The Potential of Islamist Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa

International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol. 18, No. 1, Fall 2004 ( C© 2004)

The Potential of Islamist Terrorismin Sub-Saharan Africa

Abdelkerim Ousman1

This paper is about the potential of terrorism in African Islamic movements.In order to lessen ambiguities related to the plethora of definitions given tothe Islamist phenomenon, the various definitions related to the phenomenonof Islamism are examined as introductory information indispensable to theunderstanding of the topic. While it describes the encounter of sub-SaharanAfrica with Islam, it also covers a number of movements in different coun-tries in the African continent: Nigeria, Tanzania, Senegal, Kenya, SouthAfrica, Somalia, Ethiopia, Niger, Mali, Chad, and Sudan. In all of thesecountries, the emergence of Islamic movements, their socio-political status,their present position in relation to the ongoing debate on their perceivedradicalization or their supposed threat of violence or terrorism are compar-atively analyzed.

KEY WORDS: Da’waa; Islam; Islamism; Muslim; Fundamentalism; Sufi; Sub-Saharan Africa;Ummah; Shari’ah.

INTRODUCTION

More than two decades before the end of the Cold War, the Muslimworld has witnessed a movement towards a return to the fundamentals ofIslam, as the proponents of this movement believe Islam is the basis fortheir new societal and political project. The fundamentals of Islam are thepillars upon which their political activism is based. Their ultimate aspirationis the Islamization of society and the state.1 The internal and external socio-political factors behind the recurrence of this form of Islamism cover a widerange of interconnected circumstances. Some of these could be traced back

1Department of Politics and Economics, Royal Military College of Canada, PO Box: 17000 StnForces, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, K7L 7B4. E-mail: [email protected].

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to Islam itself in the pre-colonial period, and others are rooted in modernity,in the colonial and postcolonial eras.

In traditional Islamic political theory the state rests on three pillars:the Ummah (the community of Muslim believers), the Caliphate, and theShari’ah (Islamic Law). With the development of Islamic history, events andinstitutions, the concept of Ummah and the institution of Caliphate hadeither become dysfunctional or changed beyond recognition long beforethe advent of western influence in the region. Contacts with Europe andchanges of social and economic life contributed to the shrinking of Shari’ah’sinfluence.2 The bankruptcy of these Islamic institutions generated a strongdesire among various Muslim scholars to search for plausible ideologicalalternatives to the traditional system of government.

This article is about the potential of terrorism in African Islamic move-ments and militancy. In what follows, Section One describes the factors thatcontributed to the Resurgence of the Islamic movements worldwide. In or-der to lessen ambiguities related to the plethora of definitions given to theIslamist phenomenon, Section Two briefly examines the various definitionsand characterizations related to the phenomenon of Islamism as introduc-tory information indispensable to our understanding of the topic. While Sec-tion Three describes the encounter of sub-Saharan Africa with Islam, SectionFour covers a number of movements in different countries in the African con-tinent: Nigeria, Tanzania, Senegal, Kenya, South Africa, Somalia, Ethiopia,Niger, Mali, Chad and Sudan. In all of these countries, we will review theemergence of Islamic movements, their socio-political status and investigatetheir present position in relation to the ongoing debate on their perceivedradicalization or their supposed threat of violence or terrorism.

We selected these countries because of their diversity in colonial back-grounds, power structure, the composition and the status of Muslim com-munities, the relationships of the state to various religious movements; theissue of clientelism or protagonism of local Islamic leaders with respect tothe state, and the differing impacts of their religious militantism on nationalpolitics. This is because African Islamic movements do not share commonorganizational or doctrinal features. Their motivation and actions as well asthe circumstances of their beginning vary widely from one location to an-other. In countries with a remarkable Muslim majority they tend to focus torealizing political and social gains for their communities. On the other hand,where the Muslims are in minority they focus primarily on proselytism orthe Da’waa mission.3 That is to say, they are fashioned by their social andpolitical environment and their local challenges, obstacles, community inter-ests and political agendas. Also, the objectives, strategies, experiences anddoctrinal inclinations of their leaderships differ largely from one place toanother.

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However, we should note that the appearance and development ofIslamic movements as a political force in Africa south of the Sahara is notidentical in all different regions of the sub-continent. Many social and his-torical factors have influenced the rise of African Islamic movements.4 Themanner in which these movements appeared and are using their politicalinfluence now depended in large part on the policy of the colonial powers ofdirect and indirect rule. Veronique Dimier, notes that “the French colonialsystem in Tropical Africa is usually described as very centralized, unified,and bureaucratic and based on Direct Rule and assimilation. By contrast,the British system is regarded as very decentralized, pragmatic and basedon Indirect Rule, which means the respect of native customs and chiefs.”5

In view of these different colonial policies, modern Islamic movementstend to be more challenging and militant in countries where traditionalJihadist movements have already flourished under the British system ofindirect rule such as Nigeria and Sudan or, in addition to this, in countriesexposed to the long influence of the reformist movements in the middle eastand Asia such as Kenya, Tanzania and South Africa, where there are sig-nificant minorities of Africans of Asian and Arabic origins who have beenin direct contact and exposure to the ideas of Islamic thinkers in Pakistan,India, Egypt or Saudi Arabia.

It is, however, interesting to note that even today Islamic militancy ismore visible in the British former colonies of Sudan, Nigeria, and SouthAfrica among others. Applying their policy of indirect rule, the British lefta wide range of customary administrative and jurisdictional powers to beperformed by Africans, particularly in the area of Islamic Shari’a law. Inthese countries, the British indirect rule policy had contributed largely tothe development of Islamic militantism.6

In contrast to the British, the French through their policy of directrule have replaced the customary administrative and jurisdictional pow-ers with new customary administrative and jurisdictional powers shapedby European officials and operated largely by them. The French generallysaw in Islam a serious rival, and sought to neutralize it by restricting theconstruction of schools and mosques and supporting further fragmentationof the “Marabout” movement into much localized religious fiefdoms. Later,colonial leaders gradually developed a policy designed to use and subvertIslam, in which certain networks of “Marabouts” and imams were rewardedfor acting as transmission belts for administrative policy.7

As a result, in the French colonies of West and Central Africa such asSenegal, Mali, Chad, Cameroon and Niger, the policy of direct rule haveencouraged the development of different brands of Sufi orders and powerrelationships with the structures of the colonial authority. In these countries,until now Islamic movements are in general supportive and less challenging

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to the secular establishment. In many cases however, European colonialistsadopted Muslim law as a unifying administrative structure, rather than theindigenous and often competing tribal customs of their artificially demar-cated colonies.8

SECTION ONE: FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THERESURGENCE OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS WORLDWIDE

Western colonization of the Islamic world and the sudden impact ofthe globalization process on the ill-equipped and unwary Muslim nationshave left far-reaching consequences and bear a good deal of responsibilityin the recurrence of contemporary Islamic movements. In the same line ofreasoning, the policies of the international financial and trade institutionshave created dehumanizing conditions of abject poverty in many Muslimcountries, destroyed the web of public services in the sector of education,health and social welfare, and perpetuated disparities and inequalities amongthe citizens, leaving them without hope. This environment has contributedenormously to the emergence of Islamists and predisposed them to fill thevacuum left by the states, which abnegated their traditional functions.9

The rich countries of the gulf have also played a role in the resurgenceof Islamism. The oil boom10 coupled with the emergence of Wahhabism inSaudi Arabia and the creation of the Muslim World league in 1962 to countersecular nationalism and communism facilitated largely the expansions ofIslamism all over the world through the financing of Islamic movementsand their social, educational, financial and other missionary and communityprograms.

The policies of the U.S and other western governments towards theArab-Israeli conflict, the Gulf wars and the Middle East in general are con-sidered by many Muslims to be in favor of the Israelis. This has contributedto the feeling that Western governments at all times lean towards what isbest for the State of Israel, which has aggravated the already existing deepsenses of injustice and animosity in the Muslim world, and accelerated theemergence of Islamism throughout the Islamic world.11

The media has played its role in the resurgence of Islamic militancy. InAmerican and Western media any reference to Islam is commonly coupledwith violence, hostility towards women, holy wars, backwardness, terror-ism, threat to freedom and progress or to the world peace and security.12

Anti-Islamic language by some newspapers and television journalisms of-ten portrays Islam as a fanatic medieval threat to the civilization, cultureand values of the western world has also contributed heavily to the distrustand hostility of Muslims, and created in them a deep sense of being falsely


demonized and vilified, and consequently, conferred vigor to their growltowards Western powers.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the US support to the Afghanfighters helped to create a climate conducive to the emergence of the Jihadwarriors. The defeat of the Soviet and the vacuum left by the collapse of theAfghan government have brought to the fore the Taliban government whopromised heaven for Islamists from all over the world.13 The unexpectedconsequences of this US-Soviet confrontation during the Cold War was theemergence not only of a radical Islamist movement but one with a wellstructured and aggressive Islamic political agenda calling for Jihad againstthe West as well as the liberation of the whole Islamic Ummah.

The widespread existence of non-elected repressive one party authori-tarian regimes strangling political opposition and governing on a theocratic,military or tribal basis; bungled economic and financial policies; corruptionof the elites and the leaders; instrumentalization of religion as the stateraison d’etre; extensive abrupt process of secularization in societies wherethe spiritual appraises all aspects of life; identity crisis due to western cul-tural invasion and the absence of social web to absorb social grievancesleft no other venue for expressing political discontent within many Muslimstates. Islamism became the only home-grown medium for attaining politicalchange.14 In almost all Muslim countries where the movement has an appealand resonance there are common features of cultural, social, economic, in-stitutional and political failures.

The essence of the movement, therefore, is not directed to a spiritualelevation but has a holistic self-protective approach, expected to achieve aradical social, cultural, educational, financial, economic and political change.Equally, it is invoked to eradicate external policies and influences perceivedas a menace to the integrity of Islamic society. It aims at the rejection ofsome aspects of Western culture, political thoughts, philosophy, values andinstitutions as well as the substitution of their own failed local governmentsby establishing an Islamic state constructed on the fundamentals of Islam. Inshort, it is meant to achieve a fundamental reform through a wide-rangingrenewal of society and state structures.

SECTION TWO: CHARACTERIZATION OF ISLAMICMOVEMENTS: ISLAMISM OR FUNDAMENTALISM?

Some Western analysts and moderate Muslims milieu perceive Islamismas a “fundamentalist” creed with the sole objective of bringing down corruptsecular governments and harming their Western allies and friends. How-ever, many Muslims reject the fundamentalist label, because it has created

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a wrong impression that Islam is a violent religion. They say Islam stressesjustice and peace.15 Ali A. Mazrui16 sees the term as being misinterpretedand used loosely especially with regard to politicized Islam. He perceivesIslam as politically militant and prefers the term Islamic militancy for thosegroups that are very militant such as the Islamic movement in Algeria and el-ements within the Sudanese government as examples of Islamic militants.”17

Suleiman Nyang, for his part, draws a parallel between Marxists and thosecalled Islamic fundamentalists. He argues that:

Muslims should be able to control their destinies in accordance with their own values,and of course they see the State as a central instrument to be in the hand. In thiscase really, without acknowledging it, many of these people (fundamentalists) farewith the Marxists in the fact that history has been very much controlled, not by classstruggle in their view, but by the State and the manner in which the State is used asan instrument of an ideologue.18

Dr. Hassan Al Turabi, the leader and architect of the Sudanese Islamicmovement regards such an argument as a distortion. He interprets funda-mentalism as an Islamic revival that offers Muslims a sense of identity andhigher values. For him: “unlike Marxism the Islamic revival manifests itselfpeacefully.”19 According to him, Islamic revival only means total submissionto god. He expresses his divergence with Marxian politics as follows:

We do not believe the state is the only force that determines history or moves it. Islamis not a belief that could be imposed from above. The communist party on behalf ofthe proletariat believes in taking power by force. Islam actually spreads voluntarily,freely through the masses and expresses itself upward into government, economy,art, culture, human relations, across even borders of religions and cultures.20

Mr. Al-Turabi concludes that “the Islamic revival is based on the reli-gion’s holy book, the Qur’an, which the people obey out of belief, not becausethey are enforced by governments.”21 Al-Turabi equally refutes extremismcharges: “Most of the terrorist movements in the Middle East were far closerto European leftism and nationalism than to the tradition of Islam.” 22 Hebelieves that Islamic movements are characterised as fundamentalists inline with some understanding of religious fundamentalism in the AmericanSouth, and now after the spirit of jihad has emerged, they are being calledterrorist in order not to infuriate the majority of Muslim societies. In hiswords: “It is clear that they use the word Islam as a synonym of terrorismand they do not mean the erroneous use of violence but equate self-defensewith terrorism.”23

In fact, the heterogeneity of Islamic school of thoughts, Islamist move-ments and the motivations behind the studies of diverse scholars producedloose and sometimes completely erroneous terminology. Terms such as re-vivalism, Islamism, militant Islam, Islamic extremism, firebrand IslamicJihad, radical Islamism, Islamic fanaticism are used interchangeably and


from time to time with negative connotation or lack of precision to defineIslamism or politicized/ militant Islamic movements. In any case, the termfundamentalism does not reflect the reality of political Islam for the simplereason that it refers to a stiff eschatological religious belief and does not injectthe Islamist movement into a more positive societal and worldly vein. Be-sides, the term was originally branded to be used for the depiction of certainChristian denominations such as radical Baptist, Lutheran and Presbyteriangroups.24 Even if accepted as it is, it would be wrong to equate fundamental-ism with extremism because if a fundamentalist means someone who havea conformist approach to Islam and believe in its fundamentals, which arethe Qur’an and the Sunnah, then all Muslims are fundamentalist. Therefore,the use of the term to qualify a small minority of Muslims becomes faultyand inaccurate because in the case of Islam all Muslims believe in absoluteinerrancy of the Qur’an and the Sunnah.

Also the term revivalist25 is vague, less precise and gives incompatibledefinition to the movement. Revivalists are an amalgamation of traditionalUlamma (religious scholars), pragmatists and other contemporary Muslimthinkers and scholars who contributed in a way or another to the revival ofIslam. Although they advocate the restoration of traditional Islamic ideasand advocate an Islamic state based upon the Islamic law of Shari’ a revivalisttakes up a less politically active attitude with regard to the State and society.The use of words such as extremism, radicalism or fanaticism still lacksprecise material elements of categorization and their usage depends largelyon who is evaluating the movements, why he is doing so, how he does it and inrelation to what event. In the case of Islamic movements, the characterizationis left to the eye of the beholder.

Since Islamists seek the introduction of Islam in politics and society withthe objective of creating a modern Islamic State, then the term Islamism ismore appropriate because it assembles the religious, political, institutionaland organizational objectives of the movement within one ideology. Further-more, the term would cover a wide range of thinkers with different origin,approaches and methods with regards to the implementation of their po-litical agendas. Noah Feldman, an American academic, calls Islamism “acomprehensive political, spiritual and personal world-view defined in op-position to all that is non-Islamic.” 26 Graham Fuller, a former CI officialaffirms that an Islamist is ”one who believes that Islam as a body of faithhas something important to say about how politics and society should be or-dered in the contemporary Muslim world and who seeks to implement thisidea in some fashion.”27 Olivier Roy, a French scholar, prefers the narrowerdefinition of political Islam, which means an attempt to create an Islamicstate.28 Whatever the definition (and there are plenty more to choose from),the main point of interest here is the growing tendency in the Islamic world

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for Muslims to turn to religion as a solution or part-solution to politicalproblems. . . “But ‘Islamist’ for ‘Islamic activist’ is seemingly acceptable toeverybody, even if some activists are militants, which usually some activistsin any movement are.”29

Exclusive of the groups branded as “terrorists,” Islamists are but a seg-ment of the larger picture of worldwide Islam. With their flexible doctri-nal reasoning, the ever changing nature of their ideological approaches toquestions of modernism and secularism, their political maneuverings andstrategies, Islamists, in the view of Melvin E. Matthews, Jr. “embrace manyaspects of the modern world and in many areas they tend to be pragmatic po-litical leaders and use a conciliatory tone with the west.” 30 Islamists interprettheir faith in contemporary modern terms. They accept Western industrial,technological, economic and scientific progress. They believe it is possible tocombine Islamic identity and modernization and create a modern economi-cally and politically independent and authentic Islamic country.31 What theyreject is the materialistic consumerist, permissive aspects and other valuesin western civilization they consider as immoral according to the teachingsof Islam. Turabi maintains, “. . . modern Islamic movements don’t believe inschools of jurisprudence, they don’t define themselves as Shia’a or Sunnahor of this Sufi order or that Sufi order. They recognize this as quite a heritageand they can learn a lot from such history. They don’t want to break withhistory altogether, but they want to go forward and develop.”32

Although they tend to advocate the materialization of a universalis-tic supranational Islamic dogma, Islamist groups’ local priorities, diversityof goals, approaches to the establishment of an Islamic order or the en-forcement of Shari’a prevented them from being truly global.33 In fact, themajority of them are busy focusing on local political problems and strugglingto enforce national agendas by working within the confines of their state-runpolitical systems using either a bottom up long term mass mobilization strat-egy, available democratic tools as opposition parties or, in extreme cases,resort to political violence when governments outlaw or abort their accom-plishments. A militant Islamist is, therefore, not a religious nationalist, arevivalist, a traditionalist fanatic trying to impose a conservative religion onmodernizing societies, a radical or a ready to die Taliban extremist type ofJihadist.

However, the survey of Islamist groups reveals immediately the factthat uniformity is not their attribute. Despite some similarities and somegeneral common features such as their call to reform the social order inharmony with the true principles of Islam resulting from the Qur’an andthe Sunnah, rejection of western democracy, the concept of universal hu-man rights and, the supremacy of religious laws in the areas of financial andbanking systems, they are not unanimous in terms of their origin and focus,


doctrinal approaches, means of struggle, objectives and political programs.Islamic scholar Abdel- Qader Yassine differentiates between three majortypes: controlled fundamentalism in Saudi Arabia; messianic fundamental-ism in Iran and retributive fundamentalism in Egypt, Algeria, Sudan andAfrica South of the Sahara.34 This characterization leads us to the followingreview of contemporary African Islamic movements beginning first with theAfricans encounter with Islam.

SECTION THREE: THE ENCOUNTER OF AFRICANS WITH ISLAM

The relationships between Islam and the African continent go deepto the roots of Islam itself. During the fifth year of the mission of ProphetMohammed around 615 A.D. the polytheists of Makkah maltreated thosewho acknowledged the message of the Prophet. To escape this persecution,the Prophet advised them to migrate to Al-Habasha (Abyssinia, the mod-ern Ethiopia). Referring to this migration, Nourah Abdul Aziz Al-Khereijimaintains “. . . if they went to any region in the Arabian Peninsula they wouldbe returned to Quraysh. Persia was eliminated because the Persians wereidolaters, and the Romans, though people of the book, were known for beingtough and tyrannical. The Prophet thought Ethiopia would be the best.”35

In Abyssinia the followers of the Prophet were received with great open-handedness and given asylum as refugees by the King Najjaashi. Soon aftertheir escape, the rivals of the Prophet sent a delegation of Meccans to theNegus and asked for the extradition of the Muslim refugees. The Emperorausterely refused to deport them. The importance and the implications ofthis migration to Islam were overriding. It was, unquestionably, the founda-tion stone upon which the whole Islamic dynamics, history, events, politics,triumphs and accomplishments were built. Later in the 7th Century, severalIslamic kingdoms emerged in Africa south of the Sahara; amongst the wellrenowned are Ghana, Mali and the Songhay, Kanem-Bornou in the mod-ern Chad and Nigeria territories, in the Sudan the Funj and the Fur andthe Kingdom of Kilwa in East Africa. All these kingdoms developed com-plex and efficient systems of government and rule of law based on Islamicconcepts.36

It is worth mentioning that in these early years, the richness of Islamiclaws provided Africans with strong tools of state-building. Its educationaland learning systems offered them the knowledge of writing and the preciousoption to transcribe in Arabic their major three oral languages, the Hausaand Fulani in West Africa and the Swahili in East Africa. Islamic jurispru-dence gave them a variety of school of thoughts, religious groupings and Sufifraternities compatible with their mystical practices. The wholeness of the

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faith and its classless egalitarian nature infused Africans withself-consciousness, esteem and a psychological and spiritual immunity thatsheltered African identity from being entirely absorbed or completely shat-tered by the colonial policies of cultural assimilation and absorption. More-over, Islam in its early years in black Africa exercised a modernizing in-fluence, imposed a consistent order among different societies, strengthenedpowers of government and broke down ethnic loyalties.37 Unlike Christian-ity, Islam tolerated traditional African values and made conversion to Islameasier and less upsetting than conversion to Christianity.38

The colonial system was tainted with racism and based on the shadeconcept of white supremacy. In view of that, remonstrations were organizedthrough the religious ideological and spiritual channel to challenge the colo-nial governments’ groundless belief that God wanted white people to ruleover black people, and that the colonial powers had a somewhat “divine”mission to pull Africa out of darkness and lead Africans to the light of West-ern Civilization. Like Islamic scholars, social protesters, resistance heroes,Jihadists and reformers in other parts of the world, African Muslim leaders’socio-political, doctrinal and militant legacy fashioned the struggle of theAfrican Muslim communities against western domination during the colo-nial period and continue to wield its influence on the life of Africans as wellas the politics of the post-colonial African states. At the moment, one out ofthree Africans, professes the Islamic religion in Africa South of the Sahararepresenting a majority in approximately ten countries: Djibouti, Guinea,Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, and Chad. Andhas strong minorities in about ten others: Burkina, Cameroon, the CentralAfrican Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Liberia, Mozambique, Uganda,Sierra Leone and, Tanzania.39

Islam in Africa is manifested through three main tendencies. First, theIslam of Sufi brotherhoods is tolerant of African traditions, and a loyal part-ner to the State, dominated by religious traditional Muslim scholars, and itobserves a conciliatory approach in dealing with the secular State. The sec-ond tendency is puritanical, oriented towards the literal meaning of religioustexts and finally, the Islamists who claim the dismantlement of secular statesand their replacement by political systems based on the fundamentals ofIslam. However, this tendency is not well rooted and could be described asan emerging one.

However, it should be noted that the Islamic tradition in Africa hasbeen changed in the post-Cold War era by the rise of Islamic activist groupsseeking to use Islam as a means of political empowerment. Dissatisfied byresults of the past and the failure of post-colonial African states to provideadequate solutions to the socio-economic and political problems, many peo-ple were looking for an alternative ideology of governance. Asad Abukhalil,


assistant professor of political science at California State University arguesthat “Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ has a special appeal because it is anti-West,because it has a level of authenticity, and because it speaks a language allpeople can understand. It is not a language of the elite. It is not a languagethat is spoken by those African graduates of the Sorbonne in the Cafe’s ofParis.”40 Professor Abukhalil is of the view that both nationalism and so-cialism have failed to solve national problems affirming that “Many peoplewere looking for a new system of ideology that is neither west nor east, andIslamic “fundamentalism” filled that vacuum.”41

Dr. Hassan Al-Turabi, leader of the Sudanese Islamic Front believesthat only Islam offers a true democracy. Al-Tourabi maintains that: “Cap-italism does not offer us a political role because it means people who mo-nopolize wealth monopolize power. So there is no shared power by allpeople. Socialism did not help very much because there would be only apublic sector, which controls everything and the elite on behalf of the pro-letariat will become a dictatorship over a very large class of people. Islamis offering us the solution for a model of a government of all people, atrue democracy not party democracy, tribo-democracy or bureaucracy, but ademocracy.”42

The failure of post-colonial African states to provide adequate solu-tions to the economic problems, to fight corruption, to prevent violationsand abuses of human rights by both its civilian as well as military officials,to organize dissents and resolve disputes through political channels, the un-conditional support of some Western countries to these unpopular despoticregimes together with the obstinate implementation of Western values andinstitutions without taking into account the legitimate aspiration of its dif-ferent religious communities or, in some cases, creating socio-economic dis-parities between Muslims and Christians, have also contributed to the riseof Islamism in sub-Saharan Africa.

Promises of social development and welfare have not been realized bythe political secular elites. Islamic or Muslim elites presented themselves asthe viable alternative that realizes a society based on social justice, defenseof the poor, of morality and cultural identity. Frustrated by the depressingresults of their past under colonial rules and their present under oppres-sive kleptomaniac and corrupt leadership, Africans like other peoples inthe Islamic World are in search of a new ideological tool of governancebased on their Islamic faith. The well-constructed illustration of the Islamistdiscourse has attracted professionals, intellectuals, students and, ordinarycitizens. Today, the presence of Islamic activism in the social and politicalfield in Africa is an undeniable fact.

In countries where Islam has a sizeable attendance, the political dis-course is hardly capable to carry on in a way totally independent from

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religion. And this is true not only to the religious elites but even to thesecular ones who have been trying to ignore and refute the linkages betweenreligion and politics. In this context, it is worth mentioning that manysecular African government leaders and heads of political parties (Aminin Ouganda, Bokassa in RCA, Bongo in Gabon) converted to Islam or pre-tended so in order to be in touch with their Muslim community, fearingrebellion or in quest of popular legitimacy.

The Islamist message gained popularity and presence through the abil-ity of the leaders to provide a web of community services and to convincethe masses of believers that Islam is the solution to their problems and thereturn to the fundamentals of Islam by accepting the advent of the Islamiststo power will end their problems. The discourse of the Islamists is not onlypolitical and socio-economic but cultural and religious too. They are againstwestern cultural domination and hold their regimes responsible for allow-ing this culture to penetrate and corrupt their Islamic mores and values.Consequently, their actions cover a large web of social, educational, cul-tural, political and financial fields. Health services and volunteering are alsointegral part of this action. These services are carried out by a multitudeof channels such as Universities, schools, Islamic institutions, Internationalgovernmental and non governmental organizations, companies, banks, asso-ciations, private initiatives and the media. As a general rule its spokesmendeploy considerable efforts to spread the faith and in some parts call for theimplementation of its content to look for influence or expand support fortheir power seeking ambitions.

In addition, the emergence of Islamic movements in Africa South of theSahara is not an isolated phenomenon but it is a comprehensive componentof a long-lasting struggle of Muslims in Africa to attain their liberty and inde-pendence from local autocracies, global authoritarianism and to assert theirright to have their own self-directed choice of destiny. Therefore, it wouldbe necessary to size up the field of modern African Islamic movements onthe current map of African Islamic activism, examine their distinguishingcharacteristics and common features and end up with an assessment of thedifferent views and opinions on their potential threat to home country secu-larism, western interests or their ability to transform the sub-continent intoa launch pad for transnational terrorism.

NIGERIA

The history of Islam in Nigeria goes back to the seventh Century andthe religion is part of the countries’ political, social and cultural heritage.With over 53,000,000 million Muslims, Nigeria has more Muslims than


Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and the whole gulf countries combined. It is also anIslamo-Christian nation with a slight majority of Muslim population. Afterthe advent of democratic pluralism in 1999 and the emergence of politicizedmilitant Islamic movements, the country became increasingly a subject ofregional and international concern. Decades of military dictatorships, eco-nomic mismanagement, financial chaos, lawlessness, poverty, political re-pression, social tensions, corruption, are but major causes behind the rise ofIslamism in Nigeria. People turned to the religious channel to address theirsocial grievances, to reassert their Islamic identity and to realize their polit-ical aspirations convinced that Islam will bring greater justice and economicwell-being. Under the military rule, Muslim generals opposed firmly the ex-tended application of Shari’a penal legislations on constitutional grounds.The sporadic attempts of some Islamist movements calling for an Islamicsystem of government have been defeated.

However, the advent of democratic pluralism and the return to civilianrule in 1999 paved the way to the rise of political Islam. Shifting the balanceof power from the Muslim military rulers of the North to the Christian South,the advent of democratic pluralism has equally brought into focus the Shari’a as a new tool by which northern Muslim leaders may well mobilize themasses around the Islamist rhetoric to achieve political gains and keep thebalance of power to their advantage.

Headed by a mixture of modern educated contemporary Islamic class ofintellectuals and traditional Muslim scholars, Islamic movements in Nigeriabelieve in Jihad and martyrdom as vital means to establish a true IslamicState. They denounce secularism and claim their attachment to the applica-tion of Shari’a law as an important component of their Islamic faith. Theirdeclared objective is to create an Islamic State based on the fundamentals ofIslam. They use preaching, discussion groups, distribution of Islamic pam-phlets, lectures in educational institutions, the media, public manifestationsand a variety of other social and community services to create an Islamicpolitical consciousness. They advocate the adoption of Islamic economic in-stitutions, Islamic banking and insurance systems in line with the teachings ofIslam. Under its influence, many universities are offering courses on Islamiceconomics as part of their curriculum.43

Currently, there are at least seven cross-cutting tendencies within theNigerian Muslim community.44 Some observers of the Nigerian political land-scape assume that the appearance of Islamism in Nigeria conceals its realpurpose under the mask of religion. They argue that religion has been ma-nipulated and the implementation of Shari’a law hides a more inclusivepolitical agenda of the Islamist movements. In contrast, Nigerian Islamistsbelieve that the socio-economic problems, the legal, financial and moral cor-ruption are the result of the people’s desertion of Islam. Whatever the case

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may be, the fact is that the larger majority of Nigerian Muslims accept Shari’aas a component of Islam and a divine source for a complete Islamic way oflife and codes of personal behavior.

Since Nigeria returned to civilian rule in May 1999, several states innorthern Nigeria have introduced and extended the application of the Islamderived Shari’a penal code to criminal matters.45 Lower courts that werepreviously limited to addressing matters of personal and civil law are nowentitled to judge criminal cases involving Muslims and hand down “Hudud”punishments for criminal offences such as robbery, fornication and adultery.

There are fears that the emergence of Islamism, together with the riseof inter-religious violence, ethnic nationalism, and anti western sentimentscould transform Nigeria into a magnet to violent militant Islamists, and con-sequently, a heaven to terrorist networks. Although these fears are not wellgrounded46, they are sometimes justifiable by the fact that the federal gov-ernment declared on March 2002 Shari’a to be unconstitutional and irrecon-cilable with the provisions of the federal constitution and Nigeria’s interna-tional obligations. This may deprive Nigerian Islamists of political expressionand make them to resort to unlawful political tactics such as terrorism, and toseek alliances with global reach Islamic terrorists. Some reports allege thatIranian-sponsored Hezbollah, Sudan and Saudi Arabia continue to developtheir presence within the Nigerian movements and that Al-Qaeda has clas-sified Nigeria as a country ready to be liberated from the slavery of tyrannyand apostate regimes.47 However, at the moment, there is no known con-nection between Nigerian Islamic movements and global militant Islamic orterrorist networks. There is indeed violence between and within Nigeria’sdifferent religious communities. However, presently, there are no signs ofactions qualified as “terrorist” against the Nigerian government or Westerninterests.

Finally, Nigeria is the largest Muslim populated country in Sub-SaharaAfrica, it has problems of socio-economic development, political instability,vast uncontrollable borders, widespread poverty, unemployment and socialinequalities, inter-religious and ethnic tensions, notorious culture of lawless-ness and corruption, linkages with Wahabism in Saudi Arabia and Shismin Iran, loose financial regulation, judicial deficiency and multitude of edu-cational systems. There is no doubt that such an environment needs to bemonitored in order to avert the growth of religious extremism and avoid theadvent of terrorist money laundering, recruitment or other occult activities.However, this does not imply that Nigeria is an outfitted hotbed for “Islamicterrorism.” There is indeed a danger, but it should not be stretched out of itsrealistic proportions and should be checked out and monitored within thelimits of its context. Although concerns over the rise of religious extremismcoupled with the socio-economic and political chaos in Nigeria are justifiable


apprehensions, the most urgent issues to be addressed in order to keep outthe menace are strengthening the emerging democratic rule, enforcing in-ternational human rights and guaranteeing public accountability.

TANZANIA AND ZANZIBAR

Tanzania is the most populated Muslim country in east Africa. It hasabout 34 million inhabitants, about 1% are of non-African origins and twothirds of East Africa’s Muslims reside in Tanzania. Islam spread in east Africaduring the eighth Century through trade. Muslim and Christians are equallydivided (40%) and the remainder (20%) consists of practitioners of otherfaiths, mostly traditional indigenous religions.

After the independence of Tanganyika in December 1961 and Zanzibarin December 1963, the two entities signed an Act of Union that createdthe new nation of The United Republic of Tanzania in April 1964 withDr. Julius Nyerere as President. The great majority of Muslims in Tanzaniaare Sunni. There is also some Hanafi with Indo-Pakistani origins and Malikiwith Yemini origins. They are divided between Qadriyah, largest Sufi order,the Shadiliyah, the Imami and Ismaili Shitte minority followers of Aga Khanand the Ibadiyya, which is a moderate branch of the Khariji movement andfollowed by Tanzanians of Omani origins.48

In the beginning of the last century Zanzibar witnessed the emergenceof Islamic movements such as the the Jamiyyatu Shubba al-Muslimin (TheYoung Muslims Association), founded on November 25, 1935 by Salimbin Abdullah bin Wadan (1901–1942) and the Indian National Associa-tion (INA), whose first president was Yusufali Esmailjee Jivanjee.49 OtherTanzania’s Islamic organizations such as the East African Muslim WelfareSociety (EAMWS) founded in Mombassa in 1945 by the then Aga Khan,the Tanzania Muslim Council, the Islamic Writers’ Workshop which wasfounded in 1975 as a unit within BAKWATA (The Supreme Council ofTanzanian Muslims), Tanzania Qur’anic Council and the Daressalaam Uni-versity Muslim Trusteeship concentrated their focus on issues related toShari’a, Muslim welfare and Islamic education.50

Writing on Islam and politics in Tanzania, Mohammed Saeed of theMuslim Writer’s Organization noted “few of these organizations are offi-cially registered. More rigid Islamic groups spreading propaganda for theresurrection of an Islamic government in Tanzania are few and small, butless far-reaching signs of revitalization of Islam are evident.”51 However, therise of more active Islamic movement in Zanzibar was obvious. With over98% Muslim population, the history and dynamics of Islam in Zanzibar makeit a whole different story. Zanzibar accounts for 2.5 percent of the country’s

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population. The Islands were tied to the Islamic world since the arrival ofIslam, particularly to the Omani sultanate. Whereas the mainland is secularthe islands’ populations are tied by history, culture and origins to Islam andto the gulf countries. Some observers have suggested that there were signsthat Islamism in Zanzibar and the mainland of Tanzania is rising. In ZanzibarIslamists known as Simba wa Mungu (God’s Lion) and Wanaharakita (ac-tivists) hold close drastic interpretation of the religion and have led actionsin order to replace conservative imams, destroy alcohol stores and controlthe public appearance of Women.52 Later some western countries warnedtheir citizens of potential terrorist attacks on the Island.

Also, in Tanzania, Islamists are suspected to have interest in trading,banking, oil, farming and gemstone dealings, especially in diamonds, tan-zanite and gold. 53There is also a fear that the existence of Muslims withArabic or Indo-Pakistani descent in Zanzibar who are sympathetic to vio-lent militant Islamist groups in the Middle East and Asia could transformthe Island into a hunting lodge for terrorist movements’ money launder-ing activities or operations. Unemployment and poverty could also provideradical movements with fertile recruitment ground.

Although these fears are meaningful they should not be hyped. The riseof Islamism in Tanzania and particularly in Zanzibar is closely related to lo-cal political problems rather than to a global Islamist agenda. Also, it is notthe result of political rivalry between Muslims and Christians as such but be-tween the Muslims and the mainland government. The majority of Muslimsfelt discriminated against for decades by the mainland government and ex-cluded from good education, employment, and public service opportunities.However, the closeness of Sufi-based popular Islam to African traditions pre-vented the emergence of violent militant Islamist movements and promotedamicable relationships between the two religious communities. Sporadic ten-sions have existed particularly on the issues of Shari’a law, Islamic educationand Tanzania’s membership to the organization of Islamic conference, butthere is no evidence of violent inter-religious clashes and confrontation.

SENEGAL

The Republic of Senegal is a small but influential country at the extremewest of Africa. Islam has been in Senegal for over 1000 years. The country hasa population of six million people, of whom almost 90 percent are Muslim;the remaining 10 percent are either Christians or animists. The country hasalso adopted multi-party politics earlier than most other African States.

Islam in Senegal has a special character in that it is overwhelmingly rep-resented by Sufi orders, to which the vast majority of the Muslim


population owe allegiance. The Islamic mystical orders (Sufi) characterizethe Senegalese political, economic and cultural life. The largest of these or-ders are the Tijaniyyah and the Muridiyyah. There is also the Qadiriyah andthe Layenne (Lebu). Individual adherents to these orders become membersby inheritance and by paying allegiance to a Sheikh or Marabout. In somecases adherents learn a supplementary prayer formula peculiar to the or-der. Male members usually meet regularly, and devotion to the order andits sheikhs is often the primary loyalty of its members although feelings ofSenegalese nationalism and identity are also strong today. 54

In addition, hierarchies within the order take the place of the learned“orthodox” Islamic leaders, or Ulamma. The orders also have a major polit-ical and economic influence. For many Senegalese Islam is what the orderssay it is, although the orders themselves are becoming increasingly learnedin Islamic orthodoxy. Manifestly, there is no conflict between these religiousorganizations and the secular institutions of the State.55

The dynamics of religion and politics in Senegal have created relation-ships of dependence and cooperation between the government and the Sufileaders and preserved peace and stability in the country. It is interestingto note that contrary to the practices of politicized religious organizationsin other places, Senegalese Islamic brotherhoods are neither subversive nordestabilizing but supporting pillars of the national political edifice as a whole,and this, in spite of their efforts to influence the political course of the coun-try in some areas of social and public concern such as education, Islamicfinance and banking. In the justice system there is a perfect harmony be-tween secular and Islamic laws. Shari’a codes are only applied on mattersof marriage, divorce, property and inheritance. The Shari’a codes of harshcriminal punishment are excluded from the legal system.

Recently though, with a growing external influence in Senegal, a moreorthodox type of Islamic education and intellectual is appearing. The“Ibadou Rahmane,” an Islamist movement which was founded 25 years agoand related to the Egyptian Muslim brothers, is struggling to establish a cul-ture of Islamic mores and virtues. Through their community services, theyrecruit militants to advance their cause. From kindergarten to the high schoollevels, they promote religious instruction in the educational sphere. Manyof their followers are university graduates.56

However, regardless of some calls to establish an Islamic republic andthe fact that Islamism could gain ground considerably faster if the govern-ment’s policy of socioeconomic revival of the country would fail, the Islamistmovement in Senegal lacks leadership and a large base to immediately cre-ate an Islamic State.57 Moreover, some observers believe that there is atendency toward the politicization of Islam in Senegal pointing to the factthat the Islam of Sufi brotherhood is gradually loosing ground to a form of

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militant Islam, particularly in the suburbs, of representing a real challenge tothe secular establishment. They guess Senegal will become the first Islamicrepublic in Black Africa within the coming two decades. Whatever hap-pens, an Islamic state does not necessarily mean an “extremist” one and thepossibility of Senegal becoming an extremist Islamic country is remarkablyremote.

KENYA

In Kenya, Islam has been associated with the country for close to amillennium when Islam first came to the country during the second CaliphUmar lbn Al-Khatab. It came through individual Arab traders and emi-grants who arrived at the coast. It is also believed that Islam, came to Kenyathrough a group of immigrants from Shiraz, a town in today’s Iran, un-der the leadership of Ali bin al-Hasan in the 10th Century C.E.58 Presently,over half of Kenya’s Muslim minority is of Somali origin. The remain-der is largely made up of Galla-speaking peoples and the Swahili-speakingcommunity.59 Muslim peoples of Kenya are a diverse, heterogeneous mi-nority population weakened by internal divisions. 60 Despite this position,their concentration in the coastal areas, their uninterrupted contact withMuslims from the Arabian Peninsula since the fourteenth Century,61 theirconnections with Islamic movements in Tanzania, Sudan and Somali and therecent operations conducted by some elements of violent militant Islamistgroups have made Kenya’s Muslim community a subject of internationalconcern.

Moreover, the marginalization of almost 30% of Kenyan Muslims andtheir neglect by the central government for decades has brought theIslamic movement grievances to the forefront, particularly with the adventof multiparty democracy. According to Sheikh Abdallah A. Kheir, a lec-turer at the department of Islamic Studies, Islamic University in Uganda:“The establishment of the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) shortly beforethe Kenya National election in 1992 provides evidence of a great Muslimawakening in the country.”62 Furthermore, groups such as Muslims for Hu-man Rights (Muhuri), the Council of Imams and Preachers, the Mombasabranch of the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims and the Friends of AlAqsa continue to play a potent role in Mombassa politics.”63 They expresstheir opposition through Islamic activism to redress social, economic andpolitical grievances. Although, religious tensions have started to build upover a proposal to entrench the authority of Islamic courts in Kenya, thedevelopment of religious extremism, at any time in the future, isdistant.


SOUTH AFRICA

About 1 million of South Africa’s 43 million people are Muslim. Un-der the leadership of academics and professionals in the Western Cape andinspired by modern Islamic movements in Pakistan and Egypt as well asthe Non-European Unity Movement in the Western Cape, South Africa’sIslamic movement began in the 1950’s.64 In 1970, the Muslim Youth Move-ment and, in 1983, the Call of Islam joined the larger democratic movement inthe fight against social and political inequalities in South Africa. Nowadays,two predominantly Islamist organizations operate in South Africa: PAGAD(an acronym for People Against Gangsterism and Drugs) and Qibla (theArabic word for the direction to the holy city of Mecca).65 The emergenceof local crime and drug gangs’ activities and the inefficiency of local po-lice authorities to eradicate their dealings coupled with the frustration ofMuslim communities led to the creation of PAGAD in 1996.66 Observers be-lieve that PAGAD is not only a community organization opposed to crime,gangsterism and drugs, but a politically-oriented Islamic organization whoseeks to control the whole Muslim community of South Africa. Qibla wasformed in 1980 by Achmad Cassiem,67 a charismatic Islamic leader and a for-mer Robben Island political detainee who was inspired by Iran’s AyatollahKhomeini. Started out as an anti-Apartheid movement, Qibla is today amilitant Shiite Muslim organization. It seeks to create an Islamic politicaland oppositional consciousness to mobilize and give direction to the SouthAfrican Muslim community. 68

PAGAD and its ally Qibla view the South African Government as athreat to Islamic values. Both movements promote greater political voicefor South African Muslims. Abdus Salaam Ebrahim currently leads bothgroups. PAGAD’s G-Force (Gun Force) operates in small cells and is be-lieved responsible for carrying out acts of “terrorism.” “PAGAD uses sev-eral front names including Muslims Against Global Oppression (MAGO)and Muslims Against Illegitimate Leaders (MAIL) when launching anti-Western protests and campaigns.”69 Since 2001, PAGAD’s activities havebeen severely curtailed by law-enforcement and prosecutorial efforts againstleading members of the organization. Between 1996 and 2000, they still con-ducted a total of 189 bomb attacks, including nine bombings in the WesternCape.” PAGAD’s previous bombing targets have included South Africanauthorities, moderate Muslims, synagogues, gay nightclubs, tourist attrac-tions and Western-associated restaurants. PAGAD is also believed to havemasterminded the bombing on 25 August 1998 of the Cape Town PlanetHollywood.”70

Beside these movements, there is Al-Murabitun or “Murabitun” (whichwas established in 1983 under the influence of Shaikh Abdul Qadir

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al-Murabit) the Mujlisul Ulama of South Africa (MUSA) and the IslamicUnity Convention (IUC), which was established in March 1994 to serve asan umbrella body for Muslim organizations in South Africa and to act asa “watchdog” on issues affecting the Muslim community.71 There is muchcontroversy as to whether the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) existsin South Africa or not. Very little is also known about the Jihad Movementof South Africa whose spokesperson is known only by the alias of Younus.72

Factors conducive to the emergence of religious extremism such aspoverty, corruption, massive unemployment, high levels of crime do exist inSouth Africa and could strengthen the current Islamist drive in the country.73

Bearing in mind the fact that under the Apartheid regime, South Africa hadone of the world’s most advanced bio-chemical weapons programs and thatthere are many symbols of Western corporate interests in the country, fearsof future threats are justified. However, due to the relatively small size of theMuslim Community in South Africa, its conservative nature and the coun-try’s smooth transition to multi-party democracy, Islamic militancy in SouthAfrica has been slowed down.74

SOMALIA

Islam was probably brought to Somalia by early followers of the Prophetwho sought refuge from persecution in Mecca. It is also possible that Islamcame to Somalia through contacts with Persian and Arab merchants andseamen who founded settlements along the Somali coast 1,000 or more yearsago.75 As in other parts in Africa, Islam in Somalia is one of the largest Sufibrotherhoods. The Somali, who are Sunni Muslims, are equally the followersof three prominent Sufi orders; the Qadiriyah, the Ahmadiyah-Idrisiyah, andthe Salihiyah. The social role of these traditional religious functionaries indirecting the society began to shrink in the 1950s and 1960s as some of theirlegal and educational powers and responsibilities were transferred to secularauthorities.76

The position of religious leaders changed substantially after the 1969revolution and the introduction of scientific socialism. Siad Berry insistedthat his version of socialism was compatible with Qur’anic principles andreacted harshly to the criticism of some religious leaders by executing some ofthe protesters.77 Subsequently, religious leaders seem to have accommodatedthemselves to the government.78 The activism of current Islamic movementsappeared on the Somali religious and political scene in the 1980’s whenthe Al Ittihad Islamic movement was founded by University graduates andprofessional Somali intellectuals as a reaction to the repressive and corruptpolicies of former president Mohammed Siad Berry.79


Before the collapse of the Berry regime in early 1991 and the eruptionof the civil war, the Muslim community never witnessed religious disputesor tendencies towards Islamism. This is mainly because the tribal tendency,which is predominant to date, prevailed over the communal configuration.80

The stateless situation which followed the civil war after the overthrowof President Siad Berry created a fertile ground for the emergence anddevelopment of fundamentalism as a political trend which will be used as analternative unifying factor (ideology) by the most important Somali funda-mentalists movements such as Al Itihad Al-Islami, Al-Islah and Al- Wahda.81

According to Ken Menkhaus, what makes the development of contem-porary Islamic fundamentalism fearsome in Somalia is that the movementevolved in a stateless situation and uses grass roots approach, ideology, busi-ness and military expansionism to advance its cause.82 In the author’s words,however, if these processes succeed in gaining their final stage, they willbecome highly regimented, formidable and a hard nut to crack. Menkhausalso observed that from 1996, Al Ittihad leaders changed their approach onthe premise that Somalia was not yet ready for Islamic rule and adopted anew strategy based on “Promoting education in fundamentalist Islam; De-centralization and the inclusion of the ‘Turabi strategy’ of infiltrating exist-ing governmental organizations, rather than seizing power.”83 In accordancewith this strategy, he stated that “Al Ittihad has taken key posts in manygovernments while allowing the secular authority to continue to function.”84

Mr. Menkhaus warned from portraying “Al Ittihad as a monolithicorganization.”85

ETHIOPIA

Ethiopia was the land of refuge for the first Muslims who fled to thiscountry to escape persecution. Most of Ethiopia’s Muslims are Sunnis, mem-bers of the largest sect of Islam. Islam arrived early in Ethiopia with thefirst emigration of Muslims from Mecca in 615 CE, well before the founda-tional Hijra to Medina in 622.86 In the 15th Century, Muslims had alreadyconquered the strongest grounds of Christianity, the highlands settled byAmharas, which the Christians however recaptured. In the 17th Century, theposition of Islam was strengthened and stabilized. Several kingdoms andsultanates developed in the Ethiopian highlands.87

Currently, Islam shows a tendency to expand, which can be seen in in-creasing educational activities and new mosques rising in different areas inEthiopia. The number of Muslims varies locally and amounts to 30–50% ofthe total population. In spite of their strong presence, Muslims have neverdominated the political scene in Ethiopia and for a long time Ethiopia’s

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Muslims had not been in contact with the rest of the Muslim world.88 Withthe near exception of the Ogaden National Liberation Front, Islamist groupssuch as the Afar Liberation Front and the Islamic Front for the Liberationof Oromia are considered to be relatively inactive. 89 However, there is apossibility that Ethiopia will be exposed to Islamism if the current govern-ment fails to address the economic crisis and if the Oromo’s Muslim racialgroup succeed in getting hold of the political power.90

In a recent survey of Islamic populations around the world, the Inter-national Population Centre at San Diego State University maintains thatEthiopia’s Muslim population is 29 million. The same survey indicates thatEthiopia is tied with Morocco for the eleventh-largest Muslim populationin the world. If the figures in this survey are accurate, it means“Christian” Ethiopia has more Muslims than Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Iraq,and Afghanistan. Ethiopia’s current population is probably about 45 per-cent Ethiopian Orthodox, between 40 and 45 percent Sunni Muslim, at least5 percent Protestant, and most of the remainder animist. But militant Is-lam is in rise in Ethiopia. Groups such as the Oromo Liberation Front andthe Benishangul Liberation Front, aim to topple the government in Ad-dis Ababa.91 In contrast, bearing in mind its higher Muslim population andits geographical coastal location on the red sea, the threat of Islamism inEritrea is more eminent than in Ethiopia. Islam has played an importantrole in the creation of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) in Cairo in 1960and the war for independence. The liberation movement was founded as anIslamic organization and supported by Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Iraq, andSudan.92

NIGER

In Niger, the rising tide of Islamism took serious proportions and wor-ried even the central government in particular in the regions neighboringNigeria where there is a tendency to the practice of Islamic Shari’a andstricter interpretations of Islamic law despite the efforts of the government tocombat extremism. The tribal, religious and social links and interactions be-tween the Izalah fundamentalist groups of Nigeria and the religious groupsin Niger increased the tendency toward the adoption of Shari’a law. TheIslamic University of Niger has also played an important role in provid-ing the Shari’a advocates with university graduates ready to practice theirknowledge. Furthermore, the widespread rejection (on the grounds of bothcustom and Islamic law) of the long-standing draft Family Code, the target-ing of local churches, the campaign against mini-skirts and family planningprograms, are all clear signs of a desire to observe a strict form of Islam.93


In its efforts to curtail the activities of militant Islamists, the govern-ment banned six fundamentalist-oriented organizations in November 2000on the grounds that these organizations were responsible for “disturbingthe peace.” Two other organizations were banned in the fall of 2001 and thegovernment reaffirmed the ban in April 2002 against the same organizationswho issued a tract calling for a jihad in which they denounced the secularstate and advocated Shari’a law. The leaders were arrested in June 2002and charged with incitement to revolt.94 The leader of the Association forIslamic Education and Culture (ACEI), Chairman Sheikh Imam Younous,and the leader of the Niger Islamic Organization (OIN), Secretary-GeneralBoubacar El-Hadj, are believed to be spreading anti-western sentiments andmobilizing followers to support Jihad.95

In today’s Niger, there is no factual warning sign that pure religiouspolitics have started to take root or a predictable extremist nightmare. Al-though Islamism is gaining ground and there is a real wish for an Islamicrule system, the fact that the government is still in solid control, the absenceof a well-structured fundamentalist ideology and qualified leaders to headthe movement, exclude the emergence of a politicized extremist religioustrend within the Nigerian society. The majority of Muslims in Niger are re-ligious and loyal to their faith but they still appear to be free from extremisttendencies.

Nevertheless, due to its proximity to Nigeria and its high percentageof Muslim population, Niger Islamism is on rise particularly in the South.Local Islamists groups’ threats of terrorist attack against the 2001 Paris-Dakar rally led to the cancellation of the event. However, as it is common inmany African countries, Islam in Niger is rather a faith and an identity thana political creed.

MALI

Mali, where an Islamic State and Islamic University were found since thedawn of Islam in Africa96, is witnessing a significant but a distinctive and a dif-ferent move towards Islamism. The role of democratic rule in curtailing theemergence of religious extremism is evident in the case of Mali. Despite thedepressing image of democracy in Islamic countries and the lack of politicalparticipation in African states, a recent survey conducted by Freedom Houseindicated that of the forty-seven countries in the world with Muslim majori-ties, only one, Mali, could be characterized as free.97 “To qualify as ‘free,’ acountry must have democratic elections as well as a gamut of civil libertiesand citizens’ rights.”98 The fact that Mali met those tough criterion, provethe uniqueness of its political system and establish a relationship betweenits democracy and its Islamic movement’s broadminded and peaceful move

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towards their hope of establishing an “‘Islamic state’ more in line with tra-ditional African values and more representative of the population.”99

Although Muslim leaders, politicians and some religious figures repeat-edly asserted the need for an Islamic state, the existence of some calls tojihad to rid the country of the “infidels” and implement Shari’a law, and inspite of the fact that Mali is not entirely sheltered from potential religiousextremism occurrence, the espousal of democratic ideals almost every timeexclude the preconditions for rendering active the region’s religious forcesthat are ready to resort to extremism. This situation strengthens the State andopens the door to acceptable compromises and/or settlements of religiouslybased political disputes to the satisfaction of all concerned.

CHAD

In Chad, Islam is the cornerstone of the historical kingdom of the Kanemfounded in the sixth Century and the Sultanate of Baguirmi in the sixteenthCentury and Ouaddai in the seventeenth Century. The religion was also oneof the ideological pillars of the Front of the National Liberation of Chad(FROLINAT) founded after the Nyala conference in Sudan in 1966. Theimpact of the religion on the civil war and the divide between the Muslimin the North and Christians in the South continued during the eighties andis still controlling the essence of the political divergence between these twocommunities.

Contrary to Sudan and Nigeria where Jihadist and reformist tendencieshave characterized the religion, Islam in Chad has been relatively under thesupremacy of the Sufi brotherhoods. The majority of Chadians owe alle-giance to the Tijaniyyah Sufi order.100 But unlike Senegal where the move-ment has renowned local clerics and a major political and economic influ-ence, the movement in Chad restricted itself to the practice of the Tijanniahrites of Wirds (litanies), Wazifa (office) and the participation in the weeklyFriday Hadra (seance). The brotherhood in Chad is not politically orientedand has not provided a rallying point for unified action to gain local politicalinfluence comparable to that of the Tijanniah in Senegal or Khatmiyah andthe Ansar in Sudan. Similarly, the Sanusiyah,101 a brotherhood founded inLibya in the mid-nineteenth century, enjoyed substantial economic and po-litical influence in the Lake Chad Basin around 1900. Despite French fearsof an Islamic revival movement led by “Sanusi fanatics,” Chadian adherents,limited to the Awlad Suleiman Arabs and the Toubou of eastern Tibesti,have never been numerous.102

The reason behind the flawed appeal of the order is to be found in thefact that the Sanusya of Muhammad Ibn ’Ali Sanusi (1787–1860), who had


ruled Northern Chad from 1835 until their defeat by the French in 1913, wasfirst and foremost a theocratic military organization operating under thecover of religious reform to achieve political and economic goals and not anexclusively Sufi order in search for a trusty mystical knowledge of God, thedistinguishing attribute of Sufism. Furthermore, the selfish mercantilist andexpansionist intentions of the Sanusyah toward Northern Chad has reducedits standing and limited its audience within the descendants of the Arabrefugees who began their escape to Chad after their defeat by the Turks inthe Al Baqla battle in the middle of the nineteenth Century.

In recent times, within the Islamic community, the Government hasintervened to imprison and sanction Islamist imams believed to be promot-ing conflict among Muslims. The Government claims that the men wereresponsible for inciting religious violence; their followers reject the Govern-ment’s claim and cite religious differences with the Government.103 Also,some voices have been raised lately to reform the family code in conformitywith the teachings of Islam and there is a growing religious social activism interms of collective moral and social conduct with a significant move towards adiscovery, or rediscovery, of certain fundamental Islamic values. Althougha small minority of the country’s Muslims (5–10 percent) are consideredIslamist104, there is no a clear tendency towards religious extremism as such.Chadians single out religion only to resolve local conflicts instead of makingtransnational troubles.

However, the fact that Islam was the streamer of the first liberationmovement (FROLINAT) in the country, the occurrence of sporadic religioustensions between Christians and Muslims due to the proselytizing activitiesby evangelical Christians, the exploitation of oil fields in the South, the ram-pant religiosity of the population, the lack of democratic rules and respectfor human rights added to external political and educational influences donot exclude the appearance of an extremist religious tendency in the future.Similarly, there is a fear that the exclusion of Arabic educated elites, whosemajority are graduates of Islamic Universities in the Middle East and sym-pathetic to the Islamist agenda, from real employment opportunities andpower positions will create a distinct class of elites with a militant potentialready to mobilize the disenfranchised pious masses and challenge the secularestablishment.

SUDAN

Islam spread in Sudan in the 7th century A.D. during the reign of CaliphOsman Ibni Affan, when Muslim conquerors invaded the country under theleadership of Ouqba Ibni Nafi El—Fahri, one of the Prophet’s companion

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who fought the Nubians and torn down the Christian presence in the cityof Dunqulah. In Sudan, the Islam of the rural areas is, as often as in Africa,one of the big confraternities. In the Northern and Eastern parts of thecountry the leading religious brotherhoods or orders are the Qadiriyyah,implanted in Sudan since the XVIth Century and the Khatmiyyah, foundedin the beginning of the XIXth Century by Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani.This confraternity is, much hierarchized, centralized and the most politicaland most influential of the country.105 Other notable religious brotherhoodsare the Tijaniyah, the Majdhubiyah, the Idrisiyah, the Ismailiyah, and theSammaniya. As in other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, the existence of thiswide variety of Sufi orders has shed the Sudanese society with moderation,tolerance and openness.

Distinct from the traditional conservative Islamic Umma and Khatmiyyapolitical parties, the National Islamic Front is not derived from a Sufi con-fraternity. It is a contemporary militant and elitist Islamist movement with aspecific political and social agenda committed to the goal of creating a mod-ern Islamic State. The movement advocates Islam not as a mere religiousfaith, but as a rational political ideology, which should be integrated intopolitics, state, and society and in the whole national establishment to chal-lenge contemporary rival ideologies. They have a well-built confidence thatthe introduction of the laws and the ideals of Islam will prevent the Muslimcommunity from national, ethnic and class divisions, will help them create ajust society, a modern Islamic State with up to date economic and financialinstitutions, excel in science and technology and eventually challenge thehegemony of the west.

Since their ultimate objective is the pursuit of political power, they usevery sophisticated wide variety of approaches to ensure the triumph of theIslamist creed. Confrontation, conciliation, alliance and counter-alliance, in-filtration of the bureaucracy, army, student and women organizations, unionsand banks, political mobilization, incitement and uprising and engagementin charitable works are in the midst of their general tactics and method of ac-tions. Contrary to the leaders of the traditionalist and conformist movementswho preferred being the devotional focus of their followers and shaped theirIslamic ideas into mainstream political platforms and opposition parties,from its very early stages, challenging the existing regimes by a revolution-ary ideological Islam and the seizure of political power has been the burningpassion of the National Islamic Front leaders.

The Sudanese Islamist movement began as an Islamist students move-ment and was created in 1949 by Sudanese students and by Egyptian Broth-ers sheltered in Sudan after the repressive waves of 1948 and 1954 in theircountry.106 In the 1960s, the Islamic Charter Front became the Muslim Broth-erhood and in 1986 it was transformed into the National Islamic Front.107


From the beginning, its objective has been to implement the Shari’a Islamiclaw in the country and to establish a full Islamic state attuned to modernityand opened to innovations.

Since the foundation of the movement, Dr. Turabi 108has been the in-contestable leader and the chief planner of the National Islamic Front.Studious, familiar with International relations, politics and history, renownedjurist with deep understanding of Islamic thought and jurisprudence andboth common and civil law traditions, he transformed the movement intoa modern Islamist party and Sudan into an Islamic State and a podium forglobal Islamism.

During the Cold War, the movement “benefited both from US anti-communism and indiscriminate Saudi finance for Islamic groups.”109 Thecontext of the ideological battle between the superpowers facilitated themovement’s vigorous work towards the attainment of its Islamist agenda.Throughout the Cold War years, the movement recruited middle-class youngstudents, indoctrinated new followers, invested almost in all economic, bank-ing, insurance and financial sectors, infiltrated the public service, the military,trade unions, syndicates, student as well as youth movements and feminineand neighborhood associations. In short, it became an incontestably “pow-erful political force during the 1970s and 1980s, although it represented onlya small minority of Sudanese.”110

From 1953 (date of its legalization) till now the National Islamic Front(NIF) under the leadership of Turabi realized significant moves towards itspolitical assertion, in the mid-1960s it clamored for—and got—the expul-sion of the legitimately elected Communist Party from Sudan’s parliament,111 in 1983 it orchestrated the controversial introduction of the Shari’ a andin 1989 it planed the military coup which ended the democratically electedgovernment of Sadiq al-Mahdi and brought to power a military junta domi-nated by the National Islamic Front (NIF) led by Gen. Omar Hassan Ahmadal-Bashir who had, before the putsch, the reputation to direct the militarybranch of the NIF.

Soon after the 1989 coup, Sudan became officially a single party IslamicState governed by General al-Bashir and increasingly dominated by theNational Islamic Front (NIF), led by Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, the leading pro-ponent of militant Islam and the country’s head militant Islamist ideologue.The NIF is widely seen as the main political force behind the coup andunder its influence, the new government sped up the State’s Islamizationprocess and hastened the application of the Shari’ a Islamic law. Turabi be-lieves in cooperation between Islamic movements and “the developmentof institutionalized international links with other Muslim states and worktoward the eventual unity of the Umma and beyond.”112 “Furthermore, heemphasizes that it is important and obligatory for Islamic activists to work

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towards worldwide unity and to develop a balance between regional andinternational cooperation.”113

Convinced with this perception, he created the Popular Arab IslamicConference (PAIC) in 1990 as a global forum for Muslims from all over theWorld to meet at the popular level to exchange views on contemporary issuesof particular concern to Muslim nations and to counterpoise the Organiza-tion of Islamic Conference (OIC), the biggest international Islamic organi-zation, over which Saudi Arabia is believed to have tremendous influenceand considered by Turabi as unrepresentative of the Muslim peoples andinactive. Tourabi’s ambitions to encourage Islamic militants and to maintainrelations with Islamic movements throughout the world were manifest fromthe start. He overtly acknowledged that Sudan “has developed relations withall Islamic movements in the world and it is now becoming one of the leadingmodels because it is a complete movement with political, economic, social,cultural dimensions, very well-organized.”114

Because of its links to transnational militant Islamist movements, Sudanis considered as a sanctuary of global Islamism providing support, training,meeting place and safe heaven to radical Islamic groups primarily of Mid-dle Eastern origin such as Egypt’s Islamic Jihad, Iran’s Hezbollah and thePalestinian Hamas. In addition, observers mention as evidence of Sudan’sassociation with global terrorism, the fact that the Saudi-born Osama binLaden lived in Sudan for several years until he left to Afghanistan in 1996and that Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, convicted in the bombing of the WorldTrade Center obtained his visa to the U.S. in Khartoum. 115

The connection between Sudan and Iran and Sudan’s alleged involve-ment in the attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarakin June 1995 in Addis Ababa were also cited to proclaim Sudan as a playerin the world of international terrorism. Also, the Islamist government ofSudan has been widely accused of eradicating Christianity by implementingforced conversion, proscribing religious freedom and condoning slavery inthe country. As a result, Sudan was listed amongst the nations that spon-sor international terrorism alongside Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Koreaand Syria in 1993 and in October 1997, the U.S. imposed trade and financialsanctions against the Khartoum regime. The designation of state sponsorsof terrorism is a mechanism for isolating nations believed to use or supportterrorism as a means of political expression by imposing strict sanctions onthem.

Also, the UN Security Council imposed a series of international sanc-tions on Sudan after Khartoum denied complicity but refused to turn overthe would-be assassin and two others believed to be involved in the AddisAbaba plot against President Mubarak of Egypt. Besides, in August 1998, inthe wake of the East Africa embassy bombings, the U.S. launched retaliatory


cruise missile strikes against Khartoum Al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant claim-ing that the factory has a dual use or has been used to manufacture chemicalweapons.

In order to assess adequately the position of Sudan’s National IslamicFront as well as the country’s government regarding their alleged supportof global terrorism, it is essential to review the accusations leveled at boththe Sudanese Islamic movement and government that they are involved inthe encouragement of, and support for, international terrorism to estab-lish whether they are to some degree verified and defensible or hyped andunproven. General Al—Bashir, head of the Sudanese State and al-Turabi,leader of Sudan’s National Islamic Front, have denied any links with terror-ism and confirmed repeatedly that Sudan has no connections to transnationalterrorism and is being fallaciously accused because of its Islamic orientation.However, both leaders have acknowledged the presence of a mixture of Is-lamist who entered their territory during the period of their non-visa opendoor policy to Arab nationals and Palestinian refugees, but firmly deniedany presence of training camps for non-Sudanese groups.

Defying the allegations that Sudan is providing training camps forIslamic extremists groups, al-Turabi declared that “There isn’t any countryin the world that can provide one person as evidence of him being trained inthe Sudan. People say that we are training Algerians, why don’t you provideone Algerian or one Egyptian and prove that he was trained in the Sudan?This is an absolute concoction, find out the facts yourself.”116 He went on tosay “We suspect that it’s just an anti-Islamic spirit but they can’t say it thatway, they just want to use another pretext.”117

Although al-Turabi, was the first to welcome Bin Laden, some observersof the Sudanese political scene believe that his acceptance in Sudan was morerelated to financial reasons than to unconditional ideological support for hisglobal Islamic agenda. They argued “the Sudanese viewed him as an investorwho came to support the Islamic project declared by Dr. Hasan al-Turabi.”118

Al-Quds al-Arabi’s investigation and interviews revealed that during hisSudan years, Bin Laden was “a moving bank” for the Sudanese Government.“He saved the government from many of the problems it faced.”119 Theyaffirm that Osama bin Laden used to purchase the entire product of Sudanesecotton in cash and hard–foreign—currency, pay the bill of petrol importedby the Sudanese Government whenever it was short of hard currency andgave the government once an $80-million loan to import wheat urgentlydue to an acute shortage in this commodity.120 “Another source notes thatOsama bin Laden built a network of businesses, including an Islamic bank(al-Shamal), an import-export firm (Wadi al-Aqiq), and firms that exportedgum arabic, corn, and sesame products (Taba Investment and Al-Thamar al-Mubarakah).” “An engineer by training, they say, bin Laden also used his

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family connections “in the construction business to help Sudan build roadsand airport facilities.”121

Concerning the Sudano- Iranian connections, the bilateral relations be-tween the two countries were based essentially upon economic and diplo-matic considerations. While Iran turned to Sudan mainly as part of its effortsto break its diplomatic isolation, the Sudanese seem interested mainly inIranian economic aid, including subsidized oil. Out of this particular con-text, there was in fact some kind of uneasiness in the interaction betweenthe two Islamic models. “In addition to the historical animosity betweenthe Sudanese Sunni and the Iranian Shia branches of Islam, Al-Turabi useto criticize the dominance of the clergy in the Islamic Republic contend-ing that it has alienated the intellectuals and has frustrated attempts totranscend tradition and re-think basic concepts, leading to sectarianism andsuperficiality.”122

Accordingly, Turabi as a global Islamist leader distanced himself fromthe orthodox views of the Iranian clergy fearing alienation of his liberalapproach to Islamism and Islam. Turabi also voiced regret that Islam hadbeen introduced through a revolution, a process which leaves a legacy. Hedescribed Khomeini as “too abstract” and “sometimes wrong.” “The mainproblem of the Iranian militants, he has said, is that they lacked a clearpolitical and social agenda.”123 Interviewed by veteran New York Timesjournalist Judith Miller, Turabi pointed out some of the differences betweenShia and Sunni Islam. He hoped that in the future “all the titles of the Shiitechurch—the ayatollahs, or marjahs, or hajatollahs, or whatever, will disap-pear from their society.” Miller points out that Shiite religious leaders would“undoubtedly find this view obnoxious and heretical.”124 In a comparisonbetween Turabi and Sheikh Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah of Lebanon, aleading Shiite cleric, Miller speaks of a “vast gap in outlook, intellectual tra-dition, and dogma.” Turabi also clearly did not recognize the Shia’a conceptthat the most senior cleric should be an Islamic country’s supreme politicaland religious leader, opposing “barriers” between an individual and God.125

The accusations that the attempt made in Addis Ababa in June 1995 byEgyptian dissidents to assassinate President Mubarak has been planned anddirected with the support of the Government of Sudan remain to be proved.Many meticulous analysis of some of the intrinsic aspects of the case con-cluded that “the evidence against Sudanese complicity in the assassinationattempt is remarkably poor.”126 It is significant to note that Egypt as well asEthiopia—where the assassination attempt took place—both voted in sup-port of the September 2001 Resolution that lifted the International sanctionsimposed on Sudan by the United Nations Security Council. More astonish-ing, the Resolution in question was originally formulated with regard to theassassination attempt.


Turning to Alshifa Pharmaceutical and Veterinary Factory and its al-leged production of chemical weapons and poisonous gases for terroristpurposes, it is worth mentioning that many prominent peoples from thescientific and business community associated with the factory have dis-puted the claims that the factory is a military plant, that it has a dualuse or could have been used to manufacture chemical weapons.127 Theyrecognized it as a normal pharmaceutical factory for the production of sim-ple pharmaceutical products—syrups for humans, powders for goats andcamels.128

After a thorough investigation, Scott Loughrey, an amateur media criticfor the Baltimore Chronicle concluded: “The El-Shifa plant was never clan-destine.” It was opened in June 1997 with much fanfare. Over the years itwas visited by heads of state, foreign ministers, ambassadors, by internationalguests including the president of the Republic of Niger, the World Health Or-ganization’s director for the Mediterranean Region, the British and Germanambassadors to Khartoum, students of pharmacology, including Sudaneseschool children, and pharmacists from Switzerland, Britain, Egypt and theUnited Arab Emirates. “He wondered; would all these people have visiteda chemical weapons facility?”129

Oriana Zill, the associate producer for “Hunting Bin Laden” frontlinebulletin wrote:

“if the factory was ever producing any nerve gas-related chemicals, the evidence hasbeen less than convincing. There are two major problems with the U.S. government’scase. First, a test on a soil sample that the administration says proves that the plant wasinvolved in chemical weapons production is, according to many experts, inconclusive.Secondly, the Clinton administration has failed to demonstrate a solid financial linkbetween the plant and bin Laden. They initially claimed that the plant was ownedby the Sudanese Military Industrial Corporation, yet the plant had actually beensold to a Saudi millionaire, Saleh Idris, several months before the attack. The privateinvestigative firm of Kroll and Associates has found no solid financial link betweenbin Laden and Idris.”130

The government of Sudan had filed an official complaint about theAmerican action before the United Nations Security Council and askedthe United Nations to establish “a commission to verify the nature of theactivity of the plant.”131 The United Nations Security Council, under pres-sure from the United States, postponed a decision on whether or not tosend a verification Mission. No further steps were taken in spite of thecontinuing persistence of the Sudanese government. Finally, Defense Sec-retary William Cohen admitted in a press interview that he should haveknown that Al-Shifa made medical and agricultural products. SecretaryCohen also admitted in the same statement that there was no longer anydirect financial connection to be asserted between bin Laden and theplant.132

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In short, it was established beyond any doubt that the only Sudanesepharmaceutical plant, Al-Shifa, was privately owned and produced morethan half of Sudan’s need for human and veterinary medicines, including90% of the most critically needed drugs for the treatment of Malaria, Tu-berculosis and Cholera. The allegations that Osama bin-Laden owned thisfactory and that it produced chemical weapons and poisonous gases for ter-rorist purposes were proved to be devoid of truth.

On the other hand, most political observers and commentators reason-ably judge that there was no inconvertible evidence that the Governmentof Sudan is a hard liner extremist government, or a government that con-duct or sponsor terrorist operations within Sudan or overseas. Sean Gabbmaintains:

“. . . true, the Sudanese Government did for several years after 1989 operate an opendoor policy for the citizens of all other Arab countries, and of the territories occupiedby the Israelis. It is likely that many of those who came to the Sudan were members ofor sympathetic to organizations distasteful to the United States and Western opinionin general. But there is a considerable jump from these facts to inferring that officialtraining was given to any of these people.133

Dr. Douglas Johnston, president and founder of the International Cen-ter for Religion and Democracy, which has been working in the Sudan forinter-religious cooperation, acknowledged that “The brand of Islam in theSudan is very liberal. . . ”134and that there is no sign in the Sudan of allegationsof a state-sponsored terrorism.”135

CONCLUSION

Although they advocate the re-establishment of Islam in the social orpolitical life of their communities, and with the near exception of move-ments in Sudan, Nigeria and to some degree South Africa, African Islamicmovements are, in general, less politicized and locally oriented with a limitedagenda. This, could be attributed to many reasons. First, in the remainingcountries, Islam has not yet been developed into a tool of political struggle;second, the movements’ activities are mainly directed toward the missionof Da’wah (call for Islam) and its followers are busy to dampen the mount-ing activism of Christian proselytism. Third, the movements operate withinthe legal and constitutional margins of autocratic secular states; fourth, thecharacteristics of Islam in Africa which are predominantly Sufi (that is mys-tical, contemplative and less political) prevented the development of vastlypoliticized and ideologized Islamic movements and finally; the high degreeof religious heterogeneity in Africa rendered the objective of political mo-bilization under the banner of one religion neither desirable nor feasible.


With the exclusion of Sudan, there is no country built upon a religiousmovement in the sub-continent. Militaristic movements that struggle againstoccupation such as Hamas, Islamic jihad and Hizbollah or Islamic armed sep-aratists and independentist movements as in Chechnya, Kashmir or Philip-pines are not present in the sub-continent. There is also no sign of Africanneo-salafist movements with a political agenda and clear objectives capa-ble of attracting large numbers of activists, sympathizers and volunteers fortheir causes or organizing large scale transnational terrorist operations likethose that happened in Tanzania and Kenyan, in Yemen, in the US, Tunisia,Indonesia, Saudi Arabia or lately in Turkey.

The movements are still on their first stage of politicization and haveno organizational monopoly over the social, economic or political life oftheir Muslim communities. Due to the fact that they operate under seculargovernments and because they lack a structured legal or organizational basis,they rely upon a conciliatory or sometimes an expedient leadership andmany of the social, educational and other community services were left tobe performed by a wide range of various Islamic NGO’s, local associationsor the private initiatives of Muslims on the individual level. Competitionand sometimes rivalry have been noted among different African religiousmovements, orders and sects.

These doctrinal and sectarian differences prevented them from creatinga well-structured operational and politicized militant Islamic movementswith a strong unified leadership and a mobilized popular basis. This is not tosay that they are not united under the banner of Islam, but to draw attentionto the difficulty to create cohesive Islamic movements in a realistic way in thesub-continent. On the popular level, they can be characterized as emotionallyfanatic but they are not ideologically violent. That is to say, their fanaticismis a belief-based phenomenon and not a product of a purely religio-politicalideology.

In the case of African Islamic movements, the distinction between fa-naticism and violence becomes important. While movements in some partsof the Islamic world mix religious fanaticism with violence as a tool of politi-cal struggle to assert political claims, African Islamic movements’ fanaticismis expressed through a passionate defense of Islam as a faith against Christianproselytism. They defend Islam as a civilization, a faith and a code of moralconduct, not as a political creed.

Although there is a possibility that African Islamic movement’s politicalactivism might produce in the short run an indoor militant phenomenon thatwill be directed against their secular autocratic local authorities, the absenceof a unified operational rallying ideology and a clear cut militant motivationwill prevent the emergence of a genuinely African brand of a violent militantIslamism at least for the near future.

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There are almost 50 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa all of which aresecular states mostly built upon a multitude of religious fraternities, sects,tribes, cultural values and beliefs. While they have accepted both Chris-tianity and Islam, the accumulation of traditional values, mystical practicesand the structure of African indigenous religions have sheltered Africansocieties against the outbreak of violent militant Islamism. Consequently,African Islamic activism still appears to be free from terroristactivities

The sporadic revolt of Muslim communities is rarely doctrinal and whenit occurred it is always mixed with social and economic grievances or eth-nic, tribal and sectarian tensions. It is usually projected to redress politicalinjustices, which could otherwise be addressed through peaceful democraticprocesses. When African Muslims revolt, as in the case of the FROLINATrevolution in Chad, they seek equality of opportunity more than power andstatus within the existing society more than its wholesale transformation.Clashes between African Muslims and non-Muslims are frequent but ingeneral they are over the control of local resources, or in form of communityresistance to outsider intrusions, in defense of the faith but seldom as a resultof a politicized religious ideology that seeks the destruction of the secularestablishment. Despite the people’s soaring desire to maintain Islamic lawsand values in their day-to-day life, there is still a separation between Islamas a cultural and moral value system and Islam as a political credo. Religiousextremism or terrorism, therefore, is not regarded as an occupation of highmerit by African Muslims.

If not cornered by oppressive governments, socio-economic problemsand proxy wars, Africans are tied, with regard to religion, to their tradition oftolerance. In front of spiritual convictions, the continent stretches to a biggeropen-mindedness. Accordingly, the view that portrays Islamic movementsin Africa as threatening to Western interests ignores the uniqueness of Islamin Africa as a product of African triple heritage represented by a mixtureof Islamic Sufi brotherhood, Christianity and Western cultural influences.136

However, in spite of the tolerant aspect of Islamism in the region, the sub-continent Muslim communities show some form of hostility against the west.Several political, cultural, religious and socio-economic factors contributedto the development of this hostility.

Historically, the colonial policies of assimilation and acculturation whichwere intentionally projected to chip the African identity, left terrible con-sequences on the African Muslim psyche and have created a sentiment ofrevulsion towards western culture and values. Similarly, the prompt depic-tion of the animosity between the west and the modern Islamist and Jihadistgroups as a conflict of religion between global Islam and the western cul-ture has inflamed the already existing resentment within the African Islamic


communities toward the west and is perceived as western conspiracy againstIslam as a religion and the Muslims as its adherents.

ENDNOTES

1. Jeff Haynes, Religion in Third World Politics, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Col-orado 1994, p.64. Cited by Abdus Sattar Ghazali, Islam in the Post-Cold War Era. AnAnalysis of the Problems Faced by the Islamic World and the role of Islam in the NewMillennium, http://www.ghazali.net/book2/

2. Abdel-Qader Yassine, “Islamic militant movements between tradition and modernity,”The Third Nordic Conference on Middle Eastern Studies: Ethnic Encounter and CultureChange, Joensuu, Finland, 19–22 June 1995, Gothenburg University. Available online at:http://www.hf.uib.no/smi/paj/Yassine.html.

3. Ousman Muhamad Bugaje. “Islamic Movements and the Political Economy in Africa:An Overview of Sub-Saharan Africa.” Available Online at: http://www.balli-group.com/∼ubugaje/polecon4.html

4. Ibid.5. Veronique Dimier, Le Discours Ideologique de la Methode Coloniale chez les Francais

et les Britanniques de l’entre-deux guerres a la decolonisation (1920–1960), Travaux etDocuments, N˚ 58–59 – 1998, Responsable de la collection : Didier Morin, Centre d’Etudesd’Afrique Noire, Institut d’Etudes politiques de Bordeaux.

6. Wilfred Cartey and Martin Kilson, The Africa Reader: Colonial Africa, Vintage BookEdition, September 1970, pp.73–74.

7. Ibrahima Lalya Bah, ElHadj Bella Doumboula, Mohammed Lamine Barry, andMohammed Lamine Bayo, Ministry of Higher Education/Republic of Guinea.AdamaSy and Mountaga Sam ROCARE/Republic of Mali.Laouali Malam Moussa INDRAP/Republic of Niger. Boubacar Kane, Mohammadou El Bachir Dia and El Hadji NdaoROCARE/ Republic of Senegal. Nonformal Education Working Group, Research Stud-ies Series no. 8, Association for the Development of Education in Africa, InternationalWorking Group on Nonformal Education. Peter Easton and Mark Peach, Centre forPolicy Studies in Education, Florida State University. May 1997.

8. “Islam in Africa,” The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition, 2001. Available Online at:http://www.bartleby.com/65/is/IslaminA.htm1.

9. Abdus Sattar Ghazali, “Islam in the Post-Cold War Era, An Analysis of the ProblemsFaced by the Islamic World and the role of Islam in the New Millennium.” Availableonline at: http://ghazali.net/book2/.

10. John L. Episto, Political Islam: Beyond the Green Menace, Current History, January 1994.Available online at: http://www.arches.uga.edu/∼godlas/espo.html.

11. Caryle Murphy How West fuels Islamic militancy - Dawn - 21.2.1993. Cited in AbdusSattar Ghazali, Supra, Note 9.

12. Bashy Quraishi. “Islam in the Western Media.” The Multicultural Skyscraper, Vol. 1 No.3. Friday, October 12, 2001 Available online at: http://www.multicultural.net/newsletter/article/issue3-bashy.htm.

13. Andrew Tait, “Terror In the Shadow of the Cold War.” International Relations and Secu-rity Network. September 11, 2002. Available online at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/wtc/analysis/ 2002/0911cold.htm.

14. See John L. Episto, Supra. Note 10.15. Background Report, N0: 5–36087, Islam in Africa Part III, Hilleteork, Washington,

Mathias, 4/1/97. (Source: Voice of America). Available online at: http://www.islamtz.org/articles/islam in af3.htm.

16. African scholar, Professor of African History and Politics at State University of New Yorkat Binghamton.

17. Background Report, N0: 5–36087, op. cit.

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18. Ibid., 15.19. Ibid.20. Ibid.21. Ibid.22. Hassan al-Turabi, “The Islamic Awakening’s New Wave,” New Perspectives Quarterly 10,

No. 3 (Summer 1993): 45. Cited in Excerpt from Masters Thesis PSPA 399: “The IslamicMovement in Sudan” by Claes-Johan Lampi Sorensen. Full text of the thesis dated April26, 2002. Available online at: http://www.sudansupport.no/kompetanse/akademia/lampi-s/mou febr-2001.htm.

23. See Interview with Dr. Al Turabi: America is a Country Built on Violence. 24/October/2003. Available online at : http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2003/10/10–24–15. htm.

24. Macksood Aftab, “What Does Fundamentalism Really Mean?,” The Islamic Herald, April1995. Available online at: http://www.ais.org/∼bsb/Herald/Previous/495/fundamentalism.html.

25. David G. Kibble observes: ”Revivalists reject Western ideas and call for restoring tradi-tional Islamic ideas. They believe in literal creation, accept the Qur’an as [God’s] actualwritings which should be followed as such, and press for an Islamic state based uponSharia. . . Revivalists are sometimes called fundamentalists because they wish to returnto their faith’s original tenets. . . Fundamentalism, in its militant Islamic sense, is just onevariant of revivalism. Revivalism may also be a ‘quietest’ type, which retains traditionalreligious belief but espouses a less politically active stance. David G. Kibble “Understand-ing Islamic Fundamentalism” Military Review , 75:40–45 September-October 1995. p. 41

26. See “Talk Political Islam,” Disinfopedia, the encyclopedia of propaganda. Available onlineat: http://www.disinfopedia.org/wiki.phtml?title=Talk:Political Islam.

27. Ibid.28. Ibid.29. Ibid.30. Melvin E. Matthews, Jr. “What Is the Difference Between Islam and Islamism?”

Centre for History and New Media. 9 August 2003. Available online at: http://hnn.us/articles/1671.html.

31. See “the Political Imagination of Islam.” Conversation with Oliver Roy. Senior Re-searcher, Centre national de recherche scientifique (CNRS), Paris. “Conversations withHistory” Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley April, 16 2002. Available onlineat: http:// globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people2/Roy/roy-con4.html.

32. “Islamic Fundamentalism in the Sunni and Shia Worlds,” A Lecture by Dr Hassan al-Turabi delivered in Madrid on August 2, 1994. Available online at: http://www.sufo.demon.co.uk/reli004.htm.

33. See “The Political Imagination of Islam.” Conversation with Oliver Roy. Supra. Note. 30.34. See Abdel-Qader Yassine, Supra. Note 2.35. Nourah Abdul Aziz Al-Khereiji, “Hijra Still Offers Valuable Lessons.” March 7, 2003.

Al-Jazeerah News. Available online at: http://www.aljazeerah.info36. See Dr. Ousman Muhamad Bugaje.Supra, Note. 3.37. During the period following the Portuguese arrival to the African coast in the 15 Century

and the instigation of the colonial era, many African Islamic scholars and Jihadists (suchas Sheikh Ahamadou Ibn Muhammad Ibn Habib Allah, Bamba (1312–1927) in Senegal,Immam Ahmed Ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi (1506–43) nicknamed Gran in Somalia, Uthmanben Muhammad ben Salih (1754–1817) known as Shehu Usuman dan Fodio in Nigeria,Al-Hajj ’Umar b. Sa’id al Futi al-Turi, Tall (1794–1864) in Senegal and Mali, Samori Toure(1830–1900) who in the 1880s and 1890s) established an empire that extended over largeparts of present-day Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Ivory Coast. Mohammed Ahmed ibnAbdullah Al-Mahadi (1848–1885) of Sudan and, Sayyid Muhammad ’Abd Allah Hasanof Somalia (1864 – 1920), headed early Islamic reformist movements and waged unrelent-ing struggle against European colonization in Africa South of the Sahara. Armed withtheir belief and Jihadist spirit, their thought and struggle gave a sense of direction and


a meaning to the resistance of African Muslims against the political oppression and thecultural domination of the colonial powers and enabled them to oppose with continuingpersistence the effects of European colonial policies intended to their assimilation andWesternization.

38. Fred Bridgland, “People fall victim as Islam and Christianity battle for Africa’s soul,” Sun-day Herald. 01/December/2002. Available online at:http://www.sundayherald.com/29694.2002.

39. Jean de la Gueriviere, “Les Multiples visages de l’islam noir,” Geopolitique Africaine, No5. Hiver 2002. Available online at : http://www.african-geopolitics.org/show.aspx? Arti-cleId=3348

40. See. Background Report, N0: 5–36088, Islam in Africa Part IV, Hilleteork Mathias, 4/1/97.Washington. D.C. Available online at: http://www.islamtz.org/articles/islam in af4.htm.

41. Ibid.42. Ibid.43. The movement called for an Islamic free interest banking system and in September 2001,

the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Dr. Shamsuddin Usman,announced that the Federal Government has approved the granting of two licenses forthe establishment of Islamic banking in the country.

44. These are: 1) emir-ate authorities and traditional nonsectarian mainstream Muslimgroups; 2) Sufi brotherhoods, especially the Qadiriyyah and Tijaniyyah; 3) anti-innovationlegalists, especially the Izala; 4) intellectual reformers; 5) anti-establishment syncretists,especially remnants of the Maitatsine movement; 6) antiestablishment “Muslim Broth-ers” (Ikhwan), sometimes labeled as “Shiites;” and 7) unemployed urban youth andQur’anic student movements, formed around local schools and teachers” John Paden,Islam and Democratic Federalism in Nigeria. See. John Paden. “Islam and DemocraticFederalism in Nigeria.” Africa Notes, Number 8. March 2002. Available online at: http://www.csis.org/africa/ANotes/ANotes0203.pdf.

45. Twelve federal states in Northern Nigeria (Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano,Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, Zamfara) have gradually incorporated Shari’ a intotheir justice system since January 2000. Punishments such as floggings, amputations anddeath penalty (Qasas) for murder have been carried out in some States. There are cur-rently at least three adultery convictions under appeal in Nigeria, but no stoning has yetbeen carried out.

46. “The Shari’a Debate: Religion and Politics in Nigeria.” Interview with RosalindI. J. Hackett. Professor at the Department of Religious Studies of the University ofTennessee in Knoxville and Adjunct Professor at the Department of Anthropology ofthe same University, Religioscope—26 April 2002. Available online at: http://www. reli-gioscope. com/info/articles/012 nigeria.htm.

47. See “Blowing the Cover?. U.S. Officials Knew of Osama Bin Laden Tape Before ItWas Aired.” ABC NEWS. Available online at: http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/US/binladen030212.html.

48. Abdulaziz Y. Lodhi and David Westerlund, “African Islam in Tanzania,” (MSS March1997). Available online at: http://www.islamtz.org/articles/islam2.htm.

49. Khatib M. Rajab. “Role of Islam on Politics in Zanzibar.” Available online at: http://victorian.fortunecity.com/portfolio/543/islam and nationalism.htm.

50. See. Abdulaziz Y. Lodhi and David Westerlund. Supra. Note. 47.51. See. Khatib M. Rajab. Supra. Note. 48.52. Gørill Husby. “Politics in Tanzania. Islamist Ascendancy Threatens Peace.” Dehai News.

May 24 2003. Available online at: http://dehai.org/archives/dehai news archive/apr-may03/0946.html

53. Ibid.54. Nikki R. Keddie. “Senegal: The Islam of Sufi Orders.” August, 1986. The World and

I. Available online at: http://www.worldandi.com/specialreport/1986/august/Sa10179.htm.

55. Ibid.

102 Ousman

56. Hacene Belmessous, “the Progress of Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Available online at:http://www.african-geopolitics.org/show.aspx?ArticleId=3116.

57. Ibid.58. Sheikh Abdallah A. Kheir, “Islam and Muslims in Kenya,” Journal of Islamic Guidance

(1999) Vol. 5–1.59. Kenya: Religion. African Studies Centre. University of Pennsylvania. East Africa Liv-

ing Encyclopedia. Available online at: http://www.africa.upenn.edu/NEH/kreligion.htm.

60. David C. Sperling. “Islam and the Religious Dimension of Conflict in Kenya.” Availableonline at: http://payson.tulane.edu/conflict/Cs%20St/SPERLFIN5.html.

61. Ibid.62. See. Sheikh Abdallah A. Kheir. Supra. Note. 57.63. Ibid.64. Benjamin White Haefele, “Islamic Fundamentalism and Pagad: An Internal Security Is-

sue for South Africa?” Centre for Military Studies. University of Stellenbosch. Availableonline at: http://www.und.ac.za/und/indic/archives/crime/issue11/islam4.htm.

65. Ibid.66. C.J.B Le Roux: “PAGAD (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs). A vehicle for radical

Islamic Fundamentalism in South Africa or an organization of concerned citizens?.” Con-ference on Theopolitics, Durban-Umlazi Campus, 27–28 March 1998. Available onlineat: http://www.duc-uz.co.za/PAGAD%5B1%5D.HTM.

67. Imam Achmad Cassiem is the Chairperson of the Islamic Unity Convention (SouthAfrica). At aged 15 he joined the armed struggle against the oppressive apartheid regimein South Africa and at the age of 17 he was one of the youngest people to be imprisonedon Robben Island.

68. See C.J.B Le Roux. Supra. Note. 65.69. Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002. Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Coun-

terterrorism. April 30, 2003. Available online at: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/html/19992.htm.

70. Ibid.71. C.J.B le Roux & HW Nel, “Radical Islamic Fundamentalism in South Africa. An Ex-

ploratory Overview,” Journal for Contemporary History, December 1998. 23 (2), pp.1–24.Available online at: http://www.duc-uz.co.za/IslambyCJB.htm.

72. Ibid.73. Ibid.74. Ibid.75. See “Somalia: The Tenets of Islam.” Available online at:http://somalinet.com/library/ so-

malia/?so=0056.76. See “Somalia. County Study.” Available online at: http://countrystudies.us/somalia/44.htm77. Ibid.78. Ibid.79. Professor Menkhaus’ Presentation, in Africa, Islam, and Terrorism—Meeting Summary.

Synopsis prepared by Jeffrey Krutz, Junior Fellow with the Democracy and Rule of LawProject at the Carnegie Endowment. December 2001. Available online at: http://www.ceip.org/files/events/africaterror-summary.asp.

80. Youssef Khazim, “Islamic Movements in Somalia: Their Origin, Configuration & Rolein the Civil War,” Al-Hayat Newspaper, December 15, 2001. Available online at: http://www.somaliawatch.org/archivedec01/011231601.htm.

81. Ibid.82. See Professor Menkhaus’ Presentation. Supra. Note. 78.83. Ibid.84. Ibid.85. Ibid.86. David Robinson. “Muslim Societies in African History.” February 2004. Oxford Book

Reviews. Available Online at: http://books.cambridge.org/052153366X.htm.


87. ETHIOPIA: “The Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus and The Finnish Evan-gelical Lutheran Mission in Partnership.” Available online at: http://www.mission.fi/felm/ethiopia.html.

88. Dr. Jillani . “Ethiopia: Muslims had lost touch with Muslim world.” Available online at:http://www.islamicpopulation.com/Ethiopean muslims.html.

89. David H. Shinn, “Ethiopia: Coping With Islamic Fundamentalism Before and AfterSeptember 11.” Friday, March 15, 2002. Available Online at:http://www.somaliawatch.org/archivemar02/020316601.htm.

90. Ibid.91. Ibid.92. Ibid.93. “Niger: Thematic Reports. Mechanisms of the Commission on Human Rights,”

23 January 2002. Available online at: http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord2002/engtext/vol2eng/nigertr.htm

94. International Religious Freedom Report 2002. Niger. Released by the Bureau of Democ-racy, Human Rights, and Labor. Released on October 7, 2002. Available online at: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13849.htm.

95. Geoff Stamp, “An Analysis of the Growing Confrontation between Evangelistic Faiths,”April 20, 2001. Available online at: http://worthynews.com/news-features/spread-of-islam.html.

96. Islam came to Mali in the seventh century AD, shortly after the death of ProphetMohammed, but it was only in the 13th century that Sundiata Keita, the King, officiallydeclared the country an Islamic state. In the fourteenth century, the African Empire ofMali was a glittering jewel of scientific, mathematical, architectural, cultural and artisticachievement. Ruling over this glorious center of learning and culture was the devoutlyMuslim ruler Mansa Musa.

97. Barbara Crossette, ”Survey of Islamic World Finds Few Democracies,” New York Times,23 December 2001.

98. Joshua Muravchik, “Freedom and the Arab World.” American Enterprise Institute forPublic Policy Research. Publication Date: January 1, 2002. Available online at: http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.13511/pub detail.asp.

99. Nico Colombant, “Mali’s Angry Clerics.” Available online at: http://www.angelfire.com/dc2/usnico/mali-islam.html.

100. The Tijaniyyah is a Sufi order founded by Ahmed al-Tijani in 1781 in Fez, Morocco.Sheikh Tidjani was born in 1737 to a black mother and a father who was a veneratedman of learning. The movement extended the borders of Islam towards West Africa andcontributed to the emergence of great African kingdoms.

101. The Sanusiyah an Islamic Sufi brotherhood is also a military organization started by SidiMuhammad ibn ’Ali Sanusi (1787–1860) in Libya with political and military as well asreligious aims. The Senusiyah have resisted the Italian occupation and became active inNorthern Chad in the late 19th century when the center of the order was moved to Kufra.For several years the French failed to subdue them. By the end of 1919 however, the lastof the sporadic fighting ceased and the French exercised hegemony over the region.

102. See, “Chad: A Country Study,” Library of the Congress. Available on line at: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field (DOCID+td0053).

103. Chad: Religious Freedom Report 2000. United States State Department. Available onlineat: http://atheism.about.com/library/irf/irf00/bl irf chad00.htm.

104. International Religious Freedom Report 2002. Chad. Released by the Bureau of Democ-racy, Human Rights, and Labor. U.S. Department of State. Released on October 7, 2002.Available online at:http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13813.htm.

105. Sudan, Atlas Mondial de l’Islam Activiste. Universite Pantheon-Assas (Paris II). Insti-tut de Criminologie de Paris. Departement de Recherche sur les Menaces CriminellesContemporaines. (Mis a jour au 30/11/1990). Available online at: http://mccccm.free.fr/html/archives/ne/ne15–17/soudan.html

106. See “Sudan,” Atlas Mondial. Supra. Note. 104.

104 Ousman

107. Who’s Who. Significant People and Organizations. National Islamic Front. Available on-line at: http://www.sudanupdate.org/WHOSWHO/NIF.HTM.

108. Dr Hassan al-Turabi was born in 1932 in Sudan. His father was a Judge and an ex-pert in Islamic law. He joined Khartoum University and received a degree in law in1955. He is equally a holder of a Masters Degree in law awarded by the Universityof London in 1957 and a Ph.D. from the Sorbonne in 1964. His thesis was on the roleof emergency powers in a liberal state. He was appointed Dean of the Faculty of Lawat the University of Khartoum in 1964, joined the Islamic Charter Front and becamethe movement’s Secretary General until 1969. Appointed attorney general underNumayri in 1979, foreign affairs advisor in 1983, in April 1985 he established the Na-tional Islamic Front (NIF) during the rule of General Abdul Rahman Suwar Al Dahab.He is believed to have been the main force and the mastermind behind the military coupthat brought Al-Bashir to power in 1989. In 1991, he was elected Secretary General ofthe Arab and Islamic Congress by leaders of Islamic and Nationalist parties from 55countries and in 1996 speaker of the new National Assembly. In 1999 Mr Turabi be-came the secretary-general of the National Congress (NC) Party, which evolved out ofthe NIF under the leadership of President Bashir and was suspended from this postafter calling for a boycott of the president’s re-election campaign in 2000. Soon after,Turabi was placed under house arrest and then in jail in August 2002. He was releasedin October 2003. He leads presently the opposition Islamist Popular National Congress(PNC) which he Created in June 2000 after his expulsion from the National Congressand is one of the government’s harshest critics. During his almost half a Century ofstruggle to establish an Islamic State and to implement Islamic Shari‘a Law, he hasbeen imprisoned or held under house arrest on several times for his Islamic activities.Although the direct consequences of his political struggle are within his own country,his political thought and theories have influenced all other Islamic political movementsthroughout the Arab and Muslim world. For a detailed biography see Sudan Founda-tion Reports. Available online at: http://www.sufo.demon.co.uk/, and Hassan al-Turabi:Profile and Biography, Agnosticism/Atheism. About Religion & Spirituality Channel.Available online at:http://atheism.about.com/library/FAQs/islam/blfaq islam turabi.htm.and; The Making of an Islamic Political Leader: Conversations with Hasan Al-Turabiby Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi, Hasan Turabi. 129 pages. Westview Press;(January 1999).

109. See Who’s Who, Supra, Note. 106.110. “Islamic Movements and Religious Orders.” Source: U.S. Library of Congress. Available

online at: http://countrystudies.us/sudan/48.htm.111. See. Who’s Who. Supra, Note. 106.112. Turabi, “The Islamic State,” in Esposito (Ed.) Resurgent Islam, 242. Cited in Excerpt from

Masters Thesis PSPA 399: “The Islamic Movement in Sudan” by Claes-Johan LampiSorensen. Full text of the thesis dated April 26, 2002. Available online at: http://www.sudansupport.no/kompetanse/akademia/lampi-s/mou febr-2001.htm.

113. Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi, The Making of an Islamic Political Leader, Al-MustakillahPublishing House Limited, London 1996; p.123. Cited in Supra. Note. 66.

114. Paul Eedle, “Beguiling zealot preaches Islamic revolution,” REUTER NEWS SER-VICE, 7 MAY 1992. Available online at: http://www.outtherenews.com/about/stories/920507tourabi.htm.

115. Richmond Odom. “Blind Sheik Continues to Lead Terrorists.” April 11, 2002 NewsWith-Views.com. Available online at: http://www.newswithviews.com/NWO/newworld15.htm

116. See Turabi “Islamic Fundamentalism in the Sunna and Shia Worlds,” Supra. Note. 31.117. Ibid.118. See “Bin Laden’s life in Sudan.” In The Development of Osama’s Viewpoints. Reprinted

from London Al-Quds al-Arabi, Translated from Original Arabic Text. November 24,2001. Available online at: http://www.jihadunspun.net/BinLadensNetwork/background/

119. Ibid.120. Ibid.


121. “State Department Factsheet: Usama bin Ladin: Islamic Extremist Financier” August1996-1 ABC News Nightline. June 10, 1998, Defense Department Factsheet, August 20,1998; conversations with U.S. counter-terrorism officials.

122. Tim Niblock, “Islamic movements and Sudan’s political coherence,” in Herve Bleuchot,Christian Delmet and Derek Hopwood (Editors), Sudan: History, identity, ideologies,Ithaca Press, Reading, 1991, p.263. Dr Turabi’s quotes are taken from an interview withNiblock. Cited in Religion in Sudan, Religion File Number 3, An occasional paper pub-lished by The Sudan Foundation, 212 Piccadilly, London WC1V 9LD, United Kingdom.Available online at: http://www.sufo.demon.co.uk/reli003.htm.

123. Ibid.124. Judith Miller, “Faces of Fundamentalism,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 1994,

Volume 73, Number 6, p.139. Cited in Supra, Note. 236.125. Ibid.126. Dr. Sean Gabb, “International Terrorism and Sudan: A Brief Discussion,” The Sudan

Foundation, 1997. Available from http://www.sufo.demon.co.uk/fact004.htm.127. The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council. Subject: The Al-Shifa Bombing in

Sudan—A Timeline. Available online at: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/NileRiver/files/Countries/Sudan/Alshifa.txt.

128. Among others, Tom Carnaffin, a British engineer of Hexham, northern England, who hadhelped to build and equip the al-Shifa factory, and who had worked there as a technicalmanager for four years, Mr Henry Jobe, formerly of the MSD Pharmaceutical Company,the designer of the al-Shifa factory, Mr Dino Romantti, from Italy, whose company sup-plied the al-Shifa factory with powders that that were formed into pills, Dr Bob Arnot,the American NBC network’s chief medical correspondent, British businessman PeterCockburn and three Jordanian engineers who had assisted with the construction of thefactory. See. The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council. Supra. Note. 126.

129. Scott Loughrey, “the El Shifa Tragedy.” Available online at: http://www.media-criticism.com/Clinton Sudan 1999.html. Quoted from Covert Action Quarterly, CAQ, winter, 99Media Criticism.

130. Oriana Zill. “The Controversial U.S. Retaliatory Missile strike.” Available online at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/bombings/retaliation.html.

131. Adds Beshir, “Sudan to protest to UN over US strike”—Comments’, News Article byAgence France Presse on August 20, 1998. Cited in The European-Sudanese Public Af-fairs Council. Subject: The Al-Shifa Bombing in Sudan—A Timeline. Available online at:http://groups.yahoo.com/group/NileRiver/files/Countries/Sudan/Alshifa.txt.

132. Christopher Hitchens, “Close, But No Cigar.” The Nation. Minority Report. October5, 1998. Available online at: http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml%3Fi=19981005&s= hitchens.

133. See Dr. Sean Gabb, Supra. Note.125.134. James Solheim, Conference explores thorny issue of relations between Christianity and

Islam. Episcopal News Service, ENS. December 12, 2001. Available online at: http://www.episcopalchurch.org/ens/2001–350.html.

135. Ibid.136. Ali Mazrui, “The African Renaissance and the Triple Heritage: Indigenous, Islamic, and

Westernizing Forces,” Stanford University, April 24, 2000. Available online at: http://www.researchchannel.org/program/displayevent.asp?

The Potential of Islamist Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa

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