The Sea Robbery: History and the

truth for the Somali cutting edge of

Theft in Horn of Africa

Mohammed H. Yusuf 1

CENADER

Oslo, Norway

10 April, 2015

Keywords: the Somali Pirates, Security, Illegal unreported and Unregulated, Toxic dumping

waste

1 Center for Environment, Development Research & Capacity Building ( Cenader)

i

Abstract

This study concerned the piratical attacks occurring along the coast of Somalia. Although

maritime piracy along the coasts of Africa is not a new phenomenon, as the history of pirates

operating at Bab el Mandeb and the Indian Ocean where also the current pirate attacks

happen, dated back in about 18th -19th century however these pirates where no Somali-origin.

The main objective of this study was to show the main cause of the maritime piracy in

Somalia. And link them to their state anarchy and how both the greed and grievance are

documented.

2

Contents

Abstract .................................................................................................................................................... i

The History and the Current Situation of the Piracy in Somalia.............................................................. 1

The History of Somali Piracy .................................................................................................................... 1

After the collapse of the Somalia state ................................................................................................... 2

The types of piracy in Somalia and the root cause ................................................................................. 3

Pirate types of organisation .................................................................................................................... 5

The fall and the containment of piracy in Somalia .................................................................................. 6

Conclusion: .............................................................................................................................................. 8

Literature ............................................................................................................................................... 10

1

The History and the Current Situation of the Piracy in Somalia

Somalia took its independence from Britain and Italy in 1960 and established the Somali

Republic. Until 1969 Somalia had democratically elected government. In 1969 the elected

president was killed and the military took the power. This military regime collapsed after

rebels took the power. Today Somalia is partitioned into three regional administrative. The

Somaliland which is unrecognised, a self-declared breakaway republic. Puntland is

independent area in north-eastern of Somalia and pirates stronghold region.

The third region is central and southern Somalia. The Somali Federal Government controls

some area of the southern and central Somalia with the help of AMISOM2. Ahlu-sunna

Wajama’a which is a moderate Islamic group controls some part of this region. Al-Shabaab

groups controls also major part of this central and southern region of Somalia. As the country

fragmented into parts some areas became without the control of any authority and save

onshore bases for pirates. This lack of control makes the pirates easy that they operate in these

areas and find ports where they can anchor their hijacked ships. This Term Paper I would like

to examine the history of Somali piracy. I would like also to find out the root cause of Somali

piracy as well as why coastal people of some small regions practises piracy when most of the

regions have no any piracy.

The History of Somali Piracy

The history of pirates operating at Bab el Mandeb and the Indian Ocean where also the

current pirate attacks happen, dated back in about 18th -19th century however these pirates

where no Somali-origin. The famous pirates such as William Kid, Thomas Thew and Henry

‘Long Ben’ Every hunted at Bab el Mandeb to commercial ships to India and they also hunted

pilgrimage ships travelling to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina3. In the 19th century there

were also Arab pirates called Qasimi operating this area. In the history although this is not

suitable the current UNCLOS article 1014 of definition of piracy there were some ‘that time’

piracy-related activities from people of Somali-origin. The coastal people from the area that

2 The African Union Mission in Somalia: A regional peacekeeping mission which also directly fight against Al-

Shebab group 3 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: The causes of piracy and links to organised crime. 4 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Article 101. “Any illegal acts of violence or detention or

any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship against another

ship or against persons or property on board such ship or against a ship. Persons or property in a place outside of

any state’s exclusive economic zone”

2

called Puntland today used to operate as shipwreck scavengers looting goods from wrecked

ships. The first ship plundered was Weisshelm which was plundered by Somalis in 1801.

These practises were stopped by the Italians who occupied the region after 1884. The Italians

built onshore authorities which fought against these activities. Except these ships wreckage

plundering there is no any historical record of Somalia piracy before Somali contemporary

piracy. The first recorded piracy which can be defined as a political piracy happened in 1988

when the rebel group Somali National Movement (SNM) who fought against the regime of

Siyad Barre captured two ships heading to Berbera with oil and another cargo intended to the

Somali Army fighting against the insurgency. SNM confiscated the two ships and the cargo.

These two ships where the only ships which were confiscated. However according Gaas,

Somali local interviewees suggest that the first ship hijacked by SNM was illegal fishing

Thailand registered ship. Those interviewed say after SNM hold the ship for some time the

owner of the ship paid 3 million USD to SNM and the ship was released. Although this

incidence might happened however the incidence is not registered as a pirate attack.

After the collapse of the Somalia state

After the Somali's central government collapsed in January 1991 the whole country became

anarchy. Everything where looted. That was the time when the Somali pirates begun to

emerge from some coastal areas of Somalia. The first piratical ship attack happened in 1991

near Haafuun when Somali pirates hijacked MV Navluck. Three members of the crew were

killed and the remaining were thrown overboard, although they were later rescued by another

ship. The cargo was stolen. The first ransom driven attack happened when pirates hijacked

two fishing ships owned by the Somali government but operated by a man called Hassan

Munye. This man did not own the ships but he was the last director of the state owned

company SHIFCO5 which was the owner of the ships. After the government collapsed he took

all the state owned fishing ships for his own and made a base in Yemen. The ships used to

fish in Somalia's water so that it can happen that the pirates knew that the ships where not his

real property or could be licence disagreement because the ships where registered in Yemen

that time. These hijacked ships were set free after the so called owner paid ransom. This was

the first time ransom was paid to Somali pirates. After that time piracy emerged from

different regions in the country although they were not many attacks. The onshore bases

where pirates operate were Eyl and Gara’ad in Puntland and Harardheere and Hobyo in the

5 SHIFCO: Somali High Seas Fishing Company.The biggest state owned fishing company with many

fishing ships during the regime of Siyad Barre.

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central Somalia. In this time the Somali Marine or Somali coast guard narrative begun. The

first pirates who operated this area begun to use this argument in order to take ships. After the

collapse of the central government the Somali navy also collapsed that is why the pirates have

got the possibilities to operate as Somali coast guard. In the beginning the reason that the

pirates took ships they used to say that there was huge illegal fishing in the Somalia water and

also that there were other ships dumping toxic waste to the Somalia water. They say, in order

to defend our resources and defend our sea from those damaging, we have the right to hijack

them. Although this is well known that there is huge illegal fishing in the Somali water

however the pirates mostly don’t prioritise to hijack fishing vessel up to know. When it

comes to waste dumping, in the early 90s there is evidence that toxic waste were dumped to

the Somali water. As all the Somali populations are against the illegal fishing and the other

illegal activities in the Somali water the pirates got good argument that they defending their

rights however the ransom that they taking is treated as forbidden (Haram) in the Islamic

believes.

The types of piracy in Somalia and the root cause

Although the first piracy recorded in Somali was a political caused by a Somali rebel group

and the argument that the piracy are self-defending from illegal fishing and waste dumping

from foreign vessels however the real intention of the Somali pirates are ransom driven.

Divided the piracy into the categories of political, social and economic, the Somali piracy

come all of them to economical category. The Somali pirates want only economical gain. In

the beginning it can happen that some Somali fishermen who suffered from the damage of

their livelihoods by illegal fishing started the piracy but after all piracy became a lucrative

income generating for Somali pirates. The argument that saying the root cause of Somalia’s

piracy is poverty and unemployment, Somalia has the longest coastline in Africa with its

3330km. The coastal populations are nearly millions and poor but according to UNODC

report of piracy only 5000 people participate piracy since beginning of piracy in Somalia with

the population of around 12 million6. If poverty is main cause of driving piracy, one wonders

why so few people participates the piracy in Somalia. Also according to Stig Jarle Hansen the

regions that most pirates operate are not among the poorest coastal people in Somalia7. For

6 UNODC: The causes of piracy and links to organised crime 7 Hansen, Stig Jarle NIBR-Report 2009-29: Piracy in the greater Gulf of Aden: Mytes, Misconceptions and

Remedies.

4

example the four of old Somali regions where pirates operate, the World Bank and United

Nations estimated that these regions are comparatively rich. Only the Mudug region is just

little bit below the average of income per Family. Even the International Crises Group

suggests that Puntland in general which is very strong hold of piracy is more well of than any

other part of the country. That is why only poverty can’t be blamed the Somali pirate

phenomena. Of course the people undertaking to risk their lives to attack ships on the high

seas are mostly unemployed and they want better live to them and their families but

everybody who have skills to handle the risk of the sea cannot be a pirate. To be pirate in

Somalia depends on that you are rely on a very powerful clan who can defend you if you get

trouble. For example some of the most skilled people on sea, they live the southern coastal

area of Somalia specially the towns of Markka, Barawe and Kismayo however but they never

undertake a pirate operation. The reason is as that they are minority Bantu and Arab origin

and they don’t have any power onshore. If they take a ship, they can’t defend them self from

the other powerful clans. Although these communities are poor and some of the most skilled

Somalis on sea, they cannot be pirates. That is why it is not always true that poverty causes

always piracy. The reason than the most pirates always come from Himan and Heeb,

Galmudug and Puntland is not that they are poorer or more skilled than others, but these

pirates belong to mostly the powerful Hawiye- Haber-Gidir or Majerteen clan. The strength of

the clan and the lack of local authority (as there is no any powerful central government) make

the piracy easier. Although most of pirate groups contain the same clan however multi-clan

pirates operate together in recent years. The first pirate who started the multi-clan pirates was

Mohammed Abdi Hassan Afweyne (big mouth) who is the Hawiye ‘Salebaan clan. Afweyne

travelled to Puntland and brought very skilled pirates from the Majerteen clan including very

well-known Puntland pirates called Mohamed Garaad, Farah Hirsi Kulan “Boyah” and Farah

Abdullahi to the area where Hawiye clans operate such as Harardheere and Hobyo. These

professional pirates from Puntland worked not only as pirates but they were also instructors8.

After the multi clan piracy begun about 2004-2005 the attack of ships and the pirates success

increased. In this time it was easy to recruit pirates because of the lucrative of the piracy

organisation. Afweyne and his group developed the piracy to be huge successful enterprise.

Their probability that attacks succeed became higher. This kind of successful piracy became

interrupted in 2006 when the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) took power from the warlords in

most part of central and southern Somalia. The ICU attacked pirates. As ransom is treated

8 Hansen, Stig Jarle NIBR-Report 2009-29: Piracy in the greater Gulf of Aden: Mytes, Misconceptions and

Remedies.

5

Haram in the Islamic laws and huge negative impacts of pirate money in to the society such as

prostitution, the courts did not tolerate piracy. After this time piracy became difficult as

onshore bases became occupied by the courts. The recruitment of pirates decreased. Most of

the skilled pirates from Puntland returned to home and all in all piracy became less attractive.

After six months of power, Ethiopia interfered and thrown the Islamic Courts Union from the

power. Ethiopia brought the Somali Transitional Federal Government to Mogadishu. This

weak government controlled only few blocks in Mogadishu and had not any what so ever

power to fight against piracy. This lack of authority made the piracy flourish again and the

attacks increased slowly but effectively. In 2009, 117 ships were hijacked by Somali pirates9.

According to the International Maritime Bureau the probability of success rate was 26% in

2009 however the rate dropped to 22% in 201010 where only 53 ships were hijacked11.

Although the total captivity ships were 200 in 201112 however the successful pirate attacks

decreased dramatically from 2011 to 201313. The 200 ships hold in 2011 were mostly ships

hijacked from previous years as Somali pirates often keep the ships many months or even

years. Given the huge ransom that pirates gain and the less possibility to be caught is the

driving power that the pirates operate. The coast guard narrative against illegal fishing,

poverty, unemployment and other arguments that Somali pirates use is just to justify their

activities. As the pirates mostly attack slow-moving cargo ships and nearly never hijack

fishing ships the arguments could be the trigger of the piracy in 1990s but not current

situation. Very high percentage of Somalis population are unemployed even those who have

jobs earn not more that 100-200 USD a months so that comparing these meagre income with

the huge money from ransom pirates prefer to take the risk. The risk taking from the pirates is

not much different that many people from Africa risk their lives in order to reach Europe most

of them never making that trip. Although the illegal immigrants just want to escape from

poverty.

Pirate types of organisation

Somalia’s pirates are divided into two groups. The first group is poorly equipped subsistence

piracy with one small skiff containing one family or poor fishermen operating close to the

9 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ships_attacked_by_Somali_pirates 10 UNODC report: The causes of piracy and links to organised crime 11 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ships_attacked_by_Somali_pirates 12 Lecture: M. H. Gaas-The rise and the fall of Somali deep-sea piracy 13 Hansen, Stig Jarle: Piracy, Security and State Formation: In the early Twenty-First Century

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coast14. These pirates are short term piracy just attacking when they spot easy target.

Although this kind of piracy exist in Somalia however this piracy is most common in

Indonesia. In Indonesia these pirates operate at ship ports and sometimes within the territorial

waters. They just spend very short time on the ship and mostly robe small valuable things and

money from the crew. In Somalia subsistence pirates don’t attack to robe the ships they hijack

but they have the intention of getting ransom. The second group is a professional and heavily

armed. Having some sort of structure and command15. Their attacks take place mostly on the

deep sea, sometimes far from the Somali’s economical water. As this kind of pirates are

professional and their intention is to get huge ransom. The time they held the ships they hijack

are more than several months or even years. In order to manage this long term program they

need investment. There are three types of Somali pirate organisation. The first responsible

model which means that one investor provides whatever pirates need such as skiffs, food, oil,

weapons etc. After successful attack this investor takes most of the ransom. The second model

is co-operation. This model the sub-clan or the pirates them self-invest the operation. This

model the pirates share the ransom. The third model is called the investor. This model one

investor who does not participate direct to operation invests the attack. This includes the feed

of the crew if ship is taken. This investor takes also the most of the paid money16. Most of the

time pirates of one operation are divided into two groups. The first group is the group that

attack and hijack the ship. The second group is the group that guards the ship and the crew

when the ship is brought to the base. The first group gets higher percentage of the ransom

than the guard group. In 2008 each attacking pirate got about 35000-55000 US$17 in every

successful operation while most guards got about 15000$ of income each, depend on the

amount of the ransom that the pirates get. Stig Jarle Hansen suggests that of the pirates he

interviewed claimed that the first pirate who board a ship gets highest share.18

The fall and the containment of piracy in Somalia

Piracy in Somalia declined from 2009 and in 2012 the most pirate attacks happened in south-

east Asia particularly the Indonesian sea .There are several reasons that piracy declined. One

of the reasons is that international naval patrols started to deal the piracy in to the high seas.

There are also developments assistances that the international actors want to deal with the

14 Lecture: M. H. Gaas-The rise and the fall of Somali deep-sea piracy 15 Lecture: M. H. Gaas- The rise and the fall of Somali deep sea-piracy 16 UNODC: The causes of piracy and links to organised crime 17 Lecture: M. H. Gaas-The rise and the fall of Somali deep-sea piracy 18 Stig Jarle Hansen (2009) ”Piracy in the greater Gulf of Aden” NIBR Report 2009:29

7

problem of piracy. The European Union has the largest fleet and the operation is called

Operation Atlanta. There is also US led coalition called Task Force 151. These fleets escort

not only the Word Food Program ships transporting food aid to Somalia but also to protect the

ships travelling through the International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) in the Gulf

of Aden. There are also other national naval ships coordinating with the international fleets.

Some states have fleets in the area just to protect their ships19. These international fleets

patrolling the transit corridor have reduced the time that pirates have to attack just 15 to 20

minutes20. Although these fleets declined the Somali piracy in a way, the most effective way

that minimised the likelihood that pirates succeed is the counter-measures employed by the

targeted ships. Best Management Practices show that it is the most successful counter-piracy.

The evasive actions include razor wires on the deck, automatic hot water hosts, and armed

guards on the ship. To increase the speed of the ship to 20 knots has shown that the attacked

ship successfully escape from the small pirate skiffs. Although these mentioned practises

contributed that the number of hijacked ships declined and making piracy less attractive but

there is still easy prey for pirates as there are many slowly moving small ships without the

possibility to employ BMPs such as armed security guards for instance. In order to curtail the

Somali piracy international actors implemented two approaches. The first approach is the

above mentioned naval patrol and the second approach is to build strong Somali state with

trained coast guard who can fight against piracy effectively. Both approaches seem to be

complicated due to different challenges. Considering the vast Somali water with the second

busiest shipping line in the world21, it is difficult that the naval patrols cover all these area.

There is also challenging according the operation cost which involves. The other approach to

build Somali State is not also easy task. Although many Somali soldiers were trained with 500

coast guards from 2004 to 2013, and that the government is getting help from 20000

AMISOM soldiers the government only took the control of some regions however none of

these regions has nothing to do with piracy. The 50022 trained coast guard with poor

equipment and they are stationed in Mogadishu which is very far from any pirate strong hold.

After ten years of state building still the Somali central government has not the power to fight

piracy however to fight piracy is not lost war. In Somalia the Islamic Shari ’a Council and

Somaliland had proven that piracy can be stopped and the chance to curtail in the future is still

19 Stig Jarle Hansen (2009) ”Piracy in the greater Gulf of Aden” NIBR Report 2009:29 20 Sig Jarle Hansen: Present day piracy: scope, dimensions, dangers and causes 21 20000 ships travel through Bab el Mandab strait per year 22 Stig Jarle Hansen (2009) Piracy in greater Gulf of Aden. NIBR-Report. The number of the coast guard is data

from 2009. The number can be more today. Although the number of personal can be more however the ability of

what they can do is not changed .

8

there, it only needs to implement the right approach. In the case of Somaliland the best way to

fight piracy is that the local institutions are functioning and that any pirate activities are dealt

with the help of police and the judiciary system. To deal piracy onshore had proven to make

positive results. Not only Somaliland has functioning local institutions, Puntland which is

stronghold of pirates has also functioning system. The thing is needed is to strengthen these

existing institutions rather than concentrating centralised control. The other pirate regions

such as Gal-Mudug and Himan-and Heeb have also kind of institutions but the problem here

is that none of these regional states control the pirate areas. These two regions need to expand

their control to the pirate are through clan negotiations. Both Puntland and Somaliland had

shown that clan negotiations can be solved many problems. After these regions get some sort

of control the international actors need to work together with the locals onshore where the

pirate operations take place. According to Stig, Jarle Hansen dealing piracy onshore and to

strengthen and build local institutions is the best way to fight piracy in Somalia. This

approach show also cost to me more cost effective. One good example of Hansen is that the

operational cost of one Norwegian ship in Somalia which is 30.7$ for six months could be the

salary for 100,000 Puntland police officers for the same period. If the cost of one ship can be

the salary of so many forces for so long time the idea of building local institutions show that it

cost less and could be more effective taking into consideration what 100.000 police officers

can do if they be paid very months for their service.

Conclusion:

Obviously the collapse of Somalia state was one of the biggest reasons that piracy get

possibility to operate in the country. It is clear that illegal fishing is very common in the water

of Somali and there are many nations plundering the resources but if the main reason that

piracy started is little bit questionable. First of all the illegal fishing happens everywhere

including Somaliland and the Al-Shabaab controlled southern regions of Somalia without

causing any piracy. One other thing to know is that although fishing is important for local

Somali fishers however fish is not one of the most important income generating activities in

Somalia. The income from fishing comes after livestock export and remittance. To some

southern regions with very rich water, fishing brings less that the income from charcoal and

banana export. The only region which gets very good income from fishing is Puntland. The

income that Puntland get per year is estimated 100 to 300M of USD per year. As long as fish

is very important in Puntland that Puntland is very strong hold of piracy, every counter piracy

should be started in Puntland. To counter piracy it needs that illegal fishing should be stopped

9

and that international actors should direct some of the cost they use to patrol on sea to the

local institutions which exist in Puntland. The other pirate-regions also need to same

approach. Job creation, fishermen’s livelihood improvement and dealing piracy onshore will

help to curtail piracy. The approach to patrol on sea has less effect than fighting onshore.

Many times when pirates are caught it is difficult to deal with legal system because most of

the western countries operating there don’t want to bring the pirates to their countries due to

the lack of the (pirate-dealing) legal system and the challenges that pirate may apply asylum.

Although the Somali state building takes time and that the pirate regions are mostly beyond

the control of any authority however there is some sort of control. The pirates can’t operate if

there is no peace in the area they operating. One of most important control of these areas is

the clan based control. As long as there is some kind of control, functioning institutions can

be expanded here through negotiations with the clan elders. To counter piracy in these regions

it needs that the international actors work with the locals. Gathering information from locals

can be one of the best ways to deal piracy onshore. Some other pirate regions like Puntland

there are functioning local institutions and they need to strengthen. Piracy will remain in the

region unless onshore approach strategy should not be implemented. Although the piracy

declined last years, the pirates are still there waiting their chance. When the international

patrolling decline, the pirates can emerge from the area like 2007-2008.

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Literature

Hans Tino Hansen, “Distinctions in the Finer Shades of Grey: The “Four Circles Model” for

Maritime. Threat Assessment” in Julio Espin-Digon, ... Lloyd's MIU Handbook of Maritime

Security (London: CIC, 2008).

Hansen, Stig Jarle (2009) ‘Piracy in the greater Gulf of Aden: Myths, Misconception and

Remedies’, NIBR Report 2009:29.

Hansen, Stig Jarle (2012):”The pirates of the Horn”, Journal of Conflict and Terrorism

Studies, Journal of Terrorism and Conflict studies.

Hansen. Stig Jarle (2011):” Debunking the Piracy Myth: How Illegal Fishing Really Interacts

with Piracy in East Africa RUSI Journal, Dec 2011, Vol. 156, No. 6 .

Hansen, Stig Jarle (2013) ‘The causes of piracy and links to organised crime’ Report for

UNODC.

Hansen, Stig Jarle (Forthcoming) ‘Piracy, Security and State Formation’

Jay Bahadur (2011):”The Pirates of Somalia” harper-collins

Murphy, Martin N (2007) ‘Contemporary Piracy and Maritime terrorism: The threat to

International security’, IISS Adelphi Paper, 47

Peter Chalk and Hansen, Stig Jarle (2012) “Introduction” :Journal of Terrorism and studies.

Peter Chalk (2008): chapter 1 and 2 in “The Maritime Dimension of International Security

Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges for the United States”, rand corporation,

Stefan Eklöf (2006),Pirates in Paradise, (Copenhagen, NIAS Press),