1

To what extent does the role of religion

motivate an individual to resort to ‘home grown’ terrorism

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the degree:

Master of Science

Security and Risk Management

Department of Criminology

University of Leicester

March 2012

Paul Keys

Student Number:

099020187

19896 words

(Excluding Appendices and References)

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Abstract

This study concerns the recent emphasis on the radicalisation process of individuals resorting to

‘home grown’ terrorism, with focus on the Muslim community in the UK who have come under an

increasing core of attention. Studies indicate to terrorism or become radicalised. This paper

evaluates the role of religion, in particular Islam, as a motivational factor in ‘home grown’ terrorism

and radicalisation. Tensions and strained levels of trust exist between Muslims and non Muslims

which have been illustrated in a number of ways since the July 7th bombings of the London

transportation system. The levels of grievance and alienation are well documented in various

studies and polls which have been consistently highlighted. The underlying factors affecting the

issues are examined and compared to the results of research conducted with members of the

Muslim community. Through this examination, four key themes emerged of ‘Personal identification’,

‘Reliance on media to formulate ideas’, ‘Conforms to social norms’ and ‘Development of sub

culture’. From these themes examples were found which indicated that an individual’s

interpretation of a religion is a factor in the justification for using terrorism as a form of violence.

However, another factor was identified that individuals have no direct control over, yet does have

considerable impact on the way Muslims are viewed; ‘Contemporary media representation’. It is

found that the role of the media shapes how society interprets events, consequently having a

negative impact on the perceptions of Muslims and Islam. However, it is concluded that while there

are other factors, other than the role of religion, which contribute as a stimulus, the frequency to

which religion occurred in the research suggests that there are foundations in the analysis derived

from previous research.

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Acknowledgement

Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor, Sam Weston, for her wise words and continuing support

throughout this study.

Thanks to the support of Tom Griffiths, the head of Europia in Manchester, without his help I would

not have been able to accomplish the focus group. Also, my appreciation goes out to the Officer

Commanding Harden Troop at 45 Commando Royal Marines, for being flexible and understanding

in his support throughout this process.

Lastly I would like to show my respect and gratitude, amongst others, to my Mum who sadly

passed away during the latter stages of this study. She was an inspiration and showed me the true

meaning of courage, spirit and determination.

Paul Keys

February 2012

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Contents

Abstract 2

Acknowledgements 3

Chapter One Introduction 5

Chapter Two Literature Review 8

Unresolved issues of the definition 8

The era of radicalisation 11

The extent of the ‘home grown’ threat 13

Root causes of ‘home grown’ terrorism and radicalisation 14

A presence of ‘malignant literature’ 16

Relevance of sub cultural theory 19

Chapter Three Methodology 24

Chapter Four Data Chapter 31

Objectives 31

‘Contemporary media representation’ 31

‘Grievance’ 33

‘Personal identification’ 36

‘Role of religion’ 37

‘Identity with wider society’ 39

‘Feelings of marginalisation’ 40

‘Domestic social stimuli’ 41

Chapter Five Conclusion 43

Data Findings 43

Discussion 45

Appendices

Appendix A – Questions for focus group/individual interviews 47

Appendix B – Objective One Data Results 50

Appendix C – Objective Two Data Results 52

Appendix D – Participant Consent Form 54

Appendix E – Participant Information Letter 55

References 57

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Chapter One Introduction

This study focuses on the extent to which religion plays a role in motivating an individual in the

radicalisation process and ‘home grown’ terrorism. The field of terrorism studies has grown

significantly since 9/11, with literature increasing exponentially (Silke, 2008). However, despite this

increase, problems still persist such as the failure to find a universally accepted definition of

terrorism, despite the fact that appropriate micro definitions have been established. With this

increase in focus and attention, especially amongst the Muslim community, there has been an urge

to understand what the drivers of ‘home grown’ terrorism and radicalisation are. The study

examines in relation to the importance of the role of an individual’s view of a religion bearing a

factor on the radicalisation process towards ‘home grown’ terrorism. Studies have noted how there

is no consistent theory for understanding any single motivation involved in the process towards

‘home grown’ terrorism. Some academics emphasise that religion is one of the factors which

contribute to the process, though the extent of which is not clear-cut (Gartenstein - Ross and

Grossman, 2009, Githens - Mazer, 2010, Precht, 2007 and Silke, 2008). This presents an

opportunity to conduct research to evaluate the effectiveness of religion in motivating an individual

towards ‘home grown’ terrorism.

The conventional wisdom of academics and commentators is that since the July 7th bombings

there has been has slight departure from the notion of ‘international’ terrorism as the main cause

for concern amongst Western governments, with a shift in focus towards a ‘domestic’ problem and

on radicalisation policies. This raises the question of what has caused this shift in focus, whether

this is a product of conditions such as foreign policy, or as some have argued, due to the conflicts

of culture and identity within society is responsible. As evident in a speech by the head of MI5,

Jonathan Evans, the threat to the UK has diversified from its international roots,

‘The percentage of the priority plots and leads we see in the UK linked to al Qaeda in the tribal

areas of Pakistan …. has dropped from around 75 % …. to around 50% now. This does not

mean that the overall threat has reduced but that it has diversified …. the reduction is also partly

a result of increased activity elsewhere’, (Evans, 2010).

Central to this study is the evaluation of the combination of religion and sub cultural theory as

mechanisms for motivation and incentives for ‘home grown’ terrorism and therefore the following

objectives were set:

Objective 1. Examine the extent to which an individual’s interpretation of Islam is a factor in

why religion is sometimes seen as a mechanism for an incentive to support and engage in terrorist

acts.

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Objective 2. Elucidate how sub cultural theory can assist in explaining why some individuals

resort to terrorism and fall into the radicalisation process.

The challenge of understanding the relationship between religion and terrorism is as great as ever.

In the midst of the images created by the media, the temptation remains to view terrorism as

associated with religion, and in the perspective of this study, Islam. Individuals formulate their own

ideas and understandings on terrorism, Muslims and Islam; and how they are co related. Examples

have included incidents that have affected how society observes the Muslim community. These

consist of events such as the ‘Muslim Girl Gang who kicked a woman in the head’, where the

identity of the gang was attached with a religious prefix, rather than an ethnic or social attachment.

Despite the fact that the attack had nothing to do with being religiously motivated, the question

beckons as to why attach the stigma of being a ‘Muslim Gang’ rather than a ‘Somalian Gang’ or a

‘Black Gang’, as the attack did have apparent racial motivations (Telegraph, 2011). Another

example of bias media reports is the story published in the Daily Express in 2005 which claimed

that NatWest bank had removed images of ‘piggy’ banks from their promotional material in order to

avoid offending Muslims. The story was critical of the ‘political correctness that makes us trim our

national culture in ludicrous ways’ (Osborne and Jones, 2008). Despite NatWest’s insistence that

the decision to remove the posters was purely due to an alteration in campaign, the less exciting

factual account was ignored in favour of a more sensationalist story. These incidents summarise

the strained levels of confidence between the Muslim community and main stream society, with an

almost mutual distrust of each other, which have been constantly characterised as poor since 9/11

and more recently post the July 7th bombings. The underlying factors of these general grievances

shall be explored in more detail in the research part of this study in Chapter Four. Preceding this

assessment of the findings, an evaluation of the issues affecting this study needs to be addressed

in the context in which it exists and so set the scene for an examination of relevant existing

literature that will follow in Chapter Two.

The intense disaffection of many Muslims, especially the second and third generations of

immigrant families, themselves born and bred in the UK, is particularly problematic for the

government. The complexity of issues concerning Muslim dissatisfaction remains unresolved. The

Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) commented that the loss of values and national identity

related to the UK has been the result of misplaced policies, such as multiculturalism, that has led to

a fragmented society (The Guardian, 2008). It is these challenges that the Muslim community

faces specifically, that this study rests on. These and other issues will be discussed in more detail

throughout this study, the research for which has adopted a qualitative approach to the collection of

data. The results will provide a descriptive approach to theory that is not detached from previous

hypotheses. The research methodology of ‘triangulation’ has been used as it is well suited to this

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small scale study, in order to establish validity and gain further insight into the role of religion as a

motivational factor. This descriptive approach to qualitative data which has been employed, will

allow for themes to be constantly refined throughout the analysis of data from the actual words of

the respondents. The data collection has followed the principles of ‘themed content analysis’ which

followed the utilisation of a blend of two interviews, a focus group and comparison with existing

literature. All the respondents to the research are from the Muslim community, who have

experienced, in various capacities, the grievances that are documented in this study. This research

has been conducted in an open, accountable and evidence-based manner, in accordance with

ethical responsibilities, in order to produce an objective scrutiny into a field of research that is

littered with subjective findings.

The results of the data collected in the research phase will be described in Chapter Four, leading to

the findings and conclusions for the study being summarised in Chapter Five. Key themes to have

emerged in this study firstly relate to how an individual understands a religion, ‘Individual’s

perception’ and ‘Reliance on media to formulate ideas’; and secondly relate to sub cultural theory,

‘Development of sub culture’ and ‘Conforms to social norms’. The research findings support the

argument that to reject the notion of religion as a motivation for ‘home grown’ terrorism is not only

premature but possibly subjective in doing so. The role of religion, to a degree, is characterised by

the erosion of an individual’s critical and objective observations that allow the justification for the

use of violence.

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Chapter Two Literature Review

The aim of this chapter is to examine the relevant material published with regards to home grown

terrorism in the United Kingdom (UK), paying particular reference to the ‘radicalisation’ of the

Muslim diaspora. To begin with, there will be an assessment of key expressions; the terms ‘home

grown terrorism’ and ‘radicalisation’ shall be evaluated. These terms shall be examined from a

domestic perspective, and a contextualisation of the threat will be proposed in regards to the UK’s

history of countering terrorism. The role of religion shall be discussed from a domestic viewpoint in

as much as how it is a motivational factor for individuals that that resort to terrorism and

radicalisation.

Unresolved issues of the definition

Firstly, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by the term terrorism (Silke, 2008: 100). It is widely

acknowledged that the term terrorism has no precise or universally accepted definition. An

examination of the array of definitions present in terrorism highlights the complexity of the problem.

In 1988 Schmid and Jongman noted over 109 definitions of terrorism based on the responses of 50

experts (1988:5 as cited in Schmid and Jongman, 2005). Twenty-three years later their work was

revised again involving almost 100 experts and 262 definitions were found to be present (Schmid,

2011: 157). Sandwiched between the crux of this research was, the September 11th attacks in the

United States, the aftermath of which has seen an explosion in research on terrorism to a

proportion never seen before. Silke (2008:29) noted that the levels of publication hovered in the

hundreds prior to these attacks, yet since this event these levels increased ten-fold. This 138% rise

(109 to 262) therefore not only shows how subjective the problem is, but also highlights that

terrorism does not fit neatly into any single area of academic study, and hence the multitude of

definitions from various experts. This along with Silke’s (2008) analysis is emblematic of the

growing popularity of terrorism in research and adds to the problematic nature of the definition.

This study has a domestic approach to terrorism, focusing on the home grown aspect of this

phenomenon, and it is important to highlight the history of terrorism legislation in the UK. The first

significant piece of terrorism legislation can be traced back to the introduction of the Prevention of

Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act 1939 in the wake of the Irish Republican Army’s (IRA)

Sabotage campaign (S-Plan). The act was reintroduced in 1974 as the Prevention of Terrorism Act

to combat the increase in violence after the IRA reignited their campaign. The nature of this

legislation has consistently been presented as temporary and as an emergency measure, in

response to particular or anticipated events. The Terrorism Act 2000 was the exception to this trait

which became more permanent and built upon previous statutory codes which had been

developed in the preceding three decades. The current definition used in UK legal systems can be

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found in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and is consistent with international comparators

(Carlile, 2007: 47). The definition draws heavily on Lord Lloyd’s review in 1996 of counter terrorism

legislation, and concluded that the definition was too narrow and so broadened the motives and

causes (Carlile, 2007: 6). The result of this enables the security services a variety of responses to

counter a terrorist act and validate any action given the definitions legal status. The legal definition

shall be used in this study due to the domestic and security context of this research, and the

stronger sense of clarity that it provides over an academic definition. Its agenda is specific to the

threat apparent in the UK alone, and it would be ineffectual to use any other definition.

It is commonly known that terrorism is a multifaceted phenomenon and there are numerous ways

to classify the threat, with one of the facets being ‘home grown’. Crone and Harrow (2010)

discussed the notion of home grown terrorism and in their literature review established an

underlying concept that researchers had a tendency to restrict their theories to include only

western countries. The fundamental basis of the criticism was that the term ‘home grown’, as with

the parental definition of ‘terrorism’, has no accepted meaning and thus complicates the matter

even further. The article concluded that ‘home grown’ terrorism could be more correctly portrayed

as being ‘internal’ which is autonomous from influence outside of western society (Crone and

Harrow, 2010: 19). However Sageman (2008) characterises this phenomenon primarily as a

European occurrence by using statistical clarification and contrasting European and US figures on

arrests. Developing the definition further, Thachuk, Bowman and Richardson (2008: 2) note that

‘home grown’ terrorism should be associated with insiders, whether they are acting individually or

in groups, or have travelled to foreign countries in order to train and then returns to their ‘homeland’

in order to carry out the attack. Similar to Crane and Harrow’s conclusion, Thachuk et al (2008)

avoid the complications of classifying ‘home grown’ through citizenship, nationality status and

whether they are born and bred in the country of question.

Importantly, these crude definitions condense the complicated categorisation of ‘home grown’ and

offer a simple form of belonging which is more easily recognised. This allows an appropriate

analysis of the threat without getting too caught up in the definition. Given the difficulties that vex

the international definition for terrorism, hindering the community’s ability to develop a coherent

counter terrorism policy; it seems meaningless to scrutinise on whether to develop a definition to a

domestic problem that is of general applicability. For the purpose of this study the term ‘home

grown’ terrorism will be associated with the description offered by Thachuk et al (2008). This

definition is appropriate in the context of the UK due to the diverse ethnic make up of the Muslim

community, which has around 56 nationalities and 70 languages present amongst the approximate

two million Muslims in the UK (Briggs and Birdwell, 2009: 4).

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It is interesting to note that the UK never defined ‘home grown’ terrorism during the counter

terrorist operations against the IRA. Statistics available from the Home Office on the Operation of

Prevention of Terrorism Legislation (1997 and 2000) highlight detention levels for individuals on

terrorism charges and show two categories of terrorism; International and Northern Irish. The

figures show that during an era when it was regarded that the IRA posed the major terror threat,

the Home Office was comfortable in defining this peril specifically to where it originated from and

this is still the case presently. Under the website of MI5, the security service classifies sources of

terrorist threats to the UK presently as ‘domestic extremism, international terrorism and Northern

Ireland’ (MI5, 2011). The threat posed by individuals such as the UK citizens and national (albeit

with a very loose affiliation to al Qaeda) who struck the London transportation system on July 7th is

categorised as ‘International terrorism’. The ‘domestic extremist’ classification is wide open to

interpretation to include groups such as animal rights protesters. One of the criticisms of the

Terrorism Act 2000 was that it is quite a broad piece of legislation and blurs any distinction between

targets that are military, political or civilian and therefore organisations could face being banned on

the basis of their activities fitting within the broad definition of terrorism. It has been suggested that

the government, through fear, failed to define this indigenous threat as being native to the UK in

order not to upset the Muslim community, and hence preferring to categorise this threat as

‘International terrorism’ (Omand, 2006: 110).

Previous to the 7th July attacks the UK’s domestic security service (MI5) recognised the existence

of home grown terrorists, but gave little credibility to arguments that any operations threatened the

UK (Irons, 2008: 5). This failure to recognise the threat from citizens or nationals of the UK was

one of the short comings of the authorities, including the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) which

was highlighted by the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) in 2006. Their report stated that,

‘we remain concerned that …. the development of the home grown threat and the radicalisation of

British citizens were not fully understood or applied to strategic thinking’ (ISC, 2006: 43). This

statement is qualified by the JIC’s assertion in 2002 that the possibility of a terror attack was more

likely to be carried out by foreigners than British nationals (JIC, 2004 as cited in Precht, 2007: 18).

The former head of the Police Counter Terrorism Command, Peter Clarke (2007) shared the same

view that the threat to the UK had its origins overseas until 2003 when the first real indications that

citizens and nationals were being recruited came to light. This theme has clearly been altered as is

evident in the Prevent Strategy Review (2011) when the Home Secretary announced that it will

challenge both ‘violent and non violent extremism, home grown terrorism and the radicalisation

process’ (May, 2011). This turn around of rhetoric from the government suggests an acceptance

that the ‘home grown’ threat is perhaps a priority over the international counterpart, and also a

thawing in policy to hone in on the specifics of the threat, as was the case with Northern Irish

terrorism.

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The era of radicalisation

The term radicalisation was used with minimum quantity prior to the suicide attacks on London and

most studies conclude that the term is a relatively recent idea that was banded about loosely in the

academic world prior to 9/11. There is an understanding that it was not considered in a sufficient

quantity for it to be applied in a theoretical approach in order to understand the process. Neumann

(2008: 3). argues that the term is in itself acutely politically driven, highlighting the United States

attempt to pass the Violent Radicalisation and Home grown Terrorism Act of 2007, as an effort to

merely criminalise political dissent, protests and radical thinking. The same sort of denigration has

been levelled at the UK government’s effort to tackle radicalisation when the fourth amendment to

the Terrorism Act in 2006 became law introducing new offences such as the preparation and

glorification of terrorism. Sedgwick agrees with Neumann’s opinion but specifically suggests that

there was an increase in the frequency of its use from 2005 to 2007, coinciding with the London

bombings (Sedgwick, 2010: 480). The term ‘radicalisation’ appears to be inextricably linked to this

event, and highlights Neumann’s suggestion that it is politically biased. It is contended that by

manipulating the terminology and shifting the spotlight onto a process of radicalisation, the

government is not labelling every individual along this continuum as a terrorist, enabling a closer

analysis of the root causes without upsetting certain communities.

Richards suggests that the current emphasis on radicalisation has lead to a policy focus on

radicalisation studies and that if ‘radicalisation is to be used as the focus for response, establishing

what is meant and understood by it …. is imperative’ (Richards, 2011: 143). The UK’s policy for

counter terrorism, CONTEST, was developed in the immediate aftermath of the London bombings,

though was written and prepared around the time of the Madrid attacks. The policy has four

components known as ‘the four P’s’: Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare. The Prevent

component is key, its scope and focus is aimed on preventing individuals from being lured into

terrorist activities by responding to the ideologies of terrorism. The main objectives include

challenging violent extremist ideology and addressing associated grievances while supporting

‘mainstream voices …. and individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment’ (Home Office, 2011). It

was noted that the original emphasis on the strategy was not on the Prevent component (Rabasa,

Pettyjohn, Ghez and Boucek, 2010: 124). This suggests that initially the strategy was more of a

reflex reaction than a considered response. The strategy has been dogged by condemnation

(Leppard, 2005 and Casciani, 2009) due to its lack of clarity, and the main criticisms include; the

disproportionate criminalisation and over burdens of Muslim communities, usage of terminology

and lack of trust through the ‘securitisation’ of Islam. Notwithstanding this, Demos proposed that

despite the initial weakness the policy was a positive step forward as it attempted to unite

government departments that traditionally acted independently (Demos, 2007: 16).The An‐Nisa

Society ‘Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) & PREVENT – A response from the Muslim

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Community’ (2009: 29) recommended that the strategy be rethought as it failed to address the

Muslim community properly and tackle issues that isolate the Muslim community. Along with further

policy reviews this lead to the development of what is known now as CONTEST 2. Though the

aims remain the same as the original version, Prevent is now one of the key sections of the policy,

with the scope and focus on fighting radicalisation.

Radicalisation, according to the Coalition government’s review, is simply defined as, ‘the process

by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism’

(Prevent Strategy, 2011: 108). When contrasted with other views, such as Sageman’s (2008) and

the Global Futures Forum report (2006) these definitions initially seem to cover the same

assumptions, but upon closer examination they emphasise different end results. Sageman defines

radicalisation as the process of ‘transforming individuals from rather unexceptional and ordinary

being into terrorists with the willingness to use violence for political ends’ (Sageman, 2008: 103).

This definition seems narrow when contrasted with the Home Office’s as it specifies that violence is

inextricably linked to the term. According to a Global Futures Forum (GFF) report, ‘radicalisation is

a process, not an end unto itself, and it does not necessarily lead to violence’ (GFF, 2006: 3). This

account is also reflected in Precht’s statement that radicalisation ‘does not necessarily have to

result in terrorism and the use of violence’ (Precht, 2007: 16). Importantly, this theme is illustrated

in the Home Secretary’s statement mentioned previously in this chapter, that the Prevent strategy

will focus on forms of non-violent support as well as violent means. Mandel (2009: 101) concisely

wraps up this point by declaring that what ever the perspective on the definition, terrorism is

dependant on the radicalisation process which generates motivational factors that develop into

terrorism. If, in a relative sense, the process of radicalisation is generally accepted and that

violence is not necessarily implicit in the end stage, then it is a useful tool in the counter terrorism

policy so long as the continuum which the process is developed along is carefully considered.

The July 7th attacks, for the UK in particular, seemed to have brought a new urgency to try and

understand terrorism and radicalisation, and reiterated the fact that the domestic form (previously

the IRA) is as much a concern, if not more than its international counterpart. A great deal of

research and policy has subsequently been spent on how to counter and prevent what has

popularly been conceived now as Islamic inspired terrorism. The Muslim community in particular

have come under intense focus and scrutiny of not only this strategy but also various studies and

polls. The Director for the Centre for Social Cohesion (CSC), Douglas Murray, believed that the

serious threat and nature of violent Islamic movements to the UK was of paramount concern and

that the ‘main undercurrent of disaffection is radical Islam’ (Murray, 2007).This opinion is shared by

other reports such as Europol (2010: 6) which stated that ‘Islamist terrorism is still perceived as the

biggest threat to most member states’. However, it is particularly characterised by Dame

Manningham-Buller, who normally shuns publicity, but spoke out with regards to the seriousness

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and apparent rise of the threat in 2006. This sensationalism of the threat, although justified, needs

to be placed in context with the previous menace posed from the IRA which will enable a

comparison of just how dangerous this home grown danger is.

The extent of the ‘home grown’ threat

The Home Office figures for detentions and charges relating to terrorism offences under the

Terrorist Act 2000 shall firstly come under scrutiny. For the interlude of 2001 to 2008 a total of 1471

individuals arrested, and of this figure only 340 were charged with terrorism related offences

(Home Office: 2009: 1). For the period in question, this amounts to an average of 210 arrests and

49 charged per annum. The Guardian newspaper reported recently that terrorism arrests in the UK

have fallen steeply. Figures released in October 2011 show that arrests for the 2010/11 period fell

to 121 but also more interestingly show that since 9/11 of the 1963 people arrested as terror

suspects, 421 were charged with offences relating to terrorism (Travis, 2011). This is consistent

with the tone set for the period 2007 to 2008, though lowers the annual average over the period to

196 arrests and 42 charges per annum.

A quick cross examination with the charge statistics for 1986 to 1996 shows that arrests and

charges for International and Northern Irish related terrorism amounted to 1631 and 247

respectively, which equates to 163 arrests and 25 charges per annum (Home Office, 1997: 4). This

shows that there has been a slight increase in detentions and arrests for the first decade of the

new century compared to this data set. However, if statistics are examined under the Prevention of

Terrorism Act (PTA), for the period 1974 to 1990, which accounts for a period when the IRA threat

was at its peak, a total of 6932 individuals were arrested in connection with Northern Irish terrorism

alone; of the 6932, nearly 6000 were released without charge (Statewatch, 1991: 25). This equates

to an annual average of 433 arrests, and a rough approximation of those who were actually

charged for the period would amount to 58 if, for simplicity, it was assumed that those charged

amounted to 932. The data shows that for the period there were approximately twice as many

people arrested annually, for those charged there was nearly 15% more than for 2001 to 2010.

A limitation to the statistics from the period 1974 to 1990 is that they were not centrally located, by

the Home Office’s admission, until 1984. However the fact that the statistical mean for the period is

calculated from a greater number of years (sixteen compared to ten) further strengthens the

argument that the analysis of the figures should be taken into consideration. There are other

factors noteworthy that highlight the significance of the statistics. Firstly, for any fragility in the

strength of this period’s data, it should be pointed out that this era included several IRA ceasefires

(1972, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977 and 1990) which may have played a small role in the outcome of

the arrest/charge statistics on an annual basis. The initial Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) 1974

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only applied to ‘acts of terrorism connected with the affairs in Northern Ireland’ and was not

expanded until 1984 to include other acts of terrorism of any other description (Statewatch, 1991:

25). When the Prevention of Terrorism Acts (PTA)1974 – 1989 were replaced by the Terrorism Act

2000, the new legislation not only added a raft of additional powers, but also made permanent

many key elements of the previous temporary acts. This expansion in legislation, it could be

argued, has certainly widened police authority with respect to terrorism, and thus should lead to

more arrests and charges when in comparison to other periods. However, for the period 1974 to

1990 the statistics when tallied up clearly surpass those of the first decade in the 21st century.

The assessment of the statistics of arrests and charges over the past three or four decades shows

an amplification of the domestic threat from ‘Islamic terrorism’ when compared to the other menace

of the IRA, yet does not explain why this threat was exaggerated. The threat from ‘home grown’

terrorism is certainly something to be concerned with, however, an analysis of the figures suggest

that there has been a ‘cyclic boom’ in terrorist related activities. This has been undoubtedly

connected firstly to the period of ‘the Troubles’ with the IRA and secondly to the events surrounding

9/11 and July 7th. Between the former and latter epochs, the figures descend and plateau, and five

years since the attacks on London the statistics again seem to be lowering. This statistical

perspective is not widely echoed at the moment by other studies. However LaFree (2010)

highlights, through a worldwide study, that the IRA was the fourth most active terrorist organisation

in terms of frequency of attacks from 1970 to 2006. In further analysis, it was suggested that

though al Qaeda ranked highly in terms of fatality, the group were not ranked in terms of frequency,

and hence the high casualty rate of 9/11 is undoubtedly linked to this. The scrutiny of the statistics

suggests evidence that though the threat definitely remains extant, the severity of it put into context

above is relevant. This also illustrates that the current research agenda on radicalisation causes

and motivations are justified, as these individuals and groups have characteristics that are

dissimilar to those of the IRA.

Root causes of ‘home grown’ terrorism and radicalisation

Research amongst the Muslim diasporas has received considerable attention, with an urge to

understand what the drivers of radicalisation are. Studies agree that there is no consistent

theoretical structure for understanding any single motivation for the radicalisation process although

an understanding of the factors involved is essential. Hence the only explanation for the resulting

radicalisation of an individual must be through a combination of different factors (Hudson 1999,

Nesser 2004, Victoroff 2006, and Silber and Bhatt, 2007). Some scholars assert that one of the

factors which contribute to the process is religion though the extent of which is not clear-cut

(Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman, 2009, Githens - Mazer, 2010, Precht, 2007 and Silke,

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2008).Though over emphasis on any single cause is incorrect; it appears that the significance of

religion is a common theme. In 2008, the Home Secretary described the threat from the new form

of terrorism in terms of motivation and suggested they had, ‘a detailed ideology that draws on the

language of religion.’ (Smith, 2009). This suggests the terrorists wanted their motivation to be

understood to be based in religion but the reality remained that it was political. Although UK

government officials do not say so publicly, this new threat to the UK is understood to be a form of

political Islam.

Some studies have downplayed the importance of religion as a factor, indeed the Institution of

Race Relations (IRR) conducted research to be presented to the UK parliamentary select

committee inquiry, and one of the recommendations from the report was that the government over

emphasised the role of religion (IRR, 2010: 78). Sageman (2008: 157) contributes to the debate

and is in agreement with this view and suggests that thinking too much into the role of religion is

ineffectual. However, Sageman’s empirical study of over 500 terrorists does not dismiss the role of

religion, but believes the development of a religious belief is through self-instruction and suggests

that there should be less of a focus on religion (Sageman, 2008). Merari, one of the relatively few

to have interviewed and assessed suicide bombers, concluded that religion is unimportant in the

phenomenon of suicide terrorism and that any framework is more of a moral justification rather

than an actual reason (Merari, 1990: 206).Though there are studies which dismiss the importance

of religion even after those as empirically sound as Merari’s, it should be noted that Sageman’s

conclusion on religion was less so and more subjective.

Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman (2009) produced a significant study with regards to the attributes

of the radicalisation process by empirically examining those known to have been involved in

Islamic terrorism in the UK and US. The UK part of the study examined 56 individuals’ behavioural

symptoms during the radicalisation process and included those not only considered ‘home grown’

but also those individuals who offered support or participated in activities connected to terrorist

plots. The study attempts to assess as much primary data as possible and stay clear of one of the

inherent plagues of terrorism research which is the reliance on secondary and tertiary source

material to develop theories. When examining the broader field of terrorism studies, Crenshaw

(2000: 410) observed that ‘the study of terrorism still lacks the foundation of extensive primary data

based on interviews and life histories of individuals engaged in terrorism’. This observation was

made against Schmid and Jongman’s conclusion over decade previously that around 80% of

research and publication is based on open source secondary source material (Schmid and

Jongman, 1988). Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman attempt to rectify this with their analysis

(whether it was personal blogs or views posted on internet forums) and keep the use of secondary

source material to the minimum in order not to fall down the key pitfall of reiterating and

16

reintegrating the same research over and over (Silke, 2004: 62-63 as cited in Githens-Mazer, 2010:

7).

The study firstly left the ‘home grown’ definitional debate behind by offering a wide interpretation of

belonging, a view similar to that discussed earlier by Thachuk et al (2008). The analysis of the

relationship between theology and radicalisation centres on the perspective to which a religious

belief is taken; whether it is personal, an institution or broader cultural context. Six manifestations

were observed in the study and it was concluded that within five of the six traits, the role of how an

individual interprets their religious belief was an important factor thus making any dismissal of the

role of theology hasty (Gaternstein - Ross and Grossman, 2009: 14). Though the empirical

evidence makes it difficult to dismiss Gaternstein-Ross and Grossman’s claim that that religion is

an important element of the radicalisation process; it is a small proponent in some cases and

therefore offers individuals a moral justification for their actions. Similarly, Precht’s assessment of

the factors influencing home grown terrorism concluded that ‘Religion plays an important role, but

for some it rather serves as a vehicle for fulfilling other goals’ (Precht, 2007: 7).This suggests that

religion is offering a moral justification for an individual’s violent actions. Examination shall now

focus on how readily accessible literature available in the public domain that may provide a further

insight into how movement along the radicalisation path, although entails several competing

components, is nudged along by religious interpretations.

A presence of ‘malignant literature’?

Literature obtained from the Manchester Islamic Centre, Didsbury Mosque, highlight some

examples to how an invalid interpretation of religion can lead individuals who are at a vulnerable

point, or what Wiktorowicz (2005: 24) called a ‘cognitive opening’, onto a path of radicalisation.

One of the publications, ‘What does Islam say about terrorism’ is reproduced by the Islamic Dawa

Centre International (IDCI) and sets out to clear any misconceptions regarding links between Islam

and terrorism. The piece describes how the word terrorism is of recent origin, and how there are

various forms and different perpetrators of the act. In the second paragraph, whilst broadly

attempting to describe not only the origins but also causes, it concludes,

‘Ironically however, the politician who uses age-old ethnic animosities between peoples to

consolidate his position, the head of state who orders ‘carpet bombing’ of entire cities, the

exalted councils that choke millions of civilians to death by wielding the insidious weapon of

sanctions, are rarely punished for their crimes against humanity’ (IDCI, 2011).

17

Importantly, this statement was included in the paragraph that attempted to describe how terrorism

‘manifests itself in various forms’ (IDCI, 2011: 2). Though to appreciate the significance of the

comments an analysis of the whole leaflet is needed, if it is contrasted to that of Sidique Khan’s

pre-recorded address for the July 7th attacks there is a resemblance in expression,

‘….Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuates atrocities against

my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly

responsible….Until we feel security you will be our targets and until you stop the

bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop the fight. We

are at war and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the reality of this situation’ (BBC,

2005).

Clearly the statement from the IDCI stops short at declaring a formal hostility, but importantly these

statements illustrate how there is a division in union between western and Islamic interests. The

undertone here is what Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman viewed as a perceived schism between

the West and Islam. Though this observation is expressed in numerous ways, the most significant

concept is that of loyalty to where the individual’s identity and duty is confined to Islam alone

(Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman, 2009: 45). To further analyse this judgment, other literature was

reviewed that was available as well. Amongst the other pieces of work were articles from Sheikh

Ahmed Deedat, whom is described as a contemporary Islamic scholar who is critical of western

society in addition to Christianity, Judaism and Hinduism. According to Legifrance, an official

website of the French government for the publication on legislation and regulations, Deedat’s

material has been banned for being violently anti-western, anti-semitic and inciting to racial hate

(Legifrance, 1994). His critics are extensive as are his supporters; however despite the damaging

views Deedat holds on different faiths, analysis by Zebiri concludes that ‘his work barely goes

beyond rhetoric and apologetic’ and due to this lack of quality was omitted from a review on

theological scholars (Zebiri, 1997: 47 - 48, as cited in Chesworth, 2011: 356). Westerlund (2003)

holds a similar view and argues that Deedat merely engaged in apologetics, a form of religious

denouncing, in order to defend the minority Islamic religion in Africa.

Further research into the IDCI found that there is an ongoing investigation into its activities after the

MP for Birmingham Hall Green called for an inquiry after the IDCI invited Dr Zakir Naik, a Muslim

preacher to speak at an event hosted by the charity (Sunday Mercury, 20010). Naik, has

controversially refused to condemn Osama bin Laden, has loosely supported terrorism against the

United States and supports conspiracy theories with regards to 9/11. This ultimately led to the

Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith, banning Naik from entering the UK on the grounds of his radical

style. Samuel and Rozario (2010) suggest that Naik’s opinions are morally conservative and

appeals to young Muslims by exploiting the anti Western hostility towards Islam. Naik promotes his

18

ideas by attempting to tie in Islam with science by suggesting that the Qur’an has predicted many

things to which science had no answers for until recently. This style appeals to the younger

generation whom have a greater connection to technology and science, and offers an explanation

as to how certain Islamic teachings are indoctrinating youth who may be more impressionable. The

website for the IDCI also sells literature by other controversial clerics, including Sayyid Qutb, a

fundamentalist Egyptian Imam who is said to have inspired Osama Bin Laden to establish al

Qaeda (Guardian, 2001). Qutb’s written work is of particular significance and according to

Zimmerman (2010: 223) is significant as it ‘provides an intellectual justification for extreme anti-

Western sentiment on a cultural as well as political level and a justification for overthrowing all

world governments, including those governed by Muslims, by means of a worldwide holy war’.

Some may assume that this type of narrative, as above, must be rooted in some form of

radicalised individuals (or groups) with a core hatred to western society, but some evidence

suggests this is not the case. For example, in order to research Qutb’s life, it is extremely difficult

as, ‘many of the works already produced are characterised by a lack of objectiveness and

excessive bias. Some portray him as a saint and some as a devil’ (Musallam, 2005: x-xi).

Accordingly, Zakir Naik’s ban on entering the UK in the context of things could appear to be rooted

in Naik’s constant denouncing of other religions through theological debate and a brand of Islam

known as Wahhabism. The doctrine of Wahhabism is a rigid set of positions rooted in a particular

reading of the Quran and the Sunna. Adherents of the Wahhabi principle take the view that it is the

only true path of Islam.

These articles demonstrate the dangerous precedent of trying to delineate the extent to which a

relevant or hypothetical intention may extend and facilitate expression through home grown or any

form of terrorism. This growing ambiguity has found credence in the need to understand and

manage the threat from radicalisation. The expression form of this is seen in Siddique Khan’s

verbal proclamation and consequent action, and the academic focus needs to be on the

background and process. However, such works as above are important to this study as they

highlight the extreme difficulty to formally denounce any role that religion plays in the radicalisation

process to those individuals who may be vulnerable to influence and misinterpretations of Islamic

teachings. Chesworth (2011) highlighted the distinct gap in such literature and demonstrated that

very little academic study has been carried out on practitioners such as the above. This highlights

the very subjective nature of classifying such individuals as being radical, when there has been so

little research.

As will be noted later in the research chapters, the influence of certain individuals (as above)

whose views cannot be objectively interpreted adds to the problems in the countering radicalisation

19

and the role of religion in particular. The scrutiny of this type of literature is important to this study in

order to understand how parts of the Muslim community may take harbour in theological narrative

that it is based on insubstantial support. To further this opinion it is important to highlight the

growing prominence of Islam as a marker within the Muslim community. The analysis above

highlights how religion is offering a justification for those on the radicalisation path. And as

Oberschall (2004: 28) suggests ‘….without legitimising ideology, terrorist violence will lack

justification and acceptance from the population that gives cover to the terrorist’. So, without cover

from the immediate population or communities these individuals would quickly be exposed to the

security forces. When the current head of MI5, Jonathan Evans (2008) suggested that 2000

individuals were plotting, and a further 200 networks being monitored, it seems hard to identify

where those individuals fall into Obershall’s suggestion. The British born Muslims who carried out

the attacks on London in July 2007 had no known record of terrorist activity and blended into their

community so well, yet they committed such an extreme form of terrorism (Wilkinson, 2006: 338).

These individuals were recruited and indoctrinated, or formed a subculture, because of their beliefs

that their demands for political ends had gone unheard.

Relevance of sub cultural theory

To apply a sub cultural theory analysis to understand the factors that explain how individuals resort

to terrorism, it is firstly important to understand the ethnic make up of the UK’s Muslim community.

The UK has the most diverse Muslim community in the world, with at least 15 large ethno-national

sub-communities present (Gaines, 2008). Of the two million Muslims in the UK, which represent

the second largest faith group, 46% were born in the UK (Bunglawala, Halstead, Malik and Spalek,

2004). The various levels of affiliations increase the problem of identity within the Muslim

community and bring to the fore cultural issues, including those of national identity and ethnicity.

According to Gilbert, national identity influences choices and perceptions and therefore is a form of

personal identity that has much in common with others with the same national identity (Gilbert,

1994:107). Whereas the cultural peculiarities of European migrants, who take advantage of the

EU’s so called ‘Schengen agreements’, are generally outdated versions of British ones, Islam is

different. It requires adjustments or safe guards of many customs, state structures and ideas to

which it comes in contact. Segers (2006: 262) suggests that in Western society, national identity

usually takes precedence over race and ethnicity. However, in the 2001 census, religion was

considered important to self-identity by over half of the adult Muslim population but by just one fifth

of Christians (Office for National Statistics, 2001). The relegation of religion within mainstream

society has only served to further cultural differences and fuel mistrust of those for whom religion is

a way of life. Some studies and surveys challenge some misconceptions about identity and social

integration. A Gallup poll (2009) suggests Muslims can be just as supportive of British identity as

20

the general public. The poll’s findings represent a direct challenge to the popular myth that Muslims

are less patriotic than the country at large. The vast majority are content to live and work in the UK

and feel at home (Green, 2009). However, some wish to establish a separate Muslim identity,

including the use of Islamic family law and legal system and conformation to certain cultural norms.

This response to social and cultural conditions shows how a subculture has been created not only

within mainstream society, but also amongst the Muslim community.

Muslim dissatisfaction within society as a whole is well documented. According to a PEW Global

Attitudes survey in 2011, in general westerners and Muslims generally agree that relations

between them are poor (PEW, 2011: 15). However this negative view is less than what it was five

years previously (2006), but still the overall perception is considered low. When the UK’s figures

are compared to other western European countries in the poll, the figures are significant as the UK

has favourable impressions when compared to other western countries regarding relations

between the Muslim community and western society. The discontent and perceived injustices that

individuals are subjected to in the norms of society, allows individuals to then create their own

subculture and sense of identity that can provide a building block for any potential emergence into

‘home grown’ terrorism. Silke supports this view that an individual must identify with that part of

society that supports forms of terrorism, however, suggests that it can be a gradual process

through being isolated from mainstream society and exposed then to a subculture or even merely

as a result of a general life experience (Silke, 2008: 38). This does not necessarily lead to an

individual of this subculture to become a terrorist. The common path to this begins to take shape

when an individual is introduced to a similar sub culture with a specific ideology (Wahhabism),

which is supported and sustained through an expression.

Sub cultural theory explains how the lack of opportunity for reaching conventional goals creates the

conditions for emergence of cultures within society (Department of Criminology, 2010: 2-17).

Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967) developed a sub culture of violence theory, where subcultures or

groups learn and develop different norms and values through differential associations that justify

the use of violence above and beyond that which is regarded as ‘normative’ of the culture as a

whole. Wolfgang and Ferracuti concur that a subculture is only partly different from a parent

culture, and cannot be totally different from the culture of which it is a part, otherwise it is what

Wolfgang (1967: 99-100) termed a contra culture. It was also implied that the subculture has some

values in common with the dominant parent culture (Wolfgang and Ferracuti, 1967: 104). This

theory sits neatly into the diverse layout of the Muslim community which has many different and

distinctive cultures, whose sub groups may have norms and values that differ to that of the

mainstream Muslim community, but importantly do not necessarily represent a culture deemed

deviant by the majority. Rock agrees that groups such as these should not be conceived to be

utterly distinct from normal society (Rock, 2002: 73). Wolfgang and Ferracuti’s sub cultural of

21

violence theory therefore offers a conceptual framework for making sense of why individuals join or

affiliate themselves along the radicalisation process.

This is relevant to the recent expressions of many terrorist demands, such as al-Qaeda’s issue of

Fatwa, may echo into wider society and have a degree of support. As Wilkinson (2007: 332) noted

that the general aim of al Qaeda is to expel the US and other ’infidels’ from the Middle East and

from Muslim lands in general it is easy to see how this sits with the wider Islamic community. The

British born Muslim’s who carried out the attacks on London in July 2007 had no known record of

terrorist activity and blended into their community so well, yet they committed such an extreme

form of terrorism (Wilkinson, 2007: 338). These individuals were recruited and indoctrinated, or

formed a subculture, because of their beliefs that their demands for political ends had gone

unheard.

The case of Siddique Khan gainfully demonstrates the nature of this process. According to

Sageman (2008) Khan and the other July 7th bombers, belong to a third wave of would-be

terrorists, who were angered mostly by the invasion of Iraq and aspired to join a movement that

supplies members with a powerful narrative by means of which they can feel a sense of belonging.

Khan seemed to have a complicated relationship with religion and identity, struggling with being a

‘British’ Muslim who did not integrate with either. Khan’s family was part of the first generation of

Mirpuri immigrants who moved to the UK in the 1960’s (Malik, 2007). According to Sial (2008: 7)

the older generation tend to keep traditional values, such as the preference to find a spouse in

Pakistan for their children in order to keep tribal ties alive and in line. Khan was religious, but went

against this religious tradition by choosing a wife rather than an arranged marriage, and this

difference with a norm of the Muslim community and a search for identity, may have led Khan to

become more radical in his views of Islam.

Malik’s (2007) research on Siddique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer and Hasib Hussain evolved around

the area of Beeston in Leeds. The area is generally one of the poorest and deprived in the UK, and

therefore attracts immigrants and more recently drugs. The problems that encompass drugs were

left to second generation Pakistanis to take charge of, most notably a group called the ‘Mullah

boys’, of which Khan, Tanweer and Hussain were members. This group became isolated not only

from both the culture of their parents and first generation Pakistanis, but also main stream society.

Uncertain of an allegiance and a form of identity the group became more religious, which pitted

them against the first generation’s traditional approach to Islam. Malik (2007) suggests that this

theme of identity that is present in Khan, Tanweer and Hussain’s radicalisation is linked to an

interest in Wahhabism, which provided them with a sense of belonging and status, but also cultural

solidity. Within this subculture of Islam, the group was able to shake off the perceived injustices to

the traditional approach to Islam adopted by the older generation. Malik (2007) suggests that Khan

22

was perfectly well integrated, reasonably liked, bright and not especially religious. Therefore, this

conventional path does not seem especially problematic or intolerable to the point where society

had rejected Khan. Khan’s redefinition to a soldier of Islam seems to be linked with the sub branch

of Wahhabism, and concisely shows how a personal interpretation of a religious belief can lead an

individual along the radicalisation path.

Sub cultural theory cannot offer a complete understanding of how an individual comes to embrace

‘home grown’ terrorism through the radicalisation process. However it can help to bring into focus

the framework which the radicalisation process occurs. It can provide an explanation of why,

second generation (or what Sageman would have classified as potential third wave terrorists)

though immersed in the main stream culture, are withheld from the norms and values of that

culture. This in turn leads to a sense of injustice and lack of united identity with that of the parent

community. Wolfgang and Ferracuti’s subculture of violence theory (1967) although one of the

most cited theories is also one of the least tested. It therefore cannot offer a comprehensive

informal account of why certain individuals amongst the subculture resort to terrorist violence.

Though this limits the descriptive scope of theory, it can help create an explanation on the wider

backdrop against which these individuals operate with other theoretical approaches.

Thus far this paper has considered how one of the factors that may give rise to ‘home grown’

terrorism is religion. Although the casual and motivational factors for individuals involved in ‘home

grown’ terrorism is complex and usually a combination is required, the evidence of the role of

religion is sufficient enough not to expel the cause. Amongst the causes are the issues of culture

and identity, which can have a profound effect on behaviour. Cultural differences between Muslims

and non Muslims, in the UK, can be severe. Muslims have a strong culture and group identity, and

associate more with a religious view point than a national identity. Mainstream society, in turn,

becomes more suspicious of individuals and groups for whom religion is a way of life.

The UK faces a variety of known and evolving threats, not just from international terrorism but also

‘home grown’. Statistical evidence suggests that the indigenous threat is certainly acute and real,

yet when contrasted with past experiences with the IRA, the menace appears not quite as strong.

However, the urgency to try and understand how individuals become involved in terrorist activities

has led to an increase in focus of radicalisation policies and studies. Radicalisation, in general,

creates the motivational preconditions ripe for terrorism, however it does not necessitate in

violence. An understanding of radicalisation in a relative sense is an important pre requisite for

combating not only the process but also ‘home grown’ terrorism. As will be noted in the research

chapters, the effect of identity can be themed as one of sub cultural identification where the

influence of the main stream Muslim community not only adds to the pressure conforming to the

23

parent group but also the realities of the complex sub groups make the identification issue more

problematic.

24

Chapter Three Methodology

This chapter focuses on the methodology used in the research stage of this study. At this point it is

meaningful to recount the framework in which this study sits; that being where the nature of the

threat of ‘home grown’ terrorism is judged to be potentially still increasing and not likely to diminish

for a significant number of years (Briggs, Fieschi and Lownsborough, 2006: 11). The previous

chapter examined existing academic and policy work together with statistics, and this study has

offered the opinion that the threat is actually possibly not as acute as feared. Research on

terrorism and related issues has increased dramatically since the 9/11 attacks and coupled with the

July 7th London bombings this has led to an increase in attention towards the Muslim community

with a focus on radicalisation policies and studies concerned with how individuals become involved

in terrorist activities. The dynamics behind why individuals become involved in ‘home grown’

terrorism is multifaceted, though one of the factors that reoccurs more frequently than most is

religion. Although academic commentators have offered diametrically opposed views on the role of

religion the evidence examined so far is sufficient enough not to expel the notion altogether.

This is a small scale study which has utilised qualitative research techniques involving semi

structured interviews and a focus group. A key intention of the study was to document the

experiences of the Muslim community towards the often negative images perceived towards them

by non Muslims. This is significant as Muslim discontent within society as a whole is well

documented. One of the roots is the issues of culture and identity which fuel the complex

relationship within the Muslim community even further. Research has shown that one of the

symbols of identity that is increasing in prominence amongst Muslims is religion (Choudhary, 2007:

5). The documentation of individuals’ perspectives and experiences in a qualitative manner

enables this study to produce a critical scrutiny of the complex reasons for the foregrounding of

religion in the identity of the Muslim community. This research has been conducted in an open,

accountable and evidence based manner, in accordance with the University’s ethical guidelines.

Robson (as cited in Silke, 2002: 1) notes that the purpose of research is to produce new data or

knowledge that can be split into three purposes; exploratory, descriptive and explanatory. Silke

(2002: 1) added that the most important step for any research is therefore progression to the next

level of understanding; however the field of terrorism studies has failed to make this leap. The

theories of how different individuals and groups resort to terrorism are significantly under

developed. In part, this is because the field has until recently been dominated by political science

studies and lacked input from other disciplines such as criminology (Jackson, Smyth, Gunning and

Jarvis, 2011). In aiming to examine individual’s attitudes between religion and ‘home grown’

terrorism from a Muslim perspective, a descriptive approach has been utilised for the purpose of

this study. Consequently this study does not draw on frequencies or data on variables, but the

25

interpretations and words of specific individuals. The research design of this study was developed

by utilising the sub cultural theory of violence with qualitative research methods in order to bring

into focus the wider framework in which the radicalisation process and ‘home grown’ terrorism

occurs. This is in order to produce an analysis within the terrorism field of research that is

habitually dominated by state-centric perspectives (Jackson, 2007: 3; Schmid and Jongman, 1988:

179, as cited in Silke, 2001: 2).

The small sample size of the two selected semi-structured interviews and the one focus group will

mean that any conclusions drawn could be misleading. This study has therefore used the

principles of methodological triangulation in order to enhance confidence in any ensuing findings.

Methodological triangulation is a sub form of triangulation. According to Bryman (1984: 86)

triangulation is generally a broad approach to a research question that utilises a combination of

techniques in order to enhance confidence in the subsequent findings. Validity in any research

relates to whether the findings in the study are true. The triangulation method has the benefit of

eliminating any bias that any one dimensional method may have. In methodological triangulation, if

the conclusions from each method are the same, then validity is established (Guion, 2002: 2). As

discussed previously, the consensus on the role of religion plays in terrorism or radicalisation is

incomplete. By combining methods of research data, albeit qualitative, the study has sought to gain

some more insight into the role of religion as a motivational factor in ‘home grown’ terrorism and

the radicalisation process. And for these reasons this study has used the principles of

methodological triangulation.

Members of the Muslim community were chosen as respondents to this study. Due to the sensitive

nature of the research proposal, the author’s ethnic background has been taken into consideration.

However this has not been a hindrance to this study, as it has been shown in previous research

that there is no simple rule on ethnic matching and it may even result in more valid results

(Dotinga, 2005). The respondents were chosen from the Muslim community on the basis of

meeting the criteria of the definition of ‘home grown’ that was set by Thachuk, Bowman and

Richardson (2008) in Chapter Two of this study. The demographic information of the respondents

who took part in this study included their religious background, marital status, education and

occupation along with other peripheral information. Limitations on resources, time and places were

considered prior to conducting this study, and therefore the result was not only a preference for

orthodox methods of research which are perceived less time consuming, but also a decision was

taken that the majority of the participants were to be from the Greater Manchester area.

This location is relevant firstly due to the close proximity of the researcher’s residence, offering

practical time considerations, but also due to the diverse population and the multicultural

agglomeration of the area. As of the 2001 census, 74% of Greater Manchester's residents were

26

Christian and 5% were Muslim, which equates to a Muslim population of approximately 125,000

(Office for National Statistics, 2001). It is significant to note that the proportions of Muslims living in

the region are nearly fifty percent higher than the national average. The influence of radical Islam

has been seen in the Greater Manchester area through a number of counter terrorism operations.

The most notable being Operation Pathway in 2009, where suspects were arrested on alleged

plots to blow up locations in the region which included the Trafford Centre and the city’s Arndale

Centre, with the potential for a disaster worse than the London bombings (The Telegraph, 2009).

The principle factors therefore affecting the choice of respondents were access, location and

relevance to the theme of this study.

According to databases there now are around 1500 mosques in England and Wales

(www.salaam.co.uk, 2011). A quick search highlights 36 listed mosques in the Manchester area

which provided a starting point for this study. Through background research, the Manchester

Islamic Centre (MIC) Didsbury Mosque was selected for two reasons. Firstly, the MIC has a weekly

open event for both new and non Muslims and offers an opportunity to open discussions on a walk-

in basis. This offers the prospect to speak to the gatekeepers to conduct research, and build a

rapport up, which is key to the visit. Secondly, the centre according to various sources (Mosque

Directory and Muslims in Britain, 2012) is advertised as a Salafist Mosque. Salafism is a term often

used to describe fundamentalist Islamic thought. In the UK, Salafism has been equated by parts of

the media and academics with radicalism and terrorism (GLA, 2007: 100). According to research,

68 of the 1526 mosques in the UK are Salafist, which represents a very small portion. However an

opportunity for this study was also highlighted through the ‘hoards of malignant literature that are

present in nearly a quarter of all mosques’ (The Independent, 2007). As shown in the literature

review, some of the books and articles distributed may have been from questionable sources.

These factors were crucial in the selection of the mosque as the centre quite clearly is trying to

establish relationships with the mainstream community. It is also important to note that Salafism is

not inherently tantamount with violence, terrorism or radicalisation.

Utilising personal contacts within the ethnic community, the Manchester Council for Community

Relations (MCCR) was also approached to take part in a focus group. As with the MIC, this

institution again lies within the heart of the urban area of Greater Manchester and thus offering

practical considerations due to the location. The MCCR was initially set up in 1966 in partnership

with the Home Office, Manchester City Council and local ethnic minority groups and has a large

management committee which reflects the diversity of Manchester’s community. The main aim and

objectives of the MCCR’s work is to eliminate racial hatred and tension and promote equality and

relations within the community (MCCR, 2011).

27

Due to the cultural difference between the researcher and the respondents, there was a danger

that the researcher did not have the knowledge to interpret the meaning of any data because of a

lack of familiarity with Muslim culture and Islam. The researcher, however, has experience of

dealing with Muslims, albeit abroad, in a mentoring and training capacity which has enabled a

better understanding of cultural norms, specifically in the context of Islam. Rubin and Rubin (1995:

171) discussed the roles of an ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’, which is defined by culture and in any cross-

cultural research, the researcher is seeking to cross that boundary. Therefore, due to these

dimensions, sensitivity was a high priority in this research. As this study is concerned with

developing explanations of social phenomena, any lack of sensitivity would hamper the ability to

answer the specific questions that shape this research. Because it was unclear whether the Muslim

community would actually welcome dialogue, the researcher contacted very early on in the study

the Manchester Islamic Centre (MIC) and the Manchester Council for Community Relations

(MCCR).

Also included as respondents in the interview stage of the study was Muslims who were selected

to represent different strands of the Muslim community. Key to the selection of the respondents

was the aspiration to share their views on a particular sensitive subject and consequently

individuals were identified who represented various demographics of the Muslim community. It was

envisaged that the research issue under discussion would provide quality feedback from the focus

group and interviews, as the focus on terrorism and the role of religion (Islam) may prove to be a

controversial issue amongst the selected participants (Simmons, 2008: 186). It was considered an

important factor for the objectives of this study to develop an understanding of how issues affecting

the norms of society are viewed from an average Muslim’s perspective. The first respondent

(Interview one) was a middle aged, married, second generation Muslim, who is a director of a

management consultancy firm. With extensive experience of working with various different charity

organisations with links to the community, at local, regional and national level, this respondent was

well placed to discuss the general views across the Muslim community. The second respondent is

a Muslim member of the Armed Forces, also with Pakistani ancestral roots, whom is single with no

independents and represents the ‘generation y’ of society today. The inclusion of these two

different respondents presents an opportunity to compare and contrast the qualitative data from

different sides of the Muslim community. It is envisaged that this will produce a better spectrum of

information to analyse with less potential for bias to one side of the story. It is also relevant to point

out that an informal interview was held at the MIC with one of the members of the management

committee, however, they wished to remain anonymous and also any audio recording was banned.

Subsequently, though the interview was transcribed by hand, the data was not analysed to the

extent of the other two interviews and consequently the findings were not included in this study, in

recognition of the potential to corrupt any findings and reduce the validity.

28

Informed consent is a central element of ethical research practice along with the principles of

confidentiality and anonymity (The British Educational Research Association, 2004: 6). Ensign

(2003) observed the importance of ethical considerations for studies wanting to recruit social

groups on the fringe of mainstream society and highlighted the significance of the relationship of

information between the research and participant. Initial contact was made by email and post with

the two institutions and two individuals in order to obtain informed consent and provide information

of the subject matter and objectives of the research (informed consent form and information letters

for both the focus group and interviews are attached at Appendix D and E respectively). The letter

informs the conditions under which any data obtained may be handled. This includes the secure

storage and handling of the data and the arrangements for sharing data with the University of

Leicester. The issues of confidentiality and anonymity of the participants were thorough and

considered. The information and informed consent letter also stated that participants had a right to

withdraw consent at any time without prejudice and without providing a reason, and be guaranteed

access to the findings of the research, supplied free of charge, upon request.

The original study plan was to hold two focus groups, with the MIC and MCCR organisations as the

choice of participants. Following a positive response to the initial ‘informed consent’ letter, the MIC

declined to participate in a focus group purely on a basis of time consideration. The researcher of

this study had visited the MIC on several occasions in order to gain a rapport and also a better

understanding with the Islamic Managers of the Mosque. Initially a positive response was received

from the centre, which seemed reciprocal to help the author with the research. They offered advise

and literature, however when pushed to conduct a focus group the response was not only slow, but

poor. Denscombe (2007: 23) discusses the validity of any non response in social research, noting

that this is often the result of either ‘refusal or non-contact’. In the context of this study, this is not

characterised as a non-response, if this definition is taken into account.

The MCCR responded in a more positive way and agreed to conduct a focus group within their

premises at a time of the organisations own choosing. Following the same process of initial contact

by post and email to acquire informed consent and provide information (see Appendix D and E)

contact was made with five individuals, all of whom responded positively. The role of the facilitator

was acted out by the researcher, and discussions took place based on questions evolved around

the objectives of this study (see Appendix A). The chief executive of MCCR acted as the ‘informal

gatekeeper’ for the focus group. Siedman (2006: 45) suggested the role of an ‘informal gatekeeper’

can be to persuade other reluctant individuals to participate through a form of ‘approval’ and

respect, and it was in this capacity that the gatekeeper in this study performed the screening and

selection of participants for the focus group.

29

This study employed the use of a focus group as a means of data collection, and so the researcher

was mindful of the need to distinguish between the opinions of individuals and group opinions.

Cronin (2008: 242) notes that the ‘group’ is the unit of analysis rather than the individual; this study

took account firstly of the group context then sought categories and themes that consequently

arose. According to Richardson and Rabiee (2001) the participants in focus groups are selected on

the criteria that they have a common association with the topic in question. The focus group

consisted of participants with varying demographic backgrounds and social identity which

promoted the free expression of views and an active and stimulating discussion. The MCCR focus

group consisted of the Chief Executive of the MCCR, two committee members of MCCR, a

member of the organisation Community on Solid Grounds, and a member of the Greater

Manchester Police Advisory Committee and Interfaith.

The second method of data collection was interviews. It was attempted to conduct three or four, but

due to time constraints and non responses, only two semi structured interviews were completed.

Following the same process of initial contact by email and post to obtain informed consent and

provide information (see Appendix D and E), contact was made with three individuals (a manager

from the MIC, a member of the Armed Forces and also a director of a management consultancy

firm). The researcher acted as a medium level facilitator for both interviews and the focus group,

which took place based on the same questions. Cronin (2008: 230) noted that the advantage of

medium level moderation is that it enables a high level of control over the course of the discussion

ensuring that the data is relevant to the study.

The benefit of qualitative interviews is the utilisation of open ended questions that allow for

individual variations. Questions in this study were developed that were pertinent to each objective

in question. Caution was utilised in the development of the questions and the use of terminology

due to the sensitive nature of the study. ‘Open’ questions formed the basis of the focus group and

interviews, as they allowed respondents as much freedom as possible in deciding how to reply.

Furthermore, by utilising ‘open’ questions, the researcher was able to develop probing questions

spontaneously in the course of discussion as new themes emerged. This emphasis was also to

encourage participants to contribute more, aid the flow of discussion and help the researcher

control the direction of the discussion.

Firstly the data from the focus group and interviews was transcribed into a Microsoft Word

document for ease of analysis and comparison. The data was organised for analysis by allocating

them into either of the objectives. For objective one: questions three, four, five and the introduction

were grouped together. For objective two: questions one and two were grouped together (see

Appendices A, B and C). Each question in both objectives was analysed and initial open coding

was highlighted in order to distinguish themes and issues that were evident in the response to that

30

particular question. This was repeated for all of the questions in each objective and encompassed

a total of six questions. The constant comparison of analysis in a circular not linear fashion allowed

saturation until no new codes and themes emerged. After this procedure was completed, the open

coding from both objectives was analysed to generate categories. This identified common themes

across the entire data set and condensed the original open coding to a fewer number of central

categories so that a final analysis could be conducted in order to compare with existing theories

and develop the final hypotheses and conclusions. The same questions have been used for the

respondents in the focus group and the semi structured interviews, and the framework for these

was constructed from the objectives of the study.

Following the principles of themed content analysis, the examination of the three sets of data

obtained would present options to identify emerging themes and refine hypotheses as data

emerged. Themed content analysis is a descriptive presentation of qualitative data, which may take

the form of interviews or focus groups transcripts collected from participants. According to Holloway

and Todres (2003) due to the complexity of qualitative research, themed content analysis should

be used as the primary means of analysis for those not familiar with qualitative data analysis. This

study has conducted themed content analysis in order to ensure that the researcher’s

epistemological stance is purely objective which is critical in such a sensitive topic

This research has been conducted in a totally overt manner. Given the focus on the Muslim

community in this study, willing participation was a necessity. It has been made clear that in

seeking the co operation of individuals and those at the MCCR and the MIC for that matter, the

research is based purely on academic post graduate study; however the findings will be accessible

through the University’s library. All risks in conducting this study were duly considered by the

researcher. Due to the researcher’s role in the Intelligence community, albeit Military, it was

decided that classified information would not be referred to and only open source material would

be accessed. This was taken from an ethical viewpoint, and ethical responsibilities have been

maintained throughout this study. It is recognised that ‘home grown’ terrorism is a sensitive subject

and controversial issue, which may lead to varying and contrasting opinions as both studies and

reports of recent origin have highlighted with polar opposite views held by different scholars.

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Chapter Four Data Chapter

The previous chapter described the methodological approach taken in this study. This chapter sets

out the results and findings of the research undertaken. Three sets of research data were collected

from members of the Muslim community that were examined utilising ‘thematic content analysis’ as

described in the previous chapter. Two of these sets are the results of semi-structured interviews

and one set was the result of focus group discussions. For ease of reference the following

abbreviations will be used to distinguish between the respondent groups when describing the data

captured in this chapter; interview one, interview two and MCCR. The same questions (see

Appendix A) have been used for the respondents in the focus group and also formed the structure

for the semi structured interviews. The framework for these was constructed from the objectives of

the study. Two main objectives have been identified in this study and for the purpose of this

analysis they will be referred to under the following headings:

Objective 1. Examine the extent to which an individual’s interpretation of Islam is a factor in

why religion is sometimes seen as a mechanism for an incentive to support and engage in terrorist

acts.

Objective 2. Elucidate how sub cultural theory can assist in explaining why some individuals

resort to terrorism and fall into the radicalisation process.

Under both objectives, each question was analysed in order to identify initial open coding. These

results were then subjected to additional analysis and the data from the set of questions within

each objective was analysed as a whole within that particular group, and the process completed

sequentially for both the objective groups. For example, an open coding titled ‘impact of the media’

would be designated with a category of ‘contemporary media representation’ and an open coding

of ‘policy makers’ double standards’ designated with a category of ‘grievance’, and so on. This

process identified seven categories (See Appendices B and C) specifically: ‘contemporary media

representation’, ‘grievance’, ‘personal identification’, ‘use of religion’, ‘identifies with wider society’,

‘feeling of marginalisation’ and ‘domestic social stimuli’.

Contemporary media representation

Aspects of the ‘Contemporary media representation’ category is a key issue for objective one and

although it may have been mentioned in varying contexts, such as ‘Impact of the media’ and

‘Media hype’ in open coding, it has been categorised as a factor that runs through many of the

issues being examined. The media features heavily as a factor which impacts on people’s

perceptions of Islam and Muslims and terrorism. Given the ‘open’ terms of the questions, it is

32

interesting to note the almost unanimous agreement within the focus group concerning the

negative image of the media in the eyes of Muslims. The regularity of the open coding and

categories (two out of three) for question one, to which ‘media’ occurs shows that there were clear

consistencies to the pessimistic view of which respondents viewed the role of the media.

The first code generated related to the ‘Impact of the media’ and was mentioned by three of the

respondents as an area of concern due to the role the ‘free media’ plays that makes them

susceptible to pressures that distort attempts to tell the truth. Comments included,

“I feel that sort of opinion, that stat, is a lot of media hype. We don’t believe a lot of the

stuff that the media says …. a lot of the people who run the media, they are kind of like

anti Islam as well …. I just feel, yes, some things do happen, and it gets blown out of

proportion” (MCCR).

“Negative perceptions towards Muslims and any resistance …. within the Muslim

community when it comes to oppression or injustice, this connection is the very heart of

the question” (MCCR).

The focus group and interview one held negative views regarding how the media has cultivated the

notion of ‘Islamic terrorism’, so much so that the image of Muslims in general being either terrorists

or sympathisers currently enjoys wide currency. Two respondents mentioned that,

“Media affects the community’s views and has a ripple effect” …. as if you look at it on the

other side, the Muslims who don’t live in England they wont blame the west being

Christian terrorists …. the media since 9/11 kicked off in 2001 …. they still use Muslim or

Islam, its nothing to do with Islam, so for the media to still use the words …. what kind of

people are they? And you know the government and the media is accepting that

wholeheartedly, because they’re against it. So what are they?” (MCCR)

“The media...has influence over the community and the way people perceive things”

(Interview two).

One respondent mentioned that the media portrayal of Muslims is damaging the levels of trust, with

the comment that,

“Reporting suggesting that Islam is a religion of violence has had a significant negative

effect on community relations ….” (MCCR).

Interestingly, further probing questions highlighted a split in views with regards to the respondents’

opinions to the introductory question. Two respondents thought that the statistic in question was

accurate and represented the general view of the public, with one respondent commenting,

“I think fifty percent would say that …. people are mostly informed by what they hear in

the media ....they haven’t actually made a conscious effort to find out themselves ....so

when there is a bombing it becomes an Islamic issue” (Interview two).

33

The focus group however provided a mixed response as the opinion was divided, with three of the

participants blaming the media for exaggerating the story,

“Politicians were portraying something that is shaping the perception of ordinary citizens

…. They’re kind of aggravating it for more to happen” (MCCR).

The ‘contemporary media representation’ category as examined broadly falls into two open

codings, ‘impact of the media’ and ‘media hype’. As discussed in the literature review where

statistical evidence highlighted the apparent ‘media hype’ which shapes a societies interpretation of

events; the rise in the threat of ‘home grown’ terrorism when evaluated with the threat from

previous experiences with the IRA, is not as severe. The portrayal of these statistics, polls, studies

and coverage by the media are significantly negative and often bear little resemblance to the facts

and influence the way an individual or group perceive Muslims. However, before developing any

final conclusions based on such a judgement, it is firstly important to highlight the lower codes to

which this theme was developed that may explain why the role of the media has evolved in this

manner.

The ‘Impact of the media’ through the lens of the focus group participants and the two interviewees

highlighted a deteriorating opinion in so far as the media was termed “anti- Islamic” (MCCR). The

central issue of how the media affects views is given more credence in a report commissioned in

2007 by the former Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, which concluded that the media often

‘frequently distort facts and at the same time are likely to provoke grievances amongst Muslims’

(Greater London Authority, 2007: xiv). Thus, as the qualitative data in this study has been analysed

and refined, of all the coding identified in this study, it is the role of the media that is perceived by

respondents as one of the biggest influencing factors in the development of how individuals, as

well as society, formulate ideas on topics such as terrorism and radicalisation. The significance of

the ‘media’ cannot be underestimated in how some sections of society adopt a mistrust towards

Muslims through general misunderstanding and oversimplification of the relationship between

Islam and terrorism.

Grievance

The second category, ‘Grievance’, was identified but also inextricably linked to ‘Contemporary

media representation’ in that the media create bias reporting that does not highlight the positive

actions and deeds of the Muslim community. The prevailing narrative about Muslim dissatisfaction

in the UK is well documented and the sources of grievance are much broader than foreign policy

discontent which will be discussed in this chapter. It can extend to any hostility that is perceived to

be anti Muslim and include domestic issues in the UK ranging from terrorism legislation to the

police ‘stop and search’ powers. The category ‘Grievance’ was derived from four open codes,

34

‘Discrimination’, ‘Politicians double standards’, ‘Embitterment towards the west’ and ‘Lack of

understanding by policy makers’.

The first code implied that there was a sense of injustice and ‘Discrimination’ that any good deed

was over looked by the media in favour of a more sensationalist story. A comment on the impact of

the media was,

“Just because the person carrying out any form of criminal act subscribes to a faith, to

then brand the whole faith as a terrorist faith is just heart breaking” (Interview one).

This was in relation to how the media wrongly label and classify an act of terrorism with a loose

classification of Islamic terrorism. Notably this comment was made by interview one, whom has

extensive experience in community related charities and projects. The second code highlighted

how Muslims feel generally aggrieved by the ‘Politicians double standards’ with one comments

including,

“The rank hypocrisy of how Gaddafi’s death was tinged with racist colonial superiority,

one minute were shaking his hands, the next minute were publicly contributing to over

throw him” (MCCR).

“The principle reason …. is that people are incensed by foreign policy. Iraq was a

smoking gun; those from a Muslim background were dismayed with the hypocrisy …. It

was never about Weapons of Mass Destruction” (Interview two).

This code was further highlighted in question four with comments such as,

“From a Muslim perspective, if a politician is getting away with it, he won’t on the Day of

Judgement” (MCCR).

“It depends on who is controlling it [the media], some people want Blair brought to justice

for crimes against humanity” (MCCR).

“The Iraq War was never sanctioned by the UN so as far as international law is

concerned, we did something naughty there …. It has an element of “hang on a second”

…. that’s it ….” (Interview one).

Respondents were asked to discuss their opinions on a paragraph found in a leaflet produced by

the Islamic Dawa Centre International, titled ‘What does Islam say about Terrorism’. The focus

group and both the interviews referred to Western democratic governments’ aggression against not

only Muslim states, but other non Muslim nations. Specific reference was also mentioned with

regards to foreign policy towards Iraq and Afghanistan. There was agreement amongst

respondents that the statement had a shade of ‘Embitterment towards the west’ and its policy

makers which was mentioned by four respondents. Comments included,

“I personally believe that it means the US in Cambodia and Vietnam and also the Second

World War and the bombings of Dresden by the British” (MCCR)

35

“You have to understand, the injustices the Muslim community felt …. driven by Foreign

Policy …. not unemployment” (Interview two).

Probing questions produced a further code which echoed a code emanating from the initial

question but concerned the ‘Lack of understanding by policy makers’ in attempts to deal with the

perversion of Islam by rogue individuals with callous intentions. This was highlighted with

comments including,

“And that’s where the government went wrong, they just don’t get it, if you take someone

who everyone knows is harmless (Zakir Naik) and ban him …. His following is massive

and they all know he is harmless and he’s banned from country to country, how can that

not be interpreted as “these guys have got it in for us” (Interview one).

The centrality at issue for ‘Grievance’ was that the blame lies with the UK foreign policy rather than

an Islamist ideology. The perception amongst the focus group and both interviews was that the UK,

along with the United States, was hypocritical in its foreign policy. The primary reasons cited for this

was that no action was taken in relation to Muslim struggles in Bosnia or Kashmir, however

involvement in the so-called ‘War on Terror’ in Iraq and Afghanistan took little persuasion. The Iraq

War was not only extremely unpopular and a source of anger with Muslims, but also contributed to

the radicalisation of Muslims in the UK. According to Neumann (2006: 76) the foreign policy played

a crucial role in creating discontent among younger generations of Muslims. This is reflected in

Chapter Two of this study and the examination of Siddique Khan’s perceived injustices towards

Muslims. The researcher also has firsthand experience of Muslims joining the fight in Afghanistan,

that are born and raised in the UK joining, and judges this is an indication of the power of foreign

policy issues as a driver to mobilise support for terrorist groups and radicalisation.

The ‘Lack of understanding’ code related to the frustration that some of the respondents expressed

in regards to the banning of individuals and organisations to whom they considered moderate and

not radical. This is consistent with Chapter Two’s observation that the distinct gap in literature and

academic study on religious scholars which leads to the subjective nature of classifying individuals

such as Zakir Naik, as being radical, highlights that radical views are not necessarily a pre requisite

for terrorism. Thus when analysing between the literature review and one of the most consistently

mentioned categories in the study, it can be concluded that there is evidence that the relationship

between Muslims and the state still has significant issues to overcome. It is also pertinent to point

out that any opposition to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and any ‘Grievance’ with the state or

wider society does not equate to a form of support for terrorism.

36

Personal identification

The ‘Personal identification’ category related to the open code, ‘Identity’. However this code was

found to have two completely different perspectives. The first perspective was that Islam is a

salient marker of identity among Muslims. Both the focus group and the interviews were in

agreement in relation to this. The latter perspective of ‘Identity’ was as a crisis that concerns how

young Muslims face a predicament in the sense of not being accepted or belonging to a group.

Such a crisis emerges often when Muslim and non Muslim cultures conflict. The intensity of such

feelings is reinforced by discrimination and racism, both of which occur later in this chapter.

The ‘Identity’ code which emerged from question two concerned how Islam is more than a religion,

it is a system of life and more of an ‘Identity’ for Muslims with comments that,

“I think another thing is .... we don’t have a religion.... people don’t understand... we have

a way of life. So, when people don’t understand that difference ... between religions. We

don’t have a religion.... you people have” (MCCR)

“I’d say the Qur’an is a [written] constitution for Muslims, who abide and go by the Qur’an

…. and there are guidelines …. the UK does not have a written constitution” (MCCR).

A surprising reflection from the focus group was the comment that the UK exists as one of the few

non-constitutional monarchies with a head of state that serves as the head of an established

Church. This highlights how the Muslim community finds itself at the centre of such a debate and

also illustrates the difficulty in judging Islam in such a generalisation. This identity with religion may

be further reinforced by relative deprivation factors that occur throughout this study. In this context,

embracing a form of radical Islam can be seen as a possibility to gain a sense of belonging and

respect.

The second perspective to the code and was that of an ‘Identity’ crisis amongst the younger

Muslims with the older generation crucially failing to recognise this. One respondent noted that,

“The younger generation need to be a focus …. from policy makers ….when Sheikh Tahir ul

Qadri issued a fatwa with absolute condemnation of terrorism and even pinpointed where these

terrorists are coming from and how there is no place in Islam for violence and no justification

provided for it …. young Muslims liked this” (MCCR).

Further comments highlight the challenge for young Muslims trying to integrate with the main

society,

“Your average British Muslim on the streets of Manchester, or so, is told he has to

integrate more fully with the society around him…. however, what he tends to see around

37

him, the binge drinking, drugs and other forms of addiction apparently rampant …it

doesn’t look very nice” (Interview two).

This problem of ‘Identity’ and belonging was illustrated in chapter two where surveys of Muslim

opinions in the UK were examined. Though there was a broad conclusion that relationships

between Muslims and non Muslims in general are poor, this view had improved slightly from the

previous poll five years earlier (PEW, 2011:15). Many young Muslims living in the UK are split

between society’s effervescent mix of culture, identity and religion that comprise the wider

community. Silke noted that social identity in particular, was a common reason for individuals

turning to terrorism. He suggests the individual must identify with that part of society that supports

the aims and grievances of the terrorist group. However commitment to a cause does not mean an

individual will necessarily become a terrorist (Silke, 2003: 39). It is noteworthy that the ‘identity

crisis’ involves a crucial element of younger Muslims wanting to distinguish themselves from the

older generation (AIVD, 2006: 36). In their search for identity, some individuals are turning to

religion. Under certain circumstances, this can lead to a sub culture amongst young Muslims which

was examined in the literature review and will be discussed further in the next chapter.

Role of religion

The ‘Role of religion’ was identified as a category due to the significance of the open code ‘Moral

justice’ for violence as a possibility for an individual or group to perceive a theological mandate to

commit violence. Respondents tended to elaborate on theological issues here, and focus on how

justifying violence in the name of any religion, let alone Islam, is a straightforward affair depending

on how an individual interprets the religion. This category was developed from three open codes,

‘Moral justice’, ‘Morally unjustifiable’ and ‘Allegiance to Islam’ and links well with the overall aim of

the objective one.

For question three, the ‘Role of religion’ category was mentioned in relation to the cultural issues

which can be difficult for Westerners to understand in the context of an ‘Allegiance to Islam’.

Culture can have an overpowering effect on behaviour and there are stark differences between

Muslim and non Muslim culture. In particular, the cultural issues associated with terrorism can be

very difficult for westerners to comprehend. Interestingly, with this code, two respondents

commented on the ‘rhetoric of war’ whereby the very nature of religions, not just Islam,

incorporates notions of sacrifice and martyrdom; one respondent commented that,

“The idea of the hero sacrificing himself for the interests of Islam is not surprising”

(Interview Two).

38

A main reason for this is that religion and the state are separate identities in the minds of

Westerners, whereas in an Eastern culture, religion is a fundamental part of state affairs. Interview

one noted in particular that martyrdom is an accepted rationale for some Muslims, yet this concept

to a Western non Muslim in particular would be hard to accept; where a preference to exercise

rationality in decision making would take precedence. A further perspective to the ‘Allegiance to

Islam’ code was mentioned by three respondents to indicate that some Muslims may feel more

duty bound to protect their religious rather than national identity, with comments such as,

“I think they just felt it was right and justified and whether they are fighting against British,

American or Pakistanis is irrelevant” (Interview one).

The second code related to the use of religion as a ‘Moral justice’ for violence whereby most

religions have ideologies and doctrines which are so complex that justification for violence can be

found within their traditions which leads to divergent interpretations. One respondent noted that,

“You can use religion to justify murder ....you can use any religion to almost justify

anything....you just need to pick out what-ever you need” (Interview one).

The third code highlighted importantly the huge rejection of violence by Muslims all respondents

believing it has no place in any political struggle and that Muslims are just as likely as non Muslims

to condemn attacks as ‘Morally unjustifiable’. This was mentioned by two respondents with one

explanation from a respondent that,

“There is just no place in Islam for any form of violence” (MCCR) and “were fighting

extremists not Muslims, the threat is real, but so is the Muslim opposition to it” (Interview

Two).

The development of a ‘Role of religion’ category indicates how the literature examined in chapter

two which highlights the extent that the role of religion plays as a motivational cause for terrorism,

cannot be dismissed. As discussed in-depth previously, scholars have differing views on the

function of religion, however Hoffman (1993) noted that a particular ‘striking feature of religiously

motivated terrorism is the radical value systems and mechanisms of justification that terrorists

embrace’. This identifies with the ‘Moral justice’ code that was developed in the responses. The

‘Allegiance to Islam’ code is closely linked to identity, in that religion is part of the make up in

society which contributes to the norms of behaviour (Lee and Newby, 1994). The ‘Role of religion’

is a major issue for this study and the findings will be discussed in greater detail in the next

chapter. However just to recapitulate the analysis in the literature review and also the brief findings

from the data results, this study reasons that the ‘Role of religion’ is a factor in the process of how

an individual resorts to the various forms of terrorism, whether that be acts of violence or just forms

39

of support. The consistency of how religion links in with the majority of the codes and other

categories shows that the evidence is sufficient so that it should not be rejected.

Objective 2. To elucidate how Sub cultural Theory can assist in explaining why some

individuals favour terrorist tactics.

Two questions were set in the second objective which produced a further four categories (see

Appendix C). One of these (‘Personal identification’) reoccurred from the previous objective.

Identity with wider society

The ‘Identity with wider society’ category occurred in both questions of Objective Two. The

category related to how Muslims feel comfortable living in the UK and though they face problems

as a minority ethnic group, they are well placed to deal with them. The first code identified was the

general acceptance that ‘Islam is compatible’ with the rest of society as a whole, however there

was a degree of caution with comments such as,

“I found that if you talk to people of faith ....they would understand better .... in the sense

that they are tolerant” (MCCR).

This comment highlights how Muslims feel they need to be accepted as an identity with in

mainstream society. This form of social identity affects choices in behaviour, which occurs naturally,

particularly where there is regular and sustained contact with other spheres of influence, for

example families, schools and mosques. However other comments highlighted the apparent sense

of pride that Muslims can go about their ordinary day to day lives freely,

“My parents are from Pakistan, but I am proud to say that I am a British born Muslim ….

when I go and visit Pakistan and see a different life to how we live and when the plane

touches down in Manchester I say “Yes! I am home” …. I am proud to be living in Britain

today, I work…. practise Islam and find more knowledge …. I don't think that if I was living

in Pakistan I would get that chance” (Interview two).

These comments highlight a belief that Muslims are able to appreciate the political freedoms they

enjoy in the UK when compared to their family roots to far more oppressive and non democratic

countries. Interview two’s reflection is particularly noteworthy and relevant as it highlights how old

ties to countries of origin have weakened in many ways.

40

The majority of respondents were in agreement that there is a ‘Concern related to reports of

Muslims being radicalised’ in the UK. However, two respondents suggested that radicalisation

cases were perhaps on the decrease. One comment noted that,

“I think it is complete nonsense and runs a danger of becoming a self fulfilled prophecy”

(Interview one).

“It will invariably become hidden because it was seen as such a bad thing and it is shifting

the boundaries” (Interview two).

Despite the general agreement on the state of the current situation, opinions differed on what the

drivers of radicalisation are. The third code produced highlighted how ‘Muslim interaction’ with

other levels of the wider community helps integrate Muslims into the wider society but the level of

integration differs in respect to the different spheres of life and areas of activity such as work,

leisure, family and friendship. While the Muslim community remains relatively disadvantaged

compared to other ethnic communities, this selective interaction can cultivate friendships that

benefit both sides.

The open codes show a shift within the Muslim community in the UK, towards an overall British

identity, perhaps particularly within the younger generation. Various indicators demonstrate this:

the feeling of a need to be understood by other communities and religions, and the increase in

concern of domestic issues. This is particularly important when contrasted with the other

categories in this study, most notably ‘Personal identification’ and ‘Role of religion’. This category

also links well with the issues discussed in the literature review, in so far as Muslims are equally as

compassionate as non Muslims, of the idea of a ‘British identity’ and are just as content to live and

embrace life in the UK.

Feeling of marginalisation

The second category produced ‘Feeling of marginalisation’, related to the note of caution in the

responses across the board to the previous category. Interestingly, both interviews commented on

personal experiences of ‘Prejudice and racism’, but also the focus group, with the broad

experience and demographic range of the respondents, noted how marginalisation has been a

long-term issue for Muslims in the UK. The ‘Feeling of marginalisation’ varied in different scales

and included hostility to individuals (and groups) because they follow different customs or belong to

a different religious group from the majority community. Sometimes marginalised groups are

41

viewed with hostility and fear, which was echoed by the first code and concerned how ‘Prejudice

and racism’ was still a problem but only in certain communities with comments such as,

“If you look at us as individuals, you know, we live in these types of areas where there’s

a lot of [difficult to translate] populations, it’s not really an issue. But when you do speak

to some of the people who live in the majority white areas, or non Muslim areas, they

really feel uncomfortable. They feel a threat. They feel they’re gonna get attacked, some

people decide they’re scared to wear the Hijab …. you know some of the women they

don’t go out on their own. They won’t go out, wait for their husband or their brothers, so it

has been restricted” (MCCR).

“After the July bombings there was a backlash and young Muslims felt the atmosphere

change” (Interview 2).

This sense of exclusion leads to sub communities not having access to opportunities and

resources and in their inability to assert their rights. This experience of a sense of disadvantage

was highlighted by the second code as respondents felt that there was a ‘General sense of

grievance’ (which echoed a code originating from Question Three) that the needs of Muslims are

not a priority for policy makers and authorities and frustration of being underrepresented in the

political process. This was mentioned by two respondents with comments such as,

“Invitations for Muslims to participate and integrate in public institutions are severely

lacking” (Interview two).

Marginalisation of Muslims or the perception of being outsiders is well documented and often

considered one of the common reasons for individuals turning to terrorism. The issue of

marginalisation was briefly examined in the literature review. According to Malik’s (2007)

investigation into the so called ‘Mullah Crew’ and the July 7th bombers, all of the individuals lived in

the same area and were not isolated from mainstream society. There was evidence that they had

embraced parts of Western culture to differing degrees. This evidence along with the results from

the study suggests therefore that marginalisation, alone, cannot be a main casual factor in

individuals resorting to terrorism.

Domestic social stimuli

The last category to emerge, ‘Domestic social stimuli’ related to how certain members of the focus

group believed how there has been a slight shift in grievances amongst Muslims from foreign

policy concerns to domestic issues. This category relates to the extent to which individuals feel

42

they identify with what they see as the dominant values and concerns of the wider society, and

thus feel a sense of belonging to the parent community.

The code produced highlighted that although global events such as the wars in Iraq and

Afghanistan contributed to the radicalisation of young Muslims, there was an increasing concern

that the motives have an ‘increased focus on domestic issues and targets’ with one comment,

“If you are involved in the finer details you’ll find there are young people being radicalised

.... and I’m dealing with a case now....it’s very difficult” (MCCR).

Thus following the principles of ‘themed content analysis’, the data collected in this study has been

subjected to the above analysis from which open codes have been allocated to categories. Further

analysis was then conducted in order to identify themes and hypotheses which can then be

compared to existing theory. The next chapter will discuss all conclusions drawn from this study.

The key issues evident from the respondents in objective one sustain the argument that an

individual’s perspective on religion may be more than a casual factor in why religion is some times

seen as a mechanism for an incentive to support and engage in terrorist acts. Two themes

emerged from the categories which were developed for this objective (see Appendix B); ‘reliance

on media to formulate ideas’ and ‘individual’s perception’. The latter theme statistically occurred in

nine out of the twelve data totals (‘Grievance’, ‘Personal identification’ and ‘Role of religion’). This

emphasises the analysis of the literature review which was subsequently brought up by

participants through ‘open’ questions in the research part of this study.

Evidence from objective two produced a mixture of support and rejection of the relationship

between sub cultural theory and why some individuals resort to terrorism. This objective produced

a dichotomy of two themes, ‘Conforms to social norms’ and ‘Development of sub culture’ (see

Appendix C). The issues of ‘Identity with wider society’ and ‘Domestic social stimuli’ were

highlighted by the respondents studied, which suggests some form of support for the themes

deriving from literature on sub cultural theory. However, the categories ‘Feeling of marginalisation’

and ‘Personal Identification’ though reject the notion that the Muslim community feel content with

their role in the wider community, still gives support to the hypothesis that sub cultural theory may

assist in explaining the ‘home grown’ terrorism phenomenon; however this needs to be further

investigated as it is not prevalent in terrorism research. These issues will be discussed in the

conclusion of this study.

43

Chapter Five Conclusion

Data Findings

Objective one focused on examining the extent to which an individual’s interpretation of Islam is a

factor in why religion is sometimes seen as a mechanism for an incentive to support and engage in

terrorist acts. The responses to the questions in this objective produced four separate categories.

These include and occurred at the following frequency: four ‘Grievance’, three ‘Role of religion’,

two ‘Contemporary media representation’ and two ‘Personal identification’.

It is contended that two themes have emerged from the categories of objective one in relation to

the way an ‘individual’s interpretation of religion is sometimes seen as a mechanism for an

incentive to support or engage in home grown terrorism’. These themes relate to ‘Individual’s

perception’ and ‘Reliance on media to formulate ideas’. The reference to ‘individual’s perception’

was occurred frequently throughout the study, resulting in eight of the eleven themes for the first

objective which highlights the significance of objective one in this study. Crucially, the literature

examined in Chapter Two of this study also highlighted how individual’s can become motivated by

a religious belief to commit and support acts of terrorism. Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman (2009),

Githens - Mazer (2010), Precht (2007) and Silke (2008) all examined and asserted that religion

contributes to the process of radicalisation and home grown terrorism, but to various extents. The

significance of Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman’s study (2009) in particular was that the analysis

was done on the perspective to which a religious belief is taken. The role of how an individual

interprets their religious belief was found within five of the six traits they examined. This analysis

was further supported by this study which examined articles on the influence of Islamic scholars,

and how there is a significant gap in literature available to make an objective opinion on the extent

to which they are deemed ‘radical’. If a balanced interpretation on the extent of their influence

cannot be achieved then the significance of how an individual then interprets a particular religion is

increased. Just as applicable is the regularity (eight out of eleven) in which ‘Individual’s perception’

occurred in this study. Thus, when comparing these viewpoints with one of the most consistently

mentioned themes in this study it is concluded that there is foundation in the literature to the theory

of how an individual perceives and interprets a religion can justify the means of violence.

Objective two set out to clarify how sub cultural theory can assist in explaining why some

individuals or groups resort to terrorism. The responses to the questions in this objective produced

four categories. These categories materialised on six occasions and were broken down into the

following frequency: two of these related to ‘Identity with wider society’, two ‘Feeling of

marginalisation’, one ‘Personal identification’ and one ‘Domestic social stimuli’. The first question

44

concerned how the respondents ‘manage their religious beliefs and living in a western society’ and

produced three categories. Objective two developed two further key themes which will now be

discussed.

The intent of this objective was to ‘elucidate how sub cultural theory can assist in explaining why

some individuals favour terrorist tactics’. This part of the research objective highlighted themes,

‘Conforms to social norms’ and ‘Development of subculture’, which frequented the section equally.

The first theme to emerge, ‘Conforms to social norms’ and the categories linked to it, ‘Identity with

wider society’ and ‘Domestic social stimuli’ highlight the desire of Muslims to fully embrace UK

society. Respondents in the focus group and both interviews were satisfied with their lives, though

acknowledged that blocked social mobility can hinder some Muslims. This optimism among the

respondents is reflected in the literature review of this study, which examined opinion polls that

reflected the positive outlook from Muslims. The literature review also discussed how experiences

within society can shape an individual’s behaviour and beliefs. Influences are internal (family,

identity, ethnicity and religion) and external (economy, politics, community and culture). Any one, or

a combination could provide sufficient impetus to cause an individual to become aggrieved, yet as

the results showed from the focus group and interviews, Muslims seem content living in the parent

community of the UK. The framework considered in this study (identity, marginalisation, grievance,

religion) and the linkages between them capture the root causes behind individual’s motivations to

become terrorists. However, the respondents in this study identified and were satisfactorily

immersed with main stream society even though issues such as marginalisation were highlighted

as issues.

The second theme identified in objective two is that of the potential ‘Development of a sub culture’.

The occurrence and frequency of this theme provided an indication of the Muslim communities

potential ‘marginalisation’ within society due to the strains encountered and imposed on them.

Academic studies such as Cottee (2011) support this view and note that the discontent and

apparent injustices that Muslims are subjected to, allows for the creation of a sub culture.

Respondents acknowledged Muslim dissatisfaction within society, though it is difficult to measure,

the frequency of the occurrence highlights that the concerns displayed are acute and real. The sub

categories linked to this theme, ‘Personal identification’ and ‘Feeling of marginalisation’, show that

although Muslims are deeply immersed within the parent culture, the defining advertised values

and aspirations of that culture when withheld, create resentment and frustration. Although

encouragingly there were examples from respondents in this study of where social norms are

conformed to; the response to social, political and cultural conditions shows how Muslims have

created a sub culture within main stream society, and also within the Muslim community. Thus, it is

found that the establishment of a sub culture has not necessarily represented a culture deemed

deviant by the majority, yet this view has been distorted by the various other themes and

45

categories highlighted in this chapter. These concepts above provide the foundations for the final

discussion in the next part of this chapter.

Discussion

This study set out to examine the role of religion as a factor of motivation for ‘home grown’

terrorism and whether sub cultural theory could be used as a tool to identify conditions that may

lead an individual onto the trajectory of the radicalisation path. The literature reviewed verified how

an individual’s interpretation of religion may misrepresent the actual relationship between religion

and terrorism. This is not the only observation to be distorted, as will be discussed further on. The

research phase showed how casual and motivational factors for individuals being involved in

‘home grown’ terrorism are complex in the UK as they are elsewhere and a combination of these is

usually required. However, the frequency of religion as a data result suggests that it is one of the

factors that should be considered.

As discussed previously in this study, the IRA were the pinnacle domestic security threat to the UK

even when statistically compared to the ‘new’ domestic security peril of ‘Islamic terrorism’. This

study has offered the opinion that society’s fear of ‘Islamic terrorism’ is greater than that of the

IRA’s due to the rhetoric from sources such as the media. Firstly, statistical comparison suggested

this premise, and then in the research phase, data from ‘open’ questions proposed that Muslims

have a general grievance with the media due to a combination of factors. The role of media

influence and the impact on the psyche of an individual’s basic beliefs is beyond the scope of this

study. However it is noted that after the review in Chapter Two, because this threat from ‘Islamic

terrorism’ is more complex and less understood than the threat from the IRA, then the media

naturally portrays more apprehension towards the threat.

Although the idea of the relationship between cultures and sub cultures, which encompass various

different ethnic groups, along with crime has been present since the ideas of the Chicago School;

explanations of sub cultural theory generally ignore terrorism theories. Sub cultural theories help

explain how some individuals and groups respond to the social and cultural conditions in which

they live in. Chapter Two examined how individuals switch to terrorism and band together sharing

their own bitterness; resentful of the rejections and perceived injustices they have been subjected

to in the norms of society. They then create their own sub culture and sense of identity providing a

building block for the emergence into terrorism. The research part of this study did not conclude

the presence of an apparent ‘deviant’ sub culture forming within the Muslim community; however

the categories and themes produced highlights the existence of conditions that are concurrent to

sub cultural theory. The evidence produced shows that despite the presence of a variety of issues,

46

the Muslim community in the UK is committed to sharing an identity with the main stream UK

society whilst up holding their own values and cultural norms.

In summary, this study has shown by examining the three sets of data, that it is apparent there is

evidence of the role of religion as a motivational factor for an individual to resort to ‘home grown’

terrorism. By coordinating an understanding of religion (and Islam in particular to the context of this

study) and sub cultural theories of crime, then the domestic threat will be counter-acted by learning

to understand what motivates an individual to resort to terrorism and what conditions contribute to

their formation. Religiously motivated terrorism is not a new phenomenon and may never be

prevented, however, armed with a better understanding of Islam can contribute to a reduction in

not only the occurrence of such an activity, but also the fear and anxiety created amongst the

public who have lesser knowledge of a religion whose origin is foreign to the UK and its cultural

norms.

Finally, it is acknowledged that this is a small scale study, and therefore it is difficult to draw any

significant conclusions about the role of religion as a motivation for ‘home grown’ terrorism. Within

any criminological research, in order to draw significant conclusions, a larger sample of the

representative population (Muslims) needs to be selected. Despite this potential limitation,

a concluding suggestion is for future work to incorporate a greater quantity of interviews and focus

groups within the Muslim community in order to further the results of this research.

47

Appendix A - Research Questions for Focus Groups/Individuals.

Objective 1: The extent to which an individuals belief in Islam is a justification to use

violence

Objective 2: To elucidate how Sub Cultural theory can help explain why some individuals

resort to terrorism.

Stage 1: Introduction.

Introduce myself and briefly highlight my career.

Briefly outline the topic of the research and include a statement that any data collected will form the

basis of the dissertation alone.

Assure confidentiality, and point out there are no wrong or right answers.

Stage 2: Opening circle.

Get participants to say their name and a quick mini bio of themselves.

Stage 3: Introductory question.

In a recent survey by YouGov (2010) 50 % of people questioned linked Islam with terrorism.

How do you feel about these results?

Highlight how terrorism has been described variously as both a tactic and strategy; a crime and a

holy duty; and a justified reaction to oppression. Researchers have different views on how people

are being radicalised into terrorist activities. Some see political or social reasons as a major factor;

others believe that religious ideology plays a significant role. This leads the discussion now into the

key questions and focus of this study.

Stage 4: Key Questions.

1. As a Muslim, do you manage practising your religious beliefs and living in a western

democratic society?

If yes – ask participants to expand on what parts they feel are uncomfortable/

incompatible with each other.

If no – ask participants if they feel that they, as a Muslim, are understood or

accepted by the majority of mainstream society. Expand on how comfortable they

feel and why; and how they manage to balance between the two (religion and

constitutional monarchy).

48

2. How do you feel about the consistent flow of reports that suggest that there is a rise

in Muslims being radicalised in the UK?

Encourage participants to expand on their answer. Highlight recent studies that

show this (MI5, Pew Global Research).

If participants express a concern towards this rise, ask them to expand on what

they feel are the reasons behind this.

Explore whether participants have an understanding of radicalisation and how it

occurs.

If participants express little or no concern, ask what their opinions are on why these

reports are suggesting there is an apparent unease.

3. How do you feel about those individuals/groups that resort to violence/terrorism,

especially against civilians, and use the name of Islam as a justification for their

actions?

Ask participants what they believe to be the primary motivation(s) for targeting

civilians?

Encourage participants to expand on whether they feel this is justified, rarely or

never. Explore what teachings of Islam may encourage violence and how it may be

manipulated by rogue individuals.

If participants denounce these actions, explore whether they would accept these

individuals in their communities (subculture).

4. What are your opinions on British Citizens that travel across the globe to fight

against fellow British Citizens (Armed Forces) in order to defend fellow Muslims?

Ask if they feel if this is a defence of Islam against western influence. If so, do they

feel that these individuals are justified in doing so?

Explore if participants feel there is more of an allegiance to a religious identity than a

national one.

Link question 4 to the statement in question 5.

49

5. The Islamic Dawa Centre International has produced a leaflet which is titled, ‘What

does Islam say about Terrorism’. The leaflet highlights how Islam is a peaceful

religion and that all life should be respected. It also describes how the term ‘jihad’

has been misused/ abused as the phrase is not understood properly. However, in the

second paragraph the leaflet states,

‘ …. The politician who uses age-old ethnic animosities between peoples to

consolidate his position, the head of state who orders “carpet bombing” of entire

cities, the exalted councils that choke millions of civilians to death by wielding the

insidious weapon of sanctions, are rarely punished for their crimes against

humanity’.

In your opinion, who or what, do you think this statement is in regards to?

Probing Questions in general.

– What are your first thoughts on this statement?

– Ask what they mean by their answers and to expand on them.

Closing summary for the focus group.

50

Appendix B - 1 Objective One Data Results

Objective 1. To examine the extent to

which an individual’s interpretation of

Islam is a factor in why religion is

sometimes seen as a mechanism for an

incentive to support and engage in

terrorist acts.

Open Coding

Category

Theme

Q 1. Impact of the media.

Contemporary media representation

Reliance on media to formulate ideas

Discrimination Grievance Individual’s perception

Probing Question - Media hype

Contemporary media representation

Reliance on media to formulate ideas about

terrorism

Q 2. Identity Personal identification Individual’s perception

Moral justice Role of religion Individual’s perception

Identity ‘crisis’

Personal identification Individual’s perception

Q.3 Morally Unjustifiable

Role of religion Individual’s perception

Allegiance to Islam

Role of religion Individual’s perception

Politicians double standards

Grievance

Reliance on media to formulate ideas

Q 4. Embitterment towards the west

Grievance Individual’s perception

Politicians double standards

Grievance

Individual’s perception

Lack of understanding by Policy Makers

Grievance Individual’s perception

51

Appendix B - 2 Objective One Data Results

52

Appendix C - 1 Objective Two Data Results

Objective 2. To elucidate how Sub

cultural Theory can assist in explaining

why some individuals favour terrorist

tactics.

Open Coding

Category

Theme

Q 5. Islam is compatible Identity with wider society Conforms to social norms

Prejudice and Racism Feeling of marginalisation Development of sub culture

Muslim interaction Personal identification Development of sub culture

Q 6. Concern related to reports of Muslims being radicalised.

Identity with wider society Conforms to social norms

Increased focus on domestic issues and targets

Domestic social stimuli Conforms to social norms

General sense of grievance Feeling of marginalisation Development of sub culture

53

Appendix C - 2 Objective Two Data Results

54

Appendix D:

Participant Consent Form

To what extent does the role of Religion motivate an individual to resort to ‘home grown’

terrorism.

Researcher: Paul Keys (Distance Learning Student)

Department of Criminology University of Leicester

PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 1: Service Users Researcher: Ask the participant to read the service user leaflet and answer any questions. If the participant agrees to be interviewed, ask them to read and sign their consent. If the respondent is unable to read, please read out the consent form to them. Consent to be interviewed: Please initial box 1. I confirm that I have read/had read to me the information sheet dated …….

(version …..) for the above study. 2. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and

have had these answered satisfactorily and understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time. without giving any reason, and without my treatment status, medical care or legal rights being affected.

3. I understand that my interview will be recorded and written out word for word.

The recording and interview notes containing my answers will be securely stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act and later destroyed.

4. I understand that my words may be quoted directly. With regards to being

quoted, please initial next to any of the statements that you agree with: I wish to review the notes, transcripts, or other data collected during the research pertaining to my

participation.

I agree to be quoted directly.

I agree to be quoted directly if my name is not published (I remain anonymous).

I agree to be quoted directly if a made-up name (pseudonym) is used.

5. I agree to take part in the study by being interviewed Name of participant Date Signature Name of Researcher Date Signature By signing this consent form, you are indicating that you fully understand the above information and agree to participate in this study.

55

Appendix E: Participant Information Letter

INFORMATION FOR SERVICE USERS

To what extent does the role of religion

motivate an individual to resort to ‘home grown’ terrorism

Invitation

You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully.

What is the purpose of the study?

The study aims to examine the extent to which an individual’s religious belief is a factor in why religion is sometimes seen as a mechanism for an incentive to support and engage in terrorist activities. I want to find out about your personal views and perspectives on the following issues; religion, terrorism and also government measures to counter the threat. The United Kingdom’s Foreign Policy is unpopular among some Muslims, as it is with other social/religious groups. Yet Muslim opinion seems to be unfairly translated as some form of support for terrorism – more specifically, al Qaeda.The Focus Group/Interview should last approximately 1 hour.

Why have I been invited to participate?

The views of British Muslims, those who are classified as citizens/nationals of the United Kingdom by law are the sole focus of this study. British citizenship and your religion are the determining factors in receiving this invitation to participate as yours views are some of the most important factors in this study.

Do I have to take part?

It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. You are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason if you do participate.

What will happen to me if I take part?

After an informal introduction, this session will involve a discussion of the participants’ views of the research subject, and it is essential to note there are no right or wrong answers. It is important to express your own personal views. All views and opinions expressed in the interviews/focus groups will be recorded either by audio means or hand written in order for me to remember correctly all the participants views.

There will be no financial incentives or rewards for taking part in this study.

What are the possible benefits of taking part?

The benefit of taking part in this study is that it is hoped that the research will further our understanding of Muslim attitudes towards terrorism, and seek to further dispel the myth that Muslims support terrorism.

56

Will what I say in this study be kept confidential?

All information collected will be kept strictly confidential and all privacy and anonymity will be ensured in the collection, storage and publication of research material. Any audio recordings will be erased once a written copy has been produced. All quotes that are used will be done so in accordance with paragraph 4 on the consent form.

What should I do if I want to take part?

By signing the consent form, you are agreeing to take part in the study. You may leave the interview at any time you want to. The interview will take place at a time to be determined that is of benefit to all parties involved.

What will happen to the results of the research study?

The results of the research will be used in my dissertation for an MSc in Security and Risk Management.

Who is organising the research?

I am conducting the research as a distance learning student of the Department of Criminology, University of Leicester. It is important to note that I am a current serving member of the Royal Marines (Armed Forces).

Who has reviewed the study?

The research has been approved by the University Research Ethics Committee, University of Leicester.

Contact for Further Information

Paul Keys

Distance Learning Student, Dept of Criminology, University of Leicester,

The Friars 154 Upper New Walk,

Leicester LE1 7QA

Tel: 07817 457694

Email: pmk8@le.ac.uk Email: paul.keys994@mod.uk

Thank you for taking the time to read the information sheet, if there are any further queries please do not hesitate to contact me.

Date.

October 2011

57

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