The Official Position of Cn. Pompeius in 49 and 48 BCE

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The Official Position of Cn. Pompeius in 49 and 48 BCE Author(s): Frederik Juliaan Vervaet Source: Latomus, T. 65, Fasc. 4 (OCTOBRE-DÉCEMBRE 2006), pp. 928-953Published by: Societe d’Etudes Latines de BruxellesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41544329Accessed: 18-08-2014 23:30 UTC

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The Official Position of Cn. Pompeius in 49 and 48 ВСЕ (*)

1. Introduction. - At first sight, it seems fairly easy to ascertain the official chain of command of the armed forces opposing the recalcitrant proconsul Iulius Caesar from the outbreak of civil war in January 49 until the momentous battle of Pharsalia which sealed the fate of Pompeius Magnus and the dying Republic. On the basis of the age-old constitutional premise that, in the absence of a dicta- tor, the consuls were the highest magistrates in the Roman Republic and undis- puted commanders-in-chief of its armies, the supreme command in the war effort against Caesar would have automatically fallen to the consuls in 49. As long as there were lawful consuls in the Republic, Pompeius, like every other loyal proconsul, could only have acted as their adiutor , irrespective of his powerful command in the Spains and his unrivalled prestige as a military man 0). Only from 1 January 48 could he possibly have been charged with the exclusive summum impérium auspiciumque, the sole high command of the combined forces fighting the renegade Caesar (2). Careful scrutiny of the extant source material, however,

(*) The term imperator is used in its broad sense of official cum imperio suo iure. All translations are those of LCL , modified where necessary.

(1) See, e.g., M. Gelzer, Pompeius , Stuttgart, 1984, p. 167 & esp. 169, where it is argued that by virtue of the s.c. ultimum of January 49, "Pompeius war formell nur einer von den bevollmächtigten Prokonsuln", and that the Senate "ließ ... die heikle Angele- genheit des Oberbefehls wie bisher in der Schwebe." Gelzer claims that although the rejection of Cato' s motion to invest Pompeius with the supreme command was compre- hensible, as many optimates mistrusted the proconsul, it was "vom militärischen Stand- punkt aus... ein ungeheuerlicher Fehler, angesichts eines Gegners wie Caesar auf einen Oberbefehlshaber zu verzichten." Gelzer explains that "Es war freilich nach repub- likanischem Staatsrecht ein solcher Beschluß auch gar nicht zu formulieren, wenn man die Diktatur vermeiden wollte. Wie sollte der Prokonsul den Konsuln vorgesetzt wer- den ?" ; and R. Seager Pompey. A Political Biography , Oxford, 1979, p. 166f., who also suggests that Pompeius official position did not change in January 49 : "Cato's advice [cf. infra] had been ignored ; despite the powers that had been voted to him, Pompeius had not been given the supreme command. So the consuls persisted in harassing him with their own views."

(2) E. Meyer, Caesars Monarchie und das Principát des Pompejus. Innere Geschichte Roms von 66 bis 44 v.Chr., Stuttgart/Berlin, 19192 , p. 313 ("So beschloß der Senat ... jetzt, wo es keine Consuln mehr gab, dem Pompejus für das nächste jähr an ihrer Stelle die Oberleitung zu übertragen") ; M. Gelzer, Pompeius [n. 1], p. 182 ("Die Schwierigkeit, daß bisher die beiden Konsuln die ranghöchsten Magistrate waren, fiel mit dem neuen



THE OFFICIAL POSITION OF CN. POMPEIUS IN 49 AND 48 ВСЕ 929

suggests that reality was slightly more complicated, and points to the fact that, by force of circumstances, the Senate broke new ground by authorizing a couple of spectacular deviations from established constitutional practices.

An inquiry into the subtleties of Roman public law and more precisely the exact position of Pompeius within the command structure of the forces opposing Caesar in 49 and 48 may now seem somewhat irrelevant in the face of the bare facts of Г histoire événementielle. Already about two and a half centuries later, Dio Cassius indeed made the sarcastic observation that although Pompeius and Caesar for the sake of good repute bore the official titles of proconsul and consul respectively in 48, their acts were not those which their offices permitted, but such as they themselves pleased (3). Nonetheless, the utmost importance of the events of 49 and 48 automatically substantiates the significance of this matter as well, the more so as the civil war was still officially the ultimate consequence of a disceptatio de iure publico (4). Secondly, it was the embarrassing failure of

Amtsjahr fort") ; R. Seager, Pompey [n. 1], p. 179 (Pompeius granted the supreme command "Probably on 1 January 48, since the problem of the relationship between a proconsul with impérium maius and consuls in office would cease to exist at the end of 49") ; K. M. Girardet, Imperia und provinciae des Pompeius 82 bis 48 v. Chr. in Chiron 31, 2001, p. 204 ("mit Wirkung ab 1. Januar 48 v. Chr. ?") & В. Woytek, Arma et Nummi. Forschungen zur Römischen Finanzgeschichte und Münzprägung der Jahre 49 bis 42 v. Chr. y Wien, 2003, p. 28 ("Pompeius wurde nämlich erst mit dem 1. Jänner 48 v. Chr. Offiziell vom Senat mit dem Oberkommando der Truppen betraut. Während des gesamten Jahres 49 blieb er de iure als Proconsul den damals amtierenden Consuln... untergeord- net") & 74, also believe that Pompeius assumed the supreme command only as of 1 January 48. See my forthcoming monograph on 'The Principle of the summum impérium auspiciumque under the Roman Republic' for an exhaustive discussion of the generally ignored though most important Republican constitutional principle of the summum impérium auspiciumque.

(3) Dio 41,43,5 : rfjç //¿v щ'щд evexa ràç êvv ófiovç етихЦоеьд, ó fièv rrçv rov máiov ó ôè rfjv rov ávdvnárov, ê'xovceç, Jigárrorreç ôè ovx боа êxelvai ёжетдеяоу àkX õoa avToi rjdekov.

(4) See Hirtius, B.G. 8,55 : tamen Caesar omnia patienda esse statuii, quoad sibi spes aliqua relinqueretur iure potius disceptandi quam belligerandi ; Fam. 4,4,3 (October 46) : id est postquam armis disceptari coeptum sit de iure publico & 4,14,2 (around the end 46) : pertimescebam uidebamque quanto periculo de iure publico disceptaretur armis. The fact that (the appearance of) legality still mattered to Caesar's adversaries, too, is quite clear from the fact that although they had dedicated a templům in Thessalonica for the auspicia , "in order that these might seem to take place under some form of law, so that they regarded the People and the whole City as present there", the consuls of 49 still refrained from organizing electoral Comitia because they had neglected to pass their lex curiata (de imperio) at the outset of the year (Dio 41,43,1-3). Although the lex curiata probably invested the consuls and the praetors with the ius auspicandi/auspicium pub- licum (Livy 22,l,5f. & esp. Cic., Agr. 2,27-31) and the consuls still needed to take the auspices for their attested meetings of the Senate (M. Terentius Varro in A. Gellius 14,7,7), an election of consuls and praetors without public auspices optimo iure was apparently considered too much of a good thing.



930 F. J. VERVAET

many of Rome's most noble and prominent senatorial commanders to fully comply with the Senate's official decisions pertaining to the military chain of command that significantly contributed to the historic defeat of Pompeius at the hands of Caesar.

2. The decree(s) of January 49. - At the outset of his second consulship in 55, the fierily contested lex Trebonia de prouinciis consularibus invested Cn. Pompeius Magnus (cos. 70) with a privileged five-year command over both Spains. Among other things, Pompeius was, rei publicae causa , given the extraordinary right to govern his provinces from Italy, in absentia (5). Roughly three years later, while Pompeius was still consul sine collega, this special command, which was normally to expire around 1 April 50, was extended in quinquennium by virtue of a plebiscitum de imperio Cn. Pompeii prorogando passed by decree of the Senate. Pompeius' position of strength as holder of a special impérium consulare and his command of no less than six legions were now secure until the early spring of 45, a situation that would soon become a thorn in Caesar's flesh, as the latter' s second quinquennium in the Gauls and Illyricum was bound to lapse on the first of March 49 (6).

In January 49, however, matters in Rome took a dramatic turn. In the face of a now unavoidable civil war, the Senate invested Pompeius with a series of plenary powers. Already in December 50 the consul C. Claudius Marcellus, eager to teach Caesar and tired of waiting for resolute action on the part of a sharply divided Senate, had taken firm action on his own initiative, and without the for- mality of a vote (suo Consilio ). In consequence of a false rumour that Caesar had opened hostilities, the consul went to Pompeius, then residing ad urbem , and charged the proconsul per edictum to protect the City and to assume the command of two legions that were stranded in Apulia on their way from Gaul to Syria. Pompeius was at once given authorization to levy whatever additional troops in Italy as he saw fit (7). With his typical phlegm, Pompeius promised to

(5) See T. R. S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic (= M RR), Volume 2, New York, 1952, p. 215 and Dio in 39,39,4f. & Caesar, B.G. 6,1,2 for Pompeius being given the right to govern his provinces from Italy rei publicae causa.

(6) On Pompeius' impérium being prolonged for another five years : T. R. S. Broughton, MRR 2 [n. 5], p. 238. A discussion on the nature and temporal extent of the commands of Pompeius and Caesar is beyond the scope of this inquiry.

(7) See tor Marcellus debatable move Dio 40,64,4 & 66 - Dio explains that these pro- ceedings took place near the close of the year and stresses that they were destined not to remain long in force, since they had been approved neither by the Senate nor by the People. Next, the consuls-elect, C. Claudius Marcellus and L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus, promptly went over to Pompeius and the consul, who caused them to issue the same commands. See also App., B.C. 2,31 (Appian mistakingly states that Marcellus was accompa- nied by his colleague, L. Aemilius Lepidus Paullus) ; Plut., Pomp. 59,1-2 & Hirtius, B.G. 8,55. Marcellus' action proves that during his second consulship, Pompeius had dis-




obey the order of the consul, yet added "unless we can do better" (8), which shows that the proconsul was fully aware of the provisory nature of the consul's arrangement and the blatant lack of legitimacy. At the very outset of 49, the consul C. Claudius Marcellus promptly proposed to formally put Pompeius in command of the forces in Italy and to give him power to levy others. This motion was vetoed by the tribune M. Antonius, who in turn drafted a decree that the forces already assembled should be sent to Syria and that the troops which Pompeius was then levying should not belong to him (9). Finally, on 7 January 49, after Pompeius had already stationed soldiers around the curia (10), the Senate cut the knot after heated discussions and issued the dreadful senatus consultum ultimum :

decurritur ad illud extremum atque ultimum senatus consultum. . . : dent operam cón- sules, p rae tore s, tribuni plebis quique pro consulibus sunt ad urbem, ne quid res publica detrimenti capiat. (n)

In B.C. 1,6, Caesar explicitâtes that on the following days, the Senate passed a whole series of decrees, among other things ordaining that levies should be made through all Italy and that money should be granted to Pompeius from the public treasury. Caesar's opponents wasted no time in executing these directives, as levies were made throughout Italy, arms demanded, and money exacted from the municipal towns and taken from the temples (12). In 41,3,4, Dio likewise records that the Senate entrusted the proconsul with the public funds and the troops : rà хдщаха xai атдапсотад eôœxav (13). Appian attests in B.C. 2, 33f. that the Senate declared Pompeius' army the protector of Rome and directed him to levy 130.000 Italian soldiers, chiefly experienced veterans, and to recruit as

charged those troops that he had raised at the tumultuous outset of 52 as proconsul ex s.c. (Dio 40,50,1), and that after 52, he continued to lack the right to command troops in Italy as proconsul. See Caesar, B.C. 1,14 for the fact that the two legions destined for the war in Syria hibernated in Apulia during the winter of 50/49.

(8) App., B.C. 2,31, ei fir] n xgetooov. (9) Plut., Ant. 5,2f. Since Plutarch records that Pompeius was already raising addi-

tional troops at that time and makes mention of L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus in Ant. 5,4, this clash in the Senate definitely occurred during the first week of January 49.

(10) App., B.C. 2,33. Although Appian indicates it concerned a detachment ot Pom- peius' army, these troops evidently still fell under the (nominal) supreme command of the consuls.

(11) Caesar, B.C. 1,5. (12) tota Italia dilectus habeatur... pecunia uti ex aerario Pompeio detur. (...) Tota

Italia dilectus habentur, arma imperantur, pecuniae a municipiis exiguntur, e fanis tol- luntur...

(13) In B.C. 1,14, Caesar records that it was the consul Lentulus who ad aperiendum aerarium uenisset ad pecuniam Pompeio ex s.c. proferendam. These extra funds were of course to be used as military pay (see e.g. B.C. 1,23). See Dio 41,43,5 for Pompeius being proconsul at that time.



932 F. J. VERVAET

many able-bodied men as possible from the neighbouring provinces. Belli causa , Pompeius was also voted all the money in the public treasury, and, if they should be needed for the pay of the soldiers, the private fortunes of the senators themselves. Appian adds that they levied additional contributions on the allied cities, which were collected with the greatest possible haste (14). It is clear that the Senate officialized the orders that C. Claudius Marcellus had issued at his own initiative at the very end of the previous year (15).

Dio 41,5-41,6,3 relates that at the beginning of 49, Pompeius was not pleased with the growing popularity of the proposal that he and Caesar would simulta- neously lay down their commands, and therefore 'commanded' (êxékevoev) the whole Senate and the magistrates to accompany him to Campania to further the war preparations. By virtue of an edict in which he declared a state of anarchy (тадахл = tumultus ), Pompeius authorized the senators to depart from Rome, and announced that he would regard all stay-behinds as enemies (1б). He also 'ordered' the Senate to pass an unprecedented decree authorizing him to seize all moneys from public temples and the votive offerings in Rome in order to pay for his projected mass levies :

aôeiáv ré ocpioi òóyfian rfjç екдщьад ôovç, xai ngoeutòv on tòv vnó¡ieívav та ev те тф low xai êv тф ô(ioiœ toïç та êvavría ocpíoi jtqóttovolv è'Çoi. Tlgòç S èn xai та хдщата та Ьщоош та те Ауавщата та êv Tf¡ JióXei návra ávaigedfjvai JigooéTa^ev amoïç Щсршаоваь, èfozíÇcov na'mXi]Qelç far' amœv отдатштад áQgoíoeiv. (17)

The Greek authors indeed consistently portray Pompeius as supreme commander of the anti-Caesarian coalition from the very beginning of the civil war. Dio states in 41,11,1 that after he had taken the far-reaching decision to evacu-

(14) See e.g. Dio 41,9,7 ; 41,10,4 & 41,55,2f. for Pompeius making full use of his emDOwerment to collect funds and raise trooos.

(15) So correctly B. Woytek, Arma et Nummi [п. 2], p. 29. Farn. 14,18,3 (12 January 49) shows that the Senate had also divided Italy into districts, each under an appointed supervisor, Cicero being assigned Campania and its shores - comp, also Fam. 16,12,5. It is clear that the Senate redefined the tasks of those imperatore who were not charged with provincial commands.

(16) bee also Plut., Pomp. 61,3 & Caes . 33,5 for this edict. In B.C. 1,33, Caesar merely states that when quitting the City, Pompeius said in the Senate that he would look upon those who remained at Rome as enemies. M. Gelzer, Pompeius [n. 1], p. 169 plausibly suggests that Pompeius proclaimed a state of civil war after it became known in Rome that Caesar's troops had pushed on from Ariminum over Pisaurum to Ancona, whereas Antonius had occupied Airetium (Att. 7,11,1 - comp. 9,10,2 ; & esp. Fam. 16,12,2).

(17) See Dio 41,6,5f. for the fact that although the Senate granted Pompeius' extraordinary recommendation, the precipitous evacuation of Rome prevented the execution of this ordinance. Since Pompeius was already empowered to draw anywhere from the aerarium as he saw fit, it concerns the moneys from the public temples and sanctuaries.




ate Italy, Pompeius 'ordered' ( èxékevoe ) the proconsul L. Domitius Aheno- barbus (cos. 54) to abandon his plan to make a stand in Corfinium and follow him overseas. In B.C. 2,37, Appian, too, has Pompeius advising everybody to to evacuate Italy before he departed for Capua to take command of the legions there, after which the consuls duly follow him thither. In B.C. 2,38, Appian records that Pompeius sent letters from Brundisium to all the allied peoples, kings, and cities, the provincial governors and grandees (18), urging them to send aid for carrying on the war with the greatest possible speed. In 2,39, Appian indicates that Pompeius gave some of the legions he already had in Italy to the consuls to be moved from Brundisium to Epirus, and that the consuls accordingly crossed over safely to Dyrrachium (19). In Pomp. 62,2 and Caes. 35,1, Plutarch likewise relates that Pompeius in Brundisium embarked the consuls and thirty cohorts and sent them before him to Dyrrachium.

On the basis of this information one might be tempted to conclude that as early as January 49, the Senate (and the consuls) had already charged the proconsul Pompeius with the exclusive supreme command in the war against Caesar. To my thinking, however, there is enough evidence to show that Pompeius was not appointed sole commander-in-chief at this stage of the war. In Pomp. 61,1, Plutarch records that in reaction to the capture of Ariminum, M. Porcius Cato (pr. 54) advised that the Senate should confer the summum impéri- um auspiciumque on Pompeius alone : Kátcov ôè ovveßov kevev шдешваь atgatrjyòv avtoxgátoga По/шщоу. This interpretation of Cato's sententia is corroborated by Cat. Min. 52.3, where Plutarch in more explicit words attests that Cato advised the Senate to put affairs into the hands of Pompeius alone : ovveßovkevev ó Kátcov évi По/жщсо tà ngáy'iata tfjv ovyxkrjtov êyxsígi- octL (20). Although from September 57 to about 53, Pompeius had already been invested as proconsul with the summum impérium in all matters pertaining to the prouincia inermis of the cura annonae (21), a motion to bestow the supreme command in a major war exclusively upon a proconsul while there were acting consuls was apparently still regarded as non ferenda at the outset of 49.

There is, however, every indication that the Senate did take a spectacular measure on behalf of Pompeius in January 49 in that it made the bold move of charg- ing the proconsul and seasoned military man with the summum impérium on a footing of equality (pari imperio) with the consuls. Whereas Caesar's quite lit-

il 8) edveoL te jzãot xai ßaoikevoi xai Jtókeoi xaì otgatriyoLÇ xai ôvváotaiç. (19) Dio likewise records in 41,12,1 that Pompeius had sent ahead the consuls to

Epirus ; see also Plut., Pomp. 62,2, where Plutarch explains that the consuls crossed over with 30 cohorts.

(20) See for Cato's motion also Plut., Mor. 8 IOC : èxékevoe По/ллщср Jiagaôovvat rnv řiyeuovíav.

(21) T. R. S. Broughton, MRR 1, New York, 1951, p. 203f. and especially Att. 4,1,7.



934 F. J. VERVAET

eral reproduction of the s.c.u. in B.C. 1,5 (supra) shows that the consuls were duly to play their natural role in the civil war, Per. 109 of Livy's History neatly paraphrases both the s.c.u and the decree conferring the supreme command in the war against Caesar on all three of the consuls and Pompeius :

Cum senatus consultum factum esset, ut successor Caesari mitteretur, M. Antonio et Q. Cassio tribunis plebis, quoniam intercessionibus id senatus consultum impediebant, urbe pulsis...mandatumque a senatu consulibus et Cn. Pompeio , ut uiderent, ne quid res publica detrimenti caperei. "When a decree of the Senate was passed that a successor to Caesar should be sent out, M. Antonius and Q. Cassius, tribunes of the plebs, were driven from the City because they tried to block this decree of the Senate with their vetoes, and the consuls and Cn. Pompeius were charged by the Senate to see to it that no harm befell the Republic." (22)

Cicero's letters clearly show that the consuls did actively play their traditional role of supreme commanders. In Att. 7,16,2 (Cales, 28 January 49), the proconsul reports that the consuls instructed him to return to Capua by the Nones of February : Nos a consulibus Capuam uenire iussi sumus ad Non. Febr. (23) In Att. 8,1 IB, 2, Cicero relates that, fui Capuae quoad cónsules. Iterum , et erat <e>dic- tum a consulibus , ueni Capuam ad Non. Febr. (24). It is also obvious from Cicero's correspondence that Pompeius and the consuls shared the supreme command for the major part of 49. After his remarkable defection from Caesar, Labienus arrived at Teanum on the 22nd of January where he met Pompeius and the consuls (25). When L. Caesar offered terms on the authority of Caesar in Teanum on 23 January, he was received by Pompeius and the consuls, who jointly issued an official answer to his plea (26). On 7 February the tribune C. Cassius arrived in Capua with a message ( attutii mandata) from Pompeius for the consuls instructing them to go to Rome and remove the money from the Inner Treasury. One of the consuls replied by asking Pompeius to go himself to Picenum first (27). That Pompeius and the consuls held the supreme command on a footing of equality {pari imperio) is also clear from the tenor and content of Att. 8,1 IB, a letter written at Formiae to Pompeius on 15 or 16 February 49. In

(22) The epitomator neatly summarizes both the s.c. ultimum and the remarkable decision to give Pompeius impérium par cum consulibus in the war against Caesar.

(23) See also Att. 7,17,5 ( Capuae Non. Febr. esse uolebam, quia cónsules iusserant ) ; Att. 7,18,1 ( ipse cumfratre Capuam ad cónsules (Nonis enim adesse iussi sumus) III. Non. profectus sum) ; Att. 7,20,1 ( Capuam ueni prid. Non., ut eram iussus) & Att. 7,21,1 ( ueni Capuam ad Non. Febr., ita ut iusserant cónsules).

(24) "I remained at Capua as long as the consuls. I visited the town a second time, in accordance with the consuls' edict, for the Nones of February."

(25) Att. 7, 13a, 2 (24 January 49). (26) See Att. 7,14,1 (25 January 49) & Att. 7,16,1 (28 January 49). (27) Att. 7,21,2 (8 February 49).




8,1 lB,2f., Cicero refers to instructions given him by Pompeius and next by the consuls, and makes it clear that he is ready to obey the proconsul's every command. Att. 8,12C,2f., a letter written by Pompeius to L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, shows that the consuls were equally entitled to outline their own strategy : cón- sules constituerunt idem face re... cónsules praesidia omni deducturi sunt aut in Siciliam ituri. In Att. 9,15,4 (Formiae, 25 march 49), Cicero makes mention of messages ( mandata ) from Caesar ad cónsules et ad Pompeium (28). In Att. 9,6,4 (Formiae, 1 1 March 49), Cicero indicates that he is consumed with grief because Pompeius et cónsules ex Italia exierunt.

As regards the war preparations against him, Caesar as well as Cicero record that the large-scale dilectus organized throughout Italy after he occupied Ariminum was conducted by the consuls as well as Pompeius. In B.C. 1,10, Caesar clarifies that : non intermissuros cónsules Pompeiumque dilectus (29). In Att. 8,12D,1 (17 February 49), Cicero likewise records that the consuls were raising levies. Dio's information further corroborates the conclusion that since 7 January 49, the consuls and Pompeius jointly carried the high command. In 41,12,2, Dio records that when Caesar offered Pompeius to work out an agree- ment in Brundisium, the latter frustrated Caesar by replying that he would com- municate his message to the consuls, although they had already decided to receive no 'citizen in arms' for a conference (30). According to Dio 41,15,4, Caesar later still proposed to send envoys to the consuls and to Pompeius to treat for peace and harmony. In 41,18,4f., Dio elucidates that the order to abandon Rome and follow the high command (supra), too, was issued by both the consuls and the proconsul Pompeius, and that the proconsul Cicero and most other senators and équités accordingly gathered in Thessalonica (31). That the consuls were equally entitled to set the strategy is also clear from B.C. 2,36, where Appian relates that immediately after Caesar's invasion of Italy, the consuls did not allow

(28) See also Att. 10,3 (7 April 49), where Cicero wonders whether Caesar's Senate had appointed peace envoys ad Pompeium et ad cónsules.

(29) See also B.C. 3,4 for the consul Lentulus' levying of two legions of Roman citi- zens in Asia in a later stage of the war.

(30) See also Caesar, B.C. 1,26 for Pompeius' categorical refusal to negotiate given the absence of the consuls.

(31) ОГ re yàg vjvároi, jzqív êxickeïv , xai êxeïvoç, are ávrí vjtázov äg/cov, Jtáv- raç avrovç èxékevoav êç Qeooákovíxrjv âxokovdfjoaL Dio explains that the consuls and Pompeius held that the capital was held by enemies and that they themselves were the Senate and would maintain the (Republican) form of government wherever they should be. The templům dedicated in Thessalonica (Dio 41, 43, If.) obviously served the purpose of creating a proper meeting place for the Senate - see A. Gell. 14,7,7 for the fact that M. Terentius Varro, Tum adscripsit de locis in quibus senatusconsultum fieri iure posset, docuitque confirmauitque, nisi in loco per augurem constituto, quod ' templům ' appel- laretur, senatusconsultum factum esset, iustum id non fuisse.



936 F. J. VERVAET

Pompeius to act according to his own judgment, in spite of his vast experience in military affairs, but urged him to traverse Italy and raise troops (32).

That it was, nonetheless, Pompeius who really took charge of the war preparations from the very beginning, is obvious from, for example, Fam. 16,1 l,2f., written outside Rome on 12 January 49. After summarizing the s.c. ultimum ( postea quam senatus consulibus , praetoribus , tribunis pl. et nobis qui procon - sulibus sumusy negotium dederat ut curaremus ne quid res publica detrimenti caperei), Cicero confidently adds that the war preparations were vigorously carried out by the authority and zeal of Pompeius : auctoritate et studio Pompei nos- tri, In Att. 7,11,3 (21 January 49), Cicero also confirms that the highly contro- versial decision to abandon Rome was Pompeius'. In Att. 7,31, If. (23 January 49), Att. 8,1 ID, 5 (27 February 49) & Fam. 7,3,2 (mid- April ? 46), Pompeius is consistently portrayed as the leader (dux) of the forces opposing Caesar in 49.

In the history of the Roman Republic there are only three known examples of proconsuls being given the right to hold the supreme command on a footing of equality (pari imperio) with one or both consuls within the same prouincia. Unsurprisingly, all three of these happened during some of the more critical phases of the Second Punic War. In 211, as part of a series of emergency mea- sures to beat off Hannibal's attack on Rome itself, the Senate made the highly unusual decision to authorize the seasoned proconsul Q. Fulvius Flaccus (cos. 237, 224, 212, 209 ; pr. 215, 214) to exercise his impérium within the pomerium on a footing of equality with the consuls, in order to prevent him from losing his impérium at the time of entering the Urbs (33). Apart from being able to exercise his consulare impérium within Rome as proconsul, Fulvius was at once given the exceptional privilege of wielding his command in defense of Rome on equal terms with the consuls, who normally held the summum impérium auspiciumque. In 202, in consequence of the consuls' eagerness to have Africa decreed prouincia consularis , the People confirmed the position of the proconsul P. Scipio Africanus (cos. 205) as supreme commander in Africa. When the consuls next still cast lots for Africa and the province fell to Ti. Claudius Nero, the Senate decreed that the consul should command in Africa on a footing of equality (parique imperio) with Scipio, both imperators thus being equally entitled to the supreme command (34). At the beginning of 201 yet another exceptional arrange-

(32) (Qv ol vmxroL JivvOavonevoi rov Поцжщоу от eïwv êm rfjç éavzov yvœfirjç è/MUELgojtoXé^œç evoradeiv, akX êÇcÒT çvvov èxjrrjôãv èç rrjv 'Irakiav xai огда- xoXoyeïv. Comp, also Diu. lul. 34, where Suetonius records that cónsules Pompeiusque confugerant to Brundisium.

(33) See Livy 26,9,10 : cui ne minueretur impérium, si in urbem uenisset, decernit senatus ut O. Fuluio par cum consulibus impérium esset.

(34) See Livy 30,27,1-5. The decree further determined that the consul who would get the naval command was to make for Sicily and should only cross over to Africa if peace could not be arranged with the Carthaginians (in 201). If the proconsul would manage to




ment was made because of the consul Cn. Cornelius Lentulus' ardent desire to obtain Africa as prouincia consularis. The Senate now decided that whereas the summum impérium on land belonged to Scipio, the consul who should obtain Africa would hold the supreme command of the fleet (35).

At any rate, it is obvious that the Senate's decision to entrust the supreme command in the looming civil war against Caesar and his partisans in Italy to both the consuls and the proconsul Pompeius was both spectacular and highly unusual (36). As both Caesar's and Cicero's quite careful reproductions of the s.c.u. (in B.C. 1,5 & Fam. 16,11,2, supra) only mention the general category of those who were pro consulibus ad urbem after listing the magistrates in their customary order (consuls, praetors, tribunes of the plebs ), it is clear that the actual s.c.u of 7 January was modelled on earlier examples (37). Therefore, the decision to invest both the consuls and Pompeius with the supreme command must have closely followed the s.c.u. proper as one of the executive decrees passed pro) t- imus diebus extra urbem (38).

3. The decree of December 49. - At the end of 49, however, by force of circumstances, the consuls and the Senate at last decided to formally sanction

force the Carthaginians to come to terms in 201, the tribunes of the plebs were to ask the People whether the consul or the proconsul was to grant peace and who was to bring back the victorious army from Africa if need be. If the Comitia would order that P. Scipio was to dictate peace and bring the army back, the consul should not cross over to Africa at all. These last two provisions were necessary in that if a truce was made and the consul did cross over, both commanders would (as summi imperatores) have been equally entitled to make peace and bring back the army, a situation which would have almost certainly led to a serious rift between the consul and the proconsul given the spirit and ambition of both aristocrats. See Livy 30,43,2-5 for the fact that the tribes later voted that P. Scipio should grant the peace and that he also should bring back the army.

(35) Livy 30,43,2-5. (36) See my forthcoming book on 'The Principle of the summum impérium auspici-

umque under the Roman Republic' [n. 2] for the fact that the Senate (and the People) were indeed perfectly entitled to make exceptions to the rule that (only) the consuls were summi imperatores in Italy and their prouinciae decretae. As regards the consequences of the s.c. ultimum for Pompeius' position, K. M. Girardet, Imperia und provinciae des Pompeius [n. 2], p. 203 claims that the decree created "eine Kumulation von provinciae , nämlich zusätzlich zu den beiden Hispaniae jetzt die militärische Verteidigung Roms und Italiens gegen den Putschisten Caesar". To my thinking the extraordinary and almost discretionary commission to safeguard the Res Publica in a civil war should better not be defined as a prouincia decreta.

(37) See, e.g. S all., Cat. 29 : senatus decreuit, darent operam cónsules , ne quid res publica detrimenti caperei - comp, also Sall., Hist., frag., 1,77,22 (senatus consultum ultimum, ...utiAp. Claudius interrex cum Q. Catulo pro consule et ceteris, quibus impéri- um est, urbi praesidio sint operamque dent, ne quid res publica detrimenti capiat ) ; Dio 37,26,1 and 31,2 ; 38,14,5 ; and Cíe., Pis. 11. As the consuls, the praetors and the tribunes of the plebs were the magistrates of the Roman People and the plebs respectively, it is only natural that they are listed before the promagistrates lingering ad urbem.

(38) See Caesar, B.C. 1,6 supra.



938 F. J. VERVAET

Pompeius' predominant role in the war effort. Fortunately enough, this dramatic and unprecedented move is on record in various sources. First, there is the unequivocal evidence of Lucan 5,44-49. Shortly before the turn of the year, the consuls convened about 200 senators for a meeting in Thessalonica (39). On the motion of the consul L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus and rei publicae causa , the Senate now officially charged the proconsul with the sole summum impérium auspiciumque :

Nostrum exhausto ius clauditur anno ; uos quorum finem non est sensura potestas, consulite in medium , patres, Magnumque iubete esse ducem. Laeto nomen clamore senatus excipit et Magno fatum patriaeque suumque imposuit. "For us the time of office expires when the year closes, but your authority, senators, can never be subject to any limits ; and therefore take counsel for the common good, and vote for Magnus as your leader ; that name was hailed with applause by the senators, and they laid on the shoulders of Magnus the burden of Rome's fate and of their own."

In B.C. 3,3 Caesar himself also produces indirect though powerful evidence of this decision. At the start of a brief summary of Pompeius' impressive war preparations, Caesar explains that around the beginning of 48,

Pompeius annuum spatium ad comparandas copias nactus , quod uacuum a bello atque ab hoste otiosum fuerat, magnam ex Asia Cycladibusque insulis, Corcyra , Athenis, Ponto, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phoenice, Aegypto ciassem coegerat, magnam omnibus locis aedificandam curauerat ; magnam imperatam Asiae, Syriae regibusque omnibus et dynastis et tetrarchis et liberis Achaiae populis pecuniam exegerat, magnam soci- etates earum prouinciarum, quas ipse obtinebat, sibi numerare coegerat.

"Pompeius, availing himself for the purpose of collecting forces of a whole year which had been free from war and without disturbance from an enemy, had gathered a large fleet from Asia and the Cycladic islands, from Corcyra, Athens, Pontus, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phoenice, Egypt ; had contracted for the building of a large fleet wherever possible ; had requisitioned a large sum of money from Asia, Syria, and all the kings, potentates, and tetrarchs, and from the free communities of Achaia ; and had

(39) See Lucan 5,5-9 for that fact that this momentous meeting took place at the end of December 49 - M. Gelzer, Pompeius [n. 1], p. 240 n. 27 rightly points out Lucan's 'Epirus' is "dichterischer Freiheit". In Pomp. 64,3, Plutarch recounts that enough senators gathered in Berrhoea to form a full Senate. Dio 41,43,2 also mentions the number of 200 senators, and indicates that a templům was dedicated for the purpose of taking the auspices in Thessalonica in 49. In Pomp. 65,1 & Cat. Min. 53,4 , Plutarch records that on the motion of Cato, a second and probably last decree was passed that no Roman should be killed except on a field of battle, and that no subject city should be plundered. It is quite clear from Pomp. 65, 2f. that this s.c. was passed before 1 January 48, i.e., while there were still magistrates with the ius agendi cum senatu in the anti-Caesarian camp. The meetings mentioned in Pomp. 66,4 & 67,1 (comp, also 68,1) doubtlessly regard Pompeius' consilium.




compelled the associations of publicans of the provinces of which he was himself in command to pay over large sums of money. (40)

Although this passage in its entirety speaks volumes, the earum prouinciarum , quas ipse obtinebat strongly suggests that Pompeius had been formally invested with the supreme command (summum impérium auspiciumque) over all the provinces and resources still controlled by anti-Caesarian forces (41). The expression prouinciam obtinere (and its variations) is indeed recurrently used in the sense of assuming or holding a provincial command by decree of the Senate (42). Pompeius' final grand command only bears a resemblance to that of 67 in terms of geographical extent and the method of his war preparations. In 67, Pompeius had been given the commission to fight piracy throughout the entire Mediterranean, be it only within certain well-defined geographical boundaries and on equal footing with the local proconsuls (43). At the end of 49, however, Pompeius was charged with the supreme command of all Republican forces, with full powers in terms of raising troops and funds in the war against Caesar. Pompeius' decision, however, to revive his well-tried strategy of systematic naval encirclement turned out to be a fatal mistake (4A).

In B.C. 3,16, Caesar makes a second, more explicit reference to what he of course considered to be a decision of Pompeius' consilium (45). When L. Scribo-

(40) In B.C. 3,4f. Caesar gives a more detailed explanation of Pompeius' war preparations, the number and nature of his troops, who basically came from all parts of the Empire and its periphery, his substantial requisitions and exactions from the provincials and the allies, and his division of the Eastern Mediterranean into 6 naval commands under the supreme command of M. Bibulus.

(41) B. Woytek's observation (Arma et Nummi [п. 2], p. 115 + п. 443) that only now did Pompeius acquire "die oberste Finanzauf sieht", whereas he had been merely given "das Verfügungsrecht liber die staatlichen (und privaten) Gelder in Januar" is only correct in that Pompeius was now given the exclusive supreme authority over the public moneys, as he had already received the power of drawing from the aerarium for military purposes along with the consuls in January 49 (supra).

(42) See, for example, Corn. Nepos, Cato 1,4 ; Att. 5,21,7 & Caesar, B.C. 3,53. lhe imperfect tense indicates that this decree was passed at any rate before the consuls of 48 entered upon their office (see also B.C. 3,1 and 3,6., where Caesar describes what happened on January 4).

(43) See Vell. 2,31,2 : impérium aequum...cum proconsulibus , an equivalent for par impérium. . .cum proconsulibus.

(44) In Att. 10,8,4 (Cumae, 2 May 49) Cicero tells Atticus that Pompeius still swore by his tested strategy as his entire plan was 'Themistoclean'. Cicero explains that Pompeius reckoned that whoever holds the sea is sure to be master, and that he consequently was never interested in holding the Spanish provinces for their own sake. Pompeius' main care was to fit out a navy, put to sea with huge fleets and land in Italy.

(45) See Att. 9,17,1 & 18,1 (Formiae, 27 & 28 March 49) for the fact that Caesar, too, convened the Senate in Rome on the Kalends of April 49, which issued its own decrees (Att. 8,9,2 & 9,19,2), as he did not recognize decrees passed after the departure of the tri-



940 F. J. VERVAET

nius Curio conferred with Caesar and asked for a truce on behalf of the proconsul M. Calpurnius Bibulus (cos. 59), then supreme commander of all naval forces (46), he immediately made it clear that although Pompeius desired to come to terms with Caesar, neither Bibulus nor he were authorized to negotiate a rec- onciliation since Pompeius had been decreed sole commander-in-chief of all anti-Caesarian forces :

Pompei summam esse ac fuisse semper uoluntatem ut componeretur atque ab armis discederetur. Se potestatem eius rei nullam habere , propterea quod de consilii sententia summam belli rerumque omnium Pompeio permiserint.

Although it is generally argued that this decree took effect from 1 January 48 only, the sources strongly suggest that it concerned a measure that immediately took effect. Besides, Vellerns Paterculus also indicates in 2,49,2 that Pompeius was given the supreme command while the consuls were still in office : Cónsules senatusque causae non Pompeio summam imperii detulerunt. (47) This means that at the very end of 49, the supreme command in a war waged by consuls and numerous proconsuls was for the first time in the history of the Roman Republic formally conferred upon a proconsul C8).

Before proceeding, it is important to emphasize that the only fundamental change in the chain of command of the 'Republican' army was that the supreme command henceforth resided in only one imperator, as opposed to the period from 7 January to the final weeks of December 49, when all three of Pompeius and the consuls had held the high command on a footing of equality (pari imperio). Although the Senate could have done so, it for obvious reasons discontin- ued the structure of a shared high command. This decision to confer the overall command in the civil war exclusively upon Pompeius affected the official position of the other imperatore in the anti-Caesarian camp only in that, at least in constitutional theory, they were now required to obey the war directives of Pompeius alone. In all other respects they simply continued to hold their provincial or other commands and the duties and prerogatives involved. All of this is

bunes on 7 January 49 (Att. 11,7,1). For their part, Cicero and Caesar's other opponents neither recognized the meetings of senators (concessu senátorům) that Caesar started to convene from the beginning of April onward (Att. 10,1,2 & Fam. 4,1,1).

(46) The fact that Pompeius himself charged the proconsul Bibulus (cos. 59) with the summum impérium over the maritime operations (see Caesar, B.C. 3,5 & 18,2 and Plut., Cat. Min. 54, 4f.) by itself powerfully underscores his position as commander-in-chief of the combined anti-Caesarian armies.

(47) "The consuls and the Senate conferred the supreme command not on Pompeius but on his cause."

(48) Contra Th. Mommsen, Römisches Staatsrecht 3, Leipzig, 18873, p. 925 n. 6 : "Die Uebertragung des Obercommandos an Pompeius, welche der Dichter also beschliessen lässt, ist wohl seine Erfindung, da ihm dies bereits übertragen war, bevor er Rom verlies s."




perfectly illustrated by the case of the proconsul Scipio Nasica (cos. 52). On the one hand, Pompeius was ever since 7 January 49 uninterruptedly in a position to instruct his father-in-law, irrespective of the latter' s consular rank and equal official status. In B.C. 3,33, Caesar records that in consequence of his army cross- ing the sea, Pompeius sent a dispatch to Scipio stating "that he was to make haste to come to him with his army and to put everything else aside." Although Pompeius' order doubtlessly took the form of a courteous request, his move and Scipio's immediate compliance reveal that Pompeius held the high command (49). Plutarch's statement in Pomp. 62.2 that Pompeius in 49 sent Scipio from Brundisium to Syria to raise a fleet shows that Pompeius had already given the proconsul a series of instructions at that stage of the war. On the other hand, Scipio, who was in the wake of 7 January 49 formally assigned Syria as his prouincia , continued to command his army of two legions suo nomine , like all other legitimate imperators with official provincial commands (50). Evidently to boost his prestige and assert his standing as proconsul suo iure , Scipio had his army salute him as Imperator on account of a victory near Mount Amanus (51).

At any rate, there are sundry concrete indications that Pompeius wielded the summum impérium auspiciumque alone from the end of 49. In July 48, it was Pompeius who took full credit for the initial victories over Caesar at Dyrrachium as he alone was hailed Imperator at a time his ranks already numbered several other proconsuls (52). After the two battles, Pompeius prematurely sent victorious letters per omnes prouincias ciuitatesque (53). In Fam. 7,3,2, a letter to M. Marius written in Rome around mid- April 46, Cicero refers to the baleful consequences of Pompeius' tactical victories at Dyrrachium in July 48, which filled him with unwarranted confidence in the strength of his inexperienced troops (54). Cicero's carefully chosen words leave little scope for discussion as regards Pompeius' official position at that time :

ex eo tempore uir ille summus nullus imperator fuit. Signa tirone et collecticio exerci- tu cum legionibus robustissimis contulit. Victus turpissime amissis etiam castris solus fugit-

(49) At that time, Scipio was in Ephesus where he busied himself with imposing heavy requisitions throughout the province of Asia.

(50) See Caesar, B.C. 1,6 for the assignment of the consular and praetorian provinces under the terms of the lex Pompeia of 52 in January 49. See B.C. 3,57 for Scipio contin- uing to command an army (of two legions : B.C. 3,4) in his own name.

(51) Caesar, B.C. 3,31, where Caesar mocks Scipio's alleged success and his assump- tion of the title of Imperator.

(52) Caesar, B.C. 3,71 & Dio 41,52,1. (53) Caesar, B.C. 3,79. Plutarch likewise records in Pomp. 66,1 that after his initial vic-

tories, Pompeius wrote to distant kings and generals (отдатщоьд) and cities in the tone of a victor.



942 F. J. VERVAET

"from that time on that great man ceased to be a sensible commander-in-chief. With his raw medley of an army he fought a pitched battle against the hardiest of legions. After being defeated and even having lost his camp, he fled shamefully, alone."

By way of a sarcastic game of words, Cicero unambiguously indicates that Pompeius in 48 held the summum impérium auspiciumque in the war against Caesar (55). Plutarch's definition of Pompeius as "sole commander of so many nations and armies" also shows that the proconsul commanded in Greece as summus imperator of all anti-Caesarian forces (56). In B.C. 2,50f., Appian relates that shortly before the decisive confrontation, Pompeius harangued the assembled senators, équités and soldiers, and concluded his speech with the message that all should be ready to obey his orders (та nagayyeXkójieva) promptly. That Pompeius held the supreme command at Pharsalia is quite clear from Caesar B.C. 3,88 and Pomp. 69,1, where Plutarch explains that Pompeius himself commanded the right wing, while he stationed (ávréra^e) the proconsuls Scipio and L. Domitius in the centre and in command of the left wing successively (57).

Pompeius' emphatic call for strict obedience before the ultimate confrontation was surely not a rhetorical commonplace, since it was precisely in this respect that the shoe pinched. In B.C. 2,67, Appian records that Pompeius was sur- rounded by a great number of senators of equal rank with himself : JtoXv ô' âficp' avròv Jtkfjdoç àvÔQœv ânó те rfjç ßovXfjg óiâotí/mdv. After the victory at Dyrrachium, these men of rank,

tqjv ёл' àfyœoecoç avròv èmTwQa^óvTwv èç (pikagxíctv œç éxóvra ßgaövvovua, W âvôgœv оцотщыу rooœvôe agxoi, xai ёжь iwôe amòv ßaoikea те ßaoikmv xai 'Aya/ié/bivova xakovvccov, on xâxetvoç fiaoikéwv ôià tòv JZÓXe(iov r¡gxev. "accused him of being fond of power and of delaying purposely in order to prolong his authority over so many men of his own rank and for this reason called him derisively 'king of kings' and 'Agamemnon', because he also ruled over kings while the war last- ed". (58)

(54) In Att. 1 1,4a, written in Dyrrachium around mid-June 48, however, even a usual- ly highly apprehensive Cicero avers that the rest of the war would not prove be too difficult.

(55) Although both Caesar and Pompeius (as well as the consuls) were supreme commanders in 49, it is better to interpret Cicero's definition of both antagonists in Att. 10,4,4 (14 April 49) as horum ... summorum imperatorum in the non-technical sense of "greatest of generals".

(56) Pomp. 67,4 : tooovtcov edvcov xai ôvvafiecov аутохдатодс отдатцуы. (57) Compare Plut., Ant. 8,3, where Plutarch relates that Caesar took the right wing

and gave ( mxgéôœxev ) command of the left to M. Antonius, then tribunus plebis pro praetore.

(58) In B.C. 2,69, Appian relates that after his fateful concession and amidst the bick- ering in his camp, Pompeius silently resigned himself to his fate, "as though he were no




Plutarch produces a similar summary of the severe criticism of Pompeius' strategy to avoid battle and instead wear Caesar's army down in Pomp. 67, 2f. Pompeius was accused of unduly prolonging the war "in order that he might always be in office and never cease to have for his attendants and guards men who claimed to rule the world." Thanks to Plutarch we know that it was Domitius Ahenobarbus who nicknamed Pompeius 'Agamemnon' and 'King of Kings', and that even some of Pompeius' staunchest partisans like L. Afranius (cos. 60) open- ly questioned the supreme commander's strategy of delay. From Plutarch's very similar account in Caes. 41,1, it is yet again quite obvious that Pompeius officially held the sole high command in 48. Plutarch indicates that apart from Cato, all the rest reviled Pompeius for trying to avoid a battle, and sought to goad him on by calling him Agamemnon and King of Kings, implying "that he did not wish to lay aside his sole authority, but plumed himself on having so many commanders dependent on him and coming constantly to his tent" :

cog òri цг) ßovkoiievov ánoQéoQai rrjv /iovagxiotv , аЯЯ ' àyakXópievov fiye^ovœv TooovTüjy êÇrjQTrinévcov avTOV xai (poi tcovtcúv tni oxrjvijv.

In B.C. 3,82, finally, Caesar himself records that in Thessaly, after Scipio's huge forces had reinforced Pompeius' army, many senators put Pompeius through the hoops by questioning his motives as commander-in-chief. Whenever any action on the part of Pompeius showed some degree of slowness and delib- eration, "they declared that it was only a single day's task, but that he was making the most of his supreme command and treating men of consular and praetorian rank as though they were slaves" :

unius esse negotium diei, sed ilium delectari imperio et consulares praetoriosque seruorum habere numero.

Although in our times, matters of social standing and rank under normal circumstances don't affect the composition, authority and efficiency of the military command structure, a few illuminating examples may suffice to show that such complexities were of the utmost importance to Roman aristocrats, ever touchy as they were about their precarious dignity, and that they definitely affected officially-defined hierarchies. In 105, the patrician proconsul Q. Servilius Caepio (cos. 106), a man of the noblest patrician stock, refused to cooperate with the consul Cn. Mallius Maximus, a plebeian homo nouus (59), a situation which even-

longer commander but under command, and as though he were doing everything under compulsion and against his judgment". Appian also indicates that some of Pompeius' critics feared that even if Pompeius would conquer, he would not lay down the supreme command (r r¡v fiovagxioiv).

(59) For Mallius Maximus' social rank, see T. P. Wiseman, New Men in the Roman Senate , Oxford, 1971, p. 203 & 239.



944 F. J. VERVAET

tually resulted in their notorious defeat at the hands of the Cimbri at Arausio C0). Valerius Maximus elucidates in 8,15,8 that Pompeius, at that time a mere eques Romanus , was dispatched in 77 as proconsul to Spain against Sertorius with the right to command on a footing of equality with Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius (cos. 80), the foremost citizen of the moment (61). Although Pompeius was officially entitled to share the supreme command with Metellus, it should come as no sur- prise that Metellus' seniority and superior senatorial rank resulted in Pompeius' conceding the summum impérium auspiciumque to Metellus of his own accord in the event of collective operations, as a courteous display of deference to the noble consular. In Pomp. 19,5 Plutarch relates that when Metellus was drawing near after the indecisive battle by the river Suero and Sertorius retired, Pompeius went to meet Metellus and ordered his lictors to lower their fasces at the moment of their encounter, out of deference to Metellus as his superior in dignity (62). Metellus, however, would not allow this and showed a magnanimous considera- tion of Pompeius in all other ways : He did not assume any superiority as a senior man of consular rank (63), except that when they shared the same camp the watch- word was given out to all from the tent of Metellus. In 67, the proud proconsul Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus (cos. 69) refused to give way to Pompeius in Crete. As a senator of consular rank and officially in command of significant forces against the pirates in Crete, Metellus felt strong enough to insist that he was equally entitled to the supreme command in the war against piracy in his own prouincia decreta (M).

In Fam. 2,18,2 (Loadicea, early May 50), Cicero urges the propraetor of Asia, Q. Minucius Thermus, who was about to delegate the command of his province to one of his staff members, to appoint his quaestor, the young L. Antonius (cos. 41). Otherwise, Thermus would make formidable enemies slighting a powerful young nobleman. Cicero explains that Thermus had nobody of superior rank available, and that, apart from his noble standing, the young man in question had a better claim than Thermus' legates from the very fact that he was Thermus' quaestor : habes enim neminem honoris gradu superiorem ; ille autem , ut omit-

(60) See Dio 27,91 & Granius Licinianus 33 (p. 11-12 Flemisch) for the fact that Caepio from pride obstinately refused to resign himself to the consul's position as supreme commander.

(61) Eques Romanus pro consule in Hispaniam aduersus Sertorium pari imperio cum Pio Metello principe ciuitate missus est. By the conspicuous paraphrase pari imperio cum Metello , Valerius is not referring to the fact that Pompeius held impérium consulare like Metellus, since this is self-evident from his being sent off to Spain pro consule.

(62) êxékevoev vcpelvai rag (5äßovg, deçajtevwv óç kqovxovto. rtfifj rov Mérekkov.

(63) ovôèv (be тапхш mi JtpeoBvrépa) véucov èavrœ nkéov. (64) See T. R. S. Broughton, MRP 1 [п. 21], p. 145 for a series of references to the

sources concerned.




tam nobilitatem, hoc ipso uincit.. .legatos tuosy quod est quaestor et quaestor tuus. In other words, if Thermus had had one or more praetorian legati on his staff, it would have been far less evident to make a right and proper choice, even if a quaestor officially ranked higher than a legatus. This conclusion is corroborated by Cicero's own choice of a replacement and its underlying justifica- tion (65). In Att . 6,6,3 (Side, ca. 3 August 50), Cicero reports to Atticus that he has finally decided put his quaestor C. Coelius Caldus in charge of his province, even though he admits it concerns a particularly young and immature young man. Cicero, however, explains that except his own brother there was no one whom he could put ahead of his quaestor, a nobleman too, without insulting him : nam praeter fratrem nemo erat quem sine contumelia quaestori, nobili praesertim, anteferrem. As Q. Cicero then served on Cicero's staff as legate of praetorian rank, Cicero could have preferred him over Coelius without giving offence, irrespective of the latter's higher official status C6).

That apart from the official chain of command as defined by one's official status and formal decisions on the part of SPQR, one's senatorial rank also played an important role in the power relations between respective officials cum imperio is also clear from Plut., Cat. Min. 55,3. Plutarch here relates that after the defeat at Pharsalia, Cato vainly offered to give up the command of fifteen cohorts of soldiers (cf. Cat. Min. 55,1) and a fleet detachment to Cicero because the latter was of consular rank whereas Cato himself had been only a praetor. In Cic. 39,1, Plutarch in more explicit words records that Cato asked Cicero in vain to take command of his considerable forces "in accordance with the law and because of his superior consular dignity" : хата vófxov mi то rfjç vjxareíaç á^ícofia. If Cicero had not been proconsul at that time and he as well as Cato had been propraetors, his consular rank would have still given him precedence to Cato as to which of both commanders was entitled to assume the supreme command (67).

During the crucial period from January 49 until the battle of Pharsalia, reality in the field was surely no different in this respect. Even if the summum impéri- um auspiciumque had been explicitly conferred upon one (or more) commanders), relations between the high command and all other imperators and officials continued to be strongly affected by every official's social standing ( nobilis or

(65) For an excellent discussion of (the background of) Cicero's choice of a deputy governor, see A. J. Marshall, The lex Pompeia de prouinciis (52 B.C.) and Cicero's Imperium in 51-50 B.C. : Constitutional Aspects in ANRW 1.1, Berlin-New York, 1971, p. 901-919.

(66) C. Pomptinus {pr. 63), Cicero's senior praetorian legatus had already left the province by the time Cicero had to make this decision : see A. J. Marshall, The lex Pompeia [n. 65], p. 914 n. 104.

(67) See Plut., Cat. Min. 57,3 for the fact that a propraetor could not lawfully command over a proconsul.



946 F. J. VERVAET

homo nouus) and senatorial rank ( consularis , praetorius , quaestorius , etc.). A striking example of how such individual qualities strongly affected hierarchic relations between commanders is provided by Pompeius' at times desperate communication with the recalcitrant and self-willing proconsul L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (68). In Att. 8,12B,lf. (11 February 49), Pompeius reprimands Domitius' worrying lack of cooperation in very mild and almost imploring terms :

Valde miror te ad me nihil scribere...miror quid causae fuerit qua re consilium mutaris...Quam ob rem etiam <atque etiam> te rogo et hortor, id quod non destiti superioribus litteris a te petere, ut primo quoque die Luceriam ad <me> uenires...sed si erunt qui te impediant ut <u>illas suas seruent, aequum est me a te impetrare ut cohortis quae ex Piceno et Camerino uenerunt,...

"I am very much surprised that you do not write to me... I am at loss to understand why... you subsequently changed your plans... Accordingly I once again beg and urge you, as I have continually asked you in my previous letters, to come to me ad Luceria on the earliest possible day... If, however, you are held back by certain persons anx- ious to save their farms, I am surely entitled to expect you to release the cohorts which have come from Picenum and Camerinum,..."

From the tenor of Pompeius' words, however, it is still obvious that he is writ- ing in the capacity of commander-in-chief, that he was seriously displeased at Domitius' wayward course of action, and that that Domitius was perfectly aware of this. In Att. 8,12C,2 (16 February 49) Pompeius politely though firmly reit- erates his request that Domitius should join him as soon as possible : Quam ob rem te magno opera hortor ut quam primům com omnibus copiis hoc uenias (69). In Att. 8,12A,3 (18 February (?) 49) Pompeius indirectly incites the consuls to bring Domitius into line :

D. Laelio mandaram, quod maiores copias sperabam nos habituros, ut, si uobis uideretur, alter ut uestrum ad me ueniret, alter in Siciliam cum ea copia quam Capuae et circum Capuam comparastis et et cum iis militibus quos Faustus legit proflciscere- tur, Domitius cum XII suis cohortibus eodem adiungeretur,...

"Hoping to have a larger force I sent you word by D. Laelius that, if you saw fit, one or other of you should join me, while his colleague should proceed to Sicily with the force which you raised in Capua and the surrounding area and with the troops recruit- ed by Faustus, that Domitius with his own twelve cohorts should be attached to this force,..."

In Att. 8,12D,1 (Luceria, 17 February 49) Pompeius makes it quite clear to Domitius that he was very displeased at his obstinacy : quo etiam magis tuis lit-

(68) In Att. 8,1,3 Cicero frankly avers that nemo пес stultior est quam L. Domitius. (69) See loc. cit. 3f. for yet another a repetition : etiam atque etiam te hortor ut cum

omni copia quam primům ad me uenias.




teris sum commotus. In loc. cit. 2, the agonized proconsul even omits his customary courtesy to adopt a more imperative tone : Qua re da operam... ut te explices, hoc quam primům uenias,... Ç°)

In this respect, it is important to ascertain that aristocratic courtesy and deferential politeness was standard policy in communication between imperators, regardless of each commander's official position in the chain of command. As some of his above-mentioned correspondence shows, Pompeius' instructions to his fellow imperators generally took the form of friendly requests or recommendations. This is also quite clear from Att. 8,1,1 (15 or 16 January 49 ; Pompeius to Cicero: tu censeo Luceriam uenias ) and Att. 8,1 1С (20 February 49; Pompeius to Cicero : magno opera te hortor) (71). The same courtesy marks his communication with the consuls, his equals in the command against Caesar, in which the formula si tibi / uobis uideretur recurs. In Att. 8,6,2 (20 February 49) Cicero cites a letter from Pompeius to the consuls in which the proconsul's urgent demand again takes the form of a friendly request :

Litterae mihi a L. Domitio a.d . XIII Kal. Mart, adlatae sunt ; earum exemplum infra scripsi. Nunc , ut ego non scribam, tua sponte te intellegere scio quanti rei publicae in<tersit> omnis copias in unum locum primo quoque tempore conuenire. Tu, si tibi uidebitur, dabis operam ut quam primům ad nos uenias, praesidi Capuae quantum constitueritis satis esse relinquas. "I have received a letter from L. Domitius on 17 February, a copy of which I append. As matters now stand I know that you will realize for yourself without any letter from me how important it is for the public interest that all forces should be concentrated at the earliest possible moment. You will take steps, if you see fit, to join us as soon as possible, leaving in Capua as large a garrison as you and your colleague judge to be sufficient." (72)

In § 4 of Pompeius' above-mentioned letter to the consuls of 18 February (?) 49 (73), Pompeius yet again urges the consuls to "muster all the troops you can

(70) "Therefore make sure to extricate yourself and to come here as soon as possible,..." From B.C. 1,19, where Caesar briefly records Pompeius' urgent requests to Domitius, it is equally clear that the former was not amused at the latter' s obstinate refusal to comply with his directives : Pompeius enim rescripserat sese rem in summum pericu- lum deducturum non esse, neque suo Consilio aut uoluntate Domitium, se in oppidum Corfinium contulisse ; proinde, si qua fuisset facultas, ad se cum omnibus copiis ueniret.

(71) See also Att. 8,1 ID, 4 for a reference to this letter quibus nos hortaris ut celerius Brundisium ueniamus.

(72) See also Att. 8,11D,3 for a reference to this letter to the consul(s). This letter is also instructive in that Domitius reports to Pompeius, one of the three supreme commanders, who in turn notifies the consuls, his fellow summi imperatores - see also Att. 8,8,2 : ecce subito litterae Domiti ad ilium [i.e., Pompeius], ipsius ad cónsules.

(73) Att. 8,12A,4 (Luceria). See also Aft. 8,3,7 (Cales, 18-19 February 49) for a reference to this letter, where Cicero records that Pompeius had written to the consuls that he wished one of them to take a legion to Sicily ( legionem Fausto conscriptam in Siciliam sibi piacere a consule duci scrips erat ad cónsules).



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and come likewise to Brundisium as soon as possible. I advise that that you use the arms which you were going to send me to. . ." :

uos hortor ut quodcumque militum contrahere poteritis contrahatis et eodem Brundisium ueniatis quam primům . Arma quae ad me missuri eratis, iis censeo...

A short reference to a letter of Domitius Ahenobarbus to Pompeius in Att. 8,12C,4 (16 February 49 - Pompeius to Domitius Ahenobarbus) reveals that style and tone of Domitius' own official dispatches also perfectly follow the rules of mutual deference and aristocratic courtesy :

His litteris scriptis fsic adpoetef mihi litteras et mandata attulit. Quod me hortare ut istuc ueniam, id me facere non arbitror posse, quod non magno opera his legionibus confido. "After I had written this letter ? brought me your letter and message. I do not think I can comply with your request that I should join you because I have no great confidence in these legions."

To my thinking, it should not be doubted that under the Republic, instructions from supreme commanders to hierarchically subordinate imperators and even all communication between imperators (of equal or unequal official status / senatorial rank) generally took the form of polite requests and recommendations.

In addition to these illuminating letters, some other striking examples show that these customary displays of courtesy and mutual respect should definitely not be taken as literal indications of (a particular imperatori position within the) official hierarchy. In Brut. 3,4,3, Plutarch records that when M. Iunius Brutus (pr. 44), at that time officially attached to the staff of P. Sestius as legatus (74), came of his own accord to Macedonia, Pompeius was so filled with delight and admiration that he rose from his seat as Brutus approached and embraced him as a superior (cbç kqeíttovo) in the sight of all. After the armies of Scipio and Pompeius had joined forces, Pompeius conspicuously shared his official dignity with Scipio by giving the order that the bugle should be sounded before him and a second general's tent erected for his headquarters :

cum Scipionem honorem partitur classicumque apud eum cani et alterum illi iubet praetorium tendi.

Scipio's recorded pride and his unrivalled degree of nobility perfectly account for this remarkable display of honour, courtesy and deference (75). Both from the fact that the order came from Pompeius, and that Caesar next clearly indicates that Scipio's coming increased the army of Pompeius (auctis copiis Pompei), this evidently concerns a voluntary - though symbolically important - gesture on the

(74) T. R. S. Broughton, MRR 2 In. 51, d. 267. (75) See also Caesar, B.C. 3,57 for Scipio's great personal auctoritas.




part of Pompeius to parade his courteous and tactful deference to Scipio's high social and official standing.

Before proceeding, it is important to add two more observations. First, as concerns the relationship between imperatore with consular impérium , the summum impérium did surely not have the force of a consulare impérium maius quam. This is very clear from a couple of senatorial debates on the creation of special commands for Pompeius in 57 and Cassius in 43 (76). As there was a quantitative difference between a consulare impérium that had been officially defined as maius with respect to certain other consularia imperia on the one hand, and a regular consulare impérium on the other hand, refusal to comply with legitimate orders on the part of holder of consulare impérium maius quam would have been breaking the law. Especially if the imperators involved not only held the same genus imperii but also the same senatorial rank could it happen that a commander felt that the public interest compelled him not to heed the directives of the supreme commander. The attitude of L. Domitius Ahenobarbus speaks volumes in this respect (77). In Att. 7,11,5 (21 January (?) 49) and 7,14,2 (25 January 49), Cicero indicates that it was Pompeius who wanted him to supervise part of Campania and its shores from Capua and help with the levy in this area. In Att. 8,3,4f. (18-19 February) & Att. 8,1 ID, 5 (27 February 49), Cicero explains that he simply ignored this order because he lacked both the troops and the money to hold Capua. Secondly, it should be stressed that this veil of aristocratic courtesy and politeness should not deceive. Regardless of the often mild and suggestive tone of communication between imperators, every actor perfectly knew what his position was within the chain of command as defined by SPQR and the official status of each commander. This is made perfectly clear by what Cicero writes in Att. 8,12,2 (Formiae, 28 Feb. 49), where Cicero yet again defends his decision not to assume the Capuan command as being taken for valid reasons :

Omnia sunt integra nobis ; nihil praetermissum est quod non habeat sapientem excu- sationem, non modo probabilem. Nam certe ñeque tum peccaui cum imperatam iam Capuam non solum ignauiae dedecus sed etiam perfidiae suspicionem fugiens accipere nolui.

(76) See Cíe., Att. & Phil. ll,30f. & 36 and Fam. 12,7,1 & Brut. 2,4,2. In both cases, motions to invest Pompeius and Cassius with a functionally and geographically limited consulare impérium maius quam were rejected as unacceptable ( non ferenda).

(77) Although Gelzer is mistaken in that Pompeius indeed was officially entitled to issue directives to Domitius Ahenobarbus as summus imperator along with the consuls, he in the context of a discussion of Att. 12,8B at any rate rightly suggests ( Pompeius [n. 1], p. 172) that an early redefinition of Pompeius' impérium as maius quam with respect to that of other proconsuls might have greatly facilitated matters : "Dieser Brief führt uns sehr anschaulich die gewaltigen Schwierigkeiten vor Augen, mit denen Pompeius zu kämpfen hatte. Da man ihm keine übergeordnete Befehlsgewalt übertrug ( impérium maius), war er bei seine, Unternehmungen ganz auf den guten Willen der andern, ihm gle- ichstehenden Prokonsuln angewiesen."



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"My position is quite uncompromised. For any past omissions on my part I have a rationally just, and not merely plausible, excuse. Assuredly I was not wrong when, avoiding not only the discredit of cowardice but the suspicion of treachery, I refused to take the Capuan command when actually ordered to do so."

This letter at once provides striking proof that the whole façade of deferential and polite formulation did not detract from the fact that orders were still orders (78). The document also suggests that failure to comply with the orders of the supreme commander could eventually end in a trial de maiestate Populi Romani minuta. The immediate abrogation and conviction of the proconsul Q. Servilius Caepio (cos. 106) in 105 may suffice as a powerful example (79). As Cicero tells Atticus in 8,12,6 (28 February 49) that Pompeius put all the blame for everything that went wrong on Domitius Ahenobarbus, the latter was clearly at risk of being brought to trial in the aftermath of a hard- won final victory. As copies of many key documents out of Caesar's and Pompeius' correspondence were widely distributed among senatorial commanders and protagonists (80), there would have been conclusive evidence as to the position and policies of the litigants. In this respect, it is finally worth calling to mind that the polite formu-

(78) Livy relates in 23,48,2 that in 215 the consul Ti. Gracchus (cos. 213) ordered the proconsul M. Claudius Marcellus (cos. 222, 215, 214, 210, 208) to send part of his army to Rome : M. Claudio proconsuli imperauit ut, retento Nolae necessario ad tuendam praesidio, ceteros milites dimitteret Romam. In 212 the consuls Q. Fulvius Flaccus (cos. 237, 224, 209) and App. Claudius Pulcher (pr. 215), both fighting in Campania, ordered the proconsul Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (cos. 215, 213) to march from Lucania to Beneventum : Beneuentum uenire iubent : see Livy 25,15,20. Although it should not be doubted that these consular directives were issued under the form of polite and deferential recommendations, especially if addressed to proconsuls of consular rank, Livy' s words show that it really concerned official orders. Similarly, Dio indicates in 41,1,1 (supra) that Pompeius' friendly entreaties to Domitius Ahenobarbus were really orders, while it should not be doubted that the edict to abandon Rome (see Dio 41,6,2 & 41,18,4f. supra) and the iussa Cicero received from the consuls (see Att. 7,16,2 ; 7,17,5 ; 7,18,1 ; 7,20,1 ; 7,21,1 & 8,1 IB, 2 supra) were also issued under the form of polite requests and recommendations. The case of the praetorian proconsuls M. Iunius Brutus (pr . 44) and Q. Hortensius is equally illuminating in this respect. In February 43, the Senate had officially invested Brutus with the summum impérium in Macedonia, Illyricum and Greece, whereas it at the same time also confirmed Hortensius in his position of proconsul of Macedonia (Cic., Phil. 10,25f.). Although Brutus ordered Hortensius to execute C. Antonius by means of a polite request (Plut., Brut. 28,1 ; comp. Dio 47,24,4), Livy's epitomator (Per. 121) makes it quite clear that it still concerned an official order : M. quoque Bruti iussu С. Antonius captus occisus est.

(79) See Val. Max. 4,7,3 : tribunus enim plebis Caepionem in carcerem coniectum, quod illius culpa exercitus noster a Cimbris et Teutonis uidebatur de le tus, & Per. 67 : Caepionis, cuius temeritate clades accepta erat, damnati bona publicata sunt, primi post regem Tarquinium, imperiumque ei abrogatum.

(80) See, for example, Att. 7,17,2 ; 8,6,2 ; 9ДЗАД ; 9,14,1 & 9,17 for the deliberate distribution of important letters by the associates of Caesar and Pompeius.




la si uobis / eis uideretur (or a variant) was also standard procedure in senatus consulta (81). Although this formula reminds us of the fact that the Senate's decrees officially were no more than public recommendations, ignoring or dis- obeying them could have dire consequences, especially if the official concerned could not afterwards convince the Fathers that his self-willed actions were taken rei publicae causa.

At any rate, the reprehensible failure on the part of Pompeius' senatorial equals to fully and unconditionally go along with his position of supreme commander significantly contributed to Caesar's crushing victory at Pharsalia. Appian explains in B.C. 2,67 that Pompeius, fully aware of Caesar's increasing want of supplies, initially tried to convince those who preferred a quick decision, arguing that Caesar only pushed for battle out of sheer necessity, and that it was better to wait and wear his army out. Pompeius nonetheless allowed himself to be moved from his own purpose and gave in to his senatorial critics. Instead of firmly standing on his dignity and rights as commander-in-chief, Pompeius finally decided to give battle "against his will, to his own hurt and that of the men who had persuaded him." (82) In view of these considerations, it is quite possible that the decision to invest only Pompeius with the supreme command in the war against Caesar was not taken as unanimously as Lucan wants us to believe.

4. Conclusion. - In view of this reassessment of what the sources attest, K. M. Girardet rightly refutes the suggestion that at any given time in 49 or 48, the Senate had redefined Pompeius' consulare impérium as greater with respect to (maius quam) the consulare impérium of his fellow proconsuls, let alone that of the consuls, Rome's traditional summi imperatores (83). Girardet's thesis that in 49, "Die gegen Caesar eingesetzten Inhaber des impérium consulare blieben somit kompetenzrechtlich einander gleichgestellt", however, must be refined in that in January 49 the Senate did confer the supreme command (the summum impérium auspiciumque) in Italy upon all three of the consuls and Pompeius. This means that on a footing of equality with the consuls (pari imperio ), Pompeius too was given the right to issue commands that were to be followed by all other officials cum imperio, including his fellow proconsuls. As has been argued in the above, this statutory reality does not exclude the fact that in actual

(81) See, e.g., Cic., Phil. 9,16 & 11,31. (82) In Pomp. 67,4, Plutarch also expresses his strong indignation at the fact that

Pompeius as sole commander of a formidable coalition meekly succumbed to his critics, behaviour which he deems unworthy of even the captain of a ship. Contra M. Gelzer, Pompeius [n. 1], p. 183 + 240, n. 27), who wrongly avers "daß seine Befehlsgewalt als impérium maius dem Imperium der anderen Prokonsuln übergeordnet wurde" at the very end of 49, and that "Für Pompeius dagegen bedeutete die Klärung der Oberbefehlsfrage eine große Verbesserung."

(83) K. M. Girardet, Imperium und provinciae des Pompeius seit 67. v. С nr. in CCCr 3, 1992, p. 188 & Imperia und provinciae des Pompeius [n. 2], p. 203-206.



952 F. J. VERVAET

practice, it rarely occurred that direct orders were issued to fellow imperators. For reasons of courtesy and deference to senatorial rank and high office, it was standard procedure to release such commands in the form of Consilia or even petitions, especially if the addressee was a high-ranking nobilis of consular standing and tenant of the same titl d genus imperii as the supreme commander. It is precisely this above-outlined background of 'inter-senatorial respect' for one another's dignity that perfectly accounts for the fact that,

"der Prokonsul Pompeius dem Prokonsul L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, der, obwohl zum Nachfolger Caesar's im jenseitigen Gallien bestellt, in der augenblicklichen Notsituation mit der Verteidigung Etruriens beauftragt worden war, regelrechte Betelbriefe in militärischen Dingen schreiben mußte, statt einfach zu befehlen."

In light of the above, it is equally difficult to maintain Girardet's view that Lucan, Caesar and Vellerns are not referring to "eine vermeintlich neue rechtliche Struktur der Heeresführung", but rather "an freiwillige (oder auch widerwillige Unterordnung der anderen Träger von impérium consulare denken als an die rechtliche Fundierung einer hierarchischen Kommandostruktur durch Senatsbeschluß". In sum, Girardet's observation ad Velleium 2,49,2 (supra) that "diese Formulierung spricht nicht für eine förmliche 'Ermächtigung' des Pompeius und Ausstattung mit impérium

' maius "' is only partially correct in that Pompeius was formally given the sole high command at the end of 49, whereas the conclusion that Pompeius "mit Zustimmung der geflohenen Konsuln und des in Makedonien weilenden Restsenates faktisch, aber nur informell die Leitung des Widerstandes gegen Caesar innegehabt hat", is wrong altogether О*4).

Finally, on the basis of the almost analogous plenary powers that were decreed in February 43 to the proconsul M. Iunius Brutus (pr . 44), it is, perhaps, possible to attempt a reconstruction of the decree that was passed in the immediate aftermath of the s.c. ultimum of 7 January 49 with respect to the role of the consuls and Pompeius in the war against Caesar :

Vtique C. Claudius Marcellus et L. Cornelius Lentulus, cónsules, atque Cn. Pompeius Magnus , pro consule, pari imperio rem publicam tueantur, defendant, custodiant incolumemque conseruent eique exercitui quem Apuliae est praesint atque dilectum

(84) K. M. Girardet, Imperia und provinciae des Pompeius [n. 2], p. 204-206. M. Gelzer, Pompeius [n. 1], p. 172 and R. Seager, Pompey [1], p. 171 also infer from Pompeius' correspondence with Domitius that both proconsuls commanded on a footing of equality (pari imperio) : "This correspondence... illustrates only too well the impossi- ble nature of Pompeius' position. Unable to give orders, he could only ask for co-opera- tion". Although Girardet wrongly believes that what he labels an unofficial decision only boosted Pompeius' auctoritas , he rightly emphasises (p. 206) that neither Pompeius' impérium nor his potestas was enhanced. T. R. S. Broughton [n. 5], p. 263 & 278 also states that Cato's demand that Pompeius be made commander-in-chief was rejected and that the proconsul was only "in fact accepted as commander in chief' at the end of 49.




habeant tota Italia , pecuniamque ad rem militarem, si qua opus sit quae publica sit et exigi possint , utantur, exigant, pecuniasque a quibus uideatur ad rem militarem mutuas sumat frumentumque imperent (85).

"C. Claudius Marcellus and L. Cornelius Lentulus, consuls, and Cn. Pompeius Magnus, proconsul, should, on a footing of equality, protect, defend, guard, and keep safe the Republic, and should command the army which is in Apulia, and raise an army throughout Italy, and should employ and levy, if occasion arise, for military operations any public moneys that can be levied, and may borrow from whomsoever good moneys for military operations and command supplies."

On the analogy of a motion that Cicero a little later proposed to no avail in behalf of the proconsul C. Cassius Longinus (pr. 44) (86), it is quite possible that at the end of 49, the Senate not only entrusted Pompeius with the sole high command in the war in omnibus prouinciis (supra), but also determined that the proconsul,

eius belli gerendi causa , quibus ei uideatur, naues , nautas, pecuniam ceteraque, quae ad id bellum gerendum pertineant, ut imperandi in omnibus prouinciis ius potes- tatemque habeat.

"In order to wage this war he shall have the right and power in all provinces of making requisitions, from whomsoever he thinks good, of ships, sailors, and money, and other things pertaining to the carrying on of this war."

Ghent University . Frederik Juliaan Vervaet.

(85) See Cic., Phil . 10,26 for a reproduction of the decree that empowered Brutus. See K. M. Girardet, Die Rechtsstellung der Caesarenattentäter Brutus und Cassius in den Jahren 44-42 v. Chr. in Chiron 23, 1993, p. 212-217 for an analysis of this s.c. and its precise scope. In my opinion, the Senate charged Brutus with the summum impérium auspiciumque in the listed provinces, with the mandate to protect this vast area from Caesar's partisans. In order to provide Brutus with the necessary means to successfully discharge his duty, the proconsul was at once invested with a series of extraordinary powers.

(86) See Phil. 11,30 for the relevant part of Cicero's motion on behalf of C. Cassius. See K. M. Girardet, Die Rechtsstellung der Caesarenattentäter [п. 85], p. 218-222 for a discussion of the precise bearing of this motion. See Plut., Pomp. 56,1 for the fact that in 48, Pompeius indeed wrote to distant kings and governors and cities in the tone of a victor : TOÏÇ fièv è%œ ßaoikevoi xai отдатцуоТд xaí jtókeoiv coç vsvLxrjxcbç еудагре.



The Official Position of Cn. Pompeius in 49 and 48 BCE

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