© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2013 DOI: 10.1163/15700615-13120205

EJEAS 12 (2013) 243–267

European Journalof

East Asian Studies

brill.com/ejea

Transmigrant Identities andHuman Capital Flows in Singapore

Faizal YahyaNational University of Singapore

faizal.yahya@nus.edu.sg

Abstract

Singapore provides a useful model of how the flow of transnationals and their economic,political and social impacts aremanaged. Singapore is one of theworld’smost open economiesbut its low total fertility rate (TFR) has threatened its economic growth and survival. Asa result, the government has been recruiting foreign human capital in order to expand itsworking population and economic growth. The imperative was business to leverage on globalgrowth in 2005 but the city-state was not adequately prepared for the huge influx of foreignersor non-resident workers. The number of non-resident workers increased by 100 per cent tomore than 1.3 million in about five to six years from 2005. Some of the unintended ‘spillover’effects have been rising inflation, increasing competition for jobs, escalating property pricesand overcrowding on public transport. Societal tensions have emerged around the conceptof ‘us’ and the ‘other’ in Singapore. The paper discusses how the state and companies haveimplemented programmes to reduce the ‘gaps’ between local and foreign human capital inSingapore. Some of these have included orientation programmes, activities with voluntarywelfare organisations and other interactions under the overall integration policy the state hasimplemented.

Keywordshuman capital; transmigrants; identities; governance; foreigners; economy

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, economic integration has beenhastened with the process of globalisation, manifested by more multinationalcompanies (MNCs) expanding into the Asian region on a large scale to enhancetheir profits base. From the human capital perspective, in order to persuadeexecutives to assume positions in the Asian region, MNCs were willing to payattractive expatriate wage packages. A decade later, with the emergence of mul-tilingual Asian executives with international exposure and education, this has

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influenced changing trends in human capital recruitment. Contemporaneously,Western developed countries experiencing low total fertility rates (TFR) andrecruitment agencies started to shift their focus towards recruiting human capitalresources from emerging Asian economic giants China and India. Both theseAsian economies have a large local talent pool but their skilled workers andprofessionals are increasingly reluctant to move overseas because of their ownbooming economies.1

Their ‘best and brightest’ talents were able to find employment domesticallywith the various MNCs heading to China and India. In addition, Indian con-glomerates such as Reliance, Tata, Birla and others were increasingly able toabsorb their local talent. Interestingly, diaspora talent from the two large econ-omies was also returning to assume more senior positions. Companies in Indiawere also recruiting heavily from Ivy League universities in the United Statesto expand their own operations.2 In particular, a growing number of technol-ogy companies had taken advantage of the stagnating information technology(IT) sector in theUS and began recruiting some ofAmerica’s ‘best and brightest’in this field. For example, Kunal Bahl, CEO of Snapdeal, one of India’s fastest-growing tech companies, visited four topUS universities with the aim of recruit-ing 20 to 30 engineers, product managers and marketers. The recruiting triphad stops at Columbia University, the University of Pennsylvania, Northwest-ern University and Stanford University.3 Another Indian automotive company,Mahindra and Mahindra, was recruiting from another Ivy League tertiary insti-tution, the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School of Business.

The other main reason why developed economies such as the US are not ableto attract (or attract for long) the ‘best and brightest’ foreign students con-cerned US visa regulations. Research undertaken on ‘losing the world’s best andbrightest’, by the universities of Berkeley andDuke and funded by theKaufmannFoundation,4 gave the following results:

The research survey drew responses from 1,224 foreign nationals who werecurrently studying in institutions of higher learning in the US and who hadgraduated by the end of 2008. The survey comprised 229 students from China(includingHong Kong), 117 fromWestern Europe and 878 students from India.

1) F. Yahya andA. Kaur,TheMigration of IndianHumanCapital:The Ebb and Flow of IndianProfessionals in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 2010).2) J. Swartz, ‘Foreign tech companies woo USA’s best, brightest’, USA Today (16 November2011).3) Swartz, ‘Foreign tech companies’.4) V. Wadhwa, A. Saxenian, R. Freeman and A. Salkever, ‘Losing the world’s best and bright-est: America’s new immigrant entrepreneurs’, Part V (Duke University, UC Berkeley andKauffman Foundation, March 2009).

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Among the respondents who wanted to return to their home countries afterfive years in the US, 55 per cent were from India, 40 per cent were from Chinaand 30 per cent were from Europe. Most of the students were concerned aboutobtaining work visas, and 74 per cent of the Indian students and 76 per centof the Chinese students were also worried about obtaining jobs in their fields.TheChinese students in particular felt that the best job opportunities were to befound inChina, at 52 per cent.The Indian students were themost positive on theeconomic future of their home country and less likely to see the economic futureof India as negative.5

These trends have effectively shifted the ‘brain drain’ argument towards a‘brain gain’ and ultimately a ‘brain circulation’ phenomenon in the global econ-omy.Even amongmoredevelopedAsian economies like Japan andSingapore, therecruitment of foreign human capital has become a priority because of their owndecliningTFRandan ageing anddecliningworkingpopulation. For example, fora city-state of 5.4 million in population, the number of foreigners who are work-ing, studying or living in Singapore on work or education visas had increased to1.56million in September 2013, from 1.31million in 2010.The influx of foreignersor non-residents in Singapore has created infrastructure problems, more compe-tition for employment and a rising cost of living.

Statement of the Problem

How did the government of Singapore, working along the principles of prag-matism in its public policy framework, end up with a crisis of lagging infras-tructure development and social tension as a result of a massive influx of foreignhuman capital? The assumption is that the government placed the emphasis oneconomic growth without adequate provisions to study the linkages and effectsof the influx of foreign human capital on its citizen population. Arguably, withinthe framework of Development Studies, in Singapore’s case, social theorisingdid not keep pace with its economic counterpart.6 The Singapore governmenttook the decision to leverage on global economic growthwithout resorting to anincremental approach in allowing for an influx of foreign human capital. How-ever, the government misjudged the length of the recovery in the global econ-omy. As such, a longer than expected time of global economic growth enabledthe influx to continue unchecked until the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008to 2009. In this regard, policy-makers did not question economic growth as the

5) Wadhwa et al., ‘Losing the world’s best and brightest’.6) P. Preston, New Trends in Development Theory, Essays in Development and Social Theory108 (London: Routledge, 1985).

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single forward path to ‘progress’. Rodrik commented that there is one economicsbut many recipes: institutions and policies matter and take many forms;7 andPieterse conceptualised this as development pluralism.8

The public outcry over the influx of foreign human capital also indicated thatthe government did not adequately inform and prepare its citizens for the largeinflux of foreigners. As such, it could be argued that in public policy terms thegovernment’s actual policy temperature differed from the preferred policy tem-perature of the population. In this context, the public as voters could act as a‘thermostat’ to send a signal to the government to adjust its policy on immigra-tion and intake of human capital.9 It will be argued that this occurred throughthe ballot boxes in the general elections (GE) in May 2011 and subsequent by-elections.

Thepaperwill then examine how transmigrants or transnationals in the labourforce impacted the citizens of Singapore in terms of lifestyle andnational identitywhich comprises its civil society.10 One in three individuals now living in Singa-pore is a foreigner.11 What is the way forward in resolving tensions caused bythe influx of human capital? Resolving infrastructure deficits through increasedpublic spending on housing and transportation is less challenging compared torepairing the tension between foreigners and locals in society. Encouragingly,

7) D. Rodrik, ‘Normalising industrial policy’, Commission of Growth and DevelopmentWorking Paper No. 3, World Bank (2007).8) J.N. Pieterse, ‘Twenty-first century globalization: a new development era’, Forum for Devel-opment Studies, Vol. 39, No. 3 (2012), pp. 367–385.9) C. Wlezien, ‘The public as thermostat: dynamics of preferences for spending’, AmericanJournal of Political Science, Vol. 39, No. 4 (November 1995), pp. 981–1000.10) TheWorld Bank has adopted a definition of civil society developed by a number of leadingresearch centres:

the term civil society to refer to the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profitorganizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and valuesof their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious orphilanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer toa wide of array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations(NGOs), labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organi-zations, professional associations, and foundations.

(‘Defining civil society’, World Bank; available at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0,,contentMDK:20101499~menuPK:244752~pagePK:220503~piPK:220476~theSitePK:228717,00.html.)11) ‘Manage immigration issues before fault line deepens, say observers’, Channel News Asia(11 October 2011); available at: http://www.channelnewsasia.com/ (accessed 12 October2011).

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Figure 1. Population Profile in Singapore from 2004 to 2012Source: Singapore Department of Statistics

several variants of Singapore’s civil society have emerged that connect with thecalls of liberal democracy from the middle class and go against the culture ofmaterialism and political apathy.12 However, this poses a challenge to the priv-ileged position of the state in the public sphere and has influenced the processof realignment in society–state power relations. Chong describes civil society inSingapore as enlightened and humanist ideals that presented as an antidote tothe pervasive culture of materialism, consumerism and individualism.13 It willbe argued that this trend will ultimately be beneficial for the integrative policyand measures that the government has introduced to reduce the ‘gaps’ betweenforeigners and locals in Singapore.

Increasing Diversity

In September 2013 Singapore’s population stood at 5.4 million, comprising 3.84million residents of whom 3.3 million were Singapore citizens (SCs) and 531,200permanent residents (PRs). This is an increase from June 2011 where the totalpopulation was 5.18 million, comprising 3.79 million residents of whom 3.26million were Singapore citizens and 530,000 permanent residents.14 However,Singapore’s population has expanded at its slowest pace since 2004. Figure 1

12) T. Chong, ‘Civil society in Singapore: popular discourses and concepts’, Sojourn, Vol. 20,No. 2 (April 2005), pp. 273–301.13) T. Chong, ‘Civil society in Singapore: reviewing concepts in the literature’, ISEAS Work-ing Paper, Social and Cultural Issues No. 1 (2005).14) Singapore Population Brief 2010 (Singapore: Singapore Department of Statistics, June2010).

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Figure 2. Rate of Growth of Population Profile from 2004 to 2011Source: Singapore Department of Statistics

shows the increasing number of foreigners or non-residentsworking and living inSingapore from2004 to 2012. In addition, Figure 1 indicates that the growth ratesfor Singapore citizens and permanent residents are marginal compared to therate of growth of non-residents (foreigners).The number of PR applications thatwere approved has decreased dramatically since 2008. In 2008, 79,200 foreignerswere granted PR status; this figure decreased to 59,460 in 2009 and 29,265 in2010.15

Figure 2 shows that the rate of growth of foreigners or non-residents (NR)expanded at an increasing rate from 2004 to a peak in 2008, declining sharplyin 2009 as a result of the GFC. After 2010, the rate of growth of NR increasedrapidly, but more slowly than from 2004 to 2008. In 2010, the median age forSingapore’s population had risen to 37.4 from 34.0 years in 2000. While this isindicative of an ageing population and workforce, at the same time the numberof successful PR applications had been reduced.16 Then Deputy Prime MinisterWong Kan Seng commented that the number of PR applications had decreaseddramatically since 2008. In addition, for Figure 2, the rate of growth for non-residents (NR) appears to be rapidly increasing again in 2011 and 2012. In con-trast, the rate of growth for PR is increasing more slowly from 2004 to 2008.

15) ‘New PR and citizenship applications declined in 2010’, Asiaone News, Singapore PressHoldings (26 January 2012); available at: http://news.asiaone.com/News/Latest+News/Singapore/Story/A1Story20120116-322202.html.16) Lai Han-Wei, ‘S’pore population at 5.08m’, Straits Times (31 August 2010).

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However, the rate of growth for PR shows amarked increase in 2009, presumablyfor foreigners seeking employment security after the GFC. PR status is covetedamong non-residents because it enables them to remain in Singapore in the eventthat they are retrenched to look for new employment. In addition, for PRs,their residency requirements are not pegged to their employment passes. It isalso believed that employers prefer to hire Singapore citizens or PRs becausethis involves less administrative work and they are not regulated by employmentquotas as stipulated by theMinistry ofManpower (MOM) forwork permits andemployment passes.

The rate of growth for PR in 2010 has decreased and reached negative growthin 2011 because of themore stringentmeasures ofPRapproval andflight of talent.The rate of growth for PRs is positive again in 2011.The PopulationWhite Paperreleased by the government in January 2013 said that the number of new PRswould be held constant at around 30,000 annually. In terms of citizenship, therate of growth of Singapore citizens (SCs) was constant from 2004 to 2012. Thisis in line with the government’s aim to increase the number of citizens by 15,000to 25,000 per year.17

Lack of Incremental Measures

Why did the government’s actual policy temperature differ from the preferredpolicy temperature of the population? Singapore citizens based the legitimacyof its government on fulfilling their economic aspirations and maintaining agood standard of living, such as the provision of improving employment oppor-tunities, education, housing and healthcare among other needs. However, theseexpectations from citizens have been threatened by increasing inflows of foreign-ers or non-residents working in Singapore. In a democratic governance structure,government accountability through keeping the public reasonablywell informedis one of several key criteria. In this regard, the government did not do this andinstead placed heavy emphasis on economic growth as a source of its legitimacyto rule. Singapore’s Prime Minister (PM) Lee Hsien Loong, speaking at the Sin-gapore Perspectives 2013 conference organised by the Institute of Policy Studiesin Singapore in January 2013, acknowledged the lapse in policy judgement. Heexplained that his government was trying to ‘make up’ for time lost to the post9/11 global economic recession in 2005 to 2006. He said, ‘I decided (by 2005and 2006) that we should try and make up for lost time because you want theeconomy to grow.’ He added:

17) A Sustainable Population for a Dynamic Singapore: Population White Paper (Singapore:National Population and Talent Division, Prime Minister’s Office, January 2013).

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You want Singapore to make progress and you don’t know how long the sun is going toshine. As it turned out, the sun remained shining for longer than we expected. So thepopulation grew faster than we expected; our infrastructure didn’t keep up.18

PM Lee noted how the strains that subsequently showed up were ‘quite instruc-tive’, because they did not showup gradually but ‘quite suddenly’, and by themid-dle of 2009Singapore’s leaderswere scrambling to devisemeasures to ‘cool thingsdown’ in the propertymarket. PMLeewent on to say: ‘We’ve been trying to coolthings down ever since.’ He admitted, ‘So we lacked that 20/20 foresight.’ Onwhether there were alternatives to the policies implemented, PM Lee said:

Should we then have said, ‘I didn’t plan for this infrastructure, let’s tell the businesses togo away and let’s forget about the growth, we don’t need the IRs, we don’t need theseextra jobs, we just stay where we were’? I think that would be very risky. So we wentahead.19

‘Next time, we will try to do better, certainly to have a bigger buffer and not tocut things so fine, but I think it’s very difficult to know 10 years from now howmany [homes] you will need,’ said PM Lee.20

Voting Public as ‘Thermostat’

With the influx of non-residents, the cost of living has increased tremendouslyas Singapore has become one of the world’s most costly cities to live in. Theseconcerns created a ‘backlash’ against the ruling incumbent People’s Action Party(PAP) among voters. Voters became the ‘thermostat’ in the general elections(GE)ofMay 2011 that corrected the disjuncture between the government’s actualpolicy temperature and the preferred policy temperature of the population. TheGE in May 2011 saw 82 out of a total 87 parliamentary seats being contested,the highest number of constituencies contested since Singapore’s independencein 1965. The GE saw the public voting in the largest number of opposition par-liamentarians, and the key electoral concerns were ‘bread and butter’ issues suchas employment, the large inflows of foreigners, rising property prices, transporta-tion constraints and rising inflation.21 Thetotal vote share of the incumbent Peo-

18) J. Tan, ‘Clearly, we could have done more: PM Lee’, Yahoo News (29 January 2013); avail-able at: http://sg.news.yahoo.com/clearly-we-could-have-done-more-pm-lee-052136326.html (accessed 27 September 2013).19) Tan, ‘Clearly, we could have done more’.20) P.S. Yong, ‘Singapore Perspectives 2013: PM throws light on what led to infrastructurestrain’, Straits Times (29 January 2013).21) G. Bhatia, ‘Singapore’s propertymarket headed towards a perfect storm?’ CNBC (30May2011); available at: http://www.cnbc.com/ (accessed 30 May 2011).

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ple’s Action Party fell to 60.14 per cent, a 6 per cent drop from the previous gen-eral elections in 2006. Nonetheless, with Singapore’s declining TFR, it wouldnot have been economically feasible for the government to stop the inflow offoreigners. However, given voting sentiments and the need to have a more sus-tainable economic model, growth would have to be tempered against the back-drop of a rising civil society that ismaking its voice heard, and votes count.Couldthe foreigners themselves help to allay the increasingly ‘xenophobic’ fears amongthe locals?

Discussions about skilled and professional foreigners residing in Singaporehave revolved around influencing them to ‘root’ themselves and to adopt Sin-gapore as their new home. This sense of rootedness is portrayed as being loyalto Singapore and not using the country as a ‘stepping stone’ towards better lifeprospects elsewhere. In this context, critics have argued that foreigners find itattractive to work and live in Singapore when the economy is vibrant but fleeoverseas when the economy is in recession. However, the emergence of foreign-ers and new citizens getting involved and assisting in social enterprises and vol-untary welfare groups which contribute to society’s well-being could be criticalin creating and sustaining an open civil society in Singapore.22Thestate’s rhetoricto voters, of Singaporeans mostly having migrant origins and thus needing to beopen to more immigrants and foreigners, is increasingly a ‘hard sell’ for policy-makers. Singapore citizens need to be assured that more inflows of foreignerswill not only benefit economic growth but also contribute to society’s overallwell-being.

In January 2013, a by-election was called in the constituency of Punggol Eastand was won by the leading opposition party, the Workers’ Party (WP). Tomost, this by-election was a ‘tipping point’ of sorts, in the words of MalcolmGladwell,23 against the incumbent PAP because the WP won in a four-corneredcontest with two other political parties, the Reform Party (RP) and the Singa-poreDemocraticAlliance (SDA).TheWP’s candidate, LeeLiLian, received 54.2per cent of the votes, beating the PAP’s Koh Poh Koon, who received 43.7 percent out of 29,415 valid votes cast. Significantly, there was an 11 per cent voteswing against the PAP. In addition, in terms of qualification and credentials,often a strength of the incumbent PAP in past elections, Ms Lee Li Lian, a salestrainer, was not as well qualified as Dr Koh Poh Koon, a surgeon, but the major-ity of voters viewed this as irrelevant. Political observers commented thatMs LeeLi Lian was a familiar face to voters, having contested the GE 2011 in the same

22) E. Toh, ‘Immigrants find new ways to integrate’, Straits Times (25 September 2011).23) M. Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (Boston:Little, Brown, 2002).

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Figure 3. Rate of Growth of Singapore Labour Force from 2004 to 2012Source: Ministry of Manpower, Singapore

constituency, and voters were also voting to air their grievances on issues such asmore competition in employment opportunities, the high cost of living, immi-gration and greater housing costs, among others.

Employment

In 2013, the median age of the citizen population increased to 38.9 years from35.3 years in 2002.24 In addition, there are fewer working adults compared tothe elderly. Figure 3 shows that the number constituting the non-resident labourforce has also increased, to 1.24 million in early 2013 from 652,700 in 2002, anincrease of 90 per cent. In terms of workforce figures in Singapore, as of June2013 total employment in Singapore was 3,420,200. The total foreign workforcenumber was 1,296,800, which is a third of the total workforce. The total foreignworkforce, excluding foreign domestic workers and construction, was 743,300.

24) PopulationTrends 2013 (Singapore:Department of Statistics,Ministry ofTrade and Indus-try, Singapore, 2013); ‘Singapore’s population growth slows’, Today Online (26 September2013); available at: http://www.todayonline.com/singapore/singapores-population-growth-slows-0.

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There was a slight decrease in those with an Employment Pass (EP), at 172,100from 173,800 in December 2012. However, numbers of those with an S Pass (awork permit for those withmedium skills) increased to 154,100 from 142,400 inDecember 2012. In December 2011, residents comprised 79 per cent of the totalprofessionals, managers, engineers and technicians (PMET) workforce, whilenon-residents comprised the remaining 21 per cent. The importance of PMETsmust be highlighted because two-thirds of Singaporeans (1.25 million) will holdwhite-collar PMET jobs by 2030, rising from approximately half the workforce(850,000) in January 2013.

Employment remains a thorny issue for voters: for example, according to theRedundancy and Re-entry into Employment 2012 report released by the Ministryof Manpower’s Research and Statistics Department, 11,010 workers were maderedundant in 2012, up 10 per cent from 9,990 in 2011. PMETs have becomemorevulnerable to redundancy. In 2012, 7.4 workers were made redundant for every1,000 PMETs, an increase from 5.5 per 1,000 in 2011. In addition, PMETs hada higher incidence of redundancy than production and related workers, as wellas clerical, sales and service workers. In 2012, PMETs formed more than half thenumber of workers made redundant by employers. How could the governmentassuage the feelings of voters who viewed foreigners as added competition foremployment?

On 23 September 2013, the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) announced newregulations requiring employers to consider Singapore citizens fairly before hir-ing foreigners under EPs. Firms which have discriminatory hiring practices willbe subjected to additional scrutiny and may have their work pass quotas cur-tailed.25 The new provisions follow similar guidelines to those already availablein the US, Australia and other developed economies. Under the new hiring reg-ulations, the MOM has established a Fair Consideration Framework and a newjobs bank to be administered by the SingaporeWorkforce Development Agency(WDA). In this context, employers are required to advertise their employmentvacancies for at least 14 days. In addition, the qualifying salary for new EP appli-cations will be raised from S$3,000 to S$3,300 to ensure that recruiters andemployment agencies are not able to leverage on lower salaries to attract foreignhuman capital and disadvantage new graduates among Singaporeans.

The Singapore economy has thrived in the past because it has rested uponthe pillars of political and socio-economic stability, thanks to its employmentpolicies, shaped through consultation between the trade unions, governmentand companies. To a large extent the employment market here has worked on

25) MOM website, available at: www.mom.gov.sg.

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a free and open market policy. Nonetheless, the international economy and theSingapore economy have evolved, and with greater economic integration thereis greater mobility of labour of all kinds worldwide. These regulations are aimedat achieving a balance or parity in the workforce among Singapore’s increasinglydiverse working population.

Assimilation Measures—Voluntarism and Integration Programmes

Would voluntary activities and integration programmes be effective in assimi-lating new citizens and PRs into Singapore society? A recent survey on publicvoluntarism commented that Singapore residents were not averse tomaking cashdonations to charitable causes butwill shy away fromvolunteering their own timeforwelfarework.However, thismay provide opportunities to foreignersworkingin Singapore to undertake some voluntary welfare activities. For example, someforeigners, such as those fromChina, have formed their own volunteer groups toteachMandarin to kids at homes for displaced children. Future projects for suchvoluntary welfare groups include befriending the elderly and engaging them inrecreational activities in homes for the aged.26 Some foreign human capital fromIndia had also undertaken voluntary work at local ethnic Indian self-help asso-ciations. Are foreigners as permanent residents (PRs) volunteering in self-helpgroups?

The number of PRs who have become members of grassroots organisationssuch as residents’ committees (RCs) or citizens’ consultative committees(CCCs) should be capped at 15 per cent of total membership. However, this capis not widely known and some RCs and CCCs comprise as many as 18 per centPRs in their total membership. The RCs and CCs are under the purview of thePeople’s Association (PA), a statutory board which comes under the purview ofthe Prime Minister of Singapore. The PA’s view is that the involvement of PRsin community activities would contribute towards establishing a better under-standing between them and Singaporeans. Some of these activitiesmight includehosting block parties, festival celebrations at community clubs and orientationtours in the neighbourhood for new citizens. Many PRs serve on the integra-tion and naturalisation committees (INCs) to help with the integration of otherPRs and new citizens with Singaporeans.The INCs are also divided into specificcommittees to cater to specific ethnicity, such as the Indian Activities ExecutiveCommittee (IAEC).

However, observers point out that apart from expanding their social networkin Singapore, some PRs have viewed grassroots activities as a means to boost

26) Toh, ‘Immigrants find new ways’.

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their chances of acquiring citizenship. Critics also argued that some PRs areprobably more enthusiastic to join grassroots organisations than local citizensbecause of the perks which come along with membership, such as priority inenrolment of their children in primary schools. Some internet bloggers havealso alluded to the timing of the debate on PRs and new citizens with the thenimpending GE. Bloggers have pointed out that new citizens are likely to votefor the political party in power, so that the number of new citizens and theirgeographic spread among the various constituencies may be a means of shoringup votes in marginal constituencies held by the PAP. Some bloggers have floatedthe idea that new citizens should not be allowed to vote until at least two yearsafter receiving their citizenship. The right to vote has become a sensitive issuesince it seems to be the key defining privilege between Singaporeans and PRs.Ironically, after the results of the last GE and the presidential elections (PE) inAugust 2011,more policy-makers, including thenewly electedpresident,DrTonyTan, have affirmed a ‘Singaporeans First’ policy.27 Has the ballot box assumedgreater importance in Singapore’s political landscape?

Singaporeans’ apathy as voters is changing. For over four decades the incum-bent ruling party has exhorted the public to take an interest in societal issues andto nurture an active civil society, but to no avail. In early 2000, the governmentlaunched the Singapore 21Committee to look at the key dilemmas facing society,including the need to enhance citizen participation in civic groups.28 The Singa-pore 21 Committee ultimately produced several recommendations in what wasregarded as a blueprint or social contract between the government and citizens.29However, this social contract is unravelling because one of the key concerns thathas emerged since the Singapore 21 ‘blueprint’ has been over the impact of thelarge influx of foreigners into Singapore and its influence on civil society.30 In ayoung nation-state that is just over 45 years old, the Singaporean identity is oftendescribed as amorphous and vague, but arguably a nascent Singaporean identityis formingwhich is encountering greater churnwith greater inflows of foreigners.

27) A. Wong, ‘Tony Tan: Singaporeans first, not Singaporeans only education policy’, YahooNews (19 July 2011); available at: http://sg.news.yahoo.com/blogs/singaporescene/tony-tan-favour-singaporeans-first-education-policy-060406055.html.28) T. Lee, ‘The politics of civil society in Singapore’, Asian Studies Review, Vol. 26, No. 1(March 2002), pp. 132–154.29) Lee, ‘The politics of civil society’.30) A Talent Capital in the New Economy (Singapore: Ministry of Manpower, Singapore,2011); A. Ahad Osman-Gani, ‘Human capital development in Singapore: an analysis of na-tional policy perspectives’, Advances in Developing Human Resources, Vol. 6, No. 3 (August2004), pp. 276–287.

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Singapore’s social and physical landscape is changing and its impact on an invig-orated civil society is uncertain. How would an active citizenship galvanised bythe influx of foreigners affect civil society in Singapore?

Table 1 shows the TFR for the various ethnic groups in Singapore from 2002to 2012. Across the board for all ethnic groups, the TFR has fallen below thereplacement level of 2.0. In 2010, the TFR was 1.16 per resident female, andamong the majority Chinese it was 1.02.31 In 2011 there was a slight reboundof TFR to 1.2 overall and 1.08 for the Chinese. This continued in 2012, whenthe TFR rose to 1.29 because of the ‘mini dragon’ effect (the Chinese consideredbirths in the Chinese horoscope dragon year to be auspicious). As Table 1 shows,for the Chinese the TFR increased to 1.18, for Malays it increased to 1.69 and forIndians it increased to 1.15.

Table 1. Total Fertility Rate by Ethnic Group (per Female) in Singapore, 2002 to 2012

Year Total Chinese Malays Indians

2002 1.37 1.19 2.39 1.512003 1.27 1.09 2.10 1.392004 1.26 1.09 2.07 1.342005 1.26 1.10 2.03 1.292006 1.28 1.11 2.02 1.272007 1.29 1.14 1.94 1.252008 1.28 1.14 1.91 1.192009 1.22 1.08 1.82 1.142010 1.16 1.02 1.65 1.132011 1.2 1.08 1.64 1.092012 1.29 1.18 1.69 1.15

Source: Singapore Department of Statistics and Today newspaper (27 September 2013)

Identity and Civil Society

With nearly one out of every two individuals residing in Singapore a foreigner(including PRs), the general assumption is that the state has tenuous bondswith the citizenry because of its history, the open nature of its economy and itsvaried and fluid ethnoscape. Arjun Appadurai defines ethnoscape as the land-scape of persons who constitute the shifting world in which we live, such astourists, immigrants, refugees and exiles, among others.32 To various degrees,these groups have become a feature of the world and appear to affect the politics

31) Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s Chinese New Year Message, 2011.32) A. Appadurai, Modernity at Large (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

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of nations.33 Arguably, feelings of nationalism are still not entrenched, givenSingapore’s relatively recent independence.However, surprisingly, within an areaof 710sq. km., among a heterogeneous population that is besieged by globalforces which threaten to overwhelm local traditions, there is a reassertion ofthe ‘local’, which is a characteristic associated with a particular area or locality.Seemingly the Singaporean identity forms the core of this debate between ‘us’and the ‘other’.

Arguably, identity is a component of civil society because it defines the citi-zenry in Singapore which is still evolving. When Singapore was separated fromMalaysia in 1965, therewere sporadic public debates about the Singaporean iden-tity. Up until the 1970s, the common assumption was that there was no Singa-porean identity. The decades from the late 1960s to the 1980s were perhaps notthe most opportune of times to reflect on a Singaporean identity, which wasat the height of implementation of resettlement policies. Singapore witnessedthe resettlement of thousands of people into Housing and Development Board(HDB) or government-subsidised flats. Familiar districts and buildings under-went drastic changes and makeovers, creating different landscapes. Is the chang-ing landscape part of the state’s plans to construct a Singaporean identity?

The inference was that the Singaporean identity would not spontaneouslyemerge from the country’s ongoing social, political and cultural life. Rather,it would have to be consciously created and ‘built’ by policies, directives andeducational campaigns.TheNational Service (NS) formen, the public sector andeducational institutions in general became tools to forge a Singaporean identityamong the locals. Arguably, the content of the Singaporean identity remainedvague and ill-defined. To add to its ill-defined nature, values like ‘multi-racial’,‘tough-minded meritocratic individualism’ and ‘society before self ’ were addedto the equation. Connections to ‘Asian roots’ and ‘traditional values’ were alsoemphasised. The ideal Singaporeans were to be modern and cosmopolitan whileretaining their distinctively Asian traditions. The construction of the nationalidentity in the late 1980swas pegged to discourses onAsian values, seen as criticalbecause of their influence in the branding of Singapore.34

Singapore’s pioneering political leaders did not opt for policies of assimilation,and some academics would argue that they stopped just short of assimilation.Instead, the objective was to create a confidentmulticultural society whose com-ponent ethnic groups shared participation in such common institutions as elec-toral politics, public education, military service, public housing and ceremonies

33) Appadurai, Modernity, p. 33.34) S. Ortmann, ‘Singapore: the politics of inventing national identity’, Journal of CurrentSoutheast Asian Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 4 (2009), pp. 23–46, p. 7.

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of citizenship, while at the same time they were to retain distinct languages,religions and customs.The ‘Singaporemodel’ is not the ‘melting pot’ of theUSAbut more the ethnic mosaic of the Canadian model, in which each ethnic groupcan maintain its distinctiveness yet adopt a new national identity.35

In the effort to create a suitable national identity, in 1989 Singapore’s leaderscalled for a ‘national ideology’ to prevent the harmful drift towards superficial‘Westernisation’. The national ideology’s aim was to help in the development ofa national identity and bond Singaporeans together by finding and encourag-ing core values common to all the country’s diverse cultural traditions. Theseincluded emphasising community over self, valuing the family, resolving issuesthrough the search for consensus rather than contention, and promoting racialand religious tolerance. In order to reduce friction between locals and foreign-ers, if there was a Singaporean identity would it be possible for transmigrants ortransnationals to adopt it? Singapore has often been referred to as a cosmopoli-tan society composed of people from all parts of the world or from many dif-ferent spheres, and it could be argued that within the conceptual idea of cos-mopolitanism it was able to reconcile its identity as a global city and a nation-state. As a global city-state Singapore’s exposure to globalising influences mightdecrease the forms of social exclusivity including nationalism, ethnicity, religiousfundamentalism and other forms of extremism. However, this would not nec-essarily be the case and, paradoxically, globalisation might exacerbate forms ofsocial exclusivity.36 To a large extent, the recent debate about immigration andforeign talent in Singapore has had similar echoes to those occurring during thelast Asian financial crisis of 1998. In 1998 to1999, the high-profile appointmentsof foreign talent at government-linked companies (GLCs) such as the Develop-mentBank of Singapore (DBS) andNeptuneOrient Lines (NOL) caused publicconsternation and raised overt nationalist sentiments.37

The need for foreign human capital in Singapore is linked to national sur-vival because of the declining TFR. Without an adequate manpower base theeconomy will not be able to expand and support an ageing population, hencethe need to attract foreign talent to keep Singapore competitive as a knowledge-based economy (KBE). The Singapore 21 Committee Report stated that Singa-

35) A.H. Kim, ‘Panethnicity and ethnic resources in residential integration: a comparativestudy of two host societies’, Canadian Studies in Population, Vol. 32, No. 1 (2005), pp. 1–28,p. 7.36) B. Yeoh and K. Willis, ‘Singapore unlimited: configuring social identity in the regionali-sation process’, unpublished paper, p. 3.37) M. Amaldas, ‘The management of globalization in Singapore: twentieth century lessonsfor the early decades of the new century’, Journal of Alternative Perspectives, Vol. 1, No. 3(2009), pp. 982–1002, p. 991.

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pore is competing against developed economies like Germany and Finland withsignificantKBE industries andno longer competingwith emerging economies.38For example, in areas such as the insurance sector, there is a pool of local tal-ent but there are still shortages and foreign talent was recruited to contributetowards Singapore’s status as an insurance hub in Asia.39 In other areas, Singa-pore is also trying to establish itself as a hub for non-governmental organisationsand humanitarian activities. However, it does not have a pool of sufficient localtrained manpower.

The same Singapore 21 Committee Report also stated that when it came toaccepting the need for foreign talent in Singapore, 70 per cent of graduates didso, and among thosewith ‘O’ levels acceptancewas42per cent.The local nationalnewspaper,TheStraitsTimes, conducted a survey amongdifferent age groups andfound that while 85 per cent of those in their twenties are supportive of the influxof foreign talent, this figure falls to 68 per cent of those in their forties.40Nationalidentity and shared values featured prominently in the Singapore 21 Report, andpart of the shared values will be to bond with new citizens and welcome themto Singapore. In relation to citizenship, the Singapore 21 Report urges for anactive citizenry and making citizenship count. Part of an active citizenship isbeing well informed about the issues and challenges facing Singapore. Activecivic participation is a key facet of civil society, such as caring for the old andnurturing the young.

How attractive is Singapore to expatriate talent? In an annual report by theHongKong and Shanghai BankingCorporation (HSBC), the bank interviewedmore than 4,217 expatriates worldwide, the largest survey of its kind.

Table 2. Proportion of Expatriates Earning More than US$200,000 a year, 2009–2010

S/no. 2010 Rank (2009) Countries % of Expatriates

1 1 (4) Singapore 452 (2) Russia 403 (–) Bermuda 394 (3) Hong Kong 364 (13) Saudi Arabia 35

Source: Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC)

38) Singapore 21 Committee Reports, available at: http://was.nl.sg/details/www.singapore21.org.sg.html (accessed, 14 November 2011).39) Teh Shi Ning, ‘Taking off into a world of opportunities’, Business Times, Singapore (23January 2009).40) Singapore 21 Committee Reports.

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Table 2 shows that Singapore is ranked number 1 globally, with 45 per cent in2010 in terms of the percentage of expatriates earning at least US$200,000 peryear compared to theworldwide average of 21 per cent.41Expatriates in Singaporewere also ahead of their counterparts in Russia, China, the Philippines,MalaysiaandHongKong. Since the last GFC of 2008,MNCs that are repositioning theirbusiness strategies to focusmore inAsia are basingmore of their senior executivesand top-end management in Singapore. Why is Singapore a preferred locationfor MNCs? Singapore happens to be an ideal location because its first languageis English and it has an efficient transport system, good global connectivity, asafe, clean environment and good facilities. However, the influx of expatriatetalentmayhave increased the cost of living in Singapore. In this regard, Singaporeis ranked only seventh in terms of the proportion of expatriates who have adisposable income of more than US$3,000 per month. In 2007, in a cost ofliving survey conducted by Mercer Human Resource Consulting for 143 citiesacross six continents for items such as housing, transport, food, household goodsand entertainment, the cost of living index for Singapore rose from 92 points to100.

Table 3. The World’s Most Expensive Big Cities 2009–2010

Rank 2010 Rank 2009 City Country

1 – Luanda Angola2 1 Tokyo Japan3 – Ndjamena Chad4 3 Moscow Russia5 4 Geneva Switzerland6 2 Osaka Japan7 – Libreville Gabon8 6 Zurich Switzerland8 5 Hong Kong Hong Kong10 7 Copenhagen Denmark11 10 Singapore Singapore11 14 Oslo Norway

Source: Mercer Consulting

According toMercer, the rise in house prices and increasing transportation costscontributed to Singapore’s high ranking on the global list.42 Singapore’s privateresidential prices rose 38 per cent in the second quarter of 2010 and the city-state

41) M. Kok, ‘Expat income: S’pore tops global list’, Straits Times (23 September 2010).42) ‘Singapore is 14th most expensive city to live in: survey’, Channel News Asia (18 June2007); available at: http://www.channelnewsasia.com/ (accessed 19 June 2007).

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led 36markets around the world in property-value changes.43 In 2007, Singaporewas listed number 14 in the list of world’s most expensive cities in which to live.44In 2009, Singapore jumped four places and was tenth on the list of the world’smost expensive cities. In 2010, it slipped aplace tonumber 11.As shown inTable 3,Singapore and three other East Asian cities (Hong Kong, Osaka and Tokyo) arelisted in Mercer Consulting’s most expensive city list.

While seemingly convinced of the state’s economic argument of the needto attract foreign talent, many Singaporeans are anxious and view foreignersas a source of unwelcome competition, particularly during times of economicdownturn.45 In examining the forumpages of local newspapers and internet blogsites, it seems that the government’s policy of attracting foreigners is causingstress and anxiety among local individuals, with some locals fearing that therewill be ‘glass ceilings’ for them. For example, graduates from Indian universitiesare taking up administrative positions in Singapore and competing with lesswell-educated locals.46

In addition, with numerous foreigners arriving from non-traditional sourcessuch as China and India, there is growing concern that these foreign talentshave achieved critical mass and are forming their own exclusive social networksdisconnected from those of local Singaporeans. Is the anxiety of the local Sin-gaporeans about increasing competition for employment from foreigners justi-fied? As Singapore moves towards a more individualistic society, this will dis-advantage local talent in competing with foreign talent whose social networksare far more extensive and global. In 2009, the writer organised a discussionforum of university undergraduates from India at a Singapore university andwasinformed that they networked extensively with their alumni in India and over-seas before and after arriving in Singapore. In addition, Indian graduates fromvarious elite colleges such as the Indian Institute ofTechnology (IITs) and IndianInstitute ofManagement (IIMs) form their own social chat forums and regularlyexchange information about employment and business opportunities. In inter-viewing other undergraduates who are Singaporeans, I found that they are notactively networking and strengthening their own bridging networks comparedto the students from India.

43) S. Adam and J. Koh, ‘Singapore tightens mortgages to cool property market’, BloombergNews (30 August 2010).44) ‘Singapore is 14th most expensive city’.45) J. Koh, ‘Global flows of foreign talent: identity anxieties in Singapore’s ethnoscape’, So-journ, Vol. 18, No. 2 (October 2003), pp. 230–256.46) Singapore 21 Committee Reports.

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In June 2011, the consumer price index rose to 5.2 per cent, an increase of 4.5per cent from 2010, and transport was the top gainer, rising by 10.4 per cent.47With the rising cost of living, the social andwelcoming aspect of Singapore’s civilsociety towards foreigners has come under threat because of greater competitionfor employment. Are foreigners the next catalyst for the private home market,and if so how would this influence civil society? Owning one’s own home is alsopart of civil society in being able to provide stability and security. This has comeunder threat because of increasing property prices. In the first quarter of 2011,foreign buyers accounted for 16 per cent of total private property purchases inSingapore, establishing a new record high.48 The property boom in Singaporehas been buoyed by affluent foreign buyers. While Singapore has always been apopular place for wealthy Indonesians and Malaysians to park their wealth, thekey difference is the influx of wealthy Chinese and Indians.49 In 2007, only 7per cent of foreign buyers were Chinese but this had increased to 19 per centin 2011. In the first half of 2011, foreigners bought 162 non-landed units with aprice tag of more than $5 million, which is about 60 per cent of the propertytransactions at the top end of the market.50 Singaporean buyers have retreatedfrom the top end of the market and accounted for just 20 per cent of purchasesof more than $5 million, while companies made up the rest of the propertytransactions.

Cars—Certificate of Entitlement Prices (COE) Prices

Are Singapore’s transport woes, including rising COE prices for cars, changingthe attitude of civil society towards the influx of foreigners? The Certificate ofEntitlement (COE) which enables an individual to purchase a car in Singaporeis central to Singapore’s VehicleQuota System.51 This system enables the govern-ment to control the growth of the car population and the level of congestion onthe roads. In 2010,COEprices for cars increased to their highest peak since 2000.For dealers in the luxury cars category, the increase of COEs between $10,000

47) C.N. Seah, ‘Commuters may see years of price increases’, Yahoo News (9 August 2011);available at: http://sg.news.yahoo.com/blogs/singaporescene/commuters-face-price-increases-possibly-years-013639012.html.48) ‘16% of private homes buyers in S’pore in Q1 are foreigners: DTZ’, Channel News Asia(25 May 2011), available at: http://www.channelnewsasia.com/ (accessed 15 January 2012).49) ‘Flat plan’, The Economist (6 August 2011).50) E. Teo, ‘Luxury apartments drawmore foreign buyers’, Straits Times (12 September 2011).51) ‘Certificate of Entitlement (COE)’, LandTransportAuthority of Singaporewebsite; avail-able at: http://www.lta.gov.sg/content/ltaweb/en/roads-and-motoring/owning-a-vehicle/vehicle-quota-system/certificate-of-entitlement-coe.html.

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and $15,000 is not a problem.52 The increase resulted in fewer first-time buyers,who had probably settled for a second-hand car. Market forces were behind theincrease in COE prices.53 The deprivation of buying a car among young Singa-poreans will have ended the dream of owning a car for many of those who earnbetween $2,500 and $4,000 a month.54 Some critics said the rising COE priceswere in tandem with the number of wealthy foreigners settling in Singapore.55

A survey of expatriates in Singapore, undertaken by HSBC International,showed that Singapore’s expatriate population earns the highest income in theworld as compared to their counterparts in other countries. The Expat Explorersurvey 2010, commissioned by HSBC, showed that Singapore is the ideal des-tination for expats who aspire to earn the highest income. In the survey, 45 percent of Singapore-based expatriates earned over US$200,000 annually. This fig-ure is proportionately large relative to global terms, when on average only 21 percent of expatriates earn over US$200,000. This places Singapore ahead of coun-tries like Russia, Hong Kong and Saudi Arabia. The survey, which covered 4,127expats in over 100 countries, found that Singapore was the world’s third mostwealthy hot-spot among 24 other countries. Singapore also ranked seventh forthe proportion of expats with a disposable income of over US$3,000 and thir-teenth for luxuries owned by expatriates, such as property, domestic help, carsand boats, holidays, healthcare and swimming pools.Whyhas Singapore becomeattractive for expatriates? One of the main reasons behind Singapore’s huge per-centage of expatriates with higher disposable incomes is the fiscal or tax regimein Singapore. Singapore’s authorities imposed one of the lowest rates of personaland corporate income tax in the world, thus enabling its residents to retain ahigher portion of their wages as disposable income. Singapore’s personal incometax rate starts at 0 per cent and is capped at 20 per cent for those earning aboveS$320,000 for residents, with a flat rate of 15 per cent for non-residents. The cor-porate income tax rate is approximately 8.5 per cent for profits up to S$300,000and a flat 17 per cent above S$300,000. The Expat Explorer survey found that 61per cent of the 109 expats surveyed in Singapore thought they had more dispos-able income than had they been living in their country of origin. This has influ-ence on income inequality in Singapore and is linked to issues of citizenship.HasSingaporemerely become a destination for thewealthy?Howdoes this influenceSingapore’s sense of citizenship, belonging and identity?

52) K. Aquino, ‘BMW costing $260,000 means cars only for rich in Singapore as taxes climb’,Bloomberg News (17 February 2011).53) Aquino, ‘BMW costing $260,000’.54) Seah, ‘Commuters may see years of price increases’.55) Seah, ‘Commuters may see years of price increases’.

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Identity Issues

Academics Yeoh and Willis comment that the literature examining the poli-tics of identity in the context of globalisation suggests that the influences ofthe nation-state and globalisation are operating on the individual’s identity inoppositional terms.56 Singaporean academic TerenceChong adds that the globalcity and nation-state dichotomy has created conflicting impulses in Singapore.While the global city celebrates the alternative cultural identities which pro-vide the creative buzz and economic output, the nation-state has the unenvi-able never-ending task of nation-building in a rather fluid societal and urbanlandscape.57 How can we reconcile these oppositional forces? Gunesh opinesthat cosmopolitanism is an explicit and transnational identity which not onlyencompasses but transcends national boundaries and categories.58 In this regardthe concept of transnationalism used in this paper could be defined as ‘the pro-cess in which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations thatlink together their societies of origin and settlement’.While Singapore is famousfor its ‘isms’, could understanding concepts like cosmopolitanism and transna-tionalism and their linkages hold the key to reducing tension between locals andforeign talent? The government has taken cognizance of this and has made aneffort to differentiate the privileges given to Singaporeans, PRs and foreign resi-dents.

Political Participation

It is likely that new migrants will become increasingly involved in political prac-tices such as electoral participation and/or membership in political associations.The community of transnationals could also become involved in political activ-ism to improve access to services, to fight discrimination or to heighten thegroups’ recognition rights.59 In the case of Singapore, transnationals as PRs havebecome involved in ‘grassroots’ organisations in their thousands. In December2009, there were about 29,400 grassroots leaders, including 1,360 PRs in Singa-

56) Yeoh and Wills, ‘Singapore unlimited’.57) T.Chong, ‘In Singapore—the great identity conundrum’,OpinionAsia (11March 2008),available at: http://opinionasia.com/.58) K. Gunesch, ‘Cosmopolitanism as a transnational identity form in the time of globaliza-tion’, paper submitted for the First International Congress of Qualitative Inquiry, 5–7 May2005, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, United States.59) P. Levitt and B.N. Jaworsky, ‘Transnational migration studies: past developments andfuture trends’, Review in Advance, Vol. 33 (18 April 2007), pp. 129–156, p. 136.

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pore.60 The 1,360 PR grassroots leaders comprised 4.6 per cent of the total num-ber of grassroots leaders. In addition, the Minister of Community, Youth andSports has said that about 4,500 new citizens are serving in grassroots organisa-tions in the various housing and development board (HDB) estates.61

Asnoted earlier, apart fromexpanding their social network inSingapore, somePRs view grassroots activities as ameans to boost their chances of getting citizen-ship. Some PRs are probably more enthusiastic to join grassroots organisationsthan local citizens because of the perks which come along with this, such as pri-ority in enrolment of their children in primary schools. Some internet bloggershave also alluded to the timingof thedebate onPRs andnewcitizenswith theGEon 7 May 2011. Internet bloggers have pointed out the fact that new citizens arelikely to vote for the party in power and the number of the new citizens and theirgeographic spread among the various constituencies may be a means of shoringup votes in marginal seats. The right to vote has become a sensitive issue since itseems to be the key defining privilege between Singaporeans and PRs.

The government seems aware of the challenges in the process of integratingforeigners in Singapore society and the danger of creating societal fissures. In thelong run, the government realises that it cannot sustain the foreign influxwithoutconsidering society’s ability to adapt.62 Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong com-mented that, ‘We have to continue to bring in people but we will adjust the flowso that we will not dilute our national identity or weaken social cohesion.’63 Thisstrategy will add to the diversity of the ethnoscape in Singapore. In 2008, it wasreported that one in four Singaporeans were marrying foreigners. The SingaporePopulation Brief noted that marriages between citizens and non-citizens haveincreased.64

Conclusion

As a city-state with a market-oriented economy, Singapore’s tax regime is one ofthe lowest in the world and its ability to attract wealth and investment is cru-cial for Singapore’s continued economic success. While economic challenges arebeing handled in creative ways, the same could not be said of societal adjust-ments to prepare citizens for the massive changes that have transformed the

60) ‘PRs queuing up to join grassroots organizations inGeylang’,Today newspaper, Singapore(7 December 2009).61) ‘PRs queuing up’.62) C.Ong, ‘Keep an openmind to foreign talent: PM’,TheNanyangChronicle (22 September2009).63) Ong, ‘Keep an open mind’.64) Singapore Population Brief.

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Singapore landscape. With regard to the Singaporean identity, the way forwardwould be to assist in the integration of foreigners into the workforce and society.Some of the measures implemented included orientation programmes under-taken by employers for their diverse workforce and voluntary work for commu-nity projects. These could include activities under the corporate social responsi-bility (CSR) rubric for companies. Exposure through voluntaryworkwouldhelpto facilitate interaction between the foreign workforce and voluntary welfareorganisations (VWOs), in the process reducing the ‘gap’ between the ‘other’ andSingaporeans.This is especially important for non-residents should they apply tobecome PRs.

The Singaporean identity is influenced by the circulation of foreigners, andthe amorphous nature of the identity suggests that without core values it willprobably be submerged by ethnic identities, especially those of foreigners work-ing and living in Singapore. It could be argued that experiments to create mul-ticultural societies in various cities in the world are facing stiff challenges. As acity-state, Singapore has been built on the very foundations of diversity andmul-ticulturalism. Singapore does not have a hinterland, unlike Hong Kong. Singa-pore’s demographic profile has changed rapidly over the last few years and it mayhave to lower the intake of foreigners to enable its citizenry to adjust to societalchanges and accept lower economic growth. In order to facilitate integration,the government established the National Integration Council (NIC) in April2009. The NIC assists in the coordination of efforts between key stake-holdersfrom the public, private and people sectors aimed at promoting social integra-tion. Through its Community Integration Funds, the NIC has co-funded up to80 per cent of activities by various voluntary and grassroots organisers to pro-mote social integration.

Since 2009, the government has created greater distinction between citizensand PRs in terms of welfare and benefits. There is greater scrutiny and strin-gency for the approval of PR applications. However, Singaporeans are question-ing specifics concerning the implementation of the foreign human capital strat-egy.TheGE inMay 2011 was a ‘watershed’ election because the number of oppo-sition candidates voted inwas the largest since Singapore’s independence in 1965.Thereafter, the PAP looked in earnest at the key issues that rankled with vot-ers, such as influx of foreigners, employment, housing and transport among oth-ers.While more public spending was devoted to housing and transport, employ-ment was more tricky because Singapore’s political leaders had always empha-sised the open-market policies which have driven economic growth and devel-opment since its independence in 1965.65 Nonetheless, labour policies and reg-

65) A. Goh, ‘Towards an innovation-driven economy through industrial policy-making: an

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ulations would also have to be re-examined to ensure that foreign human cap-ital is not seen to be unfairly displacing or marginalising citizens for employ-ment.

OnSeptember 2013, new employment regulationswere unveiled by theMOMto tighten up the inflow of foreign human capital.66 The restriction imposed onlabour regulations seems to be antithetical to open market polices, but it couldalso be argued that the political and socio-economic landscape has changed,especially since theGEof 2011. Inclusive growth and equitable benefits from eco-nomic growth seems to be the newmantra for governance in Singapore.The newlabour regulations should not be seen as favouring Singapore citizens but as ameans to address an imbalance that has occurred in the labour force, especiallyafter reported incidents of marginalisation and discrimination of Singapore citi-zens by foreigners in charge of recruitment and training in various companies.67It could also be argued that the new labour regulations were rather belated andless severe compared to developed economies such as theUS andAustralia. Evenneighbouring countries such as Indonesia and Thailand have imposed stricterlabour regulations on the hiring of foreigners to work in their respective coun-tries.

The market-oriented growth policies had to be tempered with policies aimedat addressing adverse social impacts caused by the influx of foreigners in Singa-pore.This could be seen as a policy oversight by the government, but in acknowl-edging the government’s misjudgement it could also be argued that the crisis itencountered and the voter backlash, acting as a public thermostat, were intrinsicto the development of Singapore. In a landscape of increasing diversity among itspopulation, this crisis helped shaped public policy and implementation, servingas a useful indicator for the government.

evolutionary analysis of Singapore’, The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector Innovation Jour-nal, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2013), article 34.66) Teh Shi Ning, ‘Foreign manpower tightening up a notch’, Business Times (24 September2013).67) A Sustainable Population for a Dynamic Singapore.