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The Rules of the Game—Nationalism, Globalisation and Football in Spain:Barça and Bilbao in a Comparative PerspectiveShmuel (Shmulik) Nili

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The Rules of the Game—Nationalism, Globalisation

and Football in Spain: Barca and Bilbao in a

Comparative Perspective

SHMUEL (SHMULIK) NILI�

This paper discusses the triangular relation between nationalism, globalisation and foot-ball in Spain. The aim of the work is to compare the way two Spanish football clubs—theCatalan FC Barcelona (known as “Barca”) and the Basque Athletic Bilbao—respond tothe challenges posed by the game’s globalisation, and through this comparison learnabout the nexus between nationalism and globalisation. The main claim is that thedifferences between the two clubs’ behaviour can be attributed to varying characteristicsof Basque and Catalan nationalism. Focusing on different path dependency, the develop-ment of a civic Catalan nationalism is contrasted with the growth of Basque nationalismas essentially ethnic. These characteristics emerged and crystallised primarily during theregions’ industrialisation, and the nationalist response to this advent of modernismwould later shape the response to post-modern globalisation. The diametricallyopposed ways in which the two football clubs react to the game’s globalisation reflectthe significant differences between the two national movements’ core values. This illus-trates the importance of path dependency as a factor that produces diverse responses toglobalisation—the results of which are not predetermined.

Introduction

This paper deals with the triangular relation between nationalism, globalisationand football in Spain. The aim of the work is to compare the way two Spanish foot-ball clubs—the Catalan FC Barcelona (known as “Barca”) and the Basque AthleticBilbao—respond to the challenges posed by the game’s globalisation, and throughthis comparison learn about the nexus between nationalism and globalisation.

Sports in general and football in particular, as the world’s most popular sport,constitute an especially interesting arena for the study of interrelations betweennationalism and globalisation. A movement of capital, workers (players) and cul-tural icons across national borders is discernable in the game, especially from themid-1990s onwards. Simultaneously, football introduces important questions

� This article is an abridgement of a Master’s thesis completed in the Israeli Open University’sDemocracy Studies Program. The author would like to thank Guy Ben-Porat and Zeev Rosenhek,the thesis supervisors, for their insightful comments throughout various stages of the work. YagilLevy and Ram Ben-Ari also provided valuable suggestions regarding the arguments developed, asdid Global Society’s anonymous reviewers.

Global Society, Vol. 23, No. 3, July, 2009

ISSN 1360-0826 print/ISSN 1469-798X online/09/030245–24 # 2009 University of Kent

DOI: 10.1080/13600820902958014

Downloaded By: [Nili, Shmulik] At: 12:18 12 June 2009

regarding national identity. A prime example is France’s World Cup victory in1998, achieved by a team comprised mainly of sons of African immigrants andled by Ziandine Zidane, a Muslim of Algerian decent who turned into a nationaland global icon. To what degree did the successes of that team really open upopportunities for improved integration of African immigrants among the “orig-inal” French? This remains an open question. A similar question arises regardingthe Palestinian citizens of Israel in the context of Israeli clubs and the nationalteam, in which a clear Jewish dominance exists.1

The political aspects of the game are especially evident in Spain, where minoritynationalism suffered political oppression throughout large parts of the 20thcentury. In these circumstances football clubs have become a unique substitutefor institutionalised political activity. Specifically, both Athletic Bilbao and Barca(established in 1901 and 1899, respectively) quickly became political institutions,paralleling the development of the Basque and Catalan national movements. Bothclubs maintain their status as political symbols in the democratic era as well.2

In recent years the two clubs have also faced a crucial dilemma regarding theextent of their involvement in the global football market, as economic and sportiveneeds collide with the potential damage to their national identity. Ostensibly, onecould expect a similar attitude from both clubs towards the game’s globalisation.The two clubs are owned by their members; they are similarly linked to the regionalnational movements; and there are similar structural circumstances surroundingthese movements (operating in the same state at the same time). It thereforeseems reasonable to expect no major differences in their responses to globalisation.3

However, the two clubs deal with the game’s globalisation in diametricallyopposed ways: Barca attempts to bind together national and global identitywhile Athletic Bilbao explicitly rejects globalisation in order to try and protectits national identity. A clear example of the substantial difference between thetwo clubs can be seen on the pitch: in Bilbao the policy of the “cantera” hasexisted for almost 80 years, according to which the team employs only Basqueplayers (though the definition of “who is a Basque” has changed over theyears). In contrast, foreign players have enjoyed a prominent role in Barca inthe past as well as at present (so much so that at the beginning of the currentdecade the team used an orange away kit as a gesture towards the eight Dutchplayers who were then featuring in the starting line-up).4

The main claim presented here is that the opposite response by each club resultsfrom the varying characteristics of the two national movements to which they areclosely related. These movements represent a different type of locality in eachregion—and therefore the result of their interaction with globalisation (the

1. See Tamir Sorek, “Arab Football in Israel as an ‘Integrative Enclave’”, Ethnic & Racial Studies, Vol.26, No. 3 (2003), pp. 422–451.

2. The history of dictatorship sets Spanish sports apart from the Israeli, French and even Canadiancases that express minority questions. Spain is also set apart from the other leading football nations likeEngland and Italy, for example, where the identification with teams relates more to socio-economicstatus rather than nationalist sentiment.

3. Daniel Guerin and Rejean Pelletier, “Cultural Nationalism and Political Tolerance in AdvancedIndustrial Societies: The Basque Country and Catalonia”, Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, Vol. 6, No. 4(2000), p. 3. Bilbao and Barca are non-profit associations owned by their fans that choose the presidentof the club in democratic elections held once every four years. This ownership structure gives addedmeaning to the clubs’ political identity, thus increasing their potential as objects of research.

4. Phil Ball, Morbo—The Story of Spanish Football (London: WSC, 2003), p. 83.

246 Shmuel (Shmulik) Nili


“glocality”) also varies. This can be explained in terms of path dependency, whichemphasises the notion that “history matters”: social, economic and political routesresult from a set of alternatives shaped by past circumstances and conditions.5

There may be some degree of exaggeration in claims by writers such as Ghezziand Mingione, who consider preservation and change in local features a “muchneglected aspect in sociology”6—yet such claims still express the importance ofpath dependency as a theoretical tool. Here, the influence of path dependencyis discernable in the Spanish industrial revolution, which had a deep impact onboth Catalonia and the Basque Country. These were the two areas that tradition-ally led the Spanish economy, yet in the Basque case, much more than in Catalonia,industrialisation was also a traumatic event, coinciding with the abolishment oftraditional autonomy.

The different circumstances of industrialisation in each of the two regions led todifferent types of nationalism—ethnic nationalism in the Basque case, civicnationalism in the Catalan case. Ethnic nationalism defines the limits of thenational community according to ethnic origins—thus producing a distinctpossibility of exclusion. Civic nationalism, by contrast, is usually seen as moreinclusive: the nation is defined in political rather than biological terms. A memberof an ethnic minority who accepts the civil religion of the nation can therefore beconsidered—theoretically at least—an equal citizen. Civic nationality, unlikeethnic nationality, can be acquired and therefore provides much more significantscope for assimilation.

Brubaker’s differentiation between these two types of nationalism in his com-parison between German and French nationalism is especially useful for thecontext of the Basque and Catalan case studies. Brubaker uses historical, geographicand cultural path dependency in order to explain the differences between an assim-ilation-oriented French nationalism and an exclusionary-oriented German nation-alism. The similarity with the two cases discussed here is important, especiallyregarding the contrast between a civic nationalism that is developed in a societywith one dominant cultural-political centre (France as well as Catalonia) and anethnic nationalism characterising a society that is essentially split betweenvarious regions (Germany as well as the Basque Country).7

The discussion below explores how Basque nationalism was cast in a distinctlyethnic, exclusionary mould and how Catalan nationalism, in contrast, took a muchmore civic pattern, tending towards inclusion of the many immigrants whoflocked to the region. Conversi uses the concept of “core values”—”pivotsaround which the whole social and identificational system of the group is organ-ised”8—to explain the differences between the two movements. Race as an exclu-sionary core value (seconded by religion) was the focus of Basque nationalism,especially in its early stages. In contrast, culture and specifically language func-tioned as an inclusive core value of Catalan nationalism from its inception. The

5. Sheri Berman, “Path Dependency and Political Action: Reexamining Responses to theDepression”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 30, No. 4 (1998), p. 380.

6. Simone Ghezzi and Enzo Mingione, “Embeddedness, Path Dependency and Social Institutions:An Economic Sociology Approach”, Current Sociology, Vol. 55, No. 1 (2007), p. 13.

7. Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationalism in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1992).

8. Daniele Conversi, The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilization(Reno and Las Vegas: University of Nevada Press, 1997), p. 165.

The Rules of the Game 247


seeds of the clubs’ diametrically opposed behaviour in the global, post-modernera were thus planted in the way the two regions responded to the advent ofthe modern era.

This centrality of path dependency illustrates the extent to which globalisationdoes not produce predetermined results. Even though it can be understood as a verycurrent development, globalisation eventually meets patterns and realities thatwere formed way back. The local choices made in the face of globalisation arepath dependent and are thus heavily influenced by prior choices. Before the empiri-cal examination of these choices, some theoretical background is needed regardingthe complex relationship between nationalism, globalisation and football.

Football between Globalisation and Nationalism

Numerous attempts to define the globalisation process relate to its complex,dynamic and fragmented influence on the nation-state. Ake, for example,defines globalisation as the “stretch of processes, practices, and structuresacross space, especially the national space to globality. It is the transnationaliza-tion of things.”9 This definition demonstrates the difficulty in presenting asimple yet not simplified conceptualisation, since as Ake himself stresses, globa-lisation is a process

. . . replete with ambiguities, variations, uncertainty and incompatibilities[. . .] globalization concentrates and decentres, uniformizes and differen-tiates; it universalizes particulars and particularizes universals [. . .] Themanifestations and effects of globalization are not uniform and predicablebecause they are always mediated in historical actualities.10

A broader definition encapsulating the differential, historically contingentnature of globalisation is offered by Held and others who define it as a trans-formation “in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions—assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact—generatingtranscontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interactionand the exercise of power.”11

Held and others use this definition as a starting point for their discussion ofglobalisation as a process that does not “pound everything into the samemould”. Yet this emphasis, which also constitutes the main theoretical pointhere, is far from self-evident. In fact, it represents a middle ground between the“sceptic” and “hyper-globalist” writers. The “sceptics” argue that late 20th-century globalisation doesn’t carry substantial changes in relation to olderpatterns of transnational interdependence. The “hyper-globalists”, in contrast,claim that globalisation profoundly changes fields and areas of the world insimilar fashion, primarily as a result of identical economic processes.12

9. Claude Ake, “Dangerous Liaisons: The Interface of Globalisation and Democracy”, in AlexHadenius (ed.), Democracy’s Victory and Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 285.

10. Ibid.

11. David Held et al., Global Transformations (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 16 (emphasis in original).

12. See David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, “A Skin not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Pol-itical Science”, in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds.), Theory and Methods in Political Science, 2nd edn(London: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 32–40.



The middle-ground approach, however, claims that even if the effects of theprocess are significant, this does not make them predetermined. As Ben-Poratpoints out:

The consequences of contemporary global interactions are thereforecomplex, diverse and unpredictable, and need to be studied in relationto micro “local” structures and political agency. Globalisation’s influence,in other words, is the result of specific interactions between global andlocal.13

The global movement of wealth, workers and cultural symbols is often resisted bylocal, “tribal” forces (as Barber terms them).14

In sports and football in particular, one can find representations of both the localand the global. Locally, the game provides a venue for national “imaginedcommunities” to define themselves vis-a-vis “significant others”, wearing theother team’s uniform, with the help of the frenzied sports media. At the sametime, football’s global flow, transcending national borders, neatly reflects globali-sation’s challenge to the nation-state.15 Since the mid-1990s, with the “Bosmanruling”16 and the “hyper-commodification” process of the game, as Giulianottiterms it, football has been characterised by

extraordinary [. . .] volumes of capital that have entered the game fromentirely new sources: satellite and pay-per-view television networks,Internet and telecommunications corporations, transnational sportsequipment manufacturers, public relations companies, and the majorstock markets through the sale of club equity.17

Barca and Athletic Bilbao meet the challenge posed by the game’s globalisation intwo very different ways. The reason is a different historical path dependency,whose roots can be traced back to the 19th century and even earlier.

13. Guy Ben-Porat, Global Liberalism, Local Populism: Peace and Conflict in Israel/Palestine and Northern

Ireland (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006), p. 3. See also Held et al., op. cit., p. 19.

14. Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld (New York: Times Books, 1995). See also PhillipeC. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy is . . . and is Not”, in Larry Diamond and M.F.Plattner (eds.), The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993),pp. 39–52; Donatella Della Porta, “Globalisations and Democracy”, Democratization, Vol. 112, No. 5(2005), pp. 668–685.

15. Hunter Shobe, “Football and the Politics of Place: Football Club Barcelona and Catalonia, 1975–2005”, Journal of Cultural Geography, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2008), pp. 87–105. On the media’s role see Liz Crolley,David Hand and Ralf Jeutter, “Playing the Identity Card: Stereotypes in European Football”, Soccer and

Society, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2000), p. 108.

16. Given by an EU court in December 1995, the ruling banned restrictions regarding foreign EUmembers in the national leagues and allowed professional football players in the European Union tomove freely to another club at the end of their contract with their present team. As a consequence,many footballers born outside of the European Union now take advantage of its naturalisation rulesto obtain a passport of an EU member country.

17. Richard Giulianotti, “Supporters, Followers, Fans, and Flaneurs: A Taxonomy of SpectatorIdentities in Football”, Journal of Sport and Social Issues, Vol. 26, No. 25 (2002), p. 27.



The Basque Country and Catalonia—Industrialisation and Nationalism

Spain has existed as a unified kingdom since the late 15th century yet it is still not aunified nation. The tension between centralism and autonomy, the focal point ofthe country’s modern history, still exists. While the northern neighbour, France,was able to successfully assimilate various minorities (including the Basquesnorth of the Pyrenees), in Spain a separate minority identity remains, chiefly inCatalonia and the Basque Country.18

These two regions led the Spanish industrial revolution in the late 19th century,and as a result their distinct identity was challenged by the massive influx ofimmigrants from the other parts of Spain: during the first wave of industrialis-ation, the Basque population grew by more than 50%, from 190,000 in 1877 to310,000 in 1900. Specifically in Bilbao, the heart of Basque industrialisation, thepopulation grew from 35,505 in 1877 to 83,306 in 1900. By that time 80% of thecity’s inhabitants were already immigrants or sons of immigrants. Similar percen-tages existed also in Catalonia and specifically Barcelona. In both regions, a signifi-cant demographic transformation had taken place.19

It was at this point that path dependency became an important factor, as differ-ent historical courses in both regions contributed to different responses to theimmigrants.20 Though both regions enjoyed local autonomy for hundreds ofyears, the Catalan emphasis was on the resulting economic opportunities, whilethe Basques took special care of the opportunity to exclude foreigners, an oppor-tunity that their traditional autonomous rights ( fueros) provided. Such insecure,xenophobic sentiments were much weaker in Catalonia with its memories ofthe imperial past, and especially in Barcelona, the region’s unchallenged capitalwhich took pride in its cosmopolitan atmosphere.21

In addition, a dissimilar relation existed in each region between industrialis-ation and autonomy. Catalan autonomy was abolished in 1716, 150 years beforethe industrialisation of the region began in earnest. The Catalans were thus ableto gradually—and successfully—adjust to the changing circumstances. Alreadyby the 18th century, Catalonia enjoyed economic prosperity as an integral part

18. This is why this paper, like many other works on Basque nationalism, focuses on the SpanishBasque regions. In addition, it is important to bear in mind that 85% of the Basque Country is on theSpanish side, in the four provinces of Biscaya (Vizcaya in Spanish, Bizkaia in Basque), Guipuzcoa(Gipuzkoa), Alava (Araba) and Navara (Nafarroa). On the implications of this fact, see LudgerMees, “Politics, Economy, or Culture? The Rise and Development of Basque Nationalism in theLight of Social Movement Theory”, Theory and Society, Vol. 33, No. 3–4 (2004), pp. 311–331. OnSpain as a kingdom and nation see Stanley Payne, “Catalan and Basque Nationalism”, Journal of Con-

temporary History, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1971), pp. 15–31, 35–51.

19. Gershon Shafir, Immigrants and Nationalists: Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation in Catalonia,the Basque Country, Latvia and Estonia (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), pp. 42–43;Conversi, op. cit., p. 197.

20. Shlomo Ben-Ami, “Basque Nationalism between Archaism and Modernity”, Journal of Contem-porary History, Vol. 26, No. 3/4 (1991), p. 494.

21. Ibid., p. 493; Claude Mar-Molinero, “The Role of Language in Spanish Nation Building”, inAngel Smith and Claude Mar-Molinero (eds.), Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula(Oxford: Berg, 1996), pp. 77–78. It is possible here to talk also of a geographical path dependency(which I do not discuss owing to a lack of space), analysed already in the 1930s—see E.H.G. Dobby,“Catalonia: The Geographical Basis of its Regionalism”, Geographical Review, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1938),pp. 224–249. See also Maria del Puy Ciriza, “The Discursive Construction of Basque National Identityin Argumentative Discourse”, Inicio, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2007), available: ,http://ojs.gc.cuny.edu/index.php/lljournal/article/viewArticle/224/195..



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of the Spanish economy. In the Basque case, in contrast, there was to be no gapbetween the abolition of autonomous rights and the beginning of industrialis-ation. The end of the Second Carlist War in 1876 brought political defeat for theBasques as well as initiating industrialisation. This was a traumatic convergencefor the more conservative segments of Basque society, a trauma that did nothave a Catalan parallel. As a result, Basque nationalism was later cast primarilyas a frightened counter-reaction on the part of rural elements of society towardsthe massive wave of immigrants.22

These elements, characterised by a religious and collectivist-egalitarian ethos,where hurt by industrialisation much more significantly than was the case in Cat-alonia. There, the dominant ethos was very much pro-capitalist, in so far as itcentred on bourgeois, secular and individualistic values.23 As a result, in lateryears the main driving force of the Catalanist movement would be the economicand cultural elite. As for the Basques, by contrast, far from leading a public con-sensus regarding the need for greater autonomy, the economic elite were, in Mar-Molinero’s words, “happy to work with Madrid”: Spain’s banking elite weredominated by Basques closely tied to the economy and politics of the Spanishstate. There was elite presence in the Basque movement, as it was led by intellec-tuals, yet their attempts to revive Basque identity in the following decades reliedon the support of the “pure” rural Basques rather than the urban bourgeois elite.24

Nationalism would become a truly significant feature of the two regions only inthe 20th century—as the impact of the immigrants was becoming apparent in theBasque Country and Catalonia grappled with the economic consequences ofSpain’s 1898 defeat in Cuba, which signalled the end of the Spanish colonial pres-ence in America.25 However, it is possible to say that the sources of the differencesbetween Catalan and Basque nationalism in the global era had already appeared inthe industrialisation process of the 19th century and the elite reaction to this process.Catalan nationalism has grown together with industrialisation. Basque nationalismhas developed as an opposition to it. This contrast was evident in the markedlydifferent ideas of the founders and leaders of the two national movements.

Catalan Language, Basque Race

Catalan identity, as Conversi states, was at first a “vaguely defined identity [that]began by attributing to a different mentality the existing economic gap betweenMadrid and Barcelona”.26 By the 1830s, this amorphous idea began takingshape through the demand by Catalan industrialists to receive protection fromthe central government in the face of foreign competition. The first organised

22. Payne, op. cit., p. 16; Ben Ami, op. cit., Shlomo Ben-Ami, “Basque Nationalism betweenArchaism and Modernity”, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 26, No. 3/4 (1991), p. 494.

23. Conversi, op. cit., p. 258; Payne, op. cit., p. 36.

24. Mar-Molinero, op. cit., p. 78; Angel Smith and Claude Mar-Molinero, “The Myths and Realitiesof Nation-building in the Iberian Peninsula”, in Smith and Mar-Molinero (eds.), op. cit., p. 17. Oneshould bear in mind that the values of the national movement and the values of the society in questionare not identical, even if they are related. For a treatment of nationalism as a discourse serving specificgroups in society see Eric John Hobsbawm’s classic Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme,Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

25. For the Catalan economic elite, which sent 60% of its exports to the island, the 1898 failure wasconcrete proof of Madrid’s inaptitude. See Paine, op. cit.

26. Conversi, op. cit., p. 11.



presentation of a Catalan national manifesto was produced by Valenti Almirall(1841–1904). In his book “The Catalanism” [Lo Catalanisme, 1886], Almirall articu-lated two principal demands that would guide the activity of the national move-ment throughout the 20th century: economic and cultural autonomy—with theCatalan language at its centre—within the framework of the Spanish state.

Catalan economic ambitions were matched by cultural ambitions even earlier.By the mid-19th century the Catalan language was at the heart of the region’s cul-tural “renaissance” (renaixenca(, visible in poetry, opera and theatre. GrowingCatalan confidence was expressed even before the loss of Cuba in an 1892 conven-tion held in Manersa, north of Barcelona. This convention led to a significantdocument—the “Manersa Base”—which described the main autonomousdemands by the Catalans vis-a-vis the central government. Among the demandswere a reorganisation of the administrative division of the region, according toCatalan tradition; secured public posts for Catalans; legislative and executivepowers in taxation and currency issues; autonomous civic, criminal and commer-cial legislation; the definition of specific Catalan units in the Spanish military; thecreation of a regional police; and control over local education.27

These demands where represented by Enric Prat de la Riba (1870–1917), whowas elected as President of the Diputacio—the Catalan regional government—in1907. In his political activity and writings (especially his book “Catalan National-ism” [La Nacionalitat Catalana, 1906], considered the founding text of the Catalanistmovement), Prat, like Almirall, showed faith in Catalan economic and politicalpotential—as a part of Spain. This faith was expressed in various projectswhose intention was to promote Catalan culture and especially language. Inthis field the work of the linguist Pompeu Fabra (1868–1948), who contributedto a standardisation of the Catalan language, took centre stage. The importanceof language as a core value of civic Catalan nationalism was maintained through-out subsequent decades. As Jordi Pujol, then president of the Catalan Generalitat(autonomous government) stated in 1989: “language and culture . . . are the coreelements of our identity as a people”.28

The difference in comparison to ethnic Basque nationalism is significant.Inclusion through the teaching of the Catalan language has been a centralelement of the Catalan attitude towards immigrants to the region. Yet in theBasque Country language was originally used for an opposite, exclusionarypurpose. The thought of Sabino de Arana constitutes a clear example. Aranawas undoubtedly the founding father of the Basque national movement: Hesingle-handedly designed its first political programme, gave the BasqueCountry its current name (Euskadi), drew its boundaries, wrote its anthem anddesigned its flag.29 For Arana, the massive industrial immigration posed a racialthreat to Basque society. Language was therefore an exclusionary device: theSpanish, who could not speak Basque (Euskera) as (unlike Catalan) it has norelation whatsoever to Spanish, where unable to “contaminate” the region.30

Euskera, even more than Catalan, was a language that suffered fromdiglossia—unequal existence in a community, alongside another language.

27. Ibid. See also Smith and Mar-Molinero, op. cit., p. 5.

28. Conversi, op. cit., pp. 30–31, 172.

29. Ibid., p. 53.

30. Jeremy MacClancy, “Bilingualism and Multinationalism in the Basque Country”, in Mar-Molinero and Smith (eds.), op. cit., p. 210.



Castilian—Spanish—was the high language used in the public sphere and, unlikeBasque, it had a standardised version. Echoing the famous Gelnerian argument,proficiency in Spanish—not in Euskera—was considered essential for socialmobility in the Basque country itself.31 The diglossic decline of Euskera ruledout the possibility of its being the centre of a major cultural renaissance, as wasthe case in Catalonia.32 Therefore, Arana’s chief cultural goal was not to spreadEuskera but to prevent foreigners from knowing it. Accordingly, he wrote:

Many are the Euskerianos who do not know Euskera. This is bad. Manyare the maketos [a pejorative referring to those of “impure” blood] whoknow it. This is even worse. Great damage can be done to the Fatherlandby one hundred Euskerianos who do not know Euskera. Even worse is thedamage that can be done by only one maketo who knows it.33

These words demonstrate how historical path dependency generated an exclu-sionary strategy for the national movement. Basque national identity wasdefined principally in opposition to “significant others”. The vast majority ofArana’s thought was dedicated to the negation of those others, rather than tothe construction of a national identity that is complete in its own right. The con-servative and reclusive nature of Basque nationalism was further compoundedby the centrality of religion as another element of Arana’s vision, which combinedracial and religious “salvation”. This conceptual framework was, of course, quitefar from that of secular Catalan nationalism.34

The problem that immigrants posed to Basque nationalism was ostensibly easedby external developments. When the second wave of massive industrial immigra-tion arrived in the 1950s, Arana was long dead. With Franco’s oppression ofBasque identity, “action” against the central government had taken the place ofrace as the core value of the national movement. The torture meted out by theGuardia Civil was able to do what Arana could not (and would not) do—offerthe immigrants a common denominator with “original” Basques. With everyviolent act of repression by Madrid, ETA’s popularity grew—and this time immi-grants could be part of the struggle as well, as they too suffered from the regime’srepressive measures.35

However, like the PNV—the leading Basque party established by Arana in1894—ETA represented a distinctly defensive Basque identity. Throughout boththe first and the second waves of immigration, Basque nationalism lacked thestable, civic nature that allowed Catalan nationalism to grow regardless of thenegation of “the other”. The only civil religion established by ETA was a civilreligion of violence (which still carried racist overtones against immigrants fromtime to time).

The difficulties inherent in the choice of violence as a core value became appar-ent in the democratic era. Owing to the lack of external oppression over which toprotest, the major source of identification with the Basque national movementdisappeared: ETA’s cycle of violence was broken and the conservative branch of

31. See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).

32. Conversi, op. cit., pp. 168–169, 201–202.

33. Ibid., p. 177.

34. Ben Ami, op. cit., pp. 495–496.

35. Omar G. Encarnacion, “Managing Ethnic Conflict in Spain”, Orbis, Vol. 47, No. 1 (2003), p. 94.



Basque nationalism, surely in its Aranist version, was no longer relevant cultu-rally, economically or politically. As late as the early 2000s, the Basque nationalistmovement and especially ETA were facing a dead end, evident in their failures inlocal elections, with the electoral results showing Basque society to be united in its“firm rejection of ETA’s violent campaign”.36

As the violent route only led to a deadlock and a loss of domestic support,efforts were also taken to promote Basque cultural values, yet the impact was—and still is—limited at best. Language is the main example: institutionalisedefforts to promote the use of Euskera do not change its diglossic standing evenamong its teachers. Spanish remains the “real” language that is used in dailyconduct. The numbers tell the tale. A decade ago Catalonia had 6 million inhabi-tants, with over 90% of them claiming to understand Catalan and over 60% statingthey use it one way or another. In Euskadi, however, less than a quarter of the 2.5million inhabitants claimed in the mid-1990s that they spoke Euskera. As Franco’sregime disappeared, the political incentive to use Euskera effectively disappearedas well. In fact, there are some Basques who refrain from studying the language aspart of their rejection of the radical nationalist position.37

Such a dynamic—a direct result of the problems of Basque ethnic nationalism—is very rare in the context of civic Catalan nationalism. There is a basic Catalanagreement regarding three main points: (1) language as the core value of nationalidentity; (2) maximum autonomy within Spain as the goal of the national project;and (3) an ongoing effort to sustain and promote Catalan culture in order toachieve this goal. It can be argued that a similar consensus never existed withinthe Basque national movement. Is the goal full independence or autonomy?Should it be achieved with or without violent struggle? In the name of whatcore values should this struggle be carried out? Basque nationalists failed tooffer clear answers to these questions.

This fundamental difference between the two movements is intimately relatedto their varying link to industrialisation. Catalan civil religion used modernity,brought by industrialisation, as a tool. In contrast, Arana’s ethnic, exclusionarycore values created an anti-modern national movement. These opposites wouldeventually lead to contrasting approaches to the post-modern globalisationprocess. The two major football clubs of the two regions, serving as significantnational symbols, exemplify these contrasting approaches.

Barca and Athletic Bilbao as National Symbols—Before the Global Era

Early Days and through the Dictatorships

Barca and Athletic Bilbao’s comportment linked between football and politicspretty much from the day of their founding. This was not surprising given thatfootball started growing as a popular sport in Spain just when the Catalans andBasques began articulating their demands vis-a-vis the central government. Foot-ball became manifestly political very quickly in the case of both clubs. In 1919 Ath-letic Bilbao initiated the cantera policy, according to which only Basque players

36. Elisa Roller, “The Basque Country and Spain: Continued Deadlock?”, Mediterranean Politics, Vol.7, No. 1 (2002), p. 113.

37. MacClancy, op. cit., p. 217; Mar-Molinero, op. cit., pp. 83–84.



would play in the team—excluding, at first, immigrants. For Barca, 1925 marked apolitical watershed, as in the presence of prominent Catalanist leaders the crowdgathered at the team’s old stadium (Las Corts) collectively booed the Spanishanthem—an act which caused De Rivera’s dictatorship to fine the club heavilyand ban its activity for six months.38

In the 1930s, Jose Antonio Aguirre, a former striker for Athletic Bilbao, was thefirst president of the Basque autonomous government during the second republic(1930–1936) in the name of the PNV. Aguirre also paved the way for an intimateconnection between Athletic Bilbao and the PNV: following the Civil War, all ofthe club’s presidents belonged to the party.39

In the context of football, as well as in the more general context of the twonational movements, oppression was a major catalyst for the growth of collectiveidentity. This was most evident in the Civil War. As Aguirre’s tenure was dis-rupted by the bombs of Guernica, so too was Catalan nationalism, representedby Barca, subdued. Josep Sunol, the Catalanist president of the club, who sawhis role as a springboard for an “official” political office in which he’d promoteregionalist nationalism, was murdered by Franco’s forces in 1936, an eventwhich further cemented the club’s political association. Later on during theCivil War the two clubs became officially involved in the struggle as theirplayers formed the main components of two “national teams”—Basque andCatalan, of course—who played abroad raising funds for the republican wareffort.

Following the war the Franco regime went to great lengths to “exorcise” theseparatist spirit away from both clubs. One of the first symbolic steps was toforce the clubs to change their names to “patriotic” Spanish names: the Catalan“FC Barcelona” became the Spanish “Barcelona Club de Football”, and the fourred-yellow stripes in the club’s crest, representing Catalonia, were now two,like the Spanish flag; the English “Athletic Bilbao” became the Spanish “AthleticoBilbao”. The two clubs were forced to conduct all official meetings and communi-cation in Spanish only, with Franco’s pictures and Falangist symbols in thebackground; national flags and protest slogans were strictly forbidden withintheir stadiums.

The regime was also heavily involved in decisions regarding appointments atthe clubs—yet failed to neutralise their basic national support. Every success bythe teams was still taken by their supporters as an indication of national

38. By this time there were also marked differences between Barca and Espanol, the “Castilian”club in Barcelona, established in 1909 as an explicit contrast to Barca’s growing Catalanism. Theclub’s deliberate use of the Spanish rather than Catalan pronunciation (Espnaol), as well as its (success-ful) request of royal patronage which earned it the name Real Club Espanol, differentiated it from Barcaimmediately. The royal crest on the team’s shirt, clearly opposed to Barca’s Catalan shield, symbolisedthe contrast between the bourgeois elite backing Barca and the Castilian workers wishing to maintaintheir monarchist alignments and dominance of the Castilian language. The contrast was even moreclearly political when in 1918, following Wilson’s “14 points”, the Campaign for Catalan autonomygathered pace yet Espanol not only refused to sign the popular petition for autonomy but even initiateda counter-petition. The club would change its name to the Catalan pronunciation—Espanol—only in1994. See Jimmy Burns, Barca—A People’s Passion (London: Bloomsbury, 2000), pp. 85–87.

39. Ball, op. cit., pp. 65–66, 76. Aguirre was a prime example of a famous dictum in the BasqueCountry, according to which anyone who aspired to be a political figure had to go through eitherthe Jesuit University or a football career. See Jeremy MacClancy, “Nationalism at Play: The Basquesof Vizcaya and Athletic Club de Bilbao”, in Jeremy MacClancy (ed.), Sport, Identity and Ethnicity(Oxford: Berg, 1996), p. 187.



determination to overcome the regime’s oppression. An official publication byAthletic in 1986 termed the club the “other food” of Bilabinos in the years ofrationing and black market following the Civil War, an “irrinitzi” (outcry,protest) sent “to the four winds”.40 A Catalan parallel could be seen in the recol-lections of Gregorio Lopez Raimundo, a Barcelona fan and a communist activistduring the Franco years:

These were dangerous times. We had to be very careful who we met andhow. They [the regime’s security forces] were constantly watching us [. . .]in Las Corts I felt protected in a way that I didn’t in the street, where I wasalways looking two hundred meters ahead in case I recognized a police-man [. . .] Out in the city, Fascism was very visible—the names of thestreets, the Falangist crests, the portraits of Franco, the flags—but in thestadium you were among the masses and I felt [. . .] that everyonearound me was really anti-fascist deep down [. . .] the club managementwas pro-regime, hand picked no doubt, but not the fans—they identifiedthemselves with a democratic Catalonia.41

Final Days of the Francoist Regime and the Beginning of the Democratic Era

In the late 1960s, Spain—and especially Catalonia and the Basque Country—wasexperiencing economic liberalisation which led to demands for political democra-tisation. The ossified regime, relying on the personal authority of a dictator whosehealth was quickly deteriorating, was less and less capable of oppressing politicalprotest that had not been tolerated in earlier times. In 1969 Franco appointedPrince Juan Carlos as his heir; had to cope with a massive financial scandal andadjust to a reality in which Basque terror, strikes and student protests in thename of democracy all became more and more frequent.

Football, of course, was also a part of this dynamic. In the late 1960s the Basqueflag (the Ikurrina) became a common sight in San Mames (Bilbao’s stadium),though its display was still formally illegal; in 1968 Barca’s official motto—”More than a club” (Mas que un club)—was created as a clear reference to theclub’s political role off the pitch. This motto was first used in the debut speechof the (temporary) club president, Narcis de Carreras, who was also the firstCatalanist president of the club in the Franco era. Following Carreras’ brieftenure, Augustin Montal, also a devout Catalanist, became president—thuspaving the way for one of the most political periods in the club’s history. LikeAthletic Bilbao and the PNV many years previously, Barca became deeply con-nected to a political party. The club’s popularity now went hand in hand withthe growth of Jordi Pujol’s CiU.

Here too, just like in the Basque case, the identification between the club and theparty was primarily personal. Senior members of the club’s managementappointed by Montal were also Pujol’s senior political partners. Pujol, a Barcafan since boyhood, saw Catalan cultural development—also in the field ofsports—as the basis for political development and autonomy. With Franco’sdeath in 1975 the connection between the CiU and the club reached a new level,

40. Quoted in MacClancy, “Nationalism at Play”, op. cit., p. 192.

41. Burns, op. cit., p. 140.



despite contrary ambitions by other political parties in the region. Several publicfigures simultaneously held key positions in the club, in the CiU and in Pujol’sBanca Catalana, one of the club’s major financers.42

With the advent of democracy both Bilbao and Barca continued to function asnational symbols. If earlier the clubs expressed the Basque and Catalan strugglefor autonomy, they now celebrated its success. One important proof was thecontinued effort by both clubs to represent—explicitly and officially—the regions’national teams. A tradition in which Catalan and Basque national teams,represented mainly by players from the two clubs, face other national teams infriendly matches was initiated and is carried on to this day.

The clubs were also acting as national teams in deeper, even more politicalways. Barca’s historic 5-0 win over its archrival Real Madrid in Madrid, in Febru-ary 1974, was seen as a major indicator of Catalan political victory over Franco. Itnot only sparked mass celebrations in Catalonia but also triggered a rare referenceto football in the American press: the New York Times claimed in a special articlethat Johan Cruyff, the famous Dutch player who led Barca’s display, had achievedfor Catalan nationalism in 90 minutes of play more than many politicians wereable to achieve in decades of political struggle.

Even if this claim was somewhat of an exaggeration, it still revealed the politicalimpact of football as a reflection of the changing power balance in the country inthe twilight days of Franco’s regime. The political aspect of the entire affair wasfurther emphasised by Cruyff’s personality. The Dutchman, who was the mostfamous of Catalonia’s “adopted sportsman”, explicitly supported Catalan nation-alism just as much as he attacked Franco’s dictatorship, right from the moment hearrived in Spain in 1973. His determination to baptise his son under the name ofJordi (Catalonia’s patron saint) further endeared him to the Catalan masses, evenbefore his considerable ability on the pitch was taken into account.43

The contrast here with Bilbao’s political heroes is illuminating. The most impor-tant of those in Cruyff’s time was Jose Angel Iribar, the goalkeeper who played forBilbao for 18 years (1962–1980), most of them as the team’s captain. It was Iribarwho carried the Ikurrina onto the pitch in the 1976 derby between Bilbao and RealSociedad, “a politically seminal act which all Basques remember”.44 Iribar alsocampaigned for the release of political prisoners and was even mentioned as apolitical candidate for local coalitions. He later promoted Basque culturethrough various sporting activities. Yet the crucial point here is that he had tobe Basque. There could have been no Dutch hero for Bilbao.45

This doesn’t mean, of course, that the Basques had problems expressing whatthey felt was, in many ways, their national liberation. Preceding a match in SanMames in August 1977, Jesus Maria Donabetia, the club’s recently elected presi-dent, lifted the Ikurrina—formally an illegal gesture—to the sound of applausefrom the crowd; ritual Basque dance routines were performed using traditionalBasque musical instruments and the players took to the field to be received byan “honorary guard” created by the dancers.46 Similarly, four months earlier, in

42. Shobe, op. cit.

43. Burns, op. cit., p. 212.

44. Ball, op. cit., p. 34.

45. See Ildefonso Olmedo, “La ‘seleccion’ de ETA”, Cronica, El Mundo (17 December 2000), No. 270,available: ,http://www.elmundo.es/cronica/2000/CR270/CR270-01.html..

46. MacClancy, “Nationalism at Play”, op. cit., pp. 192–193.








April 1977, Montal, as Barca’s president, officially declared that the club has ahistorical role in

Our collective resistance [. . .] today, as in the 1930’s, the word autonomy isbeing heard throughout our land and the cry “We want our statutes!” isone that belongs to a reborn Catalonia that is looking towards thefuture. Catalonia is ready to live forever in freedom and brotherhoodwith the other peoples of the Spanish state on terms of equality and aspart of a democracy.47

The growing confidence of the two national movements was also expressed intheir cooperation on the field. In the early Franco period the two teams wereforced to play against each other with their names, shirts and players all dictatedby the regime in order to rebut any sign of separatism; following the dictator’sdeath, however, the matches between the two teams (with their original namesreinstated) turned into a national tour de force, with fans of both teams carryingthe same flags and singing the very same national anthems that were bannedimmediately after the Civil War.48

Barca and Bilbao in the Global Era—Still a National Symbol

In the global era, just like in earlier years, Barca and Bilbao continue to see them-selves—and to be seen from the outside—as “more than clubs”. This fact isexpressed, among other things, in the perceptions and expectations of thefans—the clubs’ owners. An example can be found in the words of the Basquewriter Luis de Castresana:

Athletic is for me something more than a football team; a part of theemotional landscape of my Bilbao, my Vizcaya [. . .] at root, we Vizcayanslove Athletic because we intuit that it has something which belongs to us,because we intuit that within it is a piece of ourselves. [Athletic has] anidentity as an umbilical cord linking men to the land, a geographical-emotional capacity.49

Similar sentiments were expressed by Barca fans, even in the 1990s. Catalan jour-nalist Antonio Franco claims that through his membership of the club he can seehimself as “. . . part of a collective fiesta in which I can celebrate the great oppor-tunity of being surrounded by others who feel the way I do. The club belongs tous; we are linked to it as if it were a vital element of our existence.”50 This is why,as another fan puts it, “to be a cule [Barca fan] is to express a sentiment that goesbeyond sport. It has to do with a feeling of community, of shared culture, of[Catalan] patriotism.”51 Even in the global era, the ability of both clubs to maintainthe community’s sentimental attachment springs from a much deeper source than

47. Burns, op. cit., p. 222.

48. Ibid., p. xii.


50. Quoted in Burns, op. cit., p. 45.

51. Ibid., p. 41.



interest in sports alone. The belief that the two clubs express national identity isthe basis of their wide-ranging popularity. Achievements on the pitch only comp-lement the political foundations and are used to promote political aims.

It is no coincidence that Barca’s titles are celebrated in St. Jaume square, thepolitical square of Barcelona which is home to the city hall and the seat of theGeneralitat. In 1992, for example, politics and sports merged when Barca wonits first ever European club championship—a central event in the club’s sportivehistory. In the same year, Barcelona hosted the Olympic Games, and sports osten-sibly reflected more than ever the strength of Catalan autonomy when Barcelona’smayor proposed that the city would officially be defined as Spain’s second capital,alongside Madrid. The European cup victory was even mentioned as one of thefactors that gave political momentum to this suggestion. In this context, JordiPujol’s traditional call as the president of the Generalitat—”Visca el Barca, viscael Catalunya” (Victory for Barca, victory for Catalonia), during the title celebrationsat St. Jaume, seemed quite pertinent.

Beyond the statements, here too numbers tell the story. When English clubManchester United won both the FA Cup and the league title in May 1994 itscelebrations in the city were attended only by several thousands fans, thoughthis rare accomplishment had been achieved only three times before during theentire 20th century. In contrast, when Athletic Bilbao won the Spanish leaguetitle in both 1983 and 1984, over a million fans greeted the team each year.The reason, of course, was political—a “communion of a people and its team”,as Castresana later described it.52 A year later Barca won the league title andthe celebrations took on a similar emotional pattern, and as the team’s Englishmanager Terry Venables recalled, this was relevant for women as well as men:

When we arrived at the airport and got into the bus, there were so manypeople that a journey that should have taken 25 minutes ended up takingover 7 hours. People were raising their children up to our windows, oldladies were on their knees. It was incredible, as if we were the triumphantarmy that had returned after achieving the impossible [. . .] the sufferingof the past was something that had stuck these people together, throughgenerations. I felt it had nothing to do with sport at all.53

The sentiments expressed in the 1980s and early 1990s are still present.54 It is littlewonder that in both regions there are journalists assigned specifically to cover theaffairs of the “national club” in the general media—not to mention the sportsmedia. These journalists may criticise the team’s sporting conduct but never itsinherently national identity. That is why criticism of Bilbao’s cantera policy isseen as criticism of Basque society as a whole.55 This view of the clubs is sodeeply rooted that they are able to rise above not only sportive adversity but


53. Quoted in Burns, op. cit., p. 277.

54. This is also true for women’s identification with the game, expressed in Ball’s words: “you canstart up a dialogue about football with a perfect stranger in any bar, in the sure knowledge that he willrespond, Or indeed she, for here women are less marginalized by the game . . .” See Ball, op. cit., pp. 62,13; Simon Kuper, Football against the Enemy (London: Orion, 1994), ch. 10, pp. 85–92.

55. MacClancy, “Nationalism at Play”, op. cit., p. 188.



also above political changes: Francoist oppression may have gone, but thememory of it remains—and is commemorated in the clubs’ comportment.

This memory is, of course, especially vivid vis-a-vis symbols of the central gov-ernment. Even in the 1990s, Bilbao fans stated, almost is if it were obvious, thatthey will burn the Spanish flag if seen in San Mames.56A similar (thoughpassive) detachment from Spanish identity occurred as late as March 2008,when Barca’s under-12 team was ordered not to stand to the playing of theSpanish anthem in an international tournament.57

Matches between Bilbao or Barca and Real Madrid, still considered in theregions (and to some extent in the whole of Spain) as the prime representativeof “the (central) establishment”, still arouse political passion. The world-recordtransfer of the Portuguese player Luis Figo from Barca to Real Madrid in 2000caused an unprecedented furore from the Barca supporters, upon his returns tothe Camp Nou (Barca’s home stadium).58 The matches between Bilbao andMadrid raised similar sentiments. In 2002 dozens of Bilbao fans ran across thepitch during a match against “the old enemy”, carrying banners calling forBasque independence. There are many more examples of political “traditions”in such matches. Yet while both Barca and Bilbao remain national symbolsin equal measure even during football’s global era, their reaction to the game’sglobalisation varies substantially.

Globalisation and Football—Movement versus Stagnation in the TwoRegions

God, family, the Basque Country and Athletic—only in reverse order.Koldo Asua, Bilbao youth team manager, 200859

Barca that is so concerned for its people needs to be globalised.Barca’s official website60

Workers

Athletic Bilbao takes pride in the fact that for almost 80 years, only Basques play inthe club’s ranks. Barca, on the other hand, was based from its inception (byforeigners61) on foreign players as a central element in its sporting success. Ofcourse, Catalans also play in the team, yet the club is distinctly global in itsefforts not only to purchase foreign stars but also to cultivate foreign talent in

56. Ball, op. cit., p. 37.

57. See “Laporta Hits Back in Anthem Row”, available: ,http://www.goal.com/en/Articolo.aspx?ContenutoId¼635550..

58. Figo was subjected not only to verbal but also physical expressions of contempt, with a pig’shead and a full whisky bottle thrown at him in the 2002 match that became known as “the derby ofshame” (derbi de la verguenza). See Ball, op. cit., pp. 18–19.

59. Quoted in Walter Mayr, “How a Proud Basque Team is Resisting Globalisation”, Der Spiegel,English online edition (11 April 2008), available: ,http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,546860,00.html..

60. ,http://www.fcbarcelona.com/web/english/club/club_avui/mes_que_un_club/mesqueunclub.html..

61. Barca was founded by a Swiss (Hans—who later changed his name to Joan—Gamper) togetherwith two English brothers.























its ranks from a very young age. This is obviously done at the expense of localplayers—those who are seen as the heart of the club in Bilbao. These diametricallyopposed approaches result from the different national core values outlined above.

While Barca takes pride in its ability to “connect” foreigners to the club—especially in the global era—in Bilbao the explicit belief remains that there areessential elements of the club’s identity that could not be grasped by outsiders.As Jose Maria Artata stated upon his election to club president in 1994:

Athletic Bilbao is more than a football club, it is a feeling—and as such itsways of operating often escape rational analysis. We see ourselves asunique in world football and this defines our identity. We do not saythat we are either better or worse than others, merely different. We onlywish for the sons of our soil to represent our club, and in so wishing westand out as a sporting entity, not a business concept. We wish tomould our players into men, not just footballers, and each time a playerfrom the cantera makes his debut we feel we have realised an objectivewhich is in harmony with the ideologies of our founders andforefathers.62

This will to maintain separation from business concepts stands at the core ofBilbao’s clear rejection of the game’s globalisation, at a substantial sportive cost.It is no coincidence that the club, traditionally a significant powerhouse in theSpanish game, last won the league title in 1984, when strict limitations wherestill imposed on the use of foreign players. In contrast, in the 2005/06 and 2006/07 seasons Bilbao only just survived relegation to the second division in theseason’s final matches.

It is important to point out that the sporting costs are acceptable to the club’sowners—Bilbao’s fans. In a poll conducted among the fans by the newspaper ElMundo during the 1990s, 76% of the respondents made clear that they wouldprefer the club to drop to the second division (something which had neveroccurred in Bilbao’s history) rather than to abandon the cantera policy. Such senti-ments are reflected in club statements (e.g. on its official website), declaring that“we must and we want to maintain our [cantera] philosophy, and this obligationwon’t be conditioned by the sportive results”.63 Iribar, the local icon who todayserves as honorary club president, similarly noted recently that “We cannot andwill not change our principles.”64

Finance and Values

The contrast between Bilbao and Barca’s attitude towards the game’s globalisationis manifested not only in the identity of the players on the pitch but also in theirfinancial conduct. Barca constitutes a global brand with substantial economicpotential. As a result it receives, along with Real Madrid, the largest sums inSpain for the right to televise its home matches. The media company Telefonicapaid Barca $400 million(!) in June 1999 for the broadcasting rights to all of the

62. Ball, op. cit., 61.

63. See ,www.athletic-club.net..

64. Quoted in Mayr, op. cit.







team’s home matches in the years 2003–2008. Telefonica might be a Spanishcompany but its willingness to pay such sums derives from Barca’s value not asa local but as a global brand.65

This value had become even more apparent in 2006 when Barca extended itssponsorship deal with Nike for five more years, during which Nike is payingover a 150 million euros for the right to place its logo at the far corner of theteam’s shirt. Nike’s view of Barca as a “winning” global brand is reflected inthe press release announcing the deal, in which Nike’s president Mark Parkerwas quoted as saying that “Our long-term relationships with top football clubssuch as Barcelona deepens our global leadership in the world’s most popularsport and strengthens our growth opportunities as the No. 1 football brand.”The press statement further emphasised that according to Nike, Barca’s shirts,which the company sells in over 50 countries, are among the world’s mostpopular football shirts.66

A prime reason for such figures is the foreign stars that play for the team andobviously couldn’t feature for Bilbao. Brazilian star Ronaldinho is only the mostcurrent example. At present playing for AC Milan, Ronaldinho led Barca notonly to sporting success (two Spanish league titles and a much coveted Cham-pions League trophy) but also to financial success as well. His Barca shirts andother related merchandise, sold all over the world, made him a global icon—”the face of football”, in the words of the New York Times—and further cementedBarca’s standing as a global success: the club enjoyed an annual revenue of $331million (second place in the world after Real Madrid) in the 2005/06 season;and, as of April 2008, Barca has 1,462 fan clubs (penas) all over the world.67

The contrast with Athletic Bilbao could not be sharper, both economically andculturally. The Basque club is light years away from the global brand payinghundreds of millions of dollars and has traditionally financed itself only withresources coming from its members. Yet what was possible in the early 20thcentury, when the members funded the construction of San Mames (1913) andthe club’s youth academy, is no longer possible in the global era with its muchlarger sums.68

This is why in July 2008 the club’s president, Fernando Macua, announced thatfor the first time in its history, Bilbao will use the team’s shirt for commercial pur-poses, generating 2 million euros a year for three years. In order to try and easesome of the fans’ angst, it was declared in advance that only Basque companies

65. Guido Ascari and Philippe Gagnepain, “Spanish Football”, Journal of Sports Economics, Vol. 7,No. 1 (2006), p. 80; on the sums involved see David White, “TV Groups Settle Football Dispute”,Financial Times (19 June 1999). For the sums’ impact see Jaume Garcıa and Placido Rodrıguez, “TheDeterminants of Football Match Attendance Revisited: Empirical Evidence from the Spanish FootballLeague”, Journal of Sports Economics, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2002), pp. 18–38; Guido Ascari and Philippe Gagne-pain, “Evaluating Rent Dissipation in the Spanish Football Industry”, Journal of Sports Economics, Vol. 8,No. 5 (2007), pp. 468–490.

66. See “Barcelona Extends Nike Sponsorship”, available: ,http://www.eufootball.biz/Sponsorship/3260-311006-Barcelona-extends-Nike-sponsorship.html..

67. See ,http://www.fcbarcelona.com/web/english/penyes/llistat_penyes/llistat_penyes.html.;Jack Bell, “Ronaldinho Becoming the Face of His Sport”, New York Times (26 March 2007); “Real Madrid,Barcelona Lead Soccer’s Revenue List”, ESPN Soccernet (8 February 2007), available: ,http://Soccernet.espn.go.com/news/story?id¼508033&cc¼4716.; “Real Madrid Remains Richest Club in theWorld”, ESPN Soccernet (13 February 2008), available: ,http://Soccernet.espn.go.com/news/story?id¼508033&cc¼4716..

68. MacClancy, “Nationalism at Play”, op. cit., p. 183; Ball, op. cit., p. 66.














http://Soccernet.espn.go.com/news/story?id=508033&cc=4716>;










http://Soccernet.espn.go.com/news/story?id=508033&cc=4716>










would be considered as sponsor. Indeed, the Basque fuel company chosen—Petronor—is known as an avid supporter of the Basque national movement.In the press conference announcing the sponsorship, Macua, however, took adefensive tone and explained that the 6 million euros generated from thedeal provides the club with critical financial resources.69

In Barca’s terms, such a sum is almost negligible—approximately 2% of its2006/07 income. For years, Bilbao operated with much smaller sums, both interms of income as well as expenditure, yet in more recent times the club hashad to adjust to new play rules. After decades during which they played in thename of unique commitment to the club, in the early 1980s Bilbao’s playersearned a quarter of the average salary earned by their colleagues in the otherteams of the Spanish league. It was in this period that many Basque playersbegan playing for non-Basque teams, something which was considered practicallyunthinkable in Franco’s time. In the mid-1990s there were already more than 50Basque players in non-Basque teams, six of them in Barca alone. As a result,Athletic raised its salary offers and decided to break a traditional taboo by court-ing other Basque teams’ players.70

One result of that decision was unprecedented hostility between Athletic andthe other major Basque club, Real Sociedad. The idea that Athletic is the naturalplace for all Basque players now received a concrete expression that hardlymade sense for Sociedad. The club from Guipuzcoa sees itself as every bit anational institution as is Athletic. The latter, claimed Sociedad, unfairly uses itssuperior economic might in a way that leaves the other Basque clubs with nochoice but to recruit foreigners, or, “even worse”, Spaniards. Accordingly, whenin 2002 Sociedad first signed a Spanish player (Sergio Boris), it portrayed Athleticas the chief “culprit” responsible for this “drastic step”.71

Such accusations are far different from the Catalan experience. While the Soci-edad–Athletic tension is a result of a divide inside the Basque national movement,in Catalonia the divide is between the Catalanists represented by Barca and theanti-Catalanists represented by local rivals Espanol. Barca’s status as the hegemo-nic club is far clearer than that of Bilbao in Euskadi. While Barca had now longsince passed the 100,000 member mark, Espanol can still boast only the samenumber of 16,000 club members it had in 1950. There isn’t any serious challengeon behalf of Espanol to Barca’s dominance.

One result of this distinction is the different ability to cope with economic pre-dicaments. The fact that Catalan nationalism has traditionally been led by theCatalan economic elite means that financial support for Barca is guaranteed inthe event of a crisis. As Ascari and Gagnepain put it: “Catalonian or Castilianbanks will always assist important losses in Barcelona or Real Madrid, becausethese clubs are national institutions. In these cases, bankruptcy is simply not anoption.”72

69. See “Soccer—Bilbao Break with Tradition to Sign Shirt Sponsor Deal” (29 July 2008), available:,http://uk.reuters.com/article/worldFootballNews/idUKL934650620080729..

70. MacClancy, “Nationalism at Play”, op. cit., p. 195.

71. Ball, op. cit., p. 73. On the “geographical” split in Euskadi and the contrast with Catalonia seeBen Ami, op. cit., p. 495.

72. Guido Ascari and Philippe Gagnepain, “Spanish Football”, Journal of Sports Economics, Vol. 7,No. 1 (2006), p. 77.








But what is true for Madrid and Barca is not necessarily true for Bilbao. Athleticmay have been relatively rich, in Basque terms, as a result of its connections withthe Basque banking elite, but this elite has always been a much less ardent suppor-ter of regional nationalism than its Catalan counterpart. A lack of a nationalistagenda perhaps prevents these banks from rescuing Bilbao in the Catalanpattern—that is, regardless of purely financial considerations. This couldexplain why the Basque banks refused to save Athletic when the club had toface a 33 million euro compensation claim issued by angry Sociedad, followinganother attempt by Athletic to land one of their youth players.73

These dire economic circumstances eventually forced Bilbao to take steps suchas the unprecedented use of the team’s shirt for commercial purposes. It is nowonder that, just as in the matter of the shirts, Bilbao was also the last club inSpain to allow the use of advertisements at the flanks of its home stadium.Similarly, the move to a new stadium that will replace “San Mames”, known asa traditional centre for Basque nationalism, will be carried out under the pressuresof commercialisation (which stems from globalisation), demanding greater match-day revenue. In contrast, the “corporate empire that is Barca”, as Ball puts it, ishardly in need of such economic oxygen.74

Unlike the situation for Bilbao, for Barca globalisation constitutes an opportu-nity much more than a threat. This is true not only economically but also cultu-rally. Even after the Franco era, the club continues to define itself officially as aninstitution with a “democratic mission”, as can be seen in official club statementsaccording to which “FC Barcelona is ‘more than a club’ for many people livingelsewhere in Spain, who see Barca as a staunch defender of democratic rightsand freedom”.75

In this context the “democratic opportunities” created by globalisation are alsomentioned in quite a pompous fashion:

This caring and humanitarian Barca needs to be globalised. It is a strategicdecision that is in keeping with the club’s history and the way that footballis continuing to develop on a worldwide basis. That is why the club hasdecided to contribute 0.7 per cent of its ordinary income [. . .] in orderto set up international cooperation programs for development, supportsthe UN Millennium Development Goals and has made a commitmentto UNICEF’s humanitarian aid programs through the donation of oneand a half million euros for the next five years and now wears theUNICEF logo on its shirts—an agreement that has made Barca unique.76

From a critical perspective it is certainly possible to ask whether such voluntaryactivity pursued by the club does not eventually contribute to a greater brandvalue (even before considering the related tax benefits and the fact that Barcadoes go as far as having its own “official Babybel cheese” in finding original

73. See Phil Ball, “The Honest Lawyer”, ESPN Soccernet (2 October 2006), available: ,http://Soccernet.espn.go.com/columns/story?id¼383084&root¼europe&cc¼4716..

74. Mayr, op. cit.; Phil Ball, “Read All About It”, ESPN Soccernet (24 September, 2007), available:,http://Soccernet.espn.go.com/columns/story?id¼466209&root¼europe&&cc¼4716..

75. ,http://www.fcbarcelona.com/web/english/club/club_avui/mes_que_un_club/mesqueunclub.html..

76. Ibid.
































financing opportunities). After all, the sum donated to UNICEF annually fromBarca’s revenue is easily exceeded by the gains from the club’s sponsorshipdeal with Nike, which attaches much value to being the club’s only commercialsponsor, with its logo appearing next to UNICEF’s in front of hundreds of millionsall over the world, approximately 50 times a year. All of this does not mean, ofcourse, that the donations to UNICEF constitute a problem in moral terms. Yetthe “global message” of the “humanitarian Barca” should not be analysed separ-ately from the economic potential this message carries for the club as a globalbrand.

The difference between Bilbao’s new shirt sponsorship deal and Barca’s shirt—with the UNICEF logo at the centre and the Nike logo in the corner—nicely sumsup the profound differences between the clubs in relation to globalisation. Forboth clubs the issue of commercial usage of the shirt is a delicate one, consideringthe clash between economic needs and the will to maintain a “pure” shirt as anational symbol. While for Bilbao this entails tough choices, Barca approachesthis dilemma from a strong economic and sportive position and is thus able tofind “creative solutions”. It is therefore able to promote economic benefit andsimultaneously present the club shirt as “free from commercials”, since thecentre of the shirt is “donated” to UNICEF.77

At the same time, Barca also maintains clearly local aspects in its conduct.Immediately after his victory in the 2003 presidential club elections, JoanLaporta (the incumbent president) defined the study of Catalan as an obligatorypart of agreements with foreign players. Furthermore, the Catalanisation ofthe team is presented as a possible solution to its sportive problems during thelast two seasons (2006/07, 2007/08). In this spirit Laporta appointed Josep (Pep)Guardiola—a Catalanist icon—as manager. Guardiola, who among other thingscampaigned for more Catalan language studies in the local schools, was alsothe team’s captain in the 1990s. In contrast to Bilbao, in the Catalan case theselocal aspects go hand in hand with a continued “global message”.78

This global message is expressed by foreigners as well, even in the global era.One example is Hristo Stoychkov, the Bulgarian star who featured for Barca inthe early 1990s. Stoychkov expressed passionate dedication to the Catalanistcause. Prior to the match between Bulgaria and Spain in the 1998 World Cup,after already having ended his playing days at Barca, Stoychkov hung a Catalanflag over his hotel room balcony and promised he would wear a T-shirt callingfor Catalan independence under his match shirt. Stoychkov even campaignedfor a separate Catalan national team and continued attacking Real Madrid longafter he retired from the game.79

Such gestures show how Catalan national identity, unlike Basque identity, is notonly inherited but can also be acquired. Since Basque identity was traditionally amatter of one’s origin rather than convictions, Basque cultural symbols are predo-minantly local rather than global in nature. This clear difference between the local

77. Patrick Harverson, “The Shirts with no Name Sponsorship”, Financial Times (29 August 1997).

78. Shobe, op. cit., pp. 103–105; Lisa Abend, “Barcelona vs. Real Madrid: More Than a Game”, Time

Magazine (20 December 2007), available: ,http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1697027,00.html..

79. See Franklin Foer’s aptly named chapter on the “Discreet Charm of Bourgeois Nationalism”, inHow Soccer Explains the World: An Unlikely Theory of Globalisation (New York: Harper Collins, 2004),pp. 193–216.









and the global was demonstrated in the centennial (centenary) celebrations of bothclubs at the turn of the century. Bilbao’s was a relatively modest affair, with a smalllocal museum established and some limited celebrations. Barca’s centenary,however, was a global “fiesta”, acknowledged by UEFA’s (the European FootballAssociation) decision to host the Champions League final in 1999 in the CampNou. Unsurprisingly, the celebrations’ slogan was explicitly “global”: “El centen-ary de tots” (“everyone’s centenary”). Bilbao, in contrast, never aimed for such amessage of inclusion.80

This major difference, the result of the gap between the “pro-global” and “anti-global” core values, is also expressed in the role the clubs themselves played vis-a-vis immigrants to both regions. Barca was a focal point for the socialisation ofnewcomers who viewed fandom as a path leading to inclusion in the Catalan con-sensus. In the Basque case, however, Athletic Bilbao, so intimately related to thePNV—and in this regard a “spiritual offspring” of Arana—was unable toprovide a similar basis for socialisation. Significant inclusion of immigrantswould have to wait until the 1950s. Only then, “thanks” to Francoist oppressionimposed on immigrants as well, sons of immigrants could play for Bilbao—andeven this was not always certain.

Such policy still smacked of racist Aranist overtones. A clear example for theremaining presence of racist attitudes in parts of the Basque national movementcan be seen in the words of the PNV’s leader, Xabier Arzalluz, in the 1990s. Inan infamous speech in 1996, Arzalluz claimed that “the original Basques” are dis-tinguished from the immigrants, among other things, by the extra bone found inthe back of their skulls—supposedly proof of their racial purity. Ball sharplypoints out the relation between these racist positions and the cantera policy:

It is as though football can do what politics cannot, and simply excludethose whom it wishes to exclude. The “forefathers”, despite needingimmigrant workers to bring about their industrial revolution, inevitablyended up resenting their presence. How could they celebrate the goodold days before the immigration, when all their neighbors still had thatextra bone? Easy. Turn the emerging football club into a theater of nation-alist dreams.81

In matters of the team’s line-up, just like in commercial matters, changes takingplace in Bilbao reflect more than anything the narrowing room for manoeuvrein the face of globalisation—not necessarily a change of ideals. The policy dictat-ing that “only Basques” will play for the first team has remained in principle, yetthe definition of “who is a Basque” was reluctantly modified so as to become moreand more inclusive over the years: today not only those who were born inEuskadi, even if they left the region in early childhood, are considered Basqueby the club. Even players who clearly aren’t Basque by descent (Catalans andeven Brazilians) can play for the first team provided they received their “sportingeducation” in the club. This can reasonably be seen as a pragmatic compromiserather than as a change of the principle itself. As Ball notes, “what the club hasdone, and what some at the club might have preferred to have done in the past,

80. Ball, op. cit., pp. 67, 84.

81. Ibid., p. 75.



may not be the same thing”.82 Basque nationalism, surely in its more radical mani-festations, is clearly on the defensive—and globalisation is one of the reasons.Football, in this regard, is only a mirror.

In March 2008 this mirror’s reflection was as clear as ever, when the Spanishnational elections were disrupted as a result of ETA’s murder of Isaıas Carrasco,an advisor for the ruling Socialist Party. A minute’s silence was invariablyobserved in almost all of the country’s football grounds during the followingmatch-day. In San Mames, where no minutes of silence are usually held, therewere solitary shouts and abuse by only a few individuals who expressedsupport for ETA. Symbolically, it was actually those calls that revealed onceagain the isolation of the nationalist call in what used to be its home ground forso many years. It seems that only when Real Madrid comes to town does a con-sensus exist regarding Basque nationalism. In this context one could say thatBasque nationalism is, more than ever, placed in an “offside” position—as it is“one step behind” the developments in its field of activity. In such circumstancesthe deep contrast with the various projects of Catalan nationalism (and the uniquerole Barca plays within these projects) is especially clear.

Though predications are always problematic and complex, some note as to whatthe game’s globalisation holds for both clubs is necessary. If the lessons of the pastare anything to learn from—and path dependency certainly suggests so—it can beassumed that the Catalan club, just like Catalan nationalism in general, will con-tinue to “enjoy” the global era thanks to its pro-global values. At the same time,the national agenda of the Basque club (and radical Basque nationalism) will prob-ably continue to be undermined by globalisation, with more and more parts of theclub’s activity becoming subject to globalisation’s demands. A more positiveexclusion, democratically speaking, could perhaps take place—that of extremistelements out of the Basque national movement.

Conclusion

The above discussion has explored the different ways in which Barca and AthleticBilbao deal with the globalisation of football, and has tried to show that the“pro-global” reaction by Barca, just like Bilbao’s “anti-global” attitude, is relatedto differences in the character of the national movements in the two regions.Despite similar structural circumstances, the weight of historical path dependencysubstantially contributed to the development of two national movements withvery different core values.

The difficulties already inherent in the relation between Basque nationalism andits parent, modernisation, fostered the adoption of an ethnic, “German” type ofcore value, centring on race. Catalan Nationalism, on the other hand, took on a“French”, civic form, focusing on language as a core value. While the Catalannationalists used modernisation and later globalisation as tools for the advance-ment of their agenda, Basque nationalism was distinctly anti-modern. ForArana, industrialisation and the immigrants that followed it was hardly a positiveoccurrence—on the contrary, it was the source of the national problem. The differ-ences in the national movements’ attitudes towards modernity were carried on tothe global era and exemplified by the “national” football clubs.

82. Ibid., p. 76.



Different positions exist regarding the question of global patterns. The discus-sion above has aimed to provide further support to the claim that globalisationshould not be thought of as a process with predetermined results. These resultsare “glocal” in character, depending on the context in which local patterns,often going far back in time, meet the global flow of wealth, workers andculture. In this sense even globalisation—the most recent symbol of the liberal-capitalist order—is far from signalling the “end of history”. It continues historicalprocesses that take different routes. This critical impact of path dependency ismanifested in many fields—football, as a prime example of globalisation, is butone of them.

Sport is often seen as a type of popular culture that has little place in theacademic realm.83 In recent years, however, the weight of such criticism hasdiminished, as one can discern a growing recognition of sport as a reflection ofphenomena that extend beyond the field of play. However, it is also importantto note the variations between different sportive case studies. This is especiallytrue regarding the Catalan and Basque experience outlined above: the conver-gence in football of globalisation, political dictatorship and minority national-ism(s) is quite unique to Spain. Therefore, the claim here is not that “Spanishfootball represents all football” but that it provides an especially clear expressionof the relationship between nationalism and globalisation.

Finally, it should be emphasised that, at least as presented here, football andsports in general express rather than shape collective identity and attitudes: nosocial issues were created during play, and, unfortunately, no social illness wasever solved by a game. Sport is only a mirror for social processes, but this doesnot mean it should be underestimated: this mirror provides a rich, fascinatingand meaningful reflection.

83. See Mike Cronin, “Review: Playing Games? The Serious Business of Sports History”, Journal ofContemporary History, Vol. 38, No. 3 (2003), “Sport and Politics”, pp. 495–496.



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