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The Rise of Brazil as a Global DevelopmentPowerPeter Dauvergne & Déborah BL Farias

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The Rise of Brazil as a GlobalDevelopment Power

PETER DAUVERGNE & DEBORAH BL FARIAS

ABSTRACT Brazil’s influence is rising quickly in international affairs. Unlikethose of China and India, its foreign policy relies heavily on non-militarypower—a characteristic of Brazil since at least the early 20th century. Amainstay of this policy has been the pursuit of ‘development’ for Brazil and theglobal South, with domestic discourse on the need to ‘develop’ buttressing thisapproach. Foreign policy under President Lula (2003–10) did this explicitly;President Rousseff (2011–) shows no signs of changing course. This articleanalyses three foreign policy issues—South–South cooperation, health, andenvironment—to demonstrate the use and assess the value of this strategy. Notonly is the strategy serving Brazil’s national interests well, the analysis reveals,but it is also benefitting other developing countries (albeit asymmetrically),reinforcing Brazil’s capacity to influence international affairs.

Since the late 1990s Brazil has been emerging as an increasingly powerfulstate in international affairs. Although it does not possess significant militarypower, it is gaining influence through what Joseph Nye Jr and others call‘soft power’. Brazil rarely uses direct threats (whether military or economic)to achieve its foreign policy goals; instead, it is focusing on forming andleading coalitions of developing states to strengthen shared values andnormative commitments.This article analyses Brazil’s efforts to extend its international influence by

embedding the concept of development into its foreign policy. We assessthree foreign policy issues to demonstrate the use and value of this strategy:South–South cooperation, focusing on Brazil’s role in building South–Southalliances; global health, centring on Brazil’s leadership in preventing andtreating AIDS and tropical diseases in the global South; and environmentalissues, addressing Brazil’s advocacy of renewable energy, in particularbiofuels in developing countries. The goal is to better understand how Brazilis using this strategy to gain, amplify and secure its interests on the

Peter Dauvergne is in the Department of Political Science and the Liu Institute for Global Issues, University

of British Columbia, 6476 NW Marine Drive, Vancouver V6T 1Z2, Canada.

Email: peter.dauvergne@ubc.ca.

Deborah Barros Leal Farias is in the Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, C425-

1866 Main Mall, Vancouver V6T 1Z1. Email: deborahbarrosleal@gmail.com.

Third World Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 5, 2012, pp 903–917

ISSN 0143-6597 print/ISSN 1360-2241 online/12/050903–15

� 2012 Southseries Inc., www.thirdworldquarterly.com

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international stage—an approach that gained strength under President LuisInacio ‘Lula’ da Silva (2003–10) and that looks set to continue duringPresident Dilma Rousseff’s tenure (2011– ). In light of Brazil’s expandingregional and global influence, the need is growing for more fine-grainedanalyses of Brazilian foreign policy and the motives of its leaders.Drawing on interviews, scholarship, policy reports and official Portuguese

documents, the article aims to contribute to the underdeveloped English-based academic literature on Brazilian foreign policy. Innovatively it exploreshow and why Brazil has been strategically deploying the concept ofdevelopment in its contemporary international strategy. This concept hasbeen present in domestic policies since before World War II and has beenpart of the foreign policy lexicon and strategy since the early 1960s. The pastdecade, however, has seen it gain even more prominence, underpinningefforts to highlight shared values and normative positions as Brazil buildsand leads coalitions within the developing world as a strategy of internationalleadership.To begin we focus on Brazil’s position of power in international affairs.

Building on this we then look at the country’s foreign policy, with aparticular focus on the use of the concept of development. The last sectionanalyses Brazil’s South–South alliances, health diplomacy and environmentalleadership to reveal how development as an instrument of foreign policy isnot only embedded in the domestic context, but also serves to enhance thecountry’s international power.

The power of Brazil

Brazil is an atypical global power. Its economy is growing rapidly. And itsstatus in international affairs is rising quickly. ‘Brazil is on the short list ofcountries’, the US Council on Foreign Relations concluded in 2011, ‘that willmost shape the twenty-first century’.1 It is a unique ‘emerging’ power,however: an ‘in between’ state in international affairs.The idea that some states hold a ‘special’ ‘in between’ position in the

international system dates back to at least the end of World War II.Literature on this topic took off as analysts began to reveal the growinginfluence of states below the Great Powers but above the majority of smalland relatively weak states. G De T Glazebrook was one of the first to use theterm ‘middle power’ (already citing Brazil as one), defining these in 1947 as‘countries which make no claim to the title of great power, but have beenshown to be capable of exerting a degree of strength and influence not foundin the small powers’.2 Two decades later Robert Keohane refined the idea byconceptualising a middle power as ‘a state whose leaders consider that itcannot act alone effectively but may be able to have a systemic impact in asmall group or through an international institution’; he saw a small power asone ‘whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in a smallgroup, make a significant impact on the system’.3

Since then many others have researched and defined middle powers, withsome rephrasing the idea to create a likeminded expression, such as:

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‘middlepowermanship’; ‘great peripheral states’; ‘intermediate powers’; ‘newtitans’; ‘second world’; and ‘swing states’.4 Regardless of the particularterminology, analysts have consistently put Brazil into the middle powerrubric. The past decade has seen a growing trend towards understanding‘emerging powers’ as a distinctive subgroup of middle powers, with theacronym BRIC or BRICS—Brazil, Russia, India, China plus South Africa—one of the most common ways to group them together. Many emphasise theshared characteristics of these states: extensive area; large populations; statusas regional ‘pivots’; aspiration to a global role; growing economies; high GDP

but relatively low GDP per capita; large domestic inequalities; and highabsolute poverty levels.In this context many analysts now portray Brazil as one of the fastest rising

emerging powers. For Paulo Sotero, ‘by mid-2010, as the Lula administrationentered its final months, the question was no longer whether Brazil had risento a position of international pre-eminence, but how the country would assertand promote its interests as a newly recognised global actor’.5 AndrewHurrell is equally emphatic in arguing that power has been shifting in globalpolitics from the old G7 to a new group of emerging powers. For him today’semerging and regional powers are an indispensable part of the global order:‘It is impossible to conceive of managing climate change, nuclear prolifera-tion, or economic globalization without institutions that included China,India and Brazil’.6

Militarily Brazil does not fit the traditional notion of a great power: it isnot a nuclear power; nor does it possess a strong conventional arsenal. Sinceindependence from Portugal in 1822 it has never really had a globallysignificant defence force. It has only fought three wars against its neighbours,all during the Imperial regime (1822–89).7 Outside the South Americancontinent it has only fought in World Wars I and II. Since then it has onlyparticipated in peacekeeping missions. Notwithstanding political tensions,Brazil has maintained largely peaceful relations with its 10 borderingcountries, with whom it shares more than 17 000 kilometres of dry frontier—about twice the length of the US–Canada land border.Nonetheless, today Brazil is prominent along other important dimensions.

According to a recent report ‘the Brazilian economy has overtaken the UKeconomy in 2011 to become the world’s 6th largest economy’.8 It has theworld’s fifth largest population. It is home to one-sixth of the world’savailable freshwater reserves. It ranks as the world’s second biggest foodexporter, the fourth biggest food producer, and the ninth biggest oilproducer. And it has stabilised its multiracial and multiethnic society over thepast 25 years.So notwithstanding the undeniable importance of coercive instruments

and practices in foreign affairs, to understand the case of Brazil’s powersources and foreign policy strategies requires one to go beyond a narrowconception of power. It reaffirms the argument that power can come fromvarious non-military sources and be exerted through cooperative mechanisms.Back in 1945 Albert Hirschman was already noting the importance of

economic dynamism and influence as a source of power.9 By the early 1960s

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Arnold Wohlfers was arguing that trying to influence friendly countries withpromises or benefits was often a more effective instrument than makingthreats.10 In 1985 David Baldwin emphasised the need to observe bothpositive sanctions (actual or promised rewards) and negative sanctions(actual or threatened punishments) as means to exercise power, as the firstwere often overlooked as sources of power.11 Since then one of the best-known scholars looking at power outside of coercion and sanctions has beenJoseph Nye Jr, who divides power into ‘hard’ and ‘soft’. Nye defines softpower as getting others to want the same outcome that you want by co-opting rather than coercing them.12 Although rather general, this definitiondoes help in understanding Brazil’s ‘soft power’ diplomacy.Primacy of the diplomatic corps over the armed forces is one of the

strongest facets of Brazil’s foreign policy decision making.13 Baron of RioBranco, the father of Brazilian foreign policy, engrained this norm in theearly 20th century. Hailed for solving pending border disputes throughdiplomacy and the use of international law, he managed to extend Brazil’sterritory by 900 000 square kilometres without firing a shot. All governmentssince have followed in this tradition of non-belligerence, negotiated solutions,multilateralism and a focus on legal standings—even during the militaryregime of 1964–84.14 President Lula’s Minister of Foreign Affairs (2003–10)Celso Amorim succinctly explained: ‘Brazil’s great skill is to be friends witheveryone’.15

President Lula elevated the strategic focus on cooperation even further.16

His goal was to increase Brazil’s ‘weight’ in international affairs throughcoalition building in order to ‘soft balance’17 against structures that he saw asdetrimental. Hal Brands captures this when he argues that the fundamentalgoal of Brazil’s grand strategy has been ‘to hasten the transition from thedominance of the developed world to a multipolar order in whichinternational power balances and institutions are more favorable to theassertion of Brazil’s interests’. He believes that ‘because Brazil still faces, andwill continue to face, a relative deficit of economic and military might,President Lula has resorted to a strategy commonly used by ‘middle powers’,countries that rely on multilateralism, coalition-building, and other suchmethods to achieve systemic influence’.18 The need to understand themechanisms behind Brazil’s soft power resources remains, given thatPresident Rousseff is following this same foreign policy path.

Development in Brazil’s foreign policy

The concept of development has a long history in both Brazil’s domestic andforeign policies.19 Brazil’s constitution gives it priority not only in itspreamble and Article 3—‘Fundamental goals of the Federative Republic ofBrazil’—but repeats the term over 50 times throughout. And, although notall governments over the years have promoted developmental actions, theidea of development has long been a fundamental value with great politicaland policy resonance within Brazil’s political discourse.

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The focus on development in domestic politics began when Brazil adoptedthe so-called ‘national-developmentalist’ paradigm in the 1930s, whichbecame formally articulated in the late 1940s, particularly through the workof the Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL). This paradigmcontained key concepts, including: centre–periphery; industry; internalmarket; and deterioration of the terms of trade. It also implied active stateintervention in the country’s economy along with adopting an industrialisa-tion model based on import substitution.Many of these ideas spilled into foreign policy. The introduction of Polıtica

Externa Independente (‘Independent Foreign Policy’) in the early 1960sexplicitly and fundamentally incorporated ‘development’ into Brazil’s foreignpolicy. The main priority throughout the 1960s and 1970s was the economicaspect of development—particularly foreign trade. Reflective of this wasBrazil’s active engagement with multilateral initiatives with developingcountries, such as the G77 and the call for a New International EconomicOrder.20 The overarching goal was to develop the country and its economy asa way to gain power in the international arena. Joao Augusto Araujo Castro,Brazil’s Minister of Foreign Affairs (1963–64), explains: ‘for Brazil thequickest, most direct path for the strengthening of its national power is thepath of its own economic development and industrial expansion’.21

Brazil’s efforts to promote development in its foreign policy slowed duringthe domestic economic crisis of the 1980s and the revival of the Cold War. Bythe 1990s the meaning and importance of development for domestic andinternational policy strategies were shifting. The path towards nationaldevelopment was detaching from the national-developmentalist economicmodel of state intervention and import substitution. Brazil’s financialinstability was also undermining such efforts and pushing aside thosewanting to position Brazil as a ‘leader’ of developing nations.President Lula’s placing of development at the centre of both domestic and

foreign policies should not, however, be seen as a rupture with FernandoHenrique Cardoso’s presidency (1994–2002), particularly when compared tohis last years. The main differences between the two were the degree ofpriority given to development and the mechanisms seen as most ‘efficient’ tolead to sustained development. Cardoso, especially in his first term, focusedon strengthening alliances with developed countries rather than onquestioning the international status quo.22 Lula took a different approach,however, highlighting how asymmetric international structures were imped-ing development, as well as positioning Brazil firmly as a developing—andemerging—economy.23

Lula’s strategy was not a surprise. The essence was already present in theWorker’s Party electoral campaigns for the presidency in the late 1980s.24 Hiscommencement speech made his views clear: ‘in my government, Brazil’sdiplomatic action will be oriented by a humanistic perspective, and will be,above all, an instrument of national development’. All multilateral fora, headded, need to ‘preserve the spaces of flexibility for our national developmentpolicies in the social and regional, environmental, agricultural, industrial andtechnological fields’.25 President Rousseff, from the same party as her

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predecessor, has retained this same logic in her foreign policy. AntonioPatriota, Rousseff’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, made this clear in hiscommencement speech: ‘Brazil will have a foreign policy turned towardsdevelopment and peace that will seek to reduce the gap between rich and poornations’.26 Essentially, the broad idea is to try to unify, under a singledevelopmental agenda, the social and economic dimensions of public policiesadopted in both the national and international spheres.27

In the end—except for brief exceptions28— the ‘diplomacy of development’has been an underlying theme in Brazilian foreign policy. Although the visionof Brazil-as-developing-country and Brazil-as-champion-of-developing-na-tions has ebbed and flowed in importance over the years, it remains a keypart of the current diplomatic lexicon.The longstanding domestic concern with development suggests two key

points. First, its position as a foundational concept of foreign policy should beseen as a reflection of internal policies. Second, the close national–internationalconnection has added legitimacy and helped to elevate it above mere rhetoric.Combined, this has enhanced the capacity of the concept of development toserve as a soft power glue for coalition building. The cases below demonstratethe consistent efforts by both President Lula and (so far) President Rousseffto advance development for Brazilian interests, efforts that have reinforcedthe foundation underpinning the steady rise of Brazil as a global power.

‘Developing’ leadership

Brazil’s rapid economic growth over the past decade has allowed for someimpressive development gains—at least on some measures. Between 2002 and2010 the number of poor people in Brazil fell by 51 per cent. In the 2000s,while the per capita income of the country’s richest 10 per cent increased by10 per cent, the per capita income of 50 per cent of the poorest rose by 68 percent. In this same period the income of black citizens increased 43 per cent(while the income of white citizens went up 21 per cent), and the income ofwomen rose 38 per cent (compared to 16 per cent for men). Brazil is nowrecording its lowest GINI index (which measures inequality) since estimatesbegan in 1960.29 While it is true that many important social and developmentproblems remain, Brazil can claim more than ever to be a legitimateinternational voice for development. This is helping the country to positionitself as the ‘emerging among the emerging’ when it comes to real solutionsfor social development.30

Presidents Lula and Rousseff have actively sought to transform Brazil’sdomestic social and economic successes into power on the internationalstage. Both administrations have promoted the country as a legitimate andinnovative voice for development to build coalitions overseas, especiallywithin the global South. Three factors differentiate the Lula–Rousseff use ofdevelopment in Brazilian foreign policy from the 1960s/1970s period. First,Brazil has been able to draw on concrete achievements to justify andlegitimate leadership in international development, and not just rely onrhetoric or ideological commonalities. Second, while the economic dimension

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of development remains high on the agenda, the social components ofdevelopment—such as mitigating poverty and eradicating hunger—havebeen incorporated and brought to the forefront (not particularly the case inthe earlier period). Third, Brazil has in many aspects moved beyond the‘traditional’ role of calling for development to being in a position to draw onits own experience to offer development solutions. The cases below serve toillustrate how the Lula and Rousseff administrations have been able toincrease Brazil’s power and influence in international affairs.

Building South–South alliances

President Lula’s foreign policy placed great importance on defining Brazilnot only as a developing country but as a leader among them. This wasapparent in a series of initiatives to bolster South–South cooperation. Brazilwas able to strengthen its ties to other countries in tandem with‘development-as-goal’ and ‘development-as-identity’.Former foreign affairs minister Celso Amorim saw efforts to fortify

relations with other developing countries as critical to advancing Brazil’sinternational position: ‘South–South cooperation is a diplomatic strategy,’ hewrote, ‘that originates from an authentic desire to exercise solidarity towardpoorer countries. At the same time, it helps expand Brazil’s participation inworld affairs’. For him, cooperation among equals was the best way toenhance Brazil’s stature and strengthen its hand in trade, finance and climatenegotiations. In his words ‘building coalitions with developing countries isalso a way of engaging in the reform of global governance in order to makeinternational institutions fairer and more democratic’.31 Solidifying thisstance, the Rousseff administration’s foreign affairs minister, AntonioPatriota, reiterated early in his tenure that South–South policy will continueto be a key part of Brazil’s foreign policy strategy.32

Technical Cooperation (TC) agreements are ‘a central instrument’ ofBrazil’s foreign policy, particularly for bilateral South–South relations. TCsare not a synonym for ‘developmental assistance’ or ‘foreign aid’. They dealwith the exchange of knowledge and practices, not monetary transfers. Theydo not place conditionalities on the receiver. And they do not includefinancial aid (such as grants and loans). Although their use as a tool ofBrazilian foreign policy goes back decades, the number of projects andcountries involved has grown markedly over the past decade. Brazil is wellahead of any other developing country (even China and India) in system-atically using TC agreements. Substantively Brazil’s ‘South–South’ TC

agreements revolve around transferring its knowledge gained from ‘success-ful’ social and economic development experiences—notably with regard tohealth, agriculture and professional qualification—where Brazil sees TC

agreements as able to play a ‘key role in promoting capacity development indeveloping countries’.33

Through TC agreements Brazil has been fortifying its bilateral relations inthe global South. The official assessment of Brazil’s foreign policy during thetenure of President Lula explains the role of TC agreements with developing

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countries as a way to ‘strengthen Brazil’s bilateral relations with the rest ofthe world, thereby elevating the country’s profile in the internationalrealm’.34 Two examples of Brazil’s leadership in multilateral alliances are thebuilding of coalitions within the World Trade Organization (WTO) and thecreation of the India–Brazil–South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA Forum) in2003. The logic is the same in both cases (among many others): to identifyand coordinate as developing countries.During the Lula–Rousseff period Brazil has positioned itself as the main

(or ‘co-main’) representative of those identifying as developing countries.This can be understood as part of a strategy of ‘autonomy throughdiversification’—an adherence to international norms and principles bymeans of South–South alliances and agreements with non-traditionalpartners.35 The IBSA Forum is an interesting example. It was establishedby Brazil, India and South Africa in 2003, which all share a historical foreignpolicy focus on development. Documents express the three as being greatdeveloping countries, ‘destined’ for more international influence with theeconomies emerging so quickly.36 The idea is more than a ‘traditional’South–South initiative; rather it is a cooperation strategy of ‘system affecting’middle powers.37

What is significant here is how these three countries without a history ofstrategic partnering—with benign but thin relations—came together in aprocess of mutual identification. The IBSA Forum is intended to strengthentrilateral relations and cooperation (especially through practical andtechnical cooperation agreements), as well as to develop a platform to voicecommon goals of developing countries. ‘IBSA,’ explains a joint statement,‘aspires to make a significant contribution to the framework of South–Southcooperation and be a positive factor to advance human development’.38

Promoting global health

President Cardoso laid the foundations for Brazil’s ‘health diplomacy’, andefforts began to intensify in the late 1990s.39 President Lula’s foreign policycontinued to emphasise health as a core issue of international affairs: one thatwas a human right and vital for any country’s social development. Over thepast 15 years Brazil has established numerous health-related technicalcooperation agreements with developing countries. It is sharing policy andpractices related to public health campaigns. It is combating tropical diseasesand supporting technicians in epidemiological control. And it is arranging an‘epidemiological shield’ in South America to promote health and diseasesurveillance capabilities on a regional scale. Such cooperation, explainsLula’s foreign affairs minister Celso Amorim, ‘reinforces the ties that Brazilseeks to build with developing countries and strengthens our position withthe international community’.40

In 2003 Brazil’s leadership contributed to the appointment of a UN SpecialRapporteur on the Right to Health, as well as to the Commission on HumanRights adopting resolutions recognising that access to medications in thecontext of pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria is a

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fundamental right.41 In the same year Brazil played the lead role in negotiatingthe World Health Organization’s (WHO) Framework Convention on TobaccoControl.42 It was one of the leading countries to create UNITAID in 2006, anorganisation dedicated to improving access for the world’s poorest people tomedicines for HIV/AIDS,malaria and tuberculosis. Brazil is also one of the sevensignatory countries of the 2007OsloMinisterialDeclaration onGlobalHealth,an effort to bring together health and diplomatic agendas more effectively.Brazil—along with other member states—recognised that health ‘is a keyelement of any strategy aimed at promoting development and combatingpoverty’ and that it is ‘the main component of the Millennium DevelopmentGoals (MDGs), which point to the interconnectedness of the structural causes ofpoverty and under-development’.43

Brazil’s domestic and international policies to combat HIV/AIDS have hadparticularly significant impacts. The Brazilian constitution states that healthis a social right (Art 6), declaring that ‘health is a right of all and a duty of thestate, guaranteed through social and economic measures that aim to reducethe risk of diseases and other ailments and provide equal and universal accessto actions and services for its promotion, protection, and recovery’. In 1996the national government passed a law to provide free access to anti-retroviral(ARV) ‘cocktail’ medications to every person in Brazil infected with HIV/AIDS.The government then began producing off-patent ARV drugs in state-runpharmaceutical facilities. Two years later Brazil’s Minister of Healthproposed at the 1998 World AIDS Conference that universal access to ARVsbe recognised as a human right.In 2001 the Brazilian National AIDS Programme won the UN Educational,

Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)’s Human Rights and Cultureof Peace Award. That same year, however, the USA requested a panel at theWTO, claiming that Brazil’s 1996 ARV law violated patent laws under theAgreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), as itallowed for the compulsory licensing of patents under special conditions (egpublic health emergencies). Brazil responded by stating that its law was builton humanitarian values and the human right to health, arguing that life wasmore important than profit from patents. Brazil argued further that the USclaim would negatively affect developing countries, particularly leastdeveloped ones.Brazil was able to gain support from a multilateral and multi-actor

alliance, including not only many states (particularly developing ones) butalso NGOs such as Oxfam and Medicins Sans Frontieres) and internationalorganisations like the WHO and UNAIDS. As pressure mounted, the USAdropped the claim. Since then Brazil has worked consistently to ensure thatARV drugs are as cheap and available as possible, placing it in a position ofbeing ‘perhaps the rising power that is strategically most successful inconnecting its global health initiatives [such as those related to HIV/AIDS]with a declared foreign policy objective of becoming a global player ininternational affairs’.44

For health, as Lee et al argue, Brazil has ‘defied orthodox thinking ondevelopment’ by combining economic growth with progressive domestic

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social policies.45 It was the first developing country to offer free ARV

treatment to HIV/AIDS patients—despite a World Bank assessment that sucha policy was not cost-effective. For Kickbusch et al Brazil’s exercise of softpower, through moral leadership and the use of ‘opinion-shaping instru-ments’, suggests that a new kind of diplomacy is emerging to achievecollective action on shared challenges such as global health. In their viewBrazil is contributing to a ‘significant power shift within global healthdiplomacy’ by forming and leading coalitions of developing countries.46

Advancing renewable energy

For many tangible reasons Brazil is well-placed to position itself as an‘emerging environmental power’.47 It is home to the world’s biggest tropicalrainforest. It has one of the world’s largest renewable reserves of freshwater.It contains the planet’s most diverse stock of biodiversity. It has one of thecleanest energy matrixes among major economies. And it is a pioneer in usingethanol as fuel on a mass scale, doing so since the late 1970s.48 The countryhas played a key role in global environmental negotiations, hosting, forexample, the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992.During an official visit to Brazil in June 2011 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said he was counting ‘on Brazil’s leadership’ on ‘sustainabledevelopment’ at the UN Conference on Sustainable Development in 2012(also called Rioþ 20).49

As one would anticipate, Brazil frames its positions on environmental andclimate change around the concept of development. According to Brazilianscholar Amado Cervo, ‘in the view of Brazilian foreign policy, theenvironmental issue encompasses three other issues: the planet’s survival;development; and hunger’.50 Lula’s presidency firmly attached itself to theprinciple of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ over environmentalcommitments,51 taking into account the developed world’s historic respon-sibility for causing environmental problems and the need to ensure the rightof poor countries to develop.A strong domestic–international connection is clear in the case of

renewable energies. Brazil’s 2008–11 Pluri-Annual Plan states that ‘globalchallenges, such as environmental degradation, climate change and energysecurity demand an active posture from Brazilian diplomacy. The use ofrenewable and clean sources—such as biofuels—is part of Brazil’s develop-ment project, with benefits to be shared with other countries.’52 During herfirst days in power, President Rousseff presented 13 governmental guidelines,with energy policy placed under: ‘Give continuity to a national developmentproject that ensures an extensive and sustainable productive transformationof Brazil’. More important was the detailing that it should ‘emphasize theproduction of renewable energy. . .and continue with the internationalizationof its energy policy’.53

Brazil portrays biofuels as a means of national development, with greatpotential to help developing countries as long as they are producedsustainably.54 Brazil and the other BRIC leaders have issued a joint statement

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that biofuels can be an effective tool of sustainable development byconstituting ‘a driving force for social inclusion and income distributionmainly in the impoverished rural areas of developing and least developedcountries’.55

Where biofuels are concerned, Brazil wants to ensure that ‘no internationalnorms result in the limitation or questioning of a country’s options foreconomic and social development’.56 It aims to shape an international biofuelmarket—one presumably that favours Brazil. Since the early 2000s thecountry has been promoting the worldwide use of biofuels (particularlyethanol) through both multilateral and bilateral actions.57 For Brazil biofuelsrepresent part of the solution to three of the world’s greatest challenges:‘energy security, climate change and combating hunger and poverty’.58 Thefollowing statement synthesises well how Brazilian leaders tend to frame thepotential of biofuels: ‘We have learned to explore the extraordinary potentialof ethanol and biodiesel in terms of generating energy, generating employ-ment and income and the reduction of emissions. We now propose that theybe seen as a promising alternative for over 100 developing countries.’59

To date Brazil has bilateral technical cooperation agreements on biofuelswith 45 countries, two with multilateral institutions (the EconomicCommunity of West African States and the European Union), plus threetrilateral agreements: Brazil–EU–Africa; Brazil–EU–Mozambique; andBrazil–USA–Central America and the Caribbean. The total number ofcountries with direct and indirect TC biofuel agreements now tallies over 70—with the great majority being developing countries.

Conclusion

‘The time is past when the decision-making power in international relationswas restricted to the understanding among a few developed powers’, stateBrazilian scholars Amado Cervo and Antonio Lessa.60 Even if Brazil is not a‘great power’ in the traditional military sense, its influence on the global stageis now undeniable. It has a longstanding tradition of attracting allies andsupport with soft power behaviour, emphasising cooperation, multilateralinitiatives and diplomacy. And even as its economy grows, it continues tofocus on soft power resources—such as legitimacy, political values andknowledge—to achieve its foreign policy goals. In this light it does not seemfarfetched to call Brazil ‘the soft power great power’.The examples in this article are just a few in a broad foreign policy strategy

that prioritises the concept of development. The breadth and depth of thisstrategy still leaves plenty of room for further investigation. Connectingdevelopment with security, for instance, has also been common for manydecades. For some 30 years it has served as the reason for not signing theNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is the basis for a security zone in SouthAmerica and for recent initiatives in Haiti. And it underpins efforts to try toinfluence agendas and debates in the UN Security Council. Brazil’s growingpresence on the international stage means its concept of development vis-a-visnational and human security, as well as its understanding of the

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‘securitisation’ of development, is becoming increasingly relevant tointernational affairs.An analysis of how Brazil has been using the concept of development to

attract and sustain coalitions helps to reveal its rising global influence. To besure, Brazilian foreign policy to promote development serves Brazil’s owninterests. ‘The foreign policy of a country is more than its projection onto theinternational stage’, explains President Rousseff. ‘It is also an essentialcomponent of a national development project, especially in a world that isincreasingly interdependent. The internal and external dimensions of acountry’s foreign policy are then inseparable’.61 Nevertheless, one of thegreatest strengths of Brazil’s strategy is that its efforts do benefit otherdeveloping countries (even if asymmetrically) at very little cost to them,which serves to attract even more support for Brazil as a development leaderand global power.

Notes

1 S Bodman, J Wolfensohn & J Sweig, Global Brazil and US–Brazil Relations, Washington, DC: Councilon Foreign Relations, 2011, p ix.

2 G De T Glazebrook, ‘The middle powers in the United Nations system’, International Organization,1(2), 1947, pp 307–318.

3 R Keohane, ‘Lilliputians’ dilemmas: small states in international politics’, International Organization,23(2), 1969, pp 291–310.

4 On ‘middlepowermanship’, see R Cox, ‘Middlepowermanship, Japan, and future world order’,International Journal, 44(4), 1989, pp 823–862. On ‘great peripheral states’, see SP Guimaraes, 500 anosde periferia—uma contribuicao ao estudo da polıtica internacional, Porto Alegre: Editora daUniversidade, 1999. On ‘intermediate powers’, ‘second world’ and ‘swing states’, see A Hurrell,‘Some reflections on the role of intermediate powers in international institutions’, Working Paper No244: Paths to Power—Foreign Policy Strategies of Intermediate States, Washington, DC: WoodrowWilson International Centre, 2000, pp 23–41; and M Hirst, ‘Intermediate states, multilateralism andinternational security’, in AC Vaz (ed), Intermediate States, Regional Leadership and Security: India,Brazil and South Africa, Brasılia: Editora Universidade de Brasılia, 2006, pp 165–194. On ‘new titans’,see ‘The new titans’, The Economist, 14 September 2006, special section pp 3–8; and P Khanna, TheSecond World—Empires and Influence in the New Global Order, New York: Random House, 2008.

5 P Sotero, ‘Brazil’s rising ambition in a shifting global balance of power’, Politics, 30(s1), 2010, p 73.6 A Hurrell, ‘Some reflections on the role of intermediate powers’, p 8.7 Brazil was involved with Argentina over Uruguay during the Cisplatine War (1825–28) and the PrataWar (1851–52), and fought against Paraguay between 1864 and 1870.

8 Centre for Economics and Business Research, ‘Brazil has overtaken the UK’s GDP’, news release, 26December 2011, at http://www.cebr.com/wp-content/uploads/Cebr-World-Economic-League-Table-press-release-26-December-2011.pdf, accessed 10 January 2012.

9 A Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, Berkeley, CA: University ofCalifornia Press, 1945, pp 18–26.

10 A Wohlfers, Discord and Collaboration—Essays on International Relations, Baltimore, MD: JohnsHopkins University Press, 1962, pp 67–80.

11 D Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985, p 20.12 J Nye Jr, ‘Soft power’, Foreign Policy, 80, 1990, pp 153–157. Nye’s important works on this theme

include Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, New York: Basic Books, 1990; SoftPower: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs, 2004; and The Future ofPower, New York: Public Affairs, 2011.

13 For a thorough debate on this point, see JPS Alsina Jr, Polıtica externa e poder militar no Brasil:universos paralelos, Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2010; and JPS Alsina Jr, ‘O poder militar como instrumentoda polıtica externa brasileira contemporanea’, Revista Brasileira de Polıtica Internacional, 52(2), 2009,pp 173–191.

14 See M Saraiva, ‘As estrategias de cooperacao Sul–Sul nos marcos da polıtica externa brasileira de 1993a 2007’, Revista Brasileira de Polıtica Internacional, 50(2), 2007, pp 42–59; P Sotero & L Armijo,‘Brazil: to be or not to be a BRIC?’, Asian Perspective, 31(4), 2007, pp 43–70; S Burges, Brazilian Foreign

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Policy after the Cold War, Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2009; and D de F Rodrigues,‘Cooperacao horizontal Sul–Sul: arranjos de concertacao polıtica entre a India, o Brasil e a Africa doSul’, Revista Brasileira de Polıtica Internacional, 53(1), 2010, pp 45–66.

15 C Amorim, quoted in ‘Brazil emerges as a leading exponent of ‘‘soft power’’’, BBC News, 23 March2010, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8580560.stm, accessed 11 April 2011.

16 See JFS Saraiva, ‘Polıtica externa, eleicoes e academia’, Correio Braziliense (Brasılia), 2 May 2010, athttp://www.unb.br/noticias/unbagencia/cpmod.php?id¼62891, accessed 2 June 2011.

17 For more on ‘soft balancing’, see R Pape, ‘Soft balancing against the United States’, InternationalSecurity, 30(1), 2005, pp 7–45.

18 H Brands, Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy, Carlisle, PA: US ArmyWar College Strategic StudiesInstitute, 2010, pp 3–4. See also Brands, ‘Evaluating Brazilian grand strategy under Lula’, ComparativeStrategy, 30(1), 2011, pp 28–49.

19 The concept of development has run through Brazilian political discourses in two main (non-exclusionary) ways. First, it has been used as a noun to state a particular action (‘development is thegoal’; ‘the country needs development’) or prefaced by an adjective to specify a focus area, such as in‘sustainable development’, ‘regional development’ and ‘social development’. Second, it is also widelyused as an adjective to contrast ‘developing’ with ‘developed’ economies.

20 It is important to note that, while national-developmentalist ideas were translated into foreign policy,dependency theory was not. Most of the prominent scholars in this area—such as Theotonio dosSantos, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Enzo Faletto and Ruy Mauro Marini—were forced into exileduring the country’s military government (which began in 1964). As Bresser-Pereira explains, not onlydid dependency theory have a Marxist base but it was focused on exploitation structured upon class—not foreign—relations. For more, see Bresser-Pereira’s ‘Do ISEB a da CEPAL a Teoria da Dependencia’,in CN de Toledo (ed), Intelectuais e Polıtica no Brasil: a Experiencia do ISEB, Rio de Janeiro: Revan,2005, pp 201–232.

21 Translated from Joao Augusto Araujo Castro, ‘O poder nacional: limitacoes de ordem interna eexterna’, Parcerias Estrategicas, 6, 1999, p 223.

22 This approach was explicit in Fernando Collor de Mello’s tenure (1989–92). Considerable debate stillexists, however, over how far President Fernando Henrique Cardoso—one of the main contributors todependency theory—consciously followed this approach during his first term (1995–98). One can alsoargue that the need and effort to stabilise Brazil’s fragile economy curtailed Cardoso’s ability tomanoeuvre freely and challenge the ‘neoliberal’ international order.

23 On this comparison between Cardoso’s and Lula’s foreign policies, see AL Reis da Silva, ‘Astransformacoes matriciais da Polıtica Externa Brasileira recente (2000–2010)’, Meridiano 47, 11(120),2010, pp 18–24.

24 President Lula ran unsuccessfully for the presidency three times before being elected in 2002 (and re-elected in 2006): in 1988 he lost to Fernando Collor de Mello; in 1994 and 1998 he was defeated byFernando Henrique Cardoso.

25 Translated from President Luiz Inacio ‘Lula’ da Silva, Commencement Speech, Brasılia 1 January2003, emphasis added. In this speech ‘development’ (and derivative words) is one of the most commonexpressions, appearing 18 times in the document, ranking above other important concepts such as‘social’ (16 times), ‘change’ (14), ‘justice’ (five), ‘sovereign/sovereignty’ (five), and ‘liberty’ (absent).

26 Translated from Antonio Patriota’s commencement speech as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Brasılia, 2January 2011, emphasis added.

27 PR de Almeida, ‘A polıtica internacional do Partido dos Trabalhadores: da fundacao a diplomacia dogoverno Lula’, Revista de Sociologia e Polıtica, 20, 2003, pp 87–102. See also PR de Almeida, ‘Umapolıtica externa engajada: a diplomacia do governo Lula’, Revista Brasileira de Polıtica Internacional,47(1), 2004, pp 162–184.

28 This was particularly the case during the presidencies of Castelo Branco (1964–67), Collor de Mello(1989–92), and (arguably) during the first tenure of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–98). For athorough assessment of Brazil’s foreign policy since its independence, see C Bueno & AL Cervo,Historia da Politica Exterior do Brasil, Brasılia: UnB, 2008.

29 Translated from M Neri, A Evolucao dos indicadores sociais baseados em Renda—Desigualdade deRenda na Decada, Rio de Janeiro: Fundacao Getulio Vargas—Centro de Polıticas Sociais, 2011.

30 Translated from M Neri (ed), Os Emergentes dos Emergentes: reflexoes globais e acoes locais para anova classe media brasileira, Rio de Janeiro: Fundacao Getulio Vargas—Centro de Polıticas Sociais,2011.

31 C Amorim, ‘Brazilian foreign policy under President Lula (2003–2010): an overview’, Revista Brasileirade Polıtica Internacional, 53, 2010, p 231.

32 Antonio Patriota, interview (in Portuguese) given to Carta Capital (Sao Paulo), 14 February 2011.33 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Report of the Secretary-General—Promotion of South–South

cooperation for development: a thirty-year perspective’, Doc A/64/504, 2009, p 3.

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34 Translated from Section 7.1.1: ‘Cooperacao Internacional—Cooperacao bilateral prestada’, subsection2.1.1: ‘Porque foi criada a Cooperacao bilateral prestada, qual a distincao em relacao a polıticasexistentes’, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), Balanco de polıtica externa 2003/2010, Brasılia: MRE,2010.

35 T Vigevani & G Cepaluni, ‘Lula’s foreign policy and the quest for autonomy through diversification’,Third World Quarterly, 28(7), 2007, p 1313.

36 For more on IBSA, see C Alden & MA Vieira, ‘The new diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil,India and trilateralism’, Third World Quarterly, 26(7), 2005, pp 1077–1095; D Flemes, ‘India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA) in the new global order: interests, strategies and values of the emerging coalition’,International Studies, 46(4), 2009, pp 401–421; P Sotero, Emerging Powers: India, Brazil and SouthAfrica (IBSA) and the Future of South–South Cooperation, Woodrow Wilson Institute, Special Report,2009, at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/IBSA%20Publication.pdf, accessed 25 January2012; and PF Visentini, MA Cepik & AD Pereira, G3-Forum de Dialogo IBAS—uma experiencia deCoooperacao Sul–Sul, Curitiba: Jurua, 2010.

37 M Saraiva, ‘As estrategias de cooperacao Sul–Sul nos marcos da polıtica externa brasileira de 1993 a2007’, Revista Brasileira de Polıtica Internacional, 50(2), 2007, pp 42–59.

38 IBSA Dialogue Forum: New Delhi Agenda for Co-operation, Joint Communique on IBSA, New Delhi,5 March 2004.

39 For more on Brazil’s ‘health diplomacy’ initiatives, see K Bliss, ‘Health diplomacy of foreigngovernments’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011; and Brazilian Agency ofCooperation, ‘Cooperacao Tecnica Brasileira em Saude’, 2007, at http://www.abc.gov.br/document os/viaABC-baixa.pdf, accessed 15 April 2010.

40 Translated from Celso Amorim’s interview given to Brazil’s Ministry of Health, at http://portal.saude.gov.br/portal/arquivos/pdf/entrevista_celso_amorim.pdf, accessed 2 July 2011.

41 H Nygren-Krug, ‘Health and human rights at the World Health Organization’, Saude e DireitosHumanos, 1(1), 2004, pp 7–12.

42 See K Lee, LC Chagas & T Novotny, ‘Brazil and the framework convention on tobacco control: globalhealth diplomacy as soft power’, PLoS Med, 7(4) (e1000232), 2010, pp 1–5.

43 ‘Oslo ministerial declaration—global health: a pressing foreign policy issue of our time’, Lancet, 21April 2007, pp 1374, emphasis added.

44 I Kickbusch, ‘Global health diplomacy: how foreign policy can influence global health’, BritishMedical Journal, 10 June 2011, p 2.

45 Lee et al, ‘Brazil and the framework convention on tobacco control’, p 1.46 I Kickbusch, G Silberschmidt & P Buss, ‘Global health diplomacy: the need for new perspectives,

strategic approaches and skills in global health’, Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 85(3), 2007,p 231.

47 See E Viola, ‘Brazil in the politics of global governance and climate change, 1989–2003’, mimeo, Centrefor Brazilian Studies, University of Oxford, 2004; Sotero & Armijo, ‘Brazil: to be or not to be a BRIC?’;and AF Barros-Platiau, ‘When emergent countries reform global governance of climate change: Brazilunder Lula’, Revista Brasileira de Polıtica Internacional, 53, 2010, pp 73–90.

48 Over the past three decades the production yield of sugarcane has almost doubled; currently close to90 per cent of all passenger vehicles produced in Brazil are ‘flex-fuel’ (supporting a combination ofgasoline and ethanol), with these representing over two-fifths of the country’s total motorised fleet.

49 Ban Ki-Moon, speech in Brasılia, 16 June 2011, at http://www.un.org/apps/sg/offthecuff.asp?nid¼1862, accessed 3 August 2011.

50 AL Cervo, ‘Brazil’s rise on the international scene: Brazil and the world’, Revista Brasileira de PolıticaInternacional, 53, 2010, p 19.

51 Translated from Amorim, ‘Brazilian foreign policy under President Lula’, p 220.52 Translated from ‘Trabalho, Desenvolvimento e Prosperidade—13: Fortalecer a participacao do paıs

nas relacoes economicas internacionais’, Plano Plurianual (PPA) 2008–2011, Brasılia: Ministry ofPlanning, 2008.

53 Translated from ‘As treze diretrizes do governo da presidenta Dilma Rousseff’, 10 January 2011, athttp://www2.planalto.gov.br/presidenta/diretrizes-de-governo, accessed 8 January 2011.

54 For more on the issue of climate change and development, see C Saunders, ‘The stop climate chaoscoalition: climate change as a development issue’, Third World Quarterly, 29(8), 2008, 1509–1526; PMcMichael, ‘Contemporary contradictions of the global development project: geopolitics, globalecology and the ‘‘development climate’’’, Third World Quarterly, 30(1), 2009, pp 247–262; and TBanuri, ‘Climate change and sustainable development’, Natural Resources Forum, 33(4), 2009, pp 257–258.

55 BRICS’ Joint Statement on Global Food Security, Ekaterinburg, 16 June 2009.56 Section 3.2.11: ‘Temas Multilaterais—Energias renovaveis’, subsection 2.1: ‘Descricao: Atuacao

internacional do Brasil na area de energias renovaveis, incluindo biocombustıveis’, Balanco de Polıtica

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Externa 2003/2010, Brasilia: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010, at http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/temas/balanco-de-politica-externa-2003-2010/3.2.11-temas-multilaterais-energias-renovaveis, accessed 7 Sep-tember 2011.

57 In the period between 2008 and 2009 alone Brazil participated in over 50 international fora related tobiofuels.

58 Translated from Celso Amorim’s speech given during the International Biofuels Conference, SaoPaulo, 11 November 2008.

59 Translated from President Lula’s final speech at the International Biofuels Conference, Sao Paulo, 11November 2008.

60 A Cervo & AC Lessa, ‘An assessment of the Lula era (2003–2010)’, Revista Brasileira de PolıticaInternacional, 53, 2010, p 6.

61 Translated from President Dilma Rousseff’s speech given to the graduating class of new Braziliandiplomats, 20 April 2011, at http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/discursos-artigos-entrevistas-e-outras-comunicacoes/presidente-da-republica-federativa-do-brasil/discurso-da-presidenta-da-republica-dilma-rousseff-na-cerimonia-de-formatura-da-turma-2009-2011-do-instituto-rio-branco-1, ac-cessed 19 November 2011.

Notes on contributors

Peter Dauvergne is Professor of Political Science and Director of the LiuInstitute for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia. His recentbooks include Paths to a Green World, second edition (with Jennifer Clapp,2011), Timber (with Jane Lister, 2011), and The Shadows of Consumption(2008), winner of the Gerald L Young Award for the best book authored in2008 in the field of human ecology.

Deborah Barros Leal Farias is a PhD candidate in Political Science at theUniversity of British Columbia. Prior to this she was an Assistant Professorat the Universidade de Fortaleza’s Law Department for eight years andworked for five years at the International Advisory for the State of CearaGovernor’s Office in Northeastern Brazil. She has published journal articlesin Portuguese in Revista Brasileira de Politica Internacional and PoliticaExterna.

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