This article was downloaded by: [Erasmus University]On: 28 August 2014, At: 05:02Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Australian Journal of InternationalAffairsPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/caji20

The new ‘Pacific Century’ and the riseof China: an international relationsperspectiveThomas WilkinsPublished online: 16 Jul 2010.

To cite this article: Thomas Wilkins (2010) The new ‘Pacific Century’ and the rise of China: aninternational relations perspective, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 64:4, 381-405, DOI:10.1080/10357718.2010.489993

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2010.489993

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to orarising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

The new ‘Pacific Century’ and the rise of China: an

international relations perspective

THOMAS WILKINS*

The re-emergence of the ‘Pacific Century’, or ‘Asia-Pacific Century’,discourse centred on the rise of Chinese power raises important questionsin the discipline of international relations (IR). These questions relate to theconceptualisation of the Pacific Century discourse, its application to thecontemporary empirical case, and its relationship and amenability to IRtheories. In order to address these questions, the article subjects the conceptof a ‘Pacific Century’ to critical analysis through the synergy of threepertinent ‘debates’. First, it creates a novel analytical framework to defineand codify the parameters of the Pacific Century debate; a discourse that hasuntil now remained diffuse and inchoate. Second, it engages with the present‘great debate’ in IR between the traditional/rationalist and critical/reflecti-vist approaches, applying them in juxtaposition to the notion of a ‘new’Pacific Century, led by China. Thirdly, then, the article speaks to the ‘risingChina’ debate, which currently captivates commentators both in academicand policy-making circles. The article explores how the ‘Pacific Century’concept is a compound of both ideational and material factors: it is at onceboth a political/ideological project and a reified intellectual frame ofreference. Through this multidimensional analysis, the article aims to shapethe re-emerging debate on the Pacific Century, affirm the enduring value ofthe term, and demonstrate the efficacy of IR theories in deconstructingconceptual problems.

Introduction

The concept of a ‘Pacific Century’ has plainly re-entered the discourse of

international politics, after a brief hiatus following the Asian financial crisis of

1997�8. Now, according to Prime Minster Kevin Rudd, we are (again) poised to

enter a new epoch of Pacific power and prosperity. The prime minister identifies

that ‘[t]he 21st century will be the Asia-Pacific century . . . so we need to make

sure that in the decades ahead we are fully engaged with the region’ (Larkin

2008). The notion is not confined to rhetoric, as it also forms the centrepiece of

*Thomas Wilkins specialises in security studies and strategic studies at the University of Sydney.

His latest publication is ‘Building regional security architecture: the Shanghai Cooperation

Organisation from an organisational theories perspective’, in State, society and international

relations in Asia, edited by Medhi Parvizi Amineh (Amsterdam University Press, 2010).

Bt.wilkins@econ.usyd.edu.au�

ISSN 1035-7718 print/ISSN 1465-332X online/10/040381-25 # 2010 Australian Institute of International Affairs

DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2010.489993

Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 64, No. 4,

pp. 381�405, August 2010

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Era

smus

Uni

vers

ity]

at 0

5:02

28

Aug

ust 2

014

the 2009 Australia Defence White Paper, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific

Century: Force 2030 (Department of Defence 2009). This revival of the ‘Pacific

Century’ concept in its current guise, with the ‘Asia-’ prefix attached, is

underwritten by a concern over the implications of the rise of China, and Asia

in general, as outlined in the works of scholars and public intellectuals such as

Bill Emmott (2009), Parag Khanna (2008), and Kishore Mahbubani (2008a,

2008b) . The consensus is, in the words of a recent Australian Strategic Policy

Institute report, that ‘the global centre of gravity continues to shift from the

transatlantic region to the transpacific’ (Lyon and Leah 2008: 41). Canberra

surely recognises the advantages to be wrought from its engagement with China

and the other major Asia-Pacific powers. To this purpose, Rudd has enunciated

a vision for regional economic and security integration, aiming to establish an

‘Asia-Pacific Community’ by 2020.1 Yet, despite his leading efforts to revive the

Pacific Century discourse by coining the new term ‘Asia-Pacific Century’ as its

latest descriptor, Rudd is not its progenitor, nor is the concept by any means

confined to Australia, as we shall see. The invocation of the concept also presents

a number of problematic questions as to its definition, remit, and implications,

which this article seeks to examine.

Background

Notions of a ‘Pacific Century’, along with its close cognates ‘Pacific Age’, ‘Pacific

Era’, ‘Asian Century’, and, now, ‘Asia-Pacific Century’, have a long historical

pedigree.2 The term arguably has its genesis in the expansion of the European

spice trade in the Asia-Pacific from around the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,

but it was on the eve of the twentieth century that the concept began to gain real

traction in international politics (for uses of these terms, see Davenport 2006;

Korhonen 1996; Mahbubani 2008a; Moon 2006). Writing in the 1890s, a

Japanese diplomat, Inagaki Manjiro (1890), advanced the belief that the coming

twentieth century would herald the dawning of a ‘Pacific Age’ (later recast in

Western discourse as ‘Pacific Century’). Inagaki may not have seen his vision of a

‘Pacific Century’ realised in his lifetime, but the concept would reach maturity

toward the end of that century, and Japan would be firmly associated with it.It was in the late 1980s that ‘the concept of the Pacific Century . . . reached its

zenith’, according to Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter (1999: 245). At this

time, the Japanese economic miracle, which had begun in the 1960s, spread to

the ‘Asian tigers’ of Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong. With

Japan at the pinnacle of its commercial ascendancy, touted as ‘number one’ in

Erza Vogel’s best-seller, the region of East Asia experienced phenomenal

economic growth, combined with increasing domestic stability and democrati-

sation (Johnson 1982; Kim 1999; Vogel 1979). Moreover, American trade with

the Pacific world overtook its transatlantic commerce for the first time in the

1980s. Convincing arguments were made that the Pacific Basin was increasingly

382 Thomas Wilkins

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Era

smus

Uni

vers

ity]

at 0

5:02

28

Aug

ust 2

014

becoming the locus of future world development, and pundits again began to

dub this the ‘Pacific Century’ (Borthwick 1998; Gibney 1992; McCord 1991).

Politicians, financiers, and academics embraced the ‘confident prediction from

within the region that the Pacific Century will be the defining feature of the post-

Cold War world’ (Bell 1996). Indeed, the concept became something of an

intoxicant. Foot and Walter observe how ‘[t]he first half of the 1990s were the

blossoming of the ‘‘Pacific Dream’’ when the terms future, prosperity and Asia-

Pacific became almost synonymous’ (cited in Dorsch 2006: 110).The dream became a nightmare when the devaluation of the Thai baht

triggered the Asian financial crisis of 1997�8, plunging most of the region into

dire financial straits. The prevailing mood of confidence ‘was pricked and then

deflated by the devastating economic crisis’, and all talk of the Pacific Century

and its counterparts quickly evaporated (Dupont 2007: 2). However, as the

affected countries recovered with astonishing rapidity (some laggards such as

Indonesia excepted), the concept began to gradually re-emerge.

The ‘new’ Pacific Century

Now, the ‘Pacific Century’ concept is back. But this time around the role of

vanguard has shifted from a lacklustre-performing Japan to a dynamic China,

with Beijing providing the impetus to restart the region’s stalled economies. In

this iteration of the ‘new’ Pacific Century it is China that is ‘number one’ (Vogel

2004). The ascension of the People’s Republic of China*/a country with

theoretically unlimited potential*/paves the way for a renewed Pacific Century

(if not a ‘Chinese Century’). With the recovery of the ‘tigers’ through banking-

sector reform, and the emergence of the ‘new tigers’ of Malaysia, Vietnam,

Indonesia, and Thailand, flanking the Chinese giant*/not to mention ‘rising

India’*/it is thus a propitious moment to reconsider whether the ‘Pacific

Century’ concept may again be applicable to portray the geopolitical and geo-

economic dynamics of the region.In identifying a resurgence of the ‘Pacific Century’ label, this article seeks to

address a number of issues regarding its conceptualisation and application in

international relations (IR): What exactly is the Pacific Century? What are its

conceptual and empirical dimensions and applications? And how does it relate to

the key theories and concerns of IR? Firstly, the article aims to construct a sound

analytical framework to codify our understanding of the ‘Pacific Century’

concept. Although a number of writers, such as Dennis Florig (2001) and

Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter (1999), have approached the concept, on the

whole IR scholars have not systematically or conceptually interrogated

it*/certainly not in recent years. This deficiency will be addressed here. In the

second section of the article, this framework is applied to outline the parameters

of a ‘new’ Chinese-led Pacific Century, before subjecting this contemporary case

to further analysis by employing the traditional and critical perspectives of IR in

The new ‘Pacific Century’ and the rise of China 383

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Era

smus

Uni

vers

ity]

at 0

5:02

28

Aug

ust 2

014

an effort to tease out its significance, dynamics, and implications. Although the

core focus of the second section is China, the other important Asian actors

(India, Korea, and Japan) are also considered in lesser detail. The article

concludes that a new, Chinese-led Pacific Century looks very different when

viewed from the various competing perspectives of IR.As such, the enquiry benefits from operating at the nexus of three pertinent

and intersecting ‘debates’:

. the debate surrounding the ‘Pacific Century’ concept itself;

. the ‘rationalism versus reflectivism’ debate (known as the ‘third great IR

debate’); and. the ‘rising China’ debate.

Through a synthesis of these debates we can achieve a mature and sophisticated

appraisal of the ‘Pacific Century’ concept in its most recent guise, informed by

the spectrum of IR theories and dealing with perhaps the most pressing issue of

contemporary regional politics: the rise of China (see Figure 1).

PART I: Conceptualising the ‘Pacific Century’: an analytical framework

This section is dedicated to a comprehensive discussion of the first of our three

debates as it relates to the definition and parameters of the ‘Pacific Century’

(2) THE THIRD GREAT IRDEBATE

(3) RISING CHINA

(1) THE PACIFICCENTURY

x

TRADITIONAL /RATIONALIST IR

CRITICAL / REFLECTIVISTIR

x = Locus of analysis in this article.

Figure 1. Three debates.

384 Thomas Wilkins

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Era

smus

Uni

vers

ity]

at 0

5:02

28

Aug

ust 2

014

concept itself. Offering a precise formulation of the ‘Pacific Century’ concept

raises a number of problematic questions. Like so many others in the realm of

the social sciences, it may be considered an ‘essentially contested concept’.

Precision is impeded not only by its abstract nature, but by the many variations

in its labelling and usage (mentioned above). In order to probe deeper into its

symbolism and offer a clearer definition of what it might entail, three

parameters must be examined in order to render the concept meaningful, prior

to its application to the China case study in the following section. These are:

ideological (an ‘idea’); temporal (a ‘time’); and spatial (a ‘place’).

An ‘idea’

The notion of Pacific Century*/whether its exponents explicitly recognise it or

not*/is above all an ideological construct. Although it may technically be

employed in an objective, descriptive sense, the term ‘Pacific Century’ (or its

iterations) is almost invariably advanced as a political project. It speaks to a

vision of inexorable progress toward a teleological ‘end state’. In this sense, it is

a classic example of a ‘speech act’. As Ole Wæver describes it: ‘the utterance

itself is the act . . . By saying the words something is done’ or brought into

existence (Buzan et al. 1998: 26). Whenever the concept has been invoked, it

has taken on slightly different connotations, depending upon its interlocutor.

Yet, the core thesis, the alleged objective and material foundation for the

political project and the resultant speech act, has remained essentially the same.

Briefly stated, this is that a paradigm shift has occurred, is occurring, or will

occur in international politics in which ‘the economic, political, and cultural

center of the world will move from the Atlantic to the Pacific’ (Korhonen 1996:

64). Pekka Korhonen argues that:

In terms of basic concepts, very little has changed since the days of Seeley [a

British contemporary] and Inagaki. Now as then, within the Pacific age

rhetoric, economically orientated dynamic nations head together toward a

glorious century, where everything is measured in grandiose oceanic terms

(ibid.).

The stimuli behind each invocation of the concept have varied. For example, in

the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when Inagaki and Seeley

wrote, the discourse centred upon imperialist competition for the region’s

resources and strategically located ports (the ‘scramble for Asia’). In its

contemporary manifestation, it revolves around the stellar economic perfor-

mance of the major Asian states: first Japan, then the Asian tigers, and now

China (and India). The dynamism of the Asian ‘economic miracles’ has often

been twinned with the alleged superiority of Confucian and state-developmental

social models found in Asia (for an overview, see Mahbubani 1998; Yew 2000).

This opened a corresponding discourse on the role of ‘Asian values’ (or the

The new ‘Pacific Century’ and the rise of China 385

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Era

smus

Uni

vers

ity]

at 0

5:02

28

Aug

ust 2

014

‘Asian way’), famously ignited by the premiers of Malaysia and Singapore,

Mahathir bin Mohamad and Lee Kwan Yew. They argue that Asian culture and

society is proving superior to the liberal-democratic Western model, and herein

lies the root of Asia’s recent success (Subramaniam 2000). This discourse has

been muted since the Asian financial crisis revealed some of its failings.Also, embedded in the concept is a mixture of ‘threat’ and ‘opportunity’. In the

first instance, if the Pacific world is in ascent, then it follows that the Atlantic

(‘Western’) world must be in decline, and therefore menaced by the rise of Asia.

Mahbubani (2008b) argues that the impact of Asia’s rise on world order will

depend upon the West’s response to its loss of dominance and its willingness to

gracefully concede its hegemonic position. The worst-case scenario would involve

war between the current hegemon, the United States, and the rising power

challenger, China (formerly Japan) (Friedman and LeBard 1991; Galen Carpenter

2006). On the other hand, the Pacific Century has been viewed as an opportunity

for mutual prosperity and cooperation. Amitav Acharya sees occasions for trans-

Pacific collaboration and integration. He makes the case that ‘the ‘‘Asian Way’’ is

diffusing across the Pacific Rim evolving into the ‘‘Asia-Pacific Way’’’ (cited in

Evans 2000: 159). Though much of the thesis hinges on mutually beneficial

economic progress, Borthwick (1998): 525) identifies that ‘in recent years

political obstacles to cooperation have diminished, giving rise to ‘‘regionalist’’

perspectives in national capitals throughout Pacific Asia’. The development of the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), Asia-

Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and other trans-Pacific institutions

substantiates this claim.One thing is certain: unless the rise of Asia is disrupted, it will bring about a

major transformation both in the Asia-Pacific and the global international system.

Seema Desai (2006a) gives an indication of the scale of this development, claiming

that ‘[t]he ascent of the Asian giants parallels historical episodes, such as the

Industrial Revolution, or Meiji Restoration in Japan, in terms of the scope for

disruption and impact on the global economic and political order’. Indeed, Brad

Glosserman (2009) argues that ‘[a]ccording to conventional wisdom, the global

economic crisis is accelerating the transfer of power and influence from the West

to Asia’. This will have stark repercussions for the whole Westphalian-based

international system as it stands today.

A ‘time’

Secondly, one must consider the temporal question. The first hurdle is semantic.

The ‘Pacific Century’ concept is largely ‘epochal’, in that it identifies with ‘the

date of an occurrence that starts something going in a new direction’ (a point in

time) (Jones and Wilson 1995: 599). Rudd’s 2008 assertion that the country

stands at ‘the dawn of our Pacific Century’ exemplifies this pattern (Rudd

2008). Once this epoch is under way, it becomes an ‘era’: ‘a time during which

386 Thomas Wilkins

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Era

smus

Uni

vers

ity]

at 0

5:02

28

Aug

ust 2

014

what started as an epoch continues, building steam, gaining momentum,becoming established’ (Jones and Wilson 1995: 599). Thus, Stephen Smith(2008), the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in an address on Australia�Indiarelations, declared that ‘you are reminded every day that the 21st century isindeed the Asia-Pacific Century’. Thirdly, once the Pacific Century era is over, itwould then be identified as a (historical) ‘period’; think, for example, of the‘interwar period’ or the ‘Tudor period’. Lastly, the concept is also cyclical, oftenre-emerging at important centurial markers, in a fin-de-siecle atmosphere. Thus,the concept appears in many temporal guises.

Determining when the Pacific Century began, or will begin, is therefore atricky proposition: What time ‘period’ is most appropriate to assign to thePacific Century? Since the notion inextricably binds itself to a ‘century’ as theoperative time span, one is charged with assigning a clear-cut 100-year period tofit the ideological conception. Although, as mentioned earlier, there are severalpotential historical periods contending for the label ‘Pacific Century’, datingback to Portuguese navigator Ferdinand Magellan’s ingression into the PacificOcean in 1521, or the activities of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) fromthe end of the sixteenth century, the vast majority of the discourse is based uponthe twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

Frank Gibney, writing in 1992, identified the end of the twentieth century asmarking the beginning of the Pacific Century. He presented a strong case,contending that the period of sequential Japanese, Korean, and Chineseeconomic modernisations from the 1960s to the 1990s, plus the rise of othernewly industrialising economies such as Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, andHong Kong, was ushering in the Pacific Century. In this respect, the epoch ofeconomic take-off in the 1980s ‘primed the pump’ for the materialising twenty-first-century Pacific era. Mark Borthwick (1998: 1) declaims that ‘the nextcentury may bear the sobriquet of the great ocean, but it will be the product ofthe century that is now passing’. Other scholars identify the start of thetwentieth century as the catalyst, the beginning point for the ‘rise of the East’and the corresponding ‘descent of the West’ (Ferguson 2007). Korhonen (1996:49) posits that ‘[t]he Russo-Japanese War of 1904�1905 changed with onestroke the strategic landscape of the Pacific and the atmosphere of discussion’.At the very time when Oswald Spengler was brooding over the ‘decline of theWest’, Theodore Roosevelt claimed that ‘[t]he Pacific Era, destined to bethe greatest of all, is just at its dawn’ (Spengler 1922: 1). Whether one looks tothe start or the end of the twentieth century for the commencement of a Pacificepoch, Borthwick (1998: 1) concludes: ‘Used most frequently with reference tothe future, the term more accurately reflects the past’.

Yet, there are further conceptual caveats to be considered. Korhonen (1996:43) asserts that ‘[t]ime is measured in terms of centuries. Progress, on the scaleof civilisations, cannot be discerned with shorter time periods’. Yet, from acritical perspective it is not essential to be bound by centurial mileposts. Thenotion of a Pacific Century as literally a 100-year bloc permits us to determine

The new ‘Pacific Century’ and the rise of China 387

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Era

smus

Uni

vers

ity]

at 0

5:02

28

Aug

ust 2

014

a start point in 1980, for example, but, without a perspective from 2080, it is

impossible to be anything more than conjectural. Following a less constrained

interpretation, it does not even have to equal precisely 100 years. Consider, for

example, the so-called ‘Hundred’ Years War (1337�1453) in European history,

or Eric Hobsbawm’s (1994) The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth

Century, 1914�1991 in terms of academic composition. Viewed from a non-

Western, specifically Chinese perspective, the operative module of time was not

‘centuries’ at all, until they adopted it as a measurement of time or shiji in the

twentieth century.3 The Chinese thought in terms of imperial dynasties from

the Xia (2200�1750BC) to the Qing (1644�1911), as did the Japanese. Finally,

the ancient Greeks made a conceptual distinction between two forms of time.

While chronos simply appertains to the quantitative measurement of chron-

ological or sequential time, kairos is employed to capture an opportune or

‘supreme moment’*/an epoch in which something qualitatively distinctive

transpires. According to Eric White (1987: 13), kairos refers to ‘a passing

instant when an opening appears which must be driven through with force if

success is to be achieved’. This conforms well with the ideological visions of the

Pacific Century enumerated above.Yet, there is one last constituency one must take into account*/those sceptics

who believe a ‘Pacific Century’ is not being experienced at all. Chris Dixon and

David Drakakis-Smith (1995: 75) contend that ‘[i]n most cases assertions that

the ‘‘Pacific Century’’ has either arrived or is imminent have been largely

unsupported’ (see also Kraar 1999). Writing in 1999, Foot and Walter (1999:

269) declared that ‘the Pacific century has not arrived and is not likely any time

soon’ (see also Hick 2005).

A ‘place’

The last parameter to be considered is spatial. The vision must be bound to a

definite region. What comprises the ‘Pacific region’? This may be self-evident to

a geographer, but there is surprisingly little consensus on how the region is

politically demarcated, replicating the difficulties faced in defining ‘Europe’, for

example. Dixon and Drakakis-Smith (1995: 75) argue that ‘regional definitions

are notoriously difficult to establish’. This is compounded by the diverse

geographical descriptors applied to this particular region. The terms ‘Asia-

Pacific’ and ‘Pacific Rim’ appear to be the most popular appellations for

classifying the region (but the correlatives ‘Pacific Asia’ and ‘Pacific Basin’ are

also encountered). However, ‘they are seldom clearly defined and all too often

used as interchangeable’ (ibid.). This is problematic, since without clear

definitions it is difficult to specify the exact referent under study.The term preferred by many IR scholars, including this one*/‘Asia-

Pacific’*/tends to signify all the states of the Western seaboard of the Pacific

Ocean, plus the Indian subcontinent (‘South Asia’) and the United States. For

388 Thomas Wilkins

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Era

smus

Uni

vers

ity]

at 0

5:02

28

Aug

ust 2

014

Barry Desker (2008: 56), ‘[i]t includes the countries located on and within the

edges of the Pacific Ocean, as well as India, which is beginning to play an

important role in the politics of the region’. In other words, the Asia-Pacific

includes all the APEC members, plus India. The remainder of the American

continent and the smaller island groupings of the South Pacific figure only in the

most marginal capacity, if at all. The term ‘Pacific Rim’, once popular, appears

to be falling out of use. This designation would not include any state that does

not border on the Pacific Ocean and would reinstate the importance of the

Pacific islands and Latin America, while excluding India and land-locked Asia.

In both cases, however, the exact boundaries for territorial inclusion/exclusion

and delimitation are often blurred.Why specify a ‘region’ as a referent for inquiry? Under the interdisciplinary

rubric of ‘area studies’, geographical regions of the world are increasingly

viewed as coherent ‘units of analysis’ in their own right (see, for example,

Beeson 2007; Dent 2008; Farrell et al. 2005; Frost 2008; Kuijper 2008; Pempel

2005; Soderbaum and Shaw 2003). Rodrigo Tavares (2008: 107) argues that

‘[i]mportant aspects of international politics tend to be regional rather than

fully global or exclusively national’. The tendency toward ‘regionalism’ is thus

becoming widespread in IR. Take the ‘regional security complex’ concept

developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (2003), for example.4 This

exemplifies the recognition that regions and subregions demonstrate distinct

transnational (and transregional) interaction patterns, through the movement of

people, goods, and knowledge; known as ‘globalisation’ (or perhaps ‘regiona-

lisation’, in this case). Fernand Braudel’s (1972) Mediterranean world is one

such (historical) example, and one that finds a parallel in the Pacific region. The

legacy of trading networks and ethno-political divisions established by the

Western colonial powers since the Vasco da Gama epoch is still present in

certain regional affinities and animosities.Again, from a critical perspective, precise geographical demarcations may

not be strictly necessary to operationalise the concept, since Bjorn Hettne

argues, after all, that

there are no ‘natural’ regions: definitions of a ‘region’ vary according to the

problem or question under investigation. Moreover, it is widely accepted

that it is how political actors perceive and interpret the idea of region and

notions of ‘regionness’ that is critical: all regions are socially constructed and

hence politically contested (Hettne 2005: 544).

Moreover, Arif Dirlik (1995: 135) alerts us to the fact that ‘[d]efinitions

of the Pacific are part of the very struggle over the Pacific they seek to

describe’. This demonstrates that regions are social constructs designed to

serve some ideological or otherwise political purpose. Rudd’s conception of the

‘Asia-Pacific Century/Community’ is no different, in that it defines the region

according to Canberra’s preference to act as a ‘middle-power’ bridge between

The new ‘Pacific Century’ and the rise of China 389

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Era

smus

Uni

vers

ity]

at 0

5:02

28

Aug

ust 2

014

East Asia and the Anglo-Saxon powers of the Pacific, namely the United States

and Oceania. Thus, he declares that ‘[f]or the first time in the settled history of

this continent, we find ourselves in the region that will be at the centre of global

affairs’ (cited in Colebatch 2008). This provides the necessary spatial arena on

which to project the political visions of the Asia-Pacific Century/Community.

Thus, it ‘maps political; desire onto geography’ (Poole 2006: 27).

Summary

This section shows us that the concept of an imminent Pacific Century has

always been deployed in a certain historical, political, and cultural milieu. It is

an ideational and largely subjective term: it is coined by some party for some

scheme, recalling Robert Cox’s (1986: 207) maxim that ‘theory is always for

someone and for some purpose’; that is, there is ‘no view from nowhere’. Unlike

the monikers ‘American Century’, ‘Chinese Century’ and ‘Asian Century’,

which are explicitly ethnocentric conceptions (and distinctly competitive

attempts at ‘speech acts’), the ‘Pacific Century’ has the merit of being inclusive,

and thus more universally acceptable. Note that the article employs the term

‘Pacific Century’ rather than ‘Asia-Pacific’ or ‘Chinese’ Century, in order to

maintain continuity with its previous usage, but demonstrates throughout how

the parameters of the concept in its most recent manifestation have changed

accordingly.

PART II: Pax sinica 1949�2049: a Chinese-led new ‘Pacific Century’?

This section first establishes the parameters of the author’s chosen ‘Pacific

Century’ as an empirical referent for study, informed by the analytical

framework presented above. This is followed first by an application of the

‘traditional’ (realist and pluralist) and then ‘critical’ schools of IR theory to the

concept. We thus enter the second and third debates encompassed in the article:

‘rationalism versus constructivism’ and ‘rising China’, framed within the

context of the first debate on the ‘Pacific Century’, outlined above.Recognising that certain concepts can be tractable*/even contestable*/is one

thing, yet in order to proceed with a cogent and sustainable argument, one must

take a position. In order to lend some coherency to the following analysis,

I have decided to set the following parameters and priorities. First, the thesis

expounded and case study to be interrogated here are the idea of a Chinese-led

Pacific Century.5 Parag Khanna (2008: 257) asserts that ‘[t]he Pacific era will be

led by China*/and no one else’. Even as far back as 1809, Emperor Napoleon

predicted: ‘Quand la Chine s’eveillera, le monde entier tremblera’ (‘When China

awakes, the whole world will tremble’) (Peyrefitte 1980). The tremors are now

unmistakable. Policy makers are alive to China’s growing potential and the ‘rise

of China’ debate has gathered huge momentum in the field of IR (see, for

390 Thomas Wilkins

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Era

smus

Uni

vers

ity]

at 0

5:02

28

Aug

ust 2

014

example, Kang 2007; Overholt 1993; Sutter 2005). Kenneth Lieberthal,Director of the China Institute of the University of Michigan, says of theChinese: ‘I think they believe that the 21st century is China’s century’ (cited inElliott 2007: 34). A recent article, ‘The Chinese Century’, in Time (2007)indicates that this notion has now also entered the popular consciousness. Thisvision therefore portends the coming of pax sinica, spreading across Asia andbeyond, into the Pacific world.

Second, in designating a time frame for this Pacific Century, I have opted forthe chronological period 1949�2050 in a compromise between the historians,ideologues, and futurologists, and in accord with the notion of a kairos,extrapolated above. My rationale for selecting this time frame is as follows. Theepoch opens with Mao Zedong proclaiming to the masses gathered inTiananmen Square that ‘China has stood up’. The People’s Liberation Army’svictory in the Chinese Civil War (1945�9) represented the unification of themainland under a strong state, with the Communists declaring this a moment of‘national salvation’ (geming jiuguo) (Weng 2000: 100). The government of thefollowing decades, for all its imperfections, created an integrity and cohesion tothe Chinese polity that laid the foundations for the economic ‘take-off’ underDeng Xiaoping to the booming China of today. The denouement of China’sPacific era will occur by the mid twenty-first century, appropriately thecentennial of the end of the ‘century of humiliation’ (1840s�1940s), whereChina was subject to quasi-colonisation by the Western powers. The year 2050,by some estimates, also represents the point when the Chinese economy willovertake the US economy, with all the implications that entails (Fengming2006). In the teleological rhetoric of the Communists, this will represent therealisation of gaige xingguo (‘national prosperity’) for the Chinese people. Sincethe period straddles the recent past, the present, and looks toward the future, itis highly amenable to IR theories and presents much material for consideration.

Evidently, the organising idea of this Pacific Century places the People’sRepublic of China at the core of the following analysis, since in Borthwick’sview (1998: 546), it is ‘China’s resurgence . . . that poses the central questionsfor the coming Pacific Century’ (emphasis added). There is strong justificationfor this. The People’s Republic of China is now an economic powerhousefundamental to the wider notion of Asian resurgence as it is embodied in thePacific Century vision. However, this is not to suggest that the unfolding PacificCentury era is in any way confined exclusively to the so-called ‘MiddleKingdom’. David Kang declares that ‘the Rest of Asia is increasingly tied upwith China’s rise’ (cited in Pan 2006). For example, it is estimated that when theeconomies of Japan and Korea are added to the Chinese, the three together willaccount for 50 percent of the world’s gross domestic product by 2050 (Desai2006). Nor should we overlook India as a major player in the dawning PacificCentury, defined broadly. Seema Desai (2006) affirms that ‘India has thepotential to raise its US dollar income per capita in 2050 to 35 times currentlevels’. Though China occupies centre stage (especially for realists), readers

The new ‘Pacific Century’ and the rise of China 391

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Era

smus

Uni

vers

ity]

at 0

5:02

28

Aug

ust 2

014

should be alert to the major roles also played by Japan, South Korea, and India,

though space restrictions here preclude their detailed discussion.

Traditional versus critical interpretations of China’s new Pacific Century

With the analytical framework derived from the first conceptual debate having

established the parameters of the new Chinese-led Pacific Century, we now

arrive at the intersection of the second and third debates in this article, within

this context. The article now interrogates the China case from a variety of IR

perspectives. The nature and prospects of the Pacific Century look rather

different depending on which school of IR one consults. This section first

considers how the ‘traditional’ IR approaches of realism and pluralism view

the concept before turning to the alternative conceptions offered by ‘critical’

theorists (here incorporating elements of constructivism, postmodernism,

Marxism, and feminism) (see, for example, Wæver 1996).6 All these perspectives

concentrate on different aspects and offer contrasting scenarios for the

unfolding Pacific Century, thus illustrating in their application the key

characteristics of the ‘great debate’ between the traditional/rationalist and

critical/reflectivist traditions of the IR discipline. Although the first section treads

some familiar ground on the ‘rising China’ case, it is important to consider the

traditional perspectives in order to recognise the ‘mainstream’ debate on rising

China, and to set the context for the reflectivist critique that follows.

‘Traditional’ perspectives: realism and pluralism

The realist image of the new Pacific Century places a strong emphasis on rising

Chinese power and offers a somewhat pessimistic outlook for the future. This is

not surprising given its introspective philosophical foundations, based upon the

writings of Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes, all of whom

concentrated upon the more negative traits of human and state behaviour

(Hobbes 1958; Machiavelli 1981; Thucydides 1972). Realist analysis prioritises

issues of ‘high politics’*/military security, state diplomacy, and great power

rivalry.7 Above all, it is concerned with shifts in the international ‘balance of

power’ (Walt 1987; Waltz 1979). With respect to the Pacific region, analysts

identify that a structural shift is under way, in which China will eventually

equal, if not exceed, the aggregate power of the United States, thus ‘threatening’

the current hegemon (Galen Carpenter 2006). Offensive realists, such as John

Mearsheimer (2003), highlight the propensity for states to maximise their

power. It is well known that the achievement of ‘comprehensive national

power’ (zonge guoli) is an important facet of Beijing’s grand strategy to realise

its Chinese Century (Pillsbury 2000). These factors will result in a ‘security

dilemma’*/a condition of exacerbated mistrust between the United States and

its allies and a newly powerful People’s Republic of China. Realist balance of

392 Thomas Wilkins

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Era

smus

Uni

vers

ity]

at 0

5:02

28

Aug

ust 2

014

power theory predicts that this will spur the formation of competing alliance

blocs. Indeed, it could be argued that this dynamic is already taking shape, as

seen from the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

in 1996 and the inauguration of a tighter US�Japanese�Australian trilateral

relationship in 2006 (Wilkins 2007, 2010).From the realist viewpoint, there are two possible consequences of this trend.

The contest for superiority could remain ‘cold’, like the stand-off between the

United States and the USSR from 1947�91. This would still likely involve

another regional, if not global, arms race. As China’s economy grows, it is

devoting increasing resources to its defence budget in order to achieve a

‘Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics’ (Information

Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2004). The

acquisition of advanced arms from Russia and the recent demonstration of anti-

satellite weapon capabilities are indicative of China’s increasing ‘hard’ power.

Whether mutual nuclear deterrence between China and its rivals will keep

competition stable and non-violent remains to be seen. Other realist commen-

tators believe that China’s rise is occurring in a climate of instability, and that

simmering conflicts could lead to a ‘hot’ (that is, ‘shooting’) war. Aaron

Friedberg (1994; based on John Mearsheimer’s thesis) has sought to draw

parallels between Asia’s ‘future’ and Europe’s ‘past’, especially the period of

international tension prior to 1914. In this scenario, regional flashpoints, such

as the Taiwan Strait, the Spratly Islands, or even North Korea, could act as the

spark that lights the powder keg of general war, reminiscent of the 1914

assassination in Sarajevo. Thus, Samuel Huntington concludes that ‘Asia has

replaced Europe as the principal area of instability and political conflict’ (cited

in Martin 2006: 59).In both the ‘cold’ and ‘hot’ rivalry scenarios, a key challenge is how to

incorporate the reawakening Chinese ‘giant’ into the existing regional and

international order. Again, historical parallels with Europe have been drawn,

particularly the problem of assimilating a powerful and united Germany into

the European system from 1871 onwards. As Desker (2008: 57) notes: ‘The rise

of great powers and the challenge they pose to existing hegemons have been

marked by violence throughout history’. The Chinese Communist Party is also

mindful of the failed Japanese bid to realise its concept of Hakko Ichiu (‘four

corners of the world under one [Japanese] roof’) through military force and the

Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere project during the 1930s�1940s. Beijing

is acutely aware of these analogies and its declared foreign policy of Zhongguo

heping jueqi means ‘peaceful rise’.8 Realist sceptics naturally assume this to be

thinly disguised realpolitik that conceals future hegemonic ambitions. They note

that, based upon the writings of Sun Zi, the Chinese are past masters in the art

of strategic deception (Clavell 1981; Sawyer 2007). It will be remembered that

Deng Xiaoping once exhorted the country to ‘hide its ambitions and disguise its

claws’ (taoguang yanghui) (Xinhua, 2007).

The new ‘Pacific Century’ and the rise of China 393

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Era

smus

Uni

vers

ity]

at 0

5:02

28

Aug

ust 2

014

Pluralists of all persuasions alight on the prospects for regional peace and

prosperity and are less transfixed by the spectre of Chinese pre-eminence than

the realists.9 Pluralism takes the writings of John Locke (1979) and Immanuel

Kant (2005) (among others) as its philosophical points of reference. Rather than

concentrating on the relative benefits to be gained by individual state

competition, they are more transnational in approach, focusing on the absolute

benefits that may be enjoyed by all through enhanced regional cooperation.

This also includes a consensus on the need to move beyond state-centric military

conceptions of security to incorporate economic, environmental, and human

concerns onto the regional security agenda.10 There are several overlapping

‘liberal’, ‘institutionalist’, and ‘idealist’ props to the overall vision of the

pluralists with regard to the Pacific Century.First, liberals identify that due to the process of globalisation*/especially its

economic dimension*/a condition of ‘complex interdependence’ now exists

between Asia-Pacific nations. Robert Manning and Paula Stern argue:

The widespread hope is that the compelling force of geo-economics and

information age flows of capital, information, and people is creating a new

calculus and redefining interests in the Pacific in a way that will offer new

possibilities for cooperation (Manning and Stern 1994: 93).

The close interconnection between economics and security will ensure both a

prosperous and peaceful coming Pacific Century. Since all the developed or

developing states in the regions are dependent upon one another for trade,

investment, and markets, any state contemplating an initiation of military

conflict will be inhibited by the economic damage it would inflict upon itself.

Peace will therefore obtain. China is playing a crucial role in this respect.

Beijing’s Zhongguo heping jueqi foreign policy and the principles of its ‘new

security concept’ are illustrative of this thinking (Li and Wei 1997). According

to Esther Pan (2006): ‘The policy asserts that China can thrive economically in a

peaceful environment and also serve as a catalyst for global peace.’ Indeed, a

closer look at China’s notion of ‘comprehensive national power’ reveals the

importance that Beijing ascribes to elements of ‘soft’ power, such as language,

culture, and the role of the Chinese diaspora, rather than the military power

potential that captivates realists (Kolantzick 2008). One of the key props of this

‘charm offensive’ is the government establishment of Confucius Institutes

attached to university campuses across the region, including Australia’s most

prestigious institutions. The People’s Republic of China has therefore styled

itself as foremost among the proponents of a pluralist order in the Asia Pacific

seeking a ‘harmonious world’ (hexie shijie).Second, reinforcing this impetus toward cooperation, institutionalists draw

attention to the capacity of international and multilateral organisations to

govern the region and overcome or resolve disputes between states. Institutions

such as APEC and ASEAN, with all its variants, are key components of regional

394 Thomas Wilkins

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Era

smus

Uni

vers

ity]

at 0

5:02

28

Aug

ust 2

014

governance. According to Mark Berger and Douglas Borer (1997: 1): ‘APEC is

emerging as a key institutional nexus of liberal . . . visions of the Pacific

Century.’ These institutions serve as a strong foundation upon which an

increasingly comprehensive and effective ‘security community’ may be built in

the future.11 Kevin Rudd (2007) observes: ‘Whether therefore, the Pacific

Century will in fact be pacific will depend on . . . the robustness of the region’s

as yet fragile institutional architecture.’ This lies at the heart of his vision to

create a regional economic and security community by 2020. However, even the

brightest optimist would concede the idea of a unified and peaceful ‘Pacific

Community’ still has a long way to go due to the uneven economic and political

development of the region. ‘Trade, investment and a Pacific coastline do not

necessarily make for a broader sense of community’, according to Manning and

Stern (1994: 80).Finally, reinforcing the institutionalist position, idealists contend that the

wider spread of democracy and ongoing democratic reform in the region will

result in a sustainable, even ‘perpetual’, peace in the future. Based upon the

assumption that democracies do not fight each other, the more democratic the

region becomes, the more conflict between states will diminish toward a zero

point (Brown 1996). Although the regimes of Myanmar and North Korea do

little to inspire optimism on this front, the successful transformation of Japan,

South Korea, and Taiwan along democratic lines sets a positive precedent,

one it is hoped that China in particular will emulate. Hung-mao Tien and

Tun-jen Cheng (2000: 15) identify that: ‘In this region . . . the Kantian ‘‘Pacific

Community’’ among liberal states has yet to emerge.’ Since the 1989 Tianan-

men episode, China-watchers avidly search for signs of democratic progress or

regression. Managing an increasingly liberal and pluralist society based on

economic progress but lacking real democratic participation will be perhaps the

key challenge Beijing will have to contend with if it is to achieve its Pacific

Century. At present, the Communist Party leadership have identified this

eventuality as the ‘threat of peaceful evolution’ (heping yanbian), to be guarded

against (Ong 2001).

‘Critical’ perspectives: constructivism/postmodernism, Marxism and feminism

There is little consensus on the exact definition and composition of critical

theories in IR. Many traditionalists would also question their validity and

desirability as IR perspectives, and this ‘inter-paradigm’ debate*/the dispute

between the traditional or ‘rationalist’ approaches and the critical or

‘reflectivist’ approaches to IR*/forms the ‘third great debate’ in the

discipline.12 Although the critical theorists/reflectivists vary widely in their

ontological assumptions, priorities, and methodologies, they are broadly

united in their critique of the traditional perspectives above. There is no

dedicated critical literature appertaining to either the Pacific Century or

The new ‘Pacific Century’ and the rise of China 395

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Era

smus

Uni

vers

ity]

at 0

5:02

28

Aug

ust 2

014

rising China debates, but this article will now demonstrate that theseapproaches can be readily and profitably applied.13 Given the enormousdiversity and complexity of critical approaches, some simplification isnecessary. Aspects of social constructivism (extending to postmodernism),Marxism (including post-colonialism), and feminism are applied here.14

First, social constructivists argue that reality is created and perpetuated bysocial practice and the meaning given to this practice. They encourage us toreflect upon received wisdom to understand its embedded contexts and multipleinterpretations. Postmodernists go much further to argue that we shoulddeconstruct all discourse to uncover the hidden ‘regimes of power’ behind it.From a constructivist standpoint, the nature of China’s rise is expressed insubjective assessments by realists and liberals. They both examine the same‘objective’ facts and arrive at completely different interpretations. Why, forinstance, as realists argue, should a more powerful and better-armed China posea threat to regional security, while the vastly more destructive power of theAmerican and Russian arsenals are taken for granted? Ron Huisken (2009: 7)queries, for example, the Australia Defence White Paper’s ‘unmistakablyalarmist assessment of what China is about to do to order and stability inEast Asia’. Moreover, Kang (2003) implies that this whole approach isunproductive and suggests that the traditionalists have misinterpreted China’sintentions and their likely impact. Rather, he points out that the hierarchicaland stratified ‘tribute system’ led by China in East Asia which existed prior toits destruction by the Western colonial powers in the nineteenth century wasremarkably stable and peaceful. This creates a precedent for the harmoniousregional order Beijing claims to be seeking.

Postmodernists call into question all discourse as it appertains to IR analysis.For example, who has the power to brand North Korea a ‘rogue state’ or FalunGong a ‘terrorist group’, and what are the motivations for such labelling?Passive acceptance of this discourse implies complicity with certain agendas andthe foreclosing of other possibilities. The final two critical perspectives furtherillustrate these points. Above all, it is worth reflecting on the nature of theconcept ‘Pacific Century’ as being bound to certain perceptions or agendas, asposited earlier. There exists no tangible physical entity called the ‘PacificCentury’ that is amenable to analysis in the ‘positivist’ sense of the naturalsciences. Rather, it is a ‘social construction’ that implies certain acceptedunderstandings and their replication. We must therefore recognise that thewhole notion as conceived by the traditional schools is embedded in a distinctanalytical context*/‘dominant currents in Western social science thoughtcontributed to its propagation and reception’ (Foot and Walter 1999: 268).

With this in mind, let us explore some further examples and contradictionsappertaining to the Pacific Century/China debates. The first section of thisarticle detailed how the twentieth-century debate on the Pacific Century centredon the expansion of the Pacific Rim economies and the potential challenge toAmerican pre-eminence posed by Japan in the 1980s. The present terms of

396 Thomas Wilkins

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Era

smus

Uni

vers

ity]

at 0

5:02

28

Aug

ust 2

014

discourse are contested. While I have employed the term ‘Pacific Century’ as anumbrella term on account of its greater familiarity to the reader, there are twoother iterations currently offering contending versions on the theme. First arethe proponents of an ‘Asian Century’, championed by Mahbubani and others,who seek to cast the coming Pacific Century as an exclusively Asianachievement. They wish to omit the United States and Oceania from thisvision, both in ideational and material terms (for example, exclusion fromregional organisations). This stands at odds with the new Australia-championedvision of the ‘Asia-Pacific Century’, in which the United States and Oceanicpowers are firmly embedded, both in the vision and in the regional institutionalarchitecture (see above, pp. 389�90). The enunciation of an ‘Asia-PacificCentury’ not only has the virtue of extending the project to India but, indeference to the former variation, also accords Asia a greater measure ofrecognition and respect.

It is interesting to note on closer inspection how this more inclusive,communitarian vision of an ‘Asia-Pacific Century/Community’ has paradoxi-cally taken on a realist bent. It would appear that the Australian Defence WhitePaper wittingly or unwittingly seeks to ‘securitise’ or even ‘militarise’ the Asia-Pacific Century, as evinced by Canberra’s planned military build-up, whichoccurs in correlation with Beijing’s military modernisation. Thus, despite itsphatic overtones, the Pacific Century is something one needs to be prepared for,or to defend against. On the other hand, liberal versions of Chinese soft-power-based peace in the region may be overstated. ‘Peaceful rise/development’, ‘newsecurity concept’ and ‘harmonious world’ are, after all, prime examplesof speech acts designed to set the terms of discourse in Beijing’s terms. Despitesuch charm offensives as the 2008 Olympics, China’s authoritarian governmentattracts few admirers, nor does it possess any ideology that holds widespreadappeal.

Thirdly, Marxist theorists focus on the economic and class injustices thatqualify some of the reports of glowing prosperity integral to the Pacific Centuryvision. Increasing diffusion of the capitalist ‘world system’ across the Asia-Pacific is creating divisions between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ (Wallerstein2004). The fruits of the Pacific Century have yet to be enjoyed by all the region’sstates, and even huge sections within these states themselves. China is a case inpoint. The accumulating prosperity of the urban coastal belt of China, thegaige xingguo of Chinese ideologues, is not reaching the vast swath of theinterior rural heartland. According to a recent government survey, 200 millionChinese subsist on less than US$1 a day, the standard indicator of poverty.Rural inhabitants on average earn less than a third of their urban counterpartsand suffer from correspondingly low levels of education and mortality, asituation exacerbated by widespread corruption (National Bureau of Statistics,cited in Telegraph 2006). The resultant mass internal migrations and the ruralprotest movements that are developing have the potential to derail the ChineseCentury if the Communist Party fails to address them adequately, according to

The new ‘Pacific Century’ and the rise of China 397

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Era

smus

Uni

vers

ity]

at 0

5:02

28

Aug

ust 2

014

Susan Shirk (2007). History points toward social upheaval or revolution when

rising economic, social, or political expectations remain unfulfilled*/for

example, in the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917. Indeed, the very

legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party government itself may depend not

only on uninterrupted economic growth, but also a more egalitarian distribu-

tion of its fruits.In the broader perspective of class iniquity, what advanced countries like

Japan or the United States consider ‘cheap labour’*/such as factory workers in

China*/looks more like ‘labour exploitation’ to others, even neocolonial

profiteering. Therefore, closely tied to questions of poverty and exploitation

is a refocusing, first championed by Ken Booth (2005), on notions of ‘human

security’. Booth contends that the military-economic security concerns of the

traditionalists fail to reflect the security of the individual*/the right to dignity,

health, education, civil rights, and protection from persecution. This view

therefore accords the priority to a Pacific Century for all, based on social

‘justice’.Finally, the feminist approach to the Pacific Century in IR draws attention to

the continued gender inequalities in countries of the Asia-Pacific. The condition

of ‘structural violence’*/the physical and emotional abuse that many women

still continue to suffer in the region*/is sometimes allied to their ‘second-class

citizen’ status and lack of educational or economic opportunity in certain

countries (Tickner 1992). In the first instance, female infanticide (often through

‘selective abortions’) in China (and India) is not only morally abhorrent but is

resulting in a major demographic gender imbalance. In the second respect,

women in China still experience discrimination and limits to their career

advancement, especially in more patriarchal rural areas. Li Xiaoyun of

China Agricultural University records that ‘gender inequality still commonly

exists in almost all social aspects including political power, education, health,

employment and assets possession’ (Xinhua 2005). This dynamic is not

confined to Chinese society, but is also marked in highly advanced nations

such as Japan with its so-called ‘rice paper ceiling’ for women. As a result,

feminists would argue that the Pacific Century mainly represents yet another

male-dominated project in which injustices against women are not addressed.

Conclusions

The first section of this article sought to gain purchase on the ‘Pacific Century’

concept through the creation of an originally designed analytical framework to

define and structure our understanding of its multiple meanings and uses. The

second section, in applying this framework to the case study of a new Chinese-

led Pacific Century in tandem with traditional and critical IR approaches,

demonstrates the efficacy of the framework and the rich explanatory power

brought to the table by the competing IR schools. Through the synergy of the

398 Thomas Wilkins

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Era

smus

Uni

vers

ity]

at 0

5:02

28

Aug

ust 2

014

‘Pacific Century’, ‘rising China’ and ‘third great IR’ debates, an elaborate andnuanced analysis may be brought to bear on this multifaceted subject.

In particular, the first section showed that the Pacific Century is asophisticated and tractable concept. By drawing together the disparate strandsof the Pacific Century debate and schematising them into a dedicated analyticalframework, a more coherent understanding can be achieved. By structuring theconcept according to its ideological, temporal, and spatial parameters, it revealsthe coexistence and tensions between the term ‘Pacific Century’ as a political (or‘normative’) enterprise and an intellectual (or ‘objective’) frame of reference.The concept has been employed to capture the Zeitgeist of a perceived epoch-making experience. Its exact dimensions will be determined largely bywhichever state is in the ‘driving seat’ of the Pacific Century at that giventime, whether it be Japan and the United States in the past, or Asia/China in thepresent. Regardless of its occasional repackaging as ‘Asian’ or ‘Asia-Pacific’Century, the basic premise reoccurs. It is important that we not lose sight of thismuch maligned term as a result of its diminution after the temporary setback ofthe Asian financial crash of 1997�8 and current global financial crisis. AsKorhonen (1996: 69) notes: ‘When more difficult times have arrived, the visionhas always disappeared from discussion.’ Nevertheless, the longevity of theconcept is assured. In the 1850s, William H. Seward, future US Secretary ofState, was credited with prophesying that ‘the Pacific Ocean, its shores, itsislands, and adjacent territories will become the chief theater of human eventsand activities in the world’s great hereafter’ (cited in Korhonen 1996: 45�6).Whatever the time span, the general trend toward a Pacific Century (or itsChines, Asian, or Asia-Pacific variants) still obtains. As Arnold Toynbee (1948):55) observed: ‘civilisation is a movement, and not a condition, a voyage, nota harbour’.

The second section of the article, after applying the analytical framework todepict a new Chinese-led Pacific Century, investigated the utility of competingIR approaches toward interpreting its significance and likely trajectories. Theanalysis has shown that due to its ideological roots, it is the pluralist approachthat is most compatible with the teleological aspects of the ‘Pacific Century’concept, focusing optimistically on institutional cooperation and the economicprosperity. This, of course, presupposes that economic advancement is notdisrupted, and current indictors on this score are not positive, in light of theglobal recession. Desker (2008: 60) points out that ‘the worst case scenario iswhere China’s economy collapses, its political situation implodes, and itembraces a military adventurism that wreaks havoc on the regional order’.Thus, the liberal vision succumbs to realist predictions. Realists, of course,argue in any case that a Chinese-led Pacific Century will incubate great powerrivalry and potential regional conflict. For them, ‘[t]he Pacific century may turnout to be far from peaceful’ (The Economist 1995).

The critical approaches in some ways see this peace/conflict dyad as afalse dichotomy. Constructivist and postmodernist approaches question the

The new ‘Pacific Century’ and the rise of China 399

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Era

smus

Uni

vers

ity]

at 0

5:02

28

Aug

ust 2

014

embedded meanings of a Pacific Century, its implicit agendas, and reveal the

contest for control of the conceptual discourse evident in competing rhetorical

labels. Thus, the contending Pacific, Asia-Pacific, Asian, and Chinese Century

‘speech acts’ all hold differing emphases and different connotations. Marxists

and feminists argue for a reconstitution of any traditionalist liberal or power-

based order, and its transformation into a more just and inclusive one. From

this standpoint, the Pacific Century would therefore incorporate those excluded

or underprivileged in the traditional approaches*/the economically disadvan-

taged and women.

Notes

1. The term ‘Pacific Century’ has often been accompanied by the term ‘Pacific Community’,

though the two are not synonymous. For debate on the separate issues of ‘Asia-Pacific

Civilisation’ and ‘Asia-Pacific Community’, see Manning and Stern (1994) and Yamazaki

(1996).

2. These variations on the theme each involve nuances in how the thesis is organised and

advanced, but I have decided here to employ the term ‘Pacific Century’ both as a departure

point from which to frame the debate and to act as a permissible umbrella term to broadly

encompass the differentiations above (see Dirlik 1995).

3. Thanks to Edward Melillo for the introduction of this term.

4. A term identified in Buzan (1991) to facilitate security analysis of particular regions or

‘subregions’. This is further elaborated in Adib-Moghaddam (2006) and Buzan and Wæver

(2003).

5. For a popular overview, see Shenkar (2005); for IR analysis, see Scott (2008); and for

a historical overview, see Spence and Chin (1996). India, though potentially a major

player, does not at present have the capacity to lead the Pacific Century due to a number

of serious structural weaknesses. Moreover, it is only debatably part of the ‘Asia-Pacific’

region.

6. The basic tenets of the varying IR schools will be familiar to those working in the field (see

Baylis and Smith 2005; Steans and Pettiford 2005).

7. Space precludes a detailed separation of all of the variants of the realist school. For ‘classical’

realism, see Wight (1978); for its neo-realist variant, see Buzan et al. (1993).

8. See the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China at Bwww.

fmprc.gov.cn/eng/default.htm�. For a critique, see Pan (2006).

9. ‘Pluralism’ is an umbrella term for several related branches of thought in IR, including

liberalism, neo-liberalism, intuitionalism, idealism and the ‘English School’. All are affiliated

with an overall liberal ‘world view’ (see, as starting points, Keohane and Nye 1977;

Moravcsik 1997).

10. For an introduction to ‘soft security’ and the ‘broad’ security agenda, see Buzan (1991).

11. There exists a dense network of regional organisations with varying memberships. For a

conceptual overview, see Acharya (2007) and Aggarwal and Morrison (1998).

12. The previous great debates of IR centred on ‘realism versus idealism’ and ‘traditionalism

versus behaviouralism’ (see Steans and Pettiford 2005: 182�3).

13. It is impossible to even begin unravelling the debate here (see Roach 2007;Weber 2004).

14. For a sample of introductory texts, see Guzzini and Leander (2006); Jarvis (2000);

Kubalkova and Cruickshank (1989); Ling (2002) and Steans (1998). Space precludes

mention of the philosophical influences on each school.

400 Thomas Wilkins

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Era

smus

Uni

vers

ity]

at 0

5:02

28

Aug

ust 2

014

References

Acharya, Amitav, 2007. Constructing a security community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the

problem of regional order (London: Routledge).

Adib-Moghaddam, Arshin, 2006. ‘Regional security complex theory: a critical examination’,

International Studies Journal, 3(1): 25�40.

Aggarwal, Vinod K. and Charles E. Morrison (eds), 1998. Asia-Pacific crossroads: regime creation

and the future of APEC (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

Baylis, John and Steve Smith (eds), 2005. The globalization of world politics (Oxford: Oxford

University Press), Third edition.

Beeson, Mark, 2007. Regionalism and globalization in East Asia: politics, security and economic

development (London: Palgrave Macmillan.)

Bell, Roger, 1996. ‘Bilateral relations’, in Roger Bell, Tim McDonald and Alan Tidwell (eds),

Negotiating the Pacific Century: the ‘new’ Asia, the United States and Australia St Leonards,

(NSW: Allen & Unwin.)

Berger, Mark T. and Douglas A. Borer (eds), 1997. The rise of East Asia: critical visions of the

Pacific Century (London: Routledge.)

Booth, Ken, 2005. Critical security studies and world politics (Boulder: Lynne Rienne).

Borthwick, Mark, 1998. Pacific Century (Boulder: Westview Press).

Braudel, Fernand, 1972. The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world in the age of Philip II,

trans. Sian Reynolds, 2 vols. (New York: Harper & Row).

Brown, Michael E., 1996. Debating the democratic peace (Boston: The MIT Press).

Buzan, Barry, 1991. People, states and fear: an agenda for international security studies in the

post-cold war era (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf), Second edition.

Buzan, Barry, Charles Jones and Richard Little, 1993. The logic of anarchy: neorealism to

structural realism (New York: Columbia University Press).

Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver, 2003. Regions and powers: the structure of international security

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, 1998. Security: a new framework for analysis

(Boulder: Lynne Rienner).

Clavell, James, 1981. The art of war by Sun Tzu (London: Hodder & Stoughton).

Colebatch, Tim, 2008. ‘Rudd’s grand vision for Asia-Pacific’, Age, 5 June.

Cox, Robert W., 1986. ‘Social forces, states and world orders: beyond international relations

theory’, in R.O. Keohane (ed.), 1986. Neorealism and its critics (New York: Columbia

University Press).

Davenport, William W. (ed.), 2006. The Pacific era: a collection of speeches and other discourse

(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press).

Dent, Christopher M., 2008. East Asian regionalism (London: Routledge).

Department of Defence, 2009. Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: force 2030

(Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia).

Desai, Seema, 2006a. ‘Asia reaches threshold of global power’, in The Asia Pacific Century: a new

era (New York: Newsdesk Media).

Desai, Seema, 2006b. ‘Population plays decisive role for growth in China, India’, in The Asia

Pacific Century: a new era (New York: Newsdesk Media).

Desai, Vishakha N., 2006. ‘A conversation with Asia Society President Vishakha N. Desai’, in The

Asia Pacific Century: a new era (New York: Newsdesk Media).

Desker, Barry, 2008. ‘New security dimensions in the Asia-Pacific’, Asia-Pacific Review, 15(1):

56�75.

Dirlik, Arif, 1995. ‘What’s in a rim?’, Peace Review, 7(2): 135�41.

Dixon, Chris and David Drakakis-Smith, 1995. ‘The Pacific Asian region: myth or reality?’,

Geografiska Annaler, 7(2): 75�91.

The new ‘Pacific Century’ and the rise of China 401

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Era

smus

Uni

vers

ity]

at 0

5:02

28

Aug

ust 2

014

Dorsch, Joern, 2006. ‘United States security policies in Asia’, in Stephen Hoadley and Jurgen

Rueland (eds), Asian security reassessed (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies),

pp. 106�27.

Dupont, Alan, 2007. Will this be the Pacific Century?, Lowy Institute Perspectives (Sydney: Lowy

Institute for International Policy).

The Economist, 1995. ‘East Asia’s wobbles’, 23 December.

Elliott, Michael, 2007. ‘China takes on the world’, Time Magazine, 11 January: 34�37.

Emmott, Bill, 2009. Rivals: how the power struggle between China, India and Japan will shape our

next decade (New York: Mariner Books).

Evans, Paul M., 2000. ‘Assessing the ARF and CSCAP’, in Hung-mao Tien and Tun-jen Cheng

(eds), The security environment in the Asia-Pacific (London: M.E. Sharpe).

Farrell, Mary, Bjorn Hettne and Luk van Langenhove (eds), 2005. Global politics of regionalism:

theory and practice (London: Pluto Press).

Fengming, Zhang, 2006. ‘China to be biggest economy by 2050’, China Daily, 22 May,

Bwww.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-05/22/content_596360.htm�.

Ferguson, Niall, 2007. The war of the world: history’s age of hatred (London: Penguin).

Florig, Dennis, 2001. ‘Scenarios for the Pacific Century’, World Futures. Unpublished manuscript.

Foot, Rosemary and Andrew Walter, 1999. Whatever happened to the Pacific Century?’, Review

of International Studies, 25(5): 245�69.

Friedberg, Aaron L., 1994. Ripe for rivalry: prospects for a multipolar Asia’, International

Security, 18(3): 5�33.

Friedman, George and Meredith LeBard, 1991. The coming war with Japan (New York: St

Martin’s Press).

Frost, Ellen L., 2008. Asia’s new regionalism (Boulder: Lynne Rienner).

Galen Carpenter, Ted, 2006. America’s coming war with China: a collision course over Taiwan

(London: Palgrave Macmillan).

Gibney, Frank, 1992. The Pacific Century (New York: Macmillan).

Glosserman, Brad, 2009. ‘Asia’s rise: cooling on the conventional wisdom’, PacNet, 51, 16 July.

Guzzini, Stefano and Anna Leander, 2006. Constructivism and international relations: Alexander

Wendt and his critics (London: Routledge).

Hettne, Bjorn, 2005. Beyond the new regionalism’, New Political Economy, 10(4): 543�57.

Hick, George, 2005. ‘The myth of the Asian century’, Asian Wall Street Journal, 26 October.

Hobbes, Thomas, 1958. Leviathan (London: MacMillan).

Hobsbawm, Eric, 1994. The age of extremes: the short twentieth century (London: Penguin).

Huisken, Ron, 2009. ‘Force 2030: China drives Australia toward its first strategic missile system’,

Austral Policy Forum 09-16A, Nautilus Institute, 23 July, Bwww.globalcollab.org/Nautilus/

australia/apsnet/policy-forum/2009/Force-2030.pdf�.

Inagaki Manjiro, 1890. Japan and the Pacific, and a Japanese view of the eastern question

(London: T. Fisher Unwin).

Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2004, . China’s national

defense in 2004 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of

China), Bhttp://english.people.com.cn/whitepaper/defense2004/defense2004.html�.

Jarvis, Darryl S.L., 2000. International relations and the challenge of postmodernism: defending

the discipline (Columbus: University of South Carolina Press).

Johnson, Chalmers, 1982. MITI and the Japanese miracle (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press).

Jones, Judy and William Wilson, 1995. An incomplete education (New York: Ballantine).

Kang, David C., 2003. ‘Getting Asia wrong: the need for new analytic frameworks’, International

Security, 27(4): 57�85.

Kang, David C., 2007. China rising: peace, power, and order in East Asia (New York: Columbia

University Press).

Kant, Immanuel, 2005. Perpetual peace (New York: Cosimo Classics).

402 Thomas Wilkins

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Era

smus

Uni

vers

ity]

at 0

5:02

28

Aug

ust 2

014

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, 1977. Power and interdependence: world politics in

transition (Boston: Little, Brown).

Khanna, Parag, 2008. The second world: empires and influence in the new world order (New

York: Random House).

Kim, Eun-Mee (ed.), 1999. The four Asian tigers: economic development and the global political

economy (San Diego: Academic Press).

Kolantzick, Joshua, 2008. Charm offensive: how China’s soft power is transforming the world

(New Haven: Yale University Press).

Korhonen, Pekka, 1996. ‘The Pacific age in world history’, Journal of World History, 7(1): 41�70.

Kraar, Louis, 1999. ‘What Pacific century?’ Fortune, 140(10), 22 November.

Kubalkova, Vendulka and Albert A. Cruickshank, 1989. Marxism and international relations

(Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Kuijper, Hans, 2008. ‘Area studies versus disciplines: towards an interdisciplinary, systemic

country approach’, International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences, 3(7): 205�16.

Larkin, Steve, 2008. ‘Australia needs greater engagement with Asia, says Rudd’, Western Australia

Today, 20 September, Bwww.watoday.com.au/national/australia-needs-greater-engagement

-with-asia-says-rudd-20080920-4khz.html�.

Li, Qinggong and Wei Wei, 1997. ‘Chinese army paper on the ‘‘new security concept’’’, Jiefangjun

Bao, 24 December, Bwww.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/china/jiefangjun-new-security

-971224.html�.

Ling, L.H.M., 2002. Postcolonial international relations: conquest and desire between Asia and

the West (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

Locke, John, 1979. An essay concerning human understanding (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Lyon, Rod and Christine Leah, 2008. Global jigsaw: ASPI’s strategic assessment 2008 (Canberra:

Australian Strategic Policy Institute).

Machiavelli, Niccolo, 1981. The Prince, trans. George Bull (London: Penguin).

Mahbubani, Kishore, 1998. Can Asians think? (Singapore: Times Books International).

Mahbubani, Kishore, 2008a. ‘Ringing in the Asian century’, Los Angeles Times, 19 February.

Mahbubani, Kishore, 2008b. The new Asian hemisphere: the irresistible shift of global power to

the east (New York: Public Affairs).

Manning, Robert A. and Paula Stern, 1994. ‘The myth of the Pacific community’, Foreign Affairs,

73(6): 79�93.

Martin, Bernd, 2006. ‘Asia from colonialism to culturalism’, in Stephen Hoadley and Jurgen

Ruland (eds), Asian security reassessed (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), pp.

37�65.

McCord, William, 1991. The dawn of the Pacific Century (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction).

Mearsheimer, John, 2003. The tragedy of great power politics (New York: W.W. Norton).

Moon, Ban-Ki, 2006. ‘The Asia-Pacific Century’, in The Asia Pacific Century: a new era (New

York: Newsdesk Media).

Moravcsik, Andrew, 1997. ‘Taking preferences seriously: a liberal theory of international politics’,

International Organization, 51(4): 513�53.

National Bureau of Statistics, 2006. China National Development and Reform Commission, cited

in Telegraph, 6 March.

Ong, Russell, 2001. China’s security interests in the post-cold war era (London: Curzon Press).

Overholt, William H., 1993. The rise of China: how economic reform is creating a new

superpower (New York: W.W. Norton).

Pan, Esther, 2006. ‘The promise and pitfalls of China’s ‘‘peaceful rise’’ ’, Council on Foreign

Affairs, 14 April, Bwww.cfr.org/publication/10446/�.

Pempel, T.J. (ed.), 2005. Remapping East Asia: the construction of a region (New York: Cornell

University Press).

Peyrefitte, Alain, 1980. Quand la Chine s’eveillera: le monde tremblera (Paris: Fayard).

The new ‘Pacific Century’ and the rise of China 403

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Era

smus

Uni

vers

ity]

at 0

5:02

28

Aug

ust 2

014

Pillsbury, Michael, 2000. China debates the future security environment (Washington, DC:

National Defense University Press).

Poole, Steven, 2006. Unspeak (London: Little, Brown).

Roach, Steven C. (ed.), 2007. Critical theory and international relations: a reader (London:

Routledge).

Rudd, Kevin, 2007. ‘The rise of China and the strategic implications for US�Australia relations’,

Speech to the Brookings Institution, 20 April, http://www.brookings.edu/events/2007/

0420china.aspx.

Rudd, Kevin, 2008. ‘Address at commemorative service for those lost in HMAS Sydney II’,

Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 19 November, Bwww.pm.gov.au/node/5462�.

Sawyer, Ralph D., 2007. The Tao of deception: unorthodox warfare in historic and modern China

(New York: Basic Books).

Scott, David, 2008. The Chinese century: the challenge to global order (London: Palgrave

Macmillan).

Shenkar, Oded, 2005. The Chinese century: the rising Chinese economy and its impact on the

global economy, the balance of power, and your job (Philadelphia: Wharton School).

Shirk, Susan L., 2007. China: fragile superpower. How China’s internal politics could derail its

peaceful rise (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Smith, Stephen, 2008. ‘Australia and India: a new partnership in the Asia Pacific Century’, Speech

to Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, 11 September.

Soderbaum, Fredrik and Timothy M. Shaw (eds), 2003. Theories of new regionalism: a Palgrave

reader (London: Palgrave Macmillan).

Spence, Jonathan and Annping Chin, 1996. The Chinese century: a photographic history of the last

hundred years (New York: Random House).

Spengler, Oswald, 1922. The decline of the west, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (New York:

Alfred A. Knopf).

Steans, Jill, 1998. Gender and international relations: an introduction (New Brunswick, NJ:

Rutgers University Press).

Steans, Jill and Lloyd Pettiford, 2005. Introduction to international relations (London: Longman),

Second edition.

Subramaniam, Surain, 2000. ‘The Asian values debate: implications for the spread of liberal

democracy’, Asian Affairs, 27(1): 19�35.

Sutter, Robert G., 2005. China’s rise in Asia: promises and perils (New York: Rowman &

Littlefield).

Tavares, Rodrigo, 2008. ‘Understanding regional peace and security: a framework for analysis’,

Contemporary Politics, 14(2): 107�27.

Thucydides, 1972. History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Richard Warner (London: Penguin).

Tickner, Ann J., 1992. Gender in international relations: a feminist perspective on achieving global

security (New York: Columbia University Press).

Tien, Hung-mao & Tun-jen Cheng (eds), 2000. The security environment in the Asia-Pacific

(London: M.E. Sharpe).

Time, ‘The Chinese century’, 22 January.

Toynbee, Arnold J., 1948. Civilization on trial (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Vogel, Ezra F., 1979. Japan as number one: lessons for America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press).

Vogel, Erza F., 2004. ‘China as number one’, Fortune, 17, 13 December.

Wallerstein, Immanuel, 2004. World-systems analysis: an introduction (Durham, NC: Duke

University Press).

Walt, Stephen, 1987. The origins of alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

Waltz, Kenneth N., 1979. Theory of international politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley).

Weber, Cynthia, 2004. International relations theory: a critical introduction (London: Taylor &

Francis), Second edition.

404 Thomas Wilkins

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Era

smus

Uni

vers

ity]

at 0

5:02

28

Aug

ust 2

014

Weng, Byron S.J., 2000. ‘The challenge of Hong Kong in transition: its implications for Asian

security’, in Hung-mao Tien and Tun-jen Cheng (eds), The security environment in the Asia-

Pacific (London: M.E. Sharpe).

White, Eric C., 1987. Kaironomia: on the will-to-invent (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).

Wight, Martin, 1978. Power politics (London: Leicester University Press).

Wilkins, Thomas, 2007. ‘Towards a ‘‘trilateral alliance?’’: understanding the role of expediency

and values in American�Japanese�Australian relations’, Asian Security, 3(2): 251�78.

Wilkins, Thomas, 2010. ‘Building regional security architecture: the Shanghai Cooperation

Organisation from an organisational theories perspective’, in Medhi Parvizi Amineh (ed.),

State, society and international relations in Asia (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press),

pp. 163�78.

Wæver, Ole, 1996. ‘The rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate’, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and

Marysia Zalewski (eds), International theory: positivism and beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press), pp. 149�85.

Xinhua, 2005. ‘Gender inequality serious in China’s rural areas’, China Daily, 8 September,

Bhttp://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200509/08/print20050908_207353.html�.

Xinhua, 2007. ‘China’s century?’, China Post, 21 January, Bwww.chinapost.com.tw/news/2007/

01/21/100589/Chinas-century%3F.htm�.

Yamazaki, Masakazu, 1996. ‘Asia, a civilization in the making’, Foreign Affairs, 75(4): 106�18.

Yew, Lee Kuan, 2000. From Third World to First: the Singapore story, 1965�2000 (London:

HarperCollins).

The new ‘Pacific Century’ and the rise of China 405

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Era

smus

Uni

vers

ity]

at 0

5:02

28

Aug

ust 2

014