The Tensions on the Role of Civil Society in Public Sphere
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Transcript of The Tensions on the Role of Civil Society in Public Sphere
1
ERDEM SELVİN
The Tensions on the Role of Civil Society in Public Sphere
In the course of State and Public Sphere, we had discussed liberal and republican thoughts of
state and society formations by dealing with the classical texts. Each side has its own peculiar
understanding and emphasis on the existence of civil society and its role in public sphere. The
role of civil society in public sphere is utmost an interesting and significant concept since in
democracies, it is accepted as vital. However, in history, there is a multitude of different
explanations of civil society. Firstly, in antique times, Plato, Aristotle and Cicero emphasize
the existence of public sphere, at least the liberties which would come in the existence of the
community, in explaining their own ideas i.e. good society. Then, Hobbes’, Locke’s
Rousseau’s and Kant’s ideas were dominant as the rise of individuality and enlightenment. In
modern era, Hegel, Tocqueville, Marx, and Gramsci take into account the role of civil society
in different ways. And Jürgen Habermas adds the civil society into the public sphere
argument. That is why; it was always a heated debate in the history of political thoughts. In
this paper, I will look at the different descriptions of civil society by liberals and republicans
given in different conditions. The terms that used by each side, the backgrounds, the major
motives of the philosophies in constituting such an institution, who are the relevant actors that
consist the civil society provided by each side and each thinker which included in my reading
list. I will try to find the questions as how each side approaches towards the existence of a
strong civil society, the importance of it, the composition of it, what would be the results, i.e.
is this going to serve as protection for freedoms of free will of individuals or create a common
sense in creating the will of the society, in which conditions these could be realized, are there
any hierarchies constructed into society i.e. whose interests are more visible etc. At last, after
giving a brief wrap-up, I will give my closing remarks in the topic of the role of civil society
in public sphere by dealing with whether the arguments can be applied for today’s problems.
The need for liberty and equality are very motives of liberal thought. As everyone knows, I
think, the story begins with the John Locke’s assumptions on life, liberty and property1. The
theories like social contract, representative democracy, rule of law, separation of powers were
the very basics of the journey which ends in the limited government for the sake of atomistic
individualism assumptions against the absolute power of states. In this perspective, the
1 He is not actually accepted as the liberal thinker by most authorities in the history of political science;
however, when we think of the stress on the justification on life, liberty and property, we can take this argument into the consideration as the basics of liberal thinking.
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liberalists attributes more importance to the role of civil society in public sphere and their
understanding of civil society and the constituents of it are shaped by the thoughts on human
nature as self-interested individuals, free market, invisible hand, class compromise, freedoms
of interests, their competition, lack of interference from above as The State2. Republicanism,
on the other hand, mostly underlines the importance of rightly representation of societies.
Again here, the role of civil society in public sphere is very important but their understanding
of civil society and the constituents of it are in some degree different from the explanations of
liberalists. We begin to examining the republicanism by looking at the Rousseau’s
understanding of history and the creation of society. If we accept the society as something
different from the one constructed by self-interested individuals, then we take the
representation of the society, the main drives for public good, reaching to consensus as much
more significant and different from the human nature explanation of liberalists.
The clearest distinction between republican and liberal thoughts were given by Jürgen
Habermas’ text, The Three Normative Models of Democracy, in this course therefore I have
an ambition to give firstly his assumptions on the separation of the two. He introduces the
strengths and weaknesses of liberal and republican understanding of democracy or governing
process and by doing so; he adds another normative model for governing process as
deliberative democracy. His principles in describing the tensions between republican and
liberal view of democracy are the concept of the citizen, the concept of law and the nature of
processes of political will-formation. According to him, the liberal view sees the role of
democratic process with programming the state in the interest of society and the state as the
apparatus of public administration and the society as a system of market-structured
interactions of private persons and their labor. Politics (in the sense of political will-
formation) is understood as a medium to gather people and protect the social interests against
the state which obliges itself to flourish the collective goals by taking the required power as in
administration. On the other hand, republican view sees politics as constitutive for the
socialization process as a whole. Politics, as the reflexive form of substantial ethical life,
makes communities become aware of the importance of the presence of each other so as to act
with full deliberation as citizens and create the reciprocal recognition as free and equal units
under law. In this sense, solidarity becomes a third source of social integration beside
2 I approach “The State” as there are no higher authority above state, the ideal one, the desired or non-desired
the concentration of powers in the one hand. I take “The” conception, i.e. The State or The Society, in the same manner as Hegel uses it in explainin the concentration of everything, the ideal one, the real truht as The Absolute in The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807).
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sovereign state authority and decentralized market. Habermas says that for republicans, civil
society which leads actually the political public sphere has a functional importance because
the independence of civil society from public administration and market-mediated private
commerce allow political communication to flourish itself independently. By doing so, public
sphere and civil society secures the integrative power and autonomy of the communicative
practice of the citizens. On the conception of citizen, liberals emphasize the importance of
individual rights. These are the negative rights3 as we understand in the lack of government or
legal intervention or external compulsion. On contrary, republicans see political rights as
positive liberties which include preeminently rights of political participation and
communication. Governance actually takes legitimacy by providing citizens with active
participation without involving this communication practices. On the concept of law, liberals
take individual rights as the center of legal order but these subjective rights, according to
republican view, exist thanks to the objective legal order. Priority is a key matter here. On the
nature of process of political will-formation, liberals see politics as a field where struggle for
power takes place. The power relations, the race to reach it, the struggle as we see competition
in market conditions are the main factors that shape the political process of opinion and will
formation in the public sphere and in parliament. As contrary, republicans see this process in
respect to public communication oriented to mutual understanding. It is the deliberative style
what is more crucial here. Legitimacy could be realized with the clash of opinions which are
freely discussed in political arena.
“What makes society ‘civil’ is the fact that it is the locus where citizens can freely organize
themselves into groups and associations at various levels in order to make the formal bodies
of the state authority adopt policies consonant with their perceived interests. Yet, civil society
cannot be viewed as opposed to the state and economy by definition. These three spheres of
liberal democracy are strictly interconnected. Free exchange of goods and services and the
state, based on the rule of law, are preconditions of liberty and thus civil society. But at the
same time both a corrupted state and a corrupted economy can be the greatest danger for civil
society. The liberal democratic order should involve equilibrium between these three sets of
factors: adequate government, a properly functioning market economy and a civil society that
can balance the two other factors.” (Dorota & Pietrzyk 2001:5) Here we can see that the
inevitability of liberal democracy in order to construct civil society in state formation or
3 Rights considered negative rights may include civil and political rights such as freedom of speech, private
property, freedom from violent crime, freedom of worship, habeas corpus, a fair trial, freedom from slavery.
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public sphere but beside this, it is obvious that this explanation takes liberal arguments into
core of the argumentation. However, we cannot take the community for granted if we look at
from the republican eyes. Man is, by nature, the member of community; individuality comes
second in thinking that way. Individual freedom and happiness might interfere with the good
of society but common good should prevail. The public good should be considered as the
principle object of individuals’ endeavors and the happiness of individuals as the great end of
civil society. A republican constitution which was for Kant, who actually advocates liberal
republicanism, the best form of government assumes that each citizen gives his consent to the
action of sovereign through being directly or indirectly represented in the legislature. Hence,
the citizen may, in a moral sense, regard all laws as emanation of his will, and this is an echo
of Rousseau’s general will4. “In Hegel
5 view, civil society contains three stages: a) a system
of needs; b) the administration of justice; c) the public authority and competition. It is the
sphere where individuals seek to satisfy each other’s needs through work, production and
exchange. It is based on the division of labor, system of social classes, law which promotes
security of property, and may be regarded as the external state based on need and at the same
time as the system of universal interdependence and lower kind of knowledge. Individual
pursuits are linked through a web of mutual dependence that is governed by a system of
formal rules described by Hegel as external state or state based on need and abstract
reasoning.” (Dorota & Pietrzyk 2001:41) In Hegelian viewpoint, we can see the rejected
concept of social contract warning that we cannot consider the state as a contract. There is a
duality in character of modern man: man as a member of civil society and as a citizen of the
state. The same individual works for himself and his family and at the same time for the
universal and has it as an end. And the justification of the state in Hegel is quite different from
that of the classical liberalism. Not the individual but the state is viewed as an absolute end.
The concept of civil society as an arena of conflicting particular interests distinguished from
the state creates a division between state and civil society. Conversely, Marx6 saw the solution
of problems posed by the eighteenth century theorists of civil society not in the division
between civil society and the state but in its eradication as we count revolution.
4 We take Rousseau as founding father of left and republican ideas because of his assumptions on eradication
of civil society and the sovereignity of general will. 5 In the course, we underlined Hegel with his critique of liberal republicanism, critical republicanist manner.
Authonomy was the key word in explaning Hegel and Kant’s argumentation. 6 And we took Karl Marx with his critique of critical republicanism, abolishment of the state which is actually
the domain of class stuggle.
5
Hannah Arendt, in The Human Condition, undertakes a thorough historical-philosophical
inquiry that returned to the origins of both democracy and political philosophy in the Ancient
Greek world, and brought these original understandings of political life into the modern era.
Since she deals with the human nature in her complex and unique way, we can take her
arguments into consideration in terms of not liberal or republican understandings of civil
society and public sphere but as core indication. Her goal was to propose a phenomenological
reconstruction of different aspects of human activity. She makes a stringent critique of
traditional of political philosophy, and the dangers it presents to the political sphere as an
autonomous domain of human practice. The realm of action and appearance (including the
political) is subordinated to and becomes instrumental for the ends of the Ideas as Plato puts it
in the cave allegory. Arendt set herself is to save action and appearance, and with it the
common life of the political and the values of opinion, from the depredations of the
philosophers. In The Human Condition, Arendt argues for a tripartite division between the
human activities of labor, work, and action with the hierarchy of importance upon the political
freedom and responsibility. Labor is inevitably linked to the humanity which is closest to the
animal. Arendt refers to humanity in this mode as animal laborans. Because the activity of
labor is commanded by necessity, the human being as laborer is the equivalent of the slave;
labor is characterized by unfreedom. With the rise of the social, the emergence of necessary
labor has the effect of destroying the properly political by subordinating the public realm of
human freedom to the concerns mere animal necessity. Arendt names humanity in working
activity as homo faber (the builder of walls both physically and culturally which divide the
human realm from that of nature and provide a stable context of spaces and institutions within
which human life can unfold. The activity of labor and the consumption of its fruits, which
have come to dominate the public sphere, cannot furnish a common world within which
humans might pursue their higher ends. For Arendt, the activity of work cannot be fully free
insofar as it is not an end in itself, but is determined by prior causes and articulated ends. The
quality of freedom in the world of appearances is to be found elsewhere in the vita activa,
namely with the activity of action proper. “To act, in its most general sense, means to take
initiative, to begin (as the Greek word archein, ‘to begin,’ ‘to lead,’ and eventually ‘to rule’
indicates), to set something in motion. Because they are initium, newcomers and beginners by
virtue of birth, men take initiative, are prompted into action. Freedom is to be seen as a
character of human existence in the world. Man does not so much possess freedom as he, or
better his coming into the world, is equated with the appearance of freedom in the universe;
man is free because he is a beginning.” (Arendt 1998:177) So we can understand that
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humanity represents the faculty of beginning. Freedoms come from acting and the capacity
for initiation gives actions the character of singularity and uniqueness. To define politics or
the unfolding of history in terms of any teleology or immanent or objective process is to deny
what is central to authentic human action, namely, its capacity to initiate the wholly new,
unanticipated, unexpected, and unconditioned by the laws of cause and effect. Arendt argues
that “Action, the only activity that goes on directly between men…corresponds to the human
condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world.
While all aspects of the human condition are somehow related to politics, this plurality is
specifically the condition – not only the conditio sine qua non, but the conditio per quam – of
all political life.” (Arendt 1998: 23) Arendt’s theory holds that actions cannot be justified for
their own sake, but only in light of their public recognition and the shared rules of a political
community. For Arendt, action is a public category, a worldly practice that is experienced in
our intercourse with others. Action as the public disclosure requires a public space in which it
can be realized, a context in which individuals can encounter one another as members of a
community. For this space, Arendt turns to the ancients, holding up the Athenian polis as the
model for such a space of communicative and disclosive speech deeds. Such action is for
Arendt synonymous with the political. Therefore, we can understand the argumentation of
Arendt as republican in the emphasis on collective self-determination, solidarity, acting
together etc especially in the ideas On Revolution.
On the other hand, Gramsci7 is different from Arendt in saying that politics include various
ways or tactics i.e. war and mentions about the revolutionary strategy while Arendt supports
the prohibition of violence. He actually does not fit in the paper of republican and liberal
tensions on the role of civil society but we can take his arguments in contrast to the ones of
Arendt and also the other side of medallion as the hegemony integrated into the civil society.
The discussion about civil society in Marxist tradition as complementary is given here to
supply the other side of the issue. In distinguishing the civil society from the state, hegemony
is key issue according to him. He criticizes Marxism in terms of economic determinism. In
this aspect, we can say that he has a liberal view. He says that it is not Marxism to seek for the
economic inequalities and interests behind anything. There are certain relations of forces
which are direct references to Marxist historical development. One version is action oriented
7 He writes upon the myth of Lenin while he was under torture. He adds Marxist tradition some new aspects.
He also sustains some Hegelian ideas. His writings were mostly affected by Soviet Revolution. He has Leninist side since he supports the role of party and organization of masses. He is arrested for Fascist party campaign in Italy. He talks about the war making.
7
class struggle as class relations in terms of economics. The other is conflict between relations
of production and forces of production which are understood as technology in aspect of
organization of class gets into conflict because of relations of production. We say that as
structural account. Gramsci takes class struggle into account and mentions about the relations
of forces. He has a position action oriented. Relations of forces are not economic relations or
according to him. First level of relations of forces is objective, given economic relations or
facts about economics. This gives birth to the class-in-itself and class-for-itself arguments of
Marx. This level is immediate, the fact that some are patrons, some are workers is a given
thing. Second level is concepts like political consciousness. There are three stages to reach it.
Firstly, in economic corporate level, on artisanship, in-between firms and traders, the
homogenously creation of corporate interests. The other stage is that the people come together
and attend the governance as well as the bourgeois revolution of aristocrats, proletariat
revolution of workers, reaching bourgeois consciousness. Thirdly, the reaching to
consciousness of other subordinated groups. Here the party comes to the scene and creates a
superstructure. In this process, we can say that there is determinism. And inevitably, the
distinction between civil society and political society occurs but social relations are
unavoidable. Hegemony, according to Gramsci, is intellectually or morally bringing about
unity. The separation of interests happens and the state serves just one group. In this way, the
national energies come across. In immediate level, subordinated groups’ interests are realized
but in long term, the dominant groups become the decision-makers. And lastly, in third level,
with its disciplining institutions as military forces, political forces, the state come across. All
three levels are actually generating the state. Therefore, Gramsci actually introduces the
formation of state with the help of hegemony while creating public sphere. He suggests that
“What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural ‘levels’: the one that can
be called ‘civil society’, that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called ‘private’, and that
of ‘political society’ or ‘the state’. These two levels correspond on the one hand to the
function of ‘hegemony’ which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the
other hand to that of ‘direct domination’ or command exercised through the state and
‘juridical’ government.” (Gramsci 1971: 12) Bobbio Norberto, in his Gramsci and the
Conception of Civil Society, implies that Gramsci is the first Marxist writer who uses the
concept of civil society for his analysis of society. “Gramsci claims that this concept of civil
society derives from Hegel’s and Hegel’s concept of civil society as understood by Gramsci is
a superstructural concept. A great difficulty arises from these two points: on the one side,
Gramsci derives his thesis on civil society from Hegel and sees it as belonging to the
8
superstructural moment and not to the structural one; but on the other hand, Marx also refers
to Hegel’s civil society when he identifies civil society with the whole of economic relations,
that is with the structural moment.” (Bobbio 1979: 31) But we can say that Gramsci do not
refer to the system of needs but economic relations, not the one of initial moment that is the
explosion of contradictions which the state will have to dominate but the one of final moment
when the corporations provide the basic transition into the state.
While Gramsci and also Hegel and Marx were dealing with the invisible hegemony integrated
into the civil society, Jürgen Habermas searches the historical development of public sphere
and the stance of civil society in it by looking at the construction, the relevant actors and
common institutions et. He gives a schema for the structural position of public sphere as:
Private Realm Sphere of the Public Authority
Civil society (realm of
commodity ex-change and
social labor)
Conjugal family’s internal
space (bourgeois
intellectuals)
Public sphere in the
political realm
Public sphere in the
world of letters (clubs,
press)
(market of culture
products) “Towns”
State (realm of the “police”)
Court (courtly-noble society)
(Habermas, Jürgen. 1991 The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Pp.30)
Therefore, he sees the public sphere in the middle of the governance body and the private
realm. In the 18th
century, with the rise of intimate sphere or bourgeois intimacy as in the case
of salon or coffee houses example, the court lose its central position in the public sphere and
the public sphere itself was transformed. Intellectuals met with the aristocracy in those kind of
realms so poor men have disadvantages and beside this, we can see the economic and political
disputes here thus there are landed or moneyed interests. However, Habermas argues that
“Such orders, chambers and academies were preoccupied with the native tongue, now
interpreted as the medium of communication and understanding between people in their
common quality as human beings and nothing more than human beings.” (Habermas 1991:
34) Still, public sphere was realized behind closed doors since they did not want their equality
to be heard by the state. Although all the salons or coffee houses have specific differences,
they have a number of institutional criteria in common. Firstly, the basis which all discussions
are conducted is based on common humanity. Secondly, it was a domain of common concern
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that is not determined by church, market or state. We call common concern as reproduction of
social life, art and cultural product. Thirdly, inclusive public started to be adopted. The issues
discussed became general not merely in their significance, but also in their accessibility:
everyone had to be able to participate. Habermas says that “ The public sphere as a functional
element in the political realm was given the normative status of an organ for the self-
articulation of civil society with a state authority corresponding to its needs. The social
precondition for this ‘developed’ bourgeois public sphere was a market that, tending to be
liberalized, made affairs in the sphere of social reproduction as much as possible a matter of
private people left to themselves and so finally completed the privatization of civil society.”
(Habermas 1991:74) With the transformation of law in the 18th
century, civil society started to
be released from its bounds. Yet, the liberalization of market, or explaining the advances of
public sphere go hand in hand with the laissez faire, the colonial systems etc. at least we are
explaining the public sphere and civil society by looking at market situation. So it is not
wrong to say that liberal arguments were at the core of the development of bourgeois public
sphere, or the privatization of civil society. Habermas concludes this argument by saying that
“Nevertheless, only during this phase was civil society as the private sphere emancipated
from the directives of public authority to such an extent that at that time the political public
sphere could attain its full development in the bourgeois constitutional state.” (Habermas
1991: 79) According to him, the constitutional state as a bourgeois state established the public
sphere in the political realm as an organ of the state so as to ensure institutionally the
connection between law and public opinion. Dissolving the domination is a typically
bourgeois idea. When we take the fulfillment of rights into consideration as basic rights
(freedom of opinion, of speech, of press, of assembly, and of association) and their political
function (right of petition, equality of votes etc.) and other basic rights and implication
concerning individual’s status grounded in the intimate sphere, and the transactions of private
property in the civil society, we can understand that this publicness or publicity legitimizes or
justifies the public character of parliamentary deliberation and the organs of the state. He
argues that “The public sphere was safeguarded whenever the economic and social conditions
gave everyone an equal chance to meet the criteria for admission: specifically, to earn the
qualifications for private autonomy that made for the educated and property owning person.”
(Habermas 1991: 86) That’s why; he deals with the question how to create a general
consensus or reconciliation in fact there are number of inadequacies and minority problem in
the society. So his arguments have much more complexities than liberal or republican
tensions on the role of civil society in public sphere.
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To sum up, there are different explanations on the role of civil society in public sphere given
by republicans and liberals because of different motives. In this paper, I tried to explain them
by looking at first the birth of these ideologies, then the stresses on the civil society and public
sphere. Jürgen Habermas’, Hannah Arendt’s, to some extent Hegelian and Kantian ideas
about the civil society or rights against to absolutist state, Gramsci’s supply of Marxist
tradition were the main arguments in explaining the tensions and different contradictions
about public sphere and civil society.
Today, we still discuss about the role of civil society in public sphere and in political
decision-making issues and we come across the reflections while people are participating to
demonstrations against state’s much more involvement of private lifes of people or
government’s overmuch effort in order to dictate over society. It is common discussion that
what would be the red line of demonstrations whether it is violation of laws or active
participation in politics as we see in most democracies. However, I think that we need to be
careful in taking side next to liberal or republican ideas since the two explanations may serve
for different interests but it could give the same result such as civil society.
REFERENCES
Arendt, Hannah. (1998) The Human Condition. The University of Chicago.
Bobbio, Norberto. (1979) Gramsci and the Conception of Civil Society. Routledge & Kegan
Paul Ltd.
Dorota & Pietrzyk. (2001) Civil Society – Conceptual History from Hobbes to Marx.
University of Wales
Gramsci, Antonio. (1971) Selections from the Prison Notebooks. International Publishers
Habermas, Jürgen. (1999). The Inclusion of the Other. Polity Press.
Habermas, Jürgen. (1991) The Structural Transformation of Public Sphere. MIT Press.
Hall, J. (1995). Civil society: Theory, History, Comparison. UK Polity Press.