Threat ≠ prevention, challenge ≠ promotion: The impact of threat, challenge and regulatory focus...

Attention to negative stimuli 1

Threat ≠ prevention, challenge ≠ promotion:

The impact of threat, challenge, and regulatory focus on attention to negative stimuli

Kai Sassenberg1 Claudia Sassenrath1,2 & Adam K. Fetterman1

1 Knowledge Media Research Center

² University of Ulm

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2014.898612

In Press: Cognition and Emotion

DOI:10.1080/02699931.2014.898612

Corresponding author:

Kai Sassenberg, [email protected], fon +49 7071 979 220

Claudia Sassenrath, [email protected], fon +49 7071 979 229

Adam K. Fetterman, [email protected], fon + 49 7071 979 226

Knowledge Media Research Center, Schleichstr. 6, 72076

Tübingen, Germany

fax +49 7071 979 200

word count: 3,502 (main text and footnote)


Abstract

The purpose of the current experiment was to distinguish between the impact of strategic

and of affective forms of gain- and loss-related motivational states on the attention to

negative stimuli. On the basis of the counter-regulation principle and regulatory focus theory,

we predicted that individuals would attend more to negative than to neutral stimuli in a

prevention focus and when experiencing challenge, but not in a promotion focus and under

threat. In one experiment (N = 88) promotion, prevention, threat, or challenge states were

activated through a memory task, and a subsequent dot probe task was administered. As

predicted, those in the prevention-focus and challenge conditions had an attentional bias

toward negative words, but those in promotion and threat conditions did not. These findings

provide support for the idea that strategic mindsets (e.g., regulatory focus) and hot emotional

states (e.g., threat vs. challenge) differently affect the processing of affective stimuli.

(150 words)

Keywords: regulatory focus, threat, challenge, attention, self-regulation


Awareness of negative events can be crucial for survival. Therefore, many researchers

have argued that negative stimuli are preferably processed and there is indeed evidence for

this assumption (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Smith, Cacioppo,

Larson, & Chartrand, 2003). However, others assumed, and found, that positive stimuli are

preferably processed (e.g., Balcetis & Dunning, 2006; Kunda, 1990). Rothermund (2011;

Rothermund, Gast, & Wentura, 2011; Rothermund, Voss, & Wentura, 2008) introduced the

counter-regulation principle to resolve this inconsistency. According to this principle, the

processing of affective stimuli depends on the individuals’ current motivational state. When

striving for gains and positively framed accomplishments, negative cues receive more

attention and are preferably processed. When preventing losses, however, and trying to

avert dangers, positive stimuli are preferably processed. This principle is functional, because

it prevents the escalation of affective-motivational states. Research has consistently provided

evidence for the counter-regulation principle across different measures of processing and

different manipulations of motivational state (e.g., Gawronski, Deutsch & Strack, 2005; Koole

& Jostmann, 2004; Rothermund et al., 2008; Schwager & Rothermund, 2013).

More recently, Rothermund and colleagues (Rothermund et al., 2011; Schwager &

Rothermund, in press; for some early evidence pointing in this direction see Rothermund,

Wentura, & Bak, 2001) provided evidence that an “emotionally hot” affective state needs to

be present in order to induce counter-regulation, whereas the mere activation of negative

valenced concepts or a distant affective experience does not result in the preferred

processing of stimuli counteracting one’s own affect. We aimed to broaden the evidence for

the role of affect in counter-regulation by considering two theories that have received very

substantial attention in recent research on motivation and are both dealing with different

types of gains and losses, namely regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) and the

biopsychosocial model of threat and challenge (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996). More precisely,

we tested the impact of regulatory focus and threat vs. challenge on the attention to negative

stimuli.

Regulatory focus, challenge, and threat


Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) distinguishes two self-regulatory foci:

prevention and promotion. In a prevention focus, individuals regulate security needs. This

leads to a defensive strategy, a focus on ensuring “correct rejections” (i.e., avoiding errors), a

categorization of events as non-losses and losses, and a high sensitivity to negative events.

In contrast, in a promotion focus individuals regulate nurturance needs. This leads to an

eager strategy, a focus on attaining “hits” (i.e., making use of opportunities), a categorization

of events as gains and non-gains, and a particular sensitivity to positive information. As

indicated by this brief summary of regulatory focus theory, promotion and prevention focus

are related to losses and gains. But even though they have clear motivational implications,

prevention and promotion focus are not gain- and loss-related hot emotional states in the

sense of the counter-regulation principle (cf., Higgins, 2001). They rather differ at the level of

the strategies applied during achievement goals – defensive and loss-avoidant in a

prevention focus (i.e., avoiding false alarms) and eager and gain-approaching in a promotion

focus (i.e., making hits). Perhaps most importantly for the current argument, prevention and

promotion focus can be activated before any feedback concerning success or failure in goal

striving is received. This feedback about the chances for gains and losses is, however, the

precondition for affect. Thus, prevention and promotion focus are not hot emotional states,

but rather states of cognitive preparedness to process loss and gain signals leading to

strategic inclinations.

What does this imply for the attention to negative stimuli? In a prevention focus,

ensuring security – a defensive strategy – should lead to a heightened sensitivity for negative

stimuli, as these stimuli are relevant for security. Therefore, a prevention focus should result

in more attention to negative (compared to neutral) stimuli (even though it is a “losses”

related motivational state). The eager strategy in a promotion focus should not be related to

the attention to negative stimuli, due to its focus on gains. It should be noted that this has, so

far, not been shown using measures of attention, but rather using self-reports or measures of

outcomes of information processes (e.g., persuasion; Cesario, Grant, & Higgins, 2004).


Threat and challenge, on the other hand, are much more affectively laden. According to

the biopsychosocial model of threat and challenge (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996), threat

results from experiencing high demands and insufficient resources to meet these demands.

Challenge, in contrast, results from high demands and a perception of sufficient resources to

meet these demands. As such, threat is a loss-related motivational state in which individuals

strive to avoid likely failure and challenge is a gain-related motivational state because it

makes individuals focus on the likely success. Threat and challenge, then, seem to be almost

prototypical examples of the “affective-motivational states” Rothermund (2011, p. 60)

described as driving forces in the counter-regulation principle as they involve (in contrast to

prevention and promotion focus) negative or positive goal achievement related thoughts and

feelings. If so, negative stimuli should receive more attention than neutral stimuli when

feeling challenged, but not under threat. According to the counter-regulation principle this is

likely because considering information of opposite valence “is an essential requirement for

the adaptive regulation of motivation” (Rothermund, 2011, p. 60). In addition, one could also

argue that the feeling of having sufficient resources should afford one the ability or

opportunity to look for negative stimuli.

In sum, prevention and threat are related to losses, whereas promotion and challenge

are related to gains. The difference between the two regulatory foci on the one hand and

threat and challenge on the other hand is that prevention and promotion increase the

sensitivity to losses and gains respectively, whereas threat and challenge are about

upcoming gain- and loss-experiences. Sensitivity is not a hot emotional state, whereas the

anticipation of failure and success (when facing high demands) in case of threat and

challenge clearly involves hot emotion. Therefore, we predicted that participants in a

prevention focus as well as participants experiencing challenge would allocate more attention

to negative stimuli compared to neutral control stimuli. This effect should not occur in a

promotion focus and when experiencing threat.

We tested our prediction in an experiment inducing prevention focus and promotion

focus as well as threat and challenge via the remembering of congruent situations. Attention


allocation was assessed with a dot probe task using negative and neutral stimuli (e.g.,

Dewite, Koster, DeHouwer, & Buysse, 2007).

Method

Participants and Design.

Eighty-eight undergraduate students (61 women, Mage = 22.81, range 19-34)

participated in an experiment with a 2 (concept: regulatory focus vs. affective-motivational

state) x 2 (state: gain vs. loss) x 2 (dot location: valid vs. invalid) mixed design in exchange

for 8 EUR (approx. 10 $). Three additional participants were excluded from the analysis,

based on an outlier analysis (studentized deleted residuals > 2.69, p < .01). The sample size

was determined by the available lab capacity. Our aim was to include at least 20 participants

per cell of the experimental design.

Procedure.

Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were seated in semi-private cubicles. They

learned that they would take part in several studies. The session started with the current

experiment which was presented as two studies: the induction of prevention, promotion,

threat or challenge which was presented as memory task and the dot probe task presented

as a concentration test.

Specifically, to induce the motivational states of challenge vs. threat, we requested

participants to describe a situation from their leisure time or from school. The instructions

requested participants to recall situations that fit the appraisals associated with challenge

and threat (e.g., Seery, Weisbuch, & Blascovich, 2009; Tomaka, Blascovich, Kibler, & Ernst,

1997): In the challenge vs. threat condition participants were asked to remember a situation

in which they had the feeling that the demands of the situation fitted vs. exceeded their own

resources. To put participants back in that situation and the related affective states, they first

had to characterize (a) the situation itself, (b) how they felt before they tried to cope with the

situation, and (c) what they undertook to cope with the situation. This manipulation aimed to

induce challenge and threat based on remembering respective situations and the emotional

experiences that accompanied them and thus took an approach similar to previous research


on emotions (e.g., Feather & McKee, 2009; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Meanstead, & van der

Pligt, 1998). Two independent raters (blind to condition and hypotheses) rated the demands,

resources, and the success vs. failure of the situations, written by 28 participants (of the 45

participants in the threat and challenge condition), on a 5 point scale (agreement: both rs >

.6) Higher values indicate more resources and a higher likelihood of success. According to

the ratings, the situations participants described were characterized by more resources (M =

3.64, SD = 0.93) and a higher likelihood of success (M = 3.43, SD = 0.85) in the challenge

situation compared to the threat situation (resources: M = 2.69, SD = 0.86; M = 2.54, SD =

0.97), both ts > 2.5, both ps < .02. Thus, participants remembered situations in which they

experienced challenge and threat in the remembered situations which ultimately, most likely,

resulted in experiences of success or failure in the light of high task demands (i.e., gain or

loss).

To induce promotion and prevention focus we used a procedure similar to the one used

in the challenge vs. threat induction. Participants had to recall either three typical promotion

or three typical prevention situations. This procedure was adopted from Higgins et al. (2001)

with the goal that participants would, overall, experience neither strong success nor failure

(cf., Hamstra, Sassenberg, van Yperen, & Wisse, 2014). In the promotion focus condition,

participants recalled situations in which they (a) “felt like they made progress towards being

successful in their life”, (b) “felt like they failed to make progress towards being successful in

their life”, and (c) “compared to most people, they were able to get what they wanted out of

life”. In the prevention focus condition, participants recalled situations in which (a) “being

careful enough had prevented them from getting into trouble”, (b) “not being careful enough

had gotten them into trouble”, and (c) “they acted in a way that nobody would consider

objectionable”. Remembering both success and failure experiences should have prevented

participants from experiencing unequivocal success or failure (and the resulting positive or

negative affect) after writing down all three situations. In this sense, the two regulatory focus

conditions were not affectively laden, whereas the challenge and the threat condition clearly

were. More importantly, for the interpretation of differences between the two foci, participants


in the promotion and prevention conditions recalled the same amount of success and failure

situations respectively so that differences between the two conditions cannot be attributed to

affect but rather by the recalled content, namely the promotion and prevention strategies.

Afterwards, participants continued with the dot probe task to assess attention allocation

on negative stimuli. Each trial of this task started with a fixation cross located in the center of

the screen that was presented for 500 milliseconds (ms). Afterwards, one noun was

presented left and one right from fixation for 500 ms. Then a dot appeared on the screen,

either in the position of the left or in the position of the right word. Participants had to indicate

on which side of the screen the dot appeared by pressing either the left or the right control

key. The inter-trial interval was varied (250, 500, 750, or 1000 ms).

The stimuli consisted of 18 negative stimuli and 28 neutral stimuli, taken from a list of

standardized German nouns (Hager & Hasselhorn, 1994). Prior to the main experiment, the

stimuli were pretested with a different sample of participants. The nouns rated to be least

negative or threatening in their content served as neutral stimuli whereas the most negatively

and threatening rated words served as negative stimuli (see supplementary materials for

details).1 Stimulus words were paired regarding their word length. The dot probe task

consisted of 16 practice trials and 160 test trials, half of which consisted of neutral-negative

word pairs and the other half consisting of neutral-neutral word pairs. All stimulus words

appeared on both sides of the screen. For practice, a different set of negative stimuli was

used than for the test trials.

After having finished the dot probe task, participants filled in some questionnaires

unrelated to the current hypothesis. Then they were thanked, debriefed and compensated.

Measures.

We computed mean reaction times within the 80 critical trials for valid trials (reaction

time to dots appearing in the position of a negative stimulus) as well as for invalid trials

(reaction time to dot appearing in the position of a neutral stimulus). The scores were log

transformed to correct for skewedness. Response times below 150 ms and above 709 ms

(M+3 SD) and from incorrect responses (2.2 %) were omitted from analyses.


Results

It was predicted that participants in the prevention focus and the challenge condition,

but not participants in the promotion focus and the threat condition, would respond faster on

valid than on invalid trials (i.e., allocate more attention to negative stimuli). A mixed ANOVA

with concept (regulatory focus vs. affective-motivational states) and state (gain vs. loss) as

between participants factors as well as dot location (valid vs. invalid) as within-participant

factor revealed a trend towards a main effect of dot location, F(1,84) = 3.49, MSE = 0.0023, p

= .065, and a main effect of state, F(1,84) = 7.28, MSE = 0.24, p = .008. These effects were

qualified by the expected three-way-interaction F(1,84) = 4.91, MSE = 0.0034, p = .029 (all

other Fs < 1; see Table 1).

To further explore the patter of results underlying this 3-way interaction we computed

separated 2 state (gain vs. loss) x 2 dot location (valid vs. invalid) mixed ANOVAs within the

regulatory focus and the affective-motivational state conditions. Within the regulatory focus

conditions the predicted State x Dot-location interaction was not significant, F(1, 41) = 1.53,

MSE = 0.0012, p = .112, one-tailed. Simple comparisons revealed that participants in the

prevention focus condition reacted quicker on valid (M = 5.890, SE = .028, M = 365.89 ms)

than on invalid trials (M = 5.903, SE = .027, M = 370.41 ms), F(1,84) = 2.83, p = .048, one-

tailed, indicating an attention allocation to negative stimuli. Dot-location did not affect

response latency in the promotion condition, F < 0.1.

The ANOVA for the threat and challenge condition revealed the predicted 2-way

Interaction, F(1, 43) = 3.82, MSE = 0.0022, p = .028, one-tailed.2 As expected, participants in

the challenge condition reacted faster on valid (M = 5.820, SE = .029, M = 339.32 ms) than

on invalid trials (M = 5.840, SE = .028, M = 345.70 ms), F(1,84) = 5.73, p = .010, one-tailed,

again indicating an attentional bias toward negative stimuli. No reaction time difference

occurred in the promotion focus or threat condition, both Fs < 0.1.

Discussion

In line with what we predicted based on the counter-regulation principle (Rothermund,

2011), the present results indicate that thinking back to a challenge – which is a specific form


of success and thus a gain-related motivational state implying a focus on actively

approaching positive goals (e.g., Blascovich, Mendes, & Seery, 2002; Blascovich & Mendes,

2000) – fosters an attentional bias toward negative stimuli, as well. Challenge, as a hot

emotional state, results from an individuals’ evaluation of their own resources as exceeding

the situational demands (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996). Likewise, threat, as an affective state,

results from an individuals’ evaluation of situational demands as exceeding their own

resources. Hence, in our understanding, the present findings suggest that individuals who

have more resources at their disposal than needed in a given situation (i.e., challenged

individuals), can better afford to look for negative stimuli in contrast to those individuals with

fewer resources at their disposal than needed in a given situation (i.e., threatened

individuals). In a state of challenge, an individual is inclined to approach positive goals and to

tackle what is to be done (e.g., Frings, Hurst, Cleveland, Blascovich, & Abrams, 2012).

Therefore, drawing attention to negative stimuli is not only what an individual can afford, but

also represents a functional self-strategy: to search for possible obstacles standing in the

way of personal goal attainment.

To gain a more complete picture, it would certainly be important to expand the focus of

the current study beyond that of negative outcomes. Future research should also address the

differential impact of regulatory focus, threat and challenge on the processing of positive

outcomes. The assumption would be that under threat and in a promotion focus, attention

would be biased toward positive outcomes.

The evidence for the prediction that a prevention focus fosters an attentional bias

toward negative stimuli, whereas a promotion focus does not elicit this bias, was mixed.

Whereas negative stimuli attracted attention in a prevention focus, this effect did not differ

from the pattern found in a promotion focus. Given that the current sample size only allows

for detection of a strong effect (d = .77, when = .05, 1- = .80), the lack of the critical

interaction falsifies the assumption that the effect of regulatory focus on attention described

by regulatory focus theory is a strong effect.


When considering the current findings alongside those of de Lange and van

Knippenberg (2007), the predictions derived from regulatory focus theory come in to question

even further.They found that when a regulatory focus was activated, stimuli of an incongruent

valence (e.g., prevention-positive) impeded performance on subsequent tasks. Regulatory

focus theory predicts, however, that gain-related promotion focus and loss-related prevention

focus prepares individuals’ attention toward stimuli of a congruent valence (e.g., prevention-

negative). The findings of de Lange and van Knippenberg (2007) are opposed to this

prediction, whereas the current findings, if anything, are in line with the prediction. The two

studies’ paradigms differ, however, in several respects. The paradigm employed by de Lange

and van Knippenberg (2007) required participant to read the valenced words, whereas the

paradigm used here captures better whether the negative stimuli grabbed attention in the first

place. Whereas de Lange and van Knippenberg (2007) were focused on inhibitive effects,

the current paradigm focused on attentional biases. Negative stimuli are more fluently

processed in a prevention focus which should lead to less distraction, because congruent

stimuli are processed more quickly. When presented as a distractor, then, as in de Lange

and van Knippenberg studies, congruent stimuli should attract more attention initially, as was

shown here, and then released (for a similar argument see de Lange & van Knippenberg,

2007). It might also be the case that the different findings result from differences in the

manipulations applied in the respective studies. De Lange and van Knippenberg (2007) used

a regulatory focus cues manipulation (i.e., the mouse in the maze) and a regulatory focus

framing, whereas we used a recall based manipulation. Due to these numerous differences

more work is needed to disentangle the current findings from de Lange and van Knippenberg

(2007). Taken together, the evidence for the impact of regulatory focus on attention to focus-

congruent stimuli is very weak (in the current as well as in earlier research). Of more

importance, though, the purpose of the current experiment was to differentiate valenced

motivational states (threat vs. challenge) from regulatory foci (prevention vs. promotion).

The current results are also in line with earlier research on counter-regulation,

indicating that a hot emotional state is required to elicit counter-regulation (e.g., Rothermund


et al., 2011; Schwager & Rothermund, in press). Our findings specify new conditions under

which the counter-regulation principle applies, namely when success and failure are at stake

due to challenge and threat. In contrast, it does not apply when accomplishments or dangers

receive attention due to activated self-regulation strategies that are rather a cognitive state or

mindset – like a promotion or prevention focus

Taken together, the present findings confirm and extend existing research on self-

regulatory systems and their corresponding strategies. Attentional biases toward

counteracting stimuli only occur in relation to hot emotional states and do not occur when the

mere readiness to process gain- and loss-related stimuli are activated. An attentional bias

toward negative stimuli in a state of challenge might occur counter-intuitive but it should be

interpreted as functional self-regulatory strategy: searching for obstacles in the way of goals

attainment when being able to afford it.


Footnotes

1 One might argue that the effect is driven by content (i.e., threat) and not by the

negative valence of the stimuli. To rule out this explanation we computed response

times separately for targets that were according to our pretest high and low in threat.

This additional factor did not qualify the predicted effect. The crucial Valence x

Concept x Validity x Strength of Threat interaction did not turn out significant, F (1,

84) = 0.97, p = .328. We thank Klaus Rothermund for drawing our attention to this

issue.

2 Results did not differ when 2-way interactions were compute as effects within the

complete design.


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Table 1: Means (standard errors) of ln-transformed and means of untransformed response

times and number of errors in valid, invalid, and neutral trials by motivational state.

Prevention Promotion Threat Challenge

valid

ln transformed

5.890 (.028)

5.832 (.030)

5.913 (.027)

5.820 (.029)

ms 365.89 ms 343.59 ms 372.52 ms 339.32 ms

N of errors 1.00 0.28 0.50 0.33

invalid

ln transformed

5.903 (.026)

5.830 (.028)

5.912 (.026)

5.840 (.028)

ms 370.41 ms 342.79 ms 372.04 ms 345.70 ms

N of errors 0.70 0.73 0.71 0.50

neutral

ln transformed

5.903 (.018)

5.823 (.020)

5.906 (.019)

5.823 (.020)

ms 369.15 ms 340.04 ms 370.93 ms 340.12 ms

N of errors 0.24 0.53 0.51 0.61

Threat ≠ prevention, challenge ≠ promotion: The impact of threat, challenge and regulatory focus...

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Transcript of Threat ≠ prevention, challenge ≠ promotion: The impact of threat, challenge and regulatory focus...