Think globally, act locally? Symbolic memory and global repertoires in the Tunisian uprising and the Greek anti-austerity mobilizations

Vittorio Sergi

Naples University “L' Orientale”, Italy

Markos Vogiatzoglou

European University Institute, Florence, Italy

** This paper is an extended version of the article published under the same title in

Understanding European Movements: New social movements, global justice struggles, anti-

austerity protest, Cristina Flesher Fominaya and Laurence Cox (eds.), Routledge, London, 2013. **

Introduction

This chapter presents the findings of a comparative examination of two movements that

developed in the Mediterranean area during a common time frame, the winter and spring of 2010-

2011. In Tunisia, the suicide of the 27-year-old street vendor Muhammad Bouazizi the 17th of

December 2010 in the town of Sidi Bouzid, sparked a popular revolt which ended up overthrowing a

long lasting political regime and inspired other mobilizations, rebellions and regime changes in the

Arab world, notably in Egypt and Libya. This mobilization also encouraged social movements and the

people on the northern side of the Mediterranean region. When the public debt crisis exploded in the

EU, the protests in response to the austerity measures imposed on the South European countries

found a source of inspiration in the outcomes of the “Jasmine Revolution” which were considered to

be successful (Eltahawy, 2011).

In Greece, the “Aganaktismenoi”, the local version of the Indignados movement, managed to

mobilize more than 25% of the country's population against the harsh austerity measures imposed by

the Greek government and its creditors, and spearheaded the anti-austerity protests for several

months (alerthess.gr, 2011). If the Tunisian insurrection on January 2011 was described as the spark of

a complex chain of political events in the Arab world, the Greek mobilization against the austerity

measures and financial speculation has brought in the territory of the European Union an

unprecedented degree of social contention and criticism against the mainstream economic and

political models. Authors have begun to analyze the nature and characteristics of that chain of events

(Arditi, 2012; Douzinas, 2011; Kneissl, 2011). And the inevitable question that arises is whether what

we are witnessing is a new trans-national movements' contentious cycle.

A salient pattern regarding the movements that constituted the Mediterranean Spring was

their dependence on social networking tools for member recruitment, mobilizing the population and

diffusing their discourse to wider audiences (Wagner, 2011). As with the internet itself during the first

alter-globalization movement, electronic media and networking seem to have a crucial importance in

the construction of social reality (Cleaver, 1999). The new Mediterranean movements are considered

to be part of a worldwide “facebook revolution” (Crook, 2011; Naughton, 2011), which can provide

movements with innovative means (see, for example, Barney, 2007; Jordan, 2007; Olsson, 2007;

Wright, 2004), yet imposing on them new challenges and constraints (Chadwick, 2006; Salter, 2003).

Others have raised methodological concerns with regards to a potential comparison between the two

sides of the “Mediterranean Spring” (Kennedy, 2011) or even claimed that the differences in the

political, economical and social environment between the North and the South are so extensive, that

there is no point in searching for movements' similarities in a cross-national level (see Hilleary, 2011).

Should there be any apparent similarities, they are attributed to a sort of metaphysical “domino

effect” of collective action (Brown, 2011). Our research challenges both these assumptions. We argue

that, despite the obvious contextual differentiations, the Tunisian and Greek cases do present

similarities worth investigating. Yet, the most important amongst them are not to be traced in the

common digital networking platform per se, but in the rationale behind their use and the outcomes it

produced.

We will present the main events that led to the insurrection against the government of RCD

(Rassemblement Constitutionel Democratique) in Tunisia. We shall also discuss in brief the socio-

political background of the Greek version of the Indignados, which culminated in the occupation of

Syntagma square in Athens between May and June 2011. In both countries, movement members

utilized frames, slogans and mnemonic constructions bearing strong symbolic connotations, in order

to frame their grievances and claims. They re-appropriated strategic places closely associated to each

country's movement past, namely the Syntagma Square in Athens and the Kasbah Square in Tunis.

They re-shaped the meaning of nationally recognized symbols – flags, emblems and each country's

national anthem. Their discourse addressed local issues but was, at all times, framed as an attempt to

challenge the political and economic hegemony of neo-liberalism, both at the national and the global

level. Whilst exploring this rich movement repertoire and analyzing its rationale, we shall point out the

contradictions and controversies it sparked among the participants. We shall attempt to explain them

with reference to the complex societal consequences of the neo-liberal policies imposed on these two

countries, and the challenges movements operating in similar settings face, when attempting to

construct wide social alliances.

We argue that the multilevel intertwinement of the “global” and the “local” is perhaps the

most important trait of the movements under scrutiny. What we came across during our research, is a

new generation of activists that has inherited the alter-globalization movements' famous slogan

“Think globally, act locally” - and is in the process of elaborating and implementing it.

Methods

Our broad research field being what we defined above as the “Mediterranean Spring”, we

consider that the most appropriate way of approaching the cases of Greece and Tunisia in a

comparative perspective (Gerring, 2004), would be through a most-different, case-oriented research

design (Seawright & Gerring, 2008; della Porta, 2008).

The empirical data for the research project were gathered during three separate periods:

Firstly, from February to March 2011, when participant observation was conducted and interviews

were taken in various Tunisian cities, but especially in the Kasbah squat in Tunis. From May to August

2011, we visited Greece and participated in all the main events of the Greek Indignados movement.

Finally, in December 2011 we visited Greece again and interviewed several participants. In sum, we

filled dozens of field notes' pages, recorded 13 interviews, shot or participated in the shooting of many

hours of video footage, and gathered a -more or less- complete archive of the printed material

(announcements, press releases, leaflets, etc.) which was available at the time. Data were also

retrieved using the rich digital movements' archive, which is still available on the net, on various

websites and blogs. The people we interviewed were protesters from different social, geographical

and political background. During the process of selecting our sample, we took into account the

interviewees' role in the protest and their vision of how the political movement they participated in

should develop. Our top selection priorities were to achieve a political standpoints' pluralism and a

variety of viewpoints, with regard to the different ways our interviewees participated in the complex

movements we examine.

Tunisia's movements under Ben Ali and the emergence of the anti-Ben Ali movement.

The political regime that ruled Tunisia until January 2011 was founded in 1987, through a “soft

coup” led by Zinedine Ben Alì. Most opposition parties were proclaimed illegal at the beginning of

'90s and the few parties that maintained their legal status had no access to power due to direct

repression and electoral manipulation at all levels. The Islamic movements that developed in Tunisia

after the Iranian Revolution of 1979 were influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The most

important Islamic organization amongst them was the political party Ennahdah (Marzouki, 2009). In

particular, the “Ennadha” Islamist party's members and sympathizers faced direct oppression quite

often; approximately 25.000 people were imprisoned from 1991 to 1994 due to their political beliefs

(Lamloum & Ravenel, 2002). Nevertheless, whilst governmental oppression and coercion definitely

played a key role in establishing Ben Alì ´s rule, for some scholars the strength and duration of his rule

was mostly based on co-optation, integration and disciplining (Hibou, 2006). By the end of the '90s,

the Tunisian government implemented a neo-liberal agenda within a model increasingly based on the

off-shore factories of European and Asian multinational enterprises, the third sector development,

financial marketing and a black economy mostly fueled by smuggling and immigrant remittances from

Europe (Palidda, 2011).

For the liberal and democratic opposition, internet played a major role in structuring and

disseminating criticism of the regime. The internet was first launched for public use in 1996, and the

first broadband connections were made available in 2005 (Freedom House, 2011). The regime

responded by creating an extensive online censorship and filtering system. In 2009, and especially in

2010, censorship expanded and became increasingly arbitrary whilst bloggers were intimidated and

arrested (Ryan, 2011).

The political opposition to the government of RCD was pluralistic and was characterized by

various degrees of activity and contention. Its role in the recent uprising should not be

underestimated, although the regime was toppled by a social movement not completely assimilable to

the pre-existing political organizations. As massive scholarization policies were implemented by the

Tunisian government, large numbers of youngsters acceded to the secondary and tertiary level of

education, although the weak competitiveness of the Tunisian educational system made them hardly

integrable in the national labor market. In this context, social mobilization in Tunisia seems more

dependent on exclusion and increasing social inequality than on material deprivation: “Despite

moderate levels of income inequality, in most Arab countries social exclusion has increased over the

past two decades. In addition, there is evidence to suggest that the inequality in wealth has worsened

significantly more than the deterioration in income” (United Nations, 2009 : 12-13). The increased

restrictions in EU's border policy put further pressure on “the escape valve” of social tension,

international migration (Palidda, 2010). As the repression of political Islam and the growing

unemployment and inflation diminished the people's loyalty to the regime, the rise of social

contention in the past ten years was a fact which scholars analyzed in a global and regional

perspective (Harrigan & El-Said, 2011).

Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire on December 17, 2010, in the city center of Sidi

Bouzid, capital of one of the most marginalized Tunisian regions. On that same day a small group of

parents and relatives of the young man protested in front of the government building but were

dispersed by the authorities. During the next few days, the protests expanded to other cities of the

central region, being this time supported by the grassroots committees of the UGTT (Tunisian General

Labor Union). Strikes, demonstrations and sit-ins began also in Tunis, Kef and on the touristic island of

Djerba. The spreading protests were organized by the newly formed “Unemployed and youngsters'

defense committees” and the slogans ranged from the openly anti-government “Ben Ali, voleur!” (Ben

Ali, thief!) to “travail, liberté, justice sociale” (work, freedom and social justice) and the most known

“dégage” (piss off!/ get out!) (Sergi, 2011). The level of police violence increased, with live

ammunition being fired at the protesters: by the 8th of January, Amnesty International was reporting

that 60 people were killed in Kasserine, 7 in Regueb and 6 in Thala1. After several days of street

battles the police withdrew, leaving the ground to the Army and to the local people's committees.

The army, led by general Ben Ammar, refused to obey the presidential order to open fire on the

protesters and took control of strategic positions all over the country; a martial law was declared.

Despite this, on January 14th, the UGTT union called for a general strike. Large demonstrations took

1 A full report of Tunisia uprising's casualties can be found on Amnesty International's website special section,

http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/tunisia

the streets of Tunis, various groups of protesters moved towards the Ministry of Interior and the

presidential residence in Carthage. In an effort to control the situation, the army gave Ben Alì and his

close relatives permission to flee by plane to Saudi Arabia. On January 17th, a provisional government

was formed by the president of the Republic Fouad Mbazaa, led by Mohammed Ghannouchi, former

prime minister of Ben Ali. The interim government did not gain much popular support, since the claim

of the majority of the people was a complete regime change and dissolution of the RCD. Until the end

of January the protests became more intense and radical than ever. In every mobilization women were

present in numbers and, as it had also been noted for earlier protests and strikes, which took place in

2008, in Redeyef (Seddik & Dahmani, 2008), in the male-dominated political scene of Tunisia, female

participation in the demonstrations represents a good indicator of the protests' amplification. Non-

coordinated strikes, factory squats, mass avoiding of work, retaliation on bosses and landlords were

reported by the international press (Lowe, 2011). As a young UGTT member in Kasserine noted:

“...many workers, especially women, stopped going to work. Because of the

insecurity, but also because you had to keep on working for nothing... this is the revolution,

it's better to stay with your people even if you don't have any money. Then, in the past days,

many decided to loot commercial centers and banks. [...] Also, some made a sabotage in the

Benetton plants in the region and in other industrial plants. ”2.

Three elements should be pointed out with regard to the Tunisian insurrectionist movement:

the first was the cooperation of the urban and rural young unemployed, to stage a lasting protest,

using a strategic combination of a complex electronic media and communications arsenal, urban

guerrilla tactics and traditional strike. The second was the asymmetrical power of social networks'

communication and its influence on the mainstream audience. The third, as previously stated, was the

activation of mnemonic constructions bearing strong symbolic connotations. Those constructions

were rooted on strongly symbolic places such as the Kasbah historical square in Tunis, the streets as

public spaces, “immaterial” representations such as the figure of the “martyr”, prevalent in the Islamic

subjectivity, the anti-imperialist movements' slogans, the claim of the “karama watanya” (national

dignity) which, as we shall demonstrate below, added up new symbolic content to national items such

2 Interview with Ahmed, 33, holding a university degree in mathematics, member of the UGTT in Kasserine.

12/03/2011

as the flag and the national anthem.

Greece under the IMF rule: the anti-austerity movements and the Greek “Indignados”.

The Greek movements we examined are part of the Greek society's response to the explosive

combination of austerity measures and administrative reforms imposed by the Greek government and

the “troika” of its international creditors, ever since May 2010 3. The Memorandum of Cooperation

(MoC) signed at that time obliged the government to adopt harsh measures in order to reduce the

public sector's deficit, in exchange for a series of bail-out loans financed by the international

community. Two years after the initial implementation of the rescue plan, the expectations raised at

that time have not been met. Greece is still on the verge of the default, the economy's recession is

getting higher and higher each year, unemployment, social inequality and poverty indicators have

peaked to an unprecedented level (INE-GSEE, 2011).

The Greek social movement's response could be classified into three broad categories (or

periods), with regard to the movement repertoire chosen by the actors and the types of organizations

which spearheaded the mobilization.

1. [April 2010 – April 2011] The “traditional” mobilization. During this period, the movement

behaved in a similar way to the recent past's mobilizations. The repertoire included the usual General

Strikes4, demonstrations, clashes with the police and typical protests in the majority of the Greek

cities.

2. [May – August 2011]: The “Indignados” movement. After a year of unsuccessful mobilizations

against the austerity measures, it became obvious to organizers that the traditional repertoire was

insufficient. Inspired by the Arab Spring and adopting the organizational patterns of the Spanish

Indignados, the “occupy the squares” movement began from Thessaloniki and Athens to spread in a

few weeks in the main squares of all Greek cities.

3 The international creditors, hereby referred to as “troika”, are the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European

Central Bank (ECB) and the European Union (EU). 4 Eleven General Strikes took place during this period. Yet for the Greek trade union scene, the proclamation of one or

two general strikes per year, by the pluralist Trade Union Confederation (GSEE), was a relatively common phenomenon, even during the years of prosperity and relative labor relations' stability. Therefore the change noted is rather in quantitative terms, than in qualitative ones.

3. [September 2011 – May 2012] Labor mobilization and civil disobedience. The third phase of the

anti-austerity movement is characterized by the massive participation of workers' organizations, and

by the widespread discontent amongst various social groups, mostly expressed through acts of civil

disobedience: Refusal to pay newly imposed taxes, verbal and physical attacks against the politicians in

public spaces, protesting in previously non-politicized settings (such as the football stadiums, the

military and school parades) are some examples of the above (Insider, 2012; Karatziou, 2012; to vima,

2011).

The Greek version of the “Indignados” movement was launched on May 25, 2011, when,

following a widespread call to mobilization through social networking websites5, thousands of people

showed up to protest in front of the Greek parliament, in Syntagma Square, Athens and the White

Tower6, Thessaloniki. Several hundreds of them remained in the two squares after the end of the

protest, formed an improvised “popular assembly” and decided to remain there, until...

“...the troika, the government, everyone leaves”7.

The initial calls to mobilization were circulated through Facebook pages. Then the news of the

forthcoming protest began spreading outside Facebook; E-mails were sent in large numbers, articles

in blogs and news sites appeared, hashtags were introduced in Twitter 8.

The people who formulated the initial calls still remain unknown, at least in terms of their

political affiliation or socio-political background. Another notable feature was that this was not the

first time when calls to squat the Syntagma Sq. were issued9. Yet, it was the first time that a truly

bottom-up mobilization was attempted10. As Antonis states:

“...It was clear to everyone that all parties should stay out. If they [the party members]

wanted to come, they should come as citizens, as individuals, not to gather their votes or sell

5 More information and some documentation can be found on the electronic edition of the “Eleftherotypia” newspaper

- http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.ellada&id=278585 6 Emblematic monument of Greece's second biggest city. 7 Interview with Antonis, a participant in the Indignados encampment. 26/12/2011 8 “Eleftherotypia”electronic edition, http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=281752 9 See, for example, the call issued by the editors of the left-wing newspaper “Dromos tis Aristeras”, on February 15th, 2011. 10 A wide variety of relevant texts, produced by the Syntagma square occupation can be found here: http://real-

democracy.gr/en/

their newspapers11”.

On the designated day, around 50.000 people showed up in Athens, and some 5.000 in

Thessaloniki, according to media reports12. In Athens, whilst on the upper side of the square

thousands were protesting against the government and the international creditors, on the lower side

hundreds participated in the popular assembly, in an attempt to “trace a common path for their

struggle”13. The decision taken was to form an “acampada” camping on the Square, squat it and call

for daily demonstrations to be followed by popular assemblies14.

The daily assembly was the main organizational and decision-making apparatus of the

mobilization, during the months that it lasted. The assembly operated as follows:

“In the beginning [...] we would decide on which issues to discuss. Those who wanted to

speak would take a paper with a number, then we had a “lottery”, and the numbers drawn

would speak.”15.

Apart from the assembly, another characteristic inherited by the Spanish Indignados was the

formation of working groups, which would undertake specific tasks and provide constant feedback to

the assembly, in terms of refining its political positions, proposing texts to be circulated and...

“...producing actions, producing initiatives for people towards getting involved and

participating in various activities” 16.

We can distinguish four important characteristics of the protests that subsequently took place,

in May and June, 2011.

1) Their frequency and duration: the protests were on a daily basis (every evening at 18.00)

and lasted until late at night (occasionally after midnight).

2) Their explicitly non-violent character: for the first time in recent years, there was a

consensus amongst the protesters in the direction of avoiding direct confrontation with the police 11 Interview with Antonis, ibid. 12 http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.ellada&id=278585 13 Interview with Alexandros, a 55-year-old unemployed architect, participant in the Assembly and member of the

Communication working group of the Acampada. 16/12/2011 14 http://www.tanea.gr/ellada/article/?aid=4632926 15 Interview with Filippos, a student who participated in the assemblies. 20/12/2011 16 Interview with Giorgos, ibid..

forces.

3) The use of innovative means, innovative at least with regard to the traditional repertoire

of Greek movements: Laser pointers, choreographies, improvised banners and so on, were used. But

the most significant (and controversial, as we shall see in the following pages) innovation, at least for

this generation of activists, was the use of the Greek flag as a uniting symbol of all Greeks, for the first

time after the fall of the military dictatorship (1974).

4) Finally, with regard to the participants' socio-political characteristics, the crowd which

attended both the demonstrations and the assemblies was significantly diverse, compared to all

mobilizations of the post-dictatorship era. Greece has relatively strong social movement organizations,

and it was quite common in the past to organize protests where the attendance was monopolized by

the “usual suspects”. Yet this time, those “usual suspects” were not particularly welcome (since they

were considered to belong to parties and organizations that were part of the problem, not of the

potential solutions). Therefore, if present, the party and organizations' members were obliged not to

openly refer to their political identity. This characteristic gradually changed in time, as the movement

became more and more politicized. During the demonstration peaks, though (e.g. during the general

strikes proclaimed by the Greek Trade Union Confederation on 28-29 June 2011), when maximum

mobilization was an explicit goal, all potential participants were welcomed, and furthermore, some

complaints were raised against the political entities which refused to assist to a “unity in action” joint

protest. According to Katerina, a 34-year-old anarchist who did not actively participate in the

movement, considering it apolitical and reformist,

“...the craziest contradiction of Syntagma was towards the parties and organizations. They

were removing the leftists' banners and posters, but when, for example, the Greek

Communist Party [which also did not support the Indignados movement] would hold a

demonstration outside the Parliament, they were booing them for not participating

enough!17”.

The peak of the Syntagma Square mobilization were two general strike days (the 28th and 29th

of June), when yet another set of austerity measures was discussed in the Greek Parliament.

Practically all the Greek Social Movement Organizations, political parties of the left, trade unions,

17 Interview with Katerina. 10/12/2011, emphasis added.

various professional and other groups, joined their forces in and around Syntagma square, in order to

implement the Parliament blockade plan the Indignados Assembly had proposed. What followed was

forty-eight hours of street blockades, barricades, failed attempts to invade the Parliament, counter-

offensives by the police forces, fierce clashes and property destruction. The “battle for Syntagma

Square” left behind almost 800 people injured and millions of euros in damages. Yet, the proposed

legislation was finally approved by the Parliament. Despite the fact that, during those two feverish

days, an unprecedented “unity in action” spirit was evident in the majority of the Greek SMOs, and

despite the recapturing of the square by the protesters after an evacuation operation by the riot

police, the movement, lacking a clear and achievable goal, did not manage to reach the mobilization

peaks of the previous period and slowly faded.

A “Facebook revolution”?

In January 2011, shortly after the protests in Tunisia turned in riots and then in a rebellious

movement across the country, mainstream media such as the Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabya, France 24 and

BBC stared reporting the widespread use of social networks both as mobilization tools and sources of

direct and non-censored news from the social ground (Miladi, 2011). In the past years, the influence

and diffusion of social networks had grown in many countries, rapidly becoming a growing social

research field and several scholars worked on the link between electronic media and social

movements against neo-liberal capitalism (see, for example, Cleaver, 1999). As previously stated,

Tunisia had witnessed in the past decade an increase in internet use and mass formal education

(United Nations, 2009). Even if the patterns of electronic media usage and diffusion were not equal to

the western countries, they had reached significant levels in relatively short time. In the Greek case,

the use of internet and other digital tools for movement purposes was a relatively common procedure

since the beginning of the '00s. Internet was used for information exchange and organizing and, for

the first time, during the December 2008 riots, digital tools were massively used for mobilization,

direct action coordination, and documentation (see, for example, Vogiatzoglou, 2009). The Facebook

platform, though, was not too popular among the Greek activists. The main tools used until the

Indignados protest included alternative news portals, mailing lists and blogs, but Facebook for

movement purposes remained a relatively unexplored field.

In Tunisia, the political opposition to the RCD regime on the web encompassed various

political and cultural options but the majority of those were included in a “universal citizenship”

frame. In the Arab world, long before the last wave of uprisings, scholars and politicians had discussed

the relationship between modernization, democracy and Arab and Islamic political forms and

relationships (Bennani-Chraïbi & Fillieule, 2003; Kamali, 2002; Ozdalga & Persson, 1997). Much

evidence and many observers link the growing number of educated young people, the diffusion of

radical arts and music and the political mobilization across the whole Arab world. This phenomenon

had been neglected and often categorized as youth sub-culture, yet it was shaping a whole generation

of trans-national activists and artists whose impact on the Arab democratization movement deserves

further examination (Skalli, 2011).

During our research, we observed that the instrumental and conscious use of social networks

has been derived from face to face practices and interactions in the physical world, in the direction of

establishing counter-hegemonic regimes of truth, as well as mobilizing a virtual audience in public

space. Our interviewees noted how the production of news that was often elaborated and distributed

on the mainstream media was the result of a chain of symbolic and physical exchanges. The Syntagma

square media team was mostly populated by experienced activists, either professionals or skilled

amateurs in video capturing, sound and editing applications, and managed to provide – sometimes

even in real time – a detailed and well-documented briefing of all the procedures that were taking

place in the squat18. As Fatima, a 22-year-old woman and activist in the Kasbah occupation explains:

“During the day, the people that are part of the media commission take photos and video or

gather and evaluate the material that people offer, they distribute them on the internet

directly by the stream and the webcam. Our informative task is also to confirm or deny

rumors and news that are circulating because there is a lot of misinformation pushed by

people who are against the revolution19.”

These procedures proved suitable for mobilization in the context of asymmetric

communication capacity, as well as sustained police control and mainstream media embargo – in the

18 The online archive of the media team can be found on http://realdemocracygr.wordpress.com/ 19 Interview with “Fatima” at the Kasbah media centre in Tunis, 8th of March 2011.

case of Tunisia. Most of the people interviewed asserted that Facebook held a key role amongst other

social media, namely for its diffusion, usability and horizontal networking capacity:

“The revolution of 14 January took place really thanks to Facebook. If we hadn't this medium

we wouldn't have reached this point, because the mainstream media didn't have this direct

diffusion. Such information was not available on our computer screens and television.”20

Filippos, a 25-year-old student who participated in the Syntagma assemblies, admits that

Facebook also proved useful in multiple ways for the Greek Indignados:

“...you would see videos and news, for example police brutality videos, spreading in zero

time, thousands would click and share and distribute their own material. [...] I don't like it

[the Facebook platform], yet it was used in a good way, this I must admit”21.

Facebook, in our case, offered three important traits organizers could benefit from:

a) Very low or zero cost, in terms of resources needed, to set up a call to mobilization and

publicize it (for a detailed analysis see Earl & Kimport, 2011, especially pp. 65-99) . As Lance Bennett

and Toft wrote, “not only are costs of organization potentially reduced by digital linking, but various

technology links may well become part of organizational structure themselves” (2009: p.247). Rafik, a

Tunisian activist describes how the activists' personal networks were used as a mobilizing resource:

“There were three of us starting the second Kasbah occupation, I swear it is true! We

launched a call on facebook to meet up in front of the National Theatre in Avenue Bourguiba

and hundreds of people showed up”22

b) A wider audience as a potential recipient of the message (through the transfusion of political

and personal networks). This was particularly clear in the case of Greece – we noted before that the 20 Interview with Fatima, ibid.. 21 Interview with Filippos, Athens, 20/12/2011. 22 Interview with Rafik, Tunis, 27/2/2011.

participants' population was very diverse, and this could be partly attributed to the fact that the use of

Facebook, as the initial mobilizing medium, spread the message to people who do not have (or do not

wish to have) access to the traditional activist digital networks. As Giorgos, who is an occasional

Facebook user, confirms:

“There were so many calls to action [on Facebook], you simply could not resist “peeking in”

at some of them. And then, what you'd see were the hundreds, perhaps thousands of

“shares” and “likes”, and all the crazy comments, it was obvious all of these were not coming

from “our” circles. I thought these people would never show up, but in the end... they did! It

seems there was so much desperation out there, and this desperation did not have a voice.

People got a voice, and they started shouting.” 23

c) The distance between the physical identity and the claim. Even if on Facebook the

personal commitment is usually very low, in the context of increasing security control over the

internet it is not exempt from risks, as the bloggers' repression since 2003 in Tunisia showed. Abdi 37,

formerly a migrant in Europe and currently an activist in the town of Regueb, near Sidi Bouzid

explained:

“Do you know how we did? It was not possible to write “Ben Alì Bastard”, or anything else,

they would have come to arrest you! So we said, let's stay in the fan groups, with football

teams, in singer groups, let's grow in number, and at a certain point these groups started to

work as political groups, they changed the message, we stopped chatting and we started

exchanging messages to organize protests, and at this point it was not possible to stop us,

this would mean to shut down the internet.”24

The simple act of sharing a piece of information on the web page could have significant effects:

“...when I heard of clashes with the police in the university of Sousse, it was at night and

23 Interview with Giorgos, ibid.. 24 Interview with Abdi, Tunis 06/03/2011

even in front of the computer, I was afraid, but I wanted to speak, so I sent a message against

the president to my contacts, and in a few minutes hundreds of contacts shared it.”25.

It is interesting how the interviewees link the self-expressive possibilities provided by the social

networking platforms with a deliberative “getting involved” process. Some criticism has been raised

with regard to this conceptualization. Dahlberg argues that this process, although real, remains partial,

as it implies the “designation of a particular form of communication as the rational and democratically

legitimate norm” (2007: p. 131). Whether this is the case or not, most scholars agree that no matter

how strong the digital network ties are, mutual trust and commitment to the common goal is more

likely to be developed once co-presence in the physical space is achieved, at least when the claim or

grievance made is not exclusively referring to the digital network itself (Diani, 2000; Earl & Kimport,

2011).

Another noteworthy characteristic is how Facebook, and internet-based communication tools

in general, were simultaneously perceived by the protesters as encompassing global and local traits.

The activists were fully aware that the platforms they used were “border-less”, in the sense that the

basic procedures (“like”, “tweet”, “share”) were to be used in completely different settings across

countries and continents. The claim they expressed was locally oriented, yet the audience and the

potential solidarity to be received could emerge from the other side of the world. Both in Tunisia and

Greece, hashtags were introduced to disseminate information in French, Spanish and English. In

Greece, several alternative or movement-friendly news portals devoted parts of their website to non-

Greek speaking readers (see, for example, Indymedia Athens, 2012; RadioBubble, 2012). A

differentiation from the alter-globalization movement was that the globally-oriented campaigning was

formulated neither to facilitate direct involvement in the events (as for example were the cases of the

trans-national protests' websites), nor did they simply aspire to raise consciousness on a specific

subject. Jerome Roos, a Dutch blogger who went to Athens only to assist the media team's efforts,

wrote in an article entitled “Syntagma, ground zero of the global resistance movement”:

“What we’re witnessing here tonight is a grand social experiment in creating a new

democracy — from the grassroots up to the global level. […] Right now, I’m sitting next to a

Brazilian friend underneath the canvas of the media & communications tent — an

25 Witness recorded at the DIRASET – university of Tunis, seminar on “Tunisian Revolution”, 10/03/2011.

impromptu multimedia hive that includes an internet café, a print room, archives and a radio

station. He’s Skyping in Spanish with representatives of the occupations in Lisbon, Madrid

and Barcelona. […] I haven’t even spent twelve hours here yet, but I’ve already gotten to

practice my Spanish, French and Italian” (Roos, 2011).

What Roos describes is the Greek protesters' conscious effort to present Greece as a nation

“joining in” a struggle which has global characteristics.

To sum up, although Facebook, as well as the digital social networking platforms in general,

were undoubtedly an extremely important tool for the development and the publicizing of both

movements, they still maintain their tool status, constituents of a wide repertoire which also included

more traditional movement means, as well as innovations, or, most importantly, innovative ways to

approach each country's movement tradition. In the following paragraph, we will explore the latter

focusing on the use of national symbols, the flag and the national anthem.

Mnemonic constructions at the movements' service (1) : Innovation and renovation.

Based on a large corpus of inter-disciplinary research, scholars addressing the issue of social

memory construction, have produced a significant theoretical work both in a general sociological

perspective (for a brief overview, see Kansteiner, 2002; Olick, 1999; Olick & Robbins, 1998) and, more

specific to our research questions, a social movement one (Armstrong & Crage, 2006; Edy, 2006;

Harris, 2006). As Gongaware eloquently put it, the movement memory construction is a complex

process, which “allows participants to consider new ideas as though they are extensions of what the

movement is already doing or has already done” (2011: 41). Yet, as Harris warns, during this process

the members “may actually consciously or unconsciously block out some events of the past while

privileging others that are more favorable to their experience” (2006: 20).

The combination of these two assumptions is relevant to the analysis of the movements under

scrutiny. In the case of Tunisia, the national symbols' promotion already carried a strong and direct

linkage to the country's anti-colonial past. The use of national flags was widespread during all the

demonstrations and protests of December and January. In the interviews, this shift was illustrated

when compared to other social events, namely the Tunisian national football team's matches:

“...the flag was a symbol we had especially used [when playing] against the French [national

team], but now it means that the politicians have no right to wave it, it has come back into

people's hands.”26

In the Greek case, the flag and national anthem had disappeared from the movement

repertoire for more than three decades, due to the fact that they were strongly associated with the

military dictatorship (1967-1974), and more generally with the right-wing, nationalist regime which

had emerged triumphant from the Greek civil war (1946-1949). Unsurprisingly enough, the more

experienced activists raised strong concerns when the first Greek flags appeared during the Syntagma

square demonstrations:

“ When I first saw the flags, I felt nausea, I said, this cannot be happening!”27

“ I freaked out in the beginning, they would even sing the national anthem in front of the

parliament. [...] I said, we must be surrounded by nationalist monkeys, fascist

chimpanzees!28”

As the days were passing by, though, and the “fascist chimpanzees” would not appear on the

horizon29, our interviewees realized that what they were facing was a much more complex

phenomenon:

“[the people with the flags] they are members of our society, they are part of the people

who will revolt when the time will come... In the very end, we were struggling for the same

purposes and goals.”30

“We came to realize that the flag-carrying people were the members of the ex-middle class,

those whose life had been literally crushed by the crisis. Those people, when looking for a

banner of resistance to identify themselves with, they opened their closet and what they

found inside was the Greek flag. Therefore, they took the Greek flag and came out to the

26 Interview with Abdi, 6/03/2012. 27 Interview with Giorgos, ibid.. 28 Interview with Alexandros, ibid.. 29 Some extreme right-wing organizations made several attempts to participate in the Syntagma square demonstrations,

but were forcefully pushed away by anarchist and antifascist militia-like squads. These intra-movement clashes drew media attention and were, in general terms, criticized by the majority of participants, yet the outcome was that should there be any extreme right-wing involvement in the movement, it was on an individual basis, therefore unnoticeable.

30 Interview with Filippos, ibid..

streets.”31

Thus, the flag turned out to be the symbol of the threatened middle-class' re-emergence in the

streets of Greece and the symbol of national unity, national mobilization under the same goals. And at

this point, there is a significant similarity between Greece and Tunisia that needs to be noted. The

major transformation that occurred, with regard to the previous experience these two countries had

from national flags and anthems carrying symbolic connotations, was that this time, there was no

obvious external enemy whose threatening behavior could be repelled should the people unite under

the national symbols (Anderson, 1991). This time, the enemy was internal, it was each country's own

elites, might they be political or economic. For this exact reason, we argue that this common

development was rather an innovative tool in the movement repertoire than a direct reference to

movement's mnemonic constructions.

The “internalization” of the conflict - and its symbolic portrayal in the use of the national

symbols - is yet another indicator of the particular way the Greek and Tunisian protesters perceived

their mobilization to be simultaneously local and global. This is especially relevant in the Greek case -

Tunisian's international references were by default more limited, as they were the ones who initiated

the “Mediterranean spring”. A few days before the launching of the Syntagma square occupation, a

false rumor was circulated in various media outlets: Supposedly, the Spanish Indignados had raised a

banner in Plaza del Sol which wrote: “Ssshhh... The Greeks are sleeping” (Sapouna, 2011). This

initiated an extensive discussion amongst the future protesters. As Filippos recalls:

“Yes, I got really angry. I said these stupid Spaniards, who supported Franco for fifty years

and were only dancing flamenco and eating tapas, they are mocking at us. And now they

gather in thousands, what are we doing? Nothing. They are mocking at us for doing nothing” 32.

A few days after the Syntagma occupation, a banner in response to the false rumor was raised.

The banner portrayed a Spanish flag and wrote: “We have woken up. What time is it? It is time for

them [the governments of Greece and Spain] to go!”33. During the demonstrations, one saw

31 Interview with Giorgos, ibid.. 32 Interview with Filippos, ibid.. 33 A photo of the banner, as well as similar Syntagma square messages to the European people, can be found here:

protesters waving Spanish, Italian, Egyptian and Tunisian flags. The identification with the national

symbols was not perceived by them as an attempt to construct thresholds with the neighboring

Mediterranean nations, but rather as a symbol of the Greek people participating in the common effort

to overthrow the neo-liberal policies at the global level.

Mnemonic constructions at the movements' service (2): The Kasbah and Syntagma square

squats.

The first occupation of the Kasbah took place on the 23 of January 2011YEAR after the “March

of Freedom” that brought thousands of people from the rebel town of Sidi Bouzid to the capital. A few

days later, the sit-in was dispersed by the police. The second occupation of the Kasbah in Tunis lasted

from the 20th of February to the 9th of March 2011. The Kasbah is located in the middle of the

historical center of Tunis, hosts the most important palaces of the colonial authority, as well as the

Ministries of Defense and Financial Affairs, the Municipality of Tunis, the Prime Minister's office and

an important mosque. Nevertheless, the place of Kasbah, as the name reveals, is also close to the old

city's commercial and popular neighborhood. The Syntagma Square, in Athens, Greece, is the central

city square, it is situated in front of the Parliament, in close distance to many ministries, the

Presidential Residence and Prime Minister's Office, and in close vicinity to the city's commercial

center. In summary, the spatial and socio-geographical configuration of the two sites is strongly linked

to the political authorities' representation, in the way that they were distributed in the past, but also

in the present. When protesters took over the places with a permanent sit-in, they were openly

inspired by the Tahrir Square sit-in in Egypt, and the Plaza del Sol squat in Madrid, respectively.

Both movements gained political momentum by the occupation of a symbolic place that

worked as catalyst of collective representations and memories of struggle (Olick & Robbins, 1998:

113). The centrality of the Kasbah introduced a direct challenge to the regime and in fact the state

tried to respond to the challenge, succeeded at first by evacuating the occupation, failed the second

time (end of February) and then blocked it again (during the October 2011 electoral process for the

Constituent Assembly). The same process of defiance and resistance was noted in the Greek case: the

http://ksipnistere.blogspot.it/2011/05/blog-post_2744.html

main challenge of both the protesters and the riot police was to secure their presence on the square.

This became evident during the violent clashes of June 2011 and continued onwards, until the final

squat eviction.

The squatting of historical and central places in the capital cities may also be interpreted as a

strategic choice of the movements, in their attempt to build a direct link to previous instances of the

struggle for democracy. In the case of Tunisia, the reference to democracy was rooted in two

apparently distant iconic events of the past: the liberation struggle of the Fellagha34 and the

contemporary “open society” culture and rhetoric. In both cases the democratization process was the

political project chosen to challenge authoritarianism, although amongst the protesters one could

identify various political visions, even the most radical ones:

“We speak of revolution when the majority of the people takes part in a struggle and reaches

its aims. Is not what we have now in Tunisia, we can talk about a minority that started the

revolt, defended it and continued, we see that our revolutionary aims are far to be reached,

that's why we talk about revolt and not revolution. When our objectives are reached, then

we'll talk about revolution”.35

In Greece, the most prominent banner decorating Syntagma square was quoting the final

article of the Greek constitution: “Observance of the constitution is entrusted to the patriotism of the

Greeks who shall have the right and the duty to resist by all possible means against anyone who

attempts the violent abolition of the Constitution” (Hellenic Parliament, 2008: 134-135, emphasis

added). The reference – or threat - was obviously directed to the government and the MPs

overlooking the squat from the Parliament's windows. Yet it had an additional connotation:

“Syntagma” in English means “Constitution”. The name was given to the square after the 1843 popular

revolt against the King, the epicenter of which was the square, and which ended up in the approval of

the first Greek Constitution. Thus, even the name of the site chosen for the mobilization was a

reminder to participants, by-standers and claimees that the struggle for democracy (as perceived by

34 Originally, this Arab word is referring to road marauders and bandits. Fellagha fighters were the partisan guerrillas that

fought against the French colonial occupation of Tunisia during the most intense period of the anticolonial struggle - from 1952 to 1956. A film by Omar Khlifi (Les fellagas, Tunisia -Bulgaria 1970, 104 min) gives an historical portrait of this period.

35 Interview with Rafik, Tunis, 27/2/2011.

protesters36) was drawing from the past but also involved the contemporary provisions of the nation-

state's founding texts.

Conclusion

The movements we examined were characterized by an, often contradictory, linking of what is

usually perceived as “global” and “local”. The Tunisian activists would use a globally uniform platform

to spread the word that their state leader should fall. Their Greek counterparts based on a fierce

critique of worldwide neo-liberalism their argumentation on why the (locally oriented) austerity

measures should be abolished. The more militant amongst them condemned the Western-style

representative democratic models, counter-proposing a direct democracy which drew on their own

experiences, the way they had applied it to make their assembly operational. Both countries'

movements were simultaneously using their own interpretations of “universal citizenship” with

national emblems, re-configured in terms of symbolic content to suit the mobilizations' needs. The

activists found inspiration in and asked for the solidarity of the neighboring countries' version of the

movement, whilst simultaneously fearing that over-involvement of the traditional entities of their own

country would end up undermining their cause.

A similar -and perhaps even clearer- hostility was identified during the alter- or no-global

mobilizations, especially amongst the autonomous and anti-capitalist protest groups (Juris, 2005;

Pickerill & Chatterton, 2006). Flesher-Fominaya explains that whilst the institutional left conceives of

the collective, the party and/or the union as ideal-typical political actors, the autonomous promote

the model of the “individual acting collectively” (Flesher Fominaya, 2007: 338). This was also the case

with the Tunisian and Greek movements. Yet the anti-capitalist groups arrived to this conclusion after

a well-elaborated criticism to the institutions of representative democracy as a whole. To claim that

this elaboration was present in the case of Greece and Tunisia would be an exaggeration. It is possible

36 It is interesting to note that in the case of Greece, the “Democracia Real Ya!” (“real democracy now!”) slogan of the

Spanish Indignados was immediately transformed to “Direct Democracy Now!”. Some observers noted that this choice, apart from the demand for a much more specific content of what we 're referring to when talking about “democracy”, is strongly related to the ideals of the Ancient Greek democracy model (Lieros, 2011).

that the majority of the participants in the Kasbah and Syntagma square occupations were not even

aware of this debate. Giorgos' reflections on this issue are very interesting:

“Our [i.e. the more militant activists'] big illusion was that we believed that we had suddenly

persuaded hundreds of thousands of people to reject democracy, that they were ready to go

to the “next step”. [...] They [the protesters] were swearing against the politicians, all the

politicians indiscriminately, yet they remained in front of the parliament all day, as if they

were expecting something from their representatives. Their claim was addressed exactly to

the people they were shouting against. This, we did not see at that point.37”

What Giorgos confirms is that the contradictory nature of all the above did not pass unnoticed

by the participants themselves. We witnessed and discussed the controversies and doubts the

complex repertoires and organizational schemes created amongst the protesters. Perhaps one could

describe the above phenomena as inherent in the conflictual consequences of neo-liberal policies

imposed on those societies. In the same way that we perceive and analyze the importance of neo-

liberalism in shaping national and regional policies, we could also consider it as a complex procedure

that has had multiple effects on the subjectification of peoples and their cultures. If that is the case,

movement memory should not only be perceived as a potential source of movement repertoire and

identities' of resistance (Scott, 1990), but also as its contrary, as a wounded memory requiring

reconstruction. The complexity of the movements we are referring to is properly illustrated in the “lack

of memory”, symbolized by the use of non-mnemonic tools such as Facebook and Twitter and the

simultaneous evoking of memories of the founding past, considered long lost in time. It is true that

further research (and perhaps, a more extended temporal distance from the events) is required for a

more detailed analysis. Yet, a final comment related to the above should be brought forward: Both the

Tunisian and the Greek movements lacked a hegemonic organizational entity or a charismatic leader.

As the popular rhetoric put it, it was the multitude of social subjects, those who have neither public

voice nor public face who took the initiative. As a popular Tunisian poet wrote:

“It is the unemployed and the vagabonds,

the beggars and the hobos,

37 Interview with Giorgos, ibid., emphasis added.

It is the barefoot,

the sons of the scarred women,

it is the street vendors

who made this revolution!

It's the children of Thala,

Kasserine, Regueb and Jelma,

of Bouzaiene, Sidi Bouzid and Meknassy

the forgotten children of the hinterland38.”

38 Excerpt from: Qui a fait la Révolution ? (Who made the Revolution?) Poem in the Tunisian dialect by Wala Kasmi,

quoted and translated in French in January 2011, at http://revolisationactu.blogspot.com

Bibliography

Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism. Revue médicale suisse, 6(275), 1-7. Verso. Retrieved from http://www.mendeley.com/research/childrens-rights-communication-reflections-autopoietic-theory-united-nations-convention/

Arditi, B. (2012). Insurgencies don’t have a plan —they are the plan. The politics of vanishing mediators of the indignados in 2011. Journal of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies.

Armstrong, E. a., & Crage, S. M. (2006). Movements and Memory: The Making of the Stonewall Myth. American Sociological Review, 71(5), 724-751. doi:10.1177/000312240607100502

Barney, D. (2007). Radical citizenship in the Republic of Technology: A sketch. In L. Dahlberg & E. Siapera (Eds.), Radical Democracy and the Internet: Interrogating theory and practive. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bennani-Chraïbi, M., & Fillieule, O. (2003). Résistances et protestations dans les sociétés musulmanes. Paris: Presses de Sciences po.

Bennett, W. L., & Toft, A. (2009). Identity, technology and narratives. In A. Chadwick & P. N. Howard (Eds.), Routledge handbook of internet politics. New York: Routledge.

Brown, J. (2011). Algeria’s Midwinter Uproar. Middle East Research and Information Project. Retrieved December 31, 2011, from http://www.merip.org/mero/mero012011?ip_login_no_cache=2ec6f81538370cbeb343163566b24660

Chadwick, A. (2006). Internet politics: states, citizens and new communications technologies. New York: Oxford University Press.

Cleaver, H. (1999). Computer-linked Social Movements and the Global Threat to Capitalism. Retrieved December 31, 2011, from https://webspace.utexas.edu/hcleaver/www/polnet.html

Crook, E. (2011). Tunisia: The facebook revolution. The British Council Voices. Retrieved from http://blog.britishcouncil.org/2011/02/tunisia-the-facebook-revolution/

Dahlberg, L. (2007). The Internet and discursive exclusion: From deliberative to agonistic radical democratic aims. In L. Dahlberg & E. Siapera (Eds.), Radical Democracy and the Internet: Interrogating theory and practice. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Diani, M. (2000). SOCIAL MOVEMENT NETWORKS VIRTUAL AND REAL. Information, Communication & Society, 3(3), 386-401. Routledge. doi:10.1080/13691180051033333

Douzinas, K. (2011, February 7). Greek protests show democracy in action. The Guardian2. London. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/feb/07/greece-protest-democracy-government

Earl, J., & Kimport, K. (2011). Digitally enabled social change: Activism in the internet age. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

Edy, J. A. (2006). Troubled pasts: News and the Collective memory of social unrest. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Eltahawy, M. (2011, January 15). Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution. The Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/14/AR2011011405084.html

Flesher Fominaya, C. (2007). Autonomous Movements and the Institutional Left: Two Approaches in Tension in Madrid’s Anti-globalization Network. South European Society and Politics, 12(3), 335-358. doi:10.1080/13608740701495202

Freedom House. (2011). Freedom in the World 2011 - Tunisia. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4dcbf50fc.html

Gerring, J. (2004). What is a Case Study and What is it Good for? American Political Science Review, 98(2), 341-354. Retrieved from http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0003055404001182

Gongaware, T. (2011). Keying the Past to the Present: Collective Memories and Continuity in Collective Identity Change. Social Movement Studies, 10(1), 39-54. doi:10.1080/14742837.2011.545226

Harrigan, J., & El-Said, H. (Eds.). (2011). Globalisation, democratisation and radicalisation in the Arab world. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Harris, F. C. (2006). It Takes a Tragedy to Arouse Them: Collective Memory and Collective Action during the Civil Rights Movement. Social Movement Studies, 5(1), 19-43. doi:10.1080/14742830600621159

Hellenic Parliament. (2008). The Greek Constitution. Athens: Hellenic Parliament. Retrieved from http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/001-156 aggliko.pdf

Hibou, B. (2006). La force de l’obéissance. Economie politique de la répression en Tunisie. Paris: La Decouverte. Retrieved from http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00091747/

Hilleary, C. (2011). Arab Activists: Little in Common Between Occupy Wall Street, Arab Spring. Voice of America. Retrieved December 31, 2011, from http://www.voanews.com/english/news/usa/Arab-Activists-Little-in-Common-Between-Occupy-Wall-Street-Arab-Spring-131594593.html

INE-GSEE. (2011). Greek economy and employment - annual report 2011. Athens: INE-GSEE.

Indymedia Athens. (2012). Athens indymedia in English. athens.indymedia.org. Retrieved June 4, 2012, from https://athens.indymedia.org/?lang=en

Insider. (2012). The fans of PAO and the controversial banner. Insider.gr. Retrieved June 4, 2012, from http://www.theinsider.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=16157:the-angry-supporters-of-pao-and-the-controversial-banner&catid=34:football&Itemid=88

Jordan, T. (2007). Online direct action: Hacktivism and radical democracy. In L. Dahlberg & E. Siapera (Eds.), Radical Democracy and the Internet: Interrogating theory and practive2. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Juris, J. S. (2005). Social Forums and their Margins: Networking Logics and the Cultural Politics of Autonomous Space. Ephemera, 5(2), 253-272.

Kamali, M. H. (2002). Freedom, Equality and Justice in Islam. Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society.

Kansteiner, W. (2002). Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies. History and Theory, 41(2), 179-197. doi:10.1111/0018-2656.00198

Karatziou, N. (2012). Am I not paying or I cannot afford to pay? MONO. Retrieved June 4, 2012, from

http://monopressgr.wordpress.com/2012/03/25/%CE%B4%CE%B5%CE%BD-%CF%80%CE%BB%CE%B7%CF%81%CF%8E%CE%BD%CF%89-%CE%AE-%CE%B4%CE%B5%CE%BD-%CE%AD%CF%87%CF%89-%CF%84%CE%B7%CF%82-%CE%BD%CF%84%CE%AF%CE%BD%CE%B1%CF%82-%CE%BA%CE%B1%CF%81%CE%AC%CF%84/

Kennedy, M. D. (2011, October 23). Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street and historical frames: 1968, 1989, 2011. Jadaliyya. Retrieved from http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2853/arab-spring-occupy-wall-street-and-historical-fram

Kneissl, K. (2011). ELEMENTS FOR A SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF THE ARAB REVOLUTIONS IN SPRING 2011. Social Anthropology. Vienna. doi:10.1553/wpsa21

Lamloum, O., & Ravenel, B. (Eds.). (2002). La Tunisie de Ben Ali : la société contre le régime. Paris: L’Harmattan.

Lieros, G. (2011). Thoughts on Direct Democracy. Athens: Ekdoseis ton Synadelfon.

Lowe, C. (2011, February 15). Tunisia struggles to tame revolutionary spirit. Reuters.

Marzouki, M. (2009). Dictateurs en sursis: Une voie démocratique pour le monde arabe. Paris: Les editions de l’ atelier.

Miladi, N. (2011, January 17). Tunisia: A media led revolution? Al-Jazeera.

Naughton, J. (2011, February). Yet another Facebook revolution: why are we so surprised? The Observer. London.

Olick, J. K. (1999). Collective memory: The two cultures. Sociological Theory, 17(3), 333–348.

Olick, J. K., & Robbins, J. (1998). Social memory studies: From“ collective memory” to the historical sociology of mnemonic practices. Annual Review of sociology, 24(1998), 105–140. JSTOR. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/223476

Olsson, T. (2007). An indispensable resource: The Internet and young civic engagement. In P. Dahlgren (Ed.), Young citizens and new media. New York: Routledge.

Ozdalga, E., & Persson, S. (Eds.). (1997). Civil society, democracy and the muslim world. Richmond: RoutledgeCurzon.

Palidda, S. (2010). Mobilità umane: introduzione alla sociologia delle migrazioni. Roma: R. Cortina.

Palidda, S. (2011). La rivoluzione inimmaginabile: Da Cartagine al Nilo e oltre. alfabeta2, 7.

Pickerill, J., & Chatterton, P. (2006). Notes towards autonomous geographies: creation, resistance and self-management as survival tactics. Progress in Human Geography, 30(6), 730-746. doi:10.1177/0309132506071516

RadioBubble. (2012). Radiobubble news in English. Radiobubble.gr. Retrieved June 4, 2012, from http://news.radiobubble.gr/search/label/English

Roos, J. (2011). Syntagma, ground-zero of the global resistance movement. ROARmag. Retrieved June 4, 2012, from http://roarmag.org/2011/07/syntagma-ground-zero-of-the-global-resistance-movement/

Ryan, Y. (2011). Tunisia arrests bloggers and rapper. Al-Jazeera. Retrieved June 4, 2012, from http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/01/20111718360234492.html

Salter, L. (2003). Democracy, new social movements, and the Internet. (M. McCaughey & M. D. Ayers, Eds.)Cyberactivism: Online activism in theory and practice (pp. 117–144). Routledge: New York, NY. Retrieved from http://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/media/dl/documents-and-pdfs/course-readers/egovernance/Democracynewsocial.pdf

Sapouna, Z. (2011). Ssssh... the Greeks are sleeping! Skai.gr. Retrieved June 4, 2012, from http://www.skai.gr/news/opinions/article/170412/sss-tha-xupnisoun/

Scott, J. (1990). Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Seawright, J., & Gerring, J. (2008). Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options. Political Research Quarterly, 61(2), 294-308.

Seddik, O., & Dahmani, I. (2008). Leila Khaled, la Tunisienne. Committe National de soutien a la population du bassin minier. Retrieved from http://vimeo.com/14090526

Sergi, V. (2011). Appunti etnografici dalla rivolta tunisina. Etnografia e ricerca qualitativa, 3.

Skalli, L. H. (2011, June 27). Youth and the art of protest in North Africa. Al-Jazeera.

United Nations. (2009). Arab Human Development Report.

Vogiatzoglou, M. (2009). Burning, looting, falling in love. 16th panhellenic conference for PhD candidates: Methodological issues in social sciences. Rethymnon.

Wagner, B. (2011). “I Have Understood You”: The Co-evolution of Expression and Control on the Internet, Television and Mobile Phones During the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia. International Journal of Communication, 5. Retrieved from http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/view/1174

Wright, S. (2004). Informing, communicating and ICTs in contemporary anti-capitalist movements. In W. van de Donk, B. D. Loader, P. G. Nixon, & D. Rucht (Eds.), Cyberprotest: New media, citizens and social movements. London: Routledge.

alerthess.gr. (2011). MRB issues new poll on the “Indignados.” www.alerthess.gr. Retrieved December 31, 2011, from http://www.alterthess.gr/node/8839

della Porta, D. (2008). Comparative Analysis: case-oriented versus variable-oriented research. In D. della Porta & M. Keating (Eds.), Approaches and methodologies in the social sciences: A pluralist perspective (pp. 198-222). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

to vima. (2011). Riots and cancellation of the parades all over the country. tovima.gr. Retrieved June 4, 2012, from http://www.tovima.gr/society/article/?aid=427388