The Realism of Transcendence, A Critical Analysis of Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Early Ontology

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The Realism of TranscendenceA Critical Analysis of Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Early Ontology RONNY MIRON

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The Realism of Transcendence: A Critical

Analysis of Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Early

Ontology

Ronny Miron, Bar Ilan University—Ramat Gan, Israel

Abstract: This article focuses on the problem of transcendence in “On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the

Real External World” (1916) (Doctrine of Appearance) - the first publication from a vast corpus of writings by Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888-1966) (CM). The principles of the realistic phenomenology that CM explores in this treatise by

studying the phenomenon of the real external world, designate her early ontology upon which her later metaphysical

worldview would be based. Her establishing argument associates transcendence with mundane reality and eliminates mystical meaning from it. Although the ontological aspect of the problem of transcendence is more dominant in CM’s

approach, its epistemological dimensions are not denied but illuminated through her discussion of the nature of human

spirit in the face of which the world appears as external. My main argument is that CM’s phenomenology of externality lays the foundations for the phenomenology of transcendence. Consequently, transcendence transpires as the depth and

the most ultimate meaning not only of externality but also of reality as such.

Keywords: Ontology, Reality, Essence, Transcendence

A Problem with Transcendence

he philosophical problem of transcendence is raised by the awareness of the fundamental

difference between genuine cognition, which has an objective correlate in reality, and

presumed cognition, which does not. However, the individual’s reflection on an object –

either genuine or not – is a real and indisputable experience. Therefore, the study of human

experience, in which objects and the subject’s relation to them are inseparable, will never be

sufficient for the explication of transcendent objects. The externality of these objects will forever

prevent them from achieving complete lucidity. From epistemological point of view, one can put

the problem of transcendence as follows: how can an experience that is immanent to the subject

be correlate to the object that is not included in it?.1 From ontological point of view, the problem

stems from the unceasing escape of transcendence from consciousness. Since the appearing of

the transcendent before the individual’s thinking enfolds inseparably presence and absence, void

and fullness – the transcendent will never be able to be exhausted or realized by consciousness.2

The impossibility of avoiding referring to the aspect of consciousness also in the ontological

characterization of the problem indicates that in the problem of transcendence the

epistemological and the ontological aspects reach a boiling point that thwarts any possible

solution.3

The present article focuses on the problem of transcendence in “On the Ontology and

Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World” (1916)4 (Doctrine of Appearance) - the first

1 Claesges 1972, 283. 2 See: Caputo 1979, 205-206. 3 For the resistance of philosophical problems from solution, see: Dillon 1998, 75. 4 References to this book are given in the body text. Emphases in citations follow the original. Doctrine of Appearance is

used to denote the book as a whole. Doctrine of Appearance is an exploration of the first chapter in her essay on

positivism (CM 1912, 10-24) that received an award from the department of philosophy at the University of Göttingen. In 1912, Alexander Pfänder recognized Doctrine of Appearance as a Ph.D. thesis in the University of Munich (Avé-

Lallemant U. 1965/1966, 212; Pfeiffer 2005 25). In 1913, the expanded chapter of the award-winning essay was printed

and submitted as a dissertation, in a version almost identical to Doctrine of Appearance. In the epilogue to the special print in 1920 (CM 1912, 130-131), CM referred to this fact and explained that she left behind the direction of criticism of

T

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LITERARY HUMANITIES

publication from a vast corpus of writings by Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888-1966) (CM). The

principles of the realistic phenomenology that CM explores in this treatise by studying the

phenomenon of the real external world, designate her early ontology upon which her later

metaphysical worldview would be based.5 She presents her establishing argument that associates

transcendence with mundane reality and eliminates mystical meaning from it as follows: real

transcendence does not mean factual separateness (like the one that distinguishes between two

material things), but substantial rootedness in a different sphere, thus it is impossible to ‘elevate’

the one from the other. The real transcendent has an internal body’ and a ‘being stance’ that

cannot be reached by another real transcendent that has a body and stance of its own (437). In my

opinion, this means that transcendence is part of the real factuality of the world in which it is

rooted and it cannot be derived from the sphere of consciousness that is different from it.6

The problem of transcendence is structured in Doctrine of Appearance, yet the ontological

aspect of it is more dominant and decisive in it. CM clarifies that her focus is not on the unique

capability of the human spirit to achieve objectivity and thus embody the transcendence of the

world. Moreover, she herself derives the inescapable epistemological conclusion from her own

argument, according to which the external world is a real substance (386), that is self-standing in

being (Seinselbstständigkeit) (391), autonomous and absolute in its existence (392), closed in-

itself and transcendent to spirit and consciousness (424)7, meaning: transcendence and its

specific meaning remain incomprehensible (434).

However, while the epistemological problem is declared marginal, it is not denied. Not only

does CM discuss the nature of the human spirit in the face of which the world appears as

external, but the explication of the relations between the spiritual being and the world is also

harnessed to the establishing of the ontological independence of the external world.8 This does

not mean that the external is identical to the transcendent. On the contrary, externality denoted a

mode of appearing, while the transcendent is what simply does not appear, at least on the face of

the subject. However, I argue that CM’s phenomenology of externality begins to show signs – as

its far marginal edges – of the principles of the phenomenology of transcendence. Consequently,

transcendence transpires as the deepest and the most ultimate meaning not only of externality but

also of reality as such. The following discussion will extricate the main implicit insights

regarding transcendence from CM’s idea of the real external, out of which one can elicit

positivism in favor of an ontological direction. Indeed, the plan to elaborate the rest of the chapters has never been carried out. 5 CM was one of the early phenomenologists of Munich Circle which, apart from her, included a group of intellectuals

and philosophers from Munich, the first generation of the phenomenologists, whose prominent members included: Alexander Pfänder, Johannes Daubert, Moritz Geiger, Theodor Conrad, Adolf Reinach, Dietrich von Hildebrand,

Maximilian Beck, Max Scheler, Jean Hering, Alexander Koyré, Roman Ingarden and Edith Stein. For further reading

about this circle see: Avé-Lallemant 1971, 19–38. 6 In 'Realontologie' CM will clearly distinguish between the idea of transcendence upon which her realistic approach is

based and the mistaken one. The first designates a “continuing maintaining” (fortdaurende Erhaltung) of the real thing in

its real being that is established by-itself and in-itself. The second is characterized as fragile and suffering from possible dependence on immanence because of its rootedness in the human spirit, see: CM 1923, 185-186. 7 CM explains that is a mistake (quite common in positivistic approaches) to identify “existence's independence of

consciousness” with the “real external world” (CM 1916, 391). In her opinion what appears as dependent in its being cannot appear as what presents itself (CM 1916, 413, n. 2). Spiegelberg explains that the very independence of the subject

should not be considered as the essence of reality but as a “fundamental and essential result of reality” (excluding real

acts of the subject that of course depend on him or her). See: Spiegelberg 1982, 132, n. 2. 8 The early phenomenologists understood Husserl's appeal “to return to the things themselves” as indifference towards

epistemological questions. See: Avé-Lallemant U. 1965/1966, 207. For the relations between phenomenology and

epistemology and phenomenology, see: Spiegelberg 1982, 130-131. Like CM, who characterized the epistemological approach as dogmatic (CM 1916, 347) and incapable of coping with its questions (Spiegelberg 1982, 351), Spiegelberg

too criticized epistemology, which in its highly speculative accounts of how knowledge works omits its first and

paramount obligation to be critical itself (ibid., 152).

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MIRON: THE REALISM OF TRANSCENDENCE

guidelines for the explication of the transcendent dimension of the object and of transcendence in

general.9

Essence and Transcendence

The awareness of the transcendent presence in reality is implicit already in essence intuition

(Wesensfassung), to which CM is committed in Doctrine of Appearance and in the rest of her

oeuvre.10 The supreme principle of this method is eliminating the possibility of equating reality

with the immediate, concrete, and material dimensions in which reality might be fulfilled under

certain conditions. This method originated in the Husserlian phenomenology that localizes and

analyzes the “what” that establishes the real being by searching for the indispensable a-priori and

primordial foundations, thanks to which the real being can become a specific object.11

She devotes Doctrine of Appearance to “a sui generis idea of ‘real being’ surrounding

factually existing being” (365), or alternatively “for proving of phenomena that are capable of

being perceived concretely” (390).12

She clarifies that the focus of her interest is not ‘physical-

optic regularities‘or in what might be ‘seen’ or perceived by a narrow natural-scientific approach

(394), but the ‘idea of reality’ (396) that is ruled by a-priori principles which might become

transparent by the very act of observation (395). Here “idea” designates the separateness from

consciousness, the bearing of absoluteness of its own, essentiality, and substantial unity per se,

while “phenomenon” denotes the achievement of independent appearing of specific essence that

involves within itself also aspects of consciousness. She explains that these two are equally

important for the analysis of the real external world, since everything that is constituted in an

idea is accessible to essence intuition, and every genuine primordial phenomenon essentially

corresponds to an idea that has been separated out of it (353).

CM asks ‘in which real mode are essences given to us?’ and ‘where do we encounter

essences in their concrete realization, and is it indeed impossible to doubt their real concreteness

in general as well as in a special case?’ (356). These questions initiate the problematization of the

given, and thus pose a clear limit between the immediate appearance of the external world and its

real being, which in her opinion are not identical (427). CM contends that sometimes there exists

only a “semblance of real presence-being that does not correspond to the actually present being”

(356), or more specifically “that the uncovered beings-position (Seinsstelle) of the concretely

given does not always hold what actually appears in it” (358).

In the background of these words is CM’s early criticism of positivism13 that declaredly

served for her as a starting point for the discussion of the real external world (345). She

characterizes positivism as a skeptical approach according to which ‘there exist certain cognition

9 CM's approach was directed towards the object, and later on she will explicitly reject the phenomenological reduction.

See: CM 1931, 17; CM 1958, 394-402. 10 CM declares her reliance on essence intuition in: CM 1916, 355, no. 1; CM 1923, 159. Elsewhere she refers to this method in greater detail, see: CM 1956a, 377; CM 1956b, 347. 11 CM was committed to “intuition of essence” (Wesensfassung), which she shared with the early phenomenologists of

Munich Circle. They were inspired by Husserl's struggle in “Logical Investigations” against psychologism, relativism, and varying reductionism (Husserl, 1992, 81; 117), in particular by his principle that it is possible to observe

consciousness' condition apart from the thinking subject (Husserl, 1992, 240). For further reading about this circle see: Avé-Lallemant, 1971, 19–38. CM admits the influence of “Logical Investigations” on her, see: CM 1916, 355. For further reading about the method of “intuition of essence”, especially in the realistic school of phenomenology, see: Reinach

1913, 1–163; Pfänder 1913, 325–404; Pfeiffer 2005, 1–13; Schmücker 1956, 1–33; Ebel 1965, 1–25; Avé-Lallemant

1959, 89–105; Walther 1955, 190. 12 Similarly to CM, Fritz Heinemann also wrote about the affinity of phenomenology to the concrete being. He mentioned

another essay by CM (CM 1956a) but surprisingly not Doctrine of Appearance (CM 1916), in which she established this

theme and with which he undoubtedly was familiar, see: Heinemann, 1960. 13 The subtitle of Doctrine of Appearance, “Associated with a critique of positivistic theories”, as well as the debate with

positivism throughout the text (CM 1916, 345-347; 352; 357-358; 361-365; 378; 382-386; 390-391; 398-400; 423; 425)

clearly indicate its roots in the first essay (CM 1912).

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http://www.dict.cc/englisch-deutsch/regularities.html


possibilities and entire realms of objects that accompany them that are not given at all’ (346). She

holds that positivism’s basic argument is that it is capable of achieving an accurate analysis of

immanent natural consciousness, in which it is impossible to separate between the reality of this

analysis and the perceiving I. Thus, for the positivist, ‘the awareness of reality, in the pure

original sense’ is but ‘something to be perceived’ (363-364). Consequently, ‘the observation of

pure reason’ (346) is rejected in favor of ‘sensory perception’ as the only mode of perceiving

being. Accordingly, the ‘capable of sensory perception’ or ‘the feeling’ is regarded by positivism

as the only material that can be given to consciousness (347).

CM accuses positivism of naivety, which she associates with its battle against idealism

(362). She rejects as ‘unreasonable’ (347) positivism’s fundamental principle that sensory

perception is the only mode of cognition (352), and localizes her approach ‘at the place beyond

the one in which positivism culminates’ (400), meaning: in the real substance as transcendent and

independent of consciousness and spirit in general. At the same time, CM objects strongly to

dogmatism, as she assumes the original belonging of the discussed essentiality to a certain

phenomenal state of affair (347; 349). This means that even if dealing with essences is in itself

free of any dependency on factual existence inside the real world, the essence will never be able

to achieve independency from the phenomenal appearing itself. So she establishes that the

mission of explication of the external world ‘could succeed’ (348) only by perceiving an essence

that assumes the certainty of the phenomenal givenness or the possible factuality of the external

world.

Against the skepticism at the basis of positivism and dogmatism that makes redundant the

observing of the phenomenon itself, CM establishes that for the philosophical mission of

explication the real external world can be in any ‘little meaning if one wishes to deny the real or

factual givenness of the phenomenal givenness, and accordingly and so regarding the “ideality”

of these unities of essence […]. So, also could not be found any ‘ideas’ proper to the human

consciousness, how these could have enter inside?!’ (348).14 Similarly, she holds later that ‘if in

all the given parts of reality there was not inherent any givenness-being, [so also] any assumption

could not be possibly assumed and consequently all being and occurrence would be emptied and

impoverished (359).

The subsidiarity of the epistemological illumination and essence intuition in which CM’s

phenomenology of the external world is anchored is derived directly from the certainty regarding

its reality, in her words: ‘the question of how a real person can reach these ideas in a certain case,

where the genetic- psychological fundamental situation of real givenness-being actually cannot

be found, must remain marginal’ (348), or in a more radical wording: ‘the epistemological sphere

in no way relates to the question of the provability of these ‘essences’ as concrete images of the

real world. We believe that philosophy, in the genuine and rigorous sense, is outside of any

(epistemological) question of reality” (355).

The rejection of the positivistic world view in favor of essence intuition is indispensable for

establishing access to the external and the transcendent that as such are not given directly to the I

that is distinguished from them. In this respect, CM’s criticism of positivism signifies the

rejection of directedness as such, even if some amount of directedness is nevertheless preserved

also in essence intuition.15

The affinity between the essence of the real being and its transcendent

14 See CM's criticism of skepticism: CM 1916, pp: 358, 398. CM's widespread use of the word “believe” (glauben) clearly indicates the adoption of the typical certainty that stood at the foundation of the Husserlian phenomenology. See

in particular CM 1916, pp: 355, 370, 398, 407, 413, 418, 423, 446, 496, 500, 513. Husserl regarded skepticism as a denial

of apodicticity, i.e., necessary and universal truths that are essential for any theory to make sense. He distinguished between three forms of skepticism: “logical”, “noetic”, and “metaphysical”. See: Husserl 1992, chapter 10, §57-§61. As

for Husserl, so also for CM in Doctrine of Appearance the metaphysical skepticism that denies the objective knowledge

of the real world is the most problematic. For further discussion, see: Wachterhauser, 1996, 1-62, 227-238. Regarding Husserl's certitude, see: Kolakowski, 1975. 15 For further reading regarding intuitive cognition, see: Cobb-Stevens, 1990; Hintikka, 2003. CM's choice to anchor her

study of the external world in 'sensory givenness' that deals with the characters of the sensory given, which she regarded

40


dimension is rather wide. Firstly, both are established upon an evident ground and accordingly

the essence and the transcendent dimension are not addressed to explication but signify truth that

does not need any proof. Second, in both the discussed elements transpire as the

restrictedness and insufficiency of the phenomenal appearing for the embodying of the real

being. Finally, regarding the two elements, the distinction between the internal and the external is

dissolved, since the essence is the depth of the real appearing and simultaneously transcendent to

it. Or alternatively, the transcendent is not external to the real appearing but dwells insides it and

is inherent in its essence, which can never be exhausted by its external manifestations. In any

event, there is no contradiction between the realistic disposition and the methodological choice of

essence intuition. CM’s idea of realism assumes the primacy of the essential over the empirical

and knowable. Transcendence might be considered as a comprehensive expression of this

primacy – it has presence yet is independent of its appearing and does not necessarily shine in it.

Moreover, CM’s reliance on essence intuition, which in her later writings will deepen and

become more explicit, is capable of responding to the two faces of transcendence—noematic and

noetic. The noematic one refers to the objective dimensions of the real being that is characterized

also as ‘essential closedness’ (349). The noetic aspect deals with the subjective experience of

objective and independent presence beyond oneself, as well as with the negativity and

restrictions to which the elucidation of the transcendent is subordinated, as a result of which one

will never achieve a complete lucidity regarding it. These two faces, the noematic and the noetic,

are discussed in the following two sections.

Gap and Transcendence

The beginning of the dealing with the noematic pole of transcendence stems from the undecided

movement between two fundamental insights. According to the first, the explication of reality

within the boundaries of the phenomenon of the real external world is necessarily partial, due to

the objective nature of the real world, in her words: “In our observations we have not yet

achieved a grip in the problem of ‘reality’ as such, but only in this partial problem [of…] the

‘mere appearing existence’ [bloßen Ersceinungsbestand] inside the real sphere in general” (389,

note 1). CM explains that the ‘mere appearing existence’ as such, that is at the center of Doctrine

of Appearance, takes part to a certain extent in the real world; it ‘appears’ in it; ‘plunges’ in it”

(389, note 1). Indeed, this is the justification for the very establishing of realism on the external

appearing of the world. Truly, the choice to focus on the external revealing of the world enables

her to ‘be satisfied with referring purely and for-itself to ‘the manifest surface’ (sinnfällige

Oberfläche) that presents itself purely and as [existing] for-itself in the sensory appearance”

(463), or alternatively as a self-standing entity (466). Here, the “manifest surface” does not

designate only a contingent cut of a ready thing, but the exterior side of the matter in general that

faces the “principally invisible” interior. This is unreachable by any possibly real cut from the

given, for we are always walking upon the manifest surface (465, n. 1). However, for the

explication of the transcendent aspect of the phenomenon of the real world important is the

determination that the external side of the appearing stands against its ‘internal’ side which is

‘the principally invisible’. She explains that since we unceasingly walk only on ‘the manifest

surface’, we will not be able to reach the internal side be any possible real cut of the given (465,

note 1).16

Moreover, CM holds that sensory appearing does not have the ‘vocation’ of ‘revealing

the thing-in itself’ that is beneath, but “to bring ‘the world in-itself’ to exposure’ (463).

as enabling 'real touch' with the external world (CM 1916, 423), made it possible for her to keep the duality that is

composed of the objective content of givenness external in its origin and the direct experience of the subject that feels it.

Elsewhere I have discussed in length the realism of sensory givenness, see: Miron 2014. 16 In Realontologie while discussing the issue of materiality she refers again to the concept of 'the manifest surface'. Her

principal argument there is that the material being has depth and internality, but only its external can reach sensory

appearing. While the illuminated part is outside, the dark and closed faces are inside or in depth. She establishes that there

41


The second insight deals with the desire to overcome this partiality and achieve a

comprehensive and all-inclusive understanding of the real world, in CM’s wording: “our unique

way that among all possible ways took the special path of exposing the actual presence of the

totally peculiar idea of ‘real being’, is supposed to serve in this treatise not only the making of

this fact possibly illuminated but also […] to explore the clarification of the entire phenomenon

of ‘ real external world’ “ (365, my emphasis). This means that the lucid awareness of the

insufficiency of the study that is restricted to the ‘merely seen real nature’ is not the end. Despite

the fact that the external appearing of the real world is not itself the entirety of this world, the

pure observing of what is delivered by this appearing by itself and in itself serves for CM as “a

framework for the whole” of the study and ‘guideline for the order of this complex field” (399),

or alternatively might lead us to the ‘entire sphere of reality’ in which ‘we will be able to make

perceivable the primordial essence that belongs to “reality” as such (389, note 1).

Against this complexity, the explication of transcendence transpires as anchored in the

acknowledging of the gap that is stretched between the appearing and the depth or the internality

that are concealed inside the real thing, and thus seems as incapable of revealing itself. CM

distinguishes between “phenomenal beginning-material” (phänomenales Anfangsmaterial) and

“genuine phenomenon” or “primordial phenomenon” (Urphänomen). The first is but the

phenomenal given that serves as a starting point in the philosophical study of the entirety of

objectivities of possible consciousness (351). CM establishes that essence is present in these

objectivities, is not accidental, and does not signify a ‘psychological unity’ as positivist and

reductionist approaches argue (352). However, the essence is present in the phenomenal

givenness layer in a “cover and distance” manner.17

Similarly, she refers to the ‘merely apparent

reality’ of the sensory given (358) and to the state of affairs in which “the given in its ‘self-

giving’ cannot anymore offer reliable halt” (357).

The reference to what appears as covert or ‘merely apparent’ reality is liable to lead to

skepticism or dogmatism. Yet, these stances should be counted with what CM designates as

“going against the given” (358), because they do not enable the careful and restrained

observation of phenomenal givenness and of the world’s phenomena in general. First and

foremost, one faces the gap between skepticism and dogmatism. CM’s approach is apparent from

watching the slow and prolonged observation typical of her discussion in Doctrine of

Appearance and from her argument that the determinations that were reached by the method of

intuition of essences are not relative or conditioned by specific circumstances (349). In any

event, given the described state of affair, CM holds that in the work of ‘uncovering’ there is a

need for deduction of what is contingent and appears before us, which is merely ‘certain side’ of

the phenomenon, while the ‘substantial totality that delimits remains in darkness’ (353).18

She

describes the “specific and genuine philosophical-phenomenological work” as a ‘totally direct

and undeterred in its heading gaze towards the phenomenon in its pure ‘what’” and “progresses

from the still concealed, yet as such already visible “primordial phenomenon”, to the ‘pure

primordial phenomenon” (352). Only when the phenomenon “steps out in a complete absolute

objectivity” is the philosophical work ended (353) and the “primordial phenomenon” comes to

light.

is a causal bond between these two elements of the material being. Therefore, especially because there is depth, there is

also manifest surface, see: CM 1923, 205-206. For additional references to the idea of manifest surface, see: CM 1923, pp: 206-209, 214, 235-236. 17 Helmut Kuhn is a contemporary of CM’s who was part of the German phenomenological movement in the 1920’s. He

well described this as follows: “The things towards which the gaze is directed are always known in advance, we do not start at a null point. They show themselves to us, but they are concealed. They are standing up against us as known but

also as mysterious, and impose on us the distinction between what things are in their beginning and the essence that is

uncovered by penetrating observation”. Kuhn, 1969, 399. See in this context Husserl's argument that alongside the grounding of the value of the original givenness there is also an acknowledging that things are given to us under

restriction (Husserl 1950, §24, “The principle of all principles”). 18 The aspect of darkness will appear in Realontologie as one of the expressions of reality, see: CM 1923, 206.

42


For the explication of transcendence, CM makes an important clarification that as much as

‘the philosophical work can come near the “primordial phenomenon” or the essence’,

nevertheless as a result of that the phenomenon under discussion does not reach specification and

greater lucidity but, as she put is, ‘it still has the character of covering and distance’ (352). In my

opinion, the darkness that covers those sides that do not shine in the phenomenally appearing

designates the transcendent quality of the object that cannot enable the complete uncovering of

its essence. It transpires, then, that not everything belongs to the “phenomenal beginning-

material” or alternatively not all that is given is rooted in in the primordial phenomenon (351).

Rather, there always remains a transcendent residue. The power of intuition of essence is clearly

not in its capability of bringing the transcendent – be it an aspect of the phenomenal appearing or

a transcendent being – into lucidity. On the contrary, it seems that the strength of intuition of

essence is exactly in confronting one with this entity-like element that is concealed yet present in

the midst of the phenomenal appearing itself. In one of the most beautiful paragraphs of Doctrine

of Appearance, she presents her approach as an answer to what she call ‘all this lack’:

An accurate study of facts that reaches observation demonstrates that regarding the

sensory given of the real world in no way is the case of immobile and insightful

relations. This we always assume beforehand; not insightful, since the sensory given

itself as well as the prevailing approach and stance of consciousness towards it indicate

all-various formation of totally epistemological value. Therefore, addressing them to an

epistemological question can have a decisive meaning and in fact this is the case; Not

immobile, since the genuine meaning of being (Seinsbedeutung) of a momentary state of

affairs, that does not give itself from its own sensory content, but rather by means of a

sequence of perceptions-experiences is capable of arriving at complete evidence (350-

360)

Obviously, the acute awareness of the difficulty in achieving the transcendent by human

cognition does not make redundant the endeavor to seek the transcendent and uncover its dark

traces in the real appearances of reality. In any event, confronting these boundaries again and

again is an indispensable tool for any metaphysical search, especially the one that wishes to trace

the mysterious presence of transcendence.

The Human Spirit and Transcendence

In the simple sense, the idea of subjective experience of transcendence, by means of spirit or

consciousness, disproves itself. The transcendent as such is outside of the realm of human

experience. This is a fundamental fact regarding the very establishing that refers to the

transcendent as such. Therefore, except for acknowledging the existence of beings outside the

boundaries of our understanding, it seems that it is impossible to make any progress in the

elucidation of the noetic pole of the experience of the transcendent. CM describes the

fundamental difficulty that spirit or consciousness in general raise regarding the experience of

transcendent, and anyway concerning its very real existence, as follows: ‘due to its peculiar

nature [the merely appearing being] owes toward the genuine and true existence that ‘takes part’

in the real world reality ‘at second hand’ or ‘second nature’ only” (389 note 1). Meaning, as long

as spirit or consciousness accompanies the appearing of the real being, it shows itself before it as

having a ‘position is the real world’.19

Yet, once it is deprived of it, “it must disappear from it, as

reality it must become nothingness” (ibid). Thus the fundamental rule that establishes the real as

such as autonomous (389) and closed-in-itself (472) is violated. Consequently, the appearing

19 In Realontologie CM explores this aspect and determines that the real being must achieve “a position of its own”

(Eigenposition) (CM 1923, 177-179).

43


does not belong anymore to ‘real-forming in the genuine sense’ (ibid). Thus, the transcendence

of reality transpires as stemming from ‘the nature of the real being that is totally incomparable to

the nature of the specific spiritual being’, which is essentially open (439, note 1).

However, the described problematic is not the end. CM bestows a double ontological

guarantee to the real nature of the human experience of objects, thus also to that of transcendence

in general. At the outset she establishes the unambiguous reality of the objects themselves, in her

wording: “the objects that come toward me in an ‘unveiled appearing’, are not simply ‘so

suddenly’ or ‘from nowhere’, but they accidently come forward to me out of a space-sphere that

is always somehow there, and I am close enough to it” (395). True, spirit has the capability of

representation outwards. Yet, in regard to real objects, the meeting with the spirit is accidental

and it is not the case that thanks to spirit they achieve ‘external existence’ (372). It means that

especially as objects that appear in the face of spirit are not its personal expression but rather

‘already exist there’, their appearing should not be credited to spirit’s account. Moreover, the

contingency of the perception of specific parts of the external world allows disregarding it within

the evaluation of the reality (395).

In addition, CM fortifies the ontological guarantee of the human experience of objects also

from the noematic side, meaning by referring to the nature of the human spirit as capable of what

she calls ‘transcendence-achievement’ (Transzendenzleistung), thanks to which the I might be

able to establish a relation to the real being and simultaneously remain separate from it (474), or

alternatively:

We believe that in fact it should be determined that the spiritual being is such that helps

provide a bearer of sort of natural situation of transcendence – in a sense there is no

need for a specific act of some sort or executing “Saltomortale” of some kind. Hence,

this spiritual I does not live only by itself but also in a I-strange (ichfremden) world. It

belongs to the nature of the spiritual being that an entire world can be contained within

it. Without it sometimes being asked to guarantee an undisturbed spreading and

development beyond the belonging ‘range’ of its spiritual being. […spirit] can rest there

in quiet without surpassing […] its own being superficially or by means of effort (407-

408).

The argument that the human spirit is ‘open’ towards the world of objects (475), and in

particular the insight that the I can exist also in an ‘I-strange’ sphere, is essential for responding

to CM’s demand to separate between representation, meaning of the sphere where objects can

appear, and perception that is conducted inside the immanent boundaries of consciousness (371).

CM characterizes the realm of representation as “covered presentiveness“ (verdeckte

Anschaulichkeit) (371, 375) and that of perception as “uncovered presentiveness” (unverhüllte

Anschaulichkeit) (381), “uncovered appearing” (unverhüllter Erscheinung) (395), “uncovered

self-emerging” (unverhüllte Selbsthervortreten) (371, 377) and “self-announcement”

(Selbstkundgabe) (371). Her leading principle is that where something is given in a “covered

presentiveness“ any “uncovered self-emerging” is closed (371). Or alternatively: it is impossible

to create from the spirit objects of perception and put them in the real world (375). The

difference between the two spheres is the following: in representation it is impossible to

disconnect the object from the realm to which it belongs, meaning: from the reality external to

the subject, or posit it in the wrong place (367), meaning in the immanent realm of

consciousness. Accordingly, the world is typified as “observing place” for objects or

representation (373).

Although the capability of spirit to conduct “genuine ‘turns’ “ (373, note 1) by which, as we

have seen, it is capable of being also outside itself, it can reach the object in reality. Yet, this

object appears before it in a “covered presentiveness“ that as such keeps the gap and the

vagueness that are indicative of the presence of the transcendent as such. CM explains that

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http://www.dict.cc/englisch-deutsch/presentiveness.html







indeed the spiritual-presentive reaching, typical of the situation of perception, is unnecessary in

the disposition of representation, since in it ‘objects are already there for themselves in an

‘observable reaching: my spiritual gaze can immediately and directly penetrate until the position

of reality that belongs to them” (376). Despite that, in perception spirit is imposed to fixate and

keep as not-collapsing the objectivity that is obliged to serve for it as the ‘reality of the external

world’. To the extent that spirit loses, even slightly, from this effort, in her wording ‘stops before

the thing itself’, disappears also the objectivity that is represented in it. This lack of reality leads

spirit to regard the appearing object as ‘something that is planned by spirit and carried by it’

(387). More importantly, CM defined the position of perception as ‘totally contingent to the

existence and the sort of the world’. While ‘the real world is not defined only by the accidental

constraints of my perception-field due to the real position in this world’, but our accidental

perception of the external world cannot define it, and the possibility to look into the space’s

reality as such “exists above and beyond all obstacles” (393).20

Obviously, the identification of

the real appearing with the field of perception, typical of the positivist approach, also eradicates

the gap and the distance, without which the experience of the transcendent cannot be enabled.

True, also representation is a product of one’s consciousness, as she put it ‘the child of my spirit’

(375), and it is obvious that no ‘magic’ takes place here that turns representation into what she

signifies as ‘the child of the real world’. CM explains that the point is that ‘only objectivity that

is created in a representing manner (due to its nature can sometimes belong to the real world) can

be projected by a spiritual act into space reality’ and due to its unmediated preventive appearing

“by its look” seems as actually belonging exactly to real objects (375). However since perception

is rooted in spirit and not in the real world, ‘a certain act of external positioning (Hinaussetzung)

and “displacement’” is needed for bestowing what CM call ‘habits’ of existence that belong to

reality (375).

The fundamental differences between the spheres of presentation and perception, to which

the discussion only alluded, demonstrate the two as various metaphysical realms that determine

to a large extent the possible appropriate appearing for the real thing and also for the

transcendent element in it. It is not surprising, then, that CM establishes that ‘what is essential for

us is that in the representation of the real object as such needs to ‘shift the line of gaze’ from

perception to representation and self-restraint from the sphere to which I am directed as

perceiving’ (366-367). Finally, she establishes unequivocally that genuine awareness of reality

‘is associated or can be associated with the experience of representation’ while perception ‘has

no function in it’ (364).

Epilogue

The immediate meaning of dealing with the transcendent in Doctrine of Appearing, even on the

implicit level, is that the transcendence is a real and mundane phenomenon. However, CM’s

approach regarding the issue is not exhausted by that. Her choice to interconnect transcendence,

worldliness, and externality, eliminates from her ontology the separation between immanence

and transcendence. Simply, if the transcendent is part of the world, thus the transcendent is at the

same time an immanent phenomenon. On the other hand, if worldliness encompasses also a

transcendent element, then the external phenomenal alignment of things is not everything. On the

contrary, the transcendent is tied to the internality of the world, and does not and cannot appear,

in CM’s wording: “studies of essence in the sphere of actuality lead entirely to a transcendent

realm” (355, n. 1). Indeed, also immanence is not exhausted by its external appearing, but is what

20 Like CM, Spiegelberg also argues that genuine phenomena are not influenced by theoretical or other interpretations,

while untrue ones collapse as soon as their falsification is uncovered. See: Spiegelberg 1982, 164. Spiegelberg's ideas in this essay closely resemble those of CM in Doctrine of Appearance. Obviously he was familiar with this work, but

surprisingly none of CM's writings are even mentioned in his essay. However, Spiegelberg provides the lacking but

important background and explanation of CM's principles of realism.

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CM will later signify as a reality that is “structured inwardly into to the outside”.21

It seems that

what must burst forth from the study of appearance’s surface (Erscheinungsoberfläche) (354) is

the inseparable uniting of the immanent core and the transcendent element in the midst of the

essence that constitutes the real thing.

21 CM 1923, 191.

46


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Prof. Ronny Miron: Associate Professor, Head of the Program for Hemeneutics & Culture

Studies, the Unit for Interdisciplinary Studies, Bar Ilan University—Ramat Gan, Israel.

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The Realism of Transcendence, A Critical Analysis of Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Early Ontology

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