The Quest for the Good Life in Rousseau's Emile: an Assessment

YOSSI Y O N A H

The Hebrew University o f Jerusalem

ABSTRACT: Rousseau's Emile has attracted an avalanche of critical responses. His theme of negative education, or as he defines it, "well-regulated freedom", has been denounced as outright manipulation in disguise, which instead of respecting the child's autonomy and dignity, places him at the whim of the teacher's machinations and stratagems. His recommendation that the child's imagination be curtailed (that he may not acquire desires which cannot be satisfied) is widely held to militate against one of the most cherished goals of education: the fostering of the natural curiosity of the child. Rousseau is also accused of professing an "ideology of childhood" which ignores the real needs of children. In the sterilized environment which Rousseau proposes for the growing child, affection, praise and approval, are some of the sacrifices made to this ideology. Furthermore, his views on women are considered degrading, outrageous and blatantly sexist.

Yet despite the myriad criticisms leveled against his work, Rousseau's Emile highlights one of the most exacting challenges for education - how to educate the child without alienating him. Rousseau connects this issue with the larger problem of alienation: namely, that experienced by man within the modem social order. Rousseau's views anticipate the contemporary debate between virtue-based and deontological ethics.

The purpose of this paper is (i) to describe Rousseau's diagnosis of the problem of alienation as it arises in the various spheres of human life, paying special attention to the moral domain, and (ii) to assess the solutions he offers to the problem of alienation. These solutions are based on a conception of the good life which, I argue, is unaccep- table~ I also argue that this conception dissipates one form of alienation only at the expense of creating another.

The paper begins by tracing the changes which the concept of alienation has under- gone, and consequently I draw a distinction between two kinds of alienation - conscious and unconscious. I demonstrate that even if Rousseau is successful in offering a remedy for conscious alienation, this very remedy itself gives rise to unconscious alienation.

Rousseau 's E m i l e has attracted an avalanche of critical responses. His theme o f negative education, or as he defines it, "well-regulated freedom", (Bloom, 1979, p. 92) has been denounced as outright manipulation in disguise, which instead of respecting the chi ld 's autonomy and dignity, places him at the whim of the teacher 's machinations and stratagems (Sygad, 1983). His recommendation that the chi ld ' s imagination be curtailed (that he may not acquire desires which cannot be satisfied) is widely held to militate against one of the most cherished goals of education: the fostering of the natural curiosity of the child. Rousseau is also accused of professing an "ideology of childhood" which ignores the real needs of children. In the sterilized environment which Rousseau proposes for the growing child, (Peters, 1981, p. 17) affection, praise and approval, are some o f

Studies in Philosophy and Education 12: 229-243, 1993. �9 1993 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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the sacrifices made to this ideology. Furthermore, his views on women are considered degrading, outrageous and blatantly sexist (Okin, 1979, pp. 99-194).

Yet despite the myriad criticisms leveled against his work, Rousseau's Emile highlights one of the most exacting challenges for education - how to educate the child without alienating him. Rousseau connects this issue with the larger problem of alienation: namely, that experienced by man within the modern social order. Rousseau's views anticipate the contemporary debate between virtubased and deontological ethics, which I will deal with at a later point.

The purpose of this paper is (i) to describe Rousseau's diagnosis of the problem of alienation as it arises in the various spheres of human life, paying special attention to the moral domain, and (ii) to assess the solutions he offers to the problem of alienation. These solutions are based on a conception of the good life which, I will argue, is unacceptable. I will also argue that this conception dissipates one form of alienation only at the expense of creating another.

I will begin by tracing the changes which the concept of alienation has undergone, and consequently draw a distinction between two kinds of alienation

- conscious and unconscious. I will demonstrate that even if Rousseau is successful in offering a remedy for conscious alienation, this very remedy itself gives rise to unconscious alienation.

I. ALIENATION: A SHORT HISTORICAL NOTE

The term "alienation" has a pejorative connotation in modern and contemporary use. We describe a person as alienated when he does not do what he really wants to do, when he does not live according to his true nature, when his life lacks sense or meaning. Originally, however, the term "alienation" possessed positive connotations. Plotinus and Augustinus used this term in order to describe a lofty state of mind, an ecstasy, to which a person can ascend upon the contemplation of the divine. This involves estrangement from himself, which leads to transcen- dence and unity with the divine, through an unmediated knowledge of it (Rotenstreich, 1964). Hence, the self-alienation is fully compensated.

The pejorative meaning of the term "alienation" is chiefly owed to its deployment by Marx (who, in turn, borrowed it from Hegel's "entfremdung"). According to Marx, capitalism creates a social and economic order which is responsible for people's alienated existence, while communism offers the opportunity to escape this sort of existence. Put differently, capitalism prevents a person from realizing his potential capacities, thereby rendering him alienated from his true nature. In J. Elster's words, "Self-realization, for Marx, can be defined as the full and free actualization and externalization of the powers and abilities of the individual" (1986, p. 43). In a capitalist and industrial society the need for self-realization is often unrecognized by the agent himself. And indeed, the deepest kind of alienation occurs when a person is unaware that he is alienated.

However, long before Marx introduced this term to describe man's distorted

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existence in capitalist society, Rousseau had already given much thought to the phenomenon of alienation in his Emile.

~I. UNCONSCIOUS VS. CONSCIOUS ALIENATION

Despite the many and varied interpretations of alienation, there is a conceptual link connecting them all, namely that alienation implies a split within the self. This split can be unconscious or conscious. The unconscious split may occur in two forms. First, it may be manifested when a person is immersed ephemerally in intellectual contemplation (Plotinus and Augustinus), or simply day-dream- ing. In such a case, the person actually transcends the constraints of time and space, and is thus alienated from his temporal and spatial modes o f existence. Second, it can be ascribed to a person who neither experiences a conflict between opposing motivational forces nor has a clear sense of discontent with the form of life he leads. Yet this alienation is nonetheless real. It is ascribed to a person pursuing a form of life judged to be at odds with true human nature and latent potentialities (Marx). In such cases a person is alleged to be alienated from a form of life which he could and should have led. 1

A split is conscious when the motivational set o f a person is populated by conflicting and incompatible desires. Alienation is the result of the frustration of some of these desires. It is the latter kind of alienation - alienation involving a conscious split - with which Rousseau is primarily concerned. It is this kind of alienation which Rousseau attempts to diagnose and remedy.

III. CONSCIOUS ALIENATION AND ITS CAUSES

Conscious alienation arises as a result of an inability to live in harmony with one 's desires and wants. Rousseau recognizes two types of causes responsible for the discord in one 's system of desires: external and value-dependent causes.

Externally caused alienation is a feeling of disappointment and frustration experienced upon a failure to satisfy desires. This failure is due to the insur- mountable obstacles posed by external factors. Alienation of this sort is attributable to the gap between a person's desires and his physical capabilities. Rousseau points to two main sources of such alienation. The first lies in a person's interaction with the physical world only, and can be defined as object- dependent alienation. The second lies in the discordant interaction with other volitional creatures - human beings. Let us call this volitional alienation.

The following passage captures the sense of object-dependent alienation as understood by Rousseau:

In what, then, consists human wisdom or the road of true happiness? It is not precisely in diminishing our desires, for if they were beneath our power, a part of our faculties would remain idle, and we would not enjoy our whole being. Neither is it in extending our faculties for if, proportionate to them, our desires were more extended, we would as a result only become unhappier. But it is in diminishing the excess of the desires

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over the faculties and putting power and will in perfect equality. It is only then that, with all the powers in action, the soul will nevertheless remain peaceful and the man will be well ordered (p. 80).

Here Rousseau addresses a well-known human predicament, commonly viewed as a major cause of human alienation and unhappiness: the gap between a person's desires and his ability to satisfy them. Rousseau suggests two com- plementary solutions to this predicament. The first solution involves the containment of the gap. This occurs when the predicament is not overly exaggerated (i.e., the gap is not too wide), and the person has acknowledged the inevitability of the situation. In this case the person appears to adjust without compromising his happiness. Rousseau claims that "man rebels only against the things which he believes could be otherwise .... It is the nature of man to endure patiently the necessity of things..." (p. 91).

Yet Rousseau recognizes that the natural aptitude to adjust to the "necessity of things" has limits, and warns that the gap between a person's desires and his ability to satisfy them may ~ o w too wide. He identifies the major contributing factor to this gap: the imagination. When the imagination is awakened, it outstrips other human faculties. It erroneously "extends for us the measure of the possible" and in turn "excites and nourishes the desires by the hope of satisfying them" (p. 81). In behaving so mischievously, the imagination, according to Rousseau, sets us on the road to unhappiness, which is experienced in the form of conscious alienation.

Rousseau believes that the imagination should simply be curtailed. "The real world has its limits, the imaginary world is infinite. Unable to enlarge the one, let us restrict the other, for it is from the difference between the two alone that are born all the pains which make us truly unhappy" (p. 81). 2

It may be easier to accept Rousseau's analysis of the causes of object- alienation than his proposed solution. It is not evident that the imagination is either sufficient or necessary for the acquisition and emergence of new desires.

The repression of the imagination is not necessary for the prevention of alienation; indeed it may even have the opposite effect of engendering a deep sense of alienation. Suppose that a child lives alone with reclusive parents. He does not attend school, nor do his parents provide him with an adequate substitute for the school curriculum. The child's environment offers him a very limited range of activities. This situation is highly likely to have a repressive effect on the child's imagination; were it not for this restrictive environment, the child's imagination could possibly lead him to entertain new activities and pursuits, affording him a better opportunity to realize the full range of his potential capacities and talents. This situation may render him alienated with himself in an unconscious sense. That is, he may not sense an inner conflict, but sooner or later may experience inexplicable distress and discontent.

A similar example can be entertained of an adult who lives in a society which attaches a supreme value to consumer commodities. The person's drive to purchase consumer goods in this environment exacts much time and effort. This situation may be the source of a deep sense of unconscious alienation, stemming

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~om arrested potentialities. The nurturing of his imagination could lead to the fulfillment of his talents and potential. Indeed, the concern with the development of individual human potential presupposes our intuition that one of the main goals of education is to create conditions conducive to the development of the child's imagination. This intuition holds a central place within the framework of a liberal education which is committed to pluralism. This becomes an important value in an era in which the belief that there is one conception of the human good valid for every human being has long been abandoned. In the absence of a shared conception of the good, the choice of how to develop tends to devolve onto the individual child. By encouraging the imagination to roam free, the options of the individual child are expanded and increased.

These considerations bring us naturally to the other claim: that imagination is not a sufficient condition for the acquisition of new desires. A man who indiscriminately follows the call of each and every desire presents a grotesque image. Man will not attempt to attain all that is attainable and desired by him; sometimes a desire can be of no significance to him. The distinction made by Charles Taylor between a "simple weigher of alternatives" and a "strong evaluator" may be helpful in elaborating this point (1982, p. 116). A simple weigher of alternatives is a person who is passively inundated with a myriad of desires and decides upon a course of action based on quantitative criteria such as intensity, duration of desires, and the consequences of the alternative courses of action. In contrast to him, the strong evaluator adds a new dimension to his practical deliberation. He "envisages his alternatives through a richer language. The desirable is not defined for him by what he desires . . . . . it is also defined by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble or base, and so on" (p. 116).

This qualitative dimension suggests the possibility of averting object- alienation without curtailing the imagination. I f we ensure that a child becomes a strong evaluator, we need be tess concerned with the consequences of letting his imagination roam freely. This is because a strong evaluator less readily acquires new desires. He may initially become enamored with new things, and they may even generate new desires in him. But reflection and sober contempla- tion often release him from their spell, without leaving a lingering sense of alienation for not pursuing them. For a strong evaluator, a real sense of aliena- tion is generated when a person fails to satisfy desires and goals which are assigned high value. These desires and goals are of the kind which constitute a person's unique identity and character. However, a strong evaluator is better protected from the vagaries and fluctuating nature of human desires, since he acquires significantly fewer. Thus imagination need not be curtailed, since it alone is not sufficient for the aquisition of new desires.

Rousseau would probably endorse the idea of a strong evaluator, but would insist that to produce a strong evaluator the imagination of the child should be arrested. It is far from obvious that he is correct. Yet even if he is correct, the drawbacks associated with the curtailment of the imagination seem to outweigh its advantages.

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IV. VOLITIONAL ALIENATION

The second source of external alienation - volitional alienation - arises as a result of a person's discordant interaction with other human beings. Volitional alienation may take two different forms. First, a person cannot always secure the obedience of others to his will, and therefore stands to experience alienation: a person may desire that someone do something which pleases him, but that person may refuse to comply. Volitional alienation of this form can become complex. A person may be content if he is able to secure the obedience of others to his will, whether it is offered willingly or not. Yet for some this may not be enough: alienation may arise if this obedience is enforced and not offered willingly. Such situations arise in personal relationships. A person may be coerced, through threats and blackmail, to capitulate to the desires of another. But this need not bring about a desired change in the motivational structure of the forcibly "courted" person. The "courted" person may still not reciprocate with genuine desire. The failure to effect such a change can certainly be the root of frustration and alienation)

The second form of volitional alienation occurs when a person may indeed be able to secure the submission of the wil l of others to his own. To explain this form of volitional alienation, Rousseau's distinction between the two kinds of self-love or self esteem - a m o u r de soi and a m o u r p r o p r e - is in order.

The distinction between the two kinds of self-love is of central significance in Rousseau's philosophy. This distinction serves as an allegory of the Biblical story of the expulsion of man from the garden of Eden. The loss of Paradise is represented by the shift from the ideal state in which a m o u r de soi reigns to the imperfect state in which man is enslaved by a m o u r propre . Rousseau sees the "forbidden fruit" - the cause of man's downfall - to lie in the inevitable need for human interaction. The development of a m o u r p r o p r e leads to the loss of naivete, harmony, authenticity and happiness. This, then, is the original sin which can never be fully expiated, and hence, Paradise is forever lost. However, the prospect for human happiness is not entirely bleak; for Rousseau argues that the noxious ramifications of a m o u r p r o p r e can be partially mitigated.

A m o u r de soi is a type of self-love characteristic of man prior to the establish- ment of society. Self-preservation, his physical existence, forms his primary concern. The capacity to satisfy basic needs, and to postpone immediate gratification on behalf of future needs, leads to contentment and self-satisfac- tion. This requires no evaluative perspective: he does not view his actions and achievements beyond their purely functional value. He is neither aware of, nor in need of, the approbation of others. Even when he interacts with others, he is indifferent to considerations about prestige and social status. The natural man is free of the chains of social conventions which make him perceive himself and others through their respective social roles, rather than through their essential human qualities. 4

A m o u r p r o p r e is a type of self-love or self-esteem enjoyed in proportion to one's public esteem: "as soon as a m o u r p r o p r e has developed, the relative I is

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constantly in play, and the young man never observes others without returning to himself and comparing himself with them" (p. 243). 5 Furthermore, when amour propre is developed, the young man becomes sensitive to the way in which he is perceived by others. This fact presupposes certain shared conven- tions through which relative status is assessed. Hence Rousseau's claim that amourpropre tends to enslave man to social conventions.

Rousseau distinguishes between two essentially different directions in which amour propre can be developed: the directions can be constructive or destruc- tive. When destructively developed, amour propre generates many self-regard- ing desires which are ill-begotten; for they do not truly spring from within the self but rather from without. Amour propre is potentially dangerous because it places man at the mercy of public opinion. A person may expend much effort inducing others to think highly of him, even resorting to cunning and decep- tion. 6 Yet Rousseau's concern here is not with the immorality of the agent's conduct, but primarily with his well-being. The agent may be able to make others behave and think the way he wants them to: this includes submission to his will, or merely making them believe in his superiority. Yet this would not shield him from alienation. In order to secure public esteem he must continue to pretend to be what he is not. He may deceive others, but not himself. 7 Rousseau describes this predicament: "Even domination is servile when it is connected with opinion, for you depend on the prejudices of those you govern by prejudices. To lead them as you please, you must conduct yourself as they please. They have only to change their way of thinking, and you must perforce change your way of acting ... As soon as one must see with the eyes of others, one must will with their wills" (pp. 83-84).

As Rousseau realizes, both forms of volitional alienation are inevitable. We can only delay their emergence and minimize their intensity. As for the first form of volitional alienation, Rousseau proposes a daring, and perhaps ul- timately unacceptable, solution. He suggests that this form of volitional alienation be reduced to the more bearable alienation: object-alienation. According to him, there are two sorts of dependence: "on things and on men ..." (p. 85). He enjoins the teacher to "keep the child in dependence on things only".... (p. 85), since man will endure the the necessity of things "but not the ill will o f others" (p. 91). Accordingly, he demands that the child be led to believe that human beings function as if they were marionettes determined by the laws of nature under which all physical phenomena are subsumed. So adamant is Rousseau in his view, that he demands that even the institution of punishment be adapted to fit the deterministic conception instilled in his mind. This could be done if "punishment ... never be inflicted on children, but it should always happen to them as a natural consequence of their bad action" (p. 101). A child will of course discover in due time the volitional aspect of punishment, but the puly~ose of thus rearing him is to delay his realization, until very late into childhood, that human beings act upon a will of their own. This will prevent him from resorting to use manipulation to satisfying his arbitrary desires: "As soon as children consider the people who surround them as instruments depending on

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them to be set in motion, they make use of those people to follow their inclina- tions and supplement their own weakness" (pp. 67-68). But if a child is accustomed to viewing people as part of the mechanistic and deterministic nature, his later desires will not be totally dependent upon the consent of others.

One of the reasons for inculcating this belief in a child is to prevent him from developing into a tyrant, an unpleasant human being for those who interact with him. A still more important reason is that the "tyrant" himself stands to suffer the most. A child who is doted upon becomes "accustomed to seeing everything give way before [him]". But when he grows up and is no longer under the protective wings of his family, he encounters an unyielding world; and as a result finds himself "crushed by the weight of the universe [he] thought [he] can move at [his] pleasure" (p. 88).

No doubt, Rousseau identifies a common blunder in informal education. But the method suggested to prevent this educational oversight arouses considerable reservations. Firmness in dealing with a child is commendable; to lead him to believe that this firmness is a manifestation of "the necessity of things" is highly questionable. Is it not this very method which is bound to create the alienated child? Alienation may occur, not because the child is denied what he wants (since he "endures patiently the necessity of things"), but because he lacks an environment permeated with warmth, affection and discretionary space. It is this which affords humans refuge from the coldness of the mechanistic world and from the strictly and objectively regulated nature. The kind of alienation which the child may experience as a result of this educational method would not spring from conflicting desires per se but rather would manifest itself in a general sense of discontent which cannot be pinned down to any particular unfulfilled desires.

Rousseau's solution to the second form of volitional alienation is also fraught with difficulties, due to its assumption of a problematic (Stoic) conception of the good life. According to this conception, for a person to lead a harmonious and happy life, he must exhibit two intertwined master virtues: he has to be a person of moderate desires (autarchy), and also care for the well-being of others (altruism). Rousseau's prescriptions for avoiding object alienation and Volitional alienation of the first form can be perceived as preliminary stages in developing the first master virtue. These prescriptions ensure the development of an autarchic and self-sufficient person. Furthermore, these prescriptions can forestall the danger of distorted amour propre; for they are concerned with cultivating a character which is relatively immune to the vagaries of fate.

The cultivation of the second virtue (altruism) is more essential to averting the development of distorted amourpropre; for it touches directly on the interaction between individuals. Indeed the cultivation of this virtue reflects the central challenge of Rousseau's moral education, for moral conduct requires the presence of other-regarding virtues. Rousseau sees a connection between distorted amour propre and faulty moral education. This is not necessarily manifested in immoral behavior, but in moral behavior which induces self- alienation. This view actually anticipates the contemporary debate between two traditions of moral education: deontological ethics and virtue-based ethics.

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V. MORAL ALIENATION

The debate between the two traditions touches mainly on the desirable nature of the motivational structure of moral conduct. The advocates of virtue-based ethics argue that moral conduct, adequately developed, is grounded in the agent's natural inclinations and dispositions. A person's moral conduct ul- timately springs from things the agent wants, one of which is the well-being of others. This concern for others, they continue, can substitute for moral impera- tives, which are handed down to the agent as commands to be followed irrespec- tive of, and often against, his desires and wants. The advocates of virtue-based ethics recognize of course the need for moral education, given that inclinations and dispositions may be insufficiently developed. But moral education, accord- ing to them, should not be conceived as the inculcation of moral imperatives, but rather as a development of already existing inclinations and dispositions of the agent. It should aim to demonstrate to him that morally accepted conduct actually accords with his broad self-interest; (Anscombe, 1958; Foot, 1978; Stocker, 1976; Blum, 1980). Hence, this view affords a cure to the malady of alienation which attends moral conduct pursued deontologically (Stocker, 1976).

Deontological ethics indeed asserts the supremacy of duties over passions. In modern moral philosophy deontological ethics is associated mainly with Kant. He believes that we cannot make sense of moral action if it is not grounded in a motivational source other than natural inclinations and dispositions. Further- more, he argues that human freedom and full rationality can be manifested only in the moral domain; here humans have the opportunity to free themselves from the ,despotic influence of natural forces (heteronomy), which include human inclinations and dispositions. 8 Morality provides the practical principles in the form of imperatives or duties which often militate against what the agent actually desires.

Rousseau's ideas had immense impact on Kant's thought, and there are indeed numerous passages reminiscent of Kantian terminology to be found in Rousseau's writings. 9 Yet the general drift of Rousseau's ideas on moral education in Emile, underscoring the cultivation of moral character, places him witkin the Aristotelian tradition of moral philosophy: that is, virtue-based ethics.

The real challenge for Rousseau's moral education, and hence for his conception of the good life, begins after the initial stages of childhood. Emile reaches a "moment of crisis ... which is rather short ... but has far-reaching influences": the birth of sexual desire. When sexual desire becomes acute, the need for another human being can no longer be ignored. Sexual desire, more than any other desire, makes one individual dependent on the will of another. Rousseau sees it as potentially the most dangerous desire for the harmony of one's soul, in that the need to satisfy it encourages distorted amourpropre. For a person may resort to deceit; he may be tempted, especially under conditions of natural competition, to pretend to be what he is not, to assume a false super- iority, and thus become alienated with himself, for reasons previously discussed.

Despite the many dangers involved in the emergence of sexual desire,

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Rousseau views is as a useful instrument for the cultivation of moral character. The presence of sexual desire, he argues, does not necessarily involve the adolescent's awareness of its nature and object. Rousseau recommends prolong- ing ignorance in the adolescent; this period should be used to cultivate the child's character (p. 219). Rousseau advocates moral education as a sublimation of the sexual desire. A fundamental characteristic of this desire is that it draws the adolescent to other human beings: "one desires without knowing what" (220). This in turn, propels him in the direction of morality. Even when the child is unaware of the nature and object of the sexual desire, this desire still prompts him to seek the company of other human beings, not necessarily of the opposite sex. The child is seeking friendship, not love (p. 220). This inclination should be exploited in order "to sow in the young adolescent's heart the first seeds of humanity" (p. 220).

This task can be accomplished through the extension of amourpropre to other human beings: "We shall transform it into a virtue, and there is no man's heart in which this virtue does not have its root" (p. 252). This is achieved by introducing the adolescent to carefully selected facets of the human condition which should induce compassion and allow him to empathize with other human beings, For instance, the adolescent may be exposed to the misery and abject poverty of others. This evokes the feeling of pity which is the most appropriate medium for promoting identification between people. This identification results from the fact that "one pities in others only those ills from which one does not feel onself exempt" (p. 224). One is brought to an awareness of the vicissitudes of life which can elevate man to the heights of fortune, or plunge him to the depths of misery. He tastes the precariousness of his position. Yet, pity is mediated through a sense of superiority over those who actually suffer: "Pity is sweet because, in putting ourselves in the place of the one who suffers, we nevertheless feel the pleasure of not suffering as he does" (p. 221). Yet he commiserates with the plight of the others. It is this capacity for commiseration which transports the individual outside of himself, allowing him to identify and unite with others (p. 223).

The situation is entirely different when a person compares his position to that of a man whom he considers more fortunate than himself. The comparison indicates that his lot is not as good as it could be. This comparison does not induce identification, but rather leads to envy and resentment. "It is not in the human heart to put ourselves in the place of people who are happier than we, but only in that of those who are more pitiable" (p. 223). The superiority accompany- ing the feeling of pity is replaced by a sense of inferiority; while pity is sweet, envy is bitter, because "the sight of a happy man, far from putting the envious man in his place, makes the envious man regret not being there" (p. 221).

It is important to note that envy does not arise only in the heart of a person placed in wretched circumstances. Envy emerges as the result of a comparison of the relative standing of two individuals; for envy to arise in a man's heart it is sufficient for there to be someone more fortunate than he, irrespective of the degree of his own well-being) ~

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Envy is a common manifestation of distorted amour propre; it fosters estrangement among people instead of solidarity; it encourages competition instead of cooperation. Furthermore, according to Rousseau, in the very feelings of envy, resentment, and bitterness, lies the source of immorality and vice; a rapacious appetite may be developed to be satiated at all costs.

Yet the envious individual need not necessarily behave immorally; a reverence for morality may have been instilled in him. However, he may still remain vulnerable to the malady of alienation. Morality often demands the sacrifice of the desires and wants generated by envy. Moral conduct, therefore, is very likely to invoke a deep sense of self-alienation within the envious person.

Rousseau views envy as essentially negative; he fails to distinguish between a situation in which envy can be attributed to infirmity of character and a situation in which envy results from an unjust social order, and hence may be considered an excusable form of envy. 11 The underprivileged may justly envy the privileged tbr their advantages. Thus we are forced to acknowledge the existence of two distinct types of envy: particular envy and general envy (Rawls, 1971, p. 531).

Particular envy emerges against the background of rivalry and competition. To mitigate this feeling or to eradicate it entirely, a comprehensive conception of the good life is required. This actually forms the challenge undertaken by Rousseau in Emile, which will be assessed shortly. General envy may appear in a social order which is characterized by vast socio-economic inequalities. Where general envy is concerned Rousseau's contention that envy is essentially negative carries dangerous implications. For instance, such a view would condemn the "Untouchable" caste of India to a life of permanent degradation and debasement. To raise a child of this caste according to Rousseau's concep- tion of the good life, which arrests the development of envy, is to force him into an unquestioning acceptance of his lot. It is therefore clear that the mitigation of general envy demands a theory of justice (as opposed to a conception of the good life) which ensures the lessening of inequalities, the provision of equal opportunities, and the elimination of all forms of discrimination. 12

Rousseau recognizes only particular envy, and the Stoic conception of the good life which he proposes is designed to mitigate it. Autarchy, as stated, is a vital component of Rousseau's conception of the good life: "thus what makes man essentially good is to have few needs and to compare himself little to others; what makes him essentially wicked is to have many needs and to depend very much on opinion" (p. 214). Rousseau consistently emphasizes the need to moderate the child's desires throughout the educational stages of Emile. Even after Emile returns from his educational journeys and marries Sophie, Rousseau continues to impart to him the crucial importance of containing and moderating his desires: "let your condition limit your desires; let your duties come before your inclinations; extend the law of necessity to moral things." And more important than all, "learn to lose what can be taken from you; learn to abandon everything when virtue decrees it . . . . " (p. 446).

Altruism is not an independent component in Rousseau's conception of the good life; it derives from the principle of autarchy which concerns personal

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well-being. Rousseau believes that the cultivation of other-regarding virtues is instrumental to the promotion of the good life: "the more [a person's] cares are consecrated to the happiness of others, the more they will be enlightened and wise and the less he will be deceived about what is good or bad" (252). It should be evident how altruism derives from the constructive development of amour

propre. A person concentrating on the well-being of others and less on his own, does so at the expense of self-regarding desires and wants. This, according to Rousseau, entails no loss to the individual; on the contrary, he benefits from this reduction of personal drives. Preoccupation with personal drives may lead to distorted amourpropre , self-alienation and lack of happiness.

Is this an acceptable position? Does the reduction of desires and wants pose no threat to personal happiness? Rousseau's conception of the good life may hold the prospect for eradicating envy and curing (conscious) self-alienation. Yet the shortcomings of this conception may be seen to outweigh the advan- tages. For example, the reduced opportunity for self-realization, can lead to a deep sense of (unconscious) self-alienation.

Self-realization instills life with meaning; it contributes to personal self- esteem. Not all activities can be a vehicle for self-realization. A person realizes himself when he engages in the kind of activity which enables him to develop his potential. Any activity requiring little or no effort, producing nothing of moral, aesthetic or material value, does not serve as a vehicle for self-realiza- tion. Jon Elster provides a concise summary of the nature of the activity which serves as a potential vehicle for self-realization (Elster, 1986, p. 25). He emphasizes three formal criteria essential to such an activity: first, it should have "an external goal and that it can be performed more or less well - according to independently given criteria. If an activity is to be an actual vehicle for self- realization, its goal must be of suitable complexity - neither so simple as to produce boredom nor so difficult as to produce frustration." Second, "the activity must offer a challenge that can be met". Third, self-realization cannot be reached without the externalization of personal potential. This feature is necessary because self-realization is closely connected with a person's need for self-esteem, which is closely connected to the esteem bestowed upon him by others (p. 26).

Interestingly, though hardly surprising, the criteria required for an activity to serve as a potential vehicle leading to self-realization are alien to Rousseau's conception of the good life. The reason for this is obvious. The kind of activity exhibiting these criteria is likely to disrupt the harmony of one' s soul and induce self-alienation. The pursuit of self-realization is teleological - it proceeds as an attempt to attain definite goals. Although we value the development of our capacities and talents for its own sake, most of us reach a stage in our life where we set goals for ourselves. These goals constitute the vehicles to bring about self-realization. Yet~ the pursuit of self-realization may be thwarted. A person is seldom in a position to determine in advance the limit of his potential, and thus he may overestimate it. As a result, he may experience a deep sense of frustra- tion, failure and even self-alienation, because he fails to achieve his goals) 3

THE QUEST FOR THE GOOD LIFE IN ROUSSEAU'S EMILE 241

Indeed, these unfortunate states of mind - which include all manifestations of (conscious) alienation - can be avoided or at least mitigated if Rousseau's Stoic conception of the good life is adopted. But again, this is achieved at a great cost. For these desires are also constitutive of the person, of his ideal self-image. Rousseau's conception of the good life, which exhorts us to curtail the formation of desires and contain the emergence of a m o u r p r o p r e , is bound to undermine any meaningful pursuit of self-realization. Curtailing the imagination, laboring to rear a self-sufficient and complacent person, the educational process is bound to produce an unmotivated, bored and phlegmatic individual who is deeply alienated with himself and his potential. Such alienation may not emerge in the form of a conflict between man and society or between personal desires and moral precepts, but within man himself. The conflict will arise not in the form of inner strife but in the form of a life-style characterized by stagnation, monotony and an inexplicable sense of discontent.

To conclude, a doubt remains as to the adequacy of Rousseau's conception of the good life as a means of countering all forms of alienation. This conception may indeed provide the means to counter the vicissitudes of fate and the capricious opinions of others. Rousseau is correct to argue that when happiness depends on external circumstances, man finds himself at the mercy of the vagaries of fate. But his solution to this common predicament is problematic. As we have seen, this predicament is highlighted in the various manifestations of conscious alienation. Although Rousseau's conception of the good life may solve the predicament of conscious alienation, this solution may be may achieved at the price of rendering man vulnerable to unconscious alienation, which can be viewed as the least desirable of the two forms of alienation. This problem underscores one of the main structural flaws in Rousseau's philosophy of education. Differences in personal preferences and temperament notwithstand- ing, we place a high premium on a form of life which involves challenges, and the search for talents and their pursuit. Such a form of life may sometimes exact a high price: frustration, blows to the ego, loss of confidence, etc., which are indicative of conscious alienation. But many of us find this a risk worth taking for the prospect of an interesting and intriguing life, a life affording the oppor- tunity to develop capacities and experience the deep sense of satisfaction attending their realization. Few of us would opt for the dubious heaven promised by Rousseau's conception of the good life.

NOTES

* I have benefited greatly from the comments made by Jane Ismail and Daniel Kaufman on earlier versions of this paper. I The ascription of unconscious alienation presupposes the possibility of external evaluation. This issue is dealt with in my paper (Yonah, 1990). Here I examine the possibility of categorical deprivation, which suggests that although a person may be content with the form of life he pursues, this form of life might nonetheless be faulty. 2 There is an interesting contrast here with Marx, who could be interpreted as saying, let

242 YOSSI YONAH

us indeed "enlarge the one", that is, let us enlarge the world so as to render it more amenable to our desires - hence his doctrine becomes revolutionary. Hegel's famous phrase, to make the "real rational and the rational real", was given a similar interpretation by left-Hegelians, including Marx. In other words, that the imagination outstrips reality is here regarded as a fault with reality as much as with the imagination. Thus Hegel' s notion of the unhappy consciousness of the Middle Ages is explained as the "real" having not yet become rational, so that spirit is still alienated from itself. 3 Rousseau probably has this idea in mind when he states that "Neither a friend nor a mistress can be bought. It is easy to have women with money, but that way one is never the lover of any of them" (p. 349). 4 Amour de soi is relevant not only to self-evaluation, but also to the manner in which he evaluates others. A person should treat others with respect, irrespective of their attributes and roles, which are the products of social conventions. As we shall shortly see, pity is highly instrumental in cultivating such an approach. (See N.J.H Dent, 1988, pp. 93-95). A similar idea is to be found in B. Williams (1973, p. 236). 5 Amour propre, as Rousseau claims, is evident even in the very ftrst stages in the evolution of human cooperative behavior (Rousseau, 1964, p. 149). 6 In the Discourse on the Foundations and Origin oflnequality Rousseau expresses this point most eloquently (1964, pp. 155-6). 7 An agent is likely to know his true worth unless he has deluded himself so thoroughly as to believe in his contrived image. But that would no doubt entail such a high psychological cost that it would manifest itself as alienation in other ways. It would require the constant need to deny reality, and at the very least would be a form of unconscious alienation. 8 It should be noted that there are places where Kant allows for an important role for rationality at the level of the pursuit of basic desires and human needs, "securing food, shelter, safety and defense". Here, however, Kant speaks of this use of rationality (which is equivalent to what he elsewhere calls "hypothetical imperatives") as a mere stage in the historical development of the species toward full moral rationality. This is is achieved with the appearance of "a universal civic society which administers law among men" (Kant, 1963, pp. 14-16). 9 This interpretation can be supported by assertions reminiscent of Kantian terminology and which can be abundantly found throughout the Social Contract (Bk. I, ch. vi, vii and also in Emile, pp. 233,252). x0 See on this Ben Se'ev, 1990 11 It is possible, of course, for particular and general envy to merge. A defeated person may feel that his defeat by another person is attributable to the advantages his competitor enyoys due to his higher social possition. His envy may thus be directed at the personal and social components of his competitor's more fortunate lot. See J. Rawls's discussion of the distinction between particular and general envy (1971, p. 534). 12 One should not conclude from Rousseau's failure to distinguish between general and particular envy that he endorses social injustice (His Discourse on the Foundations and Origin of Inequality serves an obvious reminder of that). Yet, his failure to make this distinction leaves him open to the charge that his method of education induces in the child resigantion in the face of social injustice (see Roznove, 1986, p. 209). 13 An exception to this is the case of the moral saint, who consecrates his life to the promotion of the well-being of others, without necessarily experiencing self-alienation. But, as S. Wolf convincingly argues, the moral saint is hardly an ideal to be universally upheld (1982).

THE QUEST FOR THE GOOD LIFE IN ROUSSEAU'S EMILE 243

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