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The Media Freedom Movementin Malaysia and the ElectoralAuthoritarian RegimeRoss Tapsell aa School of Culture, History & Language, College of Asia & thePacific, Australian National University, Canberra, AustraliaVersion of record first published: 22 Feb 2013.

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The Media Freedom Movement in Malaysiaand the Electoral Authoritarian Regime

ROSS TAPSELLSchool of Culture, History & Language, College of Asia & the Pacific, Australian National University,Canberra, Australia

ABSTRACT This article will provide an outline of the Malaysian media freedom movement fromreformasi in 1998 until today. Research for this article includes testimony from those journalists andactivists who attempted to implement reform in the media industry, including detailing reportedinstances of direct editorial intervention. This article explains that the advent of new mediatechnologies has pushed journalism in new directions in Malaysia, but rather than accept thesechanges as part of a media liberalisation process, the government has retaliated through constraintsand controls over the media and its practitioners. Seen through the prism of media liberalisation,this article adds to the body of scholarly work which examines Malaysia’s electoral authoritarianregime.

KEY WORDS: Malaysia, media, journalism, press freedom, reformasi, politics

This article examines the Malaysian media freedom movement from 1998 to the presentday. It draws upon personal interviews with journalists and activists who have supportedgreater media liberalisation in Malaysia, and documents the difficulties they faced whenpursuing this cause. The media freedom “movement” in Malaysia is assessed as: thesprouting of online news and commentary, establishment of independent journalismventures, active and vociferous media freedom non-governmental organisations (NGOs),and critical discussions inside the mainstream media on the role of journalists. It is arguedthat the Malaysian government has hardened in its attitude and actions toward mediafreedom in various “waves” since reformasi, and thus the period 1998–2012 has not beenone of sustained media liberalisation. Rather, the process has been potential medialiberalisation followed by backlash and retaliation from the ruling power. Thus, this articleprovides further insights as to the way the Malaysian political regime operates, seenthrough the prism of government control over media practitioners.

Scholarship has looked to classify regimes which fall under the “messy, middleground between the poles of democracy and dictatorship” (Schedler 2006). AsSchedler (2006) has noted, concepts such as “hybrid regimes” (Diamond 2002),“semi-democracies” (Smith 2005), “semi-authoritarianism” (Ottoway 2000), “semi-dic-tatorship” (Brooker 2000) and “competitive” authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2010)have been used to understand such regimes. The concept of “electoral” authoritarianism

Correspondence Address: R. Tapsell, School of Culture, History & Language, College of Asia & the Pacific,Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia. Email: Ross.Tapsell@anu.edu.au

Journal of Contemporary Asia, 2013http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2013.765138

© 2013 Journal of Contemporary Asia

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has been adeptly applied to regimes such as Malaysia’s (Schedler 2006). Electoralauthoritarianism theory argues that while regimes might give the impression of demo-cratic elections and imply that the country is moving toward liberalisation, in realityelections are manipulated, and perceived institutional reform is actually sporadic orineffective. Case (2006, 95–112) argues that Southeast Asia is “the homeland ofelectoral authoritarianism.” In Malaysia, the Barisan National (BN) “has refrainedfrom grossly rigging or stealing elections, instead perpetuating its dominance throughsubtler stratagems for more than three decades” (Case 2009, 312). Pepinsky (2009, 115)has argued that electoral authoritarianism is a good fit for Malaysia, where “elections areintegral to the regime’s stability but where they are neither free enough nor fair enoughto be democratic.”

If we follow the argument by Linz and Stepan (1996) that there is a period of liberal-isation before democratisation then in Malaysia there is renewed hope that the process ofliberalisation is currently occurring. The 2008 national election, one of the most studiedcontests in the Southeast Asia setting, was seen by many as a “victory for the opposition”(see Case 2010, 111). It offered the prospect of a “new beginning” in Malaysia, or at thevery least, was heartening for the future of electoral democracy in the country. But asPepinsky (2009, 117) concluded: “For the 2008 elections to yield true liberalisation, theBN’s soft-liners must come to believe that liberalisation holds the key to their politicalsurvival, while hard-liners must be contained.” In his 2011 analysis, Case (2011, 453)predicted that Malaysia would not take further steps toward democratisation, but rather“might descend into harder authoritarian rule.” Thus, just as the opposition parties andreformists begin to make new inroads, the ruling government inevitably strikes back orretaliates, revoking any such liberalising steps.

The liberalisation process can involve a lessening of censorship of the media (Linz andStepan 1996, 3). The 2008 elections were seen as particularly encouraging for medialiberalisation in Malaysia because of the role played by the Internet and social media incircumventing various government controls. To date, Abbott’s (2011) work is the onlystudy which attempts to “prove” government control over the media through the prism ofelectoral authoritarianism. He does so through quantitative analysis to attempt to measurepro-government bias in his coding of two Malay-language newspapers, Utusan Malaysiaand Berita Harian. He found that both newspapers displayed a strong bias toward theruling coalition, and that legislative pressures, combined with corporate ownership, “linksthe overwhelming majority of Malaysian newspapers directly or indirectly to the consti-tuent political parties of the governing coalition, encouraging self-censorship amongMalaysian journalists” (Abbott 2011, 24). This research aims to build on the study ofelectoral authoritarianism in Malaysia by examining the pressures placed upon journalistsand activists who pursue liberalisation of the media. Through crucial testimony from thoseinvolved in the movement for greater media reforms, an assessment of the media liberal-isation process in an electoral authoritarian regime is explained.

This research will begin in 1998, when the reformasi period and arrival of the Internetbrought about acute change in the media landscape, and when journalists and activistswere encouraged by evidence that these new technologies were pushing journalism in newdirections. Assessing the movement over a fourteen-year period gives greater credencewhen assessing the current movement for media freedom in Malaysia, as many of theactivists and journalists prevalent in media reform today were involved in the push forreforms in 1998.

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As such, this research examines the people behind the movement – those who havestruggled to implement change within the industry since reformasi. Seventeen personalinterviews were conducted with the author in Kuala Lumpur, Penang and Kota Kinabalu.A further two interviews were conducted in Australia. Interviewees were selected if theywere considered to have been involved in pursuing media freedom during the period1998–2012.1 Government ministers or editors of “pro-government” newspapers were notinterviewed. The scope of this research was to hear the story of those who have attemptedto pursue the media liberalisation process within the industry and to gain a sense, throughpersonal interviews, of their thoughts as they attempted to pursue the cause of mediafreedom. As such, those who were interviewed for this article were journalists, NGOworkers and some journalism academics and authors. Further research could examine therole of those inside government, and government-appointed editors, in hindering orflourishing potential media freedom movements in Malaysia. The reform attempts out-lined in this article shed light on the liberalisation movement within the Malaysian media,and the response it incurred from Malaysia’s electoral authoritarian regime.

Reforming the Media

The ruling BN party has been Malaysia’s ruling political force since it was formed in1973 as a successor to the previous Alliance (Perikatan) Party which ruled sinceMalaysia’s independence in 1957. It has never convincingly attempted to advocate forgreater media freedom in the country (Mohd Azizuddin 2005; Jaifei Yin 2003). Whilelegal restrictions on the Malay press occurred during British colonisation (Mustafa2002, 140–142), laws which concern media practitioners in Malaysia include thePrinting Presses and Publications Act (PPPA), the Official Secrets Act (OSA), theSedition Act and the Internal Security Act (ISA).2 In particular, the ISA has beenused to subjugate individual journalists, editors or writers considered overtly criticalof the ruling power. The PPPA of 1984 is the most explicit form of legislative controlover media freedom and central to the curbing mechanism of the State. Section 22(1) ofthe PPPA empowers the Home Minister to revoke or suspend a printing or publishinglicence if that publication is deemed “prejudicial to security, morality, public orderpublic interest or national interest.” This act requires media operators to apply for anew publishing permit every year (Loo 2000, 220–221). As we shall see, activists formedia freedom have focused their energies on convincing the government (and theMalaysian people) that the PPPA is unnecessary and constricting, and hinders anydevelopment of independent media. The overall result of all these legislative regulationsand pressures, particularly pressures from the threat of permit denial, means the mediahas been described as “shackled” (Mohd Azizuddin 2005) and subject to “stringentcontrols” (Abbott 2011, 16). Prime Minister Mahathir’s decision in 1996 not to regulateor censor the Internet meant the strict PPPA laws subjected to the printed press were lessrelevant to those producing news and views online.3 Indeed, online publications such asMalaysiakini and Aliran, have at certain times continued to produce content onlinedespite not officially having their PPPA licence renewed. While the PPPA may be lessrelevant for online journalists and bloggers, the ISA and defamation charges have stillbeen used to intimidate those who criticise the regime through the Internet. Thus, theonline media in Malaysia are not exempt from legal pressures, despite their attempts tooperate under different rules from the mainstream print media.

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As well as the strict laws and regulatory mechanisms noted above, virtually all main-stream newspapers in Malaysia are owned or controlled by parties allied to the ruling BN(Abbott 2004; 2011). The government has consistently denied the opposition broadcasttime on the national radio and television corporation, Radio Television Malaysia, makingit difficult for alternative voices to reach the public via mainstream media (Abbott 2004,82). A decisive moment in Malaysia’s history was May 13, 1969, at the General Elections,when The Alliance accused the opposition of using freedom of expression and publicdemonstrations to exploit racial sentiments and dissatisfaction amongst non-Malays. Riotsand inter-communal violence followed, and a State of Emergency was declared by thegovernment (Zaharom 2002, 124–125). The print and television media was to remainmuzzled – its role projected by the government and many within the industry becamepredominantly “good news” regarding government policy, racial harmony and nationalidentity. As such, the media role as “watchdog” of the government’s activities hasstruggled to take hold in Malaysia post-May 13, 1969 (Mohd Azizuddin 2005, 347).The concept of “developmental journalism” was fostered in Malaysia (and elsewhere inAsia) as a form of journalism which assists with the process of development and onewhere the press is not a natural adversary of government (see Loo 2000, 216–218).Current Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak echoed this sentiment when he said in2010: “A symbiotic relationship between the press and the government is absolutelycritical for our future and development as a nation” (CIJ 2011, 34). While there wereperiods of increased media freedom before reformasi in 1998, the official line has been,and continues to be, that the country is not ready for greater freedom of the press as itwould lead to political instability and inter-ethnic unrest (Mahathir 1989, 107–117; MohdAzizuddin 2005, 345).4 While one of the obvious benefits of the Internet was that itprovided a way for independent media to overcome the hindrances of pro-governmentmedia ownership, online journalists and editors still face pressures to self-censor.Government officials have continued to argue that the role of journalists and mediainstitutions (online or otherwise) in Malaysia is to maintain communal harmony, ratherthan provoke political or social change (Gan 2002; see Bernama, June 24, 2012).Conversely, despite the mainstream media operating under a more institutionally con-strictive and legally restrictive environment, there have been mainstream Malaysianjournalists who have advocated for greater media freedom in the country. Thus, activistsand journalists who have attempted to encourage media liberalisation have generallyfocused their attention on two main causes. The first has been reforming strict lawsgoverning the media, particularly the PPPA. The second is promoting greater autonomyfor journalists within the media industry itself. This ultimately meant addressing institu-tional practice of self-censorship amongst media workers. Of course, the two causes dooverlap, as a central reason for the continual practice of self-censorship amongst journal-ists and editors is intrusive laws such as the PPPA.

The instigator for media reform movements has often been changes in platformtechnology used to disseminate news. In Malaysia, the reformasi period in 1998 coincidedwith the arrival of the Internet, and many activists and commentators believed that thisnew medium would drive political change and greater reforms. The next phase of medialiberalisation occurred with the onset of social media, particularly Twitter and Facebook,which helped mobilise a movement for reform driven by Bersih 2.0. Thus, changes inmedia technologies and platforms has pushed journalism in new directions, and ultimatelysparked attempts at greater liberalisation of media. The crucial issue was whether the

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Malaysian regime would embrace this liberalisation process as inevitable and crucial toBN’s survival, or whether its response would be one of retaliation and backlash againstthe reformists.

The Media Freedom Movement during Reformasi

The Asian Economic Crisis of 1997 led to unexpected protests and violence across theSoutheast Asian region. In Malaysia, as Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim positionedhimself as a reformer who spoke out against then Prime Minister Mahathir he was soonarrested and charged with sodomy and corruption in September 1998. He became the keyfigure in the movement pressuring for rapid political reform in Malaysia. The termreformasi was first introduced to Malaysia when political agitation against PresidentSoeharto was near its peak in Indonesia, with calls for greater transparency in government.As Heryanto and Mandal (2003, 5) have explained, it was the media that accordedprimacy to it, and oppositional actors found it difficult to avoid its use. The open-endedness of the term has been the source of its success, allowing disparate oppositionalgroups to find in it something that spoke to their cause and thereby galvanise their forces(Noor 1999; Khoo Boo Tiek 2003).

In November 1998, a number of Southeast Asian journalists met in Bangkok to discusspursuing a collective movement for greater media freedom in the region. The groupincluded Sheila Coronel (Philippines), Gayathry Venkiteswaran and Prangtip Daorueng(Thailand), and Andreas Harsono and Wisnu Hanggoro (Indonesia). The journalistsformed the Southeast Asia Press Alliance (SEAPA) and became key figures for mediafreedom in the region. The Malaysian journalists at SEAPA included Steven Gan, SharaadKuttan and Premesh Chandran. They were all former colleagues from The Sun, hired in1994 by former Fairfax and Australian Broadcasting Corporation journalist Kean Wong.Gan recalls: “Through SEAPA we pushed for a freer media. In Malaysia, we knew therestrictions and felt that we weren’t allowed to do our job as journalists” (Interview,December 10, 2011). Kuttan, who had been expelled from Singapore for his anti-govern-ment writings, recalled that SEAPA helped solidify links with like-minded journalists inthe region, and to improve the possibility for taking collective action: “I promised atSEAPA to get more involved [in the media freedom movement] in Malaysia” (Interview,December 12, 2011). Kuttan was writing for Men’s Review, a glossy colour magazine thatmaintained a mix of mainstream presentation yet also discussed sensitive political issues.5

Despite the commercial nature of the magazine, journalists at this publication claimed itwas an important start in their process of presenting issues more forthrightly to aMalaysian audience. Kuttan, for example, reported about the build-up to reformasi inIndonesia from Jakarta in 1996 for Men’s Review.6 The Indonesian and Malaysianjournalists in particular formed important friendships. Andreas Harsono said the groupshared important goals of “improving the quality of journalism in the region” (Interview,November 20, 2011). Santoso, who had started an underground magazine in Jakarta,Independent, was arrested under the Soeharto regime and fled to Malaysia. He stated: “Wewere all open minded and wanting more freedom of the press. In Malaysia, there werehard laws and harsh censorship conditions. We felt similar conditions in Indonesia”(Interview, November 30, 2011). Santoso lived “underground” in Kuala Lumpur withthe assistance of his Malaysian colleagues. As the New Order regime collapsed inIndonesia, Malaysians journalists watched the reformasi movement there. Optimism

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amongst political activists, some politicians, and concerned citizens in Malaysia began togrow, “buoyed by the dramatic fall of Suharto” (Mustafa 2005: 132).

The government, used to censoring journalists through press permits and through themainstream media institutional practice of self-censorship, soon found it difficult to stopthe criticism on the Internet by pro-reformasi activists (Sudibyo 2010; Weiss 2006, 192–240). One of the first journalists to have seen the potential of the Internet was M.G.G.Pillai (formerly of Far Eastern Economic Review, Reuters and Asiaweek) who had formedan online mailing list Sang Kancil (The Mouse Deer) in 1996, which later becamecommentaries and reporting on the political turmoil occurring in Malaysia during refor-masi. Sites carrying anti-Mahathir stories mushroomed. By the end of 1998, at least 30anti-government sites had appeared (McCargo 2003, 47), including Laman Reformasi,Anwar Online, Jiwa Merdeka, Freemalaysia and Reformasi Dot Com. Some of thesewebsites saw several million hits in early 1999 (Kelly 2003, 70). The content of thereformasi websites was incredibly diverse, but the impact of some of the more serious ofthem challenged the regime’s media monopoly (Khoo Boo Teik 2003, 106). AC Nielsonin 2001 found that readership amongst some of the main newspapers in Malaysia haddeclined by around 30% in the period 1998–2000 (Chin 2003, 131).

The alternative print press also increased its readership during this time. Harakah, thepublication of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party or PAS, reportedly saw its circulationgrow from 80,000 prior to Anwar’s arrest in September 1998, to 380,000 by the end of1999, numbers which exceeded that of Malaysia’s leading daily newspaper, UtusanMalaysia (Weiss 2006, 147; George 2006, 140). Other newly established Malay-languagemagazines critical of the government were Tamadun, Detik, Wasilah and Eksklusif. Aliranwas Malaysia’s pioneer civil rights group and, during reformasi, its Penang-based maga-zine Aliran Monthly, saw its circulation figures increase from 10,000 in mid-1998 to35,000 by 2000.

The most significant new venture was Malaysiakini, a news website created bySEAPA’s Gan and Chandran which received US$100,000 in start-up funds fromSEAPA through the Media Development Loan Fund (McDaniel 2002, 174).Malaysiakini became so popular at the end of 2000 that it had daily hits of more than120,000 (174). While other websites, such as Harakahdaily.com and Freeanwar.com, werereceiving daily hits of 140,000 and over, Malaysiakini’s explicit positioning was as anindependent, online newspaper (Chin 2003, 132). In 2001 Gan and Chandran were ranked18th in Asiaweek’s annual ranking of the “50 most powerful people in the region” (Rodan2004, 155). Malaysiakini received the Free Media Pioneer Award from the InternationalPress Institute earlier that year. Much has been written about the importance ofMalaysiakini as a “thorn in the side” of the Malaysian regime. Cherian George (2006,162–163) defines Malaysiakini as a “political but non-partisan brand of independentjournalism,” where he quotes Gan’s views on the sites’ role: “If we had no competitionout there, we would provide the positive and the negative. But, as things stand, ourmission is to highlight the negative.”

Sensing the “political” brand of journalism might be being stressed over the “non-partisan,” Kean Wong and Kuttan, amongst others, started a project to provide criticalanalysis of the issues of reformasi. Wong explained:

in 1998 there was a hugely partisan movement. Malaysia was stuck with this mire of‘you are either with us or against us.’ We wanted to foster independent journalism. I

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am against this notion of the journalist as crusader or as partisan to a cause(Interview, February 10, 2012).

They created the online news portal Saksi (Witness) which maintained a desk at theMalaysiakini office, and began an independent radio project, RadiQRadio, which colla-borated with Santoso at Radio68H Indonesia. The idea was to broadcast from theRadio68H transmitter from Indonesian into Malaysia from Kalimantan and Sumatra.Kuttan said their aim was to “change the practices of journalists on the net. Be moreprofessional and have journalism ethics” (Interview, December 12, 2011). This meantcriticising all sides, including the opposition:

Anwar had cronies as well, and we were critical of Anwar. We didn’t want to castreformasi as good versus evil. In fact, it was really about factionalism within UMNO.We wanted to be clear to everyone what was happening. I think good journalism willdeliver the reforms that activists are fighting for. Counterpropaganda wont [sic]. Thisview was not held by all.

Although in their infancy, these new journalism ventures were an important part of themedia freedom movement which attempted to encourage balanced reporting rather thanpartisan news. In addition to these small and independent journalism ventures, active andvociferous media freedom NGOs were also formed. Out of the Saksi venture came theCentre for Independent Journalism (CIJ). CIJ aimed to target the practice of self-censor-ship and enhance the quality of journalism in mainstream journalism. CIJ recruited SoniaRandhawa, who was retrenched at Agenda Malaysia when the news website folded in late2000. She became the Executive Director of CIJ from September 2002 until 2007. Sherecalls that when she began with CIJ: “The government had little respect for the main-stream press – and why should they? They had very little credibility” (Interview, January16, 2012). As we shall see, the only journalists union, the National Union of Journalists(NUJ) has been largely subject to nepotism and cronyism for journalists who did not wantto make changes from within the industry. At its core, CIJ aimed to change this mentality,and held workshops for journalists on topics such as media ethics and quality journalismpractice. CIJ also expanded their advocacy to include Freedom of Expression andFreedom of Information laws. In addition to CIJ, Charter 2000, launched out of Aliranin Penang in 2000, was also an important initiative in calling for freedom of expression tobe respected and higher standards of professionalism in media reporting (Aliran Charter,2012). Aliran had long been considered “an oppositional imaginative space to subvert thedominant power of Malaysia’s political establishment and mainstream media” (Kelly2003, 70) but with the Charter 2000 movement it specifically addressed issues relatingto media freedom, including monitoring the mainstream media, and joined lobby groupsin appealing to the government for media reforms. In the Malay language press,“Kumpulan Aktivis Media Inedpenden” (or KAMI) was an independent media activistgroup started by Ahmad Lutfi and Fathi Aris Omar to promote independent journalismperspectives amongst the Malay-language journalists, while Inisiatif Wartawan(Concerned Journalists from the Traditional and New Media) campaigned for an end tothe PPPA and for an independent media council (Rodan 2004, 164). The sprouting ofthese media freedom groups was a positive sign for the future pursuit for a discourse forcollective action within the journalism industry.

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The greatest achievement of these media freedom NGOs was to organise a memor-andum calling for the repeal of the PPPA. It was initially signed by 581 journalists in May1999, with a further 370 signatures added by April 2000. Masjaliza Hamzah was involvedin the petition, and said: “I felt it was time some journalists make a stand, otherwise wewould seem complicit with the government and not interested in reform. The aim of thepartition was to show that there are journalists who want change to take place in thiscountry” (Interview, December 12, 2011). She recalled that the task was not easy: “Wehad to lobby a lot of journalists and explain why we were advocating for this; that wewere not simply just being pro-opposition but [rather] were advocating for greater pressfreedom.” Then Home Affairs Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi received the petition,promising to read it and get back to them.

This petition led many activists to believe change was occurring inside the mainstreampress (Mustafa 2002, 163). Some mainstream journalists began to openly debate insidetheir newsrooms the nature of journalistic professional practice. In the Chinese-languagepress, which had relatively speaking been more independent in its coverage of politicsduring reformasi, with the China Press in particular providing consistent coverage of theAnwar trial and subsequent protests (Abbott 2004, 83), there was discussion about morebalanced coverage of all parties (Teoh Kian Hoon, Interview, December 11, 2011). In theEnglish-language press, The Sun was positioning itself as a paper where its journalistswould write more openly on politics than its main competitors, The New Straits Times andThe Star. Re-launched as a free daily, it hired Jason Tan in March 2000 to establish aSunday magazine. Tan had previously worked with Wong and Kuttan at Men’s Review,and was considered a reformer within the industry. He said: “I was optimistic that theMalaysian press and overall media scene would become more open,” and claimed TheSun “was a chance to use a national platform to sow new ideas, relook received wisdomand get your message across without being interdicted” (Interview, March 3, 2012). Thefirst edition of The Sun’s magazine, Vox, carried an extensive cover interview with oustedDeputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam (see Weiss 2006, 105). According to journalists whoworked at The Star in Kuala Lumpur during 1998–2001, there was confrontation withinthe newsroom about whether the newspaper should cover the opposition more regularly,and whether journalists should be able to report with greater autonomy. While the move-ment took hold in Peninsula Malaysia, in Sabah and Sarawak many journalists saw Anwarand reformasi as a largely Kuala Lumpur-centric movement; they considered the pro-Anwar split in the political elite had limited significance outside of the Peninsula (Abbott2004, 91–94). Anwar’s Keadilan party had little support in the 1999 elections in thesestates (Weiss 2006, 143). Ruben Sario, senior journalist for The Star in Kota Kinabalu,Sabah during this time, recalls: “Here in Sabah we were mentally and physically removedfrom the reformasi movement. We were still very cautious about what we could write”(Interview, December 18, 2011).

Access to the Internet has been less widespread in the rural areas in Malaysian Borneo.However, websites such as Sabahkini and The Sarawak Report, which commented onotherwise politically sensitive local government figures and discussed contentious topics,showed the potential for the Internet to create forums critical of the regime outside of thePeninsula.

In the first few years of the new century, optimism for change was prevalent amongstthese media freedom activists in Malaysia. They wrote about a new generation intro-duced to the Internet that would soon demand greater access to free and independent

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news. Wong wrote in 2000 that “the traditional media’s audience seems tired of playingsafe, especially since September 1998” and that “it can only be hoped that the presentpolitical crisis will give way to a more democratic and a larger civil society, so that themedia can assume a critical role in dialogue and debate” (Wong 2000, 135–137). Gan(2002, 65) wrote that “the Internet has helped put press freedom on the front burner”and that “there are journalists who are willing to draw a line in the sand and tell thegovernment: ‘This far, no further’.” While Gan also warned “we are not near breaking[the government’s] monopoly on power,” he claimed that the Internet “has enabled us tofinally break through the government’s barriers.” He cited the petition signed by over900 journalists as a crucial moment in “spurring mainstream journalists” into action.Anil Netto (2002, 19) wrote that “Websites might not have exactly taken over fromgovernments, but they have helped to fan the winds of change, and sustain movementsfor reform.” Through online ventures, there were now news sites openly critical of thegovernment, and the Internet allowed for like-minded activists and individuals tocommunicate with each other and to a wider audience. This sparked models of inde-pendent, non-partisan journalism, and a sprouting of lobby groups and NGOs advocat-ing for reform within the mainstream media and repeal of laws which regulated thepress. The movement had spread from online ventures to a small but vocal minorityinside the mainstream media who began to push for reforms from within the industry.Crucially, the movement had begun to implement some journalists inside mainstreammedia, particularly regarding opposition to the PPPA and against the concentration ofmedia ownership. All this suggested a vibrant movement that would eventually succeedin its push for greater media freedom.

Government Retaliation

Despite the optimism displayed by activists of the Internet as a liberalising force, theresponse from the BN after reformasi was one of retaliation and backlash. The November1999 elections saw half the Malay vote go to the opposition, with the Partai IslamSeMalaysia the main beneficiary, tripling its representation to 27 seats and becomingleader of the parliamentary opposition. The initial reaction of some political leaders wasthat the BN needed to reform. However, Prime Minister Mahathir rejected this idea. Heexplained the result in terms of “lies” spread by Anwar and others, and that the govern-ment “should counter lies by clamping down on or discrediting opposition parties”(Funston 2001). In the aftermath of the 1999 election, the annual publishing licences ofDetik, Wasilah and Esklusif were all withdrawn. Harakah was forced to restrict itspublication from twice-weekly to twice-monthly (Abbott 2004, 80). Malaysiakini wasdenied media accreditation, ostensibly because it did not have a permit for publication.The mainstream press continued to be governed by as many as 35 strict laws. The mostintrusive of laws, the PPPA, was not repealed by Abdullah Badawi, either in his role asHome Minister or later as Prime Minister. The 951 mainstream journalists who signed apetition requesting the repeal of this law were ultimately disappointed. The governmentused the Internal Security Act (ISA) to include “seditious” messages posted online, even ifpseudonyms were used. In Sarawak in 2002, just as the online media was beginning togain popularity in the region, police chief Mohammad Yusoff Jaafar threatened to find andcrackdown those who posted inflammatory messages online (Mohd Azizuddin 2005,348). In 2003, the police entered Malaysiakini’s offices and confiscated its computers

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after it published a reader’s letter which was considered “seditious,” as it questioned thespecial rights for Malays (George 2006; Sudibyo 2010).

While the strict laws stayed, government set about changing the mentality of journalistswho spoke out for reform. Some important examples are detailed here, including testi-mony from those journalists who were subjected to more blunt measures of subjugation.Aliran’s Mustafa K Anuar sums up the response to the government’s backlash afterreformasi: “People got scared. The government caught hold of the [reformasi] leadersand the movement died off. The people, including journalists, stopped pushing theboundaries after that” (Interview, December 6, 2011). Other journalists stressed that themain reason for the decline in the media freedom movement in Malaysia during and afterreformasi was the Malaysian government’s ability to “weed out” any reformists so thatothers who might support their ideals were reluctant to do so. Wan Hamidi was reportingfor the New Straits Times (NST) in 2000 and 2001, when he was reprimanded by hissuperiors. He recalls:

I was had to sit down with editors of my newspaper because I was writing toocritically. They said: “You know you have a reputation [as a journalist critical of thegovernment] and we can’t protect you.” I said: “The people have spoken out forchange, why can’t we change a bit?” The Chief Editor responded: “I too would liketo change, but you know my hands are tied” (Interview, December 9, 2011).

NST eventually refused to publish his stories, and he was moved to “graveyard shifteditor” (5 p.m.-2 a.m.). Not long after, he decided to quit the NST. Wan Hamidi concludes:“In the industry, we kept convincing each other there was no point. Perhaps we were tooscared. Of what exactly? I don’t know” (Interview, December 9, 2011). Masjaliza, nowwith CIJ, recalls speaking out in an editorial meeting while working for The Star. Shecomplained in an editorial meeting about a front page story which emphasised the policeas injured during a riot, when according to Masjaliza, it was the protestors who sustainedserious injuries: “I questioned the bosses. But I didn’t get the support from my colleaguesthat I thought I would. They mostly remained silent. People who I thought would supportme didn’t” (Interview, December 12, 2011).

Masjaliza left The Star, and argues that “journalists who were activists and pushing forreform largely abandoned the mainstream media. They became disillusioned with chan-ging the system from within.” Critical journalists were placed in “cold storage” – a termused in Malaysia when journalists are demoted to another desk, or a midnight editorialshift. Sario, who was working with The Star in Kota Kinabalu, recalls hearing the news ofcritical journalists being sacked at The Star headquarters in Kuala Lumpur. He said:

There was a feeling of resignation after reformasi. Everyone knows what happenedwhen journalists lost their job in KL. We think – why bother? We are stuck withreporting in this level of restrictions unless BN goes. How can we change it? Wecan’t. Why should I fight it? (Interview, December 12, 2011).

Many activists, journalists and NGOs pushing for greater media freedom dissipated,folded or have re-evaluated their aims. But the greatest disappointment for the mediafreedom movement was reserved for Malaysia’s only journalist’s union. The NationalUnion of Journalists (NUJ) did not speak out for media freedom during reformasi. NUJ

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continued to see its main role as advocating for better pay conditions of mainstreamjournalists. As a result, they needed the support of the government and the major mediaowners. This meant they were reluctant to criticise those in power; those who alsohindered the freedom of the press. This infuriated some journalists involved with NUJ.Jacqueline Surin and a number of other journalists from The Star tried to take over theleadership of NUJ in 2000. Surin ran on a platform of trying to produce reform fromwithin the industry, but her campaign failed. She said: “A common united front wasdifficult to get,” and explained further:

Trying to make reform from within [the industry] was very difficult. It would requiredoing union work for years so that the reforms could happen. And there is littleincentive for anyone to keep on being in the union because it means having to giveup promotions into a higher grade, and putting aside one’s career in order to fightthese battles (Interview, December 16, 2011).

Masjaliza was an NUJ committee member from 1994–2003. She blames “cronyism withinthe NUJ. There is always politics about who will be President, and it usually comes from[conservative newspapers] Utusan or NST,” and said: “During the reformasi NUJ simplymaintained the status quo. Some of us wanted them to discuss press freedom but theyweren’t interested” (Interview, December 12, 2011). The CIJ had continual difficulty withfunding and resources. Randhawa said that CIJ “could never really penetrate the Malay-language newsroom” as the Malay-language journalists were less interested in pressfreedom issues, particularly in conservative newspapers like Utusan Malaysia. Sheclaimed NUJ often discouraged journalists from working with them, suggesting theywould be considered radicals (Interview, January 16, 2012).

Retaliation on the more reformist elements of the mainstream press continued in theimmediate years after reformasi. In March 2001, The Sun’s new editorial team, whichincluded Jason Tan, was called into the Chief Editor’s office and told to hand overoperations back to the old management. Tan said this decision was due to Mahathirbeing “angered by The Sun’s sustained coverage of [a] by-election in Kedah, where for thefirst time, news items such as such as busloads of phantom voters were reported on”(Interview, March 3, 2012). In May 2001, a coerced take-over of Nanyang Press publish-ers by the Malaysian Chinese Association, a constituent party of the BN, saw manyjournalists leave the Chinese press to pursue other career options.7 The Chinese press hadshowed strong support for SUQIU – which represented the Chinese community’s call forreformasi (Cheah 2002, 74).8 Nanyang Press was the publisher of two of the four Chinesedaily newspapers, Nanyang Siang Pau and China Press. The other two dailies, Sin Chewand Guang Ming, were part of the Sin Chew group allied to BN. This meant the twoconglomerates commanded about 90% of the total Chinese dailies’ readership (Ng 2003).Teoh Kian Hoon was the chief leader writer of Nanyang Siang Pau during the reformasiperiod, and recalls that: “Chinese newspapers all became controlled by businessmenlinked to the government. They care only for making money and have no idea aboutthe values of journalism. There is no channel for discussion, [as] that is the way thecompany is structured” (Interview, December 11, 2011). This takeover inspired a com-munity of writers and journalists who protested against the takeover and who boycottedfrom writing for the “occupied” Nanyang Press Dailies and the “collaborating” Sin ChewGroup Dailies. They formed Writers Action for Media Independence (WAMI) and the

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“528 Yellow Ribbon Movement.” It was hoped that through these movements there wouldbe greater collaboration between the more vibrant, outspoken journalists in the Chinesepress. WAMI included Wong Chin Huat, who was to become a key figure in theMalaysian media freedom movement. He described WAMI as “the product of thereformasi era” which highlighted the “general pro-reformasi or ‘anti-government’ standheld by many writers and some journalists” (Interview, March 6, 2012). But the take-overwent ahead and, although many of its members still remain active in the movement’scauses, WAMI was not sustained:

The movement within the entire Chinese community was mainly driven by anethno-nationalist concern to save two established Chinese newspapers from forcesallied to UMNO. Three or four years down the road, it was quite clear that“rescuing” the Nanyang Press … became an impossible goal. The movement lostthe support of Chinese traditional NGO’s and business communities (Wong,Interview, March 6, 2012).

Other media freedom lobby groups, such as KAMI and Inisiatif Wartawan, also died out,unable to enlist more members or maintain the enthusiasm amongst those who hadinitially joined. Aliran continued to survive but its readership had clearly reached itspeak during reformasi.9 CIJ’s Masjaliza argues that the government’s actions meant youngjournalists coming through the system were “hard pressed to find role models in main-stream Malaysian journalism,” as those that remained were forced to tow the BN line intheir professional practice (Interview, December 12, 2011). As McCargo (2003, 48)writes: “The Mahathir government to a large extent relied on a well-established cultureof journalistic self-censorship. Despite very considerable support for reformasi, and forAnwar, opposition forces were never able to mainstream their views through the media.”The government had retaliated effectively so that journalists feared repercussions if theycampaigned for greater openness in their reporting.

In addition to the government crackdowns on media freedom organisations and indi-viduals, the situation for activists became even more difficult as independent journalismventures did not succeed in their aims to gain a mainstream following. RadiQradioultimately failed. The attempt to broadcast from Indonesian transmitters hit numeroustechnical difficulties, and funding from the MDLF was not renewed after 18 months.Saksi did not survive; those involved moving their energies to CIJ and other causes. KeanWong said they failed “in the sense that they were not sustainable financially” (Interview,February 10, 2012). However, these innovations raised the question as to whether therewas a market for non-partisan, independent journalism ventures at a time of deeppolarisation in political views, a theme which we will return to later. Despite the useful-ness of the Internet during reformasi, the space for independent journalism remained“tenuous, transient, and vulnerable to the commercial pressures” (Rodan 2004, 172).

There was some optimism that reforms would take place as Mahathir stepped down onOctober 31, 2003, and when Anwar was released from jail the following year. But BNmaintained its hold on power, winning around 90% of parliamentary seats in the 2004elections, its best result (in terms of overall seats gained) since 1955. The mainstreammedia sustained their pro-government bias in news coverage and advertisements (Weiss2006, 243). Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi’s promises of reforms in the lead up to theelection never materialised. Although in the early years of his Presidency there was an

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opening up of greater public discussion and criticism, these were seen as “appearing bydefault than as a matter of policy,” and the overall quality of reforms has been very low(Ooi 2008, xviii). In terms of Abdullah Badawi’s dealings with the media, it was businessas usual as it had been during the Mahathir years (Zaharom 2008). Self-censorshipcontinued to permeate the professional practice of the mainstream media industry. ThePPPA was not repealed, while other organisations, publications and activist movementsdied out. While Malaysiakini continued to survive and practise critical journalismthroughout the decade, almost all other independent journalism initiatives which wereformed during reformasi were not sustained. Media freedom activists lost momentum and,in some cases, lost their belief that reforms would ever take place in Malaysia. Theretaliation of the regime left some journalists to change careers, while others left thecountry altogether. Some media freedom activists maintained the cause, but a largerprocess of mobilisation was to be placed on hold until the general elections of 2008,and the rise of social media as a platform for change.

Social Media and Bersih 2.0

In its election year of 2008, Malaysia saw an economic downturn in the region.Furthermore, Anwar was out of jail and free to take on the role as opposition leader.Protests and rallies were held by activist groups, including the highly influential Bersihmovement. Although the BN ultimately won the election, they lost their crucial two-thirdsmajority in parliament, their worst election result since 1955.10 Their share of the popularvote was 52% nationally, and less on the Peninsula (Case 2010, 78). As described earlier,the election led to a discussion amongst scholars as to whether it would be the start of atransition to democracy. The build-up to the election saw a renewed push for greatermedia freedom, with the re-emergence of a vibrant blogosphere featuring political dis-cussions, and the effective use of social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter. Inparticular, the Bersih 2.0 movement used social media to great effect to publicise theircause.11 One of Bersih’s five demands included free and fair access to media, and onceagain demands were made to abolish the PPPA (CIJ 2008). Analysts argued that the 2008election was determined by the swing votes of young voters who had access to theInternet and read websites that offered alternative news and commentary to that ofmainstream media (Kee 2008; Jun-E Tan, and Zawawi 2008). Internet penetration inMalaysia had increased from 3.7 million in 2000 to 16.9 million in early 2009, an increaseof 356% since reformasi began (Samsudin 2011, 4).12 While blogging did not begin in2008, bloggers were important voices during this campaign. Gobind Runda, former editorat The Star, established Uppercaise, while Raja Petra Kamarudin (hereafter Raja Petra),who had taken to blogging during reformasi with the Free Anwar Campaign, createdMalaysia Today (Jun-E Tan, and Zawawi 2008). Although there are little data on whetherpolitical blogs affected voting results, Gong (2008, 320–325) found that 77% of blogs inthe 2008 election period belonged to opposition candidates, suggesting a political advan-tage when appealing to the young, urban, middle-class. When Prime Minister AbdullahBadawi lamented after the election: “We certainly lost the Internet war” (Malaysiakini,March 26, 2008), media freedom activists saw the Internet through social media as crucialfor implementing wider change in the media industry.

However, doubts continued as to the ability of mainstream media to implement thebroader reforms activists were looking for. A government official stated bluntly in 2008:

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“Although there were numerous bloggers, the mainstream newspapers would ultimatelyhold sway over the majority of the people” (cited in Gong 2008, 308), suggesting thatsome within the government were not overly concerned with the rise of opposition blogs.Even bloggers themselves admitted that the online media were fragmented and needed tobe more professional, and that a crucial aspect of media reform would be whethermainstream journalists have the ability to speak out (Goodtimes, September 9, 2008).Malaysiakini continued to operate and, as Steele (2009, 108) argues, “it is actually thenorms and values of independent journalism that have made Malaysiakini such a threat togovernment authorities.” The establishment and continued survival of independent newspublications to complement Malaysiakini, both in print and online, which could gain amore mainstream readership was crucial to reform. These publications included Off theEdge, The Nutgraph, The Merdeka Review and The Malaysian Insider. Jason Tan, whohad created the monthly magazine Off the Edge in 2005 to explore Malaysian politics andculture observed:

I wanted to persuade the country’s business classes, in whatever way or measure, ofthe need to help make room in our public spaces for a thriving, dynamic culture,where people can come together wherever and however they like … Frankly, I wastired of the smugness of some in the media who overtly close relationships withadvertisers were no different in nature from the ones between politicians and journal-ists (Interview, March 3, 2012).

Surin had started The Nutgraph in 2008 “to improve the standards and benchmark ofjournalism and to be fair and kind to all sexualities and genders” (Interview, December16, 2011). Both these publications appealed to the young, politically-minded English-speaking, urban elite. The Malaysian Insider was created as an independent onlinenewspaper in February 2008 by former Reuters journalist Jahabar Sadiq. After quittingthe NST, Wan Hamidi joined The Malaysian Insider. He said the news site was “tryingto be mainstream but fairer in our dimension, in a way that Malaysians have never seen”(Interview, December 9, 2011). While this approach may not have been somethingMalaysians were accustomed to, The Malaysian Insider (n.d.) believes the market forthis type of news is expanding. The Merdeka Review, an independent Chinese-languagenews site established in 2005 by the former WAMI representative Teck Peng Chang,began to build up its audience to include a Malay-language section. After his previousattempt with RadiQradio failed, Kuttan began working as a producer for a new radioproject, BFM (The Business Station) which was launched in 2008 as an “independentradio station focused on business news and current affairs” (see BFM, n.d.). Once again,independent journalism ventures were being created to provide access to voices criticalof the regime, and where an increasing cohort of Malaysians would appreciate (andhopefully subscribe to) news and analysis free from pro-government slant. For many ofthese activists, journalists, and media entrepreneurs, reformasi was only the beginning.The movement which began in 1998 was regarded as still worth fighting for, and in theirview the Bersih movements were a continuation of some of the ideals fostered duringreformasi. The persistence of Malaysiakini and now the rise of these other independentnews sites represented the next stage. The emergence of the Internet, which began underreformasi, had produced a larger platform for freedom of expression, and once again itwas doing so. In a political climate where the 2008 election was seen as a “victory for

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the opposition,” journalists and activists pursuing greater media freedom in Malaysiasaw the potential to argue for media reforms. As stated earlier, Pepinsky (2009, 117)argued that for reforms to be implemented on a wider scale, BN’s “soft-liners must beconvinced liberalisation holds the key to their political survival while hard-liners mustbe contained.” With regard to media liberalisation, would those journalists and activistswho publicly spoke out for media reforms be allowed to do so in a political environmentof greater openness? Or would the government retaliate once again, cracking down onthose looking to reform the media industry?

Electoral Authoritarian Backlash and Retaliation

Despite the optimism shown by many media freedom activists since 2008, the post-election media liberalisation movement was, indeed, subjected to a further governmentbacklash. The decision to use the ISA against journalists in August and September2008 was an early sign of the government’s determination to silence dissent after theelection. Raja Petra was arrested, and his popular website Malaysia Today was bannedfor a few days. Tan Hoon Cheng, reporting for Sin Chew Daily in Penang, was alsoarrested the same week under ISA after she had reported on former UMNO member’salleged racist remarks while he was campaigning for a local by-election (TheNutgraph, September 13, 2008). While the government is not officially censoringthe Internet, those bloggers who are seen to “threaten national security” or “touch onsensitive issues as prescribed in the constitutions” face increasing scrutiny (Samsudin2011, 6). On March 13, 2009, six bloggers were arrested for writing critically aboutthe Sultan of Perak. That same month, four Internet content authors were charged forspreading rumours via email about an imminent riot by Indonesian guest workers inMalaysia. The government was now fully aware of the existence and usefulness ofonline and social media, and became more proactive in getting the message out via theInternet, including hiring public relations firms to help with their political campaignand improve their online image (The Malaysian Insider, October 11, 2011). Thegovernment employs “cybertroopers” to slander the opposition online (The Star,June 13, 2011),13 while attempts to discredit the opposition online “went viral” dueto their sordid nature, such as the fake videos of Anwar having sex with a prostitute(Associated Press, June 24, 2011). Thus, rather than see the Internet and social mediasites as a realm of greater freedom of expression, the government has insteadretaliated by discouraging dissenting voices, and producing their own anti-oppositioncontent.

The government also continues to issue “show cause” letters (where newspapers must‘explain’ or apologise for certain articles or face suspension) to printing firms, and in 2010did so to The Star, Suara Keadilan, The Rocket and Harakah. On September 25, 2010,Malaysiakini cartoonist Zunar was arrested under the Sedition Act and police seized acollection of his political cartoons (Freedom House 2011). This was all dutifully anduncritically reported in the mainstream media, creating a sense of fear behind what peoplecan say (or draw) online (see New Straits Times, July 18, 2009). Also in 2010, the newlyelected NUJ President Hata Wahari, a journalist from the pro-government Malay-languagenewspaper Utusan Melayu, vowed to revitalise the union, which he said had been tootimid in the past. His press release boldly stated:

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The government of the day should not stifle journalists and tell them what they canwrite or not. If any print media is seen as aggressive, the government will take awayand not renew our license. The government should not give any time frame forrenewing newspaper licenses. Let the newspaper circulations determine whether anewspaper can keep its license or not (CIJ 2011, 36).

This was the first time the NUJ President publicly called for an end to PPPA. As Kuttancommented, it showed that there are “good people within vile systems. I mean, Hata camefrom Utusan Melayu, one of the most pro-government newspapers in Malaysia, and hespoke out” (Interview, December 12, 2011). But again, the government response was toretaliate. Wahari was fired from his job at Utusan Melayu in April 2011 for “tarnishing theimage of his employer” through the statements he issued regarding a free press(Malaysian Insider, April 14, 2011). He subsequently resigned from his role as NUJPresident and retired from journalism. Raja Petra (of Malaysia Today) reportedly facesdefamation cases and sedition charges, plus the further threat of the ISA (MalaysiaChronicle, January 5, 2012). He has been criticised for switching from supporting theopposition to being its critic, most famously while declaring during the Anwar sodomytrial that Anwar was “morally unfit to be Prime Minister” (Malaysia Today, January 1,2012). When well-known figures who spoke out against the regime are publicly humi-liated or seen to have been pressured to ‘switch’ their allegiances, many others whomaintained the cause of media freedom became despondent. Randhawa said despite thebest efforts of many in CIJ, everyone has “a limit” for how long they can push for reformwithin the industry. She now lives in Melbourne, Australia, and is completing a PhD onMalaysian politics: “You can only bang your head against the wall for so long untileventually you leave,” she said (Interview, January 16, 2012). CIJ has faced numerousfunding crises, and now looks to run seminars and workshops for journalists, rather thandirectly advocating for change within the industry. CIJ claims many mainstream journal-ists are still wary of being involved in any capacity with the organisation, for fear of beingconsidered a reformer. Masjaliza, now head of CIJ, says the organisation has had to tonedown its role to simply “build awareness” of press freedom issues (Interview, December12, 2011).

While the BN’s retaliation is, of course, a large part of the hindrances to medialiberalisation, the situation is more complex than simply government controls hinderingan otherwise thriving independent journalism market. As in the post-reformasi period,where most independent journalism ventures did not survive, those new publicationsestablished in 2008 elections have also not been financially sustainable. In 2010, Offthe Edge ceased publication after a string of losses. Jason Tan said the lessons he learntfrom his experience with Off the Edge were “that you should never take your eye off theball; the ball being the business, and all the different parts that make it work” (Interview,February 5, 2012). The Nutgraph shut its office and laid-off its staff in August 2010,although the online site is still partially maintained. Among the many lessons that TheNutgraph’s co-founder Surin (2010) learnt was that “providing good journalism is expen-sive.” Both these publications had perhaps aimed at the high-end, politically minded,English-language market. But other online sites that aim at a general audience also face acrisis of funding. The Chinese-language Merdeka Review had to reinvent itself in 2011,when its anonymous funders declined to continue their support. It has teamed up withMalaysiakini’s Chinese edition in an attempt to gain subscriptions. The Malaysian Insider

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faces financial ruin, a huge defamation suit naming the news portal and two of itsemployees (New Straits Times, October 1, 2011).

Some activists argue that greater press freedom will help assist these publications asthey are able to enter a wider market, in an environment where independent news is easilyaccessible both online and in print. Wong Chin-Huat said: “A more promising future forindependent journalism would come only when the market entry for print and broadcastmedia is removed. That will of course take a regime change” (Interview, March 6, 2012).Others interviewed suggest there are broader issues in Malaysian journalism that willmean that even a simple transfer of political party power will not automatically lead to arapid liberalisation of the media. These include the financial difficulties of independentmedia companies discussed above; the suggestion that Pakatan Rakyat may not “keeptheir hands off” the media; and the need to develop a vibrant public sphere including abroad understanding of what media freedom means. Even so, the establishment of morenews sites in 2010 such as The Malaysia Chronicle and Free Malaysia Today suggestthere is still potential for successful new ventures. Free Malaysia Today was establishedbecause they saw “the need for more reliable information sorely lacking in the mainstreammedia” (see Free Malaysia Today, n.d.). However, the financial difficulties faced by all ofthese private media projects since 1998 suggests that greater media freedom will not bedriven by a thriving market of independent journalism. Circulation figures of most main-stream newspapers have steadily declined since 2005, but this is true of newspapercirculation and readership figures in most parts of the world. Meanwhile, Harian Metro,a freely distributed newspaper owned by the pro-government NST group, has seencirculation figures rise.14

In addition to the financial difficulties suffered by many independent journalismventures, there are other reasons which suggest that the larger process of media freedominvolves more than the opposition defeating BN at an election. Academics have noted thatthe journalism education courses at Malaysian universities have fallen short, failing toproduce critical thinkers. Ng Miew Luan and Lim Lai Hoon (2008) have explained thatthe quality of journalism education has not improved since reformasi, and thus, there haveemerged a group of writers who are not particularly critical or independent minded. Someacademics within the journalism education field argue that it is difficult to produce thekind of journalists that independent media outlets are seeking. They blame a stiflingenvironment that does not encourage citizens to take an active interest in political andsocial issues, and thus it is no surprise that when journalists go to report news, the result islargely a sanitised analysis (Netto 2002; Mustafa 2005). Zaharom Nain (2011), a lecturerin Communications at Nottingham University in Kuala Lumpur (also on the board of CIJ),argues it is the “subservient” nature of university courses for future journalists: “I haveseen how many of the policy makers in [university] departments are constantly in awe oftop media editors and owners, desperately wanting their acknowledgement, indeedapproval, of the courses being offered.” Again, the concern of many journalists inter-viewed for this research was whether there were sufficient role models for youngerjournalists. Gan states:

I wish there were more journalists who had the skill to write well and the mindset tobe critical. But the years of depoliticising at university have made it difficult, and ifthey come from the mainstream media they get complacent and comfortable and fallinto bad habits (Interview, December 10, 2011).

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Transforming the institutionalised practice of self-censorship in journalism may not be aswift process, particularly if the ownership of mainstream media remains concentrated andlinked to constituent political parties. Studies of self-censorship in present-day Indonesianjournalism have found that despite the country’s transition to a democracy in 1998, thepractice remains prevalent today. Media owners who were successful under the previousauthoritarian regime (1965–98) “re-organised” themselves under new democratic systems,and Indonesian journalists claim that issues relating to media ownership continue tohinder their autonomy and encourage self-censorship as a crucial journalistic practice(Tapsell 2012; Darudoyo 2009). While media liberalisation in Malaysia may take on acompletely different form to that of post-reformasi Indonesia, it is important to recognisethat the process of reform of journalistic practice is not necessarily changed overnight, andthus media reforms within the industry itself may, indeed, be more prolonged, even if theopposition wins the next election.

Conclusion

The Malaysian media freedom movement has been spurred by new media technologiespushing journalism in new directions. The emergence of the Internet during the politicalenvironment of reformasi was important in promoting change in the media. The Internetencouraged independent journalism ventures, vibrant media freedom NGOs, andincreased debate amongst journalists as to their role. Ten years on, and social mediawas crucial in disseminating information and in pushing for reforms voiced by Bersih 2.0.Once again, independent journalism ventures and NGOs sprouted, and media freedomactivists attempted to create new initiatives to encourage a lessening of governmentmanipulation or control over the media. Yet recent surveys of the Malaysian mediaindicate further erosion of any independent, vibrant and free media. In their 2011/2012press freedom survey, Reporters Without Borders (2011) ranked Malaysia at 122 out of179 countries while Freedom House (2011) categorises the country’s media in 2011 as“Not Free.” These surveys reach similar conclusions, that while the Internet and socialmedia have been important in voicing anti-government causes, there is a considerable lackof independent journalism. While social networking sites contain vigorous debates onpolitical issues, media observers are concerned that new laws would be introduced togovern sedition in cyberspace.

Prime Minister Najib Razak declared on September 15, 2011 that the governmentwill revoke the PPPA by abolishing the clause which requires publishing permits to berenewed annually. At the very least, it was a public concession by the premier that thegovernment’s old ways of regulating the press were in need of some cosmetic changes.On April 12, 2012, Najib invited Malaysians to “walk with him in his journey totransform Malaysia.” Critics have since labelled this “moon-walking,” giving theillusion of moving forward but which is actually a backpedal taking you nowhere(The Malaysia Chronicle, June 2, 2012). Journalists and activists interviewed for thisresearch see Najib’s promises of media reforms as unlikely to assist with greater medialiberalisation. They argue that while there are occasional positive aspects of reformsbeing implemented by BN, these reforms are packaged under the illusion of broaderchange, when in reality they do not meet the demands of reformists. One example ofthis is the establishment of a Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC), which wasestablished after approximately 50,000 marched in support of free and fair elections

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on July 9, 2011. Nearly all proposals from the PSC are expressions of intent andwithout a time limit for implementation, and thus none of these proposals must beacted on before the next elections are held. Bersih has concluded that few of itsproposals – including access to free and fair media for the opposition – have beenaccepted by the government. The Bersih movement’s Ambiga Sreenevasan said: “Theglaring absence of true reform speaks volumes. The report was rushed throughParliament without debate” (The Malaysian Insider, April 21, 2012). The amendmentto the PPPA was rushed through despite uproar from the opposition bench, whowanted a broader discussion of the law and possible further reforms. Prime MinisterNajib has proposed amending the PPPA further, but only in return for the formation ofa Media Council, designed to monitor online media and its practitioners. CIJ and othermedia freedom activists have described the proposed council as a “new regime ofmedia control” (see Malaysiakini, June 5, 2012). Another recent example of mediacontrol includes the Malaysian Election Commission’s decision to ban caricaturesduring the next election. As Case (2011, 451) has argued more broadly, and whathas been shown here with regard to media liberalisation, the Malaysian governmenthas retaliated again since the election of 2008, and the result is a “hardening” of theregime. With regard to media liberalisation, the current regime’s hardening is morecovert. As Schedler (2006, 12) argues: “Electoral authoritarian regimes set up thewhole institutional landscape of representative democracy,” including the permitting of“private media, interest groups and civic associations. Although none of these institu-tions are meant to constitute countervailing powers.” This can certainly be said of theMalaysian government’s attitude toward media freedom activists and civic groups. AsCase (2010, 107) states: “Direct action, when mounted autonomously from below, isprohibited under any competitive authoritarian regime. After all, the logic of itshybridity lies in its squeezing the activism of often unruly civil society into manage-able electoral arenas.” The media freedom movement in Malaysia illustrates that theInternet can assist the opposition and create a space for greater openness and debate.Yet despite the increase in Internet usage and creation of all forms of online discourse,the Malaysian regime has managed to subvert or supress many publications, organisa-tions or individuals who pursued the goal of greater media freedom. Since 1998, theMalaysian regime has reacted to the process of media liberalisation by retaliatingagainst dissenters and media freedom groups, in an effort to consolidate the regime.Although this was done more overtly after reformasi, the period post-2008 has alsoseen the regime hinder the media liberalisation process. Despite the arrival of newmedia technologies, the electoral authoritarian regime has actually been very success-ful in managing the media environment in the country. However, the financial viabilityof independent journalism ventures suggests a more complex set of forces than ahostile ruling power controlling the media landscape. Future research could examinethe commercial viability of independent journalism in electoral authoritarian regimes.Internal and structural weaknesses, from lack of resources and stamina, were also toblame for the lack of progress here. This article sheds light on the stage of democra-tisation currently occurring in Malaysia – one that is complex and tense, but one thatsuggests a hardening of a ruling power intent on surviving as an electoral authoritar-ianism regime, rather than pursuing a swift transition to democracy through anacceptance of media liberalisation.

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Acknowledgement

The author would like to thank all those who were interviewed for this research, Dr John Funston, and the threeanonymous reviewers.

Notes1 Interviews in Malaysia were conducted in November and December 2011. The interviews were semi-structured, in which interviewees were asked to recall their time as journalists or in pursuing greater pressfreedom through their organisation. The “snowballing” technique followed. At the conclusion of the inter-view, interviewees were asked to recommend others who were involved in attempting to liberalise the mediafrom within, and many interviewees were identified and found upon the recommendation of other inter-viewees. Interviewees were selected if they were considered to be involved in pursuing greater press freedomin Malaysia. Some interviewees were selected largely through their publications on the topic. Some potentialinterviewees discussed in this article, such as Premesh Chandran, Tan Hoon Chen and Hata Wahari, wereapproached but were unable to be interviewed. Other interviewees were unable to be personally interviewedbut responded to questions via other means. This included Wong Chin Huat (email), Jason Tan (email) andJacqueline Surin (telephone).

2 The ISA allows for detention without trial at the Home Affairs Minister’s discretion. According to CIJ (2011)this law “still looms large in the Malaysian psyche” as calls for arrest under ISA are still commonlyemployed. The Sedition Act states that offenders can be charged for seditious “tendencies” or “affectingdisaffection” or raising “discontent” and ill-will amongst Malaysians of different races. The Official SecretsAct allows the government to classify documents as “secret” thereby making it a crime to communicate anyinformation contained in them. It is particularly effective in negating the courage of potential whistle blowers.

3 Mahathir wanted to give Malaysia an advantage over its neighbour, Singapore, which had strict controls overInternet Service Providers, and to encourage foreign investment in Malaysia’s Multimedia Super CorridorProject.

4 For example, the deregulation of the media industry by the Mahathir administration in the 1980s had someactivists hoping it would foster a growth of independent media. But publishing licences found their way intothe hands of the ruling elite and their economic allies (Ng and Lim 2008, 85). Furthermore, the internalstruggles within the BN have also meant certain newspapers at certain times would write more critically of thegovernment, depending on whether the Chief Editor was aligned to the Deputy Prime Minister. For example,see Rehman Rashid (1993).

5 A cursory examination of Men’s Review editions in 1996–97 showed it included stories about MegawatiSukarnoputri and George Soros, amongst others, but other stories included “Brigitte Bardot, threesomes,playboys & lyle;” “hipster slang decoded;” “50 years of Vespa fashion” and “Simply Red: soul survivor.”

6 For example, see November 1996 edition with the cover story and photo of Megawati: “Megawati: Indonesiaon the cusp of change” with Kuttan’s report from Jakarta.

7 Many ended up in Chinese broadcast media (TV2, NTV7, 8TV, Astro, the now-defunct online ETV), whichhave been more vibrant and vocal than their counterparts in other languages.

8 SUQUI is the Malaysian Chinese Organisation Election Appeals Committee established in 1999. It wasessentially a lobby group advocating for national unity, advance democracy and to defend Chinese educationand places of worship. In 1999 the government accepted in principle their push for reforms, including demandnumber 13: “Develop a fair media,” but after the 1999 election tended to dismiss SUQUI as “troublemakers.”

9 By 2005 Aliran was selling only “a few thousand copies per month” of Aliran Monthly (Brown 2005, 42). InMarch 2011 Aliran stopped producing the magazine for news-stands. It now produces only subscription-based copies.

10 The two-thirds majority is “crucial” in a practical sense because to change the constitution in parliament, atwo-thirds majority is required, but also psychologically the ability to gain the two-thirds majority has alwaysbeen a key factor in how many Malaysians view the success or failure of BN in the election.

11 Statistics from politweet.org showed that between June 9 and August 14, the #bersih hashtag was used by33,940 users in 263,228 “tweets.”

12 Malaysia’s internet penetration was almost 63% in 2011, and growing (see Weiss 2013).13 See also http://www.facebook.com/pages/UMNO-cybertroopers-club/19706758456914 The ABC’s figures for the full year 30 June 2010–30 June 2011 showed drops in circulation for Utusan

Melayu (–5.9%), The Star (–3.1%), The New Straits Times (–9.5%) and Berita Harian (–12.3%). Harian

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Metro’s circulation figures in West Malaysia were 386,742 from July-December 2011, up from 249,575 inJuly-December 2005. See http://www.abcm.org.my (accessed July 12, 2012).

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