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Transcript of The Rise of Pentecostalism in Latin America: A Study of Conversion, Politics, and the Dark Secrets...
Honours Thesis
The Rise of Pentecostalism in Latin America:
A Study of Conversion, Politics, and the Dark Secrets within
Contemporary Bolivia
Patricia K. Robertson
745060
University of Calgary
Religious Studies 590
April 16, 2007
Supervisor: Dr. Douglas Shantz
1
Abstract The Rise of Pentecostalism in Latin America: A Study of Conversion, Politics, and the Dark Secrets within Contemporary Bolivia is a research study by Patricia Robertson at the University of Calgary to complete an Honours Degree in Religious Studies in April 2007. The rapid rise of Pentecostalism in the global south is a significant shift in Christianity largely ignored by the religious and secular worlds. Philip Jenkins, author of The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity predicts exponential growth for Pentecostalism in the global south for the next forty years with a decidedly conservative tendency and an aversion to radical politics (7-8). Contrary to Jenkins’ predictions, this study reveals the past controversial political participation of Pentecostals, the currently increasing political involvement, the political shift toward nationalistic socialism rather than conservatism, and the negative characteristics or dark secrets of the Pentecostal movement that will restrict the growth of Pentecostalism if they are not addressed. The first section of this study covers the relevant history of religion and politics in Bolivia from Catholicism to Pentecostal conversion, the second section evaluates the controversial role of Pentecostalism in politics during the past four decades and the political trends today, and the final section discusses the dark secrets of Pentecostalism. The movement must address these issues if it desires to grow rapidly in Bolivia without reaching a plateau similar to the situation in Mexico and Guatemala. This thesis reflects on Pentecostalism using a socio-political perspective with research obtained from a diverse cross-section of contemporary sources including scholarship by ex-Pentecostals and government election statistics.
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Table of Contents
Abstract Page 1
Table of Contents Page 2
Introduction Page 3
I. Bolivian History from Catholicism to Pentecostal Conversion Page 6
Rise of Pentecostalism in Bolivia Page 15 “Nomadismo” Shopping Around for Religion Page 19
Pentecostal Conversion Page 21 II. Pentecostalism & Politics in Bolivia Page 24
Historical Pentecostal Involvement in Politics Page 25 Political Conservatism for Pentecostals is Not a Given Page 29 The Future of Pentecostal Involvement in Politics Page 35
III. The Dark Secrets of Pentecostalism Page 37 Anti-intellectualism Page 38
Conversion Page 40 Link to Globalization Page 45 Divisiveness Page 47 Other Dark Secrets Page 49
Conclusion Page 52 Endnotes Page 56 Works Cited Page 62
3
Introduction
When two noted anthropologists canvassed colonization projects in Bolivia’s lowlands, they reached the last house on the new dirt road. The owner heard them coming and ran out of the house yelling as they approached. “Soy católico. Nunca van a convertirme.” (I’m Catholic. You’re never going to convert me.) He was the last and only Catholic left in the project. (Cleary, Shopping 1)
Philip Jenkins, in his book The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global
Christianity suggests that the growth of Pentecostalism in the global south is likely “the
most successful social movement of the past century” and while there are only a few
hundred million Pentecostals in the world today, “Pentecostal believers should surpass the
one billion mark before 2050” (8). Jenkins adds that Pentecostals are “more interested in
personal salvation than in radical politics,” and in 2002, he declared that “on present
evidence, a Southernized Christian future should be distinctly conservative” (7-8). This
research study will prove that contrary to the predictions of Jenkins: 1) Pentecostal
involvement in politics is not a new phenomenon, as controversial political involvement has
spanned decades; 2) social conservatism may have been the past trend for Pentecostals but
social or political conservatism is not a given today, and in fact, religious belief is not
always a strong indicator of individual political direction; and 3) Pentecostalism will not
expand exponentially, without reaching a plateau, unless it addresses the internal
controversial features or dark secrets of the movement.
This thesis reflects on Pentecostalism using a socio-political perspective with most
of the research from contemporary sources covering a broad spectrum of disciplines that
include religious studies, theology, history, militarism, governmental statistics, sociology,
politics, anthropology, and economics. This thesis position contradicts the predictions of
Jenkins, but other scholars debating Pentecostalism such as Edward L. Cleary, Virginia
Garrard-Burnett, Daniel J. Chiquete, Otto Maduro, Pedro C. Moreno, Roger E. Olsen,
4
Huang Po Ho, Paul Freston, Allan Anderson and Jensen Michael Grant support my
arguments throughout this research study. The first section of this study is a discussion of
the broad noteworthy changes that have occurred within Latin American society with a
review of relevant political and religious historical events that provide the foundation for
Pentecostal growth. The demographics of the country are also significant to understanding
why there is such a large migrant population in Bolivia at the present, why such a lively
religious environment exists in Bolivia today, and why these migrants are attracted to
Pentecostalism. This discussion will take us from Spanish imposed Roman Catholicism to
all facets of Pentecostal conversion. The second section of this study evaluates the
controversial past political involvement of Pentecostalism in Latin America. This section
provides an assessment of the rising social movement of Bolivia’s indigenous peoples, the
country’s current political shift to the left, and the role of Pentecostals in these trends.
The third section is a thorough analysis of the lesser-known but critical dark secrets
of Pentecostalism. Beginning the focus on the most destructive dark secrets that affect the
long-term success of Pentecostalism, this study will then briefly address a list of additional
negative characteristics of the movement. The long-term viability of the movement will
depend on its transparency, willingness to confront its dark secrets, and its ability to shift
with social, economic, and political change. Research will demonstrate that while
Pentecostalism is growing rapidly and coming to the aid of the displaced migrants in
Bolivia, it will reach a growth plateau. This plateau will be similar in nature to that of
Mexico and Guatemala or worse yet, a drop in growth might occur similar to Chile. In order
to fully understand this dynamic, rapidly changing, religious phenomenon, it is imperative
to consider current societal shifts and tensions relating to Pentecostalism in Bolivia through
contemporary sources. The rise of evangelical Pentecostalism is arguably the most exciting
5
movement to hit the Bolivian religious scene in all of recent history. Throughout this study,
the response of the Roman Catholic Church to the Pentecostal assault will be monitored.
Understanding the positions taken by the Catholic Church as it struggles to reduce the theft
of its Latin American parishioners is relevant to the study of Pentecostalism.
By way of clarification, Pentecostalism, a form of evangelical religion, is the fastest
growing Protestant movement in the global south and its expansion within the country of
Bolivia is no exception. Pentecostalism in Bolivia follows a prophetic belief in the end of
the world where only those who have converted will receive salvation; it emphasizes a
direct personal experience of God, and there is a belief in biblical inerrancy, miracles,
ecstatic experience, baptism by the Holy Spirit after conversion, charismatic gifts for all
believers; and involves various forms of dancing and other body movement. “Pentecostals
and Charismatics form a distinctive group within Evangelicalism and its fundamentalist
wing” (Zeidan 24). However, Pentecostals are not to be confused with fundamentalists, who
are quick to separate themselves apart and consider evangelicals “heretics for their doctrinal
stand on charismatic gifts” such as glossolalia or speaking in tongues (Hood 84).
Evangelicalism, the broad category, includes a wide variety of Protestant groups that stress
conversion, active expression of the gospel, “a particular regard for the Bible”, and
emphasis on the “sacrifice of Christ on the cross” (Bebbington 2-17).1 Sandro Magister
maintains that Pentecostalism distinguishes itself from other evangelical movements as a
Christianity marked by “a deep personal faith, a demanding and puritanical morality,
doctrinal orthodoxy, community ties, [and] a strong spirit of mission, prophecy, healings,
and visions” (2). We will begin by briefly tracing the socio-economic and political-historical
context in Bolivia to better understand the dynamics that allowed the infiltration of
Pentecostalism into Roman Catholic Bolivia in the first place. An aggressive evangelical
6
religious marketplace has evolved in Bolivia; where once, nominal syncretic Roman
Catholicism ruled with little competition.
I. Bolivian History from Catholicism to Pentecostal Conversion
Otto Maduro points out that we cannot have a serious discussion about religion in
Latin America without discussing the “shaping forces of empires – Spaniard, British,
Portuguese, Dutch, French, etc. – upon the religious dynamics of this hemisphere” (4). In
1532, under the leadership of Francisco Pizarro, the Spaniards conquered the Incas forcing
the indigenous peoples and the imported Africans to work the land as slaves for the Spanish
overlords. Millions died in the silver mines. Until the late sixteenth century, billions of
dollars in silver were stripped from the rich Bolivian countryside and shipped to the king of
Spain (Augustin 128). When the Spaniards arrived in Bolivia, the conversion of the people
to Catholicism was an easy process, although often violent (Augustin 98). The concepts of
heaven, earth, and hell were not a stretch from the three-layered universe of the Aymara and
Quechua peoples. According to Diego Irarrázaval, the worldview of the indigenous peoples
of Latin America is a collective knowledge, using symbolic, mythical language that is
preferably ritualistic and religious (193). It expresses the profound meaning of life and
describes the understanding of the people in relation to the mysteries of the divine
(Irarrázaval 193). Their worldview involves a holistic understanding of the sacred nature of
the existence of the people (Irarrázaval 193).2 Through subjugation of their own spiritual
belief system during Spanish colonization, the indigenous peoples retained those parts of
their traditional beliefs that had significant meaning or ritual importance for their everyday
life. The new beliefs introduced by the invaders had “little meaning or influence in their
lives,” but they nevertheless “incorporated the new Catholic beliefs into their old religion”
7
(Augustin 98). This new syncretic form of Catholicism in no way resembled orthodox
Catholicism but that was of little concern to the indigenous peoples. However, it was
important that “their conversion satisfied the Spanish priests, and their own practice of
religion met their needs” (Augustin 99).
During the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, with the Napoleonic
Wars weakening the authority of the Spanish Crown in Europe, the French Revolution and
the U.S. Declaration of Independence were catalysts in the desire for Bolivian independence
(Augustin 48). In 1809, Bolivia proclaimed independence from Spain. Simon Bolivar led
the sixteen-year battle for independence for Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and
Bolivia (Augustin 129). In August 1825, Bolivia became a republic and for a few short
months Bolivar became the first president, culminating in the approval of the first
constitution in January 1826. From this time forward until 1981, Bolivia had little political
stability and experienced one hundred and ninety-two coups d’etat or sudden changes in
government in a one hundred and fifty-six year period (Augustin 50). A change of
government occurred every ten months on average and the indigenous people had no
political, economic, or educational opportunities (Augustin 50). Bolivia defended its
territory against several neighbouring countries in wars during the late 1800s and early
1900s and lost vast expanses of land, large natural reserves of oil and gas, and its only
access to the Pacific Ocean. Located in west-central South America, Bolivia is now a
landlocked nation sharing its border with Paraguay, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Peru.
As early as the 1930s and throughout the Cold War, the United States feared that
Latin Americans were on the road to becoming communist, so U.S. interventions became
commonplace. Bolivians finally grew tired of their repressive situation; they became
nationalistic, and rose up against their oppressive and often tyrannical political and military
8
leadership. Their efforts were rewarded with significant reforms. Two decades later, in
1952, another revolution gave all adults the right to vote and this was the beginning of a
politically active peasantry in Bolivia (“Peasantry” 1). Prior to this time, the indigenous
peasants “had been subjected to a form of indentured service called pongaje (“Peasantry” 1).
In the 1950s, educational reforms were put in place to educate the poor rural peasants; the
government nationalized the tin mines, and in the process, they took the power away from
the tin barons and returned the Indian lands to their rightful owners (Augustin 53). However,
the families soon discovered that the traditional lands did not have the resources to sustain
extended family members, so people set off for the cities in search of employment. This
massive demographic shift of poor migrants moving from the rural areas to the cities set the
stage for Pentecostalism.
The next few decades were violent and oppressive with dictatorial leadership
creating instability in the economy, resulting in continuous worker strikes.3 Through the
1980s, labour unrest was continuous; foreign debt was accumulating at an unprecedented
rate, and inflation was skyrocketing. From 1985 to 1989, Victor Paz Estenssoro became the
first president to serve a full term in office and political stability was the result (“Bolivia
U.S.” 55). In 1997, with the election of Hugo Banzer and the backing of the U.S.
government, a campaign to restrict the growth of the coca plant began as a response to the
rising international drug trafficking problem (“Bolivia U.S.” 6). For centuries, the peasants
had been growing the indigenous crop for its medicinal purposes, long before its use for
illicit drug production. They rebelled against the restrictions placed upon them, leading to
the creation of a new social movement that protested with “strong anticapitalist bias and an
affinity for socialism, nationalism (as expressed in anti-U.S. and anti-Chilean sentiment) and
a deep-seated suspicion of foreign corporations involv[ing] Bolivian joint ventures and
9
privatizations” (“Bolivia U.S.” 6). Also, following the example of the Caracazo in
Venezuela where there was “an explosion of political rage by the underclass in Caracas
against a program of free-market reforms,” Bolivians successfully raged against the
privatization of water in 2000 (Gott 2-3).4 The indigenous peoples of Bolivia are
discovering their collective political voice to fight for their own human rights.
Religiously, the indigenous peoples of Bolivia are exercising their right to
experiment and stray from traditional Catholicism. To this day, fifty percent of Bolivians
still blend ancient traditional rites with Catholicism and the resulting belief system is usually
referred to as popular religion or folk-Catholicism (“Bolivia U.S.” 9; “Focus” 6). Catholic
syncretism actually aided the assault by Pentecostalism in Bolivia. The lack of adherence to
one traditional doctrinal practice opened the Bolivians to the exploration of other faith
structures. Pentecostalism in Bolivia arose out of the misery of poverty and oppression.
Approximately sixty-five percent of Bolivians live in poverty with that number rising to
eighty percent for rural populations (“Bolivia U.S.” 11). The population of Bolivia consists
of mixed race (Mestizo), Quechua, Aymara, and European inhabitants. The great migration
of people from rural areas to the cities has the urban populations rising at a rate of 3.6%
annually (“Bolivia U.S.” 9).
Broad societal changes in Latin America have been influential in the growth of
Pentecostalism. These changes are not, however, only impacting the growth of
Pentecostalism, but give rise to charismatic, evangelical religion in Catholicism, mainstream
Protestantism, and traditional indigenous religion. Short-lived societal changes or fads do
not significantly affect culture but the changes to recognize are the long-term trends that
shape culture and society (Cleary, Conclusion 1). The long-term changes that are occurring
in the external social, political, economical, and religious environment of Latin America
10
include: 1) the migration of millions of people from rural to urban areas because land
holdings for food production no longer support the extended family; 2) new economic
diversity shifting from agriculture to commercial, industrial, and marketing; 3) increased
literacy rates, and a final but greatly significant factor, 4) the spread of technological
advances such as radio, telephone, television, the Internet, and travel (Cleary, Conclusion 1).
Displacement from traditional rural settings to urban centres is an economic reality that
isolates individuals from close traditional ties to family, religion, and culture. Richard Gott
maintains that “the disastrous displacement of indigenous peoples from the countryside,
driven out by oil prospectors, logging companies, and coca eradication programs has
produced immense new indigenous cities often invisible to the white middle class” (1).
Edward L. Cleary declares this is where innovative religious change finds an audience
(Conclusion 2). The need to replace traditional structures in their lives renders the
indigenous migrants open to religious innovation and change. Furthermore, when traditional
religious beliefs no longer work for them, individuals seek a spiritual replacement. It is from
this Bolivian historical and religious context that we initiate an evaluation of the rise and fall
of liberation theology and the rise of Pentecostalism.
An excellent example of radical religious change that sought a home in Latin
America in the 1960s and 70s was liberation theology. It developed within Roman
Catholicism as religious innovation that was “existentialist, christocentric, communitarian,
participatory, and egalitarian” in opposition to traditional conservative Latin American
Catholicism (Cleary, Conclusion 2). Understanding the origin of Pentecostalism in Bolivia
requires knowledge of liberation theology and the response of the global Roman Catholic
Church to the liberation theology movement. It is essential to understand why the Church
viewed liberation theology as a threat that required suppression. Initially, the liberation
11
theology movement appears to be the seed that gave birth to Pentecostalism in Latin
America; however, a lively, ongoing debate continues over the relationship between the
two. Howard Wiarda supports the argument that liberation theology, “th[e] more radical,
quasi-Marxian position that some elements within the Church adopted a couple decades
ago” was a “partial response” to the Protestant Evangelical Movement (5). He believes it
was a way for the Catholic Church to move with change and not against it, or a way to keep
from feeling overwhelmed by the change (Wiarda 5). Contrarily, Jorge A. Aquino supports
the argument that liberation theology was “displaced by Pentecostal faith” (1).5 Virginia
Garrard-Burnett adds two more possibilities to the debate proposing that Pentecostalism
either rose up from the violence of the 1960s and 70s or was the response to the suppression
of liberation theology by the Roman Catholic Church (4).
Both movements take an interest in the plight of the poor; however, it must be
remembered that liberation theology was the brainchild of progressive Roman Catholic
theologians and pastoral leaders seeking alternatives for those living in poverty (Cleary,
Conclusion 3). Liberation theology developed as a grassroots movement working for social
reform and fighting for human rights by establishing base Christian communities (Cleary,
Conclusion 3). The groundwork for liberation theology was the result of decades of
reflection throughout the twentieth century on a theology of progress by Christians such as
Jacques Maritain, Teilhard de Chardin, Henri de Lubac, Karl Rahner and Yves Congar (Boff
67). Feeling the need for change in the Catholic Church on many fronts, Pope John XXIII
opened Vatican II in 1962, pushing for an increase in Church focus on those who were
marginalized and living in poverty (“Liberation” 2). When Pope Paul VI closed Vatican II
in 1965, the Catholic Church emerged with an atmosphere of theological freedom and
creativity (Boff 69). Through a group called the Church and Society in Latin America
12
(ISAL), numerous Catholic and Protestant thinkers sought answers to the problems of
underdevelopment within their countries (Boff 69). Catholic theologians such as Gustavo
Gutiérrez, Segundo Galilea, Juan Luis Segundo, Lucio Gera and Protestants such as Emilio
Castro, Julio de Santa Ana, Rubem Alves, and José Míguez Bonino participated in meetings
in Rio de Janeiro, Havana, Bogotá, and Cuernavaca beginning in 1964 and continuing
through 1965 (Boff 69). These thinkers discussed the line of thought attributed to Gutiérrez
about “theology as critical reflection on praxis” (Boff 69). In 1967, Gutiérrez gave a lecture
in Montreal followed by lectures in Chimbote, Peru and Cartigny, Switzerland in 1969, to
evaluate the challenges posed by “the development of a pastoral strategy of liberation”
(“Liberation” 3). It was at the meeting in Switzerland that the liberation theologians put
forward “Toward a Theology of Liberation,” a critical piece of work for the movement
(“Liberation” 4). Shortly thereafter, the first Catholic congresses were held in Bogotá in
1970 and 1971 (Boff 69). During the same two years, the Protestants assembled through
ISAL in Buenos Aires (Boff 69). What followed was a flurry of publications giving the
liberation approach a doctrinal content on topics including spirituality, Christology and
ecclesiology (Boff 71). Latin Americans such as Enrique Dussel from Argentina, Leonardo
Boff from Brazil, Ronaldo Muñoz, Pedro Trigo and Otto Maduro all from Venezuela, and
Luis Patiño and Cecilio de Llora from Colombia wrote and contributed numerous works
(Boff 71). The next phase of liberation theology brought theologians, many of whom had
become pastors, and other intellectuals together as militant agents for the Catholic Church at
the grassroots level (Boff 71). Liberation theologians at this stage included António da Silva
and Clodovis Boff from Brazil; Elsa Tamez and Victorio Araya from Costa Rica; Diego
Irarrázaval and Carmen Lima from Peru; and Victor Codina, a Spanish Jesuit, from Bolivia
(Boff 71). Aiding the spread of liberation theology were meetings held at El Escorial, Spain
13
in 1972 discussing the topic “Christian faith and the transformation of society in Latin
America.” The first meeting of Latin American theologians in Mexico City in 1975; the
creation of the Ecumenical Association of Third World Theologians (EATWOT) in 1976,
and the congresses held in Dar es Salaam in 1976, Accra in 1977, Sri Lanka in 1979, São
Paulo in 1980, Geneva in 1983, and Oaxtepec, Mexico in 1986 all contributed (Boff 73,
“Liberation” 5-8).
In response to the rapid spread of liberation theology in the Catholic Church in Latin
America, Pope John Paul II became openly hostile to the movement while traveling in
Mexico in 1979 (Allen 4-5).
John Paul spoke up for the rights of the poor, the unemployed and the oppressed. But those bishops imbued with a Marxist outlook who had been encouraging the new doctrine of liberation theology – derived from a mixture of postwar German political theology and American –inspired democratic aspirations – were rebuked. Their duty lay as pastors, not politicians, the Pope warned. (“Pope John” 5)
He immediately countered with a Roman Catholic doctrine of “spiritual liberation from
personal sin, poverty of spirit, [and] apolitical stances from the rank and file” (Cleary,
Conclusion 3). This doctrine promoted “educational programs of the elite unsympathetic to
social reform” and parishes were strengthened without the formation of grassroots
communities (Cleary, Conclusion 3). Liberation theology may not have been the direct
catalyst for the rise of Pentecostalism but it certainly opened up an avenue for change. It
changed the way the indigenous people of Latin American viewed religion, from
“resignation to one’s fate and a glorification of poverty,” to hope for alternative solutions to
the oppression in their lives (Moreno, Reformation 1). It pushed many Bolivians toward
active religious participation (Moreno, Reformation 1). Liberation theology raised a
religious fervour fed by societal and political dissatisfaction and it did play a role in the rise
14
of Pentecostalism, but not a direct role.
Hannah Stewart-Gambino alleges there were three constraints limiting the
effectiveness of liberation theology (1). First, there was pressure from the Vatican on the
Latin American Churches “to rein in particularly their more progressive elements” who
were pushing for an emphasis on social justice within the Church (Stewart-Gambino 1).
With Rome feeling the threat of liberation theology on the status quo, the Church changed
its direction in the 1980s and 90s. The actions of the Catholic Church became strongly
conservative, and the new bishops, whether they were progressive thinkers or conservative,
gave no support for grassroots community actions (Klaiber 1). The “powerful weight of
Rome” pushed moderate bishops to the conservative side (Klaiber 1). Second, in order to
maintain national religious status in the country, the Catholic Church in Bolivia had to be
careful not to push too far into human rights work (Stewart-Gambino 1).6 Governments that
felt pressured to implement social reform also undermined the human rights work of
liberation theologians. The authorities definitely preferred citizens who were passive and
noncontroversial. In agreement with Stewart-Gambino, Ana de Garcia states:
The hate is not directed to the church as such. Indeed, churches that stay at the “religious” level are praised; they have no problem. It is the church that enters into defence of human life, that takes seriously that defence at all costs, that enters into conflict with these authorities. (10) 7 Fending off the assault of the rising Pentecostal movement was the third constraint
that limited the effectiveness of liberation theology (Stewart-Gambino 1). Time, energy, and
resources of the Catholic Church were required to minimize the loss of membership to the
Pentecostals. With the rise in evangelical religion, the Catholic Church encouraged the
growth of its own charismatic movement to breathe new life into the Church. Consequently
the Catholic Church is witnessing the growth of non-political charismatic groups within its
15
ranks. These groups seem to be the product of two ongoing, long-term trends: 1) the
repression of the radical church or liberation theologians by Central American governments
in the 1970s and 1980s, and 2) a rightward push from the Vatican, beginning with Pope
John Paul II and likely continuing with Pope Benedict XVI (Garrard-Burnett 1).8 A strong
understanding of Bolivian political and religious history and knowledge about the rise and
fall of liberation theology in Latin America provides the context for evaluating the rise of
Pentecostalism in Bolivia.
Rise of Pentecostalism in Bolivia
It was not long after William J. Seymour began preaching at the Apostolic Faith
Mission on Azusa Street, Los Angeles in 1906, setting Pentecostalism in motion, that
evangelical religion made its way to Bolivia. In order to bring evangelicalism to the
Quechua and Aymara peoples, the Bolivian Indian Mission (BIM) was formed in 1907
when New Zealander George Allan arrived in Bolivia (Johnstone 1; “Focus” 6). A half-
century later, the Evangelical Christian Union (UCE) was created as a merger of the Gospel
Missionary Union and the BIM (“Focus” 6). In 1960, about one percent of the Bolivian
population was listed as evangelical Christians (“Protestant” 1). At this time, “evangelicals
began an intense effort to evangelize Bolivia” (“Protestant” 1). “Corruption and
complacency had weakened the Catholic Church and evangelicals, especially Pentecostals,
offered vibrant worship and a personal faith” (“Protestant” 1). In Bolivia, the evangelical
movement grew out of healing campaigns in La Paz that spread across the country and into
all urban and rural areas (“Protestant” 1).
Tens of thousands responded at revival meetings held by Bolivian evangelist Julio Ruibal in the 1970s. Ruibal was so popular that the president allowed him to use his personal airplane to travel to his meetings. Thousands responded at evangelistic rallies led by evangelists Luis Palau and Hermano Pablo, and many churches were born from the revivals. (“Protestant” 1)
16
The growth of Pentecostalism in Bolivia and the rest of Latin America cannot be
considered anything but phenomenal after its diminutive start on Azusa Street. Evangelicals
in Latin America have increased followers from fifty thousand in 1900 to around sixty-four
million in 1997, with three-quarters of those Pentecostal or charismatic (“Pope” 1).
Pentecostal participants believe the movement has been so successful because:
its truth is complete, absolute, and unqualified, its polemic is directed against modernism, liberalism, biblical criticism, Marxism, liberation theologies, ecumenism, humanism and any other ‘corruptions.’ (Nielsen 26)
Does Pentecostalism have the ability to sustain this growth or to survive a counter-attack
from the Roman Catholic Church if it were to change its strategy? The Catholic Church
would have a greater chance of stopping the growth of Pentecostalism if it were to analyze
and understand the strategies and strengths of the Pentecostal movement.
Pentecostalism is pushing against the dominant Catholic presence in Bolivia with a
strength that has been largely ignored by the religious and secular world. It should not be a
surprise that Pentecostalism is having a strong impact in Bolivia. The Catholic Church has
good reason to be concerned for its dwindling membership; figures in 1988 declared that
four hundred Catholics an hour were converting to “evangelical, Pentecostal or other
Fundamentalist churches” (Lernoux 1). “Not since the mass baptisms of Latin American
Indians by the conquering Spanish in the 16th century has Latin America witnessed a
religious conversion of such magnitude” (Lernoux 1). In 1992, Pope John Paul II accused
the Latin American evangelicals of being “ravenous wolves” stealing his flock. The reality
of the situation was a shortage of sheepdogs guarding the flock. Two key problems have
plagued the Catholic Church in Latin America: a lack of significant involvement for women
and a great shortage of priests. In the archdiocese of Sucre in 1986, there were only sixty-
17
two priests providing sacraments to five hundred and thirty-two thousand Catholics in an
area of Bolivia that was fifty thousand square kilometers in size (“Religion” 2). Penny
Lernoux points out that the “traditional Catholic churches serve vast numbers of people who
have little or nothing in common, and they are often impersonal ‘supermarkets for the
sacraments’ ” (4). For this reason, the feeling of neglect is inevitable for the indigenous
peoples (“Religion” 2).
The Pentecostals have a major advantage over the Catholic Church because their
pastors do not require long years of theological training, in fact needing no training at all.
Pentecostal pastors are usually from the region and understand the needs of the people.
Using local pastors and creating congregations using local people to evangelize significantly
contribute to the Pentecostal success story. For instance, a comparison can be drawn using
the Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, a denomination headquartered in the United States that
utilizes foreign missionaries to promote their belief system around the world. By
association, the Latter-day Saints’ entrance to Bolivia has been fraught with suspicion and
violence due to the past negative U.S. political involvement in most Latin American
countries (Knowlton 2).9 Detachment from North American leadership and personnel is
critical to Latin American success. Besides the shortage of local priests, another weakness
of the Catholic Church in Latin America is its inflexible, institutional parish lines (Cleary,
Conclusion 10-11). In comparison, evangelicals have no boundaries and congregations can
double up in one area with pastors selecting any location they want (Cleary, Conclusion 10-
11). The Roman Catholic Church has become the church of “distance,” distance between the
priest and the parishioner and distance between the parishioner and God. The Pentecostal
movement has moved in to fill the needs of the isolated urban newcomer offering much
support and a personal relationship to God.
18
This study will now evaluate the statistical data of Bolivia to determine just how
successfully Pentecostalism has filled this niche. As one of only three countries in Latin
America that still maintains Roman Catholicism as the national religion, the official
statistical reporting on religion in Bolivia tends to be fairly monotonous. Most reports
identify ninety-five percent of the population as Roman Catholic and five percent as
Protestant, mainly Evangelical Methodist (“Bolivia U.S.” 1; “Bolivia HRW” 1). Roman
Catholicism is still the default religion for statistical purposes; however, more accurate
assessments are beginning to appear. In 1998, the Nazarene World Mission Society reported
that 9.5% of the Bolivian population was Protestant (Johnstone 1). 10 We know the
demographics are changing but by how much is difficult to determine. A growing
proportion of Bolivians belong to a number of other non-Christian religions and Christian
Protestant denominations. Pedro Moreno suggests that in 1999, only twelve percent of
Bolivians were Roman Catholics committed to attending church regularly and seventy-five
percent were nominal believers (“Protestant” 1). An Agnosticism/Atheism report from 1999
placed the Catholics in Bolivia between sixty and seventy percent of the population (Cline
1). They reported that four hundred predominantly Protestant religious groups other than
Catholicism were active in the country (Cline 1). It was in 1999, that the Catholic Church
finally changed its long held views about Pentecostals and recognized them as a religious
group rather than a “cult” (“Protestant” 2). We can summarize from these reports that
Roman Catholicism no longer has a religious monopoly in Bolivia and that Bolivians are
searching for religious alternatives. Decades of unrest have created an environment of
instability, socially and politically, with migration fostering a spiritual upheaval that opens
the door for religious experimentation.
When compiling a head count of Pentecostals, it is very difficult to separate them
19
from evangelicals of other denominations because there is a tendency for Latin Americans
to call themselves Evangélicos rather than Pentecostals (Cleary, Shopping 2). 11 Almost all
Protestant converts in Bolivia are thought to be evangelical and the vast majority of these
are Pentecostal (“Protestants” 955).12 Statistics from the department of Pando, one of the
Andean nation’s most depressed regions, declared in 1995 that more than 14.5% of the
population had converted to evangelical Protestantism (“Protestants” 955). Zacarias Salas,
president of the United Protestant Churches in La Paz, declared, “By the year 2000 we will
number 1 million,” or about ten percent of the population (“Protestants” 955). Paul Freston,
in a Pew Forum lecture in 2006, stated that by the year 2000, twelve percent of Latin
America was Protestant ranging from five to twenty percent in the different countries (2).13
The statistics reveal an obvious increase in the number of religious denominations
participating in Bolivia today and demonstrate a significant rise in evangelical Protestantism
over the last decade; however, they are not detailed enough to break out information on
Pentecostals specifically.
Nomadismo “Shopping Around for Religion”14
It is valuable to establish why the religious marketplace in Bolivia is so vibrant today
and why Pentecostalism plays such a vital role. “Many peasants and slum inhabitants need
religion as a refuge in a society in permanent and progressive disintegration in order to deal
with fear, threats, repression, hunger and death” (Lernoux 2). However, Penny Lernoux
charges that the Catholic Church has ignored this information due to lack of creativity,
money, and clergy (2). For other Pentecostal participants, “Pentecostalism is an important
part of a powerful counterattack against modern secularism and the liberal theology which
downplayed the importance of the supernatural in the Christian religion” (“Pentecostalism”
11). The diverse religious marketplace in Bolivia and rapidly rising evangelical religion
20
have produced a situation where Latin Americans no longer base their identity solely on
Catholicism. This change is highly significant to Bolivian society and culture.
Jenkins asserts there is an element of “anti-Catholicism” within the Pentecostal
movement since the claim is being made that “millions of new believers [are] being rescued
from this supposedly non-biblical and non-Christian faith” (62). Wiarda maintains that when
individuals search “for a new set of values to replace those in the historic Catholic Church
of Latin America, which they see as not useful, not helpful and not relevant […] to their
lives,” conversion to Pentecostalism becomes a way of clinging to traditional familial and
religious values that are threatened by Catholicism (4).15 Bolivians that choose to replace
Catholicism in their life have a need to fill that varies as widely as the differences in the
people themselves. Pentecostalism displays a distinct element of diversity witnessed from
church to church. This is not a new Protestant characteristic. Protestantism has always
splintered off into different denominations based on revelation and the leader’s
interpretation of the Bible. The variance from one Pentecostal church to another in Latin
America can be expected because pastoral training is not required or standardized. In
Bolivia, street front stores in large urban centres are converted into Pentecostal churches and
small churches are being built at the end of every rural road. People are shopping around for
the church that best meets their needs and they choose the one that treats them with the most
human dignity. Bolivians are often accused of “shopping” around for religion because
conversion is often a short-term event and they leave the Pentecostal church in such high
numbers. Numerous lively religious options exist in Latin America today and people
“choose more freely than ever the religion with the emphasis closest to their own
preferences” (Cleary, Conclusion 10). Bolivians select the religious group that best meets
their unfulfilled spiritual, cultural and societal needs.
21
It is a relatively straightforward exercise discovering which individuals in Bolivia
are the principal targets for Pentecostal evangelism. There are great opportunities to convert
the large demographic group of nominal Catholics or “Catholics by culture” who are
considered “religiously inert” by the Pentecostals (Cleary, Conclusion 9). Additionally, a
large group exists of “formerly active Catholics disillusioned by the changes in the church”
(Cleary, Conclusion 9). Kenneth MacHarg discloses that while most Latin American
mainline Protestants represent the middle-class, Pentecostals derive their support mainly
from the poor (26). In Bolivia, the poor are primarily the indigenous peoples and they tend
to merge their religious beliefs without regard for pure denominational adherence. There is
evidence that the poor, rural indigenous peoples are blending their traditional indigenous
beliefs, Catholicism, and now Pentecostalism into one belief system that satisfies all their
needs (“Bolivia U.S.” 9).16 For many individuals in Bolivia today, overwhelming religious
choices make selecting a church difficult. Individuals are faced with the situation where
each acquaintance or relative pulls them toward a different church. Pentecostal leaders have
carefully studied the changing social migration of Bolivians, creating a highly attractive
spiritual and structural package designed to assist the displaced, successfully filling a niche
in the religious marketplace.
Pentecostal Conversion
When examining the rise of Pentecostalism, it is necessary to discuss the meaning of
Pentecostal conversion and evaluate the characteristics of Pentecostalism that attract so
many converts to the movement. Pentecostal conversion is a controversial topic as the
definition differs greatly from the usage in traditional mainstream religious groups. In
Pentecostalism, conversion is a transitional term indicating that a significant change has
occurred in one’s life. Conversion does not necessarily entail a lifelong commitment nor
22
does it mean one is bound to a definite set of doctrinal beliefs. Bolivians convert from one
faith group, either Roman Catholicism or mainstream Protestantism, to Pentecostalism;
however, commitment to the movement is often difficult to sustain. If an indigenous
person’s relationship with the Pentecostals ends, they are very creative in blending together
religious doctrines from a multitude of faith groups. Syncretism has always existed in the
worldview of the indigenous peoples and facets of Pentecostalism are just stirred into the
pot with all the other ingredients.
Daniel H. Levine and David Stoll provide a list of five attributes that draw Latin
Americans from the Catholic Church to the evangelical Protestant movement and these
include: 1) “social change and mobility,” 2) “the allure of modernity,” 3) “the small size of
churches located on the urban periphery,” 4) “the intense informal social networks”, and
5) “the evangelical component in the message” (68). Levine and Stoll contend these
characteristics satisfy an underlying desire for progress and advancement in society (68).
Trying to assess these five attributes as to priority or importance to converts is a difficult
task. The indigenous peoples of Bolivia have been living in poverty for so many centuries
that the Pentecostal offer of movement up the social ladder must be one of the most
significant reasons to convert. That explains the rapid acceptance of the “prosperity gospel”
in the Pentecostal movement. Cleary argues that converts adopt and remain in
Pentecostalism primarily because of networks of friends, job acquaintances, and neighbours
who bring them into the church and help them remain faithful (Shopping 1). This study
agrees with his contention that for migrants who have lost their traditional societal
structures, the offer of an instant social network is high on the priority list. Attributes such
as the size of the church are not likely a major concern to the migrants when massive
Pentecostal mega churches are beginning to spring up all over Latin America. However, the
23
location of the churches on the periphery of the large urban centres where the migrants
dwell is a valuable feature. The evangelical message is more attractive for some people than
for others, since the indigenous peoples have lived with a syncretic worldview for hundreds
of years and it would not be traumatic to add a few new touches about salvation and a
personal relationship to God to their belief system. The least important feature of the five is
the “allure of modernity.” Being forced into modernity is a key explanation for the rise of
religious fundamentalism around the world in all religions. Tradition is often preferred, as
modernity is seen as carrying many undesirable qualities, especially when it comes to the
actions, behaviour, and dress of women in society.
Besides the five attributes listed above, Pentecostalism arrives with many more
positive characteristics that have been overlooked. If democracy is a goal, Freston adds that
the “democratizing potential” of Pentecostalism is viewed as a means of escape from
poverty in Latin America (3). Pentecostalism forces a change to the traditional role of men
in the Latin American community from machismo to “responsibility to the family,” and this
is a huge bonus in the daily lives of women in Bolivian society. Pentecostal commitment
means the vices of alcohol, tobacco, and drugs must go, domestic violence and adulterous
relationships have to end, and in most cases, full time employment is expected.
Pentecostal communities offer many positive experiences for the poor of Bolivia.
When one converts, there is an overwhelming sense of having all one’s problems lifted from
one’s shoulders. The whole Pentecostal community wraps itself around the struggling
individual, providing support and solutions to every problem. The warmth of the community
is difficult to resist and new friendships are immediate. Healing is important in all
Pentecostal communities and it is often the feature that renders “these communities so rich
and attractive” (Chiquete 479). Healing can be emotional, physical, spiritual or any
24
combination of the three. Common areas of importance in most Latin American Pentecostal
churches are conversion, prosperity gospel, and healing. Most conversions are attached to
miraculous healing of oneself or a loved one, through prayer that provides “proof of God’s
love and acceptance, includes the forgiveness of sins and a new life filled with the presence
of the Holy Spirit” (Chiquete 480).17 In addition, literal Bible interpretation is an attractive
feature for Pentecostals in Bolivia. The reality expressed in the biblical scriptures is not a
stretch from the daily Latin American reality of health issues and life struggles and it is
viewed as a believable part of church practice. Since the time of the early healing revivals in
Bolivia, healing is one of the characteristics of Pentecostalism that draws a large percentage
of converts to the movement. Since 1532, when Roman Catholicism first made advances in
Bolivia, spiritual development has never experienced anything like the rapid rise of
conversion to Pentecostalism. Pentecostal conversion may be controversial to other faith
groups and Christian denominations; however, Pentecostal conversion has significant
meaning in the lives of its converts. It is essential to remember that the reasons for
conversion are as plentiful as the number of new converts themselves.
II. Pentecostalism & Politics in Bolivia
This portion of the research study explains the past and present involvement of
Pentecostals in the politics of Bolivia and Latin America. The following three sections
include: 1) an account of the historical Pentecostal involvement in politics; 2) a description
of why political conservatism for Pentecostals is not a given, and 3) a discussion of the
Bolivian presidential push to end Roman Catholic national status and the affect it will have
on the future participation of Pentecostals in the political arena. This section will illustrate
that, contrary to the statements made by Philip Jenkins, Pentecostals have been involved in
25
politics for decades, and the assumption of political conservatism for Pentecostals based on
past social conservatism is a flawed prediction (8). Recent trends in Latin American politics
demonstrate that numerous other factors beyond religious affiliation influence political
decision-making. While studying the political involvement of Pentecostals today, it is
critical to bear in mind the Bolivian history outlined in the first section of this research study
that revealed the centuries-long oppressive past history of the indigenous peoples of Bolivia.
Pentecostals are slowly gaining respect within Bolivian political circles as evidenced
by the June 2006 President’s Prayer Meeting between Evo Morales and Alberto Salcedo, the
leader of the mega church Ekklesia in La Paz (Direccion 2,6).18 The key point of this
meeting was the discussion of separation of church and state for Bolivia (Direccion 2,6).
This event marked the official acceptance of Pentecostalism as a religion in Bolivia and the
acceptance of Pentecostalism into the Bolivian political arena.
Historical Pentecostal Involvement in Politics
Until recently Latin American evangelicals considered politics as something ‘belonging to the devil,’ something ‘evil and dirty,’ with which Christians should have nothing to do. (Moreno, Latin 4) In reality, Pentecostalism as a movement has been involved in politics for decades.
Since the 1980s, Protestant involvement in Bolivian politics has risen exponentially and this
is most evident in the Pentecostal denominations (Freston 2). These are the same
Pentecostals who declared politics was the work of the devil. Protestant political parties
have not been hugely successful to date because of their ultra conservative platform and
their tendency to exaggerate the size and importance of their denominations (Freston 2).
Protestant politics in Latin America has been called a process “of democratization” but not a
process “for democratization” (Freston 2). One positive trend of Protestant involvement in
politics is the advancement of the political voice of both Bolivian women and indigenous
26
people. Bolivia’s neighbouring countries are all experiencing a rise in evangelical political
influence, and by association, the same trend is likely to be evolving in Bolivia. Bolivian
evangelical churches are being influenced when they meet at regular intervals with
evangelical churches from all over Latin American.
Two key points from Bolivia’s recent political history are relevant to the
understanding of Pentecostalism’s controversial past. First, the past political leadership of
Bolivia suppressed all attempts by indigenous people to enter politics. Bolivian politics has
been dominated by “generally corrupt rightist political parties” that violently suppressed all
political opposition (McCarter 1). Second, as a means of controlling the masses, past
political leadership also restricted the involvement of any religious institution that tried to
improve the situation of the poor. As mentioned in the first section of this study, the
Catholic Church has national status in Bolivia, but its power is limited. For centuries,
crossing the line from religion into politics was forbidden for the Catholic Church. In the
1970s and 80s, the Catholic Church was able to maintain its national status as long as it
avoided human rights activity or carried it out in a subversive manner. Unlike the Catholic
Church, Pentecostals in the 1970s and 80s were able to cross into politics without
repercussion. They backed and financed U.S. military intervention in the fight against leftist
political groups and were complicit in the installment of corrupt, conservative, dictatorial
military regimes (Moreno, Evangelical 59). Their goal was to suppress the justice work of
the liberation theology movement and Catholic human rights workers (Moreno, Evangelical
59). Magister, in reference to a speech to the Italian Senate on May 13, 2004 by Joseph
Cardinal Ratzinger, now officially known as Pope Benedict the XVI, blatantly points a
finger at “the Protestant establishment in the United States that is fomenting and financing
these sects, in the interest of political domination” (3).19 Ratzinger comments, “Perhaps we
27
should also remark that the United States is actively promoting the spread of Protestantism
in Latin America, and consequently the decline of the Catholic Church as a result of inroads
made by free churches,” a frequent term used for evangelical churches (Ratzinger 8).20
Although Bolivia had three U.S. interventions between the 1960s and 80s, with
Operation Blast Furnace, U.S. assassination operations against “Che” Guevara, and
Operation Condor, a more blatant example of Pentecostal involvement comes out of Chile,
Bolivia’s neighbour (“Small” 5). Evangelicals were implicated in violent conflicts during
the regime of General Augusto Pinochet, who took power in 1973 in a U.S. backed military
coup. Pinochet favoured Protestants over Catholics because he was annoyed at Catholic
Church involvement in human rights activities (Cleary, Conclusion 9). This implies that
evangelicals were concerned for their own salvation and the rights of their own membership,
but had little regard for the human rights of the general population. Pinochet’s regime had
the support of U.S. evangelicals such as Jimmy Swaggart, Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell,
all having ties to the administration of President Ronald Reagan (Lernoux 2). Religious
groups that supported conservatism and “passive acceptance of authority” were favoured by
the Pinochet regime (Lernoux 2). In order to move forward with rapid growth, Pentecostals
will have to own up to their part in this controversial political history of Latin America. The
past involvement of Pentecostals in politics helped limit the success of the liberation
theology movement in the 1970s and human rights abuses continued unchecked.
When studying political shifts influencing democracy and religion in Latin America,
it is important to understand the tragic impact of U.S. imperial political and religious policy
on Latin Americans (Maduro 1). It is critical to look at the involvement of religion in
expressing and reinforcing “imperial views, relations and policies toward the least among
us” (Maduro 1).21 Pentecostalism is tied to imperialism through its past backing of U.S. led
28
interventions and support of military regimes. In their complicity, Pentecostals have
participated in the systematic oppression of the people of Latin America, exacerbating the
massive gap between the rich and the poor. Pentecostalism found its niche, ministering to
the poor migrants that were displaced by the empire they helped create. Bolivia is one of the
nations that experienced U.S. interventions firsthand and these historic episodes provide the
context for the discussion of Bolivian religion and politics. The type of intervention being
discussed includes “the encouragement, financing, recognition, and active economic and
military support of most right-wing military coups and dictatorships terrorizing their own
peoples in the twentieth century,” and each intervention had its religious agenda (Maduro 3-
4). Almost every democratic government elected for the first time in Latin America since
1940, was rapidly overturned by a “military, proactive conspiracy” of what Maduro calls
“the four usual suspects”:
(i) the U.S. Government in cahoots with U.S. corporations investing in the country at stake; (ii) the local large landowners; (iii) the local military and police; and, last but not least, but with significant dissidence through the 70s and 80s, (iv) the Christian churches. (5)
Thousands of Bolivians died at the hands of U.S. sponsored military groups and this
destruction was both political and economic in nature. In one intervention after another, in
countries including Guatemala, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Honduras, and Mexico, U.S.
government and evangelical support for terrorist activities was used to undermine the work
of leftist human rights groups (Lernoux 2). Violent disruptions have not only created
“political turmoil, social conflicts, demographic movements, religious changes and cultural
innovations,” including the rise of liberation theologies and base Christian communities, but
also the “growth and spread of Pentecostalisms” (Maduro 6). Evangelical churches assisted
the U.S. backed interventions to overturn leftist political rivals, leading to the further growth
29
of Pentecostalism. When discussing the negative impact of past politics on the poor
indigenous peoples of Bolivia, Pentecostalism has undeniably been part of the problem.
Moving forward two decades, evangelical Protestant involvement in politics has
been on the rise in Bolivia since the first representative was elected to the Bolivian Congress
in 1993. David Martin points out a noticeable trend occurring within Bolivian politics; “the
way many Protestants reproduce the pattern of relationships based on authority and
patronage” (259). Sean S. O’Neil concurs with Martin stating that “Pentecostalism [bears]
an uncanny resemblance to the traditional patron-client relationship ubiquitous throughout
Latin American history” (41). This historical social structure of Latin America has definitely
set the tone for political involvement of Pentecostals and at the same time has satisfied the
void in the social structure created by migration. There is a definite political trend of bloc
support for an individual with the reciprocal relationship of advocacy and protection at play.
Moving from the historical roles of Pentecostals in Bolivian politics to the more
contemporary trends has emphasized the level of involvement of Pentecostals in politics.
Not only have Pentecostals been involved for decades, but much of their participation has
been quite controversial.
Political Conservatism For Pentecostals is Not a Given
Understanding the modern political trends in Latin America is a necessity for
deciding whether the voting patterns of Pentecostals in Bolivia follow the conservative
prediction of Philip Jenkins or not (8). Social conservatism may be the past trend for
Pentecostals but conservatism cannot be assumed in Bolivia and there is evidence to prove
that religious belief plays only a minor role in current political voting. Throughout this
discussion, it is important to follow the ever-shifting definitions used in the political arena
today to understand political right from left, and liberal from conservative thought. There
30
are two rapidly growing movements changing the socio-political face of Bolivia at the
present time and these include the rapid rise in evangelical Pentecostalism among the poor
and the aggressive participation of the indigenous peoples of Bolivia in a strong, effective
social movement in the political arena that separates itself from church affiliation. Studying
the interaction between the rising Pentecostal movement and the rising social movement is
crucial, including the identification of the participants of each, and how they relate to the
liberation theology movement in the 1960s and 70s.
Where once liberation theology was the “left” in Latin America, the new “left” is
socialism and a resistance to global capitalism (Aquino 1). It is a movement to resist the
involvement of the United States on “free trade, debt, investment, and geopolitical strategy”
(Aquino 1). This social movement is the hope of millions of Latin Americans who suffer
great poverty, unemployment and forced migration, all resulting from empire and the rapid
rise of “globalization” (Aquino 1). Liberation theology spurred the social justice movement
in the 1960s and 70s and played a critical role in the wars of liberation in Central America in
the 1970s and 80s. Gott attributes the rising social movement to resistance “against the free-
market system”, “globalization”, and “privatization” (4). The defeat of the political left by
U.S. backed military regimes in the 1980s and 90s in Latin America, and the suppression of
the radical church movement by the Catholic Church, led to the decline of the liberation
theology movement as a political and social entity. The interpretation of the relationship
between the rise in Pentecostalism and the gradual dwindling of the liberation theology
movement may differ from scholar to scholar; however, it can be demonstrated that the
liberation theology movement definitely played a role in the shift in Latin America toward
democracy.
31
According to Samuel Huntington, democracy was the greatest contribution of the
Catholic Church to Latin America in the 1980s (35). However, little credit has gone to the
Catholic Church for its “long tortuous process in learning how to deal with repressive
military governments” and the courage of the Catholic Church workers in “denouncing
episodic and structural injustices” (Cleary, Conclusion 4). Most of the credit is going to the
“democratizing influence of Protestantism or Pentecostalism in Latin America” (Cleary,
Conclusion 4). According to Cleary, the Roman Catholic Church: 1) “helped to delegitimize
the arbitrarily assumed and prolonged military governments and helped to force a transition
to democracy”; 2) “fostered and protected democratic structures growing at the grassroots in
society,” for example NGOs, new social movements, and base Christian communities;
3) “offered safe space to groups in the community and a place for political groups to
communicate their policy”, and 4) “acted as mediators and moderators to form an alliance of
political parties” (Cleary, Conclusion 4). There is no denying the importance of the work of
the Roman Catholic Church in the spread of democracy across Latin America, and to its
own detriment, the resulting proliferation of other religious groups.
In the midst of rapidly rising Pentecostalism, numerous countries in Latin America,
including Bolivia, have recently elected leftist populist governments. 22 Besides Bolivia,
Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Peru have all gone this route
creating a uniform leftist front across most of South America. Pentecostal political
participation has increased at the grassroots level as community activities provide
individuals with the confidence and skills to tackle the public and political arenas. In
Bolivia, Pentecostals are traditionally thought to be conservative and grassroots Catholics
are seen to be involved in conservative, charismatic movements. Additionally, there is
overwhelming conservatism in the Latin American leadership of the Roman Catholic
32
Church, with most Cardinals actively involved in Opus Dei, the Institute for Religion and
Democracy, and the Legion of Mary (Cleary, Conclusion 3). So who was responsible for
electing Evo Morales and his leftist party to power? That is the key question to be
investigated in this section of the study. Did the “conservative” indigenous Pentecostals play
some part in this political outcome?
With the election of Evo Morales, Bolivia, and the rest of Latin America for that
matter, elected their first wholly, indigenous president. The critical question here is how the
indigenous Pentecostals voted. On one hand, we have the indigenous peoples of Bolivia
empowered to raise their political voices with a continual increase of nationalistic political
involvement. They groomed a new presidential candidate from their ranks with a strong
socialist agenda. On the other hand, we have the rapid rise of Pentecostalism within the
poor, migrant indigenous communities. It is important to determine if the indigenous
Pentecostal sector joined the remaining indigenous peoples of Bolivia, regardless of their
religious affiliation, to vote for a leftist political party.
The rising participation of religious groups, including evangelical Protestants, in
Bolivian politics is evident in the results of the last presidential election. Research
demonstrates that there is an anti-American movement sweeping Latin America. In
December 2005, listening to the acceptance speech of Evo Morales, he proclaimed to his
supporters that he was the United States’ “worst nightmare” (Dunkerley 134; Bergin 3). He
joins a growing number of anti-American leftist governments in Latin America fighting to
overcome the corruptive political atmosphere of the past three and a half decades. Most
Bolivians did not benefit from an open market in the 1980s and 90s and their selection of an
anti-capitalist for president speaks to their frustration and disappointment from past decades
and the immediate need for radical political change.23
33
Evo Morales received a 53.7 % majority in the 2005 election and it can be assumed
that a large percentage of the indigenous peoples supported him; but, did indigenous
Pentecostals support him? In Bolivia, where voting is mandatory, the population is thirty
percent Quechua and twenty-eight percent Aymara giving an indigenous total of fifty-eight
percent (“Bolivia U.S.” 9). With a 4.3% margin, the close proximity of these two
percentages cannot be ignored. Some statistics from the Bolivian election show one political
party in Bolivia known as Concertación Nacional (CN) has a “strong presence of
evangelical Christian groups” representing all departments of Bolivia except Pando (“Final”
6).24 It is not evident whether CN is supported by Pentecostals or just by other evangelical
groups such as the Methodists. Traditionally, the evangelical Methodists consist of middle-
class participants rather than poor indigenous membership, and this group is about five
percent of the Bolivian population (MacHarg 26). CN gained 3.58% of the electoral vote,
giving it five seats or 1.96% of the Constituent Assembly (“Final” 31). Even if some
Pentecostals supported CN, it can be assumed that Pentecostals voted for other political
groups, as they constitute approximately ten to fifteen percent of the population. Jenkins’
prediction of conservatism triggered this evaluation of Pentecostal voting patterns. The
question of whether Bolivian Pentecostals are socially conservative or not, and if they are,
whether they can maintain social conservatism while voting for leftist socialism? If this
pattern can be established, it would certainly run counter to the great conservative wave
predicted by Jenkins (8). This inconsistent voting pattern for Pentecostals is highly
significant and it illustrates that Pentecostals are not voting conservatively or in large
unified blocs.
In this analysis, it is important to decide if religious affiliation plays a key role in the
selection of a political leader. Lacking crucial religious details on Bolivia’s 2005 election,
34
research studies relating to Venezuela’s 1998 election reveal pertinent information for
Bolivia’s situation. A study by Jensen Michael Grant on the correlation between Pentecostal
belief and the 1998 election of leftist Venezuelan presidential leader Hugo Chávez, indicates
that religion “has little to no efficacy as a predictor of voting patterns” (33). In the study, the
strongest reason for voting for Chávez was the need to have a political change and to punish
corrupt politicians (Grant 34). Grant’s study uncovered many interesting statistics on
Venezuelan belief systems and the most striking point made was that Venezuelan society
was largely Pentecostalized and this movement was very strong among practicing Catholics
belonging to the Charismatic Catholic Movement (5, 37). In 1999, fully 92.4% of
Venezuelans self-identified as Catholics and almost all of them held significant Pentecostal
beliefs about biblical inerrancy, signs of the end of time approaching, and experiencing the
Holy Spirit (Grant 5). If sixty-five percent of practicing Catholics, 74.5% of non-practicing
Catholics and sixty-three percent of evangelicals voted for Chávez, there must have been a
significant group of Pentecostal believers that voted left (Grant 18). As expected, within the
election results, there was an overall negative correlation between evangelical belief and
votes for Hugo Chávez but there were still many Pentecostals who voted for him (Grant 20).
Combining these results from Venezuela and following the general leftist direction of Latin
American politics, we begin to understand the context that brought Evo Morales to power in
Bolivia.
While the religious demographics in Bolivia are somewhat different than those in
Venezuela, Bolivia still voted left. We can also safely assume that many Pentecostals voted
left. According to Walter Mignolo, it was not so much a political turn to the left as a “social
movement that emerged from Aymara and Quechua people, activists, and intellectuals”
wanting political change after centuries of oppression and poverty (1).25 While many
35
indigenous Pentecostals likely voted against Morales, many more likely voted for him.
Either that, or the elite ruling class supported Morales too, but that trend seems less likely.
When discussing political trends in Bolivia, it must be remembered that historically, the
country has changed political leadership an average of every ten months for the last one
hundred and fifty-six years. It would be premature at this point to suggest long-term
political stability has been reached in Bolivia. However, Jenkins predicted a conservative
wave for Pentecostalism in the near future and this does not seem likely (8). Pentecostals
appear willing to join the rest of the indigenous peoples in Bolivia, regardless of their
religious affiliation, in a leftist vote to achieve social and political change. This may even
indicate that leftist politics is the long-term trend for Pentecostals in Bolivia. Unless this is
only a short-term political trend, Jenkins’ assumption for Pentecostal conservatism will need
to be revised (8).
The Future of Pentecostal Involvement in Politics
One immediate goal of Morales’ government is to end the Roman Catholic Church’s
monopoly on religious power in Bolivia and this should have a significant impact on future
Pentecostal involvement in politics and political direction (“Bolivian” 1).26 If Morales
supports the ideology of his mentor, Jesuit Mauricio Bacardit, then Bolivia will likely
become a secular state opening the doors to all religions in a more egalitarian manner and
the focus will be placed on the reduction of poverty (Glaister 3).27 No “one” religion will
have a power advantage in politics. For Pentecostalism, this change in the Bolivian political
arena will be highly beneficial and timely. If the Pentecostal movement grows, Bolivia is
surrounded by countries with strong evangelical religious involvement in government such
as Chile and Brazil so the examples are everywhere to lead the Bolivian Pentecostals in a
similar direction.
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Strong political involvement will give the Pentecostals a greater influence in
Bolivian society and the strength to maintain a rigid break from U.S. evangelicals. Although
U.S. televangelists have had a strong influence in the growth of Pentecostalism in Latin
America, they acted as catalysts until the movement could support its own people and fill its
own leadership roles. Bolivian Pentecostalism emphasizes native-born clergy, and according
to Wiarda, speaking at a Pew Forum, “native-born evangelical clergy are more associated
with national social and political movements” than earlier religious movements (4). A
geopolitical split between Latin American and U.S. evangelicals is demonstrated by the
response of each to the Iraq War. Latin American evangelicals were against the war while
U.S. evangelicals supported it (Lernoux 3). The Latin American evangelicals have been
against the whole “war on terror” military action from the beginning (Lernoux 3). For this
reason, Latin American evangelicals are considered to be closer to U.S. mainline religious
denominations than U.S. evangelical positions (Lernoux 3).
The political direction of Bolivian Pentecostals might be influenced by: 1) the
closeness of their connections with mainline U.S. religious groups, 2) the strength of their
nationalistic indigenous ties, and 3) the strength of their human rights movement. Bolivians
are demonstrating the ability to consolidate large masses of people to fight injustice. Their
ability to fight empire and overturn the privatization of water in the country was
phenomenal. It can be assumed that Pentecostals were involved in the social movement to
overturn these adverse political decisions, as their vote would be needed to attain a majority
against the elite parties in power. Understanding the political direction of Bolivian
Pentecostals will require the observation of more than one presidential election. There is
little doubt that a highly controversial political situation is playing out in Latin America.
The hugely successful social movement of indigenous peoples in Bolivia has overturned the
37
elitist ruling parties in a statement of solidarity supporting their leftist, populist leader. Two
key points about Pentecostal political involvement must be emphasized: 1) Pentecostal
involvement in politics is not a new phenomenon, as research demonstrates that the
movement has been involved in politics for decades and 2) this study has proven that
Bolivian Pentecostals may have been socially conservative in the past; however, this does
not indicate either social or political conservatism for the future. The results of the 2005
Bolivian election suggest that the past controversial participation of Pentecostals in the
political forum, as defined by complicity in U.S. imperial intervention, is influencing the
direction of current politics with a strong stance against U.S. backed political parties. The
Pentecostal influence mentioned here is a broad statement against past U.S. intervention,
and although the Pentecostals are voting against American influence, it is an indigenous
vote more than it is a Pentecostal vote. This does not change the thesis statement that
religious belief in Bolivia is not always a strong indicator of individual political direction.
Current Bolivian politics is a wave of nationalistic socialism with the goal of lifting up the
issues of the indigenous majority, neglected for far too long. Pentecostals will need to
decide whether they plan to address the involvement in past controversial politics and to
what degree of political transparency the movement plans to adopt.
III. The Dark Secrets of Pentecostalism
Now it is time to examine the more destructive features of Pentecostalism, or the
dark secrets of the movement, in greater detail. This research study includes a
comprehensive discussion on anti-intellectualism within the movement, Pentecostalism’s
damaging link to globalization, divisiveness of the movement, and Pentecostal conversion
and the resulting mass drop out rate, four of the most damaging negative characteristics of
38
Pentecostalism. This will be followed by a succinct analysis of several other dark secrets of
the Pentecostal movement. A central player in the debate on Pentecostalism is Roger E.
Olsen who states:
Some non-Pentecostal religious scholars, such as Harvey Cox (Fire from Heaven) 28 and Philip Jenkins (The Next Christendom) have succumbed to ‘Pentecostal chic’ – a kind of romantic view of Pentecostalism as a much-needed spiritual movement of the poor and oppressed that fills the Western world’s ‘ecstasy deficit.’ Missing in some of these accounts is an awareness of the movement’s dark side. (1) While this study agrees with many of Olsen’s arguments about Pentecostalism,
contemporary scholarship on Pentecostalism in Bolivia and the wider Latin American
landscape reveals that Olsen’s assessment is not quite accurate. Cox does qualify his rosy
picture of Pentecostalism somewhat, albeit in a small section of his last chapter, giving a
brief account of the dark side of the Pentecostal movement (310-311). It should be noted
that prior to publication, it was largely Pentecostals who reviewed Fire from Heaven for
Cox, and this might explain the emphasis on the positive aspects (ix-x). The scholarship of
Jenkins and Cox almost has the feel of “political correctness.” Pentecostalism is lifted up as
a beacon of rapid growth and hope for the continuity of Christianity in the global south,
followed by growth in the global north through immigration, with an emphasis on the
positive characteristics. Little mention is made of the dark side of Pentecostalism, including
the substantial drop out rate that is witnessed in most regions of Latin America, or the
reasons for this mass exodus. This study will now assess the key dark secrets individually.
Anti-intellectualism
Anti-intellectualism has the potential of being very destructive for Pentecostalism.
This ‘phobia’ goes beyond just avoidance to a fear of speaking about “reason,
intellectualism, doctrines, [and] ideologies” (Moreno, Latin 2). This conflict between
emotion and reason is pushed to an extreme level in Pentecostalism with total reliance on
39
“emotionalism and feelings” (Moreno, Latin 2). Moreno refers to a Biblical passage often
misquoted by the Pentecostals to back their anti-intellectualism: “Do not be conformed to
this world, but be transformed by the [removing] of your minds, so that you may discern
what is the will of God – what is good and acceptable and perfect” (Romans 12:2).
Changing the word “renewing” to “removing” has tampered with this biblical passage. The
anti-intellectual aspect of Pentecostalism is quite complex and extensive and it ranges from
deep suspicion of all scholars and educators, “especially biblical scholars and theologians,”
to shunning its own scholars, rejecting rational thought, and deep resentment of those
participants who have the nerve to question doctrine (Olsen 1). Those insiders who dare to
question the church are often shamed or treated to spiritual abuse (Olsen 1). Youth who
attend Pentecostal seminaries today are often rejected when they try to return to their home
communities (Olsen 1). Anti-intellectualism extends to the lack of educational requirements
for pastors, with charismatic character emphasized over education. The study of rationalism
and theological church history are usually abandoned in most Pentecostal communities
because of the mindset that “if there is no future, then why worry about the past?” (Moreno,
Latin 2). The importance of the Holy Spirit far outweighs the importance of the Bible.
Moreno states, “there is a knee-jerk rejection of the ‘secular’ or ‘natural’ in favor of a purist
‘spiritual’ or ‘religious’ position,” however, the negative side to this position is very
destructive (Latin 2). For instance, Moreno reports that in 1993 a large number of
charismatic-Pentecostal leaders in Bolivia decided not to celebrate Christmas since many
pagan festivals used to be held at the same time of year (Latin 2). This disassociation with
intellectualism or rationality has many scholars such as Daniel J. Chiquete directing pointed
questions at the Pentecostals:
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1) “Does minimizing the need for education and study create a society unable to compete in the modern world?” 2) “Does the policy of no pastor-training requirement lend to a greater propensity for corruption and less control in the denomination?” 3) “Does the focus on healing without theological and medical knowledge lead to misinterpretations and other shortcomings in the way both the ministry of healing and mission are carried out?” (482)
Using these questions for self-analysis would create a great opportunity to strengthen the
Pentecostal movement. Although anti-intellectualism is strong in Bolivian Pentecostalism,
there is a slow shift toward understanding the need to educate children so they can compete
in the global market.
Conversion
It is now time to discuss conversion and the high drop out rate for Pentecostals, the
most controversial aspect of Pentecostalism and the characteristic most critiqued by other
Christian Churches.
However transforming they may appear at the time, moreover, conversions are not always a permanent and life-changing event: Latin America has plenty of ex-evangelicals, as well as ex-Catholics. (Jenkins 62)
Statistics are beginning to appear for Pentecostalism that run counter to the exponential
growth predicted by Jenkins and present a very different picture than the one created by
Cox, who stated, “there are not many “nominal” or “nonobservant” Pentecostals” (168).
Speaking about Pentecostal growth without adequate discussion given to the high drop out
rates is a delusional process. The dropouts from Pentecostalism are no different than any
other religion; however, the treatment of the dropouts by the community is significant.
Furthermore, the reasons for the dropout phenomenon are a great problem for
Pentecostalism, and the gathering of statistics is different from other Protestant
denominations or Catholicism.
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The treatment of the less committed members of Pentecostalism differs from the
practice and doctrine of mainline Protestant Churches and the Catholic Church. These more
mature Christian denominations consider conversion a long-term phenomenon that travels
through families for generations. Pentecostals shun the less committed. Cleary explains that
by marginalizing the less committed:
[…] those more committed might continue unimpeded in the pursuit of their high goals. Less committed would pull the committed down to a common denominator of laxer practice. The churches keep the luster of their religion bright precisely by shedding the nonobservant and the unrepentant. (Shopping 4)
The problem with this method of keeping commitment high is lack of generational
continuity and it creates rifts between family members. People are drifting away from their
churches in huge numbers and the treatment of these people by their faith community
requires examination.
To set up a comparison, when family members leave the Catholic Church it creates a
great division in the family, and so it would seem, that conversion to Protestantism of any
form would only be taken with serious commitment. It appears that Latin Americans who
convert to Pentecostalism are committed in their conversion process; however, it is a
commitment to a set of rules created by someone else and this can often lead to
disillusionment. Pentecostalism arrives with the promise of social and economic gain
through commitment to the faith group and anyone living for generations in poverty would
naturally be attracted. Evidence would suggest that lifelong commitment to Pentecostalism
is extremely stressing and often not attainable.
The problem begins with the perfectionist moral behaviour expected from the
devoted (Cleary, Shopping 3). People free themselves from their vices and lead exemplary
lives devoted to their church but it is very hard to maintain this level of perfection forever.
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As well, the promise of economic prosperity is a great motivator for many people, but
sometimes the gains do not counter the great sacrifices endured. The converts begin to
realize that the Pentecostals only care about those that convert and commit fully to the life
of the movement. It is not forgiving if you are not a strongly committed member.
Pentecostalism is not traditionally a movement seeking social justice for all people. It tends
to assist only those that convert and support the church financially, although recent voting
trends may contradict this statement. People are expected to attend their church a minimum
of once a week. Attendance several times per week shows you are truly committed and
people who fail to attend are obviously not serious about their commitment. These are the
“dropouts.”
The reasons for dropping out of Pentecostalism are many. Randall Balmer suggests,
“What can be harder than passing on religious verve and vitality from one generation to the
next, especially within a tradition that defines itself by the conversion process […]?” (93).
One problem with Pentecostalism or any other type of evangelical religion is the second or
third generation do not get the same dramatic conversion as their parents, who were likely
saved from the worst worldly vices. Balmer wonders if the children of Pentecostals can
actually claim to be saved if they were raised within a lifestyle of devote commitment (94).
Growing up within a converted family must mean that you are already living the converted
life without vices, so how do you attain conversion in a meaningful way? It would appear
that the importance of Pentecostal conversion is one of the more serious “dark secrets.”
Conversion is so profound for the first generation convert; however, it could lead to self-
destruction of the movement if the critical importance of conversion for future generations
is not addressed.
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Relating to the gathering of statistics, Pentecostals are accused of “institutional
aggrandizement” as they frequently overstate their own statistics and refrain from
mentioning drop out rates (Freston 2). Pentecostals expect commitment, and their numbers,
when honestly collected, tend to more accurately identify true believers. Certainly, the
growth of Pentecostalism has been phenomenal, but unlike the statistics found in other Latin
American countries, drop out rates from Pentecostalism in Bolivia do not seem to exist, at
least, not in the statistics. In Chile, for example, public records show less than half of
Chile’s Pentecostals attend church once a week and more than one third do not attend at all
(Cleary, Shopping 3).29 In Mexico, the statistics are very similar with forty-eight percent
attending weekly and no attendance from the other fifty-two percent (Cleary, Shopping 3).
Moreover, in Mexico, children who were raised Pentecostal are leaving the church as adults
and sixty-eight percent of individuals baptized Protestant in the 1980s had left the church by
the 90s (Cleary, Shopping 3).
In order to continue the assault on Roman Catholicism in Bolivia, it is evident that
self-examination and studies need to be conducted by Pentecostals to understand this
growing demographic called “the drop out”. Churches should be required to declare
participation statistics by baptism and then be required to alter the statistics when half the
people drop out of the denomination. However, loose statistical gathering has historically
been the norm in countries like England and Germany where nominal or cultural
participation in a religious faith group is counted as membership, even with no active church
attendance. It is really no different than reporting that ninety-five percent of Bolivians are
Roman Catholics. However, Freston would “suggest that the religious future of Latin
America is much more pluralist” where one of two individuals leaving the Catholic Church
become Protestant and the other gives up on religion altogether or chooses another faith
44
group (2). Comparative studies in countries such as Guatemala and Mexico, where
Pentecostals have been around in greater numbers for much longer, demonstrate that
participation tends to plateau at around twenty-five percent of the population (Cleary,
Shopping 3). Unless Pentecostals in Bolivia introduce some major changes to the
movement, the drop out rate will continue to be high.
Where syncretism worked well with nominal Catholicism, it fails with
Pentecostalism because you are either in or out of the movement. There is no sitting on the
fence, you are committed or you are not committed. As a result, if the indigenous people
find it impossible to stay on the high perfectionist road of Pentecostalism, they drop out.
However, they don’t seem to see conversion as an all or nothing experience. When people
drop out, it probably does not mean they reject all aspects of Pentecostalism, but once again
they will select those that work for them, such as speaking in tongues or prophecy, and
reject the rest as superfluous or unwieldy to practise. Pentecostalism will likely plateau in
the same pattern as other Latin American Pentecostal communities if the more controversial
features of conversion such as the perfectionist moral requirement and conversion for future
generations are not given considerable attention. When a religion’s structures run counter to
the cultural norms, it becomes a test for the converts to see how long they are able to last.
Where apostasy was rare in traditional Catholicism, there is little stigma attached to
dropping out of Pentecostalism. It may be Latin America’s stepping stone to dropping out of
religion altogether into a more secular model. Through neglect, traditional Latin American
Catholicism was too lenient on the moral soul and Pentecostalism is often too strict.
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Link to Globalization
Another potentially fatal quality of Bolivian Pentecostalism is its link to the
destructive forces of globalization. The forces of globalization can be liberative or
destructive depending on the situation.
Globalization is not only an economic matter but it continues to further the racial divide creating global “apartheid” … resulting in increasing violence and political instability, increasing migration and displacement, xenophobic backlash represented in new and tougher immigration policies, and the sanctioned oppression of all who can be placed in the role of ‘the other, by virtue of gender, race/ethnicity/indigenous status, age and /or sexual orientation. (“Gospel” 6-7)
The connection between globalization and Pentecostalism is so subtle that participants of
Pentecostalism do not even realize they are affected. What has all this discussion about
globalization have to do with Pentecostalism? “To many churches in the third world, the
term “globalization” has been confused with the concept of ecumenism” (Po Ho 107).
Huang Po Ho discusses the deceptive nature of globalization in the following passage:
Globalization is sort of false ecumenism that has received much support and blessing from a good number of churches even in third world countries. Many Christians in these countries enjoy the superficial economic benefits brought about by industrialization under the umbrella of globalization but are not able to see the evil nature of globalization’s effect upon the poor and displaced people; neither are they aware that they themselves have been affected unconsciously in their value concepts and lifestyles by the ideology of consumerism and competition. The unawareness of Christians of the evil nature of the existing system, and the inability of the churches to deal with it have brought about distortion of the gospel message in these regions. (107)30
“[M]onopolization becomes the dominant ideology of a society” impacting all areas of life,
“even religious life” (Po Ho 107). Pentecostalism fills a niche in the religious marketplace
creating support systems for the poor, migrant populations of all Latin American countries.
The “prosperity gospel” has given the poor an alternative to an otherwise bleak future;
however, the converts have been forced to buy into consumerism and globalization. This is
how the success and rapid growth of Pentecostalism has played out in the global south.
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Pentecostalism is implicated in this destructive process and this may in some way account
for the massive drop out rate in Pentecostalism, as the convert recognizes this new
oppressive force and gains an understanding or at least a sense of this process.
Over time, individuals internalize globalization and realize the paradoxes and
contradictions ruling their lives are not always positive or healthy. There is an urge to break
free of this new insidious form of oppression and power that overwhelms them. If
Pentecostalism decides to truly help the people of Latin America, it will resist the negative,
exclusive aspects of globalization and promote the many positive qualities created by the
effective use of high technology for transparency in communication, sharing of information,
and the ability to rally the poor and oppressed to fight for change. As the poor and oppressed
fight to overturn the negative aspects of globalization, they will need assistance with items
such as funding. This is where the door opens and the opportunity for change in
Pentecostalism occurs. If Pentecostals become inclusive within society instead of exclusive,
they could help fund the fight for all the poor, not just for participants, and this action could
assist the poor to rise above their poverty. If Pentecostals really want to make a difference in
the lives of the people of Latin America, their ability to generate wealth to assist the poor
and their ability to gather people into congregations to implement societal change can be
extremely effective. These are decisions the Pentecostal movement will have to consider,
unless it chooses to remain an entity in and of itself that is only seeking conversion and
salvation above all else, with little regard for the masses. If Pentecostals in Bolivia want to
halt the constant exodus from the movement related to its self-interested social justice, it is
important to recognize the Pentecostal link to globalization and direct its activities toward a
shift in social justice to benefit all Bolivians.
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Divisiveness
Evangelicals are capable of banding together against opponents but they can be their own worst enemy when it comes to promoting their own denomination. (Moreno, Evangelical 64) Latin American Pentecostals practise many types of divisive behaviour, both
politically and socially. The political past of Pentecostalism is definitely one of the dark
secrets of the movement. The past has come back to haunt evangelical Pentecostals because
of their support for U.S. backed conservative, dictatorial military regimes in the 1970s and
80s. These regimes in turn oppressed the indigenous peoples fostering a wide gap between
the rich and the poor. Political participation should be a positive feature of Pentecostalism as
long as it is not used against its own people or other citizens of the country. Confessional
parties are often not successful in politics because of the tension between the “sectarian
nature of religion” and the “pluralistic society of a democratic regime” (Moreno,
Evangelical 61). Politically speaking, success occurs when a party can demonstrate its broad
based appeal and the Pentecostal movement fails in this regard. Political divisiveness in the
1990s was illustrated when one evangelical political party in Bolivia split into three small
branches, reducing the political effectiveness of the evangelical voice held by the single
voting bloc (Moreno, Evangelical 61).31 Rather than building solidarity, this splintering
increased the risk of intra-faith divisions (Moreno, Evangelical 61). However, with only one
Protestant political party in Bolivia at the present time, perhaps Pentecostals have studied
the current trends in countries such as Brazil and decided to focus the vote on one good
candidate. Focusing their attention would combat the inclination to split the vote and
undermine their collective power. Gott states that Latin American “Pentecostal churches
endlessly divide and quarrel, and the indigenous movements do the same” so an emphasis
on unity rather than divisiveness would be of value (4).
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Social divisiveness is not only common in Pentecostalism but it flows from the
greater Bolivian society through racism. 32 Class structure has historically been a part of
Bolivian society and it continues to thrive today both inside and out of Pentecostalism.
Reflective of this practice is the Pentecostal tendency to set up a “class system within the
Kingdom of God due to the emphasis on being called to ministry and the promotion of
evangelizing over other occupations” (Moreno, Latin 3). Individuals not in ministry are
considered second-class in the Pentecostal community. This class system is creating a
“generation of frustrated and mediocre students and professionals,” held back by the
ecclesiastical hierarchy that is “unconsciously acting as a dominant class and is crippling the
people of God from realizing the full abilities and the breadth of their ministry” (Moreno,
Latin 3).
Pentecostal divisiveness or exclusivism is also exemplified by evangelization that
leads to a focus on salvation over social justice work. Pentecostals place their emphasis on
those individuals who convert and fall within their own ranks, and this exclusionist attitude
does not demonstrate a desire to see all of society experience social justice. According to
Allan Anderson, Pentecostalism needs to expand its ministry to accept people who have
terminal illnesses, HIV/AIDS, permanent disabilities, and those who cannot attend church
(496). 33 He comments further that these marginalized individuals are “often neglected in
Pentecostal circles where the tendency has been to proclaim healing and victory over these
‘enemies’ ” (Anderson 496). There is too much emphasis on healing as a means of
evangelization rather than “something motivated by compassion” (Anderson 496).
Pentecostal healing is heavily dependent on miracles. Through prayer, the healing of
community members is proclaimed miraculous. As people begin to rely on miracles, rather
than on natural phenomena for healing, there is a tendency to experience great
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disappointment when the miracles are not forthcoming. In addition, when miracles do not
occur, participants tend to lose faith if someone is not cured (Anderson 496). According to
Moreno, it is only when “faith” fails that Pentecostals “resort to preventative medicine, good
health habits, hard work and excellence in studies” (Moreno, Latin 2).
A huge amount of emphasis is placed on the “religious” over the “secular” in
Pentecostalism and this division can be quite destructive (Moreno, Latin 2). When you are
told that only the things you do in the church are religious, it creates an inner turmoil that
cannot be settled. The music you play at church is religious; however, the same music can
be played at school or in the home and it will not be considered religious. The work you do
in or for the church is religious, but the work you do at home, at your place of employment,
or in the community is not religious. Only the money you give to the church is considered
“for God”; whereas, money for your children or their education is “not for God.” The
message delivered to Pentecostal converts forces them to “despise their studies, professions,
or work in order to exalt church activities” and their Christian life beyond the church walls
suffers “ecclesiastical atrophy” (Moreno, Latin 2). This creates a severe restriction on
happiness in the family and broader community without living with hypocrisy. It becomes
an impossible situation over the long-term when some members of the family are
Pentecostal and others are not.
Other Dark Secrets
Harvey Cox stresses the potentially damaging tendencies of Pentecostals to “stoke
the fires of xenophobia and hostility”, to clash with fundamentalists, to avoid ecumenism in
many congregations, to divide racially within the denomination, to stray from the original
meaning of the church through health-and-wealth theology, and to blur the meaning of
“experience” (310-317). Having evaluated some of the more damaging destructive features
50
of Pentecostalism, this research study will now briefly mention some other negative
characteristics of the movement that may just require self-identification and transparency.
For decades, self-criticism was non-existent within the Pentecostal community but
slowly this is beginning to change. Although the movement has matured since Olsen turned
in his Pentecostal credentials, it has a ways to go before it becomes a fully healthy and
health-giving part of the Christian community (1). Olsen, who grew up a “Pentecostal
Preacher-boy,” began to question church doctrine and practices as a teen, but did not receive
satisfactory answers to his questions (1). At the age of twenty-six he made the decision to
leave the movement (Olsen 1). Increasingly, ex-Pentecostals are coming forward with
critiques of the movement, and in most cases, these reports are provided in a manner still
sympathetic to the religious movement, admitting that they still love the vitality and basic
tenets of Pentecostalism. While giving their assessment of Pentecostalism, ex-Pentecostals
usually add constructive suggestions for ways to improve the movement to allow it to fully
compete with other more “mature religions” (Olsen 1).
Paradox is another dark secret within Pentecostalism in Latin America, similar to the
situation in the wider community. An example would be the treatment of women within the
movement. Pentecostal participation is one of the only avenues in Bolivian society for
women to find their public and political voice; however, they are not readily invited to the
leadership levels of the movement. Unlike Bolivia, next door in Brazil, women are making
inroads as pastors in the church. An address listing of evangelical/Pentecostal churches in
La Paz, Bolivia lists only one female pastor in thirty churches and it is a mission church
working with children and youth (“Direcciones” 1-6). One Pentecostal church lists four
pastors, but all are male (“Direcciones” 2).
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Additionally, there is an overemphasis on demonization and in many cases it is the
demonization of women (Moreno, Latin 2). This is a very disturbing trend that runs counter
to traditional indigenous gender complementarity and it complicates the already paradoxical
role of women (“Bolivia - Religion” 7). Demons are unfairly attached to sin, sickness or
other problems (Moreno, Latin 2). Men frequently accuse women of having demons and
emphasize the need for prayer for healing and “deliverance” (Moreno, Latin 2). This seems
to be a setback to counter the gains women are experiencing within Pentecostalism.
There are several areas of leadership needing to be examined. Corruption and
scandals are commonplace in the movement for a number of reasons: 1) Pentecostals place
charismatic leaders on pedestals and accept that “right behaviour” is the result of being
spirit-filled; 2) they exclude ethics courses in colleges; 3) they sweep dark secrets under the
carpet, and 4) they accept all leadership without question (Olsen 2). Inappropriate sexual
behaviour and the mismanagement of funds are common scandals rocking Pentecostal
churches.
Latin American Pentecostalism frequently uses the transformative work of the Holy
Spirit as an excuse to avoid taking responsibility for personal behaviour or actions.
Whenever a person fails to complete a task or engages in inappropriate behaviour, the
common phase heard is “the Holy Spirit was moving in me.” It is simple to understand how
this mindset could cause dissention among family members and/or co-workers.
Another problematic area is the emphasis placed on the “Rapture” occurring at any
time in the near future and this leads to a very short-term perspective on life. What is the
point of spending years studying politics, engineering, law, psychology, economics or
philosophy if the world is going to end at any moment? (Moreno, Evangelical 66). This
overemphasis on the end of the world creates a society without a future vision. The short-
52
term focus of Pentecostals and the avoidance of intellectualism are failing to prepare
Pentecostal youth for the challenges of the modern world. It is imperative that the
Pentecostal movement address
this long list of negative characteristics.
Conclusion
This paper argues that Bolivian Pentecostalism, in its present form, will not be
capable of growing at the exponential rate predicted by Philip Jenkins in The Next
Christendom, without first reaching a plateau or losing momentum (8). This prediction
ignores changes in the surrounding religious environment and overlooks the long list of
negative controversial characteristics within Pentecostalism pertaining to anti-
intellectualism, conversion and the high drop out rate, the link to globalization, divisiveness
of the movement, and numerous other dark secrets. Pentecostalism does not operate in a
vacuum, and the response of the Roman Catholic Church and the mainline Protestant
churches socially, politically, and religiously, will have a significant impact on the future of
Pentecostalism. The Roman Catholic Church is certainly not going to sit by and watch its
flock become totally evangelical Protestant. The Catholic Church may be slow out of the
starting block in this situation, but it has not survived two thousand years of church history
without building a great deal of resistance to adversity. It is important to note that Catholic
Church membership is on the rise at the same time as Pentecostalism. It is likely that Latin
American Catholics will strengthen their charismatic movement into a strong, unified body
to combat Pentecostal growth similar to El Shaddai in the Philippines. El Shaddai has
spread to dozens of countries around the world and a wave of resistance to Pentecostal
growth will likely rise in Latin America as well.
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This study has been important for understanding the less savory characteristics of
Pentecostalism as it evolves in Bolivia in the face of a developing social movement that is
awesome in its potential. As the many poor indigenous peoples convert to Pentecostalism,
their lives irrevocably change. This shift invites political involvement, a means to reform the
way Bolivia is governed, and a possible end to the oppression that has kept the indigenous
peoples impoverished for centuries. This rising social movement in Bolivia is driven by
grassroots political activists encouraging the people to stand up for themselves and lay claim
to their right to the basic necessities in life, economic advancement, and human dignity. In
Bolivia today, with the election of Evo Morales, we are witnessing this shift at work.
Evidence proves that some portion of the indigenous Pentecostal converts is participating in
this leftist shift in politics. The assumption that political involvement by Bolivian
Pentecostals will be conservative is false. If Latin America is any indication, politics in the
global south will take on a nationalistic socialist face rather than be influenced by religious
conservatism. There could even be a permanent trend toward the political left for
Pentecostals, as evidenced by the severing of ties between the Pentecostal churches of the
global south and those of the global north, especially the churches of the United States.
Pentecostal churches planning to have an impact on the social and political landscape of
Latin America will be forced to meet head-on the numerous negative facets of the
movement and the churches that respond most fluidly will have the greatest impact.
Pentecostals should hold their movement to the same high standards they expect of
themselves. Churches that choose to retain the status quo will pay a severe price, reflected in
their numbers and have little opportunity for growth. It would be truly self-destructive for
the movement to ignore its negative traits. If the movement self-destructs, it will only be to
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the detriment of the impoverished indigenous people of Bolivia, who currently embrace the
Pentecostal religious experience.
If Pentecostals choose to confront the dark secrets of their movement the effect on
participants will be enormous. This could go one of two ways: 1) the participants will
welcome the opportunity to confront the past and the church will emerge stronger, or
2) mass apostasy will occur hindering all continuation of the movement. If facing its dark
secrets is the option selected, a “born again” conversion moment could occur for
Pentecostalism, as it confesses its sins and starts anew. The success of such confrontation
will either make or break the faith movement.
Contemplating the future direction of Pentecostal involvement in politics raises
many questions. Will Pentecostals support political actions that promote social justice for all
or move Bolivian society toward democracy? Can Pentecostalism survive without
capitalism? It must be remembered that Pentecostalism thrives when there is a capitalist
system in place as each individual is indoctrinated with the “prosperity gospel.” How will
Pentecostalism adapt to non-militaristic government when it supports authoritarian rule both
in the family and in society? Latin Americans have voted for socialism as the next era of
political leadership. It will be interesting to observe the ability of Pentecostals to adapt to
these changing political and social movements. If Pentecostalism is going to succeed in
taking a greater share of the religious pie as predicted by Philip Jenkins, and have societal
impact in countries such as Bolivia over the next few decades, it will need to look critically
at itself. Pentecostal growth can rely on population growth and migration to gain its converts
for only so long, before word spreads that Pentecostalism is not what it seems.
There is a long list of controversial dark secrets surrounding the Pentecostal
movement that need to be addressed. Moreno is adamant that none of these problems are
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irreversible, and with concerted effort, Pentecostalism will have a positive long-term impact
on Latin America (Latin 1). However, change must occur if Pentecostals intend to have
significant religious, economic, and social influence in any part of Latin America, including
Bolivia. According to Cox, one of the best prospects he is beginning to see for
Pentecostalism is what he refers to as “[P]entecostal liberation theology,” a more leftist
version of Pentecostalism working for social justice (319). He explains that the dividing line
between Catholic base communities and these Pentecostal liberation theology communities
is rapidly disappearing and the resulting Pentecostal derivation may be extremely “potent”
(Cox 319). Pentecostals are great at attracting new converts in the short term and this works
well while the focus is on the Rapture. Developing a long-term focus will serve
Pentecostalism well and generate momentum to deal with the many negative characteristics
that threaten to derail its progress.
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Endnotes
1 David W. Bebbington, a British historian, is professor of history at the University of Stirling in Scotland and a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society. His main research interests are in the history of politics, religion and society in Britain from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, and in the history of the global evangelical movement. David W. Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from the 1730s to the1980s (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989) 2-17. Along with others like Mark Noll, Bebbington should get credit for his efforts to place evangelicalism within religious history. For more information on evangelicalism refer to Mark A. Noll, The Rise of Evangelicalism: The Age of Edwards, Whitefield, and the Wesleys (Downers Grove. IL: Intervarsity P, 2003) 19.
2 Diego Irarrázaval is a Peruvian anthropological investigator at the Instituto de Estudios Aymara at Puno, Perú. Irarrázaval presents the characteristics of indigenous theology as follows: “a) una teología sumamente concreta, que contempla la vida, la saborea y se baña en sus misterios, que acompaña proyectos de vida de nuestros pueblos. b) una comprensión holística de la existencia del pueblo y de lo sagrado. c) un lenguaje mítico – simbólico que expresa el sentido profundo de la vida (y no un arcaísmo pre-moderno), es decir, una preferencia por el lenguaje religioso y ritual. d) el sujeto de la teología es el pueblo que elabora su pensamiento de forma colectiva, es decir, sabias y sabios en las comunidades y pueblos indígenas” Diego Irarrázaval, “Nuevas Rutas de la Teología Latinoamericana,” Revista Latinoamericana de Teologia 38 Mayo – Agosto 1996 Año XIII (Centro de Reflexión Teológica, Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas. San Salvador, El Salvador) 193. Unedited version originally presented at a meeting of la Comisión Teológica de ASETT (New York, June 1994).
3 A left-wing guerrilla uprising in 1966 led by Ernesto “Che” Guevara pressed for social and political change; however, Guevara was captured and killed for his leftist efforts in 1967. Guevara had been significant in the Cuban revolution that brought Fidel Castro to power. Byron Augustin, Bolivia (New York, Toronto, London: Children’s P, 2001) 53. In the 70s, “Bolivia’s military regime came under pressure from the United States and Europe to liberalize and restore civilian democratic rule”. “Bolivia,” Library of Congress – Federal Research Division: Country Profile, Jan. 2006: 5 <http://countrystudies.us/>. In 1980, General Luis Garcia Mesa took power in a ruthless and violent coup. He hired Klaus Barbie, former Nazi and Gestapo chief, as his internal security advisor. The “butcher of Leon” had killed thousands of Jews during WWII and he started a paramilitary group called Los Novios de la Muerte (The Newlyweds of Death). Using Garcia Meza’s backing and money from cocaine traffickers, a devastating reign of terror began in Bolivia. All opposition to the dictator and his actions was repressed and “political opponents were arrested, tortured, or [they] disappeared. Augustin 54.
4 Richard Gott is the former Latin-American correspondent of London’s Guardian newspaper, author of Cuba: A New History (Yale University Press, 2004) and Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution (Verso, 2005). Richard Gott, “Latin America at the Dawn of the 21st Century,” The Alternative Museum: Thy Brothers’ Keeper, Dec. 2005 <http://www.alternativemuseum.org/exh/tbk/essay6.html>.
5 Jorge A. Aquino, a Cuban-American scholar of religion, is a professor of Theology and Latin American Studies at the University of San Francisco. Jorge A. Aquino, “Liberation Theology & The New Latin American Left,” Changing Political Climate, Divisadero 3 Spring 2006: 1 (University of San Francisco) <http://www.usfca.edu/lainamerican/Divisadero/Issue3/Issue3_page10.htm>.
6 Mortimer Arias, a former bishop of the Methodist Church in Bolivia, discusses the result of crossing into human rights work. “Human rights in Latin America is not just a matter for foreign policy; it is a matter of life and death, a matter of our confessing life. As the German church had to come to that confessing point before Nazism, so the church in Latin America has had to stand on the matter of human rights”. I said to my interrogators who asked again and again, “Why are you defending human rights?” “Putting your own life on the line is the final ministry of hope: it is an affirmation of life”. He elaborates on this point by stating that martyrdom while fighting for human rights is an act of evangelization itself. “These life-giving deaths become the seed of the church, the seed of hope, the affirmation of a new tomorrow, of a world yet to be”. Dr. Mortimer Arias is a professor of evangelism at Claremont School of Theology, Claremont, California. This statement was made in a panel discussion on “Jesus Christ – the Life of the World from a Latin American
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Perspective at the Conference on World Mission and Evangelism commission meeting in Bucharest, May 1981. “Jesus Christ – The life of the World,” World Council of Churches, International Review of Mission 71.281 (Jan. 1982): 7-8.
7 Ana de García is a Lutheran educator in Costa Rica. Ana de García. “Affirming The God of Life in
Latin America,” International Review of Mission 71.281 (Jan. 1982): 10. 8 Virginia Garrard-Burnett is a Senior Lecturer in History and Latin American Studies at University
of Texas, Austin. Virginia Garrard-Burnett, “Christianity and Conflict in Latin America,” The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Panel Transcript – 6 Apr. 2006 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University): 1.
9 David Knowlton is an assistant professor of anthropology at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri who makes frequent trips to South America. Commenting on the murders of two Mormon missionaries and church bombings in La Paz, David Knowlton concludes the Mormon Church is struggling in Bolivia because it has been linked to North American penetration and domination of imperialism over other countries. In Bolivia, violence has erupted against the Mormon missionaries and churches because of the belief that the church is “part of a U.S. Imperialist conspiracy to rob the Bolivian people of their dream for meaningful democracy.” Unlike the Pentecostals, Mormons are seen as wealthy foreigners building beautiful churches backed by a “well-financed institutional invasion.” The violence against Mormons is seen as an anti-American response. The reasons for this evaluation of Mormons are numerous: 1) the use of the U.S. for proselytizing, 2) heavy American presence amongst missionaries, 3) American style of worship, 4) authoritarian style of leadership, 5) all truth flowing from Salt Lake City, 6) sacralization of U.S. constitution and American ideals promoted in general conference and manuals, 7) it “buys” converts through scholarships to BYU, 8) the church has extensive corporate holdings as well as the unilinal flow of tithes and offerings to the top as further imperialism, 9) missionary work divides the masses with an ideology that promotes obedience and order, authoritarianism, and political quietism, and 10) accused of destroying indigenous religion and culture. David Clark Knowlton, “Missionaries and Terror: Background and Implications of the Assassination of Two Elders in Bolivia,” Sunstone Magazine Mormon Issues 72 (Aug. 1989): 12-15 <http://www.sunstoneonline.com/magazine/searchable/Issue72.asp>.
10 David Barrett of World Christian Encyclopedia, Los Angeles Times, May 31, 2001 recommends
the estimates of Patrick Johnstone in Operation World. The estimate of Protestant participants in 1990: Chile 22%, Guatemala 20%, Brazil 17%, Nicaragua 9%, Peru 4%, Venezuela 3%, Cuba 2%. The estimates for active Catholic participation were put at 10-15%. Fuller Seminary in Pasadena, Cal. Source: “Bolivia,” Adherents.com. <http://www.adherents.com/Na/Na_542.html>.
11 Edward L. Cleary, O.P. is Professor of Political Science and Director of Latin American Studies,
Providence College, Providence, Rhode Island. He served as a missionary in Bolivia and Peru from 1958-63 and 1968-71. In his analysis, Cleary doesn’t get into statistics on Bolivia even though he spent several years living there so this might indicate that either the number of Pentecostals in Bolivia in 2004 was not significant or that there was an inability to track any of the statistics. He mentions Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Chile with high statistics for “no religion”. Edward L. Cleary, “Shopping around: Questions About Latin American Conversions,” International Bulletin of Missionary Research (Apr. 2004): 4 <http://www.providence.edu/las/ Brookongs.html>.
12 There are a wide range of Pentecostal churches in Bolivia. Ekklesia is a charismatic movement that had 5000 members in 1999 spread over 300 house groups, 8 TV stations, and a network of radio stations in Bolivia. Government and business leaders are members and many attend the central church in La Paz. It started with huge revival meetings in the 1970s. Another church, The Ministry of the New Pact of God’s Power has 15 000 members in several cities. The movement grew out of a series of evangelistic and healing campaigns in La Paz. In 1998, the Bolivian Bible Society sold a record number of Bibles, 140 000 copies, mostly to Pentecostal and charismatic churches. “Protestant Evangelicalism Booming in Predominantly Catholic Bolivia.” Religion Today (26 Nov. 1999): 1, The Layman Online <http://www.layman.org/ layman/news/news-around-church/protestant-evangel.htm>.
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13 Paul Freston is a Professor of Sociology and Byker Chair in Christian Perspectives on Political
Social and Economic Thought at Calvin College. He was speaking to the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, a nonpartisan, non-advocacy organization based in Washington, D.C. that began in 2001 to explore topics that border between religion and public affairs. Its four key areas of research include: Religion and Politics, Religion and the Law, Religion and Domestic Policy, and Religion and World Affairs. Paul Freston, “Christianity and Conflict in Latin America,” The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Panel Transcript, 6 April 2006 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University).
14 This term “nomadismo” is used by Edward L. Cleary, “Shopping around: Questions About Latin American Conversions,” International Bulletin of Missionary Research (Apr. 2004): 3 <http://www. providence.edu/las/Brookongs.html>.
15 Howard Wiarda is Dean Rusk Professor and Department Head, Department of International Affairs, University of Georgia, Athens. Howard Wiarda, “Religion, Security and the Future of Latin America,” PEW Forum on Religion & Public Life, Event transcript 6 Apr, 2006, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University) <http://pewforum.org/events/index.php?eventID=104>.
16 Lesley Gill tells the story of a thirty-six year old Aymara woman named Vacilia Choque from La Paz, Bolivia who admits she was baptized a Catholic and still calls herself a Catholic but she attends an evangelical Protestant church because she connects with its message. Lesley Gill, “Religious Mobility and the Many Words of God in La Paz, Bolivia,” Rethinking Protestantism in Latin America, ed. Virginia Garrard-Burnett and David Stoll (Philadelphia: Temple U P, 1993).
17 Daniel J. Chiquete is a Costa Rican Pentecostal theologian and author. He describes how a new convert is thrilled to share their own conversion experience with friends, family, and co-workers and this leads to the conversion of more people. Healing and mission are directly linked but it is the broader process of salvation that encourages converts to “work longer and harder, give up vices, organize finances better, improve family and working relations, more confident and energetic – these side effects seen as “signs of the new presence of God in their lives”, or “fruits of the Spirit” or “foreshadowing” of the final salvation which will be fulfilled with the second coming of Christ when he returns to establish his kingdom for ever. Daniel J. Chiquete, “Healing, Salvation and Mission: the Ministry of Healing in Latin American Pentecostalism,” World Council of Churches, Divine Healing, Pentecostalism and Mission, International Review of Mission 93.370-371 (July/Oct. 2004): 474, 481.
18 A telephone conversation with Pedro Moreno on September 26, 2006 drew my attention to the importance of the President’s Prayer Meeting with Alberto Salcedo of Ekklesia. He stated this was a huge step in the separation of church from state in Bolivia and an important step for the recognition of Pentecostals as a religious group in the country.
19 Sandro Magister is an Italian Vatican Analyst. In this article on evangelicals he refers frequently to Philip Jenkins’ book The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity and refers to sects. The conclusion is that he is referring to U.S. Protestants aiding evangelicals in Latin America. Magister, Sandro. “A New Christianity Is Conquering the Developing World. But Europe Doesn’t Know It Yet.” 29 June 2004. WWW. Chiesa <http://www.chiesa.espressonline.it/dettaglio.jsp?id=7053&eng=y>.
20 Ratzinger’s speech to the Italian senate on May 13, 2004 refers to free churches. The term “free church” traditionally means a separation of state and church but it is more commonly used today to refer to evangelical churches both in the United States and Latin America with a prominent denomination being the Evangelical Free Church of America International Mission (EFCA 1). Evangelical Free Church of America International Mission, EFCA Latin America Area, <http://www.efcmlatinamerica.org/. To verify the translation of Ratzinger’s speech, it was translated from Italian where the term chiese libere (free church) is used, so the word evangelical is not used by Ratzinger but the assumption is made that free church refers to evangelical churches. Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, “Europe: Its Spiritual Foundation: Yesterday, Today and in the Future,” Speech, Italian Senate, 13 May 2004, Inside the Vatican (Jun/Jul 2004): 44-51, Catholic Culture
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<http://www.catholicculture.org/docs/doc_view.cfm?recnum=6317> Path: Document Library. Translated from Senato della Repubblica, Europa. I suoi fondamenti spirituali ieri, oggi e domain, 13 maggio 2004 <http:// www.senato.it/notizie/21359/21361/21363/27861/41958/genpagina.htm> Path: 2004.
21 Otto Maduro is a professor and sociologist of religion at Drew University. Venezuelan born, he is Professor of World Christianity & Latin American Christianity. “Otto Maduro,” Drew University, Madison, NJ <http://www.users.drew.edu/omaduro/>.
22 The leaders of the United States of America are leading critics of Evo Morales’ rule in Bolivia.
Speaking at a Pew Forum, Howard Wiarda states that this “populist surge” is very worrisome. Wiarda implies that Evo Morales would like to see Bolivia revert back to a 14th century version of society before the time of contact with the Spaniards to “drive white, Western, Hispanic, globalized […] Bolivia back into the Pacific Ocean from which it came”. Much to the chagrin of the United States, Morales and other Latin American populist government leaders are “lionized” in Europe. Europeans love watching the Bolivian leader and others like Hugo Chávez in Venezuela thumb their noses at United States imperialism and 500 years of colonial rule. Wiarda warns that through repudiation of globalization, countries like Bolivia will isolate themselves, to their detriment. Wiarda 2-7.
23 Most Latin Americans would say that democracy, free trade, and open markets have not worked well in Latin America but Wiarda states that this market form is the only option and both, the Latin American countries and the United States, will have to bend to make it work. He also estimates that a smooth running market system will take “three or four generations to effect these kinds of changes” Wiarda 7-8. Contrary to Wiarda’s implications, Evo Morales has called a constitutional convention to create a new Bolivian republic that will include everyone and be “based on diversity, respect and equal rights for all.” Morales is highly critical of past Latin American leadership when he states, “at least Latin America no longer has racist or fascist presidents like it did in the past. Capitalism has only hurt Latin America.” Evo Morales interviewed by Jens Giasing and Hans Hoyng of Der Spiegel, Trans. from German by Christopher Sultan, “Capitalism Has Only Hurt Latin America,” ZNet/Bolivia (4 Sept. 2006): 1-2 <http://www.zmag.org/content/ showarticle.cfm?itemID=10880>.
24 “CN is an alliance of Protestant Christians (the majority), left-wing groups and community organizations.” “Bolivian Protestants Back Calls for a Secular Constitution.” Ekklesia. 14 June 2006. London <http://www.ekklesia.co.uk/content/news_syndication/article_060614bolivia.shtml>. Ekklesia is a not-for-profit think-tank that works to promote theological ideas in the public square. www.ekklesia.co.uk.
25 Walter Mignolo is the William H. Wannamaker Professor of Literature and Romance Studies at Duke University. Walter Mignolo, “Bolivia’s New President is Something Altogether Different,” Duke University News & Communications, 24 Jan. 2006: 1 <http://www.dukenews.duke.edu/2006/01/ evomorales.html>.
26 Evo Morales declares, “I didn’t want to be a politician because politicians are thieves, but then I realized that politics is the science of serving the people” (2). Dan Glaister, “Bolivia: The Theology of Inculturation and the New President,” Puritan New Weekly, 21 Dec. 2005 <http://puritans.net/news/>. Although Morales himself, and many of his supporters refer to themselves as Catholic, he and his leftist ruling party, Movement to Socialism (MAS), have been pushing to eliminate the privileges of the Catholic Church in favour of a secular state. This would require the removal of Article 3 of the Constitution of Bolivia that reads, “State recognizes and upholds the Catholic and Apostolic faith. It guarantees the public exercise of all other religions.” Relations with [the Roman Catholic] Church will be governed through concordats and agreements between the State and the Holy See.” “Bolivian Protestants Back Calls for a Secular Constitution,” Ekklesia, London 14 June 2006: 1-2 <http://www.ekklesia.co.uk/content/news_syndication/article_060614bolivia. shtml>. Morales is “opposed to a monopoly when it comes to faith.” Jens Giasing and Hans Hoyng, interview with Evo Morales, Der Spiegel, Trans. from German by Christopher Sultan, “Capitalism Has Only Hurt Latin America,” ZNet/Bolivia, 4 Sept. 2006: 3 <http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?itemID=10880>.
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27 It has taken twenty years for Morales, under the mentorship of a Jesuit priest, to build up his sense
of empowerment to bring him to the political arena and political success. Morales’ mentor, Mauricio Bacardit, instilled in him a sense of power; however, Bacardit’s allegiance is not with the Roman Catholic Church. He states, “so long as people continue to embrace false religion” in reference to what he calls “Romanism” it will keep people of Bolivia in bondage to false religion and idolatry. The priests are trying to implement the inculturization of the Aymara of Bolivia by “reviv[ing] rituals that earlier generations of Catholic priests had tried to eradicate.” Andrew Orta, Catechizing Culture: Missionaries, Aymara, and the “New Evangelization,” (New York: Columbia U P, 2004). This would indicate that Morales might be nominally Catholic and not an active participant in the Roman Catholic Church. Dan Glaister quotes Mauricio Bacardit, the Jesuit priest, “El principal reto agora es resolver el tema de la pobreza”. Bacardit has pushed Morales to encourage Bolivia to focus on the issue of poverty. <http://eldeber.com.bo/anteriores/20050130/santacruz_5.html>. According to Evo Morales, “injustice, inequality and the poverty of the masses compel us to seek better living conditions. Bolivia’s majority Indian population was always excluded, politically oppressed and culturally alienated.” This system of inculturation is nothing new but “just a new chapter in a very old playbook for Roman Catholicism has long been essentially the fusing of many pagan elements with Christianity.” Dan Glaister, “Bolivia: The Theology of Inculturation and the New President,” Puritan New Weekly, 21 Dec. 2005: 2-4 <http:// puritans.net/news/>.
28 “Harvey G. Cox Jr. is Hollis Professor of Divinity at Harvard, where he has been teaching since 1965, both at [Harvard Divinity School] and in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences. An American Baptist minister, he was the Protestant chaplain at Temple University and the director of religious activities at Oberlin College; an ecumenical fraternal worker in Berlin; and a professor at Andover Newton Theological School. His research and teaching interests focus on the interaction of religion, culture, and politics.” He taught his first Pentecostal course in 1993. See “Harvey Cox,” ed. Chris Bower, Harvard Divinity School, 26 Sep. 2006 <http://www.hds.harvard.edu/faculty/cox.html>. Philip Jenkins is Distinguished Professor of Religious Studies and History at Pennsylvania State University with interests in “US history (twentieth century); Historical study of religion; Politics and modern society; comparative colonialism.” See “Philip Jenkins,” Pennsylvania State University <http://php.scripts.psu.edu/dept/history/faculty/jenkinsPhilip.php>.
29 These statistics, upon publication, shocked Pentecostal pastors, but the Chilean pastors took a very mature approach and considered the reasons for this lack of commitment. They recognized the growing gap between the education and class background of the pastors versus that of the persons in the pews. Pastors often have less education and lower class background than the middle class in Chile but with Bolivia’s high rate of poverty, this educational and class gap should not be as obvious. Cleary, Shopping 3.
30 Huang Po Ho is involved in the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan as a professor of Contextual Theology at Tainan Theological Seminary, Tainan, Taiwan and these quotes are the response to the World Council of Churches 11th Conference on World Mission and Evangelism in Salvador, Bahia, Brazil, end of 1996 theme “Called to One Hope – The Gospel in Diverse Cultures. Huang Po Ho, “Gospel in the Setting of Globalization: A Response to the Salvador Conference,” Mission in the Twenty-First Century: Impulses From Salvador, International Review of Mission, 86.340-341 Jan./Apr. 1997: 105.
31 Evangelicals are increasing their presence in politics. In 1999, they led four political parties including prominent government and military personnel. “Protestant” 2.
32 Racist behaviour is a major concern in Bolivia. It is moving from the subsurface into the open. The
situation is being compared to African apartheid as the oppressed indigenous peoples fight for human rights and a share of the economy against the mixed-race elites. It is thought that the Europeans who stayed in Bolivia after independence in 1825 failed to notice anything had changed and they continued to treat the two-thirds of the population that are indigenous as inferiors. Racial boundaries in Bolivia are very strong and the rising social movement in the country today is fighting to change that attitude. “Bolivia: Tiny Nation, Big Troubles,” The Christian Science Monitor 9 June 2005: 1 <http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0609/p08s01-comv.html>.
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33 Allan Anderson is a reader in Pentecostal Studies in the Department of Theology at the U of
Birmingham, UK and a former pastor from Zimbabwe. Allan Anderson, “Pentecostals, Healing and Ecumenism,” International Review of Mission 93.370-371 (July/Oct. 2004): 486 <http://63.136.1.22. ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/pls/eli/ashow?aid=ATLA0001455558>.
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