Z. Müge ÖNER

114605006

Politics of Cultural Diversity in The European Union

Term Paper

THE ROLE OF THE ‘OTHER’ IN THE EUROPEAN IDENTITYFORMATION

I. INTRODUCTION

Globalization movements are increasing more and more

today at the international level and are paradoxically

associated with the increase of the importance of

‘identity’ at the local level. On the one hand the

economic activities of liberal politics, which extend the

boundaries, are bringing terms like ’transnationalism’ to

political agendas, on the other hand, its discourse of

freedom caused the questioning of the term ‘identity’.

In this conceptual confusion, The European Project is

continuing to be the longest lived among unification

examples. According to Gerard Delanty, the character of

the European project has transformed deeply since the day

it started to be brought into being. But still, whether

this economic unification can transform into an organic

political unification or not, is one of the most serious

discussion topics in Europe. Especially after the victory

of the ‘No’ campaigns in Holland and France during the

European Constitution in 2005 made this discussion

deeper.

All these developments gave way to new research that aims

to answer questions such as: ‘Is the European citizenship

is possible with all the different elements and cultures

of the European societies?’, ‘Is a common European

cultural identity is enough to cover all the member

states?’, ‘Is the emerging European identity one to

replace other identities?’ and ‘Does it coexist with the

other identities?’ To answer these questions, researchers

and scholars looked at the historical developments to

find out what the common elements are that make the

‘European identity’.

‘The East’ has an important role in the European identity

formation as the ‘Other’. This assumption comes from the

psychology which considers that people during their life,

construct their identities by placing themselves beyond

the ‘Other’. The cultural and social relations with other

people help us to construct our identities. It is not

possible to have a personality without alterity

(otherness). We usually define the nation as ‘a named

human population sharing a historical territory, common

memories and myths of origin, a mass, standardized public

culture, a common economy and territorial mobility, and

common legal rights and duties for all members of the

collectivity’.1 But the term ‘other’ lacks in this

1 Delanty Gerard, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality, Palgrave Macmillan(15 June 1995), pp. 60.

definition even though the process of national identity

construction stems from conflicts against the ‘Other’ and

exists within this context.

‘It is a complete nonsense to connect identity to people

who are feeling the same and considering themselves as

the same. Identity as a process, as a narrative, is

always described beyond the position of the ‘Other’.’2

The West has been constructing its identity through its

relation with the East, considering themselves as

honorable but the East as contemptuous.

The ‘’Other’ has been homogenized, colonized, seized and

briefly assimilated, by the Western mind by using

violence.’3 The ‘I’ evaluates the ‘Other’ by using the

measures of ‘My’ culture and seeing the ‘Other’ as an

inferior version of itself.4

Yet the East as the ‘Other’ is not stable. It can change

according to the other otherness of the Western society.

For example, the ‘Other’ for Europe in the Middle Ages

was Islam, and it were the ‘Turks’ until the nineteenth

century, and then it became the Soviets with Communism.

At the same time, the European identity always continues

2 Ibid.3 Kaya Ayhan, Emmanuel Levinas ve Öteki’nin Çıplaklıgı: Egoloji’den Idoloji’ye, Toplumbilim Dergisi Kültürel Çalısmalar Özel Sayısı, No. 14 (Ekim 2001), pp. 2.

4 Schnapper Dominique, La Relation a l’Autre, Paris Gallimard, 1998, pp. 86.

to have internal ‘Otherness’ among the European

societies.

Edward Said criticizes Orientalism in his book, as he

believes that European states think and interpret the

East within the frame of what they want to see. According

to him, Orientalism is an ideologically different

interpretation, a vocabulary, training and teaching

doctrine of dreams and thoughts. Plus Orientalism has in

itself the necessary bureaucratic and local governing

elements for colonial governance.

In Said’s perspective, Europe has only been able to

identify and strengthen its own culture thanks to the

contemptuous and distorted ‘East’.

This research aims to examine the role of the ‘Other’ in

the European identity formation. While doing this, I also

want to question if a European identity is possible or

not, as a supra-identity like the European Project aims

today.

This research methodologically is a literature research.

To tackle this subject, I divided it into three parts.

The first part is going to be a more theoretical part. In

the second part will be focused on the historical

analysis of the role of the ‘other’ in constructing the

European Identity. While examining the utilization of the

‘other’ and its reflections to the European identity

formation, I will mostly benefit from Edward Said’s book

in which he criticized Orientalism aptly.

In the last part, I will try to show the internal

otherness in Europe by looking at different cases. This

part will cover the time between the beginnings of the

Second World War to the present. In this part we will

look at the construction of the European identity that

started to be discussed by political elites as a

political project. We will also see that the differences

between societies will start to be more visible and more

fragile. Finally, apart from the differences between

societies, I will also try to show the problematic of

‘Otherness’ within the states own societies.

II. COLLECTIVE IDENTITY OF EUROPE

In this part, before looking at the ‘East’ from a

European identity perspective, I would first like to look

at the theoretical framework of collective cultural

identity to answer what growing European unification

means for the values, heritages, and cultures of Europe’s

many ethnic communities, regions and nations and if a

unified Europe can be a ‘supra-nation’. 5

In the theoretical framework of collective identity,

there are three elements that we should look for:

continuity, memories and destiny. ‘A sense of shared

continuity on the part of successive generations of a given

unit of population, to shared memories of earlier periods,

events and personages in the history of the unit and the

collective belief in a common destiny of that unit and its

culture6, are the most important elements that construct a

collective identity.

Generally speaking, collective identities are usually

constant while individuals identify themselves and are

identified by others in different ways according to the

situations in which they find themselves. As we will see

in the next part, during the Cold War period, political

elites will try to change or revise the state’s national

identities within the European unified identity context.

Actually after industrial capitalism, this term of

collective identity started to entail many different

cultural identities. ‘Today, professional, civic and

ethnic allegiances have proliferated, involving ever-

larger populations across the globe. Above all, national

identification has become the cultural and political

norm, transcending other loyalties in scope and power.’7

5 Delanty Gerard, op.cit., Footnote 1, pp. 56.

6 Ibid., pp. 58.7 Ibid., pp. 59.

Within this theoretical framework, let’s take a look at

the areas that gives us European characteristics. Anthony

D. Smith, the British Ethnographer at the London School

of Economics, talks about the four characteristics

between European nations in understanding collective

identity in his article ‘National Identity and the Idea

of European Unity’. These are linguistics, cultural

geography and territorial symbolism, religious cleavages

and sense of ‘outsider’. Language tends to be a

limitation for the European idea given not all the

languages of Europe belong to the Indo-European family.

The other thing that limits definitive European idea is

cultural geography. The boundaries of the European

territories are not certain, especially the East side.

The establishment of Islam in the southern Mediterranean

isolated and even closed Europe. The Mediterranean became

a liquid barrier.8 The other issue is religion that binds

Europe, but at the same time, divides Europe. Today

still, inter-Christian divides are limiting unification

from above between western Christendom and eastern

orthodoxy. The last thing is sense of the ‘outsider’ that

is directed at immigrants and guest workers. Then, what

are their shared traditions and heritages?9

According to Anthony D. Smith, ‘they include traditions

like Roman law, political democracy, parliamentary

8 Reau Elizabeth, Dusautoy Marc, Lagny Michele, Moussakova Svetla, Prokovas Nicolas, Europe en construction: Le second XXe siècle, Broché-12 septembre 2007, pp. 44.

9 Ibid., pp. 60-69.

institutions and Judeo-Christian ethnics and cultural

heritages like renaissance humanism, rationalism and

empiricism and romanticism and classicism. Together they

constitute the official European cultural formula.’10 I

would like to add ‘the East’ as the ‘Other’ that also

constructs to what Anthony D. Smith calls the European

cultural formula.

According to Edward Said’s perspective, Europe, and

generally the West, has been constructing its identity

through its relation with the East, considering

themselves as honorable but the East as contemptuous.11

Until the Second World War, France and Great Britain were

the only hegemon power of this orientalist frame. The way

they saw the East actually constructed the existence of

the East. So we can say the East as the other of the West

is made by this western dominant view. This European idea

was based on the supposed superiority to non-European

cultures and populations. The East is constructed on the

dreams and thought of the West. All the books and stories

about the East were nothing else more than the dreams and

thoughts of the West. The authors, who write about the

East, start with their prejudges about the East in mind.

Now, let’s see what kind of role, this representation

issue played in the European identity formation.

10 Ibid., pp. 70.11 Said Edward W., Oryantalizm, Irfan Yayinevi, Ceviren: Nezih Uzel, Mart 1998, Istanbul, pp. 15.

III. THE EAST IN THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY FORMATION

In this part, I want to show the East as the ‘Other’ in

which Europe found its most enduring expression in their

relation with the East.

National identities generally define against the ‘Other.’

‘Culture was seen to be relative and embodied in national

histories, while civilization was universal and

transfixed in the crucible of Europe. Europeans thus

evolved the capacity to hold two kinds of identity: one

national and the other European. This dual identity was a

specifically European phenomenon.’12 As I said before,

Europe has a history with divisions and cleavages and

needed to invent an ‘Other’: the construction of the East

meant a common opposite. Between 1800 and 1900 some

60,000 books were written on the near east.13

In European history, the most dominant ‘Other’ was

Islamic religion. Europe constructed its identity on

these global interests. During the colonial period,

European identity was what the East was not. This idea of

the ‘Other’ and the contrasts with the ‘Other’ were

useful to produce a unified European identity. This

identity that is based on the superiority of Europeans,

was utilized to justify conquering and exploiting the12 Delanty Gerard, op.cit., Footnote 1, pp. 85.

13 Said Edward W., op.cit., Footnote 11, pp. 204.

East. As Kabbani argued, to legitimate Europe’s interests

in the East, the East was characterized in female

stereotypes that needed the help of patriarchal Europe.14

The East is exotic and despotic and needed to be

civilized by European conquerors. For example, in the

movie ‘Lawrence of Arabia’, we see this characterization

clearly. While Lawrence is the symbol of civilization,

the Orient is childish but at the same time wild and

evil. ‘Most of these, along with the genre of oriental

romances such as Arabian nights, had no real connection

to reality.’15

‘Its desirability consisted in its otherness, in its

difference. The opposition of the female oriental slave

and the male western traveller was the perfect foil for

the invention of a specifically western identity based on

patriarchal notions of superiority and intellectual

mastery. The West was what the Orient was not.’16

‘During the Enlightenment, while Europe was progress and

civilization, the sentimentality and innocence of

humanity was to be found in the Orient. The Orient

represented what the West had overcome. The Orient was

immature and childlike and inherently incapable of

progress. Such ideas served only as distorted mirrors

image of Europe’s own identity.’17 When we arrive at The

Cold War period, we see that the ‘Other’ became14 Ibid., pp. 21.15 Delanty Gerard, op.cit., Footnote 1, pp. 89. 16 Ibid.17 Ibid., pp. 90.

communism, so as a result of this, the representation of

the European identity also changed. Now, let’s look at

the Ottoman Empire case.

The Ottoman Empire occupied a quarter of the European

continent for six hundred years. After they occupied

Constantinople in 1453, Christendom became a bigger

political actor in Europe. Pope Pius II (1458-1464) was

the first who said ‘Europe’ when he said ‘Our Europe, Our

Christian Europe’.18 It was actually a call for all

Christians to preserve the European territories and to

unite against the Turks.

Even though the Turks had an important portion of the

European territories, they were never seen as a part of

Europe.19 This can be because the Islam religion is the

oldest ‘Other’ of Europe. The Saracens were the first

religious other. There was an important growing

solidarity between Christians against the Saracens.20

‘Since the Koran was translated into Latin in 1143,

western society was familiar with Islam, but it was a

distorted version that haunted the Christian mind. Islam

was seen as a preparation for the final appearance of the

antichrist as forecast in the book of Daniel, and

Muhammad was seen as a parody of Christ. Pope Innocent18 Neumann Iver B., Uses of the Other “The east” in European Identity Formation, Borderlines Vol. 9 1999, pp. 44.

19 Ibid.20 Saracen was a generic term for Muslims widely used in Europe during the later medieval era. Accessed December 24, 2014. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saracen

III characterized Muhammad as the beast of the

apocalypse. The idea of a barbarous Muslim world

inhabited by evil tribes was a dominant theme in medieval

literature.’21

This otherness did not change in spite of the growing

political differentiation of Christendom. The role of the

Islamic other was always dominant. ‘The increasing

solidarity of Christendom gave greater power to the

Crusade against the ‘Other’; the Crusade against the

‘Other’ helped to promote solidarity among the members of

Christendom.’22

The Turk was characterized as despotic, barbarian, wild

and evil. ‘The Turk was seen as a pernicious force sent

by God scourge Christendom for its sins. To fend off this

evil, all that was required was for christens to repent,

unite, and take up the defense of the faith.’23 With his

increasing political role, the Pope became the major

actor for unification of the Christendom.

The representation of the ‘Other’ frequently changed

though. For example, at the beginning, the Turk was

othered because of the Islamic religion. After the

successful occupations by the Ottoman Empire in the

European territories, the Empire was regarded with

greater antipathy because of its military power.

‘Religion remained a factor in the representation of the

21 Delanty Gerard, op.cit., Footnote 1, pp. 87.22 Neumann Iver B., op.cit., Footnote 18, pp. 43.23 Ibid., pp. 45.

Ottoman Turk as Europe’s ‘Other’, but the military

political aspect dominated.’24 As seen, while changing the

representation of the ‘Other’, the existence of the

‘Other’ never changed.

After Westphalia, the process of state building also

increased the cultural differences between Europe and the

‘Other’. The newly European states were constructing

their identity on the secularist doctrine.

‘Single despotic kings characterized the Orient while in

the West there were numerous republics and many kings. In

this way, European identity became constructed around an

antithesis of East West. The Islamic world was seen as a

hostile politico-ideological structure, a different

civilization and an alien economic region. The images

were created which emphasized less the despotic and cruel

nature of the Orient than its romantic otherness. The

contrast between Christianity and Islam was replaced by

the more secular one of civilization versus barbarism.

The idea of the Turkish infidel was replaced by the idea

of the Turkish barbarian.’25

‘As represented by Europeans, the Ottoman Empire was

profoundly unsuited to the new Westphalia system, the

post medieval European idea of the state a territorially

defined entity apart from dynasty and organized in

24 Ibid., pp. 49.25 Delanty Gerard, op.cit., Footnote 1, pp. 87.

accordance with man-made rules was alien to Muslim

political theory.’26

At the end of the Ottoman Empire, the representation of

Turkey became that of ‘the sick man of Europe’. This

focal point was also useful against the revolutionary

ideas that are growing within Europe. Ideas such as

revolutionary ideologies, radical democracy and

liberalism, anarchism, socialism was transforming the

Europe of the old regime. The image of the orient

provided a much-needed focal point for strategies of

counter-revolution.27 This otherness continued during the

nation state process of Turkey and even continues today.

Finally it will also be good to look at the critiques

brought to this role of the East as the ‘Other’. These

critiques defends that this argument has been

considerably exaggerated by social and political analysts

anxious to read back contemporary themes into previous

history.28 According to them, Europe was the region, which

had common history as part of Charlemagne’s Empire.

European imperial contact with the Islamic world is

usually dated from Napoleon's expedition to Egypt in

1798. Before that, the area already became known as

Europe.

26 Neumann Iver B., op.cit., Footnote 18, pp. 50.27 Delanty Gerard, op.cit., Footnote 1, pp. 91.28 Rich Paul, European Identity and The Myth of Islam: a Reassessment, Review of International Studies (1999), 25, pp. 437.

‘'European' identity has really been characterized by the

emergence of a disparate and rather amorphous series of

different identities that have been formed in a variety

of contexts and historical situations. Islam has been

just one of the challengers in this process and its

impact on European inter-state politics and foreign

policy has, since at least the end of the European Middle

Ages, been largely subsumed by the logic of inter-state

power politics.’29

IV. INTERNAL ‘OTHERNESS’

As we already discussed above social identity defines not

only an ‘in-group’, but also one or several ‘out-groups’.

In this part, we will focus on the internal otherness

between European states such as Germany, France and Great

Britain during the Cold War period. In that time, the

common ‘Other’ of Europe was Communism and the Soviet

Union and so the European Union project was still

possible with the current form of the ‘Other’. But the

differences between the perspectives of such a

unification of states were making it difficult to

construct a common identity. On the other hand, this

otherness played an important role within the

consolidation of their national identities.

29 Ibid., pp. 451.

During the 1950s, we see the four conceptions of the

state and of Europe:30

1. Liberal nationalist identity constructions dominated

in Great Britain and also in France during de

Gaulle’s presidency.

2. The idea of the third force that is based on a

democratic socialist alternative between capitalism

and communism. This context was especially created

by French socialists and German social democrats.

3. The idea of a part of the Western Camp is based on

liberal democracy and the social market economy.

4. The idea of Christian Europe was the dominant idea

among the Christian Democratic parties in Europe.

Today, we see two of them as the dominant discourse in

Europe: ‘the liberal nationalist identity and the modern

Western idea of Europe as a liberal democracy.’31

After the Second World War, Germany was the most

significant ‘Other’ of France. The occupation of France

by Nazis caused traumatic memories in France so with the

de Gaulle presidency; a nationalist rhetoric dominated

the 1950s, which made the idea of European unification

difficult.

30 Marcussen Martin, Risse Thomas, Engelmann-Martin Daniela, Hans Joachim Knopf Klaus Roscher, Constructing Europe? The evolution of French, British and German Nation State Identities, Journal of European Public Policy 6:4 Special Issue 1999, pp. 618.

31 Ibid.

When we look at the 1970s, we see that with the failure

of the economic policies of President Mitterrand, there

was no choice other than to change the perspective and

support the economic unification. The only way out for

France was Europe.

As Mitterrand declared: ‘We are at the moment where

everybody unites, our fatherland, our Europe, the

ambition to support one with the other, the excitement of

our land and of the people it produces, and the certainty

of a new dimension is awaiting them.’32

When we look at the Cold War’s Germany, we see that the

‘Other’ of Germany is its own past. So Europeanization is

the only way of overcoming its own past. ‘Germany’s own

past as well as communism constituted the ‘Other’ in this

identity construction.’33

As the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) declared in

1946 ‘Europe is a supranational community among the

family of nations. We support the creation of a European

confederation for the common preservation and

continuation of the Christian Occidental culture.’34

‘Thomas Mann’s dictum that ‘we do not want a German

Europe, but a European Germany’ became the motto of the

post-war West-German elites.’35 According to German

political elites, Europe was like the anti-thesis of Nazi32 Ibid.33 Ibid., pp. 623.34 Ibid.35 Ibid., pp. 622.

Germany. This perspective also preserved Christianity,

democracy and the social market economy as the components

of the European identity.

‘In contrast to Gaullist France, German nation state

identity now embraced the modern Western vision of

Europe, with Europe’s ‘Other’ being both Germany’s past

and communism… When Chancellor Willy Brandt introduced

Ostpolitik in 1969, he made it very clear that European

integration efforts were untouchable and had to be

continued.’36

In Britain’s example, the ‘Other’ is actually Europe

itself. ‘More than twenty years after entry into the

European Community (EC), Britain is still regarded as

‘of’ rather than ‘in’ Europe; it remains the ‘awkward

partner’ and ‘semi-detached’ from Europe.’37

This exception of Great Britain is not only because of

the geographical situation but also historical issues

that remain to be in conflict with several European

states such as France and Germany. This distinction

between the European and national identity creates a

unified perspective from different parties:

‘Labor Party: ‘our vision of Europe is of an alliance of

independent nations choosing to co-operate or achieve the

goals they cannot achieve alone. We oppose a European

federal super state.’

36 Ibid., pp. 624.37 Ibid., pp. 625.

Conservative Party: ‘the government has a positive vision

for the European Union as a partnership of nations. We

want to be in Europe but not run by Europe… Some others

would like to build a federal Europe. A British

Conservative government will not allow Britain to be part

of a Federal European State.’38

This general attitude did not change even today. The

parliamentary traditions and historical conflicts over

the king make their internal sovereignty very strong and

make it difficult to share with an intergovernmental

authority of Europe.

As Prime Minister John Major declared in 1993: ‘Britain

successfully used the Maastricht negotiations to reassert

the authority of national governments. It is clear now

that the Community will remain a union of sovereign

national states. That is what its peoples want: to take

decisions through their own Parliaments… It is for

nations to build Europe, not for Europe to attempt to

supersede nations.’39

From a general perspective, we can consider that

apparently for Great Britain’s political elites, European

integration should not affect nation state identities,

since the European policy consists of intergovernmental

bodies, which do not require much loyalty transferred to

the European level. The French and the German cases

though appear to contradict this argument.38 Ibid.39 Ibid., pp. 627.

Finally, it is also important to ask how the nation

states deal with “others” within themselves, like the

case of France and their experience with the immigration

of Muslims. The French society has undergone a deep

transformation in the last 30 years; this can be

explained in two terms, which are weakening of the

national integration models and apparition of some new

forms of community life. The traditional social life has

been destructed, which has begun as early as the end of

the industrial society. The institutions that ensured

solidarity and equality have been in crisis. Besides,

xenophobic and racist ideas in the nation appeared and

strengthened their existence in the political stage. In

this structure, the Muslims have become an issue in

French society. They were a threat for the French

identity. The Muslim immigrants have been picked as the

scapegoat. The anxiety about Muslims was the idea that

Islam opted out modernity, thus they were excluded and

exposed to social and racial discrimination.40 The

political party “Front National” in France makes

xenophobic campaigns. The supporters of the party see

Islam as contributing to the weakening of the cultural

identity of the nation. France is not the only European

country with such experiences on how they see the Islam

and Muslim immigrants. These individuals would eventually

be asserted to some sort of community and the result of40 Wieviorka Michel, Race, Culture and Society: The French Experience with Muslims, 1998, pp. 135.

this exclusion is for these people to find a place in the

Muslim Community.

To conclude this part, the racist approaches are becoming

more and more common in the political discourses in

Europe. Apparently the otherness that is unifying the

European states in the past has a discriminative form

within the contemporary nations states. On the one hand

the increase of the ‘Other’ in European societies with

migrations and guest workers, exalts nationalist

activities and approaches the members of the nation, on

the other hand it makes it difficult to create a common

European identity. The term of the “European citizenship”

today became a more and more debatable issue. The

integration politics of the countries and the management

of the cultural diversity in Europe are recently the main

problems.

V. CONCLUSION

When I decided to research this subject, I was confused

because of the largess of the term the ‘Other’. As you

have read in the text, I tried to limit this by showing

examples and clear opinions from the chosen literature.

This research area has still a lot of ambiguous aspects

like what to exactly understand from the term the

‘Other’.

In the first part, we saw the theoretical perspective for

understanding what to understand from collective

identity. The three elements in the construction of a

collective identity were continuity, memories and

destiny. On the one hand, while the history of Europe

still has some common elements, memories and continuities

such as roman law, political democracy, parliamentary

institutions and Judeo-Christian ethnics and cultural

heritages like Renaissance humanism, rationalism and

empiricism and romanticism and classicism and more

importantly a common ‘Other’, on the other hand, it also

remains to have divergences and internal otherness that

make it difficult to form the idea of a European

identity.

In the second part, I tried to make an historical

analysis to show the evaluations of the representation of

the ‘Other’. The most dominant perspective as the ‘Other’

in the European identity formation was the East, in other

words: the Orient.

In the third part, I tried to show the internal otherness

by showing the French, German and British cases. In these

cases, we saw that while some of the national identities

were embracing the European identity, some were not. The

British example shows that there is not much convergence

toward a common European nation state identity. But the

German and French cases show that some collective nation

state identities have thoroughly integrated ideas about

Europe and the European order.41

We saw that it is impossible to understand what makes the

European identity without taking into account its

relations and interactions with non-European ‘Others’.

While Europe was constructing its uniqueness, it used the

elements of the opposite. The representation of this

opposite frequently changed but the existence of it did

not change.

What I hope to have demonstrated is not that the idea of

common identity of Europe is not possible, it was the

role of the ‘Otherness’ whether it is inside or outside

that is questioning the reflections of the European

identity formation.

Today, in my opinion, the post-national citizenship

perspective involves many different cultural elements

such as multiculturalism, cultural pluralism and so on,

that European states should deal with it before

constructing a supra-national identity. This

contemporary world imposes new questions among which most

importantly: 'will these new challenges create new

‘Others’ or conceptualize all the differences within the

European context?’

41 Marcussen Martin, Risse Thomas, Engelmann-Martin Daniela, HansJoachim Knopf Klaus Roscher, op.cit., Footnote 30, pp. 631.

Bibliography:

Delanty Gerard, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality,

Palgrave Macmillan (15 Juin 1995).

Kaya Ayhan, Emmanuel Levinas ve Öteki’nin Çıplaklıgı: Egoloji’den

Idoloji’ye, Toplumbilim Dergisi Kültürel Çalısmalar Özel

Sayısı, No. 14 (Ekim 2001).

Marcussen Martin, Risse Thomas, Engelmann-Martin

Daniela, Hans Joachim Knopf Klaus Roscher, Constructing

Europe? The evolution of French, British and German Nation State

Identities, Journal of European Public Policy 6:4

Special Issue 1999, pp. 614-633.

Neumann Iver B., Uses of the Other “The east” in European

Identity Formation, Borderlines Vol. 9 1999, pp. 39-63

Said Edward W., Oryantalizm, Irfan Yayinevi, Ceviren:

Nezih Uzel, Mart 1998, Istanbul.

Schnapper Dominique, La Relation a l’Autre, Paris

Gallimard, 1998.

Smith Anthony D., National Identity and the Idea of European

Unity, International Affairs (Royal Institute of

International Affairs 1944), Volume 68, Issue 1,

(Jan., 1992), pp. 55-76.

Rich Paul, European Identity and The Myth of Islam: a

Reassessment, Review of International Studies (1999),

25, pp. 435-451.

Reau Elizabeth, Dusautoy Marc, Lagny Michele,

Moussakova Svetla, Prokovas Nicolas, Europe en

construction: Le second XXe siècle, Broché-12 septembre

2007.

Wieviorka Michel, Race, Culture and Society: The French

Experience with Muslims, 1998, pp. 131-147.