Three Perspectives on Linking the Cognitive and the Emotional in Science Learning: Conceptual...

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Three Perspectives onLinking the Cognitive andthe Emotional in ScienceLearning: Conceptual Change,Socio-Constructivism AndPoststructuralismMichalinos Zembylas aa Intercollege, Cyprus , Michigan State University ,USAPublished online: 28 Mar 2008.

To cite this article: Michalinos Zembylas (2005) Three Perspectives on Linkingthe Cognitive and the Emotional in Science Learning: Conceptual Change, Socio-Constructivism And Poststructuralism, Studies in Science Education, 41:1, 91-115,DOI: 10.1080/03057260508560215

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Studies in Science Education, 41 (2005) 91-116 91

Three Perspectives on Linking the Cognitive and the Emotional in Science Learning: Conceptual Change, Socio-Constructivism And Poststructuralism

MICHALINOS ZEMBYLAS Intercollege, Cyprus Michigan State University, USA

Research in science education over the last three decades has made substantial progress in identifying and characterizing the cognitive processes that are important to success in science learning. Many views of learning science emphasize the worthy goal of 'conceptual understanding' and the importance of helping students to change their prior (or mis-) conceptions. The importance of emotion in science learning has also been asserted (Alsop, 2001; Alsop & Watts, 2003; Laukenmann et al., 2003; Santos & Mortimer, 2003; Watts & Alsop, 1997; Watts & Walsh, 1997; Zembylas 2001, 2002a, 2004). In particular, it has been emphasized that emotions have considerable influence on what happens in the science classroom and on the nature and success of students' learning in science. Thus, the increasing disaffection of young people with school science and the well-documented concerns in the developed world about the problem of recruiting students to study science provide some

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92 Michalinos Zembylas

indications that science learning is also an emotional affair and that emotion may deserve some attention (Alsop, 2005). A great deal of recent reports related to student disaffection with school science has focused upon emotional and motivational patterns and their relationship to science learning (Zembylas, 2005). Specifically, absence of interest and lack of motivation to succeed in science are likely to play central roles in some students' growing disengagement from science learning (Osborne, Simon & Collins, 2003). A better understanding of the ways in which emotion and motivation can affect learning in science, therefore, should prove valuable.

However, in spite of the recent recognition of the role of emotions in science learning, the focus still remains primarily on cognitive aspects of learning— e.g., cognitive processes of thinking or measurable cognitive outcomes. This may be because emotions have not been given the same status as the intellect or it may be because they are considered as difficult 'objects' of study (Simon, 1982; Woods, 1996). In addition, 'the archetypal image of science itself [with its] long-standing Cartesian tradition of separation, prizing apart the mind and body, divorcing and polarizing reason from feeling' (Alsop & Watts, 2003: 1044) is an aspect that further complicates any effort to appreciate the emotions associated with studying science. The relationship between cognition and emotion in science learning has yet to be analyzed and assessed in detail. As I will suggest in this paper, the failure to incorporate a deeper understanding of the intrinsic relationship between emotion and cognition in science learning has certain disadvantages.

The arguments about the disadvantages of treating emotion and cognition as separate 'entities' may be grounded in two reasons. First, the affirmation of the importance of emotion in science learning is empirically justified. The influence of emotion on how students learn science is apparent to anyone who is engaged with science teaching. Second, recent theoretical and empirical accounts from a wide variety of fields have emphasized the prominent presence of emotions in helping human beings to survive and adapt, to motivate their learning, and to communicate with others (Hyson, 1996). Specifically, scholarship in psychology (Bandura, 1997; Lazarus, 1991), sociology (Kemper, 1993), psychobiology (Damasio, 1994, 1999; LeDoux, 1994), philosophy (Stocker, 1996), anthropology (Rosaldo, 1984; Reddy, 2001), cultural studies (Lutz & Abu-Lughod, 1990), and feminist studies (Campbell, 1994, 1997) suggest that cognition and emotion cannot be adequately understood as separate phenomena. Jaggar (1989) has also argued that that growth of cognition is inseparable from emotion; thus, rather than repressing emotion in

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Linking the Cognitive and the Emotional 93

our research and knowledge, it is necessary to rethink the relation between cognition and emotion and construct conceptual models that demonstrate the mutually constitutive rather than oppositional relation between cognition and emotion. According to this perspective, 'emotion' and 'cognition' are intrinsically related, because cognition already presupposes emotion—what is cognitive depends on emotional preferences—and emotion presupposes cognition—our emotions require cognitive mechanisms to be processed and expressed (Fricker, 1991).

The purpose of this paper is to organize and critique the theoretical work done so far on the relation between the cognitive and the emotional in science learning and suggest possible directions for research that takes into consideration this relation. In light of the enduring negative effect of much school science on students' emotional reactions, it is important to evaluate critically and re-consider the philosophical ground of existing conceptual frameworks with respect to their assumptions about the relation between the cognitive and the emotional. To do this, then, three perspectives are discussed and compared in terms of: how they theorize the relationship between emotion and cognition in science learning, and what implications they suggest for science pedagogy. The first perspective is embedded within a cognitivist framework and draws on conceptual change theory (CCT), a theory that still has an immense influence on research in science learning. Despite the recognition of a relation between emotion and cognition in the process of changing one's conceptions, cognitivism and CCT maintain the essential distinction between emotion and cognition and submit emotion to the authority of cognition. The second perspective is informed by another influential theory in science education research: constructivism and in particular, the idea of social and cultural construction of learning. In this perspective, the situatedness of knowledge is highlighted and the interrelatedness of cognitive and emotional aspects of learning is recognized; however, as will be shown, the focus still remains on cognitive and metacognitive processes (situated knowledge, the zone of proximal development etc.). Finally, the third perspective draws on recent poststructural insights with an emphasis on the constitutive role played by language, the body and discursive practices in the construction and experience of learning; in this perspective, the interrelations of emotion and cognition are highlighted in ways that make artificial any separation between them.

Two final clarifications are needed before my analysis begins. First, for this paper 'emotion' and 'emotional' (aspects of learning) are used as general terms

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to represent the feelings (including motivation, goals, values, and self-efficacy) that seem to be related to science learning. The term 'emotion' is preferred instead of the more general term 'affect' precisely because it signifies the performative, cognitive and bodily aspects of emotion. The second clarification is that the emphasis placed on the third perspective, i.e. poststructuralism, is indeed an indication of a preference on my part. This preference is related to my concern with how emotions in science education are shaped and performed and how they may be disciplined. The goal is to offer an alternative perspective that destabilizes and denaturalizes the regime that privileges a dichotomy between emotion and cognition. Related to this is the fact that poststructuralism problematizes the rationalism of cognitivism and the narrow focus of socio-constructivism. At the end, I argue that instead of campaigning for one side or the other of the cognitive/emotional divide, it may be more interesting and fruitful to examine how the cognitive and the emotional are linked and what implications this has for a deeper understanding of science learning.

Nevertheless, it should be clear upfront that although my analysis partly depends on developments over time within science education, this does not in itself constitute the only criterion for judging the quality and appropriateness of each of the three perspectives discussed here (see also, Evans & Tsatsaroni, 1996). Rather, these three perspectives address to a great extent different issues and rest on different assumptions. Consequently, each perspective should be judged on its success in responding to the issues that it claims to resolve. Thus, despite my preference for poststructuralism I will suggest that different perspectives may usefully be deployed for different purposes. In this paper, this will be done in the context of assumptions made with respect to the relation between the cognitive and the emotional in science learning.

THE CONCEPTUAL CHANGE PERSPECTIVE

Conceptual change is broadly defined as learning that changes some existing conception. The conceptual change perspective of learning has been described by Posner and his colleagues (Posner, Strike, Hewson & Gertzog, 1982; Strike & Posner, 1985, 1992). This perspective has been widely influential and generative within the field of science education during the past three decades (Duit & Treagust, 2003). Science educators have proposed theories that build on Posner et al.'s model and attempt to explain how students change their conceptions when they learn certain scientific concepts (Chinn & Brewer,

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1993; Chi et al. 1994; Duit, 1999; Thagard, 1992; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1987, 1994).

In Posner et al.'s view, for conceptual change to occur (1) there must be dissatisfaction with existing conceptions; (2) there must be a new conception that is intelligible; (3) initially, the new conception must appear to be plausible; and (4) the new conception should suggest the possibility of a promising research programme. Central to the conceptual change model is a discussion of the nature of learning and conceptual development. As Posner et al. (1982) explain:

'Our central commitment...is that learning is a rational activity. That is, learning is fundamentally coming to comprehend and accept ideas because they are seen as intelligible and rational... It does not, of course, follow that motivational or affective variables are unimportant to the learning process. The claim that learning is a rational activity is meant to focus attention on what learning is, not what learning depends on. Learning is concerned with ideas, their structure and the evidence for them.' (212, added emphasis)

Posner and his colleagues do not deny that emotional or motivational aspects play an important role in learning; however, the conceptual change model they suggest is grounded on the assumption that learning is a 'rational activity.' Although they acknowledge the social and emotional nature of conceptual development (e.g. in their proposition that 'dissatisfaction' with a conception is needed for changing it), Posner et al. seem to put aside the role of social and emotional aspects. That is, although conceptual change theory relies on several presuppositions—epistemological, ontological and psychological (Chi et al., 1994)—Posner et al. focus only on epistemological issues. Chi et al. (1994) emphasize the importance of investigating the interrelations among these presuppositions. Focusing on one 'category' while ignoring others may have certain advantages for methodological purposes, however, the danger is that the holistic picture of learning is lost. This includes, for example, the learners' emotions, attitudes and beliefs as well as the social and emotional aspects of learning in a classroom community embedded in power relationships.

In response to the criticism that the conceptual change model is too rationalistic, two of the original conceptual change model authors in a revisionist account acknowledged that motives and goals as well as institutional and social sources of them need to be considered (Strike & Posner,

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1992). In addition, the 'cold' cognitive and individualistic view (Pintrich, Marx & Boyle, 1993) of learning embedded in Posner et al.'s model has been thoroughly criticized over the last few years. These critiques have raised several issues of which some are directly relevant to the concerns of this paper, i.e. the links between the cognitive and the emotional in science learning.

In particular, Pintrich et al. (1993) extended Posner's model by integrating motivational constructs such as, goals, values, self-efficacy, and control beliefs. For example, Pintrich et al. suggest that students' beliefs about their capacity to accomplish a task impacts their ability to change their conceptual frameworks when necessary. Beliefs about performance capabilities in a particular domain (self-efficacy) are also relevant to students' confidence in their capability to change their ideas when conflict arises between what they already know and what they are learning. Students' beliefs about the degree of control they have over their own learning (control beliefs) influence whether or not students will remain focused. Pintrich et al. suggest that these processes serve as mediators in the process of conceptual change that are often required when students integrate new knowledge with prior knowledge.

Besides the links between motivational and cognitive components of learning, Pintrich et al. (1993) argue that the actual classroom context may influence students' motivation and cognition 'and most importantly, interaction between these two constructs' (168); they also emphasize that 'the process of conceptual change is influenced by personal, motivational, social, and historical processes' (170). Building on these issues, Pintrich and Schrauben (1992) and Vosniadou and Brewer (1994) suggested that the learners' motivational beliefs about themselves and learning itself could facilitate or constrain conceptual change. Also, Lee and Anderson (1993) found that students' personal orientations influenced their motivation in science.

More recent work emphasizes that motivational and emotional factors may indeed support or impede conceptual change (Alsop, 1999; Demastes-Southerland, Good, & Peebles, 1995; Dole & Sinatra, 1998; Duit, 1999; Pintrich, 1999; Rhoneck, Grob, Schnaitmann & Volker, 1998; Sinatra & Pintrich, 2003; Sinatra, Southerland, McConaughy, & Demastes, 2003). In fact, some researchers have called for a socio-constructivist adaptation of the conceptual change model which is consistent with constructivist'theory and emphasizes various modes of social interaction in the development of a broad spectrum of thought processes. For example, Smith, di Sessa and Roschelle (1993) suggested a constructivist model of misconceptions that take into

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account motivational beliefs as the cognitive resources that can support the bootstrapping of more advanced cognitive structures. Also, in elaborating further on a 'hot' model of conceptual change, Pintrich (1999) identified five motivational factors that should be included in a comprehensive model of conceptual change: (a) a mastery goal orientation, (b) constructivist epistemological beliefs, (c) high levels of personal interest in and valuing of the topic as personally relevant, (d) a strong sense of efficacy or confidence in one's ability to use thinking and learning strategies to change one's ideas and synthesize new ideas, and (e) a belief in personal control over one's learning. Further, other researchers have addressed the 'extra-rational' factors that influence conceptual change (Demastes-Southerland et al., 1995; Dole & Sinatra, 1998; Sinatra et al., 2003) or have made attempts to accommodate other issues such as identity in a conceptual change model (e.g. see Cobern, 1996). Very recently, Bendixen and Rule (2004) have proposed an integrative approach that includes several fundamental elements of personal epistemology: (a) a mechanism of change (i.e., epistemic doubt, epistemic volition, and resolution strategies), (b) dimensions of beliefs, (c) advanced beliefs, (d) metacognition, (e) conditions for change (i.e., dissonance and personal relevance), (f) affect, (g) cognitive abilities and environment, and (h) reciprocal causation.

If nothing else, all of these studies indicate that an effective conceptual change perspective should take into account 'personal, motivational, social, and historical processes' of learning, and that emotions, intuitions and beliefs are an integral part of learners' 'conceptual ecologies' (Posner et al., 1982, Strike & Posner, 1992). However, a comprehensive analysis of studies on conceptual change shows that they primarily take an epistemological position. As Duit and Treagust (2003) show in their recent review, there are clear limitations to taking a single position to understand conceptual change. Even in the work of Pintrich and his colleagues in which motivational and contextual factors are included, the model 'is still overly rational' (Ashton & Gregoire-Gill, 2003: 107) and the critical role of emotion is not recognized.

The critique I wish to add here goes into two directions: First, it has to do with the attention that emotional aspects of learning have received in conceptual change theory and the prospects from rethinking this attention; and second, it is related to questions about the meaning of 'conceptual change' itself, given that other aspects beyond cognitive factors are also included. First of all, although the links between motivational aspects and students' cognition are fairly well documented, the links to actual conceptual change as well as the

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links between emotional and cognitive aspects more generally have not been documented. Research on conceptual change has tended to ignore other emotional aspects, such as the role of processing strategies in mediating emotional influences on beliefs, the role of emotion in the maintenance and change of beliefs, conceptions and attitudes, and the role of emotions and the social goals they serve in distributed cognition (Fiedler & Bless, 2000; Forgas, 2000; Harmon-Jones, 2000; Oatley, 2000). Work done in other disciplines— e.g. social and cognitive psychology—can certainly be helpful in expanding the research agenda of the conceptual change perspective in science education.

A critique of the conceptual change perspective emphasizes the need for a critical consideration of the emotional and social reality in the classroom. That is, there has to be developed a critical discourse that aims to make visible and subject to examination the emotional aspects of conceptual change. The predominance of cognitive aspects has supported and strengthened the widely held cultural perception that emotion is an obstacle to rational thinking and/or learning in science. This assumption is no longer valid, especially after recent work indicates that the complexity of classroom discourses requires research to consider the influence of factors such as, beliefs, emotions, motivation, goals, modes of knowing science, peers, gender, social class and ethnicity (Lemke, 2001). This suggests that more work is needed in examining the links between emotion and cognition in the context of the conceptual change perspective. For example, in Vosniadou's (1999) recommendation for research to determine the role of metacognitive awareness in conceptual change one could also add the importance of exploring the contribution of meta-emotional understanding in changing one's conceptions (Gottman et al., 1997; Pons & Doudin, 2000; Pons et al., 2002). The recommendation for further research that explores the interrelations between emotion and cognition is also highlighted by Duit and Treagust (2003) who acknowledge that, 'the number of studies on the interaction of cognitive and affective factors in the learning process is limited' (679).

Second, one wonders whether 'conceptual change' is an appropriate and valuable label given that many types of changes, not only of concepts but also of other aspects—e.g. epistemological and motivational beliefs, metacognitive abilities, and emotions about change—seem to be involved in knowledge restructuring. In addition, with respect to the socio-constructivist perspective (see next section) one may wonder about the interaction between the personal and the collective. In other words, is conceptual change to be still regarded merely as the product of an individual process or of collective processes in

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which individuals interact and co-construct emotions, beliefs, and conceptions? What is the role of power relationships in these processes? What are the links among emotional, cognitive and social aspects in knowledge restructuring? And, to consider the implications for pedagogy and practice, what characteristics should an appropriate learning environment have to promote 'conceptual change' in the classroom?

It is important to acknowledge that it has been shown how purely cognitive or epistemological models of conceptual change constrain rather than empower inquiry about science learning and the interpretation of the learning processes in the classroom (Caravita & Hallden, 1994). Similarly, I maintain that the role of emotional factors in science learning has been understated in students' conceptual development, and that purely cognitive premises have provided the ground for isolating conceptual change from the emotional aspects of learning as well as from the more global and complex process of learning. There is already important research indicating that conceptual change is not necessarily a rationalist/cognitive event, just as Kuhn (1970) and other philosophers of science have argued that changes in scientific theories are not necessarily driven by entirely rationalist, deductive processes. Re-thinking the interplay of cognition and emotion in the nature of conceptual change research will undoubtedly open new possibilities for exploring the multifaceted process of learning in science.

THE SOCIO-CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE

If in the previous perspective the individual's conceptual change is a major concern, in the socio-constructivist perspective the basic assumption is that individuals are always situated in and constituted by the social and cultural contexts in which they find themselves (Wertsch, 1991). In this section, I present social constructivism—one of the most important areas of science education research and practice during the past two decades—and its philosophical assumptions about the links between the cognitive and the emotional in science learning. Given the different terms and perspectives associated with constructivism (e.g. personal, cognitive, social, and radical; see Tobin, 1993, Solomon, 1994), in this paper, I will limit my reference to socio-constructivism and describe the position that is grounded in a Vygotskian theory on cognition and learning. The rationale is that the Vygotskian theory accentuates more explicitly the mutual interaction between the emotional and the cognitive (see Nelmes, 2003); this interaction is often lost in other uses of

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constructivism in science education. In addition, the discussion of some critical issues will indicate how socio-constructivism may be expanded in such a way that the role of emotions in science learning is conceptualized in a constructive manner. Besides, in social psychology and mathematics education, it has already been recognized that socio-constructivism has been interpreted too narrowly, thus diminishing some of its potential to help understand the links between emotional and cognitive processes in learning (Anderson et al., 2000; Moll, 1990; Nelmes, 2003; Op't Eynde, De Corte & Verschaffel, 2001).

In general, the narrow rationalistic-epistemological view of the conceptual change perspective is replaced here by a broader view of the role of emotional aspects in learning. Gergen (1994) emphasizes that knowledge is constructed through the interplay between an individual's knowledge, attitudes and values, on the one hand, and social interactions in a socio-cultural context, on the other. Henceforth, a socio-constructivist perspective in science learning does not only focus on the interplay between the individual and the social context, but also recognizes the close interaction between cognitive and emotional aspects.

However, in spite of the recognition of the interplay between emotional and cognitive processes, most research in science education favouring socio-constructivism has primarily focused on cognitive and metacognitive processes. For example, research advocating the use of socio-constructivism in science education has emphasized the social and collaborative nature of meaning making, the notions of distributed and situated knowledge, mechanisms of social learning and their relation to cognitive skills, and the significance of the zone of proximal development in science learning (e.g. see Garrison, 1997; Hodson & Hodson, 1998; Seatter, 2003; Tobin, 1993). The point I want to make here is that the socio-constructivist perspective has a lot of potential to be further expanded by incorporating the role of emotions into the social dynamic of learning in the science classroom. This idea is justified in two ways.

First, according to a socio-constructivist perspective of emotions, 'emotions are characterized by attitudes such as beliefs, judgments and desires, the contents of which are not natural, but are determined by the systems of cultural belief, value and moral value of particular communities' (Armon-Jones, 1986: 33). In other words, a socio-constructivist perspective on emotions emphasizes their situatedness. Emotions are grounded in the particular social context that constitutes students and their actions in the classroom. Students construct

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interpretations and evaluations based on the knowledge and beliefs they have. For example, recent work shows that depending on the emotional culture that governs the activities in the science classroom, students may experience some emotions but not others (Zembylas, 2004). Students' knowledge and beliefs about the emotional rules governing classroom behaviour is an important part of the social context in which science learning takes place (Zembylas, 2002a).

Second, the study of emotional experiences in science learning can take a holistic approach (Op't Eynde et al., 2001). In other words, studying the emotional aspects of students' activities in the science classroom cannot take place in isolation from the study of cognitive processes. Studying the emotional dimension separated from the cognitive dimension 'would never fully grasp the complexity of a student's activity. [...] Thus, it is only when a more holistic approach is taken that the study of emotional experiences can provide us with valuable insights in a student's learning and development' (Op't Eynde et al., 2001: 158). For example, following such a holistic approach Matthews, Kilbey, Doneghan, & Harrison (2002) indicate how the use of collaborative learning experiences can lead to an improvement in students' emotional literacy and positive attitudes to science.

In particular, the expansion of Vygotksy's zone of proximal development (ZPD) can further exemplify this holistic approach. Indeed, pointing to the reflexive relation between the individual and the context and acknowledging the importance of studying the emotional experiences of students can teach us a lot about their development. Although Vygotsky (as well as Piaget) emphasized the importance of emotions, it is the cognitive dimensions of their work that dominate much contemporary theorizing in science education (Alsop & Watts, 2003). However, Vygotsky (1986) wrote very clearly about the role of emotions in human development:

'Thought is not begotten by thought; it is engendered by motivation, i.e. our desires, our interests and emotions. Behind every thought there is an affective-volitional tendency which holds the answer to the last 'why' in the analysis of thinking. A true and full understanding of another's thought is possible only when we understand its volitional basis.' (252)

In other words, Vygotsky emphasized the interrelatedness of emotion and cognition and criticized any study of human development that ignored this interrelatedness:

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'When we approach the problem of the interrelation between thought and language and other aspects of mind, the first question that arises is that of intellect and affect. Their separation as subjects is a major weakness of traditional psychology, since it makes the thought process appear as an autonomous flow of "thoughts thinking themselves" segregated from the fullness of life, from the personal needs and interests, the inclinations and impulses of the thinker.' (10, added emphasis)

Unfortunately, the separation between thinking and feeling is still implied in the underlying assumptions of many theoretical and empirical accounts grounded in socio-constructivism (Nelmes, 2003). The ultimate focus of research on cognitive processes undermines Vygotsky's idea of the 'fullness of life.' Therefore, it seems that in our use of the ZPD in science learning we may benefit greatly from exploring how to incorporate the neglected dimension of emotions. For instance, the analysis of emotionality within this framework may reveal how a student interprets and acts upon a learning experience; this will also enrich our understanding about the student's beliefs, goals, and motivations underlying his or her actions (Op't Eynde et al., 2001).

The important question to be asked here is not whether the 'cognizing' individual or the 'emotional' individual should be given priority in analyzing one's learning of science, but what the interplay between them is. As Fosnot (1996) points out correctly, '(w)e cannot understand an individual's cognitive structure without observing it interacting in a context, within a culture' (24). Emotional aspects or cognitive aspects cannot be understood in isolation; the interplay between emotional and cognitive aspects of learning creates a dynamic process capable of continuous restructuring. Research that is grounded in socio-constructivist perspective and acknowledges this interplay focuses on the holistic activity of students' learning in specific contexts.

All in all, there are three remaining issues that need to be resolved in a research programme embedded in a socio-constructivist perspective: (1) the distinction between emotion and cognition is still held in a framework that describes how knowledge structures and deeper conceptual understanding come about; (2) although the interplay of cognitive and emotional processes is acknowledged in socio-constructivism, cognitive and metacognitive processes are still favoured in research and pedagogy—in other words, researchers and teachers assume that students' actions are rational, given the way that students make sense of things (von Glasersfeld, 1989); and (3) the role of discursive practices

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and the body in mediating the interplay between emotional and cognitive aspects—and consequently, that of power and knowledge—needs more attention. These issues are addressed by the poststructuralist perspective.

THE POSTSTRUCTURALIST PERSPECTIVE

One way of responding to the dilemma of researching either emotion or cognition is to try to evidence them as part of the social, cultural and political dynamic of the learning transaction between individual and context. In the poststructuralist perspective, the context of emotion and cognition is seen as constituted by the discursive practices in which students are positioned. An emphasis on discourse has emerged from recent developments in poststructuralist theory, and in particular, as it has been influenced by the writings of Foucault and Derrida. In addition, it needs to be emphasized that a poststructuralist perspective does not ignore the role of the body in one's learning experiences, especially as this is addressed through the work of feminist poststructuralism (e.g. see Butler, 1993; Grosz, 1994; Weedon, 1997). Unfortunately, this is a dimension in science learning that has not been investigated yet, although Hanrahan (1999) seems to be an interesting exception. In general, poststructuralist thinking opens the door to considering how learning evolves largely out of the history of the ways in emotions, bodily sensations, thoughts, judgments and beliefs are constituted in the classroom. The poststructuralist perspective opens up possibilities for extending already existing discourse-based perspectives in science education that are grounded on socio-constructivist theory (e.g. see Bloom, 2001; Gilbert & Yerrick, 2001; Kelly & Breton, 2001; Ritchie & Tobin, 2001).

The central argument of the poststructuralist perspective is that we can never finally know things-in-themselves, because every attempt we make to know things must be expressed through language or some other symbolic form (Lupton, 1998). Therefore, 'emotion' (like 'cognition'), for example, is seen as a discursive practice; this does not imply, however, that nondiscursive practices (e.g. facial expressions and bodily gestures) are ignored. On the contrary, this approach emphasizes the role that language, bodily performance and culture more generally play in the constitution of the emotional experience of learning. Abu-Lughod and Lutz (1990) argue that this perspective 'leads us to a more complex view of the multiple, shifting, and contested meanings possible in emotional utterances and interchanges, and from there to a less monolithic concept of emotion' (11). Consequently, the learner's identity, emotions, beliefs,

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thoughts, values and judgments must be understood as properties of conversations and performances rather than of mental mechanisms (Rose, 1998). For example, the words used to describe 'felt emotions' of learning science are not simply names for 'emotion entities,' that is, pre-existing things with coherent characteristics; rather, these words are themselves 'actions or ideological practices' that serve specific purposes in the process of creating and negotiating reality (Lutz, 1988); a similar thing may be said for what represents 'cognition.'

Recent work in poststructuralist theory and ethnography (e.g. Connor, 1997; Gubrium & Holstein, 2001) acknowledges implicitly or explicitly how emotions, beliefs, values, goals, and judgments are interrelated. This work provides spaces for creating accounts that present science learning as a dynamic process that blurs the 'boundaries' between the 'emotional' and the 'cognitive' aspects of learning. The important issue here concerns the ways in which an integrated emotional/cognitive learning in science evolves largely out of a context that is shaped by and shapes certain power relations in the classroom. Power relations influence what can, cannot, or must be said about one's self, learning, beliefs, thoughts and emotions—how classroom discourses establish, assert, challenge, or reinforce power or status differences among students and teachers (Zembylas, 2005). This is precisely the contribution of a poststructuralist approach in science learning and the acknowledgement of the interrelatedness of the emotional and the cognitive: it emphasizes the sociopolitical context that confounds the meanings and interpretations of learning. In terms of research methodologies grounded in this perspective, in-depth ethnographic investigations become useful in examining these issues (e.g. see Denzin, 1997; Holstein & Gubrium, 2000). The use of ethnographic methodologies creates spaces for the voices of those studied and capture— through photographs, transcribed interviews, and videotapes—the multiple aspects of their learning experiences.

In particular, studies in science education inspired by poststructuralist perspectives examine the role of culture, power, and ideology in creating particular discourses in teaching and learning that privilege some practices while preventing others (e.g., see Blades, 1997; Pushkin, 2001; Weinstein, 2001; Zembylas 2002a, 2003). These studies emphasize the seamlessness of thinking and feeling, by exploring the role of language, situated knowledge and social practices. The authors focus on various sets of discourses embedded in science curricula, science classrooms and learning environments to 'show' how the emotive and the cognitive may be studied simultaneously without undermining their unity in learning science. The methodologies of doing this

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vary from historical to philosophical or ethnographic work, however, the fruitfulness of this work lies in the potential of their philosophical framework.

An important issue in studies inspired by this philosophical framework is the political dimension of how learning experiences in science constitute students' identities and how these identities are assigned to students through classroom discourses and practices (Lemke, 1990). This opens up possibilities for exploring the messy meanings of student identity as it comes to be constituted through social interactions, performances, and daily negotiations in the science classroom. Described in this manner, student identity is not a pre-existing, stable element that becomes disciplined through discourses and practices of science learning, but something that is constituted through power relations. An investigation of student identity and science learning within a poststructuralist perspective calls for the acknowledgment of the interrelatedness between the emotional and the cognitive, and in fact, the impossibility of their demarcation. Emotion and cognition are social as much as they are individual. In an environment in which particular emotions must be suppressed, issues of emotion, cognition and identity lead directly to the question of what is 'appropriate', which in turn leads to the question of how acceptable emotional stances and identities get defined in science learning. In other words, maintaining 'appropriate' behaviour (and discourse) comes to be seen as reinforcing the hegemony of certain rules or norms in the science classroom.

This work also raises crucial questions that are relevant to the role of discourse and the body with respect to 'thinking' and 'feeling' in the science classroom: how are discourses constructed and utilized in the science classroom? What is the role of the body in learning science? These questions allow us to problematize assumptions and expectations about 'emotion talk' and 'cognitive strategies' and the ways those reveal the role that power relations and ideology play in the formation of learning in science. Consequently, the focus of analysis regarding the student self and his or her learning in science is on the discursive practices of the learning experiences. The experience itself does not constitute self-knowledge. Only by interrogating the discursive place from which questions of science learning are posed can we trace how this learning is subjected to the social and historical context of practices, bodies and discourses.

In a poststructuralist approach to science learning, learning is a dynamic process of intersubjective discursive practices, experiences, beliefs, intentions, and emotions: all of these aspects change over time as discursive practices change, constantly providing new configurations. As students struggle in the

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process of learning science, they struggle as vulnerable social and corporeal subjects who produce and are being produced by the bodily and socio-cultural environment in which science is taught. This theoretical 'tool' has the potential of providing interesting insights in our efforts to understand the contemporary disillusionment of young people with science.

To summarize my argument in this section: theorizing science learning and the interrelatedness of emotion and cognition from a poststructuralist perspective names simultaneously the cultural and discursive dimensions of learning experiences in science, but recognizes that these experiences are felt and embodied. A poststructuralist perspective in science learning offers three advantages: (a) it draws attention to the importance of studying science learning in cultural and political contexts where learning experiences are constantly at stake; (b) an integrated notion of emotion and cognition—rather than a dichotomy between individual cognitive functioning or social/emotional processes—provides a useful approach that refuses the singularity of each 'component' of science learning; (c) the use of a poststructuralist analysis of science learning creates spaces for understanding students as individual (corporeal) and social subjects who struggle to become science learners. Consequently, studying the relationship between emotion and cognition from a poststructuralist perspective asks for a fundamental reconceptualization of our assumptions about science learning.

A metaphor that captures this reconceptualization is the concept of 'fold' (Deleuze, 1993) which represents an ongoing dynamic (a folding and refolding) that makes thinking and feeling a vitalization of flux, intensities, movements, and tensions. This 'poststructuralist' concept allows science education to view how cognitive and emotional aspects of learning are overlapping moments of process and becoming. The student who learns science may be seen as acting in the plane of this process of becoming—a movement that blurs the lines bordering 'pure cognition' and 'pure emotion'— the 'fold' of learning science. If science educators choose to work within this philosophical perspective, they may find fruitful ways to overcome the traditional bifurcations of emotion and cognition.

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

In this analysis I have suggested that there are three different ways of linking the emotional and the cognitive in research regarding science learning. On a

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meta-level, one may identify three dimensions concerning the relationship between the cognitive and the emotional. The first dimension relates to the changing theoretical assumptions in conceptualizing the relationship between these two aspects. These assumptions shift dramatically when one moves from the conceptual change perspective to the poststructuralist perspective. Clearly, the role of the first perspective is not discounted; on the contrary, I have suggested a few directions along which the relationship between emotion and cognition may be upgraded in a more balanced manner. For the same reason, the other two perspectives offer certain advantages. Employing more holistic perspectives in thinking about the relationship between cognition and emotion in science learning—e.g. as evidenced in the research cited earlier in the paper—forces science educators constantly to revisit their assumptions with respect to what constitutes 'significant' learning in science. The move from the conceptual change perspective to the poststructuralist perspective requires a shift in meaning and focus with respect to what it means to learn science, feel science and talk about science.

The second dimension concerns the ontological aspects of the meaning and usefulness of the interrelatedness between emotion and cognition in science learning. In the conceptual change perspective, for example, the assumption is that 'emotion' and 'cognition' are separate 'entities' that interact; the preference of cognition over emotion is clearly purposive, because emotion is often perceived as 'disruptive' of cognitive processes. In the socio-constructivist and poststructuralist perspectives, there begins to emerge evidence that this separation can no longer be guaranteed. Especially, in the poststructuralist perspective a unity between the cognitive and the emotional is assumed, not only in the way that the student thinks and feels about science, but also in the way that his or her learning experiences are constituted, felt and interpreted. It is certainly encouraging that scholarship in other fields seems to converge to the same realizations, i.e. such work provides strong evidence that the mind is actually a seamless blend of thinking and feeling. The issue here is not so much to delineate the clear 'boundaries' between emotion and cognition but to problematize these boundaries and to show how they can be constructed differently in more holistic, meaningful and productive ways (Dai & Sternberg, 2004).

Finally, the third dimension concerns the political aspects of exploring the links between the cognitive and the emotional. Clearly, the poststructuralist perspective exposes the political assumptions within preferences for focusing on one aspect of science learning and ignoring others. These preferences reflect the divisions of 'cognitive' vs. 'emotional' and, in so doing, they frequently

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perpetuate particular ways of conducting research in science education. Thus, the positions which acknowledge a dynamic interplay between the cognitive and the emotional (socio-constructivism) or a powerful unity between these two (poststructuralism) may be unsettling. However, choosing to expose the complexities of the interrelatedness between cognition and emotion is not simply a methodological issue, although new research methods need to be developed to document and analyze this interrelatedness and its significance in science learning.

Consequently, learning science may be more appropriately treated in an interpretive than a causal manner. This research programme may be grounded in a paradigm of human mind which combines the previously polarized cognitive and emotional aspects of learning and is based on a holistic vision. With this notion in mind, we may begin to pursue lines of research that could lead to a more meaningful understanding of how students learn science—either one is grounded in a conceptual change perspective, a socio-constructivist perspective or a poststructuralist perspective. Rethinking the theoretical, ontological and political dimensions of research and theory in science learning helps to reveal the interrelations between cognition and emotion and the significance of finding ways to explore them further. In an attempt to develop some key aspects of a research programme that takes into considerations these dimensions, the following ideas may be promoted.

First of all, one of the consequences of the separation between emotion and cognition for science education has been the neglect in our field of the place of aesthetics and beauty in teaching and learning science (Girod & Wong, 2002) as well as the role of science as a source of inspiration and meaning in learners' lives (Kozoll & Osborne, 2004). Seeking to re-affirm the links between the cognitive and the emotional will inevitably force us to re-establish a connection between art and science. In fact, the personal and aesthetic features of science provide an exciting and fascinating motivation for students to learn science (Osborne & Brady, 2000, 2001; Zembylas 2002b).

Second, the student's self-esteem—i.e., sense of competence, affiliation, and self-worth—is influenced by his or her emotional resources as well as by the emotional and social culture of the classroom (Bandura, 1993, 1997; Dweck, 2000). Therefore, effective teaching strategies that promote conceptual understanding of science are those that also support the development of the student's self-esteem and his or her capacity for accepting ambiguity, empathizing with others, and analyzing and critically reflecting on actions.

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The well-known notion of 'scaffolding' (Collins, Brown & Newman, 1989; Vygotsky, 1997) has important emotional aspects that need to be considered, both in theory and in practice. Scaffolding is not only related to strengthening students' intellectual capability, but also to helping students cope with the emotional demands of making mistakes, undertaking ambiguous tasks and avoiding confrontation with others—what has been called 'emotional scaffolding' (Rosiek, 2003).

Finally, developing conceptual frameworks and practices that affirm the close links between the cognitive and the emotional in science learning provide a new sense of empowerment to students and teachers. In other words, the issue is not an 'either/or' position—i.e. choosing to focus either on cognition or on emotion. Instead, science educators must find ways to explore landscapes of possibilities and actions that bridge both perspectives. Thus, one may envision a science learning that allows teachers and learners to re-interpret learning experiences in an environment that encourages emotional security, dialogue, exploration, a sense of affiliation and a feeling of empowerment. In terms of designing science learning environments, the above notions call for learning activities that acknowledge the centrality of difference/diversity in learner's interests, motivations and goals, as well as the importance of the social and political context of science education. Following Arendt (1970) the interrelation among thinking, feeling, and doing is crucial to counter the status quo in modern society. Moreover, the interplay among conceptual understanding, emotional understanding, and social action is one source of resistance to and transformation of the disempowerment and disillusionment that students and teachers may often experience with respect to science.

The analysis in this paper raises new questions that make us re-think the links between the cognitive and the emotional in science learning: how do we understand children's cognitive and emotional mind and what are the relations, origins and consequences of such understanding? how is the interplay between the cognitive and the emotional related to students' desires, beliefs and emotions, as students are engaged in learning science? what are the implications of acknowledging this interplay in terms of how science instruction is planned and evaluated more successfully? I have discussed three different perspectives that conceptualize the cognitive and the emotional in science learning. Selecting any one perspective has certain benefits and drawbacks. However, there is potential in further developing all of them, depending on the epistemological, ontological and political commitments on which one wishes to ground one's theory, research and practice.

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Contact details: 46 Makedonitissas Ave.: P.O.Box 24005 1700 Nicosia CYPRUS

Email: [email protected]

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