The Use and Disclosure of Intuition(s) by Leaders in ...

TheUseandDisclosureofIntuition(s)byLeadersinAustralianOrganisations:

AGroundedTheory

MartinJ.Robson

B.Soc.Sci.(Hons.)

AthesissubmittedinfulfilmentoftherequirementsofthedegreeofDoctorof

PhilosophyoftheUniversityofNewEngland

February2011

Acknowledgements

Iwish toacknowledgeandgiveheartfelt thanks toanumberofpeoplewhoplayedavaluable role in

shapingandbringingthisresearchprojecttoacompletion:

• The elite Australian leaderswho participated in the study, gave generously of their time and

withoutwhomthisresearchwouldnothavebeenpossible.

• MysupervisorsProfessorRayCooksey,Assoc.ProfessorMuayyadJabriandProfessorJoyHiggs

fortheirsupportandtimelyassistanceoverthecandidatureperiod.

• PatBazeleyforherassistancewithdevelopingmyskillsandthinkinginqualitativedataanalysis.

• VictoriaO’Connorforherconfidenceinmyability.

• Myfriends,particularlyMargotDuelland JannGilbert,whogavemeunwavering supportand

encouragementthroughouttheemotionalroller‐coasterofthecandidature.

• TheDixonLibrarystafffortheirworkinprovidingsometimesobscurereferencematerial.

• The people of Australia for the funding assistance that enabledme to complete this journey

ofdiscovery.

Abstract

Asworkers,managers, leaders,researchersandtheoreticians inorganisationsand insociety– indeed,

ashumans–Iarguethatwecontinuetoundervalueandunderplaytheroleofthevisceral,thetacit,the

silent, the shadow, the emotional and the intuitive. Non‐rational influences in the public domain, in

particular,theorganisationsthatinfluenceourdailylives,haveeitherbeenignoredorseenasirrational

–somethingtobeavoided,negated,managed,corrected,punished,excludedorinthecaseofintuition,

marginalised,hiddenandsilenced.

Educational institutionsprepare students foranorganisational life inwhich instrumental rationality is

assumedandexpected.However,theassumptionthatleadersinorganisationsareexclusivelyrationalin

theirbehaviouranddecision‐makingprocessesisonethathascomeunderincreasingscrutiny.Research

hasshownthatleadersuseintuitionfrequentlyandconsideritimportanttotheirroleandeffectiveness.

Thesameresearchhowever,hasalso revealed that intuitionsareoftenmasked inanalytical termsor

suppressed.Acontentionofthisthesisisthatthecostofnotacknowledgingintuitionoraccountingfor

andincorporatingitinworkdiscourseandpracticesishigh.

Intuition disclosure in organisations has never been the focus of empirical research in Australia nor

internationally. Studies of intuition to date have been directed at discovering what intuition ‘is’, its

powersandpitfalls,andhowonecanbestmakeuseofthissubconsciousandelusivecognitivecapacity.

Understanding the nature of intuition and its potential is important, however, I assert that this

knowledge is impotent inapplicationunless thesocialprocessessurrounding itsuseanddisclosure in

the‘realworld’arealsounderstood.

ThisstudyemployedanapproachinformedbyGroundedTheoriestoinvestigatethesocialprocessesof

intuitionuseanddisclosureattheintrapersonal, interpersonal,organisationalandsocietal levels.Data

collected from semi‐structured interviews with 27 men and women leaders in significant Australian

organisationswasanalysedusingNVivo.Elite leaderswerepurposivelysampledfortheir influenceon,

experience and knowledge of, and accountability for, organisational decision‐making processes. Their

exceptionalcommunicationskillsprovidedrich, relevantandrevealingdata.Pursuant to thetenetsof

Grounded Theory, a balance ofmen andwomenwere sought and (almost) achieved for the sample

whenearlyanalysisrevealedgendertobesignificanttoansweringtheresearchproblem.

Thefindingsrevealedthatalltheparticipantsinthestudyconsideredintuition,whichtheydefinedasa

feeling/knowingbasedonexperience,tobeimportantintheirdecision‐makingandleadership.Intuition

use was found to be conditioned by the nature and context of the decision. However, the use of

intuition andanalysis in complementarywayswas a strong theme– to theextent that theboundary

betweenthem,formanyparticipants,wasblurred.

The degree to which intuition(s) are disclosed in organisations was found to be conditioned by

‘interiority’, the core category of the developed theory. Interiority, at the intrapersonal level, was

interpretedasanorientationto,andlegitimacygivento,theinnerrealmoffeelings,includingintuitions.

Throughananalysisofresponsesto‘feelingquestions’aboutthe‘experience’ofintuition,thewomenin

thestudywere interpretedtohavemorehighlydeveloped interiority thanthemen. Inaddition,both

themen and thewomen in the sample perceived thatwomen, in general,weremore ‘in touchwith

their feelings’and,asaconsequence, their intuition(s). Interiority facilitates the ‘surfacing’of feelings

and intuitions into conscious awareness, which renders these feelings/knowings available for

expression,articulation,discussion,explorationandscrutiny.

Interpersonal interactions,organisationsandsocietiescanalsobedescribed in termsof interiority.At

thesecollective levels interiorityrepresentsanorientationtoandthereforeexpressionoffeelingsand

intuitions. Feelings and intuitions were perceived as legitimate and were therefore acknowledged in

what I describe as integrative organisational cultures that are often led or dominated bywomen. In

organisations with competitive, tough and punishing (assertive) cultures, often led or dominated by

men, where external considerations and rational forms of knowing were elevated. In these cultures

feelingsandintuitionremainunacknowledgedandundisclosed.Thus,suchassertiveculturescanbesaid

tohavelowinteriority.

Typically, in assertive cultures, feelings and intuitions are ‘othered’ and marginalised as feminine,

inferiorand,therefore,illegitimate.Consequently,intuitionsintheseenvironmentsaresuppressedand

silenced, rationalisedthrough findingor fabricatingrationaleormaskedby termssuchas ‘judgement’

and‘experience’.Normsofexpressionaremaintainedthroughfearofridiculeandbyrewardingthose

thatconform.Consequently, it isonlyindividualswhohavepower,statusand/oragood‘trackrecord’

thatdiscloseintuitionsinenvironmentsoflowinteriority.

Thegroundedtheorydevelopedinthisstudyissignificantbecauseitisthefirsttoaddresssocio‐cultural

conditions and processes that contextualise intuition use and disclosure. Important implications for

theory, policy and practice, aswell as research and future directions for research, are raised by this

study. The findings and developed theory contribute to the rapidly‐growing body of research that

recognises the primacy of non‐rational drivers for decision‐making and behaviour in individuals,

interactions,organisationsandsocieties.

Thestudyconcludedthat interioritycanbedevelopedboth individuallyandcollectively.However,the

continuingdominanceofmenandtheconsequentpervasivenessofexternalorientationhaveresulted

inamyopiawhichisonlyrecognisedbythosewhohavehighinteriorityandthosethataremarginalised

(mostlywomeninbothcases).Unacknowledgedfeelingscanleadtohiddenindividualpowerasserting

agendas, and fragmented, toxicorganisational culturesand the suppressionof intuitions can result in

missed opportunities and exposure to substantial risk. It was concluded that future research could

further examine the hypotheses developed in this study and investigate how interiority might be

developedinindividuals,organisationsandsocietiestoenhancetransparency,cohesion,creativityand

decision‐makingatalllevelsofsocialdescription.

Certification

Icertifythatthesubstanceofthisthesishasnotalreadybeensubmittedforanydegreeandisnotbeing

currentlysubmittedforanyotherdegree.

Icertifythatanyhelpreceivedinpreparingthisthesis,allthesourcesused,havebeenacknowledgedin

thisthesis.

10thFebruary,2011

TableofContents

Chapter1:Introduction ......................................................................................................................13

1.1 Backgroundtotheresearch....................................................................................................... 13

1.2 Researchproblemandsignificance ........................................................................................... 15

1.3 Positioningoftheresearcher/evolutionoftheresearch........................................................... 16

1.4 Outlineofthethesis .................................................................................................................. 18

1.5 Definitionofterms..................................................................................................................... 21

1.6 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 23

Chapter2:CriticalReviewoftheLiterature ........................................................................................24

2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 24

2.2 PhilosophicalIntuitionism.......................................................................................................... 27

2.3 Psychologicalconstructionsofintuition .................................................................................... 32

2.4 Heuristicsandbiases ................................................................................................................. 38

2.5 Visceralfactorsindecision‐making............................................................................................ 39

2.6 Jung............................................................................................................................................ 40

2.7 Intuitionasacognitivestyle/preference ................................................................................... 42

2.8 Intuitionasapsychological/cognitiveoutcomeorevent .......................................................... 43

2.9 Intuitionandanalysis:Hammond.............................................................................................. 45

2.10 Reconcilingphilosophicalandpsychologicalconceptionsofintuition ...................................... 52

2.11 IntuitionasESPandpsychicpremonitions ................................................................................ 57

2.12 Genderandintuition.................................................................................................................. 60

2.13 Fieldstudiesofintuitioninmanagerialandorganisationalcontexts ........................................ 62

2.14 Contemporaryperceptionsandattitudesofintuition............................................................... 72

2.15 Theimpactofnegativeperceptionsconcerningintuition ......................................................... 76

2.16 Researchproblem...................................................................................................................... 77

2.17 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 80

Chapter3:TheoreticalPerspective .....................................................................................................82

3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 82

3.2 DomainTheory .......................................................................................................................... 83

3.3 Theproblemwithcurrentstand‐aloneapproaches .................................................................. 85

3.4 Layder’sStratifiedSolution........................................................................................................ 86

3.4 Layder’sDomains....................................................................................................................... 89

3.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 94

Chapter4:Methodology.....................................................................................................................96

4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 96

4.2 BackgroundandjustificationforthevariantsofGTused.......................................................... 97

4.3 GroundedTheoryunderLayder’sAdaptiveTheory................................................................. 102

4.4 Researchdesign:Datagatheringandanalysis......................................................................... 104

4.5 Methodologicalsoundness/evaluation ................................................................................... 107

4.6 EthicalConsiderations ............................................................................................................. 112

4.7 Method:DataCollection.......................................................................................................... 112

4.8 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 130

Chapter5:Analyses&TheoryDevelopment.....................................................................................132

5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 132

5.2 Participants .............................................................................................................................. 133

5.3 Researchproblemandassociatedissues................................................................................. 135

5.4 Howdotheparticipantsinterpret,(defineanddescribe)intuition(s)?................................... 136

5.5 Othervariantsofintuition ....................................................................................................... 141

5.6 Howdoparticipantsuseintuition?.......................................................................................... 147

5.7 Personalitytypes/cognitivestylesofindividuals .................................................................... 163

5.8 Whataretheviewsandperceptionsofparticipantsaboutthelegitimacyof,andotherpeople’sreceptivityto,intuition(s)?........................................................................................ 168

5.9 Whatlanguageisusedbyparticipantsandbythosewithwhomtheyassociatetotalkaboutintuition(s)? ............................................................................................................ 174

5.10 Howeasilyareparticipantsabletoarticulatetheirintuition(s)? ............................................ 177

5.11 Interiority(corecategory)........................................................................................................ 178

5.12 Synthesisoffindings ................................................................................................................ 193

5.13 Intrapersonalinteriority .......................................................................................................... 193

5.14 Interpersonalinteriority .......................................................................................................... 195

5.15 Organisationalinteriority......................................................................................................... 200

5.16 Societal/environmentalinteriority .......................................................................................... 214

5.17 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 220

Chapter6:ConclusionsandImplications...........................................................................................222

6.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 223

6.2 Conclusionsaboutmainquestion1:Howdotheparticipants(organisationalleaders)interpret,useandvalueintuitionandtheirdecision‐makingandleadership? ....................... 228

6.3 Conclusionsaboutmainquestion2:WhatarethesocialprocessesofintuitiondisclosurebyAustralianleadersinorganisations? .................................................................. 230

6.4 Alternativestofeministexplanationsofdominantrationality................................................ 242

6.5 Conclusionsabouttheresearchproblem................................................................................ 244

6.6 Implicationsforbroadertheorising ......................................................................................... 246

6.7 Implicationsforpolicyandpractice......................................................................................... 250

6.8 Limitations ............................................................................................................................... 254

6.9 Futuredirectionsforresearch ................................................................................................. 256

ReferenceList

Appendix1

Appendix2

Listoftables

Table2.1:Propertiesofnoesisanddianoia..................................................................................27

Table2.2:Dualprocesstheorists .................................................................................................33

Table2.3:Experientialandrational‘minds’ .................................................................................37

Table2.4:Modeofcognitioncharacteristics................................................................................47

Table2.5:Taskcontinuumcharacteristics....................................................................................48

Table2.6:Hendon’sthree‐levelframeworkforintuition ..............................................................54

Table2.7:Summaryofconstructsofintuition..............................................................................60

Table2.8:Acomparisonoffieldresearchconcerningintuitionusebyexecutivesand leadersinorganisations ..............................................................................................65

Table4.1:Evaluationcriteria .....................................................................................................110

Table4.2:Participantsbygenderandindustry ..........................................................................115

Table5.1:Participantcharacteristics .........................................................................................134

Table5.2:Contrastingcapacityand/orwillingnesstoarticulatetheinternalexperienceof intuition(s)................................................................................................................180

Table5.3:Comparisonofsocietalvaluesandintuition ...............................................................219

Listoffigures:

Figure2.1:Hammond’scognitivecontinuum ...............................................................................46

Figure2.2:DiagrammaticalrepresentationofEpstein’s(1990)Experientialand RationalCognitiveSystems.........................................................................................50

Figure2.3:Intuitionasanemergentoutcomefromadynamic,contextualiseddecisioncontext ...51

Figure2.4:Three‐levelstratificationimpliedbyMonisticIdealism................................................55

Figure2.5:The‘TwoHeads’solution ...........................................................................................56

Figure3.1:Layder’sDomains.......................................................................................................90

Figure4.1:TheresearchprocessaccordingtoLayder ................................................................102

Figure4.2:Researchdesign:DualapproachesofGTused ..........................................................106

Figure5.1:Conditionalandcomplementaryuseofintuition ......................................................154

Figure5.2:Propertiesofanalyticalandintuitivetypes ...............................................................166

Figure5.3:Attitudestowardintuitionandantecedentconditions ..............................................172

Figure5.4:Intrapersonalinteriorityandintuitiondisclosure ......................................................195

Figure5.5:Conditionsforinterpersonalinteriority ....................................................................196

Figure5.6:Intuitiondisclosureattheinterpersonallevel ...........................................................199

Figure5.7:Propertiesofassertiveorganisationalcultures..........................................................201

Figure5.8:Propertiesofintegrativeorganisationalcultures.......................................................205

Figure5.9:Conditionsfororganisationalculture........................................................................208

Figure5.10:Disclosureofintuitioninorganisations ...................................................................211

Figure5.11:Socialprocessofintuitiondisclosureatthesocietallevel ........................................216

Figure5.12:Overallsocialprocess.............................................................................................220

C h a p t e r 1 : I n t r o d u c t i o n P a g e |13

Chapter1:Introduction

‘Theintuitivemindisasacredgift,andtherationalmindisafaithfulservant.Wehavecreatedasociety

thathonourstheservant,andhasforgottenthegift’.(EinsteincitedinVanharanta&Easton2009,p.425)

1.1Backgroundtotheresearch

Inthe1990sanumberoftheoristsnotedincreasingcomplexity,uncertainty,discontinuouschangeand

paradox, and their consequences formanagersand leaders inorganisations (Hames1994;Cooksey&

Gates1995;Handy1995;Parry1996).Clearly,thistrendhascontinuedandgatheredpaceinthewake

of destabilising world events in this new millennium. Terrorism, the military invasions of Iraq and

Afghanistan,theglobal financialcrisis (GFC),andrapidlyevolvingeconomic,technologicalandcultural

globalisation and interdependencyhaveonly increased complexity and ambiguity, andperceptionsof

vulnerability,inglobalbusinessoperatingenvironments(Caballero&Krishnamurthy2008;Oxelheim&

Wihlborg 2008; Porter & Schwab 2008). As a consequence, the need for new management and

leadership skills, approaches and, in particular, ways of conceptualising problems and solutions has

neverbeengreater(Sinclair&Ashkanasy2005).Despitethis,educationalinstitutionshavenotproduced

graduateswith a sufficient graspof thenature of complexity or the skills to copewith it (Cooksey&

Gates1995;Gates&Cooksey1998).

AccordingtoBennett(1998),thisisbecauseformalWesternmanagementtheoryandpracticeisbased

in rational analysis.More recently, theorists havequestionedwhether traditional rationalmodels are

still relevant in21stcenturyorganisations(Eisenhardt&Zbaraki1992;Parikh,Neubauer&Lank1994;

Sinclair, Ashkanasy & Chatopadyay 2010). Measurement and analyses of variables in the external

organisational environment has become too complex and unstable. Strategic planning is problematic

because things have changedbefore theplan is finished (Hames1994;Mintzberg 1994;Handy1995;

Stacey2000).Moreover,decisionmakersoperatewithinafieldof ‘boundedrationality’ (Simon1987).

Reductionistanalysisenablesonly theunderstandingofa limitedamountofvariables (deGeus1996)

and not how variables interact and impact on each other (Brockmann& Simmons 1997). As Cappon

(1993)pointedout,‘Factbased,deductive,andanalyticalthinkingistoolate;itgoesafterthefact.Nor

isitsensitivetocircumstance,orthecomplexity,contradictions,andvariabilityofhumannature...’(p.

41).Thus,relianceonanalysisinorganisationsisproblematic.

Giventhelimitationsofrationalanalysissometheoristshaveproposedthatintuitioncanbeeffectivein

contemporary situationsbecause it candealwithmorecomplexity thancanourconsciousor rational

minds (Jung1977;Cappon1994a;Brockmann&Simmons1997;Shapiro&Spence1997;Sadler‐Smith

2008).Agenerallyacceptedandcommonlyuseddefinitionofintuitionis‘affectivelychargedjudgments


that arise through rapid, nonconscious, and holistic associations’, (Dane& Pratt, p. 40). Intuition has

been shown to be positively associated with organisational performance, particularly in unstable

environments(Khatri&Ng2000).However,untilrecently,intuitionhasnotbeenrecognisedasavalid

construct outside psychology (Hodgkinson, Langan‐Fox & Sadler‐Smith 2008), nor as a legitimate or

reliable source of information for decision‐making, particularly in organisational contexts (Cappon

1994a;Sadler‐Smith&Sparrow2007).

Moreover, Iarguethisviewof intuitionasunreliable inorganisationalcontexts,andevenmagicaland

mystical,isperplexingwhenconsideredwithevidencefromfieldresearch,whichshowsthatCEOsand

seniorexecutivesuseintuitionregularly,andconsideritimportanttotheirdecision‐making,inAustralia

(Robson&Miller2006)andinternationally(Agor1984;Agor1985;Agor1989b;Agor1989c;Parikhetal.

1994; Isenman 1997; Burke&Miller 1999). The study of intuition can therefore be seen as a site of

contention, contradiction and paradox. Although interest and research in intuition, and its use in

organisations, increased in the mid‐1980s, momentum has somewhat diminished in recent years

according to Sinclair & Ashkanasy (2005). Given the widespread use of intuition, and its perceived

importancetodecisionmakers,Iproposethatagreaterunderstandingofintuitionandtheroleitplays

inorganisationsisneeded–particularlyhowintuitionisusedincontext.

This study focuses on the use and disclosure of intuition(s) in organisations. Despite its perceived

importancefordecisionmakersandleaders,intuitionhasbeenshowntobe‘silent’orprivatepractice–

neithercommonlyacknowledgednordiscussed.However,thedisclosureofintuition(s)hasneverbeen

thefocusofempiricalresearchinAustralianorinternationally.Thisisasignificantgapintheknowledge

because the unwillingness to disclose intuitions has been shown to have the potential to negatively

impact onmajor decisions (Robson 2004). Intuition(s) will be shown to be one of a number of non‐

rational influencesonjudgementandbehaviour(suchasemotionsandvisceral influences)that,taken

together, canbedescribed as ‘feelings’ (see Section1.5Definitionof terms). If people feel unable to

openlyexpresstheirintuitivefeelingsthiscanresultinincreasedexposuretoriskandaninabilitytofully

exploitopportunitiesandinnovationthroughcollaborativeenterprise.Consequently,thespecificfocus

ofthisresearchistoinvestigate,describeandexplainthesocialprocessesofintuitionuseanddisclosure

inAustralianorganisations.


1.2Researchproblemandsignificance

Thecoreresearchproblemaddressingthesegapsinextantknowledgecanbeexpressedas:

WhatarethesocialprocessesofintuitionuseanddisclosurebyAustralianleadersinorganisations?

Iarguethat, inordertoanswerthismainresearchquestionaboutthedisclosureof intuition, it isfirst

necessary to inquire into the participants’ perceptions of intuition – their interpretations and

definitions, how they use it, and its significance in their decision‐making and leadership. Thus, the

researchproblemwasseparatedintotwoparts:

Mainquestion1:Howdotheparticipants(organisationalleaders)interpret,useandvalueintuitionin

theirdecision‐makingandleadership?

Main question 2: What are the social processes of intuition disclosure by Australian leaders in

organisations?

Essentially,inresponsetothefirstmainquestion,Iwillarguethatparticipantsuseintuitionandanalysis

incomplementarywaysthatcannotbemeaningfullyseparatedinactualdecision‐makinginthefield.In

responsetothesecondmainquestion,Iwillarguethattheextenttowhichintuition(s)aredisclosedis

conditioned by ‘interiority’. I define interiority as an orientation to the inner realm of feelings and

intuitionsatintrapersonal,interpersonal,organisationalandsocietallevels.Highinteriorityresultsinthe

capacity and willingness of an individual, relationship, organisation or society to acknowledge and

expressfeelingsandintuitions.

1.2.1 Significanceoftheresearch

Althoughtherehasbeenincreasedinterestconcerningintuitioninrecentdecades,Iwillarguethatthe

study of intuition can still be considered a nascent area, yet to attract the attention and resources

commensuratewithitsimportance.Ihaveoutlinedthemaingapintheknowledgeandwhyitneedsto

beaddressed(Section1.1).Thisisnot,however, inandofitself,thesolejustificationfortheresearch.

Certainly,theneedformoreresearch,ingeneral,isacknowledged.However,additionalmotivationfor

this research,particularly in relation tomyapproach to it, stems from the recognition that therehas

beenadominanceof competing, positivistic, psychological approaches to the studyof intuition.And,

moreover,thatthishas‘problematised’theconceptualdevelopmentofintuitionandlimitedthefocus

andnatureofresearch.AdditionalsignificanceisaffordedtothisstudyasaconsequenceofhowIwill

addresssomeofthoselimitingconsequencesintermsofphilosophy,methodandmethodology.


Morespecifically,psychologicalresearch into intuitionhasproducedanarrayofcompetingdefinitions

arising from various research programs. Each program conceptualises, defines and assigns properties

andvaluestointuition.Conceptualisationsofintuitionrangefromabsolutetruthtoabsolutenonsense

(Westcott 1968). Clearly this is in part because intuition is a slippery, elusive and polymorphous

phenomenon.However,itisalsoduetonatureofthedominantpositivistscientificresearchtraditionin

psychology which is robust not only against alternative psychological perspectives, but also against

perspectivesoutsidepsychologysuchasthemucholderWesternandEasternphilosophicaltraditions.

Extanttheoryaboutintuitionisthusfragmentedacrossandwithindisciplines.Thelackofasystematic

integrationofperspectivesonintuitionisaddressedinthisthesisbyreconcilingthesedisparateviewsof

intuitionwithinpsychology,andbetweenpsychologyandphilosophy.

Moreover, the dominance of positivist psychology in approaches to intuition have resulted in an

emphasisonunderstandingofwhatintuition‘is’–thatisthoughttobediscoveredthroughartificialand

contrived research designs. Even in qualitative studies of intuition use in the field, research seeks to

discover the ‘powers and perils of intuition’ (Myers 2002, p. 42), and how it can be most usefully

appliedbutshowslittleregardforsocialandculturalcontext.Theempiricalcomponentofthisresearch

focusesontheperceptionsofdecisionmakersattheverytopoftheorganisationalhierarchies–CEO’s,

Chairs,Directorsandseniorexecutives–concerningintuitionin‘realworld’situations.Whilethisisnot

exceptional in itself (see, for example, Agor 1989c), the study also investigated how participants

experienced,understoodanddisclosed intuition(s),aswellas theirperceptionsabout theattitudesof

others toward intuition.The research is significantbecause it showsnotonlyhow intuition isdefined

and used but also how perceptions impact disclosure of this use and, moreover, explains why

intuition(s)areseldomdisclosed.

Asopposedtothedeductivehypothesistestingthatistypicalofpositivisticpsychologicalresearch;this

study has made use of approaches to data collection and analysis that are informed by variants of

GroundedTheory.ThesignificanceoftheadaptabilityandflexibilityaffordedbyGroundedTheorywas

thediscoveryofgenderinrelationtothegreaterorientationofwomen,ingeneral,totheinnerrealmof

feelings.A significant contributionof theemergent theory is to showhow thisorientation to feelings

(interiority)influencestheacknowledgementandexpressionoffeelingsandintuitionsatindividualand

collectivelevels.Furthercontributionsintermsofimplicationsfortheory,aswellaspolicyandpractice,

willbediscussedinthefinalchapter.

1.3 Positioningoftheresearcher/evolutionoftheresearch

Researcherswhointerpretempiricaldataneedtorecognisetheirowninvolvementintheprocess.This

recognitionmeansthatresearchersare‘notonlyrequiredtomakeanappearance’withintheworkbut


should ‘reveal themselves, their background, their beliefs and biases, to their audiences’ (Bridges &

Higgs2009,p.52). This is importantbecause researchersarenot separate from their interpretations.

Self‐disclosureof theresearcheraffordsthereaderanopportunityto interpretwhat issaidaboutthe

datainrelationtowhoisdoingtheinterpreting.Self‐disclosurewillbefeaturedthroughoutthisthesis,

however,forthemoment,Iwishtoutilisethisintroductorysectiontorevealthecircumstancesthatled

tometowritingthisthesis.

Mymotivation to study intuition first arose in the context of an interview carried out as part of an

undergraduate assignment for the unit entitled ‘Leadership’ (as part of the Human Resource

DevelopmentmajoratSouthernCrossUniversity in2002).The taskwas to interview leaderswith the

aimofdiscoveringwhatattributesandskillstheyconsideredimportant.Iaskedofoneparticipant,‘You

dealwith groups ofmenwith different backgrounds, ages, experiences and situations – how do you

knowwhatprocessesortechniquestouse?’Hisresponsewas,‘intuition’.

When the opportunity to pursue an honours year arose, the topic of intuition immediately came to

mind. The thesis produced from this researchwas entitledAustralian Elite Leaders and IntuitionUse:

Rationale for the Non‐rational. The objective of the interpretive, qualitative studywas to investigate

whatroleintuitionplayedinthedecision‐makingofAustralianbusinessleadersandhowimportantthey

considered it to their effectiveness. In realising this goal, I sought first, to find leaderswhohadbeen

deemed‘effective’byadistinguishedpaneloftheirpeers(BossMagazineTrueLeaderslists2001,2002,

2003). Itheninquiredintotheiruseof intuitionandtheirperceptionsabouttherole itplayed intheir

leadership and decision‐making. I concluded that intuition was considered very important to

participantsfortheirdecision‐makingandleadership,andthustheireffectiveness.However,consistent

withotherresearchwhichwillbediscussedlater,Ialsofoundthatintuitionusewasconsideredtobea

‘silentpractice’whichwasrarelydisclosedtoothers.Thecurrentresearchismotivatedbymypersonal

curiosityinrelationtothisfinding.

1.3.1 DevelopmentoftheResearcheralongthejourney

PhDstudentworkshopwithLindadeCossartandDellaFish,RIPPLE,CSU,AlburyOctober2007

PhDstudentweekendworkshopatthe‘ResearchFarm’,Bowral,November2007

PhDstudentworkshopANZAM,10&11June,2008

3rdAnnualPostgraduateResearchConference,UNE,July2008

ANZAMMethodologyConference,Brisbane,July,2008

ASCPRIcourseQualitativeDesign,Analysisandrepresentation17thJan‐21stJan,2009


PhDstudentweekendworkshopatthe‘ResearchFarm’,Bowral,22‐23rdJan,2009

PhDStudentMethodologyWorkshopattheEducationforpracticeInstitute(EFPI),17th‐20March,2009

4thAnnualPostgraduateResearchConference,UNE,July2009

PhDstudentworkshoponmethodology,EFPI,CSU,6&7thAugust,2009

PhDstudentworkshopondataanalysis,EFPI,CSU,22nd&23rdOctober,2009

5thAnnualPostgraduateResearchConference,UNE,July2010

1.3.2 Publicationsderivedfromthisresearch

As amatter of record, one refereed journal article and three peer reviewed conference paperswere

derivedfromthisresearch:

RefereedJournalArticles

Robson,M.andR.W.Cooksey(2008),“TowardstheIntegrationandContextualisationofPerspectives

onManagerialIntuition”,AustralasianJournalofBusinessandSocialInquiry6(3),pp.62‐84.

PeerReviewedConferencePapers

Robson,M.(2009),InterviewingtheAustralianBusinessElite:'Let’sGetDowntoBusiness',Proceedings

of the 3rd Annual Postgraduate Research Conference. T. Hays and R. Hussain. University of New

England,Armidale,NSW,UniversityofNewEngland:151‐164.

Robson, M. (2010), Towards the Reconciliation of Idealism and Realism through Monistic Idealism:

Bridging the Gap, Proceedings of the 4th Annual Postgraduate Research Conference, T. Hays and R.

HussainEds.,UniversityofNewEngland,Armidale,NSW,UniversityofNewEngland:235‐244.

Robson,M (in press), The Use and Disclosure of Intuitions by Leaders in Australian Organisations: A

GroundedTheory,5thAnnualPostgraduateResearchConference,UniversityofNewEngland,Armidale,

NSW,UniversityofNewEngland.

1.4 Outlineofthethesis

InChapter2, Iwill providea critical, interdisciplinary and interpretive reviewof extant literature and

researchconcerningintuitionwithinandacrossthefieldsofphilosophyandpsychology.Iwillshowthat

whiletherearevariationsof interpretations,philosophical intuition is largelyconsideredasthedirect,

subjectiveandinfallibleapprehensionofanultimatereality(Westcott1968).


Intuition in psychology, on the other hand, is characterised by a range of competing definitions and

multipleusesoftheterm.Researchconcerning intuitionhasbeendominatedbypsychological,neuro‐

psychologicalandneuro‐scientificapproachesthataredrivenbyadesiretounderstandwhatintuition

‘is’. Intuition ismany things tomanypeople (Betsch2008) – a connection tounconscious archetypes

that may facilitate psychic growth and individuation (Jung 1978), error prone but useful (Kahneman

2003)and ‘visceral’ influences (Loewenstein1996). Intuition isalsounderstoodasa cognitiveprocess

(Epstein 1990; Hammond 1996; Epstein 1998), individual preferences in relation to perceiving and

processing information (Jung1977; Jabri1991;Allinson&Hayes1996)andasanevent (Bastick1982;

Cappon1994a;Crossan,Lane&White1999).

Iwillthenpresentamodelofcognitionthataddressestheincoherenceofdefinitionswithinpsychology.

Thismodelwill integrate the various psychological constructs examined by conceiving of intuition as

multi‐dimensional and multi‐faceted. I will argue that this allows these constructs to be ordered in

relation tooneanotherand in relation toanalysis. Following thisa fundamentaldisjuncturebetween

psychologyandphilosophicalunderstandingsof intuitionwill be revealed. Iwill show thatwhileboth

philosophicalandpsychologicalaccountsconstructintuitionassubjectiveanddirectprocessorevent,in

philosophy, intuition is considered infallible, while in psychology, intuition is discussed as inherently

fallibleatbest.

I will subsequently propose a reconciliation of philosophical and psychological intuition based onmy

owninterpretationofliteraturedrawnfromavarietyofdisciplines.Iwillsuggest,aftersomediscussion

and clarification, that the two ‘intuitions’ can be reconciled by way of a stratified ontology that is

underpinned by a transcendent, unifying and primordial ground consciousness. Following this, I will

examinedefinitionsofintuitionasESPorPsi,which,accordingtoanumberoftheorists,isexplainedby

theinter‐connectednessimpliedbytheCopenhageninterpretationofquantumnon‐locality1.

Having examined these various constructs of intuition, I will narrow the focus of the review to field

studiesconcerningintuitionuseinorganisations.Intuitioninthesestudiesismostcommonlyfoundto

be‘gutfeeling’orintuitionthatisbasedonpastexperienceanddrawsontacitknowledge.Evidencefor

thevalueofthisexpertjudgementtomanagersandleadersisunequivocal.However,Iwillhighlightthe

findingofanumberofthesestudiesthatshowsuchgutfeelingsareseldomdisclosedordiscussedby

1Goswami(1995)pointedoutthegenerallyacceptedCopenhageninterpretationofquantumphysicsinvalidated

the assumptions of Scientific Realism (objectivity, strong objectivity, causal determinism,materialmonism, andlocality). Essentially, this interpretation implies thatnothing is discreteor separate– theuniverse is a seamless

unbrokenwhole.


those that simultaneously acknowledge their import. While some theorists have attributed this

phenomenon to intuition having a bad reputation, I will argue that no research has specifically

investigatedthisdisconnectbetweenuseanddisclosure–this‘silent’useofintuition.Iwillassertthat

while knowledge about intuition and intuition use is important, this knowledge ismore potent if the

context, particularly the socio‐cultural context inwhich intuitionuseoccurs, is alsounderstood. Iwill

citethisasaprimaryjustificationfortheinvestigationoftheresearchproblemwhichwillsubsequently

bestated.

InChapter3Iwilldescribe,explainandjustifythetheoreticalframeworkIhaveadoptedtoserveasa

structurefortheanalysisandinterpretationofdata inthestudy. IhavechosentouseLayder’s(1994;

1997;2005)DomainTheory,whichproposesastratifiedontologyinordertoexplainhowmacrological

and micrological social processes interact to produce lived social reality. The principle advantage of

DomainTheoryisthatithasthepotentialtodrawonmultiplesociologicallensesintheanalysisofthe

complexandmulti‐leveldynamics inherent inanswering the researchproblem.Furthermore,Layder’s

stratified ontology is underpinned by the Critical Realism of Bhaskar (2002), which is based on the

premiseofagroundstateofconsciousness.Thus,philosophicalcongruencywillbefoundbetweenthe

theoretical framework and the way I will interpret psychological and philosophical intuition can be

reconciled.

InChapter4 Iwilldescribe,explainand justifythemethodologyandmethodsused inthestudy. Iwill

argue that an investigation of the ‘real world’ cannot occur through artificial and contrived research

designs. My approach to this research reflects the belief that there have been constraints and

inadequacieswiththetypicallypositivisticandcontrolledwaysinwhichresearchonintuitionhasbeen

conceivedandconducted.TheadvantageofGroundedTheory(GT)forthisstudy isthat it isaflexible

methodologythathasnoattachmenttotypesofdata,areaofinterestordiscipline.GTthereforeoffers

researchersanopportunitytodeveloptheirownvariantsthatarecongruentwiththevicissitudesand

contextoftheirresearchprojects.Thus,GT isan idealmethodologyforstudies,suchasthisone,that

seek to understand the complexities and subtleties of organisational life. A dual approach to data

gatheringandanalysisthroughvariantsofGTwillbedescribed,explainedandjustified.

Iwillassertthattheoryaddressingtheidentifiedgapsintheknowledgeismorelikelytoemergefrom

data drawn from the observations and descriptions of decision makers in the field. Semi‐structured

interviewswith CEOs, chairs, directors, executives and leaders of Australian organisations, aswell as

data collection and analysis procedures, will be described and justified. I will argue that research

concerning intuitiondisclosuremustconnectdirectlywith leaders in theirdecision‐makingcontexts in

ordertoachieveamorecompleteunderstandingofthephenomenaunderinvestigation.


In Chapter 5 I will present the theoretical analyses and emergent grounded theory. I will show that

intuitionwasexperiencedbyparticipantsasaninternalfeelingofknowingthatflaggedtherightnessor

wrongness of a person, choice, strategy or proposal. In general, participants trusted their intuition(s)

and considered themhighly reliable and very important to their leadership anddecision‐making. The

analysis will reveal that participants used gut feeling in conditional yet complementary ways.

Furthermore, I will show that the disclosure of intuition(s) in organisations is a complex, conditional

socialprocessthatcanbeunderstoodatdifferentlevelsofsocialorganisation.Whetherornotintuition

is acknowledged and/or expressed is conditional on the ‘interiority’ of a person, interpersonal

encounter, organisation or society – all of which are interrelated. In Chapter 6 I will compare the

emergenttheorywiththeextantresearchandliteratureexaminedinChapter2aswellasnewliterature

inordertointegrate,interpretandmakesenseofandmakeconclusionsabouttheresearchproblem.I

argue that the introduction of new literature in Chapter 6 is justified because the emergent theory

discoveredextendsbeyondthescopeofthe literaturereviewed inChapter2. Indeedthediscoveryof

theorygroundedinthedataisseenasaprincipaladvantageofaGTmethodology.

1.5Definitionofterms

Complementarity – Although the word complementarity has a variety of definitions under different

disciplines, itsadoption inthisstudycanbeseenasstemmingfromparticlephysics.Complementarity

wasoriginallyusedbyNielsBohrtoexplaintheparadoxicalparticlenature.Bohrrejecteddichotomous

and dualistic interpretations of thewave/particle problem. Instead, he saw electrons as having both

wave and particle natures simultaneously (wavicles) and that it was the way that one ‘looked’ for

particlesthatdeterminedhowwe‘saw’them(Goswami1995).Particlescannotbeaccuratelydescribed

aswavesorparticlesastheir‘truenaturetranscendsbothdescriptions’(Goswami1995,p.43).

Eliteleader–forthepurposesofthisstudyaneliteleaderwillbedefinedasapersonwhoholdsorwho

has held a senior positionwithin an organisation or chargedwith a significant share of the strategic

decision‐makingof anorganisation. Participants in this studywereprincipally chairs, directors, senior

managers,headsofdepartmentsandCEOs(Burton&Higley1987;Pettigrew1992).

Emotion– an intense feeling; a complex and usually strong subjective response such as love or fear

(Delbridge&Bernard1998).

Feeling– I acknowledge that the psychological literature discusses feelings and emotions in different

andspecificways(see,forexample,Damasio1994;Bastick2003).However,inthisstudy,Iwilltakethe

MacquarieConciseDictionarydefinition.Theterm‘feelings’isdefinedasanoverarchingtermintended

toencompassemotions,moods,intuitions,sentiments,ordesires;non‐intellectualorsubjectivehuman

responses(Delbridge&Bernard1998).


Holon–Somethingthatisawholeandsimultaneouslyapartofalargersystem(Koestler1967;Wilber

1995).

Holarchy – A hierarchy of self‐regulating holons that function as autonomous wholes and as parts

dependentonhigherlevelsofcontrol(Koestler1967;Wilber1995).

Interiority–theextenttowhichthereisanorientationtofeelings,emotionsandintuitionsatdifferent

levelsofsocialdescription(intrapersonal,interpersonal,organisationalandsocietalorenvironmental).

Intuition–Inbrief,intuitionisliterallyin‐tuition‐taughtfromtheinside‐as‘knowledge’oradriverof

behaviour that is obtainedwithout apparent effort. Intuition is discussed in philosophy as the direct,

subjectiveandinfallibleapprehensionofanultimatereality(Westcott1968).Inpsychologicalliterature

intuitionisalludedtoasaconnectiontounconsciousarchetypesthatmayfacilitatepsychicgrowthand

individuation (Jung 1978), heuristics that are error prone but useful (Kahneman 2003), as well as

‘visceral’ influences (Loewenstein 1996). Intuition is also understood as a cognitive process (Epstein

1990; Hammond 1996; Epstein 1998), individual preferences in relation to perceiving and processing

information (Jung 1977; Jabri 1991; Allinson & Hayes 1996) and as an event (Bastick 1982; Cappon

1994a;Crossanetal.1999)(seeChapter2foracomprehensivediscussion).

Intuitivedecision‐making–decision‐makingbasedonanon‐rational,non‐linear,cognitiveprocessthat

drawsontacitknowledgeandthatmaybesignalledbyaffectiveor‘feeling’cues(Agor1984;Shapiro&

Spence1997).

Leadership–Theinfluencedirectedtocreationofwillingnesstoachieveafuturegoalorstatebythose

inanorganisation(Mintzberg1989;Parry1996;Dubrin,Dalglish&Miller2006).

New science – Theory and research relating to the development of non‐linear and holistic

understandings of universal phenomena including relativity, non‐linear systems theory, chaos theory

andquantumphysics(Capra1996;Wheatley1999).

Non‐linear–non‐sequentialornotorganisedinatemporalsequenceofsteps(Sinclair2003).

Non‐rational–non‐logicalorthatwhichisnotcapableofbeingexpressedaswordsorsymbolsandcan

onlybemadeknownbyajudgement,decisionoraction(Simon1987;Bennett1998).

Organisationalculture–Althoughitisacknowledgedthatorganisationalculturesarenothomogenous

(Jermier,Slocum,Fry&Gaines1991),theuseofthetermorganisationalculturereferstoanaggregate

or stable and shared synthesis of the assumptions, beliefs, attitudes, values, rituals, behaviours,

symbols,andmythologyofanorganisation(Parry1996;Dubrin&Dalglish2003).


Parallelprocessing–twoindependent,yetinteractingprocessingsystems(Epstein,Pacini,Denes‐Raj&

Heier1996).

Tacit knowledge– Tacit knowledge is subconscious knowledge and concerns a ‘knowing how’ that is

unexpressed, understood and implicit. Its retrieval through intuition can be set against the ‘knowing

what’ofexplicit,activeandconsciousknowledge,whichisknowntobeknown(Brockman&Simmons

1997;Brockman&Anthony2002;Sadler‐Smith&Sparrow2007).

1.6 Conclusion

Thischapter introducedthestudytothereader. Idescribedthebackgroundtotheresearch,outlined

the aims and objectives, and introduced the research problem aswell as themethods bywhich the

research problem will be answered. The research was justified and the structure of the thesis was

outlined.Onthesefoundations,Iwillproceedwithadetaileddescriptionoftheresearch.

C h a p t e r 2 : C r i t i c a l R e v i e w o f t h e L i t e r a t u r e P a g e |24

Chapter2:CriticalReviewoftheLiterature

2.1Introduction

Thepreviouschapterservedasan introductiontothisstudy.The intentionofthe introductionwasto

familiarise the readerwith the purpose, aims and objectives, aswell as themethods bywhich these

aimsandobjectiveswillbeachieved.Thefindingsandconclusionsofthestudywerealsoforeshadowed.

Theoverarchingpurposeofthischapteristwofold;identifygapsintheliteraturewithrespecttotheuse

and disclosure of intuition(s) in organisations, and, to build a theoretical foundation fromwhich the

researchcanproceed.Thiswillbedonethroughacriticalanalysisofextantliteraturethatwasdeemed

relevantprecedingthedatacollectionphases.

The central theme of this study concerns intuition. However, intuition is an elusive term that has a

varietyof interpretations.Betsch (2008), forexample, stated that, ‘[T]hereareasmanydefinitionsof

intuitionaspeopleusing it’ (p.3).He implies thatbecause intuition isa facultyavailable toeveryone,

definitions will be based on subjective experience – each one unique. However, Betsch also draws

attentiontothemultiplicityofdefinitionsandconstructionsofintuition.Intuitionisconsideredanissue

ofrelevanceforpractitionersinanumberoffieldsincludingmathematics,pedagogy,ethics,aesthetics,

education (Westcott 1968; Fishbein 1987), medicine and the health professions (Hobart 1997),

particularlynursing(see,forexample,Leners1992;Ruth‐Sahd2004),aswellasinscientificmethodand

discoveryinarangeofdisciplines(Polanyi1964;Fishbein1987;Dunne1997;Sadler‐Smith2008).

However,thespecificfocusofthisthesisisintuitionuseanddisclosurewithinAustralianorganisations.

Studiesofmanagerial intuitionnormally fallwithin thesub‐disciplineofmanagerialpsychology,under

theparentdisciplineofpsychologyand,consequently,focusonconstructionsof intuitionwithinthese

disciplines. However, this study draws on awider range of disciplines, and uses amore eclectic and

integrativeapproachtointuitionandhowitcanbeinterpreted.Therefore,Ihavechosentolocatethis

study within the disciplines of Human Resource Development and Organisational Development

(LeadershipandManagement)underSocialScience.Whileconstructionsofintuitionunderpsychology

andmanagerial psychologywill be the core focus of the chapter, I will also refer to intuition as it is

constructed within the discipline of philosophy (both Eastern and Western), discussions of which

predatetheemergenceofpsychologybymillennia.Inthespiritofmyintegrativeapproach,thereview

willalsoincludeliteraturefromneuropsychology,sociology,physicsandmetaphysics.

What is described in the literature as philosophical intuition is seldom addressed in studies of

managerial intuition andmay appear tangential. However, I argue that the inclusion of philosophical

intuitioninthisreview,andinparticular,howreconciliationofthephilosophicalandpsychologicalcan


beachieved,has ledmetoadeeperandmoremeaningfulunderstandingof intuitionasawhole.This

comparison and reconciliationwill be achieved in a dialogistic fashion – through understandingwhat

psychologicalintuitionisandisnot.Moreover,therapprochementofthetwoconstructs(aspresented

below)willbeshowntobeentirelycongruentwiththestratifiedontologyofLayder’sDomainTheory,

which I have adopted as the theoretical framework for the study (developed in Chapter 3). The

advantage of this is a satisfying level of conceptual and philosophical congruency between my

interpretationofthetopicofstudyandthephilosophicalassumptionsthathavedriventheresearch.

Thechapterwillbeginwithareviewofphilosophicalaccountsofintuition.Whilethereissomevariation

inconceptsandlabels,thereviewwillshowthatancientGreek,EuropeanandEasternphilosophershold

intuitiontobeasubjective,selfevident, infallibledirectapprehensionofperfectknowledge(Westcott

1968;Hendon2004).Followingthis IwillpresentareviewofWesternpsychological interpretationsof

intuitionwhich,bycomparison,willultimatelyrevealafundamentaldisjuncturebetweenphilosophical

andpsychological perspectives.While psychological accounts of intuition also construct intuition as a

subjective and direct apprehension of knowledge, this knowledge is considered far from infallible.

Intuition in psychology is regarded as useful at best (Hammond1996), however, it is also seen to be

error prone (Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky 1982) and, in the case of ‘visceral influences’ such as

addictions,canleadindividualstoactagainsttheirownlongterminterests,sometimeswithdebilitating

andevenfatalconsequences(Loewenstein1996).

Asstated,withinthedisciplineofpsychology, literatureconcerningintuitionisproblematicbecauseof

‘multipleuses’oftheterm(Osbeck1999,p.229).DaneandPratt(2007)suggestedthatconfusioncan

arisebecausethewordintuitionisusedtodescribebothacognitiveprocess(Epstein1990;Hammond

1996),andacognitiveeventoroutcome(Cappon1994a). Iwill showthat thepsychological literature

also refers to intuition in termsof heuristics andbiases, visceral influences, cognitive preference and

style (Sadler‐Smith & Sparrow 2007), and extrasensory perception (ESP and Psi) (Westcott 1968;

Vaughan 1989; Radin 2009). A consequence of this superfluity of sometimes indistinct and even

contradictory definitions is that it hasmade cross‐study comparisons difficult (Sinclair 2003). Further

perturbationscanarisewhen‘definitionsspecifictoonespecialismaresometimesappliedtoanother’,

(Cappon1994a,p.19).Thus,thefirstaimofthechapteristoshowthatthereisnotonlyadisjuncture

betweenphilosophicalandpsychologicalaccountsofintuition,butthatdivergencealsoexistswithinthe

disciplineofpsychology.

Littlefocushasbeengiventointegratingthesedifferenttakesonintuition.Itisworthnotingthatoneof

themostrecentbooksfocusingonpsychologicalresearchintointuition(Plessner,Betsch&Betsch2008)

presented18differentinvestigationswithoutdevotinganyefforttointegratingthediverseworkintoa

coherent perspective. It has been suggested that it is the lack of an accepted, clear‐cut definition of


intuitionthatisproblematic(Lieberman2000).However,Iwillarguethattheambitiontofindasingle

definition ismisdirectedandprevents the integrationandunderstandingof findings inthe literature. I

willsupportthepositionoftheoristswhoarguethatintuitionisamulti‐dimensionalandmulti‐faceted

phenomenon (such as Parikh et al. 1994) that manifests in different ways, and in relation to the

orientationoftheinquirerandthemethodofapproach.

Inconcertwiththismulti‐dimensionalapproachtopsychologicalconstructsofintuition,thesecondaim

of this chapter is to present a conceptual framework that integrates and synthesises psychological

perspectivesofintuition.Thissyntheticapproachwillculminateinamodelofcognitionthatreflectsthis

multi‐dimensionality. I will not claim that this model provides a complete or unquestionable

interpretation.Rather,themodelreflectsmyinterpretationoftheliteratureandthuscanbeseenasa

theoreticalrepresentationofhowImakesenseofthesediverseperspectivesonintuition.

Followingthis,theidentifieddisjuncturebetweenphilosophicalintuitionandpsychologicalintuitionwill

be addressed as the third aim of the chapter. Attempts to achieve an understanding of, or an

explanationfor,thisapparentschismarerare2.However,IconcurwithOsbeck(1999),whoarguedthat

the futuredevelopmentof intuitionas a concept is hinderedby the lackof inclusionofphilosophical

understandings. The model I use to interpret the reconciliation of the two apparently diametrically‐

opposed constructions is consistentwith the expressed need for amore holistic and interdisciplinary

approach in academia (Wilber 1995; Capra 1996). My interpretation of how reconciliation can be

achieved is derived from a synthesis of the work of Hendon (2004), who argued for a multi‐level

conceptualapproach,andthenotionofameta‐ontologyofagroundstateofconsciousnessasproposed

byanumberoftheorists(Bohm1980;Bohm&Peat1987;Hagelin1987;Goswami1995;Bhaskar2002).

Thefourthandfinalaimofthechapteristoreviewthefieldresearchofintuitionuseinorganisational

contexts. The review will reveal a gap in the literature and research concerning the disclosure of

intuition(s) inorganisationalsettingsandtheir impact. Iwillshowthatfieldstudies indicatethatwhile

intuition(constructedinthisliteratureasagutfeelingbasedonpreviousexperience)isbothusedand

considered important by significant decisionmakers (Agor 1984; Robson&Miller 2006) the role that

intuition plays is seldom acknowledged or revealed through disclosure. Prior research shows that if

decisionmakersarerequiredtojustifytheirdecisions,theyarelikelyto‘dressup’their intuition(s)or,

fearingridicule,intuition(s)maybesuppressed(Agor1984;Parikhetal.1994).Iarguethatanyopacity

orlackoftransparencyinorganisationaldecision‐makingprecludestheproperevaluationofalternatives

2Hendon(2004)andParikhetal.(1994)areexceptionalinthisregard.


andconsequences.Furthermore,Iwillshowthatthesuppressionofintuitionsmayresultnotonlyinlost

opportunitiesbut incursubstantialriskofsignificantcost(bothinfinancialandhumanterms)(Robson

2004;Robson&Miller2006).

Thereviewwillproposethatnoresearchfound,todate,hasspecificallyfocusedonthesocio‐cultural

processes that surround intuition use and disclosure in organisations. I will argue this is a significant

omissiongiventheimportanceplacedonintuitionbydecisionmakersinthefield.Thelastsectionofthis

chapterwilldetailtheresearchproblemanditsconstituentcomponents,andjustifytheseinrelationto

addressingtheidentifiedgapsinthefieldsofknowledgediscussedinthereview.

2.2PhilosophicalIntuitionism

Intuition is a key concept in thedisciplineof philosophy and is often referred to in historical reviews

(Westcott 1968). Indeed, Philosophical Intuitionism has a long history in the West beginning with

ancientGreekphilosopherssuchasPlato,followedbySpinozaandlaterEuropeanphilosopherssuchas

Kant,who influenced theGerman Idealismof Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and 20th Century philosopher,

Bergson. While differences exist in interpretations, philosophical intuition is construed as an

unmediated, direct apprehension that accesses the realm of a priori laws that condition existence.

AncientGreekphilosophersdistinguishedintuition(noesis)fromdiscursivethinking(dianoia).

Table2.1belowdisplaystheessentialpropertiesofeach:

Table2.1:Propertiesofnoesisanddianoia

Intuition/noesis Discursivethinking/dianoia

Non‐inferential Inferential

A‐temporal Temporal

Graspsallatonce Reductionist

Non‐propositional Propositional

Non‐representational Representational

Infallible Fallible

AdaptedfromHendon(2004,p.8).

CentraltothelongtraditionofPhilosophicalIntuitionismisthenotionthatintuitioncanberegardedas

superiortoanalyticordiscursivethought.Incontrasttotheimmediateapprehensionthatcharacterises

noesis, dianoia is the capacity for, or process of, analytical or discursive thinking. For Plato, it was

discursive thinking that should be considered inferior because ultimatelywemust ‘see’ the inherent

truth of something in the process of deductive reasoning (Westcott 1968). Therefore, intuition is the

verybasisbywhichdeductivereasoningproceeds(Polanyi1964).‘...itisthevehicleofapprehensionof


firstprinciplesandself‐evidentunderstandingsthatgroundandsupportallknowledge’(Osbeck1999,p.

234). Intuition and discursive thought are seen to complement each other in the totality of our

understanding. However, because intuition represents the fundamental ability to grasp meaning, in

philosophyatleast,itisconsideredprimary.

Muchcanbelearntaboutphilosophicalintuitionfromexaminingthewayphilosophersdistinguishedit

fromdiscursivethought.AccordingtoWestcott(1968)Spinozamadeadistinctionbetween‘knowledge

of’ things (intuition) and ‘knowledge about’ things (discursive thought). Discursive thought concerns

abstract concepts manipulated by the intellect in the form of representational symbols, whereas

intuitionisanapprehensionofphenomenawithoutjudgement,comparisonorsymbolicrepresentation.

Intuition (inside knowledge) is attainedwhenobject and subjectmerge and are at one. Intuition is a

holisticandunified,non‐representationalandan infallibleappreciationof ‘what is’,orabsolute truth.

Intuition,forSpinoza,wastheonlywaytoabsolutetruthandabsolutetruthwasGod.

God may be represented by the intellect through discursive and analytical thought in various

manifestations, however these are incomplete representations because they are fragmentary. In

concertwithPlato,Spinozamaintainedthattheintellectcanbringtheobserveronlytothepointwhere

intuitionmust occur.Ultimately,Godwas considered aunifiedwhole thatmust be appreciated in its

totality and this could only occur through the faculty of intuition (Westcott 1968). Thus, for some,

intuitionwasconceivedofasadivineconnectionandabsoluteinitssignificance.Conversely,discursive

thoughtwasconsideredmortalandfallible.

Bergson’s(1961)notionofintuitionwasalsothedirectapprehensionoftheabsolute,whichcanonlybe

arrivedat through intuition.Ultimately, forBergson, realitywasnotexpressedasGod,but ‘duration’,

whichheviewedasacontinuousmovementandanunpredictableevolution3.Analysiswasconsidered

inferiortointuitionbecause‘analysisoperatesonimmobility,whileintuitionis locatedinmobility’,(p.

43).Bergsonargued that intuitionplacedoneselfwithinanobject ‘insteadofadoptingpointsofview

toward it’ (p. 8). Analysis distorted, separated and reduced duration into symbols, which Bergson

regardedas the toolsof thephysical sciences thatdealtwithrelativeknowledgeofa thing.However,

because this knowledgewasalways relative to somethingelse, it couldnotbewhole knowledge. For

Bergson,symbolswereofnouseinmetaphysics.Onlyintuitioncouldgrasptheessenceofathinginits

totality,whichBergsonconsideredwas‘overandaboveallexpression’(ibid).

3ThisdescriptionisremarkablysimilartothosegivenbybiologicalsystemstheoristssuchasCapra(1996).


Bergson(1961)arguedthatthefacultyofintuitionliesbetweeninstinctandintellectonacontinuumof

evolutionary development, and that these are two fundamentally different forms of acquiring

knowledge. He argued that, in lower species of animals, instinct facilitated adaptive behaviour in

concertwith duration, however,without apprehension or awareness4. Thus, intellect operateswithin

conscious awareness and this awareness (of self as separate to surroundings) allows humans to

manipulate their environment. Bergson argued that while the intellect has led to progress in living

conditionsthroughtheuseofadaptivetechnology,ithassimultaneouslydisconnectedusfromamore

evolvedandawareappreciationofpureduration.

Wild(1938)commentsonBergson’sstance:

As far, then, as our minds are dominated by intellect we are unable to grasp the nature of life and

movement and, when we try to bring them under the artificial laws of science we are faced with

contradiction.(Wild1938,p.4)

Bergson (1961) contended that theonlyway forone tocome toabsolute truthwas to free themind

fromlogic,reasonandscienceandbypassthe‘shield’oftheintellect.

Beyond modes of interpretation and expression, the shared fundamental premise of these

conceptualisationsofphilosophical intuitionisthenotionofatranscendentdomainofultimatereality

thatcannotbegraspedthroughthesensesandtheintellect.Atranscendentdomainofultimatereality

is also a feature of some Eastern philosophies such as early Tibetan Buddhism. According to this

doctrine, there are nine classes of consciousness. The first five correspond to the five senses ‐ sight,

hearing,smell,tasteandtouch.Thesixthclassofconsciousnesscanbeequatedwithdiscursivethought,

whichoperatesonandorganises the former five.Theeighthclassofconsciousness isanunconscious

accumulationofallpersonalexperience,whiletheninthclassofconsciousnessisinterpretedasultimate

reality itself.Theseventhclassofconsciousness ismind,whichcanbedualisticwhenorientedtoward

the senses, or intuitive and non‐dual when oriented toward the eighth (equated with psychological

intuition,whichwillbediscussedlater)andninthclassesofconsciousness(equatedwithphilosophical

intuition)(Hendon2004).

4Taborsky(1999,p.159)makesasimilardistinctionbetweenprimaryconsciousness,whichisa‘stateofbeing‐in‐relationship–butwithouttheregardfor,theawarenessof,sucharelationship’andsecondness(self‐awareness)

ora‘referentialdualitythatprovidesforadescriptiveawarenessofself‐other’(ibid,p.164).


InBuddhism...itisarguedthatthemindbecomesasourceoferrorifitisorientedanddirectedfromthe

universaltowardstheindividualself‐consciousness,whileintheexperienceoftheoppositedirection,from

theindividualtowardstheuniversal,itbecomesasourceofhighestknowledge.(Hendon2004,p.46)

InBuddhistphilosophy,aswellasotherEasternphilosophicalapproachessuch theVedanta tradition,

there isnodistinctionbetweenmindandmatter (Bhattacharyya1976).Theycanbeseenasdifferent

substrata of the same phenomenon. It is the identification ofmindwith the senses that produces a

dualisticstate,asubject/objectsplitresultingintheegoorthe‘self’becomingseenasseparatetothe

world that is perceived through the senses. However the mind directed toward the ninth class of

consciousness is the enlightened and non‐dual mind that intuits this separateness to be an illusion

(Hendon2004).

Asstated,thetranscendentdomainofrealityinthisversionofBuddhismandtheVedantatraditioncan

be interpreted as a kind of primal or ground consciousness, which can be distinguished from the

individualhumanmind.Atranscendentdomainofultimaterealityfromwhichlayersofrealityunfoldis

also a feature of some interpretations of quantum theory (Bohm 1980; Bohm& Peat 1987; Hagelin

1987; Goswami 1995). This idea will be instrumental to the way I interpret reconciliation between

philosophical and psychological constructions of intuition can be achieved. For the presentmoment,

however, I will present a critique of philosophical intuition by Bunge (1962), which will conclude

thissection.

The body of knowledge representing Philosophical Intuitionism has drawn sharp critique from

philosopher of science,MarioBunge (1962).He characterised the intuitionof Spinoza as nothing but

rapidinference,andtheintuitionofBergsonassoimpotentthatithas‘notevenledtofruitfulerrors’,

(p.23).Thus,BungearguedthatPhilosophicalIntuitionismhasnotresultedina‘deeperunderstanding

of history or life’ (ibid), nor has it realised any new principles of mathematics. He claimed that

‘[N]obody, save the philosophically immature or naive, believes nowadays in the possibility of an

immediateandtotalgraspoftruth’(p.25).

He further argued that contemporary intuitionists are ‘dogmatic fundamentalists’, not interested in

solving ‘a single serious problem’ (p. 9), but are instead, concerned with undermining the value of

reason, rationalism,materialism and empiricism. Bunge’s consequent concernwas that Philosophical

Intuitionism inevitably leads to irrationalism, pseudo‐science and ultimately authoritarianism. Bunge

usedtheexampleoftheGermanNationalSocialistregime,whichheviewedasthekindofdictatorship

thatcanarisethroughpoliticalagendasbasedonsuchintuitions.Thus,Bungelevelledthemostserious

allegationsimaginableagainstphilosophicalintuitionists.


It is not disputed that despotism and unspeakable horrors have been justified in the name of

fundamentalistdogmathathasnorationaldefence,however,Bunge’s (1962)critiqueofPhilosophical

Intuitionismand its connection to this despotism is flawed.While he rightly points out that ‘intuitive

knowledge’(representedbywords)isacontradictioninterms–thatintuitionissubjectiveandineffable

–hefailstoaccommodatethecorollaryofthisinhisargument.AcentralcontentionofBergson(1961)

was that ‘knowledge’ that is symbolically represented is necessarily fragmented, partial knowledge.

Therefore, as a consequence,utterances toothers canonlybe in thenameof intuitionanda flawed

‘mapoftheterrain’ratherthanthethingtheypurporttorepresent.

Onemust,necessarily,cometosuchintuitivetruthalone(Krishnamurti1995;Bhaskar2002).Obviously,

Bungeisoneofmany, includingmyself,whohasnot.Asasubjective, ineffableand,therefore,private

understanding, intuitive apprehension is thus significant and directly influential only to the individual

whocomesuponit,orwhoitcomesto,andinwaysthatcanonlybeknowntothatindividual.Bunge

cannotclaimtoknowanother’ssubjectiveapprehensionsandthereforecannotmakeclaimsaboutany

benefitsofthoseintuitions.

Inaddition,Bunge(1962)seemstoconfuseorblurphilosophical intuitionwithpsychological intuition.

Bungearguedthatoneofthevaluesofscienceisthatitiscapableofgoingbeyondintuitionsandcites

discontinuitiesinnaturerevealedbyquantumphysicsasanexampleofthis.However,theintuitionof

cause and effect, for example, is derived from our daily experience and, therefore, can be better

describedasaheuristic(seeSection2.4)andcertainlynottheperfectknowledgeofanultimatereality.

Acentralcontentionofthecurrentstudyisthatacleardiscriminationbetweenthevariousconceptsis

essentialwhenassessingthevalueofintuition(s).Lastly,IwouldliketopointtotheironyofBunge’suse

of quantumphysics to argue his case. His insistence on the ‘objectivity of scientific research’ (Bunge

1998,p.39)isnowdeniedbyscience5atthesub‐atomiclevel(Goswami1995;Capra1996;Bell2004).

InthissectionIhavearguedthatdespitethelonghistoryofPhilosophicalIntuitionism,consistencycan

befoundbetweenancientGreek,WesternandEasternphilosophicalperspectivesonintuition,referred

tohereasphilosophicalintuition.Philosophicalintuitionisseenasamodeofacquiringknowledgethat

isnon‐inferential,self‐evidentandsubjective,ineffableand,thus,incontestable.Intuitioninphilosophy

is transcendent, infallible,holisticandcapableofapprehendinganultimatereality.Asaconsequence,

these intuitionsareconsideredsuperior todiscursive thought,which isnecessarily representativeand

fragmentary. Later in the chapter I will draw on this discussion in order to reconcile philosophical

5Goswami (1995)pointedout that the fiveclaimsofScientificRealism (including theassumptionofobjectivity)

havebeeninvalidatedbythefindingsofquantummechanics.


intuitionwithconstructsofpsychologicalintuition.However,beforethiscanoccur,areviewofintuition

inpsychologyisrequired.

2.3Psychologicalconstructionsofintuition

Psychologicalconceptsof intuitionare lessconcernedwithultimaterealityandmore ‘concernedwith

themeansbywhichthatwhichisknowncomestobeknown’(Westcott1968,p.25).Whilepsychology

wasslowtotakeupthestudyofintuition,interestandresearchhasincreasedinthelastthreedecades

(Cappon1993;Osbeck 2001; Sadler‐Smith& Sparrow2007), particularly in thedomainofmanagerial

psychology. The impetus for this increase canbeattributed toacknowledgement thatpeoplearenot

always the fully rational creatures they were once assumed to be (Barnard 1938; Simon 1982;

Mintzberg1989).

For example, research over time has consistently shown that decision makers in organisations use

intuition regularly (Agor 1984; Helliar, Burke &Miller 1999; Power & Sinclair 2005; Robson &Miller

2006). Intuition is considered most useful in rapidly changing, complex, uncertain, and ambiguous

decision‐makingenvironments(Agor1989a;Parikhetal.1994;Burke&Miller1999;Khatri&Ng2000;

Patton 2003; Sinclair & Ashkanasy 2005; Sadler‐Smith & Sparrow 2007). In view of rapidly evolving

technology, economic globalisation (Hames 1994; Parry 1996; Carliopo, Andrewartha & Armstrong

2001), terrorism, environmental depletion, the global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis, I

arguethatthisincreasedinterestinintuitionistimely.

Despite this, the study of intuition remains problematic within psychology and ‘the conceptual

foundationofthisnotionitselfremainsquitemeagre’(Osbeck1999,p.232;Betsch2008).Thisispartly

because of the subjective and elusive nature of intuition (Sinclair & Ashkanasy 2005). However, as

suggestedintheintroduction,itcanalsobeattributedtothevarietyofapproachestointuitionwithin

psychology,fromwhichmanagerialconceptsofintuitionflow.Inpreparationforthepresentationofan

integrating model that will follow, I will now examine the approaches to intuition from within

psychologythataredeemedpertinenttothepresentstudy.

2.3.1Dual‐processtheories

Intuition,inpsychology,isseenasafunctionofacognitivesystemthatwasinheritedfromouranimal

ancestors, and that operates on pattern recognition and feeling. Humans have evolved a second

cognitive system that allows us to think consciously and to analyse (Reber et al. 1991; Reber 1992;

Denes‐Raj & Epstein 1994; Epstein 1998). While these systems are nominally separate, they

complementeachother.Dualprocesstheoriesexplicatethisrelationship.


Therearetwomodesofcognitivefunctioning,twomodesofthought,eachprovidingdistinctivewaysof

ordering experience, of constructing reality. The two (although complementary) are irreducible to one

another and efforts to reduce one mode to the other or to ignore one at the expense of the other

inevitablyfailtocapturetherichdiversityofthought.(Hammond1996,p.83)

System 1 operates at the sub or preconscious level of awareness, is intuitive, holistic, relational,

contextualandautomatic.Bycontrast,System2 isconscious,controlled,analytical, rule‐based, linear,

reductionist and a‐contextual (Epstein 1990; Sloman 1996; Stanovich&West 2000; Kahneman 2002;

Kahneman 2003; Hogarth 2008). Although differences can be recognised between dual process

approacheswhere ‘details and technical properties ... do not alwaysmatch exactly... there are clear

family resemblances’ (Stanovich&West 2000, p. 658). Table 2.2 belowdetails dual process theorists

andthevariouslabelsattachedtoeachsystem.

Table2.2:Dualprocesstheorists

Author(s)/Year System1:Intuitive System2:Analytical

Hammond(1996) IntuitiveCognition AnalyticalCognition

Reber(1993) ImplicitCognition ExplicitCognition

Hogarth(2005) TacitSystem DeliberateSystem

Johnson‐Laird(1983) ImplicitInferences ExplicitInferences

Evans&Over(1996) TacitThoughtProcesses ExplicitThoughtProcess

Sloman(1996) AssociativeSystem Rule‐basedSystem

Evans(1984;1989) HeuristicProcessing AnalyticProcessing

Levinson(1995) InteractionalIntelligence AnalyticIntelligence

Epstein(1994;1996)6 ExperientialSystem RationalSystem

Pollock(1991) Quick&InflexibleModules Intellection

Klein(1998) Recognition‐PrimedDecisions RationalChoiceStrategy

Shiffrin&Schneider(1977) AutomaticProcessing ControlledProcessing

Posner&Snyder(1975) AutomaticActivation ConsciousProcessingSystem

Koestler(1964) BisociativeThinking AssociativeThinking

(AdaptedfromStanovichandWest2000)

6 Epstein also recognises a third system, operating in the unconscious, he calls the associanistic system. This

systemessentiallyregulatescorebiologicalfunctions,impulsesandinstinct(seeEpstein&Meier1989).


Dualprocesstheorists,drawingonpracticalintelligence,characteriseintuitionasdrawingunconsciously

ontacitknowledgethatisstoredthroughapre‐consciousprocess.Thespeedandaccuracyofintuition

(acting as a vehicle for accessing tacit knowledge) is contingent on the depth of experience and

expertiseoftheindividualinaparticularfieldofendeavour.Tacitknowledgeissubconsciousknowledge

and concerns the ‘knowing how’ that is unexpressed, understood and implicit. Its retrieval through

intuition can be set against the ‘knowingwhat’ of explicit, active and conscious knowledge,which is

knowntobeknown,andisperceivedbythesenses(Brockman&Simmons1997;Brockman&Anthony

2002;Sadler‐Smith&Sparrow2007).

There issomedebateastowhether it ispossiblefortacitknowledgetobeaccessedbytheconscious

mind,consideringthattacitknowledge,bydefinition,isinexpressible,‘weknowmorethanwecantell’

(Polanyi 1966, p. 4). However, the extent towhich there is interactivity or overlap between systems

appears to be occluded by a dichotomous characterisation of the two types of knowledge (see, for

example,TaggartandRobey,1981);Taggart&Valenzi,1990);Taggart,Valenzi,Zalka&Lowe,1997)).

There is also debate concerning the level of independence and interactivity among dual process

theoristswhohavedevelopedmodelsofparallel systemsofperceptionand informationprocessing in

thedomainofpersonalityandindividualdifferencepsychology.StanovichandWest(2000)regardedthe

two types of systems as distinct, operating in parallel interactivity, while others regard them as

anchoring the poles of a continuum of cognition7 (Hammond 1996). However, Epstein’s Cognitive

Experiential Self Theory (CEST) suggests ‘experiential and rational thinkingarenotoppositeendsof a

singledimension.Rather, theyareuncorrelated’ (Epstein2000,p.671).Epstein’spowerfulcontention

wasthatcognition isservedbyseparatecognitivesystemswherebytheexperientialsystemunderpins

theoperationsoftherationalsystem.

Here I narrow the focus of my discussion of dual process theories because it serves to amplify the

difference between theories that I regard asmore abstract than CEST,which I findmore convincing.

CESTisconvincingnotmerelybecauseoftheextentofpublishedliterature(Epstein1990;Denes‐Raj&

Epstein1994;Epsteinetal.1996;Epstein1998;Epstein2000;Epstein2008)butbecauseEpsteinandhis

colleagues, along with others (Reber, Walkenfeld & Hernstadt 1991; Reber 1992), applied an

evolutionaryperspective to the relationshipbetween the twosystems. In thenext threeparagraphs I

will synthesise literature fromneuropsychologyandsociologyaswell cognitive science toexplainand

supportmyunderstandingofthisevolutionaryargument.

7Hammond’sworkliesoutsidethepsychologyofpersonalityandisusedhereasacomparisononly.


The experiential or intuitive system (System 1) is seen as the older andmore primitive system that

evolvedbefore the emergenceof conscious functioning. Similarly, Bastick argued that intuition is the

‘olderandgreaterpartof intelligence’ (Bastick1982,p. 77). System2 (the rational system) therefore

existsonlyinmoreevolvedmammalsspecies,andismostdevelopedandcomplexinhumans(Reberet

al. 1991; Reber 1992; Denes‐Raj & Epstein 1994; Epstein 1998). Epstein (1998) argued that the

experiential system is basically the same as that of our non‐human ancestors. According to Epstein,

lower species of animals survive through two capacities. The first is to make connections between

externaleventsandoutcomes,andtheirownbehaviour.Thesecondisthecapacityfor‘feeling’states.

Theresultisimplicitlearningwithoutconsciousawareness,wherethefeelingstate(pleasureorpain)is

associatedwithcertainpatternsperceivedintheenvironment.

Epstein’s (1998) description of this unconscious or pre‐conscious learning in humans is supported by

Lewicki,HillandBizot(1988).Intellectualability,asexplicitanddefensible,isrelativelyeasytomeasure

through standardised IQ tests. However, intuitive intelligence, as implicit, and as a construct that is

slippery,elusiveandcontested,isfarmoredifficulttoassess.Mosttestsofintuitionare,morecorrectly,

testsofcognitivepreferenceorstyle(discussedlater).However,Lewickietal.foundthattheirsubjects

wereabletonon‐consciouslyacquireinformationaboutatargetwhoselocationonacomputerscreen

followeda complexpattern. They found thatwithpractice, subjectswereable to successfullypredict

thelocationofthistarget,however,werenotabletoarticulatehowtheyachievedthis.

Subjectsreportedthatafteratime,theirfingersseemedto‘know’whattodo.Furthermore,Lewicki,et

al.arguedthatthis‘isaubiquitousprocessinvolvedinthedevelopmentofbothelementaryandhigh‐

levelcognitiveskills’ (p.24).Thisfindinghastwoimportant implications.First, itprovidesanempirical

basisfortheconceptoftacitknowledge–humansknowmorethantheycanarticulate(Polanyi1966;

Lewicki 1986; Lewicki & Hill 1987; Lewicki et al. 1988). Second, it promotes the idea of unconscious

knowledgeaspermeatinghigh‐levelcognitiveskillsandpointstowardsadeeplyintegratedrelationship

betweencognitivesystems.

In concert with Epstein’s view, I view the two systems as separate yet paradoxically unified through

stratification. The rational system, (System 2) for Epstein (1994) and Laughlin (1997), represented a

subsequent evolutionary layer that was less stimulus‐bound than the earlier System 1. System 2,

functioning as a separate part, can thusmitigate or negate impulses stemming from the experiential

system.ThisisbecauseSystem2isassociatedwiththeabilityofhumanstothinkinabstractways,using

symbolsthatrepresenttheirenvironmentandthemselvesinit.ThisenablesthecapacityforaTheoryof

Mind(Mead1967),theuseoftools, languageandcommunication,andprovidestheabilitytoimagine

an event or the possibility of an event, and, moreover, to judge a situation as good or bad.


BehaviourdrivenbySystem2canthereforebeseenasarisingfromtheconsciousawarenessofchoice

andconsequence,ratherthanunconsciousfightorflight.

Epstein’snotionofthelayeringofthetwocognitivesystemsaccountsforthewholeandyetsometimes

fragmented nature of our lived experience (Hogarth 2005). Thus, CEST accommodates being torn

between feelings (instincts such as sexual desire and hunger aswell as intuitions and emotions) and

reason,or‘whatarecommonlyidentifiedasconflictsbetweentheheartandthehead’(Epstein2000,p.

671).Moreover,subsequenttothedisplayofTable2.3below,whichgivesapointbypointcomparison

ofhowtheexperientialandrationalminds‘work’,Epstein’s(1998)layeringofthetwocognitivesystems

willalsobeshowntobeconsistentwiththephysicalstructureofthebrainitself.


Table2.3:Experientialandrational‘minds’

Experientialmind Rationalmind

Learnsdirectlyfromexperience Learnsfromabstractrepresentations

‘Thinks’quickly;primedforimmediateaction Thinks slowly, deliberately; oriented toward planningandconsideration

Holistic Analytic

‘Thinks’intermsofassociations Thinksintermsofcauseandeffects

Closelyconnectedwithemotions Separateslogicfromemotions

Interpretsexperienceandguidesconscious

thoughtsandbehaviourthrough‘vibes’from

thepast

Interpretsexperiencethroughconsciousappraisalof

events

Seestheworldinconcreteimages,metaphors,

andstories

Seestheworldinabstractsymbols

Experiencedpassivelyandautomatically Experiencedactivelyandconsciously

Experienceseventsasself‐evidentlyvalid Requiresjustificationbylogicandevidence

Paysattentiononlytooutcome Paysattentiontoprocess

‘Thinks’intermsofbroadcategories Thinksintermsoffinerdistinctionsandgradations

Operatesindifferentmodesaccordingtoemotionalstates

Highlyintegratedandmoreinternallyconsistent

Changesslowly(withrepetitiveorintenseexperience)

Changesrapidly

(AdaptedfromEpstein1998,p.71)

Thedebateconcerningtherelationshipofthecognitivesystemstoeachotherismirroredincompeting

theories concerning function and structure of the brain. For many, the two hemispheres of the bi‐

cameralbrainaremetaphorical,ifnotliteral,containersforeachsystem(Robey&Taggart1981a;Simon

1987;Mintzberg 1989; Rao, Jacob& Lin 1992; Cappon 1994a; Boucouvalas 1997). Split brain theory,

whichwasoriginallyadvancedinaninfluentialresearchprogrambySperryandBogen(see,forexample,

Sperry 1961; Sperry 1968; Bogen 1969; Benowitz, Bear, Rosenthal,Mesulam, Zaidel & Sperry 1983),

positedthat therightand lefthemisphereswereassociatedwithSystem1and2respectively (Bastick

1982; Cappon 1994a; Boucouvalas 1997; Sinclair, Ashkanasay, Chattopadhyay & Boyle 2002;

Sinclair2003).

AccordingtoSimon(1987),thecorpuscallosumconnectsthetwohemispheresandallowsthetransfer

of informationfromonetotheother.Morerecently,McGlichrist(2009)claimedthat it isthroughthe

corpuscallosumthatonehemisphereinhibitstheinfluenceoftheother.Significanttolaterdiscussion,

heclaimedthatthelefthemisphere(rational)ismoreabletodothisthantheright(intuitive).


Split brain theory was used as an effective method of introducing the idea of intuitive and rational

‘thinking’ into management discourse towards the end of last century (see, for example, Mintzberg

1976;Agor1984;Simon1987;Harper1989;Mintzberg1989;Raoetal.1992).Moreover,theterms,left‐

brain thinking (analytical) and right‐brain thinking (intuitive) have subsequently been absorbed into

everyday language through popularmanagerial literature such asMintzberg’s (1976)Planning on the

leftsideandmanagingontheright.

Epstein’sevolutionaryperspective,ontheotherhand,translateswelltothetriunelayeredstructureof

thebrainofhumansasdescribedbyMaclean(1978;1990).Thereptilianbrain(impulsesandinstinct),

paleo‐mammalianbrain(limbicsystem)andneo‐mammalianbrain(neo‐cortex,andintellectinhumans)

correspondwell toEpstein’sassocianistic, experiential andanalytical systems, respectively. In concert

withEpstein,Wilber(1995),drawingonJantsch(1980),arguedthateachsuccessiveevolutionarystage

includes and transcends the former in a holarchical8 rather than a hierarchical structure. The three

brains are relatively autonomous, however, they interact with upward and downward influence,

functioningtogetherasawhole.Theycan,therefore,beconsideredaspartsandawholeconcurrently.

Aholarchicalviewofbrainstructureandfunctionavoidsthecriticismlevelledatsplitbraintheory(see,

for example, Goldberg 1983; Lieberman 2000; Hodgkinson, Sadler‐Smith, Burke, Claxton & Sparrow

2009; McGilchrist 2009) – that cognitive functioning is complex and not attributable to specific

hemispheresandspecificareasofthebrain.

2.4Heuristicsandbiases

TheheuristicsandbiasesapproachspearheadedbyTverskyandKahneman(1974)wasaverysuccessful

researchprogram9and,duetoitsinfluence,istraditionallyassociatedwithintuitionformanydecision

researchers (Sadler‐Smith & Sparrow 2007). The heuristics and biases approach acknowledges the

bounded nature of rationality and conceptualises intuition as automatic mental shortcuts. Bounded

rationality,thenotionthathumansareonlypartlyrational,hastwodimensions:first,wearesubjectto

intuitions,emotionsandautomaticbehaviours,andsecond,wearecognitivelylimitedintheamountof

informationthatwecanperceiveandprocess(Simon1982;Simon1987).

8Damasio appears to support this notionof a holarchical relationship reflected in thephysical structure of the

brain‘Natureappearstohavebuilttheapparatusofrationalitynotjustontoponthebrainbutfromitandwithit’.(Damasio1994,p.128)

9DanielKahnemanwasawardedtheNobelPrizein2002forhisworkonheuristicsandbiases.


Themajor contentionof theheuristics andbiases approach is thatheuristics (rulesof thumb) induce

biasesincognitionthatleadtoerrorsinjudgement(Tversky&Kahneman1974;Kahnemanetal.1982;

Denes‐Raj&Epstein1994;Kahneman2002).TverskyandKahneman,afterextensiveexperimentation,

provided evidence for three heuristics: availability – where judgements are based on the ease with

which prior instances can be recalled; representativeness – where judgements are based on

comparisonstoprototypes,stereotypesorpreviouslyencounteredpatternsofoutcomes;andanchoring

– where initial judgements are adjusted subsequent to the perception of new information (Das &

Teng1999).

Abias is a tendency tooverorunderestimate theprobabilityof anoutcomedependinguponcertain

contextual features of the problem.A simple example of a heuristic leading to a bias can be seen in

judging the distance of remote objects. Someonewhohas experience at the taskwill gain expertise,

however,underchangingorexceptionalmeteorologicalconditionstheycanbefooled.WhileKahneman

(2002) admits that ‘[I]n general ... heuristics are quite useful’, he adds that ‘they sometimes lead to

severe and systematic errors’ (p. 465). Therefore intuitions, from this perspective, should be treated

withcaution.

While the fallibility of heuristics is not disputed, some issues need to be taken into account when

considering ‘intuition’ as framedby the heuristics andbiases approach. First, it should be noted that

muchof the researchhas focusedon identifying thecircumstancesandconditionsunderwhich these

errorstendtooccurand,indoingso,hascontrivedartificialsituationswheretheywerelikelytooccur.

ThisisapointthatGigerenzer(1991)convincinglydemonstratedbyshowingthatmanybiasesdisappear

ifamorenaturalorcommon‐senserepresentationofinformationispresentedtothedecisionmaker.

Second,Hammond(1996)pointedoutthattheheuristicsandbiasestheoristscontrastedanalysiswith

these automatic processes rather than with intuitive cognition or spontaneous intuitions that are

commonly referred to as gut feelings (discussed in a later section). Sadler‐Smith and Sparrow (2007)

concur,arguingthatheuristics‘shouldnotbeseenasequivalenttointuition’(p.6).Althoughtheyshare

many features, heuristics are induced at thewill of the individual, whereas intuition, as an event or

outcome,occursspontaneously.Althoughbothheuristicsand intuitiondrawontheexperienceof the

practitioner, gut feelings embrace amuchwider catchment of emotions, life experiences, knowledge

and skills. Therefore, criticisms of intuition based solely on the heuristics and biases literaturewould

bemisplaced.

2.5Visceralfactorsindecisionmaking

Loewenstein (1996) and Loewenstein,Weber et al. (2001) challengemodels of decision‐making that

assume rational choice based on perceived self‐interest. While Lowenstein does not label visceral


influences ‘intuitions’, they sitwithin theheuristics andbiasesperspectiveondecision‐making (Ditto,

Pizzaro,Epstein,Jacobson&Macdonald2006).Lowensteinarguedthattheinfluenceof‘visceral’factors

such as hunger, thirst, sexual desire, moods, emotions and addictions can influence behaviour and

decisions significantly. In a relativelybenignexample,Dittoet al. (2006) found thatparticipantswere

morewillingtoacceptrisk inexchangeforthechanceofwinningchocolatechipcookies if theycould

seeandsmell thecookiesrather thanhavethemdescribed.However, in theextreme,visceral factors

aresopowerfulthattheycancausetheindividualtosubordinateallotherobjectives.Thiscanresultin

peopleactingagainsttheirownlong‐termself interest,often infullawarenessthattheyaredoingso.

Visceral influences can lead to behaviour that can be described as ‘out of the control’ (Loewenstein

1996,p.272)oftheconsciousintentionorwilloftheindividual.

Theimpactofvisceralinfluencesiswidespread.Forexample,theinabilityofAustralianstoregulatetheir

intakeoffoodhasledtoAustraliabecomingthe‘fattest’nationonearth(Stark2008).Countlesscareers

andfamiliesaredestroyedeachyearthroughsuccumbingtothetemptationofillicitorimmoralsexual

desire(see,forexample,Kontominas2010).Theimpactofdrugaddictionhasmassiveconsequencesfor

individuals,aswellasthelegalandhealthsystemsinAustralia.In2005,inNSWalone,itwasreported

that71%ofmalesand67%offemalesciteddrugsandalcoholasplayingaroleintheoffencesforwhich

theywerecurrently incarcerated (Kevin2005).Between2004and2005,14,901Australiansdied from

the‘decision’tocontinuesmokingtobacco(Collins&Lapsley2008).

Loewenstein (1996) argued thatpeople fail to account for the impactof visceral influenceson future

decisions,despitetheirownexperienceofitsimport.Itappearsthattheintensityofcravingleadingto

therelapseoftheaddictcanonlybefullyunderstoodandappreciatedinthatmomentwhenit isfelt.

Hence recovery programs stress the ‘one day at a time’ approach where addicts are encouraged to

avoid situations that may trigger cravings (Bradshaw 1996). These examples bring into question the

extenttowhichanyonehasconsciouscontrolovertheir‘decisions’andactions.

Mankindmakefarmoredeterminationthroughhatred,love,ordesire,oranger,orgrief,orjoy,orhope,

or fear, or error, or someother affection ofmind, than from regard to truth, or any settledmaxim, or

principleofright,orjudicialform,oradherencetothelaws.(Cicero1879,p.89)

2.6Jung

Jungemergedasthefirstmoderntheoristtoinvestigateandprovideanoverarchingtheoryofintuition,

despitehisadmissionthathedidnotknowhowitworked(Westcott1968;Hendon2004).Jung’sideas

were influenced not only byWestern psychology but by awide knowledge of European and Eastern

philosophicalsystems.Forthisreason,JungisseenasabridgebetweenEasternandWesternthought,

aswellasbetweenpsychologyandphilosophy.However,hisviewswereconsideredunorthodoxandhe


was often ridiculed by his contemporaries in the scientific community (Hyde & McGuiness 1992).

Despite this, Jung’s views became popular in the West and eventually spawned a new branch of

psychologyandthus, independently influential (Westcott1968;Hyde&McGuiness1992). It is forthis

reasonthatIreviewJunginaseparatesection.

AlthoughJung’sideasonintuitionhavesubsequentlybeenappliedtopsychologyandphilosophy,they

arenotconcernedwithatheoryofknowledgebutwithpersonalityandbehaviouringeneral.ForJung:

Intuition is a cognitive event that must be accounted for. It is not an occult gift, nor reducible to the

activities of the mind. Rather it is one of the four mental functions constitutionally present in all

individuals.(Westcott1968,p.32)

The four functions Jung refers to in this quote are thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition. Thinking

involves logical judgements and cognitions concerning the truth or ‘objective fact’, while feeling is

oriented to subjective perceptions of like, dislike, pleasant or unpleasant. Thinking and feeling are

therefore oppositional, not able to operate concurrently because they are different principles of

evaluation (Jung 1977). Sensation and intuition are functions of perception and, rather than

judgements, represent the way an individual acquires information about the world. ‘Sensation and

intuitiondescribehowweprefertoperceivewhatweareexperiencing’(Barger&Hoover1984,p.57).

Thesefourfunctions,accordingtoJung,representthetotalityofpsychologicalpossibilitiesforcognition,

perception and judgements about the world, the dominance of which differs from individual to

individual,andmaychangeoverthecourseofa lifetime(Westcott1968;Jung1977;Barger&Hoover

1984). It is for this reason that Jung’s theory is said to be concerned with and connected to the

personalityofindividuals.

Inadditiontothesefourfunctionsaretwopolarattitudesthatconditionthem.Jung’s(1977)concepts

ofintroversionandextroversionaretodowithpsychologicaldirectionofinterestratherthandegreesof

gregariousnessorsociability. Introvertsaremoreinwardlydirectedtoeitherinternalphenomenasuch

as fantasiesor internal reactionstoexternalstimuli.Ontheotherhand, thefocus forextroverts ison

the external world of objects (Westcott 1968). Taken together, the three dimensions of personality

combine to produce eight possible personality types that, according toWestcott, are ‘powerful and

satisfying’(Westcott1968,p.32).

However,noteveryoneissoconvinced.Bastick,forexample,arguedJungis‘deadwrong’(Bastick1982,

p.74)inhistypesandsubtypesbothclinicallyandtheoretically.Bastick,forexample,proteststhatthe

concept of introversion has no operational definition and therefore there is no way to measure it.

Despite this, Jung’s work has served as the basis for widely‐used quantitative personality tests

(Boucouvalas1997),suchastheMyersBriggsTypeIndicator(discussedlater).


Asstated,Jung’s(1977)theoryofintuitionisprimarilyembeddedinatheoryofpersonalityandnotin

epistemology (Westcott 1968). However Jung’s conception of the collective unconscious juxtaposed

against the personal unconscious represents a philosophical problem that must be accounted for

epistemologically.ForJung,thepersonalunconsciousrepresentsaccumulatedpersonalexperienceand

knowledgewhilethecollectiveunconsciousistheinheritanceofarchetypesthataredrawnonthrough

intuition. Jung argued for the universality of these, irrespective of ethnicity, culture, time and space.

Furthermore,thesearchetypesareinheritednotonlyfrom‘one’sancestrallineage’(Westcott1968,p.

34) but all forms of organic life (Jung 1977). Thus, the two concepts, the personal and collective

unconscious,canbeseenasanalogoustopsychologicalandphilosophicalintuition.

Jung considered intuitions from the collective unconscious as more important than those from the

personal unconscious because they tap universal archetypes and basic themes of life (Jung 1971).

Hendon(2004)viewedthemascomparabletoPlatonic idealsor forms.Moreover, intuitions fromthe

collectiveunconsciousarecriticalto‘psychicgrowth’(vonFranz1978,p.161)orindividuation,andthe

evolutionofman,whichhe viewedas far fromcomplete (Jung1978). Jung contended that access to

these unconscious archetypes is hindered by civilising processes (Westcott 1968). Thus, archetypes

normallyonlybecomevisibleinmodern‐daysocietiesthroughart,mythandculture,exceptforchildren

andhighly intuitive individuals (Westcott1968; Jung1977).Thus,a tensioncanbe identifiedbetween

civilisingprocessesandtheprocessesofindividualandcollectivepsychicevolution.

There has been greater interest in Jung’s concept of intuition as a cognitive function in relation to

personalitythantherehasbeenfor intuitionsreceivedfromthecollectiveunconscious,at least inthe

domainoforganisationaldevelopment.Jung’sworkonpersonalitytypeswasreadilytakenupasaway

of measuring cognitive style (Westcott 1968). Cognitive style indicators are useful for developing an

awareness of alternative modes of thinking in organisations, which maximises the effectiveness of

groupsandprovidesappropriatetrainingthroughstylematching(Jabri1991).Isuggestthisreflectsthe

ultimateconcernofbusinessforachievingprofitgoalsratherthanpsychicgrowthor individuation.An

examinationofcognitivestyleandtheinstrumentsthatpurporttomeasureintuitionisimportanttothis

review because many of the studies concerning managerial intuition, reviewed later, utilised them.

Therefore,thefocusofthisreviewwillnowturntoexaminingtheseinstruments.

2.7Intuitionasacognitivestyle/preference

Robey and Taggart (1981b) outline three general approaches for assessing cognitive style and

preference,thefirstandmostcommonbeingsubjectiveself‐reportmeasures.Variousinstrumentsfor

assessmenthavebeendevelopedovertheyears,however,theMyersBriggsTypeIndicator(MBTI)isthe

best‐knownandmost‐widelyused.Other instruments includetheRational‐Experiential Inventory(REI)


(Epstein, Pacini, Denes‐Raj and Heier 1996; Pacini and Epstein 1999; Epstein 1998), the Human

InformationProcessing(HIP)survey(Taggart&Valenzi1990),theCognitiveStyleIndex(CSI)(Allinson&

Hayes1996),theKeeganTypeIndicator(KTI)(Keegan1982),theDecisionStyleInventory(DSI)(Rowe&

Mason 1987) and the Kirton Adaption‐Innovation Inventory (KAI) (Kirton 2003). These survey

instrumentsarepopularbecausetheyarecheapandeasytoadministerand, importantlyforpositivist

researchers,theyhaveestablishedvalidity(Hodgkinson&Sadler‐Smith2003).Cognitivestyleindicators,

however, do notmeasure intuitive capability or capacity, or whether the participantmakes intuitive

decisions, but rather purport to measure the subject’s information gathering, processing and/or

decision‐making preferences. Moreover, these instruments do not tell us about actual decisions nor

accountforthespecificcontextandenvironmentofthedecisionmaker.

The second approach is neuro‐physiological and draws on work with split‐brain patients using an

electroencephalograph(EEG)whichhas,throughmeasuringbrainactivity,identifiedthelefthemisphere

ofthebrainasassociatedwithlanguagewhiletherightisassociatedwithspatialtasks(Robey&Taggart

1981b).Studiesutilisingbrainmapping technologysuchasmagnetic resonance imaging (MRI)devices

continuetoadvanceunderstandingofbrainfunction,particularlywithrespectto intuition(seeVolz&

von Cramon 2008 for some recent examples) and matching cognitive styles (Williams Woolley,

Hackman, Jerde,Chabris,Bennett&Kosslyn2007).However,becauseof thecostof theEEGandMRI

equipment,suchresearchisexpensivetocarryoutandnotconducivetouseinthenaturalsettingsof

decisionmakers.

A third type of measure facilitates the inference of processing style based on the ability to solve

different types of problems. The embedded figures test (EFT), for example, evaluates the ability of

participants to locate figures, embedded in larger geometric figures. Field independent participants

were those who were able to locate more embedded figures and therefore were considered more

analytical. Those that were field dependent were seen to bemore right brained and by implication,

more intuitive (Schweiger 1983).However, this finding gives us no insight into howan individualwill

actuallymakedecisions.Thistestisalsosubjecttoculturalbiasandhasbeenconsideredproblematicfor

useoutsideWesterncontexts(Wozniak2006).Forexample,recentcross‐culturalpsychologicalresearch

foundthatChinesearemore‘fielddependent’intheircognitionasopposedto‘objectdependent’(Peng

&Nisbett1999;Nisbett,Peng,Choi&Norenzayan2001;Nisbett&Norenzayan2002).

2.8Intuitionasapsychological/cognitiveoutcomeorevent

Intuition as an event or an outcomeof cognitive process is a ‘knowing’,which the intuitive can then

choose to exploit (Simon 1987; Crossan et al. 1999; Sauter 1999). Falling into two categories, these

intuitionsarecommonlyknownas ‘gut feeling’and ‘insight’,although theoristshave labelled them in


differentways.Forexample,Cappon(1994a)distinguishesbetweenthetwoonthebasisofimmediacy.

Whereasas‘fasttrack’(gutfeeling)intuitionoccurs‘synchronouswithperception’(p.303),‘slowtrack’

intuition (insight) occurs subsequent to an incubation period. Similarly, Crossan et al. (1999)

distinguishedbetweenexpertandentrepreneurialintuition,andHogarth(2008),betweenforwardand

backward inferences respectively.While there isdivergenceacross the literature in termsof labelling

(Sadler‐Smith&Sparrow2007), there is considerableagreementabout thenatureandcharacteristics

ofeach.

Gut feeling ismost relevant tomanagers and leaders of organisations because they are consistently

presented with problems and decision alternatives where their expert intuition provides guidance

(Parikh et al. 1994). This is because gut feeling is the subconscious or preconscious recognition of

patternsbasedonpastexperience(Agor1984;Behling&Eckel1991;Cappon1993;Parikhetal.1994;

Shapiro&Spence1997;Burke&Miller1999;Gigerenzer2004).Crossanetal.(1999)refertogutfeeling

asexpertintuitionbecausepatternrecognitionisfacilitatedthroughthedevelopmentofhighlycomplex

‘mindmaps’overasubstantialperiodoftime(years).AccordingtoBennett(1998), ‘Experiencemakes

peopleawareofverystrongunderlyingpatternsthattranscendawidevarietyofdecisionscenarios…

experience is integrated, actions become second nature’ (p. 591). For example, chess is generally

regarded as a time‐consuming activity based in the linear analysis of potential moves. However

grandmastersareabletoplaysimultaneousgamesandmakemovesafterseconds,althoughtheplayer

isnotabletoexplainhows/hearrivedatthemove(Agor1986;Simon1987;Mintzberg1989;Crossanet

al.1999).

Insight, on the other hand, refers to a sudden new understanding of a problem, sometimeswith an

accompanying solution or a novel idea that is sometimes referred to as the ‘Eureka factor’, ‘Eureka

effect’ or a ‘Eureka moment’10. Whereas expert intuition is based on pattern recognition,

entrepreneurial intuition is able to ‘connect patterns in a new way’ (Sinclair 2003, p. 15). Insight is

thereforedescribedas,‘todowithinnovationandchange’(p.527)andcreativity(Koestler1976;Bastick

2003).ThebreakthroughsofNewton,Archimedes,EinsteinandPythagorashavebeenattributedtosuch

insights that suddenly came to them, in the apparent absence of anymentalwill or conscious effort

(Rowan 1989; Schooler, Ohlsson & Brooks 1993; Cappon 1994b). However, the notion that these

creativeinsightsoccurwithoutanyeffortoranalysisismisleading.

10TheEurekaeffect(Greekmeaning‘Ihavefound’)isnamedafterthemyththattheGreekpolymath,Archimedes,havingdiscoveredhowtomeasurethevolumeofanirregularobject, leapedoutofapublicbath,andranhome

nakedshouting‘Eureka’.


I argue that the role of mental effort and conscious analysis is integral and a precursor to both

categories of intuition.Gut feeling is immediate, however, it is based on the experience and domain

knowledgeaccumulatedoveryears,whichwouldnecessarilyentailanalysisandreflection(Simon1987;

Sauter 1999; Novicevic, Hench & Wren 2002). In the former example of the chess it must be

acknowledged that to reach the level of a Grandmaster an individual must play a lot of chess, and

analysethemovesofothers(Polanyi1966;Crossanetal.1999).Thiscanbeconsideredan incubation

period for the generation of tacit knowledge that is later drawn on by gut feeling. Insight occurs

subsequenttosustainedanalysisandthoughtaboutaproblem(Koestler1976;Cappon1994a;Crossan

et al. 1999) before the ‘moment of illumination’ (Cappon 1994a, p. 303). Hence, in both examples,

intuitionsaretheproductofcognitiveeffort.Inthecaseofgutfeeling,theconsciousefforthasoccurred

prior to the presentation of a problem or issue, whereas, in the case of insight, the intuition occurs

subsequent to it. Thus, the difference is principally one of timing. Clearly, both involve intuitive

processing(Cappon1994a;Sadler‐Smith2008).

WhileDaneandPratt(2007)alsodistinguishedbetweeninsightandgutfeelingtheywerenotinclined

toincludeinsightunderthelabelofintuition.Theyarguedthatinsightscanbeimmediatelyarticulated

(the solution to a problem for example) but gut feelings cannot. Dane and Pratt however fail to

acknowledgethat theentrepreneurial intuiter isunable toexplain theprocessbywhichs/hecameto

theilluminatingsolution(Crossanetal.1999).Iarguethatintermsofrationalefornomenclature,both

manifestationsof intuitionsharean incubationperiod,holism,andsub‐consciouscognitiveprocessing

and affect (Cappon 1994a; Crossan et al. 1999). Dane and Pratt are therefore in conflict with those

theorists who include insight as a manifestation of intuition (for example see Bastick 1982; Cappon

1994a; Crossan et al. 1999; Sauter 1999; Hogarth 2008).Moreover, practitioners in the field discuss

insightasintuition(Agor1986;Parikhetal.1994;Crossanetal.1999;Robson&Miller2006),although,

asBoucouvalas(1997)pointedout,perhapsnottoquitethesameextentasgutfeeling.Thisisperhaps

because managers and leaders in organisations (who are the participants in this study) are more

concerned with decision alternatives whereas entrepreneurs are concerned with innovation

andcreativity.

2.9Intuitionandanalysis:Hammond

Hammond (1996) focused on intuition as a cognitive process in relation to analysis rather than an

outcomeoranevent.Hearguedthatadichotomousordualisticviewofanalysisandintuitionhasledto

a historical rivalry, in terms of the value ascribed to each, which continues to this day. Hammond

rejected this dichotomous view and sought to reduce the tension by way of a cognitive continuum,


(discussedasCognitiveContinuumTheory (CCT)), ‘markedby intuitionatonepoleandanalysisat the

other’(p.147)–(seeFigure2.1below).Themiddleregion,quasi‐rationalityorcommonsense,isseenas

ablendoffeaturesofbothtypesofcognition(Cooksey1996a).

Figure2.1:Hammond’scognitivecontinuum

ForHammond,cognitionisnotan‘allornothingaffair’(eitheranalysisorintuition)butratherasarising

from various mixtures of intuition and analysis that can be ‘ordered in relation to one another’

(Hammond 1996, p. 147). Hammond considered cognition as a unified blend (unitary) as opposed to

cognitionasacomplexinteractionunderEpstein’sCEST(Epstein1990)11.Hammond’s(1996)viewisthat

cognitionwilloscillatebetweenintuitionandanalysis(alternation),sometimesevenwhenfocusingon

the same decision task and that given time, the decision‐making of an individual will utilise the full

spectrum of potential blends. Table 2.4 below displays characteristics associated with eachmode of

cognition:

11Thisthemehasbeendebatedintheliterature(see,forexample,Allinson&Hayes1996;Hayes,Allinson,Hudson

&Keasey2003;Hodgkinson&Sadler‐Smith2003).


Table2.4:Modeofcognitioncharacteristics

CharacteristicsofintuitionCharacteristicsofquasirationality

Characteristicsofanalysis

Rapidinformationprocessing Involvesaspectsofboth.Mostfrequentcognitivemodein

dailylife

Slowinformationprocessing

Simultaneouscueuse Sequentialcueuse

Judgementprocessesnotretraceable

Judgementprocessretraceable

Logicalrulesunavailable Logicalrulesavailable

Highconfidenceinoutcome Lowconfidenceinoutcome

Lowconfidenceinprocess Highconfidenceinprocess

Lowcognitiveeffortrequired Highcognitiveeffortrequired

Relianceonnon‐verbal/pictorialcues

Relianceonquantitativecues

Emphasisesrightbrainhemisphere

Emphasiseslefthemisphere

Adaptedfrom(Cooksey1996a,p.15)

Hammond(1996)alsoemphasisedthattherelativeproportionofeitherprocesswascontingentonthe

task at hand.HereHammond is capturing Brunswik’s (1952) essential point that cognition cannot be

understoodwithoutorientationtotheecologicalorenvironmentalcontextinwhichitisoccurring.For

Brunswick, artificial and contrived experiments in the laboratory destroyed the ‘causal texture of the

environment’,(Cooksey1996a,p.3).IndeedoneofthemajorcontributionsofBrunswick’sprobabilistic

functionalism to psychology was the notion that ecology should be ‘given equal consideration in all

areas’(Cooksey1996a,p.7‐8),usingparallelconceptstodoso.

The interrelatedness of organism and environment was a notion that ran counter to mainstream

psychologyatthetimeandisonlynowbeingfullyappreciated(Cooksey1996a;Cooksey1996b).Thisis

perhaps the consequence of the ascension of a more holistic approach to scientific enquiry (Capra

1996).Hammondarguedthatdecisionand judgementtasksthatconfrontpeoplewillexhibitdifferent

typesofcontextualfeatures,andthattheparticularconfigurationofthesefeatureswilltendtoinducea

correspondingmodeofcognition.Hammondthereforeproposedaparalleltaskcontinuumrepresenting

thenatureofthetask.


Table2.5:Taskcontinuumcharacteristics

Characteristicsinducingintuition

Characteristicsinducingquasirationality

Characteristicsofinducinganalysis

Complexityoftaskstructure

–manyalternatives

–largenumberofcuesdisplayed

Tasksthatinducequasirationalitywillshowa

mixtureofinducingelementsaswellasanalysisinducing

elements

Complexityoftaskstructure

–fewalternatives

–fewcuesdisplayed

Ambiguityoftaskstructure

–high

–unfamiliartaskcontent

Ambiguityoftaskstructure

–low

–highlyfamiliartaskcontent

Formoftaskpresentation

–continuous,pictorialdatacue

–brieftimeforjudgement

Formoftaskpresentation

–dichotomousordiscrete

datacue

–quantitativecuedefinitionsthatareobjectivelymeasured

–longtimeavailablefor

judgement

–judgementprocessretraceable

(AdaptedfromCooksey1996a,p.20)

AccordingtoCooksey(1996a)CCTisaunifyingtheoryofsocialjudgement.Insummary,CCTisbasedon

fivepremises:

1. Cognitionmovesonacontinuumbetweenintuitionandanalysis

2. Quasirationalityisthemiddlegroundbetweenthem3. Somecognitivetasksinduceintuitionwhileotherinduceanalysis4. Cognitionmovesbetweenintuitionandanalysisovertime

5. Cognitioniscapableofmatchingcognitionwithtask

EmergentfromCCTisthepredictionthatthefunctionalresponsebasedonjudgementachievementor

accuracy can be linked to the congruence between mode of cognition and the nature of the task

(Cooksey 2000). This prediction was confirmed by the findings of studies conducted by Hammond,

Hamm, Grassia, and Pearson (1987) and Hamm (1988), which employed specifically designed,

representativedecisiontaskstogaininsightsintocognitivemodesbeingemployedbydecisionmakers.

UsingtheThinkAloudProtocolMethod(vanSomeren,Barnard&Sandberg1994),whereparticipants

gaveamomentbymomentnarrativeoftheirthoughtprocesses,bothstudiesshowedthatpractitioners


varied their mode of cognition according to the task properties and, furthermore, that efficacy, as

predicted, was related to the degree of congruence between task characteristics and mode of

cognitiveprocessing.

These findings conflict somewhat with the contentions of Stanovich and West (2000). Drawing on

Epstein’sCEST,theyclaimthateachcognitivesystem‘construes’problemsindifferentways.Construals

triggeredby System1 are ‘highly contextual, personalized and socialized’ (p. 659),whereas System2

depersonalises and de‐contextualises the task. However, if System 1 is automatic and permeates all

thinking(Epsteinetal.1996)thenitcouldbeassumedthatalltaskswillbeconstruedascontextualand

personal, inducing System 2. However, the apparent inconsistency between CCT and CEST might be

explained by the understanding that, according to CEST, System 2 canoverride System 1. Thismight

dependonanumberof factors suchas the trainingandpersonalemotional contextof the individual

(including visceral influences), and interpersonal dynamics, culture and the climate of any

givenorganisation.

WhileHammond’s(1996)CCTservestoeasethetensionwithintheanalysis/intuitiondualitydebate, I

argueitstillremainsaless‐than‐comprehensivemodelforthewholeofcognitionandjudgement.While

CCTpurportstoincludeandequallyvalueecologicalfactorsrealisedbythetaskcontinuum,Hammond’s

model is emotionally de‐contextualised. In particular, CCT provides no account for personal and

interpersonal dynamics, and emotional complexity. Janis (1989) pointed out a range of individual,

egocentric and affiliate constraints that affect decision‐making. These included personality, attitudes,

the need tomaintain self‐esteem, the desire for prestige and the need to belong. These constraints

intersectwiththevisceral factorsdiscussedbyLowenstein (2001)andunderpin ‘officepolitics’,which

can have a debilitating effect on decision‐making and leadership in general (Dubrin et al. 2006). In

addition, CCT does not specifically account for spontaneous intuitions (gut feeling or insight). The

cognitivecontinuumrepresentsonlyintuitionandanalyticalprocessesinrelationtooneanother.

Epstein’s CEST (Epstein 1990; Epstein 2008), on the other hand, is well placed to accommodate

heuristicsandvisceral influenceswithin its frameworkbecause itdoesaccountfor irrational fearsand

behaviour,moodsandemotions.Epsteinalsoplacesemphasis,alongwithotherauthorsinawhole‐of‐

brain approach (Robey & Taggart 1981a; Cappon 1994a; Sadler‐Smith 1999; Sauter 1999), on the

synergisticfunctionoftheinteractionbetweenanalyticandexperientialsystems.

[A]titslowerlevelsofoperation,itisacrudesystemthatautomatically,rapidly,effortlesslyandefficiently

processesinformation.Atitshigherreaches,andparticularlyininteractionwiththerationalsystem,itisa

sourceofintuitivewisdomandcreativity.(Epstein1994,p.715)


Hammond’s (1996) CCT, Loewenstein’s (1996) visceral influences, Kahneman et al.’s (1982) heuristics

andbiasesandEpstein’s(1990)descriptionoftheexperientialandrationalcognitivesystemseachmake

significantcontributions.Iarguethattheyarenotincompatibleand,ifviewedinclusively,haveagreater

chance of increasing understanding than when seen as competing depictions. Thus, I have

diagrammatically represented my interpretation of how Hammond's cognitive continuum can be

expanded by synthesising it with my representation of Epstein’s CEST. Figure 2.2 below is a visual

representation of Epstein’s experiential and rational cognitive systems and their relationship to each

other.Thefigureisusefulbecauseitvisuallyrepresentstheoverlappingrelationshipoftheexperiential

and rational systems (represented by the darker shaded area) as the basis for their

part/wholerelationship.

Figure 2.2: Diagrammatical representation of Epstein’s (1990) Experiential and Rational

CognitiveSystems

Themodel also serves to accommodate and represent Epstein’s notion of intuition asmulti‐faceted.

Whileintuitionsmaybebase,instinctualandautomatic,theinteractivityofthesystems(process)may

alsoproducehigherwisdomandcreativityintheformofgutfeelingsandinsights(representedbythe

intersection of the two circles). Intuitions can be conceived as an emergent process/outcome not

dissimilar to the process of self‐organisation that is characteristic of complex systems (Capra 1996;

Lissack1997).Inaddition,thisrepresentationisusefulbecauseitrendersEpstein’sideasavailablefora

visualsynthesiswithHammond’sCCT(Figure2.1)shownbelowinFigure2.3:


Figure2.3:Intuitionasanemergentoutcomefromadynamic,contextualiseddecisioncontext

AdaptedfromRobsonandCooksey(2008,p.77)

Thisrepresentationhasalsobeenusefulformyunderstandingoftheliteraturebecauseithasservedto

make relational sense of the many multifarious, confusing, contradictory definitions. The model

presents intuitionasamulti‐faceted,multi‐dimensionalprocessandoutcomethroughthe inclusionof

automatic and visceral influences. It is also presented as an event (symbolised by the red

‘splash’symbol).

A further utility of this synthesis is the specific inclusion of decision context (represented by the

surrounding oval). Incorporating Hammond’s (1996) notion of the relationship between task and

cognition,andbuildingonearlierworkbyCooksey(2000),Iarguethatintuitioncanonlybeunderstood

against thebackdropof thecomplexdecisioncontext(s) inwhichdecision‐making isoccurring.This is

something that researchers intonaturalisticdecision‐makinghavealsoacknowledged (seeZsambok&

Klein 1997 for examples). Decisions and behaviour are emergent from a complex interaction of

influences, in termsof thenatureof thedecision,andalsoarisingasaconsequenceof individualand

interpersonal dynamics (Janis 1989). In Section 2.15, itwill be shown that socio‐cultural factors have

beenperceivedascriticaltotheuseofintuition(s)andyetremainabsentfromtheliterature.


Animplicationofthisexplicitrecognitionofcontextisthatarealisticunderstandingofintuitionthatis

useful topractitionerscannotbeachieved in theabsenceofcontextualknowledgeandthesubjective

experiences of individuals in the field. Research is likely to bemoremeaningfully extended if multi‐

disciplinary and multi‐paradigmatic approaches to the study of intuition and related issues are

undertaken(oratleastapproacheswithlessrigidboundariesintermsofwhatconstitutesknowledge).I

will later argue that this understanding is best achieved through approaches to research that can

acknowledge,andthusinvestigate,decision‐makingasaprocessinorganisations.Towardsthisaim,the

modeldepictedinFigure2.3abovemayalsoserveasabasisfromwhichfutureresearchprogramscan

proceedand feeddataback into the framework. These issueswill be addressed in termsof research

designandmethodology,whichwillbeexaminedinChapter4.

2.10Reconcilingphilosophicalandpsychologicalconceptionsofintuition

The previous sections have examined literature pertaining to constructions of intuition within

philosophy and psychology. I will now present the foreshadowed reconciliation of the disjuncture

betweenintuitioninphilosophy(whichisframedasinfallible)andpsychologicalintuition(discussedas

fallible).Ihaveprovidedthisreconciliationbeforeproceedingtothereviewofliteraturespecifictofield

studiesof intuition inorganisations.This isbecause Ibelievethat thereconciliationproposedoffersa

deeper and more meaningful understanding of both philosophical and psychological constructs of

intuition.Furthermore,someoftheideasdiscussedarerelevanttothewaysometheoristsexplainthe

accumulatedevidencethatisseentosupportthenotionofintuitionasESP,psychicintuition,orPsi,a

discussionofwhichwillalsofollow.

Whilemulti‐disciplinaryapproachesaddressingthedisjuncturebetweenphilosophicalandpsychological

literaturearerare,somerecentworkssignalrecognitionoftheneedtoaddressthisissue(Davis‐Floyd&

Arvidson 1997; DePaul & Ramsey 1998; Osbeck 1999; Hendon 2004). Osbeck (1999) suggested that

thereisaneedforintegrationoftheory,because‘philosophicalanalysisofintuitionmayusefullyinform

cognitivetheory(andviceversa)’(p.229).Iconcurwiththisspiritofinquiryandsuggestthatadeeper

and, therefore,moremeaningfulunderstandingofbothconstructsof intuition is realised through the

recognitionoftheirfundamentaldifference.Isuggestthatthiscanbeachievedinadialogisticfashion–

throughunderstandingwhatpsychologicalintuitionisandisnot.

Inaddition, therapprochementof thetwoconstructswillbeshowntobeentirelycongruentwiththe

stratifiedontologyofCriticalRealism(Bhaskar2002),uponwhichLayder’s (1997;1998;2005)Domain

Theoryrests.ThisissignificantbecauseIhaveadoptedDomainTheoryasthetheoreticalframeworkfor

thestudy(developedinChapter3).Theadvantageofthisisconceptualcongruencybetweenthebasis


forthereconciliationandthephilosophicalassumptions,whichdrivetheresearchandultimatelyinform

conclusionsabouttheresearchproblem.

As discussed, there is consistency amongst philosophers that intuition provides perfect knowledge of

ultimate reality and that it is self‐evident, subjective and therefore incontestable (Westcott 1968).

Psychological intuition(gutfeeling),ontheotherhand, isregardedasfalliblebutusefulandbasedon

personal, tacit knowledge that isgained throughexperience.Manycontemporary reviewsof intuition

(particularly in business research literature) tend to ignore philosophical intuition (see, for example,

Agor1984;Isenberg1984;Harper1989;Hammond1996;Anderson2000).Thosethatdoacknowledge

philosophical intuition do so without attempting to integrate, defend, reconcile or explain this

disjuncture(Osbeck1999).

Osbeck (1999) argued that this could be attributed to a ‘number of factors consistent with the

developmentofpsychologyintoanempiricalscience’suchas‘methodologicalconstraints,predominant

interestineveryday,‘folk’conceptionsofintuition’and‘assumptionsconcerningintuitionism’shistorical

associationwithsubjectivistaccountsoftruth’(p.229).Inaddition,particularlyinrelationtomanagerial

takeson intuition,theoristsare interested inhowintuitioncanachievematerialoutcomes,orat least

betterdecision‐makingthatcanleadtousableoutcomes,ratherthanarrivingatsomesortofabstract

truth about universal principles. In view of the fragmentation of knowledge that occurs through the

mutualexclusivityofdisciplines(Bohm1980;Bohm&Peat1987;Capra1996)thatsometimesresultsin

adversarial confrontations12, it is perhapsnot surprising that approaches to the studyof intuition are

sodifferent.

However, using a novel approach, Hendon (2004) presents a convincing solution that serves to

reduce/eliminate the apparent epistemological contradictions through a stratified or layered

framework. She proposed a three‐level model of intuition which I have duplicated here in Table

2.6below:

12Rorty(2009)forexample,arguedphilosophycan‘debunk’theclaimsofsciencethrougha‘specialunderstanding

ofknowledgeandmind’(p.3).


Table2.6:Hendon’sthree‐levelframeworkforintuition

Intuitionframework Personalunconscious Collectiveunconscious

Introvertedintuition Levelone Leveltwo

Extrovertedintuition Levelone Littleornoawareness

Integralintuition Levelthree Levelthree

(Hendon2004,p.8)

Hendon(2004)arguedthatthefirstlevelofintuitionrelatestothepersonalunconsciousand,therefore,

tothepsychologicalaccountsof intuition.DrawingonJung,shearguedthatthesecondlevelrefersto

intuitions from the collective unconscious, which can be drawn upon by each individual through

personalintuition.Introverts,asmentionedearlier,havebetteraccesstothistypeofintuitionwhereas

extrovert types (who are more directed to external objects) have less access and, therefore, less

awarenessofmanifestingautomaticphenomenathroughthemind,bodyandfeelings.

Finally, thethird levelof intuition,or integral intuition, is thedeveloped,mature intuition–thedirect

apprehension of an ultimate reality that Westcott (1968) claimed is the principal characteristic of

philosophical intuition. Hendon (2004) justifiably regarded this three‐level framework for intuition as

the major theoretical contribution of her thesis because her multi‐level approach allows for a

reconciliationofthesedifferentconstructs.Heressentiallystratifiedontologicalsolutionhasinfluenced

mythinkingsignificantly.Inoticedparallelsbetweenhermodelandtheontologicalstratificationofboth

theCriticalRealismofBhaskarandthemeta‐physicalargumentsofparticletheoristsGoswami(1995),

Bohm(1980;1987)andHagelin(1987).Consequently,IformedtheviewthatHendon’sproposalcanbe

supportedandextendedthroughasynthesiswiththeseideas.

Thefoundationofmyinterpretationrestsontheassumptionofatranscendentdomainorgroundstate

of ‘universal consciousness’ fromwhich all else arises. This propositionwill be dismissed by some as

‘Easternmysticism’,referringtotraditionssuchasVedanta(Bhattacharyya1976),Taoism(Taggart2000)

andtheTibetanBuddhismdiscussedpreviously,whichareseldomdrawnon intheWest13 in ‘serious’

discourse(seeHolbrook1981;Wilber1995asexceptions).However,thisideaisalsofoundinWestern

philosophyandmetaphysics.Thenotionofauniversalgroundconsciousnesscanbecomparedto‘spirit’

inHegel’sAbsoluteIdealism,Plato’s‘TheGood’(Hendon2004)and,morerecently,pioneeringparticle

13TheparadigmofScientificRealisminsistsonasubstantivebottomthatismatter(Burneko1997).However,thekeytounderstandingandresolvingtheproblemofmind/matter,realism/idealismand,inparticular,psychological

/philosophicalintuition,isthatthereisnosubstantivebottom.


physicist,Bohm’s(1980),implicateorder(seealsoHagelin1987).

‘...theimplicateordercouldwellbecalledidealism,spirit,orconsciousnessandthattheseparationofthe

two–matterandspirit–isanabstraction.Thegroundisalwaysone’.(Bohm1980,p.84)

Bohm’simplicateorderisanunmanifestandtranscendentdimensionofpotential(Bohm1980;Bohm&

Peat1987).Enfoldedintheimplicateorderareexplicateorders,whichcontainwhatweexperienceas

physicalreality(matter).Bohmarguesthat:

‘... ordinary notions of space and time, along with those of separately existent material particles, are

abstractedasformsderivedfromthedeeperorder.Theseordinarynotionsinfactappearinwhatiscalled

the"explicate"or"unfolded"order,whichisaspecialanddistinguishedformcontainedwithinthegeneral

totalityofalltheimplicateorders’(Bohm1980,p.xv).

Matterunfolds fromthe implicateorderatdifferent levelsofdescription–hence ‘Reality’ isstratified

yet, at the same time, unified14.My interpretation is that, individual human consciousness (including

intuitive processes and intuitions) emerges from the brain15 (matter) (Willmott 1999), which at a

differentlevelofdescriptionisgroundconsciousness.Philosophicalintuitionisthusapprehendedwhen

universalandpersonalconsciousness(throughtranspersonalintuition)realiseeachotherinco‐presence

and self‐transcendence (Bhaskar 2002). My interpretation of this three‐level stratification is visually

representedbyFigure2.4below:

Figure2.4:Three‐levelstratificationimpliedbyMonisticIdealism

14Thisexplainswhyclassicalphysicscancoexistalongsidequantumphysics.Quantumphysicsexplainsnatureatamorefundamentallevel(Capra1996).

15ThisnotionwillbeexplainedinChapter3indevelopingthetheoreticalperspectiveforthestudy.


ForHenzell‐Thomas(2005),apprehensionofthecelestialprototypeisultimateself‐realisationandcouldwellbecalledtranspersonalintuitionbecausetheindividualmindtranscendsitselfthroughaccessinga

deeperrealitythatisfoundwithin:

This‘Intellect’(universalconsciousness)…isveiledbehinddiscursivethoughtorreason;nevertheless,itis

essentiallythesame–ornotother–thanitscelestialprototype.Throughthistranscendentintellectman

[sic] is capable of the ‘recognition’ of Reality and of knowing the world, because the world is in fact

containedwithinhim,astheworldiscontainedinbeing.(Henzell‐Thomas2005,p.46)

Thistranspersonalintuition(equatedwithphilosophicalintuition)translateswelltothedescriptionsof

BergsonandSpinoza,givenearlier,ofphilosophicalintuitionas‘insideknowledge’ofathing.This‘inside

knowledge’ can be visually represented by the ‘Two Heads’ solution which, according to Goswami

(1995),actualisestherapprochementofidealismandrealismproposedbyBertrandRussellandLeibnitz.

IhavediagrammaticallyrepresentedGoswami’sdescriptioninFigure2.5below:

Figure2.5:The‘TwoHeads’solution

Example1 Example2

In the first example the circularobject is external to the individual consciousnessof theobserver–a

situation that satisfies the realist. In terms of the psychological/philosophical intuition debate, this

examplewouldtranslatetopersonalpsychologicalintuitionbasedonexperienceofanexternalworld–

gut feelings and insights – and therefore ‘knowledge about’ something. However, when the realist

position isplacedwithina largerhead (groundconsciousness)notonly is the realist satisfiedbutone

can be seen to have an inside ‘knowledge of’ a thing (second example). This is because ‘knowledge’

(philosophicalintuition)transcendsthesubject/objectsplitandisderivedfromalevelofconsciousness

thatiscommontoboththebrainandtheobject(themeta‐realityofgroundconsciousness).

Ofcourse,the‘bighead’maybeinterpretedas‘God’.However,concurringwithBohm(1980),Iwould

arguethatitisneithernecessarynorwisetospeculateabouttheexactnatureandnameofthisground

consciousness.AsTaoistsstate, ‘TheTaothatcanbetold isnottheeternalTao’ (Taggart2000,p.11).

The importantpointhere is that thedualismsthat featuresostrongly inourexistence–thedualisms


that divide self and other, self and the environment – aswell as the ideological dualisms that divide

philosophies such as idealism and realism, and consequently research paradigms,may be reconciled

(Robson2010).‘Webothstepanddonotstepinthesamewaters.Weareandarenot’(Heraclituscited

inBarnes1987,p.117).

The advantage of assuming a stratifiedmeta‐reality of ground consciousness is that dualisms can be

embraced and transcended. Two important implications for this study arise as a consequence of this

position. The first is that philosophical intuition can be seen as fundamentally different to individual

psychologicalintuitionbecauseitparadoxicallydrawsonanessencecommontoboththeindividualand

the universal. The reconciliation of the two is achieved through the appreciation that individual

consciousnessisboththesameas,anddifferentto,groundconsciousness.Thesecondimplicationisin

relation to the philosophical underpinnings of the study. A stratified ontology is themeans bywhich

Layder’sDomainTheorybringstogetherthevariousstrandsofsocialtheorythatareotherwiseseenas

irreconcilable (structure/agency, part/whole, separateness/relatedness, individual/society), and

transcendstheirindividuallimitations.

Layder’sstratifiedontologyisbasedontheworkofBhaskar(1978;1993)andArcher(1995),particularly

with reference toCriticalRealism.CriticalRealism is foundedon theassumptionof a stratifiedmeta‐

reality,whichBhaskar(2002)describesas‘beingsgroundstate’,whichis‘synchronicconsciousness’and

‘implicitlyenfoldedinmatter’(p.110).Thus,congruencycanbeseenbetweenthestratifiedontological

solution to the reconciliation of psychological and philosophical intuition, the theoretical framework

adopted for the study (Domain Theory, to be discussed later), and the stratified ontology of Critical

RealismthatunderpinsDomainTheory.

2.11IntuitionasESPandpsychicpremonitions

Westcott (1968) dismissed the inclusion of extrasensory perception (ESP), otherwise known as Psi

(psychicphenomena),inhisevaluationofintuitiononthegroundsthatitisclearlyseparatefromboth

philosophical and psychological traditions. He argued that both descriptions given for ESP, where

informationiseither(1)sentfromanotherperson(telepathy)or(2)divinedfromthe‘eventorobject’

(prescience),bydefinition, ‘reliesontheabrogationofordinary [myemphasis]sensoryknowledge’(p.

96).Westcott’sexclusionispuzzling,however,becausephilosophicalintuition,ashehasdefinedit,and

Jung’sintuitionsfromthecollectiveunconscious(whichhedidinclude),neitherrelyonthesensesnor

can be considered ordinary knowledge. Here we could become embroiled in definitions of what

constitutesasenseandwhatisordinary.IsuspectthatWestcott’somissionofESPhasmoretodowith

prevailing attitudes toward ESP in mainstream psychology, which are clearly exposed in this quote

fromBastick:


Of course it is the mystics, the parapsychologists, the gypsy teacup readers, the astral gazers, and

generallythefolksbeyondthefringedispensingtheirquackeriesandnostrumstodeprivedinnocents,who

areresponsibleforbringingintuitionintodisreputeinthepopularmind.(Bastick1982,p.20)

If Bastick’s views are typical, as Talbot (1992) asserted is the case, thenWestcott (1968)would have

been imbued with denial concerning ESP through his training and, therefore, justified in fearing the

ridicule and ostracism of his peers by taking the possibility of ESP seriously in ostensibly scholarly

publications.However,othertheoristssuchasVaughan(1979)andNaparstek(1997)discussedPsiina

waythatisconsistentwithWestcott’sdefinition.WhileitisnotclearwhetherBastickorWestcottwould

considerVaughanandNaparstek(bothpsychologists)asdwellingbeyondthefringe,whatisclearfrom

theirbooksisthatpsychicphenomenasuchasESParecommonlyreferredtoas‘intuitions’.Therefore,I

arguethatESP,asaconcept,needstobeincludedinastudyconcerningperceptionsofintuition.

Given that philosophical assumptions of Scientific Realism still dominate in research today (Goswami

1995), it isnotsurprising thatESPhasbeenridiculedby themajorityof thescientificcommunity,nor

that there havebeennumerous inquiries investigating suspicions of fraud (Schoch& Yonavjak 2008).

However, the assumptions of New Science, specifically, relativity, quantum mechanics and non‐

locality16,haveradicallychangedourunderstandingoftheUniverse–and,asaconsequence,thedebate

has intensified.ProponentsofPsi chargematerialistdeniers (asopposed to sceptics)with refusing to

acknowledgeoverwhelmingevidence,whiledenierscontinuetoconsidertheclaimsofPsiproponents

to be ‘flaky’, and their methods, questionable, particularly in terms of reliability (Alcock, Burns &

Freeman2003).

However, New Science has given supporters of Psi an opportunity to explain the 125 years of

experimentalevidence thathasaccumulated (Radin2006; Schoch&Yonavjak2008;Radin2009). The

principle of non‐locality does not justify the existence of Psi, however, it does provide an underlying

basis by which it may operate (Schoch & Yonavjak 2008). While there are different variations and

approaches to these theories, inessence, they relyon theunderlyingonenessof theUniverse,which

accountsforconnectednessofallthings.

Iftheprincipleofnon‐locality isaccepted,thecorollary isthatwearenotseparate,atafundamental

level, from other people and other things in the Universe. The notions of space and time lose their

meaning,asdothenotionsofWestcott’s(1968)definitionsforESP.Nothingis‘sent’or‘transferred’,it

16 Aspect (cited in Bell 2004) found that pairs of co‐related particles are ‘communicate’ across vast distances(action at a distance). The generally accepted Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum Physics implies that the

Universecanbeseenasaseamlesswholeratherthancomprisedofdiscreteparts(Capra1996;Goswami1995).


is simply realised–an ideanotdissimilar to intuitions fromthecollectiveunconsciousor, indeed, the

principlebywhichIhavearguedphilosophicalintuitionmayoperate.

Avarietyofbookshavebeenwrittenutilisingtheimplicationsofquantumnon‐localityinrelationtoPsi.

Thesehavebeenwrittenandpublishedforacademics(Etter1997;Rauscher&Targ2001;ShoupN.D.),

aswell as for awideraudience (Radin2006; Jones2007;Radin2009; Tart2009). In relation toPsi in

business,Bradley (2007)usesnon‐locality toexplainhowentrepreneursknowtodotheright thingat

therighttime.However,theproblemforPsiresearchersisthattheevidenceforthisphenomenonhas

apparentlynotbeencompellingenoughtoconvinceevenonemainstreampsychologicalandmanagerial

psychologicalpublication.

This section concludes the critical review of constructions of intuition. Table 2.7 below represents a

summaryof theconstructscovered.Asaconsequenceofmyunderstandingofhowphilosophicaland

psychological can be understood in relation to one another, I have grouped the various constructs

accordingtowhetherIseethemaspersonalortranspersonalintuition:


Table2.7:Summaryofconstructsofintuition

Construct Description Examplesofproponents

SpiritualIntuition

PhilosophicalIntuitionism

EasternPhilosophies

Apprehensionofprime

realitythroughtheuseofintuition.

Plato;Spinoza;Bergson;Westcott;Goswami;Taggart;EasternPhilosophersandtraditionssuchasKrishnamurti;OshoandEasterntraditionssuchasBuddhismandTaoism

Tran

s‐pe

rson

alin

tuition

PsychicIntuition,ESP,Psi

Informationdivinedfromremotepersonsorobjects

Vaughan;Naparstek;Bradley;Radin;Schoup

Asacognitiveprocess

Intuitionasafunctionofanearlierevolutionarycognitivesystem

Hammond;Cooksey;Hammetal.;Epstein;Taggart

Heuristicsandbiases,visceralinfluences

Cognitiveshortcutscreatingbiasesandprejudices.Theimpactofhunger,thirst,sexualdrive,addictionetc.

Kahneman,SlovicandTversky;Loewenstein;Epstein;Gigerenzer;Keren;andTeigen

ExperientialIntuitionGutFeelingExpertIntuition

Immediateknowingandsenseofcertaintythroughpatternrecognitionbasedonpastexperience

Cappon;Parikhet.al;Agor;Bastick;Epstein,Behlingetal.;Novicevicetal.;Sauter;Robson

InsightEntrepreneurialIntuitionTheEurekaEffectCreativity

Suddeninsightafterincubationperiodoftenasaproblemsolution

Cappon;Sauter;Simon;Bastick;Novicevic,HenchandWren;Crossan,LaneandWhite;KoestlerPe

rson

al(p

sycholog

ical)intuition

Asacognitivestyleorpreference

Aconstructinvolvingpreferenceforgatheringandprocessinginformationlinkedtopersonality

AllinsonandHayes;Hodgkinsonetal.;Jung;Myers‐Brigs;Taggart;Kirton;Jabri

2.12Genderandintuition

Lieberman (2000) asserted that no review of intuition would be complete without a reference to

women’s intuition. Lieberman is justified inmaking such a claim considering thewidespread popular

beliefthatwomenhaveamorereliableandavailableintuitivefacultythanmen;aperceptionwhichhas

been noted by a number of authors (see, for example, Vaughan 1979; Sinclair & Ashkanasy 2005).

Indeed, the association of women with intuition has a long history. As Myers (2002) pointed out,

‘Westerntraditionhashistoricallyregardedrationalthinkingasmasculineandintuitionasfeminine’(p.

44).Thisisbecausemendominatedearlyscienceandcametobeseenasthemastersoflogic,reason


and rationality17 (Cappon 1993;Wertheim 1997).Moreover, because of the elevation of reason over

religious intuition, as a consequence of the Scientific Revolution, women have been concomitantly

assignedaninferiorstatus18(Dunne1997).

Theinferiorityofbothwomenandintuitioncanbeclearlyseeninthebeliefsofthefoundingmembers

oftheAmericanPsychologicalAssociation,includingitsfirstpresident(Gigerenzer2004).Inhisbook,An

Outline of Psychology, McDougall argued, 'Intuition works ... on a lower plane of intellectuality,

exhibited by some who have limited powers of abstractive thinking, most notably women, young

childrenanddogs'(McDougall(1923)citedinOsbeck1999,p.230).Perceptionsofgenderdifferences

in relation to intuitioncan thereforebeconsideredwidespreadanddeeplyembedded,and for some,

particularly feminists, have provided rationale for continuing male hegemony in Western societies

(Shields1975).

Despitetheseculturalassumptionsofgenderdifferenceinrelationtointuition,thereissurprisinglylittle

commentaryandresearchontheissue.Thisisperhaps,atleastinpart,duetothedifficultyofassessing

or measuring the capacity for intuitive ability in actual decision‐making. The studies that do exist

therefore rely on perceptions of intuitiveness ormeasurement of cognitive style. Studies focusing on

perceptions of intuitiveness do support the historical association of womenwith intuition.Wajcman

(1996)forexample,foundwomenperceivedthatmenwerereductionistintheirthinkingwhilewomen

lookedatthingsinamoreholisticway.Similarly,PaciniandEpstein(1999)foundthatwomenaremore

likely thanmen to identify themselves as intuitive (having intuitions) andmore intuitivelyoriented in

their thinking, whereas men are more likely to consider themselves to be rational. However, these

findingsdonotguideusastowhetherwomenareactuallymoreintuitiveorjustconditionedtobelieve

theyare.

Thefindingsofstudies identifyingcognitivestyle inrelationtogenderarecontradictory.Somestudies

(Agor1986;Agor1989b;Parikhetal.1994)foundgreaterintuitiveorientationinwomen.Otherstudies

(Taggart,Valenzi,Zalka&Lowe1997;Hayes,Allinson&Armstrong2004)foundnogenderdifferencein

relation to cognitive styleandgender inmanagers,whileKirton (1989) found thatmenmaybemore

intuitive than women. However, these studies utilised different cognitive style instruments which

definedandoperationalisedintuitionindifferentways.

17Wertheim(1997)pointedoutthatthe‘fathersofscience’weredrivenbytheambitiontoprovetheexistenceof

God,which,shouldbeseenasirrationalundertheassumptionsofScientificRealism.

18Gigerenzer(2004)correctlyarguedoutthehistoricalbeliefinthesuperiorityofmencanbetracedbackasfaras

AristotleandKant.


Cappon(1993)arguedthat thenotionofwomenasmore intuitive isa falseone.Hebasesthisonhis

clinicalexperiencewith3,000people.However,hedoesnotdisclosetheratioofmentowomenorhow

he came tohis conclusion.Weare therefore forced to relyonhis experienced‐based intuition in this

matter.Hall(1984)isanoftcitedstudy(forexampleseeSnodgrass1985;Lieberman2000;Myers2002;

Sinclair&Ashkanasy2005)whenarguingacaseforwomen’sintuition.Hall’sstudyshowsthatwomen

arebetteratnon‐verbalcommunicationandassessingaffectthroughnon‐verbalcues.This,ofcourse,

equatesinterpersonalskillswithintuition.Whilethismaybereasonable,theimportantpointIwishto

reinforce here is the difficulty of comparing studieswhere intuition is defined and investigated in so

manyways.

Othersapproacheshavesought to finda linkbetween intuitionandneurologicaldifferencesbetween

thesexes.Althoughmenhavemorebraincells,femaleshavemoredendriticconnectionsbetweenbrain

cells (Haier, Jung, Yeo, Head & Alkire 2005). In addition, differences have been found in both size

(Steinmetz,Staiger,Schlaug,Huang&Jancke1995)andtheshape(Allen,Richey,Chai&Gorski1991)of

thecorpuscallosum.Thelargercorpuscallosumofthefemaleincreasesthetransferenceofinformation

ordatabetweentheleftandrighthemispheres(Nadeau1996),whichforsome,accountsfor‘women’s

intuition(DeSimone1983).

ThedisputeIhavewiththeconclusionaboveisthatitpromotesthephysicalascausalandprimaryand

overlookstheplasticityofthebraininresponsetoavarietyofenvironmentalinfluences(Doidge2007).

Plasticity is not limited to the development of neuronal connections. The brain has been shown to

change physically as a result of learning a second language (Mechelli, Crinion, Noppeney,O'Doherty,

Ashburner,Frackowiak&Price2004),learningtoplaymusic(Gaser&Schlaug2003)andintensivestudy

(Draganski,Gaser,Kempermann,Kuhn,Winkler,Büchel&May2006).Itappearsthatthebrainislikea

musclethatdevelopsinrelationtohowitisused.

2.13Fieldstudiesofintuitioninmanagerialandorganisationalcontexts

Literature extolling the importance of intuition for managers and leaders in organisations has taken

sometimetobefullyappreciated.Forexample,TheFunctionsoftheExecutive(Barnard1938),originally

published in 1938 but initially ignored, became increasingly valued, is currently considered a seminal

work (Simon1987;Novicevic et al. 2002). Barnard is now consideredoneof the ‘fathers of decision‐

makinganalysisinmanagementtheory’(Novicevicetal.2002,p.992)forhisinsightthatexecutivesuse


bothlogicalandnon‐logicalprocessesintheirdailydecision‐making19.Thiswasasignificantmilestonein

the advancement of organisational theory because it opened new avenues for research and

understanding about decisionmakers and their decision‐making processes. Up until that time it was

generally assumed that decisions proceeded by way of rational analysis. Barnard’s contributions

eventually led to critical concepts such as ‘bounded rationality’ aswell as current important areas of

research concerning tacit knowledge, organisational learning, and systems views of organisations as

emergent and self‐organising (Daft & Lengel 1986; Stonehouse & Pemberton 1999; Cooksey 2001;

Novicevic et al. 2002). Barnard should therefore be recognised as the first inmanagement theory to

explicate both the role of the preconscious processes and the limitations of conscious processes (in

termsofamountofinformationandtheabilitytoprocessit).

Field studies of intuition used in organisational contexts, although rare, have empirically supported

Barnard’s (1968) observations concerning intuition. For example, Agor (1984; 1986), in an exhaustive

study using interviews and subsequent surveys, concluded that top executives use intuition tomake

their most important decisions. Burke andMiller (1999), using semi‐structured interviews, identified

thatthe‘overwhelmingmajority’(p.95)ofexecutivesuseintuitiondailyindecision‐making,particularly

thosewhowereolderandhadmoreexperience.

Similarly,Khatri andNg (2000), ina surveyof1530CEOsandother seniorofficersoforganisations in

USA found that intuitionwas an important factor in strategic decision‐making. Parikh,Neubauer and

Lank(1994),inasignificantstudyinvolving1312managersfromninecountries,foundtwooutofthree

managers considered themselves to be highly intuitive. Parikh, et al. also found that nearly 80% of

respondentsagreedthatseniormanagers ‘use intuitiontosomeextent’(p.66). Inmyownqualitative

study(Robson2004),Ifoundthatthe11participatingeliteAustralianleadersusedintuitionindecision‐

makingandconsidereditimportanttotheireffectiveness.

Although the authors of these field studies conceptualised and operationalised intuition in different

ways (as a cognitive styles, process and outcome, see Table 2.8), they showed that intuition is an

importantdecision‐makingtool/processfordecisionmakersand leaders inorganisations.Despitethis,

intuitionuseremainsunder‐valuedinmanagementresearch,particularlyincomparisontotheplethora

of literatureandresearchconcerninganalyticaldecision‐makingtechniques(Hammond1996;Khatri&

Ng2000;Sinclair&Ashkanasy2005).

19 Interestingly,Barnard’sunderstandingwasarrivedat throughhisownexperienceasanexecutive rather than

fromformalresearch‐inaneraprecedingthewideacceptanceofinterpretivism.


Inthemid1980stherewassomeindicationthatthisdominanceoffocusonanalysismightshift.Agor

(1985) correctly pointed to a surge of interest and research in intuition in organisations, particularly

decision‐makingattheseniorlevel,towhichAgorwasamajorcontributor(Agor1984;Agor1984;Agor

1985; Agor 1986; Agor 1989a). On the basis of this increased interest and because decision makers

clearly used intuition, Agor optimistically predicted intuition would ascend to take its rightful place

alongsideanalysisinbusinessdecision‐making.

However,studiesofmanagerialintuitionslowedtoatrickleinsubsequentdecades(Agor1984;Harper

1989;Cooksey&Gates1995;Khatri&Ng2000). It ispresumablythisrecognitionthatpromptedboth

Khatri and Ng (2000) and Anderson (1999) to state that field research concerning intuition in

managementsettingswas‘virtuallynon‐existent’(Khatri&Ng2000,p.57).WhileKhatriandNgperhaps

overstate the deficiency in absolute terms it seems that field research concerning intuition has been

considered less important to researchers than to managers and leaders. Table 2.8 (below) displays

selectedfieldresearchconcerningintuitionuseinorganisationsfromAgorinthemid‐1980stomyown

Honoursresearchin2004,whichwasreportedin2006.


Table2.8:Acomparisonofselectedfieldresearchconcerningintuitionusebyexecutivesandleadersinorganisations

Study Abstract Qual/Quant Intuitionasaconcept

Circumstancesinwhichintuitionisused

Experienceofintuition

Techniquestodevelop

intuition

Relevanceofintuition

Agor(1984;1986)

Alargestudyfindingthatexecutivesuse

intuitionregularly.

Qualitativeandquantitative

Fastandaccuraterighthemisphere

brainskillthatisnotfully

understoodbyscience.Insight

andgutfeel.

Wherethereisuncertainty,little

precedent,limiteddata,limitedtimeand

complexity.

Afeelingexperienced

mentallyandphysicallyand

emotionallyindicatingfuture

outcomes.

Takingtimetorelax,learnto

‘tunein’,learntovalueand

trustintuition,research

intuition,keepajournal.

Moreimportantwithseniority.Usedin

conjunctionwithanalysis.

Isenberg(1984)

Astudylookingatthethinkingof12

executivesandhowtheydealwithdaily

problemsandstrategy.

Qualitative.Utilises

interviewsandobservation.

Non‐rationalbrainskillbased

onexperience.Insightandgut

feel.

Wherethereisambiguityand

complexity.

Notmentioned Reflectiononpastdecisions,

meditation,journalwriting,

observationofothers’

decision‐making,taking

risks,practicejudgements

withoutdata,readingabout

intuition.

Sensingwhenandwhereaproblemexists,toperform

well‐learnedtasks,tosynthesisedataandcheck

analysesandbypassin‐depthanalysisthrough

patternrecognition.Importanttodailyandlong

termactivity.Usedinconjunctionwithanalysis.


Table2.8(continued)



Experienceofintuition

Techniquestodevelop

intuition


Mintzberg(1989)

Managementisnotscientificbutcomplexin

reality.Viewsstrategyasirregularand

discontinuous.Concludesthat

decisionsaremadethroughbothoral

communication,analysisand,intuitiondrawing

ontacitknowledge.

Qualitative Intuitionasaglobaltermforrightbrain

processesthatareyetnotwell

understood.

Incontemporarycomplex,uncertainand

discontinuousbusinessenvironments.

Experiencedatthephysical,

mentalandemotionallevel.

N/A Importantbutcontextual.Handlesinterpersonal

relationshipsthroughreadingbodylanguage.Usedto

synthesisedata,diagnosesituationsandtotime

decisions.Intuitionbestusedinconjunctionwithanalysis.

Parikh,

NeubauerandLank

(1994)

Largeinternational

survey(1312managersfromninecountries),

foundthatmanagersusedintuitionoften.

Quantitative Indirectperception

bywayoftheunconscious.Multi‐

level,multi‐faceted,multi‐dimensional.

Citesinsightandgutfeel.

Usedwherethereis

complexity,uncertainty,chaosandconfusion.

Indicatedat

physical,emotionaland

mentallevel

N/A Formanagingday‐to‐day

complexity,change,conflictandcreativity.Usedtochoosefrom

alternatives.Importanttoinnovationandingettingafeel

foraproblemorsituation.Easesconfusionandchaos.

Usedtocreatevision.Usedinconjunctionwithanalysis.


Table2.8(continued)

Study Abstract Qual/Quant Intuitionasa

concept

Circumstancesinwhich

intuitionisused

Experienceof

intuition

Techniquesto

developintuition


Brockmannand

Simmonds(1997)

Surveyof110CEOsshowedapositive

relationshipbetweenindustryexperienceand

tacitknowledge/intuitionuse.

Quantitative UsedTKItomeasuretacit

knowledgeandMBTItoindicate

potentialintuitionuse.

Wheredecisionmakerhastacitknowledgeof

environmentandindustry.Inabstract,ill‐

defined,uncertaincircumstances

Notmentioned N/A UseoftacitknowledgeincreaseswithCEO

experienceandpropensityforintuition.Improves

successratefordecisionsinunstableenvironments.

Burkeand

Miller(1999)

Studyof60senior

executivesintheUSA,solicitedpractitioner

descriptionsofintuitionuse.

Qualitative Experience‐based

subconsciouscognitive

processingorevent.

Usedwherethereis

uncertainty,few‘facts’,wherethereisurgency

andinpersonneldecisions.

40%reported

intuitionisbasedonfeelings.

Bemore

attentivetodecisions,

reflectonpastdecisionsand

challengedecisionsthat

donotfeelright.Observe

others’decision‐

making,meditateand

keepajournal.

Usedmorebythosewith

moreexperience.Expeditesdecisions,facilitates

personaldevelopmentandpromotesconsistencywith

corporateculture.


Table2.8(concluded)



Experienceofintuition Techniquestodevelop

intuition


KhatriandNg(2000)

Asurveyof1530seniormanagersintheUSAthatfound

intuitiveprocessesareusedoftenandarepositively

associatedwithorganisationalperformanceinunstable

environments.

Quantitative Gutfeelingbasedon

experience.

Wheretheenvironmentis

unstable,uncertain.Usedasacheckfor

quantitativedata,wherethereisurgency

and/ornoprecedent.

Indicatedbygutfeeling Notmentioned

Important‐especiallyin

unstableenvironments.

Clarkeand

Mackaness(2001)

Astudyusingcognitivemapping

toisolateintuitiveelementswithinindividualdecision

schemas.

Qualitative Intuitionused

asameansofgoingbeyond

therationaldata.

Usedwherethereare

lessfacts

Notinvestigated N/A Seniormanagers

touseagreaterproportionof

non‐factualinformation.

Robsonand

Miller(2006)

Astudyof11Australianleaders

oforganisationsfoundthatintuitionisperceivedby

participantstobeveryimportanttotheireffectiveness.

Qualitative Gutfeeling

basedonexperience.

Usedwherethereis

complexity,uncertainty,ambiguity

andforcharacterassessment.

Indicatedbyfeelingat

multiplelevels‐emotional,physical

andmental.

Not

mentioned.

Veryimportantto

dailydecision‐making.Usedin

combinationwithanalysis.


Thelackofmomentuminfieldstudiesofintuitionuseinorganisationscanbeattributedtoassumptions

about management. Themyth that decision makers are purely rational in their decision‐making still

pervades (Helliar et al. 2005). Where the bounded nature of rationality is acknowledged, analytical

processes are perceived to be superior to intuition,which, according to Khatri andNg, is ‘oneof the

mostbasicassumptionsaboutmanagement’ (Khatri&Ng2000,p.57).Thisassumption,according to

Caballero and Dickinson, is driven by the need for management outcomes to be controllable and

predictable using scientific approaches and techniques, and has thus been labelled ‘Scientific

Businessism’(Caballero&Dickinson1984,p.5).

However, Iarguetheproblemisnotthefeltneedforascientificapproach,rather, it isthecontinued,

almost exclusive reliance on absolutist positivist ontological assumptions about the world that still

dominatesthinkinginorganisations(Wheatley1999),scientificresearch(Goswami1995)andthinkingin

general(Zohar1990).Indeed,Iwillnowarguethattheperceptionthatpositivisticscientificapproaches

are superior is also seen in management research in relation to how intuition is investigated

andunderstood.

2.13.1 Paradigmsandmethodologyinfieldstudiesofintuition

Sinclair and Ashkanasy (2005) state that the main challenge concerning managerial intuition is to

producetheorythatisrelevantandusefulforthebusinessworld.Whiletheydoacknowledgethevalue

of the existing qualitative research, they claim that interpretive approaches can only produce theory

that isof limitedvalueandgeneralisability ‘atbest’(p.356).Theyconsequentlyarguethatthegoalof

organisational science should be to find out ‘how to study this evasive and mostly non‐conscious

phenomenon objectively using scientificmethods’ (p. 354). In other words, they seek to understand

intuitionthroughpositivistresearch,undertheassumptionsofScientificRealism.Itis,therefore,ironic

that Sinclair and Ashkanasy reject research using intuitive inductive techniques when clearly they

consider intuition use an under‐valued aspect of management and seek to promote further

understandingofitthroughtheirresearch20.

Interpretivist approaches differ significantly from positivist approaches. Research paradigms can be

classifiedaccordingtotheresponsesgiventoontological,epistemologicalandmethodologicalquestions

(Lincoln&Guba1985;Easterby‐Smith,Thorpe&Lowe2002).Theanswersgiven in response to these

questions have consequences for ways of knowing andways of being a researcher (Higgs & Titchen

20SinclairandAshkanasy(2005)dosuggesttheinclusionofqualitativetechniquesintheinterestsoftriangulation.

However,itisnotclearhowthesemightbehandledunderpositivistassumptions.


2007). Positivist approaches rest on the assumptions of Scientific Realism including notions of

researcher objectivity to predict, experiment, observe and generalise about the empirical world.

Conversely, interpretivist approaches, founded on idealism, have the goal of interpreting the world

through acknowledging and embracing the subjectivity of the researcher, as well as research

participants,asconsciousandfeelingbeings(Higgs,Trede&Rothwell2007).Theygenerallydonotseek

toclaimgeneralisability.

Instruments developed through positivist approaches such as the indicators of cognitive style can be

useful for developing individual awareness and development. However, I argue that to exclude the

potential of inductive approaches, particularly, flexible emergent methodologies such as Grounded

Theory, isparadigmaticdeterminism(orparadigmblindness), reductionist,and limitsthepotential for

understanding decision‐making in ‘real’ organisational environments that are often characterised by

complexityanduncertainty(Parry1996;Wheatley1999;Carliopoetal.2001).

Interpretive approaches are particularly suitable for studying actual decision‐making because

interpretiveparadigmresearchersaimtomaintain‘contextualintegrity’(Higgsetal.2007,p.39).Thisis

importantinmanagementdecision‐makingresearchwhere‘theknowledgeneededforproblemsolving

is distributedbetween themanager'smindand the surroundingworld’ (Kuo1998, p.89). Sinclair and

Ashkanasy (2005) acknowledged the inseparability of all things in their discussion of philosophical

intuition (andby implication the redundancyof theassumptionofobjectivity) andyet fail to transfer

thisimportantnotiontotheirresearchphilosophy.

Examplesofthelimitationsofpositivist,quantitativeapproachescanbeseeninstudiesthatattemptto

establisharelationshipbetweenintuitionuseandorganisationalperformanceinthefield.Quantifying

intuition isproblematicbecauseofthewiderangeofconceptualisationsandbecause it isasubjective

phenomenon. Anderson (2000) and Brockmann and Simmonds (1997) used Jungian archetypes to

conceptualiseintuitionandaccordinglyoperationalisetheseconstructswiththeKeeganTypeIndicator

(KTI) and the Myers Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), respectively. However, as alluded to earlier,

instruments measuring cognitive style indicate intuitive tendencies and not the actual use, nor

frequencyorqualityofintuitivesynthesis.

ThejustificationforusinginstrumentMBTI,accordingtoBrockmannandSimmonds(1997),restsonthe

assumptionthatifapersonhasaparticulartalent,theywillbelikelytouseit.However,thiscontention

ignoresother individualconsiderationssuchasthedepthofexperienceofaparticulardecisionmaker

(Sinclair&Ashkanasy2005)andcontextualfeatures,whichstudieshaveshownconditiontheactualuse

ofintuition.Thesecontextualfeaturesinclude,butarenotlimitedto,thetypeofindustry(Parikhetal.


1994), the nature of the task (Hamm 1988; Hammond 1996) and organisational culture (Agor 1984;

Cappon1994a;Sadler‐Smith&Sparrow2007).

Quantifying organisational performance is also problematic because it can be conceptualised and

operationalised in different ways. Anderson (1999), taking a rather narrow and analytical view of

performance,uses simpleoutcome‐based financial indicators.Effectivemanagersweredeemed tobe

those that achieved 100% of their ‘profit margin goal’ (p. 57). However, the relationship between

effectivenessandachievingthestatedgoalcouldbeseenasrathertenuous.Theremaybearangeof

intervening or confounding variables, both internal and external to the organisation,whichwould be

impossibletocontrol.

Khatri and Ng (2000), on the other hand, offer amore sophisticated, conceptual definition including

indicatorssuchas‘qualityofcustomerservices,operatingefficiency,publicimageandgoodwill’(p.65).

However, once again, they are attempting to quantify quality. Measuring quality can only proceed

through defining and operationalising constructs, which will inevitably vary depending on the

researcher,disciplineandthecontextoftheresearch.Aswellasreducingtheconceptandpracticeof

qualitytomeasurablefragments,thisprocessfrequentlyfailstorecognisethequalitativeandsubjective

judgementsinherentindefiningwhatfragmentsofqualitymatter.

Anotherkey limitationofpositivistpsychologicalapproaches in fieldresearch is the failure toaccount

for contextual features.While researchers increasingly attempt to capture emotional states, attitude

anddisposition(Pacini&Epstein1999;Sinclairetal.2002;Sinclair2003),psychologicalapproaches,by

definition,focusontheindividualandtheintrapersonalratherthaninterpersonaldynamicsandculture,

andtheimpactoftheseonintuitionuseinorganisations.Forexample,manystudieshaveidentifiedthat

intuition is a secret or hidden practice not often disclosed or admitted in organisations (see, for

example,Agor1986;Parikhetal.1994;Burke&Miller1999).Aswillbediscussed inthenextsection,

reluctance todisclose intuitions inorganisations canhave significant consequences yetorganisational

contexthasneverbeenthefocusofinvestigationsofintuition.

OrganisationalcontextwasaddressedinanexploratoryfashionbyAgor(1984),however,theapproach

wasdeductiveinnature.Largenumbersofparticipantsweregiventhesamequestionsinsurveyform.

However,surveyshavelessflexibilityandnointeractivity(Neuman2000),andconsequentlynofacility

fortheemergenceanditerativedevelopmentofthemes.Iarguethatinterpretiveapproachesaremore

suitedtothestudyof intuitionuse inthefield.Thehuman,asan instrument, ismoreabletocapture

contextualcomplexity,particularlywherethereislittleknownabouttheresearchissue.

Iagreethatanyresearchandfocusonintuitionisusefulandmaycontributetoourunderstandingofa

phenomenon that has been shown to be used internationally (Agor 1984; Parikh et al. 1994), and is


consideredimportanttotheleadersofourlargestandmostinfluentialorganisations(Robson&Miller

2006).Thepurposeof this research is to identify themes,patternsand trends in thedata inorder to

develop theory about intuitiondisclosure in organisations. Concurrently, however, itmay also be the

casethatbecauseeachindividualisunique,eachindividualmaythereforeuseintuitioninwaysthatare

largely unique to their organisational and decision‐making contexts. I argue that the practical

understanding of intuition use can be better achieved through flexible and emergent qualitative

approaches that can account for these dynamics. While findings may not be (mathematically)

generalisable, theirmeaningsand implicationsmaybe transferableor transportable.Transferability in

thisstudyisaidedbytheinclusionofparticipantsfromawidevarietyoforganisations.Thisdiscussion

willbeelaboratedoninthemethodologychapter,Chapter4.

2.14Contemporaryperceptionsandattitudesofintuition

InthesectionongenderandintuitionIpresentedliteratureandopinionsuggestingthat,subsequentto

theScientificRevolution, intuitionhasbeenconsideredas inferior. In thissection Iwish toexpandon

thisthemebecause,whilethereisdivergenceinthedefinitionandinterpretationofthewordintuition,

thereisconsensusthatithasabadreputation(Bastick1982;Agor1984;Agor1985;Agor1986;Parikh

etal.1994;Cappon1994a;Burke&Miller1999; Lieberman2000;Sadler‐Smith&Shefy2004;Sadler‐

Smith & Burke 2009). This is important because in my own study I found that attitudes influence

disclosureandthereforetheabilitytobenefitfromintuitive‘knowings’.

Seenas ‘mysteriousandunexplainableatbest’ and ‘inaccurate,hokey,orepiphenomenal atworst ...

the legacyof intuition is less than inspiring’ (Lieberman2000p.109).Westernculture, ingeneral,has

favouredlinear,deliberate,andanalysableprocessestotheexclusionofintuition(Agor1985;Mintzberg

1989; Cappon 1993). The downfall of intuition is, according to Cappon (1993), a consequence of ‘a

Western culture obsessed with facts and science’ (p. 41). Ironically, it is also true that many of the

world’smost influentialscientistshaveadvocatedintuition’s importance.Forexample,Einsteinsaidof

intuition:

[T]heintuitivemindisasacredgift,andtherationalmindisafaithfulservant.Wehavecreatedasociety

thathonourstheservant,andhasforgottenthegift’.(EinsteincitedinVanharanta&Easton2009,p.425)

I interpret Einstein to concur with Burneko (1997), who argued that our contemporary objective,

evidence‐based, rational, scientific culture disconnects humans from the legitimacy of their own

subjectivity and, therefore, the veracity of intuitions (both psychological and philosophical). Burneko

claimedthatexpressionsofonenesswiththeUniversewillberidiculed–treatedasirrational,emotional

andchildlike.Asaconsequence,Burnekoargued,welooktoaculturethatdeniesourownsubjectivity

formakingsenseoftheworldandouridentity–wehaveforgottenourgift.


However,culturalassumptionsshiftacrosstimeandspace.Sorokin(1992)arguedthatculturalvaluesin

societies swing like a pendulum between rationality/intuitive knowledge and materialistic/spiritual

values.He further states that those societies that can achieve a ‘goldenmean’, possessing a balance

betweenthetwo,arethemost ‘enlightened’.However,Sorokin,echoingBurneko (1997),arguedthat

societies(asawhole)arenotexplicitlyawareofthisoscillationofvaluesthatareheldasassumptions,

andthereforethebalanceisnotsustainable.

Whileculturalassumptionsarefundamentaltotheperceivedinferiorityofintuition,atleastfourother

factorsmaycontribute (althoughtheyoverlap).First, there is theclaimthat intuition is regardedwith

scepticism because it is not understood (Sadler‐Smith & Shefy 2004) or misunderstood. Agor (1986)

acknowledges that intuitionhasbeenpresented inanegative light.He suggests that if intuitionwere

thoughtofasa‘subspeciesoflogicalthinking’(p.5),itwouldbemoreaccepted.However,asdiscussed,

earlypsychologicalresearchportrayedintuitionasbiased,unreliableandahazard.

Noonecanreadthroughtheliteratureofsocialpsychologyfromthe1960sthroughtothe1980swithout

drawing the conclusion that intuition is a hazard, a process not to be trusted, not only because it is

inherently flawed by ‘biases’ but because the person who resorts to it is innocently and sometimes

arrogantlyoverconfidentwhenemployingit.(Hammond1996,p.88)

However, it isdifficult toknowhowmuch impacttheheuristicsandbiasesprogrammayhavehadon

discourse in organisations because research specifically focusing on decision maker’s perceptions of

intuitionuseinorganisationsdoesnotexist.

In theprevious section I suggested thatBarnard’s (1968)TheFunctions of the Executivewas the first

book21acknowledgingtheroleofintuitioninmanagement.Althoughitwaswritteninastylethatcould

beconsideredaccessibleformainstreammanagementandleadershippractitionersatthattime22itwas

notapopularbook in termsof readership.Business/managementbooksofferingalternativeviewson

intuitivecapacitydidnotappear,toanysignificantextent,untilafter1980.Simon(1982)forexample,

drewonandextendedBarnard’sworkintermsoftheconceptofboundedrationality.Srivastva(1983)

producedaneditedbookthatincludednotableauthorssuchasKolb(1983),Weick(1983),Bennis(1983)

MintzbergandWaters(1983)andAgryis(1983).However,itwasAgor(1984;1986;1989b),particularly

21 More specifically, it was the appendix to Barnard’s book (The Mind in Everyday Affairs) that was of direct

relevancetointuitionanditsuseinorganisations.

22 Barnard did not solely focus on intuition. He included a broad sweep ofmany aspects of management and

organisations.Inparticular,hewasconsideredvisionaryforhisviewsonorganisationsascooperativesystems.


with his titlesThe logic of intuitive decision‐making: A research‐based approach for topmanagement

andeditedbook,IntuitioninOrganizations,whointroducedintuitiontopopularmanagementliterature.

Well‐renownedmanagementexpertMintzberg(1989)producedMintzbergonmanagement:Insideour

strange world of organizations, which clearly identified the disjuncture between assumptions of

rationalityand the realityofmanagementanddecision‐making inorganisations.Takingan integrative

andcomprehensiveapproach,Parikhetal.(1994)drewfromEasternandWesternperspectivesaswell

as positivist psychology and New Science in Intuition: The new frontier of management. From this

summary it can be seen that the availability of management literature addressing and explaining

intuition,anditsroleindecision‐makinginleadership,hasincreasedoverpreviousdecades.

Despite claims every decade that intuition is a concept that has ‘come of age’ (Agor 1984; Cappon

1994b;andmostrecentlyKnight2007)itisnotclearifthependulumisswingingbacktowardsbeliefin

theveracityof intuitiveknowledge.Somesupport for thispropositioncanbe found in theamountof

literature now available. A plethora of books were published extolling the virtues of intuition in

managementaroundtheturnofthecenturyandparticularlysubsequenttoit(forexampleseeContino

1996;Morató 2000;Wanless 2002; Robinson 2006; Tesolin 2006) including a ‘blockbuster’ fromwell

knownCEO JackWelchwith the indicative title Jack: Straight from theGut (Welch&Byrne2001). In

addition, academics that I have drawn on in this literature review have capitalised on their research

programsbyproducinganumberofpopularmanagementandbusinessbooks,whichfocusonintuition

(Epstein1998;Klein2003;Gigerenzer2004;Sadler‐Smith2008).

There are also less academically‐informed, popular books such as those from Day (1999), Tribodeau

(2005)andPierce(1997),whicharemoreconcernedwithpracticaltechniquesforawakeningintuition.

Amultitudeofbooks,overmanydecades,havedrawnonEasternphilosophyandareaimedat those

seeking to transcend themundane (see, forexample,Govinda1959;Krishnamurti1964;Krishnamurti

1995;Osho2001) in relation tophilosophical or spiritual intuition. Somebooks cover a rangeofor a

combination or range of conceptions of intuition including psychological, philosophical and psychic

intuition(Naparstek1997).Clearly,inthe21stcentury,thereisnolackofchoiceforthoseinterestedin

gainingagreaterunderstandingonintuition.

Whiletheavailabilityof literaturehasperhapsraisedtheprofileof intuition inthepublicmind, itwas

Malcolm Gladwell’s (2006) major international best seller Blink that brought intuition firmly into

mainstreampopularreading.Gladwellisajournalistratherthananacademicandhasbeencriticisedfor

makingavarietyofmistakesandunsupportedassumptionsinhispresentationoftheevidence(Posner

2005). However, Blink, used storytelling and a popular‐science format to deliver information about

intuitioninawaythatwasaccessibleandentertainingtogreatnumbersofpeople.


Gladwell(2006)maywellhavebeeninfluentialinmitigatingthenegativeconnotationsassociatedwith

the word ‘intuition’, and in doing so, may havemade an impact on organisational cultures that are

relianton‘extensivelyquantifiedprocedures’and‘hardfactsandtoughanalysis’(Parikhetal.1994,p.

11).However,thisisdifficulttoassessbecause,asstated,and,significanttotheresearchproblemthat

willbeestablished,researchthatfocusesonperceptionsofintuitioninorganisationsisnon‐existent.

A second consideration contributing to scepticism concerning intuition is its elusive, subconscious

nature. Both gut feeling and insight (expert and entrepreneurial intuition), as intuitive cognitive

processes,operatealmostentirelybelowthelevelofawareness(Cappon1994b;Khatri&Ng2000)and,

therefore,beyondthecontroloftheintuiter(Epstein1998;Sadler‐Smith&Sparrow2007).Peoplewho

relysubstantivelyontheuseofintuition(‘intuitives’)areoftennotabletoexplainhowtheyarrivedat

theirconclusion.Whileevidencemaybesoughttoconfirmorsupportintuitions,thismaynotalwaysbe

possible.Forthesereasons,particularlycoupledwiththefirstpointmadeinthissection–thatintuition

has not been well understood – intuition is seen as rather mysterious and even magical. Trusting

unverifiable intuitions would not be consistent with the prevailing scientific, evidence‐based

management paradigm that underpins decision‐making in most organisations (Parikh et al. 1994;

Cappon1994a).

Athirdconsiderationconcernstheconnotationsthatmightbeattachedtothewordintuitionthatstem

from associations with philosophical intuition and ‘enlightenment’. As a subjective, direct access to

perfect knowledge, such intuition is experienced as transcending the everyday subject/object divide,

wheretheegodissolvesandtheindividualfeelsatonewiththeuniverse(Vaughan1979;Wilber1995).

AlthoughIhaveproposedabasisbywhichphilosophicalintuitioncanbejustified,formostWesterners

educated under the assumptions of Scientific Realism (Osbeck 1999), this description would appear

esoteric and mystical (Vaughan 1979), and would, therefore, likely arouse scepticism. Fourth, as

discussed, pejorative connotations of intuition can be ascribed to associations with ESP and the

paranormal (Agor 1986; Behling & Eckel 1991; Parikh et al. 1994; Osbeck 1999; Sadler‐Smith &

Sparrow2007).

Isuggestthatanyoneofthefourfactorsdiscussedabove,oracombinationofthem,hasthepotential

tocontributetotheapparentwidespreadnotionthatintuitioniserrorprone,esoteric,magical,mystical

and not to be trusted. However, no research, to date, has focused specifically on the perceptions of

decisionmakers in organisationswith regard to the validity and legitimacy of intuition as a decision‐

makingtool.Iarguethatsuchresearchisneededbecausenegativeperceptionsofintuitionhavebeen

shown to modify the behaviour of those that have them (Robson 2004). The impact of negative

perceptionstowardintuitionwillnowbeexplored.


2.15Theimpactofnegativeperceptionsconcerningintuition

It is not surprising considering the nature, reputation and lack of understanding about intuition that

Cappon (1993) argued that executives find it difficult to ‘sell’ intuitivedecisions. It hasbeennoted in

field research that decisionmakers tend not to disclose their use of intuition in organisations. Thus,

intuitionisunderstoodasasecretorundisclosedpractice(Agor1984;Isenberg1984;Agor1986;Harper

1989;Parikhetal.1994;Cappon1994a;Burke&Miller1999;Sadler‐Smith&Sparrow2007),although

Parikhetal.(1994)suggestedthatthismaybechanging.Managersmaysuffercognitivedissonanceasa

result of the tension between the way they perceive they are supposed to make decisions and the

processes they have learned through experience (Isenberg 1984). An exclusive focus on analysismay

stemfromtrainingandtraditionanda lackof faith intheir intuitionsorthefearofbeingridiculedby

theirpeers(Agor1984;Robson2004).

Consequently,managersmayactivelymodifythewaytheydisclosethebasisfortheirdecisionsinorder

forthemtobemoreacceptabletocolleagues,superiorsandstakeholders(Daft&Lengel1986;Sadler‐

Smith&Shefy2004;Sadler‐Smith&Sparrow2007).Thiswasbeenfoundinmyownresearch(Robson

2004)inAustralia,aswellasinternationally(Agor1984;Harper1989).Forexample,Agor(1984)found

that executives, fearing intuitionwould be regarded as non‐scientific, irrational and illegitimate, said

theywouldcommonly‘dressup’their intuitivedecisionsin‘analyticalclothing’(p.38).Furthermore,a

perceived culture of intolerance toward intuition may cause individuals to suppress them (Cappon

1994a).

AccordingtoSadler‐SmithandShefy(2004)‘thedangeristhat, if intuitioniscontinuallysuppressed,it

mayceasetooperate,orbedrivenunderground’(p.80).Thisisbecausetheuseofintuitionoccursonly

whereitisgivenlegitimacyandvalued(Vaughan1979).However,alackofintuitionindecision‐making

canleadtoseriousandcostlyerrors(Grudin1989).Forexample,executivesandleadersoforganisations

reportedthatmanyoftheirmistakeswereprimarilyduetonotfollowingtheirintuitionsratherthanto

followingthem(Robson2004).

Theconsequences for the individualofnot following their intuitionscanbedevastating.Forexample,

my previous research (Robson 2004) into the use of intuition by ‘elite’ Australian leaders revealed a

reluctance to follow an intuition regarding the trustworthiness of the individuals presenting a rescue

proposaltoalargecompanyinfinancialdifficulties.Thedealwasacceptedonthebasisoftheanalysis

presented, however, later collapsed through subsequent actions of the individuals in question,

vindicating the intuitionof theparticipant.Thecollapseof thedealaffected the livesof thousandsof

people,costmillionsofdollarsandmanyjobs.Thewordsoftheparticipantrevealhisperceptionthat

otherswouldthinkhimirrationalifhedisclosedhisintuition:


ButIwouldhavetohavegonetoXXXandsay,look,allofitlooksgoodonpaperandtheobjectivefacts

are that we’ve got to support this position – but having looked at all of that and on the basis of my

experienceandmyintuitionaboutthesepeople,Idon’tthinkit’stherightthingforus.Theywouldhave

said,goandhavefuckingcounsellingwillyou.(Robson2004,p.83)

Agor(1985)stated‘thatthe1980smaywellbecomeknownasthebenchmarkperiod inmanagement

history when intuition finally gained acceptance’ (p. 357). Similarly, Naisbitt and Aburdene (1985)

predicted that intuition will gain acceptance in boardrooms. However, it is difficult to come to a

conclusion regarding perception of, and attitudes to, intuition because of the lack of research

andliterature.

Thatintuitionis,orwas,deemedillegitimateissometimesimplicitandappearstobetakenforgranted.

Forexample,journalarticleswithtitlessuchasLegitimizingthegutfeel:theroleofintuitioninbusiness

(Lank&Lank1995),andbusinessmagazinearticleswithtitlessuchasIntuitioncreepsoutofthecloset

andintotheboardroom (Block1990),donotexplainwhyintuitionis illegitimateorwhyithasbeenin

the closet. The focus for research and literature consistently targets the nature, use and utility of

intuition. This is despite the recognition of the importance of socio‐cultural factors in relation to

intuitionuseinorganisations(Sadler‐Smith&Sparrow2007)andrecommendationsforfutureresearch

inthisarea(Burke&Miller1999).

Therehasbeensomeresearchintothesubjectiveperceptionsofpractitionersintermsofwhatintuition

is,howandinwhatcircumstancesitisused,aswellasitsperceivedefficacy.However,thisresearchis

minimal, particularly in the Australian context.Moreover, no research found, to date, looked at the

contextintermsofattitudesandperceptionsofintuition,andhowtheseimpactondecision‐makingand

judgementincontemporaryorganisations.Iwouldarguethatthisisasignificantomission.Ifindividuals

andorganisationswishtoprofitfromthebenefitsofintuitiontheremustbeagreaterunderstandingof

theprocessbywhichintuitionismasked,suppressedorforcedunder‘underground’,andtheextentto

which it occurs. I argue that the investigation of the social processes that surround the use and

disclosureofintuitionwouldbestexaminetheperceptionsandattitudesofleadersbecauseleadersare

pivotal in forming the cultural practices of organisations (Mintzberg 1989; Sarros&Butchatsky 1996;

Dubrinetal.2006;Gill2006).

2.16Researchproblem

A review of field studies into intuition use in organisations has shown that intuition is used and

consideredavaluabletool/processbydecisionmakersinorganisations.However,someofthesestudies

alsofoundthatdecisionmakersdonotdisclosetheirownuseofintuition;rather,theykeepitasecret

ormaskitsrole.However,noempiricalresearchfound,todate,addressedthis‘silent’useofintuition.


Inviewofthediscussedimportanceoftransparencyinorganisationaldecision‐making,coupledwiththe

stated need for research concerning socio‐cultural processes surrounding intuition use, the social

processesofintuitionuseanddisclosureinorganisationshasbeenjustifiedasimportanttoinvestigate.

Thecoreresearchproblemaddressingthesegapsinextantknowledgecanbeexpressedas:


Thecoreresearchproblemcanbedividedintotwomainresearchquestions/parts.

Thefirstresearchquestionaddressedhowparticipantsdefined,described,usedandvaluedintuition(if

theydouseintuition).

MainQuestion1:Howdotheparticipants(organisationalleaders)interpret,useandvalueintuitionin

theirdecision‐makingandleadership?

Thesecondresearchquestiondirectlyaddressesthedisclosure(ornon‐disclosure)ofintuitionuse:

Main Question 2: What are the social processes of intuition disclosure by Australian leaders in

organisations?

Thisdivisionalsoreflectstheneedtofirstunderstandhowparticipantsinterpretintuitionintheirown

terms as well as how they perceive the role it plays in their decision‐making and leadership before

investigating issues relating to disclosure. This dual structure of themain research questions will be

echoedinthewaythefindingsarepresentedinChapter5:AnalysesandTheoryDevelopment.

In the interests of intelligibility, the twomain research questions are further divided, representing a

drill‐down exploration of key facets of each question. The first drill‐down explorationwithin the first

main question focuses on how participants defined and described intuition. This was considered

importanttounderstandgiventhemanydefinitionsdiscussedintheliteraturereview.

• Drilldownexploration1.1:Howdotheparticipantsinterpret,(defineanddescribe)intuition(s)?

Theseconddrill‐downexploration reflects the identifiedneed foragreaterunderstandingof theway

intuitionisusedinthefield,particularlyintheAustraliancontext.Moreover,anunderstandingofhow

participantsuseintuitionisseenaslinkedtotheirinterpretationofit,aswellasthevaluetheyascribe

toitsuse:

• Drill‐downexploration1.2:Howdoparticipantsuseintuition(s)andwhatsignificanceandvaluedo the participants ascribe to their use of intuition(s) in judgement, decision‐making and

leadership?


Note that although participants were initially asked open questions regarding how they defined and

usedintuition,someofthesubsequentprobespertainingtothisthemewerederivedfromtheliterature

(pursuant toAdaptiveTheory23whichwillbeexplainedand justified inChapter4). Theapproachwas

thereforedeductiveandconfirmatoryaswellasinductiveandorientedtodiscovery.Theunderstanding

gained from addressing the first drill‐down exploration is seen as critical in developing a foundation

against which the second main research question, concerning the disclosure of intuition, could

bejuxtaposed.

This second main research question is further subdivided into three drill‐down explorations. The

literature review indicated that intuition has had a bad reputation. However, no researchwas found

that investigatedperceptionsof intuitionintermsof legitimacy.Thefirstdrill‐downexplorationofthe

secondmainresearchquestionaddressesthisgapintheknowledge:

• Drill‐downexploration2.1:Whataretheviewsandperceptionsofparticipantsaboutreceptivityto,andthelegitimacyof,intuition(s)injudgementsanddecision‐makingintheirorganisations?

The seconddrill‐downexploration is aimedatdiscovering if intuitionuse isdisclosed inorganisations

and,ifso,whatwordsdotheparticipantsperceiveareusedtorepresenttheuseofintuitionortomask

theroleofintuitioninorganisations:

• Drill‐downexploration2.2:Whatlanguageisusedinrelationtointuition(s)byparticipantsand

thosewithwhomtheyassociate?

ConsistentwiththetenetsofdiscoveryinGroundedTheory,thefinaldrill‐downexplorationemergedas

aconsequenceoftheiterativeprocessofinterviewandanalysis.Inthepilotinterviews,the‘experience’

ofintuitionwasraisedasanissueandtheschedulewasmodified.Overthecourseofthefirstphaseof

interviews I discovered that thewomen in the sampleweremorewilling and able to articulate their

internal experience of intuitive process or ‘getting’/receiving an intuition. As a consequence, further

focuswasgiventotheparticipants’ internalexperienceof intuition,aswellastheirawarenessof,and

abilitytoarticulateintuitionswereaskedofalltheremainingrespondents.Thislineofquestioningcan

bereflectedas:

• Drill‐downexploration2.4:Howeasily areparticipants able to articulate their intuition(s) and

experienceofintuition?

23AdaptiveTheory(Layder1993;Layder1998),unlikeothervariantsofGroundedTheory,acknowledgestheuseof

extantliteraturetoinformquestionsandanalysis.


2.17Conclusion

Acritical interdisciplinaryreviewoftheliteraturehasrevealedavarietyofdiverseconstructsattached

tothelabel‘intuition’.Inphilosophy,intuitionisconsideredadirectapprehensionofperfectknowledge

of an ultimate reality. Psychological constructions characterise intuition as useful but fallible

spontaneous feeling/knowing based on experience (gut feeling and insight), heuristics that are

untrustworthybecause they can inducebiases, and visceral influences that can lead todecisions and

behaviourthatunderminelong‐termselfinterest.Intuitionisalsodiscussedasaprocessandintermsof

cognitive style. I have argued that these constructions should not be seen as competing and

incompatible.Ifurtherargueagainstthequestforasingle,clear‐cutdefinition.Intuitioncaninsteadbe

conceptualised as a multi‐dimensional and multi‐level phenomenon that manifests in different ways

underdifferentconditions.Moreover,constructionsofintuitionvaryaccordingtonatureandmethodof

researchandthepredispositionsofresearchers.Ihaveproposedamodelofcognitionwherebyeachof

these psychological constructs of intuition can be ordered in relation to one another as different

manifestationsofthetotalityofcognition.Moreover,Ihavearguedthatthispart/wholerelationshipis

facilitatedbythe interactionoftheexperientialandrationalcognitivesystems.Thus,cognitioncanbe

seenasaparadoxicalanddialogicsynthesisofthesesystemsthatareoppositionalyetcomplementary,

thedominanceandefficacyofwhichisdeterminedinrelationtothenatureofthetaskathand.

Thedisjuncturebetweenphilosophicalintuitionasineffableandinfallibleknowledge,andpsychological

intuition as fallible is seldom addressed. However, I have interpreted that philosophical and

psychologicalconstructsofintuitioncanbereconciledthroughatranscendentstratifiedyetunifiedfield

ofgroundconsciousness,inwhichallelseisenfolded.Iproposedthatintuitioncanbeseenasamulti‐

level phenomenon. Whereas psychological intuition is based in personal, individual consciousness,

philosophical intuition is a non‐dual awareness where the individual/universal, subject/object split is

transcendedinco‐presence.Philosophicalintuitionisthus,transpersonal.

Studiesofmanagerialintuitioninorganisationstendtofocusonthenatureandefficacyofpsychological

intuition (gut feeling),and investigatinghowand inwhichcircumstances it isused.Researching these

issuesisusefulandimportant,however,thisknowledgeofintuitionisinadequateifitsapplicationinthe

real world and, more specifically, the social context in which it operates is not understood. I have

discussed research that shows intuitions are routinely masked and suppressed by actors in

organisations. IhavealsogivenanexamplefrommyownHonoursresearchwherethisfelt inabilityto

disclose an intuitive feeling has lead to significant human and financial cost. However, the social

processes in relation to the disclosure of intuition(s) have never been empirically investigated in

Australiaorinternationally.Ihavearguedthisisasignificantomission.Theresearchproblempresented


canbeseenasaguidefortheempiricalcomponentofthisstudy,andasaresponsetoaddressingthe

gapsidentifiedintheliteraturereview,intermsofuseanddisclosureofintuition(s).

Suchaninvestigationofthe‘realworld’cannotoccurunderartificialandcontrivedresearchdesigns. I

havearguedthattheoryismorelikelytoemergefromdatadrawnfrominvestigatingtheperceptionsof

decision makers in the field, using a flexible methodology that tolerates complexity, ambiguity,

contradiction and paradox. What is required is an approach to data gathering and analysis that is

inductive anddeductive aswell as reflexive, andone that facilitates the emergence anddiscovery of

theorybased inthedata inordertofurthertheresearchagenda.Thisreflectsarealisationthatthere

havebeeninherentconstraintsassociatedwiththetypicallypositivistic,deductiveandhighlycontrolled

waysinwhichresearchonintuitionhasbeentheorisedandconducted.Thecriticalpointisthatresearch

has to connect directly with decision makers in their myriad contexts in order to achieve a more

completeunderstandingofintuition,itsuseandthedisclosure/non‐disclosureofthatuse.

C h a p t e r 3 : T h e o r e t i c a l P e r s p e c t i v e P a g e |82

Chapter3:TheoreticalPerspective

3.1 Introduction

Intheprecedingchapter,inaninclusiveandbroadapproachtothephenomenonofintuition,Ioutlined,

compared and contrasted various historical and contemporary philosophical and psychological

perspectives on intuition. I proposed an interpretation of how perspectives could be integrated and

synthesised.ThemodelIproposedsynthesisedEpstein’s(1990)notionofdualcognitivesystemsunder

CEST and Hammond’s (1996) Cognitive Continuum, which incorporated Lowenstein’s (1996) visceral

factorsaswellasheuristicsandbiases(Kahnemanetal.1982).Iarguedthataninclusiveviewhadmore

toofferintermsofacomprehensiveaccountofcognitionandjudgement.Ialsoproposedanextension

of Hendon’s (2004) multi‐level reconciliation of psychological and philosophical intuition through a

meta‐realityofgroundconsciousness.Theadvantageoftheseintegrativetheoreticalmodelsisthatthey

distinguish between the multiplicities of conceptualisations of intuition, and yet allows them to be

understood and ordered in relation to one another. These theoreticalmodels of intuition serve as a

basisfromwhichthisresearchcanproceed.

Theoverarchingaimofthischapteristopresent,explainandjustifytheuseofLayder’sDomainTheory

(Layder1994;Layder1997;Layder2005)asafittingtheoreticalperspectiveandamodelofsocialreality

by which the findings of this social research can be analysed, interpreted, contextualised and

understood.Amodelofsocialrealityisnecessarybecausethefocusoftheresearchisnotonintuition

itselfbutonthesocialprocessesthatsurroundthedisclosureof intuitionuse. Inordertoachievethis

aim, the chapter focuses on three tasks. The first is to show how Domain Theory draws on and

synthesisesothersocialtheoriststoachieveamorecomprehensiveexplanationofsocialbehaviourand

communicativeexchange.Thiswillbedonethroughacritiqueoftheworkofanumberofmajorsocial

theoristsandanexaminationoftheadvantagesofasyntheticapproach(accordingtoLayder).

The second task is to show that Layder’s theory of domains is specifically appropriate to this study

because its stratified ontology allows for amulti‐level framework of social reality, including objective

andsubjectiveelements,andfourdifferentlevelsofsocialdescription.Iwillarguethatitisthroughthis

stratification that the research problem can bemore comprehensively addressed. The importance of

stratification rests on the acknowledgement that while intuition can be seen as an intrapersonal

phenomenon,thefocusoftheresearchisthedisclosureandaffirmationofintuition,whichcanbeseen

asoccurringatinterpersonal,organisational,andenvironmentallevels.

The third task will be to argue that this stratified approach is consistent and congruent with the

philosophicalstanceproposedinChapter2.


3.2 DomainTheory

Cooksey (2001) provides a valuable insight into the nature of howorganisations operate at a human

level. He argued, from a complexity science perspective, that understanding individual behaviour is

complexinorganisations.Thisispartlybecauseorganisationalsystemsareinaconstantstateoffluxin

response to contextual factors or system dynamism, and also because organisations can be seen as

multi‐dimensional and multi‐level – systems within systems24. Cooksey therefore argued that there

should be ‘multi‐dimensional diversity’ (p. 77) in terms of thinking and conceptualising as well as a

paradigmdiversityinapproachestoresearch.

Kuhn (1962) originally used the term ‘paradigm’ in reference to the ‘constellation of achievements –

concepts, values, techniques etc. shared by a scientific community and used by that community to

definelegitimateproblemsandsolutions’(p.44).Theparadigmfromwhichanyresearchisconducted

has implications for howdata are to be collected and interpreted, and informs the researcher about

whichdesignsare likely toprovideanswers to the research issuesorquestions. Itmayalsoguide the

researcher,whenitisnecessary,tocreateormodifyresearchdesigns(Easterby‐Smithetal.2002)and

thusprovidesomeassistanceandsolacetotheresearcher.

Thehistoricdominanceofthepositivistic‘paradigm’andtheconsequentabsenceofparadigmdiversity

inthepsychological,behaviouralandsocialsciencesiswellknownandpreviouslyalludedtoinChapter

2. The development of interpretive and critical research traditions has challenged the dominance of

positivismandoffer researchersalternatives.However, theproblem is thateachof thesealternatives

constitutesaparadigm(Cooksey2001),which‘generate[s]boundariesthatarelargelyimpenetrableto

other perspectives’ (p. 83). This is because the nature of scientific inquiry is rooted in justification,

wherebytheseparadigmsmustbe ‘robustagainstcontradictoryevidence’(ibid),andtherefore largely

incommensurablewithotherparadigms.

Forthosewhoregardsociologyasabroad,allencompassinginquiry,theseparadigmaticboundariesare

a problem for developing social theory. C. Wright Mills, for example, defined the sociological

imagination as having ‘the capacity to range from themost impersonal and remote transformations

(referringheretomacrologicalandsocietalaspects)tothemostintimatefeaturesofthehumanself–

and to see the relations between the two’ (Mills 1959, p. 7). Habermas (1987) considered the

24 Cooksey (2001) unpacked cross‐contextual complexity in termsof intrapersonal, interpersonal, organisational

andenvironmentallevels.


integrationofmacrologicalandmicrological, roughlyequatedherewiththetwodomainsofLifeworld

andSystem,asthemostfundamentalproblemofsocialtheory.

Layder(2005)arguedthattraditionalapproachestosocialtheoryandresearchtendtoemphasiseone

aspect of society over another. Social analysis featuring emphasis on the agency of the actor,where

social activity is an inter‐subjective phenomenon, can be seen in interpretive approaches such as

symbolic interactionism, hermeneutics and phenomenology. On the other hand, macrological

institutional and systemic approaches such as functionalism, structuralism and post‐structuralism are

concernedwithidentifyingandanalysingtheunderlyingsystemic,institutionalandstructuralfeaturesof

society inexplainingbehaviour (Giddens1984;Layder1997;Outhwaite2003).Given thateachaspect

hasavaluablecontributiontomake,intermsofdescriptiveandexplanatorypower,socialphenomena

will be inappropriately attributed, compressed or expanded to fit (collapsing or ‘conflating’ structure

and agency), ignored, or rendered invisible or silent if there is an exclusive focus on one level over

another(Layder1997;Hartman2005).

On thisbasis Iargue there isaneed fora theoretical framework that iscapableof toleratingamulti‐

paradigmatic approach to social research, which includes the value of each without the distorting

constraintsofremainingdogmaticallyfaithfultotheideologyofasingularsociologicalstandpoint.Multi‐

paradigmatic approaches to research promote increased insight and creativity as a consequence of a

wider cache of conceptual tools. Eclectic use of diverse theoretical views facilitates a better

understanding of the complexity, ambiguity, and paradox inherent in organisations (Lewis &

Grimes1999).

Domain Theory is an attempt to break down these paradigmatic boundaries and integrate them by

drawing on and synthesising a number of social theories including functionalism, interpretivism,

structural, post‐structural and critical. Domain Theory advances a theoretical perspective capable of

facilitating analysis at multiple levels by way of four separate but interlocking ‘domains’ of social

description.Theadvantageofamulti‐dimensionalandmulti‐paradigmaticapproachtosocialanalysisis

thatthestrengthsofeachcontributingperspectivecanbeharnessedforamorecomprehensiveaccount

ofsocialreality(Layder1994;Layder1997;Hartman2005;Layder2005).

The central focus of Layder’s theory is to provide an explanatory account of face‐to‐face encounters.

However Layder (2005) argued that face‐to‐face encounters canonly beunderstood in termsof how

thisinterpersonaldomainintersectswithothersocialdomains.Layder’sDomainTheoryisthereforean

excellenttheoreticalframeworkforthecurrentstudybecausewhileitfocusesontheinterpersonallevel

of exchange, the disclosure of intuition is contextualised by a view of organisations as multi‐


dimensional.This isdone throughembracing theanalytical insights thateachparadigmhas tooffer–

the‘combinedinfluenceofbothsocialandpsychologicalfactors’(Layder1997,p.1).

Belowisasummaryofthedomainsandthesocialdimensionstheyrepresent:

• Psychobiography–theinnerlifeoftheindividualincludingunconsciousaspects• Situated Activity – communicative interchanges between participants that take place in social

situations

• Settings – where situated activity takes place including geographical locations, buildings, andorganisationalfeaturessuchasreproducedsocialrelationsandpractices,normsandsocialrules

• ContextualResources–material,dominativeanddiscursiveresourcesdrawnonbyindividualsto

producetheirsocialbehaviour(AdaptedfromLayder1997,p.33)

These domains correspond to Cooksey’s (2001) intrapersonal, interpersonal, organisational and

environmentallevels.IhavechosentoembraceLayder’s(1997)modelratherthanCooksey’sbecauseof

itswell‐developedexplicationand incorporationof social theory,whichwill becomeapparentwhen I

examine the domains in more detail later in the chapter. However, before proceeding to discuss

Layder’s multi‐level and multi‐paradigmatic solution, I wish to first make the limitations of current

stand‐aloneapproachesclear.

3.3 Theproblemwithcurrentstandaloneapproaches

Both structuralists and post‐structuralists can be accused of attributing the micrological world of

everydayexperience toexternalmacrological forces. Forexample, the term ‘false consciousness’was

used by Engels to denote ways of thinking promoted by institutional processes that mislead the

proletariatinrelationtoopportunitiesforupwardmobility(Marx&Engels1951;Grabb1997).Similarly,

post‐structuralistsfocusedon‘deconstructingmeaningsintaken‐for‐grantedlanguage’(Hartman2005,

p. 31),which render the individual oblivious to the influence of discourse and discursive practices of

governmentsandinstitutions.

Foucault (1979), for example, used Bentham’s panoptical prison design to illustrate his concept of

‘technologiesof theself’,andapre‐modern tomodernshift fromthephysical to thepsychological in

theapplicationofdisciplinebyinstitutions.Bentham’s‘allseeing’panopticalprisondesignfeaturescells

thatarearrangedinanarcaroundacentralpoint(whereaguardmaybestationed)sothatprisoners

are potentially visible. Consequently, prisoners tend to behave as though they are visible and thus

internalisethegazeofauthority(Foucault1979).


Althoughthisexampleiscompelling,Layder(1997)arguedthatstructuralandsystemicfactorssuchas

thedistributionand ‘ownershipof cultural,material andauthoritative resources’ (p. 4)donotwholly

determine the psychologies and subjectivities of individuals nor entirely characterise their

communicativeexchangesandinteractions.Hearguedthatmacrologicalandmicrologicalconcernsare

deeplyinter‐connected,interweaveandoverlap,however,theycannotbereducedtooneanother.

AcriticalpointforLayder,andonethatherepeatedlymakes,isthateachrealmordomainhasitsown

independentproperties,dimensionsanddistinctivecharacteristics(whichwillbeexploredfurtherinthe

next section). Layder therefore stresses the recognition of the coherence and integrity of each to

preventtheunwarrantedprioritisingofonedomainoveranother(Layder1997).Layderfacilitatedthis

separateness/relatednessdualitythroughhisstratifiedontologyandastanceofmoderateobjectivism

informedbyCriticalRealism,whichwillnowbeexplored.

3.4 Layder’sStratifiedSolution

Layder’s (1997; 2005) principal concern was one of a more inclusive and comprehensive account of

communication,actionsand interactions inthesocialworldthroughthereconciliationand integration

of interpretive, structural and post‐structural approaches, which are represented by separate but

interlocking ontological domains. In order to achieve this, Layder, informed by critical realist Bhaskar

(1978; 2002) (discussed in Chapter 2), adopted a stratified ontological position of ‘moderate’

objectivism.Here,Laydermeantthatsocialrealityisconstitutedbyobjectiveandsubjectiveelementsof

mutual influence that are conditioned by systemic phenomena. This is an acknowledgement of

Habermas’(1987)fundamentalontologicaldivision,representedbySystemandLifeworld,andaswitch

inviewpointfromthesubjectivityoftheindividualtothedetachedpositionoftheobjectiveobserverof

societal systems25. ‘To say that phenomena possess objective characteristics implies they have

propertiesthatcannotbeexplainedsimplyintermsoftheconductofindividualsorspecificencounters

betweenpeople’(Layder1997,p.9).

Moderateobjectivismallowstheresearchertobesensitiveto,andaccountfor,objectiveandsubjective

elementsofthesocialphenomenonbeinginvestigated.Theimportantcorollaryofthis istheabilityto

25 Thisuseof theword ‘ontology’ is inconsistentwithCrotty’s (1998) view.Asdiscussed inChapter2,ontologyreferstothenatureofbeingand,inthecaseoftheIdealism/Realismdebate,theexistenceornotofrealityoutside

themind.AccordingtoCrotty,tousethewordontologyconcerningthenatureofsocialrealityis‘unexceptional’but no longer ontology in the ‘philosophical sense’ (p. 11) but rather roughly corresponds to theoretical

perspectiveorhowoneviewstheworld.


rejectthenaivesubjectivismthatcannotreachbeyondsubjectiveandintersubjective‘Verstehen’26and,

conversely, the attribution of subjectivity to structure (Layder 1997; Layder 1998). Although Layder’s

modelentailsfourontologicaldomainsheusedHabermas’(1987)conceptsofLifeworld(everydayworld

ofactionsandinteractionsofanindividual)andSystem(thereproducedinstitutionalfeaturesofsociety

externaltotheLifeworldsuchasorganisations)asmeta‐domains.Thisisadivisionwhich,accordingto

Layder, ‘penetrates into theheart of social reality’ (Layder1997,p. 100). Layder’smotivation for this

strategywastoavoidtheparadigmaticboundariesofstand‐aloneapproachesandtheirlimitations.

TheconceptsofSystemandLifeworldcanbeseenasasteptowardreconcilingfundamentallyopposing

approaches,however,therearevaryingdegreesofagreementbetweenLayder(1997),Habermas(1987)

and Giddens (1984) in terms of theway these divisions are ordered.While there is concurrence for

Layder and Habermas that System and Lifeworld can be seen as mutually influential, according to

Layder,HabermasregardsSystemandLifeworldastoomutuallyexclusive, ‘as if thetwohad ‘lives’of

theirown’(Layder1997,p.78).JustificationforLayder’sassertioncanbeseeninHabermas’notionofa

continualencroachmentofSystem(intermsofcapitaliststructures) intotheLifeworldaspathological

and unnatural. Layder therefore envisions a much more unitive relationship where the term

‘encroachment’wouldberenderedobsolete–inthatsomethingcannotencroachonitself.

Thisproblemofseparateness/relatednessisfundamentaltoLayder’sDomaintheory,andalsotoother

dualismssuchaspart/whole, individual/collective,andmind/body.Forsomethingtobeonethingand

yet,atthesametime,somethingelse,appearssomewhatparadoxical.Layder’s(1997)identificationof

both the problem and the solution is critical because it provides the philosophical foundation that

allowedhimtointegratetheoppositionalontologicalpositioningembeddedinthem.

In terms of the corollary of System and Lifeworld, Layder’s (1997) ontological approach can best be

illuminated through its comparison with that of Giddens’ (1984) concepts of structure and agency.

Whereas Layder and Habermas pointed to an actual ontological difference between System and

Lifeworld(Layder1997),Giddens,asaconsequenceofhisstructuratedratherthanstratifiedontology,

approached this division as purely methodological. I argue that this distinction has important

consequences‐first,inprovidinganopportunitytoclarifytheontologicalpositioningthatunderpinsthe

interlocking nature of Layder’s domains and, second, to demonstrate its congruence with the

26TheGermanwordVerstehencanbedirectlytranslatedas‘understand’.HoweverLayder(1997;1998)drawsonthe Interpretive sociological tradition. In this context Verstehen is understood as a meaningful, empathetic

understandingthroughputtingyourselfintheshoesofotherstoseethingsfromtheirperspective(Martin2000).


stratification of individual/ground consciousness that was proposed in my interpretation of how

psychologicalandphilosophicalintuitioncanbereconciled.

In Chapter 2, I showed that some theorists regard matter to be, at the fundamental level, ground

consciousness.Matter(biological)hasevolvedtothepointwhereitproducesindividualconsciousness

via the human brain. Individual consciousness is therefore ultimately ground consciousness at a

different level of description. In contrast, Giddens’ (1984) Structuration Theory proposes a view of

structureandagencyasirreconcilableoppositions,liketwosidesofthesamecoinorthemagneticpoles

oftheEarth(Layder1997).

Willmott(1999)arguedthatGiddens’(1984)approachresultsinconflatingstructureandagency,fusing

them ‘intoone tightly‐constitutedamalgam’ (1999,p. 7), and that this approach canbe considereda

response to the legacy of Cartesian dualism that separates body and mind. By way of an analogy,

Willmottsuggeststherearetwo‘doors’thatprovideanescapefrom‘Descartes’Error’(Damasio1994)

and,inmyopinion,hecorrectlyarguedthatGiddenshasdepartedthroughthewrongone.Accordingto

Wilmott, Giddens’ structurated solution makes distinguishing between, making sense of and,

consequently, giving weightings to the importance of the different characteristics of structure and

agency(objectiveandsubjectiveelements)impossiblewhenusingthismodelforsocialanalysis(Layder

1997;Willmott1999;Hartman2005).

Providingasuperiorsolutiontotheproblem,Layder(1997)acknowledgedtheinfluenceofcriticalrealist

Archer’s (1995)morphogeneticontological approach.According toArcher, structure andagencyeach

have their own emergent properties – and,moreover, one cannot be reduced to the other. Analytic

dualismpositsthesocialworldasstratified,withstructuresandactionsthatcanonlybedistinguished

overtime.ForWillmott(1999)analyticdualism,asasolutiontotheCartesianmind/bodyschism,also

positsmindasemergent from thebrain. Theadvantageof analyticaldualism for Layder is that social

realitycanthenbeseenastextured,interwoven,layeredandstratified27–wherestructurecanbeseen

asemergentfromagencybutnotreducibletoit(Layder1997;Willmott1999;Hartman2005).Layder’s

basic ontological distinction is that Lifeworld and System should be considered as an ‘overlapping

dualism’ (such as individual and ground consciousness) and not a ‘unitary duality’ as proposed by

Giddens(Layder1997,p.109).

I interpret this to mean that Layder’s (1997) domains do not compete with each other and extend

beyondcomplementingeachother.Itisthroughtheirdifferencethatthey,andthelargerwhole,come

27ThisisadescriptionnotdissimilarfromCooksey’s‘Tapestryofcomplexityscience’(Cooksey2001,p.78).


intobeing.Justasonedoesnotfullyknowthemeaningofhealthuntilonehasbeensick,thedomains

mutually define each other through a dialogic process (rather than a dialectic one) as explicated by

Bakhtin(1981)andJabri(2005).Forexample,Bhaskar(1978)arguedthatitisthesocialstructuresand

institutions that we actively participate in, reproducing actions through tacit pre‐conditions, which

paradoxically facilitates our agency. For example, a good education gained through institutional

structuresteachesusthatwecannotonlyextendknowledgebutcanpartiallyorwhollyrejectit,which,I

would argue, is the hallmark of a good PhD thesis. Thus, for Layder, social reality is constituted and

reconstitutedthroughongoingdialogisticprocesses28.

This overlapping dialogic dualism, which is the essence of Layder’s (1997) stratified ontology, is

consistentwithavarietyofhistoricalandcontemporarythought.ForexampleHeraclitussuggestedthat

‘[A]llthingscomeintobeingbyconflictofopposites,andthesumofthingsflowslikeastream’(citedin

Laertius 1931, p. 415). This dialogic interaction can alsobe seen in thenotionofHegelianprocessof

evolutionthroughthesisandanti‐thesis(Soll1969),andtheinteractionoftheintuitiveandexperiential

cognitivesystemsdisplayed inFigure2.2.Moreover, it isnotdissimilar to thenotionofunity through

separationthatunderpinsDerrida’s(1982)conceptofdifférancethatwillbeemployedinChapter6.

3.4 Layder’sDomains

TheadvantageofLayder’s (1997)DomainTheoryoverotherapproaches is that it isable todrawand

integrateanumberofsocialtheories,bothmicrologicalandmacrological,asaconsequenceofamulti‐

layered philosophical approach to social reality. Therefore Domain Theory can be considered a

particularlyusefultheoreticalperspectiveforthecurrentstudybecauseithasthepotentialtodrawon

multiple perspectives and sociological lenses in order to tease out the complex dynamics associated

withtheresearchproblematdifferentlevelsofsocialdescription.Thefollowingparagraphswilloutline

thevariousdomainsinmoredetailaswellasthesocialrelations,powerandpracticesthatcirculateand

connectthesedomains(representeddiagrammaticallyinFigure3.1below).

However, it would be impossible, within the constraints of this thesis, to exhaustively examine the

complexities and intricacies of Layder’s work, which has progressed over decades. Indeed Layder’s

productisasynthesisofthemostinfluentialsocialtheoristsincludingFoucault,Habermas,Goffmanand

Parsons.Moreover,thetheoryisflexibleandmalleabletotheextentthatitcanaccommodatethework

28Buildingon the ideaof liberating structuresTorbert (1978) andHiggs (1993)developedamodelof liberating

program systems that has relevance to this debate. In this model individuals can act as purposive agents (orsubsystems)withinprogramsystems(suchasoperateinorganisations)anddemonstratepersonalagency,aswell

asco‐constructingthesysteminwhichtheyareacting.


ofyetmoretheoristsshouldtheneedarise29.Inthissense,DomainTheoryisprincipallyaframeworkby

which other theories can be held together to suit different research foci and contexts without

contradiction.Theaimofthissection is toprovideamapofLayder’sexplicationofthecharacteristics

andfeaturesofeachofthedomainsandtheirconnections.

Figure3.1:Layder’sDomains

AdaptedfromLayder(1997,p.78)

LifeworldElements

Psychobiography–(Intra‐personal30)

Thepsychobiographyofanindividualcanbeconsideredtheinnerlifethatisshapedbyexternalevents

and theirpersonality as theymove through theirday‐to‐day life, termeda ‘subjective career’ (Layder

1997,p.47).LayderdrewontheideasofearlysymbolicinteractionistsMead(1967)andBlumer(1969)

about selfand identity.Asopposed toanimals,humansareable toapprehenda separation fromthe

externalworldandrepresentaspectsofit(includingtheself)abstractlyandsymbolically.Consequently,

humans are able tomanipulate their environment in a way that animals cannot – although this has

recentlycomeundermuchscrutiny(seeSantos,Pearson,Spaepen,Tsao&Hauser2006;Martin‐Ordas,

29Forexample,FeministCriticalTheorywillbeadoptedinvokedinChapter6tocontextualisethefindings.

30ThelabelsgiveninparenthesisesaretheonesIhaveusedinChapter4(Analyses&TheoryDevelopment).


Call&Colmenares2008;Taylor,Hunt,Medina&Gray2008).Mead’sfocusoncognitiveconsciousnessin

constructing self and other, however, leaves no room for preconscious, affectual, biological or

unconsciousinfluence(Mead1967;Layder1997;Hartman2005).

WhileMead’stheorylendsitselftoadualityofseparatenessandrelatedness,Layder(1997)pursuedthe

inclusion of a further duality in terms of conscious and unconscious elements of the self, which he

considersvital topsychobiography.Layderenvisagedan inclusivemiddlewaybetweenFreud(cited in

Layder 1997), who regarded individuals as driven primarily by the unconscious, and Sartre (cited in

Layder1997),whorejectedsuchadeterministicviewandpositedthatpeopleareatleastpartlyaware

oftheirmotivationsor,asLayderpointedout,are‘awarethattheyareunaware’(Layder1997,p.35).

Consistentwiththemodelofcognitionpresented(Figure2.3),Layderthereforeconsideredtheselfas

whole,yetfragmented,andsometimescontradictory.

AddingfurthercomplexitytotherealmofpsychobiographyisLayder’s(1997)inclusionofcoreselfand

multiple ‘satellite selves’ that combine to realise this continuousaswell as fragmentedexperienceof

being.Layderarguedthatselfandself‐identitycanbeseenasanaggregateofpersonalitycharacteristics

thatdifferentiateoneindividualfromanother,andalsoinarelationtothesocialenvironmentandthe

peoplewithin it.HerehedrewonGoffman’s (1971)viewofpeopleasactorswhosebehaviourvaries

accordingtotheiraudience.InThePresentationoftheSelfinEverydayLife,Goffmanrevealeddailyface‐

to‐face interaction as impressionmanagement. For example, corporate ‘actors’ canbe seen to adopt

personasthattheyperceivetobecongruentwiththespecificrolethey‘play’inanorganisation.

In relation to the present study, Layder’s (1997) concept of psychobiography is appropriate to the

phenomenaunderinvestigation.AlthoughLayderdoesnotspecificallymentionintuition,onthebasisof

the discussion in Chapter 2, psychological constructs of intuition can be considered a feeling – sub‐

conscious but arising in consciousness – and therefore sits well within the definition. Moreover,

Goffman’s (1971)notionof coreand satellite selveswill beuseful inexplaining findings in relation to

diversityinintuitiondisclosureinaccordancewithdifferentsocialcontexts.Layder’simportantpremise

isthatpsychobiographyisdynamicandisintertwinedwithagivensituation.Thiscontentionwillnowbe

exploredfurther.

SituatedActivity–(Interpersonal)

Situated activity is the level of face‐to‐face interaction between two ormore individuals. For Layder

(1997),thekeywasGoffman’s(1983)notionof‘responsepresence’,whichsignifiedthedynamicnature

ofinteractionswherepeoplemodifytheirownbehaviourinresponsetooneanother.Goffmanargued

that interpersonal relations between two or more people result in micro‐cultures of negotiated

meaning. This translated to behaviour on the basis of the contribution of different personalities,


cognitivestyle,powerrelations,genderandracialmix,andthefamiliarityoftheactorswitheachother.

Thiscan,therefore,beseenasasocialsubsystemnestedwithinthewidersocialsystem.Communicative

exchangescanbeseenas‘situated’becausetheexchangeiscarriedoutbetweenparticularpeopleata

particulartimeandplace.Situatedactivityisthereforeemergent,synergisticandunique(Layder1997).

AlthoughDomaintheoryencompassesfourdomains,itisthedomainofsituatedactivitythatiscentral

to Layder because it is the site of face‐to‐face interaction, communicative exchange, action and

behaviour. The action and interaction that occurs at this level is essentially a delivery system for the

dynamics of all other domains. For example, in relation to this study, the findings reveal how

participantsperceiveintuitionisdisclosedessentiallyattheinterpersonallevel.However,aswillbeseen

inChapter5, this interpersonal exchangeoccurswithinorganisationsand is therefore conditionedby

organisationalculture.Moreover,organisationsareembeddedinwidersocietalnetworksthatcondition

them.Inthiswayexamininghowindividualsdiscloseintuition(s)revealssocialprocessesatalllevels.

Systemelements

Settings–(Organisationallevel)

Settings constitute the first domain of the System meta‐domain. Settings include reproduced social

relations and practices (cultural norms), which should be considered primary, and the geographic

locations and buildingswhere these are carried out. However Layder (1997) contended that the two

cannotbeseparated.Buildings,forexample,cannotbeconsideredneutralcontainersforsocialactivity;

theyareinfusedwithsignificanceforthepeoplewithinthem.‘Weshapeourbuildings,andafterwards

ourbuildings shapeus’ (Churchill 2003). TheHighCourt inCanberra, forexample, is anawe‐inspiring

buildingwhoseimposingfacadeandloftyinteriorspacesleavenodoubtforthevisitorthatthepeople

inside itwieldunchallengeableauthority. Inside thecourtrooms themselveswe find thebenchwhere

judgespreside inanelevatedposition.Settingsarean importantbridgingpointforthe intersectionof

the face‐to‐face encounters of the Lifeworld and macrological system features such as the justice

system(Layder1997).

Settingsconstructandreflectsocialpracticesandpowerrelationsthatare localtoaspecifictimeand

spaceinfusedwithhistory.Demarcationbetweenvarioussettingscanbedistinctbutchangeovertime

through connections to the domain of contextual resources. Hartman (2005) pointed out that the

inclusionof history is a distinctive feature of both analytic dualismandDomain Theory ‘because it is

arguedthathistorybequeathsasetofinheritedstandingconditionswhichrepresentstoalargedegree

reproduced social practices, whereas the present helps to shape the emergent features of social


practices’(p.51)31,anideatakenfromMarx(Layder1997).Asbuildingsareconstructed,modifiedand

replacedovertime,soaretheactivitiesthatarecontainedwithinthem.

ContextualResources–(Societal/Environmentallevel)

In general, contextual resources are the ‘social resources drawn upon by social actors in order to

‘produce’ their social behaviour’ (Layder 1997, p. 81). Layder discussed three categories of social

resources:

• Materialresourcessuchasproperty,money,credit,sharesandsoforth

• Dominativeresourcessecuringcontrol,authorityandpower• Cultural and discursive resources such as knowledge, technical skill, interpersonal knowledge

(socialcontacts)Dividing contextual resources in this way enabled Layder to make another distinction regarding the

degree to which the distribution of these social resources intersects with the subjectivities of

individuals. The firstway of understanding contextual resources is thatwe all have, to somedegree,

‘localisedactivitylubricants’,whichfacilitateactivitiesandallowsustogetthingsdone(Layder1997,p.

81). In this sense the understanding is an interactionist one and therefore has a ‘cognitive emotive

reality’ for actors (ibid). Second, influenced by structuralist thinking and Critical Theory, Layder

recognisedanunevenmacrological ‘distributivepattern’ (ibid)ofcontextual resources.Layderposited

thatalthoughresourcesaredistributedunevenlyacrosssocieties,theuptakeoftheseresourcesisalso

dependent on the predisposition of individuals to do so. In this way Layder accounts for the social

reproductionaswellasupwardlymobileindividuals.

Power,SocialRelations,DiscoursesandPractices

Having described and explained Layder’s four domains in more detail, I will move the focus of my

discussiontopower,socialrelations,discourseandpractices.Itisinthisexaminationthatthedualityof

subjective and objective elements, and the layered and interlocking nature of the domains, is most

evident.Althoughsocialpracticesandrelationsoccurinthedomainof‘situatedactivity’theyphysically

occurin‘settings’asmanifest, individual,discursiveandbehaviouralexpressionsofstructure(interms

ofthedistributionofcontextualresources)andindividualagency(psychobiography).Furthermoreit is

31Forexample,MiddleParkBeach inMelbourne inthe1980swasaplacewheretoplessbathingand ‘G‐strings‘

wereaday‐to‐day featureandnormalbehaviour.However, inanunarticulated, tacitagreementbetween thesebeachgoers,noonesteppedbeyondthelowwallthatseparatedsandandfootpathwithoutcoveringup.Topless

bathingisnowararephenomenonatMiddleParkbeach(Duell2009,pers.comm.).


power, social relations, discourses and practices that connect and bind these domains (Layder 1994;

Layder1997;Layder1998;Layder2005).

Layder’s (2005) view of power as central and multi‐form can be seen as a synthesis of Habermas,

GiddensandFoucault.LayderdrewonFoucaulttomovebeyondstructuralconceptsofpowerasheldor

possessed by individuals, as an unalienable divine right (sovereign power) or as the result of the

ownershipof theeconomic resourcesof a society, as arguedbyMarx (Marx&Engels1951; Foucault

1980; Foucault 1989; Grabb 1997).While appropriate to pre‐modern societies, Foucault argued that

suchexplanations cannowbe considered inappropriate formodern societies. Theyare replacedbya

view of power that decentres the human subject. Power is no longer ‘possessed’ by individuals but

exerted by shifting alliances. Regimes constituted by these shifting alliances construct discourses of

truth,whicharedisseminatedthrough‘legitimate’socialinstitutions.AccordingtoFoucault,discourses

areembeddedwithknowledge/powerandshapethesubjectivitiesofindividuals.Thesediscoursesboth

enable thecapacitiesandcreativityof individualsaswellascircumscribing theboundaries forwhat is

consideredtobenormalbehaviour(ibid).

While Layder (1997) accepted Foucault’s notion of power operating and circulating at every level of

society, the problem for Layder was Foucault’s abandonment of subjectivity. According to Layder,

Foucault’s view of power is totalising and therefore leaves no room for the rejection of these

‘legitimate’ discourses. Although Foucault accounted for revolt in the form of resistant discourses

(Foucault 1980), which Layder does not mention, this resistance could be viewed as the product of

alternative dissenting and shifting alliances rather than individual and agentic. Layder’s chief concern

wasFoucault’s removalof thepossibilityof individual revolt, theomissionof individual,psychological

and subjective, agentic, transformative forms of power advocated byGiddens (1984). Such individual

possessiveformsofpowerwouldincludephysicalpower(Layder1997),referentpower,andcharismatic

power,which are still included in contemporary leadership theory (Dubrin et al. 2006). Retaining the

Foucauldiannotionofubiquitousandomnipresentpower,Layderadvocatesacomplex,multi‐formview

of power, as both personal and radiating from institutions. Layder’s domains are bound together

throughmeshingpowerrelations,socialrelationsanddiscursivesocialpracticesthatinteractlocallyand

globallyincomplexways.

3.5 Conclusion

Selective inclusion and synthesis of historical and contemporary theorists allow Layder’s theory of

domains to resolve the major tensions created by previous approaches that are characterised by

singular emphases. In this way Domain Theory is able to extend beyond the ideas and thus the

boundariesofthesocialtheoriststhathaveinformedit.SystemandLifeworldasastratifieddialogical


ontologicalsynthesisfacilitatesthereconciliationofvariousapproachestosocialtheory.Moreover,this

principle of stratification is consistent with the way I have proposed philosophical and psychological

intuitionmaybereconciled.

The advantageof Layder’s stratifiedontology is thatDomain theory is able to drawon various social

theories, bothmicrological andmacrological. This allows the researcher to drawon a range of social

theorists in understanding and explaining phenomena. Domain Theory allows for the inclusion of

subjectiveandobjectiveelements,andaninclusiveviewofpowerandsocialrelations,and,inthisway,

has the potential to draw onmultiple perspectives and sociological lenses in order to tease out the

complex dynamics associated with the research problem. Layder’s Domain Theory is a credible and

valuable theoretical perspective for the current study because of itsmulti‐layered approach to social

reality, which allows the phenomena under investigation to be analysed concurrently at the

intrapersonal,interpersonal,organisationalandsocietallevels.

Inaddition,DomainTheory isconsistentwiththe integrativespiritandmotivationthathasdriventhe

studyfromtheoutset.Furthermore, inrelationtomethodologicalconsequences,IarguethatLayder’s

stratified ontology provides a philosophical platform from which a rapprochement for the mixed

methodologicalmarriageofconstructivistandpositivistassumptions,andapproachestodatacollection

andanalysis,willbeexploredinfurtherdetailinthefollowingchapter.

C h a p t e r 4 : M e t h o d o l o g y P a g e |96

Chapter4:Methodology

Statisticsarelikealamp-posttoadrunkenman–moreforleaningonthanillumination.(Gervais2010)

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter I outlined Layder’s (1997) Domain Theory and justified its selection as the

theoretical perspective for this study. I have argued that social reality is complex andmulti‐level and

that stand‐alone theoretical andmethodological approaches arenot able to effectivelydealwith this

withoutreducingorconflatingphenomena.Ihavearguedthattheontologicalstratificationassumedin

DomainTheoryovercomesparadigmaticboundariesandfacilitatestheinclusionofmultiplesociological

perspectives.TheapplicationofDomainTheorytothecurrentstudyisthereforeappropriatebecauseit

allows the basic social processes surrounding the disclosure of intuition to be examined at the

intrapersonal, interpersonal,organisationalandsocietal levels.Thus,DomainTheoryhas thepotential

togiveamorecompleteanswertotheresearchproblem.

In this chapter I will draw the reader’s attention to the methodological concerns of the study, the

principalaimofwhichistodescribe,explainandjustifyhowdatacollectionandanalysiswasconducted.

The first task Iwill address in accomplishing thiswill be to explain and justify the two variants ofGT

used.ThefirstapproachwasinformedbyLayder’sversionofGT,AdaptiveTheory(Layder1993;Layder

1998), which, unlike other grounded theories, acknowledges the use of extant literature to inform

questionsandanalysis.Althoughtheopennatureof initialquestionsdidnotprecludediscovery, their

purposewastoestablishwhichofthemanyconceptionsparticipantswerereferringtowhentheytalked

aboutintuition.Understandingparticipants’interpretationsofintuitionprovidedafoundationforlater

questionsconcerningthedisclosureofintuition(s).Iwillalsodescribeandexplainthesecondapproach

used,theaimofwhichwastodiscoverthebasicsocialprocessbywhichtheintuitionsofAustralianelite

leaders are disclosed and not disclosed. I will demonstrate how this approach was informed by a

numberofgroundedtheorists,principallybyStraussandCorbin’s(1990;1998)codingparadigmandthe

constructivistGTofCharmaz(2006;Charmaz2009).

ThechapterwillcommencewithageneraldiscussionofGTinordertosituate,distinguishandjustifythe

twoapproaches Iused in relation toothergrounded theories.Acoreargumentof thisdiscussionwill

mirroroneofthecentralargumentsofthisthesis–thatnon‐rational,particularlyintuitiveprocessesare

often implicit, unrecognised and unacknowledged. I will argue that while subsequent variants of GT

(Schatzman1991;Dey1999;Corbin2009)andparticularlytheconstructivistGTofCharmaz(1996),have

increasinglyrecognisedthesubjectivityoftheresearcher,theoriginalexegesisofGT(Glaser&Strauss

1967)andGlaser’spositivisticGT(Glaser1978;Glaser1992)donot.IwillarguethatGTis increasingly


recognised as a rapprochement of idiographic and nomothetic methods (specific and general

approaches), inductive and deductive logic, and intensive and extensive theorising (which can be

roughlyequatedwithpositivismandconstructivism)(Dey1999).Iwillfurtherarguethatthisapproach

of amixedmethodological and epistemological marriage32 (Strauss & Corbin 1990; Strauss & Corbin

1998; Charmaz 2006) is congruent and compatiblewith the stratified ontology adopted in this study

explicated in Chapters 2 and 3. Evaluation criteria and ethical issues for the study will then

beaddressed.

Following this Iwillproceed tooutline the techniquesandproceduresassociatedwithdatagathering

andanalysis.Iwilldescribeandjustifytheuseofpurposivesampling(Patton2002)andtherecruitment

ofleadersofAustralianorganisationsasparticipantsforthestudy.Iwillarguethateliteinterviewingis

anunderdevelopedaspectofsocialresearchmethodology.Moreover,Iwillarguethatinterviewingelite

participants or ‘researching up’ is quite different from ‘researching down’, and, as a consequence,

participantsneededtobetreateddifferently33.Iwill,therefore,describetheproceduresandtechniques

used in interviewing ‘elite’participantsasamethodand justify themwith reference tobothmyown

experience and relevant literature. Following this, procedures of data analysis using NVivo7,

underpinnedbythetwovariantsofGT,willbedescribedandexplained.

4.2 BackgroundandjustificationforthevariantsofGTused

The utility ofGT is its capacity to capture the complexity in organisational andmanagement settings

(Locke 2001; Goulding 2002) and develop abstract theoretical explanations for basic social processes

(Glaser&Strauss1967;Strauss&Corbin1998;Dey1999).GT is thereforecompatiblewiththestated

aim of this research, which is to describe and explain the basic social processes in relation to the

disclosure of intuition in Australian organisational contexts. GT’s strength is its flexibility, which is

sustained by the premise that it is not a specific method or technique (Strauss 1987) and has no

attachment to types of data, or area of interest or discipline. A consequence of the flexibility and

malleability of theGT approach is that a number of variants have been developed since the seminal

workTheDiscovery of Grounded Theory (Glaser& Strauss 1967). Current grounded theories differ in

epistemology,methodologicalstrategies,whattheorymeansandconceptualdirections(Charmaz2009).

32StraussandCorbin(1998)claimGroundedTheorytobeageneralmethodduetoitsworld‐wideapplicationin

socialresearch.

33 Iacknowledgethat Iwillmakegeneralisationsabouttherelationshipofprofessionalstatustoknowledgeand

skills.HoweverIdonotwishtoimplythatsuperiorknowledgeandskillsmakesaoneamore‘valuable’person.


GToffersresearchersanopportunitytodeveloptheirownvariantscongruentwiththevicissitudesand

contextoftheirownresearch(Glaser&Strauss1967;Strauss&Corbin1990;Strauss&Corbin1998).

Perhaps because of this flexibility and utility GT has become, according to Morse (2009), ‘the most

commonlyusedqualitativemethod’(p.13).Thecurrentstudytakestwoapproachestodatagathering

and analysis – that of Layder’s Adaptive Theory (Layder 1993; Layder 1998), and a combination of

Strauss andCorbin’s coding paradigm (Strauss&Corbin 1990; Strauss&Corbin 1998) andCharmaz’s

ConstructivistGT(2006;2009).InordertodistinguishtheseapproachesfromoneanotherandotherGT

approaches,andjustifytheselectionofthesevariants,IwillbrieflydiscusstheevolutionofGT.

ThedevelopmentoftheoriginalGTasacombinationoftwodivergentphilosophicalandmethodological

traditions can be attributed to the collaboration of Bernie Glaser and Anselm Strauss. Glaser had a

backgroundinpositivismattheUniversityofChicago(Charmaz2009)andAnselmStrausshadimmersed

himself in the symbolic interactionism of Mead and Blumer, which maintained that social research

shouldfocusontheperceptionsoftheactorsthemselvesratherthanonhowtheiractionsappearedto

theobserver(Mead1967;Blumer1969;Layder1993).Developingsocialtheoryfromdatagroundedin

theexperiencesof theactorswasapivotalnotion inMead’sworkand,after invitingBernieGlaser to

participateinastudyofdying,GTwas‘discovered’.

BuildingontheworkofMeadandBlumer,GlaserandStraussrejectedapproachestoresearchwhere

findingsyieldeda‘tacked‐onexplanation’(Glaser&Strauss1967,p.4).Theysawpositivisticresearch,in

particular, as speculative anddeductive; drivenby theories thatwere either ‘dreamedup (preferably

whilerestingcomfortablyinanarmchair)’(Dey1999,p.12)orthetheoriesofothers(Stern2009).GT

was considered novel at that time because theory buildingwas driven instead by the data itself and

therefore‘grounded’init.

Grounded theories are generated through an iterative interplay of data collection and analysis, and

makingconstantcomparisonsbetweeninstancesandgroupsofinstancesorcategories(Glaser&Strauss

1967;Dey1999).Generatingtheoryproceedsbywayofinitial‘opencoding’,wherethepresuppositions

about what may be important to the research problem are, borrowing a term from Husserlian


phenomenology(Crotty1998;Gustavsson2001),‘bracketed’34–meaningputtoonesideinthemindof

theresearcher.Thisallowsmultipleinterpretationstobeattributedtodataintheanalysisstageinthe

absenceofpreviouslyconceivedtheory.Acorepremiseofthisapproachisthattheresearcherretainsa

certainobjectivitybecausetherelevanceandimportanceofgeneratedcodesbecomeapparentthrough

theirrepetitionandrelationshiptoothercodes,andthroughtheprocessofconstantcomparison(Glaser

& Strauss 1967; Glaser 1992; Dey 1999; Charmaz 2009). The application of bracketing and constant

comparisoncanbeseenascentraltotheemergenceanddiscoveryoftheory.

ThecorecomponentsofGTinclude:

• Simultaneousinvolvementindatacollectionandanalysis

• Constructinganalyticcodesandcategoriesfromdata,notfrompreconceivedlogicallydeducedhypotheses

• Using theconstantcomparativemethod,which involvesmakingcomparisonsateachstageof

theanalysis• Advancingtheorydevelopmentduringeachstepofthedatacollectionandanalysis

(Charmaz2006,p.5)GT was first attacked by positivists, who constituted the dominant mainstream of social research,

because it was not consistent with the paradigmatic validity criteria of positivism. Along with

interpretiveresearchingeneral35,GTwasseenasbiased, impressionistic,unsystematicandanecdotal.

DespiteattemptsbyGlaserandStrauss(1967)todemonstratetherigourandobjectivityofanalysis in

Discovery, and theuseof languageaimed toappeal to thepositivist researchers,GT initially failed to

becomeadoptedasmorethanapreliminaryexerciseinmostmainstreamsocialresearch(Stern2009).

GlaserandStrauss (1967)havealsobeencriticised for the lackofcodifiedproceduresandthedense,

esoteric and impenetrable nature of their writing style, which left practitioners of GT confused (Dey

1999; Charmaz 2006; Stern 2009). Responding to this, Strauss and Corbin published a guide toGT in

34Whendiscussing themeaningof the term ‘bracketing’eachofmysupervisors referredtodifferent ideas thatlargely reflected their approach to research as I saw it. The first (who had rejected positivism for interpretive

approaches)talkedaboutbracketinginaphilosophicalway,intermsofattemptingtoperceiveanobjectdirectlywithoutmediationofthought.Myothersupervisor(whohadabackgroundinpositivistpsychology)talkedabout

excluding thebiasofhuman influenceandsuggestedtechniques formitigatingoreliminating this, includingnotasking leading questions and keeping a reflexive journal. These two divergent viewpoints mirror the original

HusserlianintuitivenotionofbracketingandtheAmericanapproachledbyShultz(asdiscussedinCrotty1998).

35Interpretiveresearchenjoyedabriefperiodofpopularityintheearly1960sthenfelloutoffavourfollowingthe

successofpositivistnaturalscienceswhichunderpinnedimpressivetechnologicalachievements(Stern2009).


1990,revisedin1998,thatwasaimedatbothnoviceandadvancedresearchers.Thesetexts,writtenin

plain language, made analytical procedures more explicit through the development of a coding

‘paradigm’(Strauss&Corbin1990).

Thenewcodingparadigm,firstintroducedbyStrauss(1987),emphasisedtheidentificationofcontext,

action/interactional strategies and consequences (Glaser 1992; Charmaz 2006). Strauss and Corbin’s

codingparadigm(conditional/consequentialmatrix)providedahighlevelofstructurefordataanalysis

(Goulding 2002). However, the coding paradigmwas vociferously criticised by the original co‐author

Glaser(1992),whocontendedthatadoptionofthecodifiedproceduresoftheparadigmwascounterto

theoriginalspiritofcreativityandflexibility.Moreover,heargued,usingsuchastructuredapproachran

theriskof‘forcing’thedata.Indeed,WilsonandHutchinson(1996)pointedoutthatsomeresearchers

applied these guidelines as ‘rigid rules’ (p. 123) aswell as adoptingminimum sample sizes andother

positivistnotions.

IndefenceofStraussandCorbin (1990;1998) Iwouldargue that thesecriticismsaregermane to the

usersofGTratherthantomethoditself.Theapplicationproblemsindicatedcouldthusbemitigatedby

educationandtutelage36.StraussandCorbinthemselvesarguedthattheirbookwasnottobeusedasa

‘recipe’,andthatGTremainsa‘fluidandflexibleapproachtodataanalysis’(Strauss&Corbin1998,p.

xi).Despite thepolemic, Strauss andCorbin’s texts now serve as the standard introduction toGT for

studentsthroughouttheworld(Strauss&Corbin1998;Dey1999;Charmaz2006).

Over time GT became more widely used and accepted, and became a separate and alternative

mainstreaminitsownright.Aconsequenceofitsincreasinguseamongstinterpretiveresearcherswas

that it became subject to critique from them. Charmaz (2006) finds it understandably ironic thatGT,

once attacked by positivists, should itself be attacked for its positivist language and leanings by later

users of GT.While the positivist language has been attributed simply to the desire to appeal to the

positivistmainstreamdominantatthattime(Corbin2009;Stern2009)theproblemofepistemologyisa

moresubtleandcomplexmatter.

Glaser and Strauss (1967) have been accused of ignoring the subjectivity and engagement of the

researcher in the process of developing theory (Dey 1999; Charmaz 2009). For many (Dey 1999;

36Iexperiencedthismyselfwhenseekingtolearnhowto‘do’GT.IreadanumberofbooksbutdidnotfeellikeIhad ‘got it’. I completed anASCPRI course onDesignAnalysis andRepresentation in January 2009, however, it

devotedonlyacouplehoursfromafour‐daycoursetodataanalysis,andGroundedTheorywasbarelymentioned.IeventuallyfoundPatBazeleyatthe‘ResearchFarm’,whereIwasabletoimmersemyselfindataanalysisusing

NVivo7andthereby‘learntbydoing’.


Charmaz2009;Corbin2009;Stern2009),GlaserandStrauss implyan ‘outthere’realityandapassive

researcherthroughtheircontentionthatthetheoryis‘in’thedata.Dey(1999)claimedthatGlaserand

Strauss speak as if the data were self‐analysing. Indeed, the notion of ‘bracketing’, and systemic

constant comparison, was intended to eliminate researcher bias (Glaser 1992; Charmaz 2009). Later

variantsofGT,however,embodyan increasingawarenessof theroleof researchersubjectivity in the

‘emergence’oftheory.

Schatzman(1991),forexample,madetheinvolvementoftheresearcherinthemysteriousprocessesof

analysismoreexplicitinhisvariationofGT,whichhecalledDimensionalAnalysis(Dey1999;Bowers&

Schatzman 2009). Dimensions of phenomena are ‘recognised’ and assigned values, along with

inferences about them, as a consequenceof the researcher’s ‘wherewithal to construct, analyse, and

define situations’ (Bowers& Schatzman2009, p. 97).However, he regarded this ‘natural analysis’, at

least in part, as an implicit, intuitive process based on the experience of the analyst. Moreover, he

regarded this process to benodifferent to thewaypeoplemake senseof theworld in everyday life

situations. It is for this reason that Schatzman considered it ‘natural’. Thus, Schatzman clearly

recognisedtheroleandvalueofintuitiveprocessinanalysingdata.

In developing a constructivist GT incorporating ‘the postmodernist sensibility’ (Bowers& Schatzman

2009,p.41),Clarke(2009)andCharmaz(2006)alsosoughttoembracethesubjectivityoftheresearcher

incollectingandanalysingdata.ConstructivistGTpresupposesarelativistepistemologythat,according

to Charmaz (2009), assumes the ‘real world exists but is never separate from the viewer’ (p. 136).

However,Charmazdistinguishedherconstructivismfromthosethatpromoteradicalsubjectivismwhere

everything is contained in, and a consequence of, the mind (solipsism). The constructivism she

advocates recognises that research practices and procedures do not occur in value‐free contexts.

Rather, theyareconstructedandconductedunderparticularsocialcircumstancesand influencessuch

as‘power,privilege, locationandpreconceptions’(ibidp.141)thatotherwiseremainunquestionedor

completely ignored in themajorityof studies. In response to this acknowledgementCharmazadvised

researcherstobecomeasawareof,andexplicateasmuchoftheseimpingingcircumstancesaspossible.

Thisisdonethroughdemonstratingreflexivityandbygivingemphasistothevoicesoftheparticipants,

andnotjusttheanalyticalcategoriesoftheanalyst(Dey1999;Charmaz2006;Charmaz2009).

Thus,bothCharmaz (2006)andSchatzman (1991) recognise that theorydoesnot ‘emerge’of itsown

volition–thedatadonotanalysethemselves.Theoryisdiscovered‘in’thedata,however,throughthe

intuitiveandanalyticalcapacitiesoftheanalyst,andinasocialcontext.Iconsiderthisrecognitionofthe

interplayoftheobjectiveandsubjectiveelementsofanalysistobeaconsiderableachievementandone

that is consistent with Layder’s conception of moderate objectivism, discussed in Section 3.4. This

themeIwillexpandoninthelatterpartofthissection.


4.3 GroundedTheoryunderLayder’sAdaptiveTheory

Layder proposed his own variant of GT as an adjunct to Domain Theory, which he called Adaptive

Theory. The ultimate aim of Adaptive Theory is to explainwhat is going on andwhy ‘bymeans of a

continuouslyreflexivesynthesisofextanttheorywithemergentdata’(Hartman2005,p.53)(seeFigure

4.1below).AdaptiveTheoryis,therefore,‘adaptive’inthesensethatitisshapedbytheincomingdata

andextanttheorythatisavailableandrelevant(Layder1998).Thus,AdaptiveTheoryisbothdeductive

andinductivethroughcheckingorconfirming,aswellasbuildingon,extanttheory(Layder1993;Layder

1998;Hartman2005).

Figure4.1:TheresearchprocessaccordingtoLayder

AdaptedfromLayder(1998,p.167)

Layder (1998) developed Adaptive Theory as a response to a number of limitations he saw in the

approachofGlaserandStrauss(1967).Herejectedthepremiseof‘bracketing’asnaiveobjectivism,ina

similarveintoCharmaz(2006;2009).Heclaimedthatpresuppositionsandtheoreticalassumptionsare

betterdealtwith ina transparentmanner.HealsorejectedGlaserandStrauss’sassertionthat theory

canonlyarisethroughdata,andassertedthisisempiricistandlimiting.Rejectingacorepremiseofthe

originalGT,Layderproposedtheuseofextanttheoryforthepurposesofinformingboththeresearch

questions and analysis. He argued that open coding is wasteful since coding all data will inevitably

generate‘superfluousandirrelevantcodes’(Hartman2005,p.71).Hecounteredthatfocuswasadded

andwastedeffort reducedby informing the interviewscheduleandanalysisbywayofextant theory.


AdaptiveTheory,therefore,standsinstarkcontrasttotheoriginalimpetusforGlaserandStrauss(1967)

whichwas toground theory in thedatacollected rather than inextant theory. Finally, Layderargued

thatGTfailstotakeaccountofmacrologicalsocialstructuresandattributesallsocialactiontotheintra‐

personalandinterpersonalsphere.

While I agree that would be naive to assume that one can entirely bracket presuppositions and

assumptions(seeThomas&James2006),Iwouldarguethatitisequallynaivetothinkthatwecanfully

be aware of, acknowledge and take account of them.Open coding is a time‐consuming process that

does result in the generation of sometimes hundreds of codes – as was the case in this research.

However,tocallthisprocess‘wasteful’isavaluejudgementthatcanonlybeappliedinhindsightwhen

onehas completed the analysis anddeveloped the entire theory. Therefore I believe Layder’s (1998)

contentionoverlooksthecentralpremiseandvalueofopencoding.

IarguethatunderthemorepositivistandobjectivistGTofGlaser(1992)presuppositionsandbiasare

mitigatedbytheimmediatefocusoftheresearcheronconstantcomparisonofthedataandincidentsin

theprocessofanalysis.Thiscomparisonoccursnot inrelationtotheresearchproblemor issuebut in

relation to context of the sentence, paragraph or other incident before the analyst37. This technique

forcestheanalysttoattendtowhatisinfrontoftheeyesandnotwhatis‘behindthem’,orinthemind

oftheanalyst.

Moreover,Iarguethattheprocessesofopencodingandcomparativeanalysisarecoretothediscovery

and emergence of theory at a high level of abstraction. Bazeley (2009), through her many years of

experienceteachingqualitativeanalysis,notedthefailureofnovicestoriseabovethedescriptivelevel–

apointalsomadebyStrauss(1987).Shearguedthatopencoding–wheretheresearcherexaminesthe

datawordbyword,linebyline,andlookingforwhatisgoingon–andaskingquestions,isthefirststep.

However, analysis must also move to dimensions and determining under which circumstances

phenomenadoordonotoccur.Itisinthiswaythatthedataarecrackedopen38(Strauss1987).Minute

analysis, which is strongly emphasised by other grounded theorists (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Strauss

1987;Strauss&Corbin1998;Dey1999) is thuscritical,because it ismore likely toproduceemergent

themes,newconceptsandcategories.

37Iacknowledgethatthisdoes‘remove’biasentirely.

38IgiveanexampleofhowIdidthislaterinSection4.7.7undertheheading‘Axialcoding’.


To conclude this section, Iwish to expand, as indicatedearlier in the section, onmy viewofGT as a

convergence of objective and subjective elements. As discussed, positivist oriented GT ignores

researcher subjectivitywhileconstructivistGTdeniesabsoluteobjectivity.While thismayappearasa

problematic and irreconcilable situation, Dey (1999) suggested a convincing view, and one that is

consistentwith thephilosophyof this study.Heargued that thegenerationofgrounded theories isa

rapprochement of inductive, deductive and abductive processes, as well as intensive and extensive

theorising39,and idiographicandnomotheticmethods.Thus,Dey’sposition is inconcertwithLayder’s

viewthatGTisneitherstrictly‘interpretivistnorpositivist’(Layder1998,p.133).Isupportthisdualand

seemingly paradoxical epistemological stance in relation to GT, based on the notion of a stratified

ontology (outlined in Chapter 2 and 3),which assumes that the researcher is both separate and not

separate fromthedata,concurrently. I thereforeconcurwithDey (1999) thatGT isamixedmarriage

that results in ‘straddling of the greatmethodological divide’, which is also ‘undoubtedly one of the

greatattractionsofGT’(Dey1999,p.213).

4.4 Researchdesign:Datagatheringandanalysis

Myapproach to data gathering and analysis took the formof twodistinguishable yet interconnected

approaches–oneforthepurposeofconfirmation(AdaptiveTheory)andtheotherinorderto‘discover’

(GT). These are diagrammatically represented in Figure 4.2 below. As previously explained, the first

series of questions focused on how participants defined, used and valued intuition(s). Theory and

research exists concerning these themes, including my own Honours research that focused on the

importanceofintuition(s)forleadership(Robson2004;Robson&Miller2006).Thefocusofthecurrent

study, by contrast, focuses on the basic social process in relation to the disclosure, or otherwise, of

intuition(s) in organisations.However, before I could proceed to questions concerning this, given the

many conceptualisations of intuition, I deemed it necessary to confirm40 what the participants were

referring to when they used the word intuition (a detailed discussion of how this was done will be

presented). I therefore acknowledge my knowledge of, and previous contribution to, extant theory.

Consequently,thefirstresearchapproachcanbeconsideredasprincipallyinformedbyLayder’s(1998)

AdaptiveTheory.

39Deyarguedthatintensiveandextensivetheorisingcanberoughlyequatedwithpositivismandconstructivism.

40 Dey (1999) defines confirm as ‘establish more firmly, corroborate’ as opposed to verify, which connotes

establishingatruth(p.241).


Thesecondapproachwasaconsequenceofa‘tabularasa’situation,atleastintermsoftheavailability

of extant theory.While literature exists that discusses intuition use as a ‘silent practice’ (detailed in

Chapter 2), no literature was found that specifically attempted to explore, describe or explain this

phenomenon. Therefore, I can argue that the theorywas ‘discovered’ as a consequenceof using the

principles of GT through an iterative process of interview and analysis of the interview, which

subsequentlygeneratednewinterviewquestions.

Despite the criticismsofWilsonandHutchinson (1996) andGlaser (1992) concerning the Strauss and

Corbins’ (1990; 1998) coding paradigm, I found this framework extremely useful after attempting a

morenaturalandintuitiveanalysis41.TheadvantageofStraussandCorbins’(1998)paradigmisthat,by

looking at action and interaction over time and under various structural conditions to see how they

change, it gives the analyst insight intowhat conditions/contexts lead to certain actions/interactions

and,therefore,theresearcherisbetterabletotracethecomplexityofsocialprocessand,moreover,to

account for variations in outcomes/actions and interactions. The constructivist revision of GT by

Charmaz (2006) influenced the research primarily throughmy recognition that research is not value

free,andthatitisconductedunderspecificandlocalcircumstancesandcontextsthatfosterareflexive

stanceintheresearchprocess,whichisreflectedinthewritingofthethesis.

41Initialanalysesweredonewithoutthisframework.Theresultantmodeldepictedawebofrelationshipsandnot

anexplanatoryprocess.DissatisfiedwiththisresultIputthisanalysisasideandassaid,tookacourseinqualitativeanalysis, readStraussandCorbin (1998)andre‐immersedmyself in theanalysis, initiallyat the ‘Research farm’.

Althoughthistookafurtherthreemonths,Iconsidertheresultjustifiedtheeffort.


Figure4.2:Researchdesign:DualinterconnectedapproachesofGTused

In summary,while noting contributions and insights fromBowers, Schatzman andCharmaz (Charmaz

2006;Bowers&Schatzman2009;Charmaz2009),thesecondmethodologicalapproach,orientedtothe

discoveryofGT,was informedby traditionalgrounded theorists in ‘crackingopen’ thedata (Glaser&

Strauss1967;Strauss1987;Glaser1992).Structurewasgiventotheanalysisusingthecodingparadigm

of Strauss and Corbin (1990; 1998), which progressed the analysis to higher levels of abstraction as

discussedbyClarke(2009),Bazeley(2009)andStrauss(1987).Extrapolationofcategoriesintheanalysis

intermsofmicrologicalandmacrologicallevelsofsocietywasfacilitatedbycontributionsfromStrauss

and Corbin (1990; 1998) (the conditional matrix), Dey (1999) (structure and agency) (Clarke 2009)

(Situational Maps) and Layder (1993; 1994; 1997; 1998) (Domain Theory). Synthesis of the various


approaches toGTwas influenced byDey (1999). Amore detailed account of the data collection and

analysiswillbegivenfollowingadiscussionofevaluationcriteria.

4.5 Methodologicalsoundness/evaluation

Both qualitative and quantitative researchers need to differentiate their work from ‘undisciplined

journalism’(Easterby‐Smithetal.2002,p.54).Allresearchersmust,therefore,concernthemselveswith

establishingtrustworthinessthroughdemonstratedmethodologicalsoundness42inrelationtotheway

researchoutcomesareachieved(Neuman2000).InthissectionIwillcompareandcontrastthecentral

notions of methodological soundness in quantitative and qualitative research, and, in particular, GT

underpositivistandinterpretivistassumptions.Iwillthenproceedtooutlinethemostrelevantcriteria

to evaluate the research processes used in this study, and state how Imet these criteria to achieve

rigourandmethodologicalsoundness.

Whilequalitativeandquantitative researchareeach frequentlyassociatedwithcertainprocedures to

establishmethodological soundness, the terms (e.g. reliabilityand transparency) focusonmethodsof

datacollectionandanalysis,andcarrynophilosophicalassumptionsinandofthemselves(Crotty1998).

AsSandelowski(2001)pointedout,interpretiveresearcherscancountanddousenumbers.Conversely,

positivist studies regularly use qualitativemethods (Bazeley 2004; Bazeley 2008). Consequently, how

qualitativeandquantitativeresearchmethodsareemployed,valuedandevaluatedaredeterminedbya

numberoffactorsotherthanthosedirectlyassociatedwiththeunitofanalysis(numbersasopposedto

concepts). Criteria used to evaluate research soundness depend, in particular, on the purpose of the

researchand the targetaudienceand,most importantly, thephilosophical assumptionsof thosewho

mightevaluatetheresearch(Crotty1998;Charmaz2006).

Positivist researchevaluation is concernedwith validity, reliability, objectivity and rigour.Reliability is

the stabilityof ameasurementor theextent towhich the research canbe repeatedandachieve the

same results. Rigour in quantitative research is seen as adherence to planned method43 (Koch &

Harrington1998).Validity,ontheotherhand,addressestheextenttowhichphenomenaareaccurately

measuredandwhetherthatmeasurementisconsistentwiththeintentionoftheresearcher(Lincoln&

Guba1985;Neuman2000;Winter2000).Quantitativeresearchers(underpositivism)arguethatvalidity

is achieved through objectivity and disassociation from the research process. They therefore regard

42Iusethistermtoencompassthetrustworthinessofbothqualitativeandquantitativeapproaches.

43 By comparison, in qualitative research rigour is about “fit” and congruencewith the research paradigm and

approach–changesinmethodsduringtheprocessareexpectedandneededtoaddressemergingthemesetc.


researcherinvolvementwiththephenomenonunderinvestigationasathreattoobjectivity. Ironically,

forqualitativeresearchersunderinterpretivistapproaches,thelackofconscioussubjectiveinvolvement

with the process of research is a threat to the development and the trustworthiness of the research

(Winter 2000; Maxwell 2005). Thus, approaches to credibility under positivism and interpretivism

are often seen as oppositional (Lincoln & Guba 1985; Marshall & Rossman 1999; Neuman 2000;

Patton2002).

This paradigmatic tension can be seen in approaches to the use of GT. Glaser’s (1978; 1998) GT

expresses his positivist antecedents and his approach is taken up by many in disciplines where

positivism isdominantandexpected (Charmaz2006).However,GT cannotbeevaluatedby theusual

criteria associated with quantitative research. It falls within the qualitative paradigm, particularly as

utilisedinthisstudy.Winter(2000)warnsthat‘whatiscertainisthatqualitativeresearchsetsitselfup

for failure when it attempts to follow the established procedures of quantitative research’ (p. 5).

Commensurately, validity and reliability are not appropriate for application to qualitative research

methods because they necessarily involve the subjectivity of the researcher (Guba & Lincoln 1989;

Corbin&Strauss1990;Guba&Lincoln1994).

Yet, while acknowledging the need to redefine and modify ‘the canons’ of ‘good science’ to fit the

realitiesofqualitativeresearch’(Corbin&Strauss1990,p.5),someresearchersstruggletocompletely

jettison quantitative terms and the notions behind them when using GT. Parry (1998) for example,

paradoxicallyinsistedthat‘objectivityinsubjectivistresearchisessential’andthatitisachievedbythe

realisationof‘asmuchvalidityandreliabilityaspossible’(p.95).TheproblemaccordingtoParryisthat

qualitativedataarenecessarilycollectedandanalysedbyaresearcherwhois,inParry’sterms,‘reactive’

(ibid). Parry’s concern is therefore to reduce the ‘direct involvement of the researcher’ (ibid).

ConsequentlyforParry,achievingobjectivitywillalwaysbe‘difficult’anda‘weakness’(ibid,p.96)ofGT.

This approach,however, rendersGTa ‘second rate’methodology fromParry’sperspectivebecause it

canneverachieveobjectivity.Furthermore,reducingtheinvolvementoftheresearcherunderminesthe

potential of the researcher in developing a truly grounded theory. I therefore reject Parry’s positivist

approachtoGT.

Asearlieralludedto,IacknowledgeIamnotseparatetotheinquiryprocess,northeconcepts,findings

andtheorygenerated.Iacceptthatitisthroughmyintuition,empathy,theoreticalsensitivity,analysis

and reflexivity (as opposed to reactivity) that the research has proceeded. Theory development is

recognised as a co‐construction of the researcher and the researched, and in relation to the specific

environment where the research was carried out. As a consequence, my evaluation of the research

throughout the project needed to specifically account for those factors. An advantage of qualitative

research in this respect is that it has no fixed tests or procedures to establish the trustworthiness or


credibilityofapieceofresearch.Criteriaformethodologicalsoundnesscanthereforebedevelopedin

relationtoeachuniqueresearchcontext(Easterby‐Smithetal.2002).

4.5.1 Criteriafortheevaluationofthisresearch

Layder(1998)ishimselfsilentinrelationtoevaluationcriteriaforAdaptiveTheory.However,anumber

oftheoristshaveaddressedthemethodologicalsoundnessofGT–eachwithadifferentbutworthyand

useful focus.Forexample,reflectingtheirconcernwiththeabilityofaGTtospeakspecificallyforthe

populationsfromwhichitwasderived,GlaserandStrauss(1967)discussedcredibility,plausibility,and

trustworthiness.Glaser (1978), adopting an instrumental stance, argued that the criteria of fit,work,

relevanceandmodifiabilityarehelpfulforthinkingabouthowusefulagroundedtheoryisforpeoplein

their everyday lives (Charmaz 2006). Corbin and Strauss (1990) detail 10 procedures for rigour, and

sevencriteriaagainstwhichtheadequacyoftheresearchcanbejudged.ChiovittiandPiran(2003)focus

on credibility, auditability and fittingness as standards of rigour. Charmaz (2006), on the other hand,

reflectshershiftfromtheobjectivistrootsofGTthroughthecriteriaofcredibility,originality,resonance

andusefulness.

I have drawn from all of these theorists in the development ofmy GT. Hence, the set of evaluation

criteria I have developed for the current study also stems from these theorists. For the researcher,

evaluation criteria are used throughout the research process to monitor the soundness of the

proceduresandemergingfindings.Forthereadertheinformationprovidedservesasanexplicationof

my(self‐)researchevaluationaswellasprovidingappropriatecriteriaforthereader’sevaluationofmy

work. The following table (Table 4.1) details the selected criteria, the authors fromwhich theywere

derived(asmanycriteriaoverlap),aswellashowthecriteriawereaddressedwithinthecurrentstudy.

Thekeyevaluationcriteriaare:

Credibilityofprocessandproduct

Auditability Resonance,fittingness Usefulness,originality,relevance


Table4.1:Evaluationcriteria

EvaluationCriteria/ProceduresforRigour Applicationtothepresentstudy

Credibility

Participantguidedinquiry.SamplinginGTproceedsontheoreticalgrounds(Glaser&Strauss1967;Glaser

1978;Corbin&Strauss1990).Integrationofparticipants’ownwords(Chiovitti&Piran2003).

AdistinctionhasbeenmadebetweentheuseofAdaptiveTheory,whichispartlydeductiveanddriven

byextanttheory,andthecomponentoftheresearchemployedtodiscovertheoryinrelationtointuition

disclosure.Thus,thelaterpartoftheresearch(andthemostsignificant)wasparticipantdriven.The

consequenceofthiswasthegenerationofnewquestions(describedinSection4.7.5)andthe

inclusionofan(almost)equalnumberofwomeninthesample(describedinSections4.7.1and4.7.2).

Participants’ownwordswereusedtoassistwithlabellingcategoriesandtheirproperties,andinjustifyingmyinterpretations.

Intimatefamiliaritywithsettingortopic(Charmaz

2006).

Section4.7.4describesrapportdevelopmentandthe

circumstancesthatledtoparticipantcandour.

Theuseofsystematicandconstantcomparisonsin

analysis(Glaser&Strauss1967;Glaser1978;Corbin&Strauss1990;Chiovitti&Piran2003;Charmaz2006).

Theuseofsystematicandconstantcomparisoninthe

analysisofdataforthisstudyisdescribedinSection4.7.7.

Buildingprocessintothetheory(Glaser&Strauss1967;Corbin&Strauss1990;Charmaz2006)

Socialprocesswasbuiltintotheresearchquestion.TheuseofStraussandCorbin’s(1998)Coding

Paradigmfacilitatedprocessinthedevelopmentofthetheory.ThisisdescribedinSection4.7.7.Process

isdepictedinChapter5:AnalysesandTheoryDevelopment.

Logicallinksbetweengathereddataandargument

andanalysis(Glaser&Strauss1967;Glaser1978;Charmaz2006)

Logicallinksbetweengathereddatawerefacilitated

throughaxialcoding,theoreticalsaturationandmemowriting.Theseideas/techniquesaredescribed

inSection4.7.7.

Patternsandvariationsaccountedfor(Glaser&

Strauss1967;Corbin&Strauss1990;Charmaz2006)

Patternsaredescribedandexplainedalongwith

evidenceinChapter5:AnalysesandTheoryDevelopment.Variationstothesepatternsare

explicitlyaccountedforwithintheinterpretationofdata.


Table4.1:Evaluationcriteria(continued)

Auditability

Demonstratedresearcherreflectionandreflexivity

(Chiovitti&Piran2003;Charmaz2006;Charmaz2009)

Researcherreflectionandreflexivitywereachieved

throughkeepingajournalandmemowriting,andwasdemonstratedinrelationtointerviewinginSection

4.7.7.Theuseoffirstpersoninthewritingofthethesis,andanemphasisoninterpretationoftheory

anddata,alsocontributed.PositioningoftheresearcherwasoutlinedinChapter1.

Participantselection–rationaleandmethod(Corbin&Strauss1990;Chiovitti&Piran2003)

ParticipantselectionisdescribedandjustifiedinSections4.7.1and4.7.2.

Justificationoftheresearcher’sinsightsandcriteria

forcategory,corecategoryselectionanddevelopment(Glaser&Strauss1967;Glaser1978;

Corbin&Strauss1990)

Insights,categoryandcorecategoryselectionis

describedinSection4.8.7.Recordsweremaintainedthroughmemowritingandkeepingofapersonal

journalassuggestedbyBazeley(2007).

Resonance,fittingness

Inclusionofbroaderstructuralconditions(Glaser&Strauss1967;Corbin&Strauss1990;Charmaz2006)

Theinclusionofbroaderstructuralconditionsisakeyfeatureofthechosentheoreticalperspectiveand,as

aconsequence,ofthedevelopedtheory.Chapter3isdedicatedtoexplainingandjustifyingthisapproach.

Thedevelopedtheoryencompassesanalysisatfourlevelsofdescription.

Relationshipofthedevelopedtheorytotheextantliterature(Chiovitti&Piran2003;Charmaz2006)

Thefunctionofthefinalchapter(Chapter6)istoexplainhowthedevelopedtheorysitswithinand

extendstheextantliterature.

Usefulness,originality,relevance

Thesignificance,relevanceandcontributionofthe

theorydevelopedtheoryi.e.howdoesthisresearchcontributetoabetterworld?(Glaser1978;Charmaz

2006).Whataretheopportunitiesforfutureresearchasaconsequenceofthisresearch?(Charmaz2006).

Chapter6detailsthesignificanceofthefindingsand

thedevelopedtheoryinrelationtotheory,policyandfutureresearch.Thetheorygeneratedaddressesa

heretounexaminedphenomenonandisthereforeoriginal.

Usefulnessandrelevanceforparticipants(Glaser&Strauss1967;Glaser1978;Corbin&Strauss1990).

Thetheorygeneratedbythisresearchwillcontributetoabetterawarenessandunderstandingoftherole

andimportanceofnon‐rationalprocessindecision‐making(intuitioninparticular).Iamconfidentthat

thefindingswillhaveconsiderablerelevancetoothersinsimilarpositions.


4.6 EthicalConsiderations

The research followed all requirements for approval by the University of New England’s Human

Resource Ethics Committee. Written consent for each of the interviews and the recording of the

interviewwassoughtandstoredonfile.Permissiontorecordtheaudioof interviewswasalsosought

andachieved inall cases.Thecandidateapplied forandreceivedclearance tocarryout theresearch:

ApprovalNo.HE07/187,validto1/11/2008.

4.7 Method:DataCollection

4.7.1 Purposiveselection:EliteAustralianLeaders

The selection of ‘elite’ organisational leaders in this PhD studywas a deliberate strategy thatwill be

explained and justified. While there is some debate as to who may be considered elite in business

environments(Smith2006),theyaregenerallyidentifiedasthosewhocontrolresources(Oniascitedin

Smith2006)andareoftenassociatedwithwealth(Odendahl&Shaw2001).However,‘businesselite’is

definedhere,consistentwithBurton&Higley(1987)andPettigrew(1992)asthosewhooccupyformal

positionsof authoritywithin institutionsandorganisations. In relation to the current research, I have

translated this to be CEOs, Chairs, Directors and senior management in Australian public service

institutionsaswellasprivateandpubliccompanies.

I acknowledge, however, that such a categorisation based on positional power may inadequately

represent actual power relations and influencewithin anorganisation. For example, Pettigrew (1992)

pointedoutthatthepowerandinfluenceofthoseinseniorpositionsissomewhatmitigatedbypeople

both inandoutsideorganisationsaswellas laws,traditionsandcultureatthesocietal,organisational

and individual level. Smith (2006), inapost‐structuralapproach topower relations,argued thatusing

positionalpowerasanorganisingprincipleignorestheshifting,transientandnatureofpower44.Indeed

attheextremeendofthisdebatearethosecomplexitytheoristswhoarguethatthesuccessorfailureof

an organisation is more due to external and environmental variables rather than actions of the

nominatedleader(Pfeffer(1977)citedinDubrin,Dalglish&Miller2006).However,thisresearchisnot

concerned with the extent of influence each particular leader might have within an organisation. I

assumeonlythatparticipantshaveatleastsomeinfluencethroughtheirdecision‐making.

44ThisisanalogoustoFoucault’s(1980)notionof‘shiftingalliances’.


Apurposivesamplingstrategywasemployed in recruitingparticipants inorder toselect ‘information‐

richcases’forthisstudy(Patton2002,p.230).PurposivesamplingisdescribedbyMaxwell(2005,p.88)

as ‘a strategy in which particular settings, persons, or events are selected deliberately in order to

provideimportantinformationthatcan’tbegottenfromotherchoices’.LincolnandGuba(1985)argued

thatpurposivesamplingisconsistentwithinterpretiveapproachesinthatitdoesnotsuppress‘deviant

(sic) or extremecases’ and thereby increases the ‘likelihood the full arrayofmultiple realitieswill be

uncovered’(p.40).Infact,LincolnandGubaciteextremecasesasajustificationforpurposivesampling.

Extremecasescanreveal information ‘thatmaybe ...enlightening’ (p.200). IconcurwithLincolnand

Gubainthisregard,andarguethatthishasindeedbeenthecaseinthecurrentstudy.

I considerAustralianelite leaders as appropriate to thepurposeof the study and ‘enlightening’ for a

numberofreasons.First,Iwouldargueitisself‐evidentthatthroughthedecisionstheymake,business

eliteshavea large influence inthecreationofthesocial, financial,culturalandphysicalenvironments

thatshapeourexperiencesasindividuals,andinfamiliesandorganisations.Isuggestthisisparticularly

relevantintoday’sbusinessdriven,consumersociety.

Second, elites are likely to be highly intelligent, articulate and confident, with high levels of

interpersonal skills (Hirsch 1995; Odendahl & Shaw 2001). In many cases elites can be considered

‘professionalcommunicators’(Welch,Marschan‐Piekkari,Penttinen&Tahvanainen2002,p.615).Given

that the phenomenon under investigation is elusive, sub‐conscious, and difficult to articulate, ‘Like

grabbing a column of smoke’ (Robson 2004, p. 74), I argue such individualswould bemore likely to

producerelevant,rich,coherentdata,whichwasshowntobethecase(discussedbelow).

Third,elitesarelikelytohavehadhighlevelsofeducation,experienceintheirjobs45andexposuretoa

wide variety of social andbusiness networks, (Neuman2000;Odendahl& Shaw2001; Smith 2006). I

wouldarguethisqualifiesthemtocommentonAustralianbusinessculture,specifictotheirrolesandin

general.Fourth,andmostsalient,Iwouldarguethatbecauseleadersaremorelikelytobeintuitiveor

use intuition (Agor 1985; Behling & Eckel 1991; Robson & Miller 2006), and also must justify the

decisionstheymaketotheirboardsaswellasstakeholders,theywould,therefore,likelybecognisantof

attitudesto,anddisclosureof,intuition.

4.7.2 Purposivesamplingprocedureandrecruitmentstrategies

Participantswerepredeterminedandcontactedthroughaletterofinvitationintwophases.Inthefirst

45Between10and40yearsinleadershippositions(asdefinedbytheparticipants).


phase,followingethicsapprovalandmyconfirmationofcandidature,onehundredinvitationsweresent

out along with an information sheet describing the research. I initially used the ‘True Leaders’ lists

published in Boss magazine46, 2001‐2007 to identify potential candidates. These leaders were

experienced, ran significantAustralianorganisationsandhadbeen selectedbya ‘distinguishedpanel’

(Macken2002)oftheirpeers.Sixparticipants,fivewomenandonemanwererecruitedfromtheselists.

When this resourcewasexhausted, I identifiedand targetedCEOs,Directorsandseniorexecutivesof

major Australian organisations through their corporate websites as well as utilising management

magazines such asManagement Today. A further 13 acceptances were received in this way. In the

meantime I conducted a pilot study using three individuals who were known to me that ran

organisations,which allowedme to try out and fine‐tunequestions, and examinemyownbehaviour

andresponsesintheinterview.

The second phase of recruitment again targeted CEO’s and Directors found through management

magazines and corporate websites which rendered a further eight participants. This group size was

substantially smaller than the first phase, however, an obvious reason for thiswas the timing of the

invitations,whichweresentoutsubsequenttothebeginningoftheglobal financialcrisis. Iargue it is

reasonabletoassumethatleaderswerefocusedontheimplicationsofglobalchaosandthereforeless

likelytobewillingtoparticipateinPhDresearch.Theparticipantsinterviewed,asindicatedinTable4.2,

representedawidevarietyofindustries/activities.Itshouldbeacknowledgedthat,inmanycases,these

individualswerewellknownatanational level in thebusinesscommunity,andcurrentlyholdand/or

haveheldmanydirectorshipsandleadershippositionsacrossdiversefieldsinmanyorganisations.

Imodifiedmyrecruitmentstrategy in thissecondphaseofparticipantrecruitment,whichoccurred in

early2008.Asmentionedearlier,inthecourseofthefirstroundofinterviewsitbecameapparentthat

femaleparticipants talkedabout intuition,asaconceptandasanexperience, inadifferentway than

maleparticipants.Furthermore,twooftheinitialparticipantsraisedgenderasrelevanttothedisclosure

of intuition(s). This was a significant finding, and one which went to the heart of the theory later

developed. In recognition of the importance of gender to the research I specifically targetedwomen

leadersinthissecondphase.

Thisstrategyoftargetingaspecificgroupisconsistentwiththeconceptof‘theoreticalsampling’.Glaser

and Strauss (1967) defined this as ‘the process of data collection for generating theorywhereby the

analystjointlycollects,codesandanalyseshis(sic)dataanddecideswhatdatatocollectnext…inorder

46ApartoftheAustralianFinancialReview.


todevelophis(sic)dataas itemerges’ (p.45).Womenparticipantshadtobeactivelysoughtbecause

theywereunderrepresentedinthegovernanceandleadershipofAustralianorganisations.Womenhold

only 8.3%of boarddirectorships and chair only 2%ofASX200 companies. Furthermore,womenhold

only2%ofthechiefexecutiveofficerpositionsand10.7%ofexecutivemanagerpositions(EOWA2008).

Fortunately however, women were both over‐represented in the True Leaders list (relative to the

former statistics) and tended to accept my invitation to participate more often than men. I was

thereforeabletoachieveanoverall(almost)equalbalanceofmenandwomenbytheendofthesecond

phaseofparticipantrecruitment(13menand14womenintotal).

Participants were between the ages of 39 and 72‐years‐old (the average being 54‐years‐old), had

between10‐40yearsof leadershipexperience (asdefinedby them)with theaveragebeing24years.

Participantsdefinedleadershipexperienceprimarilyasseniororganisationalpositionsandhigher,while

a few defined it as being responsible for people in an organisation in some form. A more detailed

accountofparticipantswillbepresentedinChapter5.

Table4.2:Participantsbygenderandindustry

Industry Female Male

Managementconsultancy 2

Arts 1 1

Finance 2 2

Law 1

Politics(state) 1 1

Transport 2 2

Govt.Dept. 3

Govt.Institute 1 1

Notforprofit 1

Communications 1 1

Retail(food) 1

Education 1

Agriculture 1

Manufacturing 1

Total 14 13


4.7.3 Interviews

Semi‐structuredinterviewsweredeemedappropriateasthesolemethodofdatacollection.Interviews

areessentiallyadirect inquiry intothepsychobiographiesoftheparticipants.ConsistentwithLayder’s

(1997)thinkingIwouldargueitisthroughpsychobiographythatweareabletoaccesstheotherlevels

ofsocialorganisation.Whileaccesstocompanyrecordsmaybeusefulinmanyareasofinquiry,Iargue

thiswouldnotbethecaseforthisresearch.Fromapracticalpointofview,thegenerosityandlimited

time of the elite participants should not be undervalued and to ask for a further intrusion might

generateillwill.Furthermore,theparticipantsmostcommonlyheldmultipledirectorshipsorotherroles

in variousorganisationsand itwouldbedifficult to knowwhich information to seek.Moreover, their

perceptionswerenotsoughtinrelationtooneparticularorganisationbutbasedontheirexperienceof

multipleorganisationsoverperiodsofupto40years.

Semi‐structured interviews combine advantages of both structured and unstructured interviews. This

study utilised a series of open‐endedquestions that allowed for the individual and unique responses

supplementedbyfurtherprobes.Furthermore,becauseintervieweeswereinitiallyaskedthesamebasic

setofquestions,comparisonandconsensusofconstructionwasalsoable tobeachieved (Marshall&

Rossman1999;Minichiello,Aroni&Hayes2008).Afurtheradvantageofsemi‐structuredinterviewswas

thecapacitytomodifytheinterviewscheduleinresponsetoemergingtheoryandengageintheoretical

sampling,bothofwhicharecriticaltoGT.

4.7.4 Interviewingelitesasamethod

Theoverwhelmingmajorityofsocialresearchandmethodologyliteratureconcerns‘interviewingdown’

and a focus on the ‘average person or the poor and powerless’ (Neuman 2000, p. 345). As a

consequence,theassociatedliteratureassumesandreflectsthisfocus.However,Iwillargueherethat

the issues, challenges and opportunities involved in elite interviewing are quite different from those

involvedininterviewingdown(Odendahl&Shaw2001;Desmond2004;Smith2006).Researchfocusing

oneliteindividualsisscarce,andtextsdiscussingeliteresearchmethodologyandstrategyarerarerstill

(Pettigrew1992;Hertz&Imber1995;Ostrander1995;Thomas1995;Neuman2000;Welchetal.2002;

Kezar2003)and,toanextent,inconsistent(Odendahl&Shaw2001;Robson2009).

Elitestudiesattractedacertainamountofacademicinterestinthe1930s,however,sincethen,Dexter

(1970), supported later by Kezar (2003), claimed that few subsequent advances have beenmade in

understandingandthishasconsequencesforthefewwhodotakesuchresearchuponthemselves.Such

apaucityoftheoryandapplicableresearchpracticesnecessitatesacertainamountofimprovisationfor


those willing, interested or required to ‘research up’. Restricting the discussion to business elites, a

numberofaspectscanbeidentifiedthatseparatesthemfromthenon‐elitepopulation.

Accessibility

Findingwillingparticipants is commonly citedby researchers as a significantbarrier (Kincaid&Bright

1957; Pettigrew 1992; Odendahl & Shaw 2001; Welch et al. 2002). Elites are likely to be very busy

people, who are in constant demand and receivemany invitations to participate in research (Dexter

1964). They are therefore likely to employ ‘gatekeepers’ to restrict access (Odendahl & Shaw 2001;

Welch et al. 2002). Neuman (2000) added that elites value their ability to maintain secrecy and

seclusion.Moreover, in the view of Hertz and Imber (1995), elites are, to an extent, defined by the

capacitytoinsulatethemselves.Thiscombinationoffactorswouldappeartoexplainwhyelitesarenot

studiedmoreoften.

However,incontrasttotheaboveconsensusintheliterature,Ifoundthatarrangingforinterviewswith

elites was a relatively easy task. I will now detail three suggestions as to why my experience was

different. First, I attempted to make it as simple and convenient as possible for the candidates to

participate.ConsistentwiththeadviceofLilleker(2003),Icreatedasinglepageletterofinvitationthat

was informative, coherent andmost importantly, concise. Imade it clear that interviewswould likely

run to an hour or less and that the participant could determine the actual length. In an attempt to

establishmyown credibility,which is consideredbyWelch et al. (2002) asmore significant for elites

thannon‐elites,IalsoincludedtheletterheadoftheUniversityandthenamesofmysupervisors,aswell

asmyqualificationsandawards.

Second, I chose to include theword intuition in the descriptionof the research because I believed it

mightattractinterestasanunder‐researchedbutrelevantaspectofleadership.Indeedthelastquestion

in my interview schedule probed the participants for their reasons for participating and several

confirmedtheirinterestinthetopicasamotivatingfactorfortheiracceptance.Thethirdandmostcited

reasonforparticipationwasthedesireoftheparticipantstocontributetoAustralianacademicbusiness

research.Participantssawthisactivityascontributingtothe‘commongood’.Asoneparticipantpointed

out, they were more likely to agree to participate in academic research rather than journalistic or

commercialresearch.

PowerRelations

Mostelites,particularlythoseinformalleadershippositions,areusedtobeingincharge,andincontrol

of interpersonal situations (Ostrander1995).Theyarealsomore likely tobe familiarandcomfortable

withtheinterviewformat,researchtechniques,andeventechniquesbywhichtheymaymanipulateand


control such situations. Researchers have found that elites will tend to steer the discussion in the

directiontheywishtotakeit,therebyprotectingtheirinterestsorthoseoftheorganisation(Ostrander

1995; Thomas 1995; Neuman 2000). Furthermore, if interviews are to be conducted in the natural

settingof theparticipants, this canmeanplushand luxurious surroundings.Collectively, these factors

canleadtheresearcher,especiallythenascentresearcher,tofeelingoverwhelmed,intimidatedandlike

a‘supplicantgrantedanaudiencewithadignitary’(Thomas1995,p.7).Icanconfirmthisfrommyown

experienceinface‐to‐faceinterviews47.

Asymmetricalpower relations canproducea ‘haloeffect’48 andnegatively impacton thedynamicsof

the interview, and therefore the quality of the data, through reluctance to appropriately probe or

confront the elite subject (Ostrander 1995; Thomas 1995). On the other hand, the advantage of

interviewing well‐educated, intelligent, and articulate participants is the quality of data thatmay be

elicitediftheinterviewerisexperienced,aware,confidentandcapable(Odendahl&Shaw2001).Welch

etal.(2002)pointedoutthateliteparticipantsare‘morethancapableofdealingwithdemandingand

probing questions’ (p. 616). This issue had relevance for theway I delivered questionswhichwill be

addressedpresently.

Businesselitesoperatefrombasesofpositional,referentandexpertpower(Dubrinetal.2006).Itisalso

assumed that this power will transfer onto the dynamics of the interview (Smith 2006). Desmond

(2004), for example, argued that, despite any strategy employed by a researcher, an asymmetrical

power relationship is inevitable.Welchetal. (2002)maintainedthat ‘studiesonelite interviewingare

unanimous in that the power balance is likely to favour the informant over the researcher’ (p. 615).

Despite this, apart from the footnoted example, normal nervousness, and a healthy respect for the

challenge, I seldom felt an imbalance of power relations. On reflection, I can attribute the power

dynamicsIexperiencedtofourperhapsuniquefactorsthatunderminedtheassumptionsaboutpower

articulatedintheliterature.

47ForoneparticularinterviewIwassuddenlysummoned20minutesearlierthanthearrangedtimeandarrived,redfaced,fromrushingtothetopfloorofaSydneyofficetowerwithacollarthatwastootight(sothattheblood

flowedup,butnotdown).Sweatingprofusely,andveryuncomfortable, Iaskedthehighprofileparticipant ifhewouldmindif I loosenedmycollar.HisvaletofferedmeachoiceofsparklingorstillmineralwaterasIwrestled

withmycollarandtiewhiletheamusedparticipantlookedon.

48A ‘halo effect’ is sometimesproducedwhen the interviewer is in aweof the interviewee.As a consequence,

anythingtheparticipantsaysisbeyondquestion.


First, it was clear tome that the positional power of the participant is consequential only in that it

identifiesthemaselite.GivenIwasnotamemberoftheirrespectiveorganisations;theyheldnoformal

poweroverme.Second,referentpowercanbedefinedasthepowerthatindividualsorgroupsgivean

individual,andcanbeseenasalignedtostatusandreputation(Dubrinetal.2006).Assaid,anumberof

these elites are well known in business circles, and with the wider public through interviews and

commentary in the media. However, their history, achievements and personal context were only

relevant and important if they revealed it themselves in their own narrative, and in relation to the

research questions. I therefore made the decision to do no research on the individuals prior to the

interview49,otherthanwhatwasnecessarytoidentifythem.Ibelievethatthisassistedinmitigatingmy

nervousness,whichinturn,allowedmetofocusmoreclearlyontheirresponses.

Third,a reversaloccurred in relationtoexpertpower.Muchof theresearch involving interviewswith

elitesseekstoelicitinformationconcerningtheparticipant’sdomainofexpertise.However,thiswasnot

thecaseinmyresearch.Participantswereselectedbecauseoftheirassumedexpertise,however,Idid

not seek to access their specific domain knowledge. I sought instead to gain their perceptions

concerningintuition.MosthadreadnothingaboutintuitionnorthoughtaboutitextensivelywhereasI

hadbeenresearchingandthinkingaboutitformanyyears‐ Iwastherefore‘theexpert’.Fourth,after

conducting a number of interviews either face‐to‐face or by telephone50, I concluded that telephone

interviewsmitigated the discussed intimidating impact of elite environments and provided a certain

anonymityforbothparties(Cavana,Delahaye&Sekaran2001).Iarguethesefactorsfurtherpromoted

symmetricalpowerrelations.

Rapportandcandourofparticipants,andauthenticity

Muchof the literaturediscusses theuniquecontextof researchingelites in relation to thechallenges

posed,aswellasstrategiesproposedtomaximisefranknessandopennessthroughdevelopingrapport

withparticipants (Odendahl& Shaw2001;Berry 2002;Welchet al. 2002). ConsistentwithOstrander

(1995) and Kincaid and Bright (1957), who found it was generally those lower in organisational

hierarchieswhowerelesscandidandmorelikelytoattempttoassertpower,Ihadnodifficultygetting

participantsto‘openup’.Insomecasesparticipantsshowedaleveloffranknessthatwassurprisingto

usboth.Oneparticipant(Participant2)remarkedthathewas‘astonished’atthethingshewassayingto

49Ioftenresearchedtheparticipantaftertheinterviewtosatisfymyowncuriosity.

50Ofthe27interviewsconductedeightwereface‐to‐faceand19viatelephone.Ofthe19telephoneinterviews10

werewithfemaleparticipantsandeightwithmaleparticipants.


me. Iattributetheparticipants’candourtothefollowingfactorsstemmingfromthepropertiesof the

researcher,theresearchedandthecontextoftheinterview.

Researcher

Iwouldagree that the capacityof the researcher tobeable to relate in away that is familiar to the

participantismostuseful.OdendahlandShaw(2001)arguedthatageisafactorinbeingtakenseriously

asaresearcher.Iwasonlysevenyearsyoungerthantheaverageageoftheparticipantsatthetimethe

interviews were conducted. I have a varied and international work and life experience, speak two

foreign languages and have two teenage children. My undergraduate degree was broad in scope

(Sociology,HumanResourceDevelopment,CommunicationandHumanRelationsmajors,andsomeLaw

units) and in addition, I have also been exposed to a number of knowledge and skill‐developing

programsaspartofthisPhDresearch.

I believe the skills, experience and knowledge gained were valuable. They provided a working

knowledgeofcommunicationprocessesandpracticalskillsthat Ioftenused,particularlyparaphrasing

(Cavanaetal.2001;Beebe,Beebe&Redmond2005).Combined,Ibelievethesefactorscontributedto

the easy rapport I felt withmost participants. I would not go so far as Berry (2002), however, who

suggestedthatagoodinterviewermakesaninterviewseem‘likeagoodtalkamongoldfriends’(p.679).

IntheelitecontextIbelieveoneshoulduseextremecautionwiththistypeofapproach,whichcouldbe

interpretedasassuming,overlyfamiliar,andlackingrespect.

Researched

IconcurwithWelchetal.(2002)thatthecandour,franknessandapparenthonestyofparticipantswere

due,inpartatleast,tothegoodnatureoftheparticipants51andtheiroutstandingcommunicationskills,

as discussed. I would regard the quality and quantity of the data as testament to the ability and

openness of the participants. Many of the participants are paid celebrity speakers. Despite the

demanding and introspective nature of the questions their ability to respond was impressive. For

example,thefirstinterviewIconductedresultedinatotalofnearly4000words,gainedinaboutahalf‐

hoursession.AlthoughWelchetal.(2002)pointedoutthatquantityofdatadoesnotequalquality,in

my opinion, their responseswere relevant, coherent and concise, and reflected superior knowledge,

experience,wisdomandinsight.

51Contributingtothecommongoodwasthemostcitedreasonforparticipatinginthestudy.


Contextofinterview

TaylorandBogdan(1998)arguedthatinorderforinterviewstobeconsidered‘indepth’theymustbe

both face‐to‐face and repeated. However I would regard this as a quantitative prescription for a

qualitativeaspiration.Multipleencountersarenoguaranteeofdepthorcredibility,noristhemedium

ofcommunication.Qualityofdata ishighlycontextualand,as Ihaveargued,dependsonmanythings

including the qualities of the researcher, the researched, and the context of the interview. The

interviews were not repeated nor were they all face‐to‐face yet I maintain the data obtained was

penetrating, highly relevant and illuminating. Using the example of the first interview I conducted

(mentionedabove), Isuggestanhonestywasachievedthatwouldberare inmanyother interviewing

contexts.WhileIcouldhaverequestedmultiple interviewswiththeparticipants, inhindsight, Idonot

believethiswouldhaveaddedagreatdeal.Moreover,Ibelievearequestformultipleinterviewsinthe

letterofinvitationwouldhavereducedtheacceptancerate.Perhapstheseinteractionscouldbetterbe

describedas‘deep’ratherthan‘in‐depth’interviews.

Asdiscussed,manyoftheinterviewswereconductedviatelephoneratherthanfacetofaceandIargue

that this did not detract from the interview. The telephone is an information‐lean medium (Beebe,

Beebe&Redmond1999)thatexcludesthevisualchannelandthereforeprecludesobservationofbody

language.However,Iwouldarguethat,inthecontextofeliteinterviews,theinterviewerismostlytoo

preoccupiedwithlisteningandanalysingtheeliteparticipant’sdenseandrapidrepliestobefullyaware

ofthisinface‐to‐facesettings.

Furthermore,thelackofavisualchannelhascertainadvantages.Aspointedoutearlier,theuseofthe

telephoneprovidesasenseofanonymityfortheparticipant(Cavanaetal.2001;Minichielloetal.2008),

which, Ibelieve,wasespeciallyvaluableconsideringtheintenselyself‐reflectivenatureofsomeofthe

questions52. I also found that, in a situation where I was doing 90% of the listening, the use of the

telephonefreedmefromthesocialobligationtomakeeyecontactandmaintainanappropriatefacial

expression. I found this to be distracting and extremely draining, and therefore detrimental to my

performanceintheface‐to‐faceinterviewsIconducted.Thesuccessofaninterviewshouldbeevaluated

intermsofhowrich,relevantandcrediblethedataare,andhowusefultheyaretounderstandingthe

researched phenomena. I concur with Minichiello et al. 2008 (2008) that electronic media has the

potentialtobothincreaseanddecreasethesuccessofaninterview,sodefined.

52Oneparticipantstatedthisexplicitly.


Inaddition, the focusof thequestionson theperceptionsofparticipantsabout intuition, rather than

their work, career or specific organisation, contributed to the candour of participants. This personal

focus,accordingtoThomas(1995),decreasestheneedtoprotecttheinterestsoftheorganisationand

increases the freedom of participants to express themselves. The result is fewer scripted and

obfuscatingresponsesthatcanconfoundandfrustratetheinterviewer(Yeager&Kram1995).

Deliveryofquestions

AccordingtoCavanaetal.(2001)interviewsoftenruntotwohoursormore,allowingtimetodevelop

rapportandtrustwithaparticipant,andcoverawiderangeofissuesandthemes.Withsuchflexibility

and latitude, it should also be possible for the researcher to make multiple attempts at probing a

particularissueinavarietyofways.Moretimeandarelaxedatmospherealsogivetheparticipantthe

opportunity to reflect and formulate a response (should they be motivated to). Furthermore, when

‘researching down’, asymmetrical power relations in favour of the researcher should dictate that

questionsbeasopenandastentativeaspossible.Thisstrategyisemployedtomitigatethetendencyof

participants to attempt to please the interviewer by providing responses he/she thinks are desired

(Dean&Whyte1970).

However, inelite interviewcontextsparticipantsarenot likely togrant interviewsof longer thanone

hour,andsometimesless,andindeedthiswasmyexperience.Itfollowsthattheinterviewermustmake

themostofthislimitedtimeframethroughefficiencystrategies.AccordingtoBerry(2002),interviewers

need to know when to further probe responses and when to continue with the interview protocol,

hence, good interviewing intuition on the part of the researcher is a prerequisite (Odendahl& Shaw

2001). As good intuition, at least in part, is based on experience (Sadler‐Smith & Sparrow 2007),

Zuckerman’s(1972)claimthateliteinterviewingisnotforthenaiveisjustified.

Myinterviewingintuition(basedontheexperienceofmyHonoursresearch)toldmeIneededtobeas

efficient,directandclearaspossible.IwasnotfullycognisantofthisuntilIsubmittedmyfirstinterview

transcript for review by an expert in the field. Pat Bazeley tactfully put it tome thatmy delivery of

questionswas ‘quite direct’ (Bazeley 2008, pers. comm.). Thiswas an insightful comment because it

forcedmetoanalysewhatIhaddoneintuitively.Onreflection,Ibelievethatmydirectmannerofasking

questionswasappropriatetothegoalsoftheresearchinviewoftheuniquesetofcircumstancesthat

circumscribedtheinterview.Basedonthediscussionabovetheseare:

♦ Limitedtimeframeforinterviews

♦ Extraordinaryself‐confidenceofparticipants♦ Extraordinaryintellectualandcommunicationabilityofparticipants

♦ Rapid,rich,relevantanddensedata♦ Abilityofparticipantstocopewithdemandingandprobingquestions


♦ Symmetricalpowerrelations♦ Excellentrapportandcandour

Iwouldarguethatallofthesecontextualfactorspointtotheappropriatenessofadirect,frank(butnot

insensitive, brash or overly‐invasive) approach. Indeed, Minichiello et al. (2008) supported a more

directive approachwhen interviewing expert informants. Of course, a balance had to bemaintained

betweenavoiding tangential issuesandbeingopen todiscoveryor themes thatmaynotat firsthave

seemedimportant.

Iarguethatdynamicsofinterviewswitheliteparticipantsaredistinctlydifferentto‘researchingdown’.

For example, interviews usually commencewith opening rituals that serve to put the interviewee at

easeandfostertrustandrapport.IncommonwithOdendahlandShaw(2001)Ifoundparticipantsdid

notwanttoengageinsuchrituals, ‘chitchat’orwhatCavanaetal.describedas‘entranceinvestment

time’ (Cavana et al. 2001, p. 139). Furthermore, I would agree with Welch et al. that the elite

participants‘welcome[d]theopportunityofrespondingdirectly’(Welchetal.2002,p.616)becausemy

approach to the interviews gave them such an opportunity. Furthermore, I believe that being direct,

conciseandtothepoint–‘gettingdowntobusiness’–isstandardpracticeforbusinesspeopleatthat

levelandthereforeculturallyconsistent.

Ifoundthatamixtureofopen,closedandcheckingquestions53wasmostuseful,dependingonwhether

I was focusing on confirmation (Dey 1999; Cavana et al. 2001) of extant theory or ‘discovering’ –

exploringnewareasandthemes(AdaptiveTheoryasopposedtoGTapproaches).Typically,Iwouldask

anopenquestioninformedbyextanttheorytoseeifaconfirmativeresponsewouldemerge.Ifnot,my

approach would becomemore direct, a technique Cavana, Delahaye et al. (2001) called ‘funnelling’.

Alternatively,probingintheinterviewmightuseopenandclosedquestionssequentially,whichsought

firsttoestablisharesponseandthentoelicitthethinkingbehindit.

The participants consistently demonstrated their ability and willingness to correct or contradict the

assertionsIputforwardinthesecheckingquestions,whichinturnledtonewthemesand‘discoveries’

thatmaynothavebeenotherwiseuncovered.AtnotimeinanyoftheinterviewsdidIhavethesense

that the data were compromised, generated biased responses (Cavana et al. 2001) or that the

53HereIdistinguishmyapproachfromCavanaetal.’s(2001)definitionofleadingquestions,wheretheystatethatsuchquestionsaredesignedtogetanswersthe‘researcherwouldliketoobtain’(p.458).Iwouldtestouthunchesthat came to me during the interview based on participant’s replies. The participants would then clarify their

positioninrelationtomine.ThiscouldbedoneinseveraldifferentwayspointedoutbyMinichiello,Aromietal.(2008) including‘devil’sadvocatequestions’, ‘hypotheticalquestions’, ‘posingthe ideal’and‘nudgingprobes’(p.

100‐101).


participantsweretryingtopleaseme.ConcurringwithDeanandWhyte(1970),Iattributethistoboth

the discussed qualities of these elite participants and the context of the interview. Furthermore, as

discussed, the techniqueswereused in fullawarenessof thepotential for suchcheckingquestions to

‘contaminate’54thedata.

4.7.5 Developmentoftheinterviewscheduleandprogressionofquestions

AsearlierdiscussedanddiagrammaticallyrepresentedinFigure4.1,theinterviewswerecharacterised

bytwodistinctapproaches.Thefirstapproach,consistentwithLayder’s(1998)AdaptiveTheory,sought

toconfirmtheconceptofintuitionthatparticipantswerereferringtowhentheydescribedanddefined

theirownintuition.MypreconceptionsofthevariantsofintuitionaredetailedinChapter2.Iaskedthe

participants to define and describe intuition in relation to their decision‐making processes. Their

responses very clearly fit the extant theoryon ‘gut feeling’ or experiential intuition, in some cases, a

textbookdefinition.Iwasthenabletoprobefurtherregardingthewayandthecircumstancesinwhich

they used intuition. Therefore, the aim of the first part of the interview was to establish their

interpretationor definitionof intuition, the importanceof it to their decision‐making and leadership,

andthecontextsurroundingthesethemes.

The subsequent questions in the initial interviews were developed in relation to disclosure of

intuition(s).Intheabsenceofextanttheory,questionsfocusedtheirattitudetowardintuition,howthey

perceived other regarded intuition and language used in relation to intuition use in various decision‐

making contexts. The pilot interviews were useful in becoming reacquainted with interviewing.

Moreover,asearliermentioned,the‘experience’ofintuitionforparticipantswasraisedasanissueand

theinterviewschedulewasmodifiedasaresult.ConsistentwiththeprinciplesofGTtheinterviewguide

evolvedinrelationtotheanalysisoftheresponsesofparticipantsthroughoutthedurationofthedata

gathering/analysisphase.Theprincipaldriverofthisevolutionwastheinterpreteddifferencebetween

maleandfemaleparticipantresponsestoquestionsconcerningtheirexperienceofintuition.Theinitial

andfinalinterviewguidescanbefoundatAppendix1and2.

54AlthoughCavana,Delahayeetal.(2001)usethistermIregarditaspositivistinorientationbecauseitimpliesthe

possibilityofabsoluteobjectivedata.


4.7.6 Datareductionandorganisation

Preparationforanalysis

Theinterviewswererecordedwiththepermissionoftheparticipants.Tworecordingdeviceswereused

intheeventofamalfunction,whichdidoccurononeoccasion.Therecordingswerethentranscribed

subsequenttoeachinterviewbymeasthesoleresearcher.Irejectedtheideaofhavingsomeoneelse

transcribe the data on cost grounds and because I wanted as much familiarisation with the data as

possible.Pauses, intonation, stuttering,andnotes Ihadmade immediatelyafter the interviews (body

language, the ‘feeling’ of the interview) were also inserted in parentheses throughout or at the

beginningofthetranscript.Thesetranscriptionswerethencheckedbymeandbyoneotherpersonfor

accuracy.OnceIwassatisfiedthetranscriptswereverbatim,IimportedthedocumentsintoNVivo7.

Thecompletedtranscriptsconstitutedroughly100,000words.Theprimarypurposeofdatareductionis

to reduce,organiseand structure theoriginal volumeofdata intomanageablequantities. Theuseof

computersandqualitativeanalysissoftwarepackages(QASP)arecommonlyutilisedtoolsforqualitative

researchersand, are suitable for thispurpose.Theprincipal advantageof softwareprogramsand the

reason I chose to useNVivo7, is that a fragment of text can be easily stored under several different

headings (nodes) that can represent multiple themes, categories or properties. This allows for

subsequent reconstitution and recombination under new organisational principles as the researcher

interpretsthedataanddevelopstheoryaboutwhatisgoingon,regardlessofthecomplexityorvolume

ofthedata(Coffey,Holbrook&Atkinson1996;Maxwell2005;Bazeley2007).

IrejectEasterby‐Smithetal.’s(2002)assertionthatthe‘investmentintermsofmoney,timeandenergy

wouldnotbe justified’ (p.129) intermsof familiarisingoneselfwithasoftwareprogramforaproject

with fewer than twentyparticipants55. I argue that justificationwoulddependon the volumeof data

generated (which can vary considerably), the aptitude of the researcher, their prior experience with

computerprograms,andthenatureandgoaloftheanalysis.Havingusedbothamanualmethodformy

HonoursyearresearchandNVivo7forthisstudyIwouldarguethatQASPsarenotonlymoreefficient

but are far superior tomanualmethods.On thebasis ofmyexperience Iwill now reviewand refute

somecriticismsmadeofQASPs.

Someauthors (see, forexample,Coffeyetal.1996;Hartman2005)attempttoarguethatuseofdata

managementsoftwarecarrieswith it theriskofbecomingremoved fromthedata.While thismaybe

55 Easterby‐Smith et al. (2002) appear to assume that the researcherwill not engage in any further qualitative

researchanalysis.


true for QASPs such as Leximancer, which automatically and quantitatively analyses text based on

frequency and co‐occurrences ofwords, the use of NVivo7 does not eliminate engagementwith the

data.Afterconducting the interviews, transcribing, reading, re‐readingandanalysing thedata twice, I

believe I can claim tohavehad ‘prolongedengagementwith thedata’, as recommendedbyMarshall

and Rossman (1999, p. 154). I would argue that NVivo7 merely provides an efficient method of

organisingandmanagingthedataandthusmaintainsthefocusoftheanalystonthecontentofthedata

ratherthanoncopingwiththeconsiderablecomplexitiesofkeepingitundercontrol.

IalsorejectCoffeyetal.’s(1996)claimthatmanyqualitativeanalysiscomputerprogramsdonotoffer

muchbywayofconceptualadvancesuponmanualmethods.Coffeyetal.’s claimwasmade13years

previous to this research (inadifferent century)and thereforewasnot cognisantof thecapacitiesof

morerecentgenerationsofsoftware.NVivo7,forexample,enablesdynamicmodellingofconceptsand

categories, inclusion of memos, field notes, and the importation and organisation of documents,

diagrams and, in the most recent version (NVivo8), audio‐visual material. Of particular value is the

facility of ‘matrix coding queries’, which allow the researcher to test out hunches by comparing two

categoriesofparticipantsinrelationtoaparticulartheme.Eachmatrixenquiry,donemanually,would

takemanyhours,evendays.

4.7.7 Descriptionofthepracticesandproceduresofdataanalysis

OpencodingusingNVivo7

CodinginNVivo7commencesbyopeningthetranscriptsandhighlightingselectionsoftext(incidentsor

themes)andthensavingthese into ‘freenodes’.Asengagementwiththedatacommencedthrougha

microscopic line‐by‐line analysis, I attached codes that describedor representedwhat I thought each

sectionofthetextwasabout.Theaimofopencodingistoproduceconceptsthatappeartofitthemes

identified in the data. Initial codes are tentative and provisional because certain free nodes will be

discardedlaterinthelightoffurtherdatacollectionandanalysis.Thereforemorethanonecodecanbe

generated from one fragment of text. The aim of the process is to open up the inquiry rather than

narrowitdown(Strauss1987).

Constantcomparisonwascarriedoutascodingproceeded,which,atthisstageinvolvedthecomparing

of incidents.Afteratime,manyoftheseincidents(freenodes)aregenerated.Atvariouspointsinthe

analysis I compared the content of the free nodes to decide how theywere similar or dissimilar and

askedquestionsofthedata:Dotheyrepresentthesameordifferentconcept?Whereweretheyseento

be different? If so, the categories could be left as theywere.Where the incidentswere seen as the

same,twonodescouldthenbemergedintoone.Itwasalsopossiblethattwoseparatecategoriescould

beunitedatahigherlevelofabstraction,andbydoingso,createacategorywithtwosub‐categoriesor


properties.Afurtherconsequenceofthisprocesswasthatsomeconceptsbecameredundant(because

no further incidents were found) while others became denser through repeated discovery of similar

incidents.Importantconcepts/categorieswereindicatedbymultipleincidents.Itisforthisreasonthat

grounded theoristsargue that the theory is groundedanddrivenby thedata (Glaser&Strauss1967;

Strauss1987;Strauss&Corbin1998).

However, it shouldbenoted that this processof discoveryoccurs in conjunctionwith the theoretical

sensitivityoftheresearcher,whichreferstotheorientationoftheresearcherandtheawarenessofthe

subtleties of meaning of data, and is therefore a personal quality of the researcher rather than a

procedure.Theoreticalsensitivityisgroundedintheknowledgeandexperienceoftheresearcher,which

isdevelopedbyongoingreadingandreflectionthroughouttheresearchprocess.Theoreticalsensitivity

enables the researcher to ‘see things’ in the data as significant and relevant (Glaser& Strauss 1967;

Glaser1998).Thecombinationof‘seeingthings’asrelevantinthedataasaconsequenceoftheoretical

sensitivity, and the frequency of occurrence of these themes or incidents, represents amixture and

a rapprochement of epistemological subjectivity and objectivity referred to earlier in the

methodologysection.

Axialcoding

Althoughthereissomeoverlapbetweenopencodingandaxialcodinginthepracticeofanalysis,they

havedifferentaimsandcanbeconceptuallydifferentiated.Axialcodinginvolvestheanalystfocusingon

the relationships between categories, specifically the building of a ‘dense texture of relationships’

around a single category (Strauss 1987, p. 64). Using the coding paradigm developed by Strauss and

Corbin(1987;1998)axialcodingassistsinthediscoveryofcategories,theirpropertiesanddimensions.

Identifyingthedimensionsofacategorythenenabledmetoidentifytheconditionsunderwhichthese

dimensionswereactivated.

Forexample,ifaparticipantsaid‘inorderformetomakeadecisionIliketohavealltheinformation’the

labelattachedmightbe‘amountofinformation’,whichimpliesthepolardimensionsofnoinformation

or all the information. It is then thatquestions aboutconditions, consequencesand strategiesand/or

interactionscanalsobeasked.Underwhichcircumstancesmighttherenotbealltheinformation?What

are the consequencesofnotenough information (orenough information), andwhat strategiesmight

theparticipantemploywhenthereisnotenoughinformation?Throughthisprocessofenquirythedata

were ‘cracked open’ and discoveries were made. While these discoveries may be described as

‘emergent’, the interactionandengagementoftheresearcherwiththedatawasclear.Thisprocess is

describedwithagreateror lesserdegreeofexplicitnessbyBazeley (2007),GlaserandStrauss (1967)

andStraussandCorbin(1990;1998).


Memowriting

Memosareconsidered integral to thedevelopmentofaGTandmaybegeneratedatanytime in the

processbutareespeciallyuseful in theearly stagesofopenandaxial coding (Strauss&Corbin1998;

Charmaz2006).Charmazregardsmemowritingas‘partial,preliminary,andprovisional’(p.84),where

theresearchercanexplorecategories,distinctionsbetweencategories,andtheirrelationships.Although

memowritingcanbeconsideredanintermediatestagebetweeninitialanalysisandwriting‐upfindings,

inmy case, theywerenotwritten for thepurposeofothers viewing them.Memowritingpointed to

possibilitiesandpotentialsratherthanconclusionsand,thus,wasoftenfreeflowing,basedon‘stream

ofconsciousness’,andrepresentedthereflectionsandinsightsIwashavingatthetime.However,the

memosIwrotewerealwaysaboutthedataormadereferencetothedataandthefocusofthewriting

wasasanalytical as itwas creative. It couldbe regardedas theproductof a ‘disciplined imagination’

(Dey1999,p.242)and,therefore,contributedtothedevelopmentofthetheory.

Consistentwithher constructivistGTprinciplesCharmaz (2006)wasnotonly interested in theorybut

how one arrives at that theory. As Charmaz pointed out, sensitizing concepts can ‘reverberate’

throughout a memo. Therefore, for Charmaz, memo writing is also a reflective (contemplative) and

reflexive(modifyingperceptionandaction)practice.Whileapplicationoftheoreticalsensitivityindata

naminghasbeencitedasanintuitiveprocess(asdescribedearlierbySchatzman(1991),memowriting

caused me, as the analyst, to become aware of, externalise and justify the coding process through

explicatingthereasonsforthechoicesImade–howandwhyImadesenseofthedata.Thisisaprocess

describedbyLocke(2001),whichcouldbeconsideredanexampleofagoodbalanceofanalyticaland

intuitive thinking in action. Leaning on Charmaz’s approach, I consider mymemowriting acted as a

catalyst to the self‐aware and reflexive development of ideas about concepts, categories and their

relationships, andprovideddocumentationof the thinking thatultimatelydrove theorganisationand

furthercollectionofdata.

Theoreticalsamplingandsaturation

Open and axial coding, in conjunction withmemowriting, brings the researcher to the point where

tentative theoretical propositions are formed and relationships between categories, as well as the

categoriesandtheirproperties,emergeandindicateatentativestory.Itbecameclearaftertheanalysis

ofthefirstinterviewsthatgenderwasgoingtobeakeyforunderstandingthestorybehindthenature

of intuition disclosure in organisations. To this end, as said, women were actively sought as


participants56.Theoreticalsampling,accordingtoCharmaz,entails‘seekingandcollectingpertinentdata

toelaborateandrefine’emergingtheory(Charmaz2006,p.96).

Theoretical saturation is typically claimed if no new patterns, properties or insights are found when

analysing freshdata (Glaser&Strauss1967; Strauss&Corbin1998;Charmaz2006).While saturation

canbedisconnectedfromsamplesize,itcanbeconsideredcontingentonthescopeoftheresearch,the

extenttowhichtheresearchcontradictsextanttheory,andtheweightofclaimsthatarebeingmade

(Charmaz 2006). Already we can see that theoretical saturation is not absolute but contingent on

circumstanceandcanneverbeclaimed.Inmyopinion,absolutetheoreticalsaturationisalogicalfallacy

because there might always be a ‘black swan’57 in the next interview. Theoretical saturation is

somethingtoaimfor,anidealratherthanagoalthatmustbeachieved.CorbinandStrauss(1990,p.14)

arguedthat:

Apoorlydevelopedcategoryisoneforwhichfewpropertieshavebeenuncoveredinthedataorforwhich

asubcategorycontainsonlyafewexplanatoryconcepts.Inorderforatheorytohaveexplanatorypower,

eachof itscategoriesandsubcategoriesmusthaveconceptualdensity.Whenthis is lacking,theanalyst

canreturntothefield,ortofieldnotestoobtaindatathatwillallowgapsinthetheorytobefilled.

I concurwithCorbinandStraussbutargue that this is alsoan ideal rather than something thatmust

occur. Clearly, data collection must cease at some point and the practical limitations of a research

project in termsof time andmoneymust also be considered. In a complex and exploratory research

project involving a relatively small sample such as the current one, the researchermakes implicit or

explicit decisions about which categories or themes might contribute to explanatory power and

therefore merit theoretical sampling. Paramount in this research was that the evidence and logical

connectionsunderlyingthecoreofthetheorywerewellsupported(multiple incidents),andshownto

bestrongthroughdatadisplay.

Theorybuildingthroughselectivecodingandcorecategoryselection

Whereasopenandaxialcodingthroughtheoreticalsensitivity,engagement, immersionandfamiliarity

withthedatacouldbelikenedtopatternrecognition(StraussandGlaser1970;Charmaz2006),theory

building through selective coding could be regarded as pattern creation (Higgs 2009, pers. comm.).

56Themechanicsofthisaredetailedintheprevioussection,onthepurposivesamplingprocedure(Section4.7.2).

57 The term black swan comes from the 17th century European assumption that all swans must be white.SubsequenttothediscoveryofblackswansinWesternAustraliainthe18thcenturyJohnStuartMillusedtheterm

todiscusssuchalogicalfallacyandconnotethataperceivedimpossibilitymayactuallycometopass(Taleb2007).


Selectivecodingisthefinalstepintheanalysisprocessandcausestheresearchertosynthesise,arrange

ororganisedatainnewwaystolimitanddeveloptheory.Memowriting,siftingandsortingasdescribed

by Charmaz (2006), and particularly dynamicmodelling, as described by Bazeley (2007), assisted this

processgreatly.NVivo7allowedmeto ‘draganddrop’nodes into themodellingwindowso that they

could be visually and actively manipulated. Whereas working with nodes and fragments of data is

essentiallyareductionist, linearprocess,dynamicmodelling isaholisticandnon‐linearrepresentation

oftheemergingelementsoftheoryandtheirrelationships.Dynamicmodellingallowedmetoarrange

and rearrange the elements of the theory, where the only limitation was the extent of my insight

andcreativity.

The term ‘selective’ in ‘selective coding’ denotes the decision of the analyst in promoting a single

category around which other categories can be integrated (Locke 2001). Before the selective coding

stage,theanalysishadreachedapointofmaximumcomplexity.Whileaxialcoding,dynamicmodelling

and the conditional/consequentialmatrix had assisted in creating some shape andorder, themodels

generatedat thatpoint in timewere conceptually fragmentedatdifferent levelsof socialdescription

(intrapersonal, interpersonal, organisational and environmental). My ‘Eureka moment’ came after

reviewingthewordsofafewofthemostinsightfulparticipantsaftertakingabreakfromtheanalysisfor

afewdays.Irealisedthattheacknowledgementandarticulationoffeelings,whichfeaturedsostrongly

intheinterviewswithwomen,couldalsobeappliedtootherlevels.

Forexample,interpersonalinteractionscaninvolvethedisclosureoffeelingsornot.Similarly,according

toparticipants,feelingswerearticulatedinsomeorganisations,butnotothers.Iwasthereforeableto

use a single concept ‘interiority’ (to denote the extent to which there is an orientation to feelings,

emotionsandintuitionsatthesedifferentlevels58),asthecoreconceptaroundwhichothercategories

couldbeorganised.Theconceptofinteriorityenabledmetointegratethetheoryateachandalllevels

ofsocialdescription.Thus,theconceptof‘orientationtofeelings’evolvedfromaprovisionalcategoryin

open coding, to a substantive category in axial coding, and to its selection as the core category in

selectivecoding/delimitationoftheory.

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter has addressed the methodological issues associated with the current study. A dual

interconnected approach to data gathering and analysis through two variants of GT was justified as

appropriatetothisresearch.ThefirstwasprincipallyinformedbyLayder’sAdaptiveTheory,whichwas

58Theconceptofinterioritywillbefullyexploredandexplainedinpart2ofChapter5.


usedtoascertaintheconceptualisationsthatparticipantsusedwhentheyspokeofusingintuition.The

secondvariantwasprincipallyinformedbyStraussandCorbin’sGTparadigmandwasusedtodescribe

and explain the basic social processes in relation to the disclosure of intuition(s) by individuals in

organisations. Purposive sampling of Australian elite leaders was described and justified. The use of

semi‐structured interviews, mostly conducted over the telephone, as well as the use of direct and

checkingquestionswasdeemedtobeappropriate,consideringtheresearcher,theresearchedandthe

contextof the interview. Evaluation criteria for theemergent grounded theorywerepresentedalong

withcorrespondingdetailsofhowmethodologicalsoundnesswasachievedinthestudy.Analysisofthe

data proceeded on the philosophical assumption thatmeaning communicated by participants can be

interpreted,at least inpart, through the intuitiveprocessesof the researcher,encapsulatedby terms

suchas‘naturalanalysis’and‘theoreticalsensitivity’,aswellasthemoreobjectivemethodof‘constant

comparison’. Consistent with the assumption of stratification assumed by this study, GT was

conceptualised as a mixed marriage of objective and subjective elements. Descriptions of the data

preparation,analysis,memowritingandtheorybuildingweregivenandtheuseofaQASPwasjustified.

C h a p t e r 5 : A n a l y s e s a n d T h e o r y D e v e l o p m e n t P a g e |132

Chapter5:Analyses&TheoryDevelopment

5.1Introduction

The previous chapter described and justified a dual interconnected approach to data collection and

analysis by which the research problem and issues were addressed. The first approach, informed

principallybyLayder’sAdaptiveTheory(Layder1998),soughttoconfirmordisconfirmextanttheoryin

relation to how participants in the study described, defined and used intuition(s) in their decision‐

making.Thesecondapproach, informedby theGroundedTheoryofStraussandCorbin (1990;1998),

Dey (1999) and Charmaz (2006; 2009) sought to discover and develop theory in relation to intuition

disclosure. The previous chapter also detailed the practices and procedures of data collection and

analysisusedinthisresearchincludingthepurposivesamplingofAustralianeliteleaders,thedeliveryof

questions,andtheuseofNVivo7toassistindatamanagement,analysisandtheorybuilding.Evaluation

criteriaandethicswerealsoaddressed.

Thischapterwillpresentfindingsinrelationtoeachoftheresearchquestionsculminatinginagrounded

theory of the use and disclosure of intuitions in organisations. The chapter will begin by providing

additional informationabouttheparticipants intermsoftheirage,gender, leadershipexperienceand

theirareaofactivity.Followingthistheresearchproblemwillberestated.Congruentwiththetwo‐part

natureoftheresearchproblemanddualmethodologicalapproach,thefindingswillbepresentedintwo

parts.Accordingly, the firstpartof the findingssectionwilldisplaydataandtheory inrelationtohow

participantsdefined,describedandused intuitionand the secondpartwill attend todataand theory

withrespecttothesocialprocessesthatconditionintuitiondisclosure.

Part 1 of the findings sectionwill show that participants experienced intuition as a received internal,

holistic, subconscious or preconscious sense or feeling of knowing thatwas informed by experience.

Importantly, I will show that participants distinguished the ‘feeling’ of intuition from emotion. The

analysiswill further show that participants used intuition conditionally, dependingon thenature and

contextofthedecision.Participantsusedintuitionprimarilyfordecisionsofaqualitativenatureandin

complex,ambiguousdecision‐makingcontextswhere therewas limited informationorprecedentand

where they had significant experience or domain knowledge. Furthermore, the participants used

intuitionandanalysisincomplementarywaysbyverifyingtheirintuitions,wherepossible,throughtheir

ownresearchandanalysespresentedbyothers.

In Part 2, I will show that the disclosure of intuition(s) is a complex, dynamic and conditional social

process. I will analyse the views and perceptions of participants concerning attitudes and language

surroundingtheuseofintuition,aswellastheinternal,subjectiveexperienceofintuition(s).Iwillshow


that the disclosure of intuition(s) is dependent on the extent to which individuals, interactions,

organisations and societies are oriented to the inner realm of feelings and intuitions. Iwill label this

orientation‘interiority’andarguethatthisconcept(asthecorecategorydevelopedinthestudy)canbe

appliedatallfouroftheselevelsofsocialdescription,and,inthisway,servestointegratethetheory.

Theanalyseswillfeaturefewreferencestoextant literature.Comparisonoftheemergenttheorywith

extantliteraturewilloccurinthefollowingchapter–Chapter6,Discussion,Conclusions&Implications.

5.2Participants

Table5.1belowdisplaysdetailsoftheage,sex,leadershipexperienceasdefinedbytheparticipants59,

thepositionheldintheorganisationthroughwhichI locatedandcontactedthemand,thecategoryof

activityor industryof thatorganisation.This tableshouldbeseenasanadjunct toTable4.2which is

displayedinthepreviouschapter.

The participants (14 female; 13male) were between the ages of 39 and 72 years‐old60 (the average

being 54 years‐old), hadbetween10‐40 years of leadership experience (as definedby them)with an

averageof23years’experience.

59Leadershipisacontestedandelusiveconstructthatisthereforedifficulttodefine(Dubrinetal.2006).Thus, Irelied on the participants to interpret the length of their leadership experience.Most defined leadership as aseniorpositioninanorganisation,whileothersincludedleadershiprolessuchas‘SchoolCaptain’.

60Ageatthetimeofinterview(2007‐2008)


Table5.1:Participantcharacteristics

ParticipantNo.

Age Sex Leadershipexperience

Title/PositionHeld

Areaofactivity

1 53 F 20 CEO ManagementConsultancy

2 64 M 40 Dept.Head Arts

3 39 F 20 Director Finance

4 50 F 15 MP Politician

5 45 M 15 Barrister Law

6 61 M 35 Director Transport

7 55 M 30 MP Politician

8 52 F 16 Director Transport

9 47 M 25 Chair Transport

10 57 F 15 DeputyDirector GovtDept.

11 62 M 25 CEO GovtInstitute

12 55 F 15 Director Communications

13 52 F 21 CEO GovtDept.

14 63 F 25 CEO NotforProfit

15 48 F 15 CEO ManagementConsultancy

16 63 F 30 Director Transport

17 45 M 15 Principal Education

18 50 M 24 CEO Retail

19 58 M 20 Chair Communications

20 55 M 15 HeadofDept. Finance

21 73 M 30 CEO Arts

22 62 F 40 Chair Finance

23 45 F 10 AreaManager GovtDept.

24 63 M 40 Managing

Director

Agricultural

25 56 F 21 Director Finance

26 48 F 30 CEO GovtInstitute

27 49 M 15 Managing

Director

Manufacturing


5.3 Researchproblemandassociatedissues

The researchproblemand sub‐questionswerederived froma critical examinationof the literature in

Chapter2.Theyarerepeatedherefortheconvenienceofthereader.


Thecoreresearchproblemcanbedividedintotwomainresearchquestions/parts.

Part1

MainQuestion1:Howdotheparticipants(organisationalleaders)interpret,useandvalueintuitionintheirdecision‐makingandleadership?

• Drilldownexploration1.1:Howdotheparticipantsinterpret,(defineanddescribe)intuition(s)?

• Drill‐downexploration1.2:Howdoparticipantsuseintuition(s)andwhatsignificanceandvalue

do the participants ascribe to their use of intuition(s) in judgement, decision‐making

andleadership?

Part2

Main Question 2: What are the social processes of intuition disclosure by Australian leaders in

organisations?

• Drill‐downexploration2.1:Whataretheviewsandperceptionsofparticipantsaboutreceptivity

to,andthelegitimacyofintuition(s)injudgementsanddecision‐makingintheirorganisations?

• Drill‐downexploration2.2:Whatlanguageisusedinrelationtointuition(s)byparticipantsand

thosewithwhomtheyassociate?




Part1:Howdotheparticipants(organisationalleaders)interpret,useandvalueintuitionintheirdecisionmakingandleadership?

5.4 Howdotheparticipantsinterpret,(defineanddescribe)intuition(s)?

Participantswereaskedtodescribeanddefineintuitioninrelationtojudgementanddecision‐makingin

theirleadershiprole(s)intheirorganisations61.

5.4.1 Thenatureofintuition

5.4.1.1Interior,internalfeelingorsenseofknowing

Participants commonly described intuition as ‘gut feeling’. Labels anddescriptions typically portrayed

intuitionasaninternal,interiorfeelingorsenseofknowing.Forexample:

Participant27Male(M)

...it'ssomethinginsideofyouthatgivesyouthatfeeling.

Participant12Female(F)

Gutfeel...appealstoyouasbeingcorrect,somethingyoushouldgowith,likeabitofaforce,aninternalforce.

5.4.1.2Receivedfromthesubconscious

Participants used thewords intuition, gut feeling, gut feel and gut instinct interchangeably to define

intuition.Intuitionwassomethingreceivedratherthanactivelysoughtafter–thereceiveristherefore

passive/receptive,atleastinthefirstinstance62.Respondentsreportedthatintuition(s)‘comestoyou’

(Participant22M;Participant19M)andisthereforepreconsciousorsubconscious–initiallybelowthe

levelofawarenessandnotreadilyaccessiblebytheconsciousmind.Asaconsequence,theexperience

ofreceivingintuitionwasthereforedifficulttodescribe.However,somerespondentsweremorewilling

andablethanotherstoprovidedescriptions (theabilityto ‘surface’,andarticulate intuitions,andthe

experienceofintuitionwillbecomeamajorthemeintheanalysisinPart2):

61Consistentwith the languageof theparticipants, theexpressions ‘gut feel’, ‘gut instinct’ and intuitionwill beusedinterchangeablyunlessotherwiseindicatedinthissection.62Thesubsequentactiveroleofparticipantswillberevealedandexaminedinlatersections.


Participant2M

...thereisaninstinctivethingthatkicksinthatIcan’tcontrolandsometimesIknowthatit’stellingmethatIshouldgoleftandI’mtoldIshouldgoright.

Participant13F

...youcouldspendanhouractuallyintellectuallypullingitapart.Itissubconscious,there'snodoubtaboutit.

Participant23F

Igetasenseofsomething...it’snotaconsciousprocess,it’sjustthesortofgutfeelthatsomethingelseisgoingonhere...

Participant18M

Whenyoufirststartoutinpositionsofleadershipyoudotaketimetodevelopthoseprocessesbutonceyoudodevelopthem...youareusingtheprocesswithoutnecessarilyconsciouslyknowingyouaredoingit.

5.4.1.3Notemotion

‘Feeling’wasawordparticipantsoftenusedintheirdescriptionsofintuition.Afewparticipantsdiduse

thewordemotion,however,manyalsomadeadiscernableefforttomakeitcleartomethattheydid

notconsiderintuitiontobeanemotionorbasedinemotion.Iattributetheiruseoftheword‘emotion’

toanumberoffactors:thesaiddifficultyofdescribingtheexperienceofintuition(becauseitisreceived

fromthesubconsciousandtherefore‘fuzzy’);becauseofthesemanticsofwhatconstitutesanemotion;

the lack of English words that can describe interior experience (feeling words); and finally, because

intuition was consistently described as multi‐sensational or multi‐dimensional, experienced mentally

andsometimesphysically,andataninternalfeelinglevel(discomfortorcomfort)oracombinationofall

of these. For example, in this interview sequence, the participant can be seen to struggle for an

appropriateword.Shefirstusesthewordemotionandthenlaterrejectsit:

.............................................................................................................................................................

Interviewsequence

Participant8F

[Pause]thefeelingofuncomfortableis...[pausestothinkandmumbles]partlywhatyouwoulddefinitelycallmental`cosyoujustthink...ahhh...butit'safeelingit’ssensationifyoulike.Idon'tknowhowyouwoulddescribethefeeling...itjustdoesn'tfeelright.Somethingisn'tright,somethingisnaggingatmeatthebackofmymindsayssomewhereinthepastyouknowthat...itssensation.Isupposeit’sasensation.

Martin

Soitisobviouslydifficulttodescribeorgivewordsto.


Participant8F

Yes.IknowitwhenIfeelit.

Martin

Canyoudistinguishitfromanemotion,youseethatitisafeeling,butisitdifferenttoanemotion?

Participant8F

Yesit'sdefinitelynotanemotion.It'slogicalbecauseyouarethinking,actuallywhatgoesthroughyourhead.Doyoucallfeelinguncomfortableanemotion?...Soitstartsoffbeingslight,butIamtalkingfractionsofasecond,feelingemotional.Youcanalmostfeelyourshouldersshudderoryoushakeyourheadatsomethingandthenveryquicklygoesonto,thereissomethingillogicalherethereissomething,somethingdoesn'ttieupandyou'renotsurewhatitisatthatstage.ThisisprobablycompletelyarticulateonaFridaylunchtime!

.............................................................................................................................................................

Indeed, intuition as an emotion or based in emotionwas a notion that thatwas almost offensive to

someparticipants(giventhetoneoftheresponse).Forexample:

.............................................................................................................................................................

Interviewsequence

Participant13F

...peoplemakedecisionsthenbasedon‘willthismakethemhappy’or‘isthisthesortofthingshewants’...

Martin

So,youmakeadistinctionbetween,onceagain,betweenfeelingsandgutfeeling?

Participant13F

YesIdo,indeedIdo.Thegutsoneisconnectedtotheheadandfeelingsarejustinappropriate...

.............................................................................................................................................................

Oneparticipantobservedthat leaderswouldnotwant tobeperceivedasemotional in theirdecision‐

makingbecauseofits‘connotationsofweakness’.

Participant15F

Toturnaroundandsayit'semotionalactuallyhastomeaconnotationofweakness....UmmandIdon'tthinkyou'dfindtoomanypeopleinseniorpositionsrushingtosaythatintuitionisemotional.

Oneparticipantavoidedusingtheword‘feeling’whentalkingaboutintuitionbecausesheperceivedit

mightbeinterpretedasinsomewayconnectedtoemotion:


Participant16F

IguessI’mcarefulusingthewordfeeling.That’swhyIprefertocallitadeepknowledge...Ithinkthereisaviewthatitisconnectedtoemotions.

Thisreluctancetousethewords‘feeling’and‘emotion’willbeimportantforlateranalyses,particularly

inrelationtotheperceivedassociationofintuitionwithwomenandtheinferiorityofboth(seesection

5.8.1.1). However, for participants, the feeling component of intuitionwas important because itwas

perceivedtobea‘signal’thatsomethingneededtheirattention.Thefeelingthatparticipantsdescribed

was interpreted tobeasenseor feelingofdiscomfort,whichparticipants thensought to resolve.For

example:

Participant23F

It’sactuallytryingtofindasolutiontothediscomfort.

This complementarityof feelingandknowing, and, as a result, intuitionandanalysis (in resolving the

‘something’),willfeaturestronglyinlaterdiscussion.

5.4.1.4Basedonexperience

Withoutexception,participantsstatedthattheirintuitionwasbasedonorinformedbytheirexperience

and/or knowledge gained over many years. In relationship to leadership, most referred to their

experiencegainedintheirorganisationalroles.Forexample:

Participant4F

...Ithinkintuition,forme,isnotsomethingthatis...agutreactionorjustareaction.Intuitioncomesfrommanyyearsofexperience.

Participant25F

Theveryreasonyouarechosenasanon‐executivedirectoristhesumofyourexperienceandideallythebreadthofthatexperiencefromallyourbusinesscareer,whichyouareexpectedtodrawonfordecision‐makingandcounsellingatthatlevel.Soitisafundamentalprerequisiteforthejob.

Participant6M

WellIsupposeattheendofthedayit’sprettyhardtodescribewhatintuitionreallyis.Iwouldsayit’sah…it’stestingthepropositionthat’sbeforeyouagainstaccumulatedexperience,trainingandhistory.Itisveryhardtohavegutfeelinginanindustryorasphereofactivityyouareunfamiliarwith.

Consequently,participantsstatedthattheywouldnotgiveasmuchcredenceto intuitionswherethey

had lessexperience. The issueof fallibility, reliability, trust and intuitionwill be takenup later.Other

participants includedgeneral lifeexperienceascontributingtothedevelopmentof their intuition.For

example:

Participant5M

Itcomesfromlifeexperience,whichyoucan'treallyquantifyoryoucan'treallyputdownonapieceofpaperinsomecases.It'stheexperienceofhavingdonesomethinglikethisbeforeandhavinggotitwrongandidentifyingwhatarethelessonsthatIhavelearntfromthisexperienceandhowcanI


avoidthem.Inothercasesit'sfromreadingthenewspaper,talkingtofriends,justreallybeingoutthereandexperiencinglifetothefullIthink.

5.4.1.5Nativeintuition/partofbeinghuman

While participants emphasised the importance of their knowledge and experience as informing their

intuition(s),someparticipantsperceivedintuitionasaninherentcapacityandthereforesomethingthat

everyonecandrawoninmakingsenseofinformation.Forexample:

Participant27M

...it’sprobablyanin‐builtskill.

Participant3F

Idothinkit’saninnateskill.Oneofmyyoungdaughters,shejustinstinctivelyknowshowtoasktherightquestion.

Participant4F

Ithinkit’spartofhumannessactually[laughing].

Intuitionwasseenbysomeasanativeorinherentcapacitythatwasdevelopedorhonedbyexperience.

Forexample:

Participant3F

Ithinkit’softencategorisedasexperience.Ithinkyoucanexperienceintuitionevenifyouhaven’tbeeninthatsituationbefore.Ithinkintuitionishonedbyexperience.

Participant27M

...it’sprobablyacombinationofexperienceand,youknow,almostaninstinct,partofyourgenesorsetuporwhatever.

5.4.1.6Holistic

Participantstendedtodescribeintuitionintermsofconnectionsandassociationsbetweenthings,ideas

andpeople,whichwasoftenreferredtoaspatternrecognition.Forexample:

Participant1F

Ihavebecomemoresensitive,Ithink,toactuallyreadingpatternsininformationandIthinkconstantlysortof,formhypotheses,youmakepatternsandformhypothesesfrominformationandyou’reconstantlycheckingagainstnewpiecesofinformation,whetherthatinformsandsupportsthepatternthatyou’reformingorwhetherinfactit’scausingnoiseandstaticonthelineandyou,andyouneedtoformadifferentpattern.

Participant8F

...it'srecognitionofpatternsyouhaveseenbeforeandthereforeareveryfamiliartoyou.


Intuition was also described as a holistic, subconscious appreciation and appraisal of complex

information.Forexample:

Participant22M

It’sjustaninnateabilitytogetalloftheinformationandshuffleit,dealwithitandbringitaltogetherinacoherentdecision,whichprovidesanadditionaloverlayofweightingeachoftheelements.Butthatis,Ithink,probablythat’swheretheintuition,youknowwithallthesevariables–thatoneislessimportantandthatoneismoreimportant–butyou’renotconsciouslysortofascribinganumericalweighttothosedifferentelements.…somehowyouareabletoalignallofthosevariableswiththeobjectiveandtheendresultisadecisionthatyoutake.

Participant15F

...whathasactuallyhappenedinthepast.It’saweighting,youknow,yougothroughamentalweightingprocess.

The previous experience of these leaders allowed them to recognise patterns they had seen before

(althoughthisoccurssubconsciously)orappraisepatternsof informationpresentedtothem.Thiswas

importantbecause itenabledparticipantstomakesenseofcomplexsituationsand ‘wicked’problems

(Rittel&Webber1973)63.

5.4.1.7Interpreteddefinition/descriptionofintuition

Althoughthereweresomedifferencesinthewordsusedandindividualemphasesonhowintuitionwas

labelled (deep knowledge, gut instinct, gut feeling, intuition, sense of knowing) and experienced

(emphasesoneitheronthemental,feelingorphysicalcomponentsorexperiencedasacombination),

definitionsof intuition forparticipantswere remarkably consistent. Basedon the abovediscussionof

responsesfromparticipantsadefinitionisgivenhereinrelationtothenatureofintuition:

Participants experienced intuition as an internal, received, holistic,

subconscious sense or feeling of knowing or mental signal. Intuitionas a feeling/knowing flags the rightness or wrongness of a person,

choice, strategy or proposal, the timeliness of a decision and/orcaution,andtheneedforaction–particularlyfurtherinvestigation.

5.5 Othervariantsofintuition

Asstatedabove,participants’descriptionsanddefinitionsof intuitionintheir leadershipanddecision‐

makingwereconsistent,intermsofintuitionasa‘gutfeeling’.Subsequenttoquestionsconcerninghow

63 ‘Wicked problem’ is a phrase originally used in social planning by Rittel and Webber (1973) to describe aproblemthat isextremelydifficult to solvebecauseof incompleteor changing informationand thepotential to

createotherproblemsthroughattemptingtosolveit.


participants defined, described and used intuition in their decision‐making and leadership I probed

whethertheyunderstoodintuitioninanyotherway,byanyotherlabel,orknewofanyothervarieties

ortypesofintuitionorhadheardthewordusedinanyotherway.Somementionedpsychicintuitionor

gavedescriptions that fit thedefinitionofpsychic intuition.Nootherdefinitionsordescriptionswere

offeredasaresultofthisinitialprobe.Atypicalscenariowasasfollows:

.............................................................................................................................................................

Interviewsequence

Martin

Wellthat’sgreat,Ihavecoveredalotofgroundhere.ThereareacoupleofotherquestionsthatIwanttoaskyouintermsofthedifferentkindsofintuition.Wehavetalkedaboutgutfeeling,areyouawareorhaveyouexperiencedanyotherdistinctlydifferentkindsofintuition?

Participant10F

Like,forexample,havingverystrongthoughtsaboutaparticularpersonandthendiscoveringlateronthat,atthetimethatyouarehavingthoseverystrongthoughtsaboutthatperson,somemajorlifeeventswashappeningtothem,thatsortofthing?

Martin

Yes.Wouldyoudescribethataspsychicintuition?64

Participant10F

WellIdon’tknowwhatIwouldcallitbutitisabitspooky[laughs].

.............................................................................................................................................................

Followingresponsesinthenegative,IaskedifIcould‘runsomeotherconstructsofintuitionpastthem

tosee if they ‘could relate to them’.Theseconstructswerediscussed inChapter2asentrepreneurial

intuitionorthe‘Eurekaeffect’,psychicintuitionandphilosophicalintuition.

5.5.1 Insight

Allparticipantsthatwereaskedsaidtheyexperienced insightstosomedegree.However,noneofthe

respondentssaidtheywoulddefineordescribethisasintuition.Forexample:

Martin

OK.Look,Iwanttogiveyousomeexamplesofhowotherpeoplehavetalkedaboutintuitiontoseeifyoucanrelatetothem.SomepeopletalkabouttheEurekaeffectwhereyouhavebeenthinkingaboutsomethingforawhileandyou’llbetakingthedogforawalkandtheanswerwillpopintoyourhead.Somethinglikethat?Canyourelatetothat?

64IhavejustifiedtheuseofdirectandleadingquestionsinChapter4.


Participant12F

Ican,butIwouldn’tthinkthatisintuition.

Participantstalkedaboutinsightintermsofthe‘pennydropping’andmakingconnections.Forexample:

Participant14F

Andit’stodowithaprogressivethoughtpathway,nothingelse,sowhetheryoucallitintuition,whatever,theEurekamomentscomebecauseyou’vebeenusingyourbrainintensivelyaboutconnections.

Participant3F

YesIdosometimes[haveEurekamoments]butIwouldmorecallitthe‘pennydropping’,butIdothinkthatEurekamomentsareaninsightinamorecommonway,justreflectingonsomethingorlookingatbodylanguageandyouthink,aha,thatallfitsintoplacenow.

Oneparticipantunderstoodinsightintermsofhavingaclearerunderstandingofanissueafteranight’ssleep:

Participant11M

ImeanI’vehadsituationswhereI’vebeen...reallystrugglingwithsomethingforseveralweeksandthen,youknow,wakeupinthemorningandsortitoutinhalfanhour.

Someparticipants said they seldomexperienced insights or that insightswere of little significance to

their leadership. Someof theseparticipants attributed this to their personality type and training. For

example:

Participant6M

Look,mybackgroundandmytrainingisasanengineerandIwouldhavetosayIamaverydeductive,logicalsortofperson.Otherpeoplemighthavethelightglobethatflashesandsortoftransportsthemacrosssomedramaticshiftintheirthinkingonaparticularissue...Youknow,Itrytoforcealternativeevaluationsoralternativescenarios,butIdon’thavealotofwhatI’dcallexperienceaboutlight‐bulbmoments...ImightcometoadifferentviewbutItendnottodartfromonetotheother;morelikeanoiltankerturning.

Othersconsideredinsightasimportantintermsofgainingnewperspectivesandsolutionstoproblems

orsituationsintheworkplace.Forexample:

.............................................................................................................................................................

Interviewsequence

Martin

Andwouldyoucallthatintuition?

Participant8F

Nonotreally.Inmycaseitisusuallybecauseafactpresentsitself,orawayoflookingatitsuddenlychanges,andshiftstheparadigmorshiftsthefocus.

Martin

Newconnections?


Participant8F

Yes,anewwayoflookingatitoranewideacomesuporchangesthebalanceoryoulookatthingsthroughadifferentperspective.

Martin

Anditisthatimportanttoyouinyourrole?

Participant8F

Yes,becauseatrelativelyseniorlevelsinbusinessandorganisations,quiteoften,thedecisionsyouwillhavetotakeareextremelycomplex...theyaremadeupofdifferentthingsandpotentiallyhaveverydifferentramifications.So,yes,itisimportanttome.

.............................................................................................................................................................

Interviewsequence

Participant10F

WhathappenswithmeisthatIthinkaboutthingsforaprotractedperiodoftimeandthenIforgetaboutitforawhileandthenacoupleofdayslater,thisnewthoughtthatsortofpullsitalltogetherwillcomeintomyhead...

Martin

Anddoesitplayaroleinyourwork?

Participant10F

Yesitdoes.Iamquitesuresometimesitisinfuriatingtopeoplebecause,youknow,I’vebeenthinkingandworryingaboutsomething,andnotnecessarilybeabletocontributetothesolutiontoaparticularproblem,andthenIwillcomebackacoupleofdayslaterandsay,IwasthinkingaboutthatissueandIreckonifwediditthiswayallofthatwillbemuchmoreuseful.

.............................................................................................................................................................

Givenitsimportanceformostparticipants,itwasinterestingtonotethatnoneofferedanexplanation

for this phenomenon. They appeared to accept that insights and background cognition occurs, were

intriguedby it,butseemedtoregard itaspartof themysteryofbeinghuman(Participant14wasan

exceptioninthisregard.Shedescribeditintermsofneuralconnectionsandnetworksinthebrain).


5.5.2 Psychicintuition

Psychic intuitionwas not considered an important component of decision‐making and leadership for

participants.However,13 (eight femaleandfivemale)participants from2565saidoragreedthat they

hadpersonallyexperiencedwhatcouldbedescribedaspsychicintuition.Exampleswerenotaskedfor,

butsomeweregiven.Typicallyparticipantsreportedtheseoccurrenceshappened‘enoughtimesforyou

tonotice’(Participant22M).Forexample:

Participant22M

...thereareoccasionswhenIthinkaboutsomebodythatIhadn’tseeninyearsandtheywilleitherringme,writetomeorIwillseetheminthestreet.AndIdon’tknowifthatisintuitionorhowyouexplainthat,butithappens.

Participant4F

IhadacaraccidentafewmonthsagoandjustthatverymorningIwasthinkingabouthavingacaraccident[laughs].

Oneparticipantdescribedpropheticdreamspredictingacolleaguewouldbepromoted,anothercited

propheticdreamsaccuratelypredicting the timeofdeathofhergrandfather,and thebirthdatesand

times for multiple family members (Participant 15). Another (Participant 2) said he had accurately

predictedthedeathoftheboyfriendofanacquaintance.Someparticipantswerereluctanttoputalabel

ontheirexperience,especiallyasa‘psychicexperience’.Forexample:

Participant3F

ImustsaythattherehadbeenoneortwothingsthathavehappenedthathavemademewonderbutIhaveattributeditto[pause],IhavekindofdismisseditIthink.SoIdon’tknowaboutthat.

5.5.3 SpiritualIntuition

Aninquiryintointuitionasphilosophical intuitionor‘enlightenment’or‘knowledgeof’somethingwas

difficult tophrase. Inasimilarway toquestionsaboutpsychic intuition, I initially felt that thesewere

inappropriatequestionstobeaskingeliteAustralianbusinessleaders(althoughlessso).Indeed,noneof

65Psychicintuitionwasdiscussedintheliteraturereview,however,Iinitiallyaskednoquestionsinrelationtothisconstruct for tworeasons.First,becausetherewasnoreferenceto it in theextantmanagement literatureand,second,becauseIconsideredpsychicintuitiontobea‘fringe’construct–somethingthatwasoutoftheordinaryexperienceofmost,ifnotall,individuals(myselfincluded).Ifearedthatparticipantswouldperhapsfeelthatthestudy was not a serious one and that this might affect their responses. This fear was supported by manyparticipants’emphaticinsistenceintheirinitialdefinitionsanddescriptionsthattheirintuitiondidnotcome‘outoftheblue’,butwasbasedontheirmanyyearsofexperience.However,asmentionedinChapter3,psychicintuition(discussed in Chapter 2 as ESP or Psi) spontaneously arose in one of the first interviews. I therefore felt itwas necessary to putmy fears aside. However, I did not dwell on this theme, given the already tightly‐packedinterviewschedule.


theparticipantsreferredtothisconstructofintuitionwhenaskedtodefineintuition.However,aspart

of‘runningsomedescriptionspast’participants,Itypicallyphrasedthequestionassuch:

Theotherone[variantofintuition]ismoreofamystical,divineinsight,higherconsciousconnectionwiththelifeforce,thecosmos,theuniverse,asenseofcalling,asenseofspirituality,anexperienceofsomethinggreaterthanyourself.Haveyouexperiencedanythinglikethatatall?

Twelveoutofthe23participantswhowereaskedreportedoragreedthattheyfeltaconnectiontoa

higher power, ‘the cosmos’ (Participant 26 F), a religious entity, to the earth, or to a ‘foreign field’

(Participant 9M). Some participants immediately interpreted the question in terms of whether they

werereligiousornotandrepliedtheywereatheists.TwoparticipantssaidtheyfeltaconnectiontoGod

and considered themselves religious. However, some participants interpreted the question more

broadly and responded to the question in their own way. Interconnectedness was a theme for this

group(mostlywomen).Forexample:

Participant2M

IalsoknowatareallysimplelevelthatIhavetried,forthelast20years,nevertodoanythingthatIcan’tofferasagifttoahigherbeing.AndifIcan’tofferittothehigherbeingthenit’smorallywrongandIshouldn’tdoitandIknowthat.

..............................................................................................................................................................................Interviewsequence

Martin

Doyoufeelthatconnectiontoahigherbeing…strongly?

Participant2M

Mmm,Ido.

..............................................................................................................................................................................

Participant3F

Inadecision‐makingcontextit’s,it’smoreabouthavingacoresetofvaluesandassessingwhat’sbeforeyouconformstothoseandwhetheritishonest.

Participant15F

[aftermuchhesitation]Mypositionisthatweareconnectedtoalifeforce,whateverthatis.

Participant16F

Ihaveasenseoftheuniverseasbeingsomuchgreaterthanmyself.Thatis,theuniverseasthewholesystemoflifeandplanetsandstars,thewholeuniverse,thereisnotanotherwordforit,Ithink.Ihaveastrongsenseofthatasbeinghugeandpowerful,andenormousandongoing,relativetothe...insignificanceofmeasanindividualandthedecisionsthatIammaking,nomatterhowmomentousImightthinktheyare.Iamveryawareofthatkindofquality–andIthinkthatdoeshaveabearingonthewayIthink–butIdon’tseeitasanactiveforce.

Participant25F

Ithinkitdoescomefromasenseof…lookingatthestarsandknowingbutmuchmorethanthat.Itcomesfromtheknowledgeoftheuniversehowcomplexitisandhowenormousitisandhowinterrelatedallthethingsareandhowonethingintheuniverseimpactsonanotherthinginthe


universeandnothinghappensinisolation.Notoneofusexistsasanentityontheirown,wearealltotallypartofthisenormoussystem,andtovaryingdegrees,andinterdependentonthatsystem.

As discussed, time constraints and a focus on intuition as gut feeling prevented further inquiry into

alternative definitions of intuition. The purpose of these questions was not to fully understand or

explain thesevariantsbut toestablish if theyhadanysignificance forparticipants.Thesignificanceof

insightshasbeendiscussed.Religionandasenseofinterconnectednesswereperceivedtobesignificant

forrelationshipswithotherpeople,relationshiptothenaturalenvironment(aswellasthecosmosasa

whole)and,asaresult,significantinshapingvalues.Oneparticipantalsocitedreligionassignificantfor

seekingstrength in timesofcrisisor stress.For twoparticipants,an intuitivespiritual connectionwas

consideredanintegralpartofdailyleadership(intermsofvalues).Thesefindingsareimportantbecause

researchesaboutpsychicandspiritualintuitionarelargelyabsentfromthemainstreammanagerialand

organisationalliterature.Ithereforearguethattheinvestigationofthesevariantsofintuitionwouldbe

afertileareaforfutureresearch.

5.6 Howdoparticipantsuseintuition?

Theprevious sectionsdescribedhowparticipantsdefinedanddescribed intuition. Theanalysisof the

datacollectedrevealsthatparticipantsrecognise,relateto,andsometimesuseorexperience,variants

of intuition put to them as insight or the ‘Eureka effect’, psychic intuition and spiritual intuition.

However thedescriptionsanddefinitionsgiven in the first instanceby theparticipantswere,without

exception, consistentwith the construct of gut feeling. A definition of gut feeling, as experienced by

participants, has been given. This section now analyses participants’ responses in relation to the use

ofintuition66.

Myanalysisoftheuseof intuitionbyparticipantstakestwoapproaches.Thefirst(Section5.6.1) isan

abstractapproachrevealingthattheuseofintuitionoccursmostofteninconjunctionwithanalysisand

isconditional(dependingonthenatureandcontextofthedecisionorjudgement).Attheconclusionof

thissectionIwillpresentadiagrammaticrepresentationofthisconditionalandcomplementaryuseof

intuition.Thisisfollowedbyamoreconcreteapproach(Section5.6.2),whichdetailstheexamplesgiven

byparticipantsandisorganisedinrelationtothesituationsorwaysinwhichparticipantsfoundintuition

tobeuseful.

66 It should be noted that these descriptions of use occurred before questions concerning other variants of

intuitionandthereforerefertogutfeeling.


5.6.1 Complementaryuseofintuition

Thefollowinganalysiswillrevealthatallleadersconsideredgutfeelingtobefalliblebutreliableinareas

wheretheypossessedsignificantdomainknowledgeandexperience.Inareaswhereparticipantslacked

significant knowledge and/or experience, leaders would, where possible, check their intuitions in a

complementarywaywithanalysis(oftenfurtherresearchandinquiry).

5.6.1.1Fallibilityandreliability

Noneoftheparticipantsconsideredtheirintuitiontobeinfallible.However,allparticipantsviewedit,at

theveryleast,tobefairlyreliable.Atypicalresponsewas:

Participant18M

Yeah,[itisreliable]onthewholebutthat’snottosayitisreliable100%ofthetimeandIdon'tthinkanybody’sis.

Oneparticipantpointedoutthatbecauseintuitionisbasedonexperience,itcouldbebiased,prejudiced

andthereforemisleading:

Participant10F

ButIthinkIwassayingthatyourintuitionisinformedbyyourexperienceanditmightbethatyoudrawupallofthesethingsfromyourpast,similarsortsofcircumstances.Whereyouhaveaparticularprejudice,Ithinkyouarestillusingyourintuition,butyouaredrawingfromthosesortsofexperiencestojustifywhatyouwanttodoorwhatyourintuitiontellsyounow.Idon’tthinkintuitionisverilyalwaysapositivething.

Manyparticipantspointedout that the relianceon intuition is inevitable in senior leadership roles to

someextentbecausedecisionsmustbetakenwherethereis inadequateinformation,andincomplex,

uncertainandambiguouscircumstances.Asanexample:

Participant6M

...amIcomfortableaboutmakingagut‐feeldecision?Sometimesnot–butyouknow,you’vegottocallitonewayoranother.Youcan’tsortofhaveaquideachway,ifyouknowwhatImean.

5.6.1.2Trustthroughuse

Acommonthemeforparticipantswaslearningtorecognisethe‘voice’ofintuitionandtoplacetrustin

it.Manyoftheparticipantshadbeenhighlytrainedinthestatisticalandanalyticaltechniquesthatthey

otherwise used. However, over time, and through experience, participants had learnt that not all

situationswereconducivetoanalysis.Forexample:

Participant25F

Idothinkitisimportant[intuition]becauseIthinkthat,attheendoftheday,youoften,youknow,havetomakedecisionsonimperfectinformation...SoIthink,intheend,youhavetohaveconfidenceinyourwisdomandjudgement,whichIguessiswhatitcomesdownto.


Participant15F

Doeseveryonehaveintuition?Probably.Dotheyhavegoodintuition?Itdependswhethertheyengagewithitortrustinit.

Participantssaidthattheyhadalso,overtime,becomemoreawareoftheirfeelingsindecision‐making

and the need to pay attention to these feelings. This was difficult for some participants who had

scientifictraining.Forexample:

Participant11M

Icouldn’treallyputmyfingeronwhateveritwas...Mybetterjudgementsaiddon’tdothis,justgobacktosquareone.Alltherationalinterviewtechniques...assessmentsandtestssaid...thisguyisfantastic...butbecauseIcouldn’tputmyfingeronit,Imadeawrongcall.

Themost common reason for ignoring or overruling intuitionswas being dissuaded by other people.

Forexample:

Participant26F

Ohanadvertisementonce,thatmystaffshowedme,andIhateditandIthought,thisisgoingtogetusintostrife,andtheyallexplainedtomeveryrationallyhowitwasagoodadvertisementanditwouldselltheproduct,anditcostalotofmoney...andIthoughtok,I’llriskit...Within48hoursofitgoingtoairwehadmassivecomplaints.IhadtotakeitofftheairandI’venevereverletthemforgetiteversince[laughter].Sowhenevertheyshowmeanadandmygutsaysthisisn'tgoingtowork,IremindthemofthelasttimeIignoredmygut–theyhateme[laughter].

Learning to use their own intuition effectively, and feeling comfortable in doing so,was described in

termsofapersonaljourneyofdiscoveryforsomeparticipants(mostlywomen).Intuitionusewasseen

asaniterativeandevolvingprocessoftrustingtheirintuition,takingdecisions,analysingoutcomesand

reflectingonthem.Forexample:

Participant16F

IamawarethatIrelyonintuitionmorenowthanIdidbefore,10yearsago,15yearsago.

Participant20M

[Ontrustingintuition]Ithinkbyrecognisingitandbyusingit.Youcanactuallyprobablysayit’saskillthatcanbeenhancedandperhapsdeveloped.Andagain,itcomesbacktothewholeself‐awarenessthing,recognisingwhatitis…andbeingsomewhatanalyticalaboutit…andactuallygoingthroughareviewprocess,afterthefact,whensomething’shappenedandsayingwell…whatwasmyintuition,howdiditinfluencewhatIdid…wheredidweendup…whatwasgoodaboutit,whatdidIlearn,beingprettypragmatic…

Participant23F

Ifyou’vegotintuitionandyourelyonitoveraperiodoftime,yourexperienceofrelyingonyourintuitiontellsyouthatyoucangowiththat.

Participant15F

Forme,hearingthevoice,buthavingtheexperiencetovalidateit,sothere'sareasontotrustit.…formetherehasbeenaprocessofestablishinganequilibrium…betweentheknowledgeandexperienceandtheintuition,andit'sgreat,thereisacomplementaritythere...Ithinkmyintuitioncamefirstandthenmyexperienceasaleaderhasactually,hasdeepened,hasevolved.


The limitationsofanalysis inmaking judgementsanddecisionswereperceivedbyparticipantsas: the

inabilitytobecertainthatallvariablescouldbeknown;whatvariablesshouldbeknown;contradictory

information; the possibility of inaccurate information; the impossibility of accurately weighting all

variables; and, the possibility that variables and their appropriate weighting might change. In

contradiction to expectations imbued by their business education, decision‐making for many was

perceivedtobeuncertainandmessy.Forexample:

Participant1F

...whenIwenttoUni,alltheproblemswerepresentedinaveryneatandtidyway.Thisistheproblemandthisishowyousolveit...andmyexperienceasamanagerwasmylifewasalwaysmessyandtheproblemspresentedtomeandmyworkwerealwaysmessy.

However,becauseparticipantsalsoconsideredtheir intuitiontobe fallible,mostdecision‐makingwas

therefore perceived to be an ‘act of faith’ (Participant 22M). In response to this perceived inherent

uncertainty of decision‐making many participants said they used intuition and analysis in

complementary ways. Participants strongly emphasised that they would do as much as possible,

particularlyforimportantdecisions,toverifytheirintuitionthroughresearchandanalysis.Forexample:

Participant6M

...you’vegottomakesurethatit’snotallgutfeelingandyou’vegottohaveanalysis

Participant16F

IwouldneversaythatIwouldjustgowithintuition...Iwouldalwaysendeavourtotryandunderstandcognitivelyorintellectually,usingtheevidencethatisavailable,andIwouldtryandlinkthatuptowhatmyintuitionistellingme.

Participants thus reported theywouldoftenuse intuition ‘hand‐in‐hand’. The complementaryuseof

intuitionandanalysiswasarepeatedthemeinthedata.Forexample:

Participant11M

...itwouldbealongthelinesofthatcombinationofcognitive,inotherwords,factsIhaveonthetable,andintangibleexperienceandknowledgeofthebroaderenvironment,soit’sacombinationofintangible,knowinggutstuffwiththeleftbrainknowledgeofthefacts.Mostlyleadersareoperatingwith80percentfactsandtheyneedtopullinallthisotherstuffatthesametime.

Thisfindingissignificantforlaterdiscussionbecauseitshowsthattheboundarybetweenintuitionand

analysiscanbecome‘blurred’indailydecision‐makinginthefield.Forexample:

Participant15F

Ithinknowafteralltheseyears,there’snodefinededge.Tomeit'sablurredprocessinthatthere’sosmosisbetweenthatintuitionandthedecision‐makinginthemorestructuredsenseofleadership.Doesoneprecedetheotheralwaysordotheytakeitinturns?Ibelievethere’snosetwayofdoingit.


5.6.2 Conditionaluseofintuition

OnthebasisoftheprecedingdiscussionIhaveinterpretedthatparticipantsbothdistinguishedtherole

that intuitionplays in theirdecision‐making,andrecognised that therewasanelementof intuition in

most of their decisions and judgements. The extent to which intuition played a dominant and

distinguishablerole in judgementandtheirdecision‐making,accordingtoparticipants,wasdependent

onboththenatureandcontextofthedecision.

5.6.2.1Natureofthedecision

Participants reported that analytical decision‐making techniques were most appropriate for matters

involvingquantitativevariablessuchasbudgets,inventoryandsoon.Ontheotherhand,intuitionwas

perceived as most useful for assessing qualitative factors – those elements that were intangible.

Typically,thesetendedtobejudgementsanddecisionsconcerningpeople.

Participant3F

...therearethemesandfactorsthataren’tmeasureablethatyoutakeintoaccountwhenmakingdecisions.

Participant6M

...it’simportantthatwetakeaccountofA,BandC.AndthefactthatABCcameupis,mightbequalitativeaspects.Itmightbethedifferentculturesoftheorganisation.Itmightbethestrengthofcharacteroftheleadershipoftheotherorganisationoritcanbeawholevarietyofthings.Attheendofthedaytheycomeintothecategoryofqualitativefactors,whichmayimpingeonthebusiness,andyoumakethatjudgementaboutthosequalitativefactorsandyoutryandquantifyitifyoucan,butyouknow,theycanbeshow‐stoppers.

Participant22M

...thereareothervariables,intangiblesthatarelessreadilydetermined,andyou’remakingdecisionsonalotofthoseissues.Ifitwaspurelyobjective...youdon’tneedtoapplyanyintuitionorjudgement,onthosefacts.

5.6.2.2Contextofthedecision(contextualconditions)

Howeverwhetherornot intuitionwaslikelytoplayarole indecision‐makingandjudgementwasalso

seenasconditionalupontheperceivedgravityofthedecision,thelevelofexperienceand/ordomain

knowledgeofthedecisionmaker,precedentandtheamountofinformationavailable,complexityand

ambiguity, whether or not there is urgency and whether the decision is about business or private

matters.Theseelementswillnowbeexaminedinfurtherdetail.

5.6.2.3Perceivedgravity

Inmoreroutinedecisionsordecisionsoflesserimport,participantsweremorelikelyto‘go’withtheir

intuitionwithoutfurtherresearchoranalysis.Forexample:


Participant27M

...indailydecisionsthatdon’thavethemagnitude...you’remorecomfortablesimplyusingitwithouteventhinkingaboutit.

However,whereconsequenceswereperceivedtobemoresevere,participantswerereluctanttorelyon

theirunsupportedgutfeelings.Forexample:

Participant4F

…butIwouldn’tforexamplemakeahugedecisionaboutlegislationthat’sgoingtobeaffectinglotsoflivesjustbasedonintuitionorasense,soIwouldwanttohavethatkindofdecisionverymuchbacked‐upbywhatexpertssay,bywhatthesciencesays,bywhatthefactsare.

Participant23F

AgainitwouldbedependonhowseriousthedecisionwasorhowserioustheissuewastohowmuchImightfeelcomfortable.

5.6.2.4Levelofexperience

As previously stated, participants perceived that their intuition was informed by their years of

experienceand/orknowledgeofaparticulardomain.Consistentwiththisperception,someleaderssaid

they would not have or not trust their intuition in areas where they lacked this experience or

knowledge.Forexample:

Participant8F

QuiteoftenIwouldsaymyintuitionprobablycomesfromknowingsomethingreallywellandthereforeIwouldbemorelikelytomakeintuitivedecisionsinabusiness,forexample,whereIhavebeenworkingforalongtimethaninonewhereIhaven'tbeen.

5.6.2.5Precedentandamountofinformationavailable

However,indecision‐makingcontextswheretherewasalackofinformationorprecedentparticipants

saidtheyweresometimesforcedtorelyheavilyontheirintuition.Forexample:

Participant21F

Therewasnone![precedentandinformation].Therewasatelevisionprogram,whichtheydidn’tsee,andtherewasasortofstorybehinditandthatwasitreally,aproposition.

Participant16F

Nowifthereisnotenoughevidenceor,ifitrunscountertowhatmyintuitionistellingme,Iwouldtreadwarily,Iwouldproceedverywarily.IwouldmakesurethereisplanAandplanBinplace.

Participant20M

...ifyoudidn’thavetheopportunitytodotheanalysisandhavealloftheinformationitwouldbeasenseofknowingwhat’sright.


5.6.2.6ComplexityandAmbiguity

Intuitionwasoftenthedecidingfactorincomplexdecisionswheretherewastoomuchinformationor

conflictinginformation.Forexample:

Participant7M

Itcomesup[gutfeeling].Oftenwhenit’stothepointwhereadecisioncan’tbemade,becausesomethingissocomplexandisverydifficult...I’mnotquitesureoftheramificationsofthispieceoflegislation,butIhaveagutfeeling…

Participant20M

[useofintuition]perhapsmoresowherethecomplexityoftheevidencemakesitveryhardtosay...it’sjusttoocomplextobeabletotell...Inaline‐balldecisionIwouldprobablyerronthesideofmyintuition.

Participant22M

Thereisanadditionalingredient[intuition]thatplucksyouonesideortheother.Andit’saveryfinelineveryoften.

5.6.2.7Urgency

Wheretherewasnotenoughtimetogatherevidenceandproperlyresearchadecision,participantssaid

theywerealsoforcedtorelyontheirintuition(s).Forexample:

Participant9M

Oftendecisionscan’twaitandyouwillgowithyourgut,and99.9%ofthetimeyourgutisgoingtoberight.

Participant25F

Particularlyattimesofcrisis,timeisoftenoftheessenceandyoucan'taffordtobeforeverspinningwheelstryingtogetmoreinformationtomakethedecision.

5.6.2.8Business/private

Manyparticipantssaidtheyweremorecomfortablerelyingsolelyontheirintuitioninpersonalmatters

ratherthanbusinessmatters.Forexample:

Participant4F

Butinothercontexts,particularlyonapersonallevel...aroundyourfamily,aroundyourfriends,aroundyourlife,Iwouldbeverycomfortableandprobablydomakelotsofdecisionsbasedonintuitioninthatcontext.Itisacontextualthing.

This business/private dualism is important because it indicates a potential cleavage in relation to

intuitionuseintermsofsettings.ThisisathemethatIwillreturntolater.Figure5.1belowsynthesises

theabovefindingsinamodelofconditionalandcomplementaryintuitionuse.


Figure5.1:Conditionalandcomplementaryuseofintuition

5.6.2.9Explanationofthemodel

Figure5.1diagrammaticallyrepresentstheanalysispresentedintheprevioussectionsinordertomake

the conditional and complementary use of intuition and analysismore transparent to the reader. As

discussed,thenatureofadecision(representedbytheorangerectangles)willinvokemorerelianceon

intuition or analysis. However, a decision will always have a context (represented by the blue

rectangles), which will also contribute to the tendency to use one or the other. Viewed from this

perspective, decisions can be seen as a rich, complex, dynamic interplay of decision conditions. For

example, a proposition involving variables that can be measured and quantified would invoke an

analyticalresponse.However,notalloftheinformationthatisseentoberequiredforastraightforward

analyticaldecisionmightbeavailableorconsideredreliable,accurateand/orunambiguous.Inaddition,

theurgencyofthedecisionmightdictatethatnomoreinformationcanbegeneratedoraccessed.

Conversely, participants expressed a tendency to rely on their gut feelings where a decision was

perceived to be qualitative in nature. However, in view of the fallible nature of intuition previously

discussed,participantssaidtheysought,whereverpossible,toverifytheirintuition(s)throughengaging

in supplementary information gathering. Thiswas considered particularly relevantwhere participants

hadlittleexperienceandknowledgeofsimilarsituations,wheretherewasprecedenttodrawon,where

there was perceived gravity, where there was less urgency, where the decision related to business

ratherthanprivateconcerns,andwheretherewasanadequateamountoflesscomplexandambiguous


information. Consequently,much decision‐making, according to participants, could be described as a

mixtureofbothanalysisandintuition.Forexample:

Participant20M

...whileI’dsayit’s[intuition]animportantpartofmydecision‐makingprocess,it’salwaysthere...Iamalsoverydiligentaboutensuringthatthereisdueprocessaswell...sometimesyourintuitioncanbewrong,anditcouldendupbeingverycostlyandyouwanttomakesurethatyoudon’tendupinthatsituation.

This finding is significant because it demonstrates the extent to which intuition and analysis are

entwinedandenmeshedfordailydecision‐makingandleadership.Asaconsequenceoftheirnatureand

context some decisionsmight be dominated by onemode or another, however, the analysis of data

reveals intuition and analysis are not mutually‐exclusive processes. Participants had intuitions about

their analyses, conversely, they also analysed their intuitions.Moreover, participants sought to align

theirintuitionsandanalyses.Thus,mostdecision‐makingwasperceivedtobeamixtureofintuitionand

analysestotheextentthat,asstated,thedifferencebetweenthembecame‘blurred’.

5.6.3 Examplesofconditionalandcomplementaryuseofintuitionandanalysis

Participantsofferedmanyexamplesofhowtheyusedintuitionintheirdailyleadership.Inthepursuitof

clarity I have categorised these examples of intuition use in five ways: in assessing alternatives; in

assessing judgements and weightings of others; as a prompt for enquiry or caution; in making

judgementsaboutpeople;andinrelationtointerpersonaldynamics.However,Iacknowledgethatthese

categoriesoverlap.

5.6.3.1Assessingalternatives,proposals,dataandinformationgiven

Participants commonly cited their use of intuition in relation to a feeling of knowing about whether

something would work or not work (potentially a proposition or strategy or a choice between

alternatives).Forexample:

Participant27M

...youlistentoalternativesandtothescenariosandyougetacertainfeelingabout...whatyouthinkisrightandyougoforit.Soit’safeelingyougetbylisteningtotheoptionsyouhave.

Participant25F

It'sasensethatitfeelsrightoritdoesn'tfeelright,orthereissomethingthatiscausingyouanigglinguneaseoraconcern,evenifyoucan'tquiteputyourfingeronthespecificissueimmediately.

Participant6M

Attheendoftheday,it’sprettyhardtodescribewhatintuitionreallyis.Iwouldsayit’sah…it’stestingthepropositionthat’sbeforeyouagainstaccumulatedexperience,training,historyand,whereyou’reuncertain,whatothersmightcontributetothediscussions.


5.6.3.2Assessing the judgements and weightings given to various data, propositions,

presentationsandperceptionsgivenbyothers:

Participantswereofteninthepositionwheretheyneededtorelyoninformationpresentedbyothers

andfoundintuitionusefulinassessingtheinformationtheyreceived.Forexample:

Participant22M

Itmaybethatthepersonpresentingtheevidencewastoorisk‐averseinthesituation.So,youweighthatup,putadifferentweightingthanthatpersondidandthatmightbebecauseyou’reinapositiontoweightherisks.Imeanwearedealingwithalotofabstracts.Itisnot,asIsaidbefore,notreadilydeterminedfact.Butattheendoftheday,nomatterhowgoodthebusinesscase,ifyougowiththebusinesscasewithoutmakinganyfurtherjudgement...it’snotyourjudgement.You’resayingwell,theseguysknowwhatthey’redoing,sowewillfollowthem.

Participant1F

Wehadthenumbersandwewentthroughaveryrationalprocessofdoingaforecasteveryquarterandthings,butjustfromkickingthetyresandwanderingaround,eachofuswassaying,thesearethenumbersandthisisaforecastandwe’dstickwiththeforecast,butIsaid...mysenseiswearegoingtodobetterandhesaid,‘yeah,mysenseistoo’.

Participantspointedoutthattheinformationtheyreliedonwasnevercomplete,norwasseparatefrom

the individuals thatprovided the information.Participants said theydevelopeda ‘feel’,over time, for

where there was missing data, incorrect data, and detecting the ‘spin’ others might place on data.

Moreover,intuitionwasperceivedtobeusefulinpiercingtheintentionsofthemessenger.Intuitionwas

thereforeacknowledgedasapowerfuland indispensibletoolatthe intersectionofthesubjectiveand

objective(peopleandinformation).Forexample:

Participant3F

Asaleader,youdogetfilteredinformationandit’sunintentional,it’sjusthumannature.EveryonehastheirownperspectivesandIthinkoneofthekeythingsinmakingadecisionisassessingwhatarethekeydrivers,intentionsanddesiresofthepeoplethatareprovidingyouthatinformationsoyoucanrecalibrateitaccordingly,beforeyoumakethedecision.Ithinkthatisakeystep.

Participant10F

Iguesstheotherthingisthat,overaperiodoftimewhenyou’reworkingwithpeople,youformjudgementsabouthowupfronttheyarewithyou.I’vegot11peoplewhodirectlyreporttome,IcanpinpointthosewhowillfrontuptomeandgivemeeverypieceofinformationthatIcouldpossiblywantandmore,andotherswhoperhapshavemotivesofprotectingstafforsomethingisgoingon,thatmeansthattheydon’tnecessarilytellyoutheinformationunlessyouspecificallyaskthem.

Participant6M

Thereisalotofsnakeoilsalesmanoutthereandsomeofthemareverygoodatsellingit.

Asaconsequenceoftheimportanceofpeople intheconstructionanddeliveryof ‘information’,some

participantsplacedapriorityonface‐to‐facemeetingswhereverpossible.Forexample:


Participant3F

Somakingadecisionjustonwrittensubmissions,Idon’tthinkistheoptimalway.I’mabigbelieverinface‐to‐facemeetingsetc.Notbecausepeoplearelyingortryingtodosomethingfraudulent,buthowtheypresenttheinformationandhowtheyreacttoquestions,howotherpeopleintheroomrespondtoitaswell,whichinturnfeedsintointuition.

Participant9M

...physicallygoingdownandhavingalookandsmellingitwithyourownnose...andseeingit,andgetasenseofwhetherornotit’sright.

5.6.3.3Intuitionasapromptforenquiryorcaution

Participantsindicatedareflexiveuseofintuition.Aconsistentthemeinthedatawasintuitionasasignal

orwarning that somethingwasnot right.Participants said they felt/knewthat somethingwaswrong,

suspicious,didnotadduporthatthesituationwasnotasitappeared.Thiswouldcausethemtoseek

furtherinformationinordertoconfirmordenytheirfeeling.Forexample:

Participant4F

Myintuitiontoldmesomething,butittookmeaweekoftestingthat,oftalkingtopeople,ofthinkingaboutitandofreflectingonitandIcamebackto...whatwasmyfirstintuitivereactiontomakingthatdecision.

Participant10F

Itwillperhapsguidemetoaskfurtherquestions.Butformeit’snotaconsciousprocess,it’sjustthesortofgutfeelthatsomethingelseisgoingonherethatIneedtodigaroundabittosatisfymyself.

Participant23F

IgetasensethatsomethingisnotrightorIgetasense,forexample,thatweneedtogoanddigandferretabitmoreforsomeinformationbecauseIhavegotthesensethatitmightenduponapoliticalagendaoritmighthitthemediaorsomethinglikethat.

Alternatively, intuitioncouldcauseparticipantstobecautiousand/ordevelopalternativestrategies in

casetheirintuitionswereprovencorrect.Forexample:

Participant16F

Ifmyintuitionwastellingmethatsomethingwasnotgoingtoworkoutthewaythatpeoplewerepresentingittomebasedonevidence,Iwouldnottotallyignoremyintuition.Iwouldnotfullylaunchintoaplanofactionwhichdeniedmyintuition.Iwouldprobablymakesomeallowancesforit,andIwouldtakeitinsmallersteps.

5.6.3.4 Assessingpeople

Theuseof intuitionwasoftendiscussedinrelationto judgementsaboutpeople.Participantsplaceda

highpriorityonthesejudgementsbecausetheyperceivedthatpeoplewereintertwinedandcriticalto

the success of all aspects of organisational strategy. A common example given was assessing an

individualeitherforapositionintheorganisationorsomeotherinvolvementorengagementwiththe

company. Curriculum Vitae and other ‘evidence’ were considered in making these judgements,


however,notsolelyreliedonbecause‘sometimesthepicturepaintedonapieceofpaperisrosierthan

thereality,soyou’vegottoseethroughthat’,(Participant19M).Forexample:

Participant8F

Isthispersongoingtobedetailed,makedecisions,goingtobeanirritant,goingtobea‘moodHoover’?

Participant18M

...ifyoudon'thavetheirchemistryjudgementinapositivesenseinthefirst30minutesIdon'tthinkyou’llgotoofardowntheinterview.

Interestingly, the only participant from the sample, who said he regarded intuition with some

scepticism,contradictedhimselfbysubsequentlyadmittingthatheusedintuitioninstaffselectionand,

moreover,thatheconsideredthistasktobecentraltohisroleasaleader:

Participant19M

IsupposeifIwastouseintuition,andIcertainlyconsciouslydon’tdoit,buttheareainwhichit’smostdefinedformeisinjudgingpeople.I‘vespentmoretimepickingpeopletocarryouttasks,thanalmostanythingelse.

Femaleparticipants,inparticular,placedahighvalueontheirintuitiveabilitytoidentifyindividualsthat

were articulate but incompetent, dysfunctional, deceitful, corrupt or a potential ‘organisational

psychopath’.Forexample:

Participant1F

...andthenImethimandIsaidtomyfellowdirectorsandtothemanagingdirector,Ihaveaterriblesenseaboutthisman.Isaid,hecan’trelatetome…hegivesmethesenseofbeingslippery,shonky,whatever.AndIdon’tknowwhyIfeltthat…Ijustlike,Ijustfeltthat.Isaid,look,Ican’tgiveyouchapterandversebutthismangivesmethecreeps.Thismanhastroublewrittenalloverhim.Andsubsequentlywehadnoendoftrouble.Hesuedus,hedidthis,hedidthat...

Participant15F

Iwasoneoftheboard‐panelthatwasinterviewingforanewCEO.Iwasn'tchair,Iwasthedeputychair.Andthepersoncameinandtheywereinterviewedandthereweresayingalltherightstuff,butsomethingwastellingmethisguywasn'ttherightone...AndattheendofitIsaid,Ican'ttellyouwhy,andI’llsaytoyouit'snotif,butwhenthispersonfailswe'regoingtohavetomovequickly.AndIsaidtothematthetimethatisjustmyintuitiontellingmethatthisisthewrongperson.Ihavenothingtosubstantiateitbecauseonpaperthispersonlooksfine.Theyhiredthispersonandunfortunatelyhehadtoberemovedfairlysoonafterwards.

Participant26F

I’mnotsureifIcantellyouexactlywhatitisI’mrespondingtobutI’vebeendoingitlongenoughtoknowwhetherthatpersoninfrontofmeisrealandcanpullitoffortheyarefulloftheproverbial...I’malmostalwaysright.

Assessments were also made in relation to their ‘fit’ with the culture of the organisation. This was

perceivedasvery importantbecausesometimes ‘goodpeoplewere justnot right foraparticular job’

(Participant22M).


5.6.3.5Interpersonalrelations

Participantsdescribedhowintuitionwasusefulforinterpretingthedynamicsofinterpersonalrelations,

particularlywithintheorganisation.Intuitionwouldoftengiveparticipantsinsightsintohiddenagendas

including moods, attitudes, desires, needs, motivations, and tensions between individuals (sexual or

otherwise)–allofwhichmaycontradictwrittenorspokeninformation.Commonlyspokenofasreading

subtext, participants described intuition as useful in sensing subtle signals – typically body language,

intonation, gestures,or justpickingupona ‘vibe’ inan individualororganisation.Asa consequence,

participantswould form rational strategies in response to these intuitions, sometimes in conjunction

withfurtherintuitionsaboutwhatwouldandwouldnotwork.Forexample:

Participant2M

Idon’tputitintermsofintuitionbutIputitintermsofbodylanguageandIputitintermsofsubtext.Ifthephysicallanguageisdenyingwhat’sbeingsaidtoyou,whichyoubelieve?

Participant23F

Ithinkit’s[intuition])havingthecapacitytoreadbetweenthelines[ofwhatsomeoneissaying].

Participant26F

Particularlyinthecontextofwhereintuitionmeans…whatarethevibesinthisorganisationabouthowpeoplearefeeling?Imean,peoplewillusewordslike,‘what'sthetemperatureintheorganisation’,youknow‘youneedtolistentowhat'snotsaid…’,‘whatarewenothearingrightnow’,andwedotalkaboutthat.Wedousethatkindoflanguageinourexecutivegroup.

Some leaders perceived intuition to be useful formaximising the potential of individuals and groups

within the organisation through sensing how to develop and match the skill sets, personalities and

attributesofstaff,aswellasmotivatememberswithinateam.Forexample:

Participant8F

Icomefromafinancebackground,solet’slookatthecompositesoftheassets.Imeanyouactuallydowantyourassetsworkingforyousothatyou'vegotanoptimumoutcomeandoutput.Youdonotwantthose...piecesorthoseresourcesworkingasaliability.

Participant15F

Asaleader,youactuallyhavetounderstandwhatyouneedandhowyouactuallystrategicallyengageandmotivatetogetthedeliverythatisrequired...enablingpeopletofeeltheycanactuallycontributetoitandunderstandingthevariouswaystheywillcontribute.

Someparticipantssaidtheyintuitedtheimplicationsoftheirdecisionsandhowothersmightreact.For

example:

Participant3F

...therearethemesandfactorsthataren’tmeasureablethatyoutakeintoaccountwhenmakingdecisions.Ithinkalsothat…thinkingabouthowwillthisdecisionplayout,howwillemployeesfeelaboutthis,howwillmanagementfeelaboutthis,howwillIfeelaboutthis,willthedirectorsfeelchallengedbythis?Sothinkingaboutthedifferentperspectivesofthestakeholdersinvolvesintuition.


Furthermore, intuition was reported by one participant to be useful in sensing how best to

approachpeopleand ‘constructa conversation’ (Participant23F)ona sensitive topicoremotionally‐

chargedissue.

5.6.4 Whatsignificanceandvaluedotheparticipantsascribetotheiruseof intuition(s) in

judgement,decision‐makingandleadership?

Asaconsequenceoftheusesdiscussedintheprevioussections,allparticipants67consideredintuition(s)

importanttojudgementanddecision‐makingintheirleadershiproles.Participantsexplicitlystatedtheir

perception that intuitionwas an important component of their decision‐making. A few examples are

displayedbelow:

Participant16F

...Ithinkwedon’tuseintuitionenoughandIthinkwedon’tunderstandenoughaboutwhatgeneratesintuition,andIthinkit’sincrediblyimportant.

Participant4F

...intuitionisanimportantpartofdecision‐making–oritisformeanyway.

Participant9M

It’swhenyouoverruleyourgut...youcomeunstuck

Participant20M

ImaybeoverstatingthisbutIgetthesensethatitplaysabigpartinalotofpeople’sdecision‐making…fromwhatIhaveobserved.

Participant24M

Ohit'sthekeytothewholeexercise...It'salldonebyintuitionandhumanrelationshipsbasically.

Participant15F

…there’sanosmosisbetweenthatintuitionanddecision‐makinginthemorestructuredsenseofleadership.

5.6.5 Genderandtheuseofintuition

As I havealready stated,questions concerning gender and intuitionwerenot included in theoriginal

interviewschedule.However,thefirstfemaleparticipantinterviewedraisedthesignificanceofgender

to intuition for her. Consistent with principles of Grounded Theory, the interview schedule and the

sampling strategy evolved in response (as described in Chapter 4). Gender and intuition became a

67Oneparticipantconsideredintuitionimportantonlyinmakingjudgementsaboutpeople.ThisexceptionwillbediscussedinSection5.8.1.


centralthemeinansweringtheresearchproblemintermsofthedisclosureofintuition.However,hereI

restricttheanalysisofdatatoresponsesconcerningperceptionsaboutgenderandintuitionuse.

Participants(equallybothmenandwomen)perceivedthatwomenweregenerallymoreintuitiveorhad

‘better’intuitionbothintermsofqualityandfrequency.Forexample:

Participant26F

Practicallynoneofmymaleexecutiveshavegotit[intuition]andoneortwoofmyfemaleexecutiveshavegotit,andoneIrecogniseasbeingatthesamesortoflevelthatIhave.

Participant20M

Ihaveverystrongopinionsonthis.Iactuallythinkthatwomenhavefantasticintuition

Many respondents perceived that women had superior intuition, particularly in making judgements

aboutpeople.Forexample:

Participant9M

Ithinkthatfemalebeingshaveinfiniteadvantageintermsoftheirinstinct...I’mspecificallytalkingaboutchemistry.Theyhaveasenseofchemicalmakeup...wheretheycansenseasituationveryquickly...[or]asenseofdiscomfortwithaparticularperson.

Participant26F

Ithinkit'sagenderthing[intuition]...maybeI’malsotalkingaboutpeopleskillstooandsensitivitytopeople'sfeelingsbutIdon'tobserveintuitionorsensitivityto...interpersonalenergy,whichiswhatIthinkintuitionis,isverystrongamongstmymaleexecutives,andI’vegota50/50splitinmyexecutiveteam.

Participantsalsoreportedthatothersperceivedwomenasbeingmoreintuitive.Forexample:

Participant3F

Ithinkyouwouldhavetotalktootherwomendirectorsbut,ingeneral,womenareknownfortheirintuition.

.............................................................................................................................................................

Interviewsequence

Martin

It’sinterestingthatyousayitmightbeafemininequality.

Participant16F

Yes,IhesitatedbeforeIsaidthat...Ithinkitisseenasonthefemininesideoftheledger...Womenareperceivedasbeingmoreintuitive.

.............................................................................................................................................................


Furthermore, it was perceived by one participant (Participant 15) that intuition was ‘feminine’ and

historically,a‘domainofwomen’:

..............................................................................................................................................................

Interviewsequence

Martin(paraphrasing)

...areyouimplyingthere’sadifferenceinrelationtoattitudestointuitionorthepracticeofintuitionintermsofgender?

Participant15

Ithinkthatthat'shistorical.Ithinkthatwomenwereallowedtobecauseitwasexpectedofthemtoexploreothersides...Soitwasseenasafemininetrait.

.............................................................................................................................................................

Someparticipantsbelievedthatwomenweremoreacceptingoftheconceptandthewordintermsof

attitude(whichwillbeexploredfurtherinPart2).Forexample:

Participant15

Ithinkyou'llfindthat,moreoften,previouslywomen...haveusedtheword.AndusedthewordtosayIamintuitiveorI’mnotintuitive.

Participant12F

Womenacceptit[intuition],mendon’t.That’smyexperience[laughs].

Participant16F

It’smoreacceptabletowomengenerally.

Some female participants also perceived that women were more interested in, and had a greater

intuitivesensitivitytotheirsocialenvironment.Forexample:

Participant13F

Idothinkthatwomenpickupmorecuesabouttheenvironmentthanmen.

Participant23F

...womenworkmoreonthesesubtletiesforarangeofdifferentreasonsandcanprobablytuneintopeople.

Moreover, this sensitivitywas based on concern and a sense of responsibility for the impact of their

decisionshadonotherpeople.Forexample:

Participant14

You[referringtomen]don’tactuallyexaminethereaction,anditcouldbeinstantaneous,ofyourdecisiononsomebodysittingoppositeyouand,what’smore,youdon’tcare.WellIthinkwomenreallydocareaboutthat...Ithinkwomenunderstandthatenvironmentisveryimportantbecausedecision‐makingisnotanisolatedevent...


Importantly,manyparticipantsattributedtheperceptionthatwomenhadbetterintuitiontoagreater

sensitivityto,orgreaterawarenessof,theirintuition.Forexample:

Participant16F

Mencanbeabsolutelyasintuitiveandrelyonintuitiveknowledgetoexactlythesamedegreeaswomen...Ithinkmendotendtonotseekitouttothesameextent,exceptsomemen,sothat’swhytheyprefertojustrounditalloffinawordlikejudgement,whereit’sincludedbutnotsowellarticulated.

Thisparticipantperceivedthatmengenerallyhavegoodintuitionbuttendednottoacknowledgeitas

such,labellingit‘inmyexperience’,and‘inmyjudgement’.Theissueofsensitivityto,andconsequent

capacityfortheexpressionofintuition(s),wasfoundtobefundamentaltoansweringthesecondmain

researchquestionandwillthereforeexploredfurtherinPart2ofthischapter.

5.7 Personalitytypes/cognitivestylesofindividuals

Initiallynoquestionswereaskedinrelationtocognitivestyleortypes.Howeverintheearlyinterviewsit

emergedthatparticipantsoftenperceivedthepeopletheydealtwithintermsofanalyticalorintuitive

personality types.This constructwill be referred to as cognitive type from this point. Bothmale and

female participants talked about distinctly different types of individuals in relation to how they

approached and talked about decision‐making, regardless of gender. This is significant for later

discussionandfortheresearchproblembecauseitwillbeshownthatperceptionoftheother(interms

oftype)influencedhowpeopletalkedaboutproblemsanddecisions.

5.7.1 Analyticaltypes

Participants described analytical types as people whom they perceived to be linear, methodical,

disciplined,analytical, slow, logical,wooden,black‐and‐white and rigorous. I havehighlighted these

propertieswithinthetextofeachquotebelowinsteadofdisplayingthemunderseparateheadings.This

isbecausesomeoftheutterancescontainmorethanonecharacteristicorindicatorineach:

Participant27M

...fromtheirpersonalitystyle,they’rehighlyanalyticalpeople.

Participant23F

Ithinkitdoesgetbackto,asIsaidearlier,personalitytypetraitsinpeople.Idon’tconsidermyselftobeblack‐and‐white,IconsiderthatIam,mostthetime,operatinginthegreyandIthinkthatpeoplewhooperatemoreinblack‐and‐whitetypestyleortypeapproachwouldbelessinclinedtobeintuitive.


Participant23F

Youlayoutthefactstohimandthat’swhatyoudo,youlayoutthefactsinalogical,disciplinedapproach.Heisonlyresponsiveifthat’sthekindofconversation.

Participant14F

...Ididhaveaveryblack‐and‐whitethinker.Imeanshewasfromthefinancialworldandcauseandeffectwasalwaysalinearequation...peoplehavegottheirbrainshardwiredindifferentways,andthey’renotjustbeingbloody‐minded,it’sjustthattheycan’tseewhatyoucansee.

Participant27M

...thenthere’sthemoreanalyticalpeople,whojustneverfeelcomfortableonlyapplyingintuitivedecisions.Theyjustneedthereassuranceofsomekindoflogicalthing...andIdon’tblamethem...that’sjusttheirsetup.

Participant1F

Youknowsomepeoplearevery‘wooden’andtheyprobablyhidethemselvesawayinatechnicalareabecauseIthinkpeoplechoose,andtherearesomepeoplewhowe’vegotwhoareterrifictechnically,youknowterrificaccountants,butyouknowthey’rebestleftreallywithspreadsheetsinthebackground...they’reblack‐and‐white.

Participant15

Ihavehadinstancesofpeoplewhohaveworkedformeandhavebeenincrediblyanalytical...Ihaveforexample,peoplewhoareveryanalytical,verymethodical,gothroughthestepsrigorously,one,twoandthree.

5.7.2 Intuitivetypes

In contrast to analytical types, intuitive types we perceived to be more rapid or quick in their

deliberations.However,accordingtoparticipants,speedydecision‐makingshouldnotbeequatedwith

rashdecision‐making.Intermsofcontinualinformationgatheringthroughcommunication,forintuitive

types,decision‐makingwasalways‘on’(Participant15)andaddingtoaninformationbank,andmaking

connectionsinaholisticwaythattheywerereceptiveto.Forexample:

Participant15F

Mydecisionscanlookasthoughthey’reveryquick...thatI’vejustcometoasnapjudgement.Isaid,whatyouhavetounderstandisthatIactuallygointodecision‐makingmodealotearlierthanyourealise...whenyouareactuallycontinuallycommunicating,youareactuallyalwayssourcinginformation.Soit'sthe‘SarahLee’effectIcallit.I’mactuallybuildinguplevelsofinformationandknowledgeallthetimesothatwhenIdohavetomakeadecision,IactuallyhaveaninformationbankthatIcanrefertoveryquickly...Ilooktoeveryonearoundmeasanadjuncttomentalprocessingcapacity.Somy…modeofdecision‐makingisonallthetime.

Participant18M

Idon'tsetouttobe,butIhavethemake‐uptobeapromptdecisionmaker.

Participant26F

...mydecisionsarebasedontheaccumulationofamultitudeofthingsthatIhaveread,peopleI’vetalkedto,conferencesthatI’vebeento,itallseemstosynthesisetogethertoapointwhereIjustknowthatthiswillworkorIjustknowit'snotgoingto...


Participant14F

I'mcertainlynotgettingintoeveryone’sbusiness,butIactuallyhavecontinualcommunication...I’maconnectorofideasandaconnectorofpeople...

Participant1F

NowItriedtoexplaintoher[ananalyticaltype]whatthatmeant,andthebestthingIcouldthinkofwasthatIwaspickingupinformation...Ihavebecomemoresensitive,Ithink,toactuallyreadingpatternsininformationandIthinkconstantly,sortof,formhypotheses,youmakepatternsandformhypothesesfrominformationandyou’reconstantlycheckingagainstnewpiecesofinformation,whetherthatinformsandsupportsthepatternthatyourforming.

Participant8F

...usuallyit'srecognitionofpatternsyouhaveseenbeforeandthereforeareveryfamiliartoyou.

.............................................................................................................................................................

Interviewsequence

Participant23F

SoIdefinitelylistenmoreandobservemore.

Martin

Soit’sareceivingthing?

Participant23F

Yes.SowhenItalkedbeforeaboutbeingcriticallyaware,youcan’tbecriticallyawareifyouarefocusedonyourselfanddoingthetalkingIthink.

.............................................................................................................................................................

5.7.3 Conditionsfortypes

Manyparticipantswhoperceiveddistinctionsincognitivetypesamongstthepeopletheyworkedwith

attributed the difference to the personality of the individual and their professional training.

Forexample:

Participant6M

Look,mybackgroundandmytrainingisasanengineer.AndIwouldhavetosay...Iamaverydeductive,logicalsortofperson.

Participant20M

...Ithinkyourownsituation,trainingandexperienceinpersonalitydoesinfluencealotofyourintuition.Youknow,Italktopeopleintheriskmanagementareaandtheygethorrifiedaboutthefactthatyouwouldeventalkaboutintuition.

Participant17M

...wehaveamaleheadandafemaledeputyandI’manEnglishteacherandXXXisachemist.AndXXXhaspubliclysaidthatherroleistokeepmyfeetonthegroundwhilemyheadisintheclouds[laughter].


Oneparticipantbelievedthatthesetypeswerenotfixedandthatpeoplecouldpotentiallyberetrained:

Participant27M

...forthemit’sreallydifficult,becausetheyprobablyhavebeentrained...morethanothers,inusinglogicandsciencetocometodecision‐making...butIthinkwithabitoftrainingtheycanredeveloptheseskills.

Interestingly, participants did not refer to gender in relation to cognitive types. In fact, some of the

female participants, all of whom acknowledged their use of intuition and its importance to them,

described themselves as intellectual and rational. Therefore, gender was not seen as a relevant

condition to cognitive type. Figure 5.2 (below) diagrammatically represents cognitive types, their

associatedpropertiesandantecedentconditions.

Figure5.2:Propertiesofanalyticalandintuitivetypes

5.7.4 SummaryofPart1

Part1displayedand interpreteddataconcerning thewayparticipants in the studydefined,usedand

valued intuition intheirdecision‐makingand leadership.Whenprompted,someparticipantssaidthey

couldrelatetoordidexperiencepsychicintuition,‘spiritual’intuitionandparticularlyinsight.However,


when initially asked for their definition of intuition in relation to their role as leaders, participants

overwhelmingly referred to intuition as a ‘gut feeling’. More specifically, participants experienced

intuitionasaninternal,received,holistic,subconscioussenseorfeelingofknowing.Intuitionwasvalued

by participants as a feeling/knowing that flagged the rightness or wrongness of a person, choice,

strategyorproposal,thetimelinessofadecisionand/orcaution,andtheneedforaction–particularly

furtherinvestigation.

Noneoftheparticipantsconsideredtheirintuitiontobeinfallible.However,allparticipantsviewedit,at

thevery least, tobefairlyreliable.Acommonthemeforparticipantswas learningtopayattentionto

andplacetrustintheirintuitionswhenconfrontedwithcontradictoryorambiguousinformationand/or

the strong views of others in a decision making process. Intuition use was seen as an iterative and

evolvingprocessoftrustingtheirintuition,takingdecisions,analysingoutcomesandreflectingonthem.

Thecomplementaryuseofintuitionandanalysisfordecisionmakingwasastrongthemeinthedatato

the extent that the boundary between them could become ‘blurred’. Despite this, a strong view

emerged that whether intuition played a dominant role in judgement and decision‐making, was,

accordingtoparticipants,dependentonboththenatureandcontextofthedecision.

Participants reported that analytical decision‐making techniques were most appropriate for matters

involvingquantitativevariableswhereasintuitionwasperceivedasmostusefulforassessingqualitative

factors. Typically, these tended to be judgements and decisions concerning people.Whether or not

intuitionwaslikelytoplayaroleindecision‐makingandjudgementwasalsoseenasconditionedbythe

perceived gravity of the decision, the level of experience and/or domain knowledge of the decision

maker,precedentandtheamountof informationavailable, thecomplexityandambiguity,urgencyof

thedecisionandwhetherthedecisionrelatedtobusinessorprivatematters.

Examples givenby participants revealed five general categories orways inwhich theyused intuition.

These were: assessing alternatives, proposals, data and information given; assessing the judgements

andweightingsgiventovariousdata,propositions,presentationsandperceptionsgivenbyothers;asa

prompt for enquiry; in assessing people in relation to prospective involvement, and for judgements

aboutinterpersonalrelationsanddynamics.

Manyparticipants,bothmaleandfemale,perceivedthatwomenweregenerallymoreintuitiveinterms

ofthequalityandthefrequency,particularlyinjudgementsconcerningpeople.However,somefemale

participantsbelievedthatmenwereequallyintuitivebutdidnotacknowledgetheirintuitionusetothe

sameextent.Manyparticipantsalsoobserveddifferencesinapproachtoproblemsolvinganddecision‐

making irrespective of gender (cognitive type). The analysis showed that people with an analytical

cognitive type were characterised by participants as linear, methodical, disciplined, analytical, slow,


logical, ‘wooden’, ‘black‐and‐white’ and rigorous. Participants also described people who were

continually gathering information through communication, adding to an information bank of

connectionsthattheywereintuitivelyreceptiveto.Participantsattributedthisdifferencetopersonality

andtraining.

Part2:WhatarethesocialprocessesofintuitiondisclosurebyAustralianleadersinorganisations?

InPart1Iexaminedtheresponsesofparticipantsinrelationtohowtheydescribed,definedandused

intuition in their leadership and decision‐making. In addition, I described and discussed the

circumstances and contexts under which participants considered intuition use appropriate and gave

examples of the ways in which they used it. I also indicated the importance of intuition for the

participants,andparticipants’perceptionsofcognitivetypeandconditioninginfluencesweredisplayed.

Part2willpresentfindingsinrelationtothefollowingresearchissues:

• Drill‐downexploration2.1:Whataretheviewsandperceptionsofparticipantsaboutreceptivityto,andthelegitimacyof,intuition(s)injudgementsanddecision‐makingintheirorganisations?

• Drill‐downexploration 2.2:What language is usedby participants and thosewithwhom theyassociateinrelationtointuition(s)?



Followingthis,modelswillbepresentedthat integratethefindingsfromPart1andPart2 inorderto

addressandanswertheresearchproblemidentifiedinChapter2(Section2.16).

5.8 Whataretheviewsandperceptionsofparticipantsaboutthelegitimacyof,andotherpeople’sreceptivityto,intuition(s)?

5.8.1 Attitudesofparticipantstowardintuition

Allparticipantsconsideredintuitionimportanttotheir judgementanddecision‐making(Section5.6.4).

While this might suggest that all participants would accordingly have a positive attitude toward

intuition, this was not entirely the case (discussed earlier in Section 5.6.3.4). Early in the interview,

Participant19Msuggestedthat ‘peopledothingswithout fullyanalysingthem’andthatgut feelwas

usedbypeople‘asanexcuseforinadequateanalysisinsomecases’.Moreover,laterintheinterview,he

equatedtheexpressionsgutfeelingandintuitionwith‘muckandmystery’.Thisisdespitethefactthat


headmittedmakingintuitivejudgementsinrelationtoselectingpeopleforrolesinhisorganisationand,

furthermore,thatthistaskwascentraltohisroleasaleader,andoneheconsideredcoretothesuccess

oftheorganisation:

Participant19M

WellIsupposeitisaninterestingword[intuition]andIhaven’tthoughtagreatdealaboutit.Mydecision‐makingprocessisallaboutunderstandingwhereIam,understandingwhereIwanttobe,andthepointsinbetweenandgettingthere.Isuppose,ifIwastouseintuition,andIcertainlyconsciouslydon’tdoit,buttheareainwhichitismostdefinedformeisinjudgingpeople,and...I’vespentmoretimepickingpeopletocarryouttasks,thanalmostanythingelse.

While he appears to contradict himself in the interview, I argue that this can be understood by

delineatingtwoargumentsthatParticipant19Mmade.First,whenParticipant19Mstatedthatpeople

‘use the word intuition as an excuse for inadequate analysis’ he did not imply that intuition was

illegitimate,inandofitself,butsuggestedthattheword,‘insomecases’,canbeusedasanexcusefor

lackofeffortandthuscanbea‘justificationforguesswork’.Thefactthatheadmittedusingintuitionin

judgementsaboutpeoplesuggeststhathedoesacceptacasefor‘legitimate’intuitionanditsuse.

Second,althoughParticipant19Mequated intuitionwith ‘muckandmystery’he laterstatedhisview

that (his) intuition is ‘based on analysis and experience’. The participant gave an example of this in

relationtopeople:

.............................................................................................................................................................

Interviewsequence

Martin

Wouldyousaythatyouhaveafeelforsomebody,wouldyouusethatexpression?Oragutfeelaboutsomebody?Howwouldyoudescribeit?

Participant19M

HowwouldIdescribeit?Yessupposethatisawayofdescribingit.It’scertainlyajudgementaboutsomebody.Youkindoflookatthemandlistentothemandseehowtheyrelateandwhetherornottheycanliveuptothepromise.Soyes,Isupposeyes,afeelingaboutthemisquiteright...Ithinkyougetafeelforpeoplethatgoeswithalltheotheranalysisastowhetherornotthepeoplearewhateithertheyorotherssaytheyare.

.............................................................................................................................................................

The participant’s description of ‘judgement’ is consistent with the definitions of intuition offered by

other participants: that it is basedon previous analysis and experience, and that it involves a feel or

feeling,whichisthencomparedtootherinformationavailable.Inaddition,Iarguethattheparticipant’s

contradicting statements should be considered in the light of his admission that he had not thought


muchaboutit.Hisdiscomfortwithacknowledgingintuitionuseshouldalsobeviewedinrelationtothe

viewthatintuitioncanbeperceivedasmystical,esotericandunscientific68.Thiswasacommontheme

when participants were asked for their perceptions about the attitudes of others to the concept of

intuition.Attitudestotheconceptofintuitionwillnowbeexplored.

5.8.1.1Perceivedattitudesofotherstotheconceptofintuition

Theanalysisrevealedthatparticipantshadexperiencedsignificantdiversityinrelationtothereceptivity

ofotherstowardtheconceptofintuitionandtheuseofintuitionindecision‐making.Someparticipants

linkedattitudetointuitiontocognitivetype(discussedinSection5.7).Forexample:

Participant15F

Ithinkthatwill,again,gobacktothetypeofstylethattheyhave.Somewillsayitscompleterubbish,otherswillsay,lookIdon’tgenerallybelieveinintuitionbuttherehavebeeninstanceswhen…andotherssay,sure.You’vegotthewholespectrumthere.

Mostparticipantshowever,believedtherewasnotageneralacceptanceofintuition,rather,ahighlevel

ofscepticisminindividualsandorganisations.Reasonsgivenforthislackofacceptanceofintuition,or

theuseof theword intuition,were thatparticipantsbelieved it carriedwith it connotationsof being

esoteric,unscientificandnon‐business‐like.

Participant1F

...theythinkit’sabitwacky...itdoesn’tmakesense....there’sbeenalotofpressureonmakingmanagementseemveryscientificandit[intuition]seemstobetantamounttocrystals.

Participant10F

It’sgenerallybelittled.Ithinkpeoplethinkofintuitionassomethingthat’sabitoffwiththepixies.There’sstillnotawideacceptanceinsocietytodayaboutintuition.

Participant2M

Oh,it’sshit,it’scrap.It’swhyyoudon’ttrustintuition.Youcan’tputadollarsignagainstintuition.Youcan’tquantifyintuition.It’soneofthosethingsthatyoucan’tsaynineoutof10forintuition...andyetitisthemostvaluablecommodity.

Participant4F

Becauseitisnotscientific,becauseit’snotnecessarilybasedonfact,it’snotabletobebackedupbyresearch...Becauseitsounds...fluffy,non‐business‐like.

Moreover,asindicatedearlier,somefemaleparticipantsperceivedthatintuitionwasnotaccepted,and

consideredasinferiortoanalysis,becauseitisgenerallyassociatedwithemotionandwomen.

68Laterintheanalysis(Section5.13)itwillbeshownthatindividualswithlow‘interiority’arelessawareoftheir

feelings,andasaconsequence,theirintuition(s).


Participant12F

Ithinkthatgutfeelingpeoplecanlivewith,butgenerally,ithasaprefix–women’sintuition...andit’spoohpoohed...peoplethinkthatifwomengetpregnanttheirbrainfallsoutoftheirhead.Peoplethinkthatifwomenmakedecisionsbasedonintuitionthenithasnofactualbasis,it’sunsupportable,it’sjust,youknow,girltalk.

Participant16F

Ithinkthereisaviewthatit’sunreliable.Ithinkthereisaviewthatitisconnectedtoemotions.Ithinkthereisaviewthatitismaybeafemininecharacteristicand,withtheenormouspushtorelyonsomeevidence,thatitismovingawayfromevidence‐basedthinking,science,research...Ithinkithasbeen…notawordthathasafullacceptance,evenjustatitchcondescendingorderogatorytorelyonit.

Participant4F

Becauseit’svoodoo,becauseit’sweird,becauseit’sagirlthing.

This findingcanbeconsideredsignificantbecause itwasonethatwasrepeatedby thewomen in the

study.Someparticipants,bothmaleandfemale,assuggestedearlier,believedthatthisassociationof

womenwithintuitionhadahistoricalbasis:

Participant15F

Ithinkthatthat'shistorical.Ithinkthatwomenwereallowedto[talkaboutintuition]becauseitwasexpectedofthemtoexploreothersides...andthatwassafeandletthemhavetheirintuitionbecauseitneveractuallyimpactedonanythingthatwassignificant.Soitwasseenasafemininetrait,againbecauseitwasesoteric...

Participant7M

TheirsocialisationovermillenniaisverydifferentandIthinkit[intuition]isaresourcethatthey[women]use.

Participantsperceivedaneedtojustifyandaccountforthedecisionstheymakeinascientific,evidence‐

based,rationalandbusiness‐likefashion,whichconflictedwiththenatureofintuition.

Participant1F

There’sbeenalotofpressureonmakingmanagementtoseemveryscientificandit[intuition]seemstobetantamounttocrystals.

Participant27M

...sometimesyouhavetojustifywhyyoumadethedecisionyoumadeandthere’sstillnotawideacceptanceinsocietytodayaboutintuition.

Participant5M

Yeah,thereiscertainly...[ageneralsuspicionofintuition]anditcomesbacktothisideathatyou’vegottabeabletorationaliseandverbalise,articulateyourassumptionsandyourreasoningprocesses,andifyoucameforwardandsaid,well,I'vegotanapproachwhichisbasedonsomethingyoucan’tsee,youcan'ttouch,youcan'tarticulate,youknow,trustme...itwouldn'tfly.

Participant26F

Soattheendofthedaythenumbersstackupandweshouldhavewrittenitoff,butmygutfeelingwasthatwewouldgetthroughthis.That’snotwhatpeoplewanttohear.


Thus, on one hand, participants perceived intuition(s) to be legitimate for their owndecision‐making

and thiswasaconsequenceof theirownexperience.However, theyalsoperceived thatmanyothers

considereditillegitimate.Participantsexplainedthisperceptionofillegitimacyintermsofeducationand

training.AttitudetointuitionandantecedentconditionsarerepresentedinFig.5.3below:

Figure5.3:Attitudestowardintuitionandantecedentconditions

5.8.2 Consequencesofnegativeattitudes

As a consequence of this disjuncture, most participants (men and women) suggested that there

might not be a greatwillingness to admit use of intuition, especially in formal business settings and

largerorganisations.

Participant16F

It’snotusuallyreferredtointhediscussion...Youtalkabouttheevidence,whatistheevidence,andyouaskpeoplewhattheythinketc.HowdoesthatmakesensetothemandIguessthat’swhereyou’recallingonyourintuition...Butitisinteresting,becauseinthoseformalkindsofmeetings,particularlybusinessmeetings,thewordisseldomused.


Participant8F

Ihavenotheardanybody,inmyexperience,everstandupandadmittoit[intuition],withthepossibleexceptionofentrepreneurs...bigcorporatebusinesses,theywouldshyawayfromit.

Participant9M

Ithinkyourintuitionisn’tgenerallyshared.Idon’tknowwhy.Ithinkintuitionisaveryprivatething.

Participant6M

Ithinkit’sunderstoodratherthantalkedabout.

Someparticipantssuggestedthatattitudestointuitionwerenegativeenoughtoinvokeridicule:

Participant12F

...nofemaleintheboardroomwouldeverwanttohaveherdecisionsreferredtoas…basedonwomen’sintuition.Youwoulddieathousanddeathsifyouthoughtanybodythoughtthat’swhatyouweredoing.

Participant15F

Ifyoucan'trationaliseyour...intuition,thenyou'refrightenedofbeingridiculed.Whetheryouarecorrectornot,you’restillfrightenedofbeingridiculed.Perhapsit'sahangoverfromtheoldwitchcraftdays.WhatIhavenoticedisthatwhensomeoneturnsroundandsays,‘I’vegotafeelingbutIdon'tknowwhyorIcan'tjustifyit’,Ithinkthattheyfeelapologeticfortheirfeelings.Andthat'sbecauseIthinkthey'reafraidofridicule.

Participant22M

Peopledon’twanttothinkthattheyaregoingtobeseenaswacko,psychic.

Participant27M

Probablyalotofpeoplewilllookatyouandgiveyouthatfunnysmile.

5.8.3 Changingperceptionsofintuition

Asseenintheprevioussection,manyparticipantsperceivedsignificantscepticismtowardsintuitionasa

concept,aswellastheuseofintuitioninbusinessdecision‐making.Nevertheless,someparticipantssaid

theyhadnoticedashiftinattitudesoverrecentdecadestowardincreasingreceptivity.Forexample:

Participant16F

Ithinkitischangingquitefuriously[thecollectiveattitudetointuition].

Participant14F

Idon’tthinkanyonewouldcomeout,liketheymighthavefiveyearsago,andsayit’s‘hocuspocus’.

Someparticipantsattributedchangingattitudes to increaseddiversity in theworkplaceandaneedto

embrace this diversity through a more inclusive and all‐encompassing approach to leadership.

Forexample:

Participant15

Weareundergoingalotofchange...It’sprobablybeingledbythegenderanddiversityinitiatives...you'veactuallyhadtoevolveyourleadershipstylebecauseyou'vegottoengageallthepeoplewho


workforyou.Andalotofpeoplehavegonekickingandscreaming,andsomepeoplearestillkickingandscreamingoverit.Butthereisageneralrecognitionthatthereisabroadeningofahumanskillbase.

Participant20M

Yesit’schangingbutitisveryslow.Thewholeorganisationalculture,tryingtobreakdownbarriersandgettingpeopletocollaboratemore,totrytocreatemorefreedomofexpression.

However, somewomen in thestudywereadamant thatattitudes to intuitionhadnotchanged in the

termoftheircareer.

5.9 Whatlanguageisusedbyparticipantsandbythosewithwhomtheyassociatetotalkaboutintuition(s)?

5.9.1Disclosureofintuition(s)

Asaconsequenceofperceivednegativeconnotationsofthewordintuition,manyparticipantssaidthey

would not disclose the role of intuition in their decisions. This was particularly relevant in the

constructionofstatementsissuedtothepublic.Forexample:

Participant3F

I’msureyouknowhowmuchtimegoesintothewordingofpublicstatements...itoftenishowyouexpressit...mygutfeelingwasthatwewouldgetthroughthis,that’snotwhatpeoplewanttohear.Onceagainit’showit’sphrasedandsold,um…Ithinkthemediawouldthinkyouarebeingwishywashyifyouexpresseditthatway.

Participants perceived that the words experience and particularly judgement were acceptable in

businesscontexts.Forexample:

Participant1F

Isupposeit’smorecomfortableforpeopletotalkaboutjudgementthantotalkaboutintuition..............................................................................................................................................................

Interviewsequence

Participant3F

Ifyouhadtoclassifyityouwouldprobablysayexperience,becausethat’swhatpeoplewanttosee.

Martin

Oryoumightsayjudgement?

Participant3F

Yes,that’sright,judgement.Ithinkthatcomesbacktojudgementinthecorporateandlegalambitsofdecision‐making...Ithinkit'salwaysbeenaroundandvaluedbutperhapsjusttalkedofindifferentterminology.

Martin

Intermsofjudgementandexperience?


Participant3F

That'sright.Ijustthinkit's,Ijustthinkit'speople'slevelofcomfortwithdifferentlanguageandwhatthey'dbetterrelateto,intermsofcommunicatingaconcept,theywilltalkaboutsomethingthatisperhapsmorepreciseanddescriptiveaboutwhattheyaretryingtoencapsulate.Itmightbejustthevaguenessoftheterm.

.............................................................................................................................................................

As pointed out by one participant, judgement is consistentwith Section 181 of the Corporations Act

(2001)where the term ‘business judgement’ is defined as any decision to take or not take action in

respectofamatterrelevanttothebusinessoperationsofthecorporation’.

Manyparticipantsacknowledgedthatforthem, intuitionwasanintegralpartof judgement.However,

thiswasimplicitandunderstoodratherthanexplicit.Forexample:

Participant6M

Ithinkit’sunderstoodratherthantalkedabout[intuition];thisisnotsomebodyweoughttobedoingbusinesswith,that’sjudgement.

Participant16F

Whenwetalkjudgement,maybeeveryonearoundtheroomrealisesthatintuitionisapartofjudgement.Infact,intuitionismaybeadominantpartofjudgementthatmakesyouendupinonepositionasopposedtoanother,whereyoucan’talwaysnecessarilyarticulatewhyyou’retheretotally,confidently,notwithscienceorarationalargument...Ithinkit’saverysubtleandsubconsciouspartofjudgement.

.............................................................................................................................................................

Interviewsequence

Participant12F

Youwouldhavenoconcernifyouthoughtpeoplethoughtyouaremakingdecisionsbasedonlife’sexperiencesandyourbusinessexperiencebecausethat’swhatyouaretherefor.Butwrappedupinthat,Ithink,thereisalwaysabitofintuition.Butitisunacknowledgedandremainsunacknowledged.

Martin

Soifyousaidit’smyjudgementthatwouldbeokay?

Participant12F

That’sfine.

Martin

Butifyousaidit’smywomen’sintuition?

Participant12F

Notfine.

.............................................................................................................................................................


Participant16F

...peoplesay‘whatdoesyourexperiencetellyou…’Idoubtthatajournalistorananalystwouldpursuethebasisofthatjudgementtotheextentthatintuitionwouldeverbementioned.Andthenitwouldbespelledoutasexperienceratherthanintuition.

Therefore,usingthewordsjudgementandexperienceallowedparticipantstoarticulatetheirintuitions

inanacceptablewaywithoutexplicitlyacknowledgingtheroleofintuition.

5.9.2Genderdifferenceintheexpressionofintuition(s)

Althoughparticipants, ingeneral,didnotexplicitlydisclosetheiruseof intuition,particularly inpublic

statements, itwasalso found thatwomenwere comfortablewithwords that reflected the feelingof

knowingassociatedwithintuition.Thewomeninthestudyperceivedthattheyandotherwomenwere,

ingeneral,morecomfortablewithusingwordslike‘myfeelingis’,‘mysenseis’,‘thisdoesn’tfeelright’,

particularlyamongstotherwomen.Forexample:

Participant12F

‘Idon’tknowaboutthat,itjustdoesn’tfeelright’,that’softenanexpressionthatwomenusewhentheirintuitionissaying,haveanotherthink.

Participant4F

ImeanIoftensay,forexample,thatmysenseis…It’satermIusealot.Mysenseisthatthisistherightthingtodo,ormysenseiswehavegotaproblemhere.Iusethattermquitefrequently,andIthink,whenIthinkaboutit,that’sprobablybasedonanintuitivereasoning.

Participant16F

Ithinkwomenarewillingtoadmitthattheyareusingintuitionmuchmorethanmen.Andagain,Ithinkthisiswhereitcomesbacktothatmenwouldprefertousethewordjudgementbecausetheythinkit’smorerationalandlessemotional.

Someparticipantsarguedthatwomen,ingeneral,useddifferentlanguagethanmen;oftenmorefeeling

based (depending on the context, which will be explored later). Many participants (both men and

women)attributedthistowomenbeingmore‘intouch’andcomfortablewiththeirfeelings, including

intuition(s).Theseparticipantsclaimedtheir languagereflectedagreatersensitivityto,andawareness

of,feelings,emotionsandintuitions.Forexample:

Participant8M

Ithinkwomenaremoreattunedto,ingeneral,theemotionalstuffarounddiscussions.

Participant12F

Ijustthinkthatwomen,womenhaveadeepersenseof…ofhowwefeelaboutthings.We’remore,moreintouchwithfeelingokay,feelingnotokay,andweexpressthoseviews.Wetalkaboutfeelingswithourcolleagues,ourmatesetcanyway.Weusedifferentwords–Idon’tlikethat,thatdoesn’tfeelrighttome,thatsortofthing.That’showwegetcomfortablewithit.SoIthinkitisabitofself‐awareness...Inadecision‐makingprocessaroundtheboardtablewherethereareallwomen,nobodyreallymindsifyouinterjectandbuttinandwetendtofinisheachother’sconversationsetc.It’smoreinclusiveintermsoflisteningtowhatpeoplehavetosay...Ican’trecallwhethertheword[intuition]wasactuallyusedbutit’squiteclearlyaroundthediscussion.Thewayinwhichthingsaretalked


aboutismorearoundfeelings,Ithinkallthisfeelsrighttome,Ithinkweshouldgiveitago,whydon’twehaveagoatthatsortofthing,it’sverydifferentlanguage.

However,oneparticipantobservedthat‘gutfeel’or‘gutfeeling’wasatermthatwasincreasinglyused

by men because of its visceral, physical and muscular connotations that might appeal to men and

becauseitappearstobedistinctfromthefeminineandemotionalconnotationsofthewordintuition:

Participant15

I’mnoticingmenstartingtouseitmoreandmorenow,youknow,Ihaveafeelingormyintuitiontoldme,orthegutsaid.Oftenthey'llputitintothephysicalbecauseIthinkthephysicalismorecomfortableformenandtheywillturnaroundandtheywillsaymygutreactionis.

Thisdistinction inrelationtogenderandtheabilityandwillingness toexpress intuitive feelingswasa

strongtheme.InthefollowingsectionsIwillarguethatthisperceiveddifferenceisimportantandone

thatcanbeobservedbycomparingutterancesofmenandwomeninthestudy.

5.10Howeasilyareparticipantsabletoarticulatetheirintuition(s)?

In previous sections I showed that women were perceived by many participants to have better69

intuition(s)thanmen,tobemorelikelytouseintuitionandthattheywouldbemorelikelytousethe

wordintuitionorwordsthatcanbeseentoimplyintuition,particularly‘feeling’words.Ialsofoundthat

manyparticipants,bothmaleandfemale,believedthatwomenweremoreawareofor‘intouch’with

theirfeelingsthanmen–morecomfortablewiththeinteriorworldoffeelingsandintuitionsthanmen.

Moreover, in relation to this study, women were perceived to be more willing and interested in

articulatingtheirfeelings,includingintuitions.Forexample:

Participant26F

...thewomenwanttotalkaboutwhatthey’refeelingandexperiencingandtheblokeswanttotalkabout[startslaughing],youknow,theygetveryirritatedbythisprocessbecausetheydon'twanttotalkaboutthisstuff.

Significantly, some female participants perceived that this lack of awareness of feelings resulted in

a failure to acknowledge the role that intuition played in their judgement and decision‐making.

Forexample:

Participant12F

Idon’tthinkmenarecloseenoughgenerally,todealwithintuition.Idon’tthinktheyacknowledgeitparticularlywell,somedo,butgenerally,theydon’t–theylikethefacts,theylikethedata,theylikestatistics.

69Betterintuitionintermsofqualityandfrequencyasperceivedbyparticipants.


Participant16F

Ithinkmenarelessawareofthefactofintuitionintheirthinking–lessawareofit.ButIthinkitisthereandIthinktheydorelyonit.Buttheyjustdon’tcallitthatandtheydon’tnecessarily...theyhaven’tthoughtitthrough,whatitisthatisdrivingtheirthinking.

Thisfindingishighlyrelevantforaddressingtheresearchproblembecauseifmenarelessintouchwith

theirfeelingsanddonotacknowledgeintuitionaswellaswomenthentheyareconsequentlylessable

toarticulatetheirintuition(s).Thedegreeofawarenessof‘feelings’(whichwouldincludeintuitionsand

emotions) and the extent to which individuals are interested in, and willing and/or capable of

articulatingthisinternalawarenessisaconceptthatIwillnowbegintodevelop.

5.11Interiority(corecategory)

Icontendthattheperceptionsdisplayedintheprevioussectioninrelationtogenderandintuitionare

supportedbyacomparisonofresponsesbyparticipantstoquestionsabouttheirinternalexperienceof

intuition.Basedonthedatadisplayed inTable5.2 (below) I suggest that theresponsesof the female

participants imply a greater orientation to, awareness of, and/or a more developed ability and

willingness to describe and articulate their subjective experience of intuition. Furthermore, this

differencecanbeobservedirrespectiveofage,experienceandactivity/industry.

Moreover, female rather than male participants considered the realm of feelings (including both

emotionandintuition)tobeimportanttoacknowledgeindecision‐making.Idonotmeantoassertthat

themaleparticipantsarenotawareoftheir intuitionsorthattheydonotuse intuitionasoftenoras

effectivelyas thewomen.Rather,my interpretationof theevidence is that theextent towhichthese

men andwomen are aware of and acknowledge the feeling component of intuition is different. Put

simply, the data in the table suggests that women are indeed ‘in‐touch’ with their feelings. High

interiorityrepresents,attheintrapersonallevel,agreaterorientationtotheinnerrealmoffeelingsand

intuitions, and consequently a greater awareness and willingness to more effectively articulate and

perhapsutilisethem. Inthewordsofonefemaleparticipant, ‘I justthinkthatwomen,womenhavea

deepersenseof…howwefeelaboutthings’(Participant12F).Interioritybecamethecorecategoryof

theanalysisandcoreconceptofthethesisthatwillultimatelybeusedtoanswertheresearchproblem.

Table 5.2 (below) displays the utterances of male and female participants70 for the purpose of

comparison. Column 1 contains responses to questions concerning how participants subjectively

experiencedintuitions.Thequotesarearrangedinsuchaway(male/femalealternatelydownthepage)

70Thisthemeemergedduringthepilotinterviews.


sothatacomparisoniseasilymade.Thecolumnstotheleftindicateparticipantidentifier,genderand

whetherIconsidertheparticipanthasindicatedahighdegreeofinteriority.Icontendthatacomparison

ofthedatainColumn1supportstheperceptionsofparticipants,whicharedisplayedinColumn2,that

male participants, in general, were not as willing and/or able to describe their internal experience.

However, the last rows of the table display data from twomale participants who I deemed to have

intrapersonalinteriority.TheseparticipantswillbediscussedinSection5.11.4.

Theutterancescontained inthetablewillshowthatsomeofthemaleparticipantsappearedtoavoid

the question. Others did not understand the question, thought it was a strange question or gave

minimal responses. Indeed, onemale participant (Participant 19M) began tapping his fingers on his

chairindicatingsomediscomfortand/ortension.Incontrast,thefemaleparticipantswerebothwilling

andabletoarticulatetheirinternal,subjectiveexperienceofintuition.Thiswasevenmoreremarkable

consideringthesubtleandelusivenatureofthephenomenon.


Table5.2:Contrastingcapacityand/orwillingnesstoarticulatetheinternalexperienceofintuition(s)Pa

rticipan

tNo.

Gen

der

Interiority?

ority

Column1:Responsestoquestionsconcerningtheirinternalexperienceofintuition

Column2:Perceptionsofparticipantsinrelationtogender,awarenessof

feelingsandintuition(s)

4 F Y ...Ithinkintuition,forme,isnotsomethingthatisnotjustnecessarilya

gutreactionorjustareaction...itcomesfromthinkingdeeplyabout…experiencesinyourlife...formeintuitionisalmostaphysicalreaction...

Ithinkwomenknowthemselvesalotbetterthanmendo.

6 M N [avoidingornotunderstandingthequestion]Wellmyviewis,quiteoften,thereisapersonputtingforwardapropositionoracoupleof

people.Iftheycan’texplainclearlyanddefineandtalkabouttherisksand…

8 F Y [longpause]thefeelingofuncomfortableis...[pausestothinkand

mumbles]...partlywhatyouwoulddefinitelycallmental,‘cosyoujustthink...ahh...butit'safeeling...itssensationifyoulike.Idon'tknow

howyouwoulddescribethefeeling...itjustdoesn'tfeelright.Somethingisn'tright,somethingisnaggingatmeatthebackofmymind

...

Ithinkwomenaremoreattunedto,ingeneral,theemotionalstuffaround

discussions.

9 M N Well,iteitherfeelsrightoritfeelswrong–it’sblackandwhite.

10 F Y It’s…whatwouldIlikenitto?It’sasenseofaccomplishment,like

preparingagoodmealwhereyouknowit’sareallygoodmealandyouknowthatpeoplearegoingtobesatisfied…it’sabitlikethat.

We’vejusthadachangeofCEO...TheformerCEOwasamaleandascientist

andalawyer,andourcurrentisafemaleandasocialworkerandacriminologist.It’smucheasiertohavethosesortsofconversations[intuitions

andfeelings]withher.


Table5.2:(continued)Pa

rticipan

tNo.

Gen

der

Interiority?

ority


Column2:Perceptionsofparticipantsinrelationtogender,awarenessoffeelingsandintuition(s)

11

M N Haveyouread,I’msureyouhave,abookwrittenbyMalcolmGladwell?[apparentlyavoidingthequestion]

[Followingasecondattempt]

Ahh,typicallyits,ahh,howdoesitfeeltome?Ahh,[pause],whenit’snotthere,ahh,it’sevidentit’snotthere.Inotherwords,acertaintyofnon‐

knowledge,sotheabsenceofitisinteresting!

Youknowthemaleofthespecies...allsixofusorallsevenofuswouldbemarchingdownonewayandthereisacoupleofwomenontheteamsaying...

doweneedtothinkaboutthisinadifferentway...andwhetherit’scomingfromleft‐fieldthinking,Idon’tknow,leftbrain‐rightbrainstufforjustthe

emotionalside,butIreallytrusttheirjudgement[women].

12 F Y ...it’sjust,um,aninnateviewthatyoujustform.It’sabitlikeyoumeetsomebodyandyoulikethispersonoryoudon’tlikethisperson,andit

maywelljustbeafeelingthatyougetfromwordsthattheyuse,whethertheystandtoocloseyouortheydon’t...

Womenaremoreintouchwiththeirownfeelingsthanmenare.Notallmen,Iamnotcategorisingthemaleofthespeciesthiswaybut,often,womenare

moreintouchwiththeirfeelings.

22 M N Idon’tthinkitisanexperience...Well,Isupposeifyoulookatme,Idon’tspendalotoftimethinkingaboutit...thesethingscometoyou...

23 F Y Notphysical,andthatyoudon’tfeellikeit’sabloworabitofawrenchoranything,it’sjustunsettlingintheguts,alevelofdiscomfortinthe

guts,whichprobablymovestothebrainbecauseIdo,Ispendalotoftimeinmyhead.

Iwouldneversuggestthatmenaren’tintuitive,Ijustthinkthatwomenworkmoreonthesesubtletiesforarangeofdifferentreasonsandcanprobablytune

intopeoplebecausetheyhavetodothat.

24 M N Idon'tseethatit'sanexperience.Iwouldn'tsaythatit'sahugesensation.


Table5.2:(continued)

Participan

tNo.

Gen

der

Interiority?

ority



25 F Y [pause]Iguessyougoback,andtosomeextentitisaclichébutagutfeelingisprobablynotabadwayofdescribingit.It'sasensethatitfeels

rightoritdoesn'tfeelright,orthereissomethingthatiscausingyouanigglinguneaseoraconcern,evenifyoucan'tquiteputyourfingeron

thespecificissueimmediately.Usuallyworkingawayatityoucanprobablyuncoverthesourceofit.

26 F Y ...youstillyourselfandyoukindofwaitfortheinnerturmoiltokindofsettle,likestirringupthemudinapondorsomethingandifyoujustsit

withit,youcanbeclearaboutwhatitisthatyouareexperiencing,ifyouallowyourselftobetrulypresentbothtotheyourselfandtotheother

person...

I’vegota50/50splitinmyexecutiveteam.Anditcreatessomedifficultybecausethewomenwanttotalkaboutwhatthey’refeelingandexperiencing

andtheblokeswanttotalkabout(startslaughing),youknow,theygetveryirritatedbythisprocessbecausetheydon'twanttotalkaboutthisstuff.

27 M N ...youlistentoalternativesandtothescenariosandyougetacertain

feelingaboutwhatyouthinkisrightandyougoforit.

Therespondentobservedthathethoughtthatwomenhadbetteremotional

intelligence.

16 F Y IthinkIliketocallitadeepknowledgebecausetheythinkyouarelookingintothedepthsanditistherethatyoufindit.

Mencanbeabsolutelyasintuitiveandrelyonintuitiveknowledgetoexactlythesamedegreeaswomen.Butitcomesbackto...actuallyseekingitout...I

thinkmendotendtonotseekitouttothesameextent,exceptsomemen,sothat’swhytheyprefertojustrounditalloffinawordlikejudgementwhereit’s

includedbutnotsowellarticulated.


Table5.2:(concluded)

Participan

tNo.

Gen

der

Interiority?

ority



19 M N I’mnotsurethatIwould[describetheexperienceofintuition],quitefrankly,I’veneverthoughtaboutitinthoseterms.

2 M Y Justbeingsilentandstilliswonderfulandthat’swhenthingsspeakto

you…wellintuitionissortofliketryingtosussoutwhatisnotbeingsaid,thesub‐textifyoulike,thebodylanguage,thekindoftheimportantstuff

thatisnotbeingexpressedthatprobablyismoreimportantthanthestuffbeingexpressed.It’saprocessandthetrickistoreadthataswellastheovertagenda.

[inresponsetoaquestionaboutintuitionuseandgender]Well,genderisa

kindofveryinteriorthing...Ithinkmenhavethefeminineside,whichisprobablytheintuitiveside,andwomenhavethefeminineside,whichisthe

intuitiveside.Butit’snotsomuchtodowithgender,it’stodowiththebalanceofyinyang,it’stodowiththebalanceofhowtheyareatthattime.Iseeitasmalewithinthecontextofmale‐femaleasone.

20 M Y Myprofessionortrainingisverytechnicalandanalytical,soIguessI

wouldliketothinkthattheprocessisanintellectualprocess,butitendsupbeingwhatyoucallgutfeel.ButoftenIthinkthatthereisastrong

emotiveelementtothat.Ineedtobecarefulthattheemotivepartdoesn’ttakeovertheintellectualpart...intuitionismostpowerfulinthe

coolofthedayandyoucanseparateoutalltheotherinfluencesonyou.Andyoucansitthereandsortofsay,well,howdoIreallyfeelaboutthis

anddrawonallofthoseelementsratherthanjustsitthereandbeangryorupset.

AndIamprobablygeneralisingherebutingeneralthey[women]arebetterat

self‐awarenessofintuitionandthereisprobablyastrongeremotionalcontexttotheirintuitionthaninmen.


5.11.1 Theneedforanewconcept

AscanbeseeninTable5.2,participantsoftenstruggledtofindappropriatewordsfortheirsubjective

experienceofintuition.Iattributethis,inpart,tothelackoflanguagedescriptiveoftheinternalrealm

of feelings.Moreover, Ipurport thatnoEnglishwordcurrentlyexpressesthe fullnessof theconcept I

seektodevelophere,andthishasmotivatedmyadoptionandadaptationofthewordinteriority.Iwill

subsequently present the properties that I wish to attach to the use of the word interiority in the

contextofthisstudyanddisplayevidencethatjustifiestheinclusionoftheseproperties.However,for

now,Iwillfocusmyanalysisonthetermsparticipantsdiduseandthroughthisanalysisarguethatthese

termsareunsuitableand/orinadequate.

‘Self‐awareness’wasatermparticipantsusedinrelationtoacriticalassessmentoftheirownqualities

andlimitations.Forexample:

Participant23F

...self‐awareintermsofwhatyourownlimitationsmightbe...

Participants alsoused ‘self‐awareness’ in the senseof being awareof internal process, emotions and

feelings,andinrelationtothequalitiesandexperienceofanindividual’sinteriorlife.Forexample:

Participant20M

...thatwholeself‐awarenessbitiscriticalbecauseoftenpeople...aren’tevenawareofallofthethingsthataregoingoninsidethem.

However, inmy view, the interiority extends beyond these two usages. At the intrapersonal level, it

would include reflexivity, or acting on their internal awareness in decision‐making contexts. For

example:

Participant3F

Yes,Ithinkthemoreyouareself‐awarethebetteryouareabletoweightit[intuition]appropriatelyamongstotherconsiderationsinthedecision‐makingprocess.

Somerespondentsusedtheexpression‘emotionalintelligence’todescribetherelationtothisreflexivity

basedontheirinternalawareness.Forexample:

Participant13F

IthinkIhavedevelopedmyownpersonalemotionalintelligencetoafairlyhighlevel.So,Icanextract…mypersonalfeelingsfromdecisions.

However, emotional intelligence is defined as the ability to reason about and manage emotions in

oneselfandothers(Mayer,Roberts&Barsade2007;Mayer,Salovey&Caruso2008).TheconceptthatI

wishtodevelopdiffersfromemotional intelligence inanumberofways. I intendinterioritytoextend

beyond emotions to encompass all feelings, including intuitions, which could be equated with the


experientialcognitivesystemexploredinChapter2.Moreover,emotionalintelligenceplacesprimacyon

reasoningaboutandmanagingemotions,whereasIplaceprimacyontheorientationandawarenessof

feelings.Iconsidertheabilitytoreasonaboutfeelingsasaconsequenceandanadvantageofinteriority.

ThisimportantdistinctionwillbefurtherexploredinChapter6(Section6.2.3.5).

There a number of definitions given for the word ‘interiority’. In general interiority is defined in

geometrictermsreferringtotheinteriorspaceorqualitiesofanobjectorthing(see,forexample,Little,

Fowler & Coulson 1965; Delbridge & Bernard 1998). However, interiority is also defined in terms of

consciousness71(Wilber1995)ortheinnerorpsychic,subjectivelifeofanindividual(see,forexample,

Olkowski&Morley1999)asopposedtoexteriority,whichpertainstothephysical,materialworld‘out

there’.Inowpresentamoredetailedexaminationofthequalities(e.g.internalawareness)describedby

theparticipantsthat,Iargue,arethepropertiesassociatedwithintrapersonalinteriority.

5.11.2 Properties and importance of intrapersonal ‘interiority’ for leadership, decision‐

makingandintuitionuse

I propose that the properties of interiority are: self‐knowledge; the ability to be aware of and

acknowledge emotion; the ability to distinguish between intuition and emotion and the ability to

‘surface’intuition(s).Althoughsomeoftheseconceptshavebeenreferredtopreviously,Ipresentthem

morefullyhere.Followingthis,Iwilldetailhowparticipantsusedinterioritytotheiradvantageintheir

judgementanddecision‐making.

5.11.2.1Self‐knowledge/awareness

Manyparticipantsindicatedanunderstandingthatallindividualscometodecision‐makingwithaframe

ofreferencebasedonculture,experience,education,personalityandsoon.Participantsacknowledged

thattheirownapproachtodecisionsisnecessarilycircumscribedbythelimitationsassociatedwiththat

frameofreference.Interiority,intermsoftheawarenessparticipantshadabouttheirownpersonality,

biasesandpredilections,mitigatedtheimpactoftheselimitationsthroughanabilitytoremainopento

alternativepointsof viewpresentedbyothers, aswell as sourcesof information thatmay conflictor

contradictthoseoftheparticipants.Forexample:

71Wilber(1995)usesthewordinterioritytodenotetheevolutionofconsciousnessthatoccurssynchronouswithouter biological, physical evolution,whichWilber accuses systems theorists of omitting. As biological evolutionproceedstohigherlevelsofcomplexity,sodoestheconcomitant‘depth’ofconsciousness.


Participant3F

Look,Ithinkit’scrucialtorecognisethateveryonehasblindspots.Myintuitionwillsaywhatneedstobedonefromabusinessperspective.Ialsoamontheboardofanot‐for‐profitandIhavetoremindmyselfthatIammuchmorefinanciallydrivenandcommercial‐outcomedriventhanmanyontheboardofthenot‐for‐profit.SobeingawareofthathelpsmeinmakingthedecisionsImightmake.Everyonehastheirownbiases.

Participant25F

Ithinkhavinganinsightintoyourowncharacterandapproachtoissues,becauseequallyyouneedtobeveryopenandmindfulofotherviews,particularlyifthey'reimportantdecisions.Soself‐awarenessintermsofbeingnotcloseddowntoothersourcesofinformation...

Participant23F

self‐awareintermsofwhatyourownlimitationsmightbe,orwhatyoumightinviteinorwhatyoumightnotinvitein,intermsofcontextualinformationorwhatyoumighthaveblockstoactuallyseeingornotseeing.

I argue that theself‐awareness theseparticipants refer tocanbedistinguished fromanawarenessof

thequalitiesanddimensionsoftheirowninnerfeelingsandemotions.Whattheydescribeisaqualityof

‘objective’ self‐awareness – an awareness of themselves as others might see them rather than a

subjectiveself‐awarenesswhich,isencompassedbyfollowingsections.

5.11.2.2Acknowledgementoffeelings

As earlier stated I have defined feelings as an overarching term to represent, consistent with the

Macquarie Concise Dictionary psychological definition, ‘consciousness without regard to thought’

(Delbridge & Bernard 1998, p. 405). This definition is also consistent with the experiential cognitive

system(Epstein1998)and,moreimportantly,howparticipantsusedtheword.Feelingswouldtherefore

include emotions, visceral influences and intuitions. Interiority and awareness of intuition will be

addressed in later sections. Orientation to feelings has been discussed. This section addresses how

participants with high interiority described and placed value on the ability to be aware of and

acknowledgethe‘feeling’oremotionalcontextofagivendecisioncontext.Forexample:

Participant8M

Ithink,attheendoftheday,successfulbusinesspeopleneedtoberelativelyself‐awarebecauseyouneedtobeabletodiscounttheemotionaroundsomething.

Participant25F

Well,Idon'tthinkthatinabusinesscontextitisgenerallyappropriateforaleadertobeveryemotionalintheirdecision‐making.ItisappropriatetorecognisetherewillbealevelofemotionarounddifferentsituationsbutIthink,attheendoftheday,havingaveryclearheadandhavingaclearmindinmakingdecisionsisprettyimportant.


5.11.2.3Distinguishingintuitionandemotion

Inrelationto intuitionuse,someparticipantsreportedthat itwas importantnotonlytoacknowledge

andaccountfortheirownemotionsbutalsotodifferentiatebetweenfeelingsthatarise,particularlyin

stressful decision‐making situations. I argue that individuals with high interiority, because of their

orientation to their feeling life, aremore aware of andmore in touch with their feelings. And, as a

consequence, these individuals havedeveloped greater ability to discriminatebetween them. I argue

that individualswithhigh interiorityareable to recognise,discriminatebetween,andcategorise their

feelings.Forexample:

Participant20M

AndifIthinkabouttheexamplethatyoujustgave,reallyactinginanangrysituation,Iwouldn’tsaythatisintuitive...intuitionismostpowerfulinthecoolofthedayandyoucanseparateoutalltheotherinfluencesonyou.Andyoucansitthereandsortofsay,well,howdoIreallyfeelaboutthis,anddrawonallofthoseelementsratherthanjustsitthereandbeangryorupset…

Participant13F

MostofthosethingsIhavemanagedtogetridofinmylife.Ifsomeone’srudetome,Iwillputthemintheirplace.SoformeintuitionisnotaboutmyownpersonalemotionalstatebutthefeelingIhavearoundthecircumstancesofdecision...

Aswillbediscussed inthenextsection,theadvantageofthis forparticipantscouldbedescribedasa

self‐mastery that allowedparticipants todrawon their feelings in away thatpreventedbeingdriven

unconsciouslybythem.Forexample:

.............................................................................................................................................................

Interviewsequence

Participant13F

...bringingyourownpersonalstufftothething,whichisjealousy,competition,somethingorother...andasenseofI’vegottopleasesomebody.So,thosearethesortofdownsidestofeelings.

Martin

So,itsoundslike,asyoumentionedbefore,thatyouneedadegreeofself‐knowledgetobeabletodistinguishbetweenthosethings[feelings]?

Participant13F

Ido.

.............................................................................................................................................................

.............................................................................................................................................................

Interviewsequence


Soyouaresayingthatsomepeoplecan’tdifferentiatebetweenintuitionandemotion?


Participant20M

Yes.Ithinkit’sthatself‐awarenessissue.

.............................................................................................................................................................

5.11.2.4Surfacingofintuition(s)

Intuition has been previously discussed as a phenomenon that is received, rather than sought, that

comestoonefromthesubconscious,withoutanyapparentwillonthepartoftherecipient.However,

somefemaleparticipantsreportedthattheywerenotonlyawareoftheirgutfeelings,butwereableto

further ‘surface’ their intuitions. These participants described how they were able to bring into

consciousnesstherationale,thebackground,theinformationortheexperiencesthathadbroughtthem

totheirintuitiveunderstanding.Forexample:

Participant15F

It’sasthoughthatcomesupandthenyou'veactuallyreceivedthatwarning,andit’senoughthatyourealise,ohthisissignificant.Andit’saniterativeprocessIguessandthenyouactuallystartinterrogatingtheintuition.

Participant26F

Ithinkahugeproportionofmyjudgementisaroundwhateverintuitionactuallymeansbutthesenseofitfeelsrightandthenreflecting,well,whydoIthinkthat,andthenkindofafterthatimmediateresponse,thenarrangingtheinformationthatI’vegotinmyheadthathasledmetothatconclusion...

The surfacingof intuition canbe seen as a paradoxical active/receptive processwherebyparticipants

were‘active’inchoosingtobereceptive.Inthiswayintuitionscouldcomeforwardormature,develop

oremergefromthesub‐consciousintoconsciousness.HereIassertthatthedichotomousnatureofthe

Englishlanguagefailstoadequatelyrepresentparticipants’experiences.

Participant1F

Ithinkintheearlystage...yougetasense...onlyasitmaturesdoesitbecomemoreconsciousandrational.SoIthinkintheearlystagesit’saboutjustbeing.IthinkI’mprettyexperiencedinthiskindofrole,andit’sjustsometimeswaitingformoreinformation.You’vegotasenseofsomethingandit’swaitinguntilmoreinformationcomes.

Iwould liketodrawthereaders’attention, inparticular, totheremark, ‘it’s justaboutbeing’. Iargue

thatthisisasignificantstatementandonethatindicatestheparticipant’ssubjectiveorientationandthe

absence of analysis or reasoning about her feeling. The participantwas comfortable to ‘sit’ with the

feeling,orperhaps‘was’thefeeling.Orientationthereforeindicatesastatewherethefeelingandthe

participantarenotseparate,intheabsenceofconsciousthought‘about’it.

Twoparticipants said theywould seek timealone and inquiet environmentswhere they could allow

theirfeelingstomatureandcomeforwardintoconsciousness.Forexample:


Participant16F

Ithinkthattheactivepursuitisself‐awarenessandtakingthetimeandthereflecting,whichquiteoftenmeanssteppingaside,beingonyourown–takingtimeoutjusttotryandgetthewholethinginperspectiveandtogetallofthatkindofdeepknowledgetocometothesurfaceandtobepartoftheactivedecision‐making.

Iarguethis receptive/activedynamiccanbeseenasacontinuationof the intuition/analysis themeof

complementaryusediscussedinSection5.6.1.

The participants, who I have previously deemed as high in interiority, perceived the necessity of

receptivity for thematurationprocessof intuitionsand thishadconsequences for their leadershipby

wayofcreatingtimeforquietreflectionwherepossible.Forexample:

Participant16F

Quiet,andtimeforreflection,andbeinginaplacewhereyoucanreflect.Andso,Ithinkit’softengoodtomakesurethatthereistimetoinsistthat,okay,thisiswherewe’vegottotoday.Butifwedon’tabsolutelyhavetomakethedecisionnow,let’sjustregrouptomorroworthisafternoonorinanhour’stimewhenwe’vehadtimetoreflect.

Quiettimealoneaccordingtothesefemaleparticipantsassistedinallowingintuitionsto‘surface’.For

example:

Participant26F

...Youstillyourselfandyoukindofwaitfortheinnerturmoiltokindofsettle,andyoucangradually,youknow,likestirringupthemudinapondorsomething,andifyoujustsitwithitit’llsettleandyoucanbeclearaboutwhatitisthatyouareexperiencing...IfIpauselongenoughIcanexplainwhatitisthat'sledmetothatconclusion.

These participants indicated that their awareness of their inner state (interiority) had evolved or

increasedovertime.Thiscanbeseeninconnectiontoapersonalmaturationprocessorevolutionthat

haddeepenedovertime.Forexample:

Participant16F

IthinkI’vebecomemuchmoreawareofit,andmaybeIwasn’tawareofit20yearsago.

Participant1F

Ithink,Intermsofself‐awareness...ImeanIsuppose,intermsofmonitoringmyownpersonalstate,asIgotolderIbecamemuchmoreaware...

Participant15F

Ithinkmyintuitioncamefirstandthenmyexperiencesasaleaderhasactually,hasdeepened,hasevolved.


One participant observed differences in others in terms inner orientation and personal maturation

throughself‐knowledgeandself‐awareness:

Participant26F

Ithinktherearesomepeoplewhoarenotterriblywelldevelopedhumanbeingsintermsofpersonalmaturation.Idon'tsaythatpejorativelyorcritically,itjustis.Theydon'treflectverydeeply,theydon’tknowthemselvesverydeeply.

5.11.3Advantagesofinteriority

The advantages of a high degree of interiority for participants were five‐fold. First, participants

perceived that if theywereable toacknowledge theemotional contextofadecision itwouldbe less

likely to impact their own decision‐making process, regardless of whether it involved intuition or

analysis.Forexample:

Participant3F

...Ithinkgoodleadersareabletoseparatetheemotion,takeitintoaccountinmakingdecisions…it’soneofthosefactors,youdefinitelyconsideritbutitdoesn’tdriveyou...

Second, according to one participant, the ability to distinguish between intuition and other feelings

(suchasvisceral influences)allowsindividualstorecognisewhentheirmotivation isgreedratherthan

intuition.Forexample:

Participant20M

Ithinkpeoplejustuseit[thewordintuition],particularlyinthefinancialworld,whenintuitionisrelatedtogreed.Peoplewillsay,well,thisisagreatthingtodoandtheyarepurelyinfluencedbygreed.Andtheywillsay,Iknowit’stherightthingtodo.

Third,theabilitytosurfaceorexternaliseintuitionsisthattheybecomemoreavailabletotherational

mind rendering the intuitions able to be articulated, evaluated and weighed up against other

considerations.Forexample:

Participant20M

Ithinktobeabletorecogniseit[intuition]andtobeabletoputittooneside,butatthesametimebeabletouseit,iscertainlyveryimportant

Participant3F

Ithinkthemoreyouareself‐aware,thebetteryouareabletoweightit[intuition]appropriatelyamongstotherconsiderationsinthedecision‐makingprocess.

Participant15F

It’saweighting,youknow,yougothroughamentalweightingprocess.AndIhavehadinstancesofpeoplewhohaveworkedforme[who]havebeenincrediblyanalyticalandbeenwrong,andthepersonwhowasintuitive,withoutanyback‐up,wasright.Soyoutakethatexperienceintoaccount.

Fourth, interiorityallowedparticipantstoexternalisethetacitknowledgetheyhadbuiltupovermany

yearsandtotransferorsharethisknowledgewithothermembersoftheorganisation.Forexample:


Participant26F

IfIpauselongenoughIcanexplainwhatitisthat'sledmetothatconclusion.AndIdoquitealot...particularlywithjuniorstaffwhohaven’tbeeninamanagementpositionsaslongasIhave...IwillexplaintothemwhyIhavecometothisconclusionasaveryconsciousteachingmoment.Cosjusttellingthem,trustme,doasIsay…that’snogood.

Fifth,oneparticipant(below)suggestedthatalackofanawarenessoftheinternaldriversofdecision‐

makingcouldleadtoerroneousandresourcewastingactivities.Interiorityinrespondingtooccurrences

inorganisationallifewasthereforeconsideredimportantinordertomitigatethispossibility.

Participant10F

Ithinkthatparticularlyifyouareinaseniorposition,ifyouarenotawareofwhatisgoingoninternallyandhowyouarereactingtothings,youcanleadpeopleonawildgoosechase.Youhavegottothinkaboutwherethisiscomingfrom,whyamIfeelinginthiswayataboutapieceofworkthatcomestoyou.

5.11.4 Maleparticipantswithinteriority

OnthebasisofthedatapresentedinTable5.2,Ihavearguedthatonlytwoofthemaleparticipantsin

the study possessed a high degree of interiority. Assuming that the reader concurs with my

interpretationofthedata inrelationtothisconcept, Inowwishtoexplorecompetinghypothesesfor

thesedivergentcasesinrelationtothemale/femaledisparityininteriority.

Itcouldbeproposedthatbothmenandwomenenjoyinterioritytoanequalextentandthatthefinding

of genderdifference is attributable to the relatively small sample sizeused for this study.However, I

considerthisexplanationunlikelybecausesomanyofthemaleandfemaleparticipantsperceivedthat

women,ingeneral,weremore‘intouchwiththeirfeelings’,andhaveagreatercapacitytosharethem.

Alternately, the lack of ‘feeling’ in the descriptions of the experiences ofmen could be attributed to

theiruseofheuristicswhich,according toSadler‐SmithandSparrow (2007),donothaveanaffective

component.WhileIacknowledgethiscouldwellbethecaseforsomeofthemalerespondents,Iargue

this cannot account for thewhole of the sample because the data shows that, whilemanymen did

acknowledgea‘feeling’component,theywerenotwilling,ordidnothavethecapacity,toelaborateon

itoraboutit(seesection5.4.1.1).

While I claim that allwomenparticipants displayed a high degree of interiority in comparison to the

men,whoonthewholedidnot,twodivergentcases(menwithinteriority)suggestthatinteriorityisnot

necessarily dependent on the gender of an individual. I propose that interiority can be developed in

contexts and cultureswhere it is useful, acknowledged, accepted and valued (social conditioning and

contextual utility). For example, Participant 2Mwas theonlymaleparticipantwhose leadership role

was intheArts. Iwouldsuggesta longandsuccessfulcareer indramahasengenderedanorientation

toward,andsensitivity to,his feelings.Moreover, theability toexpress feelings isanactor’s stock‐in‐

trade.Inotherwords,thisisanoccupationalarenawhereinteriorityisnotonlyusefulitisessential.


Thesecondmaleparticipant,whoIinterpretasdemonstratinghighinteriority(Participant20M),leda

department in a large financial institution at the time of interview. This, in itself,was not unusual in

relationtotheothermaleparticipants.However,whenaskedtocommentonhisperceptioninrelation

togenderandintuition,heofferedthefollowing:

.............................................................................................................................................................Interviewsequence

Martin

...doyouthinkthatgenderplaysaroleinthiswholediscussion[aboutintuition]?

Participant20M

LookIdo.Ihaveverystrongopinionsonthis.Iactuallythinkthatwomenhavefantasticintuition.

Martin

Thisisbasedonexperience?

Participant20M

Yesitis,andIwillputacaveataroundthatrightupfront–thereisprobablyanelementofbiasinthis,inthatmylifehasbeendominatedbywomen.AndwhatImeanbythatis,myfatherdiedwhenIwasveryyoung,mymotherwasaverystrongcharacter,Ihadtwosisters–Iwastheoldestsurvivingmaleinmyimmediatefamilyattheageof14.IhadtwograndmothersandInowhaveawifeandthreedaughters.Sowomenhaveplayedaverylargepartinmylife...AndIamprobablygeneralisingherebut...ingeneral,theyarebetteratself‐awarenessofintuition.

.............................................................................................................................................................

Ihavehighlightedthisparticipant’sfinalwordsbecauseIwishtosuggestthatinteriorityshouldbeseen

as associatedwithwomen but not specific towomen (use of thewords ‘in general’). Furthermore, I

hypothesisethathishighdegreeofinteriorityisattributabletohisupbringingwhichwas‘dominatedby

women’,wherefeelingsandintuitionswerearticulated,acknowledgedandvalued(socialconditioning).

Thus, interpersonal interactionsandculturescanbesaidtohave‘interiority’and,moreover,basedon

the above discussion, intrapersonal and interpersonal interiority condition each other. Having

establishedabasisforintrapersonalinteriority,interiorityatotherlevelsofsocialdescription,willnow

beexplored.

5.12 InteriorityandDomainTheory

I propose that interiority at the interpersonal level translates to the extent of expression and

communication about feelings, including intuitions, in an interpersonal interaction. Thus, I argue that

interpersonal interiority can be seen as an extension, consequence and exteriorisation of their

intrapersonalinteriority.Thus,interpersonalinterioritycouldparadoxicallybelabelledexteriority.


However,Ibelievethiswouldconfuseorconflatecontent(whetherexpressionisaboutfeelingsornot)

withsettings72(interactionoccursinthe‘outthere’world).

I argue that the orientation of the discussion distinguishes interiority from exteriority (feelings as

opposedtothingsinthecaseofbothintraandinterpersonalinteriority).Thus,thedegreeofinteriority,

atthe interpersonallevel,referstowhetherparticipantsdiscusstopicsexternaltothemselves(suchas

theweather,sportsresultsortheperformanceofthecompany)ortheinteriorworldoffeelings(suchas

how the weather, sports results or company performance makes them feel). High intrapersonal

interiorityaddsan interiordimensionto interpersonal interactions,whichoccur insettings,whichcan

thenbelabelledinterpersonalinteriority.

I furtherarguethat,wheretheexpressionof interpersonal interiority iswidespreadinanorganisation

(where feelingsareacknowledgedanddisclosed), theorganisationcanbesaid tohaveorganisational

interiority.Thiscouldstemfromamajoritywithinanorganisationwhohavehighlevelsofintrapersonal

interiority or from the influence of powerful people in the organisation, particularly leaders who

encourage expression of feelings and intuitions (see Section 5.15.3). Consistent with Layder’s (1997;

2005) Domain Theory, intrapersonal, interpersonal and organisational interiority can be seen as

mutually influential, interdependent, intertwined and interlocking. Interiority will be fundamental to

answering the research problem because, as amulti‐level concept, it answers the research problem

comprehensivelyatalllevelsofsocialdescription.

In thenext sections Iwillpresent theory, supportedbyevidenceandmodels, in relation to thesocial

process of intuition disclosure at these different levels of social description. I will begin with the

intrapersonallevel.Followingthis,Iwillpresentnewevidenceanddevelopfurthertheoryinrelationto

intuitiondisclosureattheinterpersonalandcollectivelevels(organisationalandsocietal).

Synthesisoffindings

5.13Intrapersonalinteriority

Drawing on the concepts developed thus far in the analysis it is now possible to represent social

processesbywhichintuitionsareacknowledged,maskedorsuppressedattheintrapersonallevel.

72HereIrefertoLayder’s(1997;2005)useoftheword‘settings’asdiscussedinDomainTheory.Layderdiscussed

settingsasthephysicallocationwhereinteractionsoccur.


5.13.1 DisclosureofIntuitionsattheintrapersonallevel

Disclosure to self, or better said, the realisationof intuition at the intrapersonal level canbe seenas

complex,however,ithingesontheinteriorityoftheindividual.Asaconsequence,theinteriorityofthe

individualcanbeseenasthebeststartingpointforinterpretingthismodel.InPart1itwasfoundthat

the use of intuitionwas conditionedby cognitive type (conditionedby personality and training – see

Section 5.7.3) and attitude toward intuition (see Section 5.7). Attitude toward intuition, in turn,was

foundtobeconditionedbyeducation,trainingandpersonality73(seeSection5.8.1.1).Iwillarguehere

that attitude to intuition and cognitive type also condition interiority. InPart 2, itwasproposed that

interioritywasconditionedbysocialisation(includinggender)andcontextualutility(seeSection5.11.4).

A low degree of interiority, bymy own definition,means low orientation to feelings and thus a low

awarenessof,orsensitivityto,feelingsandintuitions.Asaconsequence,thefeelingassociatedwithan

intuitionmaynotbe‘felt’enoughtobeconsciouslyacknowledgedandtheindividualmaybeoblivious

to it (silence). Alternatively, an individual may acknowledge a ‘feeling of knowing’ associated with a

problemorsituationbutmaynotbewilling,interested,orabletointrospect(surface)thisfeelingtoany

extent.Actionthereforebecomesautomatic.

Ifthereisinternaldialogue(intheabsencehighinteriority)withrespecttointuitiveknowing,Isuggestit

is,first,likelytobeattributed(internally)to‘judgement’or‘experience’.Second,thefeelingmayalsobe

attributed to emotion, considered illegitimate, and thus rejected (silenced). Attitude to intuition is

redundantintheseexamplesbecausethereisnorecognitionofan‘intuition’.Third,anintuitivefeeling

maybeacknowledgedbutconsideredillegitimateonthebasisofattitudetointuitionandconsequently

rejected(silenced).Thedisclosureprocessintheselattertwoexamplesisequivalenttoself‐censorship

andisaconsciousactivity.Alternatively,individualswithahigherdegreeofinterioritywillbeoriented

to their feelingsandwill thereforebecomeawareof their feelingofknowingas it ‘surfaces’ fromthe

subconscious into consciousawareness.Theyareable todistinguish their intuition fromemotionand

otherfeelingsandwillthereforerefertothefeelingasa‘gutfeeling’oranintuition(internally).Thus,

individualswithhighinteriorityaremorelikelytodisclosetheirintuitionsas‘intuitions’,andtalkmore

(self‐talk)intermsoffeelingssuchas‘mysenseis’,‘myfeelingis’andsoforthaspreviouslydiscussed.

ThisprocessisillustratedinFigure5.4below:

73Inordertoreducethecomplexityofthemodel,theseelementswillnotbeduplicatedhere.


Figure5.4:Intrapersonalinteriorityandintuitiondisclosure

5.14Interpersonalinteriority

I proposed earlier that interiority, at the interpersonal, level refers to the extent of communication

about feelings and intuitions in an interaction – the extent of an interior dimension within an

interpersonal interaction. From theanalysisof the interviews,at least four conditionswere identified

that influence the interiority of an interaction. These are:perception of the other (in terms of their

interiority);personalfamiliarity(levelsofintimacy);whetherthecontextoftheconversation,interms

of content and location, is business or personal; and, if it is business related, then in what type of

industry.Figure5.5belowdisplaystheseconditions:


Figure5.5:Conditionsforinterpersonalinteriority

5.14.1 Perceptionoftheother

Assumingthatanindividualhashighinteriority,thedegreetowhichthisindividualwilldisclosefeelings

andintuitionsisrelatedtotheperceptionoftheinteriorityoftheother.Forexample:

Participant8M

ItdependsonwhetherIknowthepersonorhowwellIknowtheperson...whetherornotIthinkthatpersonthemselvesisintuitiveornot.

Participant23F

...youlayoutthefactsinalogical,disciplinedapproach.Heisonlyresponsiveifthat’sthekindofconversation.

Asdiscussedearlier, intrapersonal interiority isconditionedby(althoughnot limitedto)cognitivetype

andattitudeto intuition.Attitude to intuitionwasconsideredbysometoberelatedtotheperceived

cognitive type of the other because individuals thatwere seen as ‘black‐and‐white’were considered

less likely to engage in conversations concerning feelings and intuitions. I interpret Participant 23 F

belowtoimplythatsomeprofessionaltraining (occupationsdealingwith‘objectivity’andquantitative

matters) is more likely to produce ‘black‐and‐white thinkers’ than others (often person‐centred

occupations).Participants (seebelow)perceivedthisas impactingonreceptivity toopinionsbasedon

feelings, which are considered nebulous, esoteric and unscientific. Here we see a specific linkage to

macrologicalorculturalinteriority(organisationalandsocietal)thatwillbediscussedlater.


Participant23F

TheformerCEOwasamaleandascientistandalawyerandourcurrentisafemaleandasocialworkerandacriminologist.It’smucheasiertohavethosesortsofconversations[intuitionsandfeelings]withher...sheisquitereceptive...butheisascientistthroughandthrough.

Participant1F

Ithinkprobablymostpeopleprobablywouldn’tsayit[theirintuition],atleastpeoplereportingtoyoubecausetheythinkit’sabitwackyandmaybetheydidn’thearmesayit,andbecauseI’mseentobeaveryintellectual,rationalsortofperson.

5.14.2 Familiarity

The development of trust over time through repeated interactions facilitates a sense of familiarity.

Familiarityconditionsinterpersonalinterioritythroughthedevelopmentofanunderstandingofhowthe

othermight react to certain disclosures. In this sense, familiarity can be seen as having a reciprocal

relationship with perception of the other. Fear of ridicule may delay disclosure of intuitions until

attitudes to intuition are known, either through explicit statements or through implication. Examples

linkingintuitiondisclosureandfamiliarityaredisplayedbelow:

Participant8M

Tosomedegreeit[disclosureofintuition]istodowiththepersonthemselves,whetherIhaveagoodrelationshipwiththemornot.

Participant1F

We’vebeenworkingtogetherfortwo‐and‐a‐halfyears.Ithinkwe’velearnthowtoworktogether.I’mnotinhibitedaboutsayingIhaveasenseoragutfeeling.

Participant10F

Ithinkthattosomeonewhodidn’tknowmeandhadtofrontupwithmeaboutsomething,itisquitepossiblethattheywouldbeapprehensiveaboutowninguptosomesortofintuitiveapproachtodealingwithaparticularproblemoranissue.

5.14.3 Businessorprivate

The interiorityofan interaction isgreater if the interaction issituated inaprivatecontextor isabout

privatematters. Inbusinessmatters participants said they felt a responsibility to be seen (or rather

heard) tobedealingwithotherpeoples’money in an appropriateway.Given the view that intuition

may be perceived as esoteric and emotional coupledwith the need to justify decisions in a business

context,participantsperceivedthat intuitionsmightbeconsidered inappropriate inbusinesscontexts.

Thesepointsarecapturedinthequotesbelow:

Participant20M

IwouldfeelmorecomfortableusingitinapersonalsituationveryopenlythanIwouldinabusinesssituation.


Participant16F

[onthedisclosureofintuitions]...personalexperienceconversations,evenprofessionaldevelopmentconversations,asopposedtobusinessdecisions...decisionsaboutone’slife,familydecisionsandcareerratherthancommercialdecisions.

Participant26F

Ifit’sinmypersonallife...perhapsIwouldn'tfeeltheneed[tojustifydecisions]quiteasstronglyasinmyformalrole.

5.14.4 Industrytype

Participantsperceiveddisclosureofintuition(s)tobemoreappropriatetosomesettings(sectors)rather

thanothers,i.e.,moreappropriateincreativedomainsandhumanserviceswherethereislessemphasis

onanalyticaltechniquesandtangible,(quantitatively)verifiableevidence.Forexample:

Participant8F

Ithinkifyou'reamarketeerIthinkyoumightgetawaywithitbutIthinkthatinvestorsandanalysts,theywantmorerationale.

Participant16F

Ihavebeenworkingwithwomenandmenanddoctorsandmidwivesaboutunderstanding...birth,pregnancy,andbirthandtheimpactithasonindividuals.AndinthatcontextIhaveusedthewordintuitionquiteafewtimes.

Participant23F

SomeonewhomightoperatemoreinanArtscontextmightnotapproachthesamesortofsituationwiththesamelevelofforensicanalysis...

5.14.5 Intuitiondisclosureattheinterpersonallevel

The interiority of an interaction will depend on the four conditions identified above. As discussed,

interactionshighininteriorityarenecessarilycharacterisedbytheacknowledgementanddisclosureof

feelings. Intuitions will be disclosed as gut feeling, intuition, my feeling is, and other related

expressions.However, ifan individualhigh in interiorityhasan intuition inaperceived lowinteriority

interpersonal context, theymight either silence or suppress it. Alternatively, these individuals might

strategically express their intuition as judgement and/or experience in order to avoid appearing

esoteric,feminine,emotionalornon‐business‐like.ThisprocessisillustratedinFigure5.6below:


Figure5.6:Intuitiondisclosureattheinterpersonallevel

Asindicatedinthequotesbelow,participantssaidtheymight‘dressup’theirintuitionsorseektofind

evidenceorrationale:

Participant1F

Ithinkwewouldprobablydressitup...

Participant26F

Iwouldn'tprobablypubliclysay,mygutinstinctisthatweneedtospend$40million[laughs].Iwoulddressitup.

One participant said he had fabricated rationale for his intuitive judgements in order to satisfy the

expectationsofothersintheorganisation:

Participant27M

Younormallyfindsomerationaleevenifyoumakeituptosatisfysomemoreanalyticalpeopleinteamsinyourenvironment...sometimesIevengobackwithmyteamandsay,right,let’sjustinventsomethingthatsatisfiesthecolleagues...or...reallyanalysewhywethinkit’sright.That’smypersonalexperience.


5.14.6 Interveningcondition:Power

Powercanbeseenasaninterveningvariableininterpersonalcontextswheretheprevailingconditions

wouldnormally leadtolowinterpersonal interiority.Amorepowerfulpersonmayrequestordemand

disclosureoffeelingstotheextentthattheotheriscapableofdoingso.Forexample:

.............................................................................................................................................................Interviewsequence


Soyouwillaskpeople,whatdoyoufeelaboutthis,whatisyourgutfeelingonthis?

Participant18M

Absolutely–rightdowntothelowestlevels.

.............................................................................................................................................................

5.15Organisationalinteriority

I propose that the level of intuition disclosure in organisations is not simply dependant on collective

intrapersonalandinterpersonalinteriority.Theextentoforganisationalinteriorityisadditionallyaligned

to other dimensions or properties of culture74. Many participants, particularly female participants,

perceivedapolarityinrelationtothesepropertiesoforganisationalculturebasedontheirexperienceof

organisationsovermanyyears.Forexample:

Participant8F

I think it varies [intuition disclosure] ... if you are in a big corporate organisation ... it is not exactlypejorative but if you said to somebody ... I just intuitively think this is the right thing to do, someorganisations might say ‘bollocks to that’. Other organisations that might be more creative ... lessstructured,areprobablymoreopentothatsortofthing.

Ihavelabelledthesedistinctculturaltypesassertiveandintegrativecultures:

74IhaveadoptedtheselabelsfromCapra’s(1996)discussionoftwosetsofvaluesandthinkingthatrepresenttheparadigmsgeneratedbyclassicalphysicsandnewscience.Iacknowledgethatorganisationalculturesareseldom

monolithic andmore often fractured and characterised bymicrological cultures (Jermier, Slocum, Fry&Gaines1991;Schein2010).However,Iarguethattheoryrelatingtoorganisationalinterioritywouldbesustainedforeachmicrological culture as well as for the aggregate or dominant culture of an organisation. I do not assert that

cultures can be neatly classified as either assertive or integrative, rather, cultures and sub‐cultures may berepresentedonanassertive‐integrativecontinuum.Moreover,Iacknowledgethatorganisationalcultureschange

overtime.


5.15.1 Propertiesofassertiveorganisationalcultures

Participants perceived that assertive cultures were often led and/or dominated by men75/76. These

organisationalculturesarecharacterisedbytheneedtoappearscientific,rationalandobjective.Social

organisation,powerandtherighttospeakaredeterminedbystronghierarchiesand leadershipstyle.

Assertive cultures value strong and active decision‐making, evidence and economics, and tough,

assertive interpersonal relations where mistakes are punished and feelings are unacknowledged.

Assertive cultures can thereforebedescribedashaving low interiority. Figure5.7belowdisplays the

propertiesofassertivecultures:

Figure5.7:Propertiesofassertiveorganisationalcultures

75Thiscanbeseenaslinkedtoformalandinformalleadershipviarolemodelling.

76 Insomecasesthepopulationmaybefemale‐dominated(e.g. insomehealthprofessions)butthepoliticsand

thereforethepowerandrewardstructuresarebasedonscience,rationalityandmaledominatedculture.


Each of these properties of assertive cultures is now examined inmore detail along with data from

whichthesecategoriesorpropertieswerederived.

5.15.1.1Stronghierarchies

Strong hierarchies influence the extent to which the unique capacities of an individual can be

represented inorganisational discourse.A top‐down leadership style can tend to reinforce the status

quointermsoforganisationalvaluesandrestrictivecommunication.Forexample:

Participant15F

Ithinkitagaindependsonthekindofhierarchyandthetypeofleadership.Soifyouactuallyhadaleadershipstylethatengages,thenyouareactuallyprovidingasafetyintheleadershipstructuretoallowpeopletoparticipateinthewaythattheyfeelthattheycanoptimallyparticipate.Ifyouarehierarchicalyourself...speakwhenIaskyoutospeak...oryou’renotthemostseniorpersonintheroom,soI’mnotgoingtolistentoyou,thenyouactuallyhaveclosedthatoff.Butyou'vealsoclosedyourselfofftofact.Soyouhaven’tclosedyourselfoffjusttointuition...you’veclosedyourselfofftoallfact,allinput,allcommunication.Thatistheproblemwiththattypeofstyle.

Participant18M

...whereyou'vegothierarchyyou'vegotlayersofmanagementandalltherestofthat.Ifyouareinacertainlayerandyouhaveanintuitionandyouwanttoreflect,andyoudon'thavetherightattitudearoundyouandtheenvironmentyouareoperatingin,theintuitionwillfallondeafears.

5.15.1.2Analysis,evidenceandeconomics

In some organisations participants had perceived an expectation foranalysis based onevidenceand

economics.Forexample:

Participant23F

Ithastoactuallybefactsandfiguresandveryevidencedriven.

Participant16F

Youtalkabouttheevidence,whatistheevidence.

Participant6M

...you’vegotto,attheendoftheday,bringthisdowntoaneconomicanalysis.

Participant10Fperceivedastrongrelianceonnumbersintheseorganisationsand,moreover,acultural

assumptionthatnumberscould‘explain’phenomena:

Participant10F

Soyou’vegottobeabletojustifyanypositionthatyoutakewithnumbers,anditseemsasthoughthereisapartofthatculturethatnumbersexplaineverything.Inthisorganisation,thereissuchastrongrelianceondata,whichisnotbad,it’sabsolutelyessentialandit’sfine,solongasit’snottotheexclusionofabsolutelyanythingelse...Ithinkitwasdeeplyembeddedwheneconomicrationalistswereinpowerandcertainlystillwithingovernment[NSW],Treasurystillholdssway.


5.15.1.3Toughandpunishing–active,strongdecisions

Participants perceived that some organisations were characterised by tough interpersonal relations

whereleadersareexpectedtomakeactive,strongandrationaldecisions.Moreover,failuretobeseen

toadheretothesevaluescouldresultinreprimandandpunishment.Forexample:

Participant15F

Ithinkunlesspeoplesometimesseethatyou'veactuallygonethroughthisrigourorthecrunchingorthesweating,they’renotsurethatyou'veactuallygivenenoughmeritormeattothedecisionandthat'snotnecessarilytrue...thereshouldbeananalyticalactotherthansomeone'slookingatit.

Participant8F

…evenifthatwastheresultofyouthinkingthatwastherightthingtodoatthetime[anactionordecision],theywillbeatyoumercilesslyuntilyouhaveexplainedittotheminarationalsense.

5.15.1.3Feelingsunacknowledged–appearrationalandscientific

Asaconsequence,emotions, intuitionsandvisceral influencesarenotacknowledgedinsuchassertive

cultures.Forexample:

Participant26F

They[corporateactors]needthebusinesscaseandtheyneeditintheformatthattheyexpect.

Participant13F

Ihavealwayslaughedwhenwomenareaccusedofbeingemotional.ManyofthemenIworkwithuseemotion–anger,depression,emotionalblackmail,subtleviolenceandwithdrawal–but,becausetheydon'tcry,thesearenotobserved.

Participant16F

Ithinkwomenarewillingtoadmitthattheyareusingintuitionmuchmorethanmen.Andagain,Ithinkthisiswhereitcomesbacktothatmenwouldprefertousethewordjudgementbecausetheythinkit’smorerationalandlessemotional.

Moreover, the non‐rational elements of organisational life, including the use of intuition(s), are

rationalisedormadetoappearrationalandobjective.Forexample:

.............................................................................................................................................................

Interviewsequence


Soyouthinkthereisaculturalimperativetoberational…

Participant2M

Toappearrational,yes...

.............................................................................................................................................................


Participant22M

Ithinkthat…frequentlywhathappensispeoplereachdecisionsandthentheygoaboutjustifyingthem.

Participant17M

Iwilluseafairlyobjectivedefinition,intermsoftheydidnotmatchourselectioncriteriaaswellasthepreferredapplicant,youknowsomethinglikethat,makingitappearobjective.

Participantsperceivedthatthisapproachgavestakeholdersreassurancethroughintelligiblecauseand

effectrelationshipsandscientificexplanations.Forexample:

Participant1F

YouknowIthinkit’ssortof,youknow,there’sbeenalotofpressureonmakingmanagementtoseemveryscientificandit[intuition]seemstobetantamounttocrystals.

5.15.2Propertiesofintegrativeorganisationalcultures

Participants also described organisational cultures, often under the leadership of women, whose

characteristicswereverydifferent,perhapsoppositional,fromthoseofassertivecultures. Iarguethat

these organisations can be said to have integrating values and a focus on developing a supportive,

inclusive,democraticculturesthataretolerantofmistakesandcharacterisedbyopenlanguage,where

feelings,includingintuitions,areconsequentlyacknowledged.Figure5.8belowdisplaystheproperties

ofintegrativecultures:


Figure5.8:Propertiesofintegrativeorganisationalcultures

Each of the properties of integrative cultures is now examined in more detail along with data from

whichthesecategoriesorpropertieswerederived.

5.15.2.1 Democratic,supportiveculture

Participantsspokeabouttheimportance,asleaders,ofdevelopinganopen,democraticculturewhere

membersfeelfreetospeakonthebasisofwhattheyfeeltheycancontributeandnotfromtheirsense

ofposition,seniorityorpower.Forexample:

Participant13F

…youcreateacultureofpeoplebeingfreetospeakbythewayyouleadateam.Andsoyoucreateanenvironmentwherepeoplefeelfreetosaywhatevertheylike,andit'stheideasthatIlookfor.

Participant21F

...soyou’vegottosetthecultureright,andthenpeoplewillfeelcomfortableaboutbeingopenandhonest.

Participant14F

Ithinkthewaywegoaboutourdecision‐makingherewouldbeverydifferent,it’snothierarchical,it’steamwork,it’sinvolvedteamwork,whatIcalldispersedleadership.


5.15.2.2Toleranceofmistakes

Manyrespondentsapproachdecision‐makingwitharecognitionthat‘theunfortunatetruthisthatyou

arenotgoingtogeteverysingleoneofthemright’(Participant14F),andthat‘theonlywayyou’llknow

astowhetherthedecisionwasarightdecisionisthroughthebenefitofhindsight’(Participant22M).In

addition, someparticipants perceived that there is often ‘more than one rightway to do something’

(Participant8F).Thus,decision‐making,forthisparticipant(below)decision‐makingwasthoughtof in

termsofestablishingadirection,whichwasperceivedascriticalforindividualsandtheorganisationas

awhole:

Participant8

...businessesareaboutmakingdecisionsandmovingon...If,infact,youdon'tmakeadecisionyoucanparalysebusinesses,youcan'tmoveforwardbecausenobodyknowswheretogo.

Toleratingmistakeswasconsideredvital,first,becausemistakesareinevitableand,second,becauseit

encouragedpeopleto‘haveago’.Forexample:

Participant21F

Iwanttoknowwhentheydosomethingwrong,nottopunishthem,becauseIneverblamepeople...ButifIdon’tknowaboutitwecan’tfixit.Butit’sallrighttomakemistakes,becauseifyoudon’tmakemistakesyou’renottakingrisks;you’renothavingago.

Participant15F

AndIsaidtoyoubeforethatI’llmakedecisions,ImaybewrongandIaccordmyselftherighttocorrectthedecision,wellI’vegottoaccordthatrighttoanyoneelseintheorganisation.Somycultureissuchthattheyhaveago.

And, asoneparticipantpointedout (below), tolerance formistakes shouldbedemonstratedandnot

merelyespoused:

Participant27M

Imean,youholdthemresponsiblebutyoudon’tpunishthem.Andyouhavetoprovethat.Alotofpeopletalkaboutittodayandthen,ifthefirstmistakehappensandbigtroublestarts…theblamesessionbegins...youmustnotdothatbecausethecredibilityofyourmessagegetslost.

5.15.2.3Feelingsacknowledged

Asupportiveculturethatallowspeopletotakerisksisbeneficialtoindividualsandtheorganisationasa

whole because it utilises and develops the skills and abilities of individuals, aswell as individual and

collectiveexperience(tacitknowledge).Someparticipantsperceivedthisas importantforthecreative

evolutionoftheorganisation.Forexample:


Participant15F

Iardentlybelievethatmistakesarepartofthecreativeprocess,andunlessyouactuallyaffordpeoplethechancetohaveagoyouwon’tgrow,youwillstagnate.

Acknowledging,integratingandallowingfullexpressionofindividualtalents,forsomeleaders,meantan

open language where all feelings and ideas could be expressed, including emotions and intuition(s).

Forexample:

Participant27M

Basically,thosefirsttwothings,intuition,gutfeeling,emotions,wetalkedaboutemotionalintelligenceandstufflikethat,just,youknow,followyourfeelingssometimes,don’tbetooscientificaboutthingsbecauseyouknow,withtheexperiencealotofpeoplehave,andtheirpersonalskills,theycanmakeadecision.Ifitfeelsright,itisright,youknow,inmanycases,andifnot,thereisstillawaytocorrectitatthesecondattempt...

Participant13F

Idon'tcarewherepeoplesaytheycomefrom–wejustwanttheideasonthetable.ButIhavetobuildanenvironmentoftrustsopeoplecanfeelbrave.

Moreover,anopenlanguageandthecapacitytoexpressfeelingsarealsoconducivetobuildingarobust

organisationwheremembersarecommittedtoit’sthesuccess.Forexample:

Participant21F

...peoplejustbondedtogethersohardthatwhenanissuewouldcomeupIwouldcallforastaffmeetingin20minutes,andtheywouldallturnupandwe’dgothroughitall,andwewerecryingandwe’dlaugh...andtheywoulddoanythingforeachotherandtheywoulddoanythingforme...Andtheyweren’tscaredtosayanythinginfrontofeverybody.Andbecauseofit,wewerehighlysuccessfulfinancially,inreallytoughtimes

5.15.3Conditionsfororganisationalculture

Iinterpretedthreeconditionsthatinfluencedthedevelopmentoforganisationalcultures.Theseare:the

natureoftheindustry,examplesofwhichweregivenunderinterpersonalinteriority;nationalcultures

(for internationalcorporations); thesizeof theorganisation,where largeorganisationsareseentobe

morehighly regimentedand formalised in their approach todecision‐making; the contributionof the

attitudes of individuals in the organisation (discussed earlier); and, in particular, the actions and

behaviours of leaders. In addition, the relative proportion of men to women or gender mix was

interpretedtoconditionorganisationalculture.Figure5.9displaystheseconditions.


Figure5.9:Conditionsfororganisationalculture

Theseconditionswillnowbeexaminedinmoredetail.

5.15.3.1Nationalculture

Oneparticipant,wholedtheAustraliandivisionofaGermanorganisation,commentedthatwhatmight

workinGermanymightnottransfertotheAustralianmarketplace.Howeverhewasnotalwaysableto

satisfytheexpectationforrationale,whichheperceivedtobestrongerinGermanythaninAustralia:

Participant27M

Wedoaverystrongreportinglinebacktoxxxxand,inmanycases,whenwechangethingshereinourlocalorganisationinAustralia,thequestionis,whydoyoudothat?...andsometimesmyanswerisasshortas,becauseit’sright,andit’srightforAustralia...Andthenyougetintothisconflictofhavingtoexplainwhyyouthinkit’sright?...theywantmoresciencebehindit.

5.15.3.2Size

Somerespondentsperceivedthatlargerorganisationsreliedonformulaicandrigidstructureswereless

flexibleinresponsetotheindividualcapacitiesofitsmembers.Forexample:


Participant20

[insmallorganisations]Ithinkyoutendtorelyontheindividualalotmoretouseeverythingthey’vegot.Whereas,Ithinkinalotoflargeorganisations,wherepeopleareundertakingalotofprocessingactivity,theyaretrainedtobehaveinacertainwayandtothinkinacertainwayandtorespondinacertainway...thoseorganisationsareprobablymuchmorestructuredabouthowtheywantpeopletobehaveandmakedecisions.

5.15.3.3Leader

The leaderof theorganisationwasperceivedbymanyparticipantsascritical to thedevelopmentand

maintenance of organisational culture. Participants saw the power to implement systems and

procedures, as well as the power of role modelling for behaviour and decision‐making processes as

significantinfluences.Forexample:

Participant27M

Imean,thatistheunsaidpartofthehierarchicalsystem...Youneverhavefullfreedominanorganisation,that’sforsure...butyougetmorefreedom,thehigheryouclimb,toimplementbeliefandculture.Soformeitwasimportanttoreallyencouragepeople…weneedtomakequickdecisionsinsalesandmarketing,that’scritical.Ithasalottodowithpsychologyandintuitionandjustgoforit,andifwegetitwrongtogether,let’sseehowwecancorrectit....ittookabouttwoyearstogetitthroughandnowIthink,everyonefeelsprettycomfortableandconfidentaboutit.

.............................................................................................................................................................

Interviewsequence

Martin

Andwhatisthereceptivitygenerallytothatkindoftalk[expressionofintuitions].

Participant26F

Inthisorganisation,fairlyhigh,giventhatit'sthewayItalkallthetime[laughter]andI’mtheboss!![laughter]

.............................................................................................................................................................

5.15.3.4Gendermixand/orleadership

Given thedisparitybetweenmenandwomen in termsof intrapersonal interiority, it follows that the

proportionofwomenandthegenderof leaderswouldinfluenceorganisational interiority. Indeedthis

logicwasseenintheperceptionsofparticipants.Forexample:

Participant10F

[onthedisclosureofintuitions]...thatisaboutthecultureoforganisationsandthepresenceofleaderswhoareabletohavethatsortofconversation.

Participant11M

Youknow,Imean,IhaveworkedveryhardindiversityinseniorleadershipteamsandIhavejustfoundfemaleintuition,anddifferentbackgroundsandethnicity,asahugerichnessforgettingdecisionsright.Youknow,themaleofthespecies,allsixofusorallsevenofuswouldbemarchingdownawayandacoupleofwomenontheteamaresaying,thereissomething,doweneedtothink


aboutthisinadifferentway,andwhetherit’scomingfromleft‐fieldthinkingIdon’tknow,youknow,leftbrain‐rightbrainstuffor...justtheemotionalside,um,butIreallytrusttheirjudgement.

.............................................................................................................................................................

Interviewsequence

Martin

Couldyouimaginebeinginaboardroomfullofwomenandtheculturebeingdifferent?

Participant12F

Absolutely,beenthere…andthecultureistotallydifferent.Theconversationismoreopen,intuition,whilstIcan’trecallwhetherthewordwasactuallyused,it’squiteclearlyaroundthediscussion…Thewayinwhichthingsaretalkedaboutismorearoundfeelings.

Martin

Itsoundsasthoughthere’saprettystarkdifferencebetweenmenandwomeninthesesituationsisitreallythatstark…isitreallythatdifferent?

Participant12F

Ithinkitisabsolutely.Yes,that’smypersonalexperience.

.............................................................................................................................................................

5.15.4 Consequencesfordisclosureofintuition(s)

Inconcertwiththemodelpresentedfor interpersonal level intuitiondisclosure, intuitive individuals in

integrative cultures high in interiority will disclose their intuition(s) through expressions such asmy

intuition is, gut feel, gut instinct, my feeling is, this doesn’t feel right and so forth. However, high

interiority individuals in assertive cultures will either silence their intuitions or seek strategies to

presentopinionsbasedonintuitionbyfindingorfabricatingrationale,ordressinguptheirintuitions

analytically.Alternatively,expressionsthatareculturallycongruentandthatmasktheroleofintuition,

suchas‘myexperience’and‘judgement’,maybeused.Figure5.10(below)illustratesthisprocess.


Figure5.10:Disclosureofintuitioninorganisations

5.15.5 Interveningconditionsfordisclosingintuition(s)

Participantsacknowledgedtherewerecircumstances(interveningconditions)inwhichindividualsmight

goagainst culturalnormsofexpression. Individualswill disclose intuitions inassertive cultures under

certainconditionssuchasinhigh‐riskventures,wherethereisnoprecedent(entrepreneurship),where

theyhavepower,status,andespeciallywhereanindividualhasestablishedatrackrecord.Inaddition,

intuitionsmaybedisclosedwherethe individual isabouttoretireorwherethe leaderhashighself‐

confidence.Inthewordsofoneparticipant:

Participant20M

Idon’tthinkyourintuitionwillchange,butthecontextinwhichyouarepresentingitwillchangehowyoupresentit.


5.15.5.1Power,statusandreputation(trackrecord)

Ihavepreviouslyshownthatleadersimplementandenforceculturalnormsinassertiveorganisational

cultures thatmandate rationalmodesofexpression.However,power is thecurrencyof influencenot

onlyindefiningculturalnormsbutalsounderpinstheabilitytoactincontradictiontothem.Thepower

todisclose intuitionswasperceived tobederived froma formalposition,andstatusachieved froma

recordofsuccessfuldecision‐makingthatprotectsindividualsfromridicule.Forexample:

Participant5M

SoIthink,attheveryseniorlevel,peoplecangetawaywithsayingthat'smyinstinctorintuition,um,atanythingotherthantheseniorlevelIthinkthatpeoplewouldbesuspiciousofitandwouldrequireaviewtobeexplainedandrationalised.

Participant20M

Again,comingbacktothepointwemadeearlier,ifyouareinapositionofpowerwithatrackrecord,yes.Ifyou’renot,they’reprobablymuchmoresceptical.

Participant27M

Yeahlookit’seasierifyoutalkoutofapositionofstrength...thanfromapositionofweakness[laughs],becauseyou’vegotproofthatit[intuition]workssomehow.

Participant8M

...iftheindividualhavingtheintuitiveideaorsomecommentongutinstincthasgotagoodsuccessfultrackrecordbehindthem,thenIthinkpeoplearemorelikelytoacceptitaswell.

5.15.5.2 Confidence/selfacceptance

Fearofridiculeaboutdisclosingtheuseofintuitionwasalsomitigatedbytheself‐confidenceandself‐

acceptanceindicatedbysomeparticipants.Forexample:

Participant15F

Well,IthinkIhavespokenaboutitpreviouslyinanumberofinterviewsthatI’vedone,inthatIsaidthatIdotrustmyintuition.Imyselfresilefromit...Idon'tfinditembarrassingorabitofwitchcraftorwhatever,it’sworkedforme[mutuallaughter].

.............................................................................................................................................................

Interviewsequence

Martin

Wouldyoufeelcomfortableadmittingintuitivejudgementstoparentsortostakeholdersortopeople?

Participant17M

[interrupts]Yeah,becauseIthinkwhatIamiswhatIam…

.............................................................................................................................................................


5.15.5.3 HighRiskVentures/Noprecedent/Entrepreneurs

Consistentwithemergenttheoryconcerningcomplementaryuseof intuitionandanalysis,participants

perceivedthatdecision‐making,wherethereismeagreinformationorevidence,tendstobedominated

by intuition. In suchcontexts,makingdecisionswasoften referred toas tantamount togamblingand

therefore intuitive guidance was seen as better than no guidance. Entrepreneurs operating in these

contexts were therefore perceived as having given license to express strategies based on their

intuition(s)orthedisclosedintuitionofotherswhomtheytrusted.Forexample:

Participant8M

...peoplewouldn'ttalkaboutit.Ihavenotheardanybody,inmyexperience,everstandupandadmitto[intuition],withthepossibleexceptionofentrepreneurs.

Participant21F

Look,Ithinkentrepreneurstakethosesortsofpunts...therewasnone[precedent]...Isupposethey’reprettyentrepreneurialtoo.Imeanxxxxhascertainlytakenhisrisks[laughter],someofthemhavecomeoff,someofthemhaven’t...

5.15.5.4 Retiringsoon

Inadditiononeparticipantperceivedthatthosewhoaresoontoretire(orthosewhodonotcare)might

bepreparedtorevealtheiruseofortrustinintuition(s):

Participant7M

Idon’tknowthatmanypoliticianswouldnecessarilywishtounravelthemselvesonthatlevel[intuitionandemotion].Ithinktheyareveryguardedabouthowtheyappear...[pause]unlessyoudon’tgiveadamnoryouaregoingtoretiresoon…

5.15.6 Paradoxesofassertive/integrativecultures

According to my interpretation of the data, integrative cultures do not jettison or reject rationality,

evidenceandanalysisnordotheyignoreeconomicconcerns.Thesethingsarestillvalued,however,not

as exclusively as they are in assertive cultures. Indeed, not acknowledging intuitions can result in

adverseoutcomes. This is because failure to acknowledge the feelings andemotions that accompany

organisational life can result in the dominance of a negative covert organisational dimension. In this

shadow dimension the aims and goals of the organisation become subordinate to individual power‐

assertingagendasof individualactors.Therefore, theexclusivedrive for rationalitycan,paradoxically,

resultinirrationalbehaviourtothedetrimentoftheorganisationanditsmembers.Forexample:

Participant21F

Theysatroundtheexecutivetableandwereverycompetitivewitheachother;theydidn’tworktogetherasaunitatall.Theydidn’tactuallyknoweachotherandsomeofthemhadbeenworkingtogetherforfouryears,andtheydidn’tknoweachother.Itwasquiteextraordinary,andasIonlythoughtIwasgoingtobethereforthreeorfourmonths,endedupbeingsix,Ithought,whatIcoulddo,asanewperson,wastotryandchangetheculture.AndatmylastexecutivemeetinglastweekI


saidtothemlook,thisiswhatIsetouttodo,doyouthinkwe’vegotsomewhere,andtheyallagreedthatwehad.Theyarenowmuchmoreopenwitheachother,theytrusteachothermore,andtherewereacoupleofhugeissueswherethetrustwasrightoutthewindow...theycommunicatebetter.They’veactuallyhadacoupleofproperdiscussionswherepeopleweretakingtheorganisationalline...ratherthantheirownportfolio,andthatwasabigbreakthrough....So,you’vegottosetthecultureright,andthenpeoplewillfeelcomfortableaboutbeingopenandhonest.Atmyfirstexecutivemeeting,afteritfinished,threedifferentpeoplecameinandburstintotearsandsaid,‘that’sthefirsttimewe’veheardtruthandintegrityandthosesortsofwordsaroundthetableinfiveyears’.Andsothatwasareallybigbreakthroughforthem–andsurewewentbackwardsacoupleoftimesbuttheykeptmovingonwards,itwasatwo‐stepsforward,one‐stepbacksortofsituation.

Theanalysisrevealedafurtherparadoxinrelationtoleadership,valuesandculture.Theterm‘assertive

culture’ might, at face value, be interpreted as a culture whose members are self‐assured and self‐

confident.However, if theorganisation isassertiveand forceful in imposingvalues throughrestrictive

communicationandpunishmentasaconsequenceofhierarchicalpowerrelations,thenIarguethatthe

oppositeconditioncanoftenbegenerated.Assertiveculturesmayengendersycophanticandcompliant

homogeneity in accordance with its values and the predilections of the leader. Moreover, this will

function to crush the individuality, intuition(s) and creative potential of members. Paradoxically,

integrative cultures appear to function to enhance the assertiveness of each individual through

integratingtheirviews.

Participant21F

...ifyougetthepeoplerightandtheculturerightyou’rethere,youdon’thavetomanagethebusiness–theymanageitforyouoritmanagesitself.

Integrationdoesnotnecessarilymeanactingon the intuitionsofmembersbut rather acknowledging

them to theextent thateach feels theyhave the right to speak, andanobligation toparticipateand

contributewhattheyfeelispertinent,legitimateandfertile.Forexample:

Participant15F

ImaybewrongandIaccordmyselftherighttocorrectthedecision,wellI’vegottoaccordthatrighttoanyoneelseintheorganisation.Somycultureissuchthattheyhaveago.

5.16Societal/environmentalinteriority

5.16.1 PropertiesofAustraliansocietalculture

As shown above, assertive organisational cultures are characterised by strong hierarchies, active and

strong decision‐making and the need to appear scientific, rational and objective with a focus on

evidenceandeconomics.Assertiveculturesalso feature tough interpersonal relationswheremistakes

arepunishedandfeelingsremainunacknowledgedandnotdisclosed. Ihavealsoshownthatassertive

culturesareoftenleadbymen.InChapter4itwasshownthatonly2%ofAustralianorganisationsare

lead by women (CEOs). Although factors other than leadership have been shown to condition the


culture of organisations, taken together, the evidence in this study suggests that the majority of

Australianorganisationsarecharacterisedbytheseproperties.

It is acknowledged that societal culture is not homogenous and furthermore, that the viewsof these

participantsdonotreflectthemultiplicityofperspectivesthatIsuspectmightbeavailablefromother

samples. However, the organisations and institutions represented in the sample (commercial, legal,

educational, political and governmental) have enormous influenceonpeople through shaping values,

discourseandpractices.Thus,itcouldbearguedthatwe,asasociety,liveinanassertiveratherthanan

integrativeculture.

However, a significant finding of this research was the business/private dualism with respect to

decision‐making(Section5.6.2.8)andinterpersonalinteriority(Section5.14.3).Ithereforeproposethat

thisbusiness/privatedualismconditionsinteriorityatthesocietallevel.Thissignificanceofthiscleavage

isillustratedinFigure5.11below:


Figure5.11:Socialprocessofintuitiondisclosureatthesocietallevel

Thequestionsposedtoparticipantsand,therefore,theparticipants’replieswerefocusedmainlyonthe

preceding levels of social organisationbecause theywere the central concernof this study.Although

participantsoccasionallymadereferencetothewidersociety,therewasnotenoughdatatosupportan

analysis to the same degree as intrapersonal, interpersonal and organisational levels. The proper

analysis of societal interiority would be complex and should involve the comparison of perceived

Australian values with those of other cultures, which was, unfortunately, beyond the scope and

resources of this study. However, a number of themes could be identified in relation to intuition

use and disclosure, and the assertive values that many of the women in the study said dominate

Australianorganisations.


5.16.1.1 CorevaluesoftheAustralianbusinesscommunity:strong=activeandexternal

Oneparticipant,asalreadynoted,pointedtotheimportanceofactiveandstrongdecision‐making:

Participant15F

Ithinkunlesspeoplesometimesseethatyou'veactuallygonethroughthisrigourorthecrunchingorthesweating...thereshouldbeananalyticalactotherthansomeone'slookingatit.

Iwouldsuggestthatthiscommentcontainstheessenceofwhatisconsideredtobeofvalueindecision‐

making in organisations and more widely. Strong (good) decision‐making in assertive cultures is

assumedtobeactiveinthescientific,rationalanalysisofmeasurablequantities,andevidenceexternal

totheself,particularlynumbers.Iproposethatactionbasedonexternalconsiderationsunderpinpublic

cultureingeneralandbusinesscultureinparticular.Forexample:

Participant3F

Ithinkstakeholdersandthemediawanttoseestrongdecisions.

Participant10F

...onthewholeIthinkthepublicdoesexpectustoworkwithfacts,toworkwithevidence,it’sarealcatch‐cry.

Participant17M

AndIthinkoneofthephenomenawe'redealingwithatthepresenttimeisthegreatcredencethatweplaceonthescientists,andsoonobjective,rationalthought,andevenrationalismasitpenetratesintoeconomicsandotherareasofthestudyofhumanexperience.

Participants perceived an increasing trend toward risk aversion and the application of analytical

approaches to the management of risk, which I would argue is underpinned by these core values.

Forexample:


Sothere’sculturalimperativetowardsexplicitrationale?

Participant26F

Yeah,Ithinkit'spartofthewhole...cultureofmanagingrisks,asifyoucanmanageriskinsomekindofscientificway...

One participant suggested that society had reached a point where it is assumed that risk can, and

should,beeliminatedthroughstrongactionsinandontheexternalworld.However,sheperceivedthis

approachwas‘disabling’:


.............................................................................................................................................................

Interviewsequence

Participant15F

...we’vealmostcometoasocietywhere...wewillnotacceptthatthere’sanaccident.Therehastobeareason,youknowtherehastobesomethingtoblameorsomeonetoblame.Um,soifthat’sthecasethenit’saknownandifit’saknown,thenwhydidithappen?Soifit’sariskthenyouremoveit.Andthat,Ithink,isadisablingapproachbecauseitwilltakeusintoablack‐and‐whitedecision‐makingprocess,ruleprocess,societalprocess,andpeoplearen’tblack‐and‐white.

Martin

Sothat’salmostadominationofrationalitythewayyoudescribeit?

Participant15F

No,[pause]no,Iwouldn’tsaythat,becauseIthinkifyouarerationalyouwillallowfortheprovocationofaccident,mishap,risketc.

Ithinkwhatitis,isit’sfearandit’sanecessityofcontrol,soit’sfearandcontrol.

.............................................................................................................................................................

I interpret that this (Participant15F)participant suggests thatactive andexternal approaches to risk

managementareinadequatebecausepeoplearenot‘black‐and‐white’butdrivenbycomplex internal

and sometimes contradictory motivations that cannot be meaningfully measured or predicted.

Moreover, in relation to interiority/exteriority, riskmanagementcanbe seenasactive strategies that

areimplementedinordertocontroltheexternalenvironmentinresponsetointernalfeelingsoffear.

However, because the external environment cannot be completely contained, risk management

strategies will continue to be less than adequate. As a consequence (if internal fears are not

acknowledged,andnotdirectlyaddressed)strongerexternalactionswillbeproposedandimplemented.

Suchanapproachtoriskmanagementisrationalifthesolecriteriaforevaluatingsuccessareexclusively

external(i.e.profit,standardoflivingintermsofwealth,numberofhospitaladmissionsetc.).However,

according to some participants, extreme and ‘black‐and‐white’ decision‐making processes have a

‘disabling’effectforqualityoflife.Forexample:

Participant21F

...theworldismoreandmoreriskaverse.ThisisoneoftheproblemsatthemomentIthink.Ifyoutakethattoofaryoujustclosedownanddon’tdoanythingordon’tdoanythingneworanythingexcitingoranythingthatpushestheboundaries.

As a consequence, one participant observed (below) a potential tension between risk aversion and

individualexpression(whichcanultimatelycontributetotheexternal):


Participant15F

...isourculturesuchnow,thatweareactuallyallowing,withinthebusinesscontext,peopletoactuallyexhibitmoreoftheirpersonality?...andoftenitisthepersonthatmakesthedifference,andeachpersonhasdifferentstrengthsandskillsandwaysofseeingthings.Soisitallowing,andeventhoughIcaveatthiswithsayingmyconcerniswearegoingtoamorerisk‐aversesociety,areweatthesametimeallowingtheexpressionofindividualismtoenhancethebottomline?Areweallowingthatmoreandmorethesedays?Ithinkthatwouldbeagoodthing.

5.16.2Disjuncturebetweensocietalvaluesandintuition

Ihavearguedthatstrong(good)decision‐makingunderassertiveculturesinmaledominatedAustralian

commercial, legal, educational and political organisations is assumed to be active in the scientific,

rational analysis ofexternalconcerns. I further argue that theseproperties are incongruentwith the

propertiesofintuition.Thus,thecomparisonofthesetwosetsofvaluesorproperties(achievedintable

5.3 below) reveals a fundamental disjuncture. Moreover, this disjuncture between the dominant

external orientation of public and business cultures and the internal orientation of interiority (at all

levels)willhaveimplicationsfortheorythatwillbediscussedinSection6.6.

Table5.3:Comparisonofsocietalvaluesandintuition

Propertiesof(dominant)publicculture Propertiesofintuition(andfeelingsingeneral)

External Internal

Rational‐analytical Non‐rational(feelingbased)

Maleorientation Femaleorientation

Active Receptive

Scientific Non‐scientific(perceivedas)

5.16.3 Perceptionsofchange

Someparticipantsperceivedaconcurrenttrendtowardplacingemphasisonthenon‐material,andthe

recognitionof feelingsandemotions,asanemergentfocusforpublicandprivate life.Thus,atension

betweenthesetwomovementscanbeidentified.Forexample:

Participant14F

…softelementsofmanagement,that’showit’sdescribedandtextbooksarecomingtothefore.That’sbecausepeoplehaverealisedthereissuchathingasemotionalintelligence,it’snotjustallintellectualintelligence,andit’sveryrealandit’stheonlythingthatwillallowinvolvementandhappinessofwork.Imeanhappinesshasbecomeabigplay...Andpeopleneedtohavemeaningintheirlives,andthewaytheygetitisnotthroughslavingawaytomakeafewmorebobfortheshareholdersorthemastersthatbe...theyneedanotherdimensiontotheirlives.

Participant10F

[onthedisclosureofintuitions]thatisaboutthecultureoforganisationsandthepresenceofleaderswhoareabletohavethatsortofconversation.Willthatbecomemoresointhefuture?It’sreallyhard–theevidence,numbers‐basedgroupcertainlyareintheascendancy.


Before I conclude thechapter Iwillpresentan illustration that representshow Ihave interpreted the

models can be viewed in relation to one another. Figure 5.12 (below) demonstrates how the core

categoryof interiority integratesexplanations for thesocialprocessof intuitiondisclosureat the four

levelsofsocialdescriptiondiscussed.Asmentionedearlier,attheintrapersonallevel,expressionisbest

thoughtofas‘selftalk’ratherthanactualexpression.

Figure5.12:Overallsocialprocess

5.16.4 SummaryofPart2

Theanalysis revealed thatmostparticipantsbelieved therewasnotageneral acceptanceof intuition

andintuitionuse,rather,thatthereisahighlevelofscepticisminindividualsandorganisations.Some

female participants perceived that intuition is considered inferior to analysis because it is generally

associatedwith emotion andwomen.Most participants (men andwomen) suggested that there is a

reluctance to admit use of intuition, especially in formal business settings and larger organisations.

Participantsperceivedthatthewords‘experience’,and,particularly‘judgement’,aremoreacceptablein

business contexts. However, it was also found that women were perceived to be, in general, more

comfortablewithwordsthatreflectedthefeelingofknowingassociatedwith intuition.Moreover,the


femaleparticipants inthestudydemonstratedagreaterorientationtotheinnerrealmoffeelingsand

intuitions through their willingness and ability to describe the subjective experience of receiving

anintuition.

The inner orientation displayed by the women in the study was labelled interiority. High interiority

results in the ability to be aware of, discriminate between, articulate and utilise intuitions and other

feelings.However,theexistenceoftwomaleparticipantswhosimilarlydemonstratedahighdegreeof

interiority indicated that intrapersonal interiority could be uncoupled from gender. Instead, high

interiority was attributed to social/ gender conditioning and contextual utility. As a consequence,

intrapersonalinterioritycanbeseenassomethingthatcanbenurturedanddeveloped,andavailableto

bothmenandwomen.Individualswithlowintrapersonalinteriorityarelessorientedandthereforeless

‘intouch’withtheirfeelings.Consequentlytheseindividualswillbelesslikelytofullyacknowledgetheir

intuitionsandexpressthem.Whileindividualsmightactontheirintuitiveknowing,thosewhoaremore

externallyorientedwilllikelyattributetheirknowingtoanalysisand/orexperience.

The concept of interiority can also be applied to interpersonal interactions, organisations andwhole

societies.Atthecollectivelevel,interioritytranslatestotheextenttowhichinteractionsareorientedto

theinterior(feelings)ortheexterior(things).Thus,wherethereishighinteriority,feelingsandintuitions

aremorelikelytobeexpressed.Attheinterpersonallevel,interiorityisconditionedbyperceptionofthe

other,perceivedfamiliarity,whethertheinteractionisaboutbusinessorpersonalmatters,thesetting

oftheinteraction(industryoractivity)andpowerrelations.Organisationalinteriorityisconditionedby

therelativeproportionofwomentomeningovernance,thesizeoftheorganisation,nationalculture,

and inparticular,powerrelationsandthe interiorityof the leader. Integrativeorganisationswithhigh

interiority are characterised by a focus on culture, have democratic power relations, are tolerant of

mistakes,aresupportiveofmembersandhaveopencommunication.Expressionoffeelingsisconducive

tolearning,collaborativedecision‐making,thedevelopmentoftheindividualpotentialofmembersand

buildingtrustbetweenthem.

Conversely,assertiveorganisationalculturesarecharacterisedbytough, interpersonalrelationswhere

mistakesarepunished.Therighttospeakisdeterminedbystronghierarchies,andexpressionisshaped

by the need to appear scientific, rational and objective – thus feelings (including intuitions) go

unacknowledged. Intuitive individuals in these organisational contexts will silence or suppress their

intuitionsorchooseexpressionssuchas‘judgement’and‘experience’thatmasktheroleofintuitionin

theirdecision‐making.Alternatively,intuitionsmaybe‘dressedup’tosoundanalyticalor,alternatively,

rationalefordecisionsmaybefoundorevenfabricatedinordertoalignwithculturalnorms.However,

disclosureofintuitionsinassertiveorganisationsisfacilitatedthroughanumberofinterveningvariables

–wheretheintuitiveindividualhasagooddecisiontrackrecord,hasformalorinformalpower,hashigh


self‐confidence,operatesinentrepreneurialenvironmentsoriftheirretirementisimminent,orifthey

justdonotcare.Atthesocietal/environmentallevel,strong(good)decision‐makinginmaledominated

Australian commercial, legal, educational and political organisations is assumed to be active in the

scientific, rational analysis of external concerns. Thus, a tensionwas identified between these values

and the properties of intuition as non‐rational (feeling based), associatedwithwomen, received and

non‐scientific(perceivedas).

5.17Conclusion

All participants stated that they considered intuition to be valuable to their decision making and

leadershiprole.Intuitionusecanbeseenasacomplexprocessconditionedbythenatureandcontextof

thedecisionaswellastheindividual(s)makingthedecision.Theanalysisshowedthatthedisclosureof

intuition is a complex, conditional social process that can be understood at different levels of social

description.Thesocialprocessesforintuitiondisclosureandantecedentconditionshavebeendescribed

andexplainedforeach level.However, it isacknowledgedthat,consistentwithDomainTheory, these

processesareintertwinedandinterdependent.

C h a p t e r 6 : C o n c l u s i o n s a n d I m p l i c a t i o n s P a g e |223

Chapter6:ConclusionsandImplications

Ourdifficulty isnotthatwehavedevelopedconsciousattentionbutthatwehavelostthewiderstyleof

feelingwhichshouldbeitsbackground.(Watts1991,p.7)

6.1Introduction

InChapter1ofthethesisIintroducedthestudyandlocatedtheresearchproblemwithinabroadfield

of literature. The introduction also served to familiarise the reader with the purpose, aims and

objectives,aswellasthemethodsbywhichtheseaimsandobjectiveswouldbeachieved. Idiscussed

the structure of the thesis with reference to how each chapter would contribute to the thesis as a

whole.Theresearchproblemwasthenpresentedandjustifiedintermsoftheneedtounderstandthe

social and cultural contexts that impact on intuition use and disclosure in the real world

oforganisations.

Chapter 2 presented a critical, interdisciplinary review of extant literature concerning intuition and

intuitionuse.Iproposedthattheconceptualdevelopmentofintuitionhadbeenslowandconfounded

by a plethora of competing and sometimes contradictory definitions within and across a number of

disciplines. I showed that, in philosophy, intuition is credited with the apprehension of perfect and

infalliblesubjectiveknowledgeofanultimatereality.Withinpsychology,awidevarietyofapproaches

to, and definitions of, intuitionwere reviewed. Incoherencewithin the psychological literature in the

constructionofintuition,aswellasadisjuncturebetweenpsychologyandphilosophicalunderstandings

ofintuition,wererevealed.

Anintegratinginterpretivemodelofintuitionwassubsequentlypresentedanddiscussed.Iarguedthat

conceiving of intuition as multi‐dimensional and multi‐faceted enabled the various psychological

conceptualisationstobeorderedinrelationtooneanother,andinrelationtoanalysis.Thedisjuncture

between philosophical and psychological constructs of intuition was reconciled through a stratified

ontology and a unifying, transcendent ground consciousness. Following this, I reviewed intuition

constructed as ESP or Psi, which, according to a number of theorists, is explained by quantum

non‐locality.

Asubsequentreviewoffieldstudiesconcerningintuitionuseinorganisationsestablishedthat,although

intuition (conceived as ‘gut feeling’) was regarded as a valuable tool by executives and managers,

intuition(s)wereseldomdisclosedinorganisations.Whilesometheoristshadattributedthistointuition

havingabad reputation, Iargued thatno research found, todate,hadsoughtanexplanation for this

phenomenon.Iprovidedevidencefrommyownpreviousresearchthattheunwillingnessofleadersto

disclosetheir intuition(s)hadresulted insignificant financialandsocialcost.Thus, Iarguedthatwhile


researchintothenatureandpropertiesofintuitionisimportant,thisknowledgeisimpotentunlessthe

context,particularlythesocio‐culturalcontextinwhichintuitionuseoccurs,isalsounderstood.Iargued

that this gap in the knowledge is most appropriately addressed through the investigation of the

followingresearchproblem:

What are the social processes of intuition use and disclosure by Australian leaders inorganisations?

In Chapter 3, I developed the theoretical framework for the study, which was informed by Layder’s

Domain Theory (Layder 1994; Layder 1997; Layder 2005). I showed that Domain Theory had the

potential to draw on multiple sociological lenses in the analysis of complex and multi‐level

(micrological/macrological) dynamics associated with the investigation of the research problem.

Furthermore, I argued that the stratified ontology underpinning Layder’s Domain Theory was

philosophicallycongruentwiththewayIproposedthatpsychologicalandphilosophical intuitioncould

bereconciled(Section2.10).

Chapter 4 outlined the methodology and methods used in the study. I argued that the gap in the

knowledgeconcerningthedisclosureof intuition(s) inAustralianorganisationswasideally investigated

byusingflexibleemergentmethodologiesthatutilisedboththeanalyticalandintuitivecapacitiesofthe

researcher.Iarguedthataresearchstrategyinformedbygroundedtheorieswassuitedtocapturingthe

complexity, ambiguity and dynamism of organisations. A dual yet interconnected approach to data

gathering and analysis through variants of GT was described and justified. Semi‐structured, ‘deep

interviews’withCEOs,chairs,directors,executivesandleadersofAustralianorganisations,aswellasthe

data collection andanalysis proceduresused,wereexplainedand justified. Evaluation criteria for the

grounded theory generatedwere presented alongwith corresponding details of howmethodological

soundnesswasachievedinthisstudy.

Chapter 5 presented the analyses and emergent grounded theory. I found that intuition was

experiencedbyparticipantsasaninternalfeelingofknowing,whichflaggedtherightnessorwrongness

ofaperson,choice,strategyorproposal,thetimelinessofadecision,and/orcautionandtheneedfor

action–particularlyfurtherinvestigation.Ishowedthatparticipantsusedgutfeelinginconditional,yet

complementaryways. In general, participants trusted their intuition(s) and considered it to be highly

reliable,andveryimportanttotheirleadershipanddecision‐making.Furthermore,theanalysesshowed

thatthedisclosureofintuition(s)inorganisationswasacomplex,conditionalsocialprocessthatcanbe

understoodatdifferentlevelsofsocialorganisation.Whetherornotintuitionwasacknowledgedand/or

expressed was conditional on the interiority of a person, interpersonal encounter, organisation

orsociety.


This final chapter (Chapter 6) has four primary aims. The first (to be achieved in this introductory

section) is to summarise the previous five chapters. The second is to establish to what extent the

emergent theory arising from the current study is consistent with or diverges from relevant extant

theoryand research.Thecomparisonwill alsocontribute to the thirdaimof this chapter,which is to

interpret, integrate and make sense of the findings of this study, and show how the study has

contributed by extending and/or reframing existing knowledge. The fourth aim is to show the

implications of contributions generated by this study for theory, policy and practice, and future

research.Thelimitationsoftheresearchandtheresearcherwillalsobeaddressedinthischapter.

Asmentionedintheintroductorysection,theemergentgroundedtheorydiscoveredinrelationtothe

disclosure of intuition(s) extends beyond the scopeof the literature originally reviewed in Chapter 2.

Indeed, discovery is seen as theprincipal advantageGroundedTheoryhasover deductivehypothesis

testing(Glaser&Strauss1967).AsdiscussedinChapter3,whilecommunicativeexchangeoccursatthe

interpersonal level, itoccursunderthecombinedinfluenceofsocialandpsychologicalfactors(System

andLifeworld)(Layder2005).Thus,new literaturewillbe introduced inthischapterat these levels.At

the Lifeworld level, new literature will include neurological, psychological and sociological research

findings inrelationtotheawarenessandexpressionof feelings, including intuitions.Thisresearchwill

beshowntosustaintheconceptof interioritydeveloped inthisthesisand itsrelationshipto intuition

disclosure. At the System level, Post‐structuralist Feminist Critical Theorywill assist in extending and

reframingthegroundedtheorydetailedinChapter5.Iwillnowintroducetheconceptofdifférancethat

willbeemployedthroughoutthechaptertoanchorthediscussionandtheconclusionsthatwillfollow.

6.1.2Différance

The reconciliation of apparently oppositional/antagonistic dualisms through stratification has been a

repeatedthemeinthisstudy. Inthischapter, Iarguethatgroundedtheorygenerated inthisresearch

concerning intuition disclosure in organisations is most appropriately reviewed within a context of

genderdualisms.PoststructuralistfeministsuseDerrida’sconceptofdifférancetoshowhowgenderisa

systemofrelationalmeaningmaking(Ely&Padavic2007).Derrida(1982)inventedtheworddifférance,

whichembodiesthedoublemeaningof‘differ’and‘defer’,toexpresshowmeaningarisesthroughthe

privilegingof one aspect of a dualismover another (Calas& Smircich 1996;Alvesson&Billing 1997).

Différanceisthereforeconsistentwiththephilosophyofreconciliationthroughstratificationgiventhat

‘Différance separates but it also unites because it represents the unity of the process of division’

(Gherardi 1995, p. 101). Similarly for deBeauvoir (1972), the creationof the ‘One’ and the ‘Other’ is

fundamental–necessaryforthedefinitionofsubjectivityandthereforeallknowledge.Meaningisnot

‘outthere’tobediscoveredbutiscreatedviatheconsciousnessoftheindividualthroughattentionto,


and deferral of, certain particularities. Thus, for Gerhardi, de Beauvoir and Derrida, the concept and

processofdifférance isprofoundbecause it is the ‘historicalandepochalunfoldingofBeing’ (Derrida

1982,p.22).

I will employ Derrida’s term différance to interpret and make sense of the grounded theory I have

developedinthisstudy.InrelationtothefirstmainresearchquestionIarguethatmakingdistinctions

betweenintuitionandanalysisincognitionanddecision‐makingisaprocessofdeferral.Consistentwith

the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, I argue that intuition and analysis can indeed be regarded as

separate and oppositional processes andmodes of cognition. However, I also argue that cognition is

wholeor,moreaccurately,aholon,whichcannotbereducedto intuition77oranalysis. Iconsequently

conclude that we create a division in the process of inquiry through giving attention to one or the

other78–ourvaluestructuresthendeferoneortheother,bywayofdifférance.

I will show that différance is also pivotal to answering the second main research question. This is

becausepost‐structuralistcriticalfeministsembracedifféranceandpaycloseattentiontoprocessesof

privileginganddeferralintheconstructionofdominantideologies,values,discourseandpracticesthat,

takentogether,constitute‘Being’inmodernWesternsocieties(Ely&Padavic2007).Accordingtothese

theorists,genderisarelationalsystemwheremasculineandfemininearemutually‐exclusivecategories

definedbytheiropposite.Thus,theyrelyoneachotherfortheirmeaning(Alvesson&Billing1997;Ely&

Padavic2007).Consequently,genderisnotstaticbutanongoingprocess–onethatisshapedinrelation

to standing historical conditions and shifting alliances of power that constitute and reconstitute

knowledge and practices (Foucault 1980; Alvesson & Billing 1997; Connell 2005; Layder 2005; Ely &

Padavic2007).Différanceisusefulindeconstructinghowthisprocessoperatesinahierarchicalwaythat

servestheinterestsofmen(Putnam&Mumby1993;Gherardi1995;Ely&Padavic2007).

Althoughincreasedparticipationbymeninthedomesticspherecanbeascribedtotheriseoffeminism,

I argue that the aimof liberal feminists (achieving equality) has not been achieved.Men continue to

dominatetheglobepoliticallyandeconomically(Barry2010).Asaconsequence,itismenwhocontinue

to determine what is privileged in meaning making through their control of social and commercial

organisations, and institutions of governance. Traits of idealised masculinity are elevated in these

institutionsthroughthedisseminationofthe‘hero’archetype(Connell1983;Sinclair1998).Masculine

77 Here I refer to intuition in the broadest sense (the automatic and unconscious processes referred to inFigure2.2).

78Thisisnotunlikewave/particlecomplementaritydescribedinthedefinitionoftermsunder‘complementarity’.


waysofthinkingandbeingarenormalisedthroughthe‘persuasionofthegreaterpartofthepopulation’

bymainstreammedia (Donaldson1993,p.647).Asaconsequence,genderingprocessesarerendered

invisible.Hence,askingmen(andwomen79)toacknowledgetheirownmasculinisedconditioningislike

askingfishtoacknowledge‘thewaterinwhichtheyswim’(Stivers1996citedinSinclair2005,p.27).In

thisway idealisedmasculine traitshavebecome infusedas the frameof reference fromwhichwhole

societiesoperate;80consideredbothnormalandnatural(deBeauvoir1972;Heckman1999).

Mengiveattentiontoandprivilege(elevate)certainvalues,traits,beliefsandthoughtformsanddefer

others.Traitsthatarenotconsistentwithcurrent‘culturallyexalted’(Donaldson1993,p.647)formsof

idealisedmasculinity are ‘othered’, denied and projected ontowomen (Gherardi 1995; Ely& Padavic

2007). Inrelationtodecision‐making,thinking,reasonandanalysis(rationality)aresetagainstfeeling,

emotion and intuition (emotionality81) as binary opposites. Rationality is elevated through positive

descriptors(orderlyandobjective)andclaimedasmasculine.Conversely,emotionalityisconstructedas

subjective and chaotic, and is consequently assigned to the feminine (Putnam & Mumby 1993). In

addition, because hierarchy is an elevated trait of the masculine in theWest (Wilber 1995) what is

constructed as ‘the feminine’ is marginalised and subordinated along with divergent and resistant

masculinities(Calas&Smircich1996;Connell2005).

Morespecifically,thecontributionofPost‐structuralistFeministCriticalTheorytothisstudyistoshow

how masculine, assertive organisational cultures elevate rational forms of knowing ‘while

simultaneouslymarginalising emotional and intuitive experiences’ (Putnam&Mumby 1993, p.43). In

masculine assertive organisational cultures it is tacitly understood that intuition(s) will be met with

suspicion because it is constructed as esoteric, emotional and feminine and therefore inferior. As a

consequence, intuition(s) are ‘othered’ and silenced, or masked in terms more congruent with the

valuesofidealisedmasculinity–suchthosefoundinthisstudy–‘judgement’and‘experience’.

79Iwouldarguethatwomen,throughupbringing,educationandtraining,arealsoconditionedtoliveina‘man’s’world. Many women, in my experience, are aware of male domination but not aware of its pervasiveness in

everydaylife(hegemonicmasculinity).

80Notionsofwhatismasculinevaryacrosstime,spaceand,betweenindividualsandgroups(Sinclair1998;2000)–hereIrefertodominantmasculinitiesofagivensocietyataparticulartime.

81 Iwill laterconclude,onthebasisof thedataand literaturereviewed, that intuition isnotemotion.However,theyarebothfeelings,and,moreover,bothseenas‘feminine’andtherefore‘othered’.Thus,IarguethatFeminist

Theoryconcerningthedeferralofemotionisasrelevantforintuitionasitisforemotion.


Studies underpinned by Critical Theory typically set outwith the intention to explain phenomena by

exposing asymmetrical power relations with the aim of emancipation (Crotty 1998). Indeed, Ely and

Padavic (2007)argued that it isusuallywomenand feminists thathave identifiedandrocentricbiases

withtheintentionoftheliberatingwomen(Calas&Smircich1996).Iamnotawoman,norwouldIhave

describedmyselfasa feministat the inceptionof this research.TheuseofPost‐structuralist Feminist

CriticalTheorywasdrivenby theconviction that itprovidedapowerful theoretical toolandthemost

appropriate conceptual framework to make sense of the grounded theory developed in this study.

Emancipatory implications for theory, policy and practice discussed at the end of this chapter are a

corollaryoftheconclusionsgenerated.

6.2Conclusionsaboutmainquestion1:Howdotheparticipants(organisationalleaders)interpret,useandvalueintuitionintheirdecisionmakingandleadership?

Participants described intuition as an internal, received, holistic, subconscious sense or feeling of

knowinginformedbyexperience.Thus,participants’descriptionsrevealedastrongcorrespondenceto

intuitionas‘gutfeeling’asdescribedbyliteraturereviewedinChapter2(Agor1984;Agor1986;Parikh

et al. 1994; Dane & Pratt 2007; Sadler‐Smith & Sparrow 2007), otherwise known as expert intuition

(Crossanetal.1999)andfast‐trackintuition(Bastick1982;Cappon1994a).Thefindingsalsoconfirmthe

importance of intuition to decision‐making in organisational contexts that has been found in other

studies (Agor 1984; Agor 1989c; Parikh et al. 1994; Robson&Miller 2006).While these findings are

consistentwiththeliterature,Iarguethatafocusonintuitionasdistinctfromanalysisencouragesthe

interpretationthatintuitioncan,infact,bemeaningfullyseparatedout.Iarguethatwhilethefindings

are useful, they need to be understood in relation to, and in view of, the deferring nature of

allinquiry.

For example, from theoutset, I have characterised intuition asdistinct fromanalysis. The titleof the

research,theinvitationtoparticipantsandthequestionsaskedofthemassumedabinaryoppositionof

intuition/analysis, which paid particular attention to intuition. It is therefore not surprising that this

analyticaldistinctionwasreflectedasanempiricaldistinctioninthefindings.Participantswereableto

describeanddefineintuitionassomethingdifferenttoanalysis.However,astheinterviewsproceeded,

itbecameincreasinglyclearthatintuitionwasalwaysenmeshed,insomeway,withanalysis.

Intuition was used hand‐in‐hand with analysis by acknowledging it as a signal for caution, which

instigated further research. Participants ‘had’ intuitions, however, they attributed them to past

experience,analysisandreflection.Theyalsoappliedresearchandanalysistotheirintuitions,aswellas

intuitiontotheiranalyses. Indeed, itwasthroughanalysisandreflectionontheiruseof intuitionthat


participantscametotrustit.Moreover,someparticipantsperceivedtheboundariesbetweenintuition

andanalysistobe‘blurred’intheexperienceofdecision‐making.Thus,Iarguethatwhileintuitionand

analysis can be spoken of independently, there also needs to be a recognition that this distinction is

ultimatelyanartificialonecreatedintheactofaskingquestionsabout‘intuition’or‘analysis’(creating

meaning).

Idoagreethatoscillation,andalternationbetweenintuitionandanalysis,thatisafeatureofHammond

(1996),Epstein(2000;2008)andPepper(1942),particularlyinrelationtothetaskathand,doesoccur.

Indeed,thisisillustratedinFig.5.1thatdepictstheconditionalandcomplementaryuseofintuitionby

participants in relation to the nature and context of the decision or problem. Furthermore, I believe

Hammondwascorrectwhenhearguedthatlackofattentiontooneaspectofcognitionovertheother

fails ‘to capture the richdiversityof thought’ (Hammond1996,p.83).However, I conclude thatboth

cognition and decision‐making are holarchic processes, which are essentially characterised by

complementarity82 rather than merely complementary processes as concluded by, for example,

Hammond(1996)andSinclairetal.(2010).

Participantsalsoperceivedthat individualscouldbedescribedasdifferentcognitive ‘types’– intuitive

holistic types and, in opposition, analytical black‐and‐white types. This finding is consistent with

psychologicaltheoriesofpersonalitythatunderpinthecognitivestyleinstrumentsdiscussedinChapter

2 (Section 2.7). However, I argued in Chapter 2 that cognitive style instruments make no

accommodation for context, task mode or complexity and ambiguity within the cognition of the

individualoralternationwithincognition.Again,applyingDerrida’s(1982)notionofdifférance,theact

ofselectingananswer,asaparticipantinsuchatest,deferstheroleofthe‘other’modeofcognition.In

thissense,Iarguethatcognitivestyleinstrumentsalsounderplaythesynergisticandholarchicnatureof

cognitionasawhole.

ConsistentwiththestratifiedontologicalpositionconsistentlytakeninthisthesisIarguethatcognition

isparadoxical.Cognitionisexperiencedasafragmentedyetsimultaneouslywholeexperience(Epstein

1990; Epstein 1998; Epstein 2008). I argue that this experience is representative of actual structure.

Intuitionandanalysisareindependent,oppositionalandantagonistic–thereisatensionbetweenthem.

Bywayofananalogy,batterieshavetwopoles;however,thesepolesaremeaninglessontheirown.Itis

thetensionbetweenthem,apropertyofneither, rathera transcendentpropertyof their relationship

82 In the same way, I would argue that the human condition can be accurately described by such paradoxicalstatements as:what eachofushas in common is thatweare all unique, and,wearehereon this earth alone

together.


thatissignificant.Itisthisantagonistic/complementaryrelationship,inmyview,thatisthepowerhouse

for the whole of wisdom, insight, creativity and the potential of human consciousness in its myriad

forms.ThisisacontentionIsharewithPepper(1942).

6.2.1 Insight,Psiandspiritualintuition

Consistent with findings from previous field research, participants agreed that they did experience

insights (Agor 1984; Agor 1986; Khatri & Ng 2000), otherwise known as ‘slow track’ (Bastick 1982;

Cappon1993)or ‘entrepreneurial intuition’ (Crossanetal.1999),whichtheyfound importanttotheir

decision‐makingandleadership.Participants,however,didnotconsidertheseexperiencesasintuitions.

It was noted that participants did acknowledge their capacity for background processing that led to

insights (labelled ‘abdominal computing’ by oneparticipant), however, theyhadno theory to explain

this.Participantsappearedtoaccepttheseinsightsaspartofthemysteryofbeinghuman.Isuggestthis

is perhaps because of the lack of information and discourse surrounding intuition and intuitive

processes in managerial education, and in education in general. This conclusion is supported by

the finding that nearly all participants related their understanding of intuition to their own

personalexperience.

BothintuitionasESPorPsi,aswellaswhatIhavediscussedasinChapter5as‘spiritualintuition’,were

considered relevant for half of the participants.However, in commonwith insight, these participants

onlyagreedthattheydidhave,orcouldrelatetosuchexperiencesaftertheconstructwasofferedto

them83. Clearly, given that these alternative constructions of intuition were relevant for participants

(Section5.5), theroleof insight,Psiandspiritual intuition inorganisational leadershipprovides fertile

ground for future investigation. I therefore argue the inclusion of these constructs in organisational

studies,andthedisseminationoftheknowledgegained,isneeded.

6.3 Conclusionsaboutmainquestion2:WhatarethesocialprocessesofintuitiondisclosurebyAustralianleadersinorganisations?

6.3.1 Intrapersonalinteriority

Thecategoryofinterioritywasdiscoveredandselectedasthecorecategoryoftheemergentgrounded

theoryinrelationtointuitiondisclosurethatwasdescribedandexplainedinPart2.Attheintrapersonal

83Nofurtherinquirywasmadeaboutinsight,ESPorPsiandspiritualintuitionbecausetheparticipantsthemselvesdid not consider these as ‘intuition’. Thiswasbecause the researchwasdesigned to focuson thedisclosureof

participants’constructionsofintuition,which,bytheirowndefinition,wasgutfeeling.


levelofdescription,interioritywasinterpretedasaninwardorientationtotheinnerrealmoffeelings,

includingemotionandintuitions.Thisinwardorientationresultedintheacknowledgement,articulation

andexpressionoffeelingsandintuitions.Interiority,itwasfound,wasconditionedbygender,context,

utility and attitude. The differing ability of individuals for awareness and expression of feelings is a

phenomenon that has been found in a number of studies in different disciplines. Craig (2004) for

example, in a neuropsychological study, found that some people aremore aware of, or have better

accesstotheirfeelings.AccordingtoCraig,introception,ora‘subjectiveawarenessofinnerfeelings’(p.

239) was localised to the rAI (right anterior insular) part of the brain, which activates during

‘feeling’experiences.

Craig (2004)demonstrated that subjectswithdamage to the rAI experienceda lossof this subjective

awareness.Moreover,hefoundthatsubjective‘introceptive’awarenessiscorrelatedwith‘bothactivity

andphysicalsizeofrAI’.Thus,accordingtoCraig,peoplewithalargerandmoreactiverAIhavegreater

‘emotionaldepthandcomplexity’ (p.241).ThescopeofCraig’sresearchhowever,didnotencompass

potential gender differences in the size and activity of the rAI nor the possibility of plasticity. Craig’s

research clearly demonstrated that differences exist and that these differences are

mirroredphysiologically.

AccordingtoSchulz (2005), thebrainsofmenandwomenare ‘hardwired’ in fundamentallydifferent

ways. Men’s brains are more compartmentalised, as opposed to women’s brains, which are more

connectedbetweencellsandbetweenhemispheres.Asaconsequenceofthis,womenspeakusingboth

left and right hemispheres, which connects words and feelings. Conversely, for men, talking about

feelingsislike‘eatinggroundglass’becausemenare‘biologicallyprimedtotalkmoreaboutthingsthan

feelings’(p.27).Consistentwithmyfindings,Schulzarguedthatwomenaremoreable,andtherefore

more likely, to be aware of and talk about their feelings, hunches and intuitions. Moreover, this

man/woman,external/internal84,thing/feelingdichotomyofexpressionhasbeenfoundinotherstudies

inotherdisciplines(see,forexample,Hill&Stull1987).

Schulz’s (2005) thesis initially appears to be biologically essentialist because she accounts for this

difference in expression through biological priming, which would preclude individual variation and

variationwithineachgender.However,shearguedthatthesegenderdifferencesarenotclear‐cutand

applyonlytowhatshedescribesas‘traditional’maleandfemalebrains.Asaconsequenceofavariety

ofnon‐traditional,culturally‐driven‘opportunitiesandpressures’,individualbrain‘gender’varieswidely

84HillandStull (1987) foundthatmentendtodisclosemoreabouttopicsexternal tothemselvessuchassport,

carsandpoliticswhereaswomendisclosemoreaboutfeelings,weaknessesandtheirrelationships.


andthat‘masculinisationandfeminisationofbrainregionsmayvary...withinonebrain’(p.23).Thus,

an individualmay ‘throw likeaboy’but ‘talk like a girl’ (p. 23). Schulzdistinguishedgender from the

characteristics associated with it, through brain plasticity in response to changing demands and

consequentactivity.Iarguethatthisproposalisconsistentwithmyfindingsbecauseshenotesgeneral

differencesbetweenmenandwomen(genderconditioning),aswellasindividualvariationsasaresult

ofnon‐traditionalcontextsandtheutilityofadaptingtothesecontexts.

InapsychologicalstudyinvestigatingemotionalawarenessandexpressionBooth‐ButterfieldandBooth‐

Butterfield(1990)developedtheconstructofAffectiveOrientation(AO)whichInowargueissimilarto

the category of intrapersonal interiority that has been developed in this study. According to Booth‐

Butterfield et al., AO has two dimensions. The first dimension entails an awareness of affective

information,whilethesecondconcernsthe inclinationtoconsideraffectivecuesasa legitimateguide

foractions.InthesewaysAOcanbeconsideredsimilartoJung’s(1977)conceptofintroversionwhich,

asdescribedinSection2.6,isaninward,ratherthananoutwarddirectionofinterest.

AO can be considered consistent with the concept of intrapersonal interiority because affectively

orientedindividualsaremoreinwardlydirectedtotheirfeelingsand,asaconsequence,aremoreable

todistinguishbetweenand labelthem. Inconcertwiththeconceptof low interiority,peoplewhoare

notaffectivelyorientedeitherdonotattendtoorarenotawareoffeelingsbecausetheyarefocusedon

ororiented tophenomena thatareexternal to them. Indeed,Bastick (2003)alsonoted research that

suggesteda focuson theexternalphenomenareduces thesensitivityof individuals to internal feeling

cues. Furthermore, confirming the conditioning relationship foundbetweenattitudeand interiority in

my findings, Booth‐Butterfield et al. (1990) found that individuals who are not affectively oriented

considerfeelingcuestobeeithersuperfluousorsomethingtoavoid.

Booth‐Butterfield et al. (1990) also distinguished gender from characteristics associated with gender

through the inclusion of the constructs ofmasculinity and femininity asmeasured by Bem’s sex role

inventory(BSRI).UnderpinningtheBSRIistheassumptionthateveryonehas‘thepotentialtoembody

bothmasculineandfemininecharacteristics’(Pringle2008,p.112).WhileBooth‐Butterfieldetal.found

thatwomenweremore affectively oriented thanmen in generalAOwasmore specifically related to

femininityratherthanmasculinity.Theyfoundthatindividualswhoreportedtraitsconsistentwiththe

constructoffemininityweremorelikelytobeguidedbytheirfeelingsandhavemorecomplexformsof

expressing them (high interiority). This finding was subsequently confirmed by Conway (2000). In

commonwiththeconceptofintrapersonalinteriority,AOrecognisesaninwardorientationtofeelings,

legitimacygiventothosefeelings(attitude),andacapacitytolabelandexpressfeelings.Moreover,AO

wasfoundnottobespecifictowomen,butmorecommoninwomen.


6.3.2 Awarenessoffeelings

In psychology, much of the research into awareness and expression of feelings stems from studies

leading toward thedevelopmentof Emotional Intelligence (EI) as a construct. The Level of Emotional

AwarenessScale(LEAS)wasdesignedtomeasuretheabilityofpeopletobeawareofemotionsinself

andothersand theability toexpress thisawareness (Lane,Quinlan, Schwartz,Walker&Zeitlin1990;

Barret,Lane&Schwartz2000;Croyle&Waltz2002;Ciarrochi,Caputi&Mayer2003;Ciarrochi,Hynes&

Crittenden2005).Consistentwiththisstudy,womenwerefoundtoachievehigherLEASscores(Laneet

al.1990;Barretetal.2000;Ciarrochietal.2003)anddisplayedmore‘complexityanddifferentiationin

theirarticulationsofemotionalexperiencesthandidmen’(Barretetal.2000,p.1027).

Emotional awareness and expression (EI) is considered relevant to intuition disclosure because if

individualshaveagreaterawarenessofwhattheyfeelthentheywouldalsohavebetteraccesstotheir

intuition(s)(Goleman1995;Goleman,BoyatzisandMcKee2002)85.Bastick(1982;2003)placedagood

dealofemphasisonintrospection,self‐awarenessandsensitivitytofeelingsforfacilitatingintuition(s).

Heacknowledgedthat ‘wedounderstandintuitivelythroughourfeelings’(p.260).Bastick(1982)also

acknowledgedthatwomenhaveanadvantage,intermsofbetteraccessandapplication,particularlyfor

interpersonalintuition(s).

However,onlyonestudywasfoundexplicitlyconfirmingthelinkbetweenemotionalawareness,gender

and intuition (whichwaspublishedas this final chapterwasbeingwritten). Sinclair et al. (2010), in a

web‐based,decision‐simulationstudyofbusiness students, replicatedBooth‐Butterfieldetal.’s (1990)

finding that thewomen in the studyhadgreaterAO thanmen.Sinclairetal. also reportedapositive

relationship between AO and self‐description as intuitive and actual intuitive decision‐making.

Moreover, Sinclair et al. concluded that women in the study were guided more by

their intuition because ‘they can access it more easily through their heightened awareness of

emotions’(p.393).

However, Sinclair et al. (2010) appears to equate or at least associate intuitionwith emotions rather

thanfeelingsmoregenerally. Iwouldrejectthisbecauseaffectiveinformation,asdescribedbyBooth‐

Butterfield, ismoreakintomydefinitionoffeelingsasanoverarchingtermassociatedwithSystem2.

Thus, I argue that Sinclair et al. found thatwomenweremore ‘in touch’with their feelingsand, asa

85Althoughemotionsand intuitionscanbedistinguished, intuitionshaveanaffectivecomponentandhaveboth

beendefinedasfeelingsinthisthesis(seeSection1.5Definitionofterms).


consequence,their intuitions.Therefore,onthebasisofthediscussion inthissection, Iarguethere is

significantempiricalsupportfortheconceptofintrapersonalinterioritydevelopedinthisstudy.

6.3.3 Interpersonalinteriority

Thefindingsinthisstudysuggestthatinterpersonalinteriority,thatistosaytheorientationtoandthus

the extent of disclosure of feelings and intuitions in an interpersonal interaction, is conditioned by

perception of the other, familiarity with the other, whether the conversation is about business or

personalmatters and, if it is business related, inwhat type of industry. I argue that extant research

confirmsthesediscoveredconnections.

Forexample,inrelationtoperceptionoftheother,severalstudiesfoundthattheemotionaldisclosures

of bothmen andwomen varied according to the gender of the disclosure recipient – bothmen and

womenweremore likely todisclosetheiremotionstowomen(Snell,Miller&Belk1988;Blier&Blier

1989; Snell,Miller, Belk, Garcia‐Falconi & Hernandez‐Sanche 1989; Bleier 1991; Dindia& Allen 1992;

Brody 1997). I argue that ifwomen generally have higher intrapersonal interiority, and interpersonal

interiority is conditioned by perceptions of intrapersonal interiority in the other, then higher

emotional disclosure (intrapersonal interiority) would be a logical consequence where women are a

partytoaninteraction.

Conversely, people who are not affectively oriented (mostly men) are more focused on logic and

‘objective’facts(Booth‐Butterfield&Booth‐Butterfield1990),andmenaremorelikelytocommunicate

about thingsexternal to themselves (low interiority) (Hill&Stull1987;Schulz2005).Thus, the finding

that interactions between men are generally not characterised by emotional self‐disclosure (low

interpersonalinteriority)isnotsurprising(Lewis1978).

Therelationshipof interpersonalfamiliarityto interpersonal interiority(emotionaldisclosure)foundin

this study is also supported by research (Jourard& Landsman 1960; Dindia& Allen 1992) aswell as

being somewhat self‐evident. Reciprocity, particularly reciprocity of self‐disclosure, is a fundamental

characteristicofinterpersonalrelationshipsbecauseitbuildsmutualtrustandintimacy.Themoreone

disclosesinarelationshipthehighertheexpectationthattheotherwilldothesame,particularlywhere

thedisclosure is intimate.Failure to reciprocate self‐disclosure is typicallya threat to the relationship

(Lynn1977;Beebeetal.2005).

Thebusiness‐public/personal‐privatedualityfoundinrelationtointerpersonaldisclosureandexpression

(Section5.14.3) isalsosupported.Consistentwithnumeroustheorists,thedomestic,privatesphere is

perceived as amore appropriate context for disclosure (see, for example, Parkin 1993). As Fineman

(1993) pointed out, our emotional life and emotionality is not removed in organisations, rather, it is


rationalisedorisplayedoutcovertly.IwillfurtherdevelopthisdiscussioninSection6.3.5inrelationto

organisationalinteriority.

Asseenabove, theconstructsofboth intrapersonaland interpersonal interiorityhaveraised issuesof

connectionstothemacrological–systemcontext.Psychologicalstudiesarefocusedontheintrapersonal

levelofanalysis.However,asLayder(2005)suggested,anexclusivefocusononeleveloveranotherin

social analysis can result in phenomena being inappropriately attributed, conflated and appearing

absolute and independent of macrological context, or rendered invisible or silent (Layder 1997;

Hartman2005).

Alternatively, deductive, positivistic studies, may ‘tack on’ a causal macrological or structural

explanation that, while plausible, remains speculative and dependent on further research for

confirmation (Dey 1999). However, later sociological studies may have different motivations,

philosophical assumptions, methodological approaches and methods. Therefore reconciling how the

psychologicalintersectswiththesociologicalisdifficult.

For example, extant researches from both sociological and psychological studies grappled with the

discoveredlinksbetweenSystemandLifeworldinrelationtointeriority.Booth‐Butterfieldetal.(1990)

for example, in their positivist psychological study, speculated that AO can be attributed to the

expectationinsocietyforwomento‘focusontheiremotionsandactuponthem’(p.456).Brody(1997),

in a sociological study, speculated that gender difference in emotional expressivity is dependent on

situation and culture. Barret et al. (2000) concluded that gender differences found in emotional

awarenessandexpressionarestableandhighlygeneralisable.Theyspeculatedthatthese ‘differences

mightbeinherited,duetodifferingsocialisationprocessesforboysandgirlsorsomecombinationofthe

two’(p.1032).Barretetal.consequentlyadvocatedfurtherresearchintoculturalcontextinrelationto

thesedifferences.Iarguethatasignificantcontributionofthemulti‐levelapproachtoresearchadopted

in this study is that explanations for macrological social processes were not speculative; they were

groundedinthedata.

I found that intrapersonal interiority was not conditioned by the gender of the participant, but by

gendersocialisation,contextandutility.Inagreementwiththiscontention,Ciarrohietal.(2005)found

that men’s scores on the LEAS could be improved to match those of women’s through providing

motivation(utility).Ciarrohietal.hypothesisedthatthesuperiorityoffemalesinLEASscorescouldbe

attributedtoyearsofpracticethroughtheconditioningofgenderrolesrequiringempathy,nurturance

andemotionalexpression.Theirhypothesisissupportedbyothertheorists(Maio&Esses2001;Simon

&Nath2004)andbystudiesthathaveshownthattheemotionalexpressionofmenengagedinprimary

childcareresembleswhatisstereotypicallyassociatedwithwomen(Hanson1988;Radin1994).


Manystudiesthatattributedifferencesinemotionalawarenessandexpressiontogendersocialisation

however,dosoinawaythatisunproblematic–gendersocialisationisdescribeduncritically.Onemust

assume that the authors are either oblivious to gender relations literature or that they support a

functionalistpositionofgenderrelationsasassertedbyParsons(1955;1964).Parsonsarguedthatthe

divisionoflabourinmodernsocietiesrequiredmentotakeaninstrumentalroleoutsidethehomeand

womenanexpressiverolecaringforothers,whichheconsideredasfunctionalforthemaintenanceand

well‐being of the family. However, Feminist Critical Theory disputes whether this arrangement is

functional for women and indeed for society as a whole (Sinclair 1998). Typical male socialisation

encouragesalackofsensitivitytofeelingsthatisa‘healthhazard’,andan‘emotionalnumbness’thatis

deleterious to social and family relationships (Sinclair 1998, p. 59).Moreover Feminist Critical Theory

describes how the construction of gender at the individual level (Lifeworld) is interwoven with

macrologicalSystemfeatures.Thus,FeministCriticalTheorycomplementsDomainTheoryinunravelling

the linkages discovered in the grounded theory developed in this thesis. These linkages will now be

examinedfurther.

6.3.4 CognitivebiasinEIresearch–System/Lifeworldconnections

Dominant masculine thought forms have consequences for research (Hekman 1990; Oakley 2000).

Hencetheorisinginmale‐dominatedpositivistresearch,whichassumesneutrality,canbecritiqued(Ely

&Padavic2007). Inowarguethatthedevelopmentoftheconstruct‘Emotional Intelligence’hasbeen

constrainedbyamasculinecognitivebias.MycritiquewillmakeimportantdistinctionsbetweenEIand

intrapersonal interiority which, will clarify the concept of interiority and explicate how masculine

cognitivebiasmayoperateinresearch.

I have interpreted interiority as an inward orientation that gives primacy and legitimacy to feelings.

Interiorityhasconsequencesfordecision‐makingandbehaviourthroughthe‘surfacing’offeelingsand

intuitions into conscious awareness, which renders these feeling/knowings available for expression,

articulation, discussion, exploration and scrutiny. EI, on the other hand, places primacy on reasoning

aboutemotion (Mayer et al. 2007;Mayer et al. 2008). This separation of the feeling from the feeler

exemplifieswhatOakley(2000)describesasthecorollaryofpositivism,wheresubjectivityisobjectified

andexploited.Whereastheprimaryfocusofinteriorityisinwardorientationandreceptivity,‘Ithinkin

theearlystagesit’saboutjustbeing’(Participant1F),theprimaryfocusofEIistheuseofemotionfor

problem‐solvingandmanagingemotions toattainspecificgoals (Mayeretal.2007).Hence,while the

constructofEIacknowledgestheinterior,Iarguethatitsorientationremainsexterior.

In thisway the significance of the interior (feminine) is subsumed by the primacy given to reasoning

(masculine).Thus,theinteriorisrenderedinferiororgivenanancillaryroleinmuchthesamewaythat


intuition is occluded in traditional decision‐making models. From a critical feminist perspective, the

primary focus on reasoning in EI is a consequence of the unspoken cognitive bias of the researchers

undermasculineinstitutionalvalues.Fineman(2000)pointedoutthatEIispresentedand‘packaged’in

awaythatcanbe‘sold’,especiallytothecorporateworld(p.102),86sothatemotionscanbemanaged.I

would argue that the motivation for ‘product’, an instrument that can be employed and applied, is

consistent with an external orientation. However, Rafaeli and Worline (2001) pointed out the

contradictionofthisapproach,‘...managingemotionisanoxymoron.Themoreitismanaged,thelessit

feels truly emotional’ (p. 116). Thus, I argue that the construct of EI has succumbed to the latent

masculinecognitivebiasinWesternsocietytowardsreason,objectivity,theactiveandtheexterior.

The consequence of the development of EI as an individual intelligence that is defined as reasoning

aboutemotions is threefold in relation to the findings regarding intra and interpersonal interiority as

discussed.Thefirst isthatbecauseEI isdefinedasreasoningaboutemotions itprecludesactionsthat

stem directly from feelings such as compassion and empathy. The Macquarie Concise Dictionary

(Delbridge&Bernard1998)definedempathyas‘enteringintothefeelingorspiritofapersonorthing’

(p. 363). One could argue that action based on empathy is not an analytical process; one does not

reasonaboutthestrengthsandweaknessesofassistingsomeoneindireneed;onesimplyacts.Indeed,

reasoningmayinhibitactionbasedonempathyiftheprinciplerationaleisself‐interest.

Thus, elevating rationality is precarious and contentious because rationality is not an ‘objective

immutable state. It is socially constructed’ (Putnam &Mumby 1993, p. 55). Rationality is rather an

organising principle that expresses tacit assumptions about what is perceived to be important by a

particular individual or group at a particular time and place. Consistent with the business/private

dualism found in this study, feelings of empathy and compassion are rationalised away in

organisations through slogans such as ‘it's not personal, it's business. Don't be emotional’ (Rafaeli &

Worline2001,p.101).

Second,Iarguethattranspersonalintuitionsmustbeexcluded.AsdiscussedinChapter2,transpersonal

intuitions are not emotions, nor are they able to be reasoned about because they cannot be

symbolicallyrepresented.Intrapersonalinteriority,incontrast,placesprimacyonsubjectivityandwould

therefore include transpersonal intuitions.Oshocommentsonconsequenceofexternalorientation in

traditionalscience in relationtoselfdiscovery that, inviewof thecontextofhisphilosophy,couldbe

equatedwithself‐transcendence:

86 In a similar way, emotion, in the concept of emotional labour, is appropriated, managed, and used for

instrumentalends(Mumby&Putnam1992).


...thescientist,deepdown,doesnotbelievethatthereisanythinginner.Hemaysayso,hemaynotsay

so,buthiswholetraining,hiswholeeducation,makeshimtrustonlyobjectswhichhecandissect,which

he can observe, which he can analyse, which he can compose, create, uncreate, find out their basic

constituents.Hiswholemindisobject‐oriented,andsubjectivityisnotanobject.Soifhewantssubjectivity

tobeputbeforehimonthetable,thatisnotpossible;thatisnotthenatureofsubjectivity.Sothescientist

goesonfindingeverythingintheworldexcepthimself.(Osho2010)

AsOsho (2010) andWilber (1995)haveargued, thedenial of the inner87 is not consistentwith ‘new’

scientific knowledge that posits duality as a fundamental anduniversal principle (Bastick 1982; Capra

1984; Mainzer 1996). If there is an outer, there must be an inner. Science predicated on the

assumptions of Scientific Realism is precluded from ultimate knowledge because, according tomany

theorists, this knowledge is found within (Bergson 1961; Bhattacharyya 1976; Krishnamurti 1995;

Wilber1995).

Third, I argue that EI is constructed as an individual ability unrelated to other levels of social

organisation88. However, a core proposition of the emergent grounded theory is that the concept of

interiority can be applied to individual and collective levels. Moreover theory that includes how

System and Lifeworld elements intersect is essential because, according to Layder (2005), they are

mutuallyconstitutive.

6.3.5 Macrological/System/Organisationalcultures

Throughpurposivesamplingtechniques,Iadvocatethatthisstudyhasamplifiedthevoicesofwomenas

aconsequenceoftheirdisproportionaterepresentationinthesampleinrelationtotheirrepresentation

in senior leadership positions. Many described a dualism in relation to their personal experience of

organisational cultures in Australia. Two distinct types of organisational cultures were discerned –

assertivecultures,predominantlyunder the leadershipofmen,and integrativecultures,mostlyunder

theleadershipofwomen.

87 Traditional psychology acknowledges the psyche but not the spiritual. Psychiatry and western medicine, ingeneral, views the physical as primary in diagnosis and cure (Bastick 1982). The inner – feelings, values and

beliefs – are considered secondary and are generally ignored. Wilber (1995) also argued that contemporarysystems theories ignore the evolution (complexification) of consciousness which he views as inseparable from

biologicalevolution.

88 Goleman (1995) discussed ‘emotionally intelligent’ organisations, however, he does so without reference to

research;hesimplyextendstheideaconceptually.


I argue that the findings discussed in Section 5.15.3 are consistent with literature that asserts

organisationalculturesaresystemsofmeaningthatareshapedbynumerousinfluences.Theseinclude

social institutions and educational systems (Hofstede 1991), aswell as individuals in, and particularly

leaders of organisations (Lord & Maher 1993; Schein 2010). The conditioning effect of gender on

leadership style and consequences for organisational culture is also acknowledged; particularly in

genderstudies literature (see, forexample,Eagly& Johnson1990;Sinclair1998;Eagly& Johannesen‐

Schmidt2001).

I have interpreted that assertive cultures often are characterised by the need to appear scientific,

rational and objective, hierarchical power structures with tough, competitive interpersonal relations

where mistakes are punished (Section 5.15.2). These properties are consistent with traits that are

considered masculine, i.e. autonomy, competitiveness, objectivity, forcefulness, aggressiveness and

ambitiousness(Sargent1983;Connell1987;Connell2005;Ely&Padavic2007),andagentic leadership

andbehaviouralstyles,which,accordingtoEaglyandJohannesen‐Schmidt(2001),areascribedtomen

ratherthanwomen.Iargue‘assertive’isanaptlabelbecauseindividualsseektoassertthemselvesand

promote their individual ego interests over the interests of others and those of the organisation. A

hierarchicalpowerstructurethereforerepresentsaformalvalidationofthiswayofbeinganddoing.

Iarguethattheextentoforientationtorationalanalysis,asopposedtothefeelingsofselfandother,

constitutes a fundamental dimension of organisational culture89 that conditions the expression of

feelingsand,specifictotheresearchproblem,intuition(s).Moreover,Iconcludethatassertivecultures

characterised by low interiority dominate commercial and public institutions in Australia. This is

supported by Sinclair (2000), Gherhardi (1995) and Ely and Padavic (2007), who argued that the

importationofmasculinederivationsofmeaningandbeingmeansthatorganisationsarebothgendered

andgendering.Ifurtherconcludethatthisdominanceoflowinteriorityisnotreadilyapparentbecause,

as an aspect of culture, it operates below the level of awareness (Lord&Maher 1993; Sinclair 1998;

Connell2005). It isonly thosewhohavebeen ‘othered’ thatareawareofadifférance.Thus, it isnot

surprising that it was almost exclusively the women in the study that pointed to the properties of

assertivecultures.

89Mydiscussionoforganisationalcultureispredicatedontheassumptionthatculturesarenothomogenousnordotheyhaveuniformlyacceptedvaluesthatcharacterisetheentireorganisation(Jermier,Slocum,Fry&Gaines

1991;Fineman2000).Clashingsubculturesexist(Fineman2000;Schein2010)aswellasarecognisableandstablesynthesis of the assumptions, beliefs, attitudes, values, rituals, behaviours, symbols, and mythology of an

organisationthatunderpinswhatpeopledo(Parry1996;Dubrin,Dalglish&Miller2006;Schein2010).


6.3.5.1Intuitiondisclosureinassertivecultures

In contradiction to traditional assumptions, men and organisations are far from unemotional (Hearn

1993; Fineman 1993). Feelings are pervasive and contextualise all social interactions (Forgas 1982).

Organisations can therefore be considered emotional arenas where, ‘the very essence of ... work

concernswhatpeopledowiththeirfeelings’(Fineman1993,p.9).Inmale‐dominatedorganisationsthe

constructionofnormsgoverningexpectations in relation to gender roles –whooccupiespositionsof

powerwithintheorganisation–andtowaysofknowingandthecontrolofemotionalexpression(Parkin

1993)occursinrelationtoidealisedmasculinity(Calas&Smircich1996).

In concertwith this feministanalysisof thedisclosureof feelings inorganisations, the findingsof this

research show that participants perceived that intuition was generally associated with emotion and

women.Moreover,rationalitywaselevatedwhileemotionality,andthereforewomen,is/areviewedas

negative90 (Putnam & Mumby 1993). Intuitions were, as a consequence, considered inferior,

unprofessionalandnon‐business‐like(Section5.8.1)andthereforeinappropriatetoinstrumentalareas

of life suchas inorganisations. Participantsperceivedaneed to justify andaccount for thedecisions

theymadeinascientific,evidence‐based,rationalandbusiness‐likefashionincommunicationstoother

membersaswellastostakeholdersandthemedia.Thus, inagreementwithfeministtheorists(Parkin

1993;Fineman2000;Rafaeli&Worline2001)normsinassertiveorganisationalcultureswerefoundto

constrainemotionaldisclosurethroughtacitly‐heldunderstandings.

As a consequence, intuition(s), it was shown, is suppressed or silenced in order to avoid ridicule.

Alternatively,participants invoked language tomask intuition inanalytical terms thatwereconsistent

withnormsofassertivecultures.Expressionssuchas ‘myexperience’andespecially ‘judgement’were

usedbecauseoftheirconsistencywiththepropertiesofassertivecultures(Section5.15.1).Participants

saidtheywouldusethesewordsintheknowledgethatintuitionwas,at least inpart,acomponentof

their experience and judgement. Masking the intuitive in such a way is attractive to organisational

actors because norms of expression and disclosure are reinforced through rewarding those that

conformandpunishingthosewhodonot(Connell1987;Putnam&Mumby1993).PutnamandMumby

(1993)pointedoutthatpeoplemanagesocialimpressionsinordertoavoidembarrassment.Itisforthis

reasonthatassertiveorganisationsarecharacterisedbylowinteriority.

90 However, certain forms of emotional expression consistent with masculinity, such as anger, are sanctioned

(Sargent1983;Hearn1992;Mumby&Putnam1992;Parkin1993).


Disclosureof intuition(s), inassertivecultures, is thereforerestrictedtothose intheorganisationwho

haveenoughpowerandstatustobeimmunefromridiculeandotherwisepunitivemeasures.Feltand

expressedfeelings(includingintuitions)arethereforenotnecessarilyconsistent(Fineman2000).This,in

turn, has implications for intrapersonal interiority because, if the suppression of authentic feelings is

sustained,peoplewilllosetouchwiththeirfeelingsorbecomealienatedfromthem(Putnam&Mumby

1993;Rafaeli&Worline2001). I argue that in thisway intrapersonal and collective interiority canbe

seenasinextricablyenmeshedandinterwoven.

Moreover, disengagement and alienation from emotions enables acts devoid of compassion and

empathy.Parkin(1993)arguedthatcorporateactorswoulddothingstheywouldnotconsideroutside

of their organisational frame of reference. Therefore the victimisation of others, environmental

degradation,and, forexample, thedubiouspractices that led toand followed theGFCcanbe seena

consequenceofthesamebusiness/private‐personaldualismthatconditionsthedisclosureof intuition

(Section 5.6.2.8) and interiority (Sections 5.14.3 and 5.16.1). Here we see a fitting application of

Goffman’s(1971)notionofcoreandsatelliteselves(discussedinSection3.4).

6.3.5.2Intuitiondisclosureinintegrativecultures

The findings revealed that organisations under the leadership of or dominated by women are, in

general,characterisedbyasupportive,inclusive,democraticculturesthataretolerantofmistakesand

characterisedbyopencommunication(Section5.15.2).Whilesomepost‐structuralfeministsarguethat

thereisnoessential‘femininity’(Calas&Smircich1996)thesepropertiesareconsistentwiththevalues

of‘sensitivity,emotionalexpressivenessandnurturancewhichrepresenttheauthenticfemininevalues

outsidepatriarchy’espousedbyradicalfeminists(Calas&Smircich1996,p.226).Inaddition,Eaglyand

Johannesen‐Schmidt(2001)alsoascribedcommunalcharacteristicstowomenratherthantomenand

listtheseas‘affectionate,kind,interpersonallysensitive,nurturantandgentle’(p.783).

Post‐structural Feminist Theory can account for the integrative organisational cultures found in this

study by way of the local power of leaders (potentially both men and women) to defer dominant

masculinevaluesanddiscourseandconstituteresistantfemininealternatives(Ely&Padavic2007).This

is supportedoutside feminist theorybyHofstede (1991)whopointedout that feminineculturesarise

wherewomenworktogetherandEaglyandJohnson(1990)whosuggestedthatwomendeveloptheir

ownleadershipstyleratherthanimitatingthoseoftheirmalecounterparts.

These perspectives are consistent withmy interpretation of the datawith respect to leadership and

gender mix and as conditions for organisational culture (Section 5.15.3). Many participants

(predominantlythewomeninthesample),saidtheyexpressedtheirintuitionsfreelyandaffirmedthe

intuitiveexpressionsofothers in theorganisations they lead.However, thisdidnotnecessarilymean


thatintuitions(noranalyses)wouldbeactedon–rationalitywasnotabandoned.Iinterpretedthatthe

intent of open language and communication, for participants, was to foster a democratic and

participativeculture(Section5.15.2).Moreover,suchaculture isconducivetotheexpressionof ideas

andemotions,and,specifictoansweringthemainresearchproblem,intuitions.

I argue that ‘integrative’ is a fitting descriptor because interiority, as a dimension of culture, can

contribute to a cultural cohesion and integration. Feelings are universal to the human condition

(Damasio 1994) and their acknowledgement and expression facilitates a sense of interrelatedness,

mutual understanding and community (Fineman 1993; Putnam&Mumby 1993). Thus, organisational

interioritycanbinddiverseanddisparateindividualsinanorganisation.Indeed,thefindingshaveshown

thatasenseofcommunity,gainedthroughemotionalexpression,canstronglymotivatepeopletoward

thegoalsofthecollectiveratherthanthoseoftheindividual(Section5.15.2).

The disclosure of feelings maximises the likelihood that the needs of organisational actors will be

mutually fulfilled (Brody 1997). If feelings are repressed, people may attempt to meet these needs

throughMachiavellian strategies that canundermine cohesivenessand,moreover, act as a contagion

and infect theentireorganisationalunit (Damasio1994;Golemanetal.2002). It is through interiority

thatorganisationsavoiddestabilising interpersonaldynamics(Golemanetal.2002).Thus, Iarguethat

intrapersonal,interpersonalandorganisationalinteriorityareinterrelatedandpivotalinunearthingand

preventingdeleteriousinterpersonaldynamicsandemotionalundercurrents.

Bakhtin’s (1981) core idea was that people only become aware of identity through engagement in

communication with the other (Jabri 2010). Higher levels of interiority therefore facilitate a more

authentic and complete self‐understanding and self‐actualisation. Emotionality helps people adapt to

different roles and the changes in work conditions that are inevitable (Brody 1997). The failure of

organisational research to include interioraspectsoforganisational life,outsidemaximisingemployee

utility,isthereforeasignificantomission(Parkin1993).

6.4 Alternativestofeministexplanationsofdominantrationality

Feminismisnottheonlybodyofknowledgetorecogniseandofferanexplanationfortheascendancyof

rationalways of knowing. In Jungian terms, thinking and being are represented by the archetypes of

Eros (feminine) and Logos (masculine). Jung argued that Western culture has been disastrously

suppressedbythepre‐eminenceofLogos(Rowland2002).Morerecently,McGilchrist (2009),takinga

neuropsychological approach, argued that there are two broadways of interpreting theworldwhich

correspondto leftbrainandrightbrain ‘thinking’ (inasimilarwaytoEpstein1998). Inanexplanation

comparabletoDerrida’sdifférance,McGilchristarguedthatourlivedrealityisgeneratedatthepointof


intersectionofthemindandwhatisoutsidethemind.Thus,heattributesourcurrentstateofaffairsin

theWest–decontextualised,fragmentedanddevoidoffeelingandmeaning,tothesupremacyofthe

lefthemisphere‘take’inthiscreationprocess.Hence,McGilchristarguedthatwehaveproducedaleft‐

brainculture.

Drawing on Gebser (1984) and Habermas (1979), Wilber (1995) charted the evolution of cultural

consciousness or our ‘social worldview’ (p. 119) in the West from archaic to magical (animistic) to

mythic(traditionandreligion)torational(scientifictruth)topluralistic(post‐modern,multiplerealities)

to integral (where the truth in former world views is acknowledged). Wilber’s contention was that

mainstreamculturehasbeenintransitionawayfromthescientific,rationalvaluesofthemodernistera

(which have dominated for centuries) to the post‐modern91 and, in some individuals and groups, to

integral values. Moreover, Wilber argued that evolution of individual and collective consciousness

involves recognition of, and connection (throughmeditation) to, the ‘within’ of things. This thesis is

strikinglysimilartothatofParikh,whoargued:

We have been evolving through geological, biological and ideological revolutions and it has been

suggested thatweare transiting towardswhat isdescribedasa ‘consciousness’ revolution.This implies

thatwearecollectivelymoving towardsagreaterawarenessabout,andaccess to,our innerdynamics,

our‘innerspace’,orconsciousness.Intuitionfromthisstandpointisviewedasahigherordeeperlevelof

consciousnessinwhichadifferentkindof‘knowing’takesplace.(Parikhetal.1994,p.3)

Thus,convergencecanbeseenbetweenJung(citedinRowland2002),McGilchrist(2009),Wilber(1995)

and Feminist Critical Theory in that they all acknowledge the current dominanceof rational formsof

knowing;theydifferonlybywayofexplanation.McGilchristattributedthedominanceofrationalityto

neuropsychology (the dominance of the left hemisphere), Jung to the dominance of the masculine

archetype,whileWilberattributedthedominanceofrationalitytoScientificRevolutionasanecessary

developmental phase in the ongoing evolution of consciousness. Thus, I do not regard these

explanationsmutuallyexclusive. Importantly,theyallcontributetoanawarenessofthepervasiveness

andimpactof‘rationality’forusandourworld.Iarguethisisparticularlyimportantinviewofthesaid

difficultyofbeingawareofconditioning,ofbeingawareofthe‘water’inwhichwe‘swim’92.

91Wilber (1995) argued thatpost‐modern valueshavepredominatedat the leading‐edgeatUniversities, liberal

politicsandsocialservicesforalmost30years.

92Ireferredearliertothedifficultyofmenandwomentoacknowledgetheirown‘masculine’conditioning(Stivers1996citedinSinclair2005,p.27).Inconcertwiththisnotion,McGilchrist(2009)arguedthatthe‘left‐brain’(which

dominatesourthinking)is‘unaware’oftheinfluenceandimportanceof‘right‐brain’influence.


TheadvantageofFeministCriticalTheory for thisstudy,however, is thathascontributedtorevealing

howthedominationofmaleleadershipinAustralianorganisationsconstituteswhatisconsideredtobe

natural and neutral organisational practice. The conclusions affirm the assertion of feminist theorists

thatgenderisacrucialyetneglectedareaoforganisationalanalysis(Gherardi1995;Collinson&Hearn

2003;Ely&Padavic2007).FeministCriticalTheoryalsoenabledmetoconnectmasculinecognitivebias

intheorising(asdiscussedinSection6.3.4)and‘genderblindness’inorganisationaltheory(Reed1996,

p.48). Iarguethis relationship is reifyingbecauseorganisational researchhasbeen largelyconducted

by, forandaboutmen(Calas&Smircich1996).Moreover,thisreifyingrelationshipcontributestothe

appearanceofgenderneutrality (Mumby&Putnam1992;Ely&Padavic2007),which legitimates the

continuedmaledominationofmostorganisations(Collinson&Hearn2003).

6.5 Conclusionsabouttheresearchproblem

The empirical research component of this thesis contributes to the growing body of literature

highlightingthesignificanceofnon‐rationalaspectsoforganisationallife.Intuitionwasinterpretedtobe

experiencedasan internal, received,holistic, subconscious senseor feelingof knowing. Intuitionasa

feeling/knowing flags the rightness or wrongness of a person, choice, strategy or proposal, the

timeliness of a decision and/or caution, and the need for action – particularly further investigation.

Thus,participants’descriptionsrevealedastrongcorrespondencetointuitionasanevent‘gutfeeling’.

The findings also confirm the importance of intuition to decision‐making in organisational contexts

which was used in complementary ways with analysis. Participants ‘had’ intuitions, however, they

attributedthemtopastexperience,analysisandreflection.Theyalsoappliedresearchandanalysisto

their intuitions, as well as intuition to their analyses. Moreover, for some participants intuition and

analysis were seen as ‘blurred’ in the experience of cognition itself. Thus, I concluded that while

intuitionandanalysiscanbespokenof,thereneedstoberecognitionthatthisdistinctionisultimately

artificial and a consequence of différance. I therefore concluded that both cognition and decision‐

makingareholarchicalprocessesthatarecharacterisedbycomplementarity.

Theprincipal contributionof this studywas todescribeandexplain thedisclosureof intuition(s) as a

complex,conditionalsocialprocessthatcanbebestunderstoodatdifferentlevelsofsocialdescription.

Whether or not intuition is acknowledged and/or expressedwas concluded to be conditional on the

interiorityofaperson,interpersonalencounter,organisationalcultureorsociety.Thecorecategoryof

interioritydevelopedinthestudyrepresentsanorientationtotheinnerrealmoffeelingandintuitions.

High intrapersonal interiority is characterised by both a greater sensitivity to intuition(s) and a

willingnesstosurface,givelegitimacytoandutiliseintuition(s).


The finding that somepeople aremore inwardlyoriented thanothers, particularlywomenand those

whose activity relies on the awareness of feelings and their expression, is supported by the

psychologicalconstructsofAOandEI.However,IarguethattheconstructofEIwasconstrainedbythe

predominant external orientation ofmale‐dominatedWestern research cultures that privilege reason

overemotionandotherfeelings, includingintuitions.EmotionsareacknowledgedinEI,however,they

are subsumed by the primacy given to reasoning. Moreover, EI instruments are often applied in

organisationsinordertoadvanceacommercialexterioragendawhereemotionsbecomea‘commodity’

tobemanagedandexploited(Fineman2000;PutnamandMumby1993).Orientationandsensitivityto

feelings,whichIhavelabelledintrapersonalinteriority,wasinterpretedtobeimportantforparticipants

(particularlythewomen)becausethisorientationallowedthemto‘surface’feelingsandbringtheminto

consciousawareness.Although intrapersonal interiority isnotnecessary tobeawareofandutilisean

intuition,interioritygivesbetteranddeeperaccesstothefeelingrealmandthereforeabettercapacity

todistinguishbetweenintuition,emotionandotherfeelings,tolabelthemandutilisethem.

Attheorganisational level, thefindingssuggestthatorganisations ledordominatedbymenareoften

characterised by low interiority. In assertive cultures the expression of intuitions and emotions is

suppressedandonlydisclosedbythosewhoareimmunetocensure.ThesefindingssitwellwithPost‐

structuralFeministCriticalTheoryutilisingDerrida’sconceptofdifférance.Thesefeministselucidatethe

processesbywhichrationalformsofbeingandknowingareprivilegedthroughthemaledominationof

economic and social institutions. Male‐dominated organisational cultures elevate that which is

consistent with the values of idealised masculinity, and deny or project that which is not onto the

feminineandwomenasinferior.Alternativemasculinities,women,intuitionandfeelingsaredevalued,

marginalisedand silenced throughnorms in relation towhat is expressed,bywhomandwhen.Post‐

structuralistFeministTheoryhas thusprovidedaconvincingexplanationas towhyparticipants in the

studyperceivedaneedtofindorfabricaterationalefor intuitionsorpresenttheminanalytical terms

moreconsistentwiththepropertiesofassertivecultures.

The explanations of social processes that I have argued to answer the research problem rest on the

interiority/exterioritydualismdevelopedinthisthesis.Ihavejustifiedthisintermsofthefindings,the

viewoftheUniverseasbinaryinnatureand,moreover,therecognitionofholarchy(wholenessthrough

stratification)andunity in theprocessofdivision (différance).However, Ialsowishtoemphasise that

individuals,interactionsandculturescannotbecharacterisedinsimpledichotomies.They,likeSchultz’s

non‐traditional brains, are better seen as a complex ‘soup’ of many, and sometimes contradictory,

dimensional properties. Nonetheless, I conclude that the interiority/exteriority dualism provides a

valuable tool to deconstruct social dynamics in away that can explain phenomena, such as intuition


disclosure,atdifferent levelsofdescription. Indeed, the interiority/exterioritydualismcanbeused to

understandandexplainsocialphenomenathatarenotencompassedby theresearchquestion.These

theoreticalimplicationswillnowbeexamined.

6.6 Implicationsforbroadertheorising

InChapter2, Ipresentedamodelofcognition(representedbyFigure2.3)wherebyseeminglydiverse

psychologicalconstructsof intuitioncanbeordered inrelationtooneanother. Inaddition Iproposed

that philosophical and psychological constructs of intuition could be reconciled through the unifying

meta‐reality of ground consciousness from which all else unfolds93. This is interpretation of the

literature isrepresentedby(Figure2.4). Iarguethatbothofthesemodelscontributetoadeeperand

moreintegrativeunderstandingofintuitioninviewofthecompetingandinterdisciplinaryconstructions

ofintuition.

One implicationof this philosophical stance, detailed inRobson (2010), is that a stratified yetunified

ontology provides a basis from which to transcend ‘paradigm wars’ and the long running

realism/idealism positivism/constructivism debate. Many researchers retreat within their traditions,

eschewingmixedmethodsonthebasisofphilosophicalincompatibility(Bazeley2008).Forthisreason,

contemporarymixedmethods research is now often done under the banner of pragmatism (Bazeley

2004) that is silentonontologyorpositsan indeterminate reality (Charmaz2009) inorder toget the

workdone.Bazeley(2008)arguedthatthisphilosophicaldilemmaremainsunresolved.However,ifitis

accepted that these apparently contradictory philosophical positionsmerely represent a deferral and

elevationofoneof twowaysofdescribingaspectsofaunifiedwhole, thenamore inclusiveand less

conflicted and divided approach to social research is possible – one that is capable of integrating

multiplemethodswithoutphilosophicalcontradiction.

The grounded theory developed in this thesis has generated a number of theoretical implications

specific to the immediate parent disciplines of management, leadership and organisational

93Anotherinterestingimplicationisthatifthis‘groundstate’issomekindofprimordial‘consciousness’,thenthe

whole Universe is alive. This renders questions like ‘How did life start?’ obsolete (through différance, humanselevatewhat appears to be animate in decidingwhat is alive andwhat is not). Thus, as a consequence of the

tendency of the Universe to complexify or evolve (Capra 1996; Wilber), ground consciousness has evolved todifferentdegreesthroughthevariousmanifestationsoflifeofwhichitisafundamentalholonicconstituent.Onecould even argue that this consciousness may come to know itself through the capacity in humans for

philosophical intuition. As said, this is where universal and personal consciousness realise each other in self‐transcendence, and co‐presence (Bhaskar 2002). The realisation that one is part of this process of cosmic

realisationgivesmeaningtolife.


development,whichhavebeendiscussed in theprevious sections.The importanceofgut feelings for

leaders in Australia on a day‐to‐day basis was highlighted, particularly in view of the increasing

complexity and uncertainty of contemporary business environments. Figure 5.1 showed how

participantsusedintuitionandanalysisincomplementaryways.Thisandtheaccompanyingexplanatory

groundedtheorycontributetoextantliteratureaboutintuitionuse.

In Chapter 5, a grounded theory was developed which, I argue, addressed the research problem in

relation to theuseanddisclosureof intuition(s). In this chapter, thegrounded theorywaspositioned

relative to the literature examined in Chapter 2, and other literature, particularly Feminist Critical

Theory, which was deemed valuable in making sense of the findings within a broader scope. The

emergenttheorycontributestothe fieldoforganisationalstudies throughanexploratory/explanatory

understandingofthesocialprocessesthatconstrainandenabletheuseanddisclosureofintuition(s)in

Australian organisations. I have addressed the research problem by showing that intuition is

unacknowledged,unexpressedormaskedwherethereispredominantexternalorientation,individually

andcollectively.Thesecontributionsareacorollaryofansweringthemainresearchquestioninrelation

to theuseanddisclosureof intuition(s) inorganisations.However, thegrounded theorydeveloped in

this thesis, particularly the core category of interiority, has a number of theoretical implications that

extendbeyondthescopeofthisthesis.

Theexterior/interiordualismcanbeappliedtoleadership.Theheroarchetypeasleadersimultaneously

creates followers,whounconsciouslysurrender theiragency in theexpectation that leaderswill solve

theirproblems(Sinclair1998).However,Iarguethatthearchetypeoftheheroicleaderasasaviour‘...

needstobeconfrontedasapowerfulunconscious force,asmuchaproductof followers’ fantasiesas

leaders’delusions’(Sinclair1998,p.31).Thisisbecauseatrocitiesarenotcommittedbymegalomaniac

leadersthemselvesbutcarriedoutbythosewhofollowthem.Starkey(1996)regardedthisdependency

on the leadership of others as infantile, and a refusal to take responsibility for one’s own living

conditionsandgeneralwell‐being.Iconcurandaddthatabdicationofthepoweraffordedtoindividual

citizens indemocratic (sic) states fertilises theeternal cycleof hopeanddisappointment through the

appointment of leaders who promise the Earth to attain power but predominantly deliver to

themselves,theirfamiliesandtheirallieswhokeepthemthere.Thus,Iarguethatthisorientationtothe

exteriorinrelationtoleadershipisafundamentalproblemforhumanity.


Many lament the state of contemporary affairs and blame ‘society’. However, society, viewed as a

holarchy (Wilber 1995), entails the recognition that each individual is, at the same time, society

(Krishnamurti 1991). This recognition is powerful because it raises awareness of the possibilities and

responsibilitiesofeachofus.Aninteriororientationtotheconceptofleadershipmightdrawattention

tohowpeoplecanget in touchwith theirown intuitions in thebroadest senseof theword– finding

guidance fromwithin rather than fromwithout.This idea is somewhatembodied inCooksey’s (2003)

concept of ‘learnership’. Cooksey’s concept extends beyond ownership of process and outcome to a

placewherelearnersevolvetobecomeleadersinandofthemselves(Cooksey2003).

Theinteriority/exterioritydualism‘discovered’asaresultofthisresearchhasimplicationsfortheories

critical of management and wider society. It can be situated alongside concepts such as hegemonic

masculinity(Connell2005),left‐brained/rightbrainedculture(McGilchrist2009),Sorokin’s(1992)notion

ofoscillatingculturalvalues,and,toalesserextent,Hofstede’s(1991)masculineandfemininecultures.

Theseperspectiveshavedifferentemphases,explanationsandimplicationsforthewaysofknowingand

beingthatshapesocieties.However,acommonfeatureistherecognitionthatsocietiesare‘unaware’

of the dominant assumptions that drive knowledge production. As a consequence, the knowledge

produced mirrors and thereby reinforces and reifies the assumptions that shaped it. The

interiority/exteriority dualism facilitates the exposure of the dominance of external orientation at

individualandcollectivelevels94.

Forexample,Ihaveshownthatawarenessofemotionshasbeen‘exteriorised’inthedevelopmentofEI

throughtheprimacygiventoreasoning. Inasimilarway,bookssuchasPinker’s (2005)AWholeNew

Mind:Why Right BrainersWill Rule the Future,promote the value of interior, ‘right‐brain’ processes

such as empathy, intuition, meaning‐making and creativity. However, the motivation for developing

thesecapacitiesappearstobeexterior–thepursuitofmaterialism,consumerismand,asreflected in

thetitleofthebook,future‘domination’.Theauthortalksaboutdeepermeaningstolife,howeveronly

in relation to its enhancement in relation to products and services. Thus, Iwould argue that Pinker’s

bookadvocatesleveraginginteriorqualitiesinthepursuitofexteriority.

Theconceptofhegemonicmasculinityshowsthatweareunawareofourbias.Theconceptofinteriority

acts as a tool to uncover how external orientation creates problems, and how we subsequently

constructanddevisesolutionstothem. Forexample, Iarguethatanumberofproblemsarecreated

through an external orientation in the way societies assess themselves in terms of Gross Domestic

94InasimilarwaytoFoucault(1980;1989),whocritiquedgrandnarrativeswithhisowngrandnarrative,Iamleft

‘hanging’here.Myownknowledgeproduction,ofcourse,reifiesmyconditioningandassumptions.


Product(GDP).GDPcanbedefinedasthetotalmarketvalueofallfinalgoodsandservicesproducedin

acountryinagivenyear.ItcouldbearguedthatunderpinningGDPisatacitassumptionthatmaterial

wealthwilltranslatetohappiness.However,researchhasshownthattherichreportbeingonlyslightly

happierthanothers(Csikszentmihalyi2005;Graham2010).AsCarnegie(1948)pointedout,‘Happiness

is fromwithin; it is not amatter of externals’ (p. 140). GDP thus reflects an external orientation to

successthatdisregardshowpeoplefeelabouttheir livesandthesocietythey live in.GDP ignoresthe

human cost of stress, depression,mental illness, and alienation from family relationships thatmight

arise as a consequence of the longer working hours in the pursuit of financial (external) success.

Ironically, increased hospitalisation from work‐related illnesses would increase GDP – there would

thereforebeanassumptionthepopulacewashappierbecauseofit.

Moreover, while it is rational to seek a certain amount of physical (external) security, unbridled

materialism is irrationalwhen this becomes a threat to the planet. This is self‐evident, however, the

assumption of GDP growth is seldom questioned (see Bastick 1982; Jackson 2009 as exceptions).

Unimpededgrowthhascomeatanenvironmentalandsocialcostthatisstillnotconsideredseriouslyby

governments.Thishasledtoaparadoxicalsituationwhereeffortsdesignedtoincreasephysicalsecurity

(increased food and goods production) have lead to a decrease in physical security (obesity and

environmentaldegradation)(Epstein1998;Egger&Swinburn2010).Evenasecologicaldisasterlooms,

theideologyofeconomicexpansionstilldominatesmainstreamdiscourseandpractice(Jackson2009).

Moreover, environmental and individual degradation can be constructed as external problems to be

dealtwithbyexternalsolutionswhenapplyingthedimensionofinteriority‐exterioritydevelopedinthis

thesisatahigherlevelofabstraction.Technologicalstrategiessuchasdesalinationplants,recyclingand

reuse,andmoreefficientdevicesarepromotedto ‘combat’ theproblemthat is ‘outthere’.However,

the issue can also be constructed as one of interiority/exteriority.Hegemonicmasculinity denies and

defers spiritualandemotionaldimensionsofbeingand Iargue this canbeconnected to thesenseof

lacking and emptiness that is, according to McGilchrist (2009), Burneko (1997) and Callenan (2004),

experiencedbymanyinmodernsociety.Moretothepoint,Iarguethatbecausetheinteriorisdenied,

theperceivedcauseof this senseof lacking isprojectedonto theexterior.Compensation is therefore

soughtbymeansoftheexterior–morefood,moremoney,moreeverything!

I claim that theproblems confronting theworld areprimarily of an interior nature, and arguablywill

onlybeaddressedthroughacknowledgementandthedevelopmentofinteriority.

‘...canweliveonthisEarthpeacefully,withoutkillingeachotherendlessly.Ithinkthatistherealissuewe

arenowfacing.Andwethinkthecrisisisoutsideus,butitisinus,inourconsciousness’.(Krishnamurti&

Salk1996,p.11)


6.7 Implicationsforpolicyandpractice

‘What the world needs today is not more competition but woman’s native genius for sympathetic co‐

operation’,(Meyer1953,p.397).

Ihaveconcludedthatintuitionisnotsomethingthataugmentsdecision‐makingbutisanintegraltoit.

Hence, to ask how important intuition is to decision‐making is analogous to asking how important

inhalationistobreathing.Yet,despitethis,intuition,atleastfortheparticipantsinthisstudy,remainsa

mysterious phenomenon. Given this, intuition, aswell as non‐rational influences, clearly needs to be

given more attention in management education and, in education more generally (Hogarth 2001;

Hogarth2005).Non‐rationalelementsneedtobefullyacknowledgedsothatpeoplearebetterableto

understandtheirownprocessesofdecision‐making, judgementandbehaviour. Inparticular,agreater

understandingofhowintuitivesynthesisprovidesamoreholisticunderstandingwillenhancetheability

ofindividualstocopewithcomplexity,uncertaintyandchange:

‘It isnoted thatwhereasmuchattentionhasbeenpaid in thepast tohelpingpeoplemakedecisions in

deliberatemode,effortsshouldalsobedirectedtowardimprovingabilitytomakedecisionsintacitmode

sincetheeffectivenessofdecisionsclearlydependsonboth’(Hogarth2005,p.2).

Gutfeelingdrawsonawidevarietyoftacitdomainknowledgeandexperience,thereforebuildingand

extendingthisknowledgeandexperiencethroughbroadeducationwouldbebeneficial.Inanagewhere

tertiaryeducationhasbecomeincreasinglyvocationallyorientedandnarrowsomeuniversitiesarenow

beginningtoadvocatethebenefitsofamorewell‐roundededucation(Schwartz2010).

Thedevelopmentofinteriorityinindividualsandorganisationsincreasesthecapacityforsensitivityto,

andthearticulationandexpressionoffeelingsandintuitions.Thebenefitsofthishavebeendiscussedin

various sections throughout this thesis. Therefore developing interiority in individuals and in

organisations is recommended. At the intrapersonal level there are therapies95 that emphasise the

importanceoffeelingsandthuspromoteattendingtothem.Similarly,transactionalanalysis,encounter

groups,andsensitivitytrainingstressthevalueof‘gettingintouchwithoneself’andacknowledgingthe

effectone’sbehaviourhasonothers(Booth‐Butterfield&Booth‐Butterfield1990).Self‐sensitivityand,

inturn,receptivitytointuitionmayalsobedevelopedthroughbodymovementexercise(Bastick2003).

Meditation is seen by some as a methodology for self‐insight and increasing self‐awareness (Booth‐

Butterfield & Booth‐Butterfield 1990; Osho 2010) and, because the cosmic is contained in the self,

95Booth‐Butterfieldetal.(1990)giveRogerianandExistentialtherapiesasexamples.


access to knowledge of the Universal (Wilber 1995; Osho 2001; Henzell ‐Thomas 2005). However,

meditation as a pathway to ‘enlightenment’ has been challenged. Krishnamurti (1964; 1991; 1995)

argued that anymeditationmotivated by the desire to transcend themind is itself a product of the

conditioning. For Krishnamurti, transformation can only occur through austere moment‐to‐moment

attentiontothelimitedandmechanicalnatureofthought(habit)anditsconsequencesforrelationship

(to everything and everyone). Krishnamurti asserted that when this is fully understood, the mind

becomesquiet,andonecan‘see’,forthefirsttime,‘whatis’.

Nevertheless, meditation is recommended as a means to calm the rational mind in order that

(psychological) intuition(s) can come to the fore (Vaughan 1979; Agor 1985; Agor 1989c; Wierzbicki

1996;Bastick2003;Suzuki2002citedinSadler‐Smith&Sparrow2007).Indeed,manyoftheparticipants

in this study reported that engaging in calming activities such as painting, walking the dog, and

especially showering, often facilitated insights. Moreover, as said, some participants actively sought

quiet time as a way to get in touch with their intuition when faced with difficult decisions (Section

5.11.2).

Given theconclusionsof this research, I argue that increasing theproportionofwomen in leadership

rolescouldenhanceorganisational interiority. Ithasbeenshownthatdemocraticandlesshierarchical

leadershipstylesleadstomoreteamwork,intrinsicmotivationandultimatelycreativity(Dezso&Smith

2008).Moreover,theinclusionofwomenonboardsiscorrelatedwithhigherperformanceandfinancial

outcomes (Sinclair 1998; Joy, Wagner & Narayanan 2007; Desvaux, Devillard‐Hoellinger & Meaney

2008). Clearly however, the existence of this evidence has not been enough to inspire change.

Organisations remain reluctant to promote women to the highest levels of leadership in Australia

(EOWA 2008) and globally (Desvaux et al. 2008). The status quo is perhaps also maintained as

a consequence of the reluctance of women, given the properties of assertive cultures, to seek

leadershippositions.

An important finding of this research is that the level of intrapersonal interiority is independent of

gender.Moreover, leadershipneedsonlytopromotean integrativecultureratherthannecessarilybe

led by women. Putman and Mumby (1993) argued that education and training may be used in

organisations to help employees understand and deal with the complexities of organisations as

emotional arenas. They advocated education in understanding of the ‘link between emotional

expressionandhumanaction...andintroducealternativesforhandlingsituations’(p.50).However,the

challenges associatedwith askingmen inorganisations tobecomemore ‘in touchwith their feelings’

andrelationshipsshouldnotbeunderestimated.Sinclair(2000),forexample,detailedtheresistanceof


maleexecutivestoexploring‘masculinities’.Inasimilarvein,thisstudyhasshownthatformanymen,

talking about feelings is neither easy nor a comfortable experience96. Nonetheless, if men can be

persuaded to develop their interiority, this, according to the findings, would, increase

organisationalinteriority.

Another hypothetical possibility, drawing on Radical Feminist Theory that embraces differentiation

between the sexes (Wilber 1995; Calas & Smircich 1996), would be tomandate the appointment of

equalnumbersofmenandwomentoboards. Isuggestboardscouldmeet ingender‐basedgroupsas

well as a collective. The evidence discussed in this study suggests that each gendered group would

develop its own culture and, when combined, would operate in a similar way to the right and left

hemispheres of the brain – antagonistic yet complementary. I concur with Wilber (1995) that the

problemisnotmasculinevaluesinandofthemselvesbuttheirdominance.Suchanarrangementwould,

arguably, ‘naturally’bringaboutabalanceoftherationalityandemotionality.AsPutnamandMumby

(1993)conclude:

Organizations do not need to abandon instrumental calls for productivity, or rationality to develop

alternativemodesofdiscourse.Emphasizingworkfeelingscallsforanendtowhatiscurrentlyignoredor

marginalizedinorganizationallife...Rationalityandtechnicalefficiency,however,shouldbeembeddedin

alargersystemofcommunityandinterrelatedness.Perhapsorganizationsofthefuturecouldoffersociety

a new alternative, one shaped by emotionally‐connected creativity and mutual understanding as

necessaryelementsforhumangrowth.(Putnam&Mumby1993,p.55)

It has also been argued that the absence of empathy and compassion in modern societies can be

attributed to the shift from tribal and communal social organisation to ever more complex and, in

particular, amore fragmented social structure.Marx argued that itwas this shift that brought about

classconflict (Marx&Engels1951). I concurwithMarxandwouldaddthatempathyandcompassion

aremoreeasilyaroused for thosewithwhomwehaveapersonal relationship97.Social fragmentation

reduces emotional expression between those of different classes and, therefore, empathy and

compassion. Both intrapersonal and organisational interiority could be increased through either

reducing the size of organisations or increasing and promoting human relationships in organisations

throughelectroniccommunication.

96Ialsofinditdifficulttoaccess,understandandexpresswhatIamfeeling.

97 It is interestingtonotetheempathyandcompassionCEOsdemonstratewhentheywork‘undercover’ intheirownorganisations(Devadas&Jones2010).ItisthroughhearingthestoriesandbackgroundsofworkersthatCEOs

gettoknowemployeesasindividuals–asfellowhumanbeingsratherthanjustnamesornumbers.


However,Iemphasisethatthedevelopmentofindividualandorganisationalinteriorityshouldnotoccur

withoutaconcomitantattempttotakesocietalinteriorityintoaccount.Thiswouldbe,again,leveraging

individual and organisational interiority in the pursuit of societal exteriority (materialism) resulting

perhaps in more rapid environmental destruction. In terms used by advocates of systems thinking

(Preismeyer1992;Senge1994) Iarguethatasasocietywemustquestionnotonlyhowwegoabout

achieving goals (single loop learning) but also question the goals themselves and why we want to

achievethem(double‐looplearning).

Asasociety,Iarguethatweneedtorejectmaterialwealthastheoverridingmeasureofpersonaland

collective success and adopt or include alternatives. Bastick (1982), for example, has developed

objectiveand subjectivemeasures for individuals to assess their personal and professional lives. The

Government of Bhutan has rejected GDP and attempted to acknowledge interior values and the

wellbeing of individuals through the development and implementation of Gross National Happiness

(GNH). A balance of exterior/material and interior/spiritual values is achieved in Bhutan through the

four goals of economic self‐reliance, environmental sustainability, cultural promotion and good

governance.Goodgovernanceiscriticalfortheachievementoftheotherthreegoalsandthiscanonly

be achieved if the happiness of others is central (Thinley 2004). In the poem below, taken from the

officialwebsiteoftheKingdomofBhutan,itisassertedthatitisthequestforhappinessofothersthat

paradoxicallybringshappinesstotheself:

Whateverjoythereisintheworld

Allcomesfromdesiringotherstobehappy

Andwhateversufferingthereisintheworld

Allsufferingcomesfromdesiringmyselftobehappy

(BhutanN.D.)

EggerandSwinburn(2010)arguedthatanewwayofthinkingisrequiredinordertoavoidtheinevitable

disastrous consequences of individual and collective expansion and consumption. Professor Ian Lowe

(cited in Barclay 2009) asserted that a change in thinking would need to be underpinned by a new

philosophyorspirituality.However,Iwouldsuggestthatthewordsthinking,philosophyandspirituality

reflectaCartesiansplitthatseparatesmindfrombody(andfeelings).Iclaimthatwhatisrequiredisa

shift in orientation of being; from the exterior more toward the interior, at all levels, from which

thinking, philosophy and spirituality would flow. Such a shift would realise the assumption that the

Universeandeverythingtherein,cannotbeseparatedfromus(consistentwiththeontologydetailedin

Section2.10). It isonly thenthatdamagingtheEarthandother individualswouldnot justbethought

but felt as harmful to us. I suggest that this shift is both timely and sorely needed. Unfortunately,


according to systems theory, r/evolutionsoccur as a consequenceof the stress a systemexperiences

whenitnolongerfitsachangingenvironment(Capra1996)98–beitfromanecological,meteorological,

socialorfinancialcrisisormorelikelycrises.

6.8 Limitations

Limitations are those considerations that are seen as limiting the research, which became apparent

during its conceptualisation and progression. These include reflections on the decisions taken,

compromisesor‘trade‐offs’thatinevitablyoccurasaconsequenceofthelimitedresourcesofthePhD

researcher(Perry1998).Interestingly,PerryviewslimitationsasanoptionalsectioninaPhD.Takingan

instrumentalview,hearguedthat‘toomuchdiscussionherewillmaketheexaminerthinktheresearch

waspoorlydesigned’ (p.40).Conversely,MullinsandKiley(2002)assertedthatgoodPhDresearchers

arecriticalof themselvesandtheirownwork. Inmyview,acognisanceandacknowledgementof the

context and constraints that surround all research enhances its value through transparency and,

therefore,credibility.Thisisparticularlyrelevantforresearchthatacknowledgestheparticipationofthe

researcherinco‐constructingknowledge.ThereforeIwilldetailthelimitationsthatIbecameawareofin

theprocessofplanningandconductingtheresearch.

6.8.1Methodologicallimitations

Telephoneinterviewing

InChapter4I justifiedtheuseofthetelephonefor interviews. Iarguedthattheuseofthetelephone

providedasenseofanonymityfortheparticipant,whichwasespeciallyusefulgiventheintenselyself‐

reflectivenatureofsomeofthequestions.Italsoprovidedmewithasenseofanonymitythatmitigated

my nervousness, stress and the ‘halo effect’, which is often associated with elite interviewing.

Consideringthediverselocationsofparticipants,andcostsandtimeinvolved,theuseofatelephonedid

allowmetointerviewmoreparticipants,however,Iacknowledgethatitalsoprecludedobservationof

body language. As Kincaid and Bright (1957) suggested, interviewing in tandem might have better

exploitedtheinterviewcontext.Alternatively,theinterviewscouldhavebeenfilmedratherthansound

recorded. This was considered, but not pursued in the interests of attracting as many elite

participantsaspossible.

98Systemsbecomemorechaotic(negativeentropy)whenstressedbytheirenvironment.Ifthesystemarrivesatthepointofmaximumchaositwilleitherevolvetoahigherlevelofcomplexityorwilldissolve,dependingonthe

energyavailable.AccordingtoCapra,energy,forsocialsystems,isinformation.


Ihavearguedthattheparticipantsdisplayedcandourandauthenticityintheirresponses.Despitethis,I

cannot rule out that responding to an unknown researcher in a telephone interview, for some

participants, may have impacted on the extent to which they were prepared to reveal themselves.

Futureresearchcouldincludedifferentdatagatheringmethodssuchasparticipantobservationand/or

interviewswithmembersoftheorganisationthatworkwiththeparticipantleadersonaregularface‐to‐

face basis. However, for the reasons specified in Chapter 4, I remain convinced that telephone

interviewsservedthepurposeofcollectingrich,relevantandrevealingdata.

Participantrecruitment

IarguedinChapter4forthepurposivesamplingofeliteleadersforthisstudy.WhileIremainconvinced

oftheirsuitability,Ineverthelessrecognisesomelimitationsinmystrategy.Intheinterestsofrecruiting

asmanyasparticipantsaspossible,myinvitationtoparticipaterequestedonlyoneinterview(inviewof

the demands on their time and the limitations on my resources). Ideally, more feedback about the

emerging theory and its resonance for the participants might have added value. In addition, the

relativelysmallsamplelimitedtherangeoforganisations,intermsofactivityorindustrythatcouldbe

included.Thislimitationwassomewhatmitigatedbythefactthatparticipantsthemselveshadextensive

leadershipexperienceofawidevarietyoforganisations.Nevertheless,Ibelievemoreparticipantsfrom

abroaderrangeoforganisationsmighthavebeenbeneficialtothestudy.

I have also noted in Chapter 4 that I chose to include the word ‘intuition’ in the description of the

researchaspartoftheletterofinvitationbecauseIbelieveditmightattracttheinterestofparticipants.

WhileIhavealreadydetailedevidencetosuggestthisdidcontributetotherateofacceptance,Isuspect

that this statementmayhavealsodeterred scepticsof intuition. Imade thisdecisionboth forethical

reasons, in being truthful about the nature of the research, but also because the research could not

proceed without these elite interviewees. I note in Chapter 5 that only one participant considered

intuition to be illegitimate, yet other participants believed that suspicion of intuition was common.

Therefore I have reason to believe the sample was not representative in this regard. More time to

recruit a larger sample and perhaps an alternative wording of the invitation to participate in the

research may have addressed this limitation. However, I do not believe this significantly detracted

from the development of theory. Certainly perceptions of illegitimacy are well‐represented and

accountedfor.

Usefulnessandrelevanceofthetheoryforparticipants

Ideally, participants would have been provided with information about the theory developed in the

studyinorderthattheycouldthencommentontheusefulnessandrelevanceforleadership.Summaries

ofthetheoryweresentouttoparticipantsandsomerepliesindicatingresonanceforparticipantswere


received.However, therewasnotsufficientevidencetodrawsupportedconclusionsaboutusefulness

andrelevanceofthetheory.

6.2 Limitationsoftheresearcher

Oneofthestrengthsofthisresearch,asIseeit,isalsoitsgreatestlimitation.Aspreviouslymentioned,I

tookan inclusiveandinterdisciplinaryapproachtothestudyof intuitionuseanddisclosure(becauseI

believeditwasthebestwaytoaddresstheresearchproblem).AsaconsequenceIwasexposedtonew

bodiesofknowledgethatpresentedmewithmanysteep learningcurvesthroughoutthecandidature.

MyundergraduategeneralisttraininginSocialSciencewasusefulinbothassimilatingandsynthesising

largeamountsofcomplexinformationfromdiversedisciplines.Iarguethatthiswouldhavesomewhat

mitigated paradigmatic ‘blindness’. However, I have no formal training in psychology or philosophy,

bothofwhichwerecentraltotheresearch.ThereforeIrecognisethatmyunderstandingmightnotbe

asdeepasthatasthatofaspecialists.

I attempted to strengthenmywork in this regard through the recruitment of three supervisors from

diversebackgrounds. Inaddition, Ihavepublishedone journalarticleandpresentedthreeconference

papers on critical areas of the study in order toobtain feedback.However, in viewof thedepth and

complexityofsomeoftheissues,Iarguethatthisresearch,ideally,shouldhavebeencarriedoutbya

teamofresearchersor,alternatively,doneoveragreaterlengthoftime.Idonotregretorresilefrom

myapproachtothisresearch(becauseImaintainitwasthebestwaytoanswertheresearchproblem),

nordoIthinkitisinadequate.However,Idohopethatthehypothesesdevelopedinthistheorywillbe

takenupandexploredinfurtherresearches.

6.9 Futuredirectionsforresearch

The grounded theory developed in this study should be considered explanatory, basic research.

However,itcarrieswithitarangeofhypothesesinrelationtointuitionuseanddisclosure,aswellasa

number of theoretical implications for theory that could be explored. While there has been some

research intoemotional awareness andexpressionat the individual and interpersonal level, onlyone

studywasfoundthatspecificallylinkedthistointuitionuseandnostudieswerelocatedthatspecifically

addressed the disclosure of intuitions in organisations. Consequently, the emergent grounded theory

provides a foundation and guide for further research in diverse areas and disciplines as well as

specificallyinrelationtointuitiondisclosure.

In Chapter 5, I detailed evidence suggesting the investigation of intuition as insight, philosophical

intuition and Psi in decision‐making of leaders was justified. Future research could also explore the

relationships of interiority to gender conditioning, context and utility that emerged in this study.


Moreover, research could focus on the consequences and implications of high and low interiority, in

termsofaccesstoanddisclosureofintuition(s),emotions,andvisceralinfluencesattheindividuallevel.

WhiletheconceptofEIhasbeenausefuldevelopmentinthisarea,ithasnotpaidspecificattentionto

intuition and, as I argued earlier, has evolvedwith an exterior bias. Therefore, future research could

more fully explore the ways in which people could enhance their decision‐making, leadership,

effectivenessandwellbeingthroughinteriority.

More specifically, future research could investigate of the kind of intrapersonal active/receptive

techniquesdescribedbyparticipants.Thehypothesesgeneratedbythisstudypointtofertilegroundfor

furtherresearchinorganisations.Thefindingsimplythatthedominationofmenatthehighestlevelsof

governanceunderminesthecapacityfororganisationstoachievemaximumpotential99.Iarguethatthis

shouldbeseenintermsofquantitativeandfinancialoutcomes,andalsoinrelationtoculture,climate,

innovation, quality ofwork‐life, and thedevelopmentof individual agency and interiority. The theory

generatedby this studymayassist in future researchseeking tounderstandwhyorganisations ledby

womenperformbetter (Sinclair 1998;Desvauxet al. 2008) andareperceived toperformbetterwith

womenintopmanagement(Welbourne,Cycota&Ferrante2007).

Acore findingof thestudywasthat thewomen inthestudyweremorecomfortableexpressingtheir

feelingsandintuitionsthanthemen.Theuseofdiscoursetheorymightbeausefulwayofinterpreting

thefindings.Itcouldbearguedthatmenandwomeninvokedifferentdiscoursesinrelationtointuition

inthecontextofbeinginterviewedaboutintuition.Discourseaboutintuitioninthissensecouldbeseen

asgendered.Theuseofdiscoursetheorywould,tosomeextent,addressthelimitationsassociatedwith

self‐reportsthroughinterviewsthatwereidentifiedintheprevioussection,particularlyifitwereusedin

conjunctionwithadditionalmethodsofdatacollection.

Similarly, a core findingwas the difference betweenmostmen andwomen in relation to attitude to

emotion. While many men discounted emotion in organisational contexts, many women sought to

acknowledgeandtakeemotionintoaccount.Althoughintuitioncanbeseenasdistinctfromemotion,

emotionwasassociatedwithintuition.Moreoveremotion(asafeelingassociatedwithaknowing)can

beseenaspartoftheprocessorexperienceofintuitionforparticipants.Futureresearchcouldextend

thefindingsofthisstudybyteasingoutwhatappearstobeastagedprocess–fromtheevents(decision

context),totheawarenessofafeeling,totheintuitionitselfanditsimplementation.

99Ormoreaccurately,themasculinewaysofbeinganddoingthatdominateasaconsequenceofmaleleadership.


The conclusions of this research suggest that, for real and meaningful r/evolution to occur, further

inquiryneedstocriticallyexaminetheassumptionsonwhichorganisationalculturesandpracticesare

based, as well as the assumptions under which research and theorising proceeds. These conclusions

point to gender blindness in organisations, and to gendermyopia in the societies in which they are

embedded.Theprincipalcontributionofthisresearchistoshowthatthereisdiversity inbeing,doing

andexpression that, in thecontextof intuitionuse (ornon‐use)withinorganisations, ismarginalised,

maskedand suppressed.The full extentof this, aswell as the implications, cannotbeuncoveredand

exploredunlessdiversityinresearchandtheorisingaboutorganisationsbecomesafundamentalfeature

offutureinvestigations.

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Appendix1:Initialinterviewguide(pilotinterviews)

Intuition:Whatisit?

Howmanyyearsofleadershipexperienceinorganisationswouldyousayyou’vehadroughly?

Doyoufeelcomfortableinyourroleasaleader?

Howimportantisdecision‐makingtoyourrole?Why?

Howdoyoutypicallygoaboutmakingdecisions?Doesthisvaryandwhy?

Howwouldyoudefineordescribeintuition?

Howreliableisintuition?

Howdoesintuitionorintuitionsplayaroleinyourdecision‐making?

Canyougivemesomeexamples?

Howimportantisintuitiontoyourleadershiprole?Why?

Whatdoyouthinkinformsyourintuition?

Arethereanytechniquesyouusetoenhanceyourintuition?

Intuitionincontext

Doeseveryonehavegoodintuition?Why?

Howdopeopleget‘good’intuition?

Aretherecircumstancesinwhichyouaremorelikelytorelyonintuition?(explain)

Howcanyouenhanceyourintuition?Doyouhaveanytechniquesormethods?

Doyouhavetodefendyourintuitions?Ifsohow?

How receptive do you think the people youdealwith regularly are people to intuition as a decision‐

makingtool‐howdoyouthinkitisregarded?

Howdoyoutalkaboutintuitiontoyourpeers‐ifyoudo?

Howdothepeopleyoudealwithonaregularbasistalkaboutintuition,iftheydo?

Howdoyoufeelintuitionisregardedbyyourstakeholders;widercommunity;media?

Whydoyouthinkthisis?Isitjustified?

Wouldyoubecomfortableadmittingyourintuition(s)publiclyortostakeholdersormedia?Why?Why

not?

Howhaveyoucometoyourviewsonintuition?

CanIaskyouwhyyouconsentedtothisinterview?

Appendix2:Finalinterviewguide

Intuition:Whatisit?

Howmanyyearsofleadershipexperienceinorganisationswouldyousayyou’vehadroughly?

Amongstthevariousaspectsofleadership,howimportantisdecision‐makingtoyourrole?Why?

Howwouldyoudefineordescribeintuition?

Howdoesintuitionorintuitionsplayaroleinyourdecision‐making?

Canyougivemesomeexamples?

Whatinformsyourintuition?

Howdopeopleget‘good’intuition?

Howreliableisintuition?

Howimportantisintuitiontoyourleadershiprole?Why?

Doyouthinkeveryonehasgoodintuitionornot?Why?

Whatarethecircumstancesinwhichmightrelyonintuition?

Howdoyouexperienceintuition‐whatdoesitfeelliketoyou?

(back‐up question) How would you describe the experience of intuition on a physical/ emotional/

intellectual/spirituallevel?

Howdoyoudistinguishintuitionorintuitionsfromthought,feelings,sensationsoremotions?

Howarepeopledifferentinrelationtothewaytheygoaboutmakingdecisions?

(back‐upquestion)Aretheredifferenttypes?

Howimportantisself‐awarenessinrelationtointuition?

Howdoyouthinkmonitoringyourowninternalstateplaysaroleinusingintuition?

Howcanyouenhanceyourintuition?Techniques?

Haveyouexperienced,orareyouawareofdifferentkindsofintuition?

Ifso,howwouldyoudescribethemorlabelthem?

Intuitionhasbeendescribedandwrittenaboutinthefollowingways,haveyouexperienced,orcanyou

relateto:

• The‘Eurekaeffect’orasuddeninsightintoaproblemorsituation

• Gutfeeling,orasenseofcertaintyaboutachoiceorsituation

• Predictionora senseofa specific futureoccurrence (propheticdreams,psychicphenomena,

ESP)

• Divine insight,enlightenment,higherconsciousnessor connectionwith the life force, cosmos,

universeetc.; a senseof calling, a senseof spirituality, amystic, religiousoranexperienceof

somethinggreaterthanyourself?

(runeachconstructionpasttheparticipantindividually)

Intuitionincontext

Howreceptivearepeopletointuitionasadecision‐makingtool?Explain.

How do the people you deal with on a regular basis talk about intuition? How do you think it is

regarded?

Wouldyoubecomfortableadmittingyour intuition(s)publiclyortostakeholdersorthemedia?Why?

Whynot?

Howdoyoufeelintuitionisregardedbyyourpeers,stakeholders,widercommunityandmedia?

Doyouhavetodefendyourintuitions?Ifsohow?

Whydoyouthinkthisis?Isitjustified?

How does your track record or status, position or track record play a role if youwant to talk about

intuition?

Canyoutellmeabouttherelationshipofgendertointuitionuse,receptivityanddisclosure?

Howdoescontext–forexample,whetheritisaboutbusinessorpersonalmattersplayarole?

Areattitudestowardintuitionarechanging?Ifso,why?

Howhaveyoucometoyourviewsonintuition?

CanIaskyouwhyyouconsentedtothisinterview?

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