OriginalPaperUDC82:165.02Received March 31st,2012

Iris VidmarUniversityofRijeka,FacultyofHumanitiesandSocialSciences,Sveučilišnaavenija4,HR–51000Rijeka 

ividmar@ffri.hr

Thought Experiments, Hypotheses, and Cognitive Dimension of Literary Fiction

AbstractSome authors defend literary cognitivism – the view that literary fiction is cognitively valu­able – by drawing an analogy between cognitive values of thought experiments and literary fiction. In this paper my aim is to analyse the reasons for drawing this analogy and to see how far the analogy can be stretched. In the second part, I turn to the claim put forward by literary anti­cognitivists according to which literature can at best be the source of hypoth­eses, not of knowledge. I challenge this claim by showing that hypotheses can have valuable cognitive benefits on their own, thus hoping to restore cognitive benefits readers get from literature.

Key wordscognitivevalues,hypotheses,literarycognitivism,realism,sciencefiction

1. Introduction

InthispaperIwanttoexploretheanalogy,putforwardbysomeliterarycog-nitivists,betweenthecognitivevaluesofliteraryfictionandthoughexperi-ments(TEs).Namely,intryingtoexplainthecognitivevalueofliterature,somephilosophersclaimthatliteraturefunctionsinthesamewayasTEsinscienceandphilosophy,andgiventhatforthemostpart,thecognitivevalue(andbenefits)ofTEsistakenasjustified,weshould,onthosesamebases,acceptthatliteraturebearscognitivevalue.WhileIdoacceptthatliteratureiscognitivelyvaluableandthatindeedtherearemanycognitivebenefitswecangainfromengagingwithliterature–inthatsense,wewillmostlyspeakof cognitivebenefits and cognitive contributionof literature – I thinkweshouldfurtherexplore theanalogyinorder toseehowfar it takesus,butalsotoseehowdiversethecognitivebenefitsavailableare.Itisimportanttonote that my aim in this paper is not to call into doubt any of the epistemic benefitsattributedtoTEsortoquestiondifferentaccountsthatwereputfor-wardinordertoexplainthem;forthemostpart,IrelyontheaccountgivenbyDavidDavies,whoprovidesoneof themostextensiveanalysisof thisanalogy.1

Literarycognitivistsclaimthatliteraryfictioniscognitivelyvaluable,whichmeanstherearesomecognitivebenefitswecangetfromengagingwithit.

1

SeeDavies2007a,2007b,2010a.PeterSwir-ski  (2007)  also  offers  and  analyzes  various accounts of TEs.

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David Davies claims there are four main categories of cognitive values one canfindinworksofliteraryfiction:2

(i) Knowledgeofmattersoffacts(factualinformationabouttheworld):atthemostgenerallevel,worksofliteraryfictioncontaindescriptionsofdifferentaspectsoftheworldwhichreaderscanpickupandaccommo-datewithintheirlargerscheme.Thiscanincluderatherdetaileddescrip-tionsscatteredthroughoutthenovelswhichcomposethebackgroundofthestory(likeMariaEdgeworth’sprovincial novelswhichdepictdiffer-ent aspects of Irish society in  the late 18thcentury,orSirWalterScottwho“openedupthenoveltothefullpanoramaofrevolution,dissent,re-bellionandsocialchange”3),orcanbepresentedinjustafewsentencesdescribingparticularcity,event,holidayetc.

(ii) Understandingofgeneralprinciples(moral,metaphysical,psychologi-cal).Theideabehindthisclaimisthatworksofliteraryfictionprovideasuitablebackgroundagainstwhichdifferentprinciplescanbedevel-oped,takenfromabstractionandpresentedintheircomplexities,givensubstanceanddeveloped through theirdifferent aspects.Forexample,many critics argue that Dickens’ Hard Times can be read as calling into question the principle of utilitarianism.

(iii)  Source  of  categorical  understanding:  apart  from  enabling  readers  to deepentheirunderstandingofgeneralprinciples,literaryworkscanalsoprovidethemwithnewconceptualframework,orcategories,whichcanbeappliedtotherealworld.DavidNovitzclaimsthattherearedifferentskills,cognitiveandpractical,availabletoreadersfromliterature.

(iv) Affective knowledge: given theway literaryworks develop the storytheypresenttothereaders,literarycognitivistsoftenclaimthattheyareparticularlysuitabletoshowdifferentaspectsofemotionalresponsesandcomplexities,whichinturnhelpsreadersunderstandwhatitfeelsliketobeinparticularcircumstances.Inengagingwiththework,readerscanseethesituationfromthe“inside”.Davieslinksthistomoralgrowthofthe readersclaiming that thisknowledgeofwhat itwouldbe likecanbearupon“ourabilitytocomprehend,andrespondappropriately,tomor-allycomplexsituationsweencounterintheactualworld”.

Althoughdevelopinganaccountofthecognitivedimensionofliteraryworksalongthesefourlinesisacommonplaceinphilosophyofliterature,therearesomeauthorswhogoevenfurtherandclaimthatliteraturehasthecapacitynotonlytogiveusknowledgeandunderstanding,butalsotomakeusmoreawareoforsensitivetowardsvariousaspectsoftheworldwemighthavenotnoticed before.4Itisalsosaidsometimesthatartgenerally,andliteratureinparticular,cannotonlyofferaperspectiveforreaders’evaluation,butalsobroaden,challengeorargue fororagainstanestablishedone.5  I accept all oftheseclaims;thelinesbetweenthemmightbeabitblurry,butcertainlythere is plausibility in the claim that different cognitive benefits and values areavailabletoreaders.Theproblemforthecognitivist,however,istoshowwhat it is thatgives strength to thesecognitivecontributions, that is,whatreasonswehave foraccepting them.Somephilosophershaveclaimed thatwecanonlyacceptclaimsliketheseifwehavesomekindofadditionalproofthattheyaretrue,thatis,onlyafterwehavesubjectedthemtofurthertesting.6 Given the strict epistemic conditions that need to be fulfilled in order for one toreachknowledge,theseclaimscanatbestbeonlyhypotheses,atleastuntilproved,confirmedorjustifiedthroughsomefurthertesting.Theproblemthen 

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becomesthatofshowingwhetherthistestingprocessisinternalorexternaltotheprocessofreadingandtheanswerstothisaretwofold.DavidNovitzarguesthatthistestingisexternaltotheprocessofreading,inthatareaderissupposedtoprojectthehypothesisintotheworldandacceptitasvaluableonlyifitprovescorrect.Atthispoint,DavidDaviesrightlyemphasisesthefactthatwehavetobecarefulandrecognizedifferentjustificatorygroundsfor each of the category of claims literature can offer (i-iv above). In the case of (i) and (iv) reasons for accepting these as true can be either the readers’ familiaritywiththemorsomeadditionalreasonforfindingtheauthorreliable(from an  internalist perspective) or  the  fact  the author  is  in  fact  reliable  in thesematters.For(ii)and(iii)Daviesclaimsthatweshouldapplythesamesolutionthatgroundsthecognitivevalueofthoughtexperiments(TEs),theso-called moderate inflationist response:

“Thesuggestionthen, is that thementalmodelsthroughwhichreaderscomprehendfictionalnarrativesalsoprovide, throughtheirmobilizationof tacitorunarticulatedknowledgeof theworld, ameansof testing thoseclaims toknowledgeof theactualworld that theoristshavelocatedinfictionalnarratives,andtherebyvalidatetheideathatfictioncanbeagenuinesourceofknowledgeoftheworld.”7

Given that according to thismodelwe expandour knowledge by creatingmentalmodelsthatoperatewiththeknowledgewealreadyhave,thatis,cog-nitiveresourceswepossessprior toreading, thetestingprocessis internal,wedonotneedanyextraevidenceorargumenttosupporttheclaimsandwedoinfactendupcognitivelyricher.Finally,Daviesargues,ifreadersdoinfactlearnsomethingfromliteraryworks,thejustificationforthatshouldbegroundednotinsubjectivefeelingthatthelearningprocesshastakenplace,butintherightkindofunarticulatedknowledgethathasbeenmobilized.Inthatsense,“[l]earningfromfictionalnarrativesinthiswayrequires‘reliabilityinthereader’ratherthan‘reliabilityintheauthor’”.8

Sothis, inanutshell, is theaccountofthecognitivevalueofliteratureputforwardbythosewhodefenditbyinvokingtheanalogywithTEs.WhatIwanttodonowistoexpanditfurther.Iwilldividethisintwoparts:first,Iwanttoseewhetherwecancomeupwithsomecriteriathatwouldspecifywhichliteraryworksinfactfunctionasthoughtexperiments.SecondIwanttosaysomethingmoreaboutthetestingprocess,thatis,aboutthevalueofhypotheses.

2. Literature as thought experiment

Davies is not alone in his claim that literature can function as extended TE. NoëlCarroll,awelldevoteddefenderofliterarycognitivism,claimsthat

“…philosophy employs a gamutof techniques toproduceknowledge and learning that areanalogoustothosefoundinliterature.WhatIhaveinmindherespecificallyarethoughtex-

2

SeeDavies2007,2010.Othercognitivistsac-cept more or less the same classification (see forexampleNovitz1984,Gaut2006).

3

CarterandMcRae2001,239.

4

SeeCarroll2002,Gaut2006.

5

SeeKieran1996,2005.

6

Novitz1984,Davies2007a,2007b,2010a.

7

Davies2007b,44.

8

Davies2007,163.

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periments, examples and counterexamples that are often narrative and generally fictional innature”.9

Theyaimat“mobilizingconceptualknowledge–aprioriknowledgeand/ortheknowledgethatunderwritesourabilitytoapplyconceptscompetently–inorder to reach certain conclusions”.10 The notion  that  plays  crucial  role  in Carroll’saccountisthatofclarification.IndescribingdifferentwaysinwhichTEs(andobviouslyliterature)arecognitivelyvaluable,hesays:

“Theymakeconnections–thatwerehithertorecessiveorobscure–betweenwhatisalreadyknownandotherpartsofourcognitivestock.Theyilluminatetherelevanceofwhatisalreadyknown to thequestionathandbyrefocusing thatknowledge inanovelway.Thiscountsasknowledgeproductions,becauseitclarifieslinkagesbetweenpartsofourcognitivemap”.11

Apartfromthat,theycanalsoraisecounterexamplestowellacceptedtheo-ries, make argumentative points, motivate conceptual distinction and givecounterexamplestowidelyacceptedclaims.Allofthesefunctionscan,Car-rollclaimsandIconcur,becarriedoutbyliteraryfiction.One  of  the  strongest  formulations  of  the  analogy  comes  from  Daniel  Do-hrn,whoclaimsthattheprocessofinterpretationisclosetocounterfactualthinking.Dohrn simply assumes that every literarywork that comes closeenoughtorealworldscenariostoinvoketheprocessofinterpretationgetsitscognitive value from engaging readers in counterfactual thinking. Narratives presentpossiblescenarioswhichresemblerealworldscenariosinthattheybringwhatissalienttoviewandthushelpusunderstandtherealworld.Hisaccountalsoreliesonthepowerofnarrativetoworkwithcognitiveresourceswehaveandmentalmodels thatwecreate,althoughhispictureisanevenwideronethantheoneDaviesreliesupon.Dorhnclaims:

“The artistic activity of representing and conceptually evaluating fictional paradigm scenarios closely resembles thephilosophical practiceof counterfactual thought experiments (…)TheauthorofanarrativemayberegardedasmakingaTE:Whatwouldbethecaseif?)”.12

OnereasonforclaimingthatallliteraturefunctionsasTEsisthefactthatwereadliteratureascounterfactuals–asifthestoryhappened,althoughweknowthatitdidnot,duetothefactthatwe,asreaders,areinvitedtoimaginethat(somethingtakesplace)whileknowingthatitdidnot.Indeed,thereisasenseinwhichthiscanbeastrongreasonforclaimingthatthecognitivevalueofliteraturederivesfromthesamesourceasthecognitivevalueofTEs:whenengagingwithTEs,weareawareofthefactthatthecontentistobeimaginedandthatitdidnot(andusuallyitcannot)happen.ButIthinkthisiswrong.Foronething,althoughsomeofthecontentdescribedinliteraryworksdidnothappen,someofitneverthelessdid.Manyaspectsofmanyliteraryworksofferustrueaccountsofrealworldstateofaffairsandinthatsenseitisjustplainwrongtopretendthatitdidnothappen.AmoredetailedanalysisoftheanalogybetweenliteratureandTEsisfoundinPeterSwirski,whoacceptstheclaimthatliteraturegivesusknowledgeinthesamewayasTEs,i.e.thattheabilityofliteraryworkstoprovideuswithknowledgederivesfromtheirsimi-laritytoTEs.However,Swirskiputsarestrictionontheanalogyandclaimsthatonlysomeworksfunctioninthisway,whileothersdonot:

“The basic premise behind Of Literature and Knowledge is that the capacity of literary fictions forgeneratingnonfictionalknowledgeowes to theircapacityfordoingwhatphilosophyandscience do – generating thought experiments. Not that allknowledgeinliteraturecanbetracedtothoughtexperiments.Historicalnovelstransmitknowledgeofhistoryinthesamemannerthathistorianstransmitit.”13

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I think this is a good place to start my analysis. Davies also accepts that only someliteraryworksfunctioninthiswaybecauseonlysomeprovide“indirectsupportforascientificorphilosophicalpositionbyillustratinghowcertainthings are possiblegiventhatposition”.14 In that sense some fiction functions ashelpful,visualisableillustrations,notlikeTEs.Myaimistotryandfindcriterionthatwouldhelpusdifferentiatebetweenthoseworksthatcanfunc-tionasTEsandthosethatcannot.Inordertodeterminethat,IthinkweshouldgobacktothereasonsforequatingfictionandTEinthefirstplace,thatis,fordrawingtheanalogybetweenthecognitivefunctioningofbothofthese.Sothequestionis:inwhatsenseisliteraryfictionsimilar(enough)toTEsfortheanalogytowork?DohrnandSwirskiputforwardtheanalogyinordertoaccountfortheproblemoffictionality,whichmanyseeasthemostpressingforliterarycognitivism:howcanweclaimtobeabletolearnfromliteraturegivenitsfictivedimen-sion?Ontheotherhand,CarrollpointsoutthatthefictionaldimensionofTEsisneverconsideredaproblemforthosewhoclaimthatTEsarecognitivelyvaluable.AccordingtoDavies,thefictionalityofliteraryfictionandTEscanbeexplainedalongtwoconditions:namely,theattitudeofmake-believeandtheno-fidelityconstraint.Thesearetwofootholdsoffictive utterance theory of fictionality,accordingtowhich,forsomenarrativetobefictional,theat-titudeprescribed isnotbeliefbutpretenceormake-belief, and thegeneralaimoftheauthorincomposingthenarrativeistotellastory,tofulfilsomeartisticaim,andthechoiceofpropositionsinsertedintothenarrativedoesnotdependonwhetherornottheyaretrue.15ThisisthebasicsimilaritybetweenliteraryfictionandTEs,anditenablesliterarycognitiviststogroundthecog-nitivevalueofliteraryfictioninthesimilarityoffunctioningbetweenliteraryfiction and TEs.Davies defines (scientific) TE as taking the

“…formofshortnarrativesinwhichvariousexperimentalproceduresaredescribed.Compe-tentreaderunderstandsthattheseprocedureshavenotbeen,andusuallycouldnot(forsomeappropriatemodality) be, enacted.She is invited, however, to imagineormake-believe thattheseproceduresareenactedandtoconcludethatcertainconsequenceswouldensue,wherethisistakentobearuponamoregeneralquestion,whichisthetopicoftheTE”.16

ThisishowTEsareusedinscience.Letusnowseewhetherwecan,relyingonthisaccountofTEs,explainthecognitivefunctioningofliteraryfiction.

2.1. Sense 1: similarity in the way the content is presented

OnepossiblecriterionthatwecanextrapolatefromDavies’accountofTEsisthatTEs(thatis,literaryfictionswhichcanfunctionasTEs)usethepro-ceduresthathavenotbeen(andcouldnotbe)enacted.Ithinkwecanbrieflyexpand these procedures so as to include different kinds of scenarios that de-

9

Carroll2002,7.

10

Ibid.

11

Ibid.,8.

12

Dorhn2009,39–40.

13

Swirski2007,4.

14

Davies2010a,52.

15

Thisisobviouslynotsoincaseofnonfiction,where the insertion of propositions dependsonwhetherornottheyaretrue.

16

Davies2010a,51.

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scribesomesetofcircumstancesandtheactionsofdifferentagentswithinit.Itseemsplausibletoclaimthatinimaginingthecontentpresentedinthisway,thereaderhastobeawarethatitispreciselybecauseofthisinabilitytoactu-allycarryoutwhatisdescribed,thatthewholesetofpropositionsisbeingputforwardinthefirstplace.Togobacktotheanalogy,itseemsthatitexcludesthefollowingtypesofliteraryfictionfromtheanalogy:i) workspertainingtothegenreofrealism,includinghistoricalnovelswhich

rely upon historical accuracy;ii) worksthat(setoutto)presentorportrayacertainpoliticalregime,his-

toricalevents,socialcircumstancesetc,astrulyaspossible;iii) worksthat,althoughmaybehighlyunrealisticfromourperspective,nev-

ertheless reflect certain realistic elements or beliefs of the target audience of the time theworkswerewritten,works likeDante’s Inferno, Poe’sEureka,Ibsen’sGhosts.

Itseemstomethatinalloftheseexamples,theattitudeof“imaginethatpalthoughyouknowthatnotp”isnottheguidingprincipleinthecomposition.Thefictionaldimensionisstronglypairedwiththeprincipleofverisimilitude,accordingtowhicheventsportrayedintheliteraryfictionarecloseenoughtotherealworld.Inthatsense,theseworksprovideuswiththefactualinforma-tion and matters of fact.17However,thatisnotall,noteventhemostimpor-tantcognitiveaspectoftheseworks,andIhavealreadysaidthattheanalogybetweenliteraryfictionandTEsisnotevokedtoexplainfactualknowledge,norisdefendingfactualknowledgethemostpressingaspectofliterarycog-nitivism.Wedonotreadliteratureinordertogetthefactualinformation,buttofollowthestory,thepointofthestory,toseewhatthestoryhastotellusaboutlife,world,otherpeopleandourowncircumstances.Problemforliter-arycognitivistishowcognitivebenefitsalongtheselinesarepossible,andsuggestionputforwardbyCarroll,Dorhn,SwirskiandDaviesis toinvokethe analogy. But my claim is that the scope of this analogy should be care-fullydelineated.Theproblemis,itisnotplausibletoapproachthesekindsofworksasiftheywereTEs.Foronething,mostoftheauthorspertainingtothisgenre insisted on the principle of fidelity at all levels of descriptions. In The Cambridge Introduction to Nineteenth­Century American Novelwefindthefollowingcharacterizationofthewriterspertainingtothisliteraryperiod:

“these novelists share a general conception of fiction as a detailed and accurate representation ofhistoricallyspecificcharactersandsettings–theirmanners,waysofdress,speechpatterns,socialhabits,mainconcerns,andtopicsofconversation.”18

Thesamededicationtodetailsisseeninthechoiceoftopicsrealistwriterswroteabout:

“Therealistswerealsocriticalofwhat theysawas thepreviousgeneration’ssqueamishnesswhenitcametodepictingthemorecommon,harsh,orevenvulgaraspectsoflife,suchasadul-tery,crime,alcoholism,radicalviolence, laborstrife,andpoliticalcorruption.(…)[R]ealistsdepictedtheexcessesofcapitalism,theplightofthepoor,andthenarroworstrainedcircum-stancesofwomen,blackAmericans,andimmigrants”.19

Becauseofthesefeatures,IthinkitisplainlyinappropriatetoaskreaderstoapproachtheseliteraryfictionsasTEs.Obviously,inwhattheydescribe,theydonot tackle“experimentalprocedures” thathavenotbeenandcannotbeenacted.Infact,duetoitsnature,realismisfurtherdescribedas“generallyempiricistinitsorientation,privilegingconcreteexamplesofexperienceovertotalizingsystemsofthought”.20

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Whatremains,whatliteraryworksareexcludedfromthesense1?Obviously,worksthatinsomesensedeviatefromtheverisimilitudeprinciple,andthatdemandthereadersadopt“imaginethatpeventhoughyouknowthatno-p”attitude.Thisissoduetothenatureofwhattheydescribe;itcanbeseeninthebreachingofthelawsofphysics,inportrayingpatternsofhumanbehaviourandrelationsthatareradicallydifferentfromourworld,increatingalterna-tiveworlds and communities, etc.The relevant background againstwhichreadersaddresstheseworkshastoincludeawarenessofthisbreach,aswellasacknowledgmentofhowbigitis.Ithinkthatthebestexamplesarenovelspertainingtosciencefiction,novelsthatrelyonstate-of-the-artscientificde-velopmentsandexaggeratethemevenfurther,fantasygenre,horrorstories,utopias and dystopias. Examples  that come  to mind are Brave New World,1984,The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde,The Island of Dr. Moreau, Herland, The Female Man,etc.Preconditionofmakingsenseoftheseworksistheawarenessofthefactthatsuchscenarioshavenotbeenenacted,thatis,at the time21thesefictionalstorieswerewritten,thesescenarioswerefictional.However, as Iwill show later, that doesn’tmean they are not cognitivelyrich.The genre of science fiction is

“…arguably,andinseveralrespects,themostchallengingformofliteratureyetdevised.(…)[I]tcanbeshownthatreading(orevenviewing)anyformofsciencefictiondoesinvolveoneextra intellectualstepoverandabovethosenecessaryforreadingotherformsoffiction”.22

What Shippey here primarily has in mind is the fact that science fictionpresentstoareaderwhathecallsnovadata,thatis,newthingsgiven:

“The basic building-block of science fiction is accordingly the novum – a discrete piece of in-formationrecognizableasnot-true,butalsoasnot-unlikely-true,not-flatly(inthecurrentstateofknowledge)-impossible”.23

IthinkthatitisherethatwecomeclosetowhatDaviesdescribesas“proce-duresthatarenotenacted”anditisbecauseofthisbreachfromthefamiliar

17

Notice that this is so even in caseofworkslike Ibsen’s Ghostwhichpresentwrongfactsregarding syphilis. Even though the facts are wrong,thereasonforthatisnotIbsen’sinten-tiontolieordeceive,butitistheoutcomeofthewrong(scientific)accountofsyphilisIb-senwasrelyingupon,whichwashowevertheaccountconsideredtrueatthetimetheworkwaswritten.Soalthoughwearegiven falseinformation, we still learn new things, forexamplewhatpeople in thosedaysbelievedabout syphilis.

18

Crane2007,156.

19

Ibid.,157.

20

Ibid.,157–158.

21

It is important to emphasize ‘at the time these storieswerewritten’, a good explanationofthat is Jules Verne’s novel 20 000 Leagues un­der the Sea.Atthetimethenovelwaswritten,

theideaoflivingundertheseawasunbeliev-able.Today,wedonotmakefussaboutsub-marines.Ithinkthisexplainswhycertainlit-eraryworksthatwereonceseenasdepictingunrealistic scenarios and procedures stopped beingtreatedinthatwayoncewemanagedtoenact theseprocedures in the realworld.ToreadJulesVerne’snovelsasTEstodaywouldbestrange,butatthesametimereaderhastobe aware that at the time theywerewrittentheywere presented asTE.Notice howeverthat this is in noway distinctive of sciencefiction: in order to understand almost any lit-erarywork,areaderhastobeawareofcertainbackground (common knowledge regardingthe social rules, political regimes, religiousbeliefs etc.) shared by the author and his tar-get audience. This also explains why thoseliteraryworksthatareinanysense“false”arenot considered as of less value.

22

Shippey2005,11.

23

Ibid.,13–14.

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that science fiction makes readers take an extra step in approaching the story andfollowing it.Another importantaspectofsciencefiction is itsengage-mentwiththe“faraway”intimeandspace;inthissense,FredBottingtalksaboutsciencefiction’s“unboundedexplorationsofchange,outsiders,escape:its‘freedomofimagery’isfreedomfromrealisticconventions”24 and many othersciencefictiontheoreticianstalkaboutdefamiliarisationofthefamiliar,“radicaldisjunctionfromthereal”,andcognitiveestrangementtypicalofsci-encefiction.Anotheressentialfeatureofsciencefictionisthatitdealswithscience,butusuallywithsciencegonewrong,25orwithpresentingpolitical,social and/or religious systems and communities that operate on significantly differentprinciples from theonesweknow. Inexplaining theworkingsofscience fiction,DavidSeed invokesArthurC.Clarke’s claimaccording towhich science fiction can challenge conservativemind-sets through narra-tively  embodied  thought  experiments.26 This  is  an  important  point  for  our research here: the invocation of thought experiments to explain the nature of science fiction.Myintuitionhere is that, ifwecompare these twoverybroadlyconceivedgenresofliterature,wehavetorecognizedifferentreadingprotocols(touseSeed’sterm)readershavetoemployinordertofollowthestory,andinthecaseofsciencefiction,thiswillincludetreatingtheworkaspresentingsome-thingnon-existent,thatis,existentonlyinthemind.Ontheotherhand,thisisnotnecessarilysoforrealism.Inasimilarvein,Ithink,inengagingwithTEs,scientistsandphilosophersrelyonthewillingnesstoacceptthedescrip-tionasgiven,evenincaseswherewhatisdescribedishighlyunlikely.Weallknowthat“theviolinistcase”cannothappen,yetthatdoesn’tpreventusfromengagingseriouslywithit.Thiscanleadustoexploreanotherreasonfordrawingtheanalogy:themotivationbehindtheconstructionofTEs.

2.2. Sense 2: motivation for particular kind of description

Ithinkthereisavaluablelessontobedrawnfromourdiscussionsofar:ifweare toexplain theanalogy,we shouldconsider theaimof constructingTEs,whyisitthattheyareusedinthefirstplace?J.R.BrownlistsseveralreasonswhyTEs are postulated, and these include: to fulfil specific func-tionwithin a theory, tohelp illustrate and clarify abstract states of affairs,acceleratetheprocessofunderstanding,asexamplesinconceptualanalysis,to provide evidence for or against a theory.27Ithinkthisisthelineweshouldpursue.Namely,alessonfromthepreviouschapterwasthatsomanyliteraryworksduetotheirstructurecannotfunctionasthoughtexperiments,primarilyduetothefactthattheydonotaskreaderstotakethatextrastep.However,ifwefocusontheartisticaimsthatgoverntheconstructionofthestory,wemight get ahead. Davies himself mentions this criterion and it seems to me weshouldtakeitmoreseriously.28 A common feature of novels like this is thattheydescribescenarioswhichbearcloseresemblancetoourworld,yetdifferradicallyfromit,inthattheyhaveneverbeenactuallyenacted.Thesenovelsexaggeratewhattheydescribe,yeteverythingtheydescribeisplau-sible,easytoimagine,notcontrarytonatural,psychologicalorsociallaws.Inordertotriggeracertainattitudeorresponse,orjustanintuitionregardingsomething,authorswhowritethissortofnoveldescribescenariosthatshouldpresenttoreadersacommonyetdisturbedpictureofreality,soastohighlighttheconsequencesthatcanbecaused.ThisisveryclosetohowphilosophicalTEs are used. I believe this model rightly captures another important aspect ofworkssuchasBrave New World and 1984:theseauthorswantedtomake

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I.Vidmar,ThoughtExperiments,Hypotheses,and Cognitive Dimension of Literary Fiction185

politicalstatementsandtherightattitude(literaryappreciation)should,astheendresult,recognizethat.TotreatBrave New World as representation (or re-port)aboutsomesocietythatisrealwouldbetoterriblymissthepoint.Ontheotherhand,itisonlyifweacceptthe“imaginethat”thatwecantrulytriggerourcognitiveresources.IthinkthispointisobviousifweanalyseworkslikeThe Possibility of an Island,whichconsistsofpartsthataretobereadas‘reallife episodes’ and parts that are based on thought-experimental scenarios. A competentreader,inordertofullyappreciatethenovel,hastohavetheabilityto shift these perspectives as he goes along reading.That,however,stilldoesnotexcludeallthepossiblesensesinwhichanalogymightwork.Whatwewanttoexplainhereishowitisthatreaderscandeepentheirunderstandingoftheprinciples–moral,metaphysicalandpsychologi-cal–throughengagingwithliterature.Ifwefocusonthisaspect,itappearsthatwhatmattersisnotonlywhatisrepresentedintheworkandwithwhatintention,butalsowhatthereaderbringsin.Criticsanddefendersofcogni-tivismagreethat inordertofollowthestoryandunderstandwhatisgoingon, a reader already needs to have at least some elementary concepts andprinciples.Theclaimputforwardbyliterarycognitivistsisthatinengagingwiththework,theseprinciplesbecomemoreencompassing,andthereaderbecomesmoresensitivetowardsdifferentaspectsofexperience.Thatiswhatthe analogy should explain.

2.3. Sense 3: the analogy with TEs at the thematic level

Onepossibleobjectiontotheanalysisofsense1and2cancomeifwedis-sectparticularliteraryworksnotintowidercategoriesofitsgenreorintheamountofrealisticdetails,butifweconcentrateondifferentaspects,thatis,thepoint,thatthestorypresents,theconceptsitdevelops,questionsitraises,etc.Namely,someonemightclaimthatwherethestorytakesplace(whetherin19ctChicagoor in thedistant future inspace)bearsnosignificance forwhat thestory isactuallyabout in termsofhumanly important issues,andthesearewhatmatters.Forexample,althoughDreiser’sAmerican Tragedy can abound in details regarding the economic development of American so-ciety,firstfactories,etc,whatwereallyneedinordertofollowthestoryisanunderstandingofpsychologicalmechanisms,orprinciplesthatguidetheactionsofthemaincharacters(forexample,inordertoexplainRoberta’strustinClydeandherfailuretoseehisliesanddeceptions,weshouldinvokethenotionsofnaivety,innocence,goodupbringingandthewaytheseprinciples

24

Botting2005,112.

25

SeedifferentaccountsofthisinCarroll1990,and Seed 2005.

26

Seed,p.5.

27

See Brown 2007. Carroll also provides asimilarlistofreasonsforconstructingTE,seehis 2002.

28

Here is Davies: “… the narratives in TE’sdiffer from thenarratives in standardworks

of  fiction not  in  failing  to meet  the  require-mentsforfictionality,butinbeingpresentedtoreceiverswithadifferentmotivation.(…)Forexample,writersofutopiasordystopiassuch as 1984 or Brave New World plausibly intendthat,asaresultofthereceiver’smak-ing-believe the content of the narrative, shewillcometobelievethat this ishowcertainsocieties would turn out, and will thereforeamendherviewsaboutthemeritsofalterna-tive political or socio-economic systems. Per-hapsthen,weshouldsimplyallowthatsomeworksoffictionareproperlyviewedasmuchmorefullyelaboratedTE’s”.(Davies2007b,33)

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I.Vidmar,ThoughtExperiments,Hypotheses,and Cognitive Dimension of Literary Fiction186

collideinhighlymoralyounggirlwhobelievesinloveanddoesn’tsuspectherlovertobeunfairorimmoral).WhilethelovestorybetweenClydeandRobertaissetagainstindustrialdevelopment,whattheauthorisreallyinter-estedinthestoryisthequestionofagency,individualchoicesandfreewill,the reasonsbehind immoralbehaviourandmanipulation, thepossibilityofrepentance,etc.And this is, itmightbeclaimed,where theanalogybetween thecognitivefunctioning  of TEs  and  literature  is  evident:  it  is  at  this  level  of  the  story thatthenarrationworksuponourcognitiveresources,enablingustorecog-nizetheworkingsofgeneralprinciples.Ifwefocusonthisaspect(socalledthematicaspect)ofliteraryfiction,thenthedifferencesbetweenrealismandsciencefictionbecomelessimportant,becausethesettingofthestoryisnotimportant.Atthislevel,sciencefiction,aswellasrealisticliterature,tacklethesame“humanlyimportantissues”whichreadersfindrelevant.Forallitsexaggeration, sublimity, gothic atmosphere and surreal setting, destructionoftheworldandtechnologicalinnovations,sciencefictiondealswithdeeplyimportanthumanissuesand“asksfundamentalquestionsabouttheworldandthenatureofselfhood”29thatbearimportantlyonhowweconceiveofour-selves,otherpeopleandtheworldaroundus.Togivebutafewexamples,onethemethatisrepeatedlybeingdevelopedthroughthewritingsofH.G.Wellsisthatofgeneticengineering,aswellastheimpactofDarwinismandevolutiononpeople,whichraisesimportantquestionsabouttheidentityandagencyofhumanbeings,aswellastheboundarybetweenspeciesandtheroleofscienceanditsimpactonhumans.StephenR.L.Clarkanalysesthewaysciencefictiontreatsreligionandreligiousissues,principlesoforganizedre-ligionandfaith,showingthatwhatisultimatelybroughtintoquestionisthepossibility of a religion that is true. Particularly important in this respect are workspertainingtoutopiasanddystopias,whichnotonlyexploredifferentpoliticalprinciplesandsocialarrangements,butalsoquestionthenatureofhumanbeings,theirwillingnessandabilitiestoconnectwitheachotherandformmeaningfulrelations,nottomentiontheir identityandself-awarenesswhichcanonlyfindexpressionwithinsocietyandwidersocialcontext.PhilipE.Wagnershowsthedependenceofutopiaontheparticularpoliticalregime,thatis,thehistoricalcontextoutofwhichitemerges:

“…throughitspresentationofthisalternativecommunity,theUtopiannarrativehastheeffectofbothhighlightinginanegativelightmanyoftheproblemsofthereigningsocialorder,andperhapsevenmoresignificantly,ofshowingthatwhatistakenasnaturalandeternallyfixedbythe members of that society is in fact the product of historical development and thus open to change”.30

Considerationsalongtheselinesshowthat,despiteahighdegreeofbreachfrom“reality”and“hereandnow”,sciencefictionisdeeplyrootedwithwhatis of the deepest human concern and can therefore certainly contribute in sub-stantialwaystoourcognitiveendeavourofunderstandingtheworld.Ontheotherhand,itcanalsobeclaimedthatthefactthatrealistliteratureisprimarilyconcernedwith“hereandnow”andinthatsenseinformativeofsocial,political,economic,etc.realityofwhatitdescribesisnotanobstacletoitstacklinguniversalthemeswhichgobeyondimmediaterealitypresentedinawork.Togoback toDreiser,noonecandeny thathisanalysisof theclassdistinctions,povertyandrichnessandtheinfluencethesefactorshadonsocial interaction and personal relations among people is of no relevance for modern readers.

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I.Vidmar,ThoughtExperiments,Hypotheses,and Cognitive Dimension of Literary Fiction187

Togobacktomyquestion,does theanalogywithTEshelpusexplainthecognitive values of literary fiction? If Thomson’s violinist case is supposed to showthatweshouldmakeadistinctionbetweentheconceptof‘righttolife’andtheconcept‘righttowhatisneededtosustainlife’,31 and if it does so by mobilizing unarticulated cognitive resources grounded in our experience of theworld,canthesameaccountbeappliedtoliteraryfiction?Canweclaimthattheverysameprocesshappenswhen,uponreadingThe Scarlet Letter,weareleadtoconsiderinmoredetailsthemoralimplicationsofcrimeandpunishment and to better understand different aspects of  the psychology of punishment?Severalthingsneedtobesaidhere.Firstofall,mostofthosewhodefendlit-erarycognitivismwilltrytogrounditatthethematiclevel,thatis,atthelevelwherewearenolongerconcernedwithpropositionsdescribingthefictionalworldandactionshappeninginit,butareconcernedwithprinciplesregard-ingmoral,metaphysicalandpsychologicalaspectsofourexperience.Wesaidbefore  that  literature can help us cognitively  in  this  respect by enabling us toseedifferentshadesofconceptsweemploy(suchasthedevelopmentoftheconceptoffreewillandactingfromone’sdeliberationthatisoneofthecentralaspectsofDreiser’swork32),orbyitsabilitytogivesubstancetobareprinciples (like calling into question the principles that determine male and femalerolesthatsomecriticsfindcentraltoNathanielHawthorne’sshortsto-ries33).Itisalsoplausibletoclaimthatsomeliteraryworks,throughthewaytheydeveloptheirthemes,notonlymakedifferentprinciplesmoreavailabletothereaders,butalsocallintoquestionsomeestablishednormsofthoughtandbehaviourorpresentanewperspectiveforconsideration.Whatneedstobe recognized here is the plurality of values and different accounts are being putforwardtoexplainhowthatispossible.WesawthatCarrollclaimsthatwhatactuallyhappensincaseslikethisistheprocessofclarification,wherea reader deepens his understanding of the (moral) concepts he has and learns howtoapplytheminnewwaysandinnewsituations.JohnGibsonclaimsthatoneoftheeffectsofengagingwithliteratureisitscapacitytomakeusmoreawareofwhatwearesupposedtodo,andBerysGautdevelopsatheoryaccording towhichwe learn from literatureby its capacity to employandguideourimagination.TogobacktotheanalogywithTEs,certainlyitisatthislevelthatitfindsitsstrongestgrounding.However,Ithinkthereisonemoresenseinwhichanalogymightbegrounded.

2.4. Sense 4: internal and external perspectives

Thenotionof internalandexternalperspectiveas Iwilluse itherecomesfromPeterGoldie,fromhisanalysisofthewayreadersengagewiththenon-actualaswellasactualevents.34Althoughhisfocusisonengagementwithnarrative and  the emotional  responses  it elicits  in  the audience –  including beingemotionallycarriedawayaswellasbeingemotionallyresistanttogoalongwithwhatistobeimagined–Ithinkhemakesapointthatwemightuse

29

Seed2005,3.

30

Wegner2005,80.

31

SeeBrown2007.

32

See Crane 2007 for  interpretation along  this line.

33

See Person 2007.

34

Goldie 2003.

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I.Vidmar,ThoughtExperiments,Hypotheses,and Cognitive Dimension of Literary Fiction188

inouranalysisoftheanalogybetweenTEsandliteraryfictions.AsGoldieseesit,narrativesinviteustotakethesetwodifferentperspectives:

“Theinternalperspectiveisinvolvedwherethenarrativerepresentsorotherwiseindicatestheperspective,includingthethoughts,feelings,andemotions,ofoneormoreofthepeoplewhoareinternaltothenarrative.Then,externaltothenarrative,thereisthenarrator’sownexternalperspective”.35

Ithinkasimilarapproachcanbetakenbythereaderofaliterarywork:wecanreaditfromexternalperspective,(althoughobviouslynotintheauthorialsenseGoldiepostulates),butas,letussay,observersofwhatisgoingoninthefictionalworld.Ontheinternalperspective,areadercanalsoplaceherselfwithinthefictionalworld,inplaceofoneofthecharacters.Thisisthethoughtbehindtheideathatwecanidentifywithliterarycharactersandseewhatitfeelsliketobeintheirshoes.Thisisthencertainlyapowerfultoolforgainingaffectiveknowledge.Atonepoint,Daviesalsotacklestheideathatwecanshiftperspectivesto-wardsTEs:

“Thompson’sTEdoesdifferfromstandardnarrativesinworksofliteraryfictioninonerespect.Thereaderisinvitedtoimaginecertainthingsoccurringtoher,ratherthantoafictionalchar-acterorgroupoffictionalcharacters.ButthisismerelyarhetoricaldeviceonThompson’spart,andisinnowayessentialtotheTE.Wecouldreplacereferencesto‘you’withreferencesto‘awoman’,etc.,withoutchangingthewayinwhichnarrativefunctions.”36

Sothequestionthenbecomes,doesitmakesensetoclaimthatareadercanapproachliteraryworkfrominternalperspectiveand,giventhatshethenen-tersascenariothatis,fromherperspectivelikeaTE,learnsomethingnew?Uptoacertainpoint,thisproposalseemsplausible.Imaginingwhatitwouldbe like forme tobe in this situationcanbea sourceofknowledge.BarysGautoffersapowerful accountalong these lines, indevelopinghis theoryof learning from the imagination.Whathewants to show is that imagina-tion should be recognized as a source of knowledge, and that literature isparticularlypowerful in governing theprocess of imagining.37But, on theotherhand, it seems thatapproaching literaryfiction in thismannerwouldseriouslyunderminetheoverallvaluetheseworkshave,includingcognitivevalues. One reason for that is that some literary fiction invites us to reflect on something,andinordertodothatwedonothavetothinkaboutwhatitwouldbeliketobeinthatkindofsituation.Forexample,inJohnFowles’novelThe Collector,weareinvitedtothink–amongotherthings–aboutthevalueofart,creativityandartisticexpression.Inordertodothat,IdonothavetoputmyselfinMiranda’sshoesandthinkaboutwhatitwouldbeliketobeheldhostage.ReaderswhoapproachedthisworkonlytoconsiderwhatitfeelsliketobeheldhostageinthemannerdescribedbyFowleswouldmisssomethingterriblyimportantthattheworkoffers.Thisstrategywillalsobe futilewith thoseworks thatofferavisual imageofsomething.Forexample,Coetzee’snovelsoftendepictpost-apartheidcir-cumstances in Africa. I do not think that readers necessarily have to put them-selves in the perspective internal to the narrative in order to grasp the political regimeandsocialconsequenceshisworksdepict, inordertoseethemandreach conclusions about them.So,westartedwiththeassumptionthatliteraryfictioniscognitivelyvaluableand that this value is in fact realized in several different cognitive benefits or payoffs.Thenweagreedthateachofthemshouldhavedifferentjustificatorygrounds;inthecaseoffactualknowledgeandaffectiveknowledge,asDavies

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I.Vidmar,ThoughtExperiments,Hypotheses,and Cognitive Dimension of Literary Fiction189

claims,weneedtohaveareliableauthor.Inthecaseofgeneralprinciples,insightfulwaysofclassifyingrealityandcategorization,fictionfunctionsinthesamewayasTEs.MyworrywastoseewhetherallliteraryfictioncanbeseenasanalogoustoTEsand,afterabriefanalysis,Iconcludedthatthisanalogygenerallycanonlybeextendedtothoseworkspertainingtosciencefiction,duetothenatureoftheircontentandtheunderlyingmotivationforthatparticularkindofdescription.However,ifwefocusonparticularcogni-tive contributions – namely elaboration of general principles and categorical understanding–we can conclude that the analogywithTEs explains howfiction can be  the source of cognitive values. For  literary cognitivists  such asDavies,thiseliminatedthehypothesesproblem.However,Ithinkthere’smore to be said about the hypotheses.

3. The value of hypotheses

Letusgobacktothehypothesesproblem.Theclaimputforwardbythosewhodenyliteraturecognitivevalueisthatgiventhatthereisnoevidenceandnoargumentwithintheliterarywork,thebestwecangetoutoftheworkaredifferenthypothesesaboutgeneralprinciples(moral,sociological,metaphys-ical)andpotentiallyinsightfulwaysoforganizingexperience.Theproblemthenishowtotestthesehypotheses;DavidNovitzclaimedthatthisprocessisdonebyapplyingthehypothesistotheworldand,ifprovencorrect,itcanbeacceptedintoone’ssystemofbeliefandconstituteknowledge.But,theargu-mentgoes,thiscannotberightbecauseitmakesthewholeprocessoftestingexternaltotheprocessofreading.Again,Carroll’sclaim,acceptedbyDavies,wasthattheanalogywithTE’ssettlesthematterinthatthistestingisdonenotbyprojectingthehypotheses to theexternalworld,butbythefact thatthehypothesesengagecognitiveresourceswealreadyhaveandinvirtueofreflective processes they generate in the reader get to be accepted or denied.Letuspursuethisabitfurther,inordertotrytoavoidonemoreargumentputagainstliterarycognitivism.Namely,onepossibleworrythatIhavethatisnotsettledbytheanalogyistheproblemofdifferent,perhapsevencontradictorythesesthatthereadermightendupnegotiating,orevencontradictorybeliefshemightendupwithafterengagingwithliterature.Manyliteraryanti-cogni-tivistsinsistupontheproblemofliteraryworkswhichadvancecontradictoryclaims.Togiveonerathergeneralexample,wecanpointtothewaythatslav-erywaspresentedinAmericanliterature.Thereisatendencytotalkintermsofpro-slaveryvs.anti-slaverywriters.WhileHarrietBeecherStowe’sUncle Tom’s Cabinisseenasarguingforrecognitionofmoralinvalidityofslavery,Caroline Lee Hentz’s Plantern’s Northern Bride aims to convince readers that slaveryfollowsthejustsocialorderandshouldnotbeabolished.38 Another in-terestingexampleofhowliteratureputsforwarddifferent,evencontradictoryviewsandperspectivescanbetracedifweanalysethewaytheconceptoffreewillisdevelopedbyAmericanwriters.WhilecharacterssuchasHuckleberryFinnembodythepossibilityoffreewill,SisterCarriecontradictstheveryno-tionofindependentagency.WhileinMarkTwainwestillhavetheideathatitispossibletoguideone’slifeaccordingtoone’sowndetermination,choices,

35

Ibid.,55.

36

Davies2010b,390.

37

See Gaut 2007.

38

For interpretation along these lines see Crane 2007.

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preferencesandmorality,inTheodoreDreiserandStephenCranecharactersare completely unable to control themselves and their choices and are utterly under the influence of the forces they cannot control or understand.39 Exam-plesliketheseshowthatthecognitivevaluesofliteraturearenotdeliveredintermsofpropositions,inmanycaseshypothesesandquestionsweextractfromworks(“Arewefree?”“Istheresuchathingasmoralobligationtowardslaves?”)willnotprovidedefiniteanswers,butwillcertainly influencethewaywe thinkaboutourworld,ourexperienceandourplace in theworld,thusdeepeningourunderstandingofit.Inthatsense,evenifdifferentworksadvocatedifferentperspectives,it is,Ibelieve,uptothereadertoconsiderthemandevaluatethemandseehowtheyfitwithone’ssystemofbelief.Forexample,ifonetriestomakesenseofthebehaviourofIsabelinThe Portrait of a Lady,onehastoassumethatintheend,shestayswithherabusiveandinsensitive husband and rejects help because she believes she has to fulfil her dutyasawife.But inA Doll’s House,whentrappedinunhappymarriage,Norarejects theprincipleofdutyandherobligationsasawife inorder topursueherownhappiness.Sowhatisareadertoconclude?Foronething,Ithinkthisquestioniswrong;whateverhypothesesreaderpicksupfromthenovelwillnotautomaticallygeneratenewknowledge.Thecognitivevalueofthesehypothesesisnotingeneratingnewknowledgeorbeliefs,butin–whatIwillroughlycall–theirinstrumentalfunction,thatis,intheimpacttheyhaveforthewayweaccountfortheexperience–cogni-tiveandemotional–withtheworld.PeterKivyhasofferedananalysisofthecognitivevaluesofliteratureintheseterms.DrawingontheworkofWilliamJames,hedrawsadistinctionbetweenliveanddeadhypotheses.Thediffer-enceisroughlythatlivehypothesesarerecognizedbytheaudienceasworthyoffurtherconsiderationandthought,whiledeadarerecognizedasofnoin-terestandprobablyuntrue.Kivyadvanceswhathecallsatheoryofliteraryplausibility,accordingtowhich:

“…oneofthepurposesofsomeliteraryworksistoexpresspropositions,frequentlymoralor,broadlyspeaking,philosophicalones,whichpresenttouslivehypothesesconcerningmatersof deep and abiding significance.When a literarywork succeeds in doing this, it possessestherebyliteraryvalue,whichImightaswellcallpropositionalvalue.Thisisbynomeanstheonlykindofliteraryvalueitpossesses,andmanyliteraryworksdonotpossesspropositionalvalueatall”.40

AlthoughKivyismostlyconcernedwiththebanalityproblem,hisanalysiscan easily be applied to the problem of the value of hypotheses. Here is again a quote from him:

“Wherethebanalityisallegedtoresultfromthelackofargumentandanalysisintheliteraryworks,asitwouldinmanynovels,thereplyisthatargumentandanalysisoccurinthegapsandafterlife,in the reader’s mind,aspartandparcelofalegitimateliteraryexperience”.41

AlthoughKivydoesnotgointoanydetailastohowthishappensintheread-er’smind,obviously,withKivyaswellaswithDavies,wehavethisideathattheprocessoftestingisinternal.Kivy,howeverextendsthisinternalitytoin-cludewhathecallsgapsandafterlifeinthereadingexperience,duringwhich“the  images and content  linger on  in  the mind  to be savoured and  thought about”.42Ithinkthishelpsussettletheproblemofdiverse,evencontradictoryhypotheses.Toconclude,literaryfictionissaturatedwithdifferentcognitivebenefitsanditscontributionto thewayweseetheworld,makesenseof it,andnegoti-ateourrelationswithothersiscertainlycognitivelyvaluable.This,however,

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I.Vidmar,ThoughtExperiments,Hypotheses,and Cognitive Dimension of Literary Fiction191

does not mean that this cognitive aspect should take precedence over overall aestheticvalue.Inthispaper,Isimplywantedtogroundcognitivedimensionofliteraturefromepistemicpointofview.Thatshouldnottakeawayfrom–ifanything,itshouldaddto–thereasonswevalueliteratureaesthetically.43

References

BottingF.(2005),“’MonstersoftheImagination’:Gothic,Science,Fiction”,inD.Seed(ed.),A Companion to Science Fiction,Blackwell,pp.112–126.

Brown J.R. (2007), “ThoughtExperiments inScience,Philosophy, andMathematics“,Croatian Journal of Philosophy,7,19,pp.3–26.

CarrollN.(1990),The Philosophy of Horror: Or, Paradoxes of the Heart, Routledge.

CarrollN.(2002),“TheWheelofVirtue:Art,LiteratureandMoralKnowledge”,The Jour­nal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,60,1,pp.3–26.

Carter R. and J. McRae (2001), The Routledge History of Literature in English,Routledge.

ClarkC.R.L.(2005),“ScienceFictionandReligion”,inD.Seed(ed.),A Companion to Science Fiction, Blackwell,pp.95–110.

CraneG. (2007),The Cambridge Introduction to Nineteenth­Century American Novel,Cambridge University Press.

DaviesD.(2007a),Aesthetics and Literature,London:Continuum.

DaviesD.(2007b),“ThoughtExperimentsandFictionalNarratives”,Croatian Journal of Philosophy,7,9,pp.29–45.

DaviesD.(2010a),“LearningthroughFictionalNarrativesinArtandScience”,inR.FriggandM.Hunter(eds.),Beyond Mimesis and Convention: Representation in Art and Science,BostonStudiesinthePhilosophyofScience262,Dordrecht:Springer,pp.51–70.

DaviesD.(2010b),“EludingWilson’s‘ElusiveNarrators’”,Philosophical Studies147.3,pp.387–394.

DohrnD.(2009),“CounterfactualNarrativeExplanation”,The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 67,1,pp.37–47.

GautB.(2006),“ArtandCognition”,inM.Kieran(ed).,Contemporary Debates in Aes­thetics and the Philosophy of Art,Wiley–Blackwell,pp.115–126.

GautB.(2007),Art, Emotion, and Ethics,OxfordUniversityPress.

GibsonJ.(2007),Fiction and the Weave of Life,OxfordUniversityPress.

GoldieP.(2003),“Narrative,Emotion,andPerspective”,inM.KieranandD.Lopes(eds.),Imagination, Philosophy and the Arts,Routledge,pp.55–69.

KieranM.(1996)“Art,Imagination,andtheCultivationofMorals”,The Journal of Aes­thetics and Art Criticism54:4,pp.337–351.

KieranM.(2005),Revealing Art,Routledge.

39

See Crane 2007 for interpretation along these lines.

40

Kivy2006,103.

41

Ibid.,112.

42

Ibid.,108.

43

IwouldliketothankDavidDavies,SnježanaPrijić Samaržija, Elvio Baccarini and twoanonymous  referees  for  their  valuable  com-ments and suggestions regarding this paper.

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KivyP.(2006),The Performance of Reading: an Essay in the Philosophy of Literature,Oxford:Blackwell.

NovitzD.(1984),“FictionandtheGrowthofKnowledge”,inJ.Margolis(ed.),The Worlds of Art and the World,Amsterdam:Rodopi.

Person L.S. (2007),The Cambridge Introduction to Nathaniel Hawthorne, CambridgeUniversity Press.

ShippeyT.(2005),“HardReading:TheChallengesofScienceFiction”,inD.Seed(ed.),A Companion to Science Fiction, BlackwellPublishing,pp.11–26.

SwirskiP.(2007),Of Literature and Knowledge: Explorations in Narrative Thought Ex­periments, Evolution, and Game Theory, Routledge.

WegnerP.(2005),“Utopia”,inD.Seed(ed.),A Companion to Science Fiction, Blackwell,pp.79–94.

Iris Vidmar

Misaoni eksperimenti, hipoteze i kognitivna dimenzija književne fikcije

SažetakNeki autori brane književni kognitivizam – stajalište da književna fikcija ima spoznajnu vrijed­nost – povlačeći analogiju između spoznajne vrijednosti misaonih eksperimenata i književne fikcije. U ovome ću radu analizirati razloge za ovu analogiju te vidjeti koliko se njen doseg može proširiti. U drugome dijelu razmotrit ću tvrdnju književnih antikognitivista prema kojoj književ­nost u najboljem slučaju može biti samo izvor hipoteza, a ne znanja. Ovu ću tvrdnju dovesti u pitanje pokazujući da hipoteze same mogu imati vrijedne spoznajne koristi, u nadi da se na taj način mogu obnoviti spoznajne koristi koje čitatelji pronalaze u književnosti.

Ključne riječispoznajnevrijednosti,hipoteze,književnikognitivizam,realizam,znanstvenafantastika

Iris Vidmar

Gedankenexperimente, Hypothesen und kognitive Dimension der literarischen Fiktion

ZusammenfassungEinige Verfasser verteidigen den literarischen Kognitivismus – einen Standpunkt, nach welchem die literarische Fiktion erkenntnismäßig ersprießlich ist – indem sie eine Parallele zwischen den Erkenntniswerten der Gedankenexperimente und der Literaturfiktion ziehen. In dieser Schrift fasse ich den Vorsatz, die Ursachen für diese Parallelisierung auszukundschaften wie auch zu ermitteln, inwieweit sich diese Analogie ausdehnen lässt. In dem zweiten Teil wende ich mich der vonseiten der literarischen Antikognitivisten vorgebrachten Behauptung zu, welcher zufolge die Lieratur günsigstensfalls eine Hypothesen­ und keineswegs eine Wissensquelle zu sein vermag. Ich hinterfrage diese These, indem ich die Anschauung erhärte, dass Hypothesen über eigene wertvolle erkenntnisbezogene Vorzüge verfügen können; all dies in der Hoffnung, kognitive Vorteile herzustellen, welche die Leserschaft aus der Literatur herausliest.

SchlüsselwörterkognitiveWerte,Hypothesen,literarischerKognitivismus,Realismus,Science-Fiction

SYNTHESIS PHILOSOPHICA 55–56(1–2/2013)pp.(177–193)

I.Vidmar,ThoughtExperiments,Hypotheses,and Cognitive Dimension of Literary Fiction193

Iris Vidmar

Expériences mentales, hypothèses et dimension cognitive de la fiction littéraire

RésuméCertains auteurs défendent le cognitivisme littéraire – position selon laquelle la fiction littéraire a une valeur cognitive – en établissant une analogie entre les valeurs cognitives de l’expérience mentale et la fiction littéraire. Dans cet article, j’analyserai les raisons de cette analogie et ver­rai jusqu’où cette analogie peut s’étendre. Dans la seconde partie, j’examinerai l’affirmation des anti­cognitivistes littéraires selon lesquels la littérature peut tout au plus être une source d’hypothèses et non pas du savoir. Je mets cette affirmation au défi en montrant que les hypo­thèses à elles seules peuvent avoir de précieux avantages cognitifs, dans l’espoir de restaurer ainsi les avantages cognitifs que les lecteurs tirent de la littérature.

Mots-clésvaleurscognitives,hypothèses,cognitivismelittéraire,réalisme,science-fiction