THE UGANDA PEOPLE’S DEFENSE FORCE: PORTRAYING REGIONAL

STRENGTH WHILE PERPETUATING INTERNAL INSTABILITY

A thesis Submitted to the Faculty of

The School of Continuing Studies and of

The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

Master of Arts in Liberal Studies

By

Sarah B. Mason, B.A.

Georgetown University

Washington, D.C. November 3, 2010

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Copyright Sarah B. Mason 2010 All Rights Reserved

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THE UGANDA PEOPLE’S DEFENSE FORCE: PORTRAYING REGIONAL

STRENGTH WHILE PERPETUATING INTERNAL INSTABILITY

Sarah B. Mason, B.A.

MALS Mentor: Thomas P. Ofcansky, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

In many nations, an examination of its military history can also serve as a guide

for the political history of that nation. This is best exhibited on the African continent

where military coups remain a common occurrence and where the only realistic chance of

an opposition group taking power is not through free, democratic elections, but through

guerilla warfare.

The small, but strategically located African nation of Uganda is an example of a

nation whose military history is almost indistinguishable from its political history.

Whoever has control of the military also has political control and holds the reigns of

power over the nation. In Uganda, military history is a contentious issue and one that is

interwoven into the fabric of national identity. From August 27, 1894, the day the British

declared Uganda a protectorate, up to the present day, the military, today known as the

Uganda People’s Defense Force (“UPDF”), continues to be a subject of national pride,

but more often, it conjures up feelings of embarrassment, confusion, abuse, divisionism,

and concern. This is partly due to the fact that the military in Uganda has had a reputation

of brutality throughout its history, but it is also due to the questionable motivations and

souring reputation of the UPDF.

The UPDF is partially made- up of the remnants of President Katuga Yoweri

Museveni’s guerilla army, the National Resistance Army (“NRA”) that seized power in

1986 after fighting a protracted guerilla war that ousted President Apollo Milton Obote

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during his second stint in office. Since taking power, some observers have argued that

President Museveni has done a formidable job professionalizing his army and developing

Uganda. This may seem to be the case after taking a cursory glance at the progress

Uganda has made since independence, but a closer examination of the UPDF and the

current political climate reveals a disturbing and worrisome image.

The UPDF has been involved in many skirmishes outside Uganda that give it an

international reputation. It has deployed troops in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

(“DRC”) on several occasions, fought over wealth and minerals with their Rwandan

counterparts in Kisangani, fought an indigenous insurgency in Southern Sudan, and most

recently, in 2007, sent peacekeeping troops to Somalia. While these external missions

give the UPDF recognition outside the Great Lakes and East Africa regions and may have

impressed some Western leaders who were eager to have allies in the global ‘War on

Terror’, the UPDF remains unable or unwilling to end to its war with the Lord’s

Resistance Army (“LRA”) in northern Uganda which has been raging on for over twenty

years.

Furthermore, while the UPDF seems capable of building an international

reputation and securing training and resources from the United States, it is woefully

unprepared to face mounting internal challenges. Some problems may indeed be a

product of the British colonial administration, but the real challenge facing Uganda today

is getting president Museveni’s military machine under control before the 2011

presidential elections.

The world witnessed a warning on September 10-13, 2009 when riots broke out in

Kampala over a relatively minor issue. Protesters took to the streets of Kampala to

demonstrate against travel restrictions placed by the government of Uganda (“GoU”) on

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the Kabaka, the King of Buganda. Although the Kabaka does not hold any formal power,

his position and influence on the Bagandan ethnic group cannot be overestimated.

Anxious to end the embarrassing riots, President Museveni showed no hesitation giving

the UPDF the right to use deadly force against the protesters. An estimated twenty-four

people were killed while hundreds more were injured. These events can only be

interpreted as a sign of things to come. Museveni now wants to ban the King of Buganda

from taking part in any political activities because he fears the Bagandan King could

breathe new life into the opposition and become an active supporter of his rivals in the

upcoming 2011 presidential election.1

The Ugandan people are certain to demand a free and democratic election in

2011, something that has eluded them in the past. The key to securing this is the willing

participation of the UPDF to act as impartial observers and exercise restraint. This is

highly unlikely since the UPDF has proved time and time again, that it is a personal army

of the president. In the words of a former Ugandan government official, “loyalty is to the

individual, the UPDF, then to the country.”2 In this part of the world, where military

power is synonymous with political power, it is virtually assured that Museveni will

continue to tighten his grip and use the UPDF for his personal political protection. The

UPDF will only serve to protect Museveni’s government rather than the nation’s political

integrity.

This paper will start with an explanation of the pre-colonial conditions in Uganda

and will explore the army’s creation and the evolution of the military throughout

1 Antoine Glaser and Francis Soler, eds, “Museveni Shoots Himself in the Foot,” The Indian

Ocean Newsletter, No. 1269 (September 19, 2009): 1.

2 Interview with a former Ugandan government official, April 27, 2009.

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Uganda’s history under different regimes. While a general history of the military is

essential to understanding the militarization of Ugandan society and the nature of the

current Ugandan state, this paper will primarily focus on the period from 1986 to the

present. Uganda’s wider military history, while fascinating, is long, rich, and often

bewildering. A thorough examination of such a history would be a great undertaking, but

the primary purpose of this paper is to examine the UPDF under the direction of the

current Museveni regime.

This paper will also explain how the UPDF has created its international reputation

by involving itself in external conflicts. Contrary to what the Ugandan government has

claimed, the UPDF is sent abroad not for noble causes, but in an effort to silence those

who might otherwise focus their criticism on Uganda and Museveni’s undemocratic

policies. The UPDF deploys troops to maintain good relations with the U.S. and other

western nations. Uganda’s and Rwanda’s role in the DRC will be examined and

evaluated on the extent to which the UPDF’s presence in the DRC was actually

detrimental to the Congolese people.

Another chapter will explore UPDF operations in southern Sudan and cooperation

between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (“SPLA”) and the current status of

relations between them. The deployment of Ugandan soldiers to Somalia as part of the

African Union peacekeeping team is the most recent example of UPDF international

involvement. This study will examine the motivations for being involved in such

peacekeeping efforts and share the feelings and opinions of Ugandans on the Somalia

matter.

Finally, this paper will address the current level of worry and dissatisfaction with

the UPDF among the Ugandan population. This analysis will include interviews with

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both current and retired UPDF members, members of the Ugandan government, and

members of Ugandan society from all walks of life. It will also include data from a

survey conducted over a ten- month period in Uganda. Finally, the reader will see that the

UPDF’s international involvements have been anything but noble and that the entire

UPDF needs to be re-evaluated and changed in order for Uganda to experience real

democracy. The purpose of this paper is not to discredit or shame the many honorable

and self-sacrificing Ugandan men and women who serve their country with the best and

most dignified of intentions. Rather, it is a call to the top leadership of the UPDF and to

the leadership of the GoU to give Ugandans what they deserve and treat the UPDF for

what is needs to be, a national army, not what it is, a personal army of a dictator. The

UPDF is and will be the cause of future instability within Uganda.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND DEDICATION

First, I would like to express my gratitude to the Institute of International

Education and the National Security Education Program for giving me the opportunity to

study in Uganda on a David L. Boren Fellowship. The fellowship was a wonderful

opportunity to engage in on-the-ground research and I am grateful for the award. I would

like to thank Dr. Chloe Schwenke and Dr. A. Byaruhanga Rukooko for making my

studies at Makerere University and the Boren Fellowship possible. Furthermore, I

acknowledge everyone who participated in my survey and trusted me enough to share

their opinions and ideas. I cannot thank everyone who made my stay in Uganda

enjoyable because the names are too numerous, but know that I will never forget your

hospitality and friendship. You truly made Uganda feel like a second home.

I am also grateful to members the Uganda People’s Defense Force for fielding my

questions and meeting with me for interviews. I would like to thank Victor Oloya of the

War Affected Children’s Association for taking me to Awach and providing translation.

In addition, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army deserves a special mention for their

unparalleled hospitality and kindness during my stay in southern Sudan.

I owe a debt of gratitude to my thesis mentor, Dr. Thomas Ofcansky, who has

given me invaluable advice and guidance throughout the research and writing process

over the last several years. I would like to express my thanks to my family, in particular

my parents and sister, for traveling to Uganda and for their constant support. I am also

thankful for the encouragement and good humor of many friends and colleagues. Finally,

I dedicate this thesis to the people of Uganda who have endured more than their share of

heartache. To those who told me to tell your story, may this be read in your honor.

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CONTENTS COPYRIGHT..................................................................................................................ii

ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND DEDICATION........................................................viii

LIST OF TABLES..........................................................................................................x CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND OF THE MILITARY IN UGANDA .............................1

Setion 1: Pre-Colonial Context and the Formation of the King's African Rifles............1 Section 2: The King's African Rifles in Theory and Action ....................................... 11

Section 3: Post War and Independence ...................................................................... 20 Section 4: Post Independence – Formation of the Uganda People's Defense Force..... 25

CHAPTER 2: UGANDA AND RWANDA: RIVALS OR ALLIES?............................. 49 Section 1: History of Military Relations Between Uganda and Rwanda ..................... 49

Section 2: Rwanda and Uganda Fall Out and Intervention in the DRC....................... 67 CHAPTER 3: SUDAN AND UGANDA: THE UNDECLARED WAR ........................ 85

Section 1: A History of Mistrust ................................................................................ 85 Section 2: Claims and Counter-Claims ...................................................................... 92

CHAPTER 4: THE UPDF IN SOMALIA ................................................................... 100 CHAPTER 5: THE UPDF AND INTERNAL INSTABILITY..................................... 113

Section 1: Northern Uganda and the LRA................................................................ 113 Section 2: Internal Security and the 2011 Elections ................................................. 135

APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW PERMISSION FORMS ................................................ 141 BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................................... 146

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LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1: Uganda Mineral Exports and Production, 1994-2000………………………..79 Table 2.2: Uganda Rough Diamond Exports, 1997-2000………………………………..79 Table 2.3: Uganda Niobium Exports, 1995-1999……………………………………..…80 Table 4.1: Public Perception of UPDF Peacekeeping in Somalia……………….……..105 Table 4.2: Breakdown of Affirmative Responses by Home Region.………………..…105 Table 4.3: Breakdown of Negative Responses by Home Region………………………106 Table 4.4: Breakdown of Combination Responses by Home Region………………….106 Table 4.5: Breakdown of Undecided/Unsure Responses by Home Region…...……….107 Table 5.1: Public Perception on Operation Lightning Thunder………………...………125 Table 5.2: Breakdown of Affirmative Responses by Home Region………………125-126 Table 5.3: Breakdown of Negative Responses by Home Region………………………126 Table 5.4: Breakdown of Undecided Responses by Home Region…………………….127 Table 5.5: Public Perception of UPDF and the Northern War…………………………133 Table 5.6: Public Perception of UPDF’s Ability to be Loyal to a Different President....136

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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND OF THE MILITARY IN UGANDA

SECTION 1: PRE-COLONIAL CONTEXT AND THE FORMATION OF THE KING’S AFRICAN RIFLES

Uganda’s current military and political situation cannot be understood without

proper historical context. One reason the topic of the military continues to be so divisive

is because the British favored certain ethnic groups to fill various roles in the

protectorate’s administration, including the army. The Acholi and Langi ethnic groups

were particularly thought to have strong, muscular builds that would enable them to be

ideal soldiers. Other groups, such as the Baganda, were thought to be well organized and

were given more administrative and bureaucratic tasks. The British viewed their subjects

simplistically, and their judgments of different Ugandan ethnic groups created

stereotypes and misconceptions that some Ugandans continue to hold about their fellow

country- men to this day. One fact has remained static since the creation of kingdoms in

Uganda to the present day; control of the military is vital in ensuring political survival.

In 1862, British explorer and geographer John Hanning Speke first arrived in the

area today known as Uganda. He was surprised to find several highly organized and

hierarchical societies, most notably, the Kingdoms of Buganda and Bunyoro-Kitara

(“Bunyoro”). Speke had started his explorations further south exploring Tanzania and

Lake Tanganyika with fellow British explorer Richard Francis Burton. Burton became

too ill to travel further after reaching Lake Tanganyika so Speke traveled northward to

Lake Victoria alone. He eventually reached the Kingdom of Buganda where, “he found

an organized Bantu Kingdom flanked by tributary states beyond its borders with an

elaborate system of native law and administration, a fleet of canoes, and a method of

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levying troops.”1 Military service, or service to the king was a right and obligation of

most males in Bagandan society. There are also reports that social status and the right to

positions of authority depended on ability or willingness to fight for the king.2 While both

the Buganda and Bunyoro monarchies had soldiers and standing military units of their

own, the mass militarization of Ugandan society began with the formation of the Uganda

Rifles by Colonel Henry Edward Colville in 1895. The Uganda Rifles would be merged

with the Central Africa Regiment and the East Africa Rifles, to form the King’s African

Rifles (“KAR”) in 1902.

Even before Speke arrived in Buganda, the Bagandans had established significant

outside contact via the Arab and Swahili traders from the East African coast starting in

1844. The Kabaka at the time, King Mutesa, wanted to establish links with the outside

world and wished to build a reputation for himself and his kingdom. He sent gifts to the

Sultan of Zanzibar, and in return, received gifts from the Zanzibaris. Mutesa felt

confident given his friendly relationship with Zanzibar, that they would assist him in

fighting off the aggressiveness of the Khedive of Egypt, whose emissaries, led by Samuel

Baker, had already tried to claim the neighboring Kingdom of Bunyoro.3

Traders coming from the East African coast enjoyed a monopoly on ivory and

convinced King Mutesa to lift the ban on selling humans, making the slave trade a

popular and lucrative venture for the traders and Bagandan chiefs who sometimes sold

their own subjects. Although trading ivory and humans is historically important, the most

1 Lieutenant-Colonel H. Moyse Bartlett, The King’s African Rifles. A Study in the Military History

of East and Central Africa, 1890 – 1945 (1956; repr., East Sussex: The Naval and Military Press, 2002), 8. 2 L.A. Fallers, Ed. and A.I. Richards, The King’s Men, Leadership and Status in Buganda on the

Eve of Independence (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 277.

3 M.S.M. Semakula Kiwanuka, A History of Buganda From the Foundation of the Kingdom to 1900 (New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1972), 160-170.

3

significant aspect of Buganda’s contact with Arabs was the introduction of Islam. There

is debate about whether Mutesa was fully devoted to Islam, or if he adopted it mainly as

political strategy, but it was well known that he observed Ramadan and encouraged many

of his subjects to adopt the faith. The introduction of Islam to Buganda was only the

beginning of non-indigenous religion in the area. In the following years, Protestants and

Catholics arrived in the region and quickly turned Buganda into a battleground for

political and religious influence.

Speke was later joined in Buganda by his counterpart, explorer Henry Morton

Stanley, in 1875. Stanley was impressed with the level of Bagandan organization, their

willingness to modernize, and their apparent acceptance of his Protestant preaching.

Stanley was so encouraged by the number of Bagandans converting to Christianity,

including the Kabaka, that he wrote a letter to the British Church Missionary Society

(“C.M.S.”) requesting the presence of missionaries in Buganda.

The C.M.S. missionaries arrived in 1877. The French, Catholic, White Fathers

followed closely behind arriving in Buganda two years later. One reason Kabaka Mutesa

tolerated the presence of foreign missionaries in Buganda was because he viewed the

missionaries in strategic terms. He wanted to strengthen his position against Egyptian

expansionism. He also expected to receive new military technology from his European

guests.4 Mutesa was greatly disappointed when he realized that the missionaries were

more interested in preaching their religion than trading firearms. Furthermore, the arrival

of two competing Christian factions along side the already present Islamic influence “was

4 Samwiri Rubaraza Karugire, A Political History of Uganda (Nairobi: Heinemann Educational

Books, 1980), 63.

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not originally a source of enlightenment in Buganda – it was a source of confusion,”5

making the presence of missionaries more regrettable than helpful.

Kabaka Mutesa died in 1884 and was replaced by his teenage son, Mwanga. From

the beginning, Mwanga was not as tolerant as his father and worried about the dangerous

influence of foreign ideologies in his kingdom. Mwanga did not enjoy the same level of

prestige and respect as his father, whom Bagandans revered as one of their greatest kings.

In 1885, Mwanga learned that a German explorer, Dr. Karl Peters, was arrogantly making

treaties on behalf of East Africa and was planning to come to Buganda. Mwanga also

learned of the impending arrival of James Hannington, the newly appointed Anglican

Bishop of Eastern Equatorial Africa. Mwanga was so irritated and annoyed at the

audacity and growing presence of the various European powers in the region that he had

Bishop Hannington and his men detained and executed shortly after their arrival in the

region.

Also on Mwanga’s orders, Christian converts in Buganda were burned alive in a

paranoid fear that they were missionary agents. Even at this early point, Bagandan

Christians were willing to die for their faith, thus undermining the Kabaka’s authority.

This terrible episode quickly changed Buganda’s political climate and eventually led to

the destruction of the Bugandan Kingdom. While this was a significant event, some have

argued that Mwanga’s “fateful march to ruin was marked not so much by his persecution

of the Christians as by his intense hatred of the senior chiefs who had been his father’s

advisors.”6 It should also be noted that up to this point, throughout Kabaka Mutesa’s

5 Ibid., 63. 6 M.S.M. Semakula Kiwanuka, A History of Buganda From the Foundation of the Kingdom, 196.

5

reign, traders and missionaries were guests of the Kabaka and his kingdom. The Kabaka

controlled their interactions, what they were permitted to trade, and how they were to

travel. Bishop Hannington’s unusual route in approaching Buganda aroused Mwanga’s

suspicions as to what the Bishop’s real motives were.7 There was an established route to

Uganda, but the Bishop decided to try another way and open up a new trade route.

Mwanga was already aware that his influence was waning and thought that Bishop

Hannington was plotting to remove him from power by invading Buganda. Hannington

and his counterparts had arrived in the Kingdom of Busoga and were detained by Basoga

chiefs on Mwanga’s orders. Mwanga ordered the execution of Hannington and his men a

few days later.

In 1888, Mwanga decided he wanted to rid his kingdom of outside influence and

ordered all foreigners to leave. However, it was too late. The Kabaka already had lost

influence and power over his people. The Christian factions and the Muslim community

had already fashioned their private armies, had their own guns, and were not afraid to use

them against the king.8 Instead of achieving his goal, Kabaka Mwanga was deposed by

his own people who united for the common purpose of removing him from power.

Michael Wright explains:

Wakoli, who was an experienced chief, an old ally of Buganda and no stranger to the affairs of its capital, had put his finger on the immediate cause of Mwanga’s downfall. Ignoring the young Kabaka’s unfitness for office, the defection of the young men and the demoralization of the old guard, all of which produced only revolutionary possibilities in Buganda, he singled out the decisive factor in the making of the revolution: control of the armed forces. In the uprising at the capital of

7 Holly Elizabeth Hanson, Landed Obligation, The Practice of Power in Buganda (Portsmouth,

NH: Heinemann, 2003), 113. 8 Ibid., 67.

6

Buganda in September 1888 the standing army was the key to success, and formed, too, the nucleus of the forces of both the major protagonists in the ensuing civil wars.9

Although these religious-turned-political parties united to oust Mwanga, they did

not stay united for long. The Muslims, worried that European influence would cause

them to lose their privileged position in the kingdom, turned on their Christian allies and

chased them out of the capital, igniting a four-year civil war. The Protestants and

Catholics went separate ways, but later agreed to reinstall Mwanga, who had eventually

sided with the Catholics, to his throne. The Christians again united to remove the

Muslims from power and Mwanga was once again Kabaka. However, by this time, it was

clear who was in control. The Kabaka was seen as a tool of the Catholic missionaries and

Protestant Bagandans did not see him as a legitimate ruler. This was evidenced by the

fact that his chiefs often made decisions without his knowledge or participation. Only one

generation earlier, people could be executed for sneezing in the presence of the kabaka.

Now, when deciding how land would be divided among Protestants and Catholics, chiefs

made their own decisions and informed Mwanga later.10 It was clear to everyone that

Kabaka Mwanga no longer retained any real power.

The arrival of two competing imperialists in 1890, the German, Dr. Karl Peters,

and the British, Captain Frederick Lugard of the Imperial British East Africa Company

(“IBEAC”), was the decisive factor in the struggle over Buganda. Lugard came to

Buganda to negotiate with Mwanga, who feared he would be executed for his role in the

murder of Bishop Hannington. Lugard eventually gained Mwanga’s confidence and

9 Michael Wright, Buganda in the Heroic Age (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 25. 10 Hanson, Landed Obligation, The Practice of Power in Buganda, 95.

7

convinced him to sign a treaty with the IBEAC.11 The French Catholics urged Bagandans

to accept German rule, or retain their independence while the British Protestants along

with Lugard, urged their followers to accept a British protectorate. This led Bagandan

Catholics and Protestants to fight each other in 1892. Despite the fact that Lugard had

arrived in Bugdanda with “three hundred well-trained and experienced Sudanese soldiers,

and after his collection of the remnants of Emin Pasha’s soldiers, he returned to Kampala

with nearly eight thousand”12 troops, the Catholics initially had control in the war.

Despite the Catholic’s early advantage, the axis of power quickly changed, when

Captain Lugard introduced the Maxim gun into the equation. One of Lugard’s British

colleagues, with approximately one hundred Sudanese soldiers and Protestants, sank

nearly thirty boats full of refugees trying to escape using the Maxim gun.13 With the

Catholics defeated and the Germans no longer vying for power, the British eventually

consolidated their rule, declared a protectorate and, with the help of Protestant Bagandan

chiefs, went about claiming the rest of Uganda for Britain.

While this war is sometimes portrayed as a religious war, it should also be

understood in terms of a war between two colonial powers disguised by the façade of

religion. The truth was, “ Lugard could dictate the terms and be certain that they would

be implemented by the Protestants who now saw clearly that their positions were due to

the success of the Maxim gun…the Protestants were now masters of the situation as long

as they had the military backing of the Company no party could challenge them.”14

11 Lieutenant Colonel H. Moyse-Bartlett, The King’s African Rifles, 49. 12 M.S.M. Semakula Kiwanuka, A History of Buganda From the Foundation of the Kingdom, 227. 13 Ibid., 232. 14 Ibid., 233.

8

The IBEAC, along with Captain Lugard, left Uganda in March 1883 after the

expiration of the company’s charter. There was much debate in Britain about whether it

should accept responsibility for the administration of the territory. However, Lugard and

others convinced the British government that it was strategically important to keep

Uganda because of economic resources such as ivory, coffee, rubber, and cereals, but

most importantly, because it was the location of the Nile headwaters.

Colonel Colvile, who served as Acting Commissioner of the Protectorate army

and replaced Captain Lugard, wasted no time declaring war and attacking the

neighboring Kingdom of Bunyoro. As Amii Omara-Otunnu explains, Colvile had three

primary motivations for declaring war on Bunyoro and its Omukama, (King) Kabarega.

First, Colvile viewed Kabarega as a stubborn enemy who only wanted to stand in the way

of British economic interests in Uganda. Second, the British and Bagandans perceived

Kabarega’s political power as a threat because unlike the Kabaka, the Kabarega was able

to retain his influence over his people despite British efforts. Finally, Colvile wanted to

establish a route from Buganda through Bunyoro to Congo and Sudan. This would be

impossible without Kabarega’s consent and cooperation.15

To fight the Banyoro, Colvile convinced the Bagandans that it would be in their

best interest to join in and fight on the British side. Colvile used six Sudanese companies,

who still made up the backbone of the army in Uganda, and a large army of Bagandans

who were not yet incorporated into the standing army. The Bunyoro War marked the first

15 Amii Omara-Otunnu, Politics and the Military in Uganda, 1890-1985 (London: MacMillan

Press Ltd., 1987), 17.

9

time the British used a local force in Uganda16 to fight an indigenous population. This set

a precedent as the method they would use to further establish their rule throughout

Uganda.

The Bunyoro War lasted until February 1894, when Kabarega was forced to flee

Bunyoro. Although the Kingdom of Bunyoro was not as organized Buganda, the Banyoro

were well prepared in their efforts to repel an outside force. The Banyoro were spared the

kind of civil wars that had plagued the Bagandans for years and had remained a strong

and united polity who were loyal to their king. Kabarega easily motivated his subjects to

fight. Their efforts against the British and Bagandans were commendable. Although they

fought hard, the war was a tremendous setback for the Banyoro. Having been the site of

the battleground, Bunyoro’s economy was shattered and the extensive long-distance trade

relations it enjoyed virtually ceased.17

While the war was a huge loss to Bunyoro, the Bagandans were rewarded for their

willingness to turn on their neighbors and for their loyalty to the British. Colvile awarded

approximately one-quarter of Bunyoro’s territory to Buganda. His actions served as a

reward to the Bagandans and a punishment to the Banyoro for resisting British rule. The

land taken from Bunyoro was later known as the ‘lost counties’. This transfer of land

created feelings of resentment and bitterness between the Baganda and Banyoro that

lasted for decades until the ‘lost counties’ were finally returned to Bunyoro in 1965.

16 Ibid., 17. 17 Samwiri Rubaraza Karugire, A Political History of Uganda, 91.

10

After the establishment of the protectorate in August 1894, Colvile started

planning a long-term military strategy that included his recommendation for the

formation of the Uganda Rifles. Colonel Colvile based his plans for the Uganda Rifles

from the Constabulary Ordinance for the Gold Coast and the Niger Coast. The Colonial

and War Offices enthusiastically approved his plans while the British Parliament

approved the Uganda Rifles Ordinance 1895.18 The Uganda Rifles was, at first, mainly

composed of Sudanese troops commanded by British officers. Major Ternan, who had

recently served in Egypt with an impressive record, was ordered to Kampala in late 1895.

He became Commandant of the Uganda Rifles the following year.

In a last ditch attempt in 1897, Kabaka Mwanga and a small group of followers

made a final effort to drive the British out of his Kingdom once and for all. He tried to

raise his own army, composed of subjects who were still partial to the Kabaka and

prepared to fight the British. He engaged with the Protectorate army in Buddu, some

twenty miles outside Kampala, where he was defeated, but not captured. Omukama

Kabarega, who had been waging his own guerilla war against the British since he had

been forced to flee his own kingdom of Banyoro, also engaged the protectorate forces in

what was now a two-front conflict. Despite facing guerilla forces from both sides, the

protectorate army quickly and easily established the upper hand in both skirmishes that,

as a result, only lasted a few months. Kabaka Mwanga later joined his former rival,

Kabarega of Bunyoro, in Lango in an attempt to evade the British led protectorate forces.

They managed to avoid arrest until they were captured in 1899 and subsequently sent into

exile.

18 Amii Omara-Otunnu, Politics and the Military in Uganda, 19.

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SECTION 2: THE KING’S AFRICAN RIFLES IN THEORY AND ACTION

The creation of the Uganda Rifles and the subsequent formation of the King’s

African Rifles (“KAR) in 1905 proved to be Britain’s greatest asset in controlling its

territories in East Africa from 1902 to 1964. Additionally, the KAR served as the armed

forces of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika (Tanzania), and Nyasaland (Malawi). In theory,

the KAR battalions were interchangeable, but in reality, they differed greatly in size and

terms of service. The only factor that united the former Central African Rifles, the

Uganda Rifles, and East Africa rifles into the new KAR, was their name and a set of

common regulations and ordinances.19

As a force composed of African troops wanting to set themselves apart from

ordinary colonial subjects, “ultimately the King’s African Rifles provided the coercive

force that made British rule in East Africa possible.”20 Although many troops had moral

reservations about fighting on the side of colonialists, the status, pay, and respect they

thought they would receive provided a strong enough incentive that these soldiers made

sure their fellow country-men did not resist the changes that British colonial rule brought.

For a hopeful laborer, enlisting in the KAR was the best opportunity they could ever

expect to receive.

The British mainly recruited un-skilled and illiterate young African males who

were willing to use lethal force against civilians. Britain did not regard its East African

territories with enough importance to put its own troops on the ground, which resulted in

the KAR being composed almost entirely of African troops with only a small number of

19 Timothy Parsons, The African Rank-and-File: Social Implications of Colonial Military Service

in the King’s African Rifles, 1902-1964 (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1999), 16.

20 Ibid., 2.

12

British commanding officers. The KAR’s recruitment policies and techniques further

exploited ethnic and artificial ‘tribal’ differences. British officers preferred soldiers from

groups they considered to have ideal militaristic qualities and physical characteristics that

would make strong soldiers.21 In Uganda’s case, many soldiers were recruited from the

northern portion of the country, where the British thought the Acholi and Langi people

had the most desirable physical characteristics of a soldier. The British also recruited

Acholi for military service because they organized themselves in territorially small

political and military units. The way Acholi villages and its leadership was organized

would make it difficult for them to raise a strong force under single leadership that had

the potential to confront the British colonial administration. It was for that reason that the

British considered them easier and safer to deal with. Therefore, the British preference

for Acholi and Langi in the military also meant the exclusion of men from central

Uganda who were members of a more organized political system.22

The British convinced enlisted African men that they carried and deserved special

status, something that lured potential recruits and kept many soldiers in the KAR. Part of

the British strategy to separate soldiers from civilians was a form of strict social isolation

that divided the soldiers from their county-men. This was also “accomplished through the

evolution of a distinct military culture that encouraged askaris to see themselves as

different from, and superior to African civilians.”23 The British ability to divide and

conquer soldiers from civilians made it easier for soldiers feel like they were different

and made it conceivable to fight against their own people. The main objective of

21 Ibid., 5.

22 Amii Omara-Otunnu, Politics and the Military in Uganda, 33. 23 Timothy Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, 9.

13

subjugating the East African population did not change when the regional forces became

integrated into one uniform body called the KAR. The army “occasionally collected

taxes, rounded up laborers, and enforced land alienation, but it usually conducted

punitive expeditions against communities that refused to acknowledge British

authority.”24 This set up a climate of distrust between soldiers and civilians that continues

to this day. Additionally, certain ethnic groups that the British preferred to use as soldiers

thus gained an unfair reputation for being rough, militaristic, and violent.

The outbreak of the First World War in August 1914 was an unexpected surprise

to many Europeans living in Uganda. As a consequence, the KAR were unprepared for

the significant combat operations that would soon entangle Africa. The KAR remained

virtually unchanged during the first few years of the war because although the War Office

had assumed responsibility for the East African forces, it did not take direct control of

them until 1916.25 The war’s outbreak put new administrative and strategic planning

demands on the protectorate administration as well as the small number of KAR in

Uganda. The KAR recruited heavily. The “army in Uganda, which had previously formed

a battalion within the KAR, was now upgraded to the status of a regiment under which

new battalions were formed.”26 In total, the Regiment grew from 2,319 men in three

battalions in 1914 to almost 31,000 men in twenty-two battalions in 1918.27 This

remarkable growth in the number of men joining the KAR did not reflect their loyalty to

24 Ibid., 16. 25 Ibid., 17. 26 Amii Omara-Otunnu, Politics and the Military in Uganda, 33.

27 Timothy Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, 18.

14

the throne or an interest in a white man’s war, but rather their desire to earn status in

society and a living to support their families.

The governors of German East Africa (modern-day Tanzania, Burundi, and

Rwanda) and British East Africa (modern-day Kenya) signed the 1885 Congo Act that

stated that African colonies would remain neutral in the event of a European war.

However, the act was quickly forgotten when KAR troops from Uganda attacked German

river outposts on Lake Victoria on August 5, 1914. The commander of the German

Schutztruppe in East Africa, Lt. Col. Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck was further

outraged when two German boats were attacked off the coast of Dar es Salaam. Lt. Col.

Lettow-Vorbeck, bypassed the orders of the German East Africa Governor Heinrich

Schnee, and sprang into action creating a multiple front battle between his forces and the

KAR.

At first, it seemed the KAR was doomed in their fight against the Schutztruppe.

Both forces were originally composed mainly of Sudanese troops and later built up their

ranks with members of the local population. However, despite similar beginnings, the

Schutztruppe enjoyed several key advantages over the KAR. First, as Charles Miller

explains, the Schutztruppe were far more organized and mobile. The Germans also

enjoyed superior fire- power. Finally, they had more combat experience due to their

familiarity quelling the constant rebellions in German East Africa. Despite the

Schutztruppe’s advantages, the KAR still felt confident in their abilities.

Miller also points out that the British commanders of the KAR were ‘first class

and seasoned hands at bush warfare’, having fought in British territories in other areas of

15

the continent28 which gave them a sense of experience, confidence, and purpose. The

KAR’s morale was certainly higher than their counterparts fighting on the German side.

This was probably partially due to the fact that, “British East Africa had been conquered

with remarkable ease and lack of bloodshed in comparison with the sub-Saharan colonies

with Britain’s colonial rivals,”29 creating a more trustworthy relationship between

colonial ruler and subject.

Although the British forces eventually gained control of German East Africa, the

battle was hard fought and had disastrous consequences for those who had participated.

As the official historian of the KAR, Lieutenant Colonel Moyse-Bartlett explains,

“neither before nor since has the KAR been faced with a campaign at once, so prolonged,

arduous and stubborn as that of the first world war.”30 Battles were fought in the coastal

town of Tanga, where the British brought in the British Indian Expeditionary Force B,

composed of approximately 8,000 men. Another major front was near Mount Kilimanjaro

with the help of the 4,000 man British Indian Expeditionary Force C. The Germans also

faced action with Belgian troops coming from the Congo with their own large force of

askaris in Rwanda and Burundi.

The loss of German South-West Africa to the British brought General J.C. Smuts

to command the East African front. He brought his own army of thousands of South

Africans to help reinforce the KAR, but they still faced a strong opponent in the

Schutztruppe. The KAR were forced to accept a leadership role when expelling the

28 Charles Miller, Battle for the Bundu, The First World War in East Africa (New York:

Macmillan Publishing Company Inc., 1974), 28. 29 Edward Paice, Tip and Run: The Untold Tragedy of the Great War in Africa (London:

Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007), 155. 30 Lieutenant-Colonel H. Moyse-Bartlett, The King’s African Rifles, 412.

16

Germans from East Africa. In 1916, General Smuts realized that most of his white troops

were no longer healthy enough to fight. That meant that more than 12,000 South African

troops would be sent home before the end of the year. The Rhodesian and Indian troops

were not much better off and would also be withdrawn from the region by 1917. With the

withdrawal of so many reinforcing troops, the task of fighting and pushing the Germans

south fell increasingly to the KAR.31 Lettow-Vorbeck led a long, costly, and drawn out

battle by deploying his forces south to Lake Tanganyika, then to Portuguese

Mozambique, and back into Northern Rhodesia and German East Africa where he finally

surrendered in present day Zambia with the remnants of his army on November 23, 1918.

While an estimated 3,000 KAR had lost their lives to disease and malnutrition and

another 2,000 to combat, that number pales in comparison with the number of Carrier

Corps who died during the war. Since it was impossible to transport equipment any other

way, the Carrier Corps brought supplies and ammunition to the British units by foot. The

military authorities had conscripted upwards of 120,000 men for this task. It is estimated

that anywhere from 40,000 to half a million men died as a result of overwork, and lack of

food, clothing, and medical care.32

When the war ended, the additional KAR battalions that Uganda had raised

between 1915 and 1919 were disbanded and the army went back to its prewar size. The

KAR Ugandan battalions were not particularly active within Uganda in-between wars,

31 Lieutenant-Colonel H. Moyse-Bartlett, The King’s African Rifles, 332. 32 Timothy Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, 19.

17

but played a larger role in Kenya where they were used to assist the colonial

administration retain power and ensure internal security.33

The outbreak of World War II was less of a surprise in Uganda than the previous

war. Many Ugandans were familiar with Hitler’s outrageous ideas and policies, partly

because at a 1938 conference to discuss the issue of Jewish refugees coming from

Germany and Austria, Lord Winterton stated that Britain was considering bringing the

refugees to East Africa. Additionally, a German newspaper proposed that all German

Jews should be sent to Uganda and Madagascar.34 Although this war was not as much of

a surprise, the KAR were, again, responsible for much of the fighting on the African

front. To meet new demands, the protectorate administration immediately began

recruiting more soldiers. Within Uganda alone, a massive military expansion occurred in

which a remarkable 77,000 troops were recruited.35 African soldiers also experienced

some important changes in their conditions of service during the Second World War.

Britain’s War Office authorized the introduction of increased rates of pay for soldiers

who had special skills. Many soldiers were artillery specialists, medics, and engineers.

The new rates of pay served as an incentive for others to try and acquire such skills and

boosted morale among soldiers.

Ugandan KAR soldiers fought many different fronts during the war. First, they

fought and eventually defeated Italian forces in Ethiopia and in greater Italian East Africa

(parts of modern-day Ethiopia, Eritrea, and southern Somalia) with the help of two Indian

33 Amii Omara-Otunnu, Politics and the Military in Uganda, 34.

34 Kenneth Ingham, The Making of Modern Uganda (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1958),

213.

35 Amii Omara-Otunnu, Politics and the Military in Uganda, 36.

18

divisions and the Sudanese Defense Force.36 They were also responsible for holding off

the French Vichy forces in Djibouti and Madagascar. The KAR’s biggest battle,

however, was not fighting in Africa, but in the jungles of Burma.

As a Japanese invasion of eastern India looked likely, Britain’s War Office

ordered the East Africa command to provide three infantry brigades for service in Asia.

However, as was in the case in most decisions, no one consulted any African rank-and-

file, most of whom had only agreed to fight to defend East Africa.37 While some refused

the assignment in Burma, many soldiers accepted because they were promised an

increase in compensation. East Africa’s contribution to the Southeast Asian Command

was immense, a total of approximately 50,000 men, who arrived in Burma in the summer

of 1944. The commanding officers assumed that African soldiers would be accustomed to

fighting in jungle conditions and would be resistant to tropical diseases, but as they soon

found out, many African soldiers fared no better than their white counterparts when

battling diseases such as malaria and typhus.

The conditions were awful, the terrain impossible, and the enemy bold. Morale

shrunk by the day and African askaris knew they could not hope for a respite or a break

to visit their families whom they had left long ago. Many askaris also discovered that

they were not being compensated as well as their Indian counterparts. These

discrepancies led some Ugandan soldiers to lead strikes and protests against their

treatment and the general conditions in Burma. Despite these difficulties, plus the fact

that they arrived to the war relatively late and constituted a small part of the total number

36 Timothy Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, 26.

37 Ibid., 38.

19

of allied forces, the East Africans played a vital role in the re-conquest of Burma.38 The

East African casualty report lists 7,301 dead out of 323,483 wartime askaris, which

amounts to just over two percent. However, that figure is misleading and does not

communicate the full extent of African sacrifice during the war. Like WWI, non-combat

deaths often went un-reported and death counts did not include the thousands of soldiers

who died from disease, malnutrition, and inadequate medical care. The underreporting of

African deaths also may have been an attempt by colonial officials to avoid accusation of

exploiting East African askaris in a war in which they had little to do with.39

38 Ibid., 31. 39 Ibid., 34.

20

SECTION 3: POST WAR AND INDEPENDENCE The end of World War II created many questions for the future of the KAR. Some

colonial officials were not convinced of the need of a standing colonial army during times

of peace. However, the growing presence of internal security concerns throughout British

East Africa led them to disband most KAR battalions, but keep others in tact for use

against quelling internal problems. It appeared that their colonial subjects were no longer

accepting colonial rule and domination without question. Nationalist, trade union, and

veterans groups grew in popularity, something that concerned colonial rulers.

Despite growing dissatisfaction among members of the public, KAR soldiers, for

the most part, continued to carry out their orders without question. In Kenya and Uganda,

KAR soldiers were used to break up mostly non-violent workers strikes and

demonstrations. However, not all actions were non-violent. As Timothy Parsons

describes, the Ugandan government called upon KAR askaris to use lethal force against

civilians on several occasions. In January 1945, “ a platoon from 28 KAR (a Kenyan

unit) fired on approximately 2,000 civilians during a general strike in Kampala, killing

four and wounding eleven.”40 Interestingly enough, the colonial administration also had

trouble with the Kabaka and his Kingdom of Buganda during the same time period. In

1949, rioting against the Kabaka, who governed his kingdom as a British client, spread

across Kampala. The governor was forced to call on the KAR to suppress the rioting.

The situation worsened when the Kenyan unit of the KAR was called to action instead of

the Ugandan KAR because the officials worried the Ugandans would fail to fire on their

countrymen.

40 “Background to Buganda,” PRO, WO 276/73; EAC Circular, “Aid to the Civil Power,” January 19, 1945, PRO, WO 276/81; “Buganda Riots,” January 18 1945, RHL, Mss.Afrs. 1512. Quoted in Timothy Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, 50.

21

In the years to come, the KAR faced significant funding cutbacks that led to cuts

in the number of East African military personnel. While Britain may have been unwilling

to fund KAR battalions that battled insecurity in British East Africa, they had no

problems finding funding for battalions they could use as imperial troops in the rest of its

empire. The KAR was seen as an ideal alternative to more costly British troops that were

needed in Korea, Germany, and many parts of the Middle East.41 The KAR also deployed

in Malaya to fight communist forces until the outbreak of the Kenyan Mau Mau rebellion

in 1952. When British officials realized the full severity of the rebellion, more soldiers

were brought in to bolster the Kenyan KAR unit already there. The KAR were once again

used as imperial troops putting down a rebellion by indigenous people. In this case, it

was mainly the Kikuyu of Kenya. It was also during the Mau-Mau rebellion that a young

KAR askari by the name of Idi Amin Dada began to show his capabilities as a leader and

soldier.

Many argue that WWII opened the political consciousness of African servicemen,

“however, in Uganda, by and large, the ex-servicemen concerned themselves with their

own social and economic betterment rather than realizing any radical political ideals.”42

In Uganda, it was the teachers and civil servants who primarily pushed for political

reforms. While African askaris may certainly have gained confidence after serving side-

by-side with Europeans, it was mainly the Kenyans serving in the KAR who took

political lessons to heart and brought their new feelings home with them. Many Kenyans

already were disgruntled with the large number of British settlers in their country and

their control over resources, issues Ugandan KAR askaris did not have to contend with.

41 Timothy Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, 39.

42 Amii Omara-Otunnu, Politics and the Military in Uganda, 39.

22

Britain’s recognition that it would soon have to relinquish some power over its

territories also created major changes for the KAR. In December 1947, Buckingham

Palace issued the East Africa High Commission Order in hopes of creating more unity

among Britain’s three East African territories. Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika would

now be treated as a single territory. The order also created the East Africa Defense

Committee, the military arm of the East Africa High Commission. However, it was not

until nearly a decade later when formal responsibility for the military was actually

transferred to the new East Africa Defense Commission. The KAR was now newly

designated as the East African Land Forces43 and would be controlled by the East African

Land Forces Organization. Although there was supposed to be a unified command

structure, the territories were eager to control their own armed forces. Additionally, the

new organization did not take the changing political climate into consideration. While

internal security problems affected all of East Africa, Ugandans were growing tired of

British rule, uncertainly over the status of the Kingdom of Buganda, and the growing

number and influence of the Indian merchant class.44

Furthermore, while the explosion of African nationalism could not have been

suppressed or reversed by any amount of military force, “the KAR’s inability to deal with

these new threats had an impact on Britain’s sudden decision to relinquish its East

African colonies.”45 Civilian officials constantly called upon the KAR by to help put

down labor strikes and other protests. Even with these mounting challenges, British

military authorities in East Africa were surprised by the British Prime Minister, Harold

43 Ibid., 40. 44 Timothy Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, 43. 45 Ibid., 43.

23

MacMillian’s, 1959 “Winds of Change” speech in which he declared Britain would grant

independence to its African colonies. They were woefully “unprepared to transform their

KAR battalions into the armed forces of independent African nations and were forced to

scramble to keep up with the political change.”46 There were barely any qualified African

officers and officials rushed to recruit young, college-educated men for service in the

military with mixed success. Although they tried to convince the newly formed

independent governments into a federation of sorts through which Britain could still

exercise influence over the KAR, the three territories opted out and went for full control

over their national armies.

The education issue in the army is an interesting one that continues to be

discussed today. The British assumed that uneducated, illiterate men often made the best

soldiers. There was an established air of ‘anti-intellectualism’ that pervaded the army that

stood in the way of many educated men joining the ranks. Despite efforts to recruit

college graduates, “the army remained an area of employment which was unattractive to

graduates with any substantial academic credentials, and its personnel continued to bear

the stigma of being generally uneducated.”47 As Amii Omara-Otunnu describes, the

education factor also explains why more men from Central Uganda, notably, Buganda did

not join the army. Uganda’s Southern and Central regions were and still are considered to

be better educated. Many felt that military service was below them, an attitude that

helped to create an army that was drawn more from certain districts than others. The view

46 Ibid., 44.

47 Amii Omara-Otunnu, Politics and the Military in Uganda, 44.

24

of soldiers as uneducated and uncivilized brutes is one that many Ugandans, particularly

from the Southern and Central parts of the country, still hold on to.

Uganda became independent from Britain on October 9, 1962. The responsibility

for the Army was transferred from the Ministry of Security and External Affairs under a

British official to the Ministry of Home Affairs under an Ugandan official. Clearly, the

new GoU anticipated that the army would not be needed to protect the country from

outside aggressors, but to handle internal dissent – it would be used as an agent to enforce

domestic order.48 This fact makes it seem rather ironic that fifty years later, the Ugandan

army would itself become the cause of internal instability.

48 Ibid., 46.

25

SECTION 4: POST INDEPENDENCE – FORMATION OF THE UGANDA PEOPLE’S DEFENSE FORCE (“UPDF”)

With independence, many members of the UPDF rank-and-file expected to see

radical changes in conditions of service, salary, leave time, and many other issues that the

British had long neglected such as housing and promotions. Among all issues concerning

the troops, the Africanization of the senior command structure was the most important to

them.49 While it had become a cause for concern during the colonial period, it was now a

demand by many soldiers who felt changes in leadership were long overdue. Although

there were more Ugandan commissioned officers, this did not reflect a fundamental

change in British thinking, but rather, a response to political pressure from London to

relinquish control over its territories. Overall, there was not much change in the army in

the first few years after independence. As many soon found out, political independence

did not translate to Ugandan control of the army.

One reason for the slow pace of change in the military was the nature of the newly

formed government and political parties in Uganda. The Ugandan People’s Congress

(“UPC”) led by pan-Africanist leader Apolo Milton Obote, won the support of many

soldiers because it had promised to Africanize the army leadership. However, this proved

to be a daunting undertaking. The GoU received monetary assistance from Britain, but

army leadership remained dominated by the British. In fact, a British officer acted as

commissioner of the Ugandan army and the 1964 mutiny of Ugandan troops was put

down with the help of British troops.50 Ugandan military leaders reluctantly accepted

British military assistance because they could not easily transfer British military positions

49 Ibid., 49. 50 Thomas P. Ofcansky, Uganda, Tarnished Pearl of Africa (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc.,

1996), 126.

26

to Ugandan officers without risking significant repercussions such as the denial of

reinforcements if another mutiny occurred.

The situation was further complicated by the fact that Uganda’s first post-

independence government was weak. Obote’s UPC formed an alliance with the Kabaka

Yekka party (“KY”). The KY, meaning ‘Kabaka Only’ was the Bugandan nationalist

political party made up of members of the Bagandan ethnic group who believed their

Kabaka, at that time, Kabaka Sir Edward Mutesa, should be the only legitimate ruler of

Buganda. However, not all Bagandans were members of this party and an alternative

party formed, called the Democratic Party (“DP”), which promised to be more inclusive

to all Ugandans. Once it became clear that the UPC and KY would lose the elections to

the DP, Milton Obote suggested a compromise to Kabaka Mutesa. If they formed and

alliance, Obote would allow the Kabaka to be president of Uganda, a largely ceremonial

position, however, he would also be allowed to retain his royal powers, while Obote

himself would become prime minister. Although it was an unlikely and uneasy alliance,

the UPC and KY realized that it would be advantageous to work together and both have a

share of power rather than be shut out completely if only the DP was in power.

Surprisingly, part of the reason the Africanization of the army leadership stalled

was because along with his new title as President, Kabaka Mutesa also became ex-officio

Commander-in-Chief of the Army. He had strong ties and affiliation to the British Army.

The Kabaka had undergone military training in Britain and had been made an honorary

Captain in the Grenadier Guards, an achievement that he later regarded as one the

proudest moments in his life.51 His military training and previous allegiance to the British

51 Amii Omara-Otunnu, Politics and the Military in Uganda, 52-53.

27

Army made Kabaka Mutesa wary of offending British officers by embarking on a policy

of Africanization. Despite his loyalty to the British Army, that only partly explained the

Kabaka’s hesitation about Africanization. Kabaka Mutesa’s primary concern was his

kingdom, Buganda, not the country as a whole. Men from his home area (Buganda)

formed only a small part of the army. Men from the north, Acholi and West Nile,

dominated the bulk of the army.

Kabaka Mutesa realized that if he were forced to Africanize the army leadership,

the future commanders also would have to come from the north. In a potential power

struggle between Obote and Kabaka Mutesa, the former would be able to inflame

regional sentiments in the army and mobilize them to be on his side. Kabaka Mustesa had

no such power or influence over the army because although he was technically

commander-in-chief, he was Bagandan and soldiers, most of whom were not Bagandan,

would not be loyal to him if they were forced to choose. Therefore, politically, it served

Kabaka Mutesa better to keep the senior ranks of the army in British hands. From the

very outset of politics in post-independent Uganda, it was clear that the army would be

key to power and control and that its leaders had already realized the potential of an

ethnic support base.52

The precarious power sharing arrangement between Obote and the UPC and

Kabaka Mutesa and the KY only lasted four years until 1966 when Obote ordered an

armed attack on the Kabaka’s palace, which was led by Idi Amin Dada. There were

rumors that the Kabaka had been receiving arms and assistance from foreign

governments, such as Britain and the U.S., in order to stage a coup against Obote. To

preempt the Kabaka, Obote acted first by ordering this surprise attack. He quickly

52 Ibid, 53.

28

consolidated his power forcing the Kabaka to flee to London where he remained in exile

until his death, while Obote declared himself President of Uganda. However, he and the

UPC lost much popularity in Uganda because much of the population saw Obote’s

actions as unlawful, unconstitutional, and unwanted.

After suspending the independence constitution in 1966 and making more

enemies for himself, Obote decided to swing his allegiance elsewhere in the world of

super powers by instituting his “Move to the Left” in 1969. In a step toward socialization,

Uganda’s foreign owned companies, including British banks, were to be nationalized.

Obote embraced the so-called, ‘Common Man’s Charter’, which was meant to inspire

Ugandans to work together to bridge the growing gap between rich and poor. Obote had

lived in Kenya for a period from 1950 to 1956 where he became involved with trade

union activities and adopted leftist tendencies,53 which explained his nascent socialist

ambitions. Naturally, this move greatly angered Uganda’s anti-communist allies

including the British, Americans, and Israelis who in-turn welcomed and allegedly helped

Idi Amin overthrow the left leaning Obote in a military coup on January 25, 1971.

There is a tendency to lay the blame of the militarization of Uganda’s political

system on Idi Amin, but as Ali Mazrui explains, it was Obote who began this

transformation by treating the Baganda as a conquered people. He also expanded realm of

fear as a strategy of political persuasion by creating an elaborate system of internal

informers using the military to silence dissent.54 While there is some speculation among

historians and observers as to why Obote ultimately lost power, most agree that it was a

53 Iain Grahame, Amin and Uganda, A Personal Memoir (Great Britain: Granada Publishing Ltd., 1980), 56.

54 Ali A. Mazrui, Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda: The Making of a Military Ethnocracy

(Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc., 1975),139.

29

combination of factors. Many Ugandans objected to Obote’s decision to suspend the

constitution. Others thought he his lost legitimacy in 1966 when he arrested and detained

five government ministers without a trial. Others attributed the coup to foreign powers,

specifically anti-leftist U.S. and Britain, meddling in Uganda’s internal affairs. However,

it is clear that the coup would not have occurred if it were not for the gradual

estrangement that took place between Amin and Obote.

In preparation for his coup, Amin had started recruiting soldiers whom he felt he

could trust from his own language group and West Nile region such as the Kakwa,

Lugbara, and Nubian. Amin and Obote, both northerners, struggled for control of the

army. However, Amin spoke a Sudanic language while Obote spoke a Nilotic one, Lwo.

As evidence of Amin’s recruitment efforts, “between 1968 and 1969, Sudanic speakers in

the Army increased by 74 percent, more than twice the rate of increase of Lwo speakers,

or…of the army as a whole in the same period.”55 In 1968 there were a total of 867

Sudanic language speakers and in 1969 there were a recorded 1,509 Sudanic language

speakers in the army.56 Clearly, Amin had begun planning for his take-over early on.

After the coup, Amin promptly promoted his best soldiers. As an illustration of the

coup’s ethnic and regional dimensions, thirteen of the twenty-two officers were from

Amin’s home area of West Nile province while another four of the twenty-two were

Sudanese.57 The leadership of the army changed in accordance with its new leader.

Although there were some accusations that the Sudanese aided a little too much in

55 Amii Omara-Otunnu, Politics and the Military in Uganda, 86.

56 Ibid, 87.

57 History Lecture at Makerere University, October 18, 2008.

30

Amin’s coup, the Sudanese soldiers in the Army were long time settlers in Uganda and

were descendants of the original Sudanese force brought into Uganda by Emin Pasha.58

By this time, many Ugandans had grown tired of Obote and welcomed Amin’s

coup. Even the Ugandan Asian community, which had been fearful of a backlash,

initially welcomed Amin and his decision to cancel Obote’s socialist ‘Move to the

Left.’59 Amin managed to gain popularity with the Bagandans by allowing the late

Kabaka Mutesa’s body to be flown from Britain to Uganda for a ceremonial burial. The

Kabaka had died in exile of alcohol poisoning in his London home. Although the death

was reported as suicide, it was suspected that Obote’s agents were ultimately behind his

death. Despite his efforts to establish allies, widespread jubilation in the streets of

Kampala celebrating Amin and his victory did not last long. He quickly established

personal military rule by promoting himself to rank of full General and Commander-in

Chief and pronounced himself President of Uganda on February 20, 1971.

After the coup, Amin gave the army sweeping powers to arrest anyone on

suspicion of any crime. He also suspended all political activities. As a consequence, the

country’s prisons were soon overflowing with ‘anti-Amin’ dissidents. Not even a year

after taking power, he announced the expulsion of the Israeli and Asian population and

later, all foreigners. Amin had also antagonized nearly every sector of the Ugandan

population. In order to eliminate his opponents, Amin created the Public Safety Unit and

the State Research Bureau, both of which were notorious for employing gruesome

interrogation and torture tactics. There were also public executions for those convicted of

58 Emin Pasha was a German-born explorer, naturalist, and medical doctor. He served under

Governor James Gordon in the Equatoria province of British administered Sudan. Emin Pasha was often sent on diplomatic missions to the Kingdoms of Buganda and Bunyoro.

59 History Lecture at Makerere University, October 17, 2008.

31

treason in Kampala and Mbale. Many civilians were forced to go and witness these

executions as a form of intimidation.60

The army itself was divided between Amin supporters and Lwo-speaking Acholi

and Langi who remained loyal to Obote and refused to acknowledge the leadership

change. The army’s reputation also began to diminish among civilians as soldiers used

their new status and sense of entitlement to harass and intimidate civilians. Contrary to

what Amin claimed, insecurity was actually on the rise in urban areas of Uganda and

many soldiers who felt they had helped Amin attain power now expected to get rich

quickly through any means. Amin’s military control over the nation left no room for self-

expression, criticism, or dissent. Any opposition was quickly and forcefully dealt with

while the semi-literate Amin made up for his shortcomings by being a skilled and

cunning soldier as well as a master manipulator.

Amin also carried out a foreign policy that angered many Christian Ugandans.

Befriending the likes of Muammur Gaddafi of Libya, King Khalid of Saudi Arabia, and

Kuwait, Amin thought he could use his Muslim identity to gain cash and political support

from rich, Arab, Muslim nations who were hopeful that he could convert Uganda into a

Muslim country. Many Ugandans, who are primarily Christian, opposed Uganda’s 1974

admittance to the Islamic Conference of Nations and did not want to have Islam be seen

as the religion of the establishment. It was also well understood that under Amin, one

could gain power by becoming a Muslim.61

60 History Lecture at Makerere University, October 24, 2008. 61 Phares Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence, A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes (Trenton, NJ:

Africa World Press, Inc., 1992), 110.

32

Another event that horrified Christians and non-Christians alike was the murder

of the Archbishop of Uganda, Janani Luwum, Internal Affairs Minister Charles Oboth

Ofumbi, and Land and Water Resources Minister Erinayo Wilson Oryema.62 It was

reported that Amin had the men murdered because the Archbishop apparently learned of

an Acholi plot to overthrow Amin’s regime and although he was not part of any such

plot, the Archbishop had failed to inform Amin of the potential threat. The Archbishop’s

murder was followed by a ban on twenty-six Christian organizations working in Uganda

and by a massive migration of exiles from every ethnic group and political background.

Amin was the subject of worldwide condemnation even from his former friends and

allies.63 The rest of the world was gradually becoming aware of the extent of human

rights violations in Uganda under Amin. Ugandans living in exile formed several rebel

groups in opposition to Amin. This included FRONASA (the Front for National

Salvation) led by Yoweri Museveni and Kikosi Maalum led by David Oyite-Ojok.

Then in 1978, perhaps in an effort to distract people from the horrors at home,

Amin decided to invade Kagera province in Northwest Tanzania in order to claim it for

Uganda. Interestingly, there is also substantial evidence that Amin invaded Tanzania in

an effort not to divert the attention of the Ugandan population, but to divert his out-of-

control army and maintain their allegiances. As Andrew Mambo and Julian Schofield

explain, Amin had long ago abandoned trying to win the support of the populace. He

faced no significant threats as any attempt at civilian opposition was violently squashed.

Additionally, organized opposition in the rural areas of Uganda was weak at best. Rather,

62 “Uganda: Death of an Archbishop,” Time Magazine, February 28, 1977, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,918720,00.html (accessed June 19, 2010).

63 Ibid., 112.

33

Amin relied solely on the support of the military for his power, thus it also became his

biggest vulnerability.64

Over the years, Amin became paranoid and suspicious of the army and attempted

coup attempts, not entirely without reason. There were a reported twelve attempted coups

against Amin by his troops by 1977.65 To calm his own fears of being betrayed, Amin

had purged the army of various ethnic groups including Alurs, Madi, Lugbara (Amin was

half-Lugbara), and Itesot. Amin dramatically increased the size of the army by recruiting

troops from Congo and southern Sudan since he had alienated all but a few Ugandan

ethnic groups. In fact, “by 1978, Amin’s army was fifty percent south Sudanese and

Nubian, twenty-six percent Congolese, and only twenty-four percent Ugandan, mostly

Kakwa and other Nubians, all overwhelmingly Muslim…Amin depended on a foreign

mercenary army…which had no allegiance to indigenous Ugandans.”66 Naturally, the

small number of Ugandans remaining in the army grew upset at the large number of

foreigners in the army. Amin recognized this and in an effort to distract the soldiers from

the army’s internal problems and his inept leadership, he manufactured a false enemy in

Tanzania.

The president of Tanzania at the time, Julius Nyerere, had despised Amin and his

brutish ways from the start and quickly deployed the Tanzania People’s Defense Force

(“TPDF”) to repel Amin’s forces. The TPDF invaded Uganda along with Ugandan exile

groups FRONASA and Kikosi Maalum. FRONASA was mainly composed of young,

64 Andrew Mambo and Julian Schofield, “Military Diversion in the 1978 Uganda-Tanzania War,”

Journal of Political and Military Sociology 35, no. 2 (Winter 2007): 299-321. 65 Ibid., 308. 66 Ibid., 308.

34

educated, intellectuals from Western Uganda. By contrast, Kikosi Maalum was made-up

of semi-educated, former army members under Obote from Lango and Acholi regions in

the north. Most Langi and Acholi soldiers who did not escape to Sudan or Tanzania after

Amin’s coup were rounded up and killed immediately.67 The ones who had escaped

wanted to exact revenge on Amin formed and the rebel group, Kikosi Maalum while

living in exile in Tanzania. Despite their ideological differences and mutual suspicions,

FRONASA and Kikosi Maalum decided to compromise and work together along with the

TPDF to invade Uganda and overthrow Amin. Although the new combined group

adopted the name Uganda National Liberation Army (“UNLA”) it was clear that the two

groups were still recruiting men separately for an eventual standoff once Amin was out of

the picture.

On April 11, 1979, Kampala was liberated and the majority of Amin’s troops

were flushed out of small areas of resistance.68 The UNLA installed a civilian

administration with Yusef Lule as President, a self-proclaimed non-political leader and

academic. The challenges Uganda faced after the war and after nearly a decade of Idi

Amin’s rule were indescribable. The economy was in shambles, there was virtually no

infrastructure to speak of, and most skilled Ugandans had left the country long ago. Lule

was seen as a compromise candidate who would appeal to a broad cross-section of the

Ugandan population more than any other political figure at the time. Lule was a former

67 Pecos Kutesa, Uganda’s Revolution 1979-1986, How I Saw It (Kampala: Fountain Publishers,

2006), 18. 68 Amii Omara-Otunnu, Politics and the Military in Uganda, 143.

35

professor at Makerere University and thus, well educated, mild mannered, and the very

antithesis of rambling Idi Amin.69 Lule was seen as a welcome change.

There were soon disputes within the Lule regime and the newly created National

Consultative Council (“NCC”), the interim civilian body that was responsible for

rebuilding the government. Lule’s leadership style was deemed rigid and clumsy at best.

It also seemed that most of his intellectual and political ideas were derived from Britain

and bore no resemblance to the problems facing war-torn Uganda.70 Lule had been in

exile in Nairobi and seemed rather detached from the realities on the ground. In fact, he

undermined the powers that mattered the most – the military. His plans to reform the

recruitment process of the army threatened the traditional areas for army recruits, Acholi

and Lango, and did not win him large amounts of support. Finally, while many men had

fought for years in the bush against Amin, “his involvement in the anti-Amin struggle

could be measured in a span of a few weeks spent in hotel rooms and caucuses.”71 After

only ten weeks in office, Lule was quickly removed from power by a vote of no

confidence. Next, the NCC chose Godfrey Binaisa, a former Obote minister and lawyer

to be President of Uganda. However, it soon became clear that Binaisa was no democrat.

He placed a two-year ban on all political parties and proclaimed that all political activity

had to be conducted under the UNLF umbrella, something that created outcry and

protests throughout the country.72

69 Timothy Kalyegira, “Why Yusuf Lule Was Removed From Office After Only 68 Days,” Sunday

Monitor, April 18, 2009.

70 T.V. Sathyamurthy, The Political Development of Uganda: 1900 – 1986 (Hants, England: Gower Publishing Company Limited, 1986), 661.

71 Moses Kalanzi, “Buganda and Uganda after the fall of Dada,” Sunday Monitor, April 26, 2009.

72 Thomas P. Ofcansky, Uganda, Tarnished Pearl of Africa, 51.

36

Another reason Binaisa created trouble for himself was that he had never

developed a following within the UNLA. Binaisa, like Lule, never fully acknowledged

the continued and crucial importance of the Army even in the post-Amin era: political

power without army backing was tenuous and hollow. In order to hold onto power, he

needed the support of a substantial portion of the army, which he did not have and

seemed little concerned to acquire.73

Binaisa further demonstrated his misunderstanding of the army and its important

political dimensions when he decided to remove David Oyite Ojok from his position as

Army Chief of Staff and appointed him as Ambassador to Algeria. This was Binaisa’s

retaliation against the army for arresting his press secretary, James Namakajo, on

suspicion of leaking documents to the media.74 The news that the man who had helped

liberate Uganda from the hands of Idi Amin was being removed from the Army was not

received well by the soldiers. Binaisa had no plan to help him win popularity within the

army. The Military Commission refused to accept Binaisa’s decision and asked for a

meeting to discuss the issue, but Binaisa flatly refused. Instead, he chose to barricade

himself in the State House at Entebbe while the Military Commission decided how best

to remove him from power. On May 13, 1980, the Military Commission announced that

it had assumed the presidential powers and that Binaisa had been removed from his

position as President of Uganda.75 The Military Commission claimed that is was not a

military coup since it took control, not the army. This bloodless coup demonstrated the

73 Amii Omara-Otunnu, Politics and the Military in Uganda, 143. 74 Thomas P. Ofcansky, Uganda, Tarnished Pearl of Africa, 51.

75 Amii Omara-Otunnu, Politics and the Military in Uganda, 152.

37

limits on Binaisa’s power and the fact that the military remained the ultimate source of

power in the country.

The Military Commission was able to re-establish discipline within the army by

appointing Paulo Muwanga as its Chairman and Yoweri Museveni as Vice-Chairman.

The commission announced a general election for December 1980. However, as the

general election drew nearer, tensions rose once again within the army. Museveni and

Ojok were fully conscious of the centrality of the army in achieving power and both men

were busy recruiting future soldiers from their home areas. Former president Milton

Obote also returned from exile and prepared to run with his UPC party in the general

election. This greatly worried Museveni who was anti-UPC and anti-Obote. Museveni

knew that Muwanga, Ojok, and Obote would all work together to recapture power for the

UPC. It was alleged that Museveni started hiding weapons during this time.76

The UPC and DP were the two frontrunners in the election along with two new

parties, the Conservative Party (“CP”) and Museveni’s Uganda Patriotic Movement

(“UPM”). To many Ugandans, these elections for 126 parliamentary seats were seen as a

chance to firmly establish civilian rule and to build a democratic country. The election

proceeded and voter participation and enthusiasm was high. The results revealed

continued Ugandan support of Obote and the UPC, which won seventy-two seats and the

DP, which won fifty-one seats. Museveni’s UPM won just one seat while two seats were

left undetermined.77 Although the DP complained of election rigging, they still opted to

join the parliament, thus legitimizing the election. Obote again became President of

76 Interview with Ugandan Historian, November 1, 2008.

77 Amii Omara-Otunnu, Politics and the Military in Uganda, 154.

38

Uganda while those opposed to the election results, the UPM, vowed to fight the rigged

elections.

Museveni returned to the bush with the UPM, fragments of FRONASA, and other

anti-Obote elements such as UNLA soldiers who were from Museveni’s home area of

Ankole in western Uganda. Museveni formed these various anti-government groups into

the National Resistance Army/Movement (“NRA” or “NRM”). Museveni’s decision to

go to the bush may have been justified by what he claimed were rigged elections, but in

reality, he always had planned to fight a guerilla war if he lost the elections as evidenced

by his recruiting soldiers and hiding weapons. The rigged elections were only one reason

to go to the bush. The main reason so many educated men and women chose to go to the

bush in 1980 was because the system was still failing them. It was the same system of Idi

Amin and the same system Obote had used to rule Uganda in the 1960’s. It was the

colonial system. As Phares Mutibwa explains, the NRA “taking up arms was a crime; but

not so much so as the continuation of the system which had been used by all of Uganda’s

leaders since independence to subjugate and terrorise the people of the country.”78

Museveni had prepared himself well for a prolonged bush-war by learning tactics during

his training with the rebel group FRELIMO in Mozambique.79

Museveni’s bush war started in the area known as the Luwero Triangle north of

Kampala. The population was predominantly Catholic and a DP stronghold and home to

Bagandans who had also formed several rebel groups such as the Uganda Freedom

78 Phares Mutibwa. Uganda Since Independence, A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes, 155. 79 From 1966-70 Museveni studied economics and political science at the University of Dar-es-

Salaam where he adopted Marxist ideology. He formed the University Students' African Revolutionary Front activist group and led a student delegation to FRELIMO territory in Portuguese Mozambique, where he received guerrilla training. From Africa Research Bulletin, February 25 1986: 7949.

39

Movement (“UFM”). Any anti-Obote activity was sure to be supported in this area. The

government army (UNLA) managed to fight a somewhat successful counter-insurgency

war in Luwero at a high cost to its civilians, who were caught between Museveni’s NRA

and the government forces crossfire. However, the Luwero Triangle area continued to

play host to the NRA for a majority of the war. Most residents preferred the well-

disciplined, well-behaved NRA to the lawless and recklessness of the UNLA soldiers

whom they typically viewed as outsiders.

Meanwhile, tensions were mounting within the UNLA. The army was still mainly

composed of northern Acholi who were the majority, as well as Langi, Obote’s own

ethnic group. As expected, Obote promoted his own Langi tribesmen much faster than

their Acholi counterparts. The division became painfully clear after the suspicious

helicopter crash that led to the death of David Oyite-Ojok in 1983. The events

surrounding Oytie-Ojok’s death were unclear. It was never known if his helicopter was

shot down intentionally or if it was a genuine accident.80 Obote appointed a fellow Langi,

but relatively junior officer, Smith Opon Acak as the new Army Chief of Staff. Other

Acholi officers were not amused by the appointment of a junior officer as Chief and

looked to a Brigadier, Basilio Okello, to lead them.

Okello was only semi-literate, but much more experienced and senior than the

new Chief. He was also Acholi, a devout Catholic, and had important political differences

with Obote, the reason why many Acholi soldiers thought he was wrongly overlooked for

the position as Chief. For many Acholi in the army, this move was the last straw that led

to the dissolution of Acholi-Langi cooperation. Oyite-Ojok’s death confirmed their fears

80 Samwiri R. Karugire. Roots of Instability in Uganda (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1988), 94.

40

that when given a choice, their leader would automatically pick a man of his own tribe

than other obviously better qualified candidates. Some army factions were also

dissatisfied because they were suffering heavy causalities in the war against anti-Obote

guerillas. Acholi soldiers such as Basilio Okello and General Tito Okello previously had

favored negotiations with Museveni and the NRA. Now after Obote’s misstep, they were

fully against him and started planning their own internal war within the army and the

method of the next coup d’etat that would finally rid them of Obote.81

Basilio Okello’s coup succeeded on July 27, 1985. He led a march of soldiers

from Gulu to Kampala and was met with remarkably little resistance during the three

days it took to reach Kampala. Once again, there was little Obote could do to stop the

coup and few people he could ask for help. The coup was bloodless and was met with

only small acts of violence and looting that erupted in Kampala in the days immediately

afterward.82 Obote fled to Kenya while General Tito Lutwa Okello was declared Head of

State with Basilio Okello serving as the Chief of Defense Forces. There was an effort to

form a government of national unity in which all political parties were to be involved and

represented on the Military Council. Most political parties and insurgent groups joined

the unity government with the notable exception of the NRA who refused to participate,

due to the fact that five of the nine Military Council members were Acholi.83 The NRA

was composed primarily of men from central and western tribes including Baganda,

Ankole, and Toro. Museveni made several demands on Okello that were all refused.

Museveni stepped up armed action against the Okello government once Okello made the

81 Phares Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence, A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes, 163. 82 Amii Omara-Otunnu, Politics and the Military in Uganda, 154. 83 Thomas P. Ofcansky, Uganda, Tarnished Pearl of Africa, 57.

41

mistake of appointing Paulo Muwanga as prime minister. Muwanga had served under

Obote as minister of defense and was viewed as partially responsible for the widespread

human rights violations that had occurred under Obote. Okello eventually realized that

the NRA would not relent anytime soon and agreed to peace talks with the NRA in

Nairobi, Kenya.

Kenyan president Daniel Arap Moi hosted and mediated the negotiations between

Okello and the NRA. After four months of discussions, the two sides eventually agreed to

a peace accord that would change the composition of the Military Council, create a

national army composed of both the UNLA and NRA, allow a multinational force from

Kenya and Tanzania to supervise the agreement, and begin for the preparation of national

elections.84 However promising the peace deal seemed, it was in the end, too good to be

true. The agreement was never implemented and the two sides began accusing each other

of various small ceasefire violations and renewed, large-scale fighting soon followed.

Museveni’s NRA had gained momentum and the UNLA were losing confidence.

Some historians claim that Museveni and the NRA were never actually committed to the

Nairobi peace talks, but rather used them as a stalling tactic in order to gain territory

while the UNLA and its leadership were distracted. Museveni also had the advantage of

being seen as a young and strong leader compared to the aging seventy-one year old Tito

Okello.85 The NRA’s renewed offensive began a month to the day after signing the peace

pact in Nairobi.86 The NRA successfully captured Kampala on January 26, 1986 and was

84 Ibid., 57. 85 Oxford Analytica Database, “Uganda: Peace Plan,” December 18, 1985,

http://www.intelink.gov/oxan/display.aspx?itemID=DB96338 (accessed July 9, 2008). 86 “Museveni Takes Kampala,” Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series 23,

no. 2 (February 15, 1986): 7949.

42

greeted with fanfare and jubilation. Museveni delivered a public radio message

announcing the dissolution of the Military Council headed by General Okello and the

upcoming installation of a broad based government. Kampala and environs enjoyed

relative calm for the first time since the fighting had renewed.

Although Museveni and the NRA captured control in a very disciplined and

methodical manner, there were still many problems they would have to deal with before

celebrating the end of their five-year guerilla war. First, there were many areas in the

north and east of the country that were not under its control. Many soldiers who fled to

the east and north of the country took weapons with them and went looting, killing and

raping as they made their way. However, many government soldiers also surrendered to

the NRA after they had been abandoned by their commanding officers.87 Members of the

Federal Democratic Movement (“Fedemo”) and the Uganda Freedom Movement

(“UFM”), other anti-Obote rebel groups were successfully incorporated into the NRA

shortly after its victory. Still, there were many northern and eastern soldiers who did not

view Museveni’s takeover as liberation, but as a threat. For the first time since

independence, a non-northerner would control the government. Museveni was swiftly

sworn in as President on January 29, 1986. Tens of thousands of Ugandans attended the

ceremony that made Museveni Uganda’s ninth leader since independence in 1962. Many

hoped he would honor his pledges to restore democracy, uphold the constitution, and

work to unite the country.

Many northerners had a legitimate reason to worry over their fate. The majority of

them feared that the NRA victory would mean an end to the colonial tradition of army

87 Ibid., 7948.

43

recruitment among the Acholi, for whom it was one of the few means of earning wages.88

Additionally, many Ugandans at that time were of the opinion that the Acholi people, the

powerbase for successive unspeakable governments, were just about to start getting what

they deserved. When forming his government, Museveni did little to quell the

northerners’ fears. All of the key posts in the government were appointed to westerners

and secondly, southerners. Out of the top forty NRA positions in the new government,

around three-quarters were held by westerners, mostly Banyankole or Banyarwanda with

the balance consisting of Baganda, with only a sprinkling of northerners.89

Museveni’s takeover was also met with fear and uncertainty in the eastern part of

the country. The Iteso population spent Obote’s second reign (1980-1985) in relative

peace. The civil war that plagued Buganda and other areas was somewhat far removed

from their daily lives. However, many men from the east had served in the previous

government’s army and police and feared they would be punished. In July of 1986,

almost three-quarters of the national police force were dishonorably discharged. They lost

the right to severance pay and pension.90 Making matters worse, the NRM also disbanded

local militias who had organized themselves to fight the neighboring Karamojongs from

reaching Teso and stealing their cattle. Karamojong warriors had been cattle raiding for

many years and now the Itseo people were unable to protect themselves or their cattle.

Many people in the area began to associate Museveni with the increase in cattle raids.

Stolen cattle also had more than financial implications for the Iteso people. Cattle

88 “Uganda: False Messiah,” Africa Confidential 28, no. 3. (February 4, 1987): 2. 89 “Uganda: Museveni and His Men,” Africa Confidential 29, no. 19. (September 23, 1988): 5.

90 Ben Jones, Beyond the State in Rural Uganda (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd.,

2009), 49.

44

represented a social identity on which people negotiated marriage, compensation, and the

means by which boys became men.91 As a result, men and women who had served under

previous governments and who were disgruntled at Museveni not sending troops to

protect them from the Karamojong, went into the bush with their guns.

From the outset, the NRM and the new president faced significant challenges in

part due to the number of people involved and the gradual militarization of Ugandan

society. It was thought that the demobilization and re-settlement of former government

soldiers and various rebels throughout Uganda involved at least 70,000 men.92 There was

also concern that the NRA would use revenge killings against former government

soldiers and the northern Acholi and Langi population to get retribution for years of

human rights abuses by both Obote and Amin regimes. However, Museveni was firm in

his declaration that no revenge killings or criminal activities would be tolerated. For the

most part, many Ugandans did not fear NRA soldiers as they did the soldiers of previous

regimes. The NRA had a well-disciplined reputation that, unfortunately, seemed to falter

and deteriorate once they encountered areas of heavy resistance.

After the NRA’s victory, General Basilio Okello fled Kampala along with some

5,000 loyal troops and large amounts of weapons to his home area in northern Uganda

forming an Acholi militia that would be known as the Uganda People’s Democratic

Army (“UPDA”). Okello held the town of Gulu under siege and proclaimed that if the

NRA dared get too close, his troops would hunt down southerners living in the area.93

91 Ibid., 48. 92 Oxford Analytica Database, “Uganda: New Leadership,” February 6, 1986,

https://www.intelink.gov/oxan.display.aspx (assessed July 9, 2008).

93 “Uganda: The Final Thrust,” Africa Confidential 27, no. 5 (February 26, 1986): 3.

45

The NRA was eventually able to take Gulu on March 8, 1986 after only a three- hour

battle with Okello’s forces.94 After their victory in Gulu, the NRA was then able to move

to various other northern towns, such as Kitgum, to establish its control. However, if the

NRA faced relatively small amounts of resistance in the early days it was largely for

show, not because they had sealed their victory. The more likely situation was the

members of this resistance were already in the bush organizing themselves into various

rebel groups. Northern Uganda would remain an area out of control and reach from the

central government for decades to come.

Many regional and ethnic rebel groups formed after Museveni’s takeover, it was a

challenge to keep track to whom their allegiances were and what exactly they were

fighting for. In eastern Uganda, a formidable rebel group formed called the Uganda

People’s Army (“UPA”). This group was mainly made up the Itesot ethnic group, which

is Uganda’s second or third largest group.95 It was in this area, specifically just outside of

Kumi district, where the NRA committed a grave mistake that would haunt them for

years to come. In an attempted crackdown on the UPA in July of 1989, more than 276

suspected rebels, mostly youth, were crammed into train cars for three days. As a result,

fifty of them died of suffocation.96 Instead of working with the population of eastern

Uganda, the NRA further alienated itself among the mostly Itesot ethnic group by killing

youth who may not have even had a rebel connection at all.

94 “Uganda: Mission Completed,” Africa Confidential 27, no. 6 (March 12, 1986): 7. 95 “Uganda: Museveni and His Men,” Africa Confidential 29, no. 19 (September 23, 1988): 6. 96 “Uganda: Army Crackdown,” Africa Research Bulletin, Political Social and Cultural Series 26,

no. 7 (August 15, 1989): 9355.

46

This incident was only the beginning of alleged abuse of civilians at the hands of

the NRA. As stated earlier, the NRA started its rule with a good record and was generally

known for treating civilians with dignity and respect. However, it seemed the more

opposition they faced, the more their tactics became just as appalling as the rebels they

were fighting. Amnesty International also accused the NRA of human rights abuses,

including rape, torture, murder, and illegal detention of civilians and reported that such

incidents were on the rise within Uganda.97

While a large number of rebels eventually ceased fighting through incentives such

as amnesty or incorporation into the NRA, such as West Nile rebel groups, the Former

Ugandan National Army (“FUNA”) and the Ugandan National Rescue Front (“UNRF”),

a large amount of rebels remained active through several decades of Museveni’s rule.

One group that formed shortly after the NRA’s takeover was Alice Lakwena’s Holy

Spirit Movement. Alice began her fight against the NRA with only a small amount of

weapons and men, most of whom were former members of the UPDA. Her group

marched into Gulu singing hymns and carrying the Bible. Alice’s rebels attacked the

NRA at several points in various locations. It was reported that they coated themselves in

palm oil for protection and often walked straight into NRA bullets. Lakwena and her

exploits quickly drew international attention and bewildered curiosity. Surprisingly,

Lakwena and some 6,000 fighters got to within fifty kilometers of Kampala, before

finally being routed by the NRA. Outside of Acholiland, Lakwena could not count on the

passive support of civilians, or intimidate them into joining her ranks. Residents also kept

97 Ibid., 9356.

47

the NRA aware of the rebels’ movements.98 Although the NRA killed many of Alice’s

fighters, she and a large group of rebels managed to escape and cross the border into

Kenya where they were detained. After her departure, part of Lakwena’s group pushed on

with her efforts and were led by her father and Joseph Kony,99 reportedly, a cousin of

Lakwena’s. Although the group went through several name changes and leadership

battles, the group that was to become the thorn in the NRA and Uganda’s side morphed

into the Lord’s Resistance Army (“LRA”) which continues to be led by Joseph Kony to

this day.

Immediately after the 1986 NRA coup, The Economist magazine pointed out that

another area of resistance to Museveni’s rule, West Nile province, “the home of ex-

President Idi Amin, is linked to the rest of the country by a single bridge. It has been in

effect a separate fief since General Amin was thrown out in 1979, and will probably

remain so.” In another news article written shortly after Museveni’s takeover, the author

commented, “from what Museveni has said so far, it is more likely that he will try to woo

than conquer them. But since all their links with the outside world pass through his areas,

he could just leave them [northerners] to rot. There is still a danger of Uganda splitting in

two.” 100 In hindsight these comments seem ironic and cruel since it is exactly what

happened and why Uganda finds itself in such a precarious situation yet again, after a

quarter century. The rugged, young, promising guerilla fighter is still in power, however,

98 Tim Allen, “Understanding Alice: Uganda’s Holy Spirit Movement in Context,” Journal of the

International African Institute 61, no. 3 (1991): 373) http://www.jstor.org/stabe/1160031 (accessed August 1, 2010).

99 Ibid., 374.

100 “Museveni Takes Kampala,” Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series 23,

no. 2 (February 15, 1986): 7951.

48

he bears little resemblance to the leader he once was and his country bears little of the

promise it once had.

49

CHAPTER 2: UGANDA AND RWANDA: RIVALS OR ALLIES?

SECTION 1: HISTORY OF MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UGANDA AND RWANDA

The Uganda-Rwanda relationship is long, complicated and fascinating. Equally as

captivating is the relationship between Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and the

NRA and Rwandan President Paul Kagame and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (“RPF”).

Although relations between the two men and the countries they govern have been on and

off again, it would be almost impossible to explain how either government or, former

rebel group came about, without mention of the other. The history and context of

Uganda-Rwanda relations is also helpful in understanding the greater regional dynamics

at play in the Great Lakes as a whole.

The Banyarwanda people form the largest single ethnic group in East Africa and

share a common language, Kinyarwanda. Long before the colonialists arrived in East

Africa, Banyarwandans had migrated and were settled into various parts of Rwanda,

Burundi, the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”), western Tanzania, and

southwest Uganda. Thus, when the colonial powers carved up Africa and fixed arbitrary

borders on the continent at the Berlin Conference in 1884, many Banyarwandans found

themselves split up by new artificial borders and denizens of new colonial territories they

had never heard of. Germany was awarded control over the territory known as Ruanda-

Urundi (modern day Rwanda and Burundi), but did not have control for long. After

losing World War I, Germany lost its colonies and control over Ruanda-Urundi, then part

of greater German East-Africa. Belgium assumed ownership of Ruanda-Urundi, a

country that was governing neighboring Congo with an unprecedented level of brutality

and exploitation

50

However, even before the introduction of colonialism, Banyarwandans had a

system of rule that separated people on the basis of economic and social status.

Banyarwandans in Rwanda could be broken down into three categories. The Tutsi people,

literally meaning ‘rich in cattle’ in Kinyarwanda were primarily land and cattle owners.

They comprised a relatively small percent of the population, approximately fifteen. The

Hutu people, meaning ‘servants’ in Kinyarwanda, were mainly pastoralists and worked

many of the farms that were owned by the Tutsis. Lastly, there was a very small, around

one percent, Twa or pygmy population, who were primarily hunter-gatherers. There was

an established Tutsi monarchy that operated on elaborate systems of organization that

broke down rule by province, district, hill, and neighborhood.1

Interestingly, Rwandans themselves did not see the categories of Tutsi and Hutu

in ethnic terms, but rather, as a dynamic class and social status. The categories of Tutsi

and Hutu were fluid, superficial classifications that did not limit a person from moving up

in society. Before the advent of colonialism, it was possible for a Hutu to become Tutsi,

either by marrying a Tutsi, or through land-ownership. There was even a process known

as ‘kwi-hutura’, literally meaning to shed one’s Hutu-ness. A Hutu could become a Tutsi

by being successful in society. Therefore, there was a mechanism in the system that

provided an opportunity for growth and advancement. Tutsi and Hutu lived and worked

side-by-side,2 inter-marrying, and mingling with each other without much regard to

perceived ethnicity.

1 Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide (London: Verso, 2004), 5. 2 Ibid., 4.

51

It was not until the introduction of colonial rule that the classifications of Tutsi

and Hutu became fixed and, of course, became the basis on which the country would later

self -destruct. The German authorities found it relatively easy and effective to utilize the

Tutsi monarchy to legitimize its rule, which made the now disenfranchised Hutu

population jealous and suspicious of their Tutsi countrymen. Both the German and

Belgian administrators insisted that Rwandans identify definitively as either Hutu or

Tutsi despite the fact that many people were actually mixed. The colonialists used

archaic means of classification including measuring the circumference of the skull, or

measuring the distance between the eyes. In fact, the Belgians dispatched scientists to

Rwanda who, “brought scales and measuring tapes and calipers, and they went about

weighing Rwandans, measuring Rwandan cranial capacities and conducting comparative

analyses of the relative protuberance of Rwandan noses.”3 Once the measuring was

done, Rwandans received an identification card that classified them as either Tutsi or

Hutu, making it impossible for anyone to change groups or advance in society as they

could before.

The colonial authorities even claimed that the Tutsi were so superior in body

shape and brain capacity that they simply could not originally be from the area. So came

into existence the ‘Hamitic Myth’ that decreed that Tutsis were really descended from

Ethiopia and foreign to Rwanda. While there was absolutely no evidence to substantiate

this claim, the Hamitic Myth became so important that it is essential to understanding

Rwanda’s history. When independence finally came to Rwanda in 1962, the long

disgruntled and ill-treated Hutu majority used the Hamitic Myth to turn the established

3 Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will be Killed with Our Families:

Stories from Rwanda (New York: Picador, 1998), 55.

52

order on its head. The génocidaires later latched on to the myth that Tutsis were foreign

to encourage Hutus to rid the country of the so-called ‘invaders’. The strategy worked

with amazing success. Léon Mugusera, a popular Hutu power figure, delivered a speech

calling on Hutus to send the Tutsis back to Ethiopia by the Nyabarongo river, a tributary

of the Nile. Not long after his speech, the river was full of dead Tutsis and tens of

thousands of their bodies washed up on the shores of Lake Victoria.4

The story of how Uganda and Rwanda became so closely linked is also tied to the

consequences of the Hamitic myth. In 1959, set off by an apparent attack on a Hutu man

by a group of Tutsis, gangs of Hutu militias went from hill to hill and village to village

targeting Tutsi families. The gangs were armed with machetes, clubs, spears, and a few

rifles that they used to terrorize their victims who they evicted, beat, and often killed.

These Hutu gangs were hungry for vengeance and in most areas of the country the local

authorities condoned and even encouraged their actions. Making matters worse, the

Belgian-led army and police made little attempt to stop the violence, leaving thousands of

Tutsi families no choice but to flee and literally run for their lives.5 The Belgians realized

that independence would soon come to Rwanda and that they had better switch their

allegiances to the majority population, the Hutu. Paul Kagame was just three years old

when his family was forced to flee their home and crossed the border into neighboring

Uganda.

In 1959, the Tutsi exodus from Rwanda began. According to the United Nations

High Commission for Refugees (“UNHCR”), by 1964, some 336,000 Tutsis had fled

4 Ibid., 53.

5 Colin Waugh, Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power, Genocide, and the Rwandan Patriotic Front

(Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2004), 7.

53

their home country seeking refuge in neighboring countries. The majority went to

Burundi, with smaller amounts going to Tanzania, the DRC, and Uganda. Some estimate

that the actual number of Tutsi refugees leaving Rwanda was much greater. Waves of

unrest and persecution caused more and more people to flee in the following years

bringing the estimated number of refugees closer to 600,000, or about half of the total

Tutsi population of one million.6 As Linda Melvern explains, starting in 1959, for the

next three decades, Rwandan political life fell under the influence of a racist ideology

that preached intolerance and hatred. The 1959 killing of Tutsis was only the first of

several genocides in Rwanda. From 1959 - 1994 the idea of genocide, although never

officially recognized, became a part of everyday life.7

Life for Tutsi refugees in Uganda was certainly not easy. In the first months they

did not have shelter, food, or access or clean water. Many did not survive the first hard

years of exile and died from starvation and disease. The Ugandan government eventually

set aside designated land for their use near the border and established refugee camps at

behest of UNHCR. However, food, medical supplies, and other essential needs were

often left unmet due to lack of attention and resources from the international community.

Gradually, however, Tutsi exiles in Uganda established themselves in society. They

started raising cattle again and provided for themselves and their families. Many

eventually settled in the areas of south and western Uganda, including the areas of

Ankole and Toro, President Museveni’s home region. Tutsi school children, including

Kagame, were often bullied at school by their Ugandan classmates and labeled as

outsiders. Many young Tutsis changed their names in school and made a valiant effort to

6 Ibid., 10.

7 Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide, 7 - 8.

54

learn English and the local Ugandan languages as best they could so they could not be so

easily identified as a Banyarwandan. This feeling of not belonging was instrumental in

shaping the future of these children who would later on become rebels. The children of

the 59’ers, as they would become known, never really knew their homeland of Rwanda,

but also did not feel included or welcome in the country they were growing up in.

Rwandan exiles were often used as a scapegoat for Uganda’s internal problems.

Both Amin and Obote blamed the exiles for being a drain on the country’s resources

although many of them were successful business and farm owners and actually employed

Ugandans. Despite this, many Ugandans started to resent the success of the 59’ers.

Uganda’s political leaders played on these fears and encouraged people to treat the exiles

like outsiders. Since almost all of the Rwandan exiles were Tutsi, they had been used to

good living conditions and elevated status at home, which is perhaps what made them

strive even harder for success in Uganda.8 Kagame’s own family had been related to the

Rwandan monarchy, but upon coming to Uganda, they were refugees like everyone else.

Some Tutsis, like Kagame’s father, never adjusted to their change of fortune and

wallowed in self-pity until they died in exile. Other Rwandan exiles took matters into

their own hands and began the slow, but strategic work that would change their own fate

and that of their homeland.

1n 1979, the Tutsi community in Uganda formed the Rwandese Refugee Welfare

Foundation (“RRWF”) which quickly changed from a humanitarian focus to a political

one by changing its name to the Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (“RANU”) later

the same year. The group first concentrated on improving living conditions among the

Rwandan exiled population and later served as a rallying cry for better treatment of Tutsi

8 Colin Waugh, Paul Kagame and Rwanda, 11.

55

both at home and in Uganda. Many young Rwandans who grew up in Uganda were

naturally curious about their homeland. Kagame undertook several clandestine trips into

his home country. Each time he returned to Uganda, he became more and more

convinced of the need to return to Rwanda permanently. Other young exiles were coming

to the same conclusion as Kagame and were eager to do something about it. One of these

men was Kagame’s longtime childhood and school friend, Fred Rwigyema, who had

disappeared from school. Then, one day Paul received word that Fred was back in

Uganda, in the western town of Fort Portal and was looking for him. Paul rushed to meet

his friend and soon learned that Fred had been recruited by a Ugandan rebel leader named

Yoweri Museveni. He had been secretly training at a base in Tanzania with Museveni’s

forces to prepare for an invasion of Uganda to overthrow Idi Amin. Fred had left Uganda

an impoverished, aimless refugee and now returned a trained and ambitious soldier.9 It

did not take long for Kagame to decide what he needed to do next.

With the successful overthrow of Amin, many Rwandan exiles thought their lives

would improve. However, they soon found out that they would be no better off during

Obote’s second presidency that lasted from 1980-1985 than during Amin’s reign of terror

from 1971-1979. All Banyarwanda were removed form government jobs. There was

widespread harassment and theft of cattle. Pro-Obote propagandists characterized the

victims as foreigners although many had now been living in Uganda for decades.10 The

state owned newspaper, the Uganda Times, published an article in which it read, “most

atrocities during Amin’s era were committed by refugees…refugees have been found to

9 Stephen Kinzer, A Thousand Hills: Rwanda’s Rebirth and the Man Who Dreamed It (Hoboken,

NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2008), 19. 10 Colin Waugh, Paul Kagame and Rwanda, 20.

56

flirt with terrorists in Luwero District and are responsible for the unrest there.”11 Soon

after, attacks against refugees began which included evictions, beatings, rape and looting.

By the end of the attacks that took place in 1982, 45,000 cows had been stolen, 70,000

people were displaced and 16,000 homes were destroyed.

Some refugees fled back into Rwanda, but some 10,000 people got caught in a

two-kilometer strip of land on the border after Kigali had deployed border guards to

prevent more from returning. Kampala would not allow them to return either so they

became trapped with no country willing to take them.12 Obote promised that those who

carried out the evictions and attacks would be punished, but no one was ever held

accountable and more evictions continued in the following years. Banyarwandans were

harassed in all parts of the country including Luwero, Teso, Lango, and Karamoja where

some worked as shepherds. The events of 1982 were a turning point for the exiles, many

of whom, naturally believed they were Ugandan. They discovered “that people among

whom they had lived for thirty years were treating them as hated and despised foreigners.

The shock was tremendous.”13 It soon become clear to many Rwandan exiles that their

host country was turning more and more inhospitable by the day and that their options for

and hopes of returning home had never been so distant.

The ‘terrorists’ referred to in Luwero were, of course, Museveni’s National

Resistance Army that took to the bush after the disputed elections of 1980. Twenty-seven

armed men and fourteen men without weapons accompanied Museveni. All were

11 R. K. Nyakabwa, “Statelessness and the Batutsi Refugees’ Invasion of Rwanda, 1990-1994” (P.hD diss., University of London, 2002).

12 Ibid., 22.

13 Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University

Press, 1995), 70.

57

Ugandan, except for Paul Kagame and Fred Rwigyema.14 Kagame and Rwigyema had

fought with Museveni’s guerilla group, FRONASA, in Tanzania in cooperation with the

Tanzanian army to overthrow Amin in 1979. Again, Kagame and Rwigyema did not

hesitate to follow Museveni, this time into the Ugandan bush, to fight Obote.

The Luwero Triangle is three thousand miles of savannah and tropical forest. It

provided a strong social base for Museveni’s rebels, but also vast, empty areas where

they could train and hide.15 Paul Kagame lived and fought in the Luwero Triangle for five

years from 1980-1985. He and Rwigyema had concluded long ago that the only way they

could ever hope to return home was through armed resistance. They had multiple reasons

for joining the NRA. First, they wanted to alleviate the immediate suffering of Rwandan

exiles under the Obote regime. His overthrow was reason enough for many

Banyarwandans to fight. Additionally, they reasoned that if Museveni’s guerilla

movement eventually succeeded, and they were part of its success, it would give them a

future ally in a neighboring country when it was time to fight their own war. Lastly, by

taking to the bush they would gain battlefield experience that would be invaluable in

preparing them for their own war in the years to come.16

Although Paul and Fred were the first Rwandans to join Museveni’s ranks, they

certainly were not the only ones who saw the benefits of joining the NRA. Obote’s 1982

evictions were meant to demoralize and weaken the exile population, but his tactics only

drove more and more Rwandans into the NRA. The decision to go and fight with the

NRA was seen as the only viable option by many young Tutsi men. As one explained,

14 Stephen Kinzer, A Thousand Hills, 43. 15 Ibid., 43. 16 Ibid., 40.

58

“you could either go into exile or go into the bush…recruitment into the NRA was an

almost automatic choice for most of us at that time.”17 In the coming years, more and

more men and women joined Museveni’s cause. The Obote government responded by

carrying out a brutal counter-insurgency operation in Luwero which killed tens of

thousands of civilians and rather than hurt the rebels, drove more people to join them.18

As the guerilla war grew more intense, Obote was also quick to point out that

Museveni was a Munyankole from a Muhima family. There were often marriage links

between Banyankole Bahima and Banyarwanda Tutsi (who lived together in the same

region of Uganda for decades), which fueled Obote’s claims that Museveni was trying to

establish a Banyankole/Banyarwanda monarchy throughout East Africa. Obote also

accused Museveni of being foreign since one of his grandmothers was Tutsi,19 which is

something that incited Ugandan attacks on the exiles and also contributed to the

perception of Tutsis being foreign and having no perceived home in the region.

Kagame and Rwigyema took notes during their time with Museveni and the NRA.

The way the NRA was structured and operated had tremendous impact on the way the

RPF and the Rwandan Patriotic Army (“RPA”) operated and formed their opinions on

what a guerilla force should be and what it should do. Museveni was a pan-Africanist and

had embraced Maoist principles. He believed in engaging with the people at the grass-

roots level to win their popular support. Museveni went about politicizing his fighters in

order to politicize the population. Every soldier was to know why he or she 20 was

17 Colin Waugh, Paul Kagame and Rwanda, 24. 18 Stephen Kinzer, A Thousand Hills, 47.

19 Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, 47. 20 According to Gérard Prunier, women accounted for as much as fifteen percent of the NRA.

59

fighting. Every unit had a political commissar and every fighter took classes in African

history and politics. When the NRA captured Kampala in January 1986, about 3,000 of

its total 14,000 fighters were Banyarwandans.21 They took part in the celebrations that

immediately followed the NRA’s victory, but had already begun planning for their next

move to return to their homeland.

Meanwhile, conditions for Rwandan exiles in Uganda improved after Obote’s

overthrow. RANU relocated its headquarters back to Uganda and soon changed its name

to the Rwandan Patriotic Front/Army. The Rwandan diaspora began organizing itself into

a cohesive political force and began training future ‘cadres’ in a secret school in western

Uganda in preparation for a future fight. Museveni tried to advocate and negotiate for the

return of some of the Rwandan refugees to their homeland, but Rwandan President,

Juvénal Habyarimana and his political party, the Mouvement Republicain National pour

la Démocratie et le Developpement (“MRND”) refused. He insisted that his country did

not have room for its current population and that he could not be expected to take back so

many refugees, Rwanda was full.

Not long after the NRA’s victory, Ugandans began to question the number of

Banyarwandans in top positions in the army. Fred Rwigyema served as army chief of

staff and minister of defense. Kagame had risen to the position of director of military

intelligence. Although his Tutsti comrades had been instrumental in the NRA’s success,

they were now becoming a political liability for Museveni who, being a new leader, was

eager to prove himself and please the nation. Not helping matters was the fact that after

the NRA’s victory, many Rwandan NRA fighters were deployed to help fight the

21 Ibid., 70.

60

resistance in the north and east of the country. Several Banyarwandan officers were

accused of human rights violations in Teso. As a result, “President Museveni found the

Banyarwanda presence in the army a stumbling –block in his efforts at negotiating some

sort of peace with the eastern and northern insurgents.”22 Museveni eventually caved to

the pressure and removed Major General Rwigyema from his position. Likewise,

Kagame was relieved of his duties and was sent to the U.S. for a training course at Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas.

The dismissal of these two influential, highly popular figures in the Banyarwanda

community was the last straw. Many Banyarwandans who had helped the NRA in its war

effort had been promised full Ugandan citizenship if Museveni succeeded. These

promises were not kept. The ill treatment of two men who had been an important factor

in the NRA’s success, not to mention thousands of others who fought alongside their

Ugandan counterparts as a single force, signaled to Banyarwandans that the NRA was

ungrateful for their sacrifices and would never fully accept them as part of their country.

The need to return home, by any means, became more apparent than ever before.

Although they probably would have liked to take more time to organize

themselves, RPF forces inside the NRA had been preparing for their eventual breakaway

for some time. They penetrated key sections of the NRA so that when the right time

came, they would be able to move a small, but well equipped Banyarwanda manned

segment of the army into Rwanda.23 In fact by 1990, “the chief of military training in

Uganda, the commander of the military police, the head of the army medical service, and

22 Ibid., 71. 23 Ibid., 74.

61

several key brigade and battalion commanders were secret RPF militants.”24 They had an

understanding with their commanders that they would hide their true allegiances until

they were ordered to desert their NRA posts.

The RFA launched their invasion of Rwanda at 2:30 p.m. on Monday, October 1,

1990. Fifty armed men crossed the border from Uganda and shot the border guards.

Hundreds more followed, all wearing Ugandan army uniforms. At the time of the RPA’s

invasion, Museveni and Rwandan President Habyarimana were both attending a United

Nations session in New York. Harbyarimana was immediately suspicious of his Ugandan

counterpart and his historical ties to so many members of the RPA.25

The RPA was ready to re-take the country and was representing all Rwandan

refugees who had been driven out from their country from 1959-1963. From the outset,

the RPA was careful to brand itself as a multi-ethnic movement seeking to dispose a

country of its dictator and initiate a democracy,26 although almost every fighter was

Tutsi. The abandoning soldiers, numbering about 4,000 made off with a good amount of

equipment including heavy machine guns, mortars, multiple rockets launchers, rifles, and

light automatic canons. Some of President Museveni’s bodyguards stole the presidential

staff radio and communication vehicles. Although there is some debate about how much

Museveni knew of the RPA’s plans, he was apparently infuriated when he realized just

how far Rwandans had penetrated the Uganda army and had used it for their own

purposes. He was even angrier when he learned of the amount of weapons and

24 Stephen Kinzer, A Thousand Hills, 55. 25 Arthur Jay Klinghoffer. The International Dimension of the Genocide in Rwanda (New York:

New York University Press, 1998), 8. 26 Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide, 13.

62

ammunition they had taken with them.27 He almost certainly knew that the Rwandan

elements present in Uganda were organizing themselves for an eventual operation of

some sort, but he was taken by surprise by how soon it came and how large it was.

Once his temper cooled, Museveni came to realize what the advantages of having

a friendly regime in Kigali would mean. It would help him politically by bringing an end

to long festering refugee problem. Refugees would be able to return home alleviating

some of the tension surrounding land shortages and jobs. Museveni never supported the

RPA publicly, but his government turned a blind eye to RPA fighters crossing back and

forth over the border. Drivers, porters, and couriers who operated unhindered on

Uganda’s roads brought supplies to the RPF frontlines throughout the war. The RPA also

sent wounded solders for treatment at semisecret clinics in Uganda.28 While Museveni

was not able to directly contribute funds to his former comrades’ cause because so much

of the national budget came from international donors, he found other ways to discretely

contribute non-monetarily, so his assistance could not be traced. One way this was

achieved was because, “NRA target practice consumed disproportionately high quantities

of ammunition, supplies vanished from military stores and later, when the World Bank

was pressing for drastic reductions in NRA troop numbers, the surplus weapons left idle

by demobilisation found their way south.”29 In this way, Museveni was able to assist the

RPA without official records and kept western donors convinced that he was not fueling

an insurgency in a neighboring country.

27 Stephen Kinzer, A Thousand Hills, 102. 28 Ibid., 102. 29 Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, 119.

63

The RPA invasion cost Museveni much more than a loss of weapons and soldiers.

It also damaged his reputation and cost him a level of international respect that he had

been building over the previous five years. The invasion also had far reaching and

unexpected consequences on how the government was able to deal with insurgent groups

in the north and east. Many Ugandans were weary of their new leader’s intentions as

evidenced by the fact that shortly after the invasion, Museveni was being called ‘Saddam’

on the streets of Kampala.30 The Kenyan government, long opposed to Museveni,

accused him of destabilizing the region acting as an ambitious warlord. Museveni

previously hoped that better relations with Kenya would reduce Kenyan support of the

eastern rebels, or at least, reduce their supply lines that came through Kenya.31 The RPF

invasion quickly dashed these hopes. Museveni was also serving as the chairman of the

Organization of African Unity (“OAU”) at the time of the invasion, causing much

embarrassment and raising eyebrows as to whether Uganda’s president had connived the

invasion of a neighboring country.32 Perhaps most importantly though, it caused division

in the army and encouraged anti-Museveni rebels to step up their efforts sensing that the

government had been weakened by the invasion.33

Museveni also faced intense pressure to purge the NRA of any remaining

Banyarwanda who had not already deserted to fight with the RPA. The question was

raised as to the ethnic composition of the NRA, which was a delicate issue as it was not

30 “Uganda: Straining at the Edges,” Africa Confidential 31, no. 21 (October 26, 1990): 4. 31 Ibid., 6. 32 “Uganda/Rwanda: No room,” Africa Confidential 32, no. 6 (March 22, 1991): 7

33 Ibid.

64

always easy to tell who was a Munyarwanda and who was a Ugandan.34 This also caused

feelings of resentment and betrayal because it seemed that the government officially

considered many Banyarwanda as Ugandan when they were fighting for the NRA and

were immediately labeled non-Ugandan when they joined the RPA.

Despite the significant, but unofficial support from Uganda, the RPA’s initial

invasion was a tactical disaster. The RPA faced the Belgian and French supported Forces

Armées Rwandaises (“FAR”). Major General Fred Rwigyema, Major Peter Bayingana,

and Major Chris Bunyenyezi, were all killed within days of the start of the invasion,

leaving the RPA temporarily leaderless and with low morale. At the time of the invasion,

Paul Kagame was at his training class in Fort Leavenworth. Although he had not directly

participated in the planning of the attack, Rwigyema and others had kept him aware of

their plans. Kagame abruptly left Kansas, but by the time he returned home and reached

the frontlines, he found the RPA in total disarray and the problems were only getting

worse. Habyarimana now had an excuse to round up the remaining Tutsi population in

Rwanda since he could point to an invading army of Tutsis as reason for doing so.

Kagame had his work cut out for him.

Most likely, the story of the RPF and Rwanda as a whole would have been

decidedly different if it were not for one man. It was Paul Kagame, “who rescued the

RPF from collapse. Kagame, a secretive, sober, intelligent and determined man, took

over the struggling remnants of the army. Within a matter of months he gave it direction,

discipline and strategy. Kagame was reputedly a military tactician of enormous talent.”35

34 “Uganda/Rwanda: Picking Up the Pieces,” Africa Confidential 31, no. 23 (November 23, 1990):

6. 35 Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide, 16.

65

Kagame recognized that the RPA needed to reorganize itself and soothe its wounds

before it could move on and fight again.

Kagame led the RPA into the remote Virunga Mountain range so they could re-

group and strategize. This tactic was apparently successful partly because of NRA

support. As one former RPA member recalled, “our most important support was our

relationship with each and every soldier in the Ugandan army. We had spent years living

together and fighting together. When we needed to slip out of Rwanda we would always

find an army officer who would say, ‘cross here, pass here.’ At the time Museveni was

saying he was not helping us, they were letting us pass.”36 The Virunga Mountains

provided little respite. So remote and frigid, almost no people inhabited the mountains.

Acquiring adequate food and medical supplies was almost impossible. Several RPA

soldiers starved and froze to death in the inhospitable conditions.

Nevertheless, the time the RPF spent re-organizing itself, mentally preparing, and

planning for next steps proved invaluable in facing the horrors that lay ahead. An

important note about the RPF invasion was the way it was regarded by Rwandans. As one

person recalled, “the aggressors were not even ‘real’ Rwandans in our eyes…they were

young men who had grown up entirely in Uganda. They spoke English. Their leaders had

names like Fred and Peter; even their organization had an English name. To us, this was a

Ugandan invasion of Rwanda.”37 Most RPF fighters already had an equation present in

their minds that motivated them and gave them confidence to carry out their battle.

36 Stephen Kinzer, A Thousand Hills, 80. 37 Ibid., 81.

66

MRND = UPC, Habyarimana = Obote, and RPF = NRA, therefore victory will certainly

belong to the RPA.38

The RPA was slowly able to recruit more soldiers with time. While most of the

initial RPA were drawn from the diaspora in Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania, and Congo, the

1991 RPA attack on Ruhengeri Prison released many of Haryarimana’s political

prisoners who quickly joined ranks with the RPA. Major Lizinde, Commander Biseruka,

and Captain Muvunanyambo were among the men released who were later instrumental

in persuading some Hutu recruits to join the RPA’s cause.39

What happened next to the RPA and the Rwandan people is well known and

horrific. Perhaps the one thing that kept the RPA going during their years of battle with

the FAR, interahamwe, and génocidaries was the knowledge that they had been part of a

guerilla victory before, in Uganda. Fighting with the NRA had been a dress rehearsal.

Now they had the experience, the battle scars, and the knowledge they needed to

overthrow a maniacal regime, even one that was supported by Belgium and France. The

RPA knew they could make it happen again, this time at home, in Rwanda.

38 Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, 155. 39 Frank K. Rusagara, Resilience of a Nation: A History of the Military in Rwanda (Kigali:

Fountain Publishers Rwanda Ltd., 2009), 177.

67

SECTION 2: RWANDA AND UGANDA FALL OUTAND INTEVENTION IN THE DRC

The end of the genocide in 1994 and the eventual capture of power by the RPA in

Kigali may have put an end to the mass killing in Rwanda, but it was only the beginning

of the region’s troubles. The genocide and the subsequent resumption of power by what

many Rwandans saw as a Tutsi party sparked the mass movement of millions of people

in the Great Lakes region. The majority of Rwandan Hutus fled to eastern DRC because

they feared retribution from the new regime for their participation in or perceived

indifference to stopping the genocide. The perpetrators of the genocide, the génocidaries

and interahamwe, did not quietly disappear either. They fled to eastern DRC where they

mingled and recruited in the refugee camps and successfully re-entered Rwanda several

times to carry out unfinished business of killing Tutsis. Many Congolese also fled their

own country for fear of their own country’s army and because they wanted to avoid

getting caught in the myriad of the fighting between the advancing RPA, the fleeing

interhamwe and génocidaires, the Congolese army, and various rebel groups present in

the eastern DRC.

Rwanda’s post-genocide security directly depended on the ex-FAR’s,

interahamwe’s, and génocidarie’s ability to launch cross-border attacks, de-stabilize, and

cause panic in the population. As long as these groups operated freely in eastern DRC,

Rwanda could not be safe from future attacks. It was for these reasons and because the

international community felt guilty about letting one million Rwandans perish in a mere

one hundred days, that it supported and looked the other way when the RPA and

Ugandan military sponsored a military intervention and change of government in the

DRC (then Zaire).

68

The international community had long grown tired of Zaire’s despotic ruler,

Mobutu Sese Seko and was more then happy to let Rwanda and Uganda support the rebel

leader who would replace him. However, what the international community did not

expect was that given too much free reign, the armies of Rwanda and Uganda would take

advantage of their geographic positions and would loot the Congo of its natural resources

without even a modest attempt to cover their tracks. The Congo war also was the

breaking point in the twenty-year relationship between the Rwandan and Ugandan

leadership and their armies.40 It could be argued that Rwanda had legitimate reasons for

being involved in both Congo wars,41 but the UPDF’s 42 intentions for entering the war

and remaining there as unwelcome visitors revealed their true intentions and exposed it as

an army of opportunity masked by other stated objectives.

During and immediately after the genocide, mass movement of refugees

destabilized the entire Great Lakes region. Millions of Hutus fled Rwanda to get away

from the advancing RPA. Many Kinywarwanda speaking Zaireans, known as

Banyamulenge, fled their homes in eastern Zaire in fear of the former Rwandan national

army and the génocidaires. Many Banyamulenge were also killed by elements of the

40 “Brothers at War,” Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series 38, no. 10

(November 22, 2001): 14620.

41 The First Congo War, or “Congo 1” began in 1996 as a result of the genocide in neighboring Rwanda. Congo 1 saw the overthrow of President Mobutu and the installation of Laurent Kabila in power in 1998. The Second Congo War or “Congo 2” started in 1998 once Rwanda realized that Kabila had switched allegiances. Uganda and Rwanda pushed for the removal of Kabila by use of rebel forces. Congo 2 did not officially end until 2003 although the entire eastern DRC region still suffers from instability and the aftermath both wars.

42 The National Resistance Army (“NRA”) officially became the Uganda People’s Defense Force (“UPDF”) with the adoption of the Ugandan constitution of 1995.

69

Zairean military.43 Other Banyamulenge had obtained military and battle training with

RPA forces and began a rebellion of their own against the repressive Mobutu

government.44 Meanwhile, tens of thousands of Tutsis who had been living in exile in

Burundi, Tanzania, Zaire, and Uganda were returning to their home countries. To gain

control of the situation in Zaire, both the RPA and UPDF supported Laurent-Désiré

Kabila and his rebel group, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of

Congo-Zaire (“AFDL”).

Museveni wanted to finally be rid of Mobutu in part because Zaire had been

hosting and providing safe haven to several Ugandan rebel groups including the Allied

Democratic Forces (“ADF’) based in the southwest Rwenzori Mountains and the West

Nile Bank Front (“WNBF”) based in the northwest province of West Nile. The ADF was

a combination of a fundamentalist Muslim group and remnants of another rebel group,

the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (“NALU”). The West Nile Bank Front,

led by Colonel Juma Oris, once a member of Idi Amin’s cabinet, had its bases in southern

Sudan and was supported by the Sudanese government in Khartoum, but was routed by

the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (“SPLA”) before establishing new bases in Congo.

Despite evidence to the contrary, Uganda claimed that the Zairean Tutsi rebels capturing

and turning over members of the ADF and WNBF was just a fortuitous turn of events45

and that they were not directly involved in the operations. The Ugandan leadership

43 “Rwanda-Zaire: Border Clashes,” Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series

33, no. 9 (October 24th, 1996):12391.

44 Oxford Analytica Database, “Uganda: Search for Security,” April 24, 1997, http://www.intelink.gov/oxan (assessed July 9, 2008): 2.

45 “Uganda: Rebels Overrun?,” Africa Research Bulletin. Political, Social and Cultural Series 34, no. 4 (May 19th 1997): 12659.

70

insisted that the UPDF was not present in the area and had nothing to do with the capture

of these rebels who were members of the ADF and WNBF although evidence later

surfaced that the UPDF was indeed present in the area.

Kabila was a life long rebel and the support of the RPA and Uganda proved to be

all he needed to finally rid Congo of Mobutu. Supported by the RPA, the AFDL started

one of the most remarkable military campaigns in modern African history.46 In only four

months, led by Lieutenant Colonel James Kabarebe, a Rwandan veteran, the anti-Mobutu

forces made their way through a thousand miles of dense jungle facing heat, swamps,

lack of food, hostile terrain, and several hard fought battles with Mobutu’s forces, who

were bolstered by French recruited Bosnian-Serb mercenaries.47 They easily took the

capital city of Kinshasa on May 17, 1997.48 Mobutu fled to Morocco where he underwent

medical treatment and died only months later on September 7, 1997. The news of

Mobutu’s death was such a shock to the outside world that the extent of Rwandan

involvement and the simultaneous intervention of the Ugandan military went virtually

unnoticed and unreported at first.49 The AFDL’s success in taking Kinshasa so quickly

was met with so much confusion and awe that few questions of how and why were asked

by the international community.

Rwanda initially denied its involvement in the coup and stated that its soldiers

were not assisting the AFDL. However, long time observers in the region knew that

46 Stephen Kinzer, A Thousand Hills, 205. 47 Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a

Continental Catastrophe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 129. 48 Stephen Kinzer, A Thousand Hills, 205. 49 Colin Waugh, Paul Kagame and Rwanda, 127.

71

Rwanda’s defense was almost synonymous with the defeat of Mobutu and regime change

in Zaire.50 Only once Kabila was successfully installed as president did Rwanda admit its

involvement and concede that its forces had been involved from the beginning of the

rebel campaign. Kabila quickly renamed Zaire the Democratic Republic of Congo and

even promoted Lt. Col. Kabarebe, the Rwandan veteran, to General and named him

Army Chief of Staff. Of course, it did not take long for the Congolese people to start

complaining that a foreigner was commanding their army. Kabila also recognized that if

he was going to be able to retain power and be seen as a legitimate ruler in the eyes of his

fellow Congolese, he could not be perceived as a puppet of Rwanda and Uganda.

Although he would not have been able to come to power without their assistance, it now

served him better to cut ties and switch allegiances.

Rwanda and Uganda also quickly realized that they would have to do something

about the man they had placed in power in the Congo. Less than a year after assuming

leadership, Kabila was giving speeches denouncing the presence of Tutsis in the country.

Ex-FAR and interahamwe forces regrouped at the border camps and conducted cross-

border raids into Rwanda and President Kabila did nothing to stop them because he did

not want to appear to be working to please Rwanda. In one such raid, insurgents stormed

a prison and freed five hundred genocide suspects.51 Kabila had officially switched sides.

He fired his Rwandan-born chief of staff, General Kabarebe, dismissed all Rwandan born

troops in his army, and ordered them out of Congo.52 Kagame and the RPF leadership

were well aware that they could not afford to let the situation fester not least because

50 Ibid.,125.

51 Stephen Kinzer, A Thousand Hills, 206.

52 Ibid., 210.

72

during late 1996 and early 1997, more then thirty thousand insurgents came back into

Rwanda, many disguised as refugees.53 They were coming back to fight. Kagame and the

RPA knew that until they could secure eastern Congo, their own woes would continue

and that peace would continue to evade Rwanda.

Rwandan troops followed Kabila’s orders to leave the country. However, much to

his dismay, they returned just five days later with reinforcements. This time, they were

determined to replace Kabila with someone who could actually deliver on their promises,

most importantly, to secure its eastern border and stop the cross flow of refugees and

various armed groups. This battle was harder fought from the start this time around partly

because Kabila was reinforced by troops sent in from Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia.

Kabila had appealed to the Southern African Development Community (“SADC”) for

help. Although Congo was not considered part of SADC or their mutual defense treaty,

leaders of some SADC countries agreed to intervene on Kabila’s behalf.

Uganda again decided to get involved in the second Congo War or “Congo 2”

which lasted from 1998-2003. The Ugandan government was still dealing with rebel

activities and cross border raids, in particular the ADF crossing over the border and

appearing and attacking in Kasese Town. Again, the government was able to use the

presence of rebel bases inside the DRC as an excuse for re-occupying Congo, but tried to

downplay the presence of foreign ex-military and minimizing the number of rebels by

instead speaking of ‘remnants’ of rebel groups.54 Sending the UPDF into Congo for a

second time only contributed to suspicions that Museveni was interested in establishing

53 Ibid., 207.

54 “Museveni’s Backyard,” Africa Confidential 38, no. 16 (August 1, 1997): 4.

73

his own empire. Although this fear was somewhat ridiculous and unfounded, Museveni’s

image as a democrat and a fighter for African unity was damaged throughout the region

and more and more Ugandans began to wonder whether their presence in the DRC was

actually based on genuine security concerns or a search for status and wealth. As one

Tanzanian political scientist put it, “Yesterday it was Rwanda, today it is Congo, who

knows who could be next?” 55 Museveni was slowly being recognized as a regional

power monger.

Similar to Congo 1, Rwanda and Uganda supported a Congolese rebel group in

order to further their objectives. The Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocracie

(RCD) received support and training from both the RPA and UPDF, but failed to advance

much further than Kisangani, Congo’s third largest city. When issue arose over RCD

leadership, Uganda and Rwanda differed and their disagreement turned violent. Uganda

supported professor Ernest Wamba dia Wamba who was replaced as the RCD’s leader by

Kigali’s favorite, Emile Ilunga. Uganda further angered Rwanda by supporting another

rebel group, the Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo (“MLC”), led by Jean Pierre

Bemba in northwestern Equateur Province.56 Wamba was kicked out of the RCD’s

headquarters in Goma, controlled by Rwandan forces, and went to Kisangani, which was

under Ugandan control. Rwandan and Ugandan commanders in Congo supposedly

disagreed about their strategy in the Congo. Kagame wanted to send a professional,

foreign-based army to seize control of the capital, Kinshasa, while Museveni wanted to

assist disgruntled local groups to slowly build a rebellion against their own leader.

55 “Uganda: Museveni Under Scrutiny,” Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural

Series 35, no. 9 (October 9 1998): 2.

56 “Rwanda/Uganda: Friends Fall Out,” Africa Confidential 40, no. 18 (September 10, 1999): 3.

74

Tension between the RPA and the UPDF built up until it resulted in four days of

intense fighting in Kisangani in mid-August 1999. The Rwandans saw their presence in

Congo as necessary for their own security at home. The RPA’s main concern was hunting

down former génocidaires, but they also viewed the Ugandan presence in the region as a

nuisance since they were not cooperating. The fighting was eventually diffused in

accordance with a ceasefire negotiated between Kagame and Museveni, but tensions

remained high and a former friendly and historical relationship was broken. Fighting

between the UPDF and RPA broke out for a short while in June of 2000. This time they

reduced the Kisangani to rubble, killed hundreds of civilians, and forced tens of

thousands to flee from their homes.57

The sad truth was that for both Rwanda and Uganda, their military involvement

and presence in Congo was more about the spoils of war than peacekeeping or hunting

down suspected war criminals. Although Kagame claimed the need to control the border

areas for Rwanda’s own well-being and security, that certainly did not necessitate the

capture of over one-third of the DRC. Similarly, if the UPDF was in the DRC in order to

counter the ADF and WNBF they were deployed much too far to the west of Kisangani in

the Equateur region. In fact, the UPDF was so far into DRC that the ADF continued its

activities along Uganda’s border uninhibited. Professor John Clark gives an example of

such an instance. On 10 December 1999, the ADF invaded Fort Portal, a town in western

Uganda, took over a prison, and successfully abducted several hundred prisoners. The

ADF also attacked Kichwamba Technical School in Kasese and killed some eighty

57 Robert B. Edgerton, Africa’s Armies: From Honor to Infamy, A History from 1971 to the

Present (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 139.

75

students who were burned to death in their locked dormitories.58 Much to the dismay of

the local population, there was not a large enough UPDF presence in the area to respond

immediately or sufficiently to the rebel’s attack.59 Certainly, if Museveni were actually

concerned about the ADF’s activities, as he stated as the primary reason for re-invading

Congo, he would have deployed the UPDF immediately across the border where the

ADF’s bases were located.

Another aspect that made Uganda’s second intervention in Congo suspect was

that Museveni appeared to make the decision to go in on his own. He did not get

permission to invade from an act of parliament, as required by the constitution. There is

also evidence that the UPDF and the military High Command itself was not enthusiastic

about entering Congo for a second time. The International Crisis Group reported one

officer as saying, “we felt that the Rwandese started the war and it was their duty to go

ahead and finish the job, but our President took time and convinced us that we had a stake

in what is going on in Congo.”60 An interview with a high -ranking Ugandan intelligence

official also confirmed that the decision to invade Congo a second time was not made by

consensus and was a surprise to many outside Museveni’s small inner circle.61

Nonetheless, it did not take long before the UPDF, in particular the top leadership,

realized the benefits that the spoils of war could bring. If the UPDF was hesitant about

58 John F. Clark, “Explaining Ugandan Intervention in Congo: Evidence and Interpretations,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 39, no. 2 (June 2001): 271 www.jstor.org/stable/3557264 (accessed July 8, 2010).

59 John F. Clark, The African Stakes of the Congo War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002),

206. 60 International Crisis Group, “Uganda and Rwanda: Friends or Enemies?” Africa Report no. 14.

(May 4, 2000) www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/rwanda/014-uganda-and-rwanda-friends-or-enemies.aspx (assessed July 22, 2010).

61 Interview with a former Ugandan government official, April 27, 2009.

76

entering Congo a second time, they were certainly content to stay in Congo for as long as

they could while they enriched themselves at the expense of the Congolese people.

The fact that both the UPDF and RPF plundered, pilfered, and abused civilians in

Congo during the second occupation from 1998-2001 is well established and has been

documented by numerous sources including several United Nations reports. Even during

the war, evidence of the UPDF’s pillaging was evident to the Ugandan public from the

vast mounts of raw material from Congo flooding the local markets, driving down prices

of raw materials like timber and foodstuffs.62 There were major differences in how

Rwanda and Uganda looted resources from Congo. The Rwandan Ministry of Defense

had set up a special desk to deal with such matters and the looting was considered more

in terms of the national interest. For the UPDF, the looting and enterprise of goods was a

private matter for personal gain that was strictly kept off the books. UPDF commanders,

well-connected officers, their friends, and families were direct beneficiaries from

Congo’s misfortunes.

As the United Nations first exposed in a 2001 report, the illegal exploitation of

resources from Congo took different forms, including confiscation, extraction, forced

monopoly, and price fixing. The panel also identified two phases of exploitation: mass-

scale looting and the systematic and systemic exploitation of natural resources. During

the first stage, between September 1998 and August 1999, the UPDF looted existing

stockpiles of minerals, livestock, and agricultural and forest products. UPDF soldiers also

made off with stockpiles from various banks, mines, and factories.63 During the second

62 Herbert M. Howe, Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States (Boulder, CO: Lynne

Rienner Publishers, 2001), 100. 63 John F. Clark, The African Stakes of the Congo War, 157.

77

phase identified in the report, UPDF commanders took over businesses or organized their

own companies to further exploit Congo’s resources. For example, a Ugandan-Thai

company named DARA-Forest began harvesting timber and running a sawmill. It was

also alleged that several UPDF commanders took over and ran Kisangani’s gold mines.

Several of President Museveni’s closest relatives benefited greatly from their

business ventures in Congo. From early on in the invasion Museveni’s half-brother,

Major General (retired) Salim Saleh and his wife, Jovia Akandwanaho were at the core of

illegal exploitation of natural resources.64 Reportedly, Mrs. Akandwanaho wanted control

of the diamond trade in Kisangani and used her husband and his military connections to

achieve this. She and her husband also set up a private air cargo transport company, Air

Alexander, to transport official supplies and commercial goods into Congo, but also used

it to transport illicit natural resources out. Many people including soldiers, journalists,

and traders told the UN panel about their flights in private aircrafts alongside bags of

coffee and other non-military items.65

Another main organizer of the looting was Janet Museveni’s relative, General

James Kazini. According to the UN report, General Kazini’s soldiers took stockpiles of

timber belonging to a logging company named Amex-bois. Later the same year, Kazini

ordered the confiscation of all the stocked timber belonging to another timber company,

La Forestiere. General Kazini also worked with Jean-Pierre Bemba in order to confiscate

several tons of coffee beans in Equateur Province. The UN report described General

Kazini as, “a master in the field; the orchestrator, organizer, and manager of most illegal

64 United Nations, “Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth from the Democratic Republic of Congo,” www.un.org/News/dh/latest/drcongo/htm (assessed August 8, 2010).

65 Ibid., 12.

78

activities related to the UPDF presence in north and north-eastern Democratic Republic

of Congo…he is the right hand of Salim Saleh.”66 In some cases, entire factories were

dismantled and moved to new locations outside of Congo, or machinery and spare parts

also were taken. Also according to the UN report, both the RPA and UPDF forced locally

and foreign owned businesses to close down in order to establish monopolies and fix the

prices of certain goods from various agricultural crops to raw metal materials.

The fighting that broke out between the RPF and UPDF in Kisangani was in fact a

fight over the control of resources, not an argument over war tactics as was reported. A

fact not lost on the UPDF or RPA was that Kisangani was the third most important

trading center in the DRC, lies at the axis of a clandestine trade in diamonds and timber,

and has two airports. Before fighting broke out, UPDF commander James Kazini

organized and was in charge of most of the Kisangani trade.67 Rwandan Army officers

told The East African newspaper that their intelligence reports indicated that the UPDF

had created a special division to kick out the RPA from Kisangani. Uganda denied the

claims and insisted that the RPA attached their units first.68

Perhaps most illustrative of the level of UPDF looting in the Congo was shown by

the UN report which gives the following tables as evidence:

66 Ibid., 15. 67 Oxford Analytica Database, “Rwanda/Uganda: Congo Clash” (September 6, 1999): 2

www.intelink.gov/oxan/display.aspz?ItemID=DB2216 (accessed July 9, 2008). 68 “Democratic Republic of Congo: Uganda and Rwanda Clash,” Africa Research Bulletin.

Political, Social and Cultural Series 37, no. 5 (June 29, 2000): 13975.

79

Table 2.1: Uganda Mineral Exports and Production, 1994-2000

Year Gold Tin Coltan Cobalt

A. Mineral exports (tons) 1994 0.22 - - - 1995 3.09 - - - 1996 5.07 3.55 - - 1997 6.82 4.43 2.57 - 1998 5.03 - 18.57 - 1999 11.45 - 69.5 67.48 2000 10.83 - - 275.98 B. Mineral production (tons) 1994 0.0016 3.704 0.435 - 1995 0.0015 4.289 1.824 - 1996 0.003 0.38 - - 1997 0.0064 1.81 - - 1998 0.0082 1.102 - - 1999 0.0047 - - 76.74 2000 0.0044 - - 287.51 Source: Uganda, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development. 2000 data are from January to October.

Table 2.2: Uganda Rough Diamond Exports, 1997- 2000 Year Volume (carats)

Value (United States dollars)

1997 1 511.34 198 302 1998 11 303.86 1 440 000 1999 11 024.46 1 813 500 2000 9 387.51 1 263 385 Source: Diamond High Council. Data collected from any third party consistently show that Uganda has become a diamond exporting country. They also demonstrate that diamond exports from Uganda coincide with the years of the wars in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, from 1997 onward.

80

As far as niobium is concerned, the pattern appears to be the same: no production prior to 1997 followed by a series of increases in exports as shown in Table 2.3. Table 2.3: Uganda Niobium69 Exports, 1995-1999 (thousands of United States dollars) Year Niobium

1995 0 1996 0 1997 13 1998 580 1999 782 Source: World Trade Organization (aggregated data). The Ugandan authorities, in their response to the Panel’s questionnaire, stated that there was no record of transit of mineral products. However, the Panel received information from one Ugandan customs post at the border between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda. Records for 1998, 1999 and 2000 reveal that mineral products as well as other commodities left the Democratic Republic of the Congo and entered Uganda (presumably this would also prove true for the other dozen or so points of entry). The following three examples show an increase in the transboundary movement of natural resources between 1998 and 1999.

Coffee 1998: 144,911 bags

1999: 170,079 bags

2000: 208,000 bags

Timber 1998: 1,900 m3

1999: 3,782 m3 and 46,299 pcs

2000: 3,272 m3 and 3,722 pcs

Cassiterite* 1998: None

1999: 30 kgs

2000: 151 drums

69 Coltan is the industrial name for columbite–tantalite, a dull black metallic ore from which the elements niobium (formerly "columbium") and tantalum are extracted also known as Niobium.

81

• *The sudden increase in the import of cassiterite may also mean an increase in the import of coltan. The Panel discovered that cassiterite is often listed in lieu of coltan, as coltan possesses a higher value, which implies high import taxes in Uganda.

As evidenced by the UN report, Uganda started exporting many raw materials that

it never did before including diamonds, tin, coltan, and cobalt. As the UN experts noted,

the diamond exports in particular were suspicious because Uganda has no known

diamond mines and records of exporting diamonds only appeared in the same years that

the UPDF occupied Congo. The report not only published hard numbers on mineral and

resource exploitation that were virtually impossible to deny, it also pointed out that

President Museveni was complicit in the illegal activities. The panel that authored the

report concluded that, “ the President chooses not to act, when he appoints the very

people who carry out criminal activities, and when his family members get away with

criminal activities, it becomes overwhelming that the President has put himself in the

position of accomplice.”70 Not surprisingly, Museveni lashed out at the UN and the report

completely denying the obvious. He only ended up further embarrassing himself, the

UPDF, and Uganda as a whole.

In many ways, Uganda’s second foray into Congo was a gigantic misstep. While

it certainly fattened the pockets of many top commanders in the UPDF and some

members of the Museveni family, it cost Uganda dearly in terms of international respect,

the opportunity to fight enemies inside its borders, and important regional alliances.

Professor John Clark even goes so far as to suggest that Congo 2 became Museveni’s

Vietnam, which is not entirely off the mark. Military expenditure to maintain the troop

70 United Nations, “Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural

Resources and Other Forms of Wealth from the Democratic Republic of Congo,” www.un.org/News/dh/latest/drcongo/htm (assessed August 8, 2010): 35.

82

levels in Congo was immense. Uganda overspent on its military budget year after year

and faced harsh criticism and scrutiny from the U.S. and other western allies. There was

also evidence that Museveni would not have been able to pull the UPDF out of Congo

even if he wanted to. He had lost control of UPDF finances. Gérard Prunier states as

follows:

When the UPDF was 100,000 strong, the cost of keeping these troops was $42 million per year. In 1996, after the demobilization exercise, the cost of only 50,000 troops had climbed to $88 million. Over $400,000 a month was being stolen from the anti-LRA operational budget. In the Congo…Col. Peter Kerim and his ADC Lt. Col. Napoleon Rutambika were accused of stealing over five million dollars’ worth of good from Congolese traders, and General Kazini admitted that he had only 6,000 men under his command and not 10,000, as shown in his books.71

The UPDF’s involvement in Congo 2 also meant that soldiers formerly posted in

northern Ugandan to fight against the LRA were moved to Congo, leaving an opening for

the LRA to advance. While Museveni’s NRM/NRA was never popular in the North,

leaving the Acholi population vulnerable to LRA attacks in order to seek wealth in the

Congo did not win Museveni any new supporters. Uganda’s intervention in Congo also

failed to rectify the problem with the ADF in western Uganda. This meant that few

Ugandans accepted or understood their government’s justification for its involvement in

the Congo.72 As further evidence that the second Congo occupation did not solve the

matter of the ADF, the rebel group recently resurfaced in 2005 and more recently in June

of 2010, attacking Mutwanga, a town in eastern DRC, killing sixteen civilians.73

71 Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World War, 197. 72 John F. Clark, The African Stakes of the Congo War, 158.

73 Mubatsi Asinja Habati, “Congo-Kinshasa: Another Election and Fear of ADF,” The

Independent, July 11, 2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/201007131051 (assessed August 8, 2010).

83

As an additional result of Uganda’s second Congo invasion, the long historic

Rwanda/Uganda relationship was damaged beyond repair. Although relations between

the two eventually improved some years later, there was a level of trust and cooperation

between the two nations that was never regained. In total, Rwandan and Ugandan forces

fought each other three times in Congo. A few dozen soldiers on both sides died along

with more than 1,000 civilians. The UPDF emerged humiliated three times having been

beaten by soldiers they had patronizingly called ‘boys’.74 There was over twenty years of

emotion that came out in the fighting between Uganda and Rwanda. Rwandans were sick

of the Uganda’s ‘big brother’ attitude while the Ugandans complained of the Rwanda’s

ungratefulness at having been helped to their current position. Many older RPA members

also felt that Ugandans still owed them for helping them fight against Obote.

There was also a personal rivalry brewing between Kagame and Museveni who

was reportedly bitter about his former pupil’s arrogance.75 In his 1997 autobiography,

Sowing the Mustard Seed, Museveni never mentions his relationship with Kagame,

Rwigyema, the RPA, or even the Rwandan genocide. However, this large omission is

hardly surprising because he also fails to mention human rights violations committed by

his army when discussing counter-insurgency operations in the North and does not

discuss any other NRM leaders despite his enthusiastic description of his colleagues.76

Relations between Uganda and Rwandan eventually got so bad that Uganda claimed

74 “Rwanda-Uganda: Brothers at War,” Africa Research Bulletin. Political, Social and Cultural

Series 38, no.10 (November 22, 2001): 14620. 75 Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, 241. 76 Ronald Kassimir, “Review: Reading Museveni: Structure, Agency and Pedagogy in Ugandan

Politics,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 33, No. 2/3 (1999): 649-673, www.jstor.org/stable/486282 (accessed July 8, 2010).

84

Rwanda was a hostile nation while General Kazini declared, “Rwanda is now an

enemy…which will be crushed.”77 Relations between Rwanda and Uganda never fully

recovered from this.

Both Rwanda and Uganda stalled their withdrawal from Congo until more

powerful, foreign forces convinced them otherwise. A peace deal between Congo and

Rwanda was signed in 2002 in Pretoria. A second treaty between Uganda and Congo was

signed in to Luanda. Although Uganda did eventually withdraw all UPDF from Congo, it

came out exposed as a corrupt and greedy army. The damage was done and perhaps worst

of all, the Congo is only one example of the UPDF’s blunders in the region.

Much to their dismay issues over UPDF’s conduct in Congo continues to

resurface. In August 2010, a draft United Nations report on conflicts in the Congo

between 1993 and 2003 was leaked and implicated the armies of Rwanda and Uganda of

human rights violations in the Congo. The report cited credible evidence to support the

conclusion that UPDF troops failed to distinguish between civilian and military targets78

while in Congo. It further alleged that in the town of Beni, “UPDF soldier instituted a

reign of terror for several years with complete impunity. They carried out summary

executions of civilians, arbitrarily detained large numbers of people and subjected them

to torture and various other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatments.”79 As will be

demonstrated in the following chapters, President Museveni continued to use the UPDF

as a tool to gain legitimacy, appease his western allies, and line his pockets with cash

77 United Nations IRIN Bulletin. No. 923. May 10, 2000. 78 Kevin Kelly, “UN Report Links Uganda to War Crimes in Congo,” East African, September 13,

2010, www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/UN%20report (assessed September 15, 2010). 79 Elias Biryabarema, “Ugandan Army Dismisses U.N. Accusations of Congo Crimes,” Reuters,

September 14, 2010, http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20100914/wl_nm/us (assessed September 15, 2010).

85

CHAPTER 3: SUDAN AND UGANDA: THE UNDECLARED WAR

SECTION 1: A HISTORY OF MISTRUST The government of Sudan (“GoS”) has long been a thorn in Uganda’s side, in

particular, for President Museveni. The two countries have played host to each other’s

refugees for decades, supported and supplied each other’s rebel movements, and fought a

proxy war on Congolese soil. As Gérard Prunier puts it, “in many ways Sudan and

Uganda have been running an undeclared war on their common border since 1986.”1

While relations between these two counties have improved since the signing of the

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (“CPA”) in 2005, they will most likely never warm up

to be particularly friendly because the wounds are too deep and the memories are too

recent. Uganda and southern Sudan are still suffering from the effects of supporting each

other’s rebel movements, some of which are still active and continue to terrorize the

entire region, especially the LRA.

Although friendship between the two countries may be out of the question, a

stable relationship between Uganda and Sudan is one of the key factors to ensuring peace

and stability in the Great Lakes region. As will be demonstrated, Museveni’s inability to

put an end to numerous rebel groups, such as the LRA and ADF, operating in Uganda

was only exacerbated by the GoS support of these same groups. Similarly, the GoS

accused Museveni of aiding the southern Sudanese rebel group, the Sudan People’s

Liberation Movement/ Army (“SPLM/A”). Finally, the UPDF’s operations against GoS

forces in the DRC during both Congo wars and its conduct during operations in southern

1 Gérard Prunier, “Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare: Uganda, Sudan and the Congo (1986 -

99),” African Affairs 103 (July 2004): 359.

86

Sudan itself further display a poor level of professionalism and questionable motivations

as the UPDF faced allegations of civilian abuse and resource exploitation.

Prior to the 1989 National Islamic Front (“NIF”) coup in Khartoum, relations

between Uganda and Sudan were already strained. After Museveni’s NRM takeover,

thousands of Ugandans fled across the border into Sudan because they feared reprisal

attacks from the NRA although this type of attack was the exception rather than the norm.

In 1986, the GoS was led by Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi. Al-Mahdi’s government

supplied fleeing Brigadier Basilio Okello supplies to fight the advancing NRA, but

Okello’s fight did not last long due to little popular support and a strong fight from the

NRA. After the 1989 NIF coup and the introduction of President Omar Hassan Ahmad

al-Bashir as President of Sudan, efforts to aide anti-Museveni forces were greatly

increased. A possible explanation for the NIF’s outright hostility toward Uganda was that

it was even more anti-U.S. than Prime Minister al-Mahdi’s government had been and

because Museveni ran a pro-U.S. regime, he was automatically seen as a puppet of the

U.S. and a natural enemy of Bashir and Sudan.

Furthermore, the NIF and the Muslim Brothers also represented militant Islam

and wanted to proceed with the Islamization of the whole Great Lakes region and

eventually continue to spread Islam through the entire continent. They believed Uganda,

a primarily Christian nation and a darling of the U.S. and western powers, stood in the

way of this vision.2 While the pro-U.S. stance of Museveni and Kampala’s opposition to

Islamic fundamentalism angered the NIF, it was Museveni’s perceived support of the

SPLA that drove the GoS to create and supply Ugandan insurgent groups.

2 Ibid., 365.

87

Ugandan assistance to the SPLA was non-existent before 1993. The GoS wrongly

assumed that because Museveni and SPLA leader Col. John Garang had both attended the

University of Dar es Salaam, a liberal mecca for left-wing African political leaders in the

1960s, that Museveni would naturally support Garang and his SPLA who were fighting

for independence from the oppressive Khartoum government. They also assumed that

Museveni would allow the SPLA easy cross-border access and would permit the SPLA to

use northern Uganda as a secondary base for its forces. What they did not realize was that

Garang and Museveni did not even attend university during the same years and that the

time they both resided in Dar es Salaam only overlapped by a few months. The two men

barely knew each other and Museveni would not have risked his political well being in

the region early on by upsetting its huge neighbor to the north. In fact, Museveni had

originally been careful so as not to antagonize Khartoum by supporting the SPLA even if

he did sympathize with them ideologically. It was only after the GoS and the Sudanese

army began reaching out to and supplying the LRA that Museveni began assisting the

SPLA in part because his previous policy of non-interference had failed to produce

positive results.3

The GoS had long been interested in assisting the LRA in its fight against

Museveni, who was their common enemy. However, it took a change of power in

Ethiopia to make that possible. In 1991, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam’s regime fell

and SPLA lost its main source of military, financial, and political support. Mengistu’s

communist regime was long at odds with Bashir’s government and took to supporting his

enemy, the SPLA. Shortly after Mengistu’s down fall, the SPLA started arguing and split

into two competing factions largely divided by their Lou Nuer and Bor Dinka ethnicities.

3 Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World War, 80.

88

The SPLA was so preoccupied fighting among themselves over issues of tactics,

finances, and where to find outside support, that they created an opportunity for the GoS

army to re-take an area along the Uganda-Sudan border. The SPLA soon split into two

factions. Nuer fighters loyal to Commander Riek Machar created SPLA-United. In what

became a watershed moment in Southern Sudan history, the Nuer SPLA-United

massacred around 2,000 Dinka,4 mostly women and children. Although the SPLA later

re-united, the damage done to relations between Dinka/Garang and Nuer/Machar

supporters was beyond repair.

While the SPLA was fighting, the GoS got into position to make contact with the

LRA. The Sudanese military made contact and invited LRA leader Joseph Kony to Juba

where he and several other LRA leaders received substantial military aid in exchange for

only a symbolic smattering of Islam and fake professions of faith. The LRA had been

reduced to around 300 fighters in 1993 and then remarkably had over 2,000 well-

equipped fighters in March of 1994 who were in position and ready to attack northern

Uganda,5 largely as a result of new support coming from the GoS. Shortly after

establishing a relationship with the LRA, the Khartoum government approached

President Mobutu of Zaire, who also despised Museveni, for permission to run supply

convoys from Bahr-el-Ghazal to northern Uganda through the Central African Republic

and the Uele province of Zaire in order to bypass SPLA held positions.6 Thus, the LRA

was being directly supplied by the GoS through supply lines across southern Sudan and

Zaire.

4 “Sudan: Massacre,” Africa Confidential 47, no. 11, May 2006. 5 Gérard Prunier, Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare, 366-67.

6 Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World War, 82.

89

The LRA was not the only Ugandan rebel group that Khartoum supported. The

GoS made contact with ethnic Kakwa and Aringa, former Amin soldiers, who had been

living in Zaire since Amin’s overthrow in 1979 and helped them organize into the West

Nile Bank Front (“WNBF”). The WNBF immediately began harassing UPDF forces in

West Nile from their safe haven in Zaire. The GoS also took advantage of other Ugandan

ethnic groups who felt snubbed by the Museveni regime. Along the Uganda-Congolese

border, the Bakonjo and Baamba tribes had fought a low- level guerilla campaign against

the British when Uganda was a protectorate. The Bankonjo and Baamba had been

wrongly lumped in with other ethnic groups and were made subjects of the Toro

Kingdom. They patiently petitioned the British and waited for their own district, a request

that was ultimately denied. As a result, some angry Bankonjo and Baamba decided to

take up arms in the name of establishing their own district or kingdom and created the

Rwenzururu movement. They fought a rather low intensity guerilla war with the

Ugandan government until they reached a peace agreement with the second Obote

regime. The leader of the Rwenzururu fled Uganda after the fall of Obote and later

approached President Mobutu and President Moi of Kenya in hopes of restarting the

rebellion. Mobutu and Moi were both hostile to Museveni and agreed to re-start

Rwenzururu under the new name of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda

(“NALU”).7 Although the NALU proved to be an irritant for Museveni, it was the rebel

group created through cooperation between Zaire and Sudan that proved to be

Museveni’s biggest challenge other than the LRA.

7 Gérard Prunier, Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare, 369.

90

In 1995, the Uganda Muslim Liberation Army (“UMLA”) declared war on the

Museveni government supposedly because NRA soldiers had killed large numbers of

Muslims during its guerilla war, a claim that the NRA disputed and the UMLA never

proved. However, its official political objective and reasons to start a fight almost a

decade after the NRA’s victory were unclear. Most of the founders of this group were

Bagandan Muslim. In London, yet another group of disgruntled Bagandans created the

Allied Democratic Movement (“ADM”) also in 1995. The ADM wanted a full restoration

of the Buganda Kingdom. In an effort to appease monarchists, Museveni did restore

traditional kingdoms in 1993, but in a diminished and non-political form8 by giving them

a ceremonial role, but no real political power. The Bagandan members of the ADM had

views similar to those of the KY party of the 1960s. They thought that the only legitimate

ruler of Buganda should be the Kabaka, a Bagandan king, and not a national president.

As Prunier explains, these two rebel groups worked well together because, “the ADM

could recruit among ordinary Baganda, while the UMLA could recruit both among the

small Baganda Muslim community and among non-Baganda Muslims…the two rebel

movements complemented each other and cleverly exploited the complex interweaving of

ethnic and class politics.”9 Therefore, although they were two separate rebel groups, they

were effective at recruiting and garnering support from various segments of the Ugandan

population.

At first, the UMLA’s military efforts were largely unsuccessful. They clashed

with the UPDF and after a one-sided battle, some UMLA survivors retreated into Zaire.

Once there, they met and mixed with members of the former Rwandan Interahamwe and

8 Ibid., 370. 9 Ibid., 371.

91

the WNBF who were being supplied by the Sudanese Army. Although the Sudanese

army had not worked with them before, they saw an opportunity to use the UMLA to

create a new, stronger Ugandan rebel group. The Allied Democratic Forces (“ADF”) was

created from Sudanese support of a fusion between the ADM and UMLA. They also

incorporated members of the NALU into the movement to give it a strong peasant

support base. The ADF continued to plague Museveni for many years and have even

resurfaced as recently as July of 2010 when they staged several attacks in eastern DRC

only fifty kilometers form the DRC – Uganda border.

92

SECTION 2: CLAIMS AND COUNTER-CLAIMS

During the second Congo war (1998-2003), Uganda realized that the ADF and

LRA were receiving military supplies from Khartoum in hopes of destabilizing northern

Uganda and thus, Museveni himself. Naturally, Sudan sided with and came to the aid of

President Mobutu and helped his forces in trying to fight the ADFL and the RPA.

Uganda’s involvement was not just about helping Rwanda, pursuing ADF rebels, or

overthrowing Mobutu. Rather, Congo presented an opportunity to fight the Sudanese

directly. President Museveni even went so far as to exclaim, “We have run out of

solutions with the Sudan. We are now seeking a solution on the battlefield.”10 Although

the strategy was not successful, at the same time the UPDF was operating in Congo, the

Sudanese military continued to air-drop supplies to the LRA in hopes that a big enough

battle and insurgency would warrant the withdrawal of the UPDF from Congo to address

the situation in northern Uganda. The north continued to suffer, but the UPDF held their

positions in Congo.

Although the Sudanese and Sudanese supported forces were eventually driven

from Congo by the alliance of the AFDL, RPA, and UPDF and were finally squashed by

the SPLA as they re-entered Sudan, the Khartoum government continued to support and

sponsor Ugandan rebels long after their exit from Congo. In addition to all the rebel

groups it supported, there were another 3,000 hostile troops in Garamba National Park,

only 60 miles from the Ugandan border, who were occasionally brought supplies by

Khartoum.11 There were also direct attacks carried out by the Sudanese army and the

10 Agence France Presse Dispatch. Kampala, January 31, 1997. 11 Gérard Prunier, Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare, 379.

93

UPDF. In 1995, the Sudanese Air Force bombed Uganda’s largest garrison close to the

border. Although the bombs did not reach their intended target near Kitgum, it was the

first direct attack carried out by the Sudanese military on Kampala.12 This brazen attack

signaled that Khartoum was not backing away from a fight.

The official line from the GoS was that it never provided assistance to the LRA.

However, there were many eyewitness accounts that supported the claim that the GoS

provided Kony with weapons, food, and medicine throughout the LRA’s stay in southern

Sudan.13 To attempt to put an end to the GoS support, the UPDF went on joint operations

with the SPLA against the LRA in November 1995 and April 1997, however these

operations only pushed the LRA’s front line closer to Juba.14 The LRA rebels still

infiltrated southern Sudanese territory and attacked villages in northern Uganda. Various

peace pacts between the GoU and the GoS were signed, but never fully implemented. A

Peace Pact was signed on September 9, 1996 based on an agreement mediated between

Libyan and Malawian leaders. Only days later on September 23, Sudanese air force

planes bombed Ugandan army barracks in Moyo, putting that agreement and any peace in

serious doubt.15 Even former U.S. President Carter and his Carter Center brokered an

agreement between the Sudan and Uganda in Nairobi in 1999, but both sides largely

ignored this agreement too. The GoS insisted that the UPDF was helping the SPLA fight

12 “Sudan-Uganda: Attack Accusations and Denials,” Africa Research Bulletin. Political, Social

and Cultural Series 32, no. 2 (March 23, 1995): 11744. 13 “Uganda: LRA Abductions,” Africa Research Bulletin. Political, Social and Cultural Series 33,

no. 8 (September 28th, 1995): 12379. 14 “Uganda: The Border War,” Africa Confidential 38, no. 23 (November 21 1997).

15 “Sudan: Peace Agreement Stalled,” Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social, and Cultural

Series 33, no. 9 (October 24th 1996): 2390.

94

its forces, the SPLA accused the LRA of fighting alongside the Sudanese government

forces, and the UPDF accused the GoS of supplying the LRA. Matters got worse as

President Museveni came out to officially declare his support of the SPLA’s main goal of

secession from Sudan to create in independent Southern Sudan if, in his words, the Arab

Africans of Sudan could not treat the Black Africans in that county as equals.16

In 2001, Uganda – Sudan relations improved somewhat with the restoration of

diplomatic relations at the chargé d’affaires level. Libya’s leader, Col. Mummar Gaddafi,

had been trying to broker a peace between Sudan and Uganda and convinced Museveni to

restore relations and begin new peace negotiations. Significantly, Col. Gaddafi and

Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir attended Museveni’s swearing in ceremony together

in May 2001.17 Another event that further pushed the GoS to change its tune was the

United States’ declaration of the LRA as a terrorist organization after the terrorist attacks

on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001. The GoS allowed the

UPDF access to LRA bases in southern Sudan based on an understanding that the UPDF

would not assist the SPLA while they were in Sudan. The SPLA was not fond of this

agreement. As told in an interview with a SPLA general in March 2009, “they [UPDF]

went to Khartoum and they signed a protocol for Iron Fist 1. For us in SPLA we told

them it wouldn’t work because it was the same people who were arming the LRA. How

can somebody who is arming and grooming another a force to overthrow you, allow you

to come and attack that same force?”18

16 “Sudan-Uganda: Uganda Threatens Sudan,” Africa Research Bulletin. Political, Social and

Cultural Series 32, no. 11 (December 21, 1995): 12079.

17 “Sudan-Uganda: Improved Relations,” Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series 38, no. 5 (June 22, 2001): 14400.

18 Interview with SPLA Spokesman, March 18, 2009.

95

The UPDF launched Operation Iron Fist (“Iron Fist”) in March 2002, sending

over 14,000 troops and heavy weaponry to defeat the LRA by year’s end. However, Iron

Fist failed miserably and only split the LRA into smaller groups that slipped behind

UPDF lines and then stepped up attacks on civilians and military targets in the north.19

There was also evidence that Khartoum was continuing to support and supply the LRA

with food, cash, and weapons. The LRA was a valuable asset to the GoS because the

LRA was a means to keep pressure on Kampala to not support the SPLA. In 2004, LRA

attacks in northern Uganda showed evidence that they possessed an increasing and

updated stock of military hardware. The GoS no longer officially supplied the LRA and

Ugandan officials backed up their claim that the GoS was not responsible, but they only

did this because they did not also want to be accused of re-supplying the SPLA.

Privately, Ugandan officials said that Khartoum was still backing the LRA.20 It was also

possible that Khartoum had actually stopped supplying the LRA, but they had become so

adept at sustaining themselves and stockpiling weapons that a few supplies could last a

long time. The LRA also had little need for high-tech weapons since most of their attacks

on civilians were carried out rudimentarily with axes and machetes.21

While the UPDF had an opportunity to prove itself in various operations in

southern Sudan, they once again showed they were a questionable army with little regard

for human rights and more of an interest in the spoils of war. Both the SPLA and UPDF

19 Oxford Analytica Database, “Uganda: Government Unable to Defeat Rebels,” July 21, 2004,

www.intelink.gov/oxan/display.aspx?Item=DB111251 (accessed July 9, 2001).

20 “Continental Alignments,” Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series 41, no. 3 (April 22nd 2004): 15690.

21 “Uganda: Background to War,” Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series

41, no. 7 (August 26, 2004): 15852.

96

attacked and looted civilians in southern Sudan and used the LRA to cover up their

attacks.22 However, the civilians of southern Sudan have been witness to so many

conflicts that it is often times hard for them to tell if they are dealing with LRA, UPDF,

or SPLA, or other smaller Sudanese rebel groups. Making it even harder to make a

distinction between the groups is the fact that many northern Ugandans are the ethnic

brothers of southern Sudanese.23

Southern Sudan civilians certainly did not appreciate the presence of a foreign

army on their soil. As Mareike Schomers explains, locals in the Eastern Equatoria regions

would not dare fight the LRA, but kept weapons to use against the UPDF. One local

testified that if you meet the UPDF in the bush and they cannot determine if you are

civilian, they would kill you anyway. One civilian lamented:

Why is the UPDF in Sudan? To make sure the LRA is not destroyed. The LRA has made the UPDF powerful because military funding in Uganda has been based on government arguments that stronger defense is needed against the rebels. With the spread and continuation of the war, the army has also become a significant economic player through its plundering activities and corruption. The resentment of the people is that these people [the UPDF] were never defending them. They did not have very effective encounters with the LRA although their mission was to fight them…they resorted to destruction of the area and cutting trees in our forest. People really resent them.24

While southern Sudanese grievances against the UPDF were not as numerous or

as serious as their displeasure with the LRA, there were still many accusations that

instead of pursuing the LRA, the UPDF had turned their guns on civilians, shooting,

22 Mareike Schomerus. “The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan: A History and Overview,” Small

Arms Survey (September 2007): 16, http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-SWP-8-LRA.pdf (accessed October 18, 2009).

23 “Sudan: Peace Agreement Stalled,” Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social, and Cultural

Series 33, no. 9 (October 24th, 1996): 12392. 24 Mareike Schomerus. “The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan: A History and Overview,” 29.

97

raping and looting as they made they way through southern Sudan. Whereas in Congo the

UPDF stole diamonds, gold, and coltan, in southern Sudan, they concentrated on looting

timber. Many locals regularly reported that the UPDF cut down teak trees and in a

particular instance locals reported that the UPDF cut down 200 trees outside Palataka and

carried them across the border before it could be reported to the proper authorities.25

Again, as they had done in Congo, the UPDF denied the accusations of looting timber as

false despite significant evidence to the contrary. As for the killing of civilians, the UPDF

response was to blame the LRA for being around civilians and for using civilians as a

shield. In this instance, just as Congolese civilians were caught in the middle of various

rebel groups and national armies, southern Sudanese civilians faced abuse and atrocities

committed not only by the GoS, SPLA, but also the LRA and the UPDF.

Although conditions for civilians improved somewhat after the signing of the

Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the SPLM and the GoS in January 2005, the

region continues to be plagued by sporadic attacks by the LRA and faces continued

UPDF presence. As recently as August 2010, the LRA was attacking villages in Western

Equatoria State, abducting people and looting huts. Kony’s renewed capabilities lead

many to believe that he is no longer operating on his own. Many of Southern Sudan’s

political and military leaders believe the old ties between Khartoum and Kony remain.26

These ties may be renewed just in time for the 2011 Southern Sudan referendum. Many

are suspicious that Khartoum will use the LRA just enough to scare southern Sudanese

25 Ibid., 30. 26 Alan Boswell, “The Ruthless Guerilla Movement That Won’t Die,” Time Magazine, August 31,

2010, http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,2014431,00.html (accessed September 2, 2010).

98

civilians into thinking that if they vote for independence, they will be welcoming back

the LRA at the same time.

In a 2008 briefing on the Uganda – Sudan border, it was reported that people saw

a potential benefit in cross border trade with Uganda. However, many Sudanese civilians

still feel wary and vulnerable to attacks by both the LRA and UPDF. The report, issued

by Conciliation Resources confirms that, “Local communities are highly suspicious of

UPDF activities, as some elements have been implicated in human rights abuses. They do

not understand the UPDF’s current mandate and fear its operations enable a Ugandan

land grab along the unclearly marked border.”27 The report went on to urge the UPDF to

use professional conduct and to clarify and communicate its mandate to local

communities.

Although civilians may have an issue with the UPDF, the SPLA defends the

UPDF’s actions inside southern Sudan. When asked about accusations that UPDF have

masqueraded as LRA a SPLA representative stated:

I don’t think, it has never happened. I was with the UPDF throughout, especially the area they were operating is my home area, Torit and Nimule, and up to here near Juba. It has never happened that UPDF kills civilians, no. And if at all anyone talks like that these are the enemies who are supporting LRA and they wanted UPDF to go away and they create a problem here and then LRA would have a rest, organize and hit again. UPDF would never behave like that. It’s a disciplined army.28

Clearly, southern Sudanese civilians and the SPLA have differing opinions

regarding the UPDF, but the SPLA will surely not question an army and a regime that

supplied and supported it for years. They fought a common enemy in the GoS and have

27 Mareike Schomerus. “Perilous Border: Sudanese Communities Affected by Conflict on the

Sudan-Uganda Border,” Conciliation Resources (November 2008): 6, http://www.c-r.org/our-work/uganda/documents/Perilous-Border.pdf (accessed September 17, 2010).

28 Interview with SPLA Spokesman, March 18, 2009.

99

an important relationship to maintain as southern Sudan moves forward to official

independence in the January 2011 referendum. Although the level and amount of UPDF

looting and killing in southern Sudan is contested, the fact that the UPDF stirs up

accusations wherever it deploys outside its borders is clear and concerning.

100

CHAPTER 4: THE UPDF IN SOMALIA

Since warlords overthrew President Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991, Somalia has

been in a perpetual state of anarchy. The destitute nation in the Horn of Africa has been

without a functioning government for two decades and typifies the classic failed state.

The botched American humanitarian intervention in 1993 ended when warlords shot

down a Blackhawk helicopter killing eighteen and wounding seventy-three American

soldiers. Angry mobs then dragged the naked corpses of American soldiers through the

Mogadishu streets. As a result, Washington and other first world countries scratched

Somalia off the list of needy countries. However, since the terrorist attacks of September

11, 2001, Somalia has indirectly been host to the international war on terror. Somalia has

also provided an opportunity for the UPDF to assist in the war on terror by providing

soldiers to the African Union (“AU”) sponsored peacekeeping force known as ANISOM.

The UPDF’s involvement and assistance in the Somalia matter has helped to silence

criticism regarding President Museveni’s own undemocratic policies. As will be

demonstrated, the recent terrorist attacks in Kampala on July 11, 2010 (“7/11”) have also

allowed Museveni to clamp down on civil rights before the upcoming presidential

elections in February 2011 without fear of reprisal from the western world.

Offering a glimmer of hope, the Somali Transitional Federal Government

(“TFG”) was created in 2004. Since it was too dangerous to rule and operate from

Mogadishu, the government had its headquarters in Nairobi. Unfortunately, the moderate

and western-backed TFG failed to accomplish much of anything. In 2006, a

fundamentalist radical group called the Islamic Courts Union (“ICU”) was poised to

overtake Mogadishu and ultimately all of Somalia, with the exception of self-declared

101

independent, and semi-functioning areas of Somaliland and Puntland in the north of the

country.

However, rather than allow the ICU to take over Somalia, the Bush administration

provided intelligence and logistical support for an Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in late

2006. In the early months of 2007, it appeared that the Ethiopian forces had been

successful in routing the ICU from Mogadishu and that many ICU members had

dispersed in defeat. Additionally, there were hundreds of ICU militants who did not

manage to escape and were either captured and put in prison, or killed.

While the invasion may have looked like a success, it proved to be a tactical

disaster that only emboldened and strengthened the enemy. Due to the contentious history

between Ethiopia and Somalia, Somali civilians saw the Ethiopian forces as unwelcome

foreign invaders and occupiers. Every Somali knew that it was American money and

logistics that provided support to the Ethiopians. In order to battle the ICU and the spread

of radical Islam, a Central Intelligence Agency unit organized a group of violent and

unreliable clan militias that even included some of the same gangs who had attacked U.S.

forces in the early 1990s.1 Although many Somalis did not like the ICU and its strict

rules, they made Mogadishu safe to walk in for the first time in a generation and provided

some semblance of law and order, something many Somalis preferred over the chaotic

rule of warlords and the inept TFG. As one Somali humanitarian worker explained, “they

[Somalis] resent the Ethiopians and Americans tearing it all up, using Somalia as their

1 Paul Salopek, “Nobody is Watching. America’s Hidden War in Somalia,” Chicago Tribune,

November 24, 2008, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-shadow_war2nov24,0,6440328 (accessed December 31, 2008).

102

battlefield against global terrorism. It’s like the Cold War all over again. Somalis aren’t

in control.”2

Furthermore, the American-backed Ethiopian invasion only enraged former

members of the ICU. Young men from the ICU splintered off into smaller groups and

joined other more radical groups such as al-Shabab. Al-Shabab quickly found outside

support and funding from Ethiopia’s mortal enemy, Eritrea. Today, al-Shabab controls

the majority of the country and threatens the entire Great Lakes and Horn region of

Africa with terrorist attacks.

In the spirit of providing African solutions for African problems, the AU

supported a peacekeeping mission in Somalia in January 2007 with hopes of getting

8,000 troops into place. The first Ugandan members of the ANISOM force arrived in

Mogadishu in March 2007. The Ugandan soldiers were joined several months later by a

small Burundian contingent making the total force number about 3,400, which was far

short of the requested 8,000. Other African countries such as Ghana and Nigeria

promised to contribute troops to the ANISOM force, but Uganda and Burundi have been

the only countries to contribute troops to date. In an interview with ANISOM

spokesman, Major Barigye Ba-Hoku, made the following comments when asked if he

was frustrated that other countries have not fulfilled their pledges to send troops to

Somalia.

I think the frustration is not about the failure of other countries to send troops into the mission. The frustration is about the fulfillment of our mandate even if these other countries didn’t deploy. The frustration is that you go into this mission area, you’ve got a mandate, you’ve got roles to play, you’ve got tasks to fulfill, but you cannot fulfill them, either because you do not have the logistical support, or you do not have enough manpower, or for any other reason, that is for me is a frustration. But, failure of other countries to deploy cannot be in itself a

2 Ibid.

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frustration. These countries have explained and they have said one of the main reasons they have failed to deploy is because of logistical support...that is why I was saying the failure of those countries in itself cannot be a frustration. The frustration should be the failure for the African continent, for the AU to resolve forever the conflict of Somalia. If other countries came up today, or the international community, or if the partners who are more developed would provide these resources and countries besides Nigeria and Ghana would be willing to deploy, that would be great.3 The ANISOM force originally worked in conjunction with the Ethiopian troops,

until they decided to pull out in December 2008, ending their two-year occupation of the

country. The Ethiopians were seen as foreign invaders and many, including the United

Nations, thought their presence in Somalia was a hindrance for furthering peace and

security. While Somalis were more than pleased to see the Ethiopians depart, their exit

left the ANISOM force with more responsibilities than they could handle in terms of

manpower and territory. It was understood that when the Ethiopian forces left, there

would be additional forces sent in to supplement the existing ANISOM force. The

additional forces would fill a vacuum created by the departing Ethiopians. Not

surprisingly, additional forces were not sent in and the ANISOM force became stretched

too thin and al-Shabab easily took over areas previously held by the Ethiopians and the

TFG.

Since they entered the country, ANISOM troops have been under constant attack

and are unable to patrol many areas of town other than the airport and seaport. The

departure of the Ethiopian troops only exacerbated problems for ANISOM forces as al-

3 Interview with Maj. Barigye Ba-Hoku. April 2, 2009

104

Shabab stepped up attacks on the peacekeepers in anticipation of Ethiopia’s departure.4

They also claimed that Ethiopia’s exit signaled a victory for al-Shabab.

While Ugandan military leaders insisted that it was absolutely important and

worth it for the UPDF to participate in the ANISOM force, its involvement has come at a

cost to soldiers as least 35 Ugandan peacekeepers have died in sporadic attacks since the

ANISOM mission began in March of 2007. UPDF leadership insisted that they have an

obligation to help neighboring counties in need. However, it is also clear that the UPDF

presence on the ANISOM force has a lot to do keeping up appearances in Africa. As

UPDF spokesman Felix Kulayigye told the author, “when we finally took over

government in 1986, what environment do you find? Locally there was euphoria, there

was excitement, we were viewed at liberators and we have to stick to that image, we must

remain the liberators.”5

Furthermore, it appears that the Ugandan public is unclear as to why its soldiers

are in Somalia. When 151 members of the Ugandan public were asked whether they

thought the UPDF was participating in peacekeeping out of genuine security concerns, or

in an effort to please the U.S. the majority, fifty-four percent, responded that the UPDF

was not involved in peacekeeping because of genuine concerns. Answers to this question,

which was asked between October 2008 and May 2009, are summarized and broken

down by answer and home region6 of the respondents as follows:

4 Alisha Ryu, “Ugandan Peacekeepers to Stay in Somalia,” Voice of America, December 2, 2008,

www.voanews.com/english/2008-12-02-voa38.cfm (accessed December 31, 2008). 5 Interview with UPDF Spokesman Major Felix Kulayigye, March 9, 2009.

6 Regions were classified into four main regions including: Central - Kampala and surroundings.

West – including areas west of Masaka and northwest up to Masindi. Greater North - including regions north of Masindi and Karuma Falls, West Nile, and Karamojoa. East – areas east of Jinja including Tororo, Mbale, Kumi and Soroti.

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Table 4.1: Public Perception of UPDF Peacekeeping in Somalia

Table 4.2: Breakdown of Affirmative Responses by Home Region

Yes 46 (31%)

30%

26% 26%

13%

4%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

Central Western Northern Eastern Undeclared

Response Total Percentage Yes (Genuine concerns) 46 30% No 81 54% Both 12 8% Unsure 11 7%

Region Percentage Total Central 30% 14 Western 26% 12 Northern 26% 12 Eastern 13% 6 Undeclared 4% 2

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Table 4.3: Breakdown of Negative Responses by Home Region

NO 82 (55%)

17%21%

34%

22%

6%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

Central Western Northern Eastern Undeclared

Table 4.4: Breakdown of Combination Responses by Home Region

Both 12 (7%)

25%

33%

8%

33%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

Central Western Northern Eastern

Region Percentage Total Central 17% 14 Western 21% 17 Northern 34% 28 Eastern 22% 18 Undeclared 6% 5

Region Percentage Total Central 25% 3 Western 33% 4 Northern 8% 1 Eastern 33% 4

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Table 4.5: Breakdown of Undecided/Unsure Responses by Home Region

Not surprisingly, the largest percentage of people who responded that the UPDF

was not involved because of genuine security concerns were people who came from the

North, reflecting their distrust of the government and the army. There also was a rather

large amount of people, thirteen percent, who either said they were not sure or that they

thought the UPDF was there for both legitimate security concerns and in an effort to

please the U.S.

The author also asked former UPDF Commander Major General (Retired)

Mugisha Muntu if he thought the UPDF was peacekeeping in Somalia out of genuine

security concerns or in an effort to pacify would- be critics. Maj. Gen. Muntu explained

that the UPDF has a history of peacekeeping, for instance in Liberia, and wanting to

stabilize trouble spots in Africa, but he also pointed out the following:

Of course the other complicating factor is the character of the incumbent, President Museveni, because I think at some point now there is a mixture of his own personal ambitions and desire to hang on to power. It undermines even what would have been good in terms of a regime that wants to be part of creating stability in a region. So the two get mixed up and I think it completely confuses

Region Percentage Total Central 27% 3 Western 0% 0 Northern 18% 2 Eastern 36% 4 Undeclared 18% 2

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the situation because it is no longer possible now to differentiate what Museveni is doing as a person because he wants to survive politically and what he would be trying to do even out of consideration for peace in an area, it’s very difficult to separate the two.7

Additionally, despite al-Shabab’s constant threat of terrorist attacks in retaliation

for Uganda participating in peacekeeping, military leaders have remained steadfast in

their commitment to provide peacekeepers. The Ugandan media has been writing about

potential reprisal terror attacks long before they actually happened. A Ugandan journalist

wrote in 2008 that, “with no immediate or medium term resolution to the conflict in

Somalia, together with its regional baggage, it is not farfetched to expect a terror attack

on any of East Africa’s cities, including Kampala.”8 Al-Shabab has made it clear for

some time that it would try to attack Kampala. In September 2008, two men of Somali

origin boarded a KLM-Kenya Airways flight to Entebbe when German police arrested

them on suspicion of terrorism and links to al-Shabab.9 Despite the threats, Uganda kept

deploying more troops to augment troops already present and sent a third battalion in

March of 2009. Many Ugandan soldiers received training from the French, Belgian, and

American armies and brought Somali troops for training in Uganda.

Just a few days after the TFG president Sheikh Ahmed Sharif visited Kampala in

March of 2009, al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden issued a statement urging Somalis to

fight alongside al-Shabab and take out Sharif. Despite the threats, General Aronda

Nyakairima, Chief of Defense Forces stated that, “we have been hearing about bin

7 Interview with Major General (Retried) Mughisha Muntu, March 3, 2009. 8 Angelo Izama, “Uganda in Danger of Terrorist Attacks,” Daily Monitor, December 6, 2008. 9 Ibid.

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Laden’s threats for a long time. He was living with Joseph Kony in 1995 and 1996 in

Sudan. He will not stop us.”10

On July 11, 2010 several suicide bombers struck an Ethiopian restaurant and the

rugby club in Kampala where large crowds had gathered to watch the World Cup finals.

The blasts killed seventy-nine people and injured many more. Not surprisingly, al-Shabab

claimed responsibility for the vicious attacks although it remains to be seen if those

accused actually have ties to the group.

In an interview with Major Barigye Ba-Hoku, the ANISOM spokesman, in April

2009, the author asked if Uganda was more at risk for terrorist threats because it is part of

peacekeeping mission in Somalia and if it was worth putting troops there if it meant

Uganda was under threat. Maj. Ba-Hoku responded with the following statement.

I like your adjective, more. Is Uganda at more risk because of being in Somalia? My answer is no, on the contrary, it will actually be a solution because if you’ve got a country like Somalia, it has a coastline of over 3,300 kilometers and so it should not even be looked at in terms of Uganda, it should be looked at in terms of the whole of this continent. So what does a coastline that has no control mean to this continent? It means that it can be used by any. So, if we stabilize that country and eventually get a strong central authority, a strong central government and therefore you can no longer have criminals hiding under so many excuses you know, possibly recruiting and training terrorists, possibly recruiting and training pirates, if we can play a part in stabilizing that country I think on the contrary, it would actually be a solution as opposed to a problem, certainly. Let’s not forget that Uganda has dealt with terrorism for a very long time. At that time we were lonely, we didn’t have any support. We tried to explain for a long time that there is terrorism here and people never understood it. Now, those people who were throwing bombs in Kampala… I can’t remember the exact time, you remember that there were bombs here, there were terrorists here throwing bombs everywhere almost everyday in Kampala. Were we in Somalia? What was the cause at that time? The excuses will be there.11

10 Julius Barigaba, “Uganda Deploys More Soldiers in Somalia Despite Osama Threat Against

Sharif,” East African 752, March 30 – April 5, 2009. 11 Interview with Major Barigye Ba-Hoku. April 2, 2009.

110

Clearly, before and even after the 7/11 attacks on Kampala, the Ugandan

leadership was and remains more committed than ever to supplying troops for the

peacekeeping mission. While Major Ba-Hoku might revise his statement somewhat to

admit that Uganda is at more risk of terrorist attacks because one did occur, Uganda is

still prepared to deploy more soldiers to Somalia. Recently, Uganda has even offered to

raise the entire force of 20,000 soldiers that the AU and seven nation East African

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (“IGAD”)12 said would be needed to defeat

Islamist rebels and pacify the country,13 on the condition that outside donors provide the

logistics and financial support for the 20,000 man operation.

Even with an increased force size of 7,100, al-Shabab has gone on a rampage in

recent weeks, in late September of 2010, killing four Ugandan soldiers in a mortar attack

on the presidential palace, attacking the airport, and bombing a government controlled

area of the city killing more than thirty civilians and four lawmakers, the need for more

ANISOM forces is more apparent than ever. Maj. Ba-Hoku recently reported that there

are not enough soldiers to hold areas once the AU forces gain control. He further went on

to explain that, “if we got 20,000, then we would have the whole of the country, and

possibly would relieve the worries of so many people in the world about this place being

a growing hub for international terror networks.”14 While having a greater number of

peacekeepers would certainly help in some aspects such as logistics and pressure to

12 IGAD is a regional development organization. Member states include: Eritrea, Djibouti,

Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, and Kenya. 13 Elias Biyabarema, “Uganda Says it Can Raise Whole Force for Somalia,” Reuters, October 5,

2010, http://af.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=AFJOE69404I20101005 (accessed October 6, 2010). 14 Frank Langfitt, “Peacekeepers, Islamists Battle For the Soul of Somalia,” National Public

Radio, October 4, 2010, www.npr.org/templates/story.php?storyId=13027380 (accessed October 4, 2010).

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produce results on current peacekeepers, one has to wonder whether any amount of

soldiers could relieve the country of its internal problems. Maj. Ba-Hoku himself

explained the following to the author in 2009.

In the case of Somalia, there is no amount of force that can be exacted into that country to help bring peace. No, we are very conscious of it and therefore our approach is to work with the positive forces on the ground to achieve that peace, but not to use force. You can even take 100,000 troops into that country, if the leadership of Somalia, if the people of Somalia are not convinced of what we are doing there, the mission will be useless. So we’ve got to work with those positive forces, we’ve got to work with the international partners and we’ve got to seek for the commitment of the Somali people through their leadership.15

So while there is a push to get more troops on the ground, it remains somewhat

questionable how much it would help if the AU forces lacked the backing of the Somali

people or if they are too afraid to admit whose side they are really on because of threats

from al-Shabab.

Uganda’s insistence that it can provide 10,000-20,000 additional troops for

Somalia is certainly timely since a United Nations report was released at the same time

documenting the UPDF’s human rights violations during both its forays into the Congo.

The offering of troops helps to deflect criticism of the UPDF and promotes the image of

Uganda and a respectable member of the international community and a partner of the

U.S. in the international war on terror.

Unfortunately, President Museveni has used the 7/11 attacks to his advantage in

the run-up to the February 2011 presidential elections by using them as an excuse to

control dissent. Three days after the bombings, parliament passed a bill authorizing phone

tapping. Several weeks later, demonstrations demanding an independent election

15 Interview with Major Barigye Ba-Hoku. April 2, 2009

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commission were squashed because the government claimed terrorists could exploit

them. The media is banned form commenting on the bombings16 and Kampala residents

are now required to obtain police clearance for all gatherings, including private parties

and wedding receptions.17 This move is widely interpreted to have little to do with

terrorism and everything to do with Museveni’s tightening grip on power to ensure he

will be re-elected. Washington is not helping the matter. While initially committed to

urging democratic reforms by denying meetings with President Museveni, President

Obama is now appearing to rescind of his tough stance because counterterrorism efforts

seem to outweigh concerns over a Ugandan democracy.

Finally, no outside deployment of the UPDF would be complete without

allegations of corruption. A 2008 report by a UN monitoring group stated that Ugandan

peacekeepers were selling arms to Somali insurgents. The reported cited one particular

incident in which Ugandan soldiers allegedly received $80,000 for one transaction. The

report stated that peacekeepers received a wish-list of weapons from insurgents and that

armed groups bought back the weapons that were originally seized from them.18

However, the UPDF leadership denied all allegations of wrong doing UPDF. The matter

of peacekeepers selling weapons to insurgents is obviously a serious concern, but the

persistent pattern of mismanagement and corruption during UPDF deployments to

neighboring countries is even more of a cause for alarm.

16 Ioannis Gatsiounis, “Balancing Counterterrorism and Democracy in Uganda,” Time Magazine.

September 7, 2010, www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2016175,00.html (accessed September 8, 2010).

17 Nicholas Young, “Uganda’s July Bombing Fall-out Exposes Flaws in War on Terror,” Daily

Monitor, October 5, 2010, www.monitor.co.ug/OpEd/Commentary/-/689364/1025872 (accessed October 7, 2010).

18 BBC News, “Peacekeepers Sell Arms to Somalis,” May 23, 2008,

http://news.bbc.co.uk.go/pr/fr/-/hi/world/africa/7417435.stm (accessed January 14, 2009).

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CHAPTER 5: THE UPDF AND INTERNAL INSTABILITY

SECTION 1: NORTHERN UGANDA AND THE LRA

As demonstrated in the previous four chapters, the UPDF’s involvements in

neighboring countries such as Rwanda, Sudan, the DRC, and Somalia have given it a

controversial international reputation and much media attention. However, while

President Museveni has been occupied building the reputation of the UPDF as a regional

powerhouse by deploying the army outside of Uganda’s borders, it has also inflicted pain

and grief on the people of northern Uganda who have suffered from the brutal insurgency

waged by the LRA since 1987. There has been relative peace in northern Uganda since

the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement went into effect on August 29, 2006. As a result,

many internally displaced persons (“IDPs”) have returned to their homes and are

rebuilding their lives. Nevertheless, the UPDF’s activities in the north remain a cause for

concern and warrant further investigation. Additionally, the UPDF’s inability to finish off

the LRA, which now terrorizes the entire region, including DRC, southern Sudan, and the

Central African Republic (“CAR”), is a major cause of concern as it could lead to further

instability in the north and the entire country.

The LRA has always claimed to be fighting for the Acholi people of northern

Uganda. However, few Acholis identified with the LRA even from the start of their fight

against the Museveni regime shortly after he captured power. Once the LRA’s leader,

Jospeh Kony, began to terrorize his own Acholi people, he was left with virtually no

supporters. The LRA is notorious for its brutal tactics. Children are taken from their

homes in the middle of the night and forced to walk long distances to the LRA’s training

posts in southern Sudan. Most boys are forced to fight while the girls are turned to sex

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slaves and were forced to serve as wives. The children are sometimes forced to kill other

abducted children who resist instructions or even kill their own families as an initiation

into the group. The LRA is also known for mutilating their victims, sometimes cutting off

lips, noses, and ears or larger limbs such as legs and arms. The LRA’s forced abductions

left many children with no choice but to seek protection during the night. Thus, the

practice of ‘night commuting’ began. Children would walk, sometimes up to ten

kilometers, from their villages or IDP camps into well-lit areas of larger towns. The

children would sleep outside and then walk home in the early hours of the morning in the

hopes of making it to school on time. During a peak time in the LRA war from July to

August of 2002, St. Mary’s Missionary hospital in Lacor, a few kilometers outside of

Gulu town was host to more than 40,000 people each night.1

As awful as conditions were for those who were abducted by the LRA, the living

conditions for those left behind were hardly much better. In what was stated as an effort

to protect civilians, the UPDF forcibly moved almost the entire rural population of

northern Uganda into IDP camps. Dr. Godfrey Odongo, a researcher at Amnesty

International based in Kampala, explained the following to the author:

The military tactics used by the UPDF led to massive displacement, its an enduring legacy, we are talking about a population of up to one million, displaced from their homes and put into camps, in camps where they were supposed to be protected, there were protected zones, but LRA ended up in fact attacking them in these very camps. The squalid conditions in the camps without water and sanitation, was abominable.2

As Dr. Odongo pointed out, the IDP camps were meant to protect the population

from further attacks from the LRA. However, the concentrated location of so many

1 Sverker Finnstrom, Living With Bad Surroundings: War, History, and Everyday Moments in

Northern Uganda (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 133.

2 Interview with Dr. Godfrey Odongo, March 11, 2009.

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people made it easer for the LRA to raid and abduct as they pleased. People no longer

had access to their land so they could not grow food. There was no sanitation and spread

of disease was rampant. The public health situation in the camps was horrific. Not only

did the population have to fear the LRA, now they were faced with many public health

concerns that would not have otherwise affected them if they would have been allowed to

stay in their villages.

As recently as 2005, there were two million displaced people in northern Uganda.

In addition, one thousand people were dying every week in the camps. Only eleven

percent died from violence inflicted on them. The remaining deaths were caused from

curable diseases such as malaria, diarrhea, and massive malnutrition.3 In 2003, the United

Nations Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, visited northern

Uganda and labeled it a moral outrage. He went on further to exclaim, “I cannot find any

other part of the world that is having an emergency on the scale of Uganda, that is getting

such little international attention.”4 Mr. Egeland’s observations certainly helped in getting

the world’s attention to the deplorable situation in northern Uganda that had already been

going on for over a decade.

In addition to the horrible public health hazard created by the IDP camps, they did

not serve their intended purpose of protecting the population. As Professor Tim Allen

explains, each IDP camp was to have an army detachment, but the UPDF soldiers

assigned to the camps were notorious for failing to respond to attacks by running away

from the LRA. When they did react, it was often in a haphazard and dangerous manner.

3 Sverker Finnstrom, Living With Bad Surroundings, 133. 4 “Uganda: UN Urged to Intervene,” Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural

Series 40, no. 11 (November 1-30, 2003, published December 18, 3003): 15542.

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Mr. Allen recalls an LRA attack while he was staying at Atiak IDP camp. The UPDF

responded and ran around the camp yelling at people in Swahili.5 Anyone found moving

around the main street was beaten. The next morning, a LRA rebel’s body was still lying

uncovered in the road and was being eaten by local pigs. The UPDF would not allow the

camp residents to cover the body with leaves, an Acholi custom, so it seemed as if the

whole camp was being terrorized and punished for what had transpired.6

Making matters worse, the LRA were not the only armed group that committed

atrocities on residents of the IDP camps. Human rights groups such as Human Rights

Watch and Amnesty International have implicated the UPDF in several reports dating as

far back as 1999. A 2005 Human Rights Watch Report entitled, “Uprooted and

Forgotten: Impunity and Human Rights Abuses in Northern Uganda,” documents both

LRA and UPDF crimes. It cites the UPDF killing, raping and uprooting civilians with no

consequences and calls for the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) to include the UPDF

in its investigations. The report also detailed abuses of civilians in several camps that

were not cases of a few undisciplined soldiers as UPDF often claims. UPDF soldiers

were found to have raped, beat, and arbitrarily detained civilians in camps.7 Such UPDF

abuses were also reported to the author in a visit to the Awach IDP camp in April 2009.8

Below are excepts from interviews with IDPs in the camp that detail LRA and UPDF

5 Swahili is the lingua franca of the military and police forces in Uganda. Many Ugandan civilians

understand some Swahili, but people living in IDP camps speak Acholi and would have probably not understood instructions yelled in Swahili.

6 Tim Allen, Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord’s Resistance Army

(London: Zed Books, 2006), 54. 7 Human Rights Watch, “Uganda: Army and Rebels Commit Atrocities in the North,” September

20, 2005 www.hrw.org (accessed June 20, 2007). 8 Victor Oloya, Chairman of the War Affected Children’s Association in Gulu, provided

translation of the interviewees responses from Acholi to English.

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abuses as well as regular life for those still struggling to return to their homes and their

former lives.

Interview #1: Santa is 26-years old and has been living in the camp for 10 years. Have you had experiences with UPDF here in the camp? Have they done good or bad? UPDF forced people to come to the IDP camp. Secondly, some people have also been killed by the UPDF. I have read that sometimes UPDF pretends they are LRA and then kill civilians and rape and do whatever, do you know anything about that? Yes, they have done that. They have done all those things? Mostly it was the men raping. Has the UPDF improved in recent years in their relations with people here and with their respect to human rights? Now, there is no problem. They are more professional now than when you first came to the camp? Yes, they are more professionalized. Interview #2: Angela is a female elder. She has been in the camp since 1997. She does not know how old she is. Were you forced to come, or did you want to come? The UPDF forced us. Do you have plans to return to where you were before you came here? Yes, we have plans to go back. Do you think the UPDF has done more good here than bad? Have they committed crimes here? Sometimes the UPDF could loot civilian’s homes. Sometimes when they are fighting with the LRA they could hurt civilians, accidentally. Do you think the UPDF have improved their relations with people in the camps in recent years? Yes, they are staying well with the people.

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Do you think things need to end with peace talks, or like with the recent operation, is that the way to go? I think peace talks are better. Do people in the camp fear LRA may return? Yes, people, they still have fear that they may come. Interview #3: Jennifer is 42 years old. She has been in Awach since 1988. Have you and your family felt safe here in the camp? LRA were disturbing us from here. One of my children was abducted, but he came back. He came back with one of the legs cut off. When did he come back? He stayed in the bush for 8-9 years and he came back 3 years ago. How old was he when he was taken? 11 years. So although you were in the camp, the LRA still abducted people from here? Yes. Has your son found it difficult to readjust after being in the bush? It was not easy for him to be rehabilitated to the community because he spent a lot of years in the bush, so it was not easy. But now, he is staying well with the friends. General impressions of the UPDF? When we were moving from here to a nearby place, it is not far, like 200 meters from here just to dig, to cultivate, we had some small huts. The UPDF said, why are we keeping these huts? So, we had to destroy them. We were also beaten saying that our child was in the bush with the LRA, I was beaten for that. They believe that child has taken long in the bush, that he has decided to stay. Was it common for UPDF to beat parents and mothers of children who were abducted? They beat you because they say you should have to convince your son to come out of the bush so that the rebels cannot disturb people. Do you think the UPDF could have done more to protect people and fight the war against the LRA? In 2005, that is when the UPDF started keeping the civilians safely. They have been better since then.

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But during the past 20 or so years, do people feel the UPDF has failed them? They were almost like the same as the LRA. Not only did you have to fear the LRA, but also UPDF? Yes, when you meet UPDF from some distance, you think they can also kill and abduct. So we were protecting ourselves from the LRA and the UPDF. Do you see UPDF as Museveni’s army, or is it for all Ugandans? For Museveni. If you were able to tell the government what they should do for people like you, what would you tell them to do? I have seven children, if the government could help me send some of them to school. I like agriculture a lot. If the government could provide things like seeds and farm equipments, that would be good for me. Should the government have continued trying to talk peace with Kony or do you really need an operation like that of Garamba? Military measures have finished our children. The best thing is talks. I would prefer the peace talks. Do you fear that LRA may return? I still fear the LRA may come. Is that part of the reason you have not moved out of the camp? Yes. Interview #4: Sandy is 28 years old. She has been in the camp for 10 years. Were you forced to move here? Yes, by UPDF. Has the UPDF been helpful here, or do they create more problems? There is nothing they have done good. They have done bad things to the people. Could you give examples? They were raping people, both female and male. The male soldiers were raping males and females? Yes, and also, the UPDF killed my father. My uncle was also killed by the UPDF. Do you know why? The rebels came, when they came, they settled in our place.

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The LRA? In your hut? In the hut and there were many. So when the UPDF came for the LRA, then they started fighting. The LRA fled and my father remained and the UPDF said that he was helping LRA, so they had to slaughter my father. But the LRA forced themselves in your home? They forced themselves. They were walking everyday and got tired and wanted to make a rest, so they settled there. So maybe you fear UPDF more than LRA? The UPDF they do bad things, but sometimes they consider civilians also. So for the LRA there is no consideration for civilians, so I fear LRA more than UPDF. Do you see UPDF as Museveni’s army or for the whole of Uganda? For Museveni. Do you think the way to end the war is to have more talks with Kony and the LRA or is the recent operation in Garamba the way to go? Peace talks are better. Do you fear LRA returning? I still fear they will come back. Is that part of why you remain here? Yes. If you could tell the government what to do for people like you, what would you tell them? I would ask the government to give oxen for plowing and a place to build a house. Interview #5: Grace is 22 years old. She has been in the camp since 1997. Were you forced to move here? The government forced me. Did you move with your parents and siblings? Yes, with my parents. What is your general opinion of UPDF? Have they done good here, or more harm than good? Both, but most of things are bad things.

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Can you give examples? They have killed. Do you think the UPDF should have done more during the war to help you and to fight the LRA? They fought the LRA and they protected the civilians. So you think they did a good enough job? Yes. How do you think things should come to an end? With talks or military action? They should have to end with peace talks. Do you have hope that eventually a peace agreement will be signed between Kony and the government? I don’t think Kony will sign. Do you know about the last UPDF operation in Garamba? Was that a good idea to go hunt him down in DRC? No, that was not good to go and disturb LRA from there. Do you think that because they went and killed or civilians or why do you think it was not good? I heard on the radio that many civilians had been killed, so that is not good. Do you fear the LRA may return here someday? I still have fear they may come back. Is that why you remain here? Yes. Do you see the UPDF as Museveni’s army, or is it for the whole country? For Museveni. How do you feel about the current government? Have they done enough here? There is no development here in the North compared to the South. How does that make you feel? It’s too painful. If you could tell the government what they need to do for people in your situation, what would you tell them?

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Capital for my business. I want to start a business. What kind of business? Crops, small things, fish. Interview #6: Kenneth is 39 years old. He was born in the area surrounding the camp. In general, how do you feel about UPDF? It depends on the situation. When they are for their military operation, for the LRA, then what they do is also bad to the civilians. But if there is no military operation, then they are staying well with the civilians. So, if they’re operating against the LRA, they’re not very good to the civilians? Yes. Do you think they’ve improved their behavior recently? They have. Before they improved, was it common for them to commit crimes in the camp and the community? They did that when they are out of the camp, and when they go out of the camp to get a little food or something else, then they think that maybe that person is a rebel, so they have to kill. So, if people went outside of the camp, they accuse them of being a rebel? Yes. They would just kill them without finding out the truth? Yes. Do you want more peace talks or military action like Garamba? For many years, civilians have been killed, UPDF are being killed, LRA also being killed through military way of solving this war. Militarily this war will not be ended. It will be through peace talks that this war will end. Do you think people who have committed crimes in the LRA should be granted amnesty? Those people were abducted and then they took years in LRA captivity, and they were forced or got used to doing bad things, but if they come home and they are forgiven they will start realizing that they’ve been doing bad things. So through that they will reconcile and they will start living together with the community. They are to be forgiven.

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Do you see UPDF as Museveni’s, or for the whole country? They are for the nation. Do you fear LRA may come back someday? They might still come back. If the UPDF does not defend the border well enough, they can come back. How do you feel about the government and them not developing the North? In the South there is development everyday, but here there was war and killing so there is no development. Several issues are apparent after talking with residents of the Awach IDP camp.

First, it is clear that the people of northern Uganda have suffered at the hands of both the

LRA and the UPDF. However, there was also an indication that most of the residents

agree that the UPDF has improved in its behavior in recent years and in terms of their

respect for human rights. In an interview with a human rights activist in Gulu, he

confirmed that there was antagonism between the residents of IDP camps and his

organization, and the UPDF. He also confirmed that the UPDF started, with his

organization’s assistance, trainings in human rights issues and that their behavior has

improved since the LRA has stopped attacking the north.9 It is also clear that although

the UPDF has come a long way, they still have work to do in order to gain back the trust

and respect of many northern Ugandans.

Another issue that stands out is people’s fear that the LRA may return to

Uganda. Many residents stated that their main reason for remaining in the camps,

although the government officially declared an end to IDP camps in March of 2009, was

continued fear of the LRA. When the Resident District Commissioner (“RDC”) of Gulu

9 Interview with Ugandan human rights activist, April 21, 2009

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district was asked why he believes people remain in the camps he responded by saying,

“the legitimate reason why some people remain in the camp is nothing but a disease

called dependency syndrome. For all these 20 years, the community has been getting

hand-outs, food items, non-food items, so they have developed a culture of dependency

that we have to fight as leaders.”10 Additionally when the author asked if there is a

chance that the LRA could return he responded, “No. LRA is not coming back at all. I’ve

told people several times…I keep telling them. I’m the most informed of what’s

happening in the LRA. I’ve been in touch with LRA. I know they will not come back.

I’ve been to [talk to] Kony eight times. So Kony is not coming. They [IDPs] will give

you all sorts of reasons. They will tell you there is no grass, but grass is grown.11

Whether IDPs remain in the camps out of fear or because of ‘dependency

syndrome’ it is clear that the government and local leaders need to do more to assist

people to return to lives of normalcy. As many people interviewed reiterated, small

amounts of assistance would make a big difference. Items such as seeds, farming

equipment, and small loans to start businesses would be greatly useful in getting people

back on their feet and would also go a long way in convincing many people that the

government really does care about them and wants to help them recover after they were

left to suffer for so long. Many international aid organizations, such as the United States

Agency for International Development, have been running massive campaigns to assist

and re-build the north, but many people have yet to benefit from these programs and

would like to see the Ugandan government develop its own reparations program.

10 Interview with RDC Colonel (Retired) Walter Ochora, May 4, 2009. 11 Ibid.

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Another subject covered during the interviews with the IDPs was the issue of

continuing peace talks with Joseph Kony and the LRA, or military action, such as the

UPDF’s most recent effort, launched on December 14, 2008, to finish the LRA,

Operation Lightning Thunder (“OLT”). Interestingly, most residents of northern Uganda

favored continued peace talks while residents of the rest of Uganda agreed with OLT.

The tables below give a revealing indication on people’s thoughts towards further UPDF

military operation in pursuit of the LRA.

Table 5.1: Public Perception on Operation Lightning Thunder

Response Total Percentage Yes 86 57% No 52 34% Not Sure 13 9%

Table 5.2: Breakdown of Affirmative Responses by Home Region

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Table 5:3: Breakdown of Negative Responses by Home Region

Region Percentage Total Central 15% 8 Western 15% 8 Northern 52% 27 Eastern 13% 7 Undeclared 4% 2

Table 5.4 Breakdown of Undecided Responses by Home Region

Region Percentage Total Central 26% 22 Western 24% 21 Northern 16% 14 Eastern 27% 23 Undeclared 7% 6

Region Percentage Total Central 31% 4 Western 31% 4 Northern 15% 2 Eastern 8% 1

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What stands out is that the majority of Ugandans, fifty-six percent, agreed with

OLT while of those who said they would have preferred more peace talks, more than

half, fifty-two percent, were northerners. Also an interesting observation, of those who

said they were not sure, the majority were from central and western parts of Uganda,

most likely because they have had the least exposure to and understanding of the war that

has plagued the north.

Initially, OLT looked like it might be the end of Kony. In an unprecedented move,

three regional armies, Uganda, southern Sudan, and the DRC, coordinated with each

other to put an end to the LRA. With U.S. military assistance, the UPDF launched a

surprise attack on the morning of December 14, 2008 on the LRA’s base in Garamba

National Park in the northeast corner of DRC, not far from the border areas with southern

Sudan and Uganda. The UPDF had been planning an attack for several years and asked

the U.S. Embassy in Kampala for military assistance. The UPDF worked closely with

seventeen American advisors from the Pentagon’s Africa Command to plan the attack.

The American military also provided satellite phones, intelligence, and over one million

dollars in fuel to carry out the operation, though no American forces got involved in the

ground fighting.12

The plan for OLT was to bomb the LRA’s base on the western edge of Garamba

National Park, Camp Kiswahili, first from the air with MiG fighters, then launch a

helicopter assault, then deploy commandos, and finally, advance two army brigades who

would liberate abductees in the LRA camp. Soldiers from the Congolese and southern

12 Jeffrey Gettleman and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Aided a Failed Plan to Rout Ugandan Rebels,” New

York Times, February 7, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/07/world/aftica/07congo.html (accessed February 25, 2010).

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Sudanese armies were to keep fighters from fleeing and block escape routes. While the

plan may have looked brilliant on paper, it was flawed even before it began. On the

morning of the operation, dense fog prevented the MiGs from flying. Instead, the UPDF

resorted to using much louder and slower helicopters that could be heard from miles

away, ruining the element of surprise essential for this kind of attack. Once the

helicopters reached Camp Kiswahili, many LRA had already fled and scattered.

Additionally, while UPDF forces were supposed arrive on the ground

immediately after the air assault, they did not arrive in the area until seventy-two hours

later.13 They recovered some of Kony’s satellite phones and guns. The delayed arrival of

the UPDF left many Congolese civilians in villages near Garamba National Park

vulnerable to reprisal attacks from the fleeing LRA. Troops did not seal off rebels’ escape

routes or even bother to deploy troops to the near-by towns. The United Nations Head of

Humanitarian Affairs, Sir John Holmes, called the LRA attacks that followed in the

weeks after OLT as ‘catastrophic.’14

Indeed, after assessing the damage the LRA inflicted on the region after OLT, it is

hard to understand how the UPDF labeled OLT a success. The LRA went on a killing

rampage that, by the end of January 2010, had caused 130,000 Congolese and at least

10,000 southern Sudanese to flee their homes. In the end, it was estimated that nine

hundred Congolese and Sudanese civilians were killed while several hundred children

were abducted.15

13 Michael Gerson, “Cornering A Killer In Africa,” Washingtonpost.com, (January 9, 2009): A17. 14 “A Country Adrift, a President Amiss,” Economist, February 12, 2009. 15 Martin Plaut, “Behind the LRA’s Terror Tactics,” BBC News, February 17, 2009,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7885885.stm (assessed February 25, 2009).

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Raids on Christmas Eve and Christmas day were particularly disturbing as the

LRA attacked at least thirteen villages around Doruma, a mid-sized town in northeastern

DRC. In the town of Faradje, rebels torched 120 homes killed 143 civilians. In Doruma

itself, eighty-nine people were killed. Human Rights Watch documented the massacres in

Doruma and in the surrounding towns and villages in its report, “The Christmas

Massacres, LRA attacks on civilians on Northern Congo.”16 The report claims that the

LRA waited until large groups of people were together for Christmas celebrations to

strike in order to kill many as quickly as possible. The report gives chilling details of

LRA pretending to be the Congolese army and drawing people close together so they

could tie them together with rubber from bike tires and strips of cloth from women’s

skirts. The LRA used clubs, sticks, axes, and machetes to hack people to death or beat

and crush people’s skulls. Women, children, and babies were not spared from the LRA’s

anger. Most girls and women were raped before having their skulls crushed. Several

toddlers and babies had their heads twisted and their necks broken.17

In just the few weeks following OLT, Kony and small groups of LRA that

scattered killed and abducted more people than it had in the entire previous year. The

botched OLT also caused panic in northern Uganda because many people feared Kony

would come back and retaliate. Furthermore, after the Christmas massacres, many

Congolese civilians organized themselves into self-defense groups, seeing few

alternatives for defending themselves. Although self-defense groups often end up

contributing to the bloodshed and violence, “thousands of teenage boys and their farmer

16 Human Rights Watch, “The Christmas Massacres, LRA attacks on civilians on Northern Congo,” February 16, 2009 http://www.hrw.org/en/features/christmas-massacres-lra-attacks-civilians-northern-congo (accessed March 12, 2010).

17 Ibid, 33.

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fathers are grabbing machetes, slingshots, axes and ragtag shotguns, wading into the bush

to confront a band of experienced killers.”18 Although the fight is mismatched, their

circumstances leave them no other choice. The Congolese national army has proved inept

to protect civilians in the vast eastern Congo and the United Nation Mission Forces

(“MONUC”) have not proved much better.

The UPDF has pointed out that as a result of OLT, they rescued several hundred

LRA captives and killed several LRA top commanders. In an interview the northern

region UPDF spokesman explained the rationale for calling OLT a success this way.

I know people wanted us, wanted to see Kony captured or killed, but what is important is that in war, defeating an enemy is not only about killing the enemy, but also defeating his ability to make war and we have basically done that. We went with an aim of making the LRA unable to make war, and that we have done. Children were rescued, we captured a lot of equipment, some of the commanders were killed. Now as we speak, the LRA has lost the what? What is called the war initiative. There is no central command, everyone is on his own. So such a force really, only time will see them off, it’s just a matter of time. What we are sure is that they are no longer capable of making war and that in itself is a very big success.19

While it is true that OLT disrupted the central command structure of LRA, it

seems that it is even more dangerous and murderous when spread out and splintered

among various groups. They certainly did not lose the ability to make war on the

Congolese people. It seems OLT made the situation worse for all involved. The LRA

spread out across a wider area, eventually making their way into the CAR. Dr. Godfrey

Odgongo of Amnesty International said that, “if you look at it from a human rights

critique point of view or humanitarian point of view, you are having a situation where the

18 Jeffrey Gettelman, “Armed With Little But Resolve, and Defending a Hollowed Village,” New

York Times. February 18, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/19/world/africa/19congo.html (accessed March 4, 2009).

19 Interview with UPDF Captain Ronald Kakurungu, April 29, 2009.

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intervention has ended up doing worse to the humanitarian situation than if it were not

there, if it was not done.”20

The UPDF stayed in DRC until March 2010 when their agreement with the

Congolese government to stay in the country expired. At that time, UPDF spokesman

Major Felix Kulayigye said, “we are not dying to stay in Congo. We think as of now the

operation is more beneficial to the Congolese than the Ugandans.”21 The Congolese

would most likely disagree with Maj. Kulayigye and probably wish that the UPDF had

stayed out in the first place. In an author interview with Maj. Kulayigye in the same

month, he said that the UPDF was closer than ever before to catching Kony and that it

was only a matter of time before he met his end. Now, almost one year later, the LRA

looks even stronger and more motivated to carry on the fight. Some analysts suspect they

may even launch a return to northern Uganda. Recently, “the LRA’s behavior in Bas Uélé

[district in northeastern DRC], and more widely in Congo, indicates a well-developed

strategy focused on maintaining a presence in Congo that enables cross-border activity in

CAR, Sudan, and potentially, a route back to northern Uganda.”22

Most northern Ugandans expect the UPDF will not fail them again. However,

given the UPDF’s past activities it seems likely that Museveni will not undertake a large-

scale military operation against the LRA, at least in the near future. For now, Museveni is

mired in yet another conflict in Somala. This undertaking has further solidified relations

20 Interview with Dr. Godfrey Odongo, March 11, 2009. 21 Benon Herbert Oluka, “How Kabila Threw Out UPDF Troops,” Daily Monitor, March 17,

2009. 22 Julius N. Uma, “Renewed LRA Attacks May Occur Before Referendum,” Sudan Tribune.

August 28, 2010, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?page=imprimable&id_article=36097 (accessed August 30, 2010).

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with the U.S. The northern problems will remain on the backburner at least for the

foreseeable future.

Whether the UPDF finishes Kony and the LRA through renewed peace

negotiations or through further military action, they must ensure that the people do not

suffer anymore. However, something else that came out in interviews with residents of

Awach was that everyone is tired of war. They are ready to forgive if it means they will

have peace. As UPDF Lieutenant Colonel Francis Achoka, who was in charge of IDP

security told the author, a “military solution in an internal conflict is not always the best

option because you may win the battle, but the war may continue. There will be bitter

feelings, hate, and reconciliation will be hard to come by.”23

The UPDF’s inability to solve the LRA issue has allowed them to grow into a

regional terrorist organization. Once solely a Ugandan rebellion, LRA fighters are now

also composed of Sudanese and Congolese. The LRA has become a menace to an entire

region of Africa. Although the UPDF would never admit its failures, the former

Commander of the UPDF, Maj. Gen. Mughisha Muntu said this about OLT:

If by carrying out this operation they managed to eliminate his [Kony’s] capabilities to operate in the north then they would be right and justified in what they did. But should there be failure, should Kony ever filter back into the north and start causing terror again to a population that has suffered for 20 years, to me that would be unforgivable…that had always been my desire, that we completely liquidate his capability to cause problems in the north, but I also knew, at least by the time I left, that we had failed.24

23 Interview with UPDF Lt. Col Francis Achoka, May 5, 2009. 24 Interview with Maj. Gen. (Ret). Mugisha Muntu, March 3, 2009.

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Not only does a former UPDF commander admit that the army has failed to

protect the northern population, but sixty eight percent, of Ugandans surveyed agree that

the UPDF could have done more to fight the insurgency in the north.

Table 5.5: Public Perception of UPDF and the Northern War

Response Total Percentage Yes 103 68% No 35 23% Not Sure 14 9%

If the UPDF is unable to control its borders and effectively fight the LRA, it will

be disastrous for the north. Inhabitants of northern Uganda are starting to get their lives

back and have enjoyed relative peace in the last several years. A retired member of the

UPDF who specialized in intelligence for nearly twenty years told the author, “Kony is

not strong, but survives on mistakes of the UPDF and the leadership may not be

interested in ending the war anyway.”25 Many observers believe that Museveni will not

take the appropriate measures to ensure that the UPDF corrects its past mistakes and

guarantees that the peace is held, a population that already feels marginalized and

separated from the rest of the country will fall and this time, it risks taking the stability of

the rest of the country down with it. If the government and the UPDF fail northerners,

25 Interview with a retired UPDF Major, March 13, 2009.

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many more will come out and say what they already think, what the retired UPDF Major

suspects, that the leadership may not actually be interested in ending the war.

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SECTION 2: INTERNAL SECURITY AND THE 2011 ELECTIONS

The creation and subsequent development of several internal security

organizations in Uganda have the potential to create instability in Uganda. The one that

warrants the most concern is a unit of the UPDF called the Presidential Guard Brigade

(“PGB”). The PGB is President Museveni’s personal protection force. It started as the

PPU, the Presidential Protection Unit and quickly grew in size and became a full-fledged

brigade. According to numerous sources interviewed, the threat in Uganda today is not

the UPDF, but the PGB. This is because they are chosen from Museveni’s home area of

western Uganda and are trained to be loyal to the president first and foremost. These

sources also confirmed that the PGB size has grown out of control. Many estimate that it

numbers at least 10,000, if not more. A former Ugandan government official described as

follows:

The man [Museveni] has created an army within an army. He has propelled his chosen people to popularity with different missions. We saw him expanding the army, establishing his own protection. In 1996 it started as the PPU – the Presidential Protection Unit, members were hand-picked by Museveni. Officers were groomed through PGB, then into leadership positions. They are comfortable. They have better uniforms and better salary. You could tell who was PGB and who was UPDF because they had better uniforms and better equipment. He expanded the PPU into PGB, it’s not even a brigade, its 10,000 men. He promotes his clan. He rewards loyalty. You can do whatever, they get away with murder, theft, but they are loyal.26 Other retired members of the UPDF confirmed that Museveni treats the PGB as a

personal militia. Members of the PGB receive more training, have better arms, better

uniforms, are paid more, and are generally better organized. Although the UPDF insists

that any member of the UPDF can be assigned to the PGB for duty, several retired UPDF

26 Interview with former Ugandan government official, April 27, 2009.

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soldiers attested that members of PGB are recruited specially from Museveni’s home

region, even sometimes from specific families.27

Additionally, some retried members of the UPDF who had fought with Museveni

when he first created FRONASA in Tanzania to fight Amin and later went back to the

bush with him in 1980, were forced out of army. As they described, their loyalties were

with the country and once it was discovered that they would not act in accordance with

Museveni’s corrupt policies and mismanagement of the army, they were told to leave.

One such man told the author that he still receives his monthly salary, however he has

been told to stay at home and keep quiet. He also stated that this was not an uncommon

practice to take care of the many dissatisfied veterans of Museveni’s bush war.

As demonstrated in the table below, many Ugandans do not believe that their

army has the capacity to be loyal to another leader, if one were elected, in 2011.

Table 5.6: Public Perception of UPDF’s Ability to be Loyal to Different President

Response Total Percentage Yes 52 34% No 68 45% Not Sure 31 21%

27 Interview with retired UPDF Major, March 13, 2009.

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When surveyed, forty-five percent responded that the UPDF would not be able to

be loyal to another leader while a little over twenty percent of those surveyed said they

were not sure. That leaves about one-third who answered that yes, the UPDF would have

the capability to follow someone else. For spending over twenty-five years in power, it

looks like President Museveni has quite a bit a work to do in terms of professionalizing

and de-personalizing the army if he wishes to convince the majority of his constituents

that his army would not take matters into their own hands if he and the NRM were to lose

an election.

Another suspicious group that was first seen in 2007, but has been active as

recently as June of 2010 is a mysterious militia-type force dubbed the ‘Kiboko Squad.’

Members of the squad flogged people, mostly opposition supporters, at a rally against the

Ugandan Electoral Commission on June 9, 2010.28 The government does not deny the

existence of a violent, pro-government group breaking up demonstrations, but it insists it

has no connections to the authorities or government. Human rights activists insist that the

militia signals the regimes growing sense of impunity.29 Whether the militia is sponsored

by the government or operates independently, its existence and apparent free-reign

represents growing tension in the run-up to the presidential elections and indicates a real

concern for the threat of violence.

If the last presidential elections in 2006 are to serve as an indication of things to

come, Ugandans can expect to see more vote rigging and violence in 2011.

Unfortunately, the UPDF cannot be expected to act as impartial observers, keep violence

28 “Uganda Government Accused of Links to Militia,” Reuters, June 17, 2010,

http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE65G0JB20100617 (accessed June 18, 2010). 29 Ibid.

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in check, and vote in their own capacity as private citizens because certain military

leaders made it clear back in 2006 that they would not support any winner other than

Museveni.30 It is unlikely that those same leaders have changed their minds only five year

later.

In addition to building up his personal protection, President Museveni has made it

more clear with each election that he does not plan on relinquishing power before he

wishes to give it up through his own choosing. The last two presidential elections, held in

2001 and 2006 demonstrated Museveni’s tightening grip on power. Museveni did not

allow multi-party elections until 2006 because he insisted the country was not ready for

the reintroduction of multi-party politics. He insisted that the country was a no-party

democracy although his National Resistance Movement was really ruling it. When he did

decide to allow multi party elections in 2006, he also pushed through a constitutional

amendment lifting presidential term limits. Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Mugisha Muntu stated:

That’s one of the biggest problems for him, the moment which we warned him against, the moment he pushed for the amendment of the constitution to lift the term limits, I think politically, that was his end as a person and an individual, whatever other good intentions he may have had, there’s no way he can now be ever judged from a position that this is genuine, this is out of a desire to have something good done. Of course, we pointed that out to him, he never heeded, and his legacy at that point, and as far as I’m concerned went up in smoke.

Many Ugandans have begun to recognize Museveni’s ways and see how he

increasingly resembles other African dictators holding onto power at all costs such as the

deceased Mobutu of Zaire and Zimbabwe’s President Mugabe. An Afrobarometer poll

also indicated that the number of Ugandans who want term limits reinstated doubled from

30 Marc Lacey, “Uganda’s President Wins Third Term,” New York Times, February 26, 2006,

http://www.nytimes.com/200602/26/international/26uganda.html (assessed July 6, 2008).

139

2005 to 2009, increasing to seventy-six percent of the population.31 Museveni is

currently serving in his third five-year term as president although he has been in power

for over twenty-five years. He will make sure he wins another five- year term in 2011

despite increasing calls for more political freedom. He has demonstrated that he will use

the country’s woes, such as the 7/11 attacks, to legitimize harsh laws that make it difficult

for opposition supporters to voice their opinions. In case there was any confusion, the

Chief of Defense, General Aronda Nyakairima recently stated that opposition leaders

would be dealt with in a serious way.32

The February 2011 elections will be Uganda’s most important since 1980. They

will determine whether Uganda and its leadership have heeded calls to move towards

democracy, which looks unlikely given the current circumstances and recent

developments, or if the country will continue to slide in the other direction. President

Museveni can afford to assume that even if the elections are flawed and marred by

violence, like pervious elections, that since he is now a significant player in the war on

terror that Washington will overlook one more African dictator in the name of American

security.

If the UPDF fails to remain impartial or if the PGB proves to be a personal militia

loyal to only the president, Museveni and the leadership will have failed the Ugandan

people. Retired UPDF officers stated that they felt betrayed by Museveni’s disappointing

actions. If many former soldiers feel betrayed it is not hard to imagine how an entire

country would feel if they were not given a chance to experience real democracy because

31 Benon Herbert Okula, “Support For Term Limits Doubles,” Daily Monitor 136. May 6, 2009. 32 Timothy Kalyegira, “Uganda: What Will Happen After Polls?” Daily Monitor, June 20, 2010,

http://www.allafrica.com/stories/printable/201006210523.html (accessed June 22, 2010).

140

one man will not loosen his grip on power. However, as in so many places in Africa,

whoever has control over the armed forces has control over the nation. In Uganda, it is

clear who has control over politics and the military. As Member of Parliament, Fungaroo

Kaps Hassan explained, “in our case, parliament does not regulate the army, but the army

regulates parliament…it is portrayed to you that the civilian authority controls the

army…so this matter of who controls who, parliament or the army, clearly, it is

deceptive.” 33 Deception is something that President Museveni has mastered. He has

deceived his western allies with self-interested regional interventions cloaked under noble

causes. He has also deceived his own people into thinking he is a democrat and that the

army is not his own personal militia.

As this study has shown, the situation in Uganda is highly complex, occasionally

violent, and potentially volatile. President Museveni’s eventual exit from power, whether

graceful or forceful, will mark a major watershed in Uganda’s post-colonial period. The

world will be watching President Museveni and Uganda with anticipation in February

2011, but as one interviewee told the author, “when the military is with you in Uganda,

you don’t need anyone’s ballots.”34 Whether that still reigns true remains to be seen.

33 Interview with Hon MP Fungaroo Kaps Hassan, May 13, 2010. 34 Interview with Ugandan human rights activist, April 21, 2009.

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APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW PERMISSION FORMS

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143

144

145

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