The Extent of Memory. From Extended to Extensive Mind (2014)

THE EXTENT OF MEMORY. FROM EXTENDED TO EXTENSIVE MIND

Erik Myin

&

Karim Zahidi

Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Department of Philosophy

University of Antwerp

[email protected]

[email protected]

Penultimate version, for Mind, Language and Action, Proceedings of the 36th Wittgenstein Conference. Please refer to the published version.

THE EXTENT OF MEMORY. FROM EXTENDED TO EXTENSIVE MIND

Abstract:

According to the Extended Mind thesis, the mind can extend so as to include parts of the

environment, such as notes in a notebook. Internalists about the mind, according to

whom the mind remains confined to the brain or body, have forcefully criticized the

thesis. In this paper, a quite different critique of the Extended Mind thesis will be

offered: not that it departs too much from internalism, but on the contrary, that it stays

too closely bound to internalism. Referring to memory, it will be argued that memory is

only extendable, if a questionable internalist picture of memory is assumed as default.

An alternative picture of memory is proposed which breaks more radically with

internalism, and the idea of memory and mind as Extensive rather than as Extended, is

proposed.

1. Introduction

In contemporary philosophy of mind, internalism – the view that mental phenomena are

confined to the brain, or at least the body of subjects – is a widely held position.

In their (in)famous paper “The Extended Mind”, Andy Clark and David Chalmers (Clark

& Chalmers 1998) have challenged internalism about the mind, proposing instead the

Extended Mind thesis. According to that view, someone’s beliefs or memories can be

“constituted partly by features of the environment” (Clark and Chalmers 1998, p. 12). In

other words Clark and Chalmers hold that parts of the environment can be part of the

mental. This position is also known under the name of “active externalism” (to

distinguish it from the passive externalism with respect to content as developed by

Putnam and Burge) (Clark & Chalmers 1998, p. 12).

The Extended Mind thesis or active externalism has been vigorously criticized by

internalist philosophers of mind. According to these critics the arguments deployed by

Clark and Chalmers are insufficient to vindicate active externalism and hence they see

no reason to abandon the belief that the mind is bounded by the skull (see e.g. (Menary

2010) for an overview of the debate).

In this paper we will argue that, despite contrary appearances, active externalism as

defended by Clark and Chalmers — or at least a reading of it — remains still very close

to internalism and as such makes itself vulnerable to internalist critiques. We will show

that this unhappy situation can be avoided by breaking more radically away from

internalism. Rather than thinking of the mind as being extended, we will propose to

view the mind as extensive.

2. Arguments for extended memory

What reasons do Clark and Chalmers provide to believe that memory (and more general

the mind) is extended? One of the main motivations that runs through their paper is

concerned with the role external elements play in cognition. Imagine that in the

execution of a cognitive task an external element plays a role that in other circumstances

could be played by an internal element. If we would qualify that internal element or

process as part of the mental, why wouldn’t we qualify the external element or process

as mental? Clark and Chalmers thus argue in favour of the parity principle:

“If as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which,

were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part

of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is part of the cognitive

process” (Clark & Chalmers 1998, p. 8)

If one were to reject the parity principle, so Clark and Chalmers argue, one would treat

the biological and the non-‐biological as different on questionable grounds. Whether the

distinction between the biological and the non-‐biological is relevant in the study of

cognition has to be shown rather than just asserted. But, given the fact that in some

cases non-‐biological items can play the same functional role as biological ones within the

cognitive life of an organism, there is prima facie evidence that the distinction between

biological and non-‐biological is far less significant for cognition than internalists assume.

According to Clark and Chalmers, if two elements or processes, one of them biological

and the other not, play the same functional role within a cognitive process, there is no

cognitively relevant difference between them. Insisting on such difference is, according

to active internalists, a form of neural or inner chauvinism (Wheeler 2010, p. 247).

To illustrate the idea that belief or memory can extend into the environment, Clark and

Chalmers have offered the example of the Alzheimer patient Otto. Otto uses a notebook,

which he keeps with him constantly, in which he registers information that he might

need at a later stage. If Otto finds himself in New York and decides to visit the Museum

of Modern Art (MoMA), he looks up the address of the museum in his notebook and then

plans how he will get there. Clark and Chalmers claim that the way Otto uses his

notebook to retrieve the address of MoMA is in relevant ways similar to the way a non-‐

amnesic subject uses his or her biological or natural memory. In other words, given that

certain conditions are met, the notes in Otto’s notebook function in the same way as the

memory traces in the brain of a non-‐amnesic subject do or could function.

The first condition that needs to be satisfied for the functional equivalence to hold,

concerns the availability of the information in the notebook. In order for the notebook to

play the role of natural memory, the notes contained in it must be as constantly and

easily available as we would expect for the biological memories of a non-‐amnesic

subject. Furthermore, for the notebook to be a genuine part of Otto’s memory, he must

use it on a regular basis. External aids and props have to become fully integrated within

the cognitive functioning of a subject before they can be regarded as genuine parts of the

mind. A third condition concerns the issue of trust in the information contained in the

notebook. Clark and Chalmers quite rightly stress the fact that an aspect of trust

characterizes our recollections. Under normal circumstances we show full confidence in

our recollections. We mostly rely on our memories without second thoughts about their

correctness. To build the element of trustworthiness into their example, Clark and

Chalmers require that the notes contained in the notebook are endorsed by Otto, both

when he enters them, as well as when he retrieves them.

The conclusion that, so Clark and Chalmers propose, should be drawn from the Otto

example is that the notes in Otto’s notebook form part of Otto’s memory and hence part

of Otto’s mind. In the same way as we regard the unconscious, implicit knowledge of the

museum’s address as part of the mental life of the non-‐amnesic subject so we have to

regard the notes in Otto’s notebook as part of Otto’s unconscious beliefs about the

location of the museum, precisely because the notes play a role that is, or could be,

played by biological memory traces.

Active externalism does not remain restricted to the claim that external elements or

processes play a causal role in our cognitive functioning, but goes beyond this in stating

that external elements can be co-‐constitutive of mental processes (provided that certain

conditions are met). Although it is less relevant for the issues under discussion in this

paper, it should be noted that parity-‐based arguments are not the only ones offered to

defend active externalism. Some authors, following a strand explicitly present in Clark

and Chalmers’ original paper, have emphasized the fact that external props and aids

help us to extend our cognitive capabilities (see e.g. (Menary 2007), (Sutton 2010)).

According to these authors the existence of such cognitive augmentation or

complementation via the cognitive integration of external processes should be the main

motivation to adopt active externalism. Presently we will focus on parity-‐style

arguments for extended memory, and argue that they remain too closely bounded to

internalism, and are therefore vulnerable to attacks from internalists. For a similar

diagnosis of the arguments based on cognitive complementation we refer to (Myin &

Zahidi 2012) and (Hutto & Myin 2013)

The position defended by Clark and Chalmers has been severely criticised by

philosophers of an internalist persuasion. A standard move to counter Clark and

Chalmers’ parity-‐based argument is to argue that in examples such as that of Otto, the

external elements only play a causal role but to deny that they are constitutive. The

internalist claims that the note in Otto’s notebook forms merely a link in the causal chain

that leads to the first the perception of the note, then its recognition, and finally the

formation of a belief about the address of MoMA. It is the internal process of perceiving,

recognizing and forming a belief, and not the initial causation by the physical note that

makes the process cognitive. True, the entry is an external element that causes the

process, but perception, recognition and belief formation are internal processes and

these internal processes constitute the act of remembering.

The internalist rejoinder starts from a number of assumptions that are not to be

taken for granted. One does not have to take as axiomatic, and not in need of further

argument, that thinking, and a fortiori recognizing and perceiving are internal processes.

The idea that in any case perception and recognition are processes in which the outer

world is essentially involved seems far from unreasonable. If this idea is correct, than

the internalist contention that Otto’s use of the notebook is cognitive because internal

processes are involved, doesn’t get off the ground.

However, Clark and Chalmers cannot avail themselves of such considerations as a

counter-‐move to their internalist critics, because they accept, or at least do not outright

reject, internalism about the mind per se. By accepting or not distancing themselves

from standard internalist presuppositions they grant the internalist picture a status as

the “default” framework and make themselves vulnerable to internalist attacks against

active externalism. One way this shows up is where Clark and Chalmers uncritically

accept that in standard cases of remembering, i.e. cases in which no external elements

such as notebooks or other aide-‐memoires seem to play a role, the mental process of

remembering is wholly internal. Their formulation of the parity principle (quoted in the

above) is equally tainted by residual internalism since it refers to a role, played by an

internal element, which would be “immediately recognized as cognitive”. Also note that

the very notion of the mind as Extended suggests default internalism, for only what is

normally confined with certain boundaries, can be extended outside of these.

Clark and Chalmers might object that we misrepresent their position. They might

argue that the parity principle is merely a device to weaken internalist prejudices. The

fact that they use the parity principle in the end does not have to mean that they endorse

the residual internalism that is inherent in the principle. Clark (2008, p.77) situates the

parity principle within a “veil of ignorance” type argument to argue for an agnostic

position with regards to the boundaries of the mind.

It is however far from clear that in its original setting the parity principle was

merely a device to promote such agnosticism. More importantly however, it seems that

such a nuanced rendering of the parity principle is incompatible with other assertions

by Clark in which he is quite explicit about the fact that the mental is usually a matter of

internal processing, such as:

“Whereas BRAINBOUND locates all our mental machinery firmly in the head

and central nervous system, EXTENDED allows at least some aspects of

human cognition to be realized by the ongoing work of the body and/or the

extraorganismic environment. The physical mechanisms of mind, if this is

correct, are not all in the head. […]. In the remaining chapters, I aim to clarify

what is at issue here and to defend the claim that the cognitive and the

mental are indeed (sometimes) best viewed through the more

accommodating lens of EXTENDED.” (Clark 2008, p.77) (own italics)

We do not wish to enter into a hermeneutic debate on the question whether Clark is

consistent in his adherence to agnosticism vis-‐à-‐vis the boundaries of the mental. The

more important point we want to emphasize is that agnosticism brings defenders of

active externalism in a difficult dialectical position, vulnerable to internalist attacks. A

much more defensible position is obtained by abandoning agnosticism, and radically

rejecting internalism about the mind.

Arguably, the reason why Clark and Chalmers allow internalism to remain on the scene,

lies in the fact that they remain wedded to the idea that memory, and more generally

cognition, is a matter of information processing. According to this picture, remembering

is a process in which information is first stored and later retrieved. Storage of

information takes place in vehicles or information carriers that can be internal (the

memory trace in the brain) or external (e.g. the notes in a notebook). Remembering

involves the manipulation of these information carriers. The dispute between active

externalists and internalists then turns on the question whether external manipulation

of information carriers can be constitutive of the mental in the same way as is internal

manipulation of vehicles. That internal information processing is constitutive for

cognition is not questioned, and in any case not rejected. Therefore, it remains possible

for internalist critics of the Extended Mind thesis to claim that only the internal plays a

constitutive role in cognition, while for some reason the external does not. By not

questioning the idea that the internal is constitutive for cognition, Clark and Chalmers

allow this strategy to be employed by their internalist opponents.

In other words, defenders of active externalism such as Clark and Chalmers put

themselves in a difficult dialectical situation because they remain wedded to the idea

that cognition is a matter of processing content-‐bearing vehicles, which can be then be

external or internal. It is possible, however, to conceive of cognition in different ways. In

the following sections we will illustrate such an alternative conception of cognition by

offering variations on the Otto thought-‐experiment. We will look at a scenario in which a

subject has access to certain pieces of information concerning the past but without any

kind of remembering taking place. Even if we enrich the initially Spartan scenario so as

to satisfy the conditions stipulated by Clark and Chalmers, it persists to be a case of

reliable access to information without any form of remembering. We will take these

scenarios as illustrating that the standard view of memory as information processing

comes under pressure when confronted with real life examples. We do not claim that it

is impossible to accommodate examples such as ours within the standard view. On the

other hand we do believe that our examples show that fundamental aspects of

remembering are neglected, if one reduces remembering to the mere access to reliable

information. Moreover, so we will propose, an alternative, embodied view of memory is

possible, which abandons the information processing framework. We will sketch such a

view, and argue that, by breaking away much more radically from internalism than the

active externalism of Clark and Chalmers, it stands firmer. On the proposed view, mental

processes are always world-‐involving or extensive and not by default internal and

potentially extendable.

3. Thought experiments

In this section we will start to uncover the limitations of the traditional view of memory

according to which remembering is a question of having access to information that is

carried by (internal or external). For this purpose we start with a rather simple scenario

which will be enriched throughout the discussion.

Consider Ada, a female person with a standard life, normal habits and capacities.

Suppose, on an average day, Ada were asked to remember what she had for breakfast

exactly a year ago. Despite the fact that Ada’s memory is intact, chances are close to zero

that she will remember. Now, in addition, suppose that, unbeknownst to her, her partner

keeps a precise record of what she has for breakfast, each and every day of the year.

Suppose now that the entry for that date in her partner’s database is shown to her,

without further information. Will Ada thereby remember what she had for breakfast

then, that is, will she remember that she has eaten what’s is on the list? The answer must

be no. The list will look to you as a rather random sample, characteristic of the kinds of

breakfast she is accustomed to have. Even if she were told about the record keeping

habits of her partner, the list won’t help her to remember what she had for breakfast,

even if she is aware of the great accuracy of her partner in such matters. Even being

shown a picture of her breakfast probably wouldn’t help. This scenario forms a case

where access to information concerning one’s past does not suffice for recollecting

events in one’s past

Contrast this case with the following: Exactly a year ago, as it was her birthday, an old

friend Ada hadn’t seen for years, came to visit her, and she brought home made mango

pie. Ada retains vivid and fond memories of the evening. Next morning, she ate the

mango pie for breakfast. Of course, in this case, the chances that Ada will remember

what she had had for breakfast exactly a year ago will be considerable. Moreover, in case

the recalling doesn’t come spontaneously, a picture of a mango, of her friend, or of the

actual mango pie will help. Even if these cues do not help her to remember what she had

for breakfast, being shown the list kept by her partner will quite certainly lead to

recognition and recollection. Indeed if she reads in these notes that she had mango pie

as breakfast, she will be able to embed that fact in the wider web of events of last year.

In contrast with the first scenario, the list of her partner will help Ada to recall what she

had for breakfast.

While in the both scenario’s Ada has access to information about her past, it is only the

second scenario that constitutes an example of genuine remembering. According to the

traditional view, accepted by mainstream cognitive scientists and philosophers

including Clark and Chalmers, mental functions are to be understood as information

processing functions. Information gets represented, coded, and manipulated both

internally and externally. On our view, the two scenarios sketched show the limitations

of this traditional picture of memory (and of cognition), as access and manipulation of

information. For our examples clearly show that having access to information

sometimes does and sometimes doesn’t give rise to genuine remembering. Access to

information is not a sufficient condition for remembering.

If this conclusion is correct, it raises the question what, apart from access to information,

matters for memory. In the following section we will try to answer that question. It will

be argued that recalling a fact always requires that the remembered fact is entrenched.

Further, we will examine whether this notion of entrenchment can be accommodated

within the framework of Clark and Chalmers by invoking endorsement.

4. Embeddedness and endorsement

In the previous section we have introduced two scenarios and we claimed that in the

first scenario there is no question of remembering while in the second scenario there is.

What then is the basis for this crucial difference between the two scenarios? The key to

answering this question, we propose, lies in the observation that in the first scenario the

information that Ada retrieves from her partner’s notebook is not entrenched, neither in

Ada’s other recollections, nor in her attitudes. The information that Ada acquires by

reading the entries in the list, is in no way connected with other memories she might

have. The information which she acquires therefore remains isolated and is not

embedded in the natural context in which the event took place. Nor is Ada in a position

to situate an event described in the list in a diachronic sequence of events. She has no

sense of what led up to it, or what further events followed it. The breakfast of one year

ago remains isolated from other events that took place (before or after) and can thus not

be integrated in Ada’s own past. In genuine cases of remembering, contextualisation can

be very explicit, as for example in cases of auto-‐noetic memories (Tulving, 1983). These

are memories in which one remembers an event by recalling specifics of one’s personal

involvement in it. One could vividly remember having seen Diana passing by at the

party, because one has a mildly painful memory of the strong perfume which one was

momentarily struck by when she passed by. But contextualisation can operate less

explicitly. One might be able to remember where a street or a building in a city is, only

because one can connect it with one’s habitual routes though the city. One might know,

and explain what one knows, by stipulating, that on the route from the university to the

townhouse, one has to make a left and not a right at the second intersection. In other

words, one remembers by situating something in a web of habits. Of course, it is true

that one might quiz one’s memory for a certain address that temporarily escapes one’s

grasp. One prods oneself, without avail initially, and then suddenly the name “pops up”.

But is this “popping up” comparable to being presented with an item on the breakfast

list? Even in the case of the address popping up, there is plenty of contextualisation.

Think about how one does actually prod oneself in such a situation: “Come on, it’s a

short name. There’s an “A” in it. The building is tall, with a beautifully crafted wooden

door. Last time I saw it it has a poster of a performance of Fauré’s requiem on its

window. ...”. And when, probably as a result of self-‐provided contextualisation, the name

finally comes, it comes with a feeling of “fitting”.

Entrenchment need not be restricted to relations between the elements of some

autonomous “memory level” or the level of explicitly formulated thoughts at which

pieces of articulated information are explicitly linked. It concerns the embeddedness in a

“a life”, with its personal history, individual motivations and emotions that are

constitutive of memory and recollection.

Because of this deeper form of embeddedness of memory with other mental and

personal domains, memory has anticipatory aspects. That is, though there surely are

acts of remembering, such acts take place, and are often only possible, because they have

been prepared, sometimes explicitly, sometimes more “in the act”. That is, our actions at

a certain moment, often lay the groundwork for later remembering. This is conspicuous

in practices of rehearsing, marking, paying explicit attention-‐to, but it needn’t be that

explicit. Aspects of a situation can be salient because they are unusual, contextually odd,

because they provide an unexpected opportunity, or because they require a special

adaptation of our normal ways of going about. One can notice salient aspects in different

ways, ranging from the very explicit (Saying aloud, or in one’s mind “Aha, Diana has

finally entered the room”), to quite implicit and thoughtless (as one can experience -‐ but

only bring to mind as an explicit thought much later -‐ that Diana's perfume had a

particularly strong scent. One might possibly remember her presence later because of

that olfactory experience -‐ "Indeed, she was there, now I remember! I was struck by her

perfume when she passed by!").

Another illustration of how deep entrenchment can run is to be found in the fact that

one can be reproached for forgetting. Forgetting the birthday of a supposedly dear

person is generally regarded as manifesting a lack of interest and a shallowness of the

emotional bond with that person.

Conceptualizing memory as a contextualized capacity, thus unveils an internal link

between acts of remembering, and acts of anticipating a potential later need to

remember. Both concern a consideration of an event or episode in the context of a

different event or episode. In the case of remembering, one connects a past moment

with a current moment, in the case of anticipating, one connects a current moment with

a future moment. Given this internal link, it should come as not much of a surprise then,

that this link is confirmed in empirical studies of people suffering from amnesia. That is,

consensus is growing in psychology, that memory should be seen as a broader capacity

for mental time travel, a capacity to project between time frames (Tulving 1993). It is

built on such evidence as a that patients with anterograde memory deficits, not only fail

to remember the events in which they are taking place, but also are incapable of

planning for the future. Just as they are cognitively disconnected from their own past,

they are cognitively disconnected from their own future, at least as a conceived.

(Rosenbaum at al 2009)

What makes the difference between the first Ada-‐scenario, in which there is no

remembering, and the second Ada-‐scenario, in which remembering does take place, is

not access to information, because such is present in both, but rather the degree to

which information is entrenched. Only in the second scenario such entrenchment is

present, and that is why one can speak of remembering here.

But what about Clark and Chalmers’ Otto-‐scenario? Is there entrenchment here or not?

It looks to us that the description given by Clark and Chalmers is not rich enough to

provide an answer this question. Dependent upon how the sketch is further filled out,

there could, or could not be, entrenchment. A lack of entrenchment throws doubt on the

basic assumptions of the scenario. For example, it is taken for granted that Otto pens

down in his notebook whatever he assesses to be of later use, but likely to be forgotten.

In the above, we have seen that it is plausible that, as a consequence of entrenchment,

the capacity for anticipation required for assessing the potential relevance of current

events in the light of his own future is entangled with the capacity to remember — a

thesis supported by the idea of “mental time travel”. If so, it becomes problematic to

assume that Otto is at the same time amnesic, while retaining the required capacity for

anticipation. If anticipating and remembering are intrinsically linked, the one capacity

falls together with the other, which would imply that the script envisaged by Clark and

Chalmers is simply incoherent.

Further doubts concerning the coherence of Clark and Chalmers’ Otto-‐scenario can be

raised by considering that Otto, despite his amnesia, must be able to recognize his

notebook and the notes contained in it, as his notebook and his notes. This is not self-‐

evident, because prima facie, this capacity to frame the notebook and the notes in it in

the past looks similar to the lost capacity for remembering. A striking and well-‐

documented case of a person with serious amnesia shows that these considerations are

not purely theoretical. The former orchestra leader and composer Clive Wearing, suffers,

because of an accident, from a serious form of anterograde amnesia, and he can’t form

new memories (Wearing 2005). To compensate, he takes the initiative, again and again,

to start a diary to regain a grasp on his own his thoughts. A typical passage in Wearing’s

diary goes as follows:

2:10 P.M: This time properly awake. . . .

2:14 P.M: this time finally awake. . . .

2:35 P.M: this time completely awake,”

“At 9:40 P.M. I awoke for the first time, despite my previous claims.”

“I was fully conscious at 10:35 P.M., and awake for the first time in many,

many weeks.” (Sacks 2007)

Tragically, Wearing cannot use his diary as a bridge to his past thoughts, because he

doesn’t recognize his diary afterwards. On later occasions, he empathically denies the

notebook is his, or that it is he who has taken notes in it.

The seemingly internal link between anticipation and memory, and the fact that

recognition is or requires a form of remembering, no strong conclusions do not rule out

the use of external tools for memory. Lots of people do rely on notebooks to write down

facts they would otherwise forget, and support their memory in these ways. In cases of

severe memory damage, it is without doubt possible to successfully pursue

compensatory strategies with lists, booklets, and ways of organising one’s environment

(Jameson & Jameson 2007).

What is crucial for our purposes, is that the existence of cases such as Clive Wearing’s,

wherein there is access to information, but no memory, show that the conception of

memory which is at the heart of Clark and Chalmers’s argumentation for the Extended

Mind thesis, seems to ignore essential aspects of mental functions.

Having arrived at this point, it could be remarked that we ourselves have ignored an

essential aspect of the scenario sketched by Clark and Chalmers. For up to now, we have

not taken into account the additional conditions which according to Clark and Chalmers

must be fulfilled in order for Otto’s notebook to count as an extension of his memory.

Clark and Chalmers emphasize, in particular, the additional condition that Otto endorses

the notes he takes in his booklet, both at the time of writing as of reading. Does the idea

of endorsement solve the problems indicated? Again, everything depends on how

precisely the notion of endorsement is filled in. A prima facie plausible way to fill in the

notion of endorsement, is to think of endorsement as a kind of label. This label,

comparable to a quality label like “made in Switserland”, gets attached to the memory

trace when it is formed, and it accompanies the memory in the recall phase. The

recognition or registration of the label engenders confidence in the memory. This

conception of endorsement as a label perfectly fits in with an information processing

framework for thinking about the mental. Endorsement becomes information, a

representational content carried by the label (which serves here as a representational

vehicle), which is accessed during the recall phase.

However, this conception of endorsement seems to lead to the same kinds of problems

which the notion of memory as access to information simpliciter led to. It just depends

on the circumstances, in particular the way the label is entrenched in someone’s life,

whether or not it does confer endorsement or trust on memories. The case of Clive

Wearing can illustrate this. The entries which Wearing enters into his notebook, like

“Today I am for the first time conscious”, often get marked by him. He forcefully ticks

them, apparently with the intention to authenticate them, to mark that this genuinely is

his note. These markings form a perfect illustration of labels for endorsement. However,

just as Wearing afterwards does not recognize his notebook, or the entries in it as his

notebook or his entries, he doesn’t recognize his markings afterwards as his markings.

Before he enters a new note in the sense of “Now I am for the first time conscious …”, he

crosses out the previous note, including the marking. The new marking he makes for his

new note, seem clearly intended to express the difference with the lack of authenticity of

the old note and the old marking.

The limitations of thinking about specific aspects of remembering as labels have been

observed by Ludwig Wittgenstein (for Wittgenstein on memory see e.g. (Moyal-‐Sharrock

2009)). He pointed out that thinking about memories as representations of facts

wearing a label “belonging to the past” leads to a cul de sac. Wittgenstein rejects that

there is something like “‘‘[...] some feature of our memory image that tells us the time to

which it belongs.’’ (Wittgenstein 1992, p. 5) Elsewhere he writes:

“[It] takes remembering to tell us that this is the past. but if memory shows

us the past, how does it show us that it is the past? It does not show us the

past. Any more than our senses show us the present.’’ (Wittgenstein 1980, §

592-‐593)

Wittgenstein’s reasoning looks perfectly applicable to the conception of endorsement as

a label. Conceiving of endorsement as a quality label does not lead to a richer notion of

remembering. For endorsement becomes nothing but an extra piece of information. A

“genuine” memory then consists of, on the one hand information with respect to a fact in

the past, and, on the other hand, the extra information that it concerns a “genuine”

memory. The problems raised by simpler informational approaches to remembering

and memory just reappear.

5. From extended to extensive memory

We seem to encounter limitations of the traditional framework for thinking about

memory —and by extension the mental— as access to information; of thinking about the

mental as the processing of represented information. Access to information, even if

enriched by notions like endorsement, seems to remain blind to essential differences

between what is genuinely and only superficially cognitive. One of the following

possibilities must hold: Either we have ourselves ignored certain ways in which the

notion of memory as access to information (and by extension cognition as information

processing) can be enriched, so that the problems we have indicated can be solved. Or

the existence of these problems shows that there are fundamental limitations to the

standard framework according to which the mental is considered in terms of

information processing, — of vehicles and contents. This is not the place the resolve the

complex and ongoing discussion between proponents and opponents of the standard

framework (for a sustained attack on the standard framework see (Hutto & Myin

2013)). Pointing at the kinds of problems we have encountered fits into a long and rich

tradition of anti-‐representationalist thinking, with pragmatist, phenomenological and

analytical champions. One of the most outspoken enemies of this tradition, Jerry Fodor,

sharply characterizes its core tenets:

“Abilities are prior to theories ... Competence is prior to content ... [and that]

knowing how is the paradigm cognitive state and it is prior to knowing that.”

(Fodor 2008, p. 10)

Instead of attempting to settle this discussion in favor of the anti-‐representationalist

approach, we now want to consider the question about the possible consequences for

the Extended Mind thesis if a non-‐representational account is correct. We will try to

point out what the consequences are for the discussion regarding the Extended Mind

thesis, if one sets out not from, but outside of, the standard framework.

So let us put, on the basis of the considerations given above, behind us the traditional

way of thinking about cognition as the processing of information and of memory as

access to information. The alternative is to think in terms of embodiment instead of in

terms of representation. Representations make explicit: they describe something, carry a

certain content, and it is by the processing of that content or meaning — by means of a

physical operation on the vehicle of that content — that an intelligent, cognitive or

mentally mediated behavior becomes possible. One remembers because one has

activated a memory trace, and one trusts one’s memory because it has the appropriate

label attached to it. The contrary view we defend, is that intelligent, mental or cognitive

behavior can be merely embodied. An organism can act in a structured — intelligent,

mental and cognitively mediated — way in a certain environment without a

representation of either the environment or the structure present in its action. Instead

of internally represented, this structure is embodied in diachronic patterns in the

organism’s behavior. Intelligent behavior does not get explained by referring to

representation of the environment or explicit instructions which “prescribe what to do”

(Keijzer 1998), but by physical changes which are due to the organism’s history of

interactions with its environment. Applied to memory, one then no longer thinks about

memory as an archive of representations to which one gains access. Remembering, on

the contrary, becomes a capacity to show behavior in certain contexts in which the

influence of previous interactions with the environment can be discerned. One

remembers an address by having an explicit thought about the address, or by being able

to head towards that address, without any need, besides previous contact with the

address, for the mediation of an internal representation of the address. Such a

nonrepresentational conception of memory allows us to spread the context of

remembering in time, in contrast to an “object-‐oriented” conception (Hutto 2006), as

when memory is seen as information carried by vehicles or traces. An embodied

approach does not link remembering to the discrete events of creation, storage and

retrieval of “a memory”, but rather considers remembering to be a consequence of a

number of not precisely datable converging processes and tendencies, none of which

individually constitutes such a discrete event, but is only a necessary, but not sufficient

condition. Already existing habits, exogenously induced or endogenously noticed

salience, either explicit or implicit, are not discrete features, but related to attitudes of a

person, without precise temporal boundaries, but nevertheless , as was illustrated

earlier, necessary conditions for later remembering. For example, one can remember at

time t3 because one has a longstanding disposition, present long before t2, to notice a

particular detail of a situation at t2. Even in this quite minimalistic sketch, the full

explanatory context covers a wide temporal span, and stands in a sharp contrast with

discrete moments of information processing.

Conceiving of memory as a contextualized capacity creates room for a fundamental role

for context and situation. Consider for example the embodied capacity of being able to

climb a ladder. It is clear that the exercise of this capacity has a built-‐in sensitivity to

situation and context. Without a ladder nearby it cannot be exercised at all. In case there

is a ladder present, further contextual factors will determine whether and how the

capacity will be deployed. Aren’t the rungs too apart? Is the climber fit? Doesn’t she or

he suffer from an injured leg or foot, which renders climbing impossible? Is she or he

willing to climb? In the same way, memory is context sensitive. In contexts which are

similar to those of an event to be remembered, remembering is facilitated. It is easier to

remember a certain self-‐related event when one takes a posture which is congruent with

the posture taken during that event (Dijkstra et al. 2007). Emotionally charged events

are more easily remembered when one enacts movements with the same emotional

charge (Casasanto & Dijstra 2010). One can also refer here to the use of re-‐enactments of

crimes in the legal sphere. The online Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary &

Thesaurus defines “to re-‐enact” with an explicit mention of such facilitating effects on

memory, saying: “If you re-‐enact an event, you try to make it happen again in exactly the

same way that it happened the first time, often as an entertainment or as a way to help

people remember certain facts about an event”, offering as example: “ Police officers re-‐

enacted the crime in an attempt to get witnesses to come forward.”

An embodied approach renders the representation of contextual factors superfluous: a

difference in behavior can simply lie in being in a different context or situation. A

different situation leads to a different interaction. There is no need to explain the

difference in interaction by means of postulating differing representations for varying

situations. This is redundant, because the difference in situation is real enough — and

more real than a representation! — and suffices to explain the difference in interaction

(Brooks 1991). This is not to deny that organisms can behave differently in cases where

the external contexts are the same. Such differences in behavior can be explained by

referring to the fact that the organism is in a different state. However these different

states need not to be understood as representational states, but can be understood in

terms of the organism’s history of interaction with the environment.

The role of context can become complex and contain elements of conscious design. One

places visible signs on or next to the road to indicate where to change directions, and

eventually knowing or remembering the road to a certain place can consist of nothing

more than that one enters the highway and follows the signposts to that place — to

invoke a John Haugeland’s famous example (Haugeland 1998) This capacity for creating

context of course get extended enormously when the capacity for language enters the

scene. A note such as one in Otto’s booklet, can be considered as a self-‐designed context

which forms part of the process or remembering which the note, together with other

factors, provokes. Or sometimes provokes, because whether or not a process of

remembering is engendered or facilitated by something like a note, is itself a context-‐

sensitive matter (compare the first Ada-‐scenario with the second one). Suppose that a

number of stones are arranged in a desert in the shape of an arrow to indicate the

direction which must be followed to reach an oasis. Rather than saying that this

configuration of stones codes certain content, or figures as a vehicle that carries certain

content, it can suffice to describe this configuration as a physical element which triggers

a certain reaction — in specific circumstances. This same logic seems applicable to more

complex situations. Wittgenstein offers the example of a person, who, when some other

person utters a sentence, draws a curve on a paper. Later, this person can, by looking at

the curve, remember the sentence. Wittgenstein rejects the idea that the curve forms a

code for the sentence. A natural description is to consider the lines on paper, just like the

stones in the above, as something that triggers the process of remembering

(Wittgenstein 1988).

Looking at memory as a contextualized capacity fully recognizes the role of external

elements in remembering. It is very important not to construct the role of “triggering” of

memories in the way in which internalists would interpret this. For they also recognize a

causal role for external elements in memory processes. Also according to them a process

of remembering can be provoked by an external element. But they will insist that there

is a crucial difference between the merely causal aspect of triggering a process of

remembering and the genuinely mental process of remembering, which remains

internal. The external element initiates this mental process, but the mental process only

appears after the occurrence of the external triggering event, and it happens strictly

internally. Moreover, on the internalist view, such internal processes of remembering

can perfectly occur without the complicity of external elements. Sometimes, or as a

general rule, remembering is context-‐insensitive. On the conception of memory as

embodied capacity which we propose, the process of remembering is always situated

and contextualized. It is always a process of interaction in which a person and his

environment are involved. The specific context unescapably plays a role, even if one that

can be less or more visible. The internalist model according to which behind the

concrete interaction of a person with its environment more fundamental internal

processes are hidden — the retrieval of a representation form an internal archive —

gets completely rejected: internal representations are replaced by external interactions.

This embodied position about memory and cognition departs much more radically from

internalism than the active externalism proposed by Clark and Chalmers. In their

formulation, it remains possible to consider extended cognition, as in the case of Otto, as

a by-‐product, of addition to bona fide internal cognition. The existence of the latter never

gets directly challenged.

The conception of memory — and by extension the mental — as embodied capacity,

recognizes the role of the environment without retaining the residual internalism still

allowed by active externalism. The mental can then be considered to be extensive,

because both organism and environment are essentially involved in interactions which

belong to the sphere of the mental. External elements, like stones in the sand, or notes in

a notebook, can in certain circumstances be essential for a process of remembering, just

like an imagined stone or an emerging thought could be. Both the real and the imaginary

stone are nothing but elements in a process in which the occurrence or non-‐occurrence

of remembering depends on a large number of additional factors. Even if we consider

the stone as external and the imagined stone as internal, then still it is the case that this

difference does not play a decisive role. Moreover, under some circumstances, the

imagined stone would not lead to remembering, just like an imagined version of the

notes of Ada’s partner would not lead to remembering, while under other

circumstances, the external stone would have the required effect. That the alleged

external or internal character doesn’t play a decisive role, is adequately recognized by

an active externalism which invokes the parity principle. But by means of the same

parity principle thinking about the mind as extended runs the risk of assuming a

subservient stance with respect to internalism, in which external elements derive their

mental aura from the playing of a role which could be played by internal elements. The

conception of memory as an embodied capacity parts company with internalism right

from the start. According to this conception, memory cannot become extended, because

it has never been internal to begin with. Memory is, and has always been, extensive.

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The Extent of Memory. From Extended to Extensive Mind (2014)

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