The socio-emotional basis of human cognition, communication, and interaction

Socio-emotional basis of interaction 1

The socio-emotional basis of

human cognition, communication, and interaction

Wolfgang Scholl, Humboldt University, Rudower Chaussee 18,

12489 Berlin, Germany,Phone: + 49-30-2093-9327/-9330

Fax: + 49-30-20939332Email: [email protected]

Abstract

A review of dimensional research on the perception ofbehavior and personality, on non-verbal and verbal communication,as well as on feelings is undertaken which reveals a basicsimilarity in the three dimensions of affiliation, power, andactivation. These parallels seem to be based on causal connect-ions and they are interpreted as an evolutionary development forcoordination needs between persons. They represent the fundamen-tal dimensions of interaction and communication, as can berevealed from the logic of exchange theories as well as fromsymbolic interactionism. Thus, they form a universal socio-emotional space which guides individual orientation socialized in


line with the surrounding culture. Based on this review, a broadarray of proposals for future research is derived. Taking theseparallels and all three dimensions seriously into account seemsto be very promising for integrative theory building within andbeyond social psychology.

Keywords: Dimensionality of behavior, personality, communication, andfeelings; interaction and communication theory.


The socio-emotional basis of human cognition, communication,and interaction

0. IntroductionSocial psychological research is scattered into many

subfields with many minitheories such that integrative researchis needed. Seen from another angle, psychological socialpsychology has been developed into a relatively individualisticdiscipline and has neglected the more “social” aspects (Scholl, 2007). Themes are less or almost not researched andtaught which are concerned with the mutual interaction andcommunication of individuals and their embeddedness within thesocial structure and culture. This has negative consequences forthe interdisciplinary exchange with the neighboring sciences aswell as with its applicability in practice. So, integration iseven more needed combining the more individualistic researchareas like social cognition with the more interactive ones likeexchange or interdependence theories and the more communicativeones like symbolic interactionism which both have close ties toor even originated from the neighboring disciplines sociology,economics, anthropology etc.

Theoretical integration is only possible if there are commonvariables with which the diverse areas can be connected. And suchvariables should be as basic as possible in order to givesuccessful guidance for the integrative efforts. Are there suchvariables? Which ones among the hundreds or even thousands ofvariables already in use could be the most promising? It is theobjective of this article to show that the same three variableshave been found inductively as basic dimensions in the perceptionof behavior, personality, non-verbal and verbal communication, aswell as feelings. Each of these dimensions has got here and theredifferent names stemming from diverse research traditions whichobscures sometimes their principal similarity: We call themaffiliation (subsuming communion, warmth, evaluation, etc.),power (subsuming agency, dominance, competence, potency, etc.),and activation (subsuming arousal, action readiness, affectintensity, etc.). Most interestingly, these three dimensions arealso the basic ones in the two encompassing research traditionsof exchange / interdependence theories and symbolic


interactionism as formalized in affect control theory; thus theyare a deductive corroboration of the inductive findings mentionedbefore. In the following paragraphs, these similarites betweenthese three variables shall be followed up through the diverseresearch fields and shall be interpreted as an evolutionarydevelopment for the coordination needs of humans as selfish andsocial animals.

1. Basic interpersonal dimensionsIn an overview, Foa (1961) was probably the first to detect

and describe that there is a convergence between several analysesof the structure of interper sonal perception of behavior and personality. Very different studies on interpersonal behavior andsocially relevant personality traits have repeatedly found twobasic factors or dimensions that were summarized under the polarlabels “love - hostility” and “dominance – submission”. Subjects were forinstance laboratory groups, combat groups, therapy groups, ormother-child dyads. Methods were factor analyses of self-reports,observer ratings, sociometric choices, or rankings on behavior orpersonality categories. The dimensions were often nameddifferently, for example “affiliation” and “power”, or “solidarity“ and“individual prominence“, but their similarity to the dimensions love– hostility and dominance – submission is clear. Later studiesfound similar results. And it is especially meaningful thatcross-cultural studies have also found these two factors ordimensions (see Lonner, 1980). In several studies which were donewith groups, a third factor was uncovered which was called“aiding group attainment”. This factor has only been found insome cross-cultural studies (Lonner, 1980); it seems to bespecific for groups and thus may not be considered a universalinteraction factor. The literature has largely focused on the twodimensions of love – hostility and dominance – submission; forreasons of simplicity these dimensions are here usually referredto as “affiliation” and “power”, which reflect perhaps best thosebasic interaction themes, just as they are used in the motivationliterature (McClelland, 1984)1.

Leary and colleagues (Leary, 1957; Freedman et al., 1951; LaForge & Suczek, 1955), referring to Sullivan (1953), alreadydescribed this two-dimensional space as a circular continuum


consisting of 16 sectors of interpersonal variables. The two-dimensional perception of interpersonal behavior and interper-sonal personality traits is not only described by two orthogonalcoordinates as resulting from a simple structure factor analysis;rather the two-dimensional space is filled with equally relevantsectors within a circular model (cf. figure 1). Following Guttman(1954), Foa called this circular arrangement a “circumplex”. Thenotion of the circumplex was taken up repeatedly and has firmlyestablished itself in today’s literature (e.g. Plutchik & Conte,1997).

The sectors are now usually ordered by letters from A to P,whereby A indicates the sector “dominating”, B the sector“proud”, etc., up to P indicating “advising”; in the more recentliterature, only 8 sectors are described, in which case thesectors P and A are grouped together as one, as well as B and C,D and E, etc. Wiggins (1979) conducted an influential and mainlycorroborating study in this field. He took all English adjectivesfrom the Encyclopedia Britannica that somehow containedinterpersonal characteristics, as opposed to material,temperamental, personal and intellectual characteristics. Withthese adjectives he tried to depict the structure of the 16traits as clearly as possible; psychometrically, this turned outto represent very fairly a circumplex structure. Wiggins,Trapnell, & Phillips (1988) delivered an improved version whichhas up to now been widely used by several researchers; anequivalent German version has been devised by Jacobs and Scholl(2005). Another important step was the refinement of the“interpersonal circle” by Kiesler (1983) that was meant not onlyas a descriptive taxonomy, but also as a set of assumptions aboutspecific action-reaction sequences. He formulated systematicarguments that actions of a person provoke complementaryreactions in the interaction partner, and that these reactionscan be predicted above chance with the circumplex system.

The impressive circumplex tradition with hundreds ofpublications sometimes focuses more on behavioral aspects as inDryer and Horowitz (1997), and sometimes more on personalityaspects as in Acton and Revelle (2002). Therefore it makes senseto compare the circumplex personality model with the 5-factor-model of personality (Big 5, McCrae & Costa, 1987, 1997).


Fig. 1: The system of 16 interpersonal mechanisms (fromFreedman et al., 1951).

The 5-factor-model includes the personality traitsextraversion, agreeableness, neuroticism, openness, andconscientiousness. Two of them, extraversion and agreeableness,clearly refer to interpersonal traits. Hence, a relationshipbetween the interpersonal circumplex and these two personalitytraits can be expected. McCrae and Costa (1989) have shownthrough a mutual analysis of both item pools that the factorextraversion is represented well in the areas O and P (Wiggins:extraverted and ambitious), but the sub-dimensions ofextraversion also touch the neighboring segments A and N(dominant, gregarious). Accordingly, agreeableness is shifted by


90 degrees and falls in the areas K and L (ingenuous, warm),touching also the sectors M and J (agreeable, unassuming). Thatmeans, these two factors from the Big-5 can be represented withinthe interpersonal circumplex when shifted geometrically by 34degrees. In fact, Trapnell & Wiggins (1990) created an adjectivelist with which they could reproduce the Big-5, where extraver-sion and agreeableness were measured with the items of thecorresponding sectors of the interpersonal circumplex. This factconfirms that there is a two-dimensional circumplex system ofcharacteristics among fundamental personality factors that arespecifically related to interpersonal behavior. It is importantto note that the interpersonal circumplex (e. g. German versions:Ostendorf, 2001; Jacobs & Scholl, 2005) and the Big-5 could beappropriately (re-)constructed in different cultures (McCrae &Costa, 1997). There is also evidence that differences in thesepersonality dimensions are to a substantial degree geneticallyinherited (Carver & Scheier, 2000).

Verbal and non-verbal communicationIt may seem surprising to some observers of the

interpersonal behavior and personality literature that basicallythe same interpersonal dimensions have been detected long ago inthe areas of non-verbal and verbal communication. But the areasof interaction and communication are in reality much closer thanin psychology textbooks and scientific disciplines; in fact, theyare hard to separate. “Interaction” focuses somewhat more onbehavioral aspects of human encounters whereas "communication"emphasizes the informational aspects (Brauner, 1994). So, it isimportant when looking for possible dimensions of humaninteractive behavior also to turn to communication studies; thesemay be subdivided in studies of verbal and non-verbal commu-nication which are reviewed in turn.

Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum (1957) provided the first studieswhich revealed that the connotative (or emotional) meaning of anychosen verbal term can be described on three dimensions that aremarked by polar adjectives and together form the so-called“Semantic Differential”. The first dimension was called“evaluation“. It is represented by adjective pairs like good – bad,pleasant – unpleasant, agreeable – disagreeable, or friendly –unfriendly. This dimension describes the most fundamental


experience of pleasure versus pain; used in an interpersonalcontext it describes apparently the above discussed dimension ofaffiliation or love – hostility. A loving interpersonalrelationship would be described and evaluated as friendly, good,agreeable, and pleasant, while a hostile relationship would bedescribed with the opposite polar adjectives. The seconddimension was called “potency”, and it is characterized by pairsof adjectives like strong – weak, superior – inferior, orexperienced – inexperienced. This dimension is perfectly suitedto describe the dimension of power or dominance – submission ifapplied to relationships. Finally, “activity”, the third dimension,is characterized by pairs of adjectives like active – passive,loud – quiet, fast – slow. There is no direct relation ofactivity to the above described dimensions of the interpersonalcircumplex, but it fits well to the third dimension of theinterpersonal relations study of Wish, Deutsch, & Kaplan, (1976;for some more detail, see below). Again, it is especiallymeaningful that studies in other cultures with other languageshave found these same three dimensions through factor analyses ofevaluative, emotionally laden words, be it adjectives or nouns(Ertel, 1965; Osgood, May, & Miron, 1975). This fact confirmsthat there is a universal three-dimensional system of affectivemeaning in human languages.

Going from studies of verbal to those of non-verbal com-munication, an interesting observation can be made: The same orat least similar three dimensions were found as qualities of non-verbal communication. While many authors, like Argyle (1975),have focused on the first two dimensions of affiliation andpower, that were already found in interpersonal perception andverbal communication, Mehrabian and his coworkers (1969, 1972,1974, 1974; Russell & Mehrabian, 1977) operationalized andfactorized three dimensions of non-verbal communication in animpressive series of questionnaire and experimental observationalstudies.

“Immediacy stimuli” serve the communication of sympathy (andantipathy on the other pole), clearly expressed through touching,close interpersonal distance between two persons, forward lean,duration of mutual eye contact as well as head nodding matchingothers communication, positive (smile) versus negative (frowns,


glares, sneers) facial expression and positive (enthusiasm,pleasure, amusement, interest) versus negative (sarcasm,annoyance, boredom, suspicion) vocal expression. These immediacystimuli correspond to affiliation or love – hostility ininterpersonal perception and to evaluation in verbal commu-nication. Mehrabian called the second dimension of non-verbalcommunication “relaxation stimuli”. They serve the communication ofstatus and social control, and signal through an easy and relaxedposture that the other person is not perceived as a threat andthat the person dominates the situation. Relaxation is measuredby asymmetrical arms’ and legs’ position, sideways lean of thetorso, relaxed hands, and less object and body manipulation.Relaxation stimuli correspond to the dimension of power ordominance – submission in interpersonal perception and to potencyin the semantic differential. Finally, Mehrabian named “activitystimuli” that communicate the readiness to (re)act. Slow, sleepymovements show little activity, while a hasty movement, a quickchange of mimics and especially excited talking in a loud voicesignal high activity or readiness to (re)act. This dimensioncorresponds to the activity dimension of the semanticdifferential.

For the empirical establishment of these dimensions it isnecessary to non-verbally recognize the dimensions of non-verbalmessages; if they are only described with verbal terms this couldsimply reproduce the three dimensions of verbal communication ofthe semantic differential. In the research by Mehrabian and hisco-workers (1969, 1972, 1974) both methods were used. In someexperiments further minor factors like ingratiation or distresswere found; but, they were interpreted as situation dependent,not as general factors such that the above mentioned threedimensions of non-verbal behavior were seen as the only gene-ralizable ones. So, the three dimensions were clearly establishedfor non-verbal behavior as well as their close connection to therespective dimensions of emotional meaning in verbal behavior.

With regard to non-verbal communication, it is alsoimportant that basic facial expressions can be identifiedindependently of cultural background. In an overview of relevantstudies, Ekman & Oster (1979) have shown that the majority ofobservants from totally different cultures can correctly identify


basic emotions from facial expression. Happiness, anger, sorrow,fear, and surprise seem to be such basic emotions or maybe thesocially most important ones. Furthermore, it was shown that notonly the recognition (decoding) of the facial expression is lar-gely culturally independent, but that members of differentcultures also produce the same facial expressions (encoding) whenasked to show a certain emotion. Essentially, the same emotionsin facial expression could be found even in children who wereborn blind and could not have learned them by imitation (Keltner& Ekman, 2000). On the other side, there is also agreement thatpeople learn to willingly produce certain emotions, and thatthere are different cultural regulations, pertaining to when andto what extent to show which emotions. With regard to non-verbalvocal expressions, the results point into the same direction:Emotions expressed in speech can be successfully detected to alarge extent by receivers, even from differing cultures(Johnstone & Scherer, 2000; Scherer, Johnstone, & Klasmeyer,2003). Unfortunately, there are substantial controversies in thefield which are addressed in the next but one section.

FeelingsAccording to Ertel (1964) and Osgood (1969), the connotative

meaning of language serves the reflection of felt emotions, i.e.feelings. Likewise, the non-verbal signal system primarily servesthe expression of emotions and attitudes (Ekman & Oster, 1979;Argyle, 1975). Hence, it makes sense to look also for fundamentaldimensions of emotions as humans subjectively perceive them.While older philosophic traditions have repeatedly emphasized thedimension of “pleasure – dislike”, Wundt (1896) was probably the firstpsychologist to expand it to three dimensions, adding thedimensions “tension – relaxation” and “arousal – calming down”. Subsequentresearch has repeatedly found these or similar dimensions usingdifferent methods (Traxel & Heide, 1961; Mehrabian, 1980; Gehm &Scherer, 1988; Plutchik, 1980, 1991).

Plutchik’s model is the most popular one. It looks like acone; looking at the highest cross-section of it, the followingbasic emotions appear; they are portrayed in figure 2: Readingclockwise, we find surprise, fear, sorrow, disgust, anticipation,anger, joy and acceptance. According to Plutchik these are thebasic emotions that produce further emotional qualities when


mixed (blended emotions). Whereas the system of basic emotionsand the location of the mixed emotions are not always convincingand are somewhat different in other systems of emotion qualities,the crucial point of Plutchik’s system for our discussion is thethree-dimensional system itself. Although the circular order ofthe basic emotions gives no “natural” dimensions, one can draw anaxis from acceptance to disgust, which distinguishes pleasantfrom unpleasant feelings and refers to love – hostility ininterpersonal situations. Shifted geometrically by 90 degrees,i.e. statistically independent from the first, another axis canbe drawn stretching from anger to fear which distinguishesfeelings to be strong, powerful versus weak, powerless vis-à-visanother person and corresponds to the dominance – submissiondimension.2 Just like Traxel and Heide (1961), Plutchik (1991)calls his third dimension an “intensity” dimension. He assumes thatno emotional qualities can be distinguished when intensity isvery low, i.e. in the extreme case of sleepiness; therefore, thecircle shrinks to a point, where the "cone" stands on the ground.When emotional intensity gets higher, the cone gains volume, i.e.differing emotional qualities can be distinguished unto thosewhich are shown in the top cross section in figure 2. Plutchik’smodel basically agrees in its three-dimensional arrangement withother empirical findings.


Fig. 2: Two-dimensional representation of emotions (fromPlutchik, 1991, p. 112).

One problem in emotion research is that sometimes only twodimensions are mentioned, especially in mood research; of course,mood may be somewhat truncated in its emotional variability (seethe differences between real life induction and imagery inStemmler, 1989). Only pleasure – dislike and activity – passivityare included, while the dominance – submission dimension is noteven mentioned (Larsen & Diener, 1992; Russell, 1980, 1997;Watson & Tellegen, 1985). Yet, Osgood (1966), Russell andMehrabian (1977), Morgan and Heise (1988), Gehm and Scherer(1988), and MacKinnon and Keating (1989) had already shown thatsimilarities and differences of emotional qualities cannot besufficiently portrayed by a two–dimensional structure, nor by a


symmetric three–dimensional cone structure. Rather, threedimensions are necessary to adequately depict felt emotions,whereby a third dimension of dominance – submission or potencywould have to be added, and this dimension is not completelyindependent of the first two. Especially for disagreeable,activated emotions it is important that a third dimension ofdominance - submission is introduced in order to distinguish suchcontrasting emotions as anger signalling potency, and fearsignalling a weak position; a problem of the two-dimensionalsolution which was mentioned in the review by Larsen and Diener(1992)3.

Shaver et al. (1987) got a corresponding three-dimensionalresult on the basis of a prototype approach, depicting everydayknowledge of emotions. Love, joy, surprise, fear, sorrow, andanger were the prototypes which formed the top of distinctclasses of emotion terms. Submitting all terms to a similarityrating, they also found three dimensions, whereby anger, fear,and sorrow as unpleasant emotions only differed in potency, notin activity, whereas love, joy, and surprise only differed inactivity and exhibited each a medium amount of potency. Moreover,anger and fear could be clearly distinguished in a real lifeinduction on physiological measures (Stemmler, 1989), and onregional brain processes (Chiao et al., under review); thisunderscores the importance of distinguishing these emotionalqualities on an emotional dominance dimension. Thus, the manyfelt emotion studies with their different methods and divergingterminology have shown the following: First, three dimensions areneeded in order to differentiate emotional qualities. Secondly,these dimensions obviously parallel the verbal and non-verbalcommunication dimensions. Thirdly, they do not have an evendistribution like a ball or a cone, because only negativeemotions can be clearly differentiated into dominant and sub-missive ones.

A third dimension in the perception of behavior andpersonality?

The separate analyses of interpersonal perception, commu-nication and felt emotions have shown that there are threedimensions that describe the perception and expression ofinterpersonal qualities. Yet, in the interpersonal circumplex


tradition of behavior and personality perception, only the firsttwo dimensions have been identified and dealt with empirically.What about a third, an activation dimension? The answer isprobably: An appropriate third dimension can be found, but it isnot included in most circumplex research. With regard tobehavior, a study on the perception of interpersonal relationsusing a different methodology is worthwhile to consider. Wish,Deutsch, and Kaplan, (1976, see also Wish & Kaplan, 1977) letstudents rate 120 interaction and communication episodes on 14bipolar scales; the 120 episodes contained 12 quite differentdyadic social relations crossed with 10 quite differentsituations or tasks. Analyzing these ratings with multidi-mensional scaling, they found a first dimension ofcooperation/friendliness versus competition/hostility (especially with closefriends and married couples on the one pole versus politicalenemies and economic competitors on the other), a seconddimension of dominance versus equality versus submission (signifyingmaster and parents versus close friends and business partnersversus servant and child), and a third dimension of intensity/activityversus superficiality/inactivity (husband-wife, parent-child versus distantrelatives and acquaintants).4 A somewhat similar extension tosuch a third behavioral dimension can be found in the three-dimensional SYMLOG-model of Bales and colleagues (Bales, Cohen, &Williamson, 1979).

In the personality literature one can find a third dimensionof more or less intense emotionality or activation dimension:Larsen, Diener, and Emmons (1986; see also Schimmack & Diener,1997) conceptualized and measured a separate trait called “affectintensity” and found that people differ in affect intensityacross all feeling qualities5. Research has been started in orderto test whether affect intensity is really independent of the twocircumplex dimensions affiliation and dominance/submission andhow these three dimensions are related to the Big-5 dimensions ofextraversion, agreeableness, and emotional (in)stability.

So, we can conclude that probably three fundamentaldimensions exist in all five areas of feelings, non-verbal andverbal communication, behavioral acts and personality traits,which parallel each other. The first is here called “affiliation”in line with a basic need for humans to affiliate and to get


support for their survival (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; McClelland,1984); it entails sympathy/love (expressed for instance throughacceptance, smile, closeness) versus antipathy/hostility(expressed through disgust, sarcasm, distance) as opposite poles,and it coincides with the more general dimension of evaluation(good – bad). A second dimension is here called “power” withdominance (expressed through anger, pride, or relaxation) versussubmission (expressed through fear, awe, or tension) as oppositepoles. The dimensional name is borrowed from the other well knowninterpersonal motive, the power motive (McClelland, 1975; VanDijke & Poppe, 2006), and itgets its fundamentalsignificance by thefact that humans, likeother social animals,form hierarchies andcompete for dominance(Buss, 2003). Finally,a third dimension of“activation” or arousalwas identified with theopposite poles of higharousal, activemovements, loud voice,and fast speaking ver-sus minimum arousal,passive, quiet, andslow behaviors. Thesethree dimensionsexhibit basic emotionalas well as social qua-lities; therefore, wecall them “basic socio-emotional dimensions”(cf. figure 3); we willelaborate thisinterpretation in alater section.

Fig. 3: The three basic socio-emotional dimensions


2. Relations between felt emotions, communication modes,behavior, and personalityThe presented three-dimensional parallels pose further

questions: Why do those parallels exist? Such a parallelismalmost certainly comes not into existence by chance. Are theredirect, possibly causal links between the respective dimensionsin these five different areas? We will look at each possibleconnection between these areas in turn. Sometimes, there isstrong evidence for a direct link, sometimes the evidence isweaker, sometimes the causality is unclear, and more researchwould be worthwhile anyway.

Feelings and and non-verbal communicationThe connection between felt emotions and non-verbal

communication seems to be obvious as emotions are linked tofacial and vocal expressions as well as bodily movements and thusare accessible to the interaction partner. Yet, this link mightbe less strong than thought 20 years ago. There are some openquestions, diverging results, and more fundamental criticisms inthis scientific field (Barrett, 2006; Fridlund, 1994, 1997;Parkinson, 2005, Russell & Fernández-Dols, 1997; Russell, Bacho-rowski, & Fernández-Dols, 2003; and rebuttals by Buck, 1994;Keltner & Ekman, 2000; Keltner, Ekman et al., 2003; Scherer,Johnstone, & Klasmeyer, 2003). The critics place a much higherweight on communicative aspects, seeing facial and vocal signalsmore as appeals to an audience, guided by social motives, than asan expression of inner states. Thus, researchers agree more thatemotions are interpreted from facial and vocal expression onuniversal dimensions than that these are expressions of inneremotional states, differentiating pleasant from unpleasant andactivated from unaroused ones, and - less so - potent versus weakones (e.g. Barrett, 2006; Russell, 1997). Yet, Scherer et al.(2003) draw the attention to a basic communication insight thatall signs can be - in varying proportions - symptoms of thesender’s state (here emotional ones), representations of a worldaspect (objects of communication are emotionally evaluated), andappeals to (attempts to affect) a receiver.

The dyadic facial expression research of the Saarbrückenclinical psychology team (e.g. Krause & Merten, 1999; Merten,


1997, 2003) clarifies this point further. The meaning of facialexpressions cannot be inferred only from the expression butseveral context aspects have to be considered, too. In thecontext of mutual gazing toward each other, the expression ismost likely to be tied to inner feelings, i.e. feeling state,representation, and appeal go together. But if the sender looksaway and the receiver looks at the sender, then the facialexpression of the sender is usually an illustration of thenarrative and/or the attitude of the sender but not necessarilyan expression of his momentary feelings. E.g. in a talk about apolitical event, the sender may facially express anger, and atthe same time feels happy to be able to express his feelingsabout the political event towards a friend. Further importantcontext aspects are the dyadic gender relation (m-m, f-f, and m-f) and the duration of mutual gaze throughout the interaction(cf. Merten, 1997, 2003).6 Moreover, if facial and vocalexpressions would never reveal anything about the sender’semotions, as Fridlund (1997) seems to assert, they could not beinterpreted so consistently as emotional appeals (which thecritics admit); such a mismatch makes no sense from anevolutionary point of view to which Fridlund subscribes.7

Complementary evidence for the connection between feelingsand facial expressions comes from the receiver side. In the lastyears, mirror neurons have been detected in macaque monkeys whichfire not only when an individual is doing something but also whens/he is seeing another individual doing the same thing and theown muscles are activated in a similar way as these of the otherindividual. Similar brain areas and activities have been found inhumans. (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). First evidence was alsoobtained that mirror neurons enable empathy for positive andnegative feelings in monkeys and humans (Jabbi, Swart, & Keysers,2007). Thus, understanding others is greatly facilitated, notonly what another persons does and intends to do, but also howanother person feels about it, i.e. what it means for the otherperson to do that. A further piece in this puzzle ofunderstanding others comes from the facial-feedback-hypothesis(e.g. Kleinke, Peterson, & Rutledge, 1998; Larsen, Kasimatis, &Frey, 1992; Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988); if the appropriatefacial muscles are contracted, the corresponding feelings arereported by subjects. This mechanism gives not only feedback to

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macaque_monkey


the sender of what he or she is expressing but may also beinvolved in the reception link from neurons which mirror thefacial expression of the sender to receiver’s own facial musclemovements to the respective feelings, the receiver’s empathy.

Moreover, physiological research begins to find relativelyclear differences in autonomic, somatic, and corticalcovariations to facially and vocally expressed emotions (Ekman,Levenson, & Friesen, 1983; Hamm, Schupp, & Weike, 2003). Ekman etal. (1983) found such physiological differences with a posedemotion task implying a facial-feedback-hypothesis as well aswith an imagery task implying that recalled feelings stimulatedthe respective physiological changes. Hamm et al. (2003) foundphysiological as well as facial differences when subjects viewedemotion eliciting pictures, classifying the feelings into thediscrete categories of happiness, surprise, fear, disgust, grief,anger, or being in a neutral state.

Taken together, mutual causal relations between feelings andfacial expressions have been established but this is not a one-to-one relationship. Frijda and Tcherkassof (1997) speak of a"distinct affinity" which "exists crossculturally and probablyuniversally" (p. 80); and they conclude: "Athough the link (sc.between felt emotions and facial expressions) is neitherexclusive nor necessary, it is an intrinsic one" (p. 99). Such aone-to-one relationship cannot be expected if the differingfunctions of the emotion components of feelings, expression, andaction preparation are considered; different factors impingeadditionally on each of these components (this is highlighted inBarrett, 2006). Facial behaviors can be emotional expressions andsocial signals, but they are not always a reflection of themomentary feelings; for a proper interpretation, the context ofthe expression has to be taken into account, including thespecific addressee, the relationship, the object of com-munication, the social motive, the possibility of deceit, andsocial and cultural learning. Last not least, the more severecritics of a close connection between felt emotions and facialexpressions do not include the additional important non-verbalcommunication devices of vocal expression (Scherer, Johnstone, &Klasmeyer, 2003) and bodily movements (de Meijer, 1991) whichgive additional clues to the likely feelings of the sender.


Feelings and and non-verbal communicationA relation between felt emotions and verbal communication

was shown in studies that examined the dimensionality of feelingsas similarity ratings on the one side and verbal semanticdifferential ratings on the other. Both showed a three-dimensional structure with similar locations of the feelings(Traxel & Heide, 1961). The relationship of feelings andsemantics could also be established in the cited emotion wordstudies which found that the same three dimensions as in thesemantic differential are necessary in order to distinguish emo-tions adequately, but that these are not evenly spread over thesemantic space. It thus can be concluded that this result is notsimply due to the affective three-dimensionality of language. Therelationship between both probably is one of learnedassociations, not a direct causal one.

Feelings and interpersonal behaviorThe connection between feelings and interpersonal behavior

is more complicated because of the diverging views and approachesof what emotions and the respective processes are. Many emotionresearchers see physiological states, feelings, emotionalexpressions, and action impulses as basic components of thecomplex compound called “emotion” (e.g. Scherer, 2000). Manifoldrelations exist between these components but the causality isdisputed. Feelings and behavior may both be instigated by more orless automatic perceptual and autonomic physiological processes(e.g. Panksepp, 2000) or by metaprograms (Cosmides & Tooby,2000), thus being just correlated. In another view, feelings areevaluative experiences of a situation which - after one or morereappraisals – trigger behavior into a goal direction which feelsbetter than other viable alternatives (e.g. Ellsworth & Scherer,2003); if there are none, this is an especially “sad” situationtriggering “passive” behavior. Feelings as evaluations steerbehavior more directly, together with factual cognitions, insteadof being only linked through a third (physiological) variable.The reverse also seems to be true, at least for the evaluationdimension, as approach behavior facilitates automaticallypositive feelings and evaluations and avoidance facilitatesautomatically negative feelings (Neumann, Förster, & Strack,2003). In both directions, the causality may result from learned


associations. There seems to be no study which directly maps feltemotions onto all three interpersonal behavior dimensions at thesame time looking for causal influence. One of the problems ofsuch a study would be the appropriate time frame: In feeling goodor angry about another person, one might form a goal to dosomething nice to the other or to revenge oneself but the actionmay be delayed until a much later appropriate moment. Onepossible approach could be to link feelings experimentally tobehavior intentions instead to behavior itself which wouldindirectly support the assumed effct if the well establishedcausal relation between intentions and behavior (Fishbein &Ajzen, 1975) is taken into account. More research is needed withregard to causal links between felt emotions and behavior alongthese three dimensions, but at least for the evaluation dimensionthe evidence is already strong.

Feelings and personalityA connection between felt emotions and personality has been

shown by Fisher et al. (1985). They used 17 adjectives taken froma personality circumplex to create self-descriptions of mood.Subjects described their momentary mood with these adjectives,and a two-dimensional circle resulted, similar to the personalitycircumplex. The authors conclude that their study proves that thecircumplex model of personality is a valid theoretical constructthat originates from everyday experiences with emotions, and isnot only an illusionary implicit personality theory. Maybe onewould not go so far in the interpretation of these data, but thisstudy shows at least that feelings and personality impressionscan be mapped on the same semantic space which is more than justour recognition of similar dimensions in the preceding sections.Yet, from a theoretical perspective one could well form ahypothesis of mutual causation: Frequent feelings of a certainkind may result in respective personality shifts, e.g. frequentjoy may strengthen extraversion and frequent sadness intoversion,and these traits in turn may foster the frequency of therespective emotion experiences.

Non-verbal and verbal communicationThe match between non-verbal and verbal communication is of

utmost importance. It was best established by Mehrabian (1969,


1972) when he corroborated the three dimensions of nonverbalcommunication with those of verbal communication in the form ofthe semantic differential. First, an interplay between verbal andnon-verbal meaning is only possible if there are comparable di-mensions. Such comparisons are for instance necessary to evaluatethe truthfulness of a speaker, as an untruthful message isnormally “refuted” by deviating non-verbal messages that can beless well controlled (Mehrabian, 1972, Ch. 6). Apart from that,many linguistic phenomena like irony, sarcasm, etc. are possible1 Wiggins (1991) used "communion" instead of affiliation and"agency" instead of power in a broad review of similarconceptions. Though several other researchers followed Wigginsin using this terminology, we see it as less appropriate."Agency" partly seems to be a mixture of power and activation(the third dimension to which we come later on) which can notonly be seen from his referrals to other authors but also veryclearly from the opposite pole which is termed "passivity". Andlooking at the descriptions it seems to be partly more personalthan interpersonal whereas power is necessarily interpersonal.Communion has an added moral meaning of motivationalcooperativeness or even altruism which may but must not be tiedto affiliation. Nevertheless, the following arguments couldalso be read with "communion" instead of "affiliation" and"agency" instead of "power" if the control aspect in agency isemphasized.

2 Relaxation as dominant non-verbal behavior and anger asdominant felt emotion seem to contradict each other, but theyjust refer to different situations: In conflict situations,dominance is emotionally expressed by anger and rage,submission by fear. When the conflict is over, dominance isexpressed by triumph or pride, submission by depression, grief,grudge, or anxiety. Outside of conflicts, when relations aresettled, dominance is expressed by relaxation and assurance,submission by tension, respect, and humility.

3 It's also memorable that in Plutchik and Conte's (1997)collection of circumplex models two kinds of emotionalcircumplexes are reported without further commentary: Apleasure – arousal (or affiliation - activation) circumplex aswell as an aggressive – nurturing circumplex (an affiliation -power plane).


because the content of the verbal message can be modified andcaricatured by a suitable non-verbal message, often through acertain intonation. Secondly, the development of the diverselanguages obviously remains confined to the socio-emotional spaceof non-verbal expression (cf. Osgood et al., 1975). Non-verbalcommunication is phylogenetically much older than communicationby language which is specific to the human race. It was alreadypointed out by Darwin in 1872, that facial expressions offeelings are common to other higher species and they are the more4 A fourth dimension of formality depicting

institutionalization processes and a fifth dimension of taskorientation both fall outside of the primary socio-emotionalrealm, cf. the interpretation below.

5 It is interesting to note here that Saucier (1992), in astudy representative of all common English trait-likeadjectives, found a 3-dimensional subset among the Big-5 withthree corresponding circumplexes. The three-dimensional subsetincludes an extraversion-agreeableness circumplex and circum-plexes of these two dimensions with emotional lability,whereas the conscientiousness and openness factors of the Big-5 exhibited simple structure. This finding suggests thepossibility that not only the extraversion-agreeableness planecoincides with a rotation of the interpersonal circumplexplane (McCrae & Costa, 1989) but also that the three-dimensional personality space of extraversion – agreeableness– neuroticism would coincide after spatial rotation with anaffiliation – power – affect intensity space. Extraversionwould then be characterized not only by a mixture of dominanceand love but had also an above average affect intensity;neuroticism had also an above average affect intensitycombined with some submission and hostility (see thecorrelations between affect intensity on the one hand andextraversion and emotionality on the other in Larsen andDiener, 1987). Carver & Scheier (2000), al least, see a simi-larity between affect intensity and the neuroticism dimensionof the Big 5.

6 Whereas all the studies mentioned up to now are studiesabout interindividual differences, the studies of theSaarbrücken group are using intraindividual differences basedon the interindividual (EM)FACS coding system. There is no


similar to those of humans the nearer these animals are on thephylogenetical tree (Darwin, 1965). Human language expands thecommunication potential enormously to denote a multitude ofactions and objects but it stays within the same three-dimensional space of emotional or connotative meaning of allthese denotable things. Thirdly, this parallelity facilitates theacquisition of a language with all its nuances of meaning, as the“correct” meaning can be verified by comparing it to theaccompanying non-verbal expressions (Scheff, 1973). This isimportant for people who go to another country to learn thelanguage, as well as for children where language development isbased on the earlier developed non-verbal communication(Mehrabian, 1972, Ch. 9).

Also interesting are the acquired disturbances of emotionalexpressions found in clinical populations where the verbalmeaning and the emotional expression have been dissociated.Successful therapists develop and express vicariously those

necessity that both kinds of differences exhibit the samestructure, as Jens Asendorpf reminded me (see Asendorpf, 2004),but at least here they seem to do so.

7 The dissensus with Fridlund does not pertain to his evolutionary postulates but to his view of human dispositions. His argumentation sometimes sounds neobehavioristic, e. g. " 'Motives', on the other hand (sc. instead of emotions), can be deduced from behavioral observation." (1997, p.106). Emotions are caricatured as "quasi-reflexive" (p. 105), whereas other ethologists see emotions as having evolved from instincts because of their much greater flexibility in need management (Bischof, 1989). But then, intentions are introduced as more reliable cues than emotions; but this argument violates his ownpostulate of evolutionary economy regarding the number of selected displays, because intentions are dependent on a host of situational factors like norms, perceived behavior control, and role identitites (Ajzen & Madden, 1986; Charng, Piliavin, &Callero, 1988; Sparks & Sheperd, 1992). His argument against a selection of a large number of displays ("little such evolutionwould occur if the displays were needlessly specific because the context carried the necessary information"; p.124, fn. 2) is a good argument against intentions or behaviors and for expressed emotions as selected devices for social encounters.


emotions which the patient is unable to generate, despite thefact that they would be necessary from the meaning structure ofthe reported situation (Krause & Merten, 1999). The significanceof the agreement of the three dimensions of meaning in verbal andnon-verbal communication can hardly be overestimated. Thus, wemay conclude that the three-dimensionality of non-verbalcommunication has phylogenetically caused the respectiveuniversal three-dimensionality of connotative meaning in allresearched languages. Equipped with this parallelity and thatbetween non-verbal communication and feelings, humans are able tosense the feeling of a focus person, self or other, if a certainevent is verbally reported to them.

Non-verbal communication and interpersonal behaviorThe connection between non-verbal communication and

interpersonal behavior has not found much research interest,probably because the relationship is too obvious. First, non-verbal behavior is already behavior, and in fact, all behaviorsexpress and communicate something to others; as Watzlawick,Beavin, and Jackson (1967) said: “You cannot not communicate”, asaying which holds only for non-verbal behavior. Secondly, non-verbal behaviors often announce likely future actions as inthreatening faces and movements (Fridlund, 1997); so, there is noclear boundary between “pure” non-verbal emotional expression,other expressive behaviors, and specific actions. In a meta-analysis of repeated dilemma games, Sally (1995) found a strongpositive effect of visual sight on cooperation rates, partiallingout all other determinants. This implies that one personforecasts relatively reliably the future action of the otherperson from nonverbal communication. The relationship betweennon-verbal communication and behavior may be even stronger thanthat between feelings and behavior, because expressions notalways reflect momentary feelings but may serve also an appealingor impression management function (Fridlund, 1997); facialfeedback should be especially helpful in controlling thesynchronization of non-verbal and other interpersonal behavior.The decisive point is that nonverbal communication announcesupcoming friendly or unfriendly, assertive or yielding behaviorand the expressed arousal signals the intensity as well as theurgency of those behaviors. Seen in a causal perspective, it is


likely that intentions play a mediating role between feelings andnon-verbal communication as well as interpersonal acts, but theremay be other direct and indirect causal relations, too.

Non-verbal communication and personality The connection between non-verbal communication and

personality has been researched in an especially convincing studyby Gifford (1991). His subjects first answered a questionnairewhich measured the interpersonal personality circumplex with 128adjectives. One week later, they participated in two-persondiscussions for 15-minutes; these were videotaped and coded fornon-verbal behaviors. The connections found were as follows:Turning one’s head to the interaction partner was the morefrequent the more the subjects described themselves as extraver-ted. Frequency of head nods correlated highest with an agreeable,cooperative personality. Object manipulations (fingering withavailable things including one’s own body) were found most oftenwith submissive persons. An asymmetric left leg posture was shownmost often by extraverted, ambitious people. A spread of bothlegs while sitting was exhibited primarily by dominant personswhile introverts were moving most frequently their legs. Thus,Gifford (1991) showed that personality affects the frequency ofnon-verbal behaviors along the two circumplex dimensions. Hethereby confirmed that the ordering of personality in theaffiliation-power-plane is not a mere perceptual effect in thesense of an implicit personality theory but it's effects onnonverbal communication can be objectively observed in space andtime.

In another study by Montepare and Dobish (2003) 32 untrainedsubjects were photographed in a neutral emotional state and inexpressing happy, surprised, angry, sad, and fearful feelingsafter thinking about respective emotion evoking episodes. Thepictures were rated in one condition on their emotional qualityand in another condition on dominance and affiliation with itemsfrom an abbreviated set of circumplex items. Taking the picturesas units of analysis, most expressions of feelings showed theexpected correlations with the respective personality traits,e.g. happy with dominance and affiliation, angry with dominancebut negatively with affiliation, or sad negatively with dominanceand non-significantly with affiliation. That means, that non-


verbal expressions cannot not only be used as information aboutthe feeling state of others but also partly as personality traitinformation, using the two fundamental socio-emotional dimensionsof power and affiliation. Probably, the intensity of non-verbalexpression, the third socio-emotional dimension, willadditionally be used as information about the respectivepersonality trait of affect intensity in live events but researchon that seems to be lacking.

Verbal communication and interpersonal behaviorThe connection between verbal communication and

interpersonal behavior is also hard to disentangle becauseinterpersonal behavior is to a large part verbal communicationbehavior. But of course, verbal behavior often just announcessymbolically upcoming behavior which manipulates the real world,not only symbols. The studies of Bales et al. (1979) areinstructive in this respect because their SYMLOG model depictsinteractive and group behavior as well as communicative content(images) in the same dimensions of affiliation (positive –negative), power (upward – downward), and a mixed taskorientation - emotion intensity (forward – backward) dimension.That means, that there is a reliable relationship between verbalcommunication and related behavior. On the other hand,communication is often used to hide one’s intentions or todeceive others about one’s own behavior. In order to detect suchpossible deceptions, people go back to nonverbal cues which aremore reliable with regard to intentions and upcoming behavior(Mehrabian, 1972, ch. 6). Thus, verbal communication isespecially useful in announcing later behavior if it is face-to-face communication where nonverbal cues can be checked (e.g. Kerr& Kaufmann-Gilliland, 1994; Kerr et al., 1997). In the same vein,Sally (1995) found that face-to-face communication has thestrongest positive effect on cooperation rates among 21independent variables in his meta-analysis of dilemma games.Because the socio-emotional dimensionality of verbalcommunication was not ascertained in these studies, the proveneffects of communication may result from the denotative insteadof the connotative meaning; more research is needed about thesocio-emotional relations between verbal communication andinterpersonal behavior (e. g. on the basis of affect control


theory, see Schröder & Scholl, subm.).

Verbal communication and personality For causal connections beween verbal communication and

personality there seems to be no proper study, probably becausepersonality studies are largely verbal studies. I could not finda study on the relationship between the semantic differential andthe interpersonal circumplex complemented by an affectivitydimension. Even better would be a study on TAT-like stories ratedby the authors themselves on the semantic differential,regressing the ratings on the three personality dimensionsmeasured at another time..

Interpersonal behavior and personalityA strong connection between interpersonal behavior and

interpersonal personality traits is empirically demonstrated andtheoretically explained by Buss and Craik’s frequency concept(1980). Using the dimension dominance, they demonstrated theclose connection between prototypical dominant behaviors and thepersonality trait dominance. People apparently judge the per-sonality of other persons by registering how often and howintensely certain behaviors occur and infer their personalityfrom that observation: The perception of behavior translates intoperceived personality dimensions, eventually shortenend up by thewell known correspondence bias (e.g. Gawronski, 2004).Implicitly, this connection lies at the heart of many measures ofpersonality which ask about the frequency of certain behaviorsand derive personality dimensions from bundles of correlated be-haviors. Causality probably flows back and forth: Personalitymoist probably has genetic roots and thus influencesinterpersonal behavior; on the other side, the frequency ofspecific behaviors triggered by external influences like forinstance role expectations influences personality.

Summing up Empirical connections could be found between almost all

pairs of the five areas with corresponding three-dimensionality,i.e. between felt emotions, non-verbal and verbal communication,behavior, and personality. More research is needed in thisrespect because some correspondencies are not well confirmed, and


the causality (from one side, mutual, or from a common thirdvariable) is often not settled. Yet, the main message for ourpurpose is quite clear: The three-dimensional parallels betweenthese five areas of human expression are not superficial normethodological artifacts nor given by chance. They have to betaken seriously into account and they ask for a deeperinterpretation and explanation.

3. The three socio-emotional dimensions and deductive theoryWhereas the three-dimensional structure of feelings, non-

verbal and verbal communication, behavior, and personality seemsto be well established, the rationale, the interpretation and theexact location have to be further discussed. In all five researchareas, the dimensionality was inductively generated with theconsequence that the exact conceptualization remains dependent onthe measurement instruments and the samples employed. Therefore,sometimes only two dimensions have been found like in the moodcircumplex, but sometimes four or more as reported by Mehrabian(1972). Sometimes, the dimensions are independent as in agencyand communion (e.g. Wiggins et al., 1988) or correlated as incompetence and warmth (e.g. Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, &Kashima, 2005). And sometimes they are equivalent but differ inlocation as is the case with the circumplex vis-à-vis the big-5dimensions extraversion and agreeableness. Of course, the broaderview over these five areas taken here helps to settle thesequestions. First, the research on the semantic space has shownthat the evaluation dimension is the primary dimension whichalways comes as the first factor with the largest percentage ofexplained variance (Osgood et al., 1975); the same has been foundin other research areas (e. g. Abele & Wojciszke, 2007) and itseems undisputed. Whether the second dimension of potency /dominance – submission / power should be independent from theevaluation dimension as in the semantic differential and in thecircumplex or correlated as with competence and warmth is moredifficult to decide, because different samples yield differingresults. The semantic differential (SD) research speaks ingeneral for independence but often correlated factors have beenfound if the SD is applied to special content areas (Osgood etal., 1975). The circumplex research speaks perhaps moreforcefully for independence because it is based on the totality


of interpersonal adjectives (Wiggins, 1979) and the whole 360o

circle is filled with adjectives such that independence is builtinto the system; yet, exactly this circumplex structure gives noempirical argument for extracting any axis or dimension. But, ifevaluation is taken as primary dimension and if independence ofthese two dimensions is assumed then potency and its equivalentsin the other areas should be taken as the independent secondbasic dimension. The independence of activity from the first twois often found in semantic research (Osgood et al., 1975) and issupported by the research on feelings (Traxel & Heide, 1961) andpartly on affect intensity (Larsen et al., 1986). Yet, theresearch on feelings shows that the power and the activationdimension seem not to be independent, they partly seem tosubstitute each other (e.g. Shaver et al., 1987). Even ifindependence of the three dimensions is probable, someuncertainty remains from all inductive research. But here,deductive theory can help.

The logic of interdependenceWith game theory, Von Neumann, & Morgenstern, (1944)

developed a basic rationale for action strategies in anyinterpersonal or intergroup relationship. Game theory and itsderivations in several exchange theories spell out theconsequences of any dependency for the respective interests ofthe concerned individuals. Kelley and coworkers have taken thegame theoretic foundations as bilateral behaviorism and developedinterdependence theory which is more differentiated and enlargedwith psychological insights (Kelley, 1979; Kelley et al., 2003;Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). The interesting point in our discussionis that in any game theoretic or interdependence matrix the samethree dimensions are involved through the pure outcome (cost-benefit or reward-punishment) logic of two or more interdependentactors (see Kelley, 1979, pp. 34-36; Kelley et al., 2003, pp.105-108). The most basic question is whether the outcomes arecorrespondent or conflicting. Correspondent outcomes inducesympathy, friendly relations, spontaneous affiliation and securecooperation: What is good for one is also good for the other.This of course fosters evaluations as good, pleasant, agreeable,cooperative, and friendly, which are the markers of the SDevaluation dimension. The less correspondent the outcomes are,


the more conflict will ensue or the relationship is dissolved, ifpossible.

A second and logically unrelated dimension pertains to thesymmetry or asymmetry of the outcomes: Differences in dependence,i.e. asymmetric matrices and alternatives, give rise todifferences in power; if somebody is less affected by thedecisions of the other than vice-versa, he or she is lessdependent and thus more powerful (Emerson, 1962). This may beused to the disadvantage of the less powerful or not (Molm,1990), but it is always possible and thus changes therelationship from equal into dominant and inferior actors. The SDcharacterizes these relations with the potency markers of strong– weak, superior – inferior, or experienced – inexperienced.

The third and again logically unrelated dimension is givenby the degree of (inter)dependence, i.e. the differences betweenthe own outcomes of the available alternatives for the actors:The larger the difference the more serious it is for an inter-actant what is at stake in the relationship, the more intensewill be his or her feelings, and the more activation and activitycan be expected. In SD terms, an interactant will become the moreexcitable versus calm in his or her feelings, fast versus slow incommunication and in decisions, and finally active versus passivein behavior, the more serious the outcome differences are.

The fact that these three dimensions are logically unrelateddoes not imply that all sections of the outcome space are equallyfilled with empirical examples (Kelley et al., 2003). Situationsinvolving very low interdependence do not only mean that thechoice of the other is rather unimportant and arises almost nospecial feelings; it also means that the distinction between goodand bad outcomes as well as the extent of asymmetric dependenceis diminishing. This fact corresponds to the emotion models ofSchlosberg (1954) and Plutchik (1980, 1991) who state that insituations of low emotional intensity the distinctions in theother two dimensions disappear (figurally the spike of the conestructure).

Kelley (1979) and Kelley et al. (1983) explore extensively afourth distinction, that between fate (partner) and behavior(joint) control. Yet, this is in practice only the differencebetween directly rewarding or punishing the other (fate control)


without a direct negotiation potential and promising a reward orthreatening to punish if the other does not choose the favoredalternative (behavior control) which fosters negotiation. Thisdistinction has no equivalent in the empirical data of Wish andKaplan (1977), as Kelley notices, and not in the other areasdiscussed here; it can be concluded that this distinction has notthe same basic importance as the three others.

Thus it confirms the above cited argumentation that"affiliation" as outcome correspondence and "dominance" asasymmetric dependence are the principal modes of coordinationbetween individuals. Both coordination modes may be combined indifferent mixtures and they may additionally vary in theirimportance, i.e. in the degree of dependence which leads to moreor less emotional and behavioral activation. And it confirms thelocation of the basic interpersonal dimensions as coinciding withthe semantic differential because its polar dimensions offer thebest description of the interdependence (or game theoretic)dimensions.

The logic of affect control theory and symbolic interactionOne further question remains: Are these three dimensions

sufficient for mapping the contents of interpersonal feelings,communication, and the perception of interpersonal behavior andpersonality? Or are four necessary as argued by Kelley andcolleagues (2003)? Or even five as in the relationshipdimensions found by Wish and Kaplan (1977)? Of course, theadditional dimensions of formality and task orientation representonly in a secondary sense interpersonal qualities. Although theresults in the five reviewed areas speak for these threedimensions as necessary and sufficient, the number of dimensionsis hard to settle on the basis of inductive research, because inall these research areas sometimes more than three dimensionshave been extracted. Again, deductive theory helps, in this caseaffect control theory (ACT)8 developed by David Heise andcolleagues (e.g. Heise, 1979, 1986. 2002, 2007; MacKinnon, 1994;Smith-Lovin & Heise, 1988). ACT is a kind of consistency theorybased on the three-dimensional affective meaning of language, i.e. on the SD, that does not only consider the evaluationdimension of the semantic differential as implicitly Heider’s(1946) balance theory and explicitly Osgood’s and Tannenbaum’s


(1955) congruity theory. It also includes the two other emotionaldimensions that are represented in language, i.e. the potency andthe activity dimension. And it is not only applicable toevaluations of objects (which can be persons), but to all partsof an event description, i.e. to actors, behaviors, objects,settings, and emotions.

In the tradition of nomothetic symbolic interactionism (e.g.Stryker & Statham, 1985), ACT postulates that humans live in asocially constructed world; any thing in this world can be anobject of human perception, reflection and action (this is thecommon core with social cognition). Its meaning, drawn from itscharacteristics and likely consequences, is emotionally reflectedin a culturally agreed understanding of the word(s) depictingthat object within the connotative semantic space which is called“fundamental sentiment” (or attitude) towards that object.Individuals learn most about their world by culture-boundcommunication and socialization, but own experiences as well asnegotiations about the meaning of an object with significantothers may modify these cultural meanings. So, it is importantfor each individual to identify the meaning of the relevantpersons, roles, groups, events, etc., and – most important – hisor her own role-identity (or role specific “working self”, cf.Markus & Wurf, 1987): what kind of “object” each is, i.e. whichfundamental sentiments apply to these socially construed objects.

Now, specific events may result in experiences which do notfit the socially agreed fundamental sentiment: This experienceinduces other, deviating feelings, it is an inconsistency or“emotional deflection” between the general meaning of an objectand the specific experience with that object. ACT predicts thatpeople attempt to decrease inconsistencies by either takingcertain actions that correct the specific experience to restorefundamental sentiments, or the object of deviating experience hasto be differently positioned in the semantic space through verbal

8 Since affect control theory has been largely ignored bypsychologists (I could not find any psychological citation) itis difficult to explain here with a few sentences. So, I onlycan give a first impression of that theory. Much more can befound on the ACT-website:<http://www.indiana.edu/~socpsy/ACT/> (retrieved 09-30-07)


modifiers or completely new labels in such a way that now thefundamental sentiments and the situational experience correspondagain. The fundamental idea of ACT is that people not only lookfor cognitive consistency but are especially in need for emotionalconsistency in order to orient themselves securely in their world,i.e. to know in advance of any own trials and errors what isdesirable and what should be avoided, what is a strong own stanceand where one is likely to lose vis-à-vis a stronger powerposition, and how intense own and other actions are to beexpected.

The operational basis of this theory is an extensivecultural encyclopedia where each word is positioned in the three-dimensional semantic space for a certain population (e.g. collegestudents), as well as a system of mathematical equations whichrelate subjects, emotions, actions, objects, and settings of anevent to each other. Based on the regression of describedprototypical events onto the semantic meaning of its containedconcepts, ACT uses the resulting equations and can predict on theone hand the kind and extent of inconsistency that may originatefrom a specific experience, and on the other hand which specificreactions are most probable due to their ability to decreaseefficiently that inconsistency. ACT has been convincingly appliedin different cultures; a new German version was established andtested experimentally by Schröder (in prep.; see also Schröder &Scholl, subm.). In my opinion, ACT is one of the mostencompassing and at the same time precise theories, translatingthe more qualitative phenomenological approaches of symbolicinteractionism into an exact quantitative system.

What is especially important for the discussion here, affectcontrol theory demonstrates that the three socio-emotionaldimensions create an interpretative space for the socio-emotionalconstruction and understanding of any event and worldview, i. e.for any social cognition object. And from ACT it can be learnedthat the three socio-emotional dimensions are not only necessaryin order to understand social events but that they are alsosufficient in creating a kind of closed socio-emotional world(whereas the cognitive world is much more diverse). Therelatively precise consistency predictions of ACT would not bepossible, if the emotional experience, construction, and


modification of our phenomenological world would be open to otherequally important socio-emotional dimensions.

The understanding of a "closed socio-emotional world"may be deepened by a comparison with space perception:We can mentally construct 4-, 5- and higher-dimensionalspaces, but our imagination goes not beyond the threedimensions of width, depth, and height. The threedimensions of space are not the “world as it is”, as weknow at least from Einstein’s relativity theory, but“the world as we are bound to perceive it”. This kind ofperception seems to be a useful phylogenetic adaptationto our evolutionary niche, which is ontogenetically “a-priori” (Kant), given before any individual experience(Riedl, 1982). The same seems to hold for the socio-emotional dimensions of affiliation, power, andactivation; socio-emotionally laden imagination seemsalways to proceed within these three dimensions, notbeyond. Seen from an evolutionary perspective, this closedness of a

three-dimensional socio-emotional world has great value forindividual learning and orientation as well as for socialcoordination because it gives a secure basis for them. Theecological niche of humans is much more complex than that of anyother species, precisely because it is mainly populated by otherhuman beings with their complex cognitive and emotionalprocesses. Fortunately, or better necessarily, evolutionaryforces have secured a sufficient amount of mutual understandingby establishing the feeling-expression-reception-understandingconnection related to the basic problems of behavior coordinationwithin this three-dimensional world of socio-emotional meaning.In a sense, the richness of our partly human-made ecologicalniche would overtax our capabilities of understanding and actingif there were not the securing guide-lines of the three socio-emotional dimensions and their co-evolution with interaction andcommunication. These guide-lines are apparently shaped byevolution to guide the social construction of symbols and actionstowards appropriate social coordination. (But, of course, thisorientation and understandig is given only within the specificculture in which one has been socialized, and that is one of the


big problems in our globalized world.)

Summing upThe dimensional bases of interdependence theory and affect

control theory fit perfectly with the three-dimensional couplingsof feelings, non-verbal and verbal communication, behavior, andpersonality, and thus corroborate their importance for everydaylife as well as for proper theorizing. Moreover, they give aprecise theoretical orientation about what these dimensions areand suggest, that these three dimensions are necessary andsufficient for any content question in social cognition,communication, and interaction.

4. Interpretation of these dimensional parallelities andempirical relationsIt was shown that the dimensions of interpersonal behavior

and personality, of verbal and non-verbal communication, and offelt emotions parallel each other in their content, and they areempirically connected and most probably causally related,directly or indirectly. Moreover, by relating these results tointerdependence theory and affect control theory it was arguedthat these three dimensions should be localized like the semanticdifferential dimensions, and that they are necessary andsufficient for the socio-emotional interpersonal realm. But then,there remains still a lot to speculate about how these parallelscame about and what they do imply. One possible interpretationcould be as follows: The emotions can be depicted by theirsimilarities and differences in a three-dimensional system. Ashuman emotions are also conveyed to other persons through non-verbal communication, it seems obvious that the same threedimensions can be found in non-verbal communication. Because itis important for verbal expressions to sense the emotionaldirection or meaning of a message, these three emotionaldimensions have also been imprinted into all languages. Sincethese dimensions of non-verbal and verbal communication influenceour information processing, the perception of interpersonalbehavior is influenced by these dimensions and in turn influencesthe inferences about personality characteristics.

This interpretation has a clear causal chain and seems


plausible at first sight; Mehrabian (1980) as well as Plutchik(1980, 1991) seem to adhere to such an interpretation, although afull exposition for all these five areas could not be found. Yet,this interpretation bears some problems. First, it is notexplained why precisely these three dimensions should describehuman emotionality. The predominant theoretical and empiricalapproaches to emotional processes are not built around thesethree dimensions and they give no hint why especially these threedimensions should show up (see Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003, forappraisal approaches, and Keltner & Ekman, 2000, or Panksepp,2000, for discrete emotion approaches; the new constructivistdimensional approach of Barrett, 2006, misses the dominance-submission dimension like other mood research, see above).Secondly, there are good reasons to believe that not all humanemotions are embedded in this system (Bischof, 1988; Cosmides &Tooby, 2000; Panksepp, 2000). Humans certainly have very specificfeelings of hunger, thirst, jealousy, and envy, that have nospecial nonverbal signals to others. From an evolutionary pointof view, feelings of hunger and thirst serve an individualfunction to redirect attention to individual needs, not aninterpersonal function. And felt emotions like jealousy and envyshould not readily be recognized, because the accompanyingtendency to change the situation to one's own advantage is betterkept secret for their success (Fridlund, 1997). These reflectionsask for another interpretation.

Coordination problems of humans as social animalsA model developed by Bischof (1989) is helpful for a better

understanding of the function of emotions. According to hisphylogenetic and ethological approach, the relatively rigid in-stincts9 of animals with a less complex nervous system weresuccessively replaced with more flexible emotions during thephylogenesis to humans. They respond much more flexibly thaninstincts to environmental opportunities and dangers as well asto – eventually conflicting – needs of the organism (see alsoEllsworth & Scherer, 2003). This flexibility enables a moreextensive search for suitable solutions of the daily problems,9 The term "instinct" is used by Bischof (1989) in theethological sense of an innate and fixed stimulus-responsecontingency.


for which animals with a more complex nervous system, especiallyhumans, have got a highly developed cognitive capacity (see alsoGross, 1998); emotionality and cognitivity culminate in humans.Additionally, for humans and other social animals, emotions servenot only a more flexible management of individual needs, but theyhelp also to coordinate the actions of adjacent individuals.According to that view, socially living mammals and theirpredecessors developed phylogenetically the capacity to expresstheir emotions non-verbally such that they can be perceived bytheir companions. Non-verbal expressions of emotions andattitudes toward any object evoke similar and complementaryfeelings in others which is often beneficial for socialrelationships (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994; Keltner &Kring, 1998). Thus, individuals can better coordinate their act-ions when each sees how the others feel or what is apparently ontheir agenda (see also Keltner & Kring, 1998). The idea of animprovement of reciprocal coordination through the expression ofemotions offers a good phylogenetic explanation for the empiricalfinding of the forward and backward coupling between innerfeelings and outer emotional signals in facial and vocalexpression. By that fact a reciprocal recognition is secured thatfacilitates social actions.

For biologists (e.g. Trivers, 1971; Bischof, 1989), forgroups researchers (e.g. Forsyth, 1998) as well as forevolutionary psychologists (e.g. Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Gaulin &McBurney, 2004) it is clear that the evolution of sociality amonganimals was possible, because combined actions and an appropriatedivision of labor among non-kin individuals enable groups tomanage larger and more complicated problems than individuals orfamilies ever can afford. Yet, combined actions as well as thedivision of labor have to be properly coordinated, which is analmost unsolvable task if individuals primarily follow theirself-oriented survival imperatives. To overcome this danger ofselfish digression there are two general possibilities to reachcoordinated actions according to Bischof (1989), named “syn-chronization” and “dominance”, and non-verbal behaviors play aprime role for both:

Coordination through synchronization “Synchronization” or voluntary cooperation is the mutual


arrangement of actions on the basis of reciprocal friendlinessand sympathy which is communicated by several non-verbal means(see above). If a well known individual approaches another with asincere ("Duchenne") smile on his or her face, bending forwardfor news exchange, and tuning in to his or her situationalfeelings, then this individual is most likely a trustworthypartner for deliberate cooperation. If the feelings of anotherindividual are less friendly, perhaps because of anger resultingfrom previous negative interactions or of disgust because thepartner endorses a disliked worldview, then this person is notlikely to cooperate or at least s/he don’t want to fulfill thetask at hand in the best possible way. Such coordination problemsdo not remain completely hidden to the partners as the negativeattitudes are conveyed by facial, vocal, and bodily expressions,and they can be identified even if the other tries to mask thenegative feelings, eventually before negative results areirreversible. Then, mutual sympathy shrinks and cooperation willbe stopped soon, if external restrictions allow it. Or, actionsare taken to restore positive feelings (sympathy) toward eachother, and coordinate action can run smoothly again.

Action coordination through synchronization covers theaffiliation sectors of the circumplex of interpersonal behavioraround loving (see figure 1) and is typical or at least expectedfor close relationship (Wish & Kaplan, 1977). Sometimes thesynchronization situation is of such a nature that the potentialparticipants are not equally equipped with capabilities orpossessions. Some might have only few or no resources available,while others have enough to solve the situational demand. In sucha case the stronger, better equipped, more powerful person canoffer support, advice, or encouragement, while the weaker may bewilling to compromise, trust, and be grateful to the otherstaying in the affiliation sectors of the circumplex (see fig.1). In other situations, the resources might be distributed theother way round, and a reciprocal action can unfold, securingreciprocity and principal equality. With this principle ofreciprocity (Gouldner, 1960; Trivers, 1971), a friendly andaccepting synchronization for actions is possible and beneficialfor all involved even if there are sometimes more or less unequalresources and conditions; outcome correspondence is eitherexpected in the long run or established by a cooperative


transformation of the given into the effective matrix (Kelley,1979). Such behavioral sequences are also correctly predictedfrom interpersonal theory (Becker-Beck, 1997; Kiesler, 1983;Strong et al., 1988).

Coordination through dominanceHowever, the less equal the partners and their resources

are, the more they can turn to a second coordination pattern,which Bischof (1989) calls “dominance” (cf. figures 1 and 3 forthe following), which can be formalized in an asymmetricinterdependence matrix. Coordination through dominance basicallymeans that the stronger, better equipped, dominating person (orgroup) gets its way, makes decisions, leads a group, and inducesor pushes the others to follow, what they often do, especially inuncertain and dangerous situations; or he or she forces theothers if they don’t want to follow. In most groups, a clearhierarchy evolves, often within minutes, where the higher rankingindividuals determine the direction while the other, lowerranking individuals follow and complement the actions of theleading individuals (Fisek & Ofshe, 1970; Savin-Williams, 1976;Savin-Williams, Small, & Zeldin, 1981). This might favor the fateof each individual in the group: (1) Joint action enables betteraccomplishments and the "cake" to be distributed becomes bigger.(2) The more powerful individuals usually get or take more of the"cake" and thus satisfy their own interests. (3) But even for theless powerful ones it might be better to be directed than to copealone - as relative weak or unexperienced individuals - withoverwhelming problems (e. g. danger from animal or human enemies,difficulties to secure food, getting the appropriate materialsfor building shelter, etc.). Thus, dominance and submission canafford a second basis for coordinate action as an evolutionarystable strategy, supplementing synchronization based on sympathyand the promse of corresponding outcomes.

Of course, the higher ranking individuals sometimes workonly for their own interests, especially for a furtherenlargement of their own power, which can lead to arrogance,discrimination and rejection of the lower ranking people (e.g.Kipnis, 1976; Mitchell et al., 1998). This may still begrudgingly accepted by others because of their weaker positionbut passive resistance will rise and coordination gets endanger-


ed. Or some lower ranking individuals may feel strong enoughtogether with companions to resist openly and to aspire morepower for themselves. This aspiration can turn into violentbehavior and fights against the leading person(s); at that pointcoordinated action breaks down since neither synchronization nordominance are accepted; in terms of figure 1, they move to theupper left quarter. If dominant hostility develops by both sidesand fights come up about the established rank order, these fightsare usually settled soon and coordinate action can taken upagain. But if rank order fights endure this will be detrimentalto all involved; therefore, in many instances, especially in hardtimes, most people are ready to follow any powerful figure inorder to stop the even more harmful fights about an appropriateorder.

The socio-emotional coordination system The two principle ways towards coordinated action, which

Bischof (1989) calls “synchronization” and “dominance”, do notonly exist in their pure form but also in several differentmixtures as the behavioral circumplex shows (Fig. 1). In eachcase it is useful to perceive the feelings, attitudes, andintentions of the other party, especially for action preparation.The rich non-verbal communication devices, i.e. the facial,vocal, and bodily expressions, allow inferences about how coor-dination will work. Love, acceptance and curiosity indicatesuccessful affiliation, while resentment and disgust indicate theopposite. The functioning of the established rank order ascoordination advice is signalled through relaxed expressions ofthe more powerful and tense expressions of the less powerful.Angry expressions, however, signal problems concerning this kindof leader-follower cooperation: Angry vis-à-vis angry expressionssignal a likely fight for superior rank position, which comesalong with a higher than chance probability (refutinginterpersonal theory, see Becker-Beck, 1997; Strong et al.,1988); as a consequence, no coordinated action is possible untilthe rank order is established again or anew. Angry vis-à-visfearful expressions, on the other side, which also comes alongwith a higher than chance probability (in line with interpersonaltheory, see Becker-Beck, 1997), signal a likely reestablishmentof rank order because the more powerful shows his or her


readiness to fight whereas the weaker shows his or her readinessto accept the claim of the more powerful.

The third emotional dimension, activation or arousal, comesinto play in order to check the degree of emotional activation asa signal for the readiness to (re)act, i.e. how soon and inten-sive an act will be performed, independent of whethersynchronization or domination or any mixture of both is signallednon-verbally. That is, the third socio-emotional dimensionfulfills a somewhat different role: It is not the kind ofcoordination means which is expressed but its intensity andurgency.

Taken together, the sociality of humans and theirevolutionary ancestors has evolved phylogenetically because so-cial actions apparently have some important advantages ascompared to solely individual actions (Keltner & Haidt, 2001). Inorder to manage such social actions, appropriate devices musthave co-evolved. Non-verbal signals which communicate affiliation(synchronization), power (dominance), and activation (intensity,urgency) are probably such phylogenetically developed, innatedevices. The same must hold for the connection between the innerfeelings of a sender and their non-verbal expression as well asthe relatively correct deciphering of these expressions andeventual empathy by the receiver, because only under thiscondition the signals can fulfill their social function properly.Of course, a tight coupling is only necessary in urgentsituations. In other situations, more cognitively laden attitudesand communications are coloured by non-verbal expressions, whichdo not necessarily reflect the momentary feelings of the sender,but underscore and illustrate the present thoughts, reported pastevents, and appeals for future coordinate actions (see thedistinction of differing levels of the cognition-emotioninterface by Leventhal & Scherer, 1987).

These reflections on the phylogenesis of the non-verbalcommunication of emotions lead to somewhat different conclusionsabout the causal / phylogenetical chain of the observed three-dimensional similarities: Emotions may by their very nature notbe bound into a three-dimensional system, and most of the re-search results point into this direction (e.g. Cacioppo et al.,2000; Panksepp, 2000; but see Barrett, 2006). Rather, this is


only the case for those felt and expressed emotional aspects andcomponents which have useful implications for social coordination:Interactive action tendencies have to be signalled socially toindicate the principal coordination possibilities ofsynchronization (affiliation) and dominance (power) or theirmixtures, completed by a third intensity or activation dimension.This is accomplished through non-verbal signals which communicatethe experienced, imagined, or intended feelings of an individualsender to others; facial feedback makes the nonverbal messagesomewhat controllable for the sender. Receivers on the other sideare able to mimic, feel, and understand these non-verbalcommunicative expressions, probably by “emotional contagion”(Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994), facilitated by mirror-neurons (Jabbi et al., 2007; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004).

The importance of such a feeling-expression-reception-understanding connection may be underscored by callingthe attention to the fact that each individual brain hasto construct an idiosyncratic version of comprehendingits world through specific patterns of neuronal firingsand networking. Thus, any relatively correct perspectivetaking or theory of mind of significant others would berare cases of lucky chance without such aphylogenetically evolved system which secures a certainamount of mutual understanding sufficient for humancoordination. This idea may be contrasted to thephilosophy of radical constructivism (e.g. Glasersfeld,1991): It postulates that the mind is operationallyclosed, i.e., semantically impenetrable, and it cannotknow any external semantics; meaning cannot betransmitted as an entity. It is not in the words,gestures, symbols with which we express ourselves.Language therefore, must be seen as a behavioral systemwhich triggers orienting actions within the cognitivedomain of the interlocutor. Thus language is an ongoingprocess of interpretation and mutual adaptation. "Tofind a fit simply means not to notice any discrepancies"(Glasersfeld, 1991, p. 25). Yet, how could such a mutualadaptation really function? Without such a feeling-expression-reception-understanding connection as


sketched above, the ‘process of interpretation andmutual adaptation’ would break down by experiencing amyriad of unsuccessful attempts at understanding if onetakes the idea of a semantically impenetrable mindseriously.The feeling-expression-reception-understanding connection

should have co-evolved with the most important social dimensionsof behavior because these are the reference points involved inthe coordination problems of interdependent actors. And if non-verbal behavior reflects the socially relevant aspects andcomponents of emotions, and if this is seen as an evolutionaryprocess starting already in our phylogenetical ancestors, then itseems clear that the evolution of language or verbalcommunication was built upon these already existing non-verbaldevices. Thus, it keeps the fundamental three-dimensionalorientation system of non-verbal communication intact by not onlydenoting objects through arbitrary words, but by also conferringan appropriate emotional meaning to them: The attached meaningsignifies their likability, i.e. whether something is worthwhileto approach or better to avoid, their power, i.e. whether oneshould be cautious or carefree, and its intensity and urgency,i.e. whether an upcoming action is or will be intensive and howmuch time is left for extended reflection and preparation. Sincefeelings have the function of evaluation, the verbal communica-tion system should be able to reflect the evaluations of theserelations in their connotative meaning. The evolution of languagebeyond non-verbal communication has the enormous advantage thatsituations, events and actions can be projected into the futureand can be abstracted into classes of situations, events, andactions, but still retain the basic nonverbal evaluations ofimmediate interaction problems and opportunities. Finally, socialcoordination should be also central for personality differencesin the interpersonal domain of the circumplex (or theextraversion x agreeableness plane), added by affect intensity(or emotional lability) because here the enduring probabilitiesof coordination problems and opportunities become manifest.

The phylogenetic selection of this feeling-expression-reception-understanding connection for social coordination insocial animals and especially humans can hence be described as


the innate socio-emotional basis of human cognition,communication, and interaction: It is socio-emotional, as it onlyconcerns felt emotions relevant for social coordination, and itis likely to be innate, i. e. it is universally given to thewhole human species. In terms of evolutionary psychology (e.g.Gaulin & McBurney, 2004), it is assumed that this three-dimensionality is genetically fixed, and not facultativelydependent on environmental variations. The universality of non-verbal facial expression, of the three dimensions of meaning indifferent languages, and the hereditary parts of personalitydimensions confirm such a phylogenetic interpretation.

Excursus: Controversies in emotion researchThere are many controversies in emotion research which makes

it difficult to create an integrative understanding of thesethree socio-emotional dimensions. On the one hand, the survivalvalue of signalling non-verbally those feelings on these threedimensions, which are relevant for social coordination, seems tobe quite plausible10. On the other hand, the neuropsychologicalmechanisms and the processual interplay between cognition andemotion may function differently from this three-dimensionalsystem. The dimensional view of affiliation, power, andactivation does not preclude a discrete emotions point of view(e. g. Keltner & Ekman, 2000). And it does not preclude thatthere may be more specific genetically evolved psychologicalmechanisms like those for the seven survival problems, functionalsystems, and primordial emotions, elaborated by Keltner and Haidt(2001). But for communication and coordination purposes, thesethree dimensions seem to integrate the expression of thedifferent specific systems which may have evolved for theadaptive problems of social coordination.10 This does not preclude the possibility of deceit; but deceitcan evolve only when signals have some reliability because onlythen deceit can be successful and only down to some equilibriumpoint beyond that deceit would make no sense because nobodywould be deceived from totally unreliable signals (Frank,1988). Against deceit there was apparently a further evolutionof more secure non-verbal devices like the Duchenne smile(Frank, Ekman, & Friesen, 1993), and laughter (Owren &Bachorowski, 2001).


This argument could also reconcile the seeminglyunbridgeable differences between basic emotions (e.g. Keltner &Ekman, 2000) and emotion dimensions (e.g. Russell, 2003)theorists. While neurophysiological evidence (Panksepp, 2000;Hamm et al., 2003) and evolutionary considerations (Cosmides &Tooby, 2000; Keltner & Haidt, 2001) speak more for a basicemotion approach complemented by emotion blends, the humanexperience of dimensionally felt emotions is also undeniable (seeabove). The evolution of a social communication system throughnon-verbal signals must not fully cover the physiological,neural, and cognitive processes which make up emotions, but onlythose emotional aspects which are useful for social coordination.And these emotional signals should be simple, fine-tunable, andshould convey as clear as possible the basic coordination messageof synchronization and dominance, as well as their intensity;such a requirement could probably better be satisfied by directlysignalling the critical aspects as dimensions than by 6-8 basicemotions and their manifold blends.

Summing up The opportunities and necessities of social coordination

through affiliation, power, and their activation may be the bestexplanation for the three-dimensional similarities between non-verbal communication and feelings, verbal communication,behavior, and personality. Their mutual fit should have anenormous survival value for humans as self-coordinating socialanimals.

5. Research derivationsFrom the developed perspective, several suggestions for

future research can be derived, only some of them can be shortlymentioned here in order to suggest the broader relevance of thesereflections about the three socio-emotional dimensions of humancognition, communication, and interaction. Each of the followingparagraphs could be expanded to a longer article and a multi-faceted research agenda.

Completing the research on the three socio-emotionaldimensions


A first type of promising research would be to complete thepicture of the three dimensions within and between the fiveareas, looking for open and controversial questions which havebeen touched upon in the first parts of this article. Forinstance, do not only some facial and vocal nonverbal behaviorsbut also some bodily movements have a universal meaning? Iffacial, vocal, and bodily nonverbal behaviors are taken together,do they tell more about inner feelings to the outside observerthan facial expressions alone? Under which circumstances are non-verbal signals appropriate expressions of inner feelings ordetached forms of impression management? How do senders andreceivers distinguish between the self-disclosure and the appealaspect of nonverbal behavior? How does the feeling–expression–reception–understanding connection precisely function?Especially, do mirror neurons react on non-verbal behavior offocused persons as was assumed above? How close and stable is theassumed coupling of mirroring the other’s face, one’s own facialreaction, and one’s facial feedback to own feelings? Is affectintensity a non-redundant orthogonal complement to thepersonality circumplex? If it complements the personalitycircumplex, how are the three dimensions empirically related to(or rotated against) the respective Big 5 dimensions of extra-version, agreeableness, and neuroticism, as to be expected fromSaucier's (1992) results? Could an affectivity/intensity measureof behavior be constructed which complements the behavioralcircumplex and what would be the explanatory surplus of such ameasure? What are the precise causal relations between the fiveareas of three-dimensionality? What is the conceptual, empirical,and causal relation of these five areas to the basic motives ofaffiliation and power (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Flammer, 1990;McClelland, 1975, 1984)?

Dimensions in social cognition content modelsA second kind of promising research would be to scrutinize

the three socio-emotional dimensions in other areas of subjectivesocial perception and judgement. If the three socio-emotionaldimensions are as basic and universal as hypothesized then thisshould have consequences for the respective measurementapproaches in other areas, where the item pools have usually beendeveloped more inductively. For instance, the most prominent


leadership dimensions, originating from the Ohio leadershipstudies (Stogdill & Coons, 1957; Judge, Piccolo, & Ilies, 2004),are called "consideration" or "relationship orientation" and"initiating structure" or "task orientation". Several otherleadership conceptions have used these dimensions under the sameor other names (Bass, 1990). The first factor, consideration,seems to apply the basic socio-emotional dimension of affiliationto the superior – subordinate relationship, whereas the secondfactor, initiating structure, contains a mixture of task and ofpower related items. Of course, it might be difficult to separatethese dimensions because tasks are given to subordinates often onthe basis of supervisory power. But, it seems worthwhile toseparate them into a pure power and a pure task dimension byadding appropriate items. And it might be also worthwhile todevelop an affect intensity scale for leadership and to exploreits predictive potential.

Another case is the SYMLOG model by Bales et al. (1979)which was developed inductively for the description of groupprocesses. Its first two dimensions correspond to the socio-emotional qualities of affiliation (positive – negative) andpower (upward – downward) whereas the third dimension, “forward =task-oriented” and “backward = showing feeling and emotions”,does not seem to be a pure dimension. Showing one's emotions maybe part of the task, e. g. in self-help and therapy groups, sothis could not be an opposite pole to task motivation (Fassheber& Terjung, 1985). It would make more sense to conceptualize twoseparate dimensions: an activation dimension that describes thedegree of expressed affect intensity, and a different, non-socialdimension that describes the seriousness of task efforts.

A third case is the stereotype-content model of Fiske,Cuddy, Glick, and Xu (2002), updated in Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick(2007). Similar to this article, they assume universal dimensionsof social cognition, but only two, named “warmth” and“competence”. Again, there is a question of adequate location:Whereas warmth seems to depict about the same dimension asaffiliation, i.e. an evaluation of others as more or lesspositive, competence is not fully comparable, but a combinationof the power and, to a lesser degree, of the affiliationdimension (see also Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima,

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?db=PubMed&cmd=Search&itool=PubMed_Abstract&term=%22Ilies+R%22%5BAuthor%5D

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?db=PubMed&cmd=Search&itool=PubMed_Abstract&term=%22Piccolo+RF%22%5BAuthor%5D

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?db=PubMed&cmd=Search&itool=PubMed_Abstract&term=%22Judge+TA%22%5BAuthor%5D


2005); this is a similar location as extraversion on thecircumplex plane (McCrae, & Costa, 1989). Probably, a dimensionindependent of warmth / affiliation like power would explain morevariance in stereotype content. Stereotypes often instigatediscrimination which have to do much more with power than withcompetence. Additionally, competence is not primarily aninterpersonal construct as warmth / affiliation or power. Andfrom the perspective developed here, the question follows whetheractivation as the third basic dimension could also be useful inexplaining additional variance in the field of stereotypes. E.g.whereas ‘Welfare recipients’, ‘Turks’, and ‘Feminists’ arelocated in the same quadrant of low warmth and low competence,they probably differ in activation in that sequence from low tohigh.

Finally, the affective appreciation of the self is usuallydescribed as self-esteem, interpreted as self-liking (Rosenberg,1979; Smith & Mackie, 2000), i.e. only the evaluation/affiliationdimension is conceived. But it would be useful to add at least apower/control dimension of the self. Possible candidates are theconcepts of locus of control (Rotter, 1966) or self-efficacy(Bandura, 1977), and these are in fact reflected in the works ofFranks and Marolla (1976), Gecas and Schwalbe (1983), as well asTafarodi and Swann (1995) who use the term self-competence. Thus,self-esteem should be generally conceived on both socio-emotionaldimensions, as self-liking on the affiliation dimension and asself-control on the power dimension. Tafarodi and Milne (2002)have clarified the meaning of the self-competence measure withseveral studies, and they found it highly correlated with self-liking. Seen from the above developed perspective, it seems to beless interpersonal than a real power dimension, where the latterprobably would be – after ipsatization – independent of self-liking. Two further questions follow from this point of view:First, how similar or different is such a two-dimensional measureof self-esteem to a self-report on the interpersonal personalitycircumplex? Perhaps they are equivalent measures of the sameconstruct? Secondly, a third self-esteem measure of self-affectivity could be conceptualized and its predictivity couldthen be tested.

A quite different case are values which have been studied in


an impressive broad-scale series by Schwartz and colleagues (e.g. Schwartz, 1992). A largely corresponding two-dimensionalstructure of values was found in 40 countries which bears someresemblance to the affiliation and power dimensions. Here onecould draw a benevolence/tradition–hedonism axis, valuingaffiliative or own benefit, and a power–universalism axis,seeking dominance or equality. But since only positive values areincluded in the item pool the matches are especially bad with thehostility and submission regions of the circumplex. It would beinteresting to include negative values and then to factorize theitem pool again as well as to try to develop a separate valueintensity scale stretched from indifference to zeal, applicableto each value region.11

Theory development and integrationA third kind of needed research would be theory development

and integration leading to new empirical examinations: Forinstance, how do cooperation rates systematically differ betweenall combinations of affiliation (outcome correspondence), power(unilaterality of dependence), and activation (degree of depen-dence)? Does degree of dependence causally influencephysiological activation or arousal? Are alternative choicesbetter predictable from subjective interpretations of thealternatives and the partner's role identity, measured with thesemantic differential on the basis of affect control theory?Could the three basic socio-emotional dimensions of interaction,which are embedded in any exchange matrix, be used to integratemore of other social psychological research with interdependencetheory? For instance, could the dynamics of conflict be conceivedand explained as an interplay between structural interdependencefactors and symbolic interpretations of the conflict (Kelley,1979); the latter could be integratively tackled from theperspective of symbolic accounts (Scott & Lyman, 1968; Schönbach,11 Locke (2000) published interesting "circumplex scales of interpersonal values"; yet, these seem not to be values in the usual sense of value research, i. e. values claiming general validity, but scales for describing an interactive ideal self because they have the following format: "When I am with him/her/them, it is [how important] that [I act or appear or amtreated this way]."


1990), attributional explanations (Anderson, Krull, & Weiner,1996), and cognitive motivations (Kruglanski, 1989).

Other questions to be fruitfully tackled might be: How muchdoes the three-dimensional socio-emotional space ease theacquisition of language in children? Could the systematic use ofthese three universal dimensions be especially helpful incomparative cultural psychology? Can socio-emotional lexica asused in affect control theory help to improve automatic languagetranslation? How could affect control theory better be combinedwith psychological reasoning? For instance, it might beworthwhile to look whether the different consistency theories, atleast those dealing with sentiments or attitudes, could beintegrated into affect control theory and whether differencesbetween these theories (e. g. the balance theories of Heider andNewcomb) could thereby be solved. Considering self-discrepancytheory (Higgins, 1989) as a kind of consistency theory, it mightalso be possible to integrate it with affect control theory.

Attempts aiming at a general interaction theory The probably most important, but also most difficult kind of

research would be the derivation of theoretically meaningfulinteraction variables from these socio-emotional dimensions andthe establishment of a general interaction theory. This is not asimple and straightforward task, as a short review of someattempts to use these dimensions will show. Mehrabian forinstance, reviewing his research on non-verbal and verbalcommunication, was fascinated by the idea to have a three-dimensional framework as an integrative device for theorizing athand. He summarized his work (1980) under the title “Basicdimensions for a general psychological theory” with the subtitle“Implications for personality, social, environmental, anddevelopmental studies”. He reported many different studies whereclear correlations between these three socio-emotional dimensionsand other psychological constructs were found. Especially usefuland novel is the use of these three dimensions for a psy-chological description of experiencing one’s environment(Mehrabian & Russell, 1974). However, his use of these dimensionsfor the prediction of preferences and approach-avoidance behaviorwas less successful (Mehrabian, 1980, ch. 10). It seems likelythat a straightforward prediction of behavior (tendencies) from


feeling states, without including cognitive and otherdispositional factors, will be insufficient.

In a similar vein, Bales et al. (1979) developed the SMYLOG-model for the description of group and other interactionprocesses. In referring to several of the above mentionedparallels, he sees it as a descriptive framework which could bethe starting point for constructing a “new field theory” (Bales,1985). But a closer inspection shows that the system of Bales andcolleagues is not a theory; there are no hypotheses about causesand effects of certain behaviors, the system remains at thedescriptive level.

A last example is the “interpersonal theory”, built on thefirst two socio-emotional dimensions, measured by the circumplexapproach, which has found many applications in clinical psy-chology (e. g. Benjamin, 1996; Horowitz, 2004; Kiesler, 1983;Leary, 1957; Sullivan, 1953). Its basic idea is the assumptionthat any behavior, located in the interpersonal circumplex (seefig. 1), induces another specific circumplex reaction in theinteraction partner with a higher than chance probability. It isassumed that the circumplex can be divided into four sectorsusing the two coordinates of affiliation and power; behaviors inthe friendly-submissive quadrant should provoke friendly-dominantreactions and vice versa, while behaviors in the hostile-dominantquadrant should be answered by hostile-submissive behaviors andvice versa. However, these predictions could only be partlyconfirmed and even contradictory results were found (Becker-Beck,1997; Orford, 1986; Strong et al., 1988). Predictions are bettercorroborated on the positive affiliation side of theinterpersonal circumplex, but less well on the negative side12.The overview by Orford (1986) especially shows that situationalconditions, e.g. role-relationships, are important influencingfactors for deviating results, which renders the simple stimulus-

12 Sadler and Woody (2003) obtained results which are consistent with the complementarity predictions of Kiesler (1983) and they tried to refute this critique. But they tested only overall ratings instead of successive behavioral acts, andthey tested the claimed deviations from predictions on the hostility side of the circumplex only for traits and not for behaviors. So, the criticism seems to be still warranted.


response scheme of the interpersonal theory insufficient.Analyses with more refined statistical methods showed that thereis some overall confirmation of the assumed complementarity butthis effect is not very large (Gurtman, 2001). This implies thatthere is much unexplained variance, and especially that there ismuch room for the disconfirmation of special predictions likethose reported above. Another and probably more importantcritique is that, even for the mainly corroborated predictions,there is no appropriate explanation. The interpersonal theory isa set of propositions about statistical regularities but notreally an explanatory theory. Dryer and Horowitz (1997) andHorowitz et al. (2006) took a first step in introducing theadditional variables of interpersonal circumplex goals, relatingthem to satisfaction with interaction and task productivity.Greatest satisfaction resulted from complementarity of partner’sbehavior with one’s own goals, i.e. one is satisfied when one’sgoals are met. But on the other hand, noncomplementary partnersperformed significantly better than complementary partners, aninteresting result, but no explanation was offered or could bederived from interpersonal theory. Relating (non-)complementarityto the likelihood of conflict one could look at the effect ofconstructive conflict management on performance (e. g. Johnson,Johnson, & Tjosvold, 2000; Scholl, 1999, 2004) for explanations.

Another theory building strategy for a general interactiontheory

Reviewing these approaches, another strategy ofconceptualization and theory building is proposed here in takingthe three socio-emotional dimensions properly into account. Weconcur with the mentioned theoretical frameworks that the firsttwo or all three socio-emotional dimensions should be ideallysuited to derive fundamental variables for a general theory ofinteraction, just because they have been developed phy-logenetically, are built into our human functioning, and can befound universally in all cultures. A theoretical framework builtaround these basic dimensions should have the best chances toarrive at universally valid hypotheses. But the socio-emotionaldimensions themselves are not an encompassing recipe for abehavioral theory because they reflect only affective aspects,and not the cognitions, intentions, norms, abilities, etc. which


are also needed for a general interaction theory. As can be seenin other, relatively well developed research areas like attitude-behavior relations (e.g. Ajzen & Madden, 1986) or self-discre-pancy theory (e.g. Higgins, 1989), one has to include a morecomplete set of predispositions to affiliative and powerfulbehavior: Behavior has to be explained not only by theemotionally evaluative or affective aspects (attitudes / self-esteem) but also by cognitive factors (like beliefs or the per-ceived actual self), by conative aspects (intentions / idealself), by normative aspects (subjective norms / ought self) and,last not least, by ability-based aspects (perceived behavioralcontrol / can self). Then one could add role-identities andhabits (see Charng, Piliavin, & Callero, 1988, for both aspectsin attitude-behavior predictions) as well as the relatedpersonality dimensions. For all these dispositional constructs,references to affiliation and power can be found and taken intoaccount for explanatory purposes; thereby rich fields of (social)psychological research can be exploited and eventuallyintegrated. Within the limits of this article, only a shortdescription of those variables is possible and a few referencesto relevant research (see Scholl, 1991, 1996, 2003, 2005 for moreextensive descriptions, theorizing, and results).

Affiliative feelings include acceptance, love, and joy onthe positive side, and disgust, resentment, and contempt on thenegative. If these feelings are used to evaluate other persons,we may speak of "sympathy – antipathy" which interaction partners mayfeel. The degree of sympathy can be depicted for each personseparately or it can be constructed as a collective variablerepresenting the relationship: We call it "affective congruence -incongruence" which is defined as the degree of mutuallysupportive feelings of the interaction partners; e. g. mutualacceptance and joy are supportive but also the compassion of onewith the grief of the other. The cognitive aspect of affiliationis referred to as "consensus – dissensus" or "cognitive(in)congruence", which is defined as the similarity of thesituation-relevant accessible cognitions of the interactionpartners (in the sense of “knowing that”: Ryle, 1949). A mutualinfluence is to be expected between consensus and sympathy(Festinger, 1954; Heider 1946). The intentional aspect ofaffiliation is conceptualized as "readiness to cooperate" where the


opposite is an inclination to withdraw or to compete. Therespective collective variable is called "conative (in)con-gruence", defined as the compatibility of the intentions of theinteraction partners. A close connection will usually be foundbetween sympathy, consensus and cooperative intentions (Scholl,1996, 2005). Related to cognitive aspects are abilities (in thesense of “knowing how”: Ryle, 1949) which may be similar ordifferent. Here it may be expected that complementary skills inducemore positive feelings and sympathy than identical skills(according to self-evaluation maintenance theory: Tesser, 1988).Thus, "ability-based (in)congruence" is defined as complemen-tarity of the relevant skills, aptitudes, experiences,intuitions, and other kinds of implicit knowledge. Shared normsare likely to foster sympathy, consensus, and readiness tocooperate, and these in turn will help in assimilating divergingnormative convictions. "Normative (in)congruence" is defined asthe similarity of internalized or personally accepted norms. Lastbut not least, cooperation-competition or "behavioral (in)congruence"is defined as the complementarity of partners’ actions; itresembles conative congruence because intentions are assumed tobe directly linked to behavior in most cases (Ajzen & Madden,1986, Charng, Piliavin, & Callero, 1988). The first five abovementioned aspects of congruence are dispositions towards behaviorand induce congruent behavior if they are themselves congruent.On the one hand, all kinds of congruence are likely to beaccompanied by affiliative feelings and their non-verbalexpression. On the other hand, these related concepts have to bedifferentiated because they may diverge under the influence ofsocialization and situational factors.

The second basic socio-emotional dimension is dominance orpower, which is about social ranking and inequality. Thedefinition of influence as an application of power is very broadas it is normally used in social psychology: Power, a potential,is the possibility to influence others (e.g. Raven, 1992); hence,any intended impact from one person on another is an “influence”.A preliminary distinction was drawn in the research on majorityand minority influence between informational and normativeinfluence and related to acceptance and compliance (Deutsch &Gerard, 1955). More explicit distinctions often have been takenby sociologists and political scientists (e. g. Abell, 1977;


Etzioni, 196813; Partridge, 1963). We take up these distinctions,but retain the usual meaning of power as a potential anddifferentiate only the diverging forms of using that potential inthe following way (Scholl, 1999): An intended social impactagainst the interests of a target person, i. e. by restrictinghis or her autonomy and control, is called restrictive control. Anintended social impact in line with the interests of a targetperson, i. e. by respecting or promoting his or her autonomy andcontrol, is called promotive control.

Such a distinction is very important because the reactionsof the target(s) of control and the resultant interactiondynamics are fundamentally different. We formulated and testedsuccessfully several new hypotheses about the differentialantecedents and consequences in our research. E. g. restrictivecontrol induces negative feelings, less sympathy, less readinessto cooperate, and especially less growth of knowledge and lesseffectiveness compared with promotive control (Buschmeier, 1995;Klocke, 2004; Krause, 2004; Scholl, 1991, 1996, 2004; Wetzel,1995). The conceptual distinction can be projected onto thebehavioral circumplex in that friendly dominance is promotivecontrol and hostile dominance restrictive control. The circumplexresearch results which do not confirm the interpersonal theory(see above) are compatible with our hypotheses, based on theintegrative model of Wortman & Brehm (1975): Restrictive control(but not promotive control) induces either reactance (hostiledominance) or, if no hope for success is seen, learnedhelplessness (hostile submission); this could be confirmed byBuschmeier (1995) and largely by Klocke (2004). Seen moregenerally: The affiliation-evaluation dimension is of such anoverriding importance that behavioral dominance has to beconceptually distinguished into friendly (promotive) and hostile

13 "An application of power changes the actor’s situationand/or his conception of his situation - but not his pre-ferences ... The exercise of influence entails an authenticchange in the actor’s preferences; given the same situation, hewould not choose the same course of action he favoured beforeinfluence was exercised ... influence involves not suspensionor suppression of their preferences but a respecification oftheir commitments." (Etzioni, 1968, pp. 359-360).


dominance (restrictive control) because they induce extremelydifferent reactions.

Power can be projected onto the same set of dispositionalqualities as affiliation: "Conative dominance" can be defined as"intention to control (an) other person(s)", which may betriggered by personality, role, or situation, but in each casemost likely by the power bases at hand. Since intentions oftendirectly precede behavior, dominance intentions should besubdivided in "promotive" and "restrictive control intentions";this distinction is nicely illustrated by the research onautomatic goal activation (Bargh et al., 1995; Chen, Lee-Chai, &Bargh, 2001).

"Normative dominance" or "normative inequality" is defined as"prerogative versus lowness", where norms and rights are notequally applied to all persons but differentiate betweensubgroups; it is a potential which figures as legitimate orposition power in the literature (French & Raven, 1959; Raven,1992). Nobility, caste, race, and gender are cases in pointwhich, by the way, often lead to a less benevolent use of power,i.e. as restrictive control. Social psychologists primarily studythe everyday use and experience of normative inequality in therespective stereotypes, prejudices, and social identities,perhaps most basically in social dominance theory (Sidanius &Pratto, 1999). On the other hand, normative inequality is justnormal in many societal institutions, from families to firms,universities, and churches, built on the hope that the resultantinequality is used promotively, a hope which quite often fails(e.g. Buschmeier, 1995; Kipnis, 1976; Lee-Chai & Bargh, 2001;Mitchell et al., 1998).

"Cognitive dominance" or "inequality" is defined as "more (valid)versus less (valid) explicit knowledge", where people can beordered along a continuum of the amount of relevant, validinformation; it figures as expert and informational power in theliterature (French & Raven, 1959; Raven, 1992). It can easily beused in a promotive or in a restrictive way: Colleagues may helpeach other with forwarding important news or they may hide orbias solitary information. Our research shows that it is moreoften used promotively (Buschmeier, 1995; Scholl, 2004).

"Ability-based dominance" or "inequality" is defined as "better


versus deficient knowledge how to do things", where people can beordered along a continuum of the amount of relevant skills andabilities. Again, ability-based dominance is an inequality, apower potential which can be used in a promotive or in arestrictive way, which is most evident in child care or in childabuse where the power differential is especially large. Cognitiveand ability-based inequality go often hand in hand: Experts haveusually not only better information (knowing that), but they havemore often the better intuition (knowing how). “Knowledge ispower” as the saying goes, and intelligence as a generalknowledge processing capability is likely to lead to leadership(Lord, de Vader & Alliger, 1986).

"Affective dominance" or "inequality" is defined as "higher versuslower status", which is accomplished by ranking people alongsocially valued dimensions. Most work has been done on socio-economic status (SES) which is measured as a compound ofeducation, occupational prestige, and income (e.g. Hauser &Warren, 1997). Societal definitions of status afford legitimatepower, but status can also be locally assigned to persons withregard to any valued attribute like strength, wit, beauty,genius, or any specific performance area which affords referentpower. Persons with higher status have better chances to get theattention of others and to take the lead, even if the problem athand has nothing to do with their status attributes (Berger,Cohen, & Zelditch, 1966; Meeker, 1981). Again, status is a powerpotential which is open for promotive or restrictive use.

We may conclude that the normative, cognitive, ability-based, and affective inequalities each raise the probability ofusing power. All these predispositions may induce promotive orrestrictive control intentions and behavior, i.e. in line with oragainst the interests of the interaction partner(s). Whichalternative is chosen may depend on many factors, for instance onthe kind of social orientation (McClintock, 1972) or on theamount of inequality which determines the probability ofretaliation; a steep inequality with large discretion and a lowdanger of punishment is perhaps the most relevant factor behindthe power - corruption link (Kipnis, 1976: Mitchell et al.,1998). Important are also the affiliation variables, especiallysympathy and the intention to cooperate: Both are likely to lead


to promotive instead of restrictive control (Scholl, 1996, 2005),which may elicit positive feelings and induce friendly intentionsresulting in friendly submissive behavior. This action-responsecircle is in line with interpersonal theory predictions andresults, but it is theoretically explained and not only astatement about regularities.

Summing up By taking established psychological knowledge about

behavioral dispositions into account, different affiliation andpower variables can be linked to these fundamental socio-emotional dimensions, new hypotheses can be generated, and a hostof established research can be integrated. The socio-emotional oraffective basis of human interaction and communication should notbe taken for theorizing without including related cognitive,conative, normative, and ability-based variables which influencethe respective behavior, too. Of course, the presentation ofthese ideas had to be very short, a more complete exposition ofthe resulting interaction theory and its empirical corroborationis given in another article Team and CollaborationEffectiveness.

6. ConclusionMany mammals, most primates, and especially humans, the only

primate species which is able to speak, are social animals. Thereare and have been several survival benefits of this kind ofsociality, e. g. joint defense, collaborative hunting, divisionand specialization of labor, and accomplishment of tasks, whichgo beyond individual possibilities. In order to reap these bene-fits, effective coordination mechanisms are necessary. Instead offixed instincts, humans use the more flexible emotions asinternal steering devices, and they express especially thosefeelings, which are relevant for social coordination, throughseveral non-verbal signals to their fellows. These others can seethem, hear them, feel with them, and judge, whether they areready for cooperation, what kind of relation the other prefers,or what kind of problem is coming up.

Coordination may be accomplished either through


synchronization, i.e. feeling attracted to each other,spontaneously affiliating with each other, and proceeding tojoint action. Or it may be accomplished through dominance, i.e. arank order develops or has been already developed where the upperones give the directions and the lower ones are induced orcompelled to follow. This may be done in a friendly, promotiveway where directions are smooth and get more easily followed. Orit may be done in a restrictive way overriding the resistance ofthe other side. Thus, affiliation and power are the principalmodes of coordination among humans; non-verbal expressions signalwhich mode or mixture of modes is coming up, whether it will beaccepted, or whether the kind of coordination still has to beworked out. An activation dimension completes the emotion –expression connections signalling the urgency of the respectiveindividual agendas and the intensity of the upcoming reactions.

The feeling-expression-reception-understanding connectionalong these three dimensions, which is so important for socialcoordination, has most probably been selected in an evolutionaryprocess towards hominization14. These three dimensions seem to beculturally invariant, not open to environmental change. Theenormous importance of this evolutionary heritage can be derivedfrom the fact that all emotionally relevant aspects of socialcoordination are affected by these three dimensions, i.e. thestructure of felt emotions, non-verbal signals, the affectivemeaning of any word in verbal communication, the perception andevaluation of behavior, and the perception of personality. Thus,we live in a closed socio-emotional universe. This is mostclearly demonstrated by affect control theory with the need toseek and the ability to find affective consistency in that three-dimensional world. This world is a mirror of the basic dimensionsinherent in any interdependence or exchange matrix. Theclosedness of this three-dimensional world seems to be extremelyimportant not only for mutual understanding and coordination, butalso for continued learning processes and orientation in ouroverly complex ecological niche in order not to end up inindividual or social confusion. Thus, the three socio-emotional

14 It would be interesting to explore the establishment ofthese socio-emotional dimensions on the phylogenetic branchesdownward, but this is a separate task for biologists.


dimensions are probably the most important equipment forinclusive fitness.

It follows, that this socio-emotional basis of interactionand communication should become a cornerstone of research inpsychology as well as in other neighboring human sciences. A lotof gaps to be filled, needs for revision, and new research ideascan be generated from this perspective; some of them have beenmentioned in the preceding sections. Some research gaps centeraround the basic three-dimensional parallelities and the linksbetween feelings, communication, behavior, and personality. Somerevisions of established dimensional descriptions seem alsoworthwhile to explore. More promising and more demanding would bea further elaboration of the three-dimensional properties ofinterdependence theory and symbolic interactionism, especiallyaffect control theory, and their interrelations. And finally, thedescriptive repertoire for the proper use of the socio-emotionalbasis of interaction and communication should be enlarged inorder to get better instruments for theory development andintegration. Using primarily affective judgements or behaviordescriptions as variables, as was done in former scientific work,falls short of explaining interactive behavior. In line withother social-psychological theories we recommend to use alsocognitive, ability-based, normative, and conative variables whichare on the one side predispositions to the respective behaviorand are tied on the other to the three basic socio-emotionalvariables. It could be shown that for each of these variables,connected to either affiliation or power, diverse researchtraditions and theories exist, which are useful for theprediction of affiliative and powerful behavior and which aresystematically related to other sciences of human behavior. 15

Thus, there seems to be a clear promise in using these threesocio-emotional dimensions for theory integration withinpsychological social psychology, between psychological andsociological social psychology, and between social psychology andother psychological disciplines like personality, the generalpsychology of emotion and motivation, cognitive psychology with

15 The model of collaboration and teamwork, developed and empirically confirmed in Scholl (1996, 2005) is based on such differentiations of affiliation and power dispositions.


it's links to emotional experience, developmental psychology, andespecially clinical psychology via an elaboration and extensionof the circumplex approach. Finally, the three-dimensional socio-emotional basis of the exchange theoretic paradigm and thesymbolic interactionist paradigm should very much ease theinterdisciplinary dialogue and possible integrations of (social)psychology and other human sciences like biology, sociology, andeconomics. Hopefully, readers will get much more ideas than thosesketched here, by reflecting their own research in the light ofthe three-dimensional socio-emotional space and its ramificationsthrough felt emotions, verbal and nonverbal communication,behavior, and personality.

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