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University of Warwick Department of Politics and International Studies

MA/Diploma 2014/15

Assessed Essay Submission Cover Sheet

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By submitting this form I acknowledge that I have read and understood the Department’s notes

on “Plagiarism” contained in the MA Handbook:

http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/currentstudents/masters/academic/mahandbook/assessment/p

enalties/

Provide the following information

Core MA/Dip Programme International Politics and East-Asia

Student ID number: u1463697

Name and number of Module: International Relations of the Asia-Pacific

(PO920)

Assignment: Short essay (2.500 words)

Module Tutor: Catherine Jones

Essay Title:

To what extent can it be claimed that US

alliances are more damaging than helpful to

regional security in the Asia-Pacific?

Is the above title Pre-approved or

Negotiated? Pre-approved

Word count 2.472 words

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To what extent can it be claimed that US alliances are more damaging

than helpful to regional security in the Asia-Pacific?

Abstract

The current essay assess whether US alliances in the Asia-Pacific are more damaging than helpful to

regional security. In order to do so, the essay use the image theory and its core concept: perceptions.

By focusing on East Asian States’ perceptions, the essay evaluates that US alliances are helpful for

China’s neighbours by balancing China’s power in the region. While on the other hand, China

considers them as more damaging, notably by emboldening its neighbours to challenge it as well as

reinforcing their military capabilities which increased the instability in the region. Consequently,

determining whether US alliances are more damaging than helpful depends on which State’s

perspective we are viewing the issue from.

Introduction

With the end of the Second World War, a security mechanism had been set up to contain the

Soviet Union and the communist ideology in the Asia Pacific: the ‘Hub and Spoke’ system.

This system consists in a series of bi-lateral agreements between the United States (US) and

East Asian States like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Australia. By doing so,

the US tried to prevent a spread of the communist ideology as well as help East Asian States’

development.

The end of the Cold War and People’s Republic of China’s rise (hereafter denominated as

China) brought new questions about the US alliances, whether they are more damaging than

helpful for the security of the region. Especially, because the alliances have been deepened and

broadened since the 1990s.

Perceptions will be central in this short essay and will be conceptualised through the ‘image

theory’ of Boulding, Fisherkeller and Herrmann. This theory will help us to determine how East

Asian States perceive the US alliances: either helpful or damaging for the region security.

As this essay focuses on the alliances system, it will be divided in two periods: during and after

the Cold War. However, the essay opens first with an explanation of the image theory. The

following section will interest to East Asian States’ perceptions in the region with regards to

the alliances system in both periods.

The essay finds that East Asian States considered the US alliances as helpful during the Cold

War, including China. Stability was guaranteed through the US presence, and the alliances

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helped the region’s development. With the end of the Cold War, however, China started to see

the alliance as a containment mechanism and more damaging for the region rather than helpful.

While on the other hand, China’s neighbours see the hub and spoke system as helpful to balance

China’s rise.

Conceptualisation of perception

The image theory includes perceptions into its analysis of foreign policy1.

The image theory has been thought by Boulding, in the beginning of the Cold War. Boulding

believes that “we act according to the way the world appears to us, not necessarily according

the way it is”2. Policymakers have perceptions – ‘images’ of States that guide them in their

decisions3. Consequently, their decisions reflect the image of the situation instead of the reality.

The theory considers that an image is:” a result of the intersection of three dimensions of

perception: relative power, goal compatibility and cultural distance”4.

Finally, Fisherkeller and Hermann further developed the image theory after the Soviet collapse

by using five ideal image types: enemy, degenerate, colony, imperialist and ally5. The image of

an ally is seen as a mutual interests gain through economic and political cooperation. The

foreign policy is characterised as ‘institutional cooperation’ in order to “enhanced combine

capability and mutual confidence in common action, (…) and reduce third party threats that

preoccupy target’s capability”6. While the image of enemy is perceived as a threat, and to

prevent the aggression, containment is the adequate foreign policy through deterrence and

“build major alliance system”7.

This theory explains, for instance, the Cold War through the lack of information about each

other’s intentions, which influenced the perceptions of both leaders, American and Soviet, and

led them to pursue an arms race and built major alliances.

1 Hermann, Richard K., Fisherkeller, Michael P., “Beyond the enemy image and spiral model: cognitive-strategic

research after the cold war”, International Organization, 49:3, 1995, p.428. 2 Boulding, Kenneth E., “National images and international systems”, Conflict Resolution, 3:2, 1958, p. 120. 3 Boulding, Kenneth E., op cit., p.121. 4 Hermann, Richard K., Fisherkeller, Michael P., op cit., p.416. 5 Hermann, Richard K., Fisherkeller, Michael P., op cit., p.428. 6 Hermann, Richard K., Fisherkeller, Michael P., op cit., p.430. 7 Hermann, Richard K., Fisherkeller, Michael P., op cit., p.430.

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This theory will help us to answer our main question, whether it can be claimed that US

alliances are more damaging than helpful to regional security in the Asia-Pacific, by analysing

East Asian States’ perceptions of the US alliances in the region.

The Cold War

China’s perceptions

In the beginning of the Cold War, China essentially focused on its own development that had

been damaged by the civil war. China adopted a pragmatic approach and saw the US alliances

helpful by containing the USSR. And this, especially when its alliance with the USSR ended

in the 1960s.

Furthermore, China saw the alliances in particular the one with Japan, as helpful by prevailing

a Japanese remilitarisation and its potential nuclearisation.

With the collapse of the USSR, its relations with the US improved but the lack of a common

enemy also appeared. While the US emerged as the hegemonic power, China’s rise became

more apparent and started to be perceived as a threat for the region’s stability by its neighbours.

East Asian States’ perceptions

During the Cold War, Japan adopted the ‘Yoshida doctrine’ which explains that the core of its

foreign policy is its alliance with the US. With similar reasons as China, Japan saw the alliance

as a mean to recover economically and politically. Zhang considers that the key challenge of

Japan was to manage that alliance in order to avoid both the fear of entrapment and the fear of

abandonment8. To illustrate his meaning, Zhang took the Sino-US rapprochement in the early

1970s (fear of abandonment) and the Vietnam War (fear of entrapment). Zhang believes that

Japanese foreign policy is always balancing between these two fears which represent Snyder’s

‘alliance dilemma’9.

The Chinese and North Korean’s threat lead Taiwan and South Korea to ally with the US. In

exchange of the security protection and an access to US markets, they provide diplomatic,

8 Zhang, Yun, “Multilateralism means for bilateral ends: Japan regionalism, and China-Japan-US trilateral

dynamism”, The Pacific Review, 27:1, 2014, p.8. 9Snyder, Glenn H., “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics”, World Politics, 36:4, 1984, p. 467.

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political and economic support in the region10. Moreover, the security agreement between the

US and Japan reassure them by avoiding a new militarised Japan.

Finally, Ikenberry considers the alliances system as helpful for the security region for two

reasons11. First, it binds the US to States in the region, and so, with the commitments,

agreements and mechanisms established, certainty and predictability reduced worries about the

US hegemony12. The second reason is the emergence of both “an open regional world

economy”13 and the East Asian tigers that followed an export-led economy which wouldn’t

happened without the American market and security. .

In conclusion, the image theory helps us to understand the dynamic between Northeast Asian

States and the US. From both side, each other’s perceptions were considered as allies. However,

the relation with China is more ambiguous and cannot belong to the five ideal images cited

above. I would claim that China tolerated the US alliances because it gained from it the required

stability for its own development. This ambiguous relation will be clarified in the following

section which concerns the period after the Cold War.

After the Cold War

China’s view

With China’s rise, it became a major power in the region with new goals and ambitions.

Consequently, it changed its perception of the US alliances. China believes that the alliances

system is trying to contain its development and aspirations in the region. Swayne did a research

regarding China’s perceptions over the US rebalancing and distinct the Chinese responses

whether it was authoritative or not14. The authoritative reactions were cautious and not many.

For example, in 2011, Geng Yansheng, the Defence Ministry spokesman, criticized the US

policy towards Australia (2.500 Marines were deployed in Australia), and stated : “This

(military alliances) is not in keeping with the spirit of peace, development and cooperation, and

does not help to enhance mutual trust and cooperation between countries in the region, and

10 Ikenberry, John G., “American hegemony and East Asian order”, Australian Journal of International Affairs,

58:3, 2004, p. 355. 11 Ikenberry, John G., “American hegemony and East Asian order”, Australian Journal of International Affairs,

58:3, 2004, 356-357. 12 Ikenberry, John G., “A new order in East Asia?” in Calder, Kent, Fukuyama, Francis, eds, East Asian

Multilateralism, prospects for regional stability, John Hopkins University Press, 2008, p. 221. 13 Ikenberry, John G., op cit., p. 356. 14 Swayne, Michael D., “Chinese Leadership and Elite Responses to the U.S. Pacific Pivot”, China Leadership

Monitor, n°38, 2010, p.1-26.

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could ultimately harm the common interest of all concerned”15. On the other hand, the other

responses were more critical towards US policies. The US alliances are seen as a “cold-war

military style” aiming at China. From the Chinese point of view, all the US alliances have been

deepened and broadened since the 1990s to prevent the so-called, revisionist power – China –

which challenge the order of the hegemonic power, the US. Furthermore,

The US-Japan alliance became a major concern for China because the alliance wasn’t perceived

as a restraint on Japanese remilitarisation anymore but rather its guide and supplier “aimed at

limiting Chinese power and forestalling reunification”16. Indeed, several agreement have been

reached since the 1990s between Japan and the US in order to increase and modernise the

Japanese military capabilities (Theatre Missiles Defence, Ballistic Missile Defence). Following

a new radar’s establishment in Japan, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman said : “Some

countries have pushed forward anti-missile system deployment in the Asia-Pacific region to

seek unilateral security, which runs against regional stability and mutual trust as well as peace

and stability in Northeast Asia“17.

Furthermore, Japan became more assertive in the beginning of the new Century through the

Prime Minister’s visit to the Yasukuni shrine, the expansion of the SDF missions and the will

for a constitution reform. In 1998, a Chinese expert on Japan identified the US presence in

Japan as either a ‘bottle cap’ which restrains the Japanese military capabilities or an eggshell

which fosters the Japanese military capabilities18. For all the reasons above, China fears that

the eggshell represents the current situation.

Another Chinese grievance concerns the alliance with Taiwan and its implications. For

example, the sales of military capabilities to Taiwan is a violation of the One China Policy, and

so, interference in Chinese internal affairs that does “harm China’s national security and

peaceful reunification efforts”19. Moreover, the President Bush’s declaration, in 2001, saying

15 Lianxing, Li, Xioakun Li, “Us base in Australia shows ‘Cold War mentality’”, Chinadaily, 01 December

2011, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2011-12/01/content_14193427.htm, Accessed 09 February 2015. 16 Medeiros, Evan S., “Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability”, The Washington Quaterly,

29:1, 2006, p. 154. 17 “China accuses US of damaging regional stability with Japan defense radar”, RT, 23 october 2014,

http://rt.com/news/198528-china-japan-us-radar/, Accessed 08 February 2015. 18 Christensen, Thomas J., “China, the US-Japan alliance and the Security Dilemma in East Asia”, International

Security, 23:4, 1999, p. 62. 19 San Pablo-Baviera, Aileen, “The China factor in US alliances in East Asia and the Asia Pacific 1”, Australian

Journal of International Affairs, 57:2, 2003, p.341 and Atanassova-Cornelis, Elena, “The US-Japan alliance and

the rise of China: Implications for the East Asian security order and the EU’s regional role”, Paper for the

International Conference : China, the EU and the restructuring of global governance, 2010, p. 9.

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that its government “would do whatever it takes” to protect Taiwan has been perceived as a

direct challenge to the sovereignty of China20.

China also fears the US alliances with its neighbours with which China already has unfriendly

relations. For instance, the alliance with the Philippines or Vietnam is perceived as a threat to

China’s sovereignty and security. Furthermore, China believes that an alliance with the US

emboldens States to challenge and provoke China. Following that reasoning, this reinforces the

instability in the region21.

Finally, China questions the effectiveness of the current US led security order to respond to

traditional and non-traditional disputes as well as considering it as unhelpful for the region’s

security22. Last year, President Xi Jinping stated at the Conference on Interaction and

Confidence Building Measures in Asia that: “It is disadvantageous to the common security of

the region if military alliances with third parties are strengthened “and called for the resolution

of Asian problems by Asians23.

Allies’ views

The simultaneous collapse of the USSR and China’s rise has resulted in a chill within the region.

As the US have defeat his enemy, there wasn’t any relevant reasons to stay in the region. So,

States like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and the Philippines feared a power vacuum

that China would gladly fulfil by becoming the following regional power which might result in

an aggressive posture towards its smaller neighbours24.

This perception has been confirmed by China’s attitude with the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996

and the territorial dispute (Senkaku-Diaoyu islands, Spratly islands) as well as its military

capabilities modernisation. Despite China’s promotion of a ‘peaceful rise’, since 2010, there

20 San Pablo-Baviera, Aileen, “The China factor in US alliances in East Asia and the Asia Pacific 1”, Australian

Journal of International Affairs, 57:2, 2003, p.341. 21 Heath, Timothy, “China and the U.S. alliance system”, The Diplomat, 11 June 2014

http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/china-and-the-u-s-alliance-system/, Accessed 06 February 2015. 22 Heath, Timothy, “China and the U.S. alliance system”, The Diplomat, 11 June 2014

http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/china-and-the-u-s-alliance-system/, Accessed 06 February 2015. 23 “China’s Xi calls for Asia Security Framework at Summit”, BloombergBusiness, 21 May 2014,

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-21/china-s-xi-calls-for-asia-security-framework-at-summit,

Accessed 06 February 2015. 24 Mak, Joon Num, “ The Asia-Pacific Security Order” in Mc Grew, Anthony, Brook, Christopher, eds, Asia-

pacific in the new world order, The Open University, 1998, p. 93 and San Pablo-Baviera, Aileen, “The China

factor in US alliances in East Asia and the Asia Pacific 1”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 57:2, 2003,

p. 343.

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are a lot of clashes between vessels from Japan, Vietnam, South Korea and China25. Moreover,

China’s policies like the Anti-Secession Law from 2005, which approve the use of force in case

an independence declaration from Taiwan, doesn’t calm down East Asian States’ fears.

The majority of East Asian states’ perceptions is that they remain “wary of China’s long term

strategic goals in the region” 26. Therefore, they consider, for the moment, the hub and spoke

system as the major guarantor for the security region through the balancing process between

China and the US. Southeast Asian States like Thailand and the Philippines, but also Singapore

and Indonesia, provide access to US naval and air forces as well as cooperate in joint military

exercises and get involved in bilateral and multilateral agreements27. By doing so, they try to

balance China’s threat in the region by anchor the US presence, and believe that this will create

a long term stability in the region28.

An exception prevails in South Korea for which the main threat isn’t China but rather an

aggression from North Korea. For several years now, South Korea changed its position and is

trying to seek a reconciliation with North Korea. While the government remains strongly in

support of the US alliance, Fukuyama noticed that the younger people in the South “are

increasingly nationalistic and anti-American” and they “frequently blame the US and its

military posture for prolonging Korea’s political division”29. This can be explained by the

change in the perception of a nuclear North Korea. While South Korean consider it as

essentially a defensive weapon for North Korea, Japan and the US see it as an offensive weapon.

Finally, South Korea also fears that the US alliance with Japan lead to a remilitarised Japan30.

With the image theory, we can noticed that China became a threat if not an enemy that the US

alliances try to contain for the regional security.

25 “The Dragon’s new teeth”, The Economist, 7 April 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21552193,

Accessed 10 February 2015. 26 Atanassova-Cornelis, Elena, “The US-Japan alliance and the rise of China: Implications for the East Asian

security order and the EU’s regional role”, Paper for the International Conference : China, the EU and the

restructuring of global governance, 2010, p. 17. 27 Goh, Evelyn, “Hierarchy and the role of the United States in the East Asian security order”, International

Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 8, 2008, p.367. 28 Goh, Evelyn, op cit., p.368. 29 Fukuyama, Francis, “The security architecture in Asia and American Foreign Policy” in Calder, Kent,

Fukuyama, Francis, eds, East Asian Multilateralism, prospects for regional stability, John Hopkins University

Press, 2008, p.235-236. 30 Ross, Robert, “The geography of the Peace : East Asia in the Twenty-first Century”, International Security,

23:4, 1999, p.85.

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Conclusion

In order to answer the main question, this essay aimed at East Asian States’ perceptions of the

‘hub and spoke’ system through the image theory and looked at two different periods, during

and after the Cold War.

The East Asian States, more focused on their own development, perceived the alliances system

as helpful to regional security during the Cold War. Although, the alliance dilemma – fear of

abandonment and fear of entrapment – has influenced States like Japan and South Korea in their

foreign policy by either foster or decrease the US presence in the region.

What is currently happening is interesting because China changed its mind towards the US

alliances. Tolerated at first, it considers them, now, as a containment mechanism if not

constraint attempts for its development and aspirations in the region. Furthermore, China sees

the US alliances as a threat for regional security for it emboldens its neighbours to challenge it.

Also, the US military supplies, for example to Taiwan and Japan, or the joint military exercises

in the South China Sea, reinforce military capabilities in the region and so, instability. However,

a distinction has been noticed by Swaine concerning the critics’ origin (authoritative sources

and not). Chinese leaders and officials remains cautious towards their critics which is not the

case regarding Swayne’s non-authoritative sources.

On the other hand, China’s rise is perceived as a threat for its neighbours, reinforcing their

positive feeling towards the alliances, considering them as helpful for the security region.

Therefore, they tried through diverse ways to anchor US presence in the region to balance

China. Further research could focus on US allies’ perceptions of the alliances in the situation

of Taiwan’s takeover by China. Indeed, through different means (domestic policies, constraints

in agreements), US allies are trying to reduce their involvements in such scenario. Moreover,

with the deepening of economic relations with China, States in the region may think twice

before openly oppose to China. In that way, are the alliances still helpful?

In conclusion, whether the US alliances are more damaging than helpful to regional security

depends on which State’s perspective we are viewing the issue from.

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Useful websites

The Economist, http://www.economist.com

The Diplomat, http://www.thediplomat.com

Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com

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China Daily, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn