The Social Basis of Secularism: From Late- Ottomans to Early Republic Period

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The Social Basis of Secularism: From Late-Ottomans to Early Republic Period

Ahmed Baran Dural and Gürkan Ozan Tekin

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE HUMANITIES http://www.Humanities-Journal.com First published in 2010 in Champaign, Illinois, USA by Common Ground Publishing LLC www.CommonGroundPublishing.com. © 2010 (individual papers), the author(s) © 2010 (selection and editorial matter) Common Ground Authors are responsible for the accuracy of citations, quotations, diagrams, tables and maps. All rights reserved. Apart from fair use for the purposes of study, research, criticism or review as permitted under the Copyright Act (Australia), no part of this work may be reproduced without written permission from the publisher. For permissions and other inquiries, please contact <[email protected]>. ISSN: 1447-9508 Publisher Site: http://www.Humanities-Journal.com THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE HUMANITIES is peer-reviewed, supported by rigorous processes of criterion-referenced article ranking and qualitative commentary, ensuring that only intellectual work of the greatest substance and highest significance is published. Typeset in Common Ground Markup Language using CGCreator multichannel typesetting system http://www.commongroundpublishing.com/software/

The Social Basis of Secularism: From Late-Ottomansto Early Republic PeriodAhmed Baran Dural, TC Trakya University, TurkeyGürkan Ozan Tekin, TC Trakya University, Turkey

Abstract: The traditional Turkish pragmatism politics which carried the Turks from the Central Asiato Asia Minor and then the Europe created a relation between the state and the religion where religionwas always a means in the hands of the state. In the Turkish state tradition, religion is a dependentvariant of the leaders of the state where it is an active means for the dominion of the state. The claimthat Turks adopted the idea of “Ilay-ı Kelimetullah” (to sublimate the name of Allah in the universe)is only an act which Turkish statesmen used to legalize their imperial visions rather than promotingIslam. So the universal state mentality of Turks derived from the mythology of traditional philosophyof state, not from Islam itself. On the other hand the breaking point in Turkish history which carriedthe nation to the laic principles was the Kemalist era. Many Republican intellectuals argue that toresist secularism means to resist the main values, principles and objectives of the Turkish Republic(ÖZEK, 1962: 72-73) Secularism is the sprit of the new regime. Ziya Gökalp, one of the “social engin-eers” and the “official sociologist” of the Republic stated that Islamic community era was over anymore and the idea of “ummah” actually dissolved the idea of nationality. Gökalp wanted religion togo back to its inner and personal area and it could still stay as one of the components of the Turkishnation.

Keywords: State, Secularism, Kemalism, Sultan Hamid the II., Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Modernism,Ottoman Empire

Introduction: Definition of Secularism

THE WORD “laiklik” (secularism) in Turkish derived from the words “laïc” or“laïque” from French and the expression is a loan word from “lāikós” in Greek and“lāicus” in Latin. The word simply means “non clerical” in its original meaning.“lāikós” is usually translated into Turkish as “the people” whereas it is actually

closer to the expressions “commons”, “hoi polloi” or even “rayah”. “Secular” meant “non-clerical”, “non-ecclesiastical” in Turkish state tradition, but it was used as “irreligious” inOttoman period (ALTINDAL, 1994: 32). The idea that “belief in rational mind and the beliefthat one can decide her/his own destiny just by walking under the light of knowledge andpersonal intelligence” supported by positivism of the Early Age forces the obligations ofthe separation of clerical and state affairs; liberalism in beliefs, religious services, free willand free mind and rationalism, scientism, realism and modernity in administrational, educa-tional and judicial manners (SONAR, 1999; 33).

Secularism is an idea where the corporal identity of state is free of religious principlesand irrational ideas and the power and authority come directly from the will of the nation.So, it is a good idea to learn the secularism definition of Turkish General Staff, who has al-ways been an active supporter of “active secularism” in Turkey: “State is a secular authority

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because takes its power from the will of the nation. Thus, secularism is a concept that preventsthe religion to supervise secular manners and provides the religion to supervise only religiousmatters and secularism maintains the motto ‘Render unto State the things which are theState’s, and unto Religion the things that are Religion’s” (TURKISH GENERAL STAFF,1999:53).

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of Turkish Republic, explained his definition ofsecularism with his practices in the early years of Turkish Republic. He used it as a basis tosolve the social problems of his time said: “Everybody prays to God anyway s/he wants inthe Turkish Republic. Nobody can be under pressure for her/his religious thoughts. … Andnobody is allowed to force others to accept her/his religious thoughts, we cannot ignorethat. … A tolerant person is someone who respects the beliefs of others. A tolerant personis someone who can at least understand the beliefs of others. This is what tolerance is”(GÖZE, 1985: 402-405).

Historical PerspectiveWhen someone takes a glance at the Turkish states founded by pre-Islamic Turks, it can beeasily seen that “laic” principles were dominant. Within the history of proto-states or statesfounded by pre-Islamic Turks, the religion “shamanism” was highly influential like otherFar Eastern societies such as China or Mongolia. This shamanist belief which actually hada pretty different system of beliefs/practices from the polytheistic religions of the period wascapable of influencing the new religion and converting it under the name “Turkish Islam”after the adoption of Islam. The idea “seven layers of worlds beneath the earth and abovethe sky” which is popular at nearly all of the current monotheistic religions and devotion inone God who created the earth, the sky and everything in between is also common inshamanism (TANYOL; 1994: 32-43).

Many shamans could not only seem to convert themselves to Islam, but also manage indominating the new religion as “prelates” during the hard period when Turks adopted Islam(EFLAKİ, 1973: 159-160). The Islamic thinkers called those philosophers “mystics” becausethey rewarded them as “having a mystical faith” (TOPÇU, 1998: 171). The shamans mixedIslam with the magic ideas Turkish people favored and helped them to adopt Islam easily.This way they created a strong religious structure supported by the society and abolishedthe barriers between the Turkish society and the new religion. In return, the state Islam called“official Islam” let the shamans survive together with popular Islam on the condition of“being under control” during the following centuries. It is strange that some “modern Islamist”philosophers accomplished the mission of legalizing the Kemalist Revolution in the eyes ofthe public after the Kemalist Revolution just as the shamans legalized Islam in the beginning.

On the other hand, the relations of shamans with God were very similar to laic practices.The shaman, especially the “master shaman,” whose real rank was kept as a secret from thecommon society until his death was not responsible for just passing the wishes of God topeople and he was not a simple religious leader calling the people to the path of God (İNAN,1972: 24-57). He was capable of meeting God in person when necessary, rejecting the ideasof God when he wasn’t convinced or even asking God to convince him against his objections.Those privileges weren’t given to ecclesiastics of any other monotheistic religion and themaster shaman was also responsible for defending people’s right against the God (TANYOL:55-56).

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From the Adoption of Islam to the Ottoman EmpireThe first relations of Turks with Islam go back to the end of VII century. The Turks whofought against the Chinese in the lines of Arab armies in Talas War got to know Islam, butthey didn’t accept the new religion in masses for a long time to come. Despite this clear truthin history, the “official Turkish history” likes to think that Turks, miraculously, adopted Islamin a short time in masses and Islam, having been honored by the Turks, reached its outmoststate practice in a short time. This problematic approach may sometimes cause a truth tolose its historical perspective under the pressure of Sunnite practice and a historical truthmay face the risk of turning into a legend. Some Islamist Turkish thinkers may even claimthat the most important milestone of Islam is not the date Muhammad started to promote thenew religion, but it is the date when Turks converted into Islam (ARSLAN, 2002: 424).Such an irrational idea is the projection of a terrible mistake concerning the religion inTurkish intelligence and it is also a breaking point in the history of Islam, which serves tocreate a non-existing para-historical system of beliefs within Islam. By contrary, the adoptionof Islam by the Turks is a painful and chaotic period lasted for 150 years long. Ahmet YaşarOcak summarizes this period under two titles:

“In any case, today we know that, Islam has reached to Turks living in certain parts ofCentral Asia by some Arab colonies in the Umayyad and Abbasid reigns and by someSogdian merchants and Sufis of Iranian schools starting from the VIII century. Forsome centuries to come Haresm, Khorasan and Fergana were the Islamic gates to Turksbut the propaganda of merchants and Iranian Sufis were much more influential thanthe ‘formal’ ways” (OCAK, 2002: 31).

To tell the truth, the quotation above any many other historians sharing the same ideas showthat Turks actually had to make a choice between the Chinese and the Arabs in a periodwhen they weren’t so strong. At this turning point, the Chinese were “the historical enemy”for the Turks so the Turkish leaders of the era who had some experiences in founding statesthought the Arabs were “lesser of two evils” against the Chinese from whom they just freedthemselves. Turks chose the way “to respect” the Arab religion in order to keep them awayin a time when they were just building a new state and needed peace. They also confrontedthe Arab society and their leaders when the new religion conflicted with their main traditionalreligious doctrines. It is pretty interesting that the mystical Iranian belief was a more importantattraction for Turks to adopt Islam rather than the Arab-nomadic values during these 150years which passed with mutual respect/reaction/revolt/partial acceptance. The Iranian Sufismthen was quite far from the Arab belief of Islam and nearly identical with the former Turkishshamanism (KÖPRÜLÜ; 1966: 10-14).

Pragmatist State MentalityAfter the Turks adopted Islam, the religious and state affairs were independent from eachother during the Karahan and Seljuk periods but when Turks invaded Baghdad in 1055, theIslamic caliphate passed to Turks and Tugrul Bey of the time made some legislation. Thecaliphate was returned to a new structure where the head of the state was also the Islam Caliph.In this sense, some can say that “tamed religious authority” had a “conditioned autonomy”

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in the Seljuk Empire. That was necessary for the domination of the state rather than thedomination of the religion. The traditional Turkish pragmatism politics which carried theTurks from the Central Asia to Asia Minor and then the Europe created a relation betweenthe state and the religion where religion was always a means in the hands of the state. In theTurkish state tradition, religion is a dependent variant of the leaders of the state where it isan active means for the dominion of the state. The claim that Turks adopted the idea of “Ilay-ı Kelimetullah” (to sublimate the name of Allah in the universe) is only an act which Turkishstatesmen used to legalize their imperial visions rather than promoting Islam. So the universalstate mentality of Turks derived from the mythology of traditional philosophy of state, notfrom Islam itself (TANYOL: 93-95).

As a matter of fact, the the Ottoman State which followed The Seljuk Empire had laic lawtradition like other Turkish states in the beginning, but it turned into an Empire which pos-sessed religious judicial practices later on. At this point, when some compares the the OttomanEmpire with the other Empires of its age (like the United Kingdom) which it could create analternative “pax” against he/she can easily say that the thesis, like many other wrongWestern-based ideas, stating the the Ottoman Empire had a theocratic structure is reallyproblematic. So, the thesis by Will Kymlicka which claims that “The the Ottoman Empirewas a federation of theocracies” (KYMLİCKA, 1997: 156-158) and is nothing but a modernversion of the traditional Orientalist comments which say that the the Ottoman Empire startedto “become a theocracy in time” is proven to be false.

In fact when Yavuz Sultan Selim took over the caliphate after the invasion of Egypt in1517 and “şeyhülislam” (the head of Islamic affairs in the the Ottoman Empire) authoritywas established, one can say that Islam as a religion got closer to the state, but it is interestingthat the Ottoman sultans hardly ever used the title of being “caliph”. Famous Ottoman sultanslike Mehmet the Conqueror or Suleiman the Magnificent actually enacted many laws whichhad nothing to do with Islam or even were contrary to traditional Islam. That shows that of-ficial pragmatism in state tradition could rule on anything including Islam throughout theOttoman Empire. On the other hand, as the Empire weakened, the Caliphate was resublimed,but the intention was still official pragmatism which helped the Muslim Ottoman subjectsto be kept under control (AKGÜN, 2006: 20-21). Under the light of all these informationand as an anti-thesis against the “federation of theocracies” claim by Kymlicka, it can beeasily argued that the Ottoman Empire was actually a Balkan empire. When one can combinethe mission of “Eastern Roman Emperor” which some Ottoman sultans used not only as ajudicial title and as a means of the Ottoman hinterland, but also for their personal destinyand the “Eastern Roma-Byzantium” tradition taken over with that title, he can understandthe Ottoman State tradition more easily. So the Ottoman Empire was a Balkan Empire whenthe roots of “devshirmeh”s (Young Christian boys recruited from different parts of the Empire.Talented ones became even grand-viziers later on), governors, commanders, viziers or artistthat flourished the Empire, the way they were raised and the geography the Empire paidspecial attention is being examined. So, it can be suggested religion didn’t play an importantrole in the Ottoman State tradition more than that of the Roman Empire.

One can also mention the welcoming of the Jewish people in the 15th and the 16th centuriesabout secular applications in the Ottoman Empire. Those Jewish people were tortured bothby the Inquisition and the Catholic fanaticism in Spain and all around Europe. The OttomanEmpire welcomed the Jews in spite of some negative prejudices about the Jewish communityin the Koran. In contrary to the Constitution of Medina, which Islamists like to promote as

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“a document of empathy” which gives non-Muslims social liberty except involving inpolitics and state affairs, the Ottoman Empire not only gave the Jewish community full lib-eration it also appointed many people of Jewish origin to important political positions in theEmpire. Some very important state projects like the transformation of the economic life afterthe end of the 17th Century and creating a Turkish bourgeoisie class would “unofficially”be given to the Jewish community (ATEŞ, 2004: 25).

The “caliphate” of the Ottoman Sultan was mentioned in Küçük Kaynarca Treaty (1774)and that was the first time in the international basis. Later caliphate was stressed especiallyduring the reign of Sultan Abdülhamit the II. He used it as a means of balance power inpolitical issues. The Ottoman sultans before Abdülhamit the II. didn’t pay much importanceto the caliphate and all the glory and success undertaken by the “Sultanship”. Besides, therewasn’t a special ceremony concerning the caliphate at the time of ascending the throne. Ofcourse, that did not mean that the Ottoman Empire was all secular, but as the Empireweakened, the ties of the Christian subjects to the Empire would attenuate and AbdülhamitII. tired to give the caliphate a political content in order the keep the Empire together(AKGÜN: 24).

Abdülhamit the Second and Pan-IslamismThe first striking truth concerning the Islamic world at the end of the 18th century was thefact that the European states had dominated most of the Muslim societies. Places like Java,Central Asia, India, Egypt, Arabian shores, Tunisia and Algeria had been under the political,economical and military government of Holland, United Kingdom, France and Russia. Asa reaction to that European power over the Islamic world, all eyes turned to Ottoman caliphateafter the mid-19th .century. When Abdulhamit the II. received congratulations as the MuslimCaliph from many countries in 1882 (the beginning of the 14 th century in hegira calendar),nearly all of the Muslim world except a few parts such as Iran, Morocco and some smallothers were under the European dominion. Many Muslim communities were longing for an“Islamic unification” under the Caliph’s flag (BERKES, 2006: 341). On the other hand,many Arab communities under Ottoman rule did not accept the caliphate of Ottoman Sultanand the caliphate was valid only out of Ottoman borders. The General Arab thought whichclaimed that the Ottoman dynasty was not of Arabic origin, thus they disseised the caliphategenerated many alternative caliphs in certain hard-to-control areas of the Empire (AKŞİN;1997: 33-64).

Kanun-ı Esasi(the Ottoman Constitution) issued in 1876, at the commencement of thereign of Abdülhamit the II., stated that the religion of the Ottoman State was Islam, the Ot-toman Sultan was the Caliph and his name would be pronounced as such. This title of theSultan had already been pronounced as the Caliph in many occasions, but to classify it offi-cially showed the caliphate was needed to be used only as a means to keep the Empire to-gether. The Ottoman Empire somehow seemed to win a religious identity in 1876 because“şeyhülislam” was in the Ministerial Cabinet but it should also be reminded that Abdülhamitthe II. contributed to the development of modern ideas and supported nearly all the reformstoo.

This is also problematic to think upon whether the Empire did mean to sublime Islam orthey just planned to give a new, modern toy to the Ottoman hands which were under thestrong influence of national consciousness and/or revolutions. Or did the The Ottoman Empire

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simply want to create a “Muslim citizenship” towards the supposedly-loyal Muslim subjectswhich it could later use to codify a western-type of a “nation”? (TÜRKÖNE, 2003: 40, 170-205)

It is very important the same Ottoman Sultan (Abdülhamit the II.) who increased thenumber of Western-type schools and opened modern high schools besides the existing sec-ondary schools strongly opposed both to the reactionist Islamists in the state and to the reac-tionist Islamic sect members in Anatolia. Eventually, the sultan who was greatly admiredby the conservative groups in Turkey, with his Islamic politics was not only a successfulfollower and speculator of world stock markets, but also a secret supporter of Turkismpolitics behind his “so-called Islamist” administration. These are important indicators of thepragmatic state approach of Turkish state administration. (DURAL, 2008: 466-474)

As a result of the Pan-Islamist support from the state, the unconscious Turkish peasantsstarted to have some kind of “Islamic conscious” by the end of the reign of Abdülhamit.The strategy of the Empire was based on using Muslim sect leaders like Sheikh Ebulhüdato promote Islamism or to translate the works of “moderate” Sunnite Islam authorities likeEl-Ghazali into Turkish (MARDİN, 2007: 92). However, these policies would fail just likethe “Ottomanism” before and there would be conservative Turks, who really believed inIslamism and some traditionalists who didn’t want to lose their status against modernism inthe the Ottoman Empire.

Secularism in the Ottoman IntelligentsiaThe concept of “secularism” entered in the Turkish agenda for the first time with a reportwhich Mustapha Fazıl Pasha wrote to Sultan Abdülaziz from Paris in 1866. The Pasha, beinga devoted supporter of the I. Young Turks opposition movement, wrote a long letter to theSultan from Paris and complained about his opponents Ali Pasha and Fuat Pasha.In this letterFazıl Pasha said “If religion does not stop within the limits of divinely matters and enters inthe area of worldly matters, it destroys not only everything but also itself… We should leaveold-fashioned rules which ruin the government let alone help it to survive. We must adoptthe new orders which flourished other states” in his letter (BERKES: 275-287).

This letter was published in the newspaper La Liberté, but the Pasha wasn’t very persistentabout secularism later on. Mustapha Fazıl Pasha settled in Paris went on supporting his fellowjournalists financially. The Pasha needed Young Ottomans and they needed his money.When Ali Suavi, another important Turkish journalist of the time arrived in Europe, hestarted publishing his newspaper The Reporter in London with the financial help by MustaphaFazıl Pasha (ORTAYLI, 2003: 45-47).

Ali Suavi was the first Ottoman intellectual after Mustapha Fazıl Pasha who openly defen-ded secularism. Suavi was successful at an exam when he was very young and he had becomea teacher in Bursa Secondary School. Later he was the principle of the school for some time.Ali Suavi was a journalist, writer and revolutionist. He is taken to be the first activist of thepan-Turkist idea. He went to Paris on an invitation from Mustapha Fazıl Pasha when he wasin Kastamonu, Turkey. He started to publish his newspaper The Reporter in London after ameeting with the Pasha and his friends in Paris ( http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Suavi ).

Although Ali Suavi has grown up in a religious school, he criticized the scholastic doctrinesof the religious education. He was not only a devoted defender of secularism, but also aconstant critic of the situation in the Muslim societies facing with at that time. He stated that

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religious matters and state affairs should be totally separated, the religious services shouldbe in Turkish instead of Arabic. He also considered Abu Bekr was the last real caliph andso for him the caliphate system ended with him. Thus he emphasized the Ottoman sultancould not call themselves as the caliphs. His words were highly opposed by traditionalMuslim scholars and he always claimed that the effect of Arabic language in the Islam worldhas always been a barrier for the development of a modern state. He defended the Turkishstates in the history have succeeded because they didn’t lean their political administrationon religious rules. (DURAL, 2005: 89-91) (KOÇAK, 2003: 73-77).

Ahmet Rıza is another intellectual who helped the development of laic thought in the Ot-toman society. Although he didn’t know the principals of positivism which he was a puredefendant very well, he is always remembered for his contributions to the enlightment traditionthat survived through the Ottoman period to the Republic era (MARDİN: 177-178). AugusteComte, the developer of positivism, was the man who systemized positivist philosophy, in-tended to rearrange the society by way of science. The most important specialty of positivismis the idea that “the nature has an absolute and almighty objective”. Positive knowledgebased on observations and experiments is the knowledge we should use to rearrange the so-ciety. ( http://felsefetarihi.net/pozitivizm.htm ). Ahmet Rıza who was affected by Comte’sthoughts concerning rationalism and the Enlightenment ideal wrote those to his sister fromParis: “... Please stop those childish behaviors like praying or so on. I know you are sometimesoffended about what I write you about Islamic practices, but I want you to know one thingfor sure: I love you as my dear sister Fahire more than the Kuran, the hell and the heavenyou believe without even thinking on what you really believe in, I mean I love you more thananything that is so sacred to you...” (KORLAELÇİ, 2003. 217).

Ahmet Rıza, the philosopher, is explaining that the reason of the underdevelopment inIslamic societies is the domestic and external chaos. One can not think and estimate logicallyin times of chaos and it is impossible to produce productive ideas in a chaotic environment.By the way, the paradoxical manners of Ahmet Rıza about religion can be explained in par-allel to the politics of the Second Young Turks movement. According to the Young Turks,until coming into the power, it was better not to talk at all about the subjects that the publicwould openly refuse or it was necessary to talk about them by covering the truth by using areligious dialectic (KORLAELÇİ: 219-223) (AYDIN, 2003: 120-123).

The Committee of Union and Progress, which was a political ramification of the YoungTurks movement that opposed the Ottoman sultans for liberty since 1890’s, could not decidefor a long time what to do against the “Islamist policy” led by Abdülhamit the II. They knewthe “social cementing” role of the religion in society and how Islam had been adopted for acertain part of the Ottoman society. Although they were more “pan-Turkists”, The Party ofUnion and Progress also used religion, like sultan, as a means. to convict citizens to theparty’s modern intentions Their pragmatic aim was to create a citizenship consciousnessaround Islam and then use it for Turkism.

The opposition against the Party of Union and Progress started to provoke the soldiersand low-rank officers in the Ottoman army arguing that their commander officers and gen-erals have “become atheists”. However after the “March 31 Event” the political terms “re-actionism” and “fight against reactionism” took their places in Turkish political literature(AKŞİN, 1994: 293). This period which actually had little to do with religion have becomea propaganda matter in the hands of political Islamists in Turkey since 1909 and showedhow Islamist who are supposed to respect Islam used religion as a political tool (KARA;

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2003: 253-260). Eventually, the secularism movements in the Ottoman society have alwaysbeen some kind of “lacking” because the social structure of the Ottoman society wasn’treally suitable for the formation of a civilian society. The religious thoughts and emotionsof the public were mostly abused and this tension was used as a “sword of Damocles” uponthe heads of the progressionists in Ottoman society (http://www.inkilap.info/archives/180).

Secularism during the Republic EraSecularism is a “sine qua non” part and a logical consequence of the rational-scientificmovement which was the core of Kemalist thought. On the other hand, secularism is an un-disputable condition for the reformation movement that is the main objective of the Turkishrevolution. The only solution of this centuries-long dispute was to understand and acceptthat religion must contain only religious matters and worldly matters should be led by rationalrules that originate from the changing and developing needs of the society. That was thescope of the will revolution that Kemalist secularism wanted to realize in Turkey. (GİRİTLİ,1998: 621-622) The passage to laicism which is one the most important pillars of the Kem-alist revolution and an inheritance of the Party of Union and Progress and its social basis isthe subject of the rest of this article.

It was inevitable for TBMM (Turkish National Assembly) to pay off old scores with Ca-liphate after the absolute glory. The revolts triggered by Sultan Vahdettin of the time againstthe national forces during the Independence War in Turkey and his inculcation on IstanbulGovernment not to approve the decisions taken by the Sivas Congress (a national congressthat united delegates from all Anatolian provinces of the Ottoman Empire which resulted ina decision for a war for the national independence) forced the Kemalist forces to deal witha civil war possibility in addition to the conflicts with Greece and France. As a matter offact, the peace talks between the Istanbul Government and the Allies depended on the factthat Istanbul Government and Caliphate problems would be solved. After very feverish dis-cussions in TBMM, Sultanate was abolished on the night of 1-2 November 1922. At anearlier decision dated October 30, 1922 it was stated that the sultanate in Istanbul was absentanymore and “the Caliphate which was the legitimate right of the Turkish Government wouldbe rescued from the foreign hands where it was detained” (MUMCU, 1999: 321-323) In theclaim it was said that the Ottoman sultan has betrayed his country and there would not beany other power other than the authority of the nation as represented by TBMM. With thisdecision the objective “to rescue the Caliphate” was abandoned and it was said that “theTurkish Government was the point of support for the Caliphate”.

Abolition of Sultanate and CaliphateThe speech delivered by Mustafa Kemal Pasha on November 1, 1922 in the General Assemblyto support the abolition of the Sultanate and the Caliphate was very interesting. The Com-mander-in-chief has convinced TBMM with this speech as fellows: “The Seljuk Empire wasa magnificent empire. The Seljuk Emperor influenced the Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad andsome time later the situation was like that: the magnificent Turkish Emperor was representingthe sovereignty of the Turkish Empire, but he saw no harm in keeping the Muslim Caliphnext to him. So, TBMM which represents the national sovereignty may easily be together

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with the Caliph and TBMM could also choose the Caliph as the Seljuk Empire influencedthe Caliph” (ATATÜRK- II, 1999: 945-947, 1133-1135).

Only a few weeks after the declaration of the Turkish Republic, on November 24, 1923,Aga Khan and Ameer Ali wrote the famous letter demanding the survival of the Caliphateand increasing the respect of it. The Kemalist government thought it was very strange forthose two keepers of “the small tradition” of Shiite order to refer to the “big Sunnite tradi-tion” when the letter was published in Istanbul press on December, 5- 6, 1923. The KemalistRevolution then understood that the letter was actually a planned act targeting the roots ofthe new regym and a step to carrying the Caliphate to the center of international conflicts.In the meantime, the Caliphate was acting cool and doubtful and trying to cement its positionswith the support from some new regime leaders like Refet Bele and Kazım Karabekir whodidn’t agree Kemal Pasha in some points and who were supporting the Caliphate “undercover”. The Caliph wasn’t listening to the warnings and suggestions of the Government andinsisting on delivering assertive speeches around using majestic titles for himself. He wasrefusing to follow the dress code of the new regime and although he was a moderate personhimself that was unacceptable under the conditions of the Revolution (ATATÜRK-II: 925-937). In the beginning of 1924, Mustafa Kemal became fully certain about the abolition ofthe Caliphate so the Caliphate was abolished with the Law No. 431 dated March 3, 1924. Itwas said in the reasoned decision that “the Caliphate was actually improper within hisscope of the new government and the republic and it wasn’t needed anymore in the new socialstructure”. Abdülmecit Effendi, the last Caliph, was to be sent abroad together with all themembers of the Ottoman Dynasty (MUMCU: 323).

Kemalist Sense of Social EngineeringUnder all those circumstances, the Ministry of Religious Courts and Foundations seemed tohave custody on the practices of the new Republic regime. With the abolition of this ministry,both the religious hierarchy and the “ulema” class (scholars of Muslim religious law) whogenerated the bureaucracy for it were abolished. Thus, the system which supervised theMuslim religious rules and its side products like the Muslim courts and education systemwere all boosted into the history. The Directorate of Religious Affairs of the new Republicwhich was founded for the religious needs of the public was responsible for carrying on onlythe religious cult of Islam, not the formal Islam represented by the “ulema” class in the Ot-toman era. (ZEKİ, 1998: 51) The new regime was announced the way that there would bea new organization, just like the way the ancient regime, to deal with the religious needs ofthe public. The new organization to appoint the “hodja”s to direct the mosques and to firethem when necessary was The Directorate of Religious Affairs of the Turkish Republic now.All the Muslim religious scholars were under the supervision of this organization anymore(KAYNAR, 1990: 2144-2145).

On the other hand, “Department of Religious Affairs” formula seemed to satisfy the con-servative right wing who couldn’t really understand the pros and cons of the new regime.The conservative elite understood that the state would somehow control the religion andthey were anxious that Kemalism would make a deal with only one Islamic group and/orlegitimize only some religious thoughts and illegalize the others. At this point Kemalismhad identified Islamism with the status quo of the ancient regime and “factionalized” theIslamic movement. The common opinion of the Islamist theoricians was for a state which

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was a cool, far, even oppressive state rather than one that was close to one or some Islamisttendencies. The mainstream Turkish conservatism thus started to clean their past which gotdirty with Islamism and began to use Pan-Turkism to stay alive in peace with the new regime.The mainstream conservatist culturally attacked the revolution process and generate a weaponof “being oppressed, assimilated, aggrieved” for the radical Islamist movements after the1980 coup d’état. The Islamist movement started this exploitation story after the 1980 coupd’état, tried to fill the gap in the political centre together with an intensive criticism of thesystem and a successful practical survive at the local municipalities. It is interesting to seethat the main conflict of the Islamist movement after 1980 was with the nationalist-etatiststructure again.

Atatürk who started the revolution with the idea of complete independence and moderniz-ation was very keen on the unification of education which he thought was the core of thenew system. Ataturk said “All the educational institutions in our country must be in uniformquality. All the men and women of our nation should graduate from those institutions.” aboutthat (ATATÜRK-I, 1961: 90). With this ideal, Ataturk started his studies in the second termmeeting of TBMM in 1924 and stated that all education systems needed to be in uniformquality. He thought two types of education (i.e. secular on one side and religious on theother) would not unite the nation and on the contrary, it would dissolve it again. There werereligious education schools and modern schools giving education together at that time. Ac-cording to the new regime, those two would never live together. Ünsal, after reminding hisreaders about Ataturk’s statement on “Unification of elementary education is inevitable be-cause it has to be obligatory and common for all our children” goes on quoting as shownbelow:

“Education was wholly taken under the control and supervision of the state. ‘Madrasah’s(Muslim theological schools) were all closed and modern educational institutions wereopened. The very first step was the enactment of the ‘Unification of Education Law’ inthat field.” (ÜNSAL, 1999; 380)

During the Ottoman modernization era, religious rules against women couldn’t really beapplied (especially in Istanbul) because of the opposition of Istanbulite women and thedressing styles of Istanbulite and Anatolian women have become quite different in time.That was another point of conflict between the conservative and progressive movements.For example, one can say that the women’s clothes in the rural areas were much more prac-tical because they needed to work in the fields (YARAMAN, 2001: 54-59). Hence, therewas some kind of chaos in dressing styles in the Ottoman Empire. Followers of every religioneven every order had different dress codes. Hat was considered the “Christian” whereas fezof the Tunisian people was accepted as a men’s cap in general. Fez was obligatory for thestate officers and soldiers, but “kalpak” was popular in the Second Constitutionalist Periodand it would be the symbol of National Independence War later on (İLSEVER, 1997:81).

In this context, National Hat Reform was one of the outstanding events in 1925. Hat wasintroduced to Turkish people during the famous Kastamonu Journey of Mustafa Kemal Pashaand it replaced all other form of caps with the Law No. 671 dated November 25, 1925. Onemay understand that the intention of Ataturk was not forcing people to wear hats or whatever,but hat was the symbol of the new dress code of the Republic and it was also a step for thenation to understand that everything was changing. The law was prepared by Refik Bey,

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Konya Congressman and his friends and was accepted at TBMM on November 30, 1925. Itbecame effective after being issued on the Official Gazette on December 22, 1925.

Many writers agree that National Hat Revolution had strong ties with secularism. The by-law about the new dress code dated September 2, 1925 for the men of religious services canbe taken as a formative secularism arrangement. At the time being it was important to replacehat with the old and religious symbols like fez or turban.

Civil CodeThe women’s liberation problem was tried to be solved after the First Constitutional Periodwith the help of the Westernist movement. The Ottoman intellectuals succeeded to openschools for girls and create working fields for women during the I. World War. Those werereal reforms for that time. “Mecelle” (the Ottoman Code of Civil Law prepared by a councilled by Ahmet Cevdet Pasha between 1869-1876 and it was enacted in 1877) was the biggestof those reforms then. Mecelle contained of 16 books and 1851 articles. Mecelle was thecore of the Ottoman law system and it was pretty modern in comparison to the other Easternlaw systems of the time.

On the otherhand, according to Mustafa Kemal, Mecelle wasn’t sufficient to respond tothe needs of the Revolution. A new Civil Code, mostly translated from that of Switzerland,and The Turkish Code of Obligations and then The Turkish Penal Code inspired by that ofItalian were all prepared during the term of Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, the Minister of Justice.The new Turkish Penal Code was really important for the new Republic to carry the nationto the level of modern countries. First of all, the laic feature of the state was all clarified inthe Penal Code. During the enactment of the new Civil Code, Hodja Mustafa Effendi, aMuslim scholar was the chairman of the commission. The Civil Code was enacted on Feb-ruary 17, 1926. Turkish Code of Obligations was issued on April 22, 1926 and enacted onOctober 4, 1926. Turkish Trade Law was enacted on May 29, 1926 and it was followed byTurkish Citizenship Law on May 28, 1928. Turkish Cede of Civil Procedure was approvedby TBMM on June 18, 1927. (TÜRKİYE TARİHİ)-IV: 111-112) International numerals(instead of the Arabic ones) were adopted on May 24, 1928.

According to the new Penal Code, the women had the same inheritance rights as men andit has been a law that one man could marry only one woman. This way the modern Turkishfamily was founding and all the laws were revised according to the modern needs. MustafaKemal Atatürk was saying that Turkish women were in no way lower than the Turkish menand, moreover, they were the also the war heroes for keeping families together, working inthe fields and even carrying munitions to the fronts during the National Independence War.Besides, it was impossible to be civilized and keep half of a nation down while the otherhalf up. He thought there could hardly be other women like the Turkish women who survivedsuch a hard struggle (KARAL, 1998:112).

The Committee of Union and Progress had always been keen on the matter of girls’ schoolsto be opened. They took the veil from the face of Ottoman women, but sexist problems likemen and women sitting separate at the universities still lingered on during the first days ofthe Republic. This rule was also abolished after the Republic and Turkish women started tohave all the rights like working in public, voting and being voted and all other women’srights thanks to the laic applications of the new Turkish Civil Code (FEYİZOĞLU, 1999:177-178).

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All the Islamic dervish lodges and pensions were closed due to the Law No. 677 in 1925.The religious sects were banned and usage of religious titles like, “sheikh”, “dervish” and“caliph” were all prohibited. Fortunetelling, curing people by religious methods and wearingclothes bearing signs of religious sects were also forbidden (FEYİZOĞLU, 1999: 176-177).The Kemalist revolution seemed to take the official Islam under its “wings.” It also didn’twant Turkish people to be abused by some “evil-minded” sects and Islamic groups any morelike some Ottoman sultans have been in the past. The Kemalist revolution was also awarethat mosques were not used only for religious services in traditional Islam and they wantedthe information flow between the state and the public to be in a much more modern way. Inthis historical point of turn where Turks have been a “nation-state” the first time in history,mosques were supposed to be the “ideological devices” where the main principles of thestate were presented to the public.

Conclusion: The Rational Manifest of Turkish ModernismAs has been argued, secularism was introduced to Turkish history with Amasya CircularNote. In Amasya Circular Note it was said that “The only thing that will save Turkish nationis their determination and resolution again.” TBMM assembled on April 23, 1920 and an-nounced that “Our main objective is to help the national will to dominate the destiny of thehomeland. There is no power higher than the TBMM.” The secularism movement of theKemalism wasn’t limited to that and in the very first article of the 1921 Constitution it wasstated that “The domination power unconditionally belongs to the nation. The administrationis based on self-determination”. The second article read “The power to administer belongsto the Turkish National Assembly, the one and only representative of the nation”.

The first article was changed with the Law No.1222 and the sentence “The religion of theTurkish State is Islam” was abolished and the sentence “Turkish State is laic” was added tothe first article of 1924 Constitution. (HAFIZOĞULLARI, 2005; 59-60).

Secularism is the main principle of the Turkish modernization movement and the KemalistRevolution. Many Republican intellectuals say that to resist secularism means to resist themain values, principles and objectives of the Turkish Republic (ÖZEK, 1962: 72-73). Secu-larism is the spirit of the new regime. Ziya Gökalp, one of the “social engineers” and the“official sociologist” of the Republic stated that Islamic community era was over any moreand the idea of “ummah” actually was dissolved by the idea of nationality. Gökalp wantedreligion to go back to its inner and personal area and it could still stay as one of the compon-ents of the Turkish nation (GÜNAY, 1989:228-232). In short, Turkish sense of secularismwas not atheism at all, as some people want to promote it. Mustafa Kemal agreed Gökalpon that matter. The sociological analysis of Durkheim needed to be supported with the nat-uralism of Max Müller and several positivist and lawful judgments.

In the meantime, most of the right-wing Kemalist and nationalist intellectuals claimedthat the Ottoman Empire wasn’t a theocratic state. One could find laic implementations inthe national system and especially the attitudes towards non-Muslims. Those intellectualsalso claim that Mustafa Kemal thought the laic implementation of the Ottomans weren’tsufficient and Kemalism put them in a modern order at the Republic era (KAFESOĞLU-SARAY, 1983: 35-157).

Atatürk separated personal rights and liberties into two main titles as corporal and intel-lectual liberty. He thought every person should have the right to think, to believe or not believe

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something, to perform or not to perform the religious services of any religion s/he prefersand to defend her/his political thoughts at every level. According to him, free will was themost important personal area of a person. Atatürk believed the main think he would expectin life was secularism. (SEZEN: 281) Thus, secularism was not only the core of the Revolu-tion, but also a cultural, national, lingual and historical aspect of the new life offered to thenation by the state. However, secularism was not meant to defeat Islam at all.

So, what was done for the revolution and especially secularism after the Republic? Mardingives us a response here: “Whenever a reason was asked for all those behaviors, ‘the neces-sities of modern civilization’ was the answer. That can be seen in many speeches MustafaKemal delivered during the 1920s. One of the laconic expressions of this logic is at the 1931Regulation of the Republican People’s Party. The new regime supported a political party,i.e. Republican People’s Party in TBMM from the very beginning and this party turned outto be the only legitimate organ of the Republican political expressions and the center wherethe official ideology of the new Republic was formed. The 1931 Regulation of the Party saidthey supported secularism because religion needed to stay as a ‘personal matter’ and thestate wasn’t supposed to take place in the religious lives of the citizens.” (Mardin: 67) Thus,secularism gained an ideological character in order to settle the young Turkish Republic onstrong basis. Secularism would later take its place in the Constitution together with the otherfive main principles of Republican People’s Party in 1937.

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Ankara)--------------------------- (1990), Türkiye Tarihi-IV (Cem, İstanbul)------------------------------, http://felsefetarihi.net/pozitivizm.htmhttp://www.inkilap.info/archives/180---------------------------------, www.hurriyet.com.tr---------------------------------, http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Suavi

About the AuthorsAhmed Baran DuralA. Baran Dural: Assistant Professor Doctor. Dural has a doctorate degree on the “Historyof New-Era Turkish Politics” and gives lectures at Trakya University Public AdministrationDepartment. Heading the Political and Social Sciences Discipline, Dural has published sev-eral books and many articles on Ataturk and some aspects of Turkish Modernization process.The titles of his boks can be stated as fellows: His Story: Mustafa Kemal and Turkish Re-

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volution (In English-2007); Revolt and Obeisance: Turkish Conservatism and NurettinTopcu (2005); Leadership of Ataturk (2002,2004) and Turkish Historical Novels (1991).

Gürkan Ozan TekinGürkan Ozan Tekin was graduated from TC Trakya University- Department of Public Ad-ministration. Heis currently a master-degree student at the same university. Tekin mainlyfocuses on Administrative Studies and Turkish History.

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EDITORS

Tom Nairn, The Globalism Institute, RMIT University, Australia. Mary Kalantzis, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA. EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Patrick Baert, Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK. David Christian, San Diego State University, San Diego, USA. Bill Cope, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA. Joan Copjec, State University of New York, Buffalo, USA. Alice Craven, American University of Paris, Paris, France. Michel Demyen, University of Victoria, Victoria, Canada. Elizabeth DePoy, University of Maine, Orono, USA Mick Dodson, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. Oliver Feltham, American University of Paris, Paris, France. Clyde R. Forsberg Jr., Oxford College/Aletheia University, Tamsui, Taiwan. Stephen French Gilson, University of Maine, Orono, USA. Hafedh Halila, Institut Supérieur des Langues de Tunis, Tunis, Tunisia. Souad Halila, University of Tunis, Tunis, Tunisia. Hassan Hanafi Hassanien, Cairo University, Cairo, Egypt. Ted Honderich, University College, London, UK. Paul James, Globalism Institute, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia. Moncef Jazzar, Institut Supérieur des Langues de Tunis, Tunis, Tunisia. Eleni Karantzola, University of the Aegean, Rhodes, Greece. Krishan Kumar, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, USA. Ayat Labadi, Institut Supérieur des Langues de Tunis, Tunis, Tunisia. Marion Ledwig, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, USA. Greg Levine, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia. Harry R. Lewis, Harvard University, Cambridge, USA. Fethi Mansouri, Institute for Citizenship & Globalization, Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia. Juliet Mitchell, Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK. Nahid Mozaffari, New York, USA. Nikos Papastergiadis, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia. Robert Pascoe, Victoria University, Melbourne, Australia. Scott Schaffer, University of Western Ontario, London, Canada. Jeffrey T. Schnapp, Stanford University, Stanford, USA. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Columbia University, New York, USA. Bassam Tibi, University of Goettingen, Goettingen, Germany and Cornell University, Ithaca, USA. Giorgos Tsiakalos, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece. Siva Vaidhyanathan, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, USA. Cheryl A. Wells, University of Wyoming, Laramie, USA. Zhang Zhiqiang, Nanjing University, Nanjing, People’s Republic of China. Chris Ziguras, Globalism Institute, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia.

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The Social Basis of Secularism: From Late- Ottomans to Early Republic Period

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Transcript of The Social Basis of Secularism: From Late- Ottomans to Early Republic Period