A Critique of Constitutional Secularism in India

Arun K Patnaik

I

Secularism and Secularisation: Problems in Theorisation

The crisis of Indian secularism is three-fold. First, there isa crisis in its goals, as its goals are not well-defineddespite availability of relevant knowledge from the moment ofits formation. Second, the means relied by Indian secularismis state-centric in both initiating reforms and settlinglong-pending disputes, thus reducing religious communities aspassive entities leaving them vulnerable for a religiousright-wing mobilisation. Third, there is a wide chasm betweensecular regime/secularism and socio-historical process/secularisation that indicates culture of religious tolerance.Bypassing good sense in social imaginary of people, itsrational doctrine is not able to develop a strong base insociety. Therefore, an evaluation of constitutional secularismin India must at least proceed along these three lines.

As the Indian constitution tries to build secularism throughan exclusive reliance on the state power in India’s feudalconservative society, political secularism is trapped within alegal constitutional path. As a result, several commentatorslike Zaheer Ali (2014), Imtiaz Ahmed (1984) and others arguethat India has witnessed a split image between the secularstate and traditional society. Instead of carrying out a massmobilisation programme as an extra-constitutional mechanism tobuild political secularism, the political forces representingsecularism have left the field of mass mobilisation openwithout any fight with the Hindu right especially since 1980s.Even the fight against Hindu right is confined to the domainof law and parliamentary institutions over the years sinceIndependence. Whether it is the need of reforming aconservative society or the need for contesting the Hinduright, secular political society by and large relies on law

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and parliamentary institutions, thus failing in its duty toconnect with masses, their social imaginaries across religiousspectrums. Its over-confidence emanating from being in chargeof the state power for the most periods of India’scontemporary history has now become its bane. Consequently,India has paid a huge price against secularism in recentelections. In a show of power, the Hindu communalism has nowturned the tables against secularism by capturing the statepower on an unprecedented scale in 2014. The over-confidenceof secular forces is now dented.

The emergence of the Modi phenomena thus should be traced backto the very statist and legalist character of politicalsecularism since 1950. The weaknesses of the secular statefollowing a legal path to initiate reforms of secularism arewidely exposed and have been exploited to the hilt by theHindu right. However, tragically the Modi phenomena representa story of continuity with the legal and statist path ofdevelopment followed by the secular state on the one handwhile it threatens to subvert the constitutional goals ofsecularism on the other hand. While commentators usuallynotice discontinuities between the Modi phenomena andpolitical secularism, it is usually forgotten to connect thestrength of Modi phenomena to several weaknesses of politicalsecularism as practised by liberal and left secularists overthe last seven decades since Independence. There is one morereason why the less introspective secular camp is silent intalking about its weaknesses which might have helped in therise of the Modi phenomena. In today’s binary world, thesecular camp is built on an anti-communal plank only. As aresult, the secular camp is wary of criticizing its ownsecular politics, its goals or reform paths or its solereliance on the agency of law/state or a combination of thesefactors. While fighting against majority or minoritycommunalism, I submit that the inherent weaknesses ofsecularism in its set of goals/paths/agencies or all of theseshould not go unnoticed.

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A sensitive commentator like Rajeev Bhargava (2010) ends up inclaiming that constitutional secularism is alright withsecular goals and paths of reforms in its formative yearssince Independence up to the Rajiv era when certain practicesof secular state began to display ‘opportunistic’ tendencies.While correctly discovering a distinctive path of secularismin the Indian Constitution, Bhargava goes overboard injustifying political secularism as envisaged in theConstitution. While responding to its critics like AshishNandy (1998: 321-344), T N Madan (1998: 297-320) and ParthaChatterjee (1998: 345-379) for having failed to recognise thedistinctive features of Indian secularism, Bhargava does notsee any problem with its normative goals or strategies orpaths of reforms as envisaged in the Indian constitution. Herather offers a philosophical justification of constitutionalsecularism. First, I agree with Bhargava that there aredistinctive features of secularism in the Indian constitution.But I would like to problematize some of its own goals andeven the strategy of reforms that Bhargava tends to justify ordoes not notice. Second, while justifying constitutionalsecularism, protagonists do not notice that secular forcesexclusively relied on the constitutional path/methods to driveits secular agenda home since 1950. It statist approach is acommon thread running from the Nehru era to the Rajiv periodand even beyond. Indeed, statist methods are its bane whichhave been converted as opportunities by the Hindu right.Thus, the exclusive reliance on the state power is a commonthread running between secular forces and the Hindu right.Despite the difference between these two ideologicaladversaries, it is necessary to recognise the tendency ofpolitical/ideological statism common across these two entitiesin India today. Thus, those who justify constitutionalsecularism fail to notice the weaknesses in statism followedby the secular camp that might have considerably helped in therise of the Hindu right as we shall demonstrate below.

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There are two competing discourses on political secularism. Onthe one hand, Bhargava argues that during its formativeperiods, Indian secularism shows certain distinctiveness incharacter. Unlike its Western counterpart which is primarilyfocused on a negotiation with intra-religious domination, theIndian variant is primarily focused on a double negotiationwith inter-religious domination and intra-religiousdomination. On the other hand, Nandy, Madan and Chatterjeeargue that the Indian secularism since its formative periodsis heavily reliant on the state power to promote secularismwhich is a tendency of post-Enlightenment rationalism in theWest and thus ignores or marginalises the many forms ofcommunitarian practices of religious tolerance in Indianhistory. I submit that, seen differently, both thesediscourses could be seen complementary rather than opposed toeach other as authors of two competing discourses tend toproject. If I may be allowed, I submit that Bhargava discussesconstitutional goals of secularism whereas his critics mainlytalk about means of cultural tolerance. Seen differently,Bhargava theorises ‘ends’ and his critics examine ‘means’. Intheir debate, authors confuse means with ends or vice versa.In other words, if I am correct, in terms of its corecontributions this debate is about non-starter, though itcould be about peripheral points. For me, both thesediscourses make tremendous sense for political secularism orsecularisation during its formative periods sinceIndependence. For Bhargava the question of means ofsecularisation is non-problematic whereas the question of endsof Indian secularism is deeply significant so much so that heends up in their ‘justification’ which is in my view is notfree from problems as stated below. Similarly, for hiscritics, the means of secularisation is deeply significant somuch that the exclusion of these means for them signifies thedemise of secularism. The goals of secularism are deeplyflawed just because means deployed are flawed or weak. Thus,there is confusion between goals and means in both discourses.

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To use Charles Taylor’s language (2013), if I may, there isconfusion between secularism and secularisation. The former isabout the form of regime that Bhargava talks about whereas thelatter is about a socio-historical process of religioustolerance that his critics examine, despite their so-called‘anti-secular manifesto’. Reflecting on European experiences,Taylor further argues that under certain historicalconjectures, due to a variety of reasons, there may not benecessary correlation between secularism and secularisation.In other words, political secularism may not be able tosuccessfully secularise society and thereby fail to protectsecular form of political regime. Conversely, a secularisationprocess in society may move ahead and push for appropriatereforms when the form of regime may suffer from a time lag dueto its wishy-washy moral stances in its conception ofsecularism. Though Taylor’s hypothesis is derived from Westernexperiences, I suggest that his hypothesis may be taken as‘empty theory’ outlining a few boundary relations valid fornon-Western history as well, notwithstanding distinctivefeatures of the lag between secularism and secularisation inIndia or elsewhere in the East. We need these distinctiveaspects of the lag between secularism and secularisation fromIndia to fill Taylor’s empty theory in order to develop a‘filled theory’ of Indian secularism and its crisis.1 Thisintroduction needs to be kept in mind while assessingsecularism and secularisation in Indian history. Below, wereturn to some of these issues.

II

Goals

As I said before, we must first examine the constitutionalgoals of secularism. Secularism as a form of regime isenshrined in the Indian constitution and the constitutioninstructs the state power to behave in a specific way topromote secularism, even though it must be admitted thatnowhere the constitution denies that the state may adopt any

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of the extra-constitutional means like dialogue withcommunities to promote secular-oriented reforms or settlereligious disputes, if any. The constitutional narrativesuggests that the state must initiate reforms of differentkinds and its different provisions suggest that the state mustenact appropriate laws to promote these provisions, if neededfurther. So secularism in the India constitution is envisagedas a ‘master reform narrative’ of the Indian state, if I mayuse Taylor’s evocative phrase for modernity/secularism. Theconstitution proposes to initiate many reforms like uniformcivil code ensuring women’s equal rights denied by religioussanctions, Dalit entry into Hindu temples, safeguards forreligious freedom, equal opportunities to Dalits and Tibalsdenied by religious sanctions, safeguards for minority rightsto culture/worship/education and so on.

In other words, Rajeev Bhargava is right in saying that theIndian secularism negotiates with two forms of domination –inter-and intra-religious – to transform a religiouscommunity. It respects religious faith and creates conditionsfor each faith to flourish without leading to domination overeach other. If we relook at the above constitutionalprovisions we will be able to make sense of Bhargava’s thesis.Intra-religious domination refers to domination within eachreligion whereas inter-religious domination refers todomination of a religion over other religions. The uniformcivil code is meant to curb domination within each religionover women’s rights in marriage/property/divorce. Similarlycriminal codes like the prohibition of dowry or domesticviolence promote women’s rights curbed by religious sanctions.Dalit entry into temples is an aspect of reform initiativewithin Hinduism recognised by the constitution. This was thedemand of a large number of anti-caste movements withinHinduism for a long time preceding the formation of thesecularism in India. Periyar’s description of Sama-Dharma orsocial equality before religions (akin to equality before law)fits our bill here. Similarly, safeguards for minority rights

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are meant to protect education, culture and religious freedomby preventing the majority religion dominating over minorityrights. As these are justiciable rights, religious minoritiescan seek a court of law to defend their rights if they feelthreatened by the majority religion. Similarly, SCs (includingDalits) and Tribes can demand equal opportunities ineducation, job and political representation for theconstitution provides for them, thereby intends to reformHindu society that denied education for these communities forages. Once again, these are justiciable rights. That means SCsand STs can go to law courts if the political executive is notable to curb the denial of opportunities for them in the statesector. These are mandates for the state to enforce themagainst any threat arising out of a caste bias sanctioned byreligion. Broadly, there are thus two kinds of constitutionalprovisions ensuring the curb of domination within or without,sanctioned by a religious community.

The constitutional provisions express the spirit of the time.These provisions articulate demands in social imaginary ofIndia up to 1940s. But they continue to remain valid today inso far as the social imaginary is not fully reformed by themaster reform narrative of the Indian constitution. However,noble as these may be, the same constitutional provisions donot fully express the spirit of the time in 1940s. There twovery important goals which are left out for a long time whenthe Constitution came into operation by the Indian state in1950. As these goals are left out, they have producedperverse consequences for secularism in 2015. The shrill voiceof Ghar Wapsi is an outcome of this kind under the Modigovernment in New Delhi. Thus, contrary to many commentatorswho see Modi phenomena as a break with constitutional past, Isee continuity of Modi phenomena from the deficits inconstitutional past of secularism. Let us elaborate thisaspect now.

Faced with the Hindu right since 1990s or the Modi phenomenain 2014, the protagonists of political secularism end up in

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justifying the Indian Constitution in 1950s or later. I wouldlike to problematize this justification. First, there is noprovision for Christian and Muslim Dalits offering them equalopportunities in the state sector. Second, the constitutiontalks about enactment of laws providing for ‘reasonablerestraints’ for propagation of a religion. Yet, there is noprovision in the constitution or even a separate national lawreasonably restraining conversion or reconversion activitiesin public spaces in India’s multi-religious society. Itsfailure to enact any national law imposing reasonablerestraints has considerably weakened constitutional goals bynow. Let us develop these two propositions further.

Religious Neutrality of the Scheduled Caste:

First, an Ambedkarite may argue that the Anglo-Indianrepresentation in the Assembly misguided Ambedkar thatChristian community must be treated as a homogeneouscommunity. This is not convincing. Ambedkar himself was morethan aware that caste operates among Christian and Muslimcommunities in India as he notes this fact in his famous workon AOC. Dalit Christian employees from Southern Railways methim in Madras in his several visits prior to the operation ofthe Assembly and brought to his attention the issues of castediscrimination faced by them. So also Nehru was aware of castebased discrimination among Christians. Yet, it is verysurprising that these stalwarts did not bother to debate atleast on this issue of reservation for Dalit Christians andMuslims in the Assembly. It is a different matter thatrepresentatives from religious minorities agreed with S PMukherjee to do away the British policy of reservation forMuslims and Christians and did not bother to even talk aboutreservation policy for their Dalit members. There was nodiscussion of caste among Christians and Muslims, unlike theother religious minority of Sikh community whoserepresentatives vigorously forced the issue of recognition ofthe caste question outside Hindu fold and demanded forreservation policy for a few major Dalit communities amongSikhs. Once the Presidential Order was issues in 1950, SikhDalits demanded to include ‘all Sikh Dalits’ which was obligedin amending the Order in 1956. On the contrary, K M Munshi’s

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proposal to drop caste from the report on minorities in theConstituent Assembly (henceforth Assembly) was unanimouslyaccepted in the Assembly, without any debate whatsoever. Nobody – Ambedkar, Nehru and others – did talk about caste amongMuslims and Christians in the Assembly, except the lone voiceof Wilson who raised the reservation for Dalit Christians ineducation sector on the concluding day of the Assembly whileadopting the Draft. Wilson’s timing was wrong for a rightnote.

Moreover, while pleading for continuation of reservation forSCs and STs for ‘at least 10 years’, Ambedkar comparesreservation for religious minorities for nearly 60 years withthe same for SCs and STs among Hindus for nearly 2 years underthe British Government. Commenting on Ambedkar’s stances inthe Assembly, Rowena Robinson (2014) argues that Ambedkar isincorrect, for the reservation of seats for Muslims in theLegislative Council was there over 40 years, not 60 years asclaimed by him. However, Robinson forgets to notice a moreserious problem that there is palpable confusion in Ambedkar’sinterpretation. A policy of reservation on the grounds ofreligion is distinct from a policy of reservation on thegrounds of caste within a religion. These two policies are notcomparable. Moreover, the distinctions are very clear in termsof his own work in the AOC which recognises caste among allreligions in India and pleads for its destruction though apolicy of equality of opportunities. Ambedkar’s own positionin the Assembly is very inconsistent in terms of hisperspective in AOC. I agree with Robinson that the entireConstitutional Assembly including the Christian and Muslimrepresentatives ignored the issue of caste in religiousminorities except in the case of Sikhs thanks to the debatesraised by them. However, there was no debate and discussion onthis issue among Christians and Muslims. What is moreintriguing is that Ambedkar and Nehru preferred to keep quitedespite having knowledge of caste discrimination in the foldof non-Hindus. They did not even bother to raise it. Both ofthem were deeply worried about reforms among Hindus only andwanted appropriate measures to be placed in the Indianconstitution. This is the beginning of crisis of secularism inIndia. The religious minorities were more worried aboutsafeguards of minority rights – a set of “interlocked rights”

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(if I may borrow from Robinson) - from being encroached by theHindu majority: the right to profess, practice and propagate,the right to language, the right to religious instruction ineducation, the right to schooling and educational property andso on. Religious minorities were projected as homogenouscommunities freed from caste discrimination as it were. So theright to equal opportunities for Dalits among them exceptSikhs is sacrificed without any contestation or debate in theAssembly. Since 1986, Dalit Christians and Muslims aredisenchanted with this constitutional position and they feelalienated from its secular principle. Faced with no otheralternative against the Hindu right, these communities havenow gone to the Supreme Court since 2004-2005 seeking remediesfor their suffering. Their demand is to strike down the ‘para3’ of the Constitution (SC) Order, 1950 as discriminatory andviolative of Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Articles 14,15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution as this para provides forreligious-basis of reservation in a secular country.

The BJP’s confusion:

The Modi government is opposed to the reservation for DalitChristians and Muslims. Its Minister for Social Justice is onrecord in saying that the government is opposed to this demandas it fears it might encourage religious conversion en masse.The BJP’s overall position on this issue is very confusing.Its first confusion consists in the denial of the existence ofcaste among Muslims and Christians. Its claim is plainlyincorrect. Its second confusion consists in mixing up thedemand of reservation on caste grounds in a religion with theBritish policy of reservation on religious grounds. Third, itclaims that such a policy would lead to a large-scaleconversion from Hinduism to Islam or Christianity. It assumesthat such a conversion did not happen due to the absence ofsuch a policy. On the contrary, by not recognising caste amongMuslims/Christians and by not initiating reforms among them,the Indian constitution and subsequent laws give an impressionthat these religions are egalitarian or liberal enough toinitiate reforms on their own and thus victims of caste maymigrate to them. Thus, in my view, the BJP has missed the busin exposing caste-based inequalities among non-Indic religiouscommunities and thereby indirectly aiding mass conversion. A

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potential convert or a victim of caste now imagines thatcaste-free practices are followed by non-Indic minorities – abelief historically reinforced by the Indian constitution andnow by the BJP’s confused policy.

By now, Dalit Christians and Muslims feel terribly alienatedfrom the Constitution that seeks to promote secularism incaste-ridden religious communities but is silent on the issueof caste discrimination among religious minorities exceptSikhs in 1956 and Buddhists in 1990. The dithering UPAgovernment being scared of the Hindu right could not evendebate the report by the Ranganath Misra commission whichrecommended for reservation for all Dalits across religiousgroups by deleting the controversial Para 3 of thePresidential Order of 1950 and by making the Scheduled Castereligion-neutral like the Scheduled Tribe. But by simplytabling the report in the Lok Sabha on the last day of thewinter session in 2009, the UPA government thought that itdischarged its secular responsibilities, as it were, and didnot even gather any courage to debate the report in thesubsequent sessions till 2014. So much for its courageousstands for secularism! Meanwhile, the deafening silence ofthe Constitution that began since 1950 continues despiteprotestations by Dalit Christians and Muslims to set it right.And the subaltern groups are left to fight their battle in theSupreme Court to drop unconstitutional provisions of the saidPara 3 of the Presidential Order 1950. When politicaltheorists justify the constitutional secularism in the faceHindu right’s assault, they miss out that it cannot bejustified in the face of protestations by Dalit Christians andMuslims. This is indeed one of the main problems in politicaljustificationism. There is still one more problem withconstitutional secularism. Before we discuss the secondproblem, let us examine one critical provision in theconstitution where the fate of Dalit Christians and Muslimshang on.

Non-Indic Dalit’s confusion

In my view, to realise the dreams of the DalitChristians/Muslims, there is one more road block in theconstitutional Article 25(2) (b) with a provision “providingfor social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu

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religious institutions of a public character to all classesand sections of Hindus.” (Note: Hindus mean Sikhs, Buddhists,Jains for the purpose of reforms) There is a deep flaw in thisprovision that has not caught their imagination in theirwritings and in their three writ petitions in the SupremeCourt. Read this provision carefully. The following questionsmay be asked. What are ‘religious institutions of a publiccharacter’? What kind of reforms that may be introduced withinHindus, Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains? Are these reforms notrelevant for other religious minorities like Christians andMuslims? If they are relevant, why are these minoritiesexcluded from the reform narrative as proposed under thisprovision? How this provision was debated in the Assemblybefore its enactment? Does the exclusion of Christians andMuslims from reform mean that social welfare or reforms arenot needed by them? Or, if they are required, does the Indianconstitution mean hereunder that communities rather than thestate must provide for social welfare or reforms forChristians or Muslims? These are all critical questions thatmust be asked at this stage. We provide some provisionalanswers below.

As Dalit scholars among Christians and Muslims argue thatthere is caste discrimination among Christians and Muslims anddemand for equality of opportunities in education, jobs andpolitical representation.2 While the Presidential Order deniesreservation, the Constitution under Art. 25 (b) (2) does noteven recognise that social welfare reforms are necessary forChristians and Muslims. Thus, both the Constitution and theConstitutional Order (CO) 1950/1990 reinforce each other. Bothassume that there is no need to reform religious practices inChristianity and Islam in India. These two religions that cameto India from outside are assumed as egalitarian andhomogenous entities as they do not believe in caste system intheory. As stated before, Christian and Muslimrepresentatives, Ambedkar and Nehru were silent on this issueof caste among Christians and Muslims. Nehru on the contraryfelt that Hindus should first reform themselves. For him,tackling Hindu communalism was a priority in the Discovery ofIndia. He thus kept quiet on the need to reform all non-Hindureligions. From Nehru’s point of view, this crucial issue ofreform was then left to the respective members of the

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Assembly. Thus, in my view, Nehru behaved as if he was amember of Hindu community, despite being agnostic himself.Ambedkar being quiet on this issue probably shared the traitof Nehru: reform Hindus first. It must be said that Ambedkardid not share this trait of Nehru all throughout before hejoined the Assembly. He (2014: 268-270) indeed criticisedGandhi and Nehru for their complicity with Muslim leadershipfomenting trouble for secular democracy. He calls theirattitude smacking of Muslim appeasement and warns that itwould be dangerous for democracy for not being bold enough tocriticise Hitler-like forces among Muslims as these forceswould produce Hitler-like forces among Hindus later on. What aprophetic warning from Ambedkar? Yet, Ambedkar did notquestion the reform narrative of the Indian Constitution. Hisplea for Hindu code bills initiating reforms for women amongHindus only proves my hunches that he was a willing partner ofa Neruvian legacy which he was quite rightly very criticalbefore. But his criticisms of Nehruvian legacy and so also hisviews on caste in all religions simply vanished in the portalsof the Assembly and later when he became India’s Law Ministerin the Nehru cabinet. It is indeed very strange that Ambedkarwho was a critique of minority appeasement policy of Nehru andGandhi and is now a perpetrator of same legacy: reform Hindusfirst, postpone reforms of minorities indefinitely and assumethat minorities are egalitarians or reform themselves on theirown. These are elements of a narrative of minorityappeasement. Ambedkar’s inconsistency is very revealing here.Losing a debate by raising a point about non-Indic subalternlife is one thing but it is a different thing altogether toshy away from a debate about subaltern life and keep quiet inorder to appease non-Indic elite interests. Ambedkar’sinconsistency has compromised with his own critique ofdemocracy as an appeasement policy.

As caste was ignored among non-Indic minorities, there was noneed to reform non-Indic religions or offer equality ofopportunities for non-Indic Dalit groups. This is indeed acentral mistake made by the Indian Constitution. DalitChristian and Muslim organisations have complicated their caseby not confronting this particular reform narrative of theIndian Constitution. By upholding the Constitution and bychallenging the CO as unconstitutional they have almost lost

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their case in what looks like a very consistent case of denialof caste based discrimination within these religiouscommunities. Both at the time of formation of the IndianConstitution and 70 years down the line in Indian politics, aconsiderable body of knowledge is available to claim thatthere are various forms of caste segregation in religiouspublic life like places of worship, marriage, graveyard, andin the matters of educational and social opportunities forDalit Christians and Muslims. As I have said before, Ambedkarand the Christian members of the Constitutional Assembly wereaware of this fact. They maintained dead silence on the issue,despite the Sikh members of the Assembly vociferously foughtfor reforms in Sikhism for a few Dalit groups in Punjab.Though the Constitution recognised the need for reforms andextended reservation for four SC communities among Sikhs inthe CO 1950, it soon led to feverish activities among Punjab’sDalit Sikh communities who demanded an amendment of the CO byincluding all Dalit Sikhs. Consequently, the ConstitutionalOrder of 1956 extended this reform narrative to all Sikh Dalitgroups. Non-Indic religious communities were left out of itsreform narrative. What must however be noted that theConstitutional Order of 1956 is consistent with the reformnarrative under the provision of Article 25 (b) (2) in Indianconstitution. Similarly, the neglect of reform of non-Indicminorities in the CO of 1950, 1956 and 1990 remains consistentwith the spirit of reform embodied in the Indian Constitution.All these successive legislations from 1950 to 1990 followingthe spirit and provisions in Indian Constitution consistentlyneglect a reform narrative needed for non-Indic minorities.The beneficiaries of a new reform narrative, if it were tohappen, would have been the SC non-Indic communities.

The Scheduled Caste, argues the Ranganath Misra Committee(2009:154), is religion-neutral group. But the Constitution ofIndia is silent on the existence of Scheduled Caste in allreligions. It is indeed very strange that the Ranganath MisraCommittee does not find any problem with the Constitutiondespite India’s non-Indic minorities being kept out of itsreform welfare perspective since 1950. But it is stillstranger that non-Indic Dalit groups and our secular politicaltheorists who are quick to find a flaw in the CO 1950 do nothave any problem with the Constitution’s reform narrative.

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Thus, a reform of the reform narrative of Indian Constitutionis the need of the hour to move beyond the present impasse inIndian secularism.

Gender is also religion-neutral

Similarly, I would simply hint here without much elaborationthat gender inequality is also there among all religions. Likecaste, gender is religion-neutral. But the constitutional lawsenvisage only reforming Hindus, following Nehru-Ambedkar’spolicy of reforming Hindus first. Both had sufficientknowledge contrary to their policy actions. To postpone apolicy action for the time being is to delay it indefinitely.These stalwarts did not even bother to debate these issues inthe Constituent Assembly or in Parliament later when they tookup Hindu code bills. As the economist Keynes famously saidthat in the long run we are all dead. At least, theoretically,political secularism has not uniformly debated women’s concernson marriage and property reforms within Indian Islam,Christianity, Sikhism and others over the last 60 years. Whilecommenting on secular sectarianism of feminist politics, GAjay and M Nassim (2014: 16-19) argue that feminist politicscould not articulate gendered practices among all religions inIndia especially after the Shah Bano case in 1985. Feministscould not even initiate dialogue for reforms of personal lawsof each religion, due to an acute fear of legitimising theHindu right that hijacked the issue of uniform civil code.

In recent years, secular political representatives woke up to recognise at least Christian marriage reforms. An exception isthe Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872 which is a colonial law. No reform was initiated by the secular state for a long time since 1947. However, since 2000 a bill initiating marriage reforms among Christians is initiated and pending forapproval by the Parliament. As Flavia Agnes (2015) argues, there is the lack of uniformity of reforms for women. While commenting on the recently introduced Indian Christian Marriage Bill (2000), Flavia Agnes (2015) argues, “While Hinduwomen have a specific and independent right of maintenance under section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1955, the same does not hold true for Christian women”. This shows bizarre character of Indian secularism. There is no uniform civil code initiating reforms across the board or even

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diverse civil codes introducing similar reforms pertaining to each religion. What is important for us is to recognise that this sectarianism originates in the Nehruvian consensus on reforming Hindus first. Ambedkar’s entire position was different from this consensus even after India’s partition, yet he fell for it in the making of the Indian Constitution. The limitations of this Nehruvian consensus have been dangerously hijacked by the Hindu right to project itself as asecular front. An elaboration of how this political expose is carried out by the Hindu right is beyond the scope of the present paper. For the moment, it is enough to point out that merely criticising present day secular sectarianism is not enough. Its historical genesis must be traced back.

No reform of a corrupted religion

Gandhi’s opposition

Let us now discuss our second problem with norms of the reformnarrative of the constitution. Neither the Constitution norany national secular law following it have any positionprohibiting public campaign for conversion or reconversion,despite a significant body of knowledge available with most ofIndia’s leaders including Gandhiji, though he was not a memberof the Assembly. It is necessary to examine this proposition.Before the making of the Indian Constitution, Gandhi, Nehru,Ambedkar, Sardar Patel, to cite a few, were very critical ofconversion/reconversion debate. Gandhi in fact had conducted aseries of dialogue with Church on this issue. Though in theoryhe was opposed to conversion/ Suddhi/ Tabligh, he more oftenopposed public campaign for all these activities. I reject histheoretical stance but accept his practical opposition. Thisfor me has great political significance to restore people’sfaith in secularism. I reject his theory because all religionsmust have some internal beliefs like conversion or Suddhi orTabligh. It is dangerous to ban internal beliefs of eachreligion. Least of all, this is not a job of the secularstate. Think differently, if the Gandhian state bansconversion/Suddhi/Tabligh it ends up in enforcing closure oneach religion and asks them to shut their doors against anyindividual eager to join as a new member. Then such religionsliving under the Gandhian state would be closed, static and

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frozen without any new membership, new ideas and new dynamismpossible due to this Gandhian over-action.

Despite a lexical confusion regarding the ban of allconversion activities thundered by Gandhi, Gandhi comes aroundand makes an interesting argument against any public campaignfor conversion which may include Suddhi or Tabligh, if I mayextend his view. In my view, let religious communities believein conversion/Suddhi/Tabligh so that their religion is openfor new members if they wish to migrate from one to anotherreligion. But, as Gandhi (1999, vol. 38: 16–17; vol. 96: 238–239) argues, religious communities should not carry anypropaganda for their religion in public places in a village orin any urban centre where masses gather in large numbers insearch of good life. For, as Gandhi (Bose, 1996: 234) argues,all religions must treat each other as friends or neighbours,not as strangers or enemies to be civilised byconversion/Suddhi/Tabligh. In my view, this is the best ofGandhi which has a deeper relevance in India today when theshrill voices of Suddhi/conversion have picked up since 1990s.There are a large number of people like Ivan Illich from amongChristians who adopt a similar view. Elaborating Illich’sperspective on this controversy, Charles Taylor (2007: 737-743) recently argues that it is one kind of corruption ofreligion to claim that one’s religion is superior to anotherreligion and should carry out civilising mission across theworld or in a particular geography. Gandhi, Illich and Taylorare all opposed to civilising mission of each religionincluding their own. That it could be pursued globally orlocally depending on the reach of each religion does notmatter really. Civilising mission might be adopted by allmajor religions – Indic or non-Indic. Political secularismmust restraint all these religious groups as and when it mayfind that any one religious group follows tenets of‘civilising mission’ or what Illich calls ‘corruptedreligion’. In fact most religious groups do not practicecorrupted religious forms but one or two sects do it time andagain. ‘Corruption’ – moral corruption – of each religionraises its ugly head in each religion time and again underdifferent historical situations, if we accept Gandhi, Illichand Taylor.

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Despite Nehru and Ambedkar shared this view of Gandhiji, theIndian constitution does not reflect on a major threat toIndian secularism and does not provide for provisionspreventing or reforming a corrupted religion. Nehru opposedmass conversion or what may be called mass campaign forconversion as he called it anti-secular for mixing up religionwith politics – politics of civilising mission. Nehru’sposition is misunderstood as casteist opposition to conversionby the followers of Ambedkar’s mass conversion programme in1956. In my view, it is an incorrect understanding. Ambedkar’smass conversion is devoid of any public campaign forconversion to Buddhism. He merely gave a call for conversionto Dalit masses without doing any mass conversion campaign. Hewas not sure if masses would turn up in large numbers for hedid not campaign for conversion in villages, towns, pilgrimplaces, hospitals or educational centres prior to his massmeeting in Nagpur in 1956 when he converted to Buddhism. So,in my view, the opposition of Nehru and Gandhi to massconversion campaign should not be seen as opposition toAmbedkar’s call for masses for conversion. The latter’s callis not still same as mass conversion campaign opposed byNehru. When Nehru opposed mass conversion in NE region, hemeant to oppose mass conversion campaigns, not an ostensibledisplay of conversion in a mass meeting. Ambedkar did thelatter without any mass conversion campaigns that Gandhi orNehru opposed. It is necessary to make sense of theirpositions on conversion in order to comprehend the conversiondebate.  It is thus analytically possible to claim that there is a subtle distinctionbetween a call for conversion in a mass meeting on the one hand and the masscampaign for conversion which is usually carried out in different public places onthe other hand. The former is usually confused with the latter byAmbekarites. I am afraid that such an interpretation ofAmbedkar or Nehru on conversion debate is not tenable tounderstand casteism or secularism.3         

Ambedkar opposed conversion or Suddhi for different reasonsthough. In the case of conversion, caste discrimination is notsubstantially reduced, though it might symbolically provideaccess to shrines. Not always again for there are caste-basedChurches or caste-based graveyards all over India. Similarly,in the programme of Suddhi, caste discrimination is reinforcedor not even questioned or may provide symbolical access to

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sacred threads for all.4 Yet, their substantial viewsexpressing reservation on conversion or Suddhi are not evenreflected in the debates or in the provisions of Indianconstitution. Gandhi welcomed the secular state afterIndependence but was cautious to warn that the secular stateshould not patronise missionary activities, while it must notinterfere in the activities of the missionaries (Gandhi 1999,Vol. 96: 238–239). It is indeed strange that none of theirideas could enter the Assembly debates and ultimately guidethe framing of the constitutional provisions preventing therise of a corrupted religion. As a result, India has paid ahuge price in the form of what could be called ‘symbolicviolence’ against Hindus and Christians, frequently resultingin ‘physical violence’ against Christians as it happened inKandhamal, Dang, Mangalore and so on during the first decadeof 21st century.5

The Culture of Toleration between Hindus and Christians, 1950-1990

Post-Independent India has an interesting trajectory inrelation to the present controversy which is a kind of revivalof what happened in the British India. After Independence,India experienced restraint in conversion activities. Thiscould be seen a direct fall-out of two very important impactfactors. Due to the impact of criticism of the missionaryactivities by stalwarts like Gandhi, Nehru and Ambedkar andalso due to the impact of a social compact around thesafeguards of minority rights and religious freedom in theIndian constitution, the Church toned down its civilisingmissions pursued since the 19th century.

As India adopted a secular constitution, it considerablycalmed down nerves of Christian missionaries. In articulatingconversion, missionaries initially assumed that idolworshippers or nature worshippers must be wiped out. So fromthe very beginning it assumed a civilising mission ofcolonies. Sometimes, it was carried out with an aggressivezeal found in its extreme form of mission: inquisition policywhich was followed by Catholic Church in Goa during 1560 to1774. The inquisitor's act was to forbid any open practice ofthe Hindu faith at the risk of life. To counter the missionaryactivities, the Arya Samaj rearticulated Suddhi in public life

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towards the end of 19th century. But, as Sumit Sarkar (2007)argues, the idea of Suddhi could be traced back to thecivilising mission of Brahminical priests towards the tribalreligions contemptuously called animistic or natural andtherefore tribes need to be civilised further. This problemstill persists in India today. Moreover, the civilisingmission was very much present in the Brahminical Hinduism fromthe pre-colonial era. The Shaivite sects or Vaishnavite sectstied to civilise each other, resulting in religious war orsectarian passions and divisions among Hindus. It is thusimportant to note that Suddhi is the root cause of many oldconflicts among Hindu sects representing sectarian dominationwithin Hinduism or between tribes and Brahminism. The secularconstitution completely bypassed this entire conflict-riddensocial imaginary of Hinduism carried over from pre-colonialera and also new conflicts arising due to theSuddhi/conversion controversy from the colonial era. Thus, theconflicting social imaginary remained and still remainunaddressed by political secularism, thus restricting thescope of its narrative of reform of religions that stillbelieve in Suddhi/ conversion.

However, the positive turn-around of the Christian attitudeswas even appreciated by the Hindu right. During 1950 to mid-1990s, for almost 40 years, the Hindu right assumed thatMuslims posed a major threat to the Hindu culture and nation.As Devare (2011: 196) recently argues that during the mid-60s,the Hindu Mahasabha leader V D Savarkar began to think that‘the problems of the minority’ in India today is that of oneminority – the Muslim minority, not that of other two non-Indic minorities whom he excluded from his project of culturalnationalism outlined in 1920s. One of the implications wasthat Christians, being modern and now less aggressive in their‘civilising mission’, are no more threat to Hindu culture. Infact, no shrill voices from the RSS and Hindu Mahasabha wereraised against Church during this period. My friend M S SPandian, born in a Christian family and an agnostic self, toldme in the early 1990s that ‘Christians’ being moderns were notconsidered any threat to Hindu middle class and the Hinduright during its campaign for Ramjanmabhumi movement from 1989to 1992. The shrill voices against Christianity rose afterliberalisation which was introduced in the 1990s. Since

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liberalisation, the forces of conversion came onto the sceneand were in ascendancy. This led the Hindu right to revive itsold bogey against Christianity. It is thus interesting toknow that there was a peaceful compact between Hindus andChristians for almost 40 years since Independence. BothChristians and secular intellectuals did not note any threatto their survival from the Hindu right during this period. Andthe Hindu right perceived no threat from the Church againstHindu religion either. It resulted in a peaceful co-existencebetween the Church and the Hindu right, and between Christiansand Hindus for almost 40 years. This was made possible due toa sort of truce in its civilising mission by the Church as aresult of a new find confidence in the secular statesafeguarding minority rights and religious freedom. Also, therelentless dialogue and criticism of its missionary activitiesby the secular intellectuals like Gandhi, Nehru and Ambedkarcontributed no less to this culture of tolerance.

The Church did not carry any seemingly aggressive campaign forconversion and as a result, its impact on the RSS/VHP was alsopositive. The Hindu organisations stopped perceiving threatsfrom Christianity. So also, Christians stopped threatperception from the Hindu right. Though this hypothesis mustbe tested further with a lot of empirical proofs, it issufficient to inform at this stage that a policy of ‘no war’against Christians by the Hindu right is very self-evident inmost of the secular writings that followed during the laterdecades of war against Christians. Commenting on the anti-Christian attitudes of the Hindu right in Kandhamal and Dangduring 2000s, Ram Punyani (2010) argues that there is a‘sudden’ spurt of anti-Christian activities in the late 1980s.6

This means that there was no notable anti-Christian propagandaor anti-Christian riots for a long time till about 1990.Punyani argues that its primary focus was against the Muslimminority after India’s partition. Punyani is surprised aboutthe ‘sudden attack’ on a religious minority by the Hindu rightas he does not notice even provisionally that both Hindus andChristians shifted their respective positions since India’spartition due to a variety of factors as stated above. It isnecessary to offer at least a provisional explanation for thisera of peaceful co-existence due to the restraints in‘civilising mission’ by both religious communities, a new find

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constitutional secularity and the critical perspectives ofnational level leaders like Gandhi, Nehru and Ambedkar. Atleast these three factors may have cumulatively contributed tothe peaceful times between Christians and Hindus lasting forabout 40 years since Independence.

The constitutional morality of give and take is very importantfor the emergence of peace in the Christian social imaginary.The Christian members appreciated that the Hindu members ofthe Assembly while recognising the safeguards of minorityrights and religious freedom helped in balancing interests ofminority and majority religions under a secular state. Thisinvolved some amount of ‘sacrifice’ of majority interests todominate minority religions.7 Apart from criticisms fromGandhi/Nehru/Ambedkar, this gesture by other Hindu membersmight have also forced the Church to ‘give up’ itscivilisational claims against other religions inherited fromthe colonial era. It is better to state these findings asprovisional explanation rather than express surprise in theturn-around of everybody including the Hindu right and theChurch.

Since the era of liberalisation, however, the new find synergybetween Hindus and Christians is considerably dented. It isimportant to note that the shrill voices against conversionare anti-Christian rather than anti-Muslim. Why? Since theMeenakshipuram conversions happened way back 1981, Hinduright’s anti-Muslim campaign is notably silent on this issue.Why so? Is this silence an omission or part of a commission?However, with the expansion of Pentecostal Churches in 1990s,the social equilibrium painfully built by a forwarding lookinghistorical process is now disturbed. The rise of the Hinduright should be seen in connection with cultural anxietiesthat Pentecostal Churches produce among all other religionsincluding Hindus. It has led to the revival of the shrillvoice of Suddhi and the forces of Suddhi are now inascendancy. The future of India’s secularism is thus caughtbetween the deep sea of conversion and the devil of Suddhi, ifI may say so. As Lancy Lobbo (2009) suggests, PentecostalChurches represent Christian fundamentalism, a sort ofcorrupted Christianity. Their activities revive memories ofcivilising missions. Lobbo argues that these Churches carry

22

out what he calls ‘symbolic violence’ by trying to dominateanother religion. They believe in Christianisation of allcultures and therefore the tendency to dominate Hindus, tribesand other religions is visible. Barker, an American left-wingfeminist, argues that these Church groups arrive from USA withAmerican dollars to convert people with allurement in Thirdworld societies and target vulnerable groups in the era ofliberalisation. Due to liberalisation, when ordinary peopleare under stress for livelihood options, the PentecostalChurches offer solace to them. Barker (2007) argues that thesynergy between Pentecostalism and US led neo-liberalcapitalism is too strong. They adopt many strategies ofconversion. Apart from financial allurements, remedies forhealth and so on, their aggressive campaign in public placesis very common. They do visit places like hospitals, pilgrimcentres like Melas, even temples like Tirupathi Balaji and soon for campaigns as these are target points where massesgather in large numbers. Thus, their activities indicate thatthese Churches believe in mass campaign for conversion, aphenomena Nehru calls as mixing of religion with politics.Barker concludes that these Churches are the cause of stressfor secularists in the Third World.

Strangely, no secularists from the Left or Liberal camps inIndia have criticised Pentecostal Churches and their role inpromoting Christian fundamentalism.8 Except Lancy Lobbo, RudolfHeredia and Walter Fernandes, no secularist has evenidentified the rise of Christian fundamentalism responsiblefor the present crisis of secularism in India since 1990s.Even, All India Christian Council (AICC) is silent on thisissue.9 It is probably afraid of criticising cash-rich Churchesoriginating in the USA. It is probably afraid of revelation inpublic that its brothers are involved in putting a lot ofstress in secularism so that it might help the Hindu right’scause. It forgot to address Hindus and their culturalanxieties and failed to separate Hindus from the Hindu right.Its attitude of why-to-criticise-our-brothers-outside is noless responsible for pushing the Hindu/tribal masses to theHindutva fold. Its silence has given advantage to the Hinduright to carry out what Lobbo (2009) calls a violent campaignagainst the Church and Christian community per se. Also,political secularism of the Liberal and the Leftist forces

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turn away from it and only blame Hindu fundamentalism for thepresent crisis of secularism. Their conspiracy of silence mustbe broken to overcome the crisis of secularism. It will betoo late to leave the role of Christian fundamentalism to ahandful of intellectuals to expose and critique whereas theAICC and secular political parties would turn their ireagainst Hindu fundamentalism. This is a typical Nehruvianstrategy of reforming Hindus first which is badly flawed andexposed and made the future of secularism vulnerable byrisking the phenomenal growth of Hindu right. Therefore therise of the Modi phenomena should be seen in connection withinternal limits of political secularism in its goals,strategies, methods, mass mobilisation limited to electionprocess and so on.

III

Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that liberalsecularists have made of a mess of their ideology and politicsof secularism by simply opposing Hindu conservatism or Hinduright. By not initiating reforms for Muslims and Christiansthrough the Indian constitution and constitutional law, thesecular state gave a wrong signal to Hindus: Hindus mustreform first. The burden of secularism is shifted to Hindusonly. True, it included Indic minorities in its reformnarrative and also subsequently corrected the ConstitutionalOrder 1950 in 1956 and 1990. But it still leaves out two non-Indic minorities out of its reform narrative. As a result,Dalit Christians and Muslims feel alienated fromconstitutional secularism today. And the Hindu right complainsagainst its minority appeasement policy. Even though the leftsecularists are different from liberal secularists, theirposition is as one-sided as the liberal political camp on acrucial issue of conversion-Suddhi debate raging since 1990s.When the liberal and left camps converged on a crucial issue,the Nehruvian strategy of ‘critiquing Hindu communalism first’is exposed to its limits. By utilising these limits over aperiod of time since 1990, the Hindu right has now acquireddomination in parliamentary politics. The rise of Modiphenomena should be thus connected with limits of liberal andthe left secularists as such. Instead, secularists like

24

Punyani (2005), Sikand (2011), Lobbo (2009) and many otherssimply assume that Hindu right gained ascendancy bymanipulating Hindu masses as ‘foot soldiers’. According to theLeft secularists, the Hindu right gained advantage in 2014elections due to a media hype that stands for manipulation.Thus, secular intellectuals or secular political formations inIndia tend to deflect some of these difficult questions posedby this paper, refuse to come out of their cocoons and fail toexplain their own limitations/self-imposed silences which haveconsiderably helped Hindu communalism to rise in politicalpre-eminence. Some others assume that everything is fine withconstitutional secularism. They see problems only in anopportunistic political secularism followed by the secularleadership out to appease to Muslims-now-Hindus-then since1985. The Shah Banu case is seen as a turning point for them.This paper tries to show flaws in their justification ofconstitutional secularism. For it bypassed pre-existinggrievances in social imaginary of Hindus or non-Indicminorities of colonial or pre-colonial era. But, moreimportantly, there is no point in simply criticising the Hinduright, by overlooking the internal limits of politicalsecularism – constitutional or otherwise. This paper exploressome of these limits but not all of them as proposed in theIntroduction. It does not discuss how communities are madepassive while initiating reforms or in settlement of theirreligious disputes. It does not examine limitations of thelegal approach followed by the secular state sinceIndependence.10 A future research work may throw more lights onthe internal limits of political secularism, without which Iam afraid political secularism cannot be taken out of itscurrent impasse.

(I would like to thank my research students, S Santhi Swarup,Rajesh Bag and Himanshu Misra who are too willing to listen tomy frustration with the political correct positions of secularcamps as scrutinised in the paper. However, responsibility oferrors is mine)

Notes:

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1 For a detailed discussion of a very useful distinction between empty and filled concepts, see Sudipta Kaviraj (1989). 2 For further details, see Bosco, S. J. A. Mohammed and others (2010).

3 A detailed exploration of positions - their similarities and differences – of Gandhi, Nehru and Ambedkar on conversion debate is beyond the scope of this paper. 4 V D Savarkar’s Hindu Mahasabha distributed sacred threads among Dalits. So also BR Ambedkar did distribute same during the early years of his resistance against caste system to establish a sort of symbolical equality. 5 Nancy Lobbo (2009: 143) distinguishes between Christian fundamentalism and Hindu fundamentalism. He rightly argues that the former may inflict symbolic violence against the Other, whereas the latter inflicts more physical violence against the Other. I would like to add: even though the latter may be reactive, its propensity to commit physical violence cannot be understated. But the moot question is why political secularism is silent on symbolic violence while it is rightly outspoken against Hindu right.

6 Ram Puniyani argues that the Hindu right has ‘suddenly’ become anti-Christian in the late 1980s. It indulges anti-conversion propaganda since then. See his Forewordin National People’s Tribunal (NPT) on Kandhamal, 2010, p. 3. However, historical processes do not develop suddenly. As Puniyani tends to ignore the role of Pentecostalism in India since 1980s, he argues that the RSS ‘suddenly’ manufactures‘a new minority’ (ibid) as a threat to Hinduism. In contrast with Lobo’s formulation, the NPT’s report does not even mention ‘symbolic violence’ or ‘economic enticements’ by ‘fundamentalist’ Churches in Kandhamal.

7 I am indebted to Himanshu Misra for drawing my attention to this aspect of sacrifice made by Hindu members of the Constituent Assembly. However, the nature of‘sacrifice’ and its consequences for the emergence of a new social compact of tolerance since 1950 need a detailed empirical investigation in a separate paper.

8 See A K Patnaik (2011).

9 Ibid. . 10 See how the legal methods of seeking solutions to the Ayodhya dispute considerably helped the Hindu right in gaining a substantial popular support from Hindu communities in Patnaik and Mudiam (2014).

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