THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION1

(Published in The Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour – Dec 1993)

We all conduct thought experiments; sometimes these are driven by the imagination and

sometimes by fantasy. There are times when the experiments involve conjectures which

might help us manipulate an uncertain world: research scientists wonder what might happen

in their experiments and new tennis professionals how they might cope with their

opponents' play during crucial points. The scientists might also dream about how they

would respond when being presented with a Nobel prize and the tennis players how they

might react when being presented with the winner's trophy at Wimbledon.

Possibly every thought experiment which is driven by the imagination has a noetic

function. Normally this function will have cognitive significance only if the experiment is

accompanied by some form of activity. The scientists need to carry out their experiments

and the tennis players need to play their matches if either set of thought experiments is to

bear cognitive fruit. There are, however, some theoretical scientists who wish to harvest

such fruit while omitting the practical activity. They believe that they can increase our

understanding of the social world by carrying out unaccompanied thought experiments.

In this paper I shall be following the fortunes of some of these theoretical social scientists.

The pursuit is subordinate to one of my main aims. I intend to identify some of the limits

beyond which arguments based on conjectures about the human condition cannot

legitimately stray. This aim is closely linked with my second objective. I intend to show

that, because the theories of radical social reformers depend upon conducting thought

experiments which assume changes in the substratum which sustains social change, the

results of the implementation of the reforms are necessarily indeterminate. Further, I shall

argue that the indeterminacy presents us with two moral issues: its absence causes a sense

of alienation which can be deeper than the one identified by Marx and its presence obscures

some of the moral and epistemological questions surrounding social transformations.

The discussion will contain an examination of the process of experimentation in both the

natural and social sciences. More precisely, I shall be concerned with the processes of

explanation intrinsic to experimentation. It will be seen that two notions lie at the heart of

all such explanatory processes. The first of these is the concept of a closure. I shall

characterise the second as a sustaining substratum2 within which closures are built and/or

discerned. I shall argue that, underpinning the possibility of forming and/or discerning

closures, is the relationship between a particular and its environment. I am claiming that

there is a parallel to be drawn between the natural and the social sciences. Natural science

operates on the assumption that the structure of physical space is not independent of the

properties of the particles which occupy it. I argue that the same assumption applies in the

social sciences; the structure of social space is not independent of the properties of social

particulars.

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The substantiation of my claim, that the notions of a closure and its sustaining substratum

are central to all explanatory processes, is a Kantian one. Indeed, Kant himself provides us

with a similar argument, in the Transcendental Doctrine of the Elements, supporting the

notion of a sustaining substratum in the natural world. The transcendental argument I

develop here is an extension of the one advanced by Roy Bhaskar3. Both his and my

arguments are based on the intelligibility of certain social practices. These practices

involve the development and application of our understanding of phenomena beyond the

confines of closures when that understanding is gained through the creation and/or

observation of what happens inside the closures.

Closures

The recognition of the significance of the concept of a closure has its roots in Marxist

thought. R N Carew-Hunt4 acknowledged the role played by the concept of a closure in the

Marxist analysis of science. Bhaskar5 identified the significance of the concept and

produced an analysis of the implications of its tacit exploitation by science. The argument

here represents a development from the Bhaskarian position. In particular, I orientate

closures in the world of things rather than, as Bhaskar does, in the world of events. This

reorientation will enable us to see that there is a fundamental difference between

conducting thought experiments in the natural and the social sciences.

Bhaskar does not analyse the concept of a closure per se. He merely offers us a criterion by

which we can identify the presence of closures: "Suppose we had a system where events of

type a were invariably followed by events of type b. We could say that a closure had been

obtained"6. This criterion, dependent upon actually occurring events, is, unfortunately for

Bhaskar, an inductively based criterion. It locates closures in what Bhaskar himself

describes as 'the domain of the actual'7 - the world of events. Part of the motive for writing

this paper is to offer a correction of this Bhaskarian oversight and relocate closures in 'the

realm of the real'.

Bhaskar offers an analysis of the implications of the intelligibility of the construction and

uses of closures (in the identification of causal mechanisms), and the exploitation (beyond

the confines of the closures) of knowledge so gained. Unfortunately, he does not analyse

the concept of a closure, beyond offering the criterion: he only examines the preconditions

for the intelligibility of 'closure-building'(my term) by scientists. He points out that the

intelligibility of scientific practices presupposes a belief in the translocal8 (my term)

operation of causal processes. In other words, causal processes operate both inside and

outside the confines of the closures which are either identified or created by scientists. The

justification for the belief in the translocal operation is based on the intelligibility both of

certain procedures and of the maintenance and development of research institutions. These

procedures involve the identification of the operations of mechanisms in a closure and the

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subsequent application, outside the confines of the closed conditions, of the knowledge of

the operations of those mechanisms. Scientific institutions train individuals to use and

develop such procedures.

Bhaskar's argument does not need to appeal directly to the intelligibility of procedures

involving the ability to create or discern closures by scientists. It need only appeal to the

intelligibility of the translocal application of knowledge, however gained, in order to

support the claim that causal mechanisms operate independently of the outcome of any

specific instance of that operation. In this paper I am extending the Bhaskarian analysis

and, I believe, making it less susceptible to criticism. I am highlighting the significance of

the fact that the translocal application of knowledge is intelligible only on the basis of a

specific assumption: that, at the point of operation, a closure could, given our current

understanding of the operations of objects in our world, be either formed or discerned. I am

pointing out that local closures are characterised by the nature of a restricted area of space

and by the natures of the objects contained in that area. Closures are not Bhaskarian ones:

they are not characterised by the phenomena which may indicate that they have been

formed.

A few examples may illustrate the simplicity of this claim. Your use of a hammer is

intelligible on the assumption that, as long as there are no impediments to the nail, it will

move into any normal wall when you hit it. Similarly your use of the money in your pocket

to make a purchase is intelligible on the assumption that bank notes are still generally

accepted as means of exchange. In both cases you are assuming that, in a closed local

environment, events of type a are normally followed by events of type b. Since any failure

of b to follow a does not make you reject the notion that a closure exists, the conjunction of

b and a does not constitute the closure. You might use insufficient force when wielding the

hammer and fail to move the nail or might look too furtive when attempting to use money

and find your bank note refused. In either case the closed conditions would still prevail yet

no expected outcome would occur.

The assumptions inherent in the uses of objects with causal powers stretch beyond the

claim that closures are not characterised by events. Further assumptions are made.

Another example can serve to illustrate their nature. Suppose you are standing at the top of

the leaning tower of Pisa. You take two bricks and apply glue to one face on each brick.

You check that the foot of the tower is clear. From the parapet you drop the two bricks,

holding them next to each other with the glued faces 2mm apart immediately prior to

release. If we assume that the air resistance experienced by each brick is not significantly

different from that experienced by the other they should reach the ground at the same time.

You now take two more bricks of the same weight and material as the first two and glue

them together in the same relative positions as the ones previously dropped. You now drop

this new large glued brick. This will take the same length of time to reach the ground as the

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two individual bricks, unless you believe that the adhesion process has somehow changed

the effect of gravity on the individual bricks. We can repeat the process with three or more

bricks, so justifying the claim that objects of different weights are accelerated by gravity at

the same rate.

This thought experiment seems to tell us something about the nature of a world which

operates independently of thought. A closer examination of the assumptions made will

reveal that the experiment tells us about our interpretations of the world rather than about

the workings of gravity. My students of applied mathematics have all accepted that it tells

us something about gravity. When presented with the same experiment my philosophy

students immediately began to ask, with their tongues firmly in their cheeks, whether the

colours or the ages of the bricks were the same, whether the experiment was to be carried

out in springtime or summertime, whether any church services were being held in Pisa at

the time or whether the bricks were dropped from the east or the north side of the tower.

These questions help to illustrate the fact that the thought experiment involves the making

of two assumptions. Firstly, the influence of all 'extraneous factors' has been brushed aside

- all possible shocks are seen as endogenous rather than exogenous to the closed system.

The decision regarding precisely what is an extraneous factor itself has not been questioned

by the theoretical physicist. The exclusion of the influence of extraneous factors is

imbedded in the parameters which discipline the thought experiment; these parameters

constitute the closure. The exclusion can only be based on the interpretations, inherent in

our understanding of phenomena, of what causes the phenomena.

Secondly, as J R Lucas indicated9, there is an assumption that the experiment could be

carried out from, say, the top of the Parthenon; that the parameters can be found in Athens

as well. Here the experimenter is assuming that there exists a substructure which sustains

the causal processes which generate the repeated phenomena. The thought experiment is

making patent our existing latent interpretations of the world. In so doing it is illustrating

to us what our assumptions are regarding the nature of the substratum which sustains the

closures which we assume occur and recur.

The sustaining substratum for a closure

The assumption of the presence of a sustaining substratum is the one to which Kant alludes

in the Transcendental Doctrine of the Elements. Kant does not explicitly state that the

rationality of attempts to replicate closures involves the assumptions of homogeneous time

and three-dimensional space. However, his argument makes the same claim using different

words. The presupposition of a single system of time rests on the possibility that illusion

can be can distinguished from non-illusion; the presupposition of a stable three-dimensional

physical world rests on the possibility that our sense perceiving mechanisms can operate;

and the presupposition that there is an ordered noumenal world rests on the possibility that

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the phenomena can be experienced. Each of these Kantian arguments supports the claim

that there is a substratum which sustains the possibility of cognitive interactions with the

natural world. Kant is, albeit implicitly, basing his argument on the repeatability of certain

operations and so of the existence of closures formed within a sustaining substratum.

I am claiming that the notion of a sustaining substratum for a closure is one which is

needed if one is to make sense of the idea of translocal operations of any causal process.

Further, the application of the knowledge gained from creating and/or identifying closures

makes sense only if the closure can, in principle, be set up in other circumstances and/or

locations. It makes sense only if the closure can be replicated. The 'discovery' of a nuclear

reaction at room temperature was dismissed as insignificant because the closure could not

be recreated. The possibility of the replication of the closure conditions is seen by

scientists as a precondition of the acceptability of a claim that a causal process has been

identified in a given experiment. In this the scientists are using the same criteria for the

validation of claims which non-scientists use. Bhaskar's analysis misses a point: the

intelligibility of the possible replication of a local closure rests on the assumption of the

existence of a stable basis upon which the closure is built. This omission leaves him with a

concept which, in his own terms, characterises closures as flat and undifferentiated10.

The ability to replicate a closure is important not because scientists are using some form of

inductive or verificationist reasoning. Rather it is important because it makes intelligible

the translocal applicability of any knowledge gained in creating the closure. Further, it is

intelligible only on the assumption that closures are sustained by a stable substratum.

Suppose I were to 'discover' that placing two coins on a window-ledge attracted certain

types of butterfly to the window. You would only believe that I had discovered a way of

pursuing armchair lepidoptery if you were able to replicate my experiment; you would, I

hope, not dismiss my claim totally if you failed to attract any butterflies. It is certainly

intelligible to claim that a causal mechanism may be operating in a new location, beyond

the confines of a closure, without a specific caused event being actualised. However, such

a claim can only be intelligible on the assumption that a closure could either be created or

discerned if, in this new location, one were able to shut off all impediments to the

operations of the identified causal mechanism. The assumption, that the local closure could

be replicated, itself rests on an assumption that the basic conditions for the creation of a

closure are present - in other words, on the existence of a base which can sustain the

closure. It is this base which I am characterising as a sustaining substratum for a closure.

The points being made here owe much to the insights of J R Lucas. He argues that:

"Natural science seeks general explanations. It does not admit of special cases, in the way

the humane disciplines do. Causes have to be in principle repeatable, and thus

universalisable in a strong sense. If a difference in position in space, or in time, or of some

human being's state of mind, or of some distant part of the universe, were enough to make

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two situations relevantly different, then science would be impossible. It is a necessary

presupposition of scientific enquiry,..., that two situations can be alike in all relevant

respects."11 Lucas' insights could take him further than he took them. He does not pursue

the point that "some human being's state of mind" should not make situations relevantly

different. It is this insight which is being developed in this paper. It is a development

which will show that Lucas' implication that explanations in the human sciences differ from

those in the natural sciences is not tenable. The difference between the natural and the

human sciences is not to be found in the type of explanations they seek - for they both seek

general explanations. The difference is to be found in the nature of the substrata which

sustain the behaviour of natural and social particulars.

The development of Lucas' throwaway insight might be characterised as a Transcendental

Doctrine of Social Elements. Its development will involve me in an examination of

explanatory processes concerned with either actual or theoretical experimentation and

either the actual or theoretical implementation of understanding gained from

experimentation. I shall also outline a condensed transcendental deduction of social space.

Underpinning the deduction is an analysis of the relationship between a social particular

and its environment.

THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL SPACE: THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS AND

INDETERMINACY

Explanations of phenomena in both the natural and social sciences incorporate some

analysis of the relationship between a particular and its environment. In quantum

mechanics the very fabric of physical space is seen as dependent upon the nature of

particles and their behaviour within a system12. Explanations in the sciences have, in this

century, recognised the effect which the relationship has on the structure of the

environment. Explanations in the social sciences have generally ignored it. This neglect

tends to lead to one of two forms of explanation: the individualistic and the holistic.

Both forms of explanation involve an assumption of an absolute social space - a space

whose structure is independent of the characteristics of the individuals who operate within

it. Individualist theorists assume that persons, the only initiators of social change, operate

in a stable environment which is independent of the individuals. A concept of social space,

which is not identical with natural space, is not even formulated. Holistic theorists, on the

other hand, assume that there is a permanent social environment within which local

closures can be formed. The holist assumes that the whole of social space constitutes an

all-embracing closure, so also assumes the presence of an absolute social space. Among

the individualistic theorists one finds Comte, Weber and the British empiricist

philosophers. Marx and many of his followers can be counted among the holistic theorists.

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Natural scientists have begun to appreciate the significance of considerations of the nature

of the substratum which sustains the possibility of forming closures. They theorise about

the nature of physical space13. They do not, however, conduct experiments which directly

test out these theories. Indeed, they cannot. The theories are assessed on the basis of their

explanatory richness, for it is logically impossible to test the nature of the basis upon which

phenomena occur - one can only test the behaviour of a given mechanism which generates

phenomena. In order to investigate the properties of a structure one has to separate oneself

from it, even if temporarily. If the structure happens to be the space within which one is

operating the separation becomes problematic. The problems of attempting to remove

oneself from the substratum which sustains the operations of things being investigated in an

experiment are vividly illustrated in Erwin Schrödinger's famous thought experiment

involving a cat.

Schrödinger's experiment14 is designed to tell us something about the function of

measurement in quantum mechanics. It points out the problems which flow from

considering a measuring system to be separate from the system which is being investigated.

The experiment involves the possible demise of a cat. The poor feline is confined to a

sealed chamber in which a quantum event can trigger the discharge of a deadly poison into

the chamber's atmosphere. The observer of the experiment is outside the sealed chamber

and has no information about the health of the cat until the chamber is opened. From the

point of view of this observer the state of the cat is in a linear superposition of being dead

and being alive. The result of the experiment would only become known when the

chamber is opened. However, if someone were, with suitable protection, to be stationed

inside the sealed chamber then, from this observer's point of view, the actual state of the cat

would be known at all times.

This is not the place to discuss the implications of this experiment on the development of

theories of quantum physics. It does not even test theories in quantum mechanics. What is

significant is the fact that the experiment tells us something about the nature of the

constraints which the system of measurement employed in the experiment place on the

possible conclusions the experiment permits us to draw. It tells us that the possibility of the

separation of the system of measurement, used in the experiment, from the experimental

activity impinges upon the nature of the experiment. This means that an experiment

cannot, per se, be used to investigate a system of measurement. In other words it cannot be

used to investigate the nature of part of the substratum which sustains the possibility of

forming local closures.

The generalisation of this result is justifiable. The extent to which the relationship between

a particular and its environment affects the structure of that environment cannot be

investigated in an experiment. Since the relationship must be seen as integral to the

substratum which sustains the formation of closures, any interpretation of observations

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presupposes a conception of what constitutes a closure. Since a closure does not constitute

a constant conjunction of events, observation of the outcome of an experiment cannot tell

us either that a closure has been obtained or that our interpretation of the relationship

between a mechanism and the sustaining substratum is sustainable. No amount of

observation of the cat can confirm or refute our conjectures about the nature of space and

time within which the cat's demise is sealed; although observation is not irrelevant to the

question. Schrödinger's experiment illustrates something about the limitations of

experimental processes in general. Such processes cannot be used to investigate the

assumptions upon which the experiments are constructed.

The need for, and limitations of, thought experiments

Both natural and human scientists do, however, need to investigate the properties of the

substratum which sustains the replication of closures. It is in attempting to understand

these operations that the thought experiment is not only a powerful tool, but is necessary. It

is only by conducting thought experiments that one can set up a series of actual

experiments using different assumptions about the nature of the substratum which sustains

the operations of mechanism in and beyond local closures. The criteria for deciding which

experiment provides one with deeper understanding cannot, in these circumstances, be

based on the observed results; the observations are themselves influenced by the perceived

constitution of the substratum. The criteria must be based on the explanatory richness of

the theory which specifies the parameters of a particular substratum. The most famous

examples of such thought experiments are the ones postulated by Einstein. The observation

of the arrival, on earth, of some particles whose half life was such as to indicate that they

should fade away in the atmosphere did not confirm Einstein's theory of relative time and

space. It showed that his theory had greater explanatory richness than the alternative.

Theoreticians in the social sciences face similar problems to those which Einstein faced.

However, they have additional ones. They cannot assume, as Einstein did, that the

substratum which sustains the translocal operations of causal mechanisms is stable. Indeed,

their own theorising may have an impact on that stability. Changes in either the belief or

knowledge of individuals may change the very fabric of social space. Such changes could

even destroy social space altogether and make all social interactions impossible15. But even

if they merely tinker with the substratum which sustains the translocal operations of social

agents, their theories become inapplicable in the social environment in which they were

framed. The possible tinkering will deprive the thought experiment of any noetic function

it might have.

Thought experiments in the human sciences

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The last point indicates that there are two types of thought experiment in the human

sciences: those which have, and those which lack, a noetic function. I indicated at the

beginning of the paper that thought experiments driven by the imagination had a noetic

function. Perhaps it would be more accurate to claim that the possession of a noetic

function is a criterion by which one judges whether a thought experiment is driven by the

imagination. The thought experiment lacking a noetic function can be said to be driven by

fantasy. This is not to assert that such experiments have no function; indeed, the argument

in the next section is based on the premise that there is an important part to be played by

thought experiments driven by fantasy. This function is based on the exploitation of the

power to alter the structure of the substratum which sustains the translocal operations of

social agents.

I shall show that there is a penalty to be paid for the exercise of this power. The penalty is

the indeterminacy of the outcome of the exercise of the power. I shall demonstrate this by

examining two well-known thought experiments. In the first the assumptions about the

structure of the sustaining substratum are clearly enunciated. In the second they are not;

but I believe that it is possible to show that the assumptions involve a distortion of the

sustaining substratum.

The first thought experiment was initially developed by J R Lucas and recently revived by

Roger Penrose16. It is an anti-reductionist argument in which the result of Gödel's theorem

is used in an attempt to show that human minds are not machines. The Lucas/Penrose

argument is a simple one. They start by assuming that the behaviour of all natural

mechanisms can be described using logico-mathematical systems. Each state of a naturally

occurring mechanism corresponds to a statement in some logico-mathematical system.

Changes of state are restricted to those which can be described as algorithms. Each

algorithm can correspond to a derivation in a logico-mathematical system. In this way

machines are restricted to reaching states which can be derived from other states. The truth

of a proposition, for them, is based on its derivability from a proposition whose truth value

has already been allocated. Penrose and Lucas now invoke Gödel's theorem: they claim

that, while a machine can be presented with a Gödel statement, it cannot attach truth to it -

for the Gödel statement asserts its own underivability. Some humans exist who patently

can assign truth to the Gödel statement. Penrose and Lucas now conclude that mechanical

devices cannot be minds.

Several attempts have been made to refute this argument17. None has so far found its main

weakness. By adopting the analytical techniques developed in this paper it is easy to see

what this is. Penrose and Lucas constrain natural objects to operate in a universe in which

all changes can be formalised into a logico-mathematical system. Gödel's theorem shows

that derivability can be formalised but truth cannot be. What Penrose and Lucas seem to

have missed is that Gödel's theorem uses an unformalised notion: recursiveness. So by

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allowing a machine to operate according to derivation rules in a logico-mathematical

system they are tacitly permitting it to use an unformalised notion. If the substratum

sustaining the operations of natural mechanisms can be constructed using one unformalised

notion, recursiveness, then Penrose and Lucas need to explain why it cannot be constructed

using another, truth.

The failure of the argument is not as significant as what its attempt emphasises. Penrose

and Lucas touched on an important feature of the mind/mechanical device comparison in

focusing on the nature of the substratum which sustains behaviour in the social and the

natural worlds. They believe that the substrata sustaining the operations of objects in the

natural and social worlds are different. The example of Schrödinger's cat illustrated that

this is a belief which cannot be tested by experiments, whether actual or postulated.

However, their belief did not involve Penrose and Lucas in postulating a disruption of the

substratum sustaining the operations of social entities. It is the power individuals have to

initiate such a disruption which provides reasons to believe that the substrata sustaining the

translocal operations of objects are different in the natural and social worlds.

A brief examination of a second thought experiment will indicate what might happen when

the thought experimenter postulates a possible change in the structure of the substratum. In

this experiment Derek Parfit18 postulates the division of a single self into two separate

selves. The separation he suggests is of a single brain one half of which is transplanted into

an identical triplet while the other half transplants into a second identical triplet. The

recipient triplets were postulated as brain dead prior to the operations and the donor as

having no functions other than brain functions. Parfit then asks which, if either of the two

new persons is the original one. He presents us with three possibilities: in the first the

original person does not survive; in the second the original person survives as one of the

two new persons; in the third the original person survives as both the new persons.

He dismisses the first of his possibilities by pointing out that there are examples of

individuals who have survived without one half of their brains. How, he asks, could a

double success be a failure? He dismisses the second by stating that "each half of the brain

is exactly similar, and so, to start with is each resulting person"19. When making this claim

he has already asserted that "the division of a person's consciousness into two separate

streams - is a feature that has actually occurred". This forces him to accept the third

possibility: namely that the person survives as both new persons.

It can readily be seen that the premises of Parfit's argument presuppose the exclusion of an

alternative conclusion to the one he offers. By asserting that the original person cannot

survive as only one of the two 'new' persons, he is tacitly assuming that persons are defined

in terms of their behavioural characteristics. He is assuming, without offering any

argument, that a Cartesian dualism is untenable. The original person might survive as one

of the twins with the other being somehow newly born.

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The importance of the analysis of this thought experiment does not, however, lie in the

discovery that its conclusions were presupposed in its premises. Its significance is to be

found rather in the nature of the consequences which flow from the assumptions embedded

in the premises. These assumptions involve the possible distortion of the substratum which

sustains the possibility of translocal operations of social agents. The continued stability of

the sustaining substratum is a precondition of the possibility of conducting any

investigation. Various factors, both natural and social, act as preconditions to the stability

of the sustaining substratum. Of those found in the social sphere one of the more

significant is the stability of the mechanisms by which meanings are confirmed and by

which they develop.

It is the significance of this precondition which lies at the heart of the analysis presented in

this paper. The mechanisms by which the meanings of concepts are confirmed and/or

develop perform similar functions in the social world to those played in the natural world

by the mechanisms by which energy is transferred and by which motion through gravity

occurs. If either set of mechanisms ceased to operate, the respective worlds would cease to

function. If the operations of either of the sets of mechanisms were to alter then the

question as to whether either world could continue to function in a recognisably similar

way would be indeterminate.

By assuming that it is possible for persons to divide Parfit is putting possible stress on the

meaning-affirming and/or meaning-developing mechanisms. Since he is attempting to say

something about all persons, the ability to divide must be one which is to apply to all

persons. It is not clear whether Parfit intends this ability to become manifest only in very

special circumstances; circumstances which would be known to all persons involved in

sustaining the operations of meaning-affirming and meaning-developing social structures.

But if the division of a person could take place without warning it is extremely unlikely that

social structures could function in any way in which we could make sense of them. In these

circumstances our concept of unity, central to the building of other concepts, would be

unlikely to be understood. What I am saying here is that, if Parfit's thought experiment is to

function as a means of increasing our understanding of our current cultural environment,

then he has to show that his conjectures do not destroy the basis upon which that

environment retains its structural integrity.

The postulated results of Parfit's experiments are not as significant as the possibility of the

indeterminacy of their outcome. It is the indeterminacy which should attract our attention.

The fact that we can conceive that persons might divide and thereby change the sustaining

substratum within which social closures are built should be the central issue in Parfit's

argument. Parfit may be correct in claiming that Personal Identity does not matter; indeed

the concept could become redundant. The reason is not, however, that identity can

bifurcate or that it might be possible to change one individual into another. The concept of

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Personal Identity might not matter because the substratum which sustains the meanings of

concepts could alter the nature of the concept in a manner which cannot be determined a

priori.

INDETERMINACY, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION AND MORAL VALUES

In the remainder of this paper I shall identify some of the consequences which flow from

the presence and absence of indeterminacy. I shall focus specifically on the moral and

epistemological issues faced by those who would transform society. These reformers face a

paradox which lies at the heart of certain moral values which are intrinsic to the operations

of social entities. Both aspects of the paradox are associated with indeterminacy: one with

its absence and one with its presence.

Radical social reform and moral values

The intelligibility of any attempt to transform society presupposes an association of moral

value with the operations of social structures. I am not concerned here with social changes

generated by forces which operate independently of the conceptualisations of individuals;

changes which result from evolutionary processes or from factors such as climate. The

concern is with those changes which result from conscious social engineering. I believe

that, using the analytical approach developed in this paper, it is possible to draw a sharp

distinction between these two types of change.

If we are to discover moral values in the operations of social structures we need to

scrutinise their possible influence on social agents. Social structures in social environments

have only two possible influences. They either enable and/or constrain specific social

behaviour, or they facilitate and/or bridle the development of the powers of social agents.

The moral values targeted by, and proposed emancipatory action taken by, the social

reformer must be concerned with either or both of these influences.

When the operations of a social structure either enable or constrain the behaviour of a

social agent they affect the agent's sense of self. An illustration of the positive side of this

effect is described by Dante. He identified the enhanced sense of self which accompanies

successful action when he stated:

"For in every action what is primarily intended by the doer whether he acts as a

result of natural necessity or out of free will, is the disclosure of his own image.

Hence it comes about that every doer, in so far as he does, takes delight in

doing; since everything that is desires its own being, and since in action the

being of the doer is somehow intensified, delight necessarily follows... Thus

nothing acts unless by acting it makes patent its latent self."20

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The negative side of this phenomenon occurs when the doer is prevented from acting and

so disclosing his own image.

The social reformer who wishes to improve the human condition would attempt either to

rearrange, or even to destroy, social structures so that their constraining effects would be

minimised and/or the enabling effects maximised. The purpose of attempting a

rearrangement, and/or destruction, would be to enhance the prospects of the intensifications

of the sense of being to which Dante refers. A natural science equivalent of such a reform

would involve the rearrangement of physical conditions in order to permit, say, wheat to

grow. The reform process might involve the destruction of a social structure, without

altering the substratum which sustains the operations of other structures. Examples of such

reforms would be the abolition of slavery and the dissipation of the Italian Fascist Party

after the Second World War; a natural science equivalent might be the eradication of

smallpox.

In both the social and natural cases there is an assumption that structure of the space within

which objects operate is the same before and after the rearrangements and/or eradications.

The enabling of the social behaviour of individuals is based on the possibility that the

powers of any social agent can operate translocally. The constraint of the social behaviour

of individuals is based on the same possibility. These in turn depend upon the possibility

that local social closures can be formed and so that a stable substratum sustaining the

closure also exists.

A welfare system will only enable individuals to activate the provision of funds if, given

the formation of a closure, any individual can trigger a payment of a quantity of money

from a specific source. A labour market will only prevent particular individuals from

earning above a pre-defined poverty line if, given the formation of a closure, any attempt to

earn a higher wage (by an individual of this particular type) were to result in failure. Both

an extension of the welfare system and an alteration of the influence of the labour market

may result in the empowering of some individuals. Both these processes can only function

if the stability of the substratum which sustains the behaviour of social entities is

maintained.

Such social changes could not, however, be seen to involve an alteration of the structural

integrity of the substratum itself. The substratum sustains the mechanisms by which the

meanings of concepts are maintained and developed, so a changing substratum could not

sustain the replication of social closures. This means that any social structure whose

operations are essential to the structural integrity of social space cannot simultaneously

perform two tasks: it cannot act as an agent which changes the properties of a social entity

and changes its own function in sustaining the structural integrity of social space.

The notion that any change is possible in the social sphere has to be rejected. A natural

science example can illustrate the nature of the point being made here. The physicist

14

Richard Feynman was asked at a conference21 why he did not try to build an anti-gravity

machine. He replied by saying that he had to work within the given laws of physics.

Gravity is a precondition of the operations of physical objects; rather than one physical

structure whose properties might be altered.

The inability of the basis upon which social structures operate to perform this dual role will

tend to produce a diminished sense of being among individuals. The individual's sense of

being is dependent upon her ability to influence the factors which contribute to the

definitions of herself as an individual. A rearrangement of the conditions under which

existing social structures operate serves partly to reinforce the structure of the substratum

which sustains those operations. Since the operational integrity of a social substratum

depends upon the conceptualisations of individuals, a continued reliance on the substratum

will reinforce the operational integrity. The completion of the rearrangement will not have

permitted individuals to alter some aspects of the forces which contribute to defining their

social powers. The sense of alienation is still present.

This means that any social reform aiming to induce an emancipatory process faces a

problem. The Marxist emancipatory program in particular is confronted by a predicament.

The predicament stems from the Marxist analysis of alienation which is seen as emanating

from the mechanism which generates ideologies. The operations of the mechanism are

grounded in the relationship between labour and nature; a relationship which is seen as

epistemological. The corruption of the relationship into one in which economic

relationships generate ideologies is seen as the source of alienation. In the emancipatory

process, the sense of alienation is eliminated by the alteration the parameters which

determine the social forces which circumscribed social behaviour. This alteration involves

the eradication of the social mechanisms which control the production of ideologies.

It is at this point that Marxist theory faces a problem which can be identified by the analysis

of the substratum concept developed in this paper. The Marxist emancipatory process

would either destroy or alter what would form part of the substratum which sustains social

space. However, if the properties of social agents are to be such that the replication of

social causal processes is to be possible in the emancipated society, then there must be a

new substratum which sustains the operations of those agents. The parameters which

specify this new substratum will also demarcate the sphere within which the development

of an individual's sense of being is restricted. I have argued that the possibility that one can

form a concept of self is dependent upon the possibility that one can distinguish oneself

from one's social environment22. This means that there must be an element of disharmony

between the specifications of the parameters of any putatively emancipated substratum and

the parameters which specify oneself.

Alienation has not been eradicated. The Marxist, like all social revolutionaries, is facing an

intractable paradox. The attempt to eradicate alienation uses means which re-establish it.

15

The attempt is, however, not fruitless. While the knowledge that one is only able to

exchange one set of constraints for another does not eradicate the sense of alienation which

accompanies the knowledge, it may diminish it. In other words, a social structure with

perfect moral values is logically out of reach, but a better one may not be.

The argument has involved the assumption that an individual's sense of being is related to

moral values. I am assuming that our sense of who we are as persons depends not only

upon our ability to control events but also on our ability to affect the parameters which

circumscribe the ability to control events. In other words, it depends upon our ability to

alter the substratum which sustains social processes. The analysis in the early part of the

paper showed that a change in the substratum must also generate the possibility of a change

in modes of conceptualising and so also of our perceived values. If social revolutionaries

were to change the structure of the substratum, the achievement of their goals could alter

every individual's sense of being. This could alter the moral values upon which the

justification of the revolution was based. We are led to conclude that the fulfilment of the

revolutionaries' own sense of being results in the possibility of the radical alteration of that

sense of being. The social revolutionaries' activities put their own goals out of reach - and

the problem they face is logical rather than practical.

Social revolutionaries need to be aware that they are operating with moral and

epistemological blindfolds. This is not true of all social reformers: the non-radical reformer

who would not alter the substratum which sustains social causal processes is not similarly

restricted. A reform which is designed to redistribute wealth by altering the operations of

an existing social structure need not alter the moral values inherent in the operations of the

substratum. Similarly, the production of wheat rather than barley does not alter the laws of

nature.

Non-social moral values and possible social reforms

The argument in the last sub-section indicated that the possibility of radical social reform

limits the range of possible knowable sources of moral value. It restricts them to social

sources. If social changes can alter moral values then these moral values must have their

roots in social structures and/or processes. A moment's reflection indicates that the

contrapositive also holds. The existence of a non-social source of moral value annuls the

possibility of radical social reform.

A non-social source of moral value would manifest itself through the operations of certain

codes of behaviour. The operation of a code of behaviour involves the possibility of the

translocal operation of causal processes. In such cases the translocal operation would be, in

part, determined independently of the conceptualisations of individuals. This means that

the non-social moral value will guarantee the permanence of part of the substratum

sustaining social causal processes. Radical social reform will be limited by this guarantee.

16

If, for example, a utilitarian principle were to hold in all societies it may be that certain

types of social reform would be doomed to failure. The establishment of a society in which

the means of production are controlled by the collective may be incompatible with the

operation of utilitarian principles which accommodate changes in taste. The lag between

the appearance of a change in taste and the provision of the means to satisfy it may be such

as to make the operations of 'collective' social structures logistically untenable. This is not

to say that utilitarianism negates Marxism, or vice versa, but rather that behavioural laws

based on either principle may preclude social reform based on the other. This would be the

case only if the moral values, and their associated behavioural laws, were unaffected by

social forces. There would be a link between the behavioural laws and the substratum

which sustains social causal processes. Perhaps the best known argument which attempts

to locate moral value in this link is the Kantian one23.

Any attempt to investigate the relationship between moral values and social reforms

provides a problem for social theorists. The relationship is enmeshed in the substratum

which sustains the social processes in general and the development of theories in particular.

The social theorist faces similar problems to those faced by the natural scientist who wished

to investigate the properties of the structure of natural space. The means by which natural

scientists become aware of phenomena would form part of the structures which generate

the same phenomena. Like the natural scientist, the social theorist would be restricted to

explanatory richness as the criterion for evaluating theories about socially exogenous moral

values.

The argument also applies in cases where non-social forces are postulated as restricting the

abilities of conscious individuals to alter the nature of underlying social structures. An

absence of indeterminacy is achieved at the expense of postulating non-social forces which

underpin the operations of social codes of behaviour. The acceptance of such absence is

accompanied by the wearing of an epistemological blindfold: the nature of the non-social

forces in general, and non-social moral values in particular, cannot be examined. On the

other hand, the presence of indeterminacy presents radical social reformers with intractable

problems. It places different epistemological and moral blindfolds on them. It also leaves

the radical reformer facing a paradox: any attempt to eradicate the alienating characteristics

of social structures necessarily builds alienating features into the reformed structures.

COPING WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF INDETERMINACY

Facing the paradox: the Democratic Intellect

Social reformers seem to be faced with an uncompromising set of options. They can alter

the operations of existing structures without significantly affecting alienating forces.

17

Alternatively, they can set up new operational parameters which remove existing alienating

structures; but they cannot determine the nature of these parameters and they face a paradox

which prevent them from eradicating alienation. In the first case they might be able to

justify the reform by citing to a non-social set of values but remain unable to determine the

link between the values and the behavioural laws they attempt to authenticate. In the

second case the set of values which underpins their reforms cannot remain valid throughout

the reform process.

The reformers have two, non-mutually exclusive, options open to them. The analysis

undertaken in this paper makes it possible to see what these might be. Firstly, they can

restrict themselves to attempting to alter each existing social structure in order to minimise

the socially-restricting effects of its operations. In so doing, they would be attempting to

enhance the sense of being of those individuals to which Dante referred. Secondly, they

can set up social structures which will enable all individuals to gain access to the means by

which the sustaining substratum, within which all our social structures operate, changes.

This option gives individuals the permanent power to rid themselves of social structures

which constrain their sense of self.

The latter option is democratic and exciting, but open-ended and risky. We cannot know

where it might lead, but it gives individuals the greatest sense of liberation which is

possible within the ambit of the stable operations of social structures. A social structure

which loosely possessed such features is described by George Davie in his book The

Democratic Intellect. Davie contrasts the formative qualities of Scottish university

education, prior to its Anglicisation, with the informative English system24

. Not only did

Scottish teaching methods promote a critical approach to all knowledge, but access to

education was not restricted by social class. The means by which some social change could

be achieved were generally available - to males! If all social structures possessed similar

qualities, and were open to all individuals, then every individual would have access to the

means by which social transformation occurs. The potential for change which each

individual possessed would override some of the alienating effects of the actual restrictions

emanating from the operations of stable social structures.

This potential must25 accompany any successful social transformation; for some individuals

will have learnt that social transformation is possible. However, there are penalties to be

paid for the development of such a seemingly emancipated social environment. The

epistemic and ethical blindness mentioned earlier are accompanied by a degree of

instability. The inevitability of the instability which accompanies even the possibility of

radical social transformation underlines the depth of the paradox facing the social reformer.

Every emancipatory social transformation carries a seed which will grow into one of two

mutant forms: the first contains the possibility of the development of some other potentially

18

oppressive social structure; the second, contains the possibility of constant social

transformation.

SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION: SOME CONCLUSIONS

In this paper some underlabouring work for both social and natural scientists has been

attempted. It has been argued that the translocal operations of causal mechanisms, whether

social or natural, are inescapably intertwined with the nature of a stable substratum which

sustains the operations. The discussion has shown that social scientists face greater

problems than natural scientists when developing explanations of phenomena: the

relationship between their activities and the sustaining substratum may affect the stability

of the substratum. This danger is at its greatest when the social scientist is engaging in

thought experiments; yet these provide the only means to assess the nature of the sustaining

substratum. The examination of some thought experiments established that it is possible to

distort the stability of the substratum and that such a distortion would necessarily have

indeterminate consequences - an indeterminacy which could infect even the stability of

fundamental concepts such as the unity of material objects.

Some of the implications, for the social reformer, of the indeterminacy have been

investigated. Among the consequences of indeterminacy some concerning moral issues

were identified. These were seen to depend upon an assumption that moral values are

related to social behaviour. Given this assumption, the analysis invoking a sustaining

substratum becomes relevant to moral issues. In other words morality and ontology are not

just contingently related. The analysis of the relationship between them has shown that

social reformers face some intractable problems. I have suggested a way of coping with

some of the problems.

The discussion in the paper has been deliberately pursued at a quasi-logical level.

References to specific social theories have been avoided. Being abstract in nature it is, I

believe, more challenging to social theorists: they are less likely to dismiss it on the

grounds that a given set of social phenomena is inconsistent with consequences which they

perceive as flowing from it.

The argument is intended to say something about the constraints under which social

theorists operate. This is a field in which others have made contributions. It has not been

my intention, in this paper, to examine where my arguments stand in relation to others such

as Habermas, Foucault and Rorty. Such an examination provides work to be done in the

future. The decision to avoid a discussion of theories in which society is seen as structure,

such as those advanced by Anthony Giddens and Roy Bhaskar26, has also been deliberate.

In view of the fact that I have argued that society is not itself a structure27, a discussion of

the theories of those who believe that it is also needs to be tackled at a later date.

19

In the meantime, if what I have said here increases social theorists' abilities to evaluate their

own work and gives them at least one way of avoiding some of the problems their activities

generate then the exercise has been worthwhile.

Francis Roberts

The Open University

Edinburgh, June 1993*

20

1 I read earlier versions of this paper at 7th Conference on Realism and the Human Sciences held in

Oxford in July 1992 and at a meeting of the Edinburgh University Staff-Postgraduate Philosophy

Group. I am indebted to Caroline New, Margaret Paton and Peter Manicas for their critical

comments.

2 In the original version of the paper I used the term 'material basis'. While sociologists seemed able

to cope with this nomenclature, some philosophers found it difficult: they seemed unable to

disassociate the term from 'materialism'.

3 Roy Bhaskar in A Realist Theory of Science

4 R N Carew-Hunt The Theory and Practice of Communism p 52

5 Roy Bhaskar A Realist Theory of Science Ch 2

6 Op cit p 73

7 Op cit p 56 ff

8 Bhaskar uses the phrase 'transfactual statements' to describe the claims in which causal laws are

invoked (A Realist Theory of Science p 51). The use of the phrase is intended to help analyse the

nature of such claims. Causal laws, Bhaskar claims, apply transfactually - or independently of the

facts given on particular occasions. The use of the phrase in such a manner has the unfortunate

effect of basing the operations of causal laws on events rather than on the conditions which sustain

the possibility of the occurrences of the events. It has the concomitant effect of associating a

closure with events rather than with the conditions which make the events possible. This leaves

Bhaskar, within his closed system, with an ontology in which it is possible to reduce a particular to

the events in which the particular is observed. It makes it difficult for him to sustain a distinction

between a particular and the context in which the particular operates. By doing this it becomes

possible for one to interpret the Bhaskarian closed system in Humean atomistic terms. By using the

term 'translocal', based upon the justification of the existence of a substratum which sustains the

operations of causal mechanisms, one avoids the danger of the slide into a Humean ontology.

The reader will notice that the points made in the last paragraph signal a need to specify the nature

of the relationship between a particular and its context. Quantum physicists consider this

relationship to be important enough for them to incorporate it into the fabric of their theories. The

concept of physical space is built into the relationship between a particular and its environment -

Cartesian absolute space is seen as having insufficient explanatory richness. I have pointed out

(Social Structures, Epistemology and Personal Identity p 57-78) that a similar analysis of the

relationship between a social particular and its environment is needed. I showed that there is a

requirement for the development of a notion of social space; that this notion is embedded in the

relationship between a social particular and the social environment in which the particular operates;

and that the notion, following similar developments of the notion of physical space, emanates from

the changes which occur in social particulars. I also showed that one can develop a notion of social

space which has sufficient explanatory richness to be able to sustain the development of explanatory

systems themselves. In the version I am preparing for publication, I go on to argue that social space

cannot be homogeneous – like physical space, it is 'lumpy'. The appreciation of the lumpiness has

the effect of redefining a range of problems such as those of incommensurability.

9 J R Lucas Space Time, and Causality p.59

21

10 An indication of Bhaskar's belief that closures are flat and undifferentiated is found in The

Possibility of Naturalism. He indicates on p 11-13 that the Humean account of causal laws operates

in closed systems but that it fails to account for the application of knowledge in open systems.

Bhaskar's belief that a Humean account of causal laws holds in closed systems involves an

assumption that closed systems consist of the reproduction of constant conjunctions of events. This

may be the case, but if it is then the Bhaskarian closed system is not what the scientist builds in

order to gain an understanding of the operations of physical mechanisms. The scientist builds

closures where unwanted influences are excluded and where a particular constant conjunction of

events might not occur (as long as the variation from the previously experienced conjunction can be

explained by reference to the differences in the ways in which the substratum sustains the

operations of the mechanism being investigated). In other words the closure which scientists

construct is not a Bhaskarian closed system: it is not a system "where constant conjunctions of

events obtain" (op cit p 160).

11 J R Lucas Space Time, and Causality p.59

12 I am indebted to my colleague Philip Cohen for insights into the nature of physical space; and

especially for the explanation of his description of the structure of the universe as being similar to a

lumpy string vest.

13 See for example Douglas Hofstadter Gödel, Escher and Bach Ch 4

14

Described by Roger Penrose The Emperor's New Mind p 375-8 15 Similar problems might be faced by natural scientists. The possible alteration of the substratum

which sustains the translocal operations of natural agents can be postulated and may even make

sense within a relatively stable cultural system. A reference to a failed conjecture helps to illustrate

how this could be achieved. One might, as did Fred Hoyle, postulate the existence of differences in

the relative strengths of positive and negative charges of elementary particles thus accounting for

the effect of gravity. He tested the postulate and found it unsupported by experiment. If now,

instead of just thinking about Hoyle's postulate, we were somehow to bring about a change in the

balance of charges it is possible that we would tamper with the homogeneity of physical space.

This may result in the alteration of the mechanisms by which the translocal operations of natural

causal processes operate. Such a change may then rule out the possibility of triggering the causal

processes which permitted the original change, or even of triggering a reversal of the change.

Note: I can find no references to Hoyle's postulate. I remember him describing his failure to explain

gravity when being interviewed in a BBC radio programme.

16 Roger Penrose op cit p 538-41

17 For a resume of some of these, see Douglas Hofstadter Gödel Escher and Bach: an Eternal

Golden Braid p 475-7 & 577-8

18 Derek Parfit Reasons and Persons p 232

19 Derek Parfit op cit p 255

20 Dante, as quoted by R D Laing The Self and the Other p 125

21 See the BBC television tribute to Feynman: Horizon - No Ordinary Genius 1993 (Christopher

Sykes Productions) - the script is available from BBC Publications, PO Box 7, London W3 6JX.

22

See Francis Roberts op cit Chapter 1 for a detailed argument supporting this claim.

22

23 Kant's universalisability principle locates moral value in the relationship between rational

behaviour and the social structure which sustains that behaviour. Further, the Kantian moral system

can only apply if the structures underpinning social behaviour cannot change. Much of Kant's

writing indicates a belief in precisely such a rigid underpinning of all behaviour. In the Critique of

Pure Reason he writes:

"For if coming to be out of nothing is regarded as effect of a foreign cause, it has to be

entitled creation, and that cannot be admitted as an event among appearances, since its

mere possibility would destroy the unity of experience." The Critique of Pure Reason B

252

This seems to preclude the possibility that social transformations might alter the substratum which

sustains social causal processes. Together with the location of moral value in the relationship

between behaviour and social structures, Kantian ethics can be seen to be built on an assumption of

an ossified base which governs all social behaviour. As the argument in this paper shows, the

Kantian intertwining of epistemology and moral value results in the restriction of the range of

possible social transformations - much in the same way, Kant would restrict the range of possible

natural transformations.

24 See George Davie The Democratic Intellect (Edinburgh 1981), page 76 "…the true aims of

instruction were forgotten, and the formative value of eduction was sacrificed to the informative."

where Davie is quoting from Burnet, Grierson and others Problems of National Education Ed. J

Clark (1919). 25

The nature of the necessity to which this 'must' refers is logical rather than normative.

26

See Anthony Giddens The Constitution of Society: Outline of a Theory of Structuration.

On page 161 he states: "I take it that, ... , it will not be presumed that I am conceptually 'starting

with the individual', or that I hold that individuals are real in some way in which societies are not."

Roy Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality p 92-94, outlines his Transformational Model of Social Activity

(TMSA) which develops a similar concept of society.

An analysis of the concept of a sustaining substratum developed in this paper leads to a rejection of

Giddens' and Bhaskar's concepts of society. Instead one will see it, not as a causal agent, but as an

area of social space which sustains the causal agencies of individuals and social structures. In a

similar way physical space is not itself a natural kind but sustains the causal agencies of natural

kinds. 27

Francis Roberts op. cit. Chapter 2.

* BIBLIOGRAPHY

Roy Bhaskar - A Realist Theory of Science (London 1978).

- The Possibility of Naturalism (London 1979)

- Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation (London 1986).

- Reclaiming Reality (London 1989).

R N Carew-Hunt - The Theory and Practice of Communism (Harmondsworth 1963).

Kenneth Craik - The Nature of Explanation (Cambridge 1943).

George Davie - The Democratic Intellect (Edinburgh 1981).

Anthony Giddens - The Constitution of Society: Outline of a Theory of Structuration

(Cambridge 1984)

Immanuel Kant - A Critique of Pure Reason, Trans. Norman Kemp-Smith (London

1929).

- A Critique of Practical Reason, Trans. L W Beck (Chicago 1949).

Saul Kripke - Naming and Necessity (Oxford 1979).

Douglas Hofstadter - Gödel, Escher and Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid (New York

1979).

R D Laing - The Self and the Other (Harmondsworth 1961).

23

J R Lucas - The Freedom of the Will (Oxford 1970).

- Space Time, and Causality (Oxford 1984).

Derek Parfit - Reasons and Persons (Oxford 1984).

Roger Penrose - The Emperor's New Mind (Oxford 1989).

Henri Poincaré - Science and Hypothesis (Dover 1952).

Francis Roberts - Social Structures, Epistemology and Personal Identity (PhD

Thesis, The Open University , Milton Keynes 1991).

Richard Rorty - The Contingency of Self, Tykociner Memorial Lecture, University

of Illinois (1986).

- Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge 1991).

W H Walsh - Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics (Edinburgh 1975).

Peter Strawson - Individuals (London 1975).

Andrew Weigert - Society and Identity (Cambridge 1986).

David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance (Oxford 1980).

D W Winnicott - Playing and Reality (Harmondsworth 1980).