From Citizens to Den-izens:

The Syrian Uprising and the Re-Imagined Community of Syria

‘The best day after a bad emperor is the first, the Roman historian Tacitus

once memorably observed. This ‘third Arab awakening’ is in the

scales of history. It has in it both peril and promise, the

possibility of prison but also the possibility of freedom’.

Boualem Sansal1

ABSTRACT

Although since March 2011, when the uprising started, the

events in Syria overwhelm the reports of international media,

references to Christians are rather sporadic – especially

until the summer of 2012 –, as the analysts’ interest is

absorbed by the Sunni-Alawite relations. Despite this limited

reference, there is a consensus concerning the Christian

attitude towards the rebellion: Christians are rather

hesitant, if not entirely unwilling, to join. This article

will turn its attention towards the rather overlooked

Christian minority in Syria and will attempt to interpret

their reluctance by looking at Syria, as imagined2 by

nationalists in the late 19th and 20th centuries, where Arabs or

Syrians were to be united in one state, while maintaining

their different religions. These ideologies came to direct

conflict with the rival ideology of Islamism supported mainly

1 Cited in F. Ajami, ‘The Arab Spring at One’, Foreign Affairs 91:2 (2012), 65.2 The term ‘imagine(d)’ is used here as it was introduced by B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 20063).

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by fundamentalist Sunni intellectuals. It will then present

the perspective of a re-imagined Syria, where religion can

potentially set a boundary line within society separating the

overwhelming Sunni majority from the Christian minority, and

thus turning a part of nowadays Syrian citizens to ‘den-

izens’. Finally, it is necessary to define and analyse the

term ‘den-izen’, and present relative examples from the major

area in an attempt to explain a potential future that seems to

emanate from the current conflict.

1. Introduction

In an interview to the Lebanese based newspaper Daily Star in

June 2011, the Syriac Orthodox archbishop of Aleppo Yohanna

Ibrahim stated: ‘To be honest, everybody’s worried… We don’t

want what happened in Iraq to happen in Syria. We don’t want

the country to be divided. And we don’t want Christians to

leave Syria’. Following the publication of the interview,

commentators posted responses. Two of them, which were rather

extensive, accused the bishop of not understanding Syrian

people and Syrian culture. However, in the last response the

commentator’s view was clear-cut: ‘Christians in Syria have

two options. Either be with the revolution or start packing’3.

Two questions emanate from the above extract. Why did the

bishop express such fears and why did he meet with such

reaction?

2. Christianity and Ideology in Syria

3 B. Anderson, ‘Syrian Christians Concerned about Instability at Home’, 07/07/2011. http://www. dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2011/Jul-07/Syrian-Christians-concerned-about-instability-at-home.ashx#axzz1yc2dsnwu visited on 23/06/2012.

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Straight Street in Damascus is the only road to be named

in the Bible (Acts 9:11)… Today you are likely to

approach it from the side of the modern city centre, and,

about halfway down, you find an alleyway which leads to

the marble church and mansion that is the residence of

His Beatitude Patriarch Ignatius IV4, the Greek Orthodox

Patriarch of Antioch and All the East; then a little

further along is another smaller sideturning which leads

to the less imposing church and residence of His Holiness

Moran Mar Ignatius Zakka I Iwas, the Syriac Orthodox

Patriarch, also of Antioch and All the East. On the other

side of the road is the church of the Greek Catholic, or

Melkite, Patriarch Maximus V Hakim5, and he too is

Patriarch of Antioch’6.

In this vivid and humorous description, John Binns presents

the variety of Orthodox Christian Churches in Syria. This is

however only a part of Syria’s mosaic of religions and sects.

Almost every form of Christianity is represented in the

country: various groups of Protestants and Catholics, as well

as Armenians, and various groups of Orthodox, i.e. Assyrian

Orthodox, Syriac Orthodox and most notably the Roman (or

Greek) Orthodox. As implied in Binns’ account, concerning the

connection between faith and place, the Orthodox groups raise

the historically valid claim of being the oldest surviving

religious groups in the country. Christians constitute an

estimated 8-10% of the country’s population. The country’s 4 Ignatius passed away on 5 December 2012 and was succeeded by Patriarch John X twelve days later.5 Maximus was the Melkite Patriarch at the time the book was written.He resigned in 2000 and was succeeded by the current Patriarch Gregory III Laham.6 J. Binns, An Introduction to the Christian Orthodox Churches (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1.

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majority is Muslim however and again almost every form of

Islam is represented in Syria: Sunnis (the overwhelming

majority of about 75% of the population), Alawites, Shi’a,

Druze, Ismailites etc. (about 13-15%)7.

Christians in Syria do not constitute pitiful relics of a

once glorious Christian past in the area. On the contrary they

are active members of vivid communities. The higher clergy of

the Roman and Syriac Orthodox Christians in the country have,

since immediately after World War II, initiated a spiritual

renewal of their communities with the establishment of

important and prestigious educational institutions and the

publication of spiritual literature. Youth Movements and

constant dialogues among the Christian communities of the

country have brought Christians together and have kept their

believers loyal to their Churches. Christians, especially in

urban centres, such as Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Latakia,

appear to be active people, conscious of their beliefs and

traditions.

Beyond the limits of their respective communities,

moreover, Christians have always assumed an active role in

Syria’s political and social changes, since the days of the

Ottoman rule (late 19th – early 20th centuries). The 1973

constitution of the country guarantees their freedom and

acknowledges their right to operate their own churches and

schools. It is obvious that the Syrian government is not

suspicious of them; it does not question their allegiance to

the state and their devotion to the Arab Syrian national

7 United States Department of State – Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, ‘Syria: International Religious Freedom Report, 2006’, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2006/71432.htm accessed on 23/06/2012.

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identity promoted by it. Arab nationalism, since its birth in

the 19th century, was promoted by Christians, for Christian

personalities were included among its pioneers. The Arab

awakening or renaissance (al-Nahda) was an intellectual

movement for the reinforcement of Arab identity. Although born

in Egypt, the movement gained momentous popularity in Syria

and Lebanon. Personalities, such as the Roman Catholic Nasif

al-Yaziji (1800-1871) from Homs, Syria, who promoted the

cultural awakening of the Arabs against the Ottoman rule, were

among its most enlightened representatives. The first book on

‘al-Nahda’ The Arab Awakening, first published in 1938 was written

by a Lebanese Roman Orthodox intellectual, George Antonius –

possibly of Greek ancestry8. The movement for the liberation

from the Ottoman Empire and the French mandate that followed

in Syria was formed in two ways. Firstly, Syrian nationalists

envisioned the unity of all Syrian lands in one state (Greater

Syria). Secondly, Arab nationalism promoted the union of all

Arab lands in one mighty country (pan-Arabism). Christians

were again among the pioneers of both. The vision of a Greater

Syria is identified with the philosopher Antun Saadeh (1904-

1949), a Roman Orthodox from Lebanon9. The rival ideology of

pan-Arabism is promoted in modern Syria by the ruling Ba’ath

party. One of the founders of the party was the philosopher

and sociologist Michel Aflaq (1910-1989), a Roman Orthodox

born in Damascus10. Perhaps the most prominent Syrian Prime

Minister, internationally esteemed, was the Presbyterian Faris8 G. Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 2001). 9 D. Pipes, Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1990), 22-33, 45-51, 100-106. A. Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 97-98. 10 Y. M. Choueiri, Arab Nationalism: A History (Oxford-Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000), 197-206. Dawisha, Arab Nationalism, 3-4.

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al-Khoury (1877-1962), who made his mark also as Minister of

Finance and permanent representative of Syria in the newly

formed United Nations. What is more, one of the most important

movements towards Arab emancipation from the Ottoman rule, was

the movement for the ‘re-arabisation’ of the Roman Orthodox

Patriarchates of Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem, which were

dominated by Greek-speaking Patriarchs and bishops, although

overwhelmingly consisted of Arab Christians. With the

influential support of Russia, the movement was successful

only in Damascus, where Meletius II Doumani (1899-1906) became

the first modern Arab Patriarch of Antioch11. It is not within

the scope of this article to enter the current scholars’

debate on the role of Christians and Muslims in the emergence

of Arab nationalism. The role of the Christians is only

emphasized here for the purposes of this essay12. The important

thing here is that Christians always acted as devoted Arabs

and viewed Arab Muslims as compatriots, having the same views

and aspirations, while joining the same struggles.

The above by no means constitutes an exhaustive

presentation of the Christian contribution to Arab or Syrian

nationalism; nor does it analyze the differences, disputes and

disagreements within these movements or between their

representatives. It only aims at pointing out the importance 11 The best account of the movement in English is D. Hopwood, The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine, 1843-1914: Church and Politics in the Near East (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969).12 For the pioneering role of the Sunni community see C. E. Dawn, ‘TheOrigins of Arab Nationalism’ in R. Khalidi, L. Anderson, M. Muslih, R. S. Simon (eds.), The Origins of Arab Nationalism (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1991), 3-30. Choueiri, Arab Nationalism, 56-100. A different view is supported by B. Tibi, Arab Nationalism: Between Islam and the Nation-State (Houndmills-London: Macmillan Press, 19973), 96-105. Seealso A. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), v-vi, 67-102, 245-259 and Dawisha,Arab Nationalism, 14-47.

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of the Christian element in almost every variant of

nationalism in the area. On the one hand, Christians have

always cited their existence in the area long before Islam in

order to prove their ties with Syria. Though some of the

Christian groups have come from neighbouring Turkey after the

Young Turks’ 1915 ethnic cleansing, such us the Armenians and

the Syriac Orthodox, they have displayed an admirable loyalty

to the state. As the case of the Syriac Orthodox clearly

indicates, they have attempted even an ‘invention’ or at least

‘reconstruction’ of their tradition in a form of cultural

Syrian nationalism, in order to fully integrate into Syria’s

society13. On the other hand, they desired to secure their

liberties and imagined themselves as free citizens in a free

nation-state. This could only take place if the Ottoman

domination was to be replaced by an effective alternative.

They promoted either a linguistic nationalism, based on the

common heritage of the Arab language and culture (pan-Arabism)

or a geographical nationalism that envisioned the unity of all

Syrian lands in the so called ‘fertile crescent’ (Greater

Syria). In both cases the religious element played a secondary

role. Despite sincere courtesies toward Islam, the Christian

intellectuals supported the separation between religion and

the state, in an effort to secure equal status for all

citizens. The ruling Ba’ath ideology in Syria is based on

these principles, promoting secularism and equality of

citizens across religion14. As it has been recently put,13 For the self-understanding of the Syriac Orthodox Christians in Syria see N. Sato, ‘Syrian Orthodox Historiography and Integration into the Syrian National Community’, Cultural Anthropology 45:1 (2012), 89-121.14 W. Harris, Challenges to Democracy in the Middle East (Princeton, NJ: MarkusWiener Publishers, 1997), 33. L. Noueihed & A. Warren, The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter-Revolution and the Making of a New Era (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 217.

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The Ba’ath party’s secularizing ideas were particularly

appealing to minority communities, who risked being

treated as second-class citizens in any conservative

Sunni-dominated state15.

The Christian support for nationalism should not be

misunderstood nonetheless. It has been stated that their

support for nationalism ‘would remove them from the status of

minority outsiders and make them equal partners in modern

pluralistic nations’16. This is not true. Arab Christians

never considered themselves as ‘minority outsiders’; they

rather belong to the region both ethnically and nationally.

Their support for nationalism was ‘natural’, as they felt

closer to their Arab compatriots than to their European co-

religionists. On the other hand, an Islamic understanding of

the state would automatically reduce them to minority status.

Thus, they found themselves in ideological – in terms of

nationalism and secularism, not totalitarianism – agreement

with the current regime in Syria. Syria, as an imagined

community, is a society of Arab Syrians, across religion. In

the principal nationalist model ‘one state for the nation’,

religion did not play a dividing role. Christians therefore

are not branded as ‘minority’, since they are as Arabs as

their Muslim compatriots. The nationalist ideologies,

supported by Christians, were not left, however, without

opposition.

The ideological alternative to nationalism in the Arab

world was Islamism, an ideology adopted by Sunni Muslim

intellectuals, which envisioned the restoration of the Islamic15 Noueihed & Warren, The Battle for the Arab Spring, 216.16 T. Michel, ‘Social and Religious Factors Affecting Muslim-ChristianRelations’, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 8:1 (1997), 57.

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state, the caliphate. According to Mehdi Mozaffari, ‘Islamism

is a religious ideology with a holistic interpretation of

Islam whose final aim is the conquest of the world by all

means’17. Although this ‘conquest’ sounds rather unrealistic,

it has to be reminded that Islam, according to its adherents,

is a universal religion. Nowadays, this ideology appears in a

modern form, which envisions the ‘nizam Islami’ (Islamic

order) or ‘dawla islamiyya’ (Islamic state) based on the

‘hakimiyyat Allah’ (God’s rule), i.e. an application of the

Shari’a. The idea was based on the fact that the Arabs, in

their vast majority, are devoted to Sunni Islam, the Quran and

the Shari’a – the Islamic Law – as the sole basis for state

legislation. For them

Islam is creed and worship, nation and nationality,

religion and state, spirituality and action, Book and

sword18.

It is important to underline here that the term ‘Islamism’ is

not identified with Islam. Islam is a religion and therefore

pluralistic and open to change, as its own history proves.

Islamism, on the other hand, is a certain ideology that

envisions the full implementation of Quran and especially

Islamic Law in state and society, first in Muslim societies

and then to the world at large; modern intellectuals refer

thus to the ‘shari’atisation’ of Islam and the state19. As a

17 M. Mozaffari, ‘What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept’, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 8:1 (2007), 21.18 The quotation belongs to Hassan al-Banna cited in A. Belén Soage, ‘Hasan al-Banna or the Politicisation of Islam’, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 9:1 (2008), 26.19 B. Tibi, ‘Islamism and Democracy: On the Compatibility of Institutional Islamism and the Political Culture of Democracy’, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 10:2 (2009), 154-156. See also J.Bale, ‘Islamism and Totalitarianism’, Totalitarian Movements and Political

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religion Islam unites all Muslims. As an ideology, Islamism is

followed by a part of the Sunni Muslim community, inspired by

its ideas. Finally, it is obvious that Islam is conceived by

Islamists as a political religion; what they suggest,

therefore, seems to be a form of politicization of religion or

even religionisation of politics20.

Modern Islamism has been expressed through the ‘Muslim

Brotherhood’, a movement which met considerable success and

has managed to survive, despite persecutions. The movement was

founded in British-controlled Egypt in 1928 by the Islamist

scholar Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949)21. Modern scholars,

critical to Islamism, believe that Al-Banna, together with his

ideological successor Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966)22, politicized

Islam in a rather totalitarian way, understanding Islamism as

an Islamic form of Fascism23. Qutb was executed by the Egyptian

nationalist leader Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970) in an act of

supremacy of nationalism over Islamism. Both al-Banna, who was

assassinated by the royalist regime of pre-Nasser Egypt, and

Religions 10:2 (2009), 74-75. B. Tibi, ‘Political Islam as a Forum of Religious Fundamentalism and the Religionisation of Politics: Islamism and the Quest for a Remaking of the World’, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 10:2 (2009), 104. Mozaffari, ‘What is Islamism?’, 17-33.20 Tibi, ‘Political Islam’, 99-100.21 For a brief account of al-Banna’s life and ideas see Soage, ‘Hasan al-Banna’, 21-45.22 For a brief account of Qutb’s life and ideas see S. Khatab, ‘Citizenship Rights of Non-Muslims in the Islamist State of Hakimiyya Espoused by Sayyid Qutb’, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 13:2 (2002), 165-167.23 On totalitarianism in al-Banna’s thought see Soage, ‘Hasan al-Banna’, 29-34. On totalitarianism in Qutb’s thought see H. Hansen & P. Kainz, ‘Radical Islamism and Totalitarian Ideology: A Comparison ofSayyid Qutb’s Islamism with Marxism and National Socialism”, Totalitarian Movements and PoliticalReligions 8:1 (2007), 68.

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Qutb were considered as martyrs of Islam and their thought

influenced the Sunni Muslim world. The Muslim Brotherhood

expanded throughout the Arab world and founded branches in

almost every Arab-speaking country. The Syrian branch was

founded in 1945 by the university professor and politician

Mustafa al-Siba’i (1915-1964)24, but had limited influence in

Syria’s domestic affairs, until it was declared illegal after

the rival Ba’ath nationalists came to power through the coup

of 196325. In the late 1970s the movement led a revolt against

the nationalist authoritarian regime of Hafiz al-Assad,

established after the 1970 ‘Correction Movement’, a coup

within Ba’ath that brought Assad to power. The uprising

questioned Assad’s authority and brought his regime into a

state of crisis. The regime managed to control the situation

only in 1982, when it violently suppressed the revolt, as it

attacked Hama, a city in central Syria, which constituted the

main stronghold of the Brotherhood. The attack is well known

today as the ‘Hama massacre’, for the brutal repression left

tens of thousands dead in the troubled city. The Brotherhood

was accused of violence against regime officials and,

moreover, for kidnappings, assassinations and attacks against

religious minorities, mainly Alawites and Christians. The

Brotherhood was banned from the country ever since, its

leaders were executed and the few who managed to escape spent

the rest of their lives outside Syria. Thus, the Syrian branch

of the Muslim Brotherhood is nowadays operating from Europe. 24 For a brief account of Siba’i and his role in Syria’s politics between 1945 and 1964 see G. H. Talhami, ‘Syria: Islam, Arab Nationalism and the Military’, Middle East Policy 8:4 (2001), 113, 119-122.25 For an account of the Syrian Brotherhood’s role in Syrian politics prior to 1970 see I. Weismann, ‘Democratic Fundamentalism? The Practice and Discourse of the Muslim Brothers in Syria’, The Muslim World 100 (2010), 4.

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Islamism functioned always as the alternative to

nationalism and despite the severe persecution and brutal

repression, the Muslim Brotherhood, remained the only

influential and well-organized opposition party in Syria,

despite operating from abroad. After the events in Hama and in

other Arab countries, mainstream Brotherhood politicians

departed from the idea of applying violence in order to gain

control on politics. Thus, nowadays the Muslim Brotherhood

follows, in every country which it operates in, peaceful

methods to express its views and gain an influential role in

Arab societies, while promoting a moderate and constitutional

image. This, however, resulted in internal disagreement, as

some Islamists maintained their radical ideas and violent

methods. The latter are known as ‘jihadists’. The difference

between moderate and radical Islamists – or, as Bassam Tibi

has suggested, between institutional Islamism and Jihadism26 –

does not seem to be ideological, but rather a problem of

method. They both share the same visions for the domination of

Islam, but the means to achieve differ from political, with

participation in election process, to violent, refusing any

participation in any process considered ‘western’, ‘corrupted’

and imposed by ‘infidels’. Thus, it can be stated that the

jihadists are also Islamists, but the Islamists are not

necessarily jihadists. Modern scholars have pointed out this

change in Islamist mentality and have suggested a potential

replacement of modern totalitarian nationalist regimes in Arab

countries with democratic Islamist ones, as it will be shown

below with special reference to Syria. Other scholars,

however, have accused moderate Islamists for not being honest

when affirming democracy. They blamed them for using democracy

26 Tibi, ‘Islamism and Democracy’, 136.

12

as a tool, for they consider it ‘the easiest and most

legitimate path to power’27. Thus, they depart from the

jihadists, as ‘they agree to ballots but not bullets’28,

without, however, departing from their basic principles, which

are identified with those of the jihadists. For them too

democracy is an alien import to Islam, imposed by the West,

and does not belong to authentic Islam. They affirm democracy

only under the Islamic Law and they give their own

understanding in the term. Therefore ‘institutional Islamists’

are moderate with respect to means but as radical as jihadists

with respect to goals29. According to these scholars, critical

to Islamism, the latter is an essentially totalitarian

political ideology and therefore any political exchange of the

current nationalist authoritarian regimes in the Arab world

with Islamist ones, would mean the exchange of one form of

totalitarianism with another30.

Connected with the question of the relationship between

Islamism and democracy is the problem of the place of

Christians – and non-Muslims in general – in an Islamist

state. Scholars, who advocate the compatibility of Islamism

and democracy, have attempted to prove that important Muslim

Brothers, such as Qutb, promoted the idea of equality of all

citizens across religion. In an Islamist state, thus,

27 Z. Baran, ‘Turkey Divided’, Journal of Democracy 91:1 (2008), 57.28 Tibi, ‘Islamism and Democracy’, 155. See also Tibi, ‘Political Islam’, 104-106.29 Tibi, ‘Islamism and Democracy’, 146, 151. Bale, ‘Islamism and Totalitarianism’, 77, 79-80. Tibi, ‘Political Islam’, 101, 105-106, 111-112.30 Tibi, ‘Islamism and Democracy’, 136. See also, Soage, ‘Hasan al-Banna’, 21-35. Bale, ‘Islamism and Totalitarianism’, 80-85.

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Non-Muslims have complete citizenship rights and

responsibilities equal to Muslims… (they) have the

complete right to think of religion, to believe in

whatever they may and to claim that their beliefs are

right… to maintain and propagate their religions as well

as criticize Islam… Muslims should not force anyone to

adopt a religion, even Islam. As for Muslims who wish to

change or have changed their religion, Qutb is not in

agreement with those who permit the capital punishment…

the fundamental characteristic of human liberation is the

right to freedom of belief31.

Such Islamists often argue for the eventual superiority of

Islamic tradition over ‘Western’ modernity on the issue of

equality and human rights. They also acknowledge to non-

Muslims the right to vote and be elected in an Islamist

state32. Despite the importance of such ideas in promoting

mutual understanding, equality and human rights, it is

significant to emphasize here that such views are not adopted

by all trends of Islamist thought. Though Qutb is a widely

respected Islamist, his followers are often militant jihadists

who do not acknowledge equality rights to non-Muslims. For

every Islamist, for instance, militant or not, the world is

clearly divided in two ways: Islamic and ‘jahili’ (i.e.

ignorant, pre-Islamic). Christians belong to the category of

ignorance. As Qutb himself put it,

31 Khatab, ‘Citizenship Rights’, 185.32 Ibid., 167-169, 171-178, 183-186. See also Weismann, ‘Democratic Fundamentalism?’, 9-10. M. Y. Abu-Munshar, ‘In the Shadow of the “Arab Spring”: The Fate of Non-Muslims under Islamist Rule’, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 23:4 (2012), 450, 491-494.

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…there are no… capitalist ethics and socialist ethics:

there are only Islamic ethics and ‘jahili’ ethics,

Islamic values and ‘jahili’ values33.

Qutb also promoted intermarriage as the strongest social bond

between Muslims and non-Muslims. It is, however, well known

that in modern legislation, inspired by the Islamic Law, even

in secular Syria, the non-Muslim who marries a Muslim converts

to Islam and the children of the couple are Muslims by birth.

Despite the efforts to prove the liberal and democratic

essence of Islamism, main Islamist principles, such as the

implementation of Shari’a, taking the Quran at face value, the

existence of different interpretations of both the Shari’a and

the Quran, which vary from absolute aggressiveness to

admirable moderation, not only within Islam as a whole, but

also within the Islamist movement, and the everyday practice

of Islamists allow not so much space for optimism for

Christians in a future Islamist state. Finally, the Syrian

Muslim Brothers’ insistence for the establishment of a higher

legislative body, which will safeguard the implementation of

Shari’a in the society, causes doubts and allows critics to

view the end of secularism in Syria as a beginning of a new

dubious and uncertain era for Christians. Within an Islamist

Syria Christians will be reduced to religious minority status,

at best tolerated, according to the provisions of the Quran

and the Shari’a34.

33 Cited in Khatab, ‘Citizenship Rights’, 167.34 Weismann, ‘Democratic Fundamentalism?’, 13. About a rather theological dialogue among Muslims on the issue see for example J. Nielsen, ‘Contemporary Discussions on Religious Minorities in Muslim Countries’, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 14:3 (2003), 325-333.

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It is obvious that Christians always saw nationalism as a

way to protect their rights in the area and Islamism as the

ultimate threat. It is under this prism, that the

participation of the Christian community of Syria in the

current uprising will be examined.

3. The Current Uprising and the Christian Participation

One of the most pressing issues, which emanate from the

interview presented at the top of this article, is whether and

to which extent the Syrian uprising contains a sectarian

character. The issue concerns the old antagonism between Sunni

and Alawite Muslims in Syria. Though a minority, the latter

enjoy a high social status in modern Syria since the 1970

coup; the al-Assad ruling family and many of the high ranking

members of the government, civil administration and the army

are Alawites35. The Sunnis, on the other hand, were among the

pioneers of Arab or Syrian nationalism and ‘along with the

Syrian Christian intellectuals, developed the guiding

principles’ of nationalism. However, there was a clear

inclination among many of the Sunnis towards Islamism,

confusing ‘Syrian independence with the rule of their own

community’. In either case, ‘the rise of the Alawites seemed

to many of them a usurpation’36.

35 On the rise of the Alawites and Assad, as well as the tension between them and the Sunnis see the very enlightening and prophetic M. Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 119-130. See also Pipes, Greater Syria, 155-188. J. Landis, ‘The Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the AssadRegime is Likely to Survive to 2013’, Middle East Policy 21:1 (2012), 72-74.36 M. Kramer, Arab Awakening and Islamic Revival: The Politics of Ideas in the Middle East(New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1996), 189.

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Lacking the Sunni inclination towards Islamic

fundamentalism, the Alawites have invested their prosperity

upon the current regime, which is based on nationalistic

rather than religious fundamentalist principles. In accordance

with this idea, the al-Assad regime carried out the

aforementioned ‘Hama massacre’ (1982). The current uprising is

looked upon by many as a return of this old antagonism,

considering it a sectarian struggle.

There are certain events indicating the sectarian

character of the conflict, as the comment on the bishop’s

interview, presented in the beginning of this text, clearly

demonstrates. Slogans, such as ‘Christians in Beirut, Alawites

in the coffin’ – demanding for the departure of the Christians

and the elimination of the Alawites – cases of Sunni attacks

against Alawites and vice versa or abductions of Christians

and pressures to abandon their homes in opposition-controlled

areas, prove that Islamic fundamentalism is well grounded in

the minds of many of the protesters37. The suppressed Muslim

Brotherhood has returned to the country, supporting the

government opposition, reinforced by other Islamist groups,

with the immediate help of other Sunni countries, such as

Turkey, with her Sunni Islamist government, Saudi Arabia and

Qatar. On the other hand, the Iran-backed Shi’a fundamentalist

group ‘Hezbollah’ actively supports the Syrian government,

together with Iran itself. Amidst this crisis Christians are

pressingly asked to take a part on either side. In a very 37 S. Starr & S. Akminas, ‘Syrian Christians Keep Uneasy Alliance WithAssad’, Christian Century 129:12 (June 13, 2012), 19. J. Diehl, ‘Lines inthe Sand: Assad Plays the Sectarian Card’, World Affairs 175:1 (2012), 12-14. Such information has come also from international media. See for instance – from a long relative list – P. Wood, ‘Syria’s Slide Towards Civil War’, 12/02/2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/world-middle-east-16984219 accessed on 23/06/2012.

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suggestive such example, Christians have started evacuating

the Homs suburb of Qusayr since March 2012. Media reports have

been conflicting as to the reason of this mobilisation. What

is certain anyway is that most of the Christians have now

abandoned their homes and found refuge in the neighbouring

town of Qa in the Lebanese side of the borders, due to

sectarian violence38.

The opposition in Syria, nonetheless, has made continuous

efforts to prove the non-sectarian character of the uprising

and promote its demands for freedom, equality and democracy

for all Syrians, without the oppressive al-Assad regime. They

imagine the transformation of their nation-state from an

‘Assad’s Syria’ to a ‘non-Assad Syria’. In doing so, they were

able to unveil the governmental efforts to push the conflict

into sectarianism, to gain the minorities’ support39.

As it appears, both claims are well grounded. On the one

hand, the government attempted to use the minorities’ fears of

a sectarian conflict for its own benefit. It is worth noting

that the Russian support for Assad has also been connected to

a plea of the influential Moscow Patriarchate to the Russian

president Vladimir Putin to protect the Christians in the

Middle East40. On the other hand, the uprising progressively

assumes a sectarian character. In the first months of the 38 Again from a rather long media list see for instance U. Putz, ‘Christians Flee from Radical Rebels in Syria’, 25/07/2012. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/christians-flee-from-radical-rebels-in-syria-a-846180.html accessed on 26/07/2012. 39 Diehl, ‘Lines in the Sand’, 14-15. S. Ismail, ‘The Syrian Uprising:Imagining and Performing the Nation’, Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 11:3(2011), 542-545.40 ‘Syria’s Assad Can Count on Support from Russian Orthodox Church’, 01/06/2012. http://www. theweek.co.uk/russia/syria-uprising/47233/syrias-assad-can-count-support-russian-orthodox-church accessed on 23/06/2012.

18

conflict, the opposition’s efforts to prove that the movement

was not connected with sectarianism could be convincing.

However, as time passes and the movement is progressively

radicalised and militarised, the features of the movement have

changed significantly. The uprising is not purely sectarian so

far. What is happening however is that Islamists are

progressively becoming a dominating element of the opposition,

as it will be shown below. It is harsh for Christians to take

a part; tug of war is proved to be a difficult game for them.

As advocates of nationalism and the civic and secular nation-

state, they are not satisfied with the lack of democracy in

their country. Numerous prominent Christian personalities,

such as the Communist Party leader George Sabra and the human

rights activist and journalist Michel Kilo, have joined the

opposition from the beginning. The search for a more

democratic society in Syria is also common among the youth of

the Christian community41. Again, as advocates of a secular and

democratic nation-state they cannot support a party that

promotes Islamic fundamentalism. The Christian leaders have

taken the part of the government42. In an indicative such

example, the Lebanese-based Maronite Patriarch of Antioch

Bechara Boutros al-Rahi, though independent from direct Syrian

control, went as far as to claim that ‘the closest thing to

democracy (in the Arab world) is Syria’, as Syria does not

41 Ch. Glass, ‘The Country that is the World: Syria’s Clashing Communitites’, World Affairs 175:2 (2012), 87-88. See also Noueihed & Warren, The Battle for the Arab Spring, 232-233. 42 ‘Syrian Bishop: Christian Community not in Danger’, 01/06/2012. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/ News/Politics/2012/Jun-01/175335-syria-bishop-christian-community-not-in-danger. ashx#axzz20z3uMUf7 accessedon 23/06/2012. H. Selimian, ‘A Message from Rev. Haroutune Selimian President, Armenian Protestant Community in Syria’, International Congregational Journal 10:2 (2011), 9.

19

recognize Islam as state religion43. Modern scholarship backs

this statement, as in a survey examining the religion-state

relations in Middle East and North Africa with a measure

system from 0 relation (absolute separation of religion and

state) to 100 (religion identified with the state), Syria is

placed 15th among 19 countries, scoring a 42.80 as opposed to

74.62 scored by Saudi Arabia, placed 1st, and 21.94 by Lebanon

placed 19th44. The attitude of the majority of Christians

towards the uprising, however, can be rather described as

hesitant45.

This Christian reluctance can be understood, if we

attempt an approach to the issue of borders within societies

and the way citizens are defined in a modern nation-state.

4. Den-izenship and the Den-izen

A very important element of the modern nation-state is its 1

line, guarded by the state’s armed forces and defining the

land that belongs to ‘us’, as opposed to the land that belongs

to the ‘others’. It is also a symbolic line that defines ‘our’

culture from the culture of the ‘others’. In modern nation-

states this means that the citizen of one state is a non-

citizen of a neighbouring state. This definition of borders

describes the visible or territorial borders. However, these

are not the only kind of borders that exist in modern nation-43 M. Scott & S. Nakhloul, ‘Violence Turning Arab Spring into Winter’,04/03/2012. http://www. reuters.com/article/2012/03/04/us-lebanon-patriarch-idUSTRE82306X20120304 accessed on 23/06/2012. 44 J. Fox and S. Sandler, ‘Separation of Religion and State in the 21st Century: Comparing the Middle East and Western Democracies’, Comparative Politics 37:3 (2005), 326.45 Glass, ‘The Country that is the World’, 88-89. For an indicative media report see P. Wood, ‘Syria’s Christians Cautious in Conflict’, 26/07/2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18996030 accessed on 26/07/2012.

20

states. Thus, more profoundly, the border line constitutes a

significant factor within society. It defines and

distinguishes the citizen from the non-citizen, according to

certain criteria, which may differ from one nation-state to

another. When speaking about Syria, only Syrians can be

citizens of the Syrian state. The criteria that define a

certain land as Syrian and another as Turkish, for instance,

coincide with those that define a certain person as Syrian and

not a Turk within Syrian society. This is a second definition

of borders, the population or imagined ones.

Syria, as an imagined community, defined her own criteria

of belonging. These were linguistic and cultural, less ethnic,

and not at all religious. According to these criteria, not

only the visible-territorial borders are defined, but also the

imagined-population ones. Therefore, there are mainly two

categories of people, the citizens who meet the state criteria

of belonging to the nation and posses full citizenship rights,

and the non-citizens who do not meet the state criteria and do

not posses citizenship rights, as they do not belong to the

nation (refugees and immigrants). The foreigners, who are in

the process of obtaining citizenship, have been described in

recent bibliography as ‘denizens’. The term does not

constitute a novelty. In 1701 England, denizens were

foreigners whose right to live and work in the country was

protected, but did not posses full citizenship rights. As a

contemporary legal expert put it, ‘a denizen is in a kind of

middle state between an alien and natural-born subject, and

partakes of both of them’46. According to the Swedish political46 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765), 362. About its origin and first uses see S. Rapalje & R. L. Lawrence, A Dictionary of American and English Law, vol. 1 (Union, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange, 1997), 374.

21

scientist Tomas Hammar the term ‘denizen’ in modern nation-

states refers to quite the same people, and describes their

status between the citizen and the non-citizen47. The Italian

influential philosopher Giorgio Agamben has considered

Hammar’s use of the term as a ‘neologism’48. However, neither

the term nor the meaning Hammar attributes to it seem to

constitute something new. The latter rather modernizes the

word in the framework of nation-states and 20th-21st century

immigration. Agamben’s view, nonetheless, led the Greek

scholar Antonios Liakos to understand the term ‘denizen’ as a

neologism that stems from an acute combination of the words

‘deny’ and ‘citizen’. In this way, Liakos believes, Agamben

refers to denizens as the immigrants who belong neither to the

country of their origin nor to that, where they live49. It is

obviously a misunderstanding. The term is not a neologism, as

Agamben stated. It is not even a neologism invented by

Agamben, as Liakos thought. The immigrants, as people who

belong neither to the state they inhabit nor to the state they

come from, are simply non-citizens. No neologism is needed. It

is a misunderstanding; a useful misunderstanding nonetheless.

47 T. Hammar, Democracy and the Nation-State: Aliens, Denizens and Citizens in a World ofInternational Migration (Aldershot: Gower Publications, 1990), 84. For denizenship – in Hammar’s understanding – in European legislation seeK. Groenendijk, ‘The Legal Integration of Potential Citizens: Denizens in the EU in the Final Years before the Implementation of the 2003 Directive on Long-Term Resident Third Country Nationals’ in R. Bauböck, E. Ersbøll, K. Groenendijk & H. Waldrauch (eds.), Acquisition and Loss of Identity: Policies and Trends in 15 European Countries, vol. 1: Comparative Analyses (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 385-397.48 G. Agamben, Means Without End: Notes on Politics, Theory Out of Bounds 20, trns. V. Binetti &C. Casarino (London-Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 23.49 A. Liakos, Pos Stahastikan to Ethnos aftoi pou Ithelan na Allaxoun ton Kosmo [How the People who Wanted to Change the World Thought about the Nation] (Athens: Polis,2005), 119.

22

Although Liakos is wrong as far as the etymology of the

term ‘denizen’ is concerned, it is important to use it here in

this sense to describe the people who are born locals, but

they are deprived of their citizenship status. What we refer

to here is the possibility of people, who previously enjoyed

citizenship status, but lost it and fell in the status of

denizens. Although we are aware that the term has always been

used in order to describe mainly aliens, it is also clear that

the term and all the relative terms are conceived according to

the way that the nation-state imagines itself. The nation-

state sets the criteria of belonging and the terms citizen,

denizen or non-citizen are defined accordingly. Boundaries are

the most crucial elements for the state to define the above

terms. Aliens are the people who have crossed the boundaries

and have come from another country. In the country of their

destination they meet new societal and imagined boundaries

drawn by the nation-state to separate the citizens from the

non-citizens. There is an additional possibility, moreover,

for people to be deprived of their citizenship and be reduced

to a lesser status. In order to describe this status the term

‘den-izen’ will be used here as more appropriate: in this

potential case, the den-izens, as ex-citizens, continue to

inhabit their country of origin, but they are viewed by the

state and their compatriots as aliens, although their

citizenship rights may or may not be denied by the state

officially. As it was shown above, aliens with rights are only

the denizens. Consequently, these ex-citizens will possibly

forfeit their quality of life and they will probably seek

refuge in other countries, where they will be considered again

aliens and they will be further reduced to non-citizens, with

better expectations nonetheless.

23

How can people fall in the den-izenship status, according

to the way we understand the term here? As it was shown above,

the nation constitutes a community that imagines itself in a

certain way. According to the criteria, set by the community,

one either belongs to the community or not. If the criteria

change, people who met the previous criteria may not meet the

new ones. In this respect, they cease to be citizens and they

become den-izens – their citizenship is denied. The example of

a religious minority can be used here. If a given nation-state

does not consider religion as part of national identity and

citizenship, the religious minority enjoys full citizenship

status. If these criteria change, however, and religion

assumes the first role in defining the nation and the citizen,

the religious minority can be deprived of its citizenship

status. Then a clear, though imagined, demarcation line can be

drawn in society to separate the citizens who meet the new

religious criteria and the den-izens who do not meet these

criteria. Citizens, in this case, will be described positively

– citizen is the person who has this religion, speaks this

language etc. – whereas den-izens will be described negatively

– den-izen is the person who does NOT have this religion, does

NOT speak this language etc.

In order to describe the content of den-izenship, we

shall go back to Agamben and his understanding of ‘bare life’.

According to Aristotle, man is an animal that lives (ζεῖν),

like all animals, but achieves quality life (εὐ ζεῖν) through

politics. Den-izens, according to the understanding posited

for the needs of this essay, can be reduced from βίος-εὐ ζεῖν

(life-quality living) to ζωή-ζεῖν (mere life-living), or, as

Agamben puts it, vita nuda (bare life). In the framework of the

24

nation-state, quality life is achieved only within the

citizenship status; the den-izen experiences bare life50. A

den-izen can also be a homo sacer, according to Roman Law, a

man, that is, who can be killed and the killer will never be

charged or convicted for the crime. It can be added here that

the state can potentially marginalize the den-izen, tending to

disregard and ignore her/his rights and remember only her/his

obligations. Finally, the den-izen’s allegiance to the state

can be questioned, especially in cases where a state maintains

hostilities with neighbouring states. In case of war this

suspicion towards the den-izen can be easily transformed to

aggressiveness. Many nation-states in history were formed by

the practice of ethnic cleansing. Locals who did not meet the

state criteria for citizenship and nationality were expelled

or even exterminated. It is therefore possible that violence

will be the result of the societal boundaries between citizens

and den-izens.

This rather long analysis about the term ‘den-izen’ and

its features was made in order to present a potential future

reality for Christians, connected with the uprising in

progress in Syria. Syria, as an imagined community in the

future, can potentially change the criteria of belonging.

Islamism, as the rival ideology to nationalism, is what will

probably prevail. As was shown above, the criteria of

belonging to the Syrian nation and therefore to the Syrian

state were cultural/linguistic, but not religious. If religion

assumes a first role in these criteria of belonging, then

Sunni Islam, as the majority’s religion will become the most

important element of defining the ‘Syrian’ and, as a result, 50 G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trns. D. Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998).

25

it will be possibly imperative for somebody to be a Sunni

Muslim, in order to be a Syrian and enjoy citizenship.

Christians, therefore, will possibly lose their citizenship

status, being reduced to den-izens, as the state will possibly

draw societal-imagined boundaries, between the religious

majority and the religious minority. Syria can then be a state

of exception. To be precise, Syria already is a state of

exception. In the strict sense of the word it has been one

since the 1963 ba’athist coup and especially since the 1973

implementation of emergency law. The Assad totalitarian regime

used the state-of-war against Israel and the subsequent

emergency law in order to control its dissidents. This is a

nationalist state of exception. An Islamist transformation,

however, will possibly transform Syria to a religious state of

exception. Christians will possibly be marginalized and

reduced from life to bare life. Then a Christian can

potentially become a homo sacer, in the sense that somebody

can kill or anyway harm a Christian without being convicted.

What will possibly make Syria such a state of exception will

be the new way that the nation-state will imagine itself and,

what is more, the way the Syrian Sunni majority will interpret

this change. Using the example of Hitler’s Germany, Agamben

gave the features of the state of exception as follows:

The entire Third Reich can be considered a state of

exception that lasted for twelve years. In this sense,

modern totalitarianism can be defined as the

establishment, by means of state of exception, of a legal

civil war that allows for the physical elimination not

only of political adversaries but of entire categories of

citizens, who for some reason cannot be integrated into

26

the political system. Since then, the voluntary creation

of a permanent state of emergency (though perhaps not

declared in the technical sense) has become one of the

essential practices of contemporary states, including so-

called democratic ones51.

By the implementation of 1973 Emergency Law the nominally

democratic Assad regime turned against its adversaries by

means of state of exception. The existence of political

prisoners in pre-2011 Syria and the notorious Hama massacre

constitute sufficient evidence. The regime turned against

people who questioned its authority, but never against entire

religious or ethnic groups. However, in an Islamist state of

exception in Syria a ‘legitimate’ civil war will be initiated,

which will probably allow for the physical elimination of

entire categories of people – the religious minorities.

Although Agamben directed his criticism towards the

notion of ‘right’ as such and against modern democracies as

states of exception52, a western-like democracy is probably

something that will save minorities. From the era of its

emergence, Islam understands itself as not only a religion,

but also a political system. Mohammad and his successors, the

‘caliphs’, were both religious and political leaders. As a

result, Islamists, often advocates of democracy, understand

politics in a religious way; they don’t usually separate the

two. When speaking about democracy, it is Islamic Republic

that they have in mind. This idea does not coincide with the 51 A. Agamben, State of Exception, trns. K. Attell (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2006), 2.52 For a criticism to Agamben‘s relative ideas see F. Daly, ‘The non-Citizen and the Concept of “Human Rights”’, Borderlands 3:1 (2004). http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol3no1_2004/daly_noncitizen.htm visited on 23/06/2012.

27

secular understanding of democracy, more familiar to citizens

with a Christian background.

Christians in Syria like to repeat that they were there

(in Syria) before Islam, they still are during Islam and that

they will be after Islam. Which will be the potential future

of the Christians, however, if an Islamic Republic – of any

form – is the alternative to the Assad regime in Syria? The

answer to this can be den-izenship, the experience of bare

life. Christians can be looked upon with suspicion or even

hostility, be marginalized elements of a predominantly Muslim

society, or even be persecuted and expelled. The potential

threat for the Christians of Syria is to fall from the status

of citizen, which they actively gained, to that of den-izen.

It has to be noted here that a prospective Islamist

government, in all probability, will not act officially. The

Christians may not be deprived from their citizenship rights

and a kind of emergency law may never be implemented. However,

certain elements in society, viewing Christians as aliens,

will possibly act as such with the possible direct or indirect

support of the state. This fear does not constitute a myth

conceived in fanciful minds. It is a reality, as we are going

to see below, experienced by Christians in neighbouring

countries, mostly Iraq.

Of course, this would mean that Christians should embrace

the regime and actively support it, fighting by its side. This

vitality and initiative, well known for Christians in Syrian

history, is not performed by the Christians nowadays.

Obviously, the oppressive and arbitrary Assad regime is not

what they had envisaged. Democracy is definitely what they

desire. If it is so, they should back the opposition with its

28

democratic rhetoric. Again, Islamic Republic is not what they

have in mind; hence, the Christian reluctance. This idea can

be only understood through a concrete example.

5. Den-izenship and the Den-izen: The Iraqi Example

What was described above is not merely a matter of societal

status or theoretical change in the criteria of imagining the

nation. Rather, it is based on the changes and developments in

the Arab world. Islamism, as the alternative ideology, the

radicalization of Islam and the role of the Muslim

Brotherhood, combined with the tragic events in the major area

of the ‘Arab Spring’ foreshadow a rather gloomy ‘winter’.

Nationalism, as the prevailing ideology in Arab

countries, has been already tested and caused nothing but

disappointment. The promising starts in Nasser’s Egypt, the

optimism that followed the rise of the Ba’ath party in both

Syria and Iraq etc. were crushed in the battlefields of the

wars against Israel53. In domestic affairs the progressive Arab

nationalist visionary rhetoric ended up in corrupted and

authoritative dictatorships54. The humiliation, disappointment

and disillusionment that followed, the poverty of the

population and the citizens’ ill-treatment at the hands of a

corrupted, clientelistic and arteriosclerotic public

administration has led many to seek alternatives. There are

Muslims who understand Islamism as the sole solution.

Gradually the Islamist democratic and clean-hands rhetoric

53 Dawisha, Arab Nationalism, 285-314.54 For an enlightening account of the pan-Arabist disillusionment and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism see E. Sivan, ‘Arab Nationalism inthe Age of the Islamic Resurgence’, in J. Jankowski & I. Gershoni (eds.), Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1997), 207-228.

29

becomes all the more convincing. The American anti-Islamic

discourse – especially the monumental J. W. Bush crusades

against the ‘axis of evil’ – reinforced this tension, while

placing the Christians of the Middle East in a very difficult

position, despite the fact that they equally disliked Bush’s

policies.

Apart from the long history of sectarian conflict in

neighbouring Lebanon, which is currently put to the test once

again, the Christian fears are further reinforced by the

developments in neighbouring countries. The example they dread

most, is that of Iraq. Clearly, the US-led 2003 invasion

brought the Christians of the country to despair. It is

estimated that half of the 1,2 million Christians of pre-2003

Iraq have left the country. The reason is that the Christians

in the post-Hussein era have been turned to den-izens. The

Iraqi governments that followed the fall of Saddam Hussein’s

ba’athist regime never questioned the Christians’ citizenship

rights. On the contrary, they repeatedly affirmed them and

assured protection. However, they issued a new constitution in

which it is stated that state law cannot contradict Islamic

law and that the Supreme Court will have the authority to

strike laws down as unconstitutional, whenever they seem to

contradict Shari’a. According to B. Tibi, what is taking place

in Iraq is the sharitatization of the state55. Despite verbal

assurances an increasing number of incidents of abductions,

torture and killings of Christians, as well as bombings

against Christian Churches effectively proved that an active

part of Iraq’s population viewed Christians as aliens. There

have also been reported incidents of pressure against

55 Tibi, ‘Islamism and Democracy’, 143.

30

Christians to convert to Islam and women to adopt Islamic

dressing, under threats of death or expulsion. In October 2006

the Syriac Orthodox priest Paul Iskander was abducted in Mosul

and was beheaded and mutilated, despite being ransomed by his

family. The prominent Chaldean Catholic archbishop of Mosul

Paul Faraj Rahho was also abducted and died during his

imprisonment by Islamists in March 2008. A Christian in Iraq,

such as archbishop Rahho, is a homo sacer. The crime he

committed is that he belonged to a community, which had never

actively opposed the Hussein regime. Therefore, he was

executed and the crime against his life was never punished by

state justice.

The new Iraq is officially not an Islamist republic.

Islamists, however, have assumed a free hand in society and

have imagined Iraq as a community for Muslims – Sunnis or

Shi’a, depending on the area, where the two communities are

established. As a result, the Christians’ citizenship rights

have been denied. Christians have been turned to den-izens

experiencing bare life. A clear, though imagined, boundary

line has been drawn in post-2003 Iraqi society separating

Muslims from Christians. The governmental indifference or

indirect approval has contributed to this. The United States

army, the only reliable security force in post-2003 Iraq, has

shown little interest to protect the Christians, a minority

that does not constitute a decisive political element in the

country; the ex-ruling Sunnis, the majority Shi’a and the

Kurds of the North seem to be the elements that interest the

US-policy makers in Iraq.

It has been observed that Islamism overwhelms politics

immediately after authoritarian regimes fall, as happened in

31

Tunisia and Egypt. It is also claimed that the more free

elections become a routine, the more poorly Islamists score56,

as was the case in Iraq, where the Shi’a Islamist party won

the majority of the vote in the two parliamentary elections in

2005, but not in 2010, when the secular nationalists gained a

narrow majority. This argument was used to prove that the

future of ‘Arab Spring’ countries will not be necessarily

Islamist57. These claims however do not seem to be true as far

as Iraq is concerned. Even in the last elections the Shi’a

Islamist parties gained a combined 42.37%. It was their

fragmentation that led them to electoral defeat and not their

influence in society. This fragmentation does not influence

the anti-Christian behaviour described here. Both the elected

prime ministers of Iraq, the current Nuri al-Maliki and his

predecessor Ibrahim al-Jaafari, have been Shi’a Islamists with

little interest for the status of Christians in post-2003

Iraqi society. This reality explains the ineffectiveness of

the quotas system applied in elections in Iraq, which has

helped Christians to elect five members of parliament. This

means, however, that they represent the 0.2% of the

parliamentary seats, whereas they currently constitute an

estimated 3% of the population. They are also represented by

one minister in every cabinet and have formed political

parties. Again, these rights cannot change the reality

presented here, for Iraqi Christian politicians and their

parties are marginalised and overlooked by the local political

elites, in the framework of Shi’a-Sunni-Kurd struggle for

56 C. Kurzman & I. Naqui, ‘Do Muslims Vote Islamic?’, Journal of Democracy21 (2010), 50-63. 57 B. Zguric, ‘Challenges for Democracy in Countries Affected by the “Arab Spring” ‘, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 23:4 (2012), 428-431.

32

power58. Moreover, the Shi’a parties have maintained their

militias, which are responsible for terrorist activities,

often against Christians. Their participation in decision-

making and power does not moderate them. As it was recently

put,

Washington did help transfer the power in Baghdad from a

corrupt secular Sunni regime to a corrupt Islamist Shiite

government that is actually allied today with theocratic

Iran. Elections did take place in Iraq, but… religious

minorities are threatened and deprived of political

power59.

The situation in Iraq as described above has caused great

distress among Christians in Syria, as the majority of their

Iraqi co-believers has abandoned Iraq and has found refuge in

Syria. Christians in pre-2003 Iraq constituted no more than 5%

of the country’s population. They are over-represented,

however, among the Iraqi refugees in Syria to an estimated

20%60. Thus, the Syrian Christians are well aware of the

misfortunes of their coreligionists in neighbouring Iraq. It

is possible therefore that a lack of political stability in a

post-Assad Syria, as well as a succession in power by

Islamists, will bring the Syrian Christians to the same

undesired dead end – they will be transformed from citizens to

den-izens. This negative perspective is further reinforced by

58 F. McCallum, ‘Christian Political Participation in the Arab World’,Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 23:1 (2012), 13-14.59 Statement by Leo Hadar in R. Ziadeh, L. Hadar, M. N. Kratz, S. Heydemann, ‘Symposium: Crisis in Syria. What are the U.S. Options?’, Middle East Policy 19:3 (2012), 5.60 N. Sato, ‘Syrian Humanitarian Aid Programmes and the Iraqi Christian Refugees in Syria: The Expectations Held by both the Recipients and the Service Providers’, The Study of Anthropology of Education14:3 (2011), 204-205.

33

the developments taking place in other ‘Arab Spring’

countries, where Islamists seem to be prevailing.

6. Den-izenship in other ‘Arab Spring’ Countries

The Ennahda Movement that succeeded the arbitrary nationalist

Ben Ali’s rule in Tunisia is directly influenced by the Muslim

Brotherhood and its intellectuals. What has followed Ben Ali’s

downfall in Tunisia is a rise of Muslim violence against non-

desired groups in society, the few Christians of the country

included, with the state doing little to control violence61.

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood also succeeded the

authoritarian and nepotistic nationalist regime of Hosni

Mubarak in Egypt. Together with a more fundamentalist-salafist

party, the Muslim Brotherhood has managed to control the

majority of the seats in the Egyptian parliament. Mohammad

Mursi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate for the presidency in

Egypt, has been elected gaining more than 50% of the votes.

Many consider the Muslim Brotherhood an intolerant party,

recalling statements of their leaders in the recent past. For

instance, Musta Mushhur, an ex-leader of the party, had stated

back in 1997 that Christians should pay the additional tax

prescribed explicitly in the Quran for Christians in exchange

for their protection by the caliphate and their exception from

serving its armed forces. Christians in Egypt, however, serve

the army and have fought in all of Egypt’s wars. Their

allegiance to their state was never questioned by the

nationalist Mubarak regime. It was questioned, however, by

61 J. R. Bradley, After the Arab Spring: How Islamists Hijacked the Middle East Revolts (Basingstoke-New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 30.

34

Mushhur, who stated that they should not serve as officers62.

Nowadays the Muslim Brotherhood seems to embrace democracy and

the recent declarations are far more liberal. It is not clear,

however, how the Brotherhood will be able to harmonise

democratic values with Sharia principles, which seem to be

taken at face value and no part of them – even the slightest

detail – can be questioned or considered obsolete63. This

reality overwhelms the post-Mubarak society in Egypt, amidst

continual reports for violence against Christians, despite the

fact that the latter energetically supported the movement

against Mubarak64.

In Libya the national branch of the Brotherhood played an

influential part in the first legislative elections after the

fall of the long-serving Gaddafi regime together with the

secular – nonetheless respecting the Shari’a principles –

multi-party ‘National Alliance’. The latter eventually won the

elections of July 2012, without, however, bringing stability

in the country so far. It is important to remind here that

numerous Islamist fighters from the country have been

reportedly transferred to Syria to back the opposition65, while

Islamist violence has been continually reported there as well.

Though the political elections in Yemen are to be held in

2014, the Islamic conservativeness of the Yemeni tribes and 62 J. Shenker & B. Whitaker, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood Uncovered: Egypt’s Islamist Opposition Group Sets Out its Demands’, 08/02/2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/08/egypt-muslim-brotherhood-uncovered accessed on 23/06/2012.63 McCallum, ‘Christian Political Participation’, 7-8.64 See for instance, ‘Coptic-Muslim Clashes Erupt in Egypt’, 01/08/2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-middle-east-19089474 accessed on 03/08/2012. 65 ‘Libyan Fighters Join Syrian Revolt, Irish Born Militant Says’, 14/08/2012. http://www.msnbc.msn. com/id/48658065/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/ accessed on 22/08/2012.

35

the considerable influence of Islamist or even Jihadist groups

in the country allow little hope for the establishment of a

secular democratic government.

Consequently, the general impression is that the

nationalist dictatorships are being replaced by Islamic

republics. Though the latter work in a parliamentary fashion,

this in itself raises suspicions among minority Christians66.

As Issam Bishara, a Catholic humanitarian activist from

Beirut, put it,

Taking into consideration the demographic composition of

the Syrian population where Muslim Sunnites make up more

than 80 percent of the Syrian population and the general

trend of all Arab Spring movements where the Muslim

Brotherhood and Salafis were the only organized political

forces capable and ready to fill the void and seize the

power in a democratic way, we strongly believe that the

same pattern will continue in Syria as well67.

The potential of den-izenship for Syrian Christians is

therefore a very possible one. This reality is also derived

from the policies followed by the United States in the area.

7. Den-izenship in American Politics

‘The Islamist groups, which are superbly financed and equipped

by the Gulf states, are ruthlessly seizing decision-making

power for themselves’, to use a statement made by the 35-year-

66 Noueihed & Warren, The Battle for the Arab Spring, 232. Bradley, After the Arab Spring, 29-30 (Tunisia), 83-84 (Egypt). 67 T. Gallagher, ‘Christians in Syria Struggle Amid Violent Clashes’, 29/03/2012. http://ncronline.org/ news/global/christians-syria-struggle-amid-violent-clashes accessed on 23/06/2012. See also Noueihed & Warren, The Battle for the Arab Spring, 226.

36

old anthropologist and artist Randa Kassis, head of an

opposition party consisting of secular elements, Muslims and

Christians alike. What is more, according to Kassis, in all

‘Arab Spring’ countries the United States considers only the

Muslim Brotherhood as the future dominant power and deals only

with them. Members of the opposition with no religious motives

are branded as ‘non-patriots’ and ‘heretics’68. The Washington

D.C.-based Brookings Institution, an influential American

think tank, has suggested open US support for Islamist

parties, even when they do not constitute a majority:

Even if Islamists underperform in elections, they will

invariably play a major role in the future of their

societies. If they are not leading governments, they will

be part of them. If they are not part of them, they will

influence the course governments take in the coming

critical years... the challenge is for the Obama

administration to get ahead of the curve and develop

stronger relations with Islamists... Of course, pursuing

such a strategy of ‘pre-emptive’ engagement is no easy

task as regimes will loudly protest any such move. At the

very least, then, the United States should pursue a

strategy of ‘do no harm’ and refuse to buy into allied

regimes’ rhetoric that it is either them or Islamists.

Such logic, which has held sway in Washington

policymaking circles for decades, is now outdated and

counterproductive. Before the Arab Spring the United

States was never quite willing to resolve its ‘Islamist

68 V. Windfuhr, ‘Syrian Opposition Group Leader: The Islamists are Seizing Power for Themselves’, 16/07/2012. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/opposition-group-leader-randa-kassis-on-Islamist-fighters-in-syria-a-844622.html accessed on 26/07/2012.

37

dilemma’. But now the spread of revolution – and the

subsequent rise of Islamists to unprecedented influence

and perhaps even power – has rendered it moot69.

The above policy is suggested even for American-friendly

regimes, such as Mubarak’s Egypt. Indeed, this is what is

happening in Syria. The United States does not question the

influence of the Islamists in the country. She considers them

the only group to talk to in the post-Assad Syria, the sole

body representing the Syrian people70. Despite the immense

political influence of the Brotherhood on the uprising, the

Brotherhood is far from solely representing the Syrian people.

The regime is indeed protesting loudly the dilemma ‘we or the

Islamists’, as the Brookings Institution has successfully

foreseen, but the United States policy promotes, at least

theoretically, democracy and, thus, the support for Islamism

is considered as support for democracy and promises a better

future. This future, however, never came in the case of Iraq,

despite initial optimism.

As a result, it should not be considered awkward that the

Christians are deeply hesitant to join a revolt dominated by

Islamists, as they know in advance that even the United States

overlooks and marginalises them already. The United States is

obviously aware of the harm that can be inflicted on

Christians and other minorities in case Islamists assume

power. However, she considers the current regime worse for her

69 S. Hamid, ‘Islamists and the Brotherhood: Political Islam and the Arab East’ in K. M. Pollack, D. L. Byman et al., The Arab Awakening, America and the Transformation of the Middle East (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2011), 37-38.70 This was a general impression among scholars even before the Arab spring. As it was put, Arabs are twisted between autocrats and theocrats. Tibi, ‘Islamism and Democracy’, 135-136.

38

interests. As in Iraq, so too in Syria, the USA cannot base

her foreign policy on Christian needs71.

American policy has been proved the most influential

factor, backing the anti-Assad opposition in Syria.

Nevertheless, the most important features supporting the

potential of den-izenship for Syria’s Christians are to be

found in Syria itself.

8. Den-izenship and Pre-2011 Syria

The potential of den-izenship for Syrian Christians can be

dated even back to pre-2011 Syria and the radicalisation of

Islam. Prior to the uprising, Syrian society witnessed an

Islamic revival and a significant turn to religious

conservatism. The characteristic beards for men, the veil of

women (hijab) or even the full-face veil (niqab) were

increasingly seen in the streets of the big urban centres of

the country. In urbanised populations these habits, often

indicating Islamic fundamentalism, used to be rather rare.

Furthermore, the Islamic revival in Syria, prior to the

uprising, was connected with radical conservative trends

coming from the Persian Gulf countries, as well as with more

dangerous currents of ideas which emerged from the conflicts

in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is generally accepted, that after

the ‘Hama massacre’ the regime loosened the rein for Islam in

Syria. It allowed more mosques for Muslims, as well as more

Islamic schools of teaching the Shari’a and memorising the

Quran. It is indicative that the building of mosques very 71 For a cynic and pragmatist approach on the issue of American support for Islamists see M. J. Totten, ‘Assad Delenda Est: The Case for Aiding Syria’s Rebels’, World Affairs 175:2 (2012), 18, 20. A firm criticism of this view see in J. Petras, The Arab Revolt and the Imperialist Counterattack (Atlanta, GA: Clarity Press, 2012), 111-122.

39

close to Christian Churches or within Christian quarters of

Syrian cities constitutes an act demonstrating Muslim

supremacy72. Moreover, in April 2006 Bashar al-Assad allowed

the establishment of an Islamic Law Faculty in Aleppo

University. The strictly secular rhetoric of the government

officials was transformed into Islamic and the nationalist

argumentation was enriched with Islamic elements. The anti-

American discourse encouraged by the government in Bashar al-

Assad’s days bore more Islamic than nationalist features:

Syria was the defender of Islam more than it was the defender

of the Arab cause. People were encouraged to go to mosques and

attend sermons there. They were also encouraged to fight the

‘infidel’ outside Syria, as in Afghanistan both in 1980s

against the Soviets and in 2000s against the NATO forces. The

same happened in post-2003 Iraq. Many of these fighters,

however, returned to Syria with radical ideas and dangerous

irregular-war experience. In February 2006 the government

allowed violent demonstrations against the publication of

prophet Mohammad’s cartoons, which resulted in European

Embassies being set on fire. In April 2006 a moderate Muslim

cleric addressed the officers of the Higher Military Academy,

the first such event since the Ba’ath coup. State media

progressively increased their reference to Islam and its

principles. The government also licensed two private Islamic

banks for the first time in Syria. These policies adopted even

by Hafiz al-Assad continued and were multiplied by Bashar as a

part of his reforms towards democratisation and were welcomed

by Islamists. Despite the numerous restrictions in everyday

72 See the very interesting article concerning Egypt, Palestine and Syria by C. F. Emmett, ‘The Sitting of Churches and Mosques as an Indicator of Christian-Muslim Relations’, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 20:4 (2009), 465-468.

40

life in Syria imposed by the regime, the internet was

satisfactorily accessible, while satellite antennas were very

common in Syrian houses, even the poorest ones. Syrians were

able to watch religious and other broadcasts, promoting

Islamic fundamentalism. This tension inevitably influenced the

content of the sermons heard in Syrian mosques73. Even now that

the conflict is still in progress, Syrians are able to follow

programs of the Qatar-based al-Jazeera or the Saudi al-

Arabiya, propagating the cause of the Syrian opposition,

against the al-Assad regime.

For many, the picture painted above constituted a very

fundamental change. Despite its victory and the violent

suppression of the Islamist revolt of 1982, the regime

admitted its… ‘defeat’. It attempted to co-opt Islamism in

order to stay in power and ease Islamist reactions.

Nevertheless, this did not mean that the state transformed

itself into an Islamist one. The main lines of secularism and

nationalism were maintained and the religious minorities were

effectively protected. Christians enjoyed access to public

administration, the higher ranks of military, as well as

membership in the cabinet74. The members of religious

minorities continued to enjoy equal status in society, despite

complaints of cases of Islamic arbitrariness. For instance,

bureaucracy could significantly delay an attempt to build a

Church but it was proved more effective in helping to build a

73 United States Department of State, ‘Syria: International Religious Freedom Report’, ibid. From relative media reports we select indicatively K. Ghattas, ‘Syria Witnesses Islamist Revival’, 22/02/2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4735240.stm accessed on 23/06/2012. See also A. Rabbo, ‘“We Are Christians and WeAre Equal Citizens”: Perspectives on Particularity and Pluralism in Contemporary Syria’, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 23:1 (2012), 82.74 McCallum, ‘Christian Political Participation’, 10-11.

41

mosque. A couple of years prior to the uprising, the Syrian

government attempted to restrict Islamic revival by imposing

censorship on the Muslim clerics’ sermons in the mosques and

by banning the use of the full-face veil by university

students. In any case, the government kept monitoring, and

imprisoning members of extremist Islamist groups and promoted

only moderate Muslim clerics in leading positions, clerics

willing to work on dialogue with other religions and

contribute to the establishment of an environment of mutual

understanding75.

As a result, Christians were free with equal

opportunities, but the state became increasingly indifferent

towards their attitude and their desires, focusing their

attention more on the Sunni Mulsim majority and not the anyway

loyal Christians. The regime was still nationalist and secular

but its progressive openness towards Islamism made Christians

mere observers of the ongoing changes. In this sense,

Christians were already marginalised. The process of den-

izeship had started in pre-2011 Syria. As a result, many

Christians, especially the youth, chose to seek a better

future away from their motherland.

If this was the case in Syria prior to the uprising,

there are more signs of den-izenship for Christians in the

current conflict. As it was noted above, there is an

increasing influence of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood within

the opposition. To begin with, the diversity and fragmentation

of the opposition, as well as its loose structure, constitute

75 United States Department of State, ‘Syria: International Religious Freedom Report’, ibid. Glass, ‘The Country that is the World’, 86, 90.

42

its major weaknesses76. There is no clear vision about the

future of Syria, which would attract people and make the fall

of the current regime faster and maybe even bloodless. On the

contrary, the Islamist organisation is the only well formed

party of the fragmented opposition, possessing the majority of

the seats in the Syrian National Council and controlling its

relief committee. It is true that members of the Muslim

Brotherhood denounce fundamentalists and consider themselves

unable to control post-Assad politics in Syria – they admit no

more than 25% of the votes of potential free elections. They

have issued a liberal document, which they called a ‘pledge’,

a ‘charter’ and a ‘covenant before God and before our people’,

where they proclaim their intentions for the future post-Assad

Syria:

This Covenant and Charter offers a national vision and

common denominators, adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood in

Syria as the basis for a new social contract that

establishes new national relationships of peace and

harmony between all segments, components and hues of

Syrian society, with all its religious, sectarian,

ethnic, political and intellectual trends... A modern

civil state, based on a civil constitution that protects

the fundamental rights of individuals and groups against

any abuse or violation, and ensures equitable

representation of all components of society... a

democratic pluralistic State with a sophisticated power-

cycling system, according to the finest standards of

modern human thought, with a republican parliamentary 76 For an analysis of the opposition see J. L. Gelvin, The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 111-115. About the endless conflicts between opposition leaders see Landis, ‘The Syrian Uprising’, 74-77.

43

system of government, in which the people choose their

representatives and governors through the ballot box, in

transparent, free and fair elections... A State of

citizenship and equality, where all citizens are equal,

with different ethnic backgrounds and religions, sects

and convictions, where any citizen has the right to work

the highest posts, on the bases of elections or

efficiency, where men and women are equal in human

dignity, and where women enjoy their full rights... The

future state shall be committed to human rights: dignity

and equality, freedom of thought and expression, freedom

of belief and worship, freedom of information, political

participation, equal opportunities, social justice... all

citizens... shall also respect other ethnic, religious

and sectarian groups’ rights and privacy in all civil,

cultural and social dimensions... The new state shall

condemn and fight terrorism...77

It is obvious, in the above extract, that the Syrian Muslim

Brotherhood makes no reference to its Islamist ideology and to

any kind of religious supervision of the political field,

something that has always characterised its way of thinking.

The image of post-Assad Syria that promotes is rather

nationalistic. It refers to a ‘social contract’, echoing

Rousseau, a ‘national vision’ of a ‘civil state’ based on

democratic principles with equality for all its citizens

across religion.

Despite these essentially liberal declarations Christians

do not seem to be convinced. The role of the Muslim 77 ‘Syria Muslim Brotherhood Issued post-Assad State-for-All Commitment Charter’, 07/04/2012. http: //ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=29851 accessed on 23/06/2012.

44

Brotherhood in Syria’s past creates the possible potential of

a new Islamic republic, if al-Assad will follow the fate of

other Arab dictators. Surely, the Syrian uprising did not

start as a purely Islamist movement; it was nonetheless from

the very beginning well connected with local Sunni chieftains

in Daraa, imams and the Friday prayers in mosques78. The

Tahrir-Square-style calls for secular youth demonstrations in

Damascus and other city-centres miserably failed79. Unlike in

Egypt, university students have not made their mark in

advocating the uprising and its democratic demands.

Additionally, the funds of the Brotherhood come from

exceptionally conservative Sunni Muslim countries, such as

Saudi Arabia, which influence the organization’s decisions and

attitudes and reinforce an Islamist struggle against the al-

Assad regime using their immense clerical network80. In short,

Islamism does not seem to like power-sharing. Hence, the fear

that the Muslim Brotherhood’s pledges constitute a political

manoeuvre ‘to gain the middle ground’ that possesses no

substantial ground81.

78 Diehl, ‘Lines in the Sand, 7-8. 79 Although scholars writing on the Syrian Uprising, such as Salwa Ismail, have acknowledged the initial lack of success of secular demonstrations in Damascus, they have failed to evaluate the Islamic elements described here. This omission in Ismail’s otherwise important essay, which is based on fieldwork, is due to her perspective, arguing that the uprising is exclusively of non-sectarian character. Ismail, ‘The Syrian Uprising’, 539, 545.80 About the Saudi attitude in the conflict see for example J. Jacobs,‘The Danger that Saudi Arabia will Turn Syria into an Islamist Hotbed’, 12/04/2012. http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/ 2012/0412/The-danger-that-Saudi-Arabia-will-turn-Syria-into-an-Islamist-hotbed accessed on 23/06/2012.81 L. Sly, ‘Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood is Gaining Influence over anti-Assad Revolt’, 13/05/2012. http:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/syrias-muslim-brotherhood-is-gaining-influence-over-anti-assad-revolt/2012/05/12/gIQAtIoJLU_story.html accessed on 23/06/2012. Weismann, ‘Democratic Fundamentalism?’, 13. For the late history of the Brotherhood and the distrust in which it

45

Most fearsome is the fact that numerous fundamentalist

terrorist groups, such as the Qutb-influenced al-Qaeda or the

notorious Fatah al-Islam, together with Islamist militants

from other countries, such as Libya and Chechnya, have

penetrated the opposition in Syria and will surely demand a

say in case al-Assad’s firm grip on the country is lost. The

Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has denounced Islamist terrorist

groups and their practices82, but their ideological kinship is

well known, despite differences. There is a widely accepted

view among western scholars that Islamism, as it appears in

the current crisis, is a different movement reconciled with

democracy and democratic practices83. Unfortunately, such an

approach can only be viewed reluctantly for the time being, as

the longer the conflict lasts the greater extremism grows. The

example of abductions in Iraq has been followed in Syria too,

and a Roman-Orthodox priest was kidnapped while attempting to

ransom one of his parishioners. He was found slain and his

body horribly tortured in a Damascus suburb84. Priest Fadi

Jamil Haddad constitutes a case of ‘homo sacer’, while

Christians are being progressively reduced to den-izenship

status in Syria.

Epilogue

is viewed by secularists see Y. Talhamy, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood Reborn’, Middle East Quarterly 19:2 (2012), 33-40. See also Tibi, ‘Islamism and Democracy’, 142.82 M. Radwan, ‘Syrian Muslim Brotherhood Denies Links to “Extremists”’, 17/11/2008. http:// ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=18638accessed on 23/06/2012. 83 Noueihed & Warren, The Battle for the Arab Spring, 266-282. Hamid, ‘Islamists and the Brotherhood’, 29-38. For the important differenceswithin the Islamist movement see M. Bishara, The Invisible Arab: The Promise and Peril of the Arab Revolution (New York, NY: Nation Books, 2012), 195-212.84 ‘The Orthodox Priest Kidnapped in Damascus Found Dead’, 25/10/2012.http://www.fides.org/ aree/news/newsdet.php?idnews=32518&lan=eng accessed on 26/10/2012.

46

It is clear that an Islamist return in Syria’s politics is

very possible. The spectre of post-2003 Iraq overshadows

Christian visions for the future. In a nationalist secular

Syria, despite her authoritarian regime, the Christian

peaceful presence in the land they inhabited for over two

millennia is secured. The imagined community of the Arab

nation in Syria considers all Syrians, across religion, as

equal. This community includes Christians as full citizens,

for they constituted pioneers of the movements and the

ideologies, which led to the expulsion of the Ottomans and the

end of the French mandate after World War II. On the contrary,

in an Islamist religious Syria, despite the promised

democracy, the peaceful existence of Christians is not

secured. An imagined Islamic community of Syrians will

possibly draw societal borders between the Sunni Muslim

majority and the religious minorities of the country, the

Christians included. Such a community will possibly separate

the country’s inhabitants to citizens and den-izens.

Christians will obviously fall to the second category, for

their religion will prevent them from enjoying full civil

rights, as their Muslim compatriots. The change of the model

of the country will possibly take place after an undefined

period of instability, when extremists will possibly have a

free hand in acting according to their desires. As Zguric has

successfully noted, free elections do not suffice to

consolidate democracy85. Both, the transitional period and the

possibly Islamic new political order constitute major concerns

for the future of Christians.

85 Zguric, ‘Challenges for Democracy’, 425-428.

47

If, however, the changes in Tunisia and Egypt, as well as

in Libya and Yemen, will be proved to be effective in bringing

freedom, democracy, justice and equality among all citizens,

across religion, through drastic reforms, and if the West,

which has supported these uprisings, will manage to guarantee

this process, the Christians of Syria will unquestionably

favour democratic developments in their own country as well.

In this case, the potential future of Syria, described here,

will be proved false. The Christian peaceful presence will be

secured and the people will be more willing to embrace the new

developments.

Lampros Psomas

There are new books in the issue that a need to check:

1. Achcar, Gilbert, People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab

Uprising

2. Ajami, Fouad, The Syrian Rebellion

3. Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, Syria:

The Crisis and its Implications

4. Danahal, Paul, The New Middle East: The World after the Arab Spring

5. Filiu, Jean-Pierre, The Arab Revolution

6. Hashemi, Nader & Danny Postel, The Syria Dilemma

7. Laferty, Zoe & Paul Wood, The Fear of Breathing

8. Lynch, Marc, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions

9. Pierret, Thomas, Religion and State in Syria

48

10. Ramadan, Tariq, The Arab Awakening: Islam and the New Middle

East

11. Scheller, Bente, The Wisdom of Syria’s Waiting Game

12. Stacher, Joshua, Adaptable Autocrats

13. Starr, Stephen, Revolt in Syria: Eye-Witness to the Uprising

14. Yazbeck, Samzour, A Woman in the Crossfire

49