Tabitha Taylor

To what extent is the framework of first

and second order mental states plausible?

IntroductionThe idea that there is more than one level of mental

states is one that runs through many areas of philosophy

from philosophy of psychology and ethics to metaphysics and

epistemology. In this essay, I intend to show that this

framework of first and second order mental states should

be questioned and I offer an alternative to it. I do this

through a criticism of the way in which Harry Frankfurt

uses the framework of first and second order desires, and

an explication of how the alternative framework can

achieve the things he does, but in a much simpler way,

without incurring the issues that the framework of first

and second order mental states comes up to.

In section 1, I outline the basic framework of first

and second order mental states and then explain

Frankfurt’s view on personhood and the freedom of the

will, paying attention to the way in which he adopts this

framework. In section 2, I discuss some worries with

Frankfurt’s view, firstly whether or not it truly

represents what we mean by freedom, and secondly how it

deals with a desire such as wanting all one’s desires to be fulfilled.

Having shown these both to be problematic, I move into

section 3 where I offer an alternative framework that

does not have these worries. I show that the alternative

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framework can explain everything Frankfurt’s view does,

as well as being simpler. I conclude that the framework

of first and second order mental states is not plausible

for the way in which Frankfurt uses it to explain his

theory of personhood and freedom of the will. Instead,

one should adopt an alternative view, such as the one I

offer, which is perhaps more desirable.

1. Frankfurt and the framework of first and second

order mental statesIn his paper Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person

(Frankfurt, 1971), Frankfurt offers a powerful and

attractive theory of what it is to be a person and how

one can have freedom of the will. Within this description

he employs the framework of first and second order mental

states, more specifically, first and second order desires

and volitions. In this section I first give a general

outline of the framework of first and second order mental

states and then reconstruct Frankfurt’s account focussing

on his use of this framework.

1.1 Basic framework

The framework of first and second order mental states

takes there to be different levels of mental states,

which refer to different sorts of things. The level of

the mental state is determined by the sort of thing the

state refers to. To demonstrate this I use the example of

desires; a first order desire is a desire that points to

something in the outside world, the world outside of

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one’s mind e.g. I want1 some orange juice. A second order

desire is one that points to a first order desire; to

something within one’s mind e.g. I don’t desire to want some

orange juice. A third order desire is one that points to a

second order desire; something within one’s mind e.g. I

want to not desire to want some orange juice. And then, in

principle, the levels could go on like this ad infinitum.

The important point is the distinction between a

first order mental state and a second/third etc order

mental state; first order mental states point to the

outside world, whereas all other levels of mental state

point to other lower level mental states and so something

within the mind. Frankfurt uses this framework to

characterise a necessary condition for personhood.

Frankfurt states that though many beings have first order

desires, “no animal other than man, [however], appears to have the

capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of

second order desires.” (Frankfurt, 1971, p. 7) Indeed, though

Frankfurt slightly alters his definition of personhood

throughout his many works, this idea of reflective self-

evaluation is constant and key to his definition. This

self-reflective evaluation is unique to a person; animals

may have desires about the world, but only people can

have desires about desires.

It is the structure of one’s will that demarcates

between a person and an animal. By will Frankfurt means the

motivating second order desire by which an agent acts.

1 Nb. I use the words ‘want’ and ‘desire’ interchangeably, but switchbetween them to make the levels more salient.

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One may have a certain first order desire to do

something, X, but even if he does X, this cannot be

called his will unless he wants to do X and this second

order desire to want to do X is the motivating one. In short,

the will is not identifiable with any of the first order

desires, nor what the agent intends to do, but only with

the effective desires, those that move the agent all the way to

action (p. 8). Frankfurt emphasises the point that one’s

second order desires may not fully constitute one’s will;

it is one’s second order volitions about what one wants

to be one’s effective desires that constitute one’s will.

Second order volitions are second order desires for

something to be one’s will (p. 10). The reason Frankfurt

introduces this idea of second order volitions is to

distinguish a proper person from a wanton. A wanton is a

creature that has first, and even second, order desires,

but lacks second order volitions. The wanton does not

care which of his inclinations is the strongest and only

pursues whichever one he is most strongly inclined to

pursue. In this way, the wanton does not have freedom of

the will since there is no awareness of the will; the

wanton does not desire to have any certain will. In this

way, the wanton is said not to be a person on Frankfurt’s

account (p. 11).

So Frankfurt’s use of the framework of first and

second order mental states, specifically desires, is

central to his conceptualisation of a person. On

Frankfurt’s view the structure of one’s will, the ability

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to form second order volitions about what one wants one’s

will to be, is what makes someone a person.

1.2 Freedom of the will

Frankfurt uses his concept of a person and the framework

of first and second order mental states to characterise

what it is to be free. He first distinguishes between

freedom of action and freedom of the will. Freedom of

action is what we usually think of as freedom; being able

to do as we please. Freedom of the will, on the other

hand, is being able to desire what one wants, to have the

will one wants to have. The concept of a person also

includes the fact that the freedom of their will is

something to take into account; the concept of a person

“can also be construed as the concept of a type of entity for whom the

freedom of the will may be a problem.” (p. 14)

One can only have freedom of the will if one has the

ability to form first and second order desires. Indeed,

as Frankfurt suggests, one does not assume that animals

do not have freedom, since they have freedom of action,

but it is only persons who have freedom of the will. In

this way, freedom of the will is exclusive to persons

precisely because persons are the only ones who have the

reflective self-evaluative ability that is characterised

by first and second order desires. And so this is what we

must mean by freedom when we speak of our own freedom.

In his later lectures Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting it

Right (Frankfurt, 2005), Frankfurt expresses simply that

one is free when one’s first and second order desires are

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in line. So if one’s first order desire is to want some

orange juice and one’s second order desire is to desire to want

some orange juice, then one’s will is free, and when one acts

on wanting some orange juice, one acts freely and in line

with one’s will. One does not act freely then, when one

acts on one’s first order desires that run contrary to

one’s second order desires; “Of course there are bound to be

occasions when the desire that motivates us when we act is a desire by which

we do not want to be motivated.” (p. 178) In this case one’s will

is not free. For example, one might not want to be

motivated by one’s greed for a third cream cake, but in

fact takes the third cream cake anyway, giving in to

one’s greed. Frankfurt expresses that if one is

“wholehearted both in what we are doing and in what we want”, then

one has “as much freedom as it is possible for us even to conceive.” (p.

178) By wholehearted Frankfurt means the unity and

agreement between one’s first and second order mental

states. Wholeheartedness is an essential part of

Frankfurt’s account of love and reasons (which will not

be explored in this essay) and so clearly the framework

of first and second order mental states on which this is

based, is essential to Frankfurt’s view.

1.3 Unfreedom of addiction

Having outlined Frankfurt’s freedom of the will and the

essential role that the framework of first and second

order mental states plays on his view, I now describe a

case in which the framework is utilised to account for

unfreedom, namely in addiction.

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In Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person (1971),

Frankfurt invites us to imagine the unwilling addict, who

has two conflicting desires; one to have the drug to

which he is addicted, and the other to avoid that drug.

His second order volition is for his desire to avoid the

drug to be the effective desire. So when he acts on his

first order desire to take the drug, his will is not

free, since his second order desire not to desire to want the

drug, conflicts with the first order desire upon which he

acts. Though the unwilling addict is moved by his own

desire, it is against his will and so he may be said to

be unfree (Frankfurt, 1971, p. 12). For the unwilling

addict it makes a difference which desire is the one that

is acted upon since if it is in line with his second

order volition, then he is free and if it is not, then he

is not free. This is as opposed to the wanton, as

discussed above, for whom it does not matter which first

order desire wins out since there is no second order

volition with which it may or may not agree. This

distinction further helps to characterise what it is to

be a person with freedom of the will; “When a person acts, the

desire by which he is moved is either the will he wants or a will he wants to be

without. When a wanton acts, it is neither.” (pp. 13-14).

The framework of first and second order desires is

essential here in explaining how the unwilling addict is

unfree. Without adopting this framework, Frankfurt claims

that one cannot account for the difference between the

unwilling addict and the wanton addict; they have

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identical conflicting first order desires, one to take

the drug, one to avoid the drug, but only the unwilling

addict can be said to be unfree when he takes the drug,

because he is a person with second order volition.

2. Objections to Frankfurt’s accountHaving explicated Frankfurt’s view, I now outline some

objections to his account of freedom and its reliance on

the framework of first and second order mental states. I

begin by questioning whether his account characterises

what we really mean by freedom. I then discuss a worry

one might have if one considers the desire “I want all my

desires to be fulfilled”, which creates a theoretical issue with

the framework in general.

2.1 Is Frankfurt’s account a good account of freedom?

On the surface, it seems that to have true freedom,

freedom of action is not sufficient, and freedom of the

will must also be considered, as the case of the

unwilling addict shows. But consider an imaginary case

where one is programmed so that one’s second order

volitions are all in line with one’s effective first

order desires. In this instance, on Frankfurt’s condition

of freedom, this agent has freedom of the will and so may

be considered to be free on his view. However, there is a

definite sense in which his second order volitions are

from an external source. In this way one is inclined to

say that in fact his actions are not free, nor is his

will (O'Connor, 2013). Since Frankfurt’s account dictates

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that this agent would be free, against our intuition,

perhaps his account is not sufficient for what we really

mean by freedom.

2.2 “I want all my desires to be fulfilled”

A further, and more worrying, issue with Frankfurt’s

account, which is more specific to the framework of first

and second order desires, is how to classify such a

desire as “I want all my desires to be fulfilled.” Before exploring

this idea, the concept of infinite levels of mental

states must be highlighted.

From the framework of first and second order mental

states, one might reasonably wonder whether there can be

third order mental states and beyond. As mentioned above,

a third order mental state points to a second order

mental state, just as a second order mental state points

to a first order mental state. For example in the case of

desires, a third order desire could be I want not to desire to

want some orange juice. It seems that the iteration of mental

states could go on ad infinitum so that one could have 4th

order, 5th order… etc. So why do we stop at two levels? It

seems an arbitrary cut off point; why is it two and not

three, or four levels etc.?

One reason may be that there is little use for

mental states in the third order and above. One does not

often think such a thing as this third order desire might

suggest; I want to not desire to want some orange juice. And even if

one did think such a thing, when one gets to fourth order

mental states, it starts to become confusing and

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nonsensical; I don’t desire to want to not desire to want some orange

juice. One might begin to get frustrated – do you want some

orange juice or not? It seems that one easily knows

whether or not one wants some orange juice and

essentially the other levels of desire are irrelevant to

the answer to the question of whether or not one wants

some orange juice. In this way, it may be argued that the

cut off point, whether it is after second or third order

mental states, is not arbitrary; it has to do with the

usefulness and comprehensibility of the statements such

mental states produce. Though higher mental states may

exist, one does not need to consider them for their

everyday purposes. Indeed, one might not be able to

consider them; the average person’s ability to self-

reflect is usually contained in two levels of mental

states. Higher mental states may not be comprehended and

so are not available for inspection and self-reflection.

Frankfurt concedes that there is “no theoretical limit to

the length of the series of desires of higher and higher orders,” but that

it is nonetheless “possible to terminate a series of acts without cutting

it off arbitrarily.” (Frankfurt, 1971, p. 16) Frankfurt’s cut

off point is when one is in a wholehearted, and therefore

decisive, position. If one’s second order volitions are

in line with one’s first order desires, then one needn’t

posit any higher order desires; “The decisiveness of the

commitment [the agent] has made means that he has decided that no further

question about his second-order volition, at any higher order, remains to be

asked.” (Frankfurt, 1971, p. 16) Frankfurt also says one

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ought to cut off at second order desires on an appeal to

common sense and “a saving fatigue” that prevents one

from trying to identify with one’s higher order desires.

As mentioned above, the higher order mental states are

much harder to access, so to attempt to determine one’s

will taking these higher order desires into account is a

project that would require a much deeper self-reflection,

wich would presumably be fairly tiring to come up with.

Frankfurt clearly does not see this as a worthwhile thing

to do when one can identify with one’s second order

volitions without too much trouble.

However, which desires one identifies with seems to

depend on one’s ability to self-reflect, which is surely

a subjective matter, different for every person. Perhaps

it would be worthwhile for those that can, to try to

identify with a higher level of mental states, since

Frankfurt seems to put emphasis on higher levels somehow

representing one’s true self more fully. Should it not be

our aim then to seek out our deeper rooted desires at a

higher level? Indeed, Frankfurt’s argument that when one

is decisive and wholehearted one needn’t look for higher

order desires to identify with relies on the assumption

that second order desires and volitions are more special

than any other. Why should one identify with one’s second

order desires? Consider the possibility that the

unwilling addict actually has a third order desire not to

want to not desire to want the drug. In this instance, the third

order desire would explain how the “unwilling” addict’s

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action could in fact be deemed free because his third

order desire is, at least indirectly, in line with his

first order desire; not wanting to not want on the third level

of desires seems to equate to wanting overall. Though it

may be practically tricky to identify with one’s higher

order desires, there is no other reason that one’s

desires cannot be motivating and account for one’s

freedom of the will on higher and higher levels ad

infinitum.

Furthermore, different people may require different

levels for their purposes. For example, a therapist may

be interested in many levels of mental states, whereas

for everyday purposes it is not useful to state even

one’s second order mental states, let alone the third,

fourth order etc. mental states. So the cut off point at

which it is no longer useful to speak of mental states of

a higher level is different for different purposes,

further showing the arbitrariness of stopping at the

second level, and further demonstrating that one could

potentially go on up for infinity.

If one is going to commit to a framework of first

and second order mental states, then one must commit

oneself to a framework of an infinite number of levels of

mental states, since there is no non-arbitrary way of

determining at which level one should stop.

Now let us return to the desire to want all one’s desires to

be fulfilled. This is the sort of desire many people might

have, say for example, in order to be happy. If one

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classifies it at some arbitrary level, say 5th level

desire, then one can always posit a higher level, a 6th

level desire, for example, not to want to want to all one’s desires to

be fulfilled, that contradicts it. One might think that the

desire to want all one’s desires to be fulfilled must be a top level

desire so as to motivate all the lower order desires

which it hopes to fulfil. However, if there are an

infinite number of levels of desires, there is no such

thing as a top level desire. So then we have a problem

with deciding which level we ought to classify the desire

to want all one’s desires to be fulfilled.

Furthermore, it is not clear which desires one wants

to be fulfilled, because clearly, one has conflicting

desires. Perhaps Frankfurt could argue that the desires

one most associates with one’s true self are those that

one means by all one’s desires. But, as we have discussed, it

is not clear which desires one ought to associate one’s

true self with, since it seems arbitrary for the second

order desires to be chosen for this role. Even if one

were able to identify a level that represents one’s true

self, on Frankfurt’s view, there can be conflicting

desires at one level, as in the case of the unwilling

addict who has both a first order desire to take the drug

and a first order desire not to take the drug.

Presumably, this ability to have conflicting desires

within one level of desires is not exclusive to the first

order. Indeed, if it were, one would need sufficient

justification as to why this is, which is not explicitly

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offered by Frankfurt. So it seems that such a desire as

wanting all one’s desires to be fulfilled produces contradictions both

across levels of desires and within single levels of

desires.

So it seems that the framework of first and second

order mental states that Frankfurt adopts incurs problems

with both the classification and the implications of a

desire such as wanting all one’s desires to be fulfilled. This

incapability to classify such a desire is a theoretical

failure of the framework of first and second order mental

states. Hence, I suggest that one must choose a framework

that does not attempt to classify mental states into

levels in the way Frankfurt does.

3. Alternative frameworkIn this section, I first outline the new framework, which

consists of two different types of mental state. The

alternative framework is then explored and further

explicated by applying it in order to show how it can

explain everything Frankfurt’s framework of first and

second order mental states can i.e. personhood and the

unfreedom of addiction. I then go on to highlight the

simplicity of the alternative framework as a reason to

use it over the framework of first and second order

mental states.

3.1 Type A and type B desires

The issues we encountered with Frankfurt’s view were due

to the multi-level framework he employs. I propose that

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instead of having many levels of mental states, one just

has one level of mental states, but more than one type of

mental state. There seems to be a difference between what

I call a type A mental state and what I call a type B mental state.

Since Frankfurt makes use of desires, I will also

demonstrate this alternative framework using desires; a

type A desire is one whose source is and is contained in

the mind, whereas a type B desire is one whose source is

the body and is contained in the body and the mind. One

might say that type B desires are bodily or physical,

whereas type A desires are more sophisticated and can

perhaps be described as the result of conscious

deliberation and reflection. For example, my desire for

food is type B when I am hungry, but my desire for food

may be type A when I am sad and decide to comfort myself

by eating. In each case the source of the desire is the

thing that defines which type of desire it is. On this

view, one can have a type B desire for something at one

time and type A desire for it at another. In the case of

hunger, this bodily phenomenon is what drives the desire

for food, whereas in the case of sadness, it is this

mental phenomenon that drives the desire for food. Often

with type A desires, the desire is more specific since

one’s mind is more complex than simple bodily functions.

For example, a type A desire for food may manifest itself

in a desire for a specific type of food, like ice cream,

whereas a type B desire for food may look less towards

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the satisfaction of pleasure and more towards the

satisfaction of hunger.

One way in which this alternative framework is

already more explanatory than the framework of first and

second order mental states is that it can account for the

desire to want all one’s desires to be fulfilled, which seems

paradoxical on the framework Frankfurt adopts. Since this

is a desire that comes from reflection, it should be

classed as a type A desire. Though some of the desires

one might want to be fulfilled will be type B desires,

the desire to want all one’s desires to be fulfilled itself has its

source in the mind, so can easily be classified as a type

A desire.

As well as this, the problem of contradictory

desires does not hold for the alternative framework since

there are no contradicting desires within each type.

Sometimes it may seem like we have conflicting desires

within one type, but this is not a conflict so much as an

uncertainty; one is simply oscillating between having one

type A desire and then the opposite type A desire; and

similarly with type B desires. For example, one may be

trying to decide whether or not they want to eat some ice

cream to cheer them up; at time t they may have the type

A desire for ice cream, but then at time t1, they may

change their mind and have the type A desire not to have

some ice cream. Essentially though, they cannot have the

type A desire to want ice cream at the same type as the type

A desire not to want ice cream. The only conflict that appears

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on this framework is between the two different types; a

type A desire and a type B desire can be contradictory as

we shall see in the case of addiction. Since it is

plausible to assume that because this desire to want all one’s

desires to be fulfilled is a type A desire, it refers to all

desires of its own kind. In this way, the seeming

conflict of desires can be resolved by taking those that

are type A desires to be the true desires of a person,

since one tends to identify one’s true desires with those

whose source is the mind. In this way, the alternative

framework can classify the desire to fulfil all of one’s

desires as a type A desire and does not incur any

problems with contradictory desires, since one just takes

one’s type A desires to be the ones that most truly

represent what one desires.

3.2 Personhood

The way in which personhood can be described using the

alternative single level framework is through the claim

that only a person can have type A mental states. This

clearly distinguishes people from animals; we would not

say that a cat’s desire for food is type A, the cat being

compelled by their sadness and their wish for comfort

food; cats do not seem to deliberate what would make them

feel better nor do they reflect on their sadness. Indeed,

this would be personification of a cat. A cat only has

type B mental states. Indeed, there is no use denying

that animals and non-persons do not have mental states,

for this would be to deny that they have a mind, which

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seems absurd, but there is something that suggests that

these mental states are not of the same type as those

that persons have. My suggestion is that the mental

states that non-persons have are still very much mental

states, not just physical compulsions, but they lack the

complex deliberation and reflection that persons possess.

In this way, the alternative framework may also maintain

some form of the self reflective evaluation that

Frankfurt assigns only to people.

Frankfurt’s definition of personhood not only

demarcates animals from people, but also another

creature, namely a wanton, from people. As before, a

wanton is someone who lacks second order volitions and so

has no will of which to have freedom. Perhaps it is rash

of Frankfurt to withhold personhood from someone just

because they do not have second order desires. In his

example, the wanton addict is someone who does not care

whether their first order desire to take the drug, or

their conflicting first order desire not to take the

drug, is motivating, since they do not have a second

order desire for either first order desire to be in line

with, or if they do, it does not constitute a second

order volition.

However, one could describe a baby as a wanton; they

do not seem to have second order desires and their first

order desires are largely motivated by their bodily

desires such as tiredness, hunger, thirst and bowel

movements. But does this mean that a baby is not a

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person? Most people would not like to concede that babies

are not people. Similarly with some brain damaged

patients who may not possess the ability to self reflect

and produce second order desires; would we revoke

personhood from them for this reason? I do not intend to

produce a full account of personhood in this essay, but

it does seem necessary to point out that Frankfurt’s

withholding personhood from what he calls a wanton,

produces various uncomfortable and counter intuitive

consequences in the discussion of personhood. So for the

purposes of this essay, I will allow that a wanton is a

person and so refrain from explaining why a wanton is not

a person on the alternative framework. Indeed, since the

term wanton is one that, by definition, depends on the

framework of first and second order mental states, the

alternative framework does not necessarily need an

explanation of it.

So on the alternative framework, a person is simply

someone who has type A desires, as well as type B

desires. It could be that this includes some non-human

persons, which on the surface seems odd; is a cat a

person as discussed above? Perhaps it is not so far

fetched that personhood is a spectrum, as opposed to a

binary concept. Animals like chimpanzees may be said to

have a limited number of type A desires and so may

possess a small amount of personhood. Indeed, we seem to

ascribe some amount of personhood to justify the rights

of animals. For example, that animals can become

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distressed, depressed, lonely, jealous etc. provides

evidence that perhaps they are more like people than one

might think. Though it may be deemed to be fictional

personification of animals when we ascribe type A desires

to them as suggested with the cat above, it is not

implausible that some animals should exhibit these

people-like desires, since the term ‘person’ is not

restricted to humans. However, it is clear that the

creatures we mostly call people are indeed humans, like

you and me. This also allows for babies to be counted as

people because, though they have far fewer type A

desires, they still have some and so must be counted as

people. As mentioned, I do not have space to give a full

account of the idea of personhood is here, needless to

say, the alternative framework can provide a definition

of personhood analogous to the one Frankfurt employs, but

in a simpler way.

3.3 Unfreedom of addiction

To demonstrate the unfreedom of addiction on the

alternative, single level framework, we must make

particular use of the type B desires. Going back to the

example of the unwilling addict, we might describe him as

someone who has a type B desire for the drug, but a type

A desire not to take the drug. There is a clear conflict

of desires here. The reason that the unwilling addict’s

addiction is unfree is due to the fact that the addict

cannot fully control and override his type B desires.

Since his type A desires are those that represent his

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true desires, and he cannot implement them, his addiction

is unfree. So on the alternative framework, freedom is

when one’s type A desires are in agreement with one’s

type B desires. The addict is only free in their

addiction if their type A desire is to have the drug, as

well as this being their type B desire. For the unwilling

addict, this is not the case; he has conflicting desires,

a type B desire to take the drug and a type A desire not

to. The unfreedom of addiction on the alternative

framework then, is that the unwilling addict cannot

implement his type A desire not to have the addiction

because type B desires are harder to control. So, on this

view, the unwilling addict makes a free choice to

actually take the drug, but his motivating desire is his

type B desire, which does not agree with his type A

desire. This makes his addiction unfree, though his act

in taking the drug is still free to some extent. The key

difference here is that it is the addiction, the type B

desire, that the unwilling addict has unfreely; his

actual choice to take the drug is free in the sense that

he allowed himself to give into to his type B desire for

the drug.

The claim that needs to be expanded upon and

justified here is the claim that we have little control

over what our type B desires are. What is meant by one

having little control over one’s type B desires is not

control in letting them be motivating, though some type B

desires are harder to ignore than others, but control of

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their existence. One’s mind cannot help one’s body from

becoming hungry. One’s mind can ignore the fact that the

body is hungry, but hunger will occur if one does not

feed oneself since it is a physical phenomenon that is

contained in the mind to some extent, but mostly in the

body, and is compelled by the body’s lack of food first

and foremost. In general for type B desires, there are

physical, as well as mental, phenomena that go with them.

For example, a headache may indicate to a coffee addict

that they have a type B desire for coffee, whether their

type A desire is to have a coffee or not. Similarly, the

physical effects of sexual arousal indicate a type B

desire for sexual satisfaction, though one’s type A

desire may be to concentrate on something else. It is

only when there is a conflict of type A and type B

desires that there is unfreedom in what one is most

focussed on and what one might find hard to resist.

Importantly, this unfreedom is in how one feels, but not

in how one acts. For example, hedonism, a way of living

one’s life by indulging in many pleasures of the body, is

not an unfree way of living. A hedonist essentially has a

type A desire to live in accordance with their type B

desires, so that ultimately, their type A desire to let

their type B desires be satisfied, is their motivating

desire. This case differs from someone who is

unwillingly addicted to pleasures of the body, for

example, addicted to food. In the case of food addiction,

the agent has a conflict between their type A desire not

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to be addicted to food and her type B desires to

constantly eat. Her having an addiction to food is

unfree, though her giving into her type B desires and

actually eating is a free choice, since she has

ultimately decided to ignore her true type A desire not

to constantly eat.

In the case of addiction, one can of course weaken

and eventually eliminate the having of these unwanted

type B desires, but the fact still remains that an addict

is not free in having type B desires for the object of

their addiction as long as they are addicted. The way in

which one, like the unwilling addict, might cease to have

these type B desires is to take the steps to physically

train one’s body not to have these desires. In this way,

one still has some control over one’s type B desires.

Thus the elimination of unwanted type B desires requires

not only physical training, but also a strong type A

desire for the physical training to work. Indeed, they

would not be unwanted type B desires if one didn’t have a

type A desire not to have them.

Take the example of a smoker. Someone trying to give

up smoking has the type B desire to smoke because smoking

satisfies the body’s craving for nicotine. When the

smoker switches the source of their nicotine intake, for

example to a nicotine patch, they may still have the

desire for an actual cigarette. This desire would be a

type A desire, which must change in order to direct one’s

type B desires away from the addiction; this is why one

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must have the type A desire not to have an addiction in

order to give it up, otherwise the type B desires will be

in line with the type A desires and there will be nothing

to resist taking the drug to which one is addicted.

So it is the influence one’s type A desires must

have over one’s type B desires that allows the addict to

give up their addiction. In this sense there is some

control over what one’s type B desires are, but in an

indirect sense, so that the unfreedom of addiction still

holds.

3.4 Simplicity

At this point, the alternative framework can successfully

do all the things that the framework of first and second

order mental states can do, as well as solving the

seemingly paradoxical problem of the desire to want all one’s

desires to be fulfilled. I now highlight the simplicity of the

alternative framework over the framework of first and

second order desires to provide further reason why one

should choose the alternative framework.

The alternative framework is simpler in the sense

that the difference between type A and type B mental

states is clearer than that between first and second

order mental states. One can easily determine whether

one’s desire is type A or type B by determining what the

source of the desire is; if it is the body, it’s a type B

desire, whereas if it’s the mind, then it’s a type A

desire2. 2 However, some physicalists and materialists would argue that all ofour desires are in fact type B desires, i.e. can be reduced to some

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In this way, understanding one’s own mental states

is simpler and easier, and much less tiring than trying

to identify with some unobtainable mental state in a

higher order. This alternative framework collapses what

one might think is trying to obtain one’s higher order

desires into simply oscillating between one desire and

its opposing one. There is no use denying that people

change their minds about what they want, and to explain

this on the framework Frankfurt adopts, one might

conceivably claim that some higher order desire is

identified with. A much simpler way of explaining this,

however, is on the alternative framework; changing one’s

mind is simply changing one’s type A mental state from

some mental state, p, to ¬p through a process of

deliberation, perhaps taking into account whether or not

it coheres with your other type A mental states. This

characterises the framework of first and second order

mental states, but in a much more straightforward way.

As well as this, though one may not worry about the

potentiality for having infinite levels of mental states

on the framework of first and second order mental states,

the alternative framework eliminates this possibility,

which can bring peace of mind to those who feel

uncomfortable about this infinity. All together, the

simplicity of the alternative framework makes for a more

physical process or phenomenon. For example, Paul Churchland argues that eventually we will be able to explain all the concepts we associate with ‘the mind’ using neuroscience, at which point the concepts will no longer be meaningful (Churchland, 1981).

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practical approach than the framework of first and second

order mental states that Frankfurt adopts.

ConclusionThe framework of first and second order mental states is

a strong framework which Frankfurt makes good use of to

explain his theory of personhood and the freedom of the

will, specifically the unfreedom of addiction. However, I

have shown that there are holes in the framework that he

uses, which weaken his theory. Firstly, the inability to

classify the desire to want all one’s desires to be fulfilled and the

contradictions this desire entails when set in the

framework of first and second order mental states can be

dealt with fairly easily on the alternative framework.

The desire to want all one’s desires to be fulfilled is a type A

desire since it’s source is the mind, and there are no

contradictions of desires within each of the types of

desires. The only contradictions that occur are between

type A and type B desires and since type A desires come

from our minds, there is cause to take these to be the

ones we ought to identify our true desires with. In this

way, the alternative framework can explain the seemingly

paradoxical desire to want all one’s desires to be fulfilled.

The alternative framework also explains personhood

and the unfreedom of addiction in a way that doesn’t

invoke this complicated structure of higher and lower

levels of desire. A person is simply someone with type A

as well as type B desires. It is easy to identify whether

or not an addict is free in their addiction or not on the

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alternative framework; they are free in their addiction

if they have a type A desire for the drug as well as a

type B desire for it, but unfree if their type A desire

is not to have this addiction. Though Frankfurt’s way of

explaining this is elegant, it is perhaps more

complicated than it need be and the use of the framework

produces the general problem with which higher order

desire to identify with. This is not a problem that the

alternative framework has and so again, the alternative

is a better option.

The final reason why one should seriously consider

adopting the alternative framework is that it is simpler

in general. The ease of demarcating between type A and

type B desires makes the whole framework flow more easily

and explain the things we see all the time like changing

one’s mind. On top of this, it does so without invoking

an infinity of levels of mental states.

All together it seems that the framework of first

and second order mental states is not the only framework

with which one can explain personhood and the unfreedom

of addiction. This essay has only discussed one way in

which the alternative framework can be used instead of

the framework of first and second order mental states,

but in this case, the alternative framework is simpler,

does not incur the same problems and can be used to

explain everything Frankfurt wants to explain.

Bibliography

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Blackburn, S. (1994). The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford University Press.Churchland, P. M. (1981). Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. The Journal of Philosophy .Frankfurt, H. (1971). Freedom of the Will and the Concept of aPerson. The Journal of Philosophy , 68, 5-20.Frankfurt, H. (2005). Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting It Right. Tanner Lectures on Human Values .O'Connor, T. (2013). Free Will. Retrieved March 2014 from Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/freewill/