There’s Regulatory Crime, and then there’s Landlord Crime: from ‘Rachmanites’ to...

There’s Regulatory Crime, and then there’s LandlordCrime: from ‘Rachmanites’ to ‘Partners’

Dave Cowan and Alex Marsh*

This article considers local authority strategies towards the regulation andprosecution of private landlords who commit the criminal offences of unlawfuleviction and harassment. Generally, local authorities operate compliance-basedstrategies, rarely (if ever) resorting to prosecution. In seeking to explain thisapproach, the article draws upon the literature concerning regulatory crime, butalso distinguishes local authority responses to landlord crime from regulatorycrime as more typically conceived. Broadly, it is argued that, while there are clearparallels with other areas of regulatory activity, there is much that is differentabout landlord crime, particularly as a result of central government strategiestowards the private rented sector, the legislative background to landlord crime,and the motivations behind local approaches to regulation.1

Introduction

Understanding and modelling strategies designed to deal with ‘regulatory crime’2

has been one of the pre-occupations of studies which cross-cut disciplines.3 Therehas been a recognition that few regulators adopt a strategy which places use ofcriminal sanctions at the forefront.4 On the other hand, regulators, it is commonlyfound, actively seek to work with regulatees over a sometimes lengthy period oftime in order to ensure that the latter comply with the former’s often pragmaticrequirements. On this basis, the role of the regulator is one of bargaining,negotiation and ‘constant vigilance’ – the aim is to secure the remedy of current

ß The Modern Law Review Limited 2001 (MLR 64:6, November). Published by Blackwell Publishers,108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. 831

* University of Bristol.

1 This paper is based in part upon research undertaken for the Department of the Environment,Transport and the Regions, published as A. Marsh, P. Niner, D. Cowan, R. Forrest, & P. Kennett,Harassment and Unlawful Eviction of Private Rented Sector Tenants and Park Home Residents(London: DETR, 2000). We would like to thank the Department for their financial and organisationalsupport for the research. The views expressed in this paper are, however, those of the authors andshould not be ascribed to the Department. The authors are grateful to the other members of theresearch team, Paddy Hillyard, Simon Halliday, Andrew Sanders and the MLR’s anonymous refereesfor comments on earlier drafts – the usual caveats apply.

2 This phrase commonly is used to mark out business-related crimes from ‘ordinary crimes’. The notionof regulatory crime carries with it an ambiguity that is inherent in this sphere of activity. It is regardedas ‘merely technically criminal and not socially considered on a par with ordinary crimes’: D. Nelken,‘White-Collar Crime’ in R. Morgan and R. Reiner (eds),The Oxford Handbook of Criminology(Oxford: OUP, 2nd ed, 1997) 900.

3 The following are the most significant contributions for the purposes of this article: G. Richardson, A.Ogus, and P. Burrows,Policing Pollution(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983); K. Hawkins,Environmentand Enforcement(Oxford: OUP, 1984); B. Hutter,The Reasonable Arm of the Law?(Oxford: OUP,1988); I. Ayres and J. Braithwaite,Responsive Regulation. Transcending the Deregulation Debate(Oxford: OUP, 1992); F. Haines,Corporate Regulation: Beyond Punish or Persuade(Oxford: OUP,1997).

4 For an exception, see the (critical) analysis of R. Kagan and J. Scholtz, ‘The ‘‘Criminology of theCorporation’’ and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies’ in K. Hawkins and J. Thomas (eds),EnforcingRegulation(Boston: Kluwer, 1984).

regulatorybreachesand preventfuture breaches.Prosecutionis regardedas theantithesisof such a strategy– althoughits threat may well be usedto enforcecompliance– becauseit effectively endsthe relationship.

In thisarticleouraim is to examineoneaspectof privatelandlordcrime– thatis,harassmentand/orunlawful evictionof ‘residentialoccupiers’5 – in relationto theinsightsgeneratedby theliteratureon regulation.Ourargumentis that,while thereareclearlyparallelsbetweenactivitiesdirectedat dealingwith landlordcrimeandregulatoryactivitiesin otherareas,therearefeaturesof thesituationin theprivaterentedsectorwhich suggestthat importantdistinctionsshouldbe drawnbetweenresponsesto landlordcrimeandtheunderstandingsof regulatoryactivity embodiedin the existing literature.We suggestthat while the output of the regulationoflandlord crime is similar to that in other areas– few prosecutionsand thepredominanceof compliance-type strategies– the contextand factorsleadingtothoseoutputs,togetherwith the rationalessuppliedby the actors involved, aredistinctive.As such,the regulationof landlordcrime providesa particularly richcasestudyof the influencesdriving regulatoryactivity.

Local authoritiesaregenerallythe regulatorsof this type of activity, andoftenemploy personneltermed ‘tenancy relationsofficers’ (hereafterTROs) for thispurpose. Our analysis draws upon fieldwork data gained during 1998–99,commissionedby theDepartmentof theEnvironment,TransportandtheRegions.6The purposesof the researchwere to provide information about the natureofharassmentandunlawful eviction,to assesstheeffectivenessof currentlegislationand associatedguidanceand to identify good practicein preventingand dealingwith such incidentsin both the private rentedand park homesectors.Statisticsshowanextremelylow level of prosecutionstakenfor theseoffences– in Englandjust 70 prosecutionswere brought in 1999, of which 25 defendantswere foundguilty.

Our first sectionprovidesa summaryof our researchmethods.We thenmoveonto abrief overviewof theliteratureconcerningtheactivitiesof regulatoryagencies,enablinganinitial comparisonandcontrastbetween,on theonehand,thefindingsof previous studiesof regulatory crime, and on the other hand, some of thebackgroundunderstandingsof landlordcrime.

In the third section,we discussthe impact of policy directions imposedbycentral governmentand the ways in which thesestructureand govern tenancyrelationswork. Our argumentis that contemporarypoliciesemphasise– asneverbefore– growth in theprivaterentedsector.In thelate1980s,for probablythefirsttimesincethesecondworld war, theprivaterentedsectorwasregardedashavingavaluablerole in thepost-Fordisteconomy.7 Whatis important,then,is to constructan understandingof regulatoryactivity which is sensitiveto historical context.8Legislation – a single act of sovereignmight – must be viewed at different

5 The term ‘residentialoccupier’ is derivedfrom the Protectionfrom Eviction Act 1977,s 1(1): ‘. . . apersonoccupyingpremisesasa residence,whetherundera contractor by virtue of anyenactmentorrule of law giving him theright to remainin occupationor restrictingtheright of anyotherpersontorecoverpossessionof the premises.’Hereafterin this article, we refer to ‘occupiers’.

6 SeeMarshet al, n 9 above,– hereafter‘the report’.7 SeeC. Pierson,‘Continuity andDiscontinuity in the Emergenceof the ‘Post-Fordist’Welfare State’

in R. Burrows and B. Loader (eds),Towardsa Post-FordistWelfare State?(London: Routledge,1994)esp103–109.

8 SeeW. Carson,‘White-Collar Crime andthe Enforcementof FactoryLegislation’ (1970)10 BritishJournal of Criminology383.

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historical junctures.David Nelken referred to legislation as ‘an experimentincontrolledsocialchange’,9 andthe experimentis clearly ongoing.

The needto locatethe operationof legislationtemporallyservesto distinguishour study from Nelken’s classic study on harassmentand unlawful eviction.Nelken’sresearchwasconductedin the1970sduringa periodin which theprivaterented sector was generally regardedas dying a well-earneddeath. It was anunsatisfactorytenureinheritedfrom thenineteenthcentury.A particularfeatureofNelken’s study, for example,was his finding that residentlandlordswere morelikely to be prosecutedbecausethey werelesslikely to co-operatewith the localauthority,dueto thenatureof thedisputesinvolved. In our study,by contrast,theresidentlandlord was almostentirely absentfrom the accountsoffered by localauthorities(partly, no doubt,becausethis partof thesectorwasalmostcompletelyderegulatedby theHousingAct 1988).10 Equally,whilst Nelken’ssampleof TROswere generallyex-policeofficers, our samplehad a variety of different workingand professional backgrounds.While the former might be construedas moreprosecution-oriented,the samecannotbe saidof our sampleTROs.

In the fourth section, we develop the argument that the structure of thelegislation providing protectionto tenantshas completelyalteredits focus. Wehavemovedfrom what judgestermedthe tenants’‘statusof irremoveability’ to a‘statusof moveability’.11 Tenantsnow haveassuredshortholdtenanciesinsteadofprotectedtenanciesandhaveto pay a marketrent insteadof a ‘fair rent’. In thissection,we link theenforcementrole of tenancyrelationsinto thedevelopment,orregression,of securityof tenurelegislation.Our argumentis that this providesafurtheressentialcontextwithin which tenancyrelationswork mustbe located.Wealso argue that, despitethe rhetoric of sanctionemployedagainstRachmanitelandlords,the legislationwhich structurestenancyrelationswork – the Protectionfrom Eviction Act 1977 – was re-designedin the 1980sto deliver co-operativestrategies.

The final elementof our argumentfocusesupon activities and understandingsoperatingat thelocal level.To explainregulatoryoutcomesin thetenancyrelationsfield it is necessaryboth to understandthe way in which the agents oftransformation – that is, thosepersonnelresponsiblefor transforminga disputeinto a prosecution12 – interprettheactivitiesandmotivationsof thevariouspartiesinvolved in incidentsof allegedharassmentor unlawful eviction. It is equallyimportant to appreciatethat thosepersonneldo not operatein a vacuum,theiractivitieslink to severalotherareasof local authorityconcern.This wider contextis of fundamental importance.The way in which local authoritiesseekto manage

9 D. Nelken,TheLimits of theLegalProcess– A Studyof Landlords,LawandCrime(LondonandNewYork: AcademicPress,1983)21; this shouldnot be takento suggestthat Nelkensawlandlordcrimeasa staticconstruct- indeed,he drawsattentionto the ‘dynamic elementsof the continuingprocessthat is society’: D. Nelken, ‘Legislation and its Constraints:A CaseStudyof the 1965British RentAct’ in A. Podgorecki,C. WhelanandD. Khosla(eds),Legal Systemsand SocialSystems(London:CroomHelm, 1984)71.

10 ‘A dimensionof thepicturethatwasmissingfrom mostlocal authority’saccountsof harassmentandunlawful eviction was the resident landlord sector.Most authorities felt that tenantsof residentlandlords consideredthemselvesto have so few rights that they did not seek help when theyencounteredproblems’:Report,para3.78.Sincethe Housing Act 1988,residentlandlordshavenotbeenrequiredto obtaina court orderto evict the occupier:s 3A, Protectionfrom Eviction Act 1977.

11 SeeD. Cowan,HousingLaw and Policy (Basingstoke:MacMillan, 1999)ch 13.12 We are here drawing upon the terminology adoptedin W. Felstiner,R. Abel and A. Sarat,‘The

Emergenceand Transformationof Disputes:Naming,Blaming, Claiming . . .’ (1980–1981)15 Lawand SocietyReview631, 645–647.

November2001] Landlord Crime

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thepressuresthey facefrom interactingandpotentiallyconflicting policy agendasbeing handeddown by central governmentcarriesimplications for the specificfield of tenancyrelations.

Researchmethods

Our researchwas conductedin three stages.The first stage involved semi-structuredinterviews with representativesfrom key organisations,such as theCampaignfor BedsitRights,ShelterandtheLocalGovernmentAssociation,whichwas designedto give an overview of the currentconcernsof thesebodies.Thesecondstageinvolved semi-structuredinterviewswith TROs(or their equivalent)in 29 local authoritiesthroughoutEngland.Theseauthoritieswerechosenon thebasisof the following factors:regionalrepresentation;type of area(basedon theOffice for NationalStatisticsfamilies andgroups13); the presenceof a memberofthe Associationof TenancyRelationsOfficers; location; and size of the localprivate rented sector. Interview topic guides sought to elicit informationconcerningthe interviewees’perceptionsof harassmentand unlawful eviction(suchas the rangeof actionswhich constitutethe offence; the type of landlordlikely to commit theoffence;andthemotivesandtriggersbehindharassmentandunlawful eviction) as well as evidenceconcerning types of casesand localauthorityresponses.Theprevalenceof harassmentandunlawful eviction reportedby TROsvariedconsiderablybetweenareas.Generally,it wassaidto bethelowerendof the marketwhich wasmostaffected,andthis wasparticularlysensitivetochanges in housing benefit regulations. This part of the sector might becharacterisedasoperatingin the shadowof the law.

The third stagecomprisedcasestudiesin eight local authorities,chosenon thebasisof the natureof the local housingmarketand the level of involvementintenancyrelationsissuesdemonstratedin thesecondstageinterviews.In eacharea,semi-structuredinterviewswere conductedwith various relevantlocal authorityand voluntary sector personnel,legal and other advisors,and police officers.Interviews were carried out with 40 such persons.Additionally, a selectionofletting agentsand landlordswere interviewedin eacharea(n�32).14 Generally,landlords were approachedthrough the local authority or a landlord forum.Although this might havebeenassumedto haveskewedthe landlord sampleinfavour of more knowledgeablelandlordswho act with propriety, our interviewsdemonstratedthat this wasnot necessarilythecase.While severalof the landlordsin our samplemight havebeenregardedasknowledgeablein termsof the law, asignificantnumberopenlyadmittedengagingin varioustypesof practicesto evictoccupierswithout a courtorder,eitherin full knowledgethat their actionswereofdubiouslegality or in ignoranceof this. In four of the casestudy areas,groupdiscussionswere conductedwith occupiersliving in propertiesin the lower andmiddle segmentsof the local private rentedmarket.Someof the occupierswerereceiving housing benefit and some were not. Thesegroup sessionsgenerallydemonstratedthatoccupierswereunawarenot only of the typeof agreementthey

13 SeeM. Wallaceand C. Denham,TheONSClassificationof Local and Health Authoritiesof GreatBritain, Studieson Medical andPopulationSubjectsNo 59 (London:HMSO, 1996).

14 The aim was to cover letting agentsalong with eachof the three types of landlords– business,sideline,institutional– identified by A. ThomasandD. Snape,In from the Cold – Workingwith thePrivate Landlord (London:DoE, 1995).



hadbut also,for example,to whomtheyshouldcomplainaboutlandlorddeviance,howeverthatmight bedefined.Furthermore,thegroupsessionsdisclosedthe lowlevel of control felt by this classof occupierin relationto their home.15

Although comparisonsbetweendata from our study and that conductedbyNelkenarepossible,thesecanonly betentative.Nelken’ssamplewasdrawnfromLondon local authorities which were Labour-controlled and with a strongweighting towardsareasof high housingstress.Our samplewas broader,bothgeographically and politically, and henceencompassedofficers reporting on amorediversevariety of local experiences.

Regulatory strategies– comparisonsand contrasts

Studiesof regulatory crime almost without exceptionnote the limited use ofprosecutionanddiscussa numberof similar factorswhich leadto the adoptionofcompliancestrategies.16 Chief amongstthesefactorsarethe often paltry penaltieshandedout to thoseorganisationswhich are successfullyprosecuted;the ofteninadequatefunding of the regulatoryagency;the belief that regulatorycrime isoften technically complex; the lack of unequivocalsupport for the regulatoryagencies’activities;andthe regulatoryagencies’understandingof the morality ofthe regulatees’actions.17

It is in thenatureof theexerciseof discretionthatdifferentbranchesof thesameregulatoryagency– be they the local authorityor stand-aloneorganisation– maywell adopt different perspectiveson compliance;indeed,thesedifferencesmayexist within a single regulatoryorganisation.So, for example,Hutter identifies‘persuasive’and ‘insistent’ compliancestrategiesin her analysisof both localauthorityEnvironmentalHealthOfficers andFactoryandIndustrialAir PollutionInspectors.18 The differencebetweeneachof thesestrategiesdependsupon thelevel of experience,flexibility, patience and understanding of the differentregulators.

We returnto someof theseissueslater in thepaper,but in theremainderof thissectionwe focus more specifically upon the constructionof regulatoryviolationandits treatmentasa crime. In doing so we examinethe extentto which privatelandlordcrimesharescharacteristicswith establishedunderstandingsof regulatorycrime.

A continuing, sometimesfractious,divide betweenauthorsconcernswhetherregulatorycrimesare,or shouldbe,regardedas‘real crimes’.19 Thequestiongoesto the root of criminology,reflecting‘the centralfact aboutdeviance:it is created

15 This might be contrastedwith the myths and metaphorsextolling the empowerment of homeownership– seeC. Gurney,‘Lowering the Drawbridge:A CaseStudyof Analogy andMetaphorinthe SocialConstruction of Home-Ownership’(1999)36 Urban Studies 1705.

16 For a brief summarywhich remainsvaluable,see R. Cotterell, The Sociologyof Law (London:Butterworths,1992)267–269.

17 As Hawkins notesin relation to the latter, ‘A strategyof complianceis only possiblewhererule-breaking is not weighty. In all but the most massivepollutions, it is the componentof moraldisreputability – of wilful or negligent rule-breakingor persistentdisregardfor the enforcementagent’sauthority– which canmakedevianceserious’:Hawkins,n 3 above.

18 B. Hutter,n 3 above;‘Variations in RegulatoryEnforcementStyles’ (1989)11 Law and Policy 153.19 CompareF. PearceandS. Tombs,‘Ideology, Hegemony,andEmpiricism’ (1990)30 British Journal

of Criminology423; K. Hawkins,‘ComplianceStrategy,ProsecutionPolicy, andAunt Sally’ (1990)30 British Journal of Criminology444.



by society. . . . [S]ocial groups create deviance by making the rules whoseinfraction constitutesdeviance, and by applying thoserules to particularpeopleandlabelingthemasoutsiders.’20

Oneview is that corporateorganisationsusetheir powerto ‘attemptto exertasmuchcontrolaspossibleovertheir operatingenvironments’.21 Corporations,ratherthanbeing regardedassocially responsible,operateas ‘amoral calculators’;theyare able to ‘constitutethe terrain upon which debatesconcerninglegitimateandfeasibleformsof regulationareconducted.’22 Certainactivitiesarenot definedasdeviant– hencecriminal – but aslegitimatebusinessactivity. Regulatoryagenciesthereforehaveno mandateto act againstparticulartypesof behaviouron the partof the regulatee.An alternativeformulation of this argumentis to questionthestrict division betweenthe ‘public’ andthe ‘private’ in the regulatoryprocessandto seeprivateorganisationsas‘governinginstitutions’ableto influencetheextentof regulatoryspace.23

A secondstrandof this argumentis that evenwherean activity is definedasaregulatorycrime suchcrime can be distinguishedfrom ‘real’ crime. Regulatorycrimesare sometimesconstructedas non-crimeswhen the particularoffender ispowerful in someway – a view mostclearlyarticulatedin thework of PearceandTombs concernedwith the chemical industry. The activities of large firms, ingeneratinglocal economicactivity and creating employment,have legitimacywithin current social structures.Given the underlying logic of the capitalisteconomy,their activitiesareconstructedasbroadlysociallybeneficial.Moreover,with the capacity to withdraw from particular localities and hence imposeconsiderablesocial costs upon local communities,they have power to contestattemptsto apply regulatorypressurearisingfrom a violation of the criminal law.

While the regulation of large enterprisesis problematic,it may be that theattentionof regulatorsis appropriatelyfocusedelsewhere.Haines’studyof deathsat work, for example,emphasiseda contextualisationof regulatoryactivity whichlocatesit within the context of the move to post-bureaucraticorganisationandemphasisingthe incentivesto, and organisationof, regulatory violation.24 Theconclusionwasthat in profit-driven sectorssmallerandmoremarginaloperatorsaremorelikely to transgress,accountfor a greaterproportionof all firms andarethemostdifficult with which to operatecompliancestrategies.Action againstsuchfirms is unlikely to beconstruedassosocially destructiveasactionagainstlargerconcerns.

Regulatorsarefacedwith a seriesof dilemmas.Whena crime is constructedasnot a ‘real crime’ it canfundamentallyweakenthe regulatoryagency’sperceivedmandate for firm action. Regulatory action becomesa delicate cost-benefitcalculation.Thelack of unambiguoussocialendorsementfor regulatoryactionis aspur to the selectionof compliancerather than enforcementstrategies.Further-more,while the relianceon compliancestrategiesis thereforeexplicableit canbeseenas exacerbatingthe problematicnatureof regulatorycrimesand regulatory

20 H. Becker,TheOutsiders(New York: The FreePress,1963),9.21 F. Pearceand S. Tombs, ‘Ideology, Hegemony,and Empiricism’ (1990) 30 British Journal of

Criminology 423, 425; drawing on the work of S. Box, Power, Crime and Mystification (London:Tavistock,1983).

22 F. Pearceand S. Tombs, ‘Hazards,Law and Class:Contextualizingthe Regulationof CorporateCrime’ (1997)6 Socialand Legal Studies79, 81.

23 L. HancherandM. Moran, ‘Organizingregulatoryspace’in R. Baldwin, C. ScottandC. Hood(eds),A Readerin Regulation(Oxford: OUP,1998).

24 F. Haines,CorporateRegulation:BeyondPunishor Persuade(Oxford: OUP,1997).



response.So, Sandersassertsthat ‘perhapsit is the lack of enforcementwhichcreatesthe non-criminogenic image’.25 In consideringthe role of law in theregulatoryprocess,Hawkinsconcludesthat:

‘. . . regulatoryenforcementis a symbolic matter, reflecting intimately the conjunctionofprivately-held(but shared)valueswith organizationalinterestsin enforcinga secularcodeofconductaboutwhich thereis a high degreeof socialandpolitical ambivalence.26

When we turn to the specific issueof private landlord crime, we can identify anumberof points of connectionwith the broaderregulatory literature, but alsosomesignificantcontrasts.By way of contrastto discussionsof regulatorycrime,therecanbelittle doubtthatunlawful evictionandharassmentby landlordsagainstoccupiersin theprivaterentedsectoris regardedgenerallyasa ‘real crime’. Suchis thevituperativeresponseto landlordcrimethat it hasits own particularword inthe English languageto describeit: ‘Rachmanism’.Although definitions of thisword lack clarity,27 there is little doubt that landlord crime has considerablecurrencybothasa mediaimage– a typeof ‘folk devil’ – aswell asa rationaleforinstitutionalinvestors’lackof interestin enteringtheprivaterentingmarketplace.28

Whilst Parliamentarydebatesabout the implementationof housingpolicies areoftensterileaffairs,debatesabouttheaffairsof PerecRachmanandotherlandlordswerepartly responsiblefor thedownfall of theConservativegovernmentin 1964,afact acknowledgedby ‘emergencylegislation’ passedby the incoming Labourgovernmentto deal with this problem. At first sight, harassmentand unlawfulevictionarecrimesagainstwhich a firm responsewould appearsanctionedby thebroadersocialandpolitical context.

Yet, while landlordcrime is generallyviewedasreal crime, it is possibleto seethe processof constructingdevianceasechoingthat occurringin otherregulatoryfields. Nelken’s perceptiveanalysisof the formulationsadoptedin the Rent Act1965to definetheoffenceof harassmentandunlawful evictionshowusthatwhatwascriminalisedwasnotRachmanismassuch,butpracticeswhichwereableto beneatly fitted into the categoryof unlawful acts. Commercialacts, such as thepaymentof moneyto occupiersto leaveproperty(a practiceknownaswinkling),were deliberatelynot includedwithin the pantheonof landlord crime. The 1965Act was not designedto criminalise business-orientedlandlords, despite therhetoric;29 rather,the true focus of the labelscontainedin the legislationwas toestablish‘a clear boundarybetweenthe behaviourlikely to be engagedin byrespectablepeople,including propertycompanies,andthat of the disreputable.’30

Evenat the time of the Milner Holland Committee,whosemembersprovidedthe

25 A. Sanders,‘Prosecutionin CommonLaw Jurisdictions’in A. Sanders(ed),Prosecutionin CommonLaw Jurisdictions(Aldershot:Dartmouth,1996)xvii.

26 Hawkins,n 3 above.27 Nelken,TheLimits of the Legal Process– A Studyof Landlords,Law and Crime (LondonandNew

York: AcademicPress,1983),refersto two suchdefinitionsto introducehis seminalsocio-legaltext:‘systematicintimidation of tenantsto extractexorbitantrents’ (PenguinDictionary); ‘conduct of alandlord who chargesextortionaterents for property in which very bad slum conditions prevail’(ChambersDictionary).Both definitionscarry the flavour of thecrime,but their materialdistinctions(intimidation, slum conditions)show both the uncertaintyabout the activities of PerecRachman’soperationandthe uncertaintyof what constituteslandlordcrime in public consciousness.

28 A. CrookandP.Kemp,Financial InstitutionsandthePrivateRentedSector(York: JosephRowntreeFoundation,1999).

29 ‘[T]he considerableimmunity of large landlordsfrom regulationrestslargely on the tendencyofpoliticiansandofficials to exaggeratetheextentto which largelandlordsalreadyengagein behaviourwhich hasbeenmadecriminal’: Nelken,n 27 above,27, original emphasis.

30 Nelken, ibid 42.



kitchencabinetof advisersbehindtheharassmentandunlawfulevictionprovisionsof the1965Act, thosesamemembersmustalsohavebeenawarethatmostof theabusesoccurred in the unregulatedpart of the private rented sector; yet thisknowledgewent unrecordedin the main body of their reportanddid not informdebate.31 Nelken explains the consequences of the way the boundariesofimproprietyweredrawn:

It is becauselarge landlordstendto specialisein economicmusclewhereaspoor landlordshave nothing but the other kind, that the impact of the criminal law here, as so oftenelsewhere,falls mainly on economicallyweakergroupsin society.But this is not thetypeofreasoningwhich would everbemadeexplicit; in fact mostpublic discussionsof harassmentattemptto give the lie to just suchan argument.32

Hence,in the private rentedsector,aselsewhere,we seethe distinctionbetweenthe largeandsmalloperatoremergingandtheconclusionthat it is thepracticesofthesmall ratherthanthe largethataremorelikely to attractregulatoryscrutiny.Itwasnotedabovethat existingresearchconcludesthat in profit-driven sectorsit issmalloperatorswhoarelikely to transgressandbesubjectto regulatoryaction.It isthereforeappropriateto considerthe motivationsandstructureof thoseoperatingin theprivaterentedsector.Hereimportantdistinctionscanbedrawnbetweentheprivaterentedsectorandotherregulatoryfields.

Most landlordsare certainly small. Most own lessthan five properties,and aconsiderableproportion own just one property.33 Their financial position is inmany casesprecarious.34 Yet they haveenteredthe sectorfor diversereasons–suchasusinga propertyobtainedthroughinheritanceor rentinga room to meetmortgagecosts– andfor manytheprofit-motivedoesnot dominate(theyaremorelikely to be seekingto cover their mortgageor supplementtheir pension).35 Theexcessdemandfor rentedpropertiesin manyareasmeansthat strongcompetitivepressuredoesnot existwithin themarketto disciplineinappropriatebehaviour.Inareasof low demandandexcesssupply,by contrast,occupiershavechoicesandcompetition could have somedisciplining effect on landlord behaviour.Whiledisputes over rent and rent arrears are undoubtedly a common trigger forharassment,the fundamentalfactor underlyingmuchof the difficulty in landlord-tenantrelationsis the cult of amateurismwhich dominatesprivate landlordisminthe UK. Ratherthan ‘new model landlords’coming into the marketplace,aswasdesiredby governmentminister JohnPattenin the mid-1980s,36 amateurismhasbecomemorepervasiveasa resultof the emergenceof ‘slump’ landlordsduringthe depressionin the owneroccupiedmarketin the early 1990sandof mortgage-lenderinducedschemes,suchas‘buy-to-let’, encouragingsmall landlordsto enterthe market.This cult of amateurismhas important implications for the way inwhichharassmentandunlawfulevictionareconstructedby localauthorities.A keyquestionbecomeswhetherthe law shouldbe usedto sanctionignorance.

At the micro-level of the relation betweenthe small-scalelandlord and theindividual tenantwe canagaindetectthe activeconstructionof devianceandthe

31 ibid 90.32 ibid 63.33 See A. Crook, J. Hughes,and P. Kemp, The Supply of Privately RentedHomes(York: Joseph

RowntreeFoundation,1995).34 op cit.35 op cit also,London ResearchCentre,HousingBenefitand the Private Landlords(London: DETR,

1999)ch 2.36 See P. Kemp, ‘Rebuilding the Private Rented Sector?’ in P. Malpass and R. Means (eds),

ImplementingHousingPolicy (Buckingham:OUP,1993).



circumscription of the activities to be designated‘criminal’. So the FrancisCommitteemadethe following comment:

[T]he bulk of [complaints]reflectnot criminal actionbut mutualill-feeling of landlordsandtenants– often peopleof different cultural backgrounds– which is frequentlyaggravatedifnot indeed causedby constrainedproximity. When casesof sheer ill-will and mutualprovocationaredisregarded,thereremaina numberwhereanoffenceis beingcommittedorcontemplated,many of them in ignorance that they are offencesand terminablewith awarning.37

One of the interestingissuesin examiningthe constructionof, and responseto,harassmentand unlawful eviction is to the purpose served by placing theprosecutorialrole on the local authority and not the police. The Milner HollandCommitteesuggestedthat thecomplexityof thecivil law in theareawassuchthatit would be inappropriatefor policeofficers to begivenprincipal responsibility todeal with incidents.38 Subsequently,the Francis Committee made similarcommentsaboutthe problemswhich might be encounteredby the ‘constableonthespot’.39 Thetechnicalityof thelaw wasregardedastakingtheissueoutsidetheperimeterof acceptablepolice action.

Nelkensuggeststhat ‘public perceptionsof which activitiesareordinarycrimesare partly contingenton the official responsesusedto deal with them.’40 Localauthoritiesprocessregulatoryoffencessuch as trading standardsinfringementswhich are quite unlike harassmentand unlawful eviction. Many thereforelackfamiliarity with landlord crime (a reasoncommonly provided by TROs for thefailure of otherpartsof the local authority,notablythe legal department,to assistwith prosecutions).While ‘regulatorycrimes’ arecommonlyvictimless, landlordcrimehasaclearvictim in theoccupant.41 Thissuggestsit is of adifferentnaturetomuchregulatorycrimeandhencemorelike ordinarycrime.Yet, not allocatingtheprimaryprosecutorialrole to thepolicesendsa messagethat landlordcrimeis alsodifferent from ordinary crime. The statusof landlord crime thereforeappearsratherambiguous.

Our datasupportthe conclusionthat wherethe police do becomeinvolved inincidents their responsecan often be to ‘no-crime’42 harassmentand unlawfuleviction(if theyrecogniseit assuchin thefirst place).Echoingthecommentof theFrancisCommittee,the police in severallocalitiestendedto treat landlordcrimesas domesticdisputes. If they did offer advice then it was often to reinforce thelandlord’sdominantposition.Many havedrawnattentionto anecdotalevidenceofthepolice assistinglandlords:our researcheventhrewup the exampleof a policeSergeantwho wascautionedby a TRO in thepolicestation.In severallocal areas,training and joint working with the local authority haveseenrecentchangesinpoliceattitudesandagreaterrecognitionthatharassmentandunlawfulevictionarecriminal as well as civil offences.Nonetheless,our interviews with the policeelicitedtheobservationthattheir reasonfor non-performancein this areawastheirsevereresourceconstraints:theyweregladto passresponsibilityon to others.And

37 FrancisCommittee,Reportof the Committeeon the RentActs, Cmnd4609(London:HMSO, 1971)105,emphasisadded.

38 Milner Holland Committe, Report of the Committeeon Housing in Greater London, Cmnd 2605(London:HMSO, 1965)175.

39 n 37 above,106.40 n 27 above,25.41 Seen 16 above271–272,for discussionof this issue.42 That is, taking no actionandnot recordingthis type of offence.



evenaftertrainingby local authorityofficers,in someareasthepoliceweresaidtocontinuewith their previouspractices.

Towards compliance: rehabilitating the private rented sector

In this sectionwe analysethe placeof the private rentedsectorin the schemeofhousing policy in order to show how housingpolicy has turned a full circle.Landlordsareno longerpenalisedthroughcentralgovernmentrhetoricandpolicy.Rather,considerableeffort hasbeenmadeto revive the sectorat leastsincethemid-1980s.Thus, the image of the landlord has shifted from the social pariahexemplifiedby Rachman(-ism)to a concentrationon the‘many goodlandlords’inthe sector. The landlord is now regardedas serving a useful social purpose,particularly in facilitating job-relatedmigration. Ratherthan benign(or malign)neglect,the sectoris now favouredby governmentinterventionto stimulatethemarketand protect landlords.Moreover,centralgovernmentpolicy now enjoinslocal authoritiesto act in concertwith the private landlord to meetlocal housingneed.This shift in policy emphasisinevitably influencesunderstandingsof whatconstitutesdeviance amongst landlords, which in turn affects the regulatorystrategiesof local authorities.

Decline

Perhapsin theselatter days[in 1974] the provisionof dwellingsfor rentingis no longeranappropriateactivity for privateenterprise.. . . But whateverhis meritsmayhavebeen(anditseemsunlikely that they were ever considerable),the private landlord seemsdestinedtoperishsoonerratherthan later. And all attemptsto delayhis demiseseemlikely to end infailure, . . . from which thereappearsto be no escape.43

Of all thehousingtenures,theprivaterentedsectorfaredworstduringmostof thetwentieth century. By the mid-1970s most commentatorswere discussingitspresumedinevitabledemise.A combinationof transformationsin the production,financeandconsumption of housingmeantthat its shareof thehousingmarketfellfrom 90 per cent in 1914to around9–10per centby the century’send.The mostcommonlycited reasonfor this declinewaslegislationwhich eithercontrolledorregulatedrents.44 Economistslined up to critique rent control;45 governmentestablishedcommitteescompoundedthat criticism;46 and the criticism wasoftenextended– particularlyin political circles– to includerentregulation.Broadly,theargumentwasthat any form of controlson rent madethe sectorunprofitableandhadundesirableeffectson the stock:

43 F. Berry, Housing:TheGreat British Failure (London:CroomHelm, 1974)123.44 For a discussion,seeA. Holmans,HousingPolicy in Britain (London:CroomHelm, 1987)ch VIII;

M. Partington,Landlord and Tenant(London:Weidenfeld& Nicolson,2nd ed, 1980).Rentcontrolrelatesto centralgovernmentcontrolson permissiblerent uplifts; rent regulationbalancesa market-basedrent againstscarcityto createa ‘fair’ rent.

45 A representativesampleis containedin Institute of Economic Affairs, Verdict on Rent Control(London: IEA, 1972).

46 Committee reports were called for in 1918 (Hunter Committee, Cmnd 9235), 1920 (SalisburyCommittee,Cmd658),1923(OnslowCommittee,Cmd1803),1931(Marley Committee,Cmd3911),1937 (Ridley Committee, Cmd 5621), 1945 (Ridley Committee, Cmd 6621), 1971 (FrancisCommittee,Cmnd4609).



In general,therefore,themain impactof rentcontrolhasbeento reducethecostof housingto existing tenants,to redistributeincome from landlords to tenants,to discouragenewbuilding of propertyto rent and to promotethe deteriorationin the quality of the existingrentedstock,andits transferinto owner-occupation.47

Thisperspectiveonrentcontrolandrentregulationis commonlynowunderstoodasa partial accountof thesector’sdecline.As befitsa retrospective, it is usuallynowarguedthat decline was ‘the outcomeof a complex set of factors, the relativeimportanceof which hasvariedover time.’48 Indeed,the effectsattributedto rentcontrol and regulationmay well havebeenover-emphasised– for example,rentcontrols were usually allied to mortgage interest controls. As most landlordsfinancedtheir rentingbusinessoutof mortgages,thesystemoriginally devised‘wasindeednot wholly to landlords’disadvantage’.49 It is alsosuggestedthat,evenif themarkethadbeen‘free’, theprivaterentedhousingstockwasin sucha poorstateitwasunlikely to havereachedacceptablestandardsof quality.50 Thereis plenty ofevidenceshowingthatlandlordswereableto avoidor ignorethelegislationandthatrentregulationfavouredlandlords.51 In fact,by thestartof thetwentiethcenturythedie hadalreadybeencast– increasingproductioncostsmeantthat rentingwasanunprofitable venture;52 housebuildersand mortgage lenders joined together toincreasethe purchasingability of householders;53 housepurchasebecamemoreattainableaspiration,particularlyin the inter-warperiod,asa resultof increasinglyaggressiveadvertisingcampaigns;54 the huge developmentof the ‘social rentedsector’,particularlyaftertheslumclearancecampaigns(whichdemolishedmuchofthe private rentedstockandreplacedit with local authorityhousing);and the taxsystemgraduallycameto favour ownersagainstothers.

As private renting becamethe tenure of last choice for households,it wasfacilitatedin this processby animageproblemwhichhadsporadicallyaffectedthesectorin the early part of the century(leading,for example,to rent strikes55) butwhichbecameafocusafterthedisastrousattemptsof theConservativegovernmentto revivethesectorin theRentAct 1957.ThatAct soughtto introduceaprocessof‘creeping decontrol’ – properties formerly subjected to rent control weredecontrolledon subsequentlettings, enabling landlordsto chargemarket rents.The extentof abuseof the 1957 Act is not known, but the profile of abusewassufficientlyhigh for theissueto beakeypartof the1964electioncampaign.It wasduring this period that Rachmangainednotoriety for his tactics (and also hissubsidaryinvolvementin the Profumoscandal).His strategyinvolved buying up

47 S. Lansley,Housingand Public Policy (London:CroomHelm, 1979)119.48 P. Kemp, ‘Rebuilding the PrivateRentedSector?’in P. MalpassandR. Means(eds),Implementing

HousingPolicy (Buckingham:OpenUP, 1993)60.49 A. Holmans,HousingPolicy in Britain (London:CroomHelm, 1987)388; drawinguponA. Nevitt,

The Nature of Rent Controlling Legislation in the United Kingdom (Birmingham: Centre forEnvironmentalStudies,University of Birmingham,1970).

50 SeeA. Murie, P. Niner, andC. Watson,HousingPolicy and the HousingSystem(London:Allen &Unwin, 1976) 187, where it is suggestedthat rent control was ‘a welcome relief from a socialresponsibility[to improvepropertieswhich landlords]might otherwisehavebeenobligedto assume’.

51 This is summarisedin n 11 above,ch 2.52 SeeM. Ball, Housing Policy and EconomicPower (London:Methuen,1983)27.53 Causingthe developmentof jerry-built propertiesandsubsequentcrisis in homeownership– seeP.

Piratin, Our Flag StaysRed (London: Lawrence& Wishart, 2nd ed, 1978) 41–42;P. Craig, ‘TheHousethatJerryBuilt? Building Societies,TheStateandthePoliticsof Owner-Occupation’(1986)1HousingStudies87.

54 P. Kemp,‘PrivateRenting:An Overview’ in P. Kemp(ed),ThePrivateProvisionof RentedHousing(Aldershot:Gower,1988)2.

55 See,for example,P. Watchman,‘The Origin of the 1915RentAct’ (1980)5 Law and State20.



propertieswith controlledrentsandoffering tenantsmoneyto leavethe property;he relet the propertiesexploiting the lack of controlson furnishedproperties.Iftenantsrefusedto leave,he madetheir lives uncomfortable,for exampleby notbeing‘picky’ abouttheothertenantsin thesameblock.Then,‘what perhapsbegannaturallyRachmanbeganto exploit, seeing,perhaps,no point in payingcontrolledtenantsto go if theycouldbepersuadedto dosoby othermeans.’56 It is perhapsanunderstatementto write that the legacyof this period– particularlyRachmanism–wasan imageproblemfor the sectorasa whole.57

Reviving the private rentedsectorBy the mid-1980s,however,obituariesof private landlordismlooked as if theywere premature. Antipathy towards local authority housing and a gradualacceptancethat owner-occupationwas reaching its limits (both in terms ofsustainability as well as potential levels of demand) drew the Conservativegovernmentinto rethinkingits strategytowardstheprivaterentedsector.Far frombeingthepariahof thehousingmarket,thesectorbeganto be regardedasin tunewith in voguelabourmarketidealsof mobility andcontractualism.

Although in its first housinglegislation it soughtto revive the sectorthroughrhetoric and the developmentof a new type of tenancy, the first Thatchergovernmentapproachedthe sectorin a half-heartedway, perhapsmindful of thefateof the1957Act.58 By themid-1980s,however,thepacehadquickenedandtheneedfor the sectorhad becomemore apparentin governmentrhetoric – privatelandlordismbeingcomparedto ‘motherhoodandapplepie’59 – policy statements,60

and funding programmes. Not only did the third Thatchergovernmentintroducetax breaksfor institutional investorsin the sector,this hasbeenperpetuatedbysuccessivegovernments.Fromthe late1980sthesectorwitnessednewinvestmentvehicles with varying degreesof success(BES (BusinessExpansionScheme),HITs (HousingInvestmentTrusts))andintermediarieswho guaranteeda returnonrentalproperty(generallysocial landlordsthroughHAMA (HousingAssociationsas ManagementAgents), HAL (Housing AssociationLeasing)or PSL (PrivateSectorLeasing)).61 At thesametime, theslumpin theowner-occupiedsectorhadaby-product of increasingthe size of the sector (one estimatewas that slumplandlordsaccountedfor about10 per cent of the sectorin 1993).62 The gradualwithdrawal of mortgageinterest subsidy from owner-occupierscreateda morelevel playing-field of sectoralsubsidy.

56 Milner Holland Committee,Report of the Committeeon Housing in Greater London, Cmnd 2605(London:HMSO, 1965)252.

57 This imageproblemremainspervasive:seefor example,n 28 above.58 Attemptsby the early Thatchergovernmentsto stimulate the sectorwere remarkablyunsuccessful:

seeP.Kemp,‘The Impactof theAssuredTenancyScheme,1980–1986’,in P.Kemp(ed),ThePrivateProvision of Rented Housing (Aldershot: Gower, 1988); House of Commons EnvironmentCommittee,ThePrivate RentedHousingSector, HC 40–41(London:HMSO, 1982).

59 JohnPatten,thenHousingMinister, in an interview for Roofmagazine:January/February1987;alsocited in n 36 above.

60 See especially Department of Environment, Housing: The Government’sProposals, Cm 214(London:HMSO, 1987).

61 One set of commentatorsrefers to a ‘bewildering display of projectsand acronyms’guiding thissectorof housingpolicy: M. CarterandN. Ginsburg,‘New GovernmentHousingPolicies’ (1994)41Critical SocialPolicy 100.

62 A. Crook and P. Kemp, ‘The Revival of Private RentedHousing in Britain’ (1996) 11 HousingStudies51, 57–58.



Particularlyimportantfor the rehabilitationof the reputationof the sector– inpolitical circles at least – has been the acceptanceof its importanceby NewLabour,leadingto anendto thehistoricaldivision betweenthemajorpartiesoverits role in thehousingmarket.63 Thus,thechangefrom Labourto NewLabourwasmorethansymbolicfor housingpolicy. Goneweretheoppositionalpolitics whichcharacterisedthe deregulationdebatein 1987–88;instead,there becamea newspirit of co-operationwhich focussedon theneedto revive thesector.64 The2000HousingGreenPaper,for example,adoptsa toneindistinguishable from thatof thepreviousgovernmentandendorsedthe needfor a healthyprivaterentedsector.65

(In-)Security of tenure: towards a ‘status of moveability’

In this sectionwe locatethedevelopmentof legislationrelatingto harassmentandunlawful eviction in the contextof the broaderattemptsto revive the sector.Ourargumentis, in essence,that the rhetoric and reality behind this legislation areratherdifferent.

Attemptsto revivethesectorin the1980s,togetherwith therehabilitationof theimageof the private landlord,wereconductedin the presenceof what Kemp hastermedthe‘ghostof Rachman’.66 Thus,whenthesectorwasderegulatedin 1988,itwasaccompaniedby a weakeningof theevidentialrequirementsfor harassment–which previouslyhadbeenbaseduponspecificintention– andthedevelopmentofa statutorytort. Both weresaidto bea deterrentto landlordcrime.67 Therationalewassaidto be the needto avoid a similar patternof practicesto thosewhich hadoccurredafter the 1957Act.68

Thedivergenceof reality from rhetoricbeginsto appearwhenwe considerwhatgoeson ‘behindthelegislation’.Nelkendrawsattentionto ‘directivesfrom centralto local government[which] always demandedstricter enforcementof theseprovisions’.69 In 1988,theDoE took theunusualstepof writing to theSecretaryofthe MagistratesAssociationdrawing attention to the ‘very low’ level of finesimposedon landlordstogetherwith the following comment:‘making it easiertosecureconvictionsmay be of little avail if the penaltiesimposedby the criminalcourtsdonot reflecttheadequacyof theoffence.’70 However,at thesametime, the

63 Legislative frameworksand governingethoschangedwith political parties.This political risk wassaid to be oneof the reasonsfor declinein the sectoras institutional landlordswerewary of beinginvolved in a volatile legislativemarket.

64 A spirit which hasremainedin place– the 2000HousingGreenPaperwasrepletewith reassurancefor landlords– a far cry from the position adoptedby the Labour governmentin the last housingGreenPaperin 1977 (seefor example,Quality and Choice: A DecentHomefor All, The HousingGreenPaper(London:DETR,2000)para5.2);D. CowanandA. Marsh,‘New Labour,Sameold ToryHousingPolicy?’ (2001)64 ModernLaw Review260,274–277.

65 For a discussionseeS. Blandy, ‘Housing standardsin the private rentedsectorand the three Rs:regulation,responsibilityandrights’ in D. CowanandA. Marsh(eds),TwoStepsForward: HousingPolicy into the NewMillennium (Bristol: The Policy Press,2001).

66 In C. Grant (ed), Built to Last (London:Roof, 1992).67 Departmentof Environment,Housing:TheGovernment’sProposals, Cm 214 (London:DoE, 1987)

para3.1768 ‘It is important that existing tenantswhoseRent Act rights will be preservedshouldbe protected

againstthe minority of landlordswho may be preparedto harassthem in order to obtain vacantpossessionandto relet at higherrents’: DoE, Cm 214,para3.17.

69 n 27 above,22.70 The letterwaspublishedin theMagistratesJournal in June1989;it alsoappearsasAppendix4 in L.

BurrowsandN. Hunter,ForcedOut! (London:Shelter,1990).



DoE issueda Circular to local authoritieswhich gavea moreambivalentmessage.Whilst referringto the ‘small minority of landlords’who would try to abusetheirposition, the Circular also suggestedvariousnon-penalpowersavailableto dealwith thoselandlords.71 Conciliationbetweenlandlordandoccupierwasregardedassomethingwhich ‘should alwaysbe considered’.72

More fundamentally,despitethe rhetoric about Rachmanismand the use oflegislationto rid thesectorof landlordswho engagein suchactivities,theHousingAct 1988createda climateof deregulationanddecliningsecurityfor occupiers.Itloosenedthe securityof tenureregimeby introducingassuredshortholdtenanciesand withdrew rent regulationin favour of market rents.73 As a consequencethe1988Act undoubtedlyshiftedthe natureandtypesof disputesbetweenlandlordsandoccupiers.Thepersonaliseddisputeswhich Nelkenfoundbetweenresidentiallandlordsandoccupiers,andwhichoccupiedmuchof thework of TROsthen,wereeffectivelywithdrawnfrom thepantheonof landlordcrimeby thesimpleexpedientof entirely withdrawing securityfrom this categoryof occupier.This shouldnotimply that current landlord and occupier relations are not characterisedbypersonalityclashes– manystill havethis at their source.However,suchdisputesaremost likely whenoccupantsareliving in closequarters.

Reductionsin securityof tenureand of regulationbring with them a feeling ofdisempowerment on the part of occupiers. In turn, this impacts upon theirperceptionsof the lawfulness of landlord activity. By contrastto other types ofregulatorycrime, suchas(say)environmentalhazard,thereis a direct, identifiableindividual(s)who hasbeenthesubject(s)of landlordactivity. If theseindividualsdonot feel able to complainabout that activity, then the basisfor regulatoryactiondisappears.Equally, the threat of regulatory action disappearswhen aggrievedoccupiers,havingcomplained,aretold the ‘realitiesof complaining’andareput offtaking their complaintsfurther. Thus, unlike other regulatorycrimes which drawupon professional witnessessuchas local authority environmentalhealthofficers,harassmentand unlawful eviction issues rely upon aggrieved occupiers beingsufficiently motivated to complain, and being willing to presstheir complaintsthroughthe legal process.Motivation is unlikely to be strongwherethe landlord-tenant relationship is inherently insecure.These differences in the stimuli forprosecutioncarryimportantimplicationsfor thelikely useof enforcementstrategies.

Thelink betweenon theonehandsecurityof tenureandon theotherharassmentand unlawful eviction is important. The framing of the latter are related tointerruptionsto the former. Strengtheningthe criminal law is counteracted byweakeningthesecurityof tenureregime.So,theintentionrequiredfor thecrimeofharassmentis:

To causethe residentialoccupierof any premises(a) to give up the occupationof the premisesor any part thereof;or(b) to refrain from exercisinganyright or pursuinganyremedyin respectof thepremisesorpart thereof.74

Thus,thecrime is contingentuponthe level of securityof tenureenjoyedby theoccupier.The 1988 Act effectively enabledlandlordsto grant limited security

71 DoE, HousingAct 1988: Protectionof ResidentialOccupiers, Circ No 3/89,paras10–16.72 op cit, para22.73 Seeabovefor further discussion.74 s 1(3),Protectionfrom Eviction Act 1977;slightly differentmensrea is requiredfor theotheroffence

of harassment,but this is equally relatedto ‘acts likely to interferewith the peaceor comfort of theresidentialoccupieror membersof his household.’(s 1(3A)(a)).



to their tenantsthroughthe useof assuredshortholdtenancies(throughwhich,afteran initial six monthperiod,the landlordis entitledto terminatethe tenancyafter a notice to quit of not less than two months and a court order) and,subsequently, acceleratedcourt procedureswere developedto speedup theeviction process.Most private landlordsnow grant this type of tenancy,whichis designedto give minimal protection to occupiersand encouragepotentiallandlordsto enterthemarketplace.Furthermore,thederegulationof the residentlandlord sub-sector75 practically removedone of the main problem environ-mentswithin which the crimesof harassmentand unlawful eviction had beencommitted.

Theevidencefrom our researchsuggestedthatthesechangeshaveleft occupiersfeelingdisempowered,a senseconveyedby the following interactionin a Londonoccupiers’focusgroup:

M1: ‘That waswhenwe hadrights, do you rememberthosetimes?’M2: ‘Oh I vaguelyrememberthem!’I: ‘Do you feel you don’t haverights now?’M1: ‘I feel they’ve been– no, no, I don’t feel I haveany rights now’M2: ‘I think it’s a lot worsenow’M3: ‘I think there’sbeensomeerosion’F: ‘Yeah – it’s not somethingyou really think aboutthoughis it? . . .’I: ‘Do you get the impressionthat the law now is fairly balancedbetween

landlordsandtenantsor do you think it weighsdownin favourof oneor theother?’

M1: ‘I canonly rememberour paranoiaat thetime, we wereonestepawayfromgoing down to Trafalgar Squareand carrying placards,I just rememberseeingtheshift of power,movingover to landlordsthenbut this wasa longtime ago’

Equally, for local authorityTROs,a senseof what could be gained(and lost) byproceedingwith a casewasimportantin explainingcompliance-typepolicies.Theprivaterentedsectoris characterisedby its easyaccessnature.Thus,manywhoaresubjectedto unlawful eviction and harassmentsimply moved on to anothertenancy.Thosewho complainedto the local authoritywerecommonlysuggestedto want other local authority services(suchasa council tenancy)and/ordid notcomplaindirectly to tenancyrelationsbut were filtered in that directionby otherbranchesof the authority.Most TROstendedto explain to occupiershow long aprosecutionwould take:

Generallywe sayto someoneif you arewantingto run with this prosecutionit is going totakeat leastsix monthsandthat is not an under-estimateat all. It is an incrediblelengthoftime and someonewho hasprobablyhad a horrendousexperienceand wantsto put it allbehindthemto havethat continuingasan issuein their lives for six monthsafter the eventhasoccurredthenI think it is just too long . . .

TROsthemselvesmight providethis informationaspart of a ‘customer-oriented’focus – providing information to the complainantmeantthat the complainant’sinformedchoicecould drive the process.Thus,the primary purposeof providingthis information wasnot to dissuade.But, facedwith this type of information, it

75 Deregulationin this contextshouldbe takento meanthat the requirementto obtaina court order todeterminethe tenancyandto give a periodof notice to quit beyondthe commonlaw requirements,weredispensedwith in the 1988Act.



mustbesupposedthatmanyoccupierswill simplyseekalternativeaccommodationanddecidenot to pursueacriminal charge.ManyTROsbelievedthatoccupiersdidnot wish to pursuewith criminal actions because,by the time a prosecutionactuallyoccurs,theaggrievedoccupierwouldhave‘movedon in their lives’. Thus,the natureof securityof tenureand the extendedperiodsrequiredfor the formallegal processmilitate againsttenantsnamingtheir experiencesas a criminal actandreducethe probability of claiming throughthe legal process.

Development of thecivil law similarly providedanopportunityto shutthegatein manycases.Complainantswould be told that they might be betteroff securingcompensationrather than seekingprosecution.76 In one London Borough, therewas a view expressedby the Housing Advice team leader that the council’senforcementrole shouldbe residualandthat the way forward:

is to look to civil damagesactionsandencouragetenantswhereappropriateto takeactionsfor damagesbecausetheactualamountthat they will get is far biggerthanthe fine that thecourt ever imposesandit actually, it hasa more[deterrent]effect on the landlord.

Thus,the paradoxicaleffect of the increasingrights of occupiersin this areawasthat they havein someinstancesbeenusedto deteranddenyprosecution;or putanotherway, the individual capital gain of the occupieris set againstthe publicinterestof prosecutingthe deviantlandlordand,in sucha contest,capitalgain isthe winner.

Local imperatives, impediments and interpretations

Clarifying the way in which the security of tenure legislation, and theaccompanyingmessagesbeing sent by government,have been modified overtime is necessaryfor anunderstandingof regulatoryoutcomesrelatingto landlordcrime.It is not,however,sufficient.In thissectionweexaminethreefurtherfactorsoperatingat local level to shaperegulatorybehaviour.First, we locate actionsagainstlandlordcrime in the contextof the rangeof otherpolicy imperativesthatfacelocal government.Theseimperativesrelateboth to otherbranchesof housingpolicy andto the shapingandoperationof public sectororganisations.We assesstheeffectson prosecutionof theshifts towards‘new public management’in localauthoritiesfollowing CompulsoryCompetitiveTenderingandBestValue.Second,we considerthebureaucraticimpedimentsaffectingtenancyrelationsactivity. Thehousing system encompassesa complex amalgam of departments andorganisationswhich interlock at different junctures77 – literature concerningthehousing system is littered with exhortationstowards joint working, despiteavariety of factorsimpedingsucharrangements.Harassmentandunlawful evictionareno different in this respect– many local authoritiessuggestedthat they have‘joint working’ arrangements78 but had yet to deal fully with the problemsthataccompanysucharrangements. Finally, we explorethe sense-makingactivitiesoftenancyrelationsstaff: how do they interpret the actionsof both landlordsandtenantsandhow doesthat shapetheir regulatoryresponses?

76 This tactic was usedparticularly where the local authority perceivedthat the complainantwouldmake,in someway, a ‘bad’ witness.

77 See, for example,P. Malpass(ed), Ownership,Control and Accountability (Coventry: CharteredInstituteof Housing,1997).

78 Indeed,they havebeenexhortedby centralgovernmentto adoptsuchsystems:DoE, HousingAct1988: Protectionof ResidentialOccupiers, Circ No 3/89.



Reviving the sector:‘partnersin meetinghousingneed’Central governmenthas sought to stimulate the private rented sector throughvariousschemeslevering centralgovernment’sinfluenceand funding into localauthorities.This comesunder the broad head of ‘the enabling role’ of localauthorities, signalled in the 1987 housing White Paper (but practically inoperationbeforethen).Theenablingrole, if it meantanythingdifferent, requiredlocal authorities to seek alternative forms of housing provision to their ownstock.79

Annual Housing InvestmentProgrammereturnsfrom local authoritiesto theDoE/DETR have required local authoritiesto engagewith central governmenthousingpolicy objectives.80 A largepercentageof financegoesto thoseauthoritieswhich haveschemeswhich satisfytheDoE/DETR- andonemethodof sodoingisto involve the private rentedsector in housingstrategies.81 Urban regenerationschemesset up by central government,such as City Challenge,were premisedupon a widespreaduse of the sector.82 PerformanceIndicatorsare designedtomeasurelocal authorities’useof thesectorasa methodof expandingtheir interestin it. Thus, local authoritiesare now requiredto work with, and regenerate,theprivaterentedsector.This canbeillustratedby thefact that,evenbeforetheywererequiredto do so by legislation,local authoritiesacrossthe spectrumof politicalcontrolweremakinguseof theprivaterentedsectorto fulfil theirobligationsunderthe homelessnesslegislation(eventhough,it is fair to say,they werewary of thesector83).

The significanceof this was that the authorities’ oppositional stancetowardshousing tenureswere breaking down into a more co-operativestrategy.Ourresearchdatashowjust how advancedthis inter-tenurialworking hadbecome,sothat, for example,in someareasprivate landlordswere regardedas ‘partnersinmeetinghousingneed’.Most authoritiesin our studyhadsomeform of strategytowork with the sector– whether this was through simply providing advice andinformation to landlords,through the developmentof a landlord forum (almostubiquitousthroughoutour studyareas),or throughan accreditation scheme.Theessenceof all theseschemeswas to provide some level of encouragementtolandlords,whilst at the sametime informing landlordsaboutrequiredstandards,housing benefit, and other related matters. These sorts of practices wereparticularly evident in areaswhere the supply of additional social housingwasperceivedas inadequateto meetneed.It was not surprisingthereforethat theseweretheareaswith themostdevelopedprivatesectorstrategies– asoneAssistantDirector of Housingput it:

For us,theprivatesectoris a very importanttool in meetinghousingneednow, becausethecouncil is not goingto build [a] massivenumberof houses.Housingassociationswill bethefew on the edges,maybe50 to 100 a year,so, if we arein the businessof meetinghousingneeds,we will haveto go to theprivatesectorto find accommodation.. . . It is a partnershipbecausewe needthemto meethousingneed,we can’t be bashingthemall the time.

79 Departmentof Environment,Housing: The Government’sProposals, Cm 214 (London: HMSO,1987)para1.16.

80 SeeI. Cole andB. Goodchild,‘Local HousingStrategiesin England’(1995)Policy and Politics 49.81 P. Malpass,‘Introduction’ in n 77 above.82 P. Malpass,‘Policy Making and Local Governance:How Bristol Failed to SecureCity Challenge

Funding(Twice)’ (1994)22 Policy and Politics 301.83 University of Birmingham, How Local Authorities Used the Private RentedSector prior to the

HousingAct 1996, DETR ResearchSummary86 (London:DETR, 1998).



Othersspokeof strategieswhich hadentirely changedtheir emphasisin termsofobjectives,approachandorganisation:‘we havecompletelyreinventedourselves’.A clearexampleof this changecamein a hard-pressedrural areawherelandlordshadcomplainedthat the standardtenancyrelationsletter ‘came on a bit strong’.The TRO explainedwhat happenedthen:

I’ve had a little chat with my Chief Officer about that which has beenquite interestingbecauseshe’ssaying‘Well hangon a minute,the landlordsareour customerstoo’, andtheyare.Sowe’re looking at how we couldsortof like maybemodify our lettersa little bit to notbe quite so heavy.But at the sametime we needto be quite clear that this is a criminaloffencethat may havetakenplace,you know.

In thesehard-pressedareas,theprivatesectorstrategywasoften(re-)designedfor aratherdifferent purpose.Temporaryaccommodation,particularly in London andpartsof theSouth,waspracticallyimpossibleto source.It wasalsoexpensive.Forsometime, local authoritieshavebeenencouragednot to usebed and breakfastaccommodationastemporaryaccommodation.84 Insufficient accommodationwasavailablethroughschemessuchasHAMA andHAL andPSL. The role of thosechargedwith combatting harassmentand unlawful eviction had consequentlyshifted. In theseareas,tenancyrelationswork becamemore a questionof ‘howlong can an eviction be stalled?’ than ‘has harassmentor an unlawful evictionoccurred?’Homelessnessdecision-makingwaspremiseduponthe following typeof advice:

We turn roundandsaywell ratherthanbook you in bedandbreakfast,you know you canactually legally live thereuntil you havea bailiff’s warrant.Well we’re not encouragingthemto get a bailiff’s warrant,all we’re sayingis that you’re not homelessyet and if youwant to carry on living thereyou are in a position to.

Homelessnessapplicationswere not receivableuntil the end of this process.85

Preventinghomelessnessthen becamethe crucial feature of tenancyrelations,uponwhich the whole strategywasbased:

Now I’m interestedasa managerin termsof activity, becausethatgivesmeanindicationinterms of workloads, flow through and trend analysis.. . . But what the organisationisinterestedin is things like how manycasesareactually threatenedwith homelessness,butmore importantly whereverit is, homelessnessprevented.. . . So that’s what we’re about,you know, we’re about improving private sector accommodation.We’re also aboutpreventinghomelessness.

The emphasisin these caseson tenancy relations was upon mediation andconciliation. Statisticalmonitoring of tenancyrelations’ operationthus featuredhomelessnesspreventionhighly. Yet, of course,this practiceraiseda paradoxforthe local authority – in seekingto position themselvesas ‘partners’ with privatelandlords,theyneverthelesswereforcedinto operatingagainstthelandlordinterestby forcing the landlord to go to the bitter end (a practice which discouragedlandlordsfrom seeingthemselvesas‘partners’).

By contrast,in someauthorities,generallyin the North of England,a differenttenurepatternpresenteditself. Here,ratherthanbeing‘partnersin meetinghousingneed’,local authoritiesandprivate landlordsfelt themselvesto be in competition

84 See,for example,DoE, HomelessnessCodeof Practice for Local Authorities(London:HMSO, 3rded, 1991) para13.11;seealso P. Watchman,‘HeartbreakHotel’ (1988) Journal of Social WelfareLaw 147.

85 A practicewhich,afterour fieldwork wascompleted,wasfoundto beunlawful: seeR v NewhamLBCex parte Khan, TheTimes, 9 May 2000.



with eachother.Landlordaccreditationschemeswere in someareasproblematicfor this reason,particularly when the quality of stock was poor: ‘given theauthority’sproblemsasa landlord,we’d far ratherhavepeoplepayinga reasonablerent to theCouncil for a fairly goodpropertythanhavethempayinga higherrentto privatelandlordsfor someof thepropertiesthatareavailablethere’.Thathavingbeensaid, it was important to appreciatethat, evenwhen therewas this type ofcompetition, local authority strategieswere devisedto createa joint workingframework.So, in oneNorthernlocal authoritywhich hadbeenstaunchlyLabourin the 1980s,the approachwasdescribedasfollows:

Oneof theweaknessesof thestrategyin [the 1980s]which certainlyderivedfrom a politicalsort of attitudeto landlordsin thosedayswasthat we didn’t seekto havea dialoguewithlandlords. . . andI think over theyearswe left it rathera long time beforewe satdownwithlandlords.But we now have.For the last threeor four yearswe’ve developedI supposeatwin track approach in which we have dialogue with landlords which is fairlycomprehensive.A landlords’ forum alsomeetsfour timesa year.

Hence,in orderto appreciatethe scopeandnatureof tenancyrelationswork it isimportantto locateit within the broadcontextof an evolution in policy thinkingabouttheprivaterentedsector.In the1970sthesectorwasregardedasanhistoricalanachronism.Now a confrontationalattitude is regardedas counter-productive.Thus, while prosecutionsmay have been relatively modest in the anti-privaterenting environmentsurroundingthe inceptionof the legislation,changesto thatcontextmeanit is now evenlesslikely that prosecutionwill occur.

The rise of the managerialistcultureNot only doestenancyrelationswork needto be contextualisedwith respectto arangeof other policy priorities, but also with respectto the organisationalandregulatory ethos within which local authorities exercise their powers. Aftercompulsory competitive tendering, which prioritised the three Es (economy,efficiency, and effectiveness),New Labour’s prescription for public servicesinvolved a shift to a lessprescriptiveand more reflexive notion of Best Value,which prioritised the four Cs (challenge,compare,consult, and compete).86

Tenancyrelations work takes place within a framework which compels localauthoritiesto undertakea cost-benefitanalysisof the value of prosecution.Iflandlordswere being given negligible fines, it took six monthsof labour for anindividualofficer to put thedocumentstogether,thewitnessesmaynotberegardedascredibleor maygive up beforetrial, wasit really worth prosecutinglandlords?

Thepenaltiesaresoskimpyanyway,you know, if you’re goingto put hugeamountsof legalwork andsoon,andofficer time,andyou’re goingto justgetsomebodywith acautionor . . .a small fine . . . is it really costeffective in the daysof bestvalueandso on?

Costis generallya higherfactor in anyactionthecouncil takesat themoment,. . . As far asthe council is concerned,the council don’t get no benefit whatsoever[when a] fine isimposed.Evenif a largefine wasimposedthen. . . it might give usa senseof achievementin havingsuccessfullyprosecuted. . . but it doesn’tget us anythingin real terms.We stillhaveto fund the case.We might get that back in the costsorder.87

86 See P. Vincent-Jones,‘Central-Local Relationsunder the Local GovernmentAct 1999: A NewConsensus?’(2000)63 ModernLaw Review84.

87 The legal officer at this local authority felt that ordersfor the defendantto pay the local authority’scostsof mountingthe prosecutionweregenerallyunrealistic.



Thecommoncomplaintthat prosecutionreapeda fractionalaward(asopposedtotheequallycertainview thatprosecutionactsasa deterrent)enabledthis officer tojustify the non-prosecutorial stanceof the local authority in cost-benefitterms.Equally,concentrationon preventionof homelessnessaspart of tenancyrelationswork, asopposedto prosecuting,wascommonlyregardedasproviding value formoneyfor the local authority:

Only when [tenancyrelations]were satisfiedthey couldn’t do anythingabout[the notice/harassment]would theyrefer to the[homelessnesssection]. . . Effectively we arelooking atall ways to preventhomelessness.. . . I mean,clearly a [homelessness]applicationto thecouncil . . . you’ve got on-costsof actuallyprocessingthat applicationandthen,ultimately,you’ve got the costof actuallyproviding accommodation.

In someauthorities,becauseprosecutionwasseenashavingnodiscernablebenefitother thanadvancingthe local authority’srhetoricof deterrence,prosecutionwasoften marginalised in favour of more co-operative strategies which weremeasurable.For others,the Best Value mentality was a constraintwithin whichtheywereforcedto work, evenif it wasa sourceof regret.So,for example,in onelocal authoritywe wereprovidedwith statisticson the privatesectorstrategyanddirected to look straight at the ‘homelessnessprevented’column – this was ameasurable,costedservice to the authority (although somewhatarbitrary andjudgment-dependent).Yet, at thesametime, this wasanauthoritywhich hadbeenwilling to takea prosecutionwhich alsoclarified a point of law within the PEA(wherea male landlordhad filmed his femaletenantsin the bathroomthroughatwo-waymirror). Hence,eventhoughthereis increasingemphasison cost-benefitthinking, becausethere is some flexibility about how ‘benefits’ should beconstruedit is possibleto arrive at very different judgementsaboutwhetherit is‘worth’ pursuinga prosecution.In this instance,clarificationof a point of law wasseenasa sufficiently largebenefit to makethe costsworth bearing.

BureaucraticimpedimentsTenancy relations work cross-cuts the activities of a number of differentdepartmentsof the local authority. In particular, environmentalhealth,housingbenefit, housingadvice,homelessnessand (social) housingallocatorscan all beincorporatedin a private sector strategy.It was thereforenecessaryfor goodworking relationshipsto exist in orderto facilitate cross-referrals.If casesdid notcometo the attentionof the TRO then clearly regulatoryaction was unlikely toresult.We havealreadyhighlightedthesituationin hard-pressedauthorities,wheretherelationshipbetweentenancyrelationsandhomelessnesswork wasregardedascrucial. The bureaucraticimpedimentsin our study areaswent beyond this,commonly extendingto the inability of theseother branchesto spot issuesofharassmentandunlawful eviction.For example,oneenvironmental healthofficerin a busy London boroughreferredto his training on landlord and tenantissuesbeing twenty yearsold; housingadvisorslacked relevant training; or, in areaswhere there was little demandfor local authority property,complainantsmightsimply be processedthroughthe housingallocationroutewithout further enquiry.

An equallyimportantissuerelatesto thelocationof tenancyrelationswithin thelocal authoritystructure.While cross-departmentalworking wasseenaseffectivein some authorities, bureaucratic structures nonethelesstended to inhibitprosecutionin favour of compliance.WhereTROsactedon referralsfrom withinthe local authorityto preventhomelessness,onceagainthis inhibitedprosecution.



Commonly,TROswereable to prosecuteonly after receivingthe go-aheadfromthe legal servicesteam.Wherelegal serviceswereprovidedon an in-housebasis,they wereregularly(althoughnot uniformly) criticisedby officers in our studyasbeingeitherundulycautiousor asnot treatingharassmentandunlawful evictionasan importantissue.Ratherthanbeingan institutionalproblem,this wasgenerallyregardedaspersonalitydriven.In someareas,it seemedthat the lawyer’sview onthe caseprovidesanotherlayer of moral judgmentwhich potentially stalls anypotentialprosecution– so,onelocal authoritysolicitor explainedher approachinthesecases:

If we feel technicallythe legislation’sbeenbreached,technicallyharassmenthasoccurred,but thelandlordhasbeen,how shallwe say,very helpful all theway through,neverhadanyproblemswith him before,the tenantswere a bit problematicin one way or another,wesometimesoffer a formal cautionratherthanproceedwith the matterto Court.

Evenwherea TRO waslocatedwithin legal services,a conciliationapproachwasregardedas more appropriatethan prosecution(althoughwe would characterisethis officer’s approach as insistent rather than persuasive,within Hutter’scategorisation). Here,the TRO explainedhis approachin the following terms:‘Ialwaysthink that to prosecuteis you’ve failed in . . . keepingthe tenantin theirhomeand in a good environment.So, really, it’s as a last resort that we wouldactually prosecute.We would try our best to conciliate and, wherepossible,tobring both partiesin.’

Interpretingthe actionsof landlordsandoccupiersFinally, theway local authorityofficers’ perceivetheactionsof bothlandlordsandtenantsis akeydeterminantof their regulatoryresponse.As Nelkenneatlyshowed,the types of landlords who are responsiblefor much of the crime (or, moreaccurately,thatwhich is reportedto thelocalauthority)in thisareaarefar from theRachmanstereotype.Our studyalsosuggestedthatmostlandlordsresponsibleforunlawful eviction and harassmentare individuals operating in the sector as asideline to their main or other business.Thus, it would not be unreasonabletoanticipatethat thesetypesof landlordswill form the majority of thosecomingtotheattentionof the local authority(particularlyasthis groupis lesslikely to haveaccessto legal advice).

The essential point, though, about this counter-stereotype was that localauthority officers by-and-largeunderstoodwhat leadsthis type of landlord intobreakingthe law. Local authorityactionswere,therefore,premiseduponworkingwith this type of landlord, to provide them with the understandingto evict theoccupierin accordancewith the law. Thus,tenancyrelationswork reinforcestherule of law (or rule throughlaw88):

ThereasonI’m keenon [providing adviceto landlords],andI’ve really pushedit, is becauseI personallyfelt that part of my job is to makesurethat evictionsaredonelawfully. Andthereis a lot of ignoranceaboutthe procedureandthe easeof going for possession.I thinkpeopleare worried that they’re given a £500bill and it’s very difficult to get tenantsout.But, with the new AST regime,asyou know, it’s a lot easier.And, I think, oncelandlordsareawarethat it’s a fairly straightforwardprocedureandit’s not costly, there’sgoing to bemorechanceof a lawful evictionthana non-lawfuleviction.So,I think it’s partof my job to

88 See P. Hillyard and J. Percy-Smith,The Coercive State: The Decline of Democracyin Britain(London:Fontana,1987).



makesurethat landlordsareawareof thelawful processandtheonly way you cando that isto openup the service.(emphasisin original)

Landlord amateurismwas particularly evident in TROs’ understandingof whatpromptedlandlord crime. The most commonly cited reasonwas that landlordsbelievedthat the propertythat wasthe subjectof the leaseremainedtheir own.89

Landlordcrime wasthereforesomethingwhich could be rectified by a little legaladvice– which in the majority of caseswas true – occasionallybackedup by athreatof prosecution.

Tenancyrelationswork requiresofficers to take a view about the actionsofoccupiersandlandlords.It is a subjectivevalue-ladenenterprise.So,for example,the principal causeof harassmentand unlawful eviction in our study areaswasnon-paymentof rent,andthis wasprincipally dueto thefailure of housingbenefitto bepaidwithin thecorrecttimescaleor to housingbenefitnot coveringthe fullamountof the rent. Landlordcrime might thenbe characterisedasan inevitablefrustrationwith local authorityprocedures,or tenantsnot filling out benefitformscorrectly. When the occupier had been involved in the stigmatisedrange ofactionswhich fell within theumbrellaterm‘anti-socialbehaviour’,landlordcrimemight beregardedby local authorityofficersas‘six of oneandhalf a dozenof theother’.

Oneof our studyareasprovidedan excellentexampleof the effect this type ofjudgmenthadon working practices.They hadrecentlysuccessfullyprosecutedamale landlord who had been videoing his female occupiersin the bathroomthrougha two-waymirror. Theprosecutionwasin manyrespectspathbreakingas,on its face, this wasnot an actionwhich fitted neatlywithin the ProtectionfromEviction Act. TheManagerdrewa distinctionbetweenthis typeof case– ‘peepingTom’ – andanothertype– ‘little old lady’ – to drawattentionto whathereferredtoasa ‘spectrumof landlords’.In the ‘little old lady’ case,

whatareyou trying to achievethere?Are you trying to achievecompensationfor a tenant?Or areyou actuallytrying to improveliving conditions?If thepropertyis okayandyou havea view about the backgroundcircumstancesto that, yeah, the questionwill be ‘Is that apriority for you in termsof the aims and objectives,you know, within the private sectorstrategy?’That’s the sort of questionthat I would expecteveryoneto askthemselves.

Often in our interviewswith local authority officers, they would talk abouttheirassessmentsof whetherthe complainantwould make a credible witnessat anypotential trial. Judgmentsabout credibility equally reflect upon the officer’sperceptionsof judicial andmagistrateprejudicesaswell astheir own perceptionsof the complainant:

we havehadcaseswheretenantshavehadcriminal recordsandwe know,althoughit maybeshouldn’t be that way, that the Court would probably look on their evidenceas not sosatisfactory.

At thesametime, it wasacceptedby mostofficers thatoccupiers’motivationsforprosecutionmight not be asstrongasthat of the officers.Particularlyin areasofhousingstress,it was believedthat the reasonfor seekingassistancein the firstplacewasto obtainbetteraccommodation.For example,oneTRO,who workedin

89 It is of someinterestthat Nelken’sstudymadea similar finding, which wasspecifically relatedbyhim to residentlandlordsasthis wasthe mostsignificant reportedperpetrator.Nelkensuggeststhat,for this group, ‘confrontedwith legislationthat deniesthemthe right to exercise[physical control],landlords[particularly resident]feel the samethreatto their ‘quiet occupation’from which the lawattemptsto defendtheir tenants.’Onemight now expandthis explanationto landlordsmoregenerally.



a housingstressarea,madethis commentaboutwhy occupiersmight not wish toproceedwith a prosecution:

I mean,with the tenants,the witnessesyou have,the materialyou‘ve got is sometimesnotvery good and they do changetheir minds,be all keenbut onceyou‘ve got their councilhouse,well, you weren‘t bothered.You‘d got what you wantedand it‘s just humannaturebecausethere‘snothing in [prosecution]for them,. . .

Occupiers’motivationwasanimportantfactorto mostauthoritieswho,asmuchasanythingelse,werelooking to seeif the occupierwould makea ‘good’ witness:

Someof the casesfall by the way becausethe tenantdoesn’tcomeback or is unabletosubstantiatewhat they’ve said.So, it’s not just that there’sa clear caseandthe tenanthasdecidednot to go becauseof thecourt, it’s alsothat,whenyou questiona tenant,it’s a lackof substance.So it could be a mixture of both: a fear of court andalsothat they’re worriedaboutbeingfoundout themselves.Thatdoeshappen.. . . And you’re neverquitesureif it’sthe fear of court, or whetherthey’ve got somethingto hide, or unableto fully substantiatewhat they’ve said.It’s very difficult really.

Partly becauseof this andpartly becausethey did not want to wastetime takingwitness statementsfor a prosecutionwhich might or might not go ahead,complainants werethenoftenwarnedabouthow long it would takebeforethecasewascompleted.

Conclusions

GiventhevociferouscampaignswagedagainstRachmanitelandlords,ononelevelit may be surprising to find that few landlords are actually prosecutedforharassmentandunlawful eviction.A readingof the regulationliterature,however,suggeststhat it would be surprisingif thereweremore prosecutionsbecausethestandardproceduresoperatedby most regulatorybodiesin the UK tend towardsenforcingcompliancewith codes,with prosecutionasa threatenedlast resort.Inthis article, we have suggestedthat the policing of harassmentand unlawfuleviction is influencedby a numberof factorswhich havebeenidentified in theexisting literatureas encouraginga compliance-based strategy.We haveargued,however, that there is a specific constellation of influences which makecompliancestrategiesall the more likely in this regulatory field. Regulatoryaction is underpinnedby legislationenactedin the 1960sand 1970s;settingtheoperationof that legislation in its broadersocial and political contexthighlightskey shifts which militate againstenforcementandprosecution.

Central governmenthas arguedsince the mid-1980sthat it needsthe privaterentedsectorand the sectorhastakenup a privileged position in housingpolicydebates.No longer are landlordsperceivedin this discourseas Rachmanites–rather,they arepartnersin local housingstrategies.The rhetoricof Rachmanismremainsin the legislationdesignedto root out landlordsguilty of harassmentandunlawful eviction,but scratchingthe surfaceof that legislationrevealsa differentsetof realities.

At the individual level reductionsin security of tenure have disempoweredhouseholdsin the sector.At the organisationallevel, the interweavingof tenancyrelations work with broaderprivate sector strategiesand homelessnessdutiesmeansthat prosecutionis almostinevitably constructedasa lessdesirablecourseof action. In areasof housingstress,the absenceof alternativeaccommodationmakesit imperativefor local authoritiesto work with the private rentedsector,



irrespectiveof whetherthis is seenasdesirable.It is perhapsno surprisethat therearebureaucraticimpedimentsin theway of prosecution,but thecurrentregimeofBest Value – which impacts upon all local governmentregulatory activity –reducesfurther theattractivenessof pursuingprosecutions,which carry largecostsbut only indistinct benefits.Similarly it is no surprisethat officers take a viewaboutthemorality of both landlordandtenantbehaviourin determiningtheactionthey will take. Yet it seemsclear that morality is constructedby referenceto anumber of different factors such as the authority’s own objectives, financialconstraintsplaced upon the authority, and displaced onto judicial attitudes.Tenancyrelations work providesa valuable insight into the complex array ofinfluencesthatshaperegulatorystrategies.It clearlyindicateshowchangingpolicydiscoursecombineswith a relatively static legal framework,resourceconstraintstogetherwith the understandingsanddiscretionary actionof implementingagentsat local level to engineercompliancestrategies.



There’s Regulatory Crime, and then there’s Landlord Crime: from ‘Rachmanites’ to...

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