when working night hours," Aveni said. Because of second jobs, family obligations, or disrupted sleep patterns, some officers, at least on occasion, come to work with as little as 3 hours' sleep, "resulting in the same level of impaired performance as ingesting the legal limit of alcohol.

"Sleep deficits may be partly recouped on days off," but until a full and satisfying compensation occurs an officer's "mood and performance are routinely affected."

Given the slim, real-world probability of consistently getting sufficient sleep, naps during duty hours could help officers fight dangerous fatigue, Aveni argues, along with brief exercise breaks, proper caffeine intake, low glycemic (sugary) food consumption, and exposure whenever possible to brightly lighted areas.

"Napping is usually seen as being derelict of duty, but progressive agencies really should encourage it. It's a healthy means of fighting fatigue, and a short nap--20 to 30 minutes--can work wonders in increasing alertness and judgment."

Recent research studies tend to agree.

For instance, a 6-person research team at Stanford University, headed by Dr. Rebecca Smith-Coggins, studied the effects of napping on 49 resident physicians and nurses working nights (1930-0730) in a university trauma center ER. Some were allowed to take up to a 40-min. nap at 0300, while a control group stayed awake for the entire 12-hr. shift.

Napping was done in a dark, quiet room away from ER activities, with a bed and linens provided. Ninety percent of the nap subjects, whose mean age was 30, were able to fall asleep quickly (within 11 minutes) and slept for an average of nearly 2 5 minutes.

?


Before and after the shift and also after the nap period, both groups were tested for vigilance, memory, mood, and task performance. After shift, all subjects participated in a 40-min. driving simulation test to measure "behavioral signs of sleepiness and driving accuracy."

At the end of shift, the nap subjects showed quicker reaction times and fewer lapses in vigilance, according to the study. They reported "more vigor, less fatigue, and less sleepiness" than those who had worked without napping. Moreover, the nappers were able to more quickly complete a simple job-performance task (the simulated insertion of a catheter IV) and exhibited "less dangerous driving," although both groups showed signs of driving impairment after working overnight.

The only negative outcome evident in the nappers was a temporary worsening of memory "immediately after the nap." This was attributed to

· sleep inertia, "the feeling of grogginess ... that can persist for up to 30 minutes after awakening."

Generally, "nap intervention provided beneficial effects," the researchers noted, and planned naps in the workplace might well "promote a high level of alertness, attention to detail, and decision-making proficiency."

[A full report of this study appears in the Nov. 2006 issue of the Annals of Emergency Medicine, under the title "Improving Alertness and Performance in Emergency Dept. Physicians and Nurses: the Use of Planned Naps." A summary appears at: http:/ /www.aemj.org/cgi/content/abstract/9 /5 I 466.]

Aveni speculates that some officers' moral judgment may also be improved by fatigue relief in the form of napping. Certainly the findings of another recent study suggest that morally framed decision-making can be negatively impacted by extended fatigue, which tends to affect activity in the region of the brain that plays a major role in moral reasoning.

In this study, Dr. William Killgore and colleagues at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research tested 26 healthy, active-duty military personnel after 2 sleepless nights to see whether the lack of shut-eye would hinder their ability to make decisions in the face of emotionally charged, moral dilemmas. 'The findings could have implications for people who are both routinely sleep-deprived and often need to make quick decisions in a crisis," the researchers said. That would include soldiers in combat and cops on the street.


The participants were first tested after an adequate sleep period and again after an unusually long stint (53. 5 hours) of continuous wakefulness. They were given a wide variety of decision-making scenarios, including some that were highly emotionally charged, highly personal, and burdened with moral considerations.

For example, one scenario stated: "You are negotiating with a powerful and determined terrorist who is about to set off a bomb in a crowded area."Thousands of people would be killed by the detonation. Your one advantage is that you have his teen-age son in your custody. [The] only one thing you cando to stop him from detonating his bomb [is to] break one of his son's arms" in front of a camera "and then threaten to break the other one if he does not give himself up." The participants were asked: "Is it appropriate for you to break the terrorist's son's arm?"

[All other scenarios used are described at: http: //www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/293/5 53 7/2105/DCl.]

The researchers were not concerned with evaluating "right" or "wrong" answers-only with analyzing the decision-making process. Among other things they found that:--the test participants took significantly longer to decide how to react to the highly personal, morally charged situations when they were sleep-deprived compared to when they were well rested. This suggests that fatigue "has a particularly debilitating effect on judgment and decision-making processes that depend heavily upon the integration of emotion with cognition," the researchers concluded.

--sleep loss also led generally "to an increase in the permissiveness or tolerance for judging difficult courses of action as appropriate," the study found. Only participants with above-average "emotional intelligence,~~ the ability to empathize and interact socially with other people, showed resistance to being influenced by sleeplessness in this regard.

Such findings "may have implications for those in occupations" frequently associated with sleep loss "and in which real-world moral dilemmas may be encountered .... When sleep deprived, such personnel may experience greater difficulty reaching morally based decisions under emotionally evocative circumstances and may be prone to choosing courses of action that differ from those that they would have chosen in a fully rested state,~~ the study report states.


enforcement officers, too, risk disastrous consequences from the effect of sleep deprivation on brain function," Dr. Bill Lewinski, executive director of the Force Science Research Center told Force Science News. "As with the controllers, slower reaction times, missed cues, and foggy judgment brought on by fatigue in cops can result in lost lives. The difference is that with police officers the lives lost may include their own."

Lewinski cites a study some years ago of officer fatalities in auto accidents. Researchers found that the highest-risk time for officers was

1

when driving home after a critical incident that significantly extended their work day. "The combination of coming off an adrenal in dump and entering a sleep-deprivation state produced fatigue that impaired their attention and judgment with deadly consequences," Lewinski explains.

He also points out that most major disasters in the last 3 decades, from the nuclear meltdown at Three-Mile Island to the explosion of the Challenger shuttle, "were caused by individuals operating with significant sleep deprivation, often on the first night of a new shift."

In a letter this month urging reform in scheduling and training, the NTSB linked sleep deprivation in air traffic controllers to the worst U.S. airline crash in 5 years and to at least 4 near-fatal incidents.

The fatal crash claimed 49 lives last August when a commuter jet tried to use a closed runway in Lexington, KY. The controller on duty had reported to work for the midnight shift after sleeping for only 2 hours.

The close calls included a controller working after only 4 hours' sleep who ordered a passenger jet to take off directly into the path of another plane in Chicago and a controller who cleared a cargo jet for takeoff on a closed runway in Denver who had gotten 60 to 90 minutes of sleep before working an overnight shift.

'The human brain is most alert and functions best when well-rested," Lewinski says. "You may think you can will yourself to overcome fatigue or compensate for it with caffeine intake, for example. But that's true only within fairly rigid limitations. Beyond those limits, physiology will win out, to your decided disadvantage."

[For more details, see "Fatigue threatens air safety, NTSB says," by Alan Levin in USA TODAY, 4/11/07 at:

7


http:/ /www.usatoday.com/newsjwashington/2007-04-10-fatigue-airsafety_N.htm.]

--------------------------------(c) 2007: Force Science Research Center, www.forcescience.org. Reprints allowed by request. For reprint clearance, please e-mail: [email protected]. FORCE SCIENCE is a registered trademark of The Force Science Research Center, a non-profit organization based at Minnesota State University, Mankato. --------------------------------

Undercover Violence By GARYE.WADE

Within the last 3 years, five( special agents of ;lt~; Drug Enforcement A!l~' .-

ministration (DEA) have been mut.-':L dcred while acting in an undercov~.r·. capacity. Unfortunately, many State_ and local officers have also suffered the same fate. After such tragic occurrences, the first question immediately asked is, "What did they do wrong?" To this fellow officers may reply, "Nothing, they were murdered by drug traffickers," or • 'The undercover officers played the role too well and the violators had no idea they were cops.'' While this may be true, a DEA study of recent undercover shooting incidents suggests that more specific factors or pract~s may contribute to the ever-increasing incidents of violence during undercover scenarios.

BEHIND THE VIOLENCE Drug enforcement and under

cover operations are exponentially more dangerous today than in recent years. Primarily, this is due to:

• An added incentive on the part of the suspect to fight and flee

• Increased paranoia from the use of crack cocaine and other mind-altering drugs

• Increased mandatory prison sentences

• The mentality of certain · foreign nationals toward law enforcement officials

J . .. ' l

Apri11990 t15

-···=---- • -=aa& 11

• The proclivity tow~ud violence of some foreign nationals ·

• The relatively high degree or anonymity of foreign criminals

• The enonnom: amounts of money involved in drug transactions. and

• The frequency of violence related to the dntg tmde

Because of these issues. all incidents where violent ncticm wns directed at the undercover agent must he care(ultv exnmined. l11ese e,;nminnt.i.rin~ should he mnde in situatiom: re!iiulting in iujury or denth to the undercover officer. m: well as in those where \'iolence was planned but never carried out.

DEA RESEARCH The DEA performed cm:e-by

case reviews of all agent-related

shootings, including. undercover agents and locnl polic·e. when possible, in an nttcmpt to determine if any commonality e:dst~. 1l1e conclusions dmwn here pertain to undercover !iihnotings only.

Analysis of the research disclosed seven critical factors ap~ plicahlc to underco\'er shootings. ~oblems nssocintcd with nt lcastpne or the following factors were' found in every shooting incitlenf: - .

• The operational plan

• Effecting nn nrrest from an undercover posture

• Management or the nnshroll

• Comnnmicntinn with the \ltldercover agent ;

• Complacency on the part of the undercover officer

• Accessihility of undercover wenpons

'' : Those Involved In undercover

operatlons ... must be aware of the necessity

for safe, effective tiJctlcs In undercover

operations.

'' Spedal Agent Wade Is Wilh the Drvg Enforcement Administration assigned to the FBI Academy In Quantico. Virginia.

16 I FBI law Enforcement Bulletin

• DrRwing innccurate conclusions rrom accurate observations

Operatfonul Plan For years. developing the

operational plan for an undercover operation consisted of officers hrainstorming the options and answering such questions as where the undercover meeting would take place. how the nashroll would be handled. and whnt the trouble and hust signals would be. Some depnrtments' operational plans were more detailed. some less. Yet, rtll plans were informal nnd not all of the essential personnel involved in the operation we.re present when the npemtionnl plan was e~plnined. As r.an be e,;pected, a poorly structured operational plan can be a detriment to the succes!\ or the operation and to the safety or the undercover officer.

Today, a complete, written operational plnn· should be mandatory. This does not suggest that a manuscript needs to be prepared for every undercover scenario: however. the details of the operational plan should rencct the risk level or the undercover operation. It should also cover pre-buy surveillance of the suspect nnd meet location. surveillnnce or the undercover agent and nashwll, alternate meet spots, trouble signals, arrest signals, and an arrest plan Rtnong others.

For example. if a large nashroll is being displayed to suspects with a proclivity for violence, the operntionat plnn should restrict the hnndling or the nashroll. the movements or the undercover agent. and the timing of the arrests. However,

]

,_

•

an operational plan need not be overly restrictive. It should be fle~ible enough to be e:n:ily amended by a phone call to the street supervisor to determine if an alternate plan i~ fensiblc and safe and to make sure that all officers are aware of the new plrtn.

The undercover agent must realize that it is essential to operate within the parameters of the oper:\tion:tl plan. The undercover officer doe~ not have and should never have the authority (m1less it is a life-ordeath situation) to alter the operntional plan without the concurrence of the street supervisor.

The most difficult item to factor into the operational plan is a shut-down mechanism in case the seller attempts to steal the flashroll. The exchange nmst be arranged in such a fashion that the seller can do nothing to the undercover officer to accomplish thi:o>. The only alternative for the seller at that point is to provide the contraband or hack out of the arrangement. giving some reason to the undercover agent for doing so. The undercover officer must he sufficicutly confident of individual e~pericnce, abilities and training to reali1.e that this is a ~mccessful conclusion to the ~cenario, even if an arrest is not made.

1\fakfn~ an Arrest One of the most dangerous ac

tion~ an undercover officer can attempt is to arrest a violator. At this stage in the operation. the violator is sold on the officer's cover or would not be delivering the drugs. Therefore, any action the officer take:-; to subdue or arrest the violator may

••• -nn• • well he perceived as simply drug violence :md he may respond in kind. The su:;pect may nlso rec;ort to violence ont;:e he reali1.es he has been tricked into ~clliug the ne:t:t 15 years of his life to :1 police officer. For this reason. the undercover agent should be as fnr removed as possible from the atTest scene. If arresting officers c-annot wait until the undercover agent has left the

'' The undercover agent must realize that It fs essential to operate

within the parameters of- the operational

plan.

'' l\Cene before announcing their presence and purpo~e. the undercover agent needs to maneuver In the hc~t nvnilahle defense po~ition a.nd prepare for any level of violence.

Further, in other than a life-ordeath situatkm. an undercover officer, who wnnts tn make an arrest or who forcel\ the situation so that a.n arrest can be made, is being controlled hy action!; and not he experience, common sense. nnd adherence to sound und~rcover tenets. In such instances. it may be necessary to reassess the officer's ability to continue in nn undercover capacity.

M:magin~ the Fla~hroll Without que~lion, the single

issue ccmsin~ the most violence in

undercover operations is mis- . management of lhe flashroll. To reduce the pos~ihility of violence, there are a few basic rules to follow regarding the nashroll. First, never let the seller know or, more imporlantly. assume where the money is being kept prior to the flash. Second. once shown, the money should not be returned lo lhe same place or at least the suspect must believe thai it is being put elsewhere. Third. money should very r:uely he disrlaycd a second time during the negolintions. If it has to he displayed a second time, extraordinary mea~ures should he taken to ensure its secmity. Obviously, there nre several variables I hat dictate the level of caution, including the nmount of the flashroll and the criminal history of the violator. These rules are necessary because without careful handling. the suspect may attempt to steal the flashroll ralher than l\ellthe drugs.

Recently. -in a large southwestern city. officers displayed a $60,000 flashroll to two foreign natiomtls for the propm:ed purchase of three kilograms of cocaine. In an nllcmpt to lure the flashroll from the undercover agents, which had been removed from the' 'show location.'' the suspects offered to di~play nine kilo~rams of cocaine for the officers to test and pick their three kilograms. The officers not only refused to displily the flashroll a second time hut they also refused to leave the original meet localion. They stnycd within the operationnl plan and were successful thai night.

How much cocaine did they seize? None. They were successful

April 1990 11·

becnn~e they comhtcted themselves :t!': profe!:sional drug officers and went home to see their loved ones. A~ it tnmed out. the suspec-ts did have three kilograms of cocaine, hut they ~old it the day before. ll1eir

''

plncent. However, complacency may occur irr more experienced undercover agents. After severn I successful undercover operations, agents cnn Jose sight of what makes an operation successful. i.e., a good

One of the most dangerous actions an undercover officer can attetnpt is to arrest a

violator.

'' snle intention was In kill the officers and srealthe nnshrnll.

Communication

Today. it is inconceivable that any police officer or agent would he in an undercover capacity without ready acce~s to n communicatinn deY ice. such a.c; a J>t'eper or cellular telt·phone. Because beepers :md cellul:n telephones are no longer cost prohibitive, even the smallest drug team cnn affnrd them. 1l1e value of this t~chnology is its capnhility to warn undercover urricers of impending danger and/or to direct them to end negotiations nnd wit~draw immediately. The of(icers' safety ic: the most important element. ami without a means of communication, their safety is put in even more jeopardy. However, undercover agents should realize that while important, communication devices can fail mul may, in fact, put the operation in even greater risk.

Complacency

Usually, it i~ not difficult to keep new and ine~perienced undercover officers from becoming com-

1 B I FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

informant, good undercover work. e~cellent surveillance, teamwork on the part of the unit. nnd/or using sound investignlive techniques.

Another factor cnusing complacency is repetitiveness of undercover contncts. Over the course of an investigation, undercover ~gents will have many contacts with the violator. Some. hut nnt nil, involve a dmg tr:msactinn. Once the undercover agents believe that they have hcen accepted by the vintator. there is :t tendency to rcln:<.to not rend the suspect's bocly langu~gl! for tronhle signnl~. or merely to ignore the signnls. As a result, all too often, violators are underestimated. Streetwise, cagey violators do not tip their hands when they become suspicious of undercover officers. Therefore, the sli~htest change in the suspect's behavior should put undercover officers on guard.

Recently, an experienced undt"rcover officrr in a large western city met with :t suspected dealer to purchm~e a quantity of heroin. When the suspect oh.c;erved surveillance, the transaction was put off to another day. Later the same eve-

ning. the suspect requested a meeting with the officer. During the telephone conversation, the officer advised the suspect not to bring drugs to the meeting because he was not bringing money and would not consummate the purchase that evening. The officer and a skeleton surveillance crew went lo the meeting. A short time after the officer met with the violator, an apparent argument broke out between the two. The suspect pulled a revolver and shnt and killed the officer. The suspect was subsequently killed by officers attempting to apprehend him.

In this case, perhaps the officer became too complacent and may have erred by taking only a :;keleton surveillance crew. However, it is.difficult, if not impossible, to predict how the criminal mind will react in any given situation. Therefore, complacency on the undercover agent's part only serves to place the undercover agent at increased risk.

Accessibility of the Undercover Weapon

Weapons are commonplace in the drug underworld; yet, criminals ~hould not be made aware that the undercover officer is anned. Howe.ver, if the criminal does see a weapon, the officer has a readymade explanation for having it. Even so, some officers feet uncomfortnhle :md believe thai a weapon restricts them in what they can do a.nd where they can go. Certainly, during negotiations with violators. the officer is at somewhat less risk than if money is or is expected to

('

I

I I I

M

be presenl. However, during exchanges of dn1!!s and money. the undercover ngent should be armed. This practice will help in most cases, hut sometimes the situation may develop too quickly.

For e1tnmplc. two DEA ngcnt.c; were killed and n third wounded in Los Angeles. California. in t9R7. Each agent carried a weapon. and another gun wns concealed in the undercover vehicle. Yet, the situation developed so rapidly th:ll the agents did not have time to dmw their weapons. This stark and tragic example sJ,ows that the weapons of undercover agents need to be rendily availahle in critical situations. hut even then. the undercover agent may not be able to access it quickly enough.

Inaccurate Conclusions from Accurate ObservAtions

Everyday. officers ·watch thousands of drug transactions, each about the same, yet each a little different. Prohlcms :nise when officers draw the wrong conclusion from :m :1ccur<1te observation and then base all operation:tl planning on that conclusion. Therefore, it is crucial that officers keep an open mind throughout the undercover operation. The following is a relevant situation.

The night before a proposed delivery of a kilo of heroin, officers observed two individuals of apparent L<1tin origin arrive at the main suspect's home. Prior to entering the house, they were observed

. removing an ohject that looked io be the size and shape of a kilogram of heroin from the trunk of their

== -· 84

vehic:le. Later thnt evening, during a telephone convcrs:-ttion. the undercover officer!; wC"re told hy the sm1r<:C" of ~upply thnt the dent wn!'> set for thC' next day as arranged. f'urthC'r~ the couriers h:td recently brought heruin to his house. The officer!;' ohscrvations. coupled with the statements made to the undercover agents, kd thrm to believe tlmt the susp<"ct was in possessicm of the heroin. the snle would take place, and that the violators had every intention of completing. the transaction and not robbing the undercover officer.

The obscrvationc; on which officers hased their opcmtionnl planning were. accurate. The individuals were Latin. They were involved with rhe source of !mpply: however. the kilo-slmped package did not contain heroin. It contained a .45

'' ... a complete, written operational plan

should be mandatory.

'' caliber pistol which was used to rob the untlercovt~r officer the following day. The pl:mning would have been significantly different h:td the ofJiccrs known a weapon was in the package. Obviously, they hncl no way of knowing this. The operntional plnn for the following day wa~ hased on the :ts~mnption that the contraband was in the ~ource·~ po~session. Once lhat presumption wa-; made. other nctions that may have indicated the suspects intended to

roh the undercover officer were either ignored or not given the signific:mce !hey should have.

Surveil1<1nce officers and tmdercover officers must be ever alert for warning flags to the suspect'!; "operational plan." The illicit dmg trade is always changing. Drug dealers are involved in a game of deceit and are p:~mnoid in dealings with others. This makes them very volatile and unpredictable. Officers should observe the traffickers' activitie~ and continually upd<1te their as~essmcnt of the traffickers' intentions.

CONCLUSION If proper procedures are ~trict

ly adhered to relating to all seven · critical factors. will officers always

walk away unhanned from undercover operations? No. Unfortum'llely, there is no formula or absolute guamntee that :tdherence to any set of underco\'er tenets is going to ensure th:ll an und~rcover officer or dmg team will go home safely e1fter every :t!;signmcnl. However, if these seven r:~ctors are discussed :md proper procedures are followed, the level of officer safety increases significantly.

The drug trade is a violent business :~nd is considered the number one social problem in the United States. Every law enforcement agency tasked to do so is trying to make an impact Those involved in undercover operations, including first-line supervisors through upperman:~gement, must he aware of the necessity for safe, effective tactics in undercover operations. em

April 1990 /19

Two years ago, American agents pulled off the greatest sting operation in narcotics history-but today it

looks as if the real scam is on us.

THE GREAT BOLIVIAN COCAINE SCAM

BY JONATHAN KANDELL

B ,;c,lly, thece oce two w•ys to ''"ellmm the United States to Bolivia. Most tourists prefer the package tour by Boeing from Miami to La Paz, an overnight flight mixing fitful naps with visions of Indian markets and reed boats across Lake Titicaca. Since Richie Fiano's only interest was to score about half a ton of cocaine, he skipped the travel brochures and passport formalities and took the other way: an antique twin-prop Convair from a small southern-Florida airfield, across the Caribbean, then over the Brazilian Amazon. And now that the rickety plane was bouncing along a rutted dirt runway on a secluded ranch deep in the jungle savannas of northern Bolivia, Richie Fiano was a very worried man.

Fiano and his three companions, agents of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, were attempting the greatest sting operation in narcotics history. Posing as American mafiosi, they had made a deal with Roberto Suarez, overlord of Bolivia's drug-smuggling industry, to purchase more than a ton of cocaine base a month for processing and distribution in the U.S. According to DEA estimates , this would have amounted to nearly a third of the cocaine that was reaching the American market.

There had been weeks of patient negotiations with Suarez lieutenants in Buenos Aires, Miami. and Santa Cruz. Bolivia. A dozen DEA agents, men and women, had carefully rehearsed their roles as racketeers, underworld financiers , bodyguards, prostitutes, and co-

PAINTING BY BRALDT BRALDS

73

caine chemists. A posh Fort Lauderdale beach house and limousines had been

. placed at the disposal of the Bolivian mobsters. Entertainment tours of Las Vegas and Broadway were booked. And $9 million had been borrowed from the Federal Reserve Bank in Miami as projected payment.to Suarez for the first delivery of cocaine.

But there had been enough small hitches along the way-Bolivian emissaries who failed to show up in Miami, scuttled flight plans, postponed rendezvous-to cast doubt on the outcome of the operation. And the Convair was flying into a Suarez stronghold, where the DEA had not a shred of leverage to negotiate out of a potential trap.

"As we're landing," recalls Fiano, "all these Bolivian Indians come scurrying out of their hooches, running toward us, and I'm thinking what's to stop them from holding us hostage and ordering Miami to release the $9 million. The whole scam is being done without the knowledge of the Bolivian government. Hell, the Bolivian Air Force is already out looking for us because we lied about our destination. So who are we going to complain to if we end up getting ripped off?"

Two years have passed since the Convair's flight into the Bolivian wilderness. Fiano and his buddies made it back to Miami, with 854 pounds of cocaine base worth over $100 million on the streets. Two ranking members of the Suarez organization are languishing in Florida prisons. Suarez 's own son, Roberto Jr., was arrested in Switzerland last December with a false passport and a reported $1 0 million in cash. He has been indicted and his extradition to Miami is being sought by the U.S. government. · A classic stroke of undercover work?

Definitely. Impact on the Bolivian cocaine traffic? Nil. Only two months after the sting against Suarez, a coup brought to power military officials whose chief concern was to protect the burgeoning drug empire created by Suarez and other large traffickers against this kind of outside disruption. Another coup in 1981 has done nothing to impair the military-civilian cocaine alliance. This year's coca harvest in Bolivia will set an all-time record, according to American diplomats and drug agents stationed in that country.

And Roberto Suarez? He remains the cocaine king of the world. conservatively grossing $400 million a year from the annual export of twenty-five tons or more of the semiprocessed drug to Colombia, and from there. as snow-crystalline powder, to the voracious American market.

The State Department is still trying to get Suarez to stand trial , and American economic aid to the country has been reduced to a trickle. DEA agents have repeatedly pinpointed his hideouts. They are having a good deal more trouble finding a military or police commander who would dare arrest him. For Roberto 7 4 PENTHOUSE

Suarez today is more powerful than the Bolivian president or any other Bolivian general. His payroll and associates include generals, colonels, majors, captains, customs officials, cabinet ministers, industrialists, businessmen, farmers, thugs and bodyguards. old Nazi fugitives, and thousands of peasants. He is de facto chairman of the board of Bolivia's largest economic enterprise. Not even the proverbial tin mines of the Bolivian Andes produce as much revenue or employ as many people as does the cocaine industry.

Statistically, Bolivia is the most economically backward nation in South America. Only Guyana ranks lower in per capita income. Coca's roots run deeply in this culture of poverty. For millennia, the Indians of Bolivia and Peru harvested the coca leaves of the Andean slopes. Their descendants chew wads of the leaves daily to stifle h·unger, overcome the drudgery of heavy work loads, and, supposedly, stimulate sexual prowess. In their unpro-

' Roberto Suarez is chairman of the board of Bolivia's

largest enterprise. Not even the tin mines of the Andes

produce as much revenue or employ as many

people as the cocaine industry.

cessed form , the leaves bear little chemical resemblance to cocaine, and are perfectly legal to harvest and distribute in Bolivia. So ingrained is the practice that factory workers. miners, and rural laborers often have specified monthly rations of coca leaves written into their contracts. Bolivians would no sooner accept a prohibition on coca than Americans would stomach a ban on coffee.

Throughout most of this century, portions of the coca harvest have been processed into cocaine and smuggled into the U.S. The conversion involves pouring kerosene over the dried leaves, stomping on them overnight until they become pasty, then using sulphuric acid to turn the paste into a light-brown powder base, and finally, through a combination of ether and other chemicals, producing the snowwhite cocaine hydrochloride crystals. Once in the United States, the powder is cut with borax and other substances down to a purity of only 12 percent or less before sale on the streets.

Until a decade ago, cocaine remained a low-priority target for American drug-enforcement officials, whose main efforts were directed at disrupting street sales

and intercepting shipments as they reached American shores. But in the late 1970s, cocaine's popularity grew so explosively that consumption was being estimated at twenty to thirty tons a year, with a street value of $25 billion or more. The only feasible way of denting the industry seemed to be undercover forays at the source-Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.

The Colombians, thanks to their relatively sophisticated chemical industry, have enjoyed a much better reputation than the Bolivians for converting cocaine base into a finished, high-quality powder. Their proximity to the U.S. and their smuggling expertise by ship or clandestine flight have also established the Colombians as the · middlemen of the cocaine trade. To this day, less than a quarter of Bolivian cocaine is exported in finished crystal form . Virtually all the rest is sent as paste or base to Colombia.

The DEA reasoned that by skimming off the cream of the profits in the cocaine trade, the Colombians were on a collision course with Suarez and the other Bolivians. By late 1979 and early 1980, Suarez in fact had a series of fallouts with his Colombian buyers. After receiving a large shipment of particularly bad-quality cocaine base from Suarez, the Colombians castrated one of his couriers as a warning. A few weeks later, five Colombian buyers were gunned down in Santa Cruz by Suarez hit men.

Suarez started to complain about the untrustworthiness of the Colombians and sought direct access to the American market. Getting wind of Suarez's discontent, DEA agents in Bolivia spread rumors that there were American underworld figures willing to bypass the Colombians and deal personally with Bolivian producers .

In April 1980, the DEA succeeded in making contact with a lieutenant in the Suarez organization. Mike Levine, an agent working out of the American embassy in Argentina, met with Marcelo Ibanez in a Buenos Aires bar. Ibanez, a former rancher from Santa Cruz and a close associate of Suarez, had been told by a gobetween that Levine was a Florida-based Mafia figure with an extensive cocainedistribution network. Levine, who came to the DEA with a professional acting background, is a tall man, about forty-five years old, with dark, Mediterranean looks, and seemed to fit the role of a racketeer.

Levine commiserated with Ibanez. acknowledging that the Colombians were a wild bunch who were violent and prone to rip-offs . He explained that he had a large organization working the whole Eas· Coast of the U.S. from Miami to New York Levine assured Ibanez that key Americar customs officials were on his payroll . mak ing it easy to bring drugs into the country And he claimed to have a fully equippe• laboratory, employing bona fide chemist~ to process the cocaine base into pur crystalline form.

Ibanez responded enthusiasticall: Suarez, he explained, had been dealir

CONTINUED ON PAGE 1

OCAINE INUED FROM PAGE 7 4

:. half a dozen Colombian syndicates , :: d now he wanted to simplify his oper:=: ons by finding two main buyers-one of -em Colombian and the other an Ameri:::n. The Bolivian suggested that Suarez : Jld sell Levine about 1,000 kilos of co:.?: i e base a month.

is was a tar larger amount than the :~A had ever thought of handling . A sin; -e monthly shipment would have sur:::ssed the total seizures made in Miami :_ •ing all of the previous year. More to the :::Jint, the agency would have been unable -:: ::ome up with the $18 to $20 million necs:sary to show Suarez that it could pur : ase that much cocaine . Making some : _ick mental calculations , Levine couns·ed Ibanez with an offer to initially buy = 0 kilos of cocaine base. If that deal went -·ough smoothly, he would be ready to :::sorb 1,000 kilos a month. In the mean-

e. Levine invited Ibanez, Suarez . and - .s son, Roberto Jr., up to Miami to inspect - .s organization. his laboratories , even ::>end some time at his home. where they :nuld meet his family and associates .

ith little haggling. Levine agreed to _ay $18,000 a kilo , or $9 million for the :: 0 kilos. Once refined and then sold on -e streets, the shipment would have

.:·ought more than $200 million in 1980

64 PENTHOUS£

prices. Levine told Ibanez that he and Suarez would be shown the $9 million on their visit to Miami , well before ·the delivery of the drugs . . The only hitch in the negotiations in Bue

nos Aires was the fai lure of Suarez to meet with Levine.lt was to be a sign of the Bolivian 's caution in all stages of the deal. " Suarez never exposed himself- we never saw him, or even talked to him directly," said a OEA agent in Washington . "He sends everybody, even his own family, out like he does to test the waters. And he remains out of sight. "

Ibanez returned to Bolivia to consu lt further with Suarez. Meanwhile, Levine flew back to Miami to mull over the mind-boggling quantities of cocaine he was being offered , and to set the sting operation in motion.

Until the Buenos Aires meeting, the DEA was uncertain just how much cocaine base was be ing smuggled out of Bolivia. As late as 1977, the agency was divided on whether Peru or Bolivia was the larger producer. It now became evident that the Bolivians had spurted ahead, and that Suarez was the single biggest cocaine merchant in the world. ·

In a very few years , the cocaine boom has radically reshaped the polit ical and economic geography of Bolivia. For most of this century- and hundreds of years be!Gre- the nation 's meager fortunes and the bulk of its population were linked to the

mineral-rich Andean range. Since 1977, coca ine has brought the

neglected northern and eastern part of Bolivia into the economic and political mainstream . All of the country's endemic disadvantages- its land locked borders, inaccessible interior . wretched rural poverty, polit ical instability. ingrained government corruption. and long-standing tradition of contraband-emerged as pillars of strength for the cocaine industry.

The Chapare. the godforsaken trop1cal highland of east-central Bolivia, has proved a natural greenhouse for new coca plantations. The leaves that grow there are too bitterly acid to chew but produce a high-quality base . The dearth of roads poses no real economic hardship and ensures privacy. Brigades of machete-wie lding peasants cut hundreds of miles of footpaths. An even larger army of campesinos carry fif!y-pound loads of coca leaves along the paths to clandestine laboratories . In fact , the only asphalted highway in the Chapare is used by the coca growers. mainly to dry their leaves in the sun before compressing them into bundles for the pack carriers. On an average day during the harvest season, a four-mile stretch of the highway- roughly the distance along Broadway from the edge of Harlem to Times Square-is blanketed on one side with dehydrating coca leaves while traffic is diverted to a single lane.

Most of the clandestine cocaine laboratories are now installed in the Beni, the jungle-and-savanna province of northern Bolivia, which is even more isolated and inaccessible than the Chapare. As big as Kansas. the Beni has only about 300,000 inhabitants . There are no paved highways and few roads of any kind. The only economic activity. besides cocaine , is catl le. The livestock, introduced into the province three centuries ago by Jesuit missionaries , multiplied into large , wild herds. like Texas longhorns Only in recent years have ranchers built dirt airstrips to transport the butchered cattle to markets 1n La Paz and the Andean tin mines several hundred mi le s southeast . And many of these same tiny airfields now serve as staging points for the sophisticated network that ferries processed and semiprocessed cocaine through Bolivia . across Brazil. into Colombia. and then to Florida.

The business and banking capital of th1s cocaine trade is Santa Cruz. the main city of eastern Bolivia . It is the gathering place of Colombian and American buyers. and the garrison fo r the army and air-force contingents who offer cocaine smugglers protection and secure contraband routes. Oil , natural gas . and agricu lture gave th1s once wild frontier town its first taste of prosperity a decade ago. Cocaine has swathed Santa Cruz wi th a flashy veneer of wealth that sets it aparl from the rest o! the country_ The city's understated Span- · ish colonial downtown d1strict of low-slung white-stucco and red-tile buildings has been encircled With suburban mansions evoking Southern Califo rn1a and Palm

Beach architecture. The shops are stocked with the latest stereo and video equipment, most of it contraband financed by coca-dollars. Santa Cruz probably has more BMWs and Mercedes per capita than any other Latin Amer ican city. Some policemen patrol in Datsun sports cars, marred only by sirens on their roofs.

Like virtually all other Bolivian cocaine barons, Roberto Suarez is a man of these hinterlands. From his family, who controlled the country's rubber trade at the turn of the century , Suarez inherited some modest cattle ranches in the Beni, the Chapare. and Santa Cruz. He was not much of a cattleman, but sen t his son. Roberto Jr ., to Texas A & Min the hopes that he would improve the family ranching operations. The father's limited farming acumen was further hampered by his weakness for gambling. A cousin remembers him losing $60,000 in one night at a La Paz casino eight years ago.

Suarez was, however, an accomplished pilot of small planes, and developed a profound knowledge of the geography of the Bolivian interior. By the early 1970s, he was flying contraband goods into the country from Brazil and Argentina. He also began selling small quantities of cocaine base abroad, usually no more than ten or twenty kilos at a time. When the boom came after 1977, Suarez was far better positioned than most of the other small smugglers. He had contacts in customs, the police, and the armed forces . Rather than simply expand his cocaine production, he hit upon the notion of acting as a middleman between the many small Bolivian smugglers and the big Colombian buyers. The idea appealed to corrupt military and police officials because it made the cocaine trade more manageable. And it made sense to the smaller traffickers because the arrangement relieved them of the expense of bribing the security forces and transporting the cocaine abroad . By now, Suarez controls fully half of the cocaine smuggled out of Bolivia.

Until a few years ago , friends described him as being tall, robust, jovial , and generous. Nowadays. at close to fifty years of age, he is thin, almost emaciated , a heavy smoker of marijuana and cocaine base, and a social recluse who surrounds himself with an army of bodyguards, according to the few friends who occasionally catch a glimpse of him.

"I last saw him about a year ago," recalled a cattleman who grew up with Suarez in the Beni. "He flew into my ranch unannounced and walked up to the house with two bodyguards-foreigners, speaking German. I hardly recognized him, he was so skinny. And he didn't make much sense. He said he fe lt badly that he owed me money for such a long time, and then he opened this big piece of luggage. It was filled with fifty- and hundred-dollar bills. and he said there was $50,000. I looked at him like he was crazy, and said: 'Roberto, this has to be a mistake. I never lent you any money. ' And it was the truth.

He just looked at me kind of strangely, closed the luggage, and walked back to the plane. "

Suarez's bodyguards are mostly Argentine, Swiss, Austrian, and South African nee-fascists . They were trained and recruited by Klaus Altmann, a former Nazi SS colonel who found refuge in Bolivia more than thirty years ago from charges that he had slaughtered hundreds of French Resistance members and deported thousands of Jews while he was Gestapo chief in the French city of Lyons.

The guards are spread over a dozen different locations in northern and eastern Bolivia because Suarez rarely spends more than two days in any one place. He does sit still in Santa Cruz whenever a large deal is in the offing. And it was there, in one of his large mansions, that he fielded phone calls from Marcelo Ibanez during the negotiations with Levine in Buenos Aires and Miami .

After being briefed by Levine on his return to Florida, the DEA decided to finance one of its most expensive undercover operations . A three-bedroom house was rented during May 1980 in Fort Lauderdale, just across from the beach, and was stocked with Johnny Walker and Tanqueray gin, and wired with a stereo for the salsa music that Suarez supposedly enjoyed. Two Lincoln Continental limousines were leased. Women agents were brought over to Miami to act as maids and escorts for the Bolivians. A warehouse in Miami was outfitted as a cocaine laboratory with funnels, cookers, and an agent. Paul Sennett, as its chief chemist. Final ly, $9 million in hundred-dollar bills was borrowed from the Federal Reserve, and deposited in six giant safety-deposit boxes at a Miami suburban bank to impress upon the Bolivians that the Levine organization was prepared to pay cash on delivery.

Mike Levine installed himself in the beach house, along with Frances Johnson, a young , attractive Spanish-speaking agent from the DEA's San Francisco office, who posed as his wife . Richie Fiano. a short, chunky, bearded agent in his early thirties, was designated as Levine's chauffeur and chief lieutenant in the Florida area. After a number of telephone calls to Bolivia , it was agreed that Ibanez, Suarez, and his son would arrive in Miami on May 15.

"Myself, Mike, and a couple of other agents, we go out to Miami airport early that morning to pick up the Bolivians on the flight from Santa Cruz," recounts Fiano. "B.ut the only guy who shows up is Ibanez. He gives us some reason or another why Suarez couldn't make it. So we say no big deal , and we drive Ibanez back to the house.

"Now, we thought we had rented a pretty impressive place, " continues Fiano, an Italian-American from the Bronx. "Hell, we're paying $2,500 a month. It's a great neighborhood. The house is big, has its own swimming pool , and it's right across from the ocean. But Ibanez looks at the

165

place like it's good enough for the hired help. And he tells us that back on his ranch in Bolivia our swimming pool could pass for a small duck pond."

The DEA agents didn't quite know what to make of Ibanez. A couple of inches under six feet tall, thin, clean-cut , with wavy

. dark hair, and in his late thirties, he had the ' air of a successful young businessman. ' His mood oscillated sharp ly between su-

preme self-confidence and deep anxiety. "We were planning on the party with the girls, maybe a quick trip to Las Vegas, even a couple of Broadway shows, " said Fiano. "But Ibanez didn 't want any of it . Wouldn't even touch a drop of booze . He just wanted to leave as soon as possible."

Ibanez spent most of the day closeted in the beach house on the phone with Suarez in Santa Cruz. He emerged only to take a brief drive along the waterfront with Levine, Fiano, and Pepe, a Spanishspeaking agent. He didn't even ask to see the $9 million or the cocaine laboratory. He turned down a suggestion that the Suarez gang deliver the cocaine base in the Brazilian Amazon or Colombia and insisted that the pickup be made in Bolivia. At one point, he demanded that Frances, the woman posing as Levine's wife. fly down with him to the rendezvous point in Bolivia as a sign of the Americans' good faith. When Levine demurred, Ibanez then suggested that Fiano come along , pretending to be Levine 's son, because Suarez would be sending his own son to the meeting in the Bolivian jungles.

At least one of the agents found this behavior peculiar, and suspected that the Suarez people might be setting a trap of their own. The agent objected that Fiano was only a dozen years younger than Levine, and could not possibly pass for his son. But Ibanez, claiming that he was anxious to see the deal go through, said he was prepared to lie to Suarez, who in any event had not met Levine and did not · know what he looked like.

"I argued that Ibanez was leveling with us," said Fiano. "In fact, !thought he had bought the whole story hook, line, and sinker. He was just nervous. I thought maybe he had a personal stake in seeing this thing through . He was the guy who had set the whole deal up for Suarez, and maybe he was thinking that if it went through he would move up in the organization. Anyway, he did seem nervous . He was getting along best with Pepe, maybe because Pepe's Spanish was so good. So that night Pepe took him to dinner, calmed him down, and assured him there would be no problems."

After dinner, a final meeting took place in the beach house to sort out the details of the flight to Bolivia. Three pilots, U.S . military veterans working for the DEA, came to the house and talked to Ibanez about the route to Bolivia, the terrain, and the length of the clandestine airstrip where the landing would be made. Ibanez placed a last phone call to Roberto Suarez to inform him of the type of aviation fuel the plane

would need for its return trip to Florida, and to receive precise instructions. He was told by Suarez that e Bolivian pilot would meet the plane when it made an intermediary stop in the Brazilian Amazon city of Mana us and guide the flight into the Bolivian jungle. Suarez agreed that his emissaries in Miami would collect the $9 million once the plane had taken ofi from Bolivia with 500 kilos of cocaine base.

Early the next day , May 16, just twentyfour hours after his arrival, Ibanez and the DEA agents drove to a small airfield near Fort Lauderdale to begin the trip to South America. Ibanez was startled by the poor quality of the plane. The Convair was about forty years old, and he commented to Fiano that it was the kind of aircraft used in Bolivia to transport meat. "We were worried that such a low-class plane might cause us some credibility problems, but it really was the only aircraft we could afford," recalls Fiano. "Ibanez said to us he couldn't understand how we were willing to risk $9 million in cocaine with this piece of shit."

Carrying Ibanez, Fiano, and the three pilots , the Convair took ofi from Florida, refueled in Puerto Rico, and laid over in Barbados. Ibanez made several phone calls to Suarez. and then, without any real explanation, told the DEA agents that it would take several more days before the cocaine would be ready for a pickup in Bolivia. The next four days were spent sunbathing and deep-sea fishing in Barbados . Finally, on May 20, the Convair took off again and landed that afternoon in Manaus. At a downtown hotel. in a sweltering room so small that only one person could stand up at a time, the Convair's passengers were joined by Renato Roca Suarez, the thirty-year-old nephew of Roberto Suarez. He was an experienced pilot and brought along aer ial maps of the landing zone in Bolivia.

The destination was to be an isolated ranch carved out of the jungle in the Beni. Roca Suarez marked ofi an airstrip on the edge of a large lake, called Rogoaguado, as the site of the rendezvous with the cocaine shipment. The dirt runway, however, was shorter than the minimum requirement of the Convair. One of the DEA pilots pointed out that while the strip might be long enough to land on, it would be difiicult for the plane, fully loaded and refueled, to take off again.

"We argued it back and forth," said Fiano. "But in the end we figured , what the hell, we 're this far along , and we gotta go for it."

The next morning, the Convair set out for Bolivia. The pilots filed a flight plan to the Bolivian air-force control tower in Santa Cruz. Then. following Roca Suarez's instructions, they informed Santa Cruz that they were turning back to Brazil because of technical problems. But instead, they flew at low altitude toward the secluded ranch in northern Bolivia. Roca Suarez told Fiano that they could probably remain an hour on the ground before Santa Cr.uz

wondered why they had lost rad io contact and sent out search planes tor them.

It was a rough landing, and the hydraulic line controlling the nose wheel was damaged. Initially startled by the large group of Indians running toward the craft, Fiano relaxed a bit wheil he saw them carting large gasoline drums to refuel the Conva1r. Within minutes. a smal l. singleengine plane circled above and then landed. Ibanez went over to talk to the pilot. who was Roberto Suarez . Jr .. and brought him over to meet Fianu and the other agents. Short, thin . dark-complexioned, and in his mid-twenties, the son of Roberto Suarez spoke a perfect Texas dialect, which he had learned during his time at Texas A & M.

There would be a short delay, no more than an hour, he explained, before the shipment of cocaine base arrived. Meanwhile, the Indians would form a bucket brigade to refuel the Convair.

"At this point, we're not only worried that the Bolivian Air Force is going to catch up with us," said Fiano. "We' re also concerned that this 1s just one big hummer. Now, over in Miami, you can go out and hum ali day for a guy who says he'll bring you a kilo of coke and never does, and it's no big thing. But for this operation, we had spent like thousands and thousands on the plane, the beach house. the cars, the agents. It was going to be one big embarrassment if these guys didn't come

through. " In less than an hour. another small

plane landed. It was carrying dozens of black, plastic garbage bags filled with cocaine base in light-brown powder form. Ibanez explained that the delay was due to the relatively poor quality of the initial shipment. This load, he said. was not quite 400 kilos, but the quality was supposed to be excellent.

Then, handing Fiano a kilo of pure white cocaine, Ibanez said: "I want you to take this present to Mike to show him that our word is good, that we're friends. and we're sorry for any problems along the way. We want this arrangement to work."

Roberto Jr , who had been monitoring the radio, reported that the Bolivian Air Force had sent out planes to search for the Convair and that a takeoff would have to be made quickly.

"Now Ibanez says to me that he's going back to Santa Cruz, and to please, please, as soon as we were in the air, call Miami and have the money released." reca lls Fiano. "He let us know that he was way out on a limb, that he just hoped everything would work out okay. He pleaded with us not to rip l1 im off. t guess it was at that point that I was really rel ieved. I smiled and I told him he didn't have a thing to worry about.

" Our only problem was taking off." continued Fiano. "The hydraulic system was ruptured on the landing. With the 854

pounds of cocaine base and the fuel tanks loaded, we were carryi!lg a lot more weight. We started down the runway, hitting all those potholes, and we just missed the lake at the end of the stnp . A little less wind under the wings, and we would have nosedived right into the water ."

Back in Miami, Mike Levine had already met with another Suarez henchman, Alfredo Gutierrez. and had shown him the money in the bank safety-deposit boxes that would be turned over as soon as the Convair flew out of Bolivia. Gutierrez, a dark, very stout, middle-aged man, was a fo rmer president of the Santa Cruz Chamber of Commerce and owner of a fleet of small airplanes in Bolivia. He was accompanied in Florida by Roberto Gasser, son of one of the wealthiest Santa Cruz industrialists.

After hearing from both Ibanez in Santa Cruz and Fiano en route from Bolivia that the cocaine base was being flown back to Florida, Levine picked up Gutierrez and Gasser at their Miami hotel and drove them over to the bank. John Lawler, another DEA agent posing as a bank security guard, welcomed them. As Gutierrez went into the vault and placed the key in a safety-deposit box, Levine and Lawler drew their guns and arrested the two Bolivians.

Meanwhile, in South America, Fiano and the three pilots made a refueling stop in Manaus and then flew to Barbados. There , the plane's hydraulic line severed

167

11111

completely, Torcmg me crew 10 wan several days until repairs could be made. It wasn 't until May 25-nine days after the Convair began its journey to Bol ivia-that the DEA agents arrived back in Florida with their cache of drugs.

The seizure of the cocaine proved far easier than the legal and diplomatic morass involved in bringing any Suarez associates to trial. The arrest of Gutierrez sparked a flood of protest letters from Bolivia. Cabinet ministers, generals, and industrialists sent documentation attesting to his character and honesty. Roberto Gasser was not formally charged, and within days of his arrest, was released .

·'The thing is his name never came up throughout the case," said a DEA agent, now back in Bolivia. "He just showed up with Gutierrez at the last moment to pick up the money. In court , he stuck to his story that Gutie rrez owed him a debt and had asked him to accompany him to the bank to pick it up."

Gutierrez was indicted on charges of consp iring to smuggle in and distribute the seized cocaine. A judge initially set his bail at $3 million . But he was then allowed to plea before U.S. District Judge Alcee Hastings , who reduced bail to $1 mil lion. in July 1980, Gutierrez's son presented two cashier's checks totaling $1 million to the clerk of the court. His father walked out of detention, and fled to Bolivia. (Last December, Judge Hastings was indicted on charges of obstructing justice and conspiracy to solicit bribes from defendants in exchange for favorable treatment in his courtroom. Hastings fell into a trap when a retired FBI agent posing as a racketeer appearing before the judge offered him a $150,000 bribe.)

More than a year was to pass before Gutierrez and then Marcelo Ibanez were brought back to Miami to stand tri al. In the meantime, Bolivia became the first country in the world to fall under the control of a government fronting for a drug mafia.

" Before the sting operation, we had some strong suspicions that the Suarez people were well connected to the mil itary and political power structure in Bolivia ," said DEA official. " But we didn' t expect the whole damn Bolivian establishment to surtace behind them."

Just a few weeks after the DEA's scam against Suarez, a small group of Santa Cruz industrialists met at a socia l club in their city with General Lu is Garcia Meza, commander of the Bolivian Army. The businessmen, led by Erwin Gasser, whose son Roberto had been arrested by the DEA in Miami, were there to convince the general to carry out a military coup against the tottering civilian government in La Paz. A suitcase containing more than $1 million was passed across the table to Garcia Meza, according to participants at the meeting. The money included contributions from Roberto Suarez and other traffickers, who were concerned that the civilian government was about to clamp down on the cocaine trade because of a

wave OJ aoverse puOIICity and strong pressure from the American government.

A few days earlier, the cocaine mafia had turned over $800,000 to General Hugo Echeverria, commander of the army garrison in Santa Cruz, according to mi litary and drug-enforcement officials. Further payments were made to other ranking military officers, along with promises of much more money in the months ahead .

On July 17, 1980. General Garcia Meza led the 189th coup in Bolivia's 157-yearold history as an independent state. It was one of the more brutal mil itary takeovers. Thousands of people were arrested, and numerous cases of torture and ki llings were reported. Although the ostensible motivation behind the coup was the fear that a left-wing civilian government wou ld take power, it quickly became apparent that the cocaine bonanza played an even greater role . Paramilitary groups swept through government buildings burning all records of drug cases. The military officers most suspected of having close links with the coca ine traffic were given key government positions.

Besides General Garcia Meza. who emerged as president. Army Colonel Lu is Arce Gomez, a cousin of Roberto Suarez , was appointed minister of interior . Besides his family connection with Suarez , the colone l had an important stake in cocaine traff ic through his joint ownership of a fleet of airplanes in the Santa Cruz area. A private plane owned by Army Colonel Norberta Salomon, a partner in Col. Arce Gomez's aircraft company, made a forced landing in the Beni in February 1980, and police sources said more than 1 ,500 pounds of cocaine base were found on board . Thanks to high-level intervention , Colonel Salomon was cleared and was reassigned as army attache at Bolivia·s embassy in Venezuela.

The United States reacted to the Garcia Meza coup by withholding recognition of his government, scaling down the size of the American embassy in La Paz and recalling the ambassador, and rescinding almost all economic aid to Bolivia . Then, when the military reg ime's strong links with the cocaine trade became obvious, Washington cut off the American anti-drug program in Bolivia.

With the election of President Reagan, the Bolivian government made an attempt to restore ties with Washington by carrying out a cosmetic crackdown on the drug trade. In February 1981, Garcia Meza forced Arce Gomez to resign as minister of interior. In the following weeks , dozens of small cocaine smugglers were arrested, and numerous small drug shipments were seized .

But only a few days later, a gathering of the largest cocaine traffickers in the country were told the government's true intentions . According to drug-enforcement officials, the meeting took place in a Santa Cruz mansion in late February 1981. For diplomatic reasons , it was said, the government felt constrained to launch a highly

publicized roundup of drug smugglers. It was suggested that the major cocaine figures transfer most of their drug operations away from the more visible Santa Cruz region to more sec luded zones in the Chapare and the Beni. And to ensure continued government protection, increased payments to high officials were demanded. As a first contribution, half a million dollars was collected from the audience.

The farcical campaign to stamp out the cocaine trade ended a few months later, fa iling to convince Washington. Not even the lucrative profits from drug smuggling could make up for the deepening crisis in Bolivia's legal economy and the failure of the government to attract international cred its because of its lamentable image abroad. So in September i 98 i, another military commander, General Celso Torrelio Villa, became president.

In an effort to repair relations with Washington, General Torrelio made at least one telling gesture. Last October, Alfredo Gutierrez, who had skipped bail after getting caught in the DEA's sting against the Suarez gang , was brought back to Miami under Bolivian police escort. A few weeks later, Marcelo Ibanez also was flown up to Florida. In March. Ibanez was sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment after pleading guilty for his role in the sale of 854 pounds of cocaine to the DEA undercover agents. A decision on Gutierrez is expected in the coming weeks.

In a stroke of luck, the Swiss police arrested Roberto Suarez, Jr., in Locarno last December when he was caught using a false Colombian passport. Until now, the Bolivian government has indicated it would not contest Washington 's request to have him extradited to Miami.

Neither DEA nor State Department officials believe that Torrelio himself is involved in the cocaine trade. But he appears too weak to clamp down on the traffic.

"Even if you could find a dozen honest generals and colonels , they would probably be gunned down by their colleagues and junior officers," says a diplomat stationed in La Paz. "The drug traffic has thoroughly corrupted the military. It has destroyed the hierarchy in the officer corps, because rank doesn't count unless you have drug connections. And even if you could somehow put together an expeditionary force to march against the cocaine growers in the Chapare and Santa Cruz, you would set off a peasant uprising , a real revolution. Those campesinos are making real money for the first time in their lives."

As if to underscore the validity of these remarks, earlier this year bombs partially destroyed the homes of two generals who had spoken out strongly against the cocaine trade. The explosions were believed to have been set off by junior officers.

The only source of optimism for the DEA now is a po tentially significant backlash against the drug traffic in Bolivia itself. Un-170 PENTHOUSE

til recently, cocaine was widely viewed as an American problem, and a boon for Bolivia. The ref ined powder was too expensive to be peddled in Bolivia. And it became a buoyant factor in the economy at a time when legal exports were in the doldrums.

Only a relatively small portion of the estimated $800 million to $ i billion a year in cocaine sales was being repatriated to Bolivia. But it was enough to stoke a nationwide boom in real estate , contraband retail trade, and other businesses. Until last year, the dollar was actually being sold more cheaply by black-market money-exchange dealers than by the official banks. Peasants were paying off their debts with wads of crisp dollar bi lls instead of pesos .

But now the economic crisis has reached tidal-wave proportions. Cocaine dealers have just about satiated their appetites for real estate and luxury goods. There are no other investments they want

' "In the beginning, we thought the cocaine trade

wasn't such a terrible thing," said a Bolivian businessman.

"It was an important source of capital . But in the end,

it corrupted everything."

to make in Bolivia at this point. The bulk of their profits is being placed abroad, in American and Swiss banks .

About the only financial game that interests them in Bolivia is the money market. With a foreign debt of almost $4 bill ion, there are no dollars available in Bolivian banks. Desperate businessmen are wi lling to pay almost any price for coca-dollars. In one week last March, the black-market rate shot up from fifty pesos to over i 00 pesos a dollar, and hundreds of bankruptcies were sweeping industry and farming . The Chamber of Agriculture took out ads in a Santa Cruz newspaper complaining that coca had become the only profitable crop in the country . A group of 200 enraged mothers stormed the Central Bank branch in Santa Cruz and held employees hostage until the government promised to give them dollars to send their children, stranded abroad as university students.

"In the beginning , all of us thought that the cocaine trade wasn't such a terrible thing ," said Luis Dario Vazquez, secretary general of the Pro-Santa Cruz Committee, the biggest booster organization in the city, embracing business, labor, and farmers.

"A lot of the profits were being reinvested here. It was an important source of capital. But in the end, it has corrupted everything. They have a stranglehold over us."

Even Erwin Gasser, who is reputed to have played an important role in financing the 1980 coup that brought the military-civilian cocaine mafia to power, now sounds thoroughly dejected. His sugarcane farm and refinery-the biggest such operation in the country-is reported ly in dire financial straits because of the precipitous decline in the peso and the far more competitive wages offered to peasants by coca growers.

"The military government has been a total disappointment, " said Gasser, at his downtown Santa Cruz office, a few hours before flying to Miami for his annual medi· cal checkup. "They keep changing cabinet ministers so quickly that by the time we can educate them about the country 's economic problems, they are thrown out of office. And of course there is the corruption problem. What makes it different from other countries is that these guys steal more money than the government has."

Out of this economic and political swamp, an opportunity may eventually emerge for a rational, balanced, and expensive program that would bring the Bolivian cocaine trade under control. According to American'CJiplomats, a relatively stable and honest government leadership would have to take power , convinced that the drug traffic is bringing the country far more drawbacks than benefi ts . Enough U.S. aid would then have to be offered to institute an effective crop-substitution program in the newer coca-growing regions like the Chapare. And drug-enforcement activities wou ld have to be stepped up, although undercover spectaculars like the sting against Suarez are not likely to be repeated.

There is no evidence yet that such a scenario is unfolding . Roberto Suarez shows no signs of cutting back his huge smuggling operations. Some DEA agents entertain the slim hope that he might at some point want to give himself up if he could receive guarantees of protection, maybe even a light sentence in Miami, in exchange for his encyclopedic knowledge of the cocaine trade.

The incentive might be the fear that he is too great a political liability for any government that wants to tidy up the country 's tarnished image abroad. It is also not inconceivable that mi litary officials would accept Suarez's murder and replacement by one of his ambitious lieutenants, a man not so notorious overseas.

"Roberto Suarez is probably the best· . known person in Bolivia," said a DEA agent. "His name is more recognizable on the streets of Santa Cruz than the current president. But there are so many pressures on him that he must be going nuts. Think of all those people he has to pay off. all those accounts he has to juggle, all those little and big things that could go wrong and explode in his face."~

OFFLCER SAFETY: COVER JOllS, COVER RESIDENCES, AND COUNTER-SURVElLLi\NCF.

111 smnt• d 1•pp urHll'rl'OVL•r opernt ions, for example, those involving long-term invp:;l i 1~ations of orgrlllizcd crime or terrorist groups, it mny .be impernLive t o 1·rc•;t!t• <1 CIIVl'r story tlwt. employs not only a cover residence b11t also n c"v"r joh. Ft·\~ ttttd<·n·over op<•rnl inns require the dev.elopment of so close ,, rr•lat inttshit; hf'lwt·c•• the offic<•r a11d violator .. Generally, person<1l questi<"'ns lwl\~t·t·u 1·rimin:ll~ nrc viewed with suspicion and disdnin, but questioning is sPmr·l inws r£'quir<•ll in developing the trust <Jnd confidence of the criminal. Thl• violator m.1y w.1nt to cnll or visit the officer at his job or residence to d•<•c·k his story or to do busine~s.

Cnv1•r j<1ln: mny he e itlter real or imaginary. The undercover officer may ,,r·(q;tlly t.11<e <'mploymcnl as a bartender, a cab driver·, 11 salesman, or c:tnothcr j nh ~Vhil'lt J".'rmits some mobility but offers an explanation for his presenc('. !;"u"· rttlrlt•rcnv<·r npcrntors .:lsSUiliL' the role of students and enroll i.n and nt tend nd 1<')',1'. /\11 i111ap,inary cover job might be that of a self-emploved consultaut, fnr l'X:uupl<~, in C'll~rgy-saving devices.

:;"'"I' i11risdict ion:; may select undc.•rcover operntors from :1mung pre-appointed I'"' in· I ist s :111d request th;tt tlwy maintain their current employment as a h:lrlt•nd"r or tru!'k driver even afl('r their appointment to the police agency. Th<· nll'dl;lll i t·s for this c:tn he \·Wrked out with or without the employer's klllllvl•·dgt•. 'J'h(l disadvilntages of an inexperienced undercover investigntor o1rl' nflt'll nvcrshadowetfby his ability to establish a deep cover \~ith little r1':1~:n11 for ~uspi<·ion. IIC! doesn't :tlk, talk, or think like a cop. lie remains " lt:1rt c•lfdc•r or t ruek driver who <'au be molded into a productive undercover llJll'r:ll•ll' hy trninl'd invest igntors or formerly successful undercover offic('rs as hi:; h;mtllers or backup team.

l·!l1t·n• dc·••p pe1wLration requires a cover residence, more is involved tllan a f i~·r it inc.1s n<ldn•ss. Local depnrtml'nts may want to rent a number of apnrtments lfl m:1intni11 .1s t:ov<.•r rcsidt>uccs. The undercover operator cnu rent the apnrt-l!lf'fll lrim:;c•lf, 111 il izing his cov<•r identity. Residences should be maint:tined pr••i'''' ly to giV<' :1 I ivC'd-in nppt•arnllt:C. Clothes should be milintni•·cd properly ' '' 1•.ivr· n I ivl•d-iu :lppc;Jrancc. Clolhes should be in the closet and dresser wlrich ::ll(l(lflrl. tit<• covt•r jub <Jnd role. Food should be i.n the refrigerator, di:dw:i in lh<.! t'ilhillC'ts nnd toill't necessities in the bathroom. Undercover ''fll'ralors :1rc.• C'Xp<'t.'lt>d to visit their residences frequently and maintain that I ivl'cl-in look. GrN•n moldy bread or rotten food in the refrigerator are teUt:llt• ~igns IIJ;tl the officer is not living there; this could jeopardi~e. both the tllHil'rl·ov<•r offi!'l•r's :;aft'ty and the investigiltion. A phone with C:lll-[orwnrding t':lu IH· illsl:tllt•cl whil'l1 will ring :H the officer's true residence. Whenever an undt'r!'roV<'r opcr:Jt·or lenves 11 m~eling with a viol.1tor, n bar, or anywhere, he :;hmJid rl'lllrll either to his covPr job or cover residence. The officer should n'm:dn at the residence at least an hour, but if . practical, stay overnight to f111 r hc•r c•11hnnce the cover. ·On no occasion should the officer go from the real of I ir·t· or rC'al residence without first being sur·e that they are not being tailed.

Clllllllt·r-surveill:nwc is importnnt in any undercover operation but of critical l'Pnr·t•rn. in de~p pentrntion. If the undercover officer hns heen questioned by tl11• violo1tor or feels any suspicion has be.en aroused regnrding the identity or role•, assume tlu .. •f..t!! is surveillance on you.

.]

l I .

1

t/11 j 1 ,. t 1 r·q••r·ntly, 111Hit•rcover offin•rs, nre required Lo report to their

1 , .. , 1 .. . ,·1 ivt• ht•adqu :•rll'r:-;, division, office or station, lo attend bricrinr,s nr 111 , .,.1 i 111 ~~;. 1o t·r•mplt·lc reports, or to perform other duries. Tht•y ntso ;111 . 1 r•·qtll'llll y req•Ji n:d to return an undt• rc:over veil ic: le to the stornge 1; 11·il ily af!l'l' making an undcrcnvl•r contAct. Quite possibly, tltey nrc rcrf'tir•·rl ~~~ \I!:C' nffil'ial vehicles for transportation toor from their rPsidence.

'lliv unrlt·rco~t·r officer should bt• very cautious when ch.1nginr, from one vr·hir·l1· 111 another. \-/here nnd how the vehicle cxchnnr,t!s take place should lw :1 crHtsith•rat inn tluriug tlte planning phase of the undercover op~;!rntion; flq~-.·•·v•·r, !Itt' undt·rcuvl'r officer should always be sensitive to this issue th• "'IJ',hnut t ht• Ofll'r:tt iun.

''~;idt' lr11n1 thP \'Oill't•ru when switching VE'hic:les, the undercover officer mu•;t nhsPrvt• !'aul ion when ridinr, in '"'fficial police vehicles, marked cr

tllllu:nlu•d. A•1oid routl's or nn•as wher., the offir.er might be seen nnd identi-1 i .. d hy tht• viuLttnrs or their associates. Any time the office>r enlt~rs or lt·:tvt•s a polin• fncility, be particularly alert to any possibility of being nbs•·rvl•d or t:ti led. The> cover is burned as soon as the viol.ntor nssociates 1 II!' u 11 til' r cove r tl f f ice r w i t h the L <H.r •

F••r till• unuC'rnJV<'r officer returning to his or her Teal residence, it is o~h~;nllltl'ly impC'rnrive to sh.1ke any tail. If the officer is beiug surveilled, i:; n•l! :1\.J:lrP. nf it, and goes directly home, value as an undercover officer is prnh:ddy lost. If !he undercover officer told the violator they live dnwn-tol·lll a11d proct't•ds to an address in a western suburb, the cover is burned. 1\u! l'V£'11 if the officer- hasn't bt>en specific about an address and tile 'violator d<H'!; 1111l susp<'ct tht> officer's real identity, the investigation is still .ir·op:11·dizt•u lwcausc the officer has compromised his or her family's security. V11lnr·r;d1ility tn !hrt•ats Olg;Jin::l the family is generally n valid reason Lo sw:pl'nd an offic-er's per(ormanct' in an undercover role.

th Penalty Sought for Killer of Undercover N.Y. Detectives

om Hays, The Associated Press

YORK, N.Y. (AP)- Federal authorities want a man accused in the execution-style killing of two undercover detectives to the death penalty under new charges announced on Monday.

alleged shooter, Ronell Wilson, 21, and four other defendants were named in a 30~count racketeering indictment. The men JIIIUeQecHv were members of a violent gang that dealt crack cocaine and illegal weapons out of a housing project on Staten Island.

gang, which was responsible for a string of robberies and drive-by shootings, "culminated its reign of terror with the of two courageous police officers," said U.S. Attorney Roslynn Mauskopf.

already had pleaded not guilty in state court to first-degree murder. He was ordered held without bail at an arraignment e new charges in Brooklyn federal court on Monday.

·ng a sting operation in March 2003, detectives James Nemorin, 36, and Rodney Andrews, 34, had met with Wilson to buy a submachine from the gang. It was alleged that Wilson decided to rob them instead and, once learning they were police

shot both in the back of the head with a .44-caliber revolver.

-~'"""•riti~>!': began to weigh possible federal charges after the state Court of Appeals ruled in June that part of New York's death a1ty law was unconstitutional. If authorized by the U.S. Department of Justice, federal prosecutors could seek death for

e potential for a capital case "is the most important aspect of this indictment," Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly said in a "Anyone wh9 murders a police officer should forfeit his life."

owing the Wilson's arraignment, his attorney, Ephraim told reporters the case represents "death-penalty politics

worst."

· dictment also charges Paris Bullock and Michael Whiten nnection with the case. But authorities said neither

ant would be eligible for the death penalty; they instead a possible life sentence if convicted of conspiracy, drugng, robbery, gun running and other crimes.

ne has been executed in New York since the death penalty einstated in 1995, after a 25-year absence. The last

in the state was in 1963.

and Andrews were the first officers killed in the line of since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

CELEBRAnNG

200 YEARS ~ !._ ~- -~ •' ~·-- ... -~ ~ - ··:. .· METRO EDITION WEDNEsDAY, MARCH 12, 2003 I Partly sunny, 55 I Weat11er: Pa~a 28 www.nypost.com

By WIWAM J. GORTA, lARRY CElONA

and MURRAY WEISS This is the face of the man wanted by

cops for the cold-blooded, executionstyle slaying of two detectives on Staten Island.

The NYPD has announced a manhunt for Ronell Wilson, 20, \Vho they say shot both cops in the head as an undercover gun buy went bad.

The alleged kingpin behind the StatSee MURDER Page 4

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Officials Provide Details of How 2 Detectives Were Shot

e man accused of shooting and killing two undercover detectives in

car on Staten Island on Monday night first ordered them to pull er to the curb, then shot the one sitting in the front passenger seat

~ore pressing the gun against the driver's head and firing, officials

'd yesterday.

e account of the shooting, which took place during what the police ed a failed robbery, was provided to investigators by Jessie

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ri!lilm acobus, 17, who was sitting in the back seat next to the man accused of being the

!"Jlllil.an, Ronell Wilson, 20, law enforcement officials said yesterday. The two men, the

orities have said, had planned to rob the two undercover detectives, who met with

em while posing as gun buyers to purchase a Tec-9 pistol .

. Wilson was arraigned yesterday on first-degree murder charges in Criminal Court on

ten Island, hours after the police recovered a silver -44-caliber revolver with a den handle, which was believed to be the murder weapon. Acting on a tip, detectives

tnm d the gun in a first-floor closet at 76 VanDuzer Street, around the corner from the

~ onds before the first shot was fired, Mr. Wilson said: "Give it up! Give it up!"

rding to Mr. Jacobus's account, one senior law enforcement official said. The

and, "is almost incomprehensible, because there appears to be almost no rtunity to give it up. It's just, 'Give it up, give it up,' and bam, bam .... almost

ediately," the official said.

1l . Wilson, according to the account, first shot Detective Rodney J. Andrews, 34, who

sitting in the front passenger seat of the car, a law enforcement official said. He

en shot the other detective, James V. Nemorin, 36, who was driving, the official said .

. Wilson and Mr. Jacobus then got out of the car and began to walk away, then

ed and pulled the two detectives out of the car, the police said. Mr. Wilson took ective Nemorin's gun, the police said, and the two men then stole the detectives' car headed to the apartment ofOmar Green, 19. Mr. Green had arranged the gun sale

lived nearby at 67 Warren Street in Tompkinsville, the police said.

they got out of the car, they were spotted by two rookie patrol officers. The officers IJCI.Dt~ea Mr. Jacobus, but Mr. Wilson got away, the police said. Mr. Wilson left his

clothes and a gun at Mr. Green's apartment and fled to Brooklyn, officials said.

police later found that gun inside a wall behind an electrical switch plate, officials Mr. Wilson was arrested on Wednesday morning in Brooklyn.

McKernan, a lawyer for Mr. Jacobus, declined to comment on the case last night.

e arraignment of Mr. Wilson on Staten Island yesterday, the courtroom was _..,.n,•n with his friends and family and with colleagues, friends and supporters of the

dead detectives. Mr. Wilson could face the death penalty if convicted of the murder

Alan Meyer of Criminal Court ordered Mr. Wilson to be held in protective custody,

mu:l denied a request from prosecutors that his phone conversations be monitored.

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Both prosecutors and a lawyer for Mr. Wilson had asked that he be held in protective custody, but for different reasons. Kelley Sharkey, a court-appointed lawyer for Mr. Wilson from the State Capital Defender Office, said it was necessary for his safety. But prosecutors feared that he might transmit threats to potential witnesses. That is also why they sought to have his phone calls monitored, said William L. Murphy, the Staten Island district attorney.

As the charges were read, Mr. Wilson stood wearing a white jumpsuit, rocking back and forth gently on his heels. His mother and father and other family members sat in the third row of the gallery, two rows behind two undercover detectives who had worked with the dead men.

Two women, Chikenya Collier of Brooklyn and Danae Pope of Staten Island, were arraigned yesterday on charges that they had hilldered prosecution by helping two of the men charged in the killings escape. Both women were released without bail.

Michael and Luciano Diaz, the brother and mother of Mitchell Diaz, one of the six men being held in connection with the killing, were arraigned on Wednesday on charges that they had helped Mr. Diaz to conceal two weapons. They were released yesterday, prosecutors said.

After the arraignment, several undercover detectives who had worked with the two

victims stood outside the courthouse in a cold rain and recalled their lives.

"You have lunch with the guy every day, you have dinner with him," said one detective who worked with Detective Nemorin for three years and would not give his name. "Now all of a sudden he's gone, and for what?"

Patrick J. Lynch, the president of the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, said: ''You cannot take a police officer's life in this city. If you do, we will find you."

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BLOOD ON .THE SHIELD

Anatomy of a n~,l:htmarr How·-NYPD!s n11$f,IJ.erileU; job_ cost 2,~co s· lhlir liv .·[ ..

.. _. .. _, :~ .: ... · ~-- ~~:i:.<_.;~-~r~:;--~_·f~:i-~!_;_ ...... _~::~;:-_ .• :~\ s:?·:-:;;.-;-r::! ·/ . .

By lARRY CELONA, ·MURRAY WEISS and ANDY GELLER

The Tac Plan meeting began at 6:30 p.m. Monday.

Detective A had been working on the sting for six months. . The previous week - posing as a gun

buyer - he had purchased a 357 Magnum from an 18-year-old Staten Island gun dealer named Omar Green.

Now. he was getting ready to buy a TEC-9 semiautomatic pistol - a deadly weapon that has a magazine cDpacity of 10 to 50 rounds.

The teen gun dealer demanded $1,300. The detective talked him dawn to $1,200.

A. a 36-year·old father of three whose real name is being 'vithheld by The Post, could probably have busted Green after buying the Magnum, but that isn't the name of the game.

No. the game is to buy more and more guns to see where they come from, to see if there's a Mr. Big involved.

If you don't fmd a Mr. Big, at least you've taken guns off the street.

A and his colleagues in the Firearms Investigation Unit of the NYPD's Organized Crime Control Bureau met in their offices at 305 Front St., a few blocks away from the !20th Precinct station house on Staten Island to plot their next move.

It was decided that Detective B, a 34-year-old divorced father of two, would ride in the car with A and there would be four backup cars, each manned by two undercovers.

The backup cars would form a diamond pattern around A and B's leased Nissan Ma.xima. One car would be in front, one would be in back and two would be on either side.

B would pretend to A's brother-in-law. Both detectives -would be wired with Kell

microphone-transmitters. The plan seemed foolproof. but in a scant

90 minutes, it would go horribly wrong.

Both Detective .A and Detective B had been on the force since 1996 and joined the fuearms unit sbc months ago after working in narcotics. ·

Firearms is one of the ·most dangerous as- . signments a cop can have because you're not only working with known criminals but known criminals who have guns.

"He wanted to get the guns off the street," said narcotics Detective Brian Grenz, a longtime friend of Detective B. "Wlwt he does is one of the most dangerous things that anyone could ever do, and he was excellent at i~ He was the best I've ever seen~

In preparation for buying the TEC-9, Detective A had called Omar Green and arranged to meet him at 67 Hill St., one of the buildings of the Stapleton housing project

When he and Detective B arrived at the building about 8 p.m., there were two men in the lobby, Ronell Wilson, 20, and Jessie Jacobus, 16, cops said.

''Who's the other guy?" one of the men

Dragnet out tO . snare MURDER from Page 1 en Island slaughter was caught yesterday morning - weari..'1g woman's cloth~ ing -on a Manhattanbound feny.

Sena, who witnessed the exchanges.

in an earlier gun buy between Green and one of the undercovers; Jessie Jacobus, 16, believed to be the other man in the back ·seat when Wilson openecl fire, and an unnamed man who had a TEC-9 semiautomatic assault weapon the cops were negotiating to buy.

Omar Green, 18, was collared after a · woman pointed him out to cops patroling the feny boa~

"She h.1d a ~ood eye, and quickly went to the cops and told them," said Nino

"If it wasn't for her he would've gotten away. • .

TI1e eagle-eyed woman, who is eligible for thousands of dollars in rewards, left before cops could get her name, police said.

Three other men also have been arrested in the case: Michael Whitten, 19, for hL< role as intermediary

Cops also were looking to question a man named Paris Bullock who may

. ·. t~ .· ! ;

:1 .. \·-~-~~~r;~:,:a~\b~~~o~;ck~-by-block ·seard1. : , ' ~- . . - both shot~ ex~

.style ·- were found lying on the .road · Hannah Place near the intersection wim

Pauls Avenue in the Tompkinsville secri . Investigators don't know if tJJ.e gun se

. knew their customers were cops - or · wanted to rob then1.. .

· · ·.. Detective A appeared to have been · · . first He had been hit in the back of . · head near the neck.

· · ··. Detective B appeared to have ~ · when he heard the shot. He was hit in . cheek and ear area

. . Both ·men were pronounced dead z: . · V'mcent's Hospital on Staten Island. DeiU · · A still had the $1,200. · · · · · Cops believe Wilson, who was stii!

large last night, was the shooter. ·· A witness told police that the same shot . both ' oftlcers ari.d then both

·.bolted from the car, leaving the detecq ' inside. '~

: The wimess said the perps ran zS tD feet, changed their minds and iin'. lja& the car, tossed out the cops', bOdies a drove off. ·. · . . , ·.

c···- ~ -::. .. _,, ,· ·. The:car, splattered with blood,' waS fa Vanderbilt and Pine streets, .a fe~~

· . was · busted by' housiil~C his shirt covered wjth bl.OO~. ~

saicl- . . ·. . . . . >'-~' ' ~ ·· .. \ ,. ... · "I stole the car,'' he explairie(l;'ji fo · and wh.en I got in, thaf!;'~@lV fi gOt.. -bloOd: on me." . :. · · ·. ·ti- ·~~ :. ·. ·-~ :· .

. Jacobus later told cops tl:ie "pJ.ati· ~ walked away from. car and" continued · ·, rob the two·undercovers, not kill therii,

~~~~'iliat.~e b·. · ..• ·z!cii~in:~ :<:3~~~~b:r~:;:g~$,bt ,. the detectives' vehicle ha~p gom!(~!J ... :: .. ·.i Michaek~tten,-19, who-l!l!d avoid being sp0tted. _ .· .: . :/ ,-: :· , .';:~ ·: ;::~;:' the· go-bclWeln:iri the first ~15

Wilson got b ack in the detectiVe?:Car;and · rested·ovetnight:.:·:··· ?······";· \ -~t~ . ~ it drove off, making a $eries of qu4:Js)ums ·' · . . : __ Green:·wa5-51qested ·:in drag" ~ - which prevented· the backup cars;from.,>. a.m:; ·. yesterday'C{.on·:' a· ·Mailhattait-ooa keeping pace. . . ·.- ·, ;::':_ :. '' c'; i~:~ii-~;t.-:i7 ,:: Stafen,:IsJ,and,i:.ferry: ·after··. a· ·woman :.or

It als::> <;ntered a hilly" area, w~ch_1~,s>ff.;;::•.· preached cops_'and·silid, ~.[Jiere's ~ - P:e~ transrruss1ons from the Kell deVIces; ·. · . ·· · here · who's . e1ther . a. guy !Jr. the ·•ug!:.e Thinef. were looking bad.. A- supe~r.. woman I've ever.seen." :: · · . .: ~ '

;tffi:1;r~~·::k~;ati'~~~ . . . ·~· - :.. , ' . .

; . ~ have helped dispose of evi~ . · detectives .i ~; ix;th seven,- . dence. · year veterans -were with- :

Police believe robbery ·. · hell,i by police for fear of was the motive. the detec- . jeapardizirig: ·other underlives agreed to pay $1.200 . _cover offi~ep;. for the gun. The criminals One ·was : a 36-year-old fled with one ·of the offi- · ·· · H3iti3n :·. iio:migraot, who cers' guns, which was later· graduated ·· from John Jay found at Green's mother's College and began his poapanment. The TEC-9 also · lice career. as a cadet. was found in an apartment He got married in 1995 -in the neighborhood. his wife was said to be "be-

The names of the slain yond devastated" at the

news of his death - z:: leaves behind three drere two boys, 7 and 5, z:: a girl; 20 monU1S. ·

The other detective, : father of two boys,lf~1ic years old, : "\'I<JS ; ~fi'klr<:~

from his wife'7Ji ~~'~P Brooklyn Nortl:i; ;-':- m l. f,'llSt. ' :-( d LU

Additionaf re.R?J:~~g Joe McGurk. ' Phtbp.; M! sing and Douglas· Mont

Shooting Chronology The sequence of events according to the New York Police Department: ·

0 Two detectives arriv~ about. 7:30 Monday night at 67 Hill Street, where they meet with two men . At 7:45, they talk to a man named Omar by phone and arr~mge to pick up a gun. The four of them leave in the detectives' car. Four unmarked police cars follow them.

B Just before 8 p.m., the de;tectives' car stops at the corner of Victory Boulevard and Corson Avenue. One of the two men borrows a phone from one of the detectives and gets out to make a call. Five minutes later, he gets _ back in and they drive away. The trailing police cars lose track of them and start a block-byblock search of the area.

IJ Two minutes later, the detectives' bodies are discovered at Hannah Street and St. Pauls Avenue. The police shut down most outbound traffic on the Staten Island bridges and a Manhattan-bound ferry is returned to Staten Island.

1\.1 Shortly afterWard, the detectives' car is found dumped at V::!nrlo<>rhilt A\/P.nttP. -'lnrl

;· }I~~;;d~i~ · ihie-~uiiitiri_ · : 6~h.t:~~-1 . ti.$(U(:(p!~ce togetlie:r th~ ev!e~ts _iliat 1ed.: ui) :tli~ -k'iii~gs 'Ma11ctay 'iii~t. iiba. ·

· hjmt ic){4It/~r,~inwrng·suspect::,Ron,- . . . eli-Wilson; and atlea:st one othe'r-irian ·.

· .~;who ~e{~ ilci4&: beue\fe ' m~yi ~ave. '"""'~-~_,. •. ..._,,_._,,._c·!· .. ·: inforriuition abOut the everits. follow~ .

,.mg th~ ~cr~me. ·/:r . ::: ,.. . . ~.··~j~1t

-·. ·But officials :·win soon ·begin: iin eXhaustive-re.View· of thEi WidercoveJ:, _ _ o~~ratiqil{ a: ~f#~afCi pra_ctic~ to _t,i I '7:~-w -.~a.~-t.!<:~t~!!· P~?C.~~ur_es: and,~o i

.learn from whatever rDlStakes 'may I from _· 4~Y~ ~o~e.ii _r!la.d~~ - . . " : ,_ ,, .. , ,(

· .Iri.vestiga- , · Unq~rcqver operations like the one ·I · de<ilef~: t~ -: ori · Mo~day night are · ·carefUlly" ;

nf.inm·.,_;;t\tn·thP i)~!l.S _of: - p_lapne,ct· ~o;l,?e a_s SCrip~eda$ P9Ssible,, \ whaf the' tw'o de:- -·:·. both to . prevent things from goirig : colleagues were . wrong and to exert control over fluid I

••u;a~l<l)'~ .uJ:5u. .. · .. -. -- . situations. . · : ,; . . . .: .. . •.. ' . "!... . !'-

. •" .. il ·-. .

.- .. ., ..

------

Slain NYC Detectives Were on Risky Detail

By The Associated Press

NEW YORK (AP)- It's one of the riskiest jobs in law enforcement: taking illegal guns off the streets by trapping anned suspects in illicit deals.

For three years, the New York Police Department's Firearms Investigation Unit has hauled in increasing numbers of guns and suspects with operations that delicately balance stealth and safety.

On Monday night, backup teams lost two undercover detectives trying to buy a $1,200 submachine gun, police said. Minutes later, the two men were dumped on a Staten Island street with fatal gunshot wounds.

Four suspects were in custody Wednesday, including 19~year -old Omar Green, who gave himself up on a Staten Island ferry Tuesday after a passenger alerted two patrol officers to a man disguised in a blond-streaked wig and stuffed bra.

Ronell Wilson, also 19, was arrested Wednesday. Also arrested were Michael Whitten, 19, and Jessie Jacobus, 17. Police said at least one other man was wanted for questioning.

In Monday's undercover operation, four police backup cars dropped out of sight when one of two suspects riding in the detectives' car got out to make a phone call, police said.

The backups could not catch up again, and a miniature transceiver on one of the detectives' bodies cut out in the hilly neighborhood, police said.

"It's a challenge, no question about it, to have something small enough to avoid detection but large enough to transmit a sufficient distance," Police Commissioner Ray Kelly said .

The police detectives' union said it had long complained of problems with the transceivers, known as "kels," although it was unclear whether a technical problem contributed to the deaths.

"Most of the time they work fine, other times they're deficient," Detectives' Endowment Association president Tom Scotto said. "Whether the outcome would have been the same is difficult to say."

The seven-year Police Department veterans were found minutes after the undercover operation began. Each had been shot once in the head and neither appeared to have fired a shot.

Investigators said they believe the officers were shot in an attempt to rob them of the $1 ,200 gun payment

The two slain detectives were among 13 undercover officers in the city's firearms investigation unit, which seized 484 guns and arrested 89 people last year, up from 260 guns and 68 arrests in 2001, according to department records.

After initially withholding their names to protect open investigations, police identified the slain officers Wednesday as Rodney Andrews, 34, and James Nemorin, 36. ·

Nemorin, a seven~year police veteran, was married with three children, ages 7, 5 and 1. Andrews, a seven-year veteran, had two sons, ages 11 and 12.

There was a $54,000 reward for information leading to convictions in the case, police said.

2 sentenced for roles in shooting deaths of N.Y. detectives

The Associated Press

NEW YORK- Two members of a drug gang have been sentenced to prison for their roles in the shooting deaths of two police detectives posing as gun traffickers.

Paris Bullock and Michael Whitten received prison terms of 25 years and 27 years, respectively, at their sentencing on Wednesday.

Detectives James Nemorin, 36, and Rodney Andrews, 34, were shot in the head and dumped on a Staten Island street in March 2003 after their sting operation aimed at buying a Tec-9 submachine gun went awry.

Bullock, 24, and Whitten, 22, had pleaded guilty in December to arges linked to the shooting deaths.

Prosecutors are seeking the death penalty for the alleged s ooter in the case, 24-year-old Ronell Wilson, who is scheduled to go on trial next month. He has pleaded not guilty

state court to first-degree murder.

I· '

MIKEAUIANS IWlY N£WS

• BlilJ P<llton Cnmm/01/anor RI!Ymnnd Kelly holds photo of · ... 1 . ... _ ....... ltJJiJUYuutiL IH_ K tl.l l ' J lnvln

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on' street, ·devoted, dads at, home

In the dangerous world of undercover cops, the two detectives slain by a gang of young gunrunners were considered among the best at their job:

Both detectives ha.d cemented who worked alongside them are their reputations as hardscrob- not jeopardized. PortTnits of ble street cops by working stints both officers were pieced toge thin Brooklyn narcotics squads. er by talking to their friends and Both men were well·regarded in co-workers. the f'ireunns Investigation Unit, One hulking detective stood even though they hod orily 6-foot-3 and wns nicknamed the worked in the elite · squad for Haitian Sensation been use of about four month.~. the flashy ensembles he favored

But even as cplleague.~ remem- in a squad where worn jeans bered the fallen officers for their and white sneakers nrc the willingness to embrace danger, nann. . thf; men who died side by side The 36-year-old cop immigrotalso were recalled for their abili- ed to the U.S. 15 years ago, nod ty to shift fTom their roles as un- earned n bachelor's degree from dercover thugs to dedicated John Jay College. He joined the dads. force in 1996, a year after he

'This is a very dangerous busi· mnnied and began his fomily. ness, a.nd this is n particularly . He Jeaves behind three childangerous pnrt of the business dren- two sons, 7 and 5, nod a -dealing with illegal firellrnls," 20·month·old daughter. Police Commissioner Raymond A soccer nficionndo, the HoiKelly said yesterday. 'A lot of tian Sensation, played on the times, they [suspects] are young Patrolmen's Benevolent Associapeople, they are prone to vio- lion's team, suffering good-nalence. So it is very. very danger· lured ribbings from fellow cops ous and very risky. These offic· who kept telling him the sport ers did a phenomenal job. They was not called football ._,. · at had outstanding reputations." least not In the U.S. .

The names of the fallen offic- If he wns all smiles in the crs nre being withheld by the squad, on the streets theiunderDnily NewH. 11 1 tho reQuest of cover cop was aU businCS:S. Julh P till fUJIBI Hnr!P' rn'Vf:t r rn1u ~nu-, uffli'11r'N fotmt'r ·~mpcrvi-

sor in Brooldyn South Nnrcot· ics, Lt. James Russell, remembercq him us a superb undercover operative who could switch roles us: smoothly as the most accomplished Hollywood actor.

"Depending on where he was , he went from police officer, to Dnddy, to undercover again -someone none of us would actually recognize," RusscU said. "Be· fore he went onto the streets, he would switch into character. If his kids called, he would switch off that character and become Daddy again. He would say in this voice, 'I'm gOing out to catch bad guys agaiil:' ·

"He was definitel)lthe best undercover who worked under me -no doubt about it/' One tall, the other wide

The Haitian Sensation may have been tall, but his partner, known as Jay, was wide. Both detectlves had served in the .. NYPD for 71h years, and workblg to· gether had made them friends, fellow cops said.

Jay, a 5-foot-ll gym rnt, spent a great deal of time building up

' his muscled 265-pound frame. recalled his friend Detective Brian Genz, who is assigned to Brooklyn North Narcotics. When he wasn't lifting weights, Jay, 34, was boasting about his two sons, 11 and 12, Genz said.

"He wa!i a big, muscular guy,

·'· Continued F rom Page Al

thing like this happens." . In addition to Mr. Green, the police

said they had arrested Michael Whit:·en; 19, in connection with an earlier gun ·sale to one of the detectives, and

·.Jessie Jacobus, 16. The police were still :searching yesterday for a fourth mari, identified as Ronell Wilson, 20,

:of Staten Island, who a senior police cifficiai said was identified as the gunninn by his colleagues. · They were also looking for a fifth

·man;·Parls Bullock, who they believe saw one of the men leave bloody cloth

.iiJg and a gun belonging to one ot the ·officers. at Mr. Green's mother's apartment, the police official said. ·· Mr. Green was suspended from

•New D6rp High School in October ·and had.not been seen at the school since Nov. 26, Deputy Mayor Dennis M. Walcott said yesterday. Mr. ·.Green Jives with his mother, Bertha .Green, a 12-year-old sister and a 1-·year-old ·brother in an eight-story 'brick building at 67 Warren Street in the Stapleton Houses, a housing ·project \" :rompklnsv!lle.

Yesterday, friends and neighbors ·described Mr. Green as a lover of video game,sand sport, "a well-man~nered kid" and, one said, "like a big · ~rother of the 'hood." But an uncle, Lawrence Black, 32, said Mr. Green had changed a while back "I saw him on the street and it seemed he ·didn't really care for life anymore," Mr. Black said. "! don't know what caused him to ·snap."

Cynthia Whiten, an aunt of Michael 'Whiten, said her nephew had once lived In the Stapleton Houses. She said he graduated from Susan Wag'ner High School in June and was attending a college she declined to

"name. She and one of her sisters said .Mr. Whiten admired sports and girls. "I'm in shock," Ms. Whiten said. "He

"WOuldn't do anything like this." . His mother and his grandfather, who identified himself only as Abdul, ·said last night that Mr. Green was innocent. They complained that the .police had ransacked their apart· ment in what they said was retaliation for the detectives' deaths. · · "We are sorry for everything that

has happened," Abdul s;ud .. "But everybody is suffering now. I'm hurting right now. That's my grandson."

Mr. Green was arrested on firearms charges In 1999 with five other people, one official said, and another said he was charged with felony drug possession charge in July 2000. The second official said Mr. Wilson was arrested on a robbery .. !;]large in March 2000. The outcomes Of those cases was not known.

The detectives were shot during an undercover sting operation, the pollee said. The detectives, one of them carrying $1 ,200, had gone to the Stapleton Houses to buy a Tec-9 semiautomatic pistol, a weapon favored by drug dealers. There, they are believed to have spoken by cellphone with Mr. Green. . ·

Then two other men, who a senior police official said we~;e believed to have been Mr. Wllso.n and Mr. Jac()bus, emerged from the building and got in the back seat of the detectives' car. With the undercover cars trailing, they drove to VIctory Boulevard and Corson Avenue, where they pulled over. One of the men In back seat, whom the official identified as Mr. Wilson, got out.

The backup police cars kept· their distance so they would not be noticed, Mr. Kelly said. The man who had gotten out of the detectives' car then returned and the car moved on. But because of what Mr. ·Kelly described as the rolling terrain in the area, the backup cars lost contact with the detectives.

"This is not unusual," he said of the transmitter's failure. "They have low wattage and they don't have that great a transmission range and when you get into hilly locations it's difficult to transmit."

He continued: "What happens routinely In these cases Is that individuals are searched, they're patted down. So it's a challenge, no question about It, to have something small enough to avoid detection but large enough to transmit a sufficient distance." ·

Ellen Borakove, a spokeswoman for the New York City medical examin· er's office, said both detectives were shot in the back of the head. The bodies of the detectives, both fathers and seven-year veterans of the force,

.,, Angel Frnnco/Thc Ncii',York TJmcs

A memorial to Detectives James V. N emonn;''36, and Rodney Andrews, 34, at Van Duzer and Hannah Streets in Staten Islarid, about five blocks from where the bodies of the two detectives were dumped Monday night.

Three suspects; from left: Ronell Wilson, Omar Green and Paris Bullock. Mr. Green was arrested and the tWo others were being sought.

were found dumped near Hannah Street and St. Pauls Avenue. None of the $1,200 In cash had been taken.

Asked if there was any 'indication that the men in the car had known that they were with police detectives, Mr. Kelly said: "There's no indication at this time that that's the case. We have reason to believe that this was intended to be a robbery." Asked why the money might have been left behind, he said, "Well, panic." Police

officials said the two men checked the trunk, as if they were looking for money- an indication that they had killed the detectives not because they knew they were police officers but because they intended to rob them.

According to one law enforcement .officiai, the two men In the back seat started to leave the car after the shootings, then returned, dragged the detectives' bodies out and drove away. Police later found the car,

soaked with blood, and caught one of the men leaving it. At first, he said he had found the car in that condition. Then he ·said he had been in it when the other man shot the detectives, the law enforcement official said.

When Mr. Green was arrested, he was wearing a dark brown wig with blond highlights, black jeans, a black shirt and the bra, the police said. Asked for his name, he gave a false ic;lentity in a phony female voice, then eventually gave his name.

The police yesterday offered a $54,000 reward for any information leading to the arrest and conviction of the killer of the two detectives and asked anyone with information to call (800) 577-TIPS or (800) COPSHOT. They said all information would be kept confidentiaL

"Both of them, according to everybody, loved their jobs and were just dedicated public servants who unfortunately paid a terrible price to protect the rest of us," Mr. Bloomberg said of the two officers at the news conference earlier in the day. "And our hearts go out to their families."

Family men killed: while investigating the gun trade.

' most of his promotions. But Dr. Umeh did not know about the most recent job change; In November, De· tective Nemorln, who had previously investigated narcotics, was transferred to the firearms Investigation unit. ,.·

The Nemorins moved to Long 'Island from Queens chiefly so tliat their children, ages 7, 5 and 1 , could go to better schools, said Karene Benoit, 31, of Lawrenceville, Ga., one of Detective Nemorin's sisters.

"They believe in education," Ms. Benoit said. ·•

Her brother, she said, dreamed that he would one day become · a chief, and that his eldest son woirld follow in his footsteps. In ·the meantime, there were other matters' oil the family's agenda, like a trip· to Disney World that the family had recently taken, a police official said.

Like the colleague he died with, Detective Andrews joined the Police Department in 1996 and was tnfusferred from narcotics to the firearms unit in November. He was raised by his aunt, Williamae W·il· Iiams, in an apartment on West BOth Street in Manhattan. ,, ·

"He was my sister's boy, but I tOOk him in and raised him like my own'," Ms. Williams said, adding that she has two daughters who work for the Police Department. •

Detective Andrews and his wife divorced last summer, a police official said. He seemed to have mo:ved to an apartment in Queens, although neighbors in Bushwick, where the couple lived, said they continuedto see him frequently playing football with his two young sons. .: ,

Detective Brian Grenz, a cloSe • friend of Detective Andrews's, said: "He's this really big, really mus.cuJar guy. And if you saw him, the fi.i'st thing you would be like, 'Oh l'llY God,' " he said. "His biggest mus_cle was his heart."

~suspects finger pal as shooter on S.l. By MICHELE McPHEE, AUCE McQUillAN and DAVE GOLDINER DAllY NEWS STAFF ~Y7UTUl.S

Cops mounted a massive manhunt last night for a Staten Island man suspected of being the cold-blooded gunman who executed two undercover officers, police sources said.

Ronell Wilson, 20, was fin. gered by three pols as the triggerman who pumped single buUets into the 'detectives' heads after a gun buy-and-bust deal went bod, the sources said.

The manhunt unfolded as a chilling audiotape revealed the finaJ mQments of the two hero cops - ~who police believe were lured into a trap to rip them off in a robbery.

''We want to search you," one of the .Ullers said in an ominous transmission picked up by a cop's wire, the Daily News hus learned.

.. Why the f-- you want to do that," replied one of the doomed officers.

The argument grew more heated and transmissions became gar-

llm!lJ Alleged master· mind Omar Green, 19, may face the death penalty. He was arrested on Staten Island ferry, disguised as a woman, after a passenger reported him to cops. In photo at right, pollee investigators haul evidence Into 120th Precinct statlon~ouse yesterday.

and he was intimidating from afar. But when he talked about his two boys, he would just light up," Genz said.

Gem: snid Jny was uc:;tnt lc: nlwul )t,! ulutt 111 1'. 1 -I J ~il(fllt~ Ji J\-11111 f!h,ff•,;" 1;,,,, +·•I ..... ~*"- -·· .• d

bled as the men drove through the Tompkinsville section.

The suspects found the cop's transmission device, but investigators do not know whether the discovery prompted the shootings or if the attackers found the wire after the murders. .

One of the cops - the flTSt NYPD officers slain in the line of duly since Sept. II, 2001 - had angered the suspected mastermind of the crime by bringing a second man, according to the tape.

"1 feel more comfo11ablc coming with my brother-in-law/' said the cop, referring to his partner.

A source told The News the second officer was there because a unit supervisor was nezvous after an earlier meeting when (our

guns off the s treets. The elite unit has made thou~

sands of arrests that officials credit with helping drive down thu dty 's nnll-tl i) l' fAitl iO rour-d• l• liUht luWii

iL

men showed u'P instead of just the seller.

The tape tra.nsmission cut off just as backup officers monitoring the conversation lost s ight of the car in the ty.risting streets.

Seconds later, the cops were shot dead. The men dumped the bodies and fled in the cops' blood-soaked car.

54G bounty Alleged mttstermind Omar

Green, 19, wa~ arrested yesterday after his pills Jesse Jacobus, 17, and Michm~l Whitten. Prosecutor'S said Gteen and Jacobus could face lh• death penalty. Whillen is charged only wilh sell· ing an illegal g>Jn.

Cops put a ~54,000 bounty on Wilson's head.

Police sources told .The News they br:li eve the gunmen intended all along to rob the undercove r cops- not :iCU them guns. ··

"Whether 1t ,.,.ns a plnnned murder or not , we're not sure," one top police sour<:e said. ~e think they wauted to lure them by se11-ing thc!m one ~n. then offer to

the :>treet. He wanted to make a difference. H~ took it seriously," Genz said. "The way he worked, he had a vig(,r for it. He was a I' I"IOrhpluH. flt; rt11Hic yuu wunt tn

~~~. ;, ~:~·~ ~:~.~ •• ,~ ,. !···-

sell a mol'e expensive gun for lots "I just want this over with," he of cash - and rob then1 of the told his grandmother from his money." jail cell.

The source sai.d investigators Inves tigators said Green had are not sure whether the gunmen sold a handgun to one of the un-knew the pair were cops. dercover officers Jast week.

"No one is coming forward to On Monday night, the cop sur-s~y why, .. a source said of the prised the teenage ex-con by shootings. showing up with a partner in his

The News is not printing the black Nissan Maxima outside the slain cops' names at the request Stapleton H?uses. ~ of the Police Department - He explamed to Green. who which fears that revealing their was taUtin~ ~y cell phone from a identities could jeopardize other nearby bu1ldmg:, that he was un~ undercover cases. comfortublc coming alone after

Green, who is 6·foot ·3 and Green's friends sold him the fi rst weighs 200 pounds, was nabbed gun. yesterday morning as he tried to <?ree~ ?rdered two other men escape on a Manhattan-bound - tdentrfted as _WJ.lson and Jacoferry disguised as a woman in a bus - to get mto the car, nnd blond-streaked wig and a bra they_ drove to a nearby apartment stuffed with socks. to .PICk up the the Tec-9 sub rna-

He was busted when a woman chme gun the cops were supon the ferry told cops thut she posed to be buy.ng

-· suspected·<?reep ~~ n ·~~· . 'J.'.~:$11~"~[:;.~~~~·~~ t~~nf~J · _After try111g to fe•!in a high- Green down from $1,300, but apptt~hed fal~etto VOJce, Green parently never got the weapon. quJckJy a~mttted to cops that he Backup officers watched the was the City's most -wanted mnn cops drive away from thal loca-nnd surrendered at 8:30a.m. tion but lost sight of the cnr.

MAmtEW AOIJtRJ'S

"What he does is one of the most dangerous things anyone could do and he was excellent at it," Genz said. ''Was hC aware of thn riNkR? Vl'ls. Wn~ h" NC/IHifi? J

Soon after hearing the argument erupt, they also los t radio contact, meaning the undercover cops were suddenly on their own

·with two armed thugs. Cops said later that the radios

and transmirters were the best available- and the transmission was lost because of the hilly terrain. Desperate search

The bl:lckup cops frant ica\ly searched for their missing col~ leagues as the undercover cops drove to the corner of Hannah St. and St. Pauls Ave. - where they were killed.

The suspects then got out of the car and opened the trunk, apparentJy searching for the cash the men were planning to use to pay for the gun.

After first walking away from the car, they quickly returned to pull the bodies out of the bloody car and dump them on the street, a witness told police.

They grabbed a gun from one sla.in cop but didn't take the other man's weapon and left be· hind the money that one of the cop.-.:; had on him.

The gunmen - dripping with the cops' blood - screeched away in the black Maxima, parked the car less than a mile away and tried to run.

But a Housing Division cop at the Stapleton Houses collared Ja· cobus as he ran from the car:

Wilson escaped and apparent · ly mel up with Green, bccuusc rnpli rfllll!fllllll Rl11l 11 rfl p' .W ~ l nlnn l \1111 h1 lhe fl f'P. I I i li-' ll{ ••f '• • Li-lj l

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"hen Double Murders Don't Matter http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles!Printable.asp?ID=7537

When Double Murders Don't Matter By John Perazzo

FrontPageMagazine.com I April 28, 2003

When will it end? New York is the city, you probably recall, where a black man named Abner Loiuma was tortured by a white policeman in the restroom of a precinct station in 1997, making national news headlines for months; where the African immigrant Amadou Diallo was gunned down by four white police officers in 1999, creating a similar firestorm in the media; and where civil rights activists like the Reverends AI Sharpton, Calvin Butts, Herbert Daughtry, and Jesse Jackson have spent many field days publicly alleging that racism and a predisposition to brutalize black men runs rampant in the NYPD. As recently as January 2003, Sharpton and New York City Councilman Charles Barron were among the many who called for a special investigation into why city police officers had felt it necessary to shoot three black suspects during the first few days of the new year.

Against this backdrop, the last thing New York needed was yet another potentially high-profile altercation between cops and black city residents, ending with two African American men lying deadin pools of their own blood. But that's precisely what occurred on the night of March 10 in Staten Island, when two men known in their community to be of excellent character - 34-year-old Rodney Andrews, who leaves behind two young sons, and 36-year-old James Nemorin, who is mourned by his wife and three children - both died of gunshot wounds to the head.

If you live outside of New York, you may perhaps be wondering why you haven't heard much about the deaths of these men. Even though both victims were black, and both were killed in an altercation between cops and civilians, the civil rights watchdogs were silent. There were no public rallies denouncing the killings; there were no pained lamentations about anti-black violence permeating the city and its police force; there were no desperate calls for greater respect for black lives. Why not?

It's actually quite simple. First, the triggerman who killed both Andrews and Nemorin was also black. And second, Andrews and Nemorin were the police officers involved in the incident, not the civilians. In the contemporary civil rights game that assigns varying degrees of significance to the deaths of human beings, that makes the victims oh-for-two.

Detectives Andrews and Nemorin were killed in a sting operation that turned disastrous. Their plan was to purchase a $1,200 subrnachine gun from 20-year-old Ronell Wilson and 16-year-old Jessie Jacobus, at which point they were to arrest the pair for illegally selling a fireann. The youngsters, meanwhile, had other ideas: they would simply steal the $1,200 at gunpoint and call it a day. As Andrews and Nemorin drove the young men toward the location where the aforementioned weapon was stashed, they were trailed by backup undercover vehicles. Unfortunately, at some point Wilson spotted the backup cars and asked, "Are we being followed?" Because Andrews and Nemorin were wired for sound, the backup officers heard Wilson's question and thus veered off the road so as to give the appearance that no one was following the lead vehicle. Nevertheless, when the lead car reached a relatively isolated area shortly thereafter, the suspicious Wilson shot both detectives in the back of the head, execution style. He and Jacobus then pulled the dead officers out of the car and drove off.

4122/07 8:36AM

When Double Murders Don't Matter http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Printable.asp?ID=75:

2of2

A member of the infamous Blood gang, Wilson is a remorseless monster who spent the days immediately following his double murder cavorting with a girlfriend. At his arraignment a few days after the crime, he "didn't seem fazed by it in the slightest," according to a detective in attendance. Jacobus and four other accomplices- including one Omar Green, who orchestrated the $1,200 robbery plot- are no better. They place utterly no value on human life. For them, murdering a man is no more morally taxing than swatting a fly.

Their wasted lives are a tragic testament to the devastating effects of fatherlessness in the black community today. According to various bits of background information in newspaper accounts, neither Wilson nor Green has a father who plays any meaningful role in his life. Nor does sixteen-year-old Mitchell Diaz, who supplied Wilson with the murder weapon. Whether any of the other three conspirators have any significant contact with their fathers is anybody's guess, but it's very unlikely that they do. In some American cities, 80 percent or more of children raised in black households have no father. What chance do such boys really have in life, growing up without the barest shred of the love and guidance they desperately need from a man whom they can respect and emulate? It is hardly surprising that they often turn, as Ronell Wilson did, to gang life not only for a sense of family, but for instruction in the difficult art of growing into manhood.

It is difficult not to feel pity for the overburdened women in their lives, who were unable to keep their boys from going astray. Consider the words ofOmar Green's grandmother Deborah Jackson, who rationalized, "Even if he [Green] was the mastermind, he wasn't in the car with them [the killers]." Green's mother, for her part, depicted her son as a basically normal boy who has a girlfriend and likes video games. Perhaps we can understand the reluctance of these women to acknowledge just how depraved is the youngster about whom they speak, for they are surely feeling maternal grief of the deepest kind.

But there is one group of folks for whom we ought not similarly cut any slack. These are the so-called "civil rights" activists of our day. Instead of talking about the vital issue of fatherless black homes, and instead of using such horrific incidents as these Staten Island killings as opportunities to encourage greater paternal involvement in the lives of young black men, these usually vocal racial hucksters suddenly become mute. They much prefer to save their breath for the next occasion when they can trace the death of an African American to the hand of a white police officer, at which time they will shout from the rooftops about police racism and brutality - as though that were the greatest source of hardship in the lives of young black men.

4/22/07 8::=

Criminal http://criminal.lawyers.com/n~ws-headline/Officers-killer-gets-death-s ...

legal News Headlines

(fj" LexisNexis·

SECTION: MAIN NEWS; National Desk; Part A; Pg. 26

LENGTH: 327 words

Copyright 2007 Los Angeles Times All Rights Reserved

Los Angeles Times

March 30, 2007 Friday

Home Edition

HEADUNE: Officers' kille r get s death sentence; Ronell W i lson sh ot two New York undercover d etectives in 2003.

BYUNE: From Newsday

DATEUNE: NEW YORK

BODY:

A man convicted of killing two undercover detectives in 2003 during a gun deal was sentenced to death Thursday.

"It Is the judgment of this court that the defendant, Ron ell Wilson, is sentenced to death," U.S. District Judge Nicholas Garaufis told a packed gallery in the federal courthouse in downtown Brooklyn. "Ronell Wilson has been proven guilty not only beyond a reasonable doubt, but beyond all doubt. "

If he dies by lethal Injection, Wilson, 24, would be the first federal inmate sentenced in New York to be executed since the 1950s.

Before Garaufis condemned him, a somber Wilson stood between his attorneys and addressed the court with a short statement.

"I would like to say to the families of the v ictims that I am sorry - - .truly sorry -- for the pain I have caused," Wilson sa id.

He also thanked Garaufis for courtesies the judge had extended him, including allowing a visit with his mother In the courthouse earlier Thursday. Looking toward his prosecutors, Wilson again Insisted that he did not know his victims -- James Nemorln, 36, and Rodney Andrews, 34, -- were undercover

detectives when he shot them.

"None of us knew they were cops, period," Wilson said while referring to his co-defendants who received prison terms for their roles In the slaylngs.

The sentencing was held In a large ceremonial courtroom to accommodate the hundreds of New York City detectives and pollee officers on hand.

Derek Williams, Andrews' cousin, spoke during the sentencing on behalf of the families.

"I am very proud of the men and women of the New York City Pollee Department and proud of detectives Andrews and Nemorin," Williams said.

Referring to his cousin, he added : "As I sit down at my desk doing my job, every so often I think about what the last few minutes and hours of his life were

!Ike. It Is hard not to break down and cry. He was a good man doing a good j ob."

No execution date was set, and years of appeals of the death sentence were expected, officials said .

LOAD-DATE: Mcuch 30, 2007

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4/22/07 8:41 AM

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http://wcbs880.com/print_page.php?contentld=249249&contentType=4

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Posted: Wednesday, 29 November 2006 7:41AM

Gang Member Says Executed Cop Begged for His Life

NEW YORK (AP) - An undercover police officer was begging for his life seconds before he was executed with a bullet to the head in Staten Island. The jury in Brooklyn Federal Court yesterday heard the testimony from a 300-pound gang-member who was testifying against his fellow gang member.

Ronell Wilson is on trial for killing two undercover police officers who were trying to make a gun buy.

The buy went bad when Wilson allegedly tried to rob the undercover cops of their money. He is accused of shooting Detectives James Nemorin and Rodney Andrews on March 10th, 2003 in Staten Island.

Yesterday, Jesse Jacobus testified that he was brought along by Wilson to offer "muscle" for the gun sale, butt he didn't know Wilson planned to rob the undercover cops and shoot them.

Jacobus testifieed that Detective Nemorin watched as his partner was shot, and then he pleaded for his life as Wilson pointed a gun at him and demanded the money for the gun purchase.

Jacobus says Wilson then shot Nemorin in the head.

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4122/()7 8:47AM

NY cops• •friendly fire• sparked barrage that killed groom

By Murray Weiss; Additional reporting by Stephanie Gaskell New York Post

A doomed young groom was caught in the crossfire of an undercover cop, whose bullets went clear through his car, and confused officers who returned their own blistering barrage, sources told The Post last night.

The blaze of gunfire lasted just 10 seconds outside the seedy Kalua Cabaret strip club in South Jamaica early Saturday. But it ended the life of 23-year-old, unarmed Queens dad Sean Bell, who was set to marry his high-school sweetheart and the mother of his two young daughters hours after his bachelor party at the club.

Dramatic new details of the deadly mayhem include the undercover cop at one point climbing onto the hood of Bell's car -his gun drawn and his police shield around his neckscreaming, "Police! Tum off your car! Let me see your hands!" said sources who talked to some of the cops involved in the shooting . .

When Bell then tried to run down the plainclothes officer -twice -the cop began shooting, with some of his 11 bullets piercing the rear window of the man's Nissan Altima, the sources said.

This left the cop's backup unit- which was just arriving on the scene amid shattering glass and the undercover's shouts of "He's got a gun!"- thinking they were being fired upon from inside the vehicle. That's when they returned fire with another 39 bullets. One 12-year veteran, a narcotics detective, pumped 31 bullets, authorities said.

The sources recounted step-by-step how quickly things spiraled out of control after a dispute inside the club involving one of 8 's associates.

According to the sources, two undercovers were at the strip joint as part of the NYPD's new Club Enforcement Initiative. The program was started after the July slaying of 18-year-old Jennifer Moore of New Jersey , who partied at a Chelsea club before being abducted, raped and killed in a Weehawken hotel. The undercovers, who usually worked in Manhattan, were on the last night of their two-month Queens job to try to nail the Kalua and other clubs on such violations as drugs and underage prostitution. ·

Inside the club, one of the plainclothes cops sat next to a woman he thought was a hooker and might proposition him, the sources said.

Suddenly, a burly man approached them and told the woman that he had heard she had gotten into a fight with a group of guys earlier in the club. It was unclear what it was over.

The man said, " 'Don't worry, baby, I got yoi,J covered,' and he takes her hand, and he rubs it across [the gun in] his waistband, a source said. "Then he tells her, 'That's what I'm here for.' "

It's unclear how the man smuggled his weapon past the metal detector outside the club. He likely was a regular who knew the bouncer at the door and may have worked there part time, hE;;Iping with security, the sources said.

The undercover then went outside the club and radioed his bac~up to tell them there was a man inside with a gun. It was arou 3:30a.m.

While the undercover was outside, the suspect came out along with the girl and others, since it was around closing time.

The undercover watched as an argument erupted between Bell 's group, which included three male pals and the beefy man wi

foe gun, and four other men -with the woman in the middle of them, the sources said.

e woman was overheard saying to the men arguing with Bell 's pals, "I'm not doing you all. I'll do one or two, but not all ," according to the sources.

•ound the same time, the undercover said he heard Bell's friend Joseph Guzman tell his buddies, ''Yo, get my gun! Get my gun! Le 's get my gun from the car! Yeah, we're gonna f--- him up!" the sources said.

e undercover, thinking there was about to be a drive-by shooting in front of the club involving Bell's group, followed Guzman, 3eU and two others to their car.

"" s getting hot! Something's going to happen! Something's going down!" the undercover radioed to his backup.

He hurried to the front of Bell 's Altima, which was parked on the side of nearby Liverpool Street , and jumped in front of it.

- at's when the undercover put his right leg up on the hood of the Altima and began screaming that he was a cop, the sources said.

e cop was leaning over the hood of the car to try to see the hands of the people inside and make sure they didn't have any ns, they said. But Bell floored the gas pedal and headed for the cop, the sources said, striking him and badly cutting his knee.

e of the Altima's passengers -who possibly had a gun -jumped out of the back of the car, the sources said.

und the same time, an unmarked Toyota Camry driven by a plainclothes police lieutenant and another cop behind him pulled , but overshot Bell 's car. A police van with an officer and the narcotics detective then managed to block Bell 's car in.

3ell 's Altima first struck the police van in the driver's desperate bid to escape, then backed up and struck the roll-down metal ::oors of a commercial building behind him. He then rewed his car again toward the undercover - which prompted the cop to scream, "He's got a gun!" and start firing, according to the sources, with the bullets passin~ through Bell's car.

' he undercover thought they had more than one gun. He thought they would do anything to get away. He was yelling, 'Let me see your hands!' " one source said.

e other cops, thinking they were under attack, started firing at the car, too.

one point, the detective thought his gun had jammed and so reloaded his magazine and· emptied the clip again at the car, ff ·ng 31 bullets.

3ell was killed, Guzman critically injured, and a third friend, Trent Benefield, was shot. They are expected to live.

3enefield later told a friend from his hospital bed that he and his buddies didn't know the undercovers were cops.

told investigators, ''I got into the car, and there was all this shooting."

· wa$ unclear when the other four men who were originally fighting with Bell and his pals fled the scene. They were spotted eaving in a black SUV.

3ell had been arrested three times in the past: twice for drugs and one on a gun rap in a case that was sealed. Guzman has ::;,een busted nine times, including for armed robbery. He spent two stretches in state prison in the '90s. Benefield has a sealed -ecord as a juvenile for gun possession and robbery.

Some marijuana was later found near the Altima. and investigators believe that it may have been tossed out by the group before . ;e gunfire. Two bullet casings also were recovered from the Altima, although cop$ said they do not believe they were from a

:x>lice gun.

e shooting of Bell , who was black, has ignited racial tensions in the city- even though the cops involved included two blacks, a Hispanic and two whites.

e five cops who fired shots were put on administrative duty. Police Commissioner Ray Kelly said it was the first time that any the officers were involved in a shooting.

tectives Endowment Association President Michael Palladino said the cops were justified in firing off a total of 50 bullets at armed men because Bell was using his car as a lethal weapon.

·"once the threat ended, so did the shooting."

source told The Post: "They [the cops] feel completely sad about what happened. They made a decision, and they're going to li e with it."

Training of cops in NYC shooting faulted

The Associated Press

NEW YORK- Four of the five officers who together fired 50 gunshots at the car of an unarmed man on his wedding day hadn't completed mandatory firearms training, a group of black officers alleged Thursday.

New York Police Department brass "failed to ensure these officers were properly trained," said Marq1..1ez Claxton, a founder of 1 00 Blacks in Law Enforcement Who Care.

At a news conference outside police headquarters, Claxton alleged that four plainclothes officers involved in the Nov. 25 killing of 23-year-old Sean Bell and the wounding of two companions attended only one of two annual "training cycles" at the police shooting range. The fifth shooter, an unidentified undercover detective, had done both practice sessions, he added.

"When you fail to attend these training cycles, tragedies occur,'~

Claxton said.

Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly said the officers' track record on training was unremarkable.

"Ideally, everyone goes to two cycles, but it's not unusual for officers not to complete both cycles in one year," he said.

The fraternal organization - made up of current and retired law enforcement officers from the NYPD and other agencies - claimed that a preliminary police department report about the shooting contains proof the officers were undertrained.

The victims in the shooting were black; the officers were white, black and Hispanic.

The report lists the last time each officer was at the shooting range: One who fired 31 of the 50 rounds was there April 5; another on March 3: another on Jan. 12; and another on March 21. The undercover detective last took practice on Oct. 4, it says.

The report also notes that none of the officers had ever fired their weapons in the field before the confrontation outside a Queens topless bar where Bell's bachelor party intersected with a police undercover operation targeting suspected prostitution.

Police have said undercover officers believed the victims were going to retrieve a gun, but no weapons were found. The undercover officer, who initiated the gunfire, has said through his lawyer that he saw a fourth, possibly armed man flee the car.

Civilian witnesses supported that claim and identified the fourth person as Jean Nelson, police said. Nelson and the two survivors from the car, Trent Benefeld and Joseph Guzman, have denied he was .in or near the car when the gunfire erupted.

The officers are on paid administrative leave while Queens prosecutor Richard Brown determines whether they will face criminal charges.

Associated Press writer Pat Milton contributed to this report.

Police questioned after NY shootings

By TOM HAYS The Associated Press

'lEW YORK- Mayor Michael Bloomberg met Tuesday with the "amily of a man killed outside a strip club on his wedding day by a barrage of police gunfire, the second straight day Bloomberg

as reached out to angry community members.

The 50-bullet police volley likened to a "firing squad" by the Rev. AI Sharpton killed 23-year-old Sean Bell after his bachelor party, wounded two of his friends and ignited concerns over ::JOiice tactics and firepower. The three men were unarmed.

31oomberg went to the family's church in Queens and met with 3 ell's fiancee and father, and with Sharpton. The mayor then .et again with other community leaders.

On Monday, Bloomberg said the police response seemed • nacceptable" and "inexplicable," but he was steadfast in his s pport for Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly, who has been Jenounced by some critics since the shooting.

the victims, Bloomberg said Monday: "There is no evidence t:hat they were doing anything wrong," referring to what led up

the moment their car struck an undercover officer outside the "'. htclub.

contrast to Bloomberg's outreach, former Mayor Rudy Giuliani was hounded for what some viewed as a slow response to the ling of Amadou Diallo, an unarmed African immigrant who was shot 19 times in the entry to his apartment building by four rte officers. Those officers were acquitted of criminal charges.

eens District Attorney Richard A. Brown said Monday his office was investigating the Saturday morning shootings and the --=suits would be presented to a grand jury.

shooting stemmed from an undercover operation that began 1 a.m. Saturday at the strip club Kalua Cabaret, part of a ide crackdown sparked by the death of a teenager following a night of partying earlier this year at a Manhattan nightclub.

:J lice said they had received several complaints about prostitution and drug dealing at the cabaret and sent in two undercover ectives who left their guns behind because of searches at the door.

e detectives apparently spent the next few hours nursing drinks and mingling with the crowd.

cials said the officers weren't impaired. "We authorize them to have two drinks, and not more," Kelly said.

e of the officers alerted the backup team outside that a man inside was possibly armed. An undercover detective retrieved his pon and confronted Bell and his friends after they entered their car.

ly suggested that it was unorthodox for the officer to blow his cover rather than rely on other officers to make the arrest. ·

· n officials insist the detective took out his badge, identified himself and ordered the men to stop before the car, driven by . lurched forward and bumped him. The vehicle then smashed into an unmarked police van, backed up and smashed the van in before the shooting began.

e crashes along with the fear that one of the men had a gun seem to be what escalated the situation to the hail of gunfire by officers.

It is not immediately clear if the men in the car knew they were dealing with a police officer. Friends and family speculated Bell got spooked by the officer's gun pointed at his car.

The NYPD discourages officers from firing on a moving vehicle. But Michael Palladino, president of the Detectives Endowment Association, argued that the officers had a right to fire if the car posed a lethal threat.

"The driver of that vehicle his actions were a contributing factor," Palladino said. "The amount of shots fired does not spell out excessive to me."

None of the five officers had fired a 16-shot semiautomatic pistol on patrol before that morning, officials said. The undercover officer shot first, firing 11 rounds; another, a 12-year-veteran, fired 31 times, meaning he reloaded.

Officials said all the officers would have been trained to avoid "contagious or sympathetic fire" when police become disoriented by the sound of friendly fire and blast away at a phantom threat.

"We stress when officers go to the range that they fire no more than three rounds and then assess what the situation is," Kelly said,

Contagious fire would not be a valid excuse, Sharpton said.

"To say that one gun causes an atmosphere where you keep shooting is to tell me that if one policeman makes a mistake, you could be subjected ... to what amounts to a firing squad," he said.

Joseph Guzman, 31, was shot at least 11 times, and Trent Benefield, 23, was hit three times. Guzman was in critical condition, and Benefield in stable condition Tuesday.

Associated Press writers Sara Kugler, Pat Milton and Adam Goldman contributed to this report.

Copyright 2006 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten , or redistributed.

Copyright© 2006 ABC News Internet Ventures

1cer who shot groom defends his actions

police on guard after death threats

The undercover police offiQer who fired the opening salvo in a 50-shot barrage that felled a Queens man on his day told his story Tuesday for the first time.

etective insisted he identified himself as a cop long before ft:ed on the car carrying Sean Bell and his buddies.

'This cop screamed, 'Police!' and he had his shield out," attorney Philip Karasyk told the New York Daily News.

The News is withholding the name of the Brooklyn-born etective to not compromise his safety or the undercover

operations he has worked on.

The detective held his fire despite Bell clipping him with his Nissan Altima, said Karasyk, who refused to name his client, even as police sources confirmed his identity. "Once the car hit im he jumped to the side," Karasyk said.

But when the cop saw the man sitting in the passenger seat_ whom police sources identified as Joseph Guzman_ reach into

is waistband, the officer fired the first of 11 rounds at the men.

Four other officers, believing they were being shot at, also opened up on the car, Karasyk said. When the gunfire was over, Bell was dead and Guzman and another man, Trent 3enefield, were badly wounded.

he other officers believed the shots were. coming from the vehicle," Karasyk said. "They only did so in this case because they ere in mortal fear for their lives."

ueens District Attorney Richard Brown has vowed to get to the bottom of the Saturday morning shooting that has outraged nlack New Yorkers_ and that Mayor Michael Bloomberg said looked like "excessive force."

arasyk, however, said the five cops involved in the shooting _ none of whom ever fired his gun on the job before _ had no ualms about telling their story before a Queens grand jury.

"That's our offer to the prosecutors_ to waive immunity," Karasyk said .

e lawyer's client is a Hispanic officer in his late 20s.

66-year-old relative told The News that the detective is a good cop.

'Only God knows what happened," he said. "Police never shoot for no reason. Maybe he's got a reason?"

e U.S. Justice Department is monitoring the unfolding investigation. but Brooklyn U.S. Attorney Roslyn Mauskopf emphasized is not independently collecting evidence or interviewing witnesses.

eanwhile, Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly said police were questioning a new witness. Sources said that witness was hina Flores, who had told The News that a fourth man nearly jumped in Bell's car before the shooting.

Police are still searching for that fourth man, who is believed to have left the Kalua Cabaret in Jamaica, Queens, with the victims _ and to have disappeared shortly before the shooting started. Police also believe that the mystery man may nave been armed.

It ;~ ,..._.., : _ __ . .. . .

All five officers have been placed on paid leave and ordered to surrender their guns.

Life-long friends, Guzman and Benefield took Bell out for a bachelor bash at the club _unaware that cops investigating drugs and prostitution were staking out the joint.

Two undercover detectives _ Karasyk's client and a female officer_ were inside. NYPD guidelines permitted them to have two drinks; Kelly said it wasn't yet known whether Karasyk's client was drinking because he hasn't been questioned pending the grand jury probe.

When Bell and his pals left at 4 a.m., Karasyk's client followed. Kelly conceded on Monday that it was unusual for an officer to pursue suspects; normally, the undercover signals his colleagues to move in.

Karasyk said his client followed because he heard Guzman say outside the club that he was going to get a gun to settle a beef with another club patron.

Many in the African-American community believe there was a racial component to the shooting because Bell and Benefield are both black.

Detective Mike Oliver, who fired 31 shots, and Officer Mike Carey, who fired three times, are both white_ as is Lt. Gerard Napoli, the supervising officer who did not fire his weapon. The two other officers who fired the ·remaining shots are both black. Their names have not been revealed.

Investigators have a mountain of evidence to go through, including video from one or more surveillance cameras near the scene of the shooting, radio transmissions among cops and ballistic reports for the 50 shots fired.

There also are more than 50 people to interview, delaying the empaneling of the grand jury. If charges are brought, all the cops' names will come out_ and the NYPD's image will be tarnished.

(New York Daily News correspondents Oren Yaniv and Scott Shifrel contributed to this report.)

Copyright 2006 Daily News

First NYPD officer to fire testifies in Sean Bell case

By Rocco Parascandola News day

wo detectives, including the undercover who fired the first bullet in the 50-shot barrage that killed Sean Bell, told their story yesterday to the Queens grand jury that will decide if any of the five officers involved in the sensational case should be indicted.

Det. Gescard lsnora's appearance, plus that of Det. Marc Cooper, sets the stage for the much anticipated testimony tomorrow of Det. Michael Oliver, who fired the most shots, 31, reloading his weapon in the process.

Sources involved in the investigation expect Oliver to testify, though he has -not confirmed he will appear. Two other officers estified on Monday.

The grand jury could begin deliberations as early as next week.

Bell, 23, was killed the morning of Nov. 25, his wedding day, after eaving the Kalua Cabaret, a Jamaica strip club. Bell was in his car with two friends, Trent Benefield, 23, and Joseph Guzman, 31 , when Is nora fired.

nora's testimony lasted for more than three hours and was tense. He was asked pointed questions by both the prosecutor

and the grand jurors, said his attorney, Phil Karasyk.

wouldn't say it was hostile but it was vigorous and intense," Karasyk said after Is nora testified. "It was emotional for him, and '"le did very well. He got his point across. He gave them a picture

exactly what was going through his mind."

e shooting killed Bell and seriously wounded his friends. The _ dercover, lsnora, police have said, approached Bell's car after earing an argument in which Guzman vowed to get his gun. No

; n was ever found . .

Cooper, who fired four times, said nothing to reporters when he showed up. He testified for two hours, then left.

'He answered all the questions posed to him by the grand jury," said his lawyer, Paul Martin. "He is relieved that this part is :Jehind him. It's a tragic situation and that is something he does think about. Again, he's a professional. He acted in a "'fessional manner ... and he's ready to go back to work."

ora's testimony is considered crucial because he was the first one to fire. In theory, according to sources familiar with the ::ase, the actions of the other four officers become easier to justify once they explain that they fired after Is nora started shooting w fi rst of his 11 bullets.

ll's death sparked 50 days of protest outside the 103rd Precinct, which is near the shooting site, even though the officers olved were assigned to a nightclub task force based in Manhattan.

=--eelancer Matthew Nester contributed to this story.

pyright 2007 Newsday, Inc.

01/28/2007

Man Shot and Killed by Police In Narcotics Operation

By Ryan Duffy and Victor Blackwell First Coast News

Advertisement: J?;,;"'l ::\:C~w

E.n~l :.: nd \.. l}!"~~::

JACKSONVILLE, FL -Jacksonville Narcotics officers shot and killed a man during an undercover operation on the Southside.

The shooting happened in the 2300 block of Westmont Street, just off Philips Highway Saturday night.

"An individual approached from between two houses brandishing a handgun. \he officers gave several commands to drop the gun, he did not, so they exchanged gunfire," says Chief Dwain Senterfitt.

Witnesses told First Coast News it appeared the man mistook the officers for drug dealers and was trying to scare them away.

"The man came out three times and said move out of my yard. So after the third time he came out with a 357 and started shooting at the individuals," said a witness who did not want to be identified.

Police say officers shot the man several times and there were bullets found in a tree the officers had used as cover.

The man died at Shands Jacksonville.

A man who says he is the victim's nephew tells First Coast News that the victim was weeks from turning 81 years old. He says hi~ uncle was a respected man in the neighborhood that everyone called, 'Pops.'

"He [got] his enjoyment from sitting under a tree and watching his collard greens and cabbages grow," said nephew Gary Evans.

''The only time anybody would hear anything out of my uncle is if they stopped in front of his house and tried to do whatever deal~ they wanted to do," Evans added.

Officers John Maynard and James Narcisse have been placed on administrative leave, which is standard procedure in police shootings.

The narcotics officers had been working in the neighborhood in response to complaints by residents about the drug activity.

The undercover investigation netted five arrests before the shooting.

The deadly shooting is the second by JSO in a week.

Last weekend narcotics officers shot and killed 18-year-old Doug Woods at the Sable Palms Apartments on Emerson, which is blocks from the scene of the latest shooting.

Investigators said Woods tried to rob an undercover officer with a gun.

Witnesses claim Woods only had a cell phone in his hand.

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Iowa undercover officer injured in sting

NIGEL DUARA Des Moines Register

DES MOINES. Iowa -An undercover officer was injured in a drug sting that went awry Wednesday afternoon.

One suspect was taken into custody, but two others are still sought by police and are believed to be armed.

Joe Byrd, 35, was arrested on suspicion of robbery after the drug sting by state narcotics agents turned violent, said Detective Mike McTaggart of the Des Moines Police Department.

The agents entered a house at 1327 24th St. in Des Moines and attempted to sell drugs. During the exchange, one agent was struck in the face with a handgun and two suspects took an

ndisclosed amount of money and fled.

McTaggart declined to name the injured officer pending family notification. The officer was taken to Iowa Lutheran Hospital.

The two other suspects "split up after the robbery, · McTaggart said. He declined to say if Byrd is the alleged assailant.

Copyright 2007 Des Moines Register

QCPR Therapy

12131/2004

Undercover Miami Officer Shot, Wounded During Raid

Advertisement:

'f 1\ (~ 'I' I (~,\ I. 'fW I I.L

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A 10 year veteran of the Miami Police Department who served a recent tour of duty in Iraq, was shot in the leg during a undercove drug raid is in stable condition.

Officer Raul Iglesia was in stable condition at Jackson Memorial Hospital. He is expected to fully recover.

The shooting occurred about 8:20 p.m. on Tuesday while he was attempting to take down two drug dealers; the subjects attempted to flee from the parking lot of an apartment building at 2040 N.W. 3 avenue.

As the two tried to escape, one turned around and shot the officer in the leg. The shooter was then shot in the leg by another office . The suspect was transported to Jackson Memorial Hospital for medical treatment.

The suspect faces numerous charges.

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0511412003

Suspect Drives Over Undercover Officer

Officer suffered road rash, broken ribs and internal injuries.

By MIKE WISER, Rockford (Ill.) Register Star

ROCKFORD, ILL. -A man driving a stolen vehicle struck an undercover Belvidere police officer, dragging him about 25 feet before making a clean getaway Monday morning.

Brandon Parker, a six-year veteran assigned to the Illinois State Police Auto Theft Task Force, suffered severe road rash, broken ibs and internal injuries to the spleen and lungs.

Parker fired his service revolver at least once at the suspect, but it's not known if the driver was hit. Parker is under police guard at a Rockford hospital recovering from his injuries, which Belvidere Police Chief Jan Noble said were "serious."

Police don,t yet have a reliable description of the suspect although there were several witnesses to the incident which happened at 10:46 a.m. at the Amoco station at Auburn Street and North Central Avenue.

The stolen gray Honda Pilotwas found about 15 minutes later in the parking lot of the Logli's supermarket on North Rockton Avenue, about two miles away from the Amoco. ·

At a 3 p.m. press conference, Noble, Rockford Deputy Police Chief Dominic lasparro and Illinois State Police Capt. Mark Hinchy encouraged anyone with information to contact police. They also offered support to Parker and his family.

'"There's absolutely no criticism of this officer as far as the tactics and techniques that he used," lasparro said. "From a practical, realistic standpoint, did the officer do what he should have done today? He absolutely did, and he did a great job."

Parker, 29, was in plainclothes when he spotted the 2003 Honda which had been reported stolen from a private residence a month ago. The driver was working under the hood, so Parker punched its license plate into his computer to check the SUV's status.

The plates came back as belonging to another Honda which was also reported stolen. Parker decided to talk to the man.

Parker approached the Honda, with its driver now inside and the door open. The two apparently exchanged some words and the suspect slammed on the gas.

The Honda knocked Parker to the ground and ran over him. The Honda crushed Parker, driving diagonally over his body starting at e left shoulder, Noble said.

Sometime during this, Parker was able to fire at least one round at the suspect. He made it back to his car and called for help.

itial broadcast reports from the 911 communications center indicated an officer had been shot. Within minutes, more than 30 qockford police officers in marked and unmarked squad cars swarmed the. gas station and blocked the northbound lanes of Central

"There were Rockford officers at the (Auburn Street Gas ?N Glo) car wash. They left their cars and ran here," lasparro said. 'The area was saturated. The initial report was a police officer had been shot, so the response by police officers was pretty massive."

Officers fanned out from the scene and located the SUV at the supermarket's employee parking lot parked between two other cars.

e driver's side taillight on the SUV was broken and red paint was scratched across the front end. The rear passenger door also

was dented.

Wood chips were found embedded in the front-end grill and along the bottom of the vehicle. Police had the vehicle impounded. bullet holes or blood was found.

"We have done a preliminary search of the vehicle, but not an extensive search," lasparro said. "We will keep it as long as we ee: to until the investigation is complete."

Parker's department-issued .45-caliber pistol and one of his shoes remained at the scene even after he had been rushed to t e hospital.

Noble said Parker will get as much time as he needs to recover. It's at least the third time Parker was injured in the line of duty. ,.,. February 2000, he dislocated and fractured his elbow while breaking up a bar fight in Belvidere. He reinjured the elbow when it smacked against a mirror of a truck that was passing by an accident scene in May 2000.

Winnebago County State's Attorney Paul Logli said the suspect, if caught, likely faces at least a felony charge of aggravated b to a police officer. The crime is punishable by up to five years in prison.

"This points out the inherent danger in all lines of police work," Logli said.

"As the office that handles criminal prosecution in this jurisdiction, we would be very interested that this person be located. We would like to bring the full force of the law onto this situation. Our officers deserve protection."

Register Star reporters Chris Green and Melissa Westphal contributed to this report.

Profile: Brandon Parker

*Age: 29

* Occupation: Six years with the Belvidere Police Department, which includes three years as part of the Illinois State Police Auto Theft Task Force.

The task force, formed in 1993, is headed by the Illinois State Police. It includes officers from northern Illinois police departments. They are trained in auto theft investigations and work undercover to recover stolen vehicles and break up auto theft rings.

* Family: Married, one child.


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Gunfire erupts during Pa. drug buy; suspect held

By Paul Peirce Tribine Review

An undercover drug buy gone awry Wednesday afternoon resulted in gunfire in Hempfield Township, directly across Route 30 from Westmoreland Mall.

The shooting and a subsequent high-speed chase led to the arrest of James Paul Henderson, 37, of Greensburg RD3, who was identified by the office of New Kensington District Judge Frank Pallone.

Henderson was apprehended by state police three miles from e shooting in the village of Bovard only a few minutes after

the 1 p.m. incident. No one was injured.

"There was a pre-planned drug-buy operation by our undercover officers and the actor suddenly decided not to cooperate," state police spokeswoman Jeanne Martin said.

"We don't know what happened ... maybe he began believing he was dealing with police officers," she said.

The transaction was to take place in a parking lot directly off Donohoe Road Extension near the McDonald's and Automatic Car Wash just across Route 30 from the mall, police said.

"The suspect started to back his car up, striking one of our unmarked cars. As he began pulling away in the parking lot from the undercover officers, another car with two uniformed troopers approached and he waved a firearm out of his window at them like he was going to shoot," Martin said.

Martin said the two troopers in the car, believing Henderson was going to open fire, ducked down in their car, and because of the commotion did not know whether he fired.

However, Martin said the undercover officers nearby believed they heard a shot. Police then fired, she said.

It was not certain how many shots were fired.

Henderson then drove east along Donohoe Road and Crows Nest Road toward Bovard Road.

About a dozen more officers were summoned to the pursuit as well as a state police helicopter.

"Once he got to Bovard, he abandoned his vehicle and ran into a house (on Prisani Street, formerly Third Street). The woman who resides in the house didn't believe she knew the man and said she chased him out of her home," Martin said.

Henderson, who police dispatchers said walked nonchalantly out of the house on the 200 block of Prisani Street, was apprehended by police a short time later.

Police obtained a search warrant and were still looking for Henderson's handgun last night around the vicinity of the house and in the car. They also called in a police search dog from Jeannette.

Police also were looking for items Henderson reportedly dropped while fleeing.

Ryan Walters, of Third Street, Bovard, said he was just driving away from his home when he saw the car chase approaching.

"They were going like 90 miles an hour around the bend. I turned around and came back home because I live right here and wondered what was happening," he said.

was dented.

Wood chips were found embedded in the 'front-end grill and along the bottom of the vehicle. Police had the vehicle impounded. No bullet holes or blood was found.

''We have done a preliminary search of the vehicle, but not an extensive search," lasparro said. "We will keep it as long as we need to until the investigation is complete."

Parker's department-issued .45-caliber pistol and one of his shoes remained at the scene even after he had been rushed to the hospital.

Noble said Parker will get as much time as he needs to recover. It's at least the third time Parker was injured in the line of duty. In February 2000, he dislocated and fractured his elbow while breaking up a bar fight in Belvidere. He reinjured the elbow when it smacked against a mirror of a truck that was passing by an accident scene in May 2000.

Winnebago County State's Attorney Paullogli said the suspect, if caught, likely faces at least a felony charge of aggravated battery to a police off1cer. The crime is punishable by up to five years in prison.

"This points out the inherent danger in all lines of police work," logli said_

"As the office that handles criminal prosecution in this jurisdiction, we would be very interested that this person be located. We would like to bring the full force of the law onto this situation. Our officers deserve protection."

Register Star reporters Chris Green and Melissa Westphal contributed to this report.

Profile: Brandon Parker

.. Age: 29

.. Occupation: Six years with the Belvidere Police Department, which includes three years as part of the Illinois State Police Auto Theft Task Force.

The task force, formed in 1993, is headed by the Illinois State Police. It includes officers from northern Illinois police departments. They are trained in auto theft investigations and work undercover to recover stolen vehicles and break up auto theft rings.

* Family: Married, one child.

--·----···-·- -·---------·---- ..


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Gunfire erupts during Pa. drug buy; suspect held

By Paul Peirce Tribine Review

An undercover drug buy gone awry Wednesday afternoon resulted in gunfire in Hempfield Township, directly across Route 30 from Westmoreland Mall.

The shooting and a subsequent high-speed chase led to the arrest of James Paul Henderson, 37, of Greensburg RD3, who was identified by the office of New Kensington District Judge Frank Pallone.

Henderson was apprehended by state police three miles from the shooting in the village of Bovard only a few minutes after the 1 p.m. incident. No one was injured.

"There was a pre-planned drug-buy operation by our undercover officers and the actor suddenly decided not to cooperate," state police spokeswoman Jeanne Martin said.

"We don't know what happened ... maybe he began believing he was dealing with police officers," she said.

The transaction was to take place in a parking lot directly off Donohoe Road Extension near the McDonald's and Automatic Car Wash just across Route 30 from the mall, police said.

"The suspect started to back his car up, striking one of our unmarked cars. As he began pulling away in the parking lot from the undercover officers, another car with two uniformed trooper'S approached and he waved a firearm out of his window at them like he was going to shoot," Martin said.

Martin said the two troopers in the car, believing Henderson was going to open fire, ducked down in their car, and because of the commotion did not know whether he fired.

However, Martin said the undercover officers nearby believed they heard a shot. Police then fired, she said.

It was not certain how many shots were fired.

Henderson then drove east along Donohoe Road and Crows Nest Road toward Bovard Road.

About a dozen more officers were summoned to the pursuit as well as a state police helicopter.

"Once he got to Bovard, he abandoned his vehicle and ran into a house (on Prisani Street, formerly Third Street). The woman who resides in the house didn't believe she knew the man and said she chased him out of her home," Martin said.

Henderson, who police dispatchers said walked nonchalantly out of the house on the 200 block of Prisani Street, was apprehended by police a short time later.

Police obtained a search warrant and were still looking for Henderson's handgun last night around the vicinity of the house and in the car. They also called in a police search dog from Jeannette.

Police also were looking for items Henderson reportedly dropped while fleeing.

Ryan Walters, of Third Street, Bovard, said he was just driving away from his home when he saw the car chase approaching.

"They were going like 90 miles an hour around the bend. I turned around and came back home because I live right here and wondered what was happening," he said.

===~------

Walters said he didn't see police capture Henderson.

Police cordoned off the area surrounding the 200 block of Prisani Street and a nearby alley, where Henderson's car was being searched.

Henderson's late-model, red Mercury sedan, which was towed from Bovard, had a visible bullet hole and scrapes in the driver's side door. The side mirror also was missing.

Martin said Henderson is believed to have been the only suspect involved in the drug deal with the undercover officers.

Henderson was arraigned in night court before Pallone via Web camera from the state police barracks in Greensburg. He is charged with simple assault, aggravated assault, criminal attempt to commit criminal homicide, and recklessly endangering another person, the court official said.

Henderson was transported last night to Westmoreland County Jail, where he remains in lieu of $250,000 straight cash bond.

Copyright 2006 Tribune Review Publishing Company

Cops vs. Drugs: Tactics and Issues for All Officers with Det. Steve Walton (Ret.)

Seven Tactical Principles

The seven tactical principles identified below are not some cleverly kept secret or some mysterious formula that can enhance safety in law enforcement. These principles are tried and true safety enhancers and in fact are very widely recognized when viewed as independent elements.

Over the course of my 25 year law enforcement career in one application or another, I had an opportunity to implement all of these strategies to my advantage. In this article I would like to introduce the 7 tactical principles as a cohesive officer safety system. This system can be applied at many different levels of law enforcement and in many different situations.

These principles are as follows:

• Cover • Threat Cuesffhreat Assessment • Time/Distance Ratio • The Plus One Rule • De-escalation ·Verbalization • The Winning Mind

Cover

In any given situation, officers must evaluate what their status is with respect to cover. In properly understanding this concept one must realize that there are two types of cover; cover from fire and cover from view. As a young SWAT officer I was told "you may not always have cover from fire, but you should always have cover from view".

Obviously there is a fundamental difference between cover from fire and cover from view. The distinction is best described in this fashion; cover from fire provides the officer with protection from high caliber rounds. Cover from view provides the officer with protection from an assailant or potential assailant because the assailant cannot see the officer. Every officer needs to remember that if someone can see you they can shoot at you.

Cover from fire can be obtained from objects that are made of metal or concrete. It can also be obtained in nature by slipping into a depression in the ground or crawling behind a hill of dirt. Large living trees can also provide officers with cover from fire. Although cover from fire is obviously preferred it might not be strategically beneficial. For example, the only tree in a field may provide cover from fire but it could isolate an officer. Huge risk may have been undertaken to obtain the cover and the officer, in obtaining the cover may be outside of the effective range of their own firearm.

For clarity, the effective range of a firearm is measured not in the effectiveness of the weapon but in the ability of the individual officer, when under stress, to deliver deadly, accurate gunfire.

At the most basic level, all officers wear or should wear personal cover from fire, what I am referring to is body armor. I am . pleased to see that this generation of law enforcement officer is prepared to accept armor as a required piece of kit. It also appears to me that technology has continued to both improve the capabilities of armor as well as its comfort level.

By constantly evaluating their cover or their need for cover and by comprehensively understanding the true nature and different types of cover, law enforcement officers can seriously enhance their safety.

Threat CuesfThreat Assessment

To further enhance their safety, officers must constantly monitor and evaluate threat cues. Most of those involved in law

enforcement are already aware of this tactic however, I believe there is a more global approach to threat cue interpretation than simply observing the body language and verbal information that is presented and provided by a subject. The activities associated to this tactical principle can best be described as intelligence gathering and reconnoitering.

When dealing with an individual or when involved in a situation, it is incumbent on officers to have complete situational awareness and they have to be articulate in the dynamics of conflict. Situational awareness is the comprehensive understanding of where an officer is, what their spatial relationship is to the subjects he or she is dealing with, cover requirements, and escape routes, etc.

With respect to contingency planning, and in conjunction with sound intelligence gathering, law enforcement officers have to continually ask themselves a series of questions:

• How can I obtain cover if required? • Did I remove myself from a position of cover to deal with this situation? • Have I conducted a weapons inventory regarding opportunity weapons? • Is there an escape route, if I have to tactically disengage? • Is my body positioning appropriate to the circumstance?

Considerations for contingency planning have to also include knowledge of conflict dynamics. Understanding that many things can happen in a short period of time can lead officers down the positive path of pre-planning and the initiation of exigent circumstance or immediate action plans.

Time/Distance Ratio

This tactical principle is straight forward and important for officers to grasp. What is learned from the time-distance ratio is that there is a direct correlation between time and distance during conflict.

For example, if an officer can put distance between himself and a subject, it takes longer for the subject to initiate contact with the officer. The more time the officer has, the more likely that the officer will be able to develop alternate action plans and avoid making snap decisions.

(This rule excludes firearms as the delivery system for a firearm is spontaneous).

Many officers are familiar with the term "minimum space cushionn; this tells us that there is a relative comfort zone for officers during a conflict. The distances that have been established for the minimum space cushion range from 21 to 32 feet.

With respect to conflict dynamics, officers must realize that when in motion, an adult human can cover 10 feet every second. Constantly evaluating distance can assist officers in developing their minimum space cushion for any given encounter.

The Plus One Rule

Like the time/distance ratio, the plus one rule is very straight forward. There is always one more than you think there is; so no matter what it is you are looking for, conduct a thorough and complete search.

There is nothing worse than leaving somewhere or someone and then having the thought that the premises or the subject or both weren't searched properly. To avoid these unsettling feeling officers should develop logical search systems that are subject to practice and repetition.

The implementation of effective searching techniques inclusive of building clearing tactics will ensure that the officer has included the plus one rule in their strategic planning.

De-escalation

At the end of the day, law enforcement officers are mandated in force application situations to incorporate the minimal amount of force that is necessary or reasonable in any given encounter. De-escalation or the attempt to de-escalate will serve officers well in surviving once the incident has been concluded.

It goes without saying that officer survival is paramount in any task that requires an officer's attention. De-escalation is a form of housekeeping that can be initiated to ensure that the officer not only acutely survives a situation, but has implemented appropriate measures to ensure after the fact survival.

All force encounters involving law enforcement officers will be examined with a fine toothed comb. The actions that individual officers undertake at the time of force application can lead to surviving internal disciplinary proceedings, or criminal investigations. These actions include de-escalation or at the very least attempted de-escalation.

Verbalization

Another after the fact survival principle is verbalization. Like de-escalation, an officers verbal actions can not only assist as a

Gunman shot during undercover drug arrest in Baltimore

By Gus G. Sentementes, Sun Reporter The Baltimore Sun

It was a tough week for Maj. John Dodson and his officers in Baltimore's Eastern District.

On Wednesday, two of his patrol officers tried to pull over a woman in a stolen car on East North Avenue. As the police approached her, an officer accidentally shot another officer, who was saved from serious injury by his bullet-resistant vest.

Then today, as undercover officers broke up a suspected drug deal and arrested a man, police said another man suddenly appeared and began shooting. Three of Dodson's patrol officers chased the man for several blocks -~exchanging gunfire along the way -and shot and wounded him in an alley.

"It's been different," said Dodson, a 24-year veteran who has commanded the Eastern District since mid-2004. "I've gotten two phone calls this week, one of which a commander dreads: that an officer was shot."

Today's incident started around 10:30 a.m. when undercover officers from the organized crime division were watching suspected drug dealers in the 1800 block of Hope St. near Green Mount Cemetery. Officers saw a stash of drugs and arrested one man, recovering 25 gel caps of suspected heroin, police said.

They were waiting for a prisoner transport wagon when a man with a gun appeared and fired at the officers, police said.

The police gave chase down streets and alleys. The gunman was hit and collapsed in an alley between Aisquith and Holbrook streets, police said.

The man's identity, and that of three patrol officers who shot at the man, were not released today. The wounded man's injuries were described as not life- threatening.

Deputy Police Commissioner Frederick H. Bealefeld Ill said the officers who made the initial drug arrest were acting undercover, buthad identified themselves as officers and that uniformed patrol officers were nearby. 'We believe it was clear to the people in the area that these were indeed Baltimore City policemen," Bealefeld said.

Preliminary police reports indicate that the suspect fired between eight and 10 rounds at the officers. The crime scene was spread over a several-block area in the Oliver neighborhood. Crime lab technicians could be seen recovering shell casings and evidence at several different locations, while patrol officers knocked on doors and interviewed residents

"I heard gunshots and I saw a boy on the ground," said Nakia Brown, 15, who lives in the 1600 block of Holbrook St.

The officers involved in today's gun battle are from the same squad involved in an accidental shooting on Wednesday on nearby North Avenue.

One officer shot a colleague by mistake as they converged on a car believed to have been occupied by a person with a gun. The wounded officer, David Hare Jr., was hit in his vest. He suffered minor injuries and walked out of the hospital the same day. The officer who fired his weapon was identified as Claude Torres.

"That incident was unbelievable," Dodson said. Hare was more worried about the officer who shot him than himself.

Copyright 2007 Baltimore Sun

Canada: Undercover officer poses as cellmate; elicits grisly details

By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

NEW WESTMINSTER, British Columbia (AP) --An undercover police officer put into the same cell as an alleged serial killer testified Monday that the jailed pig farmer voiced concerns about being "nailed to the cross" for dozens of suspected slayings.

Jurors also were shown part of a video taken while the officer was in the cell with Robert William Pickton on Feb. 22, 2002, after the farmer was arrested in connection with at least two murders.

Pickton is on trial for six alleged murders and is to be tried later on 20 additional murder counts. Most of the slain women were prostitutes or drug addicts among hundreds of women who disappeared from Vancouver's gritty Downtown Eastside neighborhood. He denies guilt.

During opening arguments in late January, prosecutors told jurors the undercover officer coaxed Pickton into telling him about the murders. Pickton is alleged to have said he killed 49 women and had meant to make it "an even 50" but that his sloppiness led to his arrest.

Jurors had yet to hear that part of the conversation by midday Monday.

The defense questioned Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers last week about the ethics of lying to Pickton to gain his trust.

The undercover officer, whose identify cannot be revealed under Canadian law, told the court Monday as the trial entered its third week that he was not given any details about the man he was supposed to spy on.

The officer, who said his cover story was that he was being held on attempted murder charges, said Pickton told him he had been arrested on two counts of first-degree murder.

"He was concerned about this, said they were looking at another 50 charges against him with relation to this," the officer testified.

The 12 jurors watched portions of a videotape in which the officer portrayed himself as angry over being put in a cell with another prisoner. The two eventually struck up a conversation about what brought them there.

The officer pretended to be skeptical when Pickton told him why he was arrested. Police would have to prove it, the officer said.

"They don't have to prove nothing," Pickton said. "They can set you up."

Pickton kept on talking to the undercover officer, even after the officer noted that their conversation was likely being recorded on the videocamera that he pointed out in a bubble in the cell.

During the conversation, Pickton appeared disheveled and pounded his bed with his fists. "My name is mud,'' he said. "I'm nailed to the cross. Screwed and tattooed."

Pickton, 56, also told the officer about an attempted murder charge against him in 1997. In the videotape, he blamed the woman for the charge against him, which was later dropped. He said the woman knifed him because she wanted $3,400 he was carrying.

Suspect Shot During Struggle with Undercover Police Officer

Suspect Shot During Struggle with Undercover Police Officer

By Associated Press

WAKEFIELD, Mass. -A man who was shot during a scuffle with an undercover police officer in Wakefield is recovering at a local hospital.

Police say it happened last night when officers stopped the unidentified man's car to arrest him on drug charges.

One of the officers had his gun drawn when the suspect allegedly attacked him. During the struggle, police say the suspect caused the officer's gun to go off and the bullet struck the man in the ann.

The officer is a member of the Southern Middlesex Regional Drug Task Force. Police are not releasing his name or saying which department he works for.

Ap Copyright 2005 Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.

Undercover Penn. officer shot, wounded

Undercover safety tips by P-1 featured columnist Dave Smith

By Moustafa Ayad

• Gather as much intelligence on the perp as possible; any rumor or history of weapons or violence, or unusual demands are cues that should make you pick a more public place for the deal.

• The Undercover Officer or Confidential lnfonnant must control the location. • Train all your U/C officers on close quarter defense to stop a possible deadly threat.

Copyright 2007 Pittsburgh Post-Gazette

An undercover Pittsburgh vice squad detective was shot last night while chasing a suspected prostitute who was trying to run from the officer and his partner.

The wounded officer, Detective Jeffrey Smith, was in good condition last night at Mercy Hospital with a gunshot wound to the side of his abdomen, said Police Chief Nate Harper, who visited with the 23-year police veteran and his wife at the hospital.

The shooting occurred about 8:30 p.m on De Ruad Street in West Oakland, just below the Hill District.

A suspect was taken into custody later in the evening and was being questioned by detectives at police headquarters. Chief Harper said.

Chief Harper gave this account of the shooting:

Detective Smith and his unidentified partner picked up the prostitute on Fifth Avenue, posing as customers.

The two officers and the woman drove a short distance and offered the woman money in exchange for sex.

A short time later, when the two men identified themselves as police officers, the woman jumped out of the car and began running on Wyandotte Street.

The officers followed her to De Ruad Street, where Detective Smith got out of the car and began running after the woman. Just as he was about to catch her, Chief Harper said, the woman turned and shot him, then fled toward the Hill District.

Detective Smith was not wearing a bulletproof vest, Chief Harper said~ He said officers usually do not wear one during such operations because they would be noticed by prostitutes.

Dozens of police responded to the scene and began combing the area, including parts of the Hill District and Oakland.

In addition to city detectives and the police Special Emergency Response Team, officers from the sheriffs department, Allegheny County police, Pittsburgh Housing Authority police and agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration and the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives assisted.

State police sent a helicopter to the scene.

Chief Harper said the wounded officer appeared to be doing well in the hospital.

"He's alert and in good condition," the chief said.

Undercover and Informant Handling Tactics Training Manual

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