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“TURKEY IS NOT EUROPEAN!”: OPPOSITION TO TURKISH ACCESSION AND THE

QUESTION OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY

KATE SKOW

PARDEE SCHOOL OF GLOBAL STUDIES

BOSTON UNIVERSITY

FALL 2014

IR 550: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

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Introduction

At the turn of the twenty­first century, the European Union (EU) accepted Turkey’s

application for membership and recognized it as a candidate country at the Helsinki European

Council—a milestone in and of itself, as possible Turkish accession was, and remains, a

contentious issue of future enlargement prospects. Now 15 years later, Turkey is still not an EU

member state. Enlargement even on its own is controversial, made even more so when

considering the possibility of Turkey joining the EU. There is disapproval for this by both EU

citizens and officials alike, but why? There are, of course, the Copenhagen criteria to meet as

well as expectations of economic contributions by Turkey that could possibly be the reasons, but,

when considering who is allowed in the EU, there is also an underlying question of “who are

Europeans?” and this then raises another: whether or not the citizens of Turkey are.

This paper looks at the factors of possible Turkish accession to the EU and specifically,

the idea of European identity as an explanation for opposition to this. First, it addresses

competing theories of European identity and the formation of identity based on an excluded

out­group. Second, it briefly explains EU enlargement and historical Turkey­EU relations. Third,

it looks at reasons for opposition to Turkey becoming an EU member, with a specific focus on

member state Germany; and fourth, it offers a possible explanation for why certain conditions

foster certain ‘types’ of opposition, as well as implications for both Turkey and the Union itself.

I. European Identity

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A singular ‘European’ identity does not exist. The idea of European identity is a fairly

confusing one because of Europe’s place within the historical Westphalian nation­state context. 1

There is no one that is universally agreed upon; there are instead many theories of possible

European identities. Neil Fligstein introduces the ‘new European’, a cosmopolitan who travels

within the EU and has met other people beyond their national borders. Kaija Schilde, in contrast,

shows that European identity can exist outside the EU, completely formed aside from Union

policy or expectations of benefits, as seen in pre­accession Eastern European countries. There is

also the possibility of a European religious identity; despite the EU promoting a secular Europe,

a majority of member states are historically Christian. And then there is another European

identity, one that lurks in the shadows and rears its head when there is an out­group in

comparison. Europeans cannot come to a consensus on who a European is, but they can identify

as such much more easily in order to point out who is not. However, even the first three theories

have a facet of exclusion; the very act of defining an identity is to exclude. It is this exclusionary

part of the European identity that provides much of the opposition to Turkish accession that is

not rooted in material reasoning, such as the economy or the membership criteria; in this way,

Turkey cannot join the European Union because it is not European.

Fligstein’s ‘new European’ can be best explained as a product of the EU. With the

benefits of being a member state, EU citizens can travel between countries easily, use the same

currency, and meet people akin to themselves outside of their home countries. This interaction 2

has fostered a European identity but only among certain people: the educated, professionals,

1 A number of identities, especially in Europe, were formed with the creation of states; a notable example of this being Italy, as immortalized by Massimo d’Azeglio: L’Italia è fatta. Restano da fare gli italiani. (“We have made Italy. Now we must make Italians.”) 2 Neil Fligstein, Euroclash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 123.

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managers, and other white­collar workers who have the opportunity to travel, speak second

languages, and interact with people in different countries. Those in Europe who have had these

opportunities, Fligstein argues, are the ones who have benefitted the most from integration, “feel

European” and support the EU. In contrast, those who have not had such opportunities still “view

the nation and their own state as the appropriate unit to be defended against external forces” and

largely do not see the EU as bringing positive change. Therefore, this European identity is 3

inherently connected to the Union; it is created by the EU and can only be felt by citizens of the

EU. Furthermore, it is not an identity that even all those in the EU can have. Lower­class,

blue­collar workers; citizens who have not traveled or learned a second language; these are not

the ‘Europeans of the EU.’ Those who aren’t members of the EU certainly are not either. Despite

not being explicitly exclusionary, Fligstein’s ‘new European’ excludes a great many.

Unfortunately then, it is a chicken­egg debacle for countries like Turkey who have been in

application limbo for decades: are they not in the EU because they are not European or are they

not European because they are not in the EU?

Yet, it is also possible for people to identify as European outside the context of the EU.

As Schilde’s findings show, the ‘new European’ of the EU is not necessarily the only European.

Against most previous literature, the study found that citizens of central and eastern European

(CEE) countries pre­accession identified as European more than western European citizens

within the EU. It is interesting to note that those in Schilde’s study who identify in some way 4

with Europe have similarities with Fligstein’s ‘children of the EU’ (as it were): they are

primarily young and educated. Yet they do not necessarily expect any benefits from the EU after

3 Ibid., 124. 4 Kaija Schilde, “Who are the Europeans? European Identity Outside of European Integration,” Journal of Common Market Studies 52, no. 3 (2014): 651.

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their country’s accession and “do not automatically support European integration.” As it turns 5

out, “the EU does not appear to have created overwhelming feelings of ‘Europeanness’” even if 6

they say as much, and feeling ‘European’ may not be contingent on being a citizen of a member

state. There may be a European identity that is much different from the tolerant, enlightened one

the EU promotes that predates accession, and instead is about “racial, ethnic, and religious

differences between people who are thought of as Europeans and those who are others.” These 7

differences are present when many try to explain why Turkey should not join the EU: it is not a

European country, therefore should not be in a ‘European’ Union.

‘European’ as an exclusionary identity is the idea that one is European when compared to

someone who is not; it has been common throughout history, and now recently with the question

of Turkish accession to the EU, i.e., to use Turks as that ‘other’ to one’s ‘European.’ The

integration project has been seen as “an act of the political imagination of Christian Democracy” 8

so despite the EU now promoting itself as a secular institution, there is a historical Christianity

that permeates European society even today, a religious identity that a majority of Turkey does

not share. Historically, two empires, by their differences, defined Europe: Ottoman and Russian.

Today, Russia is still seen in opposition to the EU (an institution Russia itself has no interest in

joining) and Turkey is the Ottoman ‘heir’—just as different from Europe as it once was.

Although Russia asserts that there is no doubt that they are culturally European despite their

differences in politics, Turkey instead has followed the guidelines for aligning their politics with

5 Schilde, 16. 6 Lauren M. McLaren, “Immigration and the new politics of inclusion and exclusion in the European Union: The effect of elites and the EU on individual­level opinions regarding European and non­European immigrants,” European Journal of Political Research 39, no. 1 (2001): 101. 7 Schilde, 15. 8 Michael Minkenberg, Hajo G Boomgaarden and Claes H de Vreese, “Turkish Membership in the European Union—the role of religion,” Comparative European Politics 10, no. 2 (2012): 140.

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the EU all the while maintaining “its appeals to multiculturalism and diversity.” Unfortunately, 9

this might hurt them, as the appeals largely come in the form of criticizing the ‘Christian club’

that is the EU, criticisms that could serve only to alienate them further from membership in the

future. Like it or not, the “meaning of ‘Europe’ is [usually] defined by the western core” and 10

there is doubt whether Turkey can ever be thought of as part of that Europe.

II. EU Enlargement and Turkey

Enlargement has been described as the EU’s ‘greatest foreign policy tool’ and its success

in implementing reforms in other countries without force is unprecedented in the international

community. The EU has been able to completely revamp governments and enact community law

in candidate countries using the ‘carrot and stick’ approach, with the ultimate carrot being

eventual membership. But when it comes to enlarging, the question is, “is there an end to

Europe?” be it territorial or cultural. In the case of Turkey, opinions vary on whether or not they

should become a member. Even within the camp of ‘no membership,’ there is discrepancy on

why Turkey should not join.

It should be noted that further enlargement, no matter the candidate country in question,

is a contentious topic. With now 28 member states, the EU is at times stretched beyond capacity

and there is a widespread belief that “with more members countries, it will be more difficult to

make decisions on a European scale.” (Although this does not necessarily mean they are 11

9 Viatcheslav Morozov and Bahar Rumelili, “The external constitution of European identity: Russia and Turkey as Europe­makers,” Cooperation and Conflict 47, no. 1 (2012): 43. 10 Ibid., 42. 11 Eurobarometer, “Thinking about the enlargement of the European Union to include new European countries, do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with each of the following statements? ‘With more members countries, it will be more difficult to make decisions on a European scale’” European Commission: Public Opinion, accessed December 7, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm.

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against more integration. The UK is an example of a member state government that supports

further ‘widening’ of the EU for this very reason.) However, the Commission advocates

enlargement and new countries have joined the EU, even when public opinion showed a majority

in agreement with the above statement. This makes it all the more interesting that national 12

governments of EU countries France and Austria have even mentioned the possibility for

referenda on Turkish accession, yet a referendum on enlargement by a current member state has

not been seen since 1972, which was held in France before allowing new members into the

European Communities. Public opinion on EU enlargement may now have a greater part to play

than it previously has. And the European public has largely disapproval for Turkey becoming the

next member state.

Applying as early as 1959 for associate membership in the European Economic

Community, Turkey has been a candidate for EU membership since 1999, yet they have not

become a full member; they have only ever been a candidate or an associate member, as laid out

by the Ankara Agreement. But this status does not entitle them to any of the benefits being an

EU member brings, such as ‘macroeconomic stability’; the euro, a currency with a fixed

exchange rate; agricultural sector reform; competition increase in the financial sector; GDP

growth with eliminated trade barriers; eligibility for EU structural funds; and with all this, the

likelihood of improved material wellbeing for Turkish people. Unfortunately, their road to 13

membership has so far been plagued by opposition and they have had to revamp almost their

entire governmental structure to comply with the criteria. While becoming a candidate country,

actual accession negotiations did not start until 2004 because of the EU’s low confidence in

12 The question was part of the Eurobarometer survey from 01/2001 to 05/2002, just before the fifth, and biggest, enlargement of the EU. 13 Sübidey Togan, “Turkey: Toward EU Accession,” The World Economy 27, no. 7 (2004): 1016­28.

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Turkey’s economic and political situations. Currently, over ten chapters have been opened on

various aspects of government, including Taxation, Environment, and Food Safety, among

others. Only the Science and Research chapter has been provisionally closed. Additionally, 14

many EU member state national officials have been open about their opposition to Turkey’s

accession, most notably German Chancellor Angela Merkel and former French President Nicolas

Sarkozy. They, along with others, want to keep Turkey out of the Union, citing reasons such as 15

not fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria, its unresolved issue with Cyprus, and Turks ultimately not

being Europeans.

Unfortunately, despite being a democratic republic since 1923, Europeans sometimes still

feel an inherent culture clash with the former “backward Ottoman Empire” who invaded 16

Vienna and once posed a serious threat to the West. Turkey is Europe’s historical ‘other’ who

“was instrumental in constructing a sense of ‘Europeanness’” but was left out of that identity. 17

This is now found as anti­Muslim and anti­immigrant feelings, especially in EU member state

Germany, which has the greatest population of Turks outside of Turkey. It is this conflict of

identities that is part of what is keeping Turkey from mass European approval for its accession

and serious negotiations with the EU to do so.

III. Reasons for opposition to Turkish accession

14 European Commission, “EU – Enlargement – Turkey,” European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, accessed November 20, 2014. 15 The Economist Online, “A fading European dream,” The Economist, October 21, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/17276372. 16 Louis Proyect, “In the Wake of the Ottoman Empire,” CounterPunch Weekend Edition, March 7­9, 2014, http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/03/07/in­the­wake­of­the­ottoman­empire/. 17 Minkenberg, Boomgaarden and de Vreese, 136.

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Explanations for opposition to Turkey joining the EU can be placed in two broad

categories: rational, e.g., economic, democratic, not fulfilling membership criteria; and what I

will call “irrational,” or a matter of identity, i.e., Turks not being what those in the EU would

consider Europeans. Each category is invoked to oppose Turkish accession at one time or

another by officials from many EU member states. But it is, of course, impossible to look at all

28 members and their opinions regarding the potentiality of Turkey joining the EU in this paper.

Instead, the case study of Germany highlights some of the reasons for opposition to Turkish

accessions present throughout the EU. Germany is an interesting case; it has significant leverage

within the EU (being the biggest member state in terms of population as well as the home of the

European Central Bank), as well as a distinctly large population of Turkish immigrants. It is

worth noting that, in comparison with the EU as a whole, Germany’s individual opposition to

Turkey becoming a member state is higher. (Table 1 breaks down opinions on Turkish 18

accession of both the EU and Germany.) But overall, Germany can both represent the EU and be

a unique case within it. Just like opposition to Turkish accession throughout the EU, the reasons

in rhetoric, especially by the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and the Christian

Social Union in Bavaria (CSU)—the two parties forming the CDU/CSU faction and ruling

government in the Bundestag, Germany’s parliament—fall under both categories of rational and

“irrational.”

EU Germany Date In favour Not in

favour DK ­ Don't know

In favour Not in favour

DK ­ Don't know

01/1996 36% 44% 20% 35% 48% 17%

18 Eurobarometer, “For each of the following countries, are you in favour or not of it becoming part of the European Union? ‘Turkey’” European Commission: Public Opinion, accessed December 7, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm.

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04/1997 32% 45% 23% 24% 53% 22% 04/1999 29% 47% 23% 24% 57% 18% 11/1999 30% 47% 23% 20% 59% 21% 06/2000 30% 47% 23% 24% 56% 19% 01/2001 30% 48% 22% 24% 57% 18% 11/2001 34% 46% 20% 31% 52% 17% 06/2005 35% 52% 13% 21% 74% 5% 10/2005 31% 55% 14% 21% 74% 5% 09/2006 28% 59% 13% 16% 78% 6% 04/2008 31% 55% 14% 16% 77% 7%

Table 1. Eurobarometer: “For each of the following countries, are you in favour or not of it becoming part of the European Union? Turkey”

If both explanations are present in rhetoric at some point, the question is then, under what

conditions are each of the categories invoked to explain opposition to accession? I propose that

while rational opposition is seen at the EU level, a European identity is invoked when explaining

opposition to Turkish accession on the national level, and the idea that “Turkey is not European”

transcends any other reason for opposition, or even support, of them joining the EU on this 19

stage. The idea that Turkish accession is of national concern is evident in the 2005 German

national election and continues in CDU/CSU rhetoric after they became the majority government

in the Bundestag. It is German Chancellor, but also EU official, Angela Merkel, and her 20

national­ and EU­level CDU party, who is much more likely to give a rational explanation. On

the other hand, the CSU, a Bavarian state party who acts only on the national level, will more

often use cultural identity differences between Europe and Turkey to explain opposition to

accession as a part of German national politics.

19 Nicolas Sarkozy, “Turkey Is Not European!” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rBoBTdh9oa4. 20 See Schoen (2008).

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The Problem of Immigration

Immigration presents itself as a special problem for Germany, as it has the largest

Turkish population outside of Turkey. Because while EU member states as a whole largely

object to Turkey’s accession for many of the same reasons, it is much more intensified in

countries where there are large immigrant populations. So Germany’s hostility towards 21

Turkey’s potential accession is largely attributed to the fact that the Turkish immigrant

population “created an atmosphere in which citizens...are generally more negative about this

candidacy.” This also explains why it is a political issue for German politicians even outside 22

the EU sphere. German public opinion on Turkish accession is widespread, so political elites

must address this with a stance one way or another. The Green and Social Democratic Parties of

Germany have historically been much more welcoming of Turkey as a member state, while the

CDU/CSU faction has opposed full membership, with the CDU frequently offering Turkey a

‘privileged partnership.’

Rational Opposition to Turkish Accession

What I would consider rational explanations of opposition would be Turkey not fulfilling

the Copenhagen Criteria in full; including domestic politics as well as issues of democracy and

human rights; economics; and specifically, the issue of Cyprus, which the EU has claimed is one

that needs to be resolved before accession. At the beginning of accession negotiations in 2004,

“GDP per capita in Turkey was around 25 percent of the GDP of the EU and around 50 percent

21 See McLaren (2007). 22 Lauren M. McLaren, “Explaining Opposition to Turkish Membership of the EU,” European Union Politics 8, no. 2 (2007): 270.

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of the GDP in the new 10 member states.” Things have improved for the Turkish economy 23

since, but there is still a divide that makes the EU nervous about its possible economic

contributions to the Union. Furthermore, “issues concerning the protection of the rights of

women, the protection of the rights of ethnic and religious minorities and other measures

designed to implement and consolidate a fully democratic regime in Turkey” are of concern to

EU officials. Since at least 2006, when Angela Merkel visited Turkey for the first time as

Chancellor, there have been debates between German parties on Turkey’s proposed membership,

with the CDU/CSU faction firmly in the camp of ‘no.’ CSU leader Edmund Stoiber said “in no

case” would they join, especially with their “faltering reform process” and the problem of 24 25

Cyprus. Bavarian Interior Minister in 2004 Guenther Beckstein of the CSU cited the “enormous

security problems” of Turkey’s neighbors Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Armenia as a potential obstacle. 26

Merkel has met with former Cyprus President Demetris Christofias (then President of the

country as well as EU President­elect) and expressed “discontent” towards Turkey’s stance on

Cyprus. In another visit to Turkey in early 2013, she pointed out that the “underlying obstacles” 27

of accession are still present, namely, the non­implementation of the Additional Protocol of the

Ankara Agreement. Former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl has said he is “convinced that 28

Turkey will not fulfil the Copenhagen criteria” and despite indecisiveness in his opinion on 29

possible accession, Kohl maintained that “meeting the demands of the EU” was what would keep

23 Minkenberg, Boomgaarden and de Vreese, 138. 24 BBC Monitoring European, “German ruling parties disagree over Turkey’s EU entry,” October 8, 2006. 25 BBC Monitoring European, “Germany: Bavarian conservatives reject EU membership for Turkey,” October 1, 2006. 26 BBC Monitoring European, “Germany: Bavarian minister on security fears over Turkey’s EU entry,” September 28, 2004. 27 BBC Monitoring European, “Cypriot president, Germany’s Merkel discuss EU presidency, Turkey,” June 29, 2012. 28 BBC Monitoring European, “Commentary views Turkey’s EU prospects in wake of Germany’s Merkel visit,” February 28, 2013. 29 The Economist Online, “Survey: Which Turkey?” The Economist, March 19, 2005.

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them from membership ultimately. Recently, it has been the protests over domestic problems 30

and Ankara’s response that has reignited the opposition issue. CSU Secretary­General Andreas

Scheuer has said “concerns over suppression of fundamental democratic principles” are why

Turkey “has no place in Europe.” The caveat to all of this rationality is, of course, whether or 31

not these reasonings are the entire truth. There is likely no doubt that German Christian

Democrat parties do indeed feel that democracy, security, economics, and Cyprus are real

problems with possible Turkish accession. But “it appears that social and economic criteria are

often used to ‘act as a smokescreen’ disguising [other] reservations.” Green MEP Cem 32

Ozdemir has said that the EU can’t “hide behind the Cyprus question” as a justification for

stalling accession negotiations. If Turkey were to suddenly have a functioning democracy and 33

the Cyprus issue resolved, would there still be opposition? It is difficult to say if politicians could

lean entirely on an exclusive European identity that does not include Turkey in order to keep it

out of the EU, but as long as there are more rational obstacles still present, they do frequently

invoke that identity as an additional explanation.

“Irrational” Opposition to Turkish Accession

In contrast to rational explanations for opposition, there has also been what I label

“irrational” opposition, in that these explanations do not cite any material criteria for

membership but are instead based on the idea that Turkey is not a country in Europe, and

30 Ralph Atkins, “Kohl shift on EU and Turkey,” Financial Times, October 1, 1997. 31 EUObserver, “Erdogan’s Turkey has no place in Europe, says CSU,” EUObserver, August 13, 2014, http://euobserver.com/tickers/125238. 32 Hajo G Boomgaarden and Andreas M Wüst, “Religion and party positions towards Turkish EU accession,” Comparative European Politics 10, no. 2 (2011): 194. 33 BBC Monitoring European, “German ruling parties disagree over Turkey’s EU entry,” October 8, 2006.

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therefore, Turks are not Europeans. The reasonings are often bookended by, or cloaked in,

rational explanations and it can be difficult to parse out what exactly is a question of criteria and

what is a matter of identity. At the same time as using the Cyprus issue to explain opposition,

Stoiber also said that Turkey was “not a European country.” Moreover, he affirmed “Europe 34

needs borders” lest they start accepting obviously non­European countries such as Japan. 35

Merkel, in 2010, argued that multiculturalism in Germany “utterly failed” in conjunction with

opinion polls confirming Germans’ hostility towards immigrants. Stoiber, in perhaps foresight 36

of Merkel’s comments four years before this, warned that “anybody who wants to live here must

accept and respect Germany’s everyday culture.” It is not particularly far­reaching, especially 37

considering his other comments, to apply this view to the wider European ‘everyday culture.’

And in perhaps the most crass declaration, although maybe therefore the most revealing of his

honest opinion, Stoiber said outright, “Turkey is not a European country and anybody who takes

it in changes Europe’s character. I do not want this and that is why I say no.” No one may be 38

able to unanimously describe who a European is, but people seem to have less trouble deciding

who a European is not, and Turks, in their opinion, to fit that bill. Minister­President of the

German state of Baden­Wuerttemberg Guenther Oettinger (CDU) has said that Turkey’s

membership “overtaxes the West” (a not altogether unfair analysis, considering they would be

the largest member state population if they did join), but then added that the West in question

was “our cultural community,” implying that Turkey was not a part of it and would be not only

34 Ibid. 35 BBC Monitoring European, “Germany’s Stoiber reiterates CDU/CSU opposition to Turkish EU membership,” May 29, 2004. 36 The Economist Online, “Europe: Multikulturell? Wir?; Immigration in Germany,” November 13, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/17469563. 37 BBC Monitoring European, “Germany: Right­wing leader opposes Turkey’s EU membership,” November 28, 2006. 38 Ibid.

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an outsider, but an outsider that is a burden. Public opinion confirms there is a feeling of 39

discordant identities that goes beyond political elites and is an explanation for opposition at the

populace level. Turkey, being a majority Muslim country, becomes a religious out­group for the

historically Christian Union and “this factor is among the strongest predictors of opposition to

Turkish entrance to the EU.” In Germany in particular, the CDU is “a traditional strong 40

proponent of European integration that nowadays openly opposes Turkish membership.” This 41

suggests that there may be something to MEP Ozdemir’s idea that some EU officials rely on

rational explanations, such as the Cyprus issue, to keep a candidate with a disparate religious

identity from acceding. The most diplomatic explanation of identity is from former French

president Nicolas Sarkozy: “Turkey is a very great civilization and culture, but it’s not a

European one” while insinuating that once all the ‘European’ countries are in the EU, they could

possibly “move onto Asia.” Unsurprisingly, Sarkozy is also a prominent EU actor, acting on an 42

international level.

IV. Evaluation

In reviewing just some of the political officials’ opinions on Turkish accession, and

specifically, those of German politicians, I found that my hypothesis—in Germany, the both

national­ and EU­level CDU would be more likely to invoke rational opposition while the strictly

national­level CSU would be more likely to invoke “irrational” opposition—was partially

39 BBC Monitoring European, “German ruling parties disagree over Turkey’s EU entry,” October 8, 2006. 40 Rachid Azrout, Joost van Spanje and Claes de Vreese, “Talking Turkey: Anti­immigrant attitudes and their effect on support for Turkish membership of the EU,” European Union Politics 12, no. 1 (2011): 16. 41 Boomgaarden and Wüst, 186. 42 “Transcript: Interview with Sarkozy ­ Europe ­ International Herald Tribune,” The New York Times, January 31, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/02/01/world/europe/01iht­web.0131sarkotext.4427470.html.

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confirmed. There are only few instances where the CDU comments on a separate identity; in

both of these instances, the CDU was speaking on a national level. (Merkel was, in fact,

commenting on multiculturalism in Germany in particular, although her comments may extend

to greater Europe.) The CSU is the major invoker of an identity that is in conflict with that of

Turkey, and uses this as a major reason for its opposition. But the party also uses rational

explanations, like the Cyprus issue, and usually in the same sentence as their ideas that Turkey is

not a European country, so it is often difficult to separate the two ‘types’ of opposition. This

could possibly mean that a European identity is contingent on the rational criteria; should Turkey

fulfil them, they will suddenly be affirmed as ‘European’ by the identity­makers. But more

likely, the assumption is actually the reverse: because Turkey is not European, it cannot fulfil

any rational criteria; it is simply too different from Europeans to ever become like them.

It is not necessarily surprising to see that “irrational” (perhaps even uncouth)

explanations to an EU debate would be seen at the national level; the EU’s institutions pride

themselves on being full of gentlemen who come together to find diplomatic solutions to

problems and frequently do so peacefully and without arguing. Unsavory opinions by members

of the European Commission or Parliament, acting in their role as Commissioners or MEPs, are

not likely to be heard, even if they exist. Yet, once off the EU stage and on one of national

politics, we see the “irrational” explanations creep into rhetoric. The national stage, at least in the

case of Germany, seems to be a sounding board for their more unfiltered opinions; maybe

because CSU actors do not participate at the EU level, deferring to the CDU, they need not

worry about cooperating with the ‘Eurocrats’ in a gentlemanly way. Therefore, as a member

state, they can use EU debates as part of national party rhetoric in a much different way than how

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we would see at the EU level. As Christian Democrat parties, the CDU/CSU faction has a

“significantly more hesitant position...vis­à­vis Turkey accession.” As Germans, in a country 43

with a distinctly large population of Turkish immigrants, they are more likely to oppose Turkish

accession and more likely to do so because of anti­immigrant sentiments. The 2005 national 44

election in Germany showed that the Turkish issue was an important one for the public, and had

the ability to influence voting. All of these contexts explain why German politicians talk about 45

Turkey and the EU as often as they do, and why the CDU/CSU faction has maintained their

stance of opposition.

But the population of Turkish immigrants in Germany presents a problem for evaluating

the validity of identity as a reason for opposition to Turkey’s accession. McLaren says feelings

of out­group hostility towards Turkey were compounded in countries with a large population of

Turkish immigrants, but this may have not been the case had they not had the immigrant

population. Yet, Azrout, van Spanje, and de Vreese argue that the perceived religious threat in

the case of a Muslim candidate like Turkey cannot be overcome in the same way the cultural

threat McLaren finds in many candidate countries (not just Turkey) can in Christian countries. 46

Not to mention, it is possible that the perceived threat of immigrants is in some way connected to

the religious threat, i.e., that there is a perceived threat of immigrants not because of rational,

economic self­interest, or even group concerns, but simply because immigrants may have a

different religious identity. The “fear of Islam [in particular, is] a major predictor” of opposition

43 Boomgaarden and Wüst, 180. 44 Rachid Azrout, Joost van Spanje and Claes de Vreese, “Focusing on Differences? Contextual conditions and anti­immigrant attitudes’ effects on support for Turkey’s EU membership,” International Journal of Public Opinion 25, no. 4 (2013): 480. 45 See Schoen (2008). 46 e.g., newest member Croatia.

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to enlargement that includes Muslim countries. Bearing these findings in mind, Turkey, being 90

percent Muslim as well as historically the cultural ‘other’ of Europe—essential in defining the

identity but never being able to identify as such, is unlikely to ever see a light at the end of the

negotiation tunnel.

While all of this is, of course, irritating for Turkey, who has had the goal of joining

Europe for more than 50 years and has been ‘waiting at its doorstep’ for just as long, it is also

rather unpleasant for Europe itself. The EU sees itself as a postmodern actor; one that seeks

“unity in diversity.” It likes to believe that multiculturalism is successful here because the

countries that used to war with each other have found peace in the twenty first century. A

Muslim country acceding to the Union would make a truly multicultural, postmodern Europe,

but that is something there is widespread opposition towards. Turkey has “contributed to a

decentring of European identity by challenging the self­perception of Europe as a multicultural

space.” Instead of embracing new cultures, the EU looks to enlarge to the countries that it sees 47

as European before anyone else, as evidenced by the hasty accession of CEE, which reunited ‘the

kidnapped west’ with its ‘family of nations.’ Turkey cannot do this as easily; it “did not belong 48

to Europe in the first place.” But this then means that the European project has had an end from 49

the beginning: to bring together only a particular Europe and no one else. As it turns out, this

Europe is “not only culturalist, but culture­exclusivist.” David Marquand claims that “history 50

trumps geography” (and perhaps even the fulfilment of membership criteria), and that “it is hard

47 Morozov and Rumelili, 29. 48 If the length of time spent in negotiations is indirectly related to how European the EU thinks you are, things do not look good for Turkey. 49 David Marquand, The End of the West: the once and future Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 175. 50 Katharina Bodirsky, “A cosmopolitan Europe? On “unity in diversity” and the politics of Turkey’s EU accession,” Focaal 55, no. 1 (2009): 13.

Skow 19

to argue that [Turkey is] part of the Europe of the mind.” A European identity is formed when 51

considering, and excluding, Turkey as Europe’s ‘other’ and clearly, Europeans want this identity

to stay as such.

Ultimately, identity is an intensely complicated concept. Identities are often in flux, none

more so than a European one, by nature of the fact that the ‘European’ Union has in its official

policies the capacity to change who belongs to it. But if this is the case, why can the EU

accommodate some new members that bring new aspects of identity to integrate and not others?

Is it possible that, for all the EU talks about diversity, they aren’t really integrating new identity

aspects when certain candidates accede? That instead, these countries have the same European

identity and they are now legally joining an institution they’ve really always belonged to? But

when it comes to the candidacy of Turkey, their accession would be a true adoption of new

identity aspects and as it turns out, maybe the EU is not ready to actually do that.

V. Conclusion

This paper attempted to elucidate the idea of European identity as an explanation for

opposition to Turkish accession to the European Union. There are many theories of a European

identity, and many facets that make up what a European identity might be, e.g., democratic,

western, Christian, educated, or well­traveled. It is difficult to say which of these facets become

more salient when identity is invoked to explain opposition to Turkish accession, although, based

on previous studies, it looks like religion is the frontrunner, specifically, Islam being a religious

identity the EU is not willing to co­opt anytime soon. It is also confirmed that a large presence 52

51 Marquand, 174. 52 Azrout, van Spanje and de Vreese (2011).

Skow 20

of Turkish immigrants has not fostered a sense of solidarity between the two groups; if anything,

citizens of countries with particularly substantial immigrant populations are all the more hostile

towards them as well as skeptical of Turkish accession, as evidenced by Germany, who has the

largest population of Turks outside of Turkey. This creates a Europe of two minds: one that is,

according to the EU, inclusive and multicultural, and another that clings to the ‘Europeanness’ of

centuries past. The fact that Europe could transcend its own violent twentieth century, yet cannot

seem to get over the European­Ottoman divide of the seventeenth century begs the question “is

there something distinct about a European?” with the answer being an obvious ‘yes.’

EU enlargement as a foreign policy tool has always focused on integrating with those the

Union considers ‘most European’ (i.e., Switzerland or Iceland). Therefore, it is much more

likely—given that, in the end, entrance into the EU is a question of “are you European?” and

many Europeans have said that no, Turkey is not—the EU will continue to cooperate with

Turkey within institutions like NATO and the Council of Europe, all the while finding ways to

stall accession negotiations under the guise of unfulfilled membership criteria, but maintaining

that there is something inherently ‘different’ about Turkey that makes Europeans unsure that it is

really one of them and belongs in their club. “Heir of the old Ottoman empire, Turkey is a

geopolitical and civilizational Janus.” 53

53 Minkenberg, Boomgaarden and de Vreese, 138.

Skow 21

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