The tax as an inducing instrument of individuals behaviors

MARCELO GALUPPO, MÔNICA SETTE LOPES,

KARINE SALGADO, LUCAS GONTIJO, THOMAS BUSTAMANTEEditors

Human Rights, Rule of Law and the Contemporary Social Challenges in Complex SocietiesProceedings of the XXVI World Congress of Philosophy

of Law and Social Philosophy of the Internationale Vereinigunf für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie

Belo Horizonte2015

Human Rights, Rule of Law and the Contemporary Social Challenges in Complex Societies: Proceedings of the XXVI World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy of

the Internationale Vereinigunf für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie

Marcelo Galuppo

Mônica Sette Lopes

Lucas de Alvarenga Gontijo

Karine Salgado

Thomas Bustamaente

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Human Rights, Rule of Law and the Contemporary Social Challenges in

Complex Societies: Proceedings of the XXVI World Congress of Philosophy

of Law and Social Philosophy of the Internationale Vereinigunf für Rechts-

und Sozialphilosophie / editors: Marcelo Galuppo, Mônica Sette Lopes, Lucs

Gontijo, Karine Salgado, Thomas Bustamanete. - Belo Horizonte : Initia Via,

2015.

3159 p.

ISBN 978-85-64912-59-5 [E-book]

1. Law - Philosophy. 2. Human Rights. 3. Rule of Law. I. Galuppo,

Marcelo. II. Sette Lopes, Mônica. III. Gontijo, Lucas de Alvarenga. IV.

Salgado, Karine. V. Bustamante, Thomas. VI. Título.

CDU: 34(082)

Special Workshop: Autonomy and paternalism • 649

The tax as an inducing instrument of individuals behaviors

Luiz Flávio Paína Resende Alves1

Paulo Antônio Machado da Silva Filho2

Ticiane Moraes Franco3

Virgínia Afonso de Oliveira Morais da Rocha4

Abstract: A discussion regarding extra-fiscal tax rules, and conflict between interventionist state, and liberal state in the private sphere. The debate to be waged in the group, which is being submitted the article (here presented in ab-stract form) corresponds to the conflict between state action, as an intervenor in the private sphere of the individual, and, the right of freedom of actions. Thus, on one side is the liberal state where the individual is given greater freedom in their actions, and on the other hand, is the face of the state intervening, that through legal standards, influence individuals in their making decisions on matters that, in principle, would be in the private sphere.

The specific analysis of the paper will stick to tax rules, especially those that concern extra-fiscal taxation, as a phenomenon in which the state uses tax rules seeking to intervene in the behavior of taxpayers. Such rules, that charac-ter is clearly extra-fiscal, are also known as inductive tax rules, dodging from the general objective, because they have the revenue collection as “secondary function”, and as a “primary function” the induction of behaviors.

Entering into an analysis of individual cases will be examined those tax rules which aim to prevent the consumption of products (such as cigarettes and liquor) through increasing the tax rate on consumption. Likewise, the analysis

1 Master’s in Business Law in course at Faculdade de Direito Milton Campos (Brazil). Lawyer. Email: [email protected] Master’s in Business Law in course at Faculdade de Direito Milton Campos (Brazil). Lawyer. Email: [email protected] Master’s in Business Law in course at Faculdade de Direito Milton Campos (Brazil). Lawyer. Emai: [email protected] Master’s in Business Law in course at Faculdade de Direito Milton Campos (Brazil). Lawyer. Email: [email protected]

DOI: 10.17931/ivr2013_sws69_02

650 • XXVI World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy

of the principle of selectivity that deals with the exemption / encumbrance of essential products / luxury, such as basic food / caviar. Another area of analysis would be the induction of behavior through taxation on property of individuals as a way to the property meets their social function. In this situation will be presented the comparison between the individual’s right to use their property in the way to better achieve their purposes, contrasting with the imposition of a higher tax burden in order to the individual achieve a social function that your property should have. The analysis of the social function of property as a way of state intervention in the sphere of private rights of the individual, particularly in the face of its assets will also be presented. The article, in the end, would try to seek a justification and a limit to the state intervention, through extra-fiscal tax rules, and the individual’s right to act and exercise their rights on their actions, and about his patrimony, in a way that best suits him, without having to stick, and worry about the state imposi-tion, by imposing tax, which could come to influence their planning.

Keywords: Paternalism. Private autonomy. Tax rules.

1. Introduction

From the fourteenth century began the process of decline of feu-dalism, to the extent that the emergence of a strong central entity that could bring order in the chaos that had settled in feuds because of the absence of political organization proved necessary.

Thus kings, financed by the rising bourgeoisie, invested in and organized armies for the emergence of national states of the fifteenth century, with regulations for industries, national languages and even national churches.

The maintenance of armies was funded by taxes nationally uni-fied, collected by a specialized administrative apparatus, which, on be-half of the central government, was responsible for organizing public finance institution.

However, insofar as the political and economic power of kings grew stronger, the administration became abusive without compliance with juridical limits. Thus, the absolute monarch was able to submit the property and lives of citizens to their will.

These factors culminated in the bourgeois revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the monarchical absolutism col-lapsed and liberalism has established itself as the dominant ideology,


marked by the maximization of freedom and embodied the ideal of no government intervention and the imposition of juridical limits to its ac-tion. Here below the reporting of Palmeira, citing Max Weber:

(...) Thus, liberalism touts the stability of legal guarantees that the state offers favorable conditions for the development of the market economy. Rationalize the law, then, means consecrating the neu-trality of the State in the name of a supposed spontaneous order of social dynamics. In this case, it counts on the stability, security and objectivity in the functioning of the legal system, national char-acter and in first predictable laws of administration. Otherwise, absent the guarantee is indispensable to industrial exploitation based on large capital prediction. (free translation)

Liberalism has been divided into three major economic models: the liberal state of law, the social state of law and the constitutional state of law. The first, characteristic of extremist total absence of “State inter-vention” and, based on a literal interpretation of the law, proved unjust, insofar as allows life in subhuman conditions, and does not enable the disadvantaged to achieve equal conditions for property.

This situation led to the creation of social movements that de-manded changes in the role played by the state, with more attention to the needy.

Thus, the passage of the liberal state to welfare state resulted from the need to create a more equitable society in which substantive equality would be achieved through the provision and implementation of social, economic and cultural rights.

Ensuring equality occur through state intervention in private af-fairs, with the clear objective of establishing a legal balance before an unquestionable factual imbalance.

In Brazil, the constitutionalisation of social rights was with the promulgation of the 1934 Constitution, which aimed to guarantee citi-zens a dignified existence and ensured greater regulation of labor rela-tions, similar to the Mexican Constitution of 1917.

The industrial revolution and the time lived after the 2nd World War led to the creation of the welfare state, enabling the generation of state benefits to its citizens through a policy of full employment and major investments in health, education and welfare social, mainly in Eu-rope, USA and Japan.

The welfare state was also inefficient, in a way that it greatly in-


creased public spending, particularly in relation to social security.In developing countries the “neo-liberal” model remained im-

posed as a condition for loans granted by the World Bank, which gen-erated significant economic development, but , in contrast, paid a high price due to the increase in unemployment , the swelling of informal market and the reduction of social guarantees .

With the advent of the Constitution of 1988, Brazil adopted the Democratic Law State, where beyond mere obedience to the law, there must be a submission to the popular will and purposes proposed by citizens.

Indeed, state intervention in the economy became necessary, but only as a measure of exception. In this sense, the lecture of Peluso:

The term ‘intervention’, therefore, translates more properly a lib-eral concept, in which case the state would be doing this against that ideology, which would only be admitted as ‘exception’. Do not act economically would be the ‘rule’ of free competition. Act would ‘intervene’ against the rule. (free translation)

Nevertheless, besides characterizing as an exceptional measure, the interventionist action must submit to boundaries of principles of the Constitution, behold, as already said Streck, “the Democratic State of Law Rule has as a goal to promote the transformation of society by adopting constitutional principles that should guide state action” (free translation).

2. The taxation versus the extrafiscality

With the adoption of a democratic state as a political/economic model, the constitutional legislator from 1988 proved unhappy with the economic and social order that he had found. This new reality was re-flected in the express provision of the goals of the Brazilian Republic, printed on Article 3, as the guarantee of “national development”, the construction of a “free society, justice and solidarity”, where eradicate “poverty and marginalization” and reduce “social and regional inequal-ities”, promoting, finally, “ the good of all”.

The permissive of economic regulation, turn left inserted in Ar-ticle 174 of the Brazilian Constitution, allowing the interventionist role of the state through the tax law.

It is the indirect intervention by induction, consisting of state-


sponsored incitement to adopt that particular market behaviour consis-tent with the goals of state economic policy. One of the main instru-ments of this form of intervention are called extrafiscal taxes.

Thus, taxation is able to induce or repress behaviours, provide distortions between taxpayers and ensure the enforcement of funda-mental rights. So for, through the taxation, the State is compelled to tax in order to meet up the necessary resources to fund their constitution-ally established purposes, and by extrafiscality taxation, the goal of col-lect revenue is put away due to the goal to promote social and economic policies.

In this sense, we see the position of Machado:

Taxes, such as taxes generally, lend themselves as instruments for mobilizing the necessary financial resources to fund public expen-diture. This is its essential purpose, but taxes may have also said extrafiscal a function, which consists of state intervention that, with them, induces is practiced or not practiced is determined ac-tivity. (free translation)

In this area, complements Machado:

It is said that a tax is a revenue tax, or who have tax purposes when it is used especially for mobilizing financial resources. And that is extrafiscal, or has extrafiscal purpose when used for any other purpose, that is, when its purpose is otherwise, than collection rev-enue. Tax, or fund raising, is undergoing fully to the limitations of the power to tax. In the other hand, the extrafiscal taxes, or regula-tory taxes, constitute exceptions with regard to these limitations, or some of them. For this reason they were predicted at the Federal Constitution expressly rules establishing exceptions with respect to certain delimiters principles of taxing power (free translation).

Indeed, one of the criteria for the identification of interventional standard is no direct link between the management of its quantitative aspect, which means, the tax base and the tax rate and the taxpayer’s ability to pay that particular tax.

However, this criterion proves flawed, in that the rules of extraf-iscal character can also relate with the taxpayer’s ability to pay, whether on purpose or not. Thus was created the need for a pragmatic approach, taking as its premise the finalistic and teleological character of the stan-dard, which will be examined in accordance with the case.


3. The limits of state intervention

The State intervention in private affairs, by applying tax rules with extrafiscal character, imposes stimulations that induce an individ-ual to adopt certain conduct to the detriment of another.

This intervention is also called legal paternalism, which concep-tualizes how the editing rules that aim to satisfy the best interest of the individual, requiring him or her abridging certain behaviours.

The legal paternalism is most striking in private relationships in which notes the existence of the theoretically weaker party in contrac-tual relations. This is the case of the workers, labor relations, and con-sumer contracts involving consumerist relationship.

In these situations, we start from the assumption that the hypo-sufficient part presents a cognitive deficit regarding the lack of informa-tion about a particular product or service (consumer) or shows obliged to accept unfavorable conditions for subsistence (worker).

In the field of taxation, we can mention the inducing tax rules that increase in a extreme way the value of taxes on marketing of luxury items such as drinks and cigarettes. The application of the tax rule with extremely high rates, and, which, in the principle, could be regarded as confiscatory, are actually a form of the State inhibiting the consumption of such products by individuals in an attempt to influence their behav-iour in choosing consumer goods. Therefore, in order of a extrafiscal function from this tax rule, there would not be, for example, a way to raise a questioning about a possible confiscatory character of such stan-dard, since it would be faced with an intention of the legislature more involved with the induction of behaviour than necessarily a high impo-sition of taxes.

Schoueri points levels of incidence of tax rule that rise according to the degree of need for the state to induce the taxpayer behaviour in every situation . In this sense it has the undesired behaviour, the sub-stitute behaviour and deviant behaviour. In summary, the tax should become more heavily unwanted behaviour towards the desired one.

However, although the use of taxes as instruments of intervention is salutary, to what extent could the State influence/induce individuals through such tax rules is a matter of tax policy. It could be questioned, for example, the extent to which the State may exercise its authority over the individual, depriving him of purchase/consume certain goods through a extreme high tax levy. After all, by raising, for example, the


price of a pack of cigarettes at $ 10.00 (ten dollar) to $50.00 (fifty dol-lars), the State would not, somehow limiting the right the individual to acquire certain property?

The search for the general welfare could be an answer, insofar that with a value of 700% more expensive, cigarette consumption would decrease, which resonate in a more healthy condition for the individual consuming it, besides the decrease of environments infested by cigarette smoke or even lower rates of diseases caused by overuse and, in some cases, treated by the public health system.

We found it in this type of intervention, the State seeking ben-efits for society as a whole, but also for the individual himself directly affected by tax law.

Another point worth mentioning concerns the way the tax law shall be considered when there is an inducer function in order to lead an intervention by the State in the decisions of individuals. In this sense Schoueri points out that:

When you highlight a function of the tax law, in case, the inducer function, what is done is a new offshoot of the primary standard. Shall be taken - a first primary standard, which will be present in the induction itself, by the legislature, which, from a legal stand-point, is nothing more than an order for the taxpayer to adopt cer-tain behaviour. Not making behaviour, arises a tax liability, the taxpayer will put in more costly situation than that in which if adopted would range prescribed by the legislature behaviour. Fi-nally, do not alter the secondary standard, since the failure of the tax liability, the penalty will arise a sanction provided by the State (free translation).

In this sense, Schoueri presents the example of real state tax (IPTU) and the authority of the municipalities. The 1988 Federal Con-stitution, in Article 182 makes clear the possibility that the tax impact of property tax could be increased through progressive tax rates, if the property in question does not attending a social function, which would be predicted in an ordinary law known as “Plano Diretor”. In this sense, the primary tax rule will present two different situations. The first situ-ation, the individual owner of the property would have attended the social function wanted by the State (in this case the municipality). In this situation, the tax assessment corresponding to the IPTU would be levied with a lower rate, as an incentive to the individual owner (the


taxpayer) meet the determinations contained in the ordinary law of the Municipality. On the other hand, the second situation described in the tax rule would be one in which the taxpayer would not have attended the social function, and therefore the tax levied would be increased as a way to induce him to achieve the function social.

Therefore, from the moment the State act in an interventional way, trying to achieve the welfare of the community, the tax rule that carries the purpose of inducing desired behaviour, no longer has the fis-cal neutrality. In this sense Schoueri, citing Moncada, argues that:

Beyond mere correction of market mechanisms, arises in inter-ventionist State, to a different standard paper, in relation to which it was secured in the liberal state: it “now assumes an economic and social content losing value neutrality that characterized the liberal moment. (...) When running values, the State operates con-stitutively in economic and social spheres, shaping it according to axiological load assumed. (...) The State thus becomes permeable to socioeconomic content that alter his understanding; of guaran-tee limits of power and respect for individual liberty a legislative program achievements becomes. The concept of State of law is of a positive nature, in moving to incorporate a state action is not only the subsidiary, but to confirm a socioeconomic model” (free translation).

Indeed, the economic intervention is legitimate and necessary to the implementation of public policies, as well as to intervene in indi-vidual behaviour, having as main objective the social welfare.

As a rule, there are no objective limits to the exercise of pater-nalistic State through intervention by tax rules. The Legislative Power is free to exercise their legislating within the limits of formal legality activ-ity, as well as attention to the constitutional power to tax, predicted in Article 150 of the 1988 Constitution.

To the Executive Power was given the opportunity to manage the rates of customs taxes, and the financial transactions taxes.

Thus, before the voluntary and necessary absence of objective criteria for State intervention by tax regulations, it is questionable which limit the discretion of the Tax Authorities to exercise paternalism, in par-ticular.

The answer to this question is certainly permeated between the principles that guide the activity of public administration, as discussed below.


4. The tax policy and the principles of administrative law

According to Mello the principle of the supremacy of the public interest over private proclaims the superiority of collective interest. It is the assumption of stable social order in which each and every one can feel secured and guarded.

Thus, the state may be in a position of superiority in relation to the individual, by focusing taxes on daily facts, for reasons which form the very basis of taxation: a) the need for revenue for maintenance of the State and, b) the achievement of state organizations, which mix with the effectiveness of fundamental rights.

Thus, the State acts, based on the principle mentioned, searching through taxation to induce certain behaviours to individuals. Induction often justified by economic policies being provided to the State, through the Executive Power modifying certain tax levies through changes in tax rates. This is done by editing decrees and through the policy adopted by the Government, at its own discretion, targeting particular outcome in the economy.

In these cases, to escape the rule of legality, the principles of mo-tivation and morality become even more evident, in the extent that pro-tect the legal certainty of the individual, being essential for the discre-tionary acts from the Public Administration are motivated by legitimate, moral and ethical reasons (the economic policy of the state).

Such values are revealed even stronger in a democratic State, in which sound louder the ideals of justice, equality and fraternity, where there is no way to conceive the Law dissociated from its ethical founda-tion. In this sense, Alves Junior:

The Democratic State of Law requires the rapprochement of ethics to politics, from the moral law, making it legal rules were before cloistered within the limits of the moral field, the interest of politi-cal and economic model (free translation).

According to Carvalho Filho:

the principle of morality requires that the public administrator does not dispense ethical precepts that must be present in their conduct. Should not only ascertain the criteria of convenience, op-portunity and justice in their actions, but also to distinguish what is honest than is dishonest. We add that such conduct must exist


not only in relations between the Administration and adminis-tered in general, but also internally, which means, the relationship between the administration and the public officials who comprise.

Thus, the morality of the Public Administration requires that the purpose of the administrative actions align with the purposes of the public interest, and observes the ethical limits even if the action is di-rected to the public interest.

It is noteworthy the economic regulatory taxes, which were cov-ered by no need for compliance with the principle of legality, allowing the management of rates by editing simple executive orders.

In this sense, the Legislator insert at the Constitution of 1988 the possibility of mitigation of that principle of legality, by admitting that the Executive Power establish the tax rates of customs taxes, industrial-ized products tax (IPI) and the financial transaction taxes (IOF).

Indeed, it does not appear moral that the Executive Power – in front of a mere failure to provide cash – uses the constitutional rule to enlarge their financial resources, without prior examination of the Leg-islative Power. Important to note that managing tax rates without the need for law must necessarily have a regulatory purpose, not being ethi-cal and moral that the Public Administrator uses these taxes for purely revenue purposes.

The arbitrary use of regulatory taxes, besides being immoral, shakes confidence between citizens and Public Administration, because may surprise individuals in their financial planning.

Regarding the principle of trust, we can infer the same through the principle of legal certainty in tax matters, like one connect to another, and both applicable to the taxes classified as regulatory ones.

Legal certainty, and as a result the confidence that the taxpayer may have is due to the legal system itself, which has as purpose to as-sure citizens the application of legal standards, strengthened in tax law through the principle of tax law.

Therefore, tax incentives and tax benefits earned through exemp-tions, amnesties, remissions and etc. existing in principle to regulate cer-tain sector of the market, may not be revoked retroactively to cause the tax levy to those taxpayers who relied on such benefits from the State, and finished planning their activities due to the lower tax burden so far guaranteed.

Indeed, the act of State intervention in private relationships for tax measures must also meet the reasonableness and proportionality, as


a criterion for prudence of different treatments, being the Tax Authori-ties responsible to prove that economic intervention is appropriate and proportionate in view of the measure itself, that will suit the purposes of the economic order.

The principle of proportionality, together with the reasonable-ness will define the limits to state action through the tax levy. In this regard an analysis of rational motivation will be made, relationship be-tween the finality and the ways to achieve, and, especially, prudence of the State actions.

Judging the constitutionality of Municipal Law from Santos, former Minister of the Supreme Court, Orosimbo Nonato, understood excessive increasing of the tax on toilet cabins. According to the Rap-porteur, the power to tax can not get to the unbridled power to destroy, since that can only be exercised within the limits that make it compatible with the freedom of labor, trade and industry and the right to property. It is a power, in short, which the exercise should not go up to abuse, excess, deviation and applies even here, the fruitful doctrine of abuse of power.

The principle of proportionality is given, in the solution of a par-ticular case, the verification of three essential elements: the adequacy of the means used by the legislature in achieving the intended purpose, the need for the use of those means; reasonable and effective measure (proportionality in the strict sense) , measured from the balance between the meaning of the intervention to the objectives pursued and achieved.

Proportionality in the strict sense, the induction tax rule under-goes principle prohibiting the exaggeration under review its necessity, which means, that the same result could not be achieved as efficiently by means of a measure that affects less citizens. Making it necessary to assess the relative effect of the standard with its purpose.

Thus, it will be necessary to consider the importance of the sub-stitute behaviour (the one desired by the legislature) and the other one (the behaviour not desired by the State), taking into account mainly the factual possibility of these alternatives and their costs.

In this sense, it is suggested to compare the situation that would have if the State had taken a direct and individual interventional mea-sure. It is from this comparison that will be extract the question if the inducing tax rule, at the concrete circumstances: (i) is compatible with the purpose (ii) is still the most neutral measure (quantitative reason-ableness), considering also the goal of influencing the little as possible on free competition.


The principle of proportionality confirm that “would only be allowed to grant exemptions to new industries where the earnings of capital employed in the industrial investment are random and uncer-tain” since “if the taxpayer receives reasonable profits for its industrial activity, does not justify exemptions under the label of the new protec-tion industry”.

In the environmental field, the rule that discourages a polluting activity should have its constitutionality examined from the condition that other equally polluting activities are also affected, otherwise just turn away customers to other polluting activity, including details on the first without any reasonableness.

Another field using the induction rule is tax progressivity of tax-es for so-called “non personal taxes”. The structural progressivity was contemplated by the Constitution legislator at the real state tax (IPTU), which enable to the Tax Administration demands to the taxpayer follow a directive from the appropriate use of the property under a “penalty” to levy a higher tax, which is progressive over time. Also in relation to the tax on rural land (ITR) there is a tax rule that allows for the fixing of rates in order to discourage the retention of unproductive properties.

The selectivity, in other hand, applies in the present constitution-al system leads to the application of tax rules for the tax on industrial-ized products (IPI), and for tax on goods and services (ICMS), and is mandatory for the first one and optional for the second one.

The Constitution of 1988 does not specify what should be con-sidered essential. The understanding is that the tax falls on the property in the inverse ratio of their need for popular consumption and in direct proportion to their superfluity, according to doctrine.

In this sense, the question arises: can the ordinary legislator in-troduce inducing tax rules, and then adopting the tax rates for that not to graduate according to the parameter of the need? We believe that is not possible. The answer, however, is subjective and may be obtained in accordance with the governing principles presented above.

5. Conclusion

Brazilian Economic Order based on the principle of free initia-tive, ensuring that all the free exercise of any economic activity, regard-less of authorization of public agencies, except in cases provided by law. Hence, therefore, it is essential to distinguish the cases of legal and il-


legal activities. If illegal, there is no way the legislator can admit this kind of activities. If the activities are legal, on the other hand, there is no way the tax legislator prevent its exercise. Certain is that the legislator, pondering constitutional principles, may seek to restrict the exercise of certain activities when public policy interests indicate the inconvenience of their uncontrolled use.

It must distinguish the legal rule that the State uses as a legal instrument to prevent or discourage directly an act or fact that the law prohibits the extrafiscal tax that is prohibitive, when there would be a predetermined duty by a legal rule that State uses as a legal instrument to prevent or discourage, indirectly, an act or fact that the legal order permit. So, for environmental reasons, as an example, may be intended to reduce the number of cars in circulation, or the number of established industries in a certain region. Also, shall be taken, in this case, the pos-sibility of inducing use of tax regulations, which may even be higher than normal.

That means that the tax burden can not be so high to preventing economic activity not prohibited by law. It is import to inspect, always, if it is the removal of part of the heritage of the particular, through taxa-tion is in accordance with the principle of ownership. Here goes the fol-lowing rule: if the economic order would not tolerate the State, through direct act, limit or reduce the scope of private property through direct intervention, either you can do it by inducing tax rules. On the other hand, it is possible to see how totally appropriate is the use of inducing tax rules of economic behaviours for which the State seeks from the in-dividuals a more appropriate behaviour for society as a whole, provided that such indirect imposition of reasonable behaviours.

References

CARVALHO FILHO, José dos Santos. Manual de Direito Administrativo, Ed. 19. Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris, 2008.

GOUVÊA. Marcus de Freitas. A Extrafiscalidade no Direito Tributário. Belo Horizonte: Del Rey, 2006.

JÚNIOR, Onofre Alves Batista. Princípio Constitucional da Eficiência Adminis-trativa, 2ª Ed. Belo Horizonte: Ed. Fórum, 2012.

MACHADO, Hugo de Brito. Inconstitucionalidade do aumento do IOF com


desvio de finalidade. Revista Dialética da Direito Tributário, São Paulo, Dialé-tica, v. 154, p. 51-60, julho 2008.

PALMEIRA. Marcos Rogério. A tributação na Idade Moderna: uma construção de mitos in O Tributo na História: da Antiguidade à Globalização. Florianópo-lis: Fundação Boiteux, 2006.

SHOUERI. Luís Eduardo. Normas Tributárias Indutoras e Intervenção Econômica. Rio de Janeiro: Forense. 2005.

SOUZA. Washington Peluso Albino de. Primeiras Linhas de Direito Econômi-co, 4ª ed., Sãu Paulo: LTr, 1999.

STRECK, Lênio Luiz e MORAIS, José Luiz Bolzan de. Ciência Política e Teoria do estado. 5.ed. Porto Alegre: Livraria do Advogado, 2006.

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