The meaning of elections in transitional democracies: Evidence from Russia and Ukraine

Pergamon Electoral Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3, 363-381, 1996 pp.

Copyright 0 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain. All tights reserved

SO2613794(96)00011-x 0261-3794/96 $15.00+0.00

The Meaning of Elections in Transitional Democracies: Evidence from Russia

and Ukraine

JON H. PAMMETT

Department of Political Science, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K15 5B6

JOAN DEBARDELEBEN

Institute of Central/East European and Russian-Area Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K15 5B6

The way in which citizens understand the meaning of elections may have a profound impact on the legitimation of transitional political systems. In post-Communist systems, this legitimation depends on the development of feelings that elections perform the functions of achieving accountability of elected officials, influencing policy direction of government and gaining personal benefits. Surveys in Russia and Ukraine at the time of elections in 1993 and 1994 show that those attaching such meanings to elections were most likely to display political interest and support system legitimacy, but that such people were a minority of the electorate. Popular acceptance of elections as legitimate democratic institutions in the future will depend on their ability to perform the functions of accountability, policy intluence and personal benefit. Copyright 0 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd

The introduction of competitive multi-party elections may be considered a cardinal signpost of democratization in the post-communist states (Lowenhardt, 1995). Such elections represent the most visible and concrete point of contact between citizens and the new institutional structures associated with the democratization process. If citizens understand elections to be meaningful vehicles of political participation, such beliefs may bolster the legitimacy of the new political structures and make the public more accepting of uncertain and sometimes painful policy outcomes. However, if elections are seen negatively or as having little meaning for the citizen, unstable fledgling institutions may be deprived of an important base of system support. Thus, the way in which citizens understand the meaning of elections may have a profound impact on the legitimation of transitional political systems.

Support for competitive elections is frequently used by Western analysts as a measure of commitment to democratic values in post-communist states (Hahn, 1991; Finifter and Mickiewicz, 1992; McAllister and White, 1995). In Russia and IJkraine, the principle of competitive elections enjoys wide support. At the same

364 Xbe Meaning of Elections in Transitional Democracies

time, many Russians and Ukrainians are uncertain about the honesty and efficacy of particular electoral processes; likewise, interest and voter turnout appear problematic. These developments suggest that elections in these countries may not bolster systemic legitimacy and may in some cases even detract from it, if current practice compares unfavourably with expectations or hopes. Support for the new regimes may need to rest more on ‘performance legitimacy’, namely the ability of the state to deliver effective policy to the citizenry, an area where these states are notably wanting. (Lowenhardt, 1995). It is in this context that we will examine the meaning that citizens of Russia and Ukraine attach to elections, based on analysis of surveys taken at the time of the first multi-party parliamentary elections in those countries in 1993 and 1994, respectively.

The Soviet Legacy and the New Electoral Regimes

The way that citizens of the post-Communist states view elections is undoubt- edly influenced by previous experiences under Communist rule. Deeply rooted habits of thought or behaviour are not quickly swept away, even while people are reacting to perceived differences between past and present electoral practices. In the Soviet period, deputies to the parliament, the Supreme Soviet, and to assembles (soviets) at other levels in the political system were chosen by direct popular vote. However, those elections involved only the single candidate selected by the Communist Party apparatus. Official results proclaimed that over 90 per cent of the eligible population voted in these elections. With the advent of glasnost in the late 1980s official critiques acknowledged that Soviet elections had been managed from above, had ritualistic features and had denied individuals the exercise of any real power. Western analysts of Soviet electoral practice have noted “the extent and depth of both the awareness and the dissatisfaction about fraudulent politics among Soviet citizens” (Mote, 1989, pp. 54-55). Philip Roeder reports that electoral avoidance increased gradually during the post- Stalinist period and was correlated with other forms of non-conformist behaviour (Roeder, 1989). Actions such as abstention from voting, unjustified requests for absentee certificates and decisions to strike out the designated candidate on the ballot were clearly exceptional, but they did occasionally occur as expressions of disapproval of the fraudulent electoral process or the political system itself. In fact, it is estimated that only about three-quarters of Soviet electors actually voted, since, they surmise, official Soviet participation figures excluded those who did not register or received absentee certificates (Zaslavsky and Brym, 1978).

Elections in the Gorbachev period were a transitional phenomenon; they gradually took on a competitive character. The Communist Party retained a privileged position in the 1989 elections for the Soviet parliament; nonetheless, in most constituencies, more than one candidate was on the ballot. The mechanisms to assure ‘voluntary participation’ in the vote were relaxed. Reported turnout in the 1989 elections declined to 89 per cent of the electorate, indicating that at least some voters felt they had a choice not to vote at all. Regional and local elections held throughout the USSR in the spring of 1990 saw further increases in compet- itiveness, and turnout fell to below 70 per cent. Not until 1993 in Russia and 1994 in Ukraine did competing political parties explicitly participate in national elections.

JON H PUIMETT ANI) JOAN DEBAIWELEHEN 365

The Meaning and Functions of Elections in Transition

Despite their formalistic character, many observers considered Soviet elections to fulfil legitimizing functions (Pravda, 1978). To the extent that they contributed to regime legitimacy, this process involved important elements of social and psychological control.

Elections buttress the regime-not by legitimizing it, but by prompting the population to show that the ilkgitirnacy of its ‘democratic’ practice has been accepted and that no action to undermine it will be forthcom- ing. (Zaslavsky and Brym, 1978, p. 362)

Furthermore, elections allowed the regime to maintain accurate records of residence, to train and mobilize party activists and to identify potential dissidents as well as loyal supporters. Rasma Karlkins points out that elections were “designed to have a deep psychological impact on the voter, who either will accept its democratic nature at face value or will feel intensely alienated”. (Karlkins, 1986, pp. 451-452). Hermet notes that during electoral campaigns a barrage of information about regime goals and values was transmitted to the population.

Moreover, electoral socialisation tends to give individuals the feeling that they share the responsibility for decisions that bind them...and that they ought therefore to collaborate willingly in carrying them out. (Hermct, 1978, pp. 13-15)

A second way in which Soviet elections may have bolstered acceptance of the regime was by providing a context in which the party/state rewarded loyal activists and responded to concrete grievances of citizens. Activists who participated effec- tively might gain benefits such as promotion or access to restricted information. More broadly, elections permitted average citizens to “bargain with the authorities over minor matters”, such as repairs needed in apartment dwellings or unpaved roads (Zaslavsky and Brym, 1978, p. 367). In order to gain cooperation, the part) activist responsible for contacting individual voters often responded to such complaints. Thus, the flurry of activity before the election could bring concrete benefits to voters, their families or their neighbourhoods. Goods in short supply, were also often for sale at the polling place.

The absence of survey data from the Soviet period does not permit a systematic analysis of how citizens themselves perceived the meaning of elections, although emigre studies are useful (Millar, 1987). Apart from concrete benefits distributed in connection with the electoral campaign, one can presume that interest in the elections themselves, like interest in politics generally, was low. It WaS observed that non-voters were more interested in politics than average; their inaction in not voting was actually an affirmative expression of dissent (Karlkins, 1986). Ironically, therefore, the high levels of turnout characteristic of the Soviet elections may more easily be seen as an indicator of political apathy than of political interest.

With the collapse of Communist Party rule and the introduction of competitive elections, some of the previous functions of elections became inoperative. Social control, for example, depended on the ability of the party to orchestrate the whole affair. Not only did that system collapse, but most of the post-Communist governments, and certainly those of the Russian Federation and IJkraine, have had difficulty in simple governance. Although personal political ties still play an important role in political recruitment in these societies (Vorzheikina, 1994), neither

366 The Meaning of Elections in Transitional Democracies

individual candidates, political parties or the state have the capacity to deliver extensive concrete benefits on a widespread basis.

In Western competitive systems, elections also serve as ways in which citizens, in groups or as individuals, can extract benefits from the state. These can be in the form of direct gifts of a material nature or occur through the advancement of the interests of a social class or ethnic, national or religious group. In this regard Communist elections did bear some similarity to modern competitive votes. The mechanism through which benefits accrued differs, however. In the Soviet system, the Communist Party was the benefactor, whereas in competitive democratic systems these benefits may be distributed through various mechanisms: adoption of general state policies that benefit the group or individual; internal reward structures of victorious political parties; or implementation of pork-barrel projects. Education, socialization and political recruitment can also occur through the electoral process in Western systems, but in a more pluralistic and less orchestrated manner than was the case in Communist systems.

However, the most fundamental legitimizing roles of elections in Western politics relate to factors that had virtually no place in the soviet system before the late 1980s. The theory of representative democracy regards elections as the major way of ensuring accountability of elected officials to the public, since voters can change their governments at regular intervals. Knowledge that the voters are capable of “throw- ing the rascals out” helps keep politicians honest and dedicated to the welfare of their constituents, at least theoretically. In this way, elections provide a mechanism by which citizens choose their leaders on a competitive basis and make judgements about their character and personality. A closely related function has to do with the policies that parties promise to enact if elected. While elections are not substitutes for referendums, they are often expected to provide an opportunity for those in government to sort out the electorate’s wishes on the major issues of the day and make choices among the possible directions for policy to proceed on these issues. At the very least, elections provide an opportunity for the public to comment on the state of the country (“let’s send them a message!“) and to indicate a basic satisfaction or dissatisfaction about the direction in which they are being taken.

To the extent that elections are perceived to fulfil these accountability and policy functions, they also spur the public to higher levels of political interest and participation. Political involvement can provide a more durable basis of system legitimacy than did the Soviet attempts at social control, by instilling a sense of fairness and responsiveness of the political system as a whole. In this sense, it should encour- age diffuse support rather than performance legitimacy. The positive legitimation functions of competitive elections are reinforced to the extent that voters feel they are offered a real choice and that, even if their preferred party or candidate loses now, the electoral process will assure an opportunity for continued citizen input.

During the process of democratization it is often assumed that citizens will recog- nize the accountability and policy functions of competitive elections, thus helping to generate diffuse support for the regime, and hence for ‘democracy’. In practice, however, unrealistically high expectations about the capability of the new electoral politics to deliver results may be easily dashed. At the same time, some of the ways in which the old electoral system provided benefits to the population may no longer be operative. The potential for public disappointment at the almost-inevitable failure of elections to live up to their ‘advance billing’ becomes greater with the speed of the transition. Old patterns may reappear-for example, a psychological withdrawal

JON H PAMMEIT AND JOAN DEBARDELEBEN 367

from the political process, which may reflect either apathy or active alienation. Citizens may question the legitimacy of the existing regime by characterizing the new competitive elections as manipulative mechanisms utilized by the country’s elite to give apparent legitimacy to the system or to achieve popular compliance.

The Russian and Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections

Elections for a new parliament were held in the Russian Federation on 12 December 1993 and in Ukraine on 27 March 1994 (with a run-off vote on 10 April). The Russian election occurred in a highly polarized and politicized environment, following the October 1993 showdown between President Yeltsin and the Russian parliament. The legitimacy of the new elections was a point of political controversy. Restrictions on the operation of the media in the period leading up to the vote (primarily related to the constitutional referendum) also raised doubts in the minds of some Russians about the degree to which the process was fair. However, there is no doubt that these elections involved multi-party competition. The lower house, the State Duma, was elected on a combined party-list/single-member district system: half of the deputies were elected in single-member constituencies, and the other half were determined on the basis of the party-list vote with a 5 per cent minimum cut-off. Thirteen parties or blocs were listed on that portion of the ballot; voters also were given the option to vote against all of the parties. Voter turnout showed a continuing downward slide in electoral participation; official figures put the rate at about 55 per cent, but there were allegations that this figure was inflated to assure that the 50 per cent needed to allow passage of the constitutional referendum would be achieved. The outcome of the Russian election represented a rebuff to the reform forces, which were represented on the ballot by four separate parties/blocs. Unexpectedly, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, emerged with the strongest support of any single party on the party- list vote. The Communist Party of Russia and the closely associated Agrarian Party also did well (Tolz, 1994; Wyman et al., 1994).

The Ukrainian parliamentary elections also occurred in the context of a tense political and economic situation. The country was experiencing a continuing downward economic slide, and this was apparently the main concern of voters at the time of the elections. Controversies over relations with the Russian Federation and crime were also high on the political agenda (Wasylyk, 1994b). A poll conducted in October 1993 indicated that only 25 per cent of the respondents felt optimistic that the election of a new parliament would improve the situation in the country (Wasylyk, 1994a). However, the controversy about the legal status of the elections themselves that characterized the Russian case was not evident in Ukraine. As in Russia, support for political parties was low, but in Ilkraine the electoral law did nothing to reinforce them. In this case the elections were based wholly on single-member district constituencies, and the party affiliations of the candidates were not listed on the ballot. An absolute majority vote was required to elect a candidate: in many of the 450 single-mandate electoral districts, run-off elections were held between the two top candidates on 10 April 1994; indeed, in 112 of the 450 districts, even the second round of votes did not produce a winner. In 20 districts in large cities turnout fell below 50 per cent in the second round; therefore, the elections there were invalid. Overall, however, turnout in the Ukrainian elections was considerably higher than in Russia: close to 75 per cent in the first


round and 67 per cent in the second (Are1 and Wilson, 1994). Candidates associated with leftist parties (the Communists, along with the Socialists and Agrarian Party) were the chief winners in the election.

Attitudes Towards the Elections

Political Interest

Interest in politics among the general population is an important correlate of participation and an indicator of the ‘health’ of democracy, though there is some debate as to the optimal level of that interest. In their classic study, Almond and Verba suggest that a mix of participatory and passive orientations on the part of citizens provides the best foundation for the development of democracy (Almond and Verba, 1963). More recently, John Lowenhardt has maintained, in his analysis of transitional societies, that “democracy requires that citizens care about politics but, as has often been stressed, not too much”. (Lowenhardt, 1995, p. 30). Empirical studies of political interest have been less hesitant about the benefits of an interested policy and have stressed the stabilizing influence of the politically interested, in terms of the greater consistency of their political attitudes over time (Jennings et al, 1990). Taking the other side of the coin, expressions of disinterest in politics give us an indication of feelings of the irrelevance of politics to peoples’ lives. However, disinterest can be motivated by many reasons, ranging from personal circumstances to systemic alienation. It is when disinterest appears to be motivated by a disdain for political institutions or doubts about the meaningfulness of basic processes such as elections that these attitudes take on more potential importance.

Interest in politics is commonly present at very modest levels in most Western countries, though it is seen by some observers as rising in recent years (Dalton, 1988). However, election interest normally outstrips general political interest, since “elections raise the political temperature” (Hart-up and Miller, 1987, p. 105). Our survey results show that, in a comparative context, Russians were not very interested in the 1993 elections. In our sample, 16 per cent said they were ‘very interested’ and another 31 per cent ‘somewhat interested’, leaving an absolute majority who claimed not to know, to be ‘not very interested’ or ‘not at all interested’. Ukrainians regarded their electoral opportunity somewhat more favourably than Russians did, with over 60 per cent of respondents saying they were at least ‘somewhat’ interested. As a point of comparison, the Political Support in Canada studies found 52 per cent of Canadians to have been ‘very interested’ in the 1993 Federal election, even though only 16 per cent followed politics ‘very closely’ in the interelection period.

Because levels of interest expressed by Russian respondents were particularly problematic, it is instructive to examine the responses to an open-ended follow-up question asking them to explain the reasons for their level of election interest, whether high or low. About half did so, with those answering the question reasonably equally divided between the interested and the disinterested. The responses give us a picture of the wide range of subjects that were in the public mind at the time of the campaign or in the aftermath of the results.

By far the largest group expressing disinterest explained their feelings by refer- ring to the nature of the elections themselves. A full 42.2 per cent of those who

JON H PAMMETT AND JUAN DEBARDELEBEN

TABLE 1. Reasons for election interest or disinterest, Russia*

369

Reasons Interested Disinterested

Institutions/Democra~/Du~ (44.8) Lost faith in improving situation by elections Undemocratic character of elections; the hastiness Desire to create a legislature; create democratic parliament; change composition of deputies Lack of information Worry about the fate of Russia Interest in anything new Patriotism; civic duty Desire for justice: law; rights Desire to express own opinion The October events

Alienation/Apathy (16.2) Lack of belief in anything/anyone Political apathy (declared); don’t care who is elected

Opinions about the government (14.9) Lack of faith in government, leadership of country and their policies Desire to change leadership Necessity of accepting constitution; like constitution Trust in Yeltsin, government, reform

Opinions about parties/candidates/leaders (18.5) Influence the make-up of parliament; elect honest, respectable people Specific party/leader/candidate references Distrust of candidates or programmes Promises of the candidates

The economqt (18.0) Desire to improve standard of living; change life for the better Economic crisis or instability; fall in standard of living Difficult personal situation

6. Order (4.0) Hope for stability in life Necessity of order, legality, to battle crime

5.1 (3.2)

3.8 (2.1)

9.0 (4.8)

1.7 (0.9) 4.3 (2.3) 3.4 (1.8) 3.0 (1.6) 2.5 (1.4) 0.9 (0.5) 0.4 (0.2)

2.1 (1.1) 3.4 (1.8)

3.4 (1.8)

6.9 (3.7) 4.2 (2.3)

5.1 (2.8)

15.8 (8.5)

7.2 (3.9) 1.7 (0.9) 1.7 (0.9)

22.7 (12.2)

3.5 (1.8)

0.4 (0.2)

5.2 (2.7) 0.9 (0.5)

42.2 (19.4)

7.5 (3.5)

1 .O (0.5)

3.5 (1.6) 0.5 (0.2)

0.5 (0.2) 0.5 (0.2) 1.0 (0.5) I.5 (0.7)

17.1 (7.9) 9.0 (4.2)

6.0 (2.8)

0.5 (0.2) -

0.5 (0.2)

1.0 (0.5)

0.5 (0.2) 7.5 (3.5) 0.5 (0.2)

5.0 (23)

1 .o (0.5)

2.0 (0.9)

1.5 (0.7)

*Multiple responses, percentages based on respondents. Table entries are percentages of interested or disinterested respondents, respectively, with percentages of total group of respondents in parentheses.

were not interested said they had lost faith in the possibility of improving the situation through the mechanism of elections. Even 5.1 per cent of those who were interested in the elections said this. A further 7.5 per cent of the disinterested criti- cized the undemocratic nature of the election process or the hastiness with which the elections had been called. The second category in Table 1 documents a group


of people whose discontent seems more absolute than those who expressed scepticism about the elections. Just over 17 per cent of the disinterested respondents said this feeling sprang from their lack of belief in anything or anyone related to politics. One might interpret this as an expression of general alienation. Added to the alienated is a group of Russians who specifically declared that they were apathetic or that it didn’t matter who got elected. Thus, three-quarters of Russian respondents who said they were not interested in the elections expressed basic doubts about the system of elections established by the new constitution.

The most prominent reasons for interest in the elections were related to the economy (category 5). Hopes for improving their standard of living or changing their lives for the better were highly correlated with the decisions of Russians to pay attention to the electoral process. In addition, a sizeable group of those interested (15.8 per cent, category 4) declared that they wanted to inlluence the make- up of parliament through electing responsible, respectable or honest members of the legislature. A group of people said they wanted to replace the old Supreme Soviet with a parliament chosen more democratically in a competitive election. Others (category 3) wanted a change of parliamentary leadership, liked the government and/or President Yeltsin or felt it was important to support the new constitution.

To summarize, people who were interested in the 1993 Russian parliamentary elections were expressing hopes for positive policy outputs, in the sense of favourable economic conditions, stability and order. Elections to them might have the instrumental purpose of helping to achieve these goals. A secondary desire on their part was to improve governmental institutions through directly electing the new Duma and removing the deputies from the Soviet period. The disinterested, on the other hand, were disillusioned about the possibility for favourable policy outputs and did not believe that the institutions and elections provided for under the new constitution would improve the situation.

Given this situation, it is no surprise that those expressing interest in the elections preferred politicians belonging to the ‘reform bloc” or the ‘centrists’z. Those feeling closer to the major opposition blocs, the Communists and the Liberal Democrats, declared themselves to be less interested. Therefore, the electoral process was identified with the architects of the new constitution that established it. The consequences of this association may be that, unless these opposition groups are allowed to exercise meaningful power or stand a reasonable chance of taking over the government at some stage, their supporters may turn away from electoral politics altogether.

The Meanings of Elections

We have discussed earlier some of the functions elections fulfilled in the Commu- nist systems as well as in competitive electoral systems. If elections are seen as assuring the accountability of public officials and as giving an opportunity for policy directions to be communicated to government, we may expect that the public will be reasonably satisfied with their operation. In addition, elections may provide the vehicle for the advancement of social groups, defined in class or ethnic terms, and provide a method for personal gain for individuals (Pammett, 1988). All of these functions allow some kind of personal psychological Involvement for individuals when elections are held.

JON H PAMMET~ AND JOAN DEBAWIELEBEN 371

To investigate the potential meanings of elections to survey respondents, a set of questions was devised to measure accountability and policy connections, as well as personal and group advancement.~ These are listed in Table 2. Most of these questions had previously been asked in the British campaign study of 1987 (Miller et al., 1990). In order to investigate additional aspects of the Russian and Ukrainian elections, we added the statements that elections were a way to “choose among leaders’ personalities” and to “deceive the people”. The question about leaders was motivated by a consideration that the party systems of these two countries were in

TABLE 2. Perceptions (%) of the meaning of elections, Russia, Ukraine, Britain

Meaning A lot Something Not much Did not know

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Choose among particular policies Russia Ukraine Britain*

Hold governments accountable for their past actions

Russia IJkraine Britain

Advance the interests of a social class Russia IJkraine Britain

Advance the interests of an ethnic, national or religious group

Russia Ukraine

Gain particular things for myself and my family

Russia Ukraine Britain

Comment on the state of the country Russia Ukraine Britain

Keep politicians honest Russia IJkraine Britain

Choose among leaders’ personalities Russia Ukraine

Deceive people Russia Ukraine

27 21 43 53 26 11 60 26 14

23 20 48 45 27 19 48 28 23

16 20 54 30 30 30 28 30 40

8 15 66 20 27 42

18 14 57 28 23 40 34 35 31

29 19 42 45 27 19 60 27 12

22 15 53 36 23 32 28 25 45

31 55

21 22

37 13

31 18 42 23 24 45

9 10 0

9 9 1

10 10

2

11 11

10 9 0

10 9 1

11 9 2

10 9

8 9

*British 1987 campaign study, post-election wave (N=l545).


the process of formation; therefore, individual leaders might be particularly important. The final question in the sequence was of a different sort and was designed to measure public distrust in elections, either as a holdover from opinions about the electoral process during the Communist regime or generated in the contemporary period.

Table 2 presents a basic comparison of the perceptions of the meaning of elections in Britain, Russia and Ukraine. Because of the unrepresentative nature of the samples in the latter two countries, we must be cautious in generalizing these findings to the population at large. Nevertheless, the distinction between the Russian results and the two other countries is wide enough to make these initial descriptive findings highly suggestive. The accountubiZity function of elections (statements 2 and 7) seems well recognized in Britain and Ukraine, but less associated with elections in Russia. While almost half of those in the first two countries said that “holding governments accountable for their past actions” had a lot to do with what elections meant to them, fewer than a quarter of our Russian sample did so. This could be because no tradition of changing governments through the election process had yet been established in Russia. The Ukrainian result may be related to the clearer consequences of the 1991 referendum vote in Ukraine as compared to the ambiguous effects of referendums in Russia.’ The differences may also stem from lower levels of general distrust of the political process in Ukraine.

It can also be seen from Table 2 that the policy function of elections (statements 1 and 6) appears well accepted in Britain and Ukraine, but not in Russia. Roughly twice as many people in the samples in the first two countries believed that “choosing among particular policies” had a lot to do with what elections meant to them. A similar finding concerns the role of elections in allowing people to “comment on the state of the country”. Sixty per cent of Britons and 45 per cent of Ukrainians thought this was important to their conceptions of elections, whereas only 29 per cent of Russians did so. This overall conception of elections as providing an occasion for people to render an assessment of the state of affairs in the country and the country’s future direction can be important in building support for the institutions of the regime.

Three items in Table 2 (statements 3, 4 and 5) are designed to measure the extent to which people feel that gaining benefits is an important function of elections for them. The figures indicate that, in general, this aspect of elections is less important than the accountability or policy functions, but they still suggest a considerable role for such material or group-based considerations in the way elections are perceived. Our initial hypothesis was that “gaining particular things for myself and my family” might be more important in the newly established electoral regimes in Russia and Ukraine, whereas Table 2 shows that it was in fact more popular in Britain, at an intermediary level of importance in Ukraine and lowest in Russia. These results in Russia may be explained by the disconnection between citizens and politicians there and the difficulties that deputies elected to the national legislature have in ‘delivering’ much of anything to their constituents in the contemporary context. Citizens may contrast this with the Soviet period when, as discussed above, they saw the electoral campaign as a context in which to derive various types of benefits from the state. One might surmise that local elections might elicit more resonance on this point, since local figures and local personnel networks are now more important in their capacity to deliver concrete benefits than are national ones.

JON H PAMMETI ANI) JOAN DEBARDELEBEN 373

When it comes to potential benefits accruing to ethnic, national or religious groups, or to a social class, Russians appear just as dubious as they are about personal gains. In Britain and Ukraine, around 60 per cent of respondents felt that elections had at least ‘something’ to do with “advancing the interests of a social class”, whereas just over one-third of Russians thought this. The suggestion that elections might have a communal basis was rejected even more resoundingly in Russia, with 66 per cent saying that this had nothing much to do with what elections meant to them. In Ukraine, where disputes over language and group relations between Russians and Ukrainians are prominent, and where future relations of Ukraine with Russia featured in the election campaign, almost half of the respondents felt that “advancing the interests of an ethnic, national or religious group” WZIS at least ‘somewhat’ important. We suspect that this figure is actuall! an underestimate of the importance of communal factors in Clkrainian society, but it may have been that they did not feature largely in the battles between indepen- dent candidates that dominated the voting in the 1994 election. Ilnfortunately, this question was not asked in the British study.

The statement that elections are a way to “choose among leaders’ personalities” was deemed most important to the way our Russian respondents conceptualized the elections. In Ukraine, it was most important as well, with 55 per cent agreeing with this idea. Elections in these two regimes appear to bc considerably personal- ized, with the individual characteristics of politicians as prominent as the polic) concerns that might lie behind these leaders. There is certainly a danger that to the extent that elections are ‘popularity contests‘ they will not be seen as fulfilling other important functions such as accountability or policy direction. This could reduce lasting and stable public support for elections as institutions. However, it Imay also be that citizens in Russia and Ukraine ident@ policy positions as part and parcel of the leader’s appeal. The mixture of issue and personality as reasons for the importance of leaders in electoral decisions has been noted in other studies (Clarke el rd., 199@.

Indicative of the fact that electoral institutions still lack a sustained basis of public support are the answers to the question of whether elections are a way to “deceive people”. Almost half of the respondents in both Russia and Ukraine agreed that this was the case. These cynical responses have many roots. as we have discussed earlier. Some of the reasons for public distrust of the electoral process relate to the legacy of the non-competitive elections of the Communist period. However, it is likely that circumstances surrounding the new electoral processes have re-evoked earlier distrust, after a period of considerable enthusiasm for competitive elections. The decline in voter turnout and indications of growing distrust in a range of other political institutions would suggest this interpretation.

The state of satisfaction with democracy in both Russia and Ukraine was low at the time of the 1993 and 1994 elections. In Ukraine, the proportion of people who were ‘very dissatisfied’ with the state of democracy in the country (28 per cent) was almost equal to those who declared any degree of satisfaction (30 per cent). In Russia, the degree of discontent was even higher, with only 19 per cent in our survey displaying any degree of satisfaction with the state of democracy and 35 per cent ‘very dissatisfied’. A further fifth of the Russian sample did not know how the! felt about the situation. In contrast, when the same question about satisfaction with democracy was asked in 1990 in Canada. three-quarters of respondents indicated they were at least ‘fairly satisfied’.


Many Russians were not hopeful that the operation of the elections would improve the situation very much. Only 20 per cent felt that the elections would help move the country toward democracy, and a full 50 per cent of the Russian sample said they did not know whether this was the case. In contrast, almost half of Ukrainians (46 per cent) thought the elections in that country would be helpful in this regard. One reason for Russian scepticism is that there were widespread doubts about whether the referendum and the elections were honestly conducted. Our survey asked a question about this, elaborating what was meant by “honestly” by adding “that is, that the voting was secret and the counting and reporting of the results were honestly conducted”. A relatively small number of Russians (23 per cent) were convinced of the honesty of the process. We have already noted the widespread allegations of dishonesty in the reporting of the turnout in voting for the referendum on the Russian constitution; these allegations were already current at the time of this survey. And, of course, the Russian turnout according to the official report was barely above the 50 per cent mark.

Faith that the elections were performing a number of functions was correlated in Russia and Ukraine with a more positive attitude toward the way democracy was functioning. In particular, those who felt that “choosing among particular policies” was important to the way they perceived elections were more likely to have been interested in the elections, to have voted in the elections and to have felt that the elections would help move the country toward democracy, and they were also more satisfied with the state of democracy itself. These findings are true for both Russia and Ukraine. Similar correlations are present for those believing that elections perform an accountability function, keep politicians honest, allow people to gain things for themselves and their families and even that they allow a choice between leaders’ personalities. The correlations are weaker in general with the belief that elections allow the advancement of social class or ethnic group interests. Finally, as we might expect, there are a series of negative correlations between the belief that elections are a way to deceive people and our variables of democratic satisfaction.

To provide a more synthetic analysis, our questions on the meaning of elections were factor-analysed to determine whether they had an underlying structure. Table 3 shows that, in each country, two factors were produced. In Britain, factor 1 contains high loadings for the items identifying elections as a way to choose between policies, hold governments accountable and comment on the state of the country. This then combines the policy and accountability functions of elections. The second British factor combines the items on gaining particular things for self and family with advancing the interests of a social class. It can be considered a self and group benefits factor, encapsulating this second distinct function of elections. The “keeping politicians honest” item is not connected at a high level with either of the British factors.

The factor analysis of the nine items in Ukraine bears similarities to the British result, but has some distinctive features. The first factor has substantial loadings for the same three items we have noted in the British case, those measuring accountability, policy and ability to comment on the state of the country. Added to them are several other items which also load on this factor, namely keeping politicians honest, seeing elections as a way of choosing among leaders’ personalities and also self-interest in the form of gaining things for self and family. This factor also has a significant negative loading for the item on elections being a way to deceive people. Therefore, the first Ukrainian factor contains accountability

JON H PAMMETT AND JOAN DEBARDELEBEN

TABLE 3. Factor analyses of ‘meaning of elections’ (varimax rotation)

375

Meaning

Russia Ukraine Britain

1 2 1 2 1 2

1. Policies 0.50 0.46 0.54 0.19 2. Accountability 0.77 0.17 0.68 0.12 3. Social class gain 0.52 0.56 0.05 0.86 4. Ethnic group gain 0.29 0.60 0.11 0.83 5. Personal gain 0.75 0.07 0.56 0.23 6. Comment on country 0.57 0.50 0.73 0.13 7. Politicians honest 0.76 0.13 0.74 -0.08 8. Leader personality 0.39 0.57 0.61 -0.08 9. Deception -0.29 0.71 -0.54 0.35 Eigenvalue 3.80 1.10 2.89 1.62 Percentage of variance 42 12 32 18 KMO 0.84 0.75

0.77 -0.10 0.67 0.16 0.02 0.76

- - 0.17 0.71 0.58 0.30 0.38 0.34

- - -

1.99 33

0.7

- 1 .oo

17 ‘5

*Factors. Russia: (1) accountability, checks, self-interest; (2) deception, group advancement, leaders. Ukraine: (1) accountability; checks, self-interest; (2) group advancement. Britain: (1) policy, accountability; (2) self and group interest.

and self-interest dimensions. Factor 2 from the Ukrainian analysis is one measuring group advancement, incorporating only the items on social class and ethnic/national group advancement.

The Russian factor analysis produces yet another arrangement of the items measuring the potential meanings of elections. Once again, the accountability item loads quite high, as does the function of keeping politicians honest. To this dimension of accountability and checks on politicians is added personal self-interest, as we also saw in the Ukrainian case. Two other items, measuring policy choice and ability to comment on the state of the country, also load on this factor at or slightly above the 0.5 mark. Therefore, in general, the first Russian factor looks like an accountability, self-interest dimension, similar in many ways to factor 1 in Ukraine. Factor 2 in Russia contains the class and ethnic group gain items we saw in the Ukrainian second factor. Also prominent are positive loadings of the items identifying the purposes of elections as choice between leaders’ personalities and a way of deceiving people. Therefore, in Russia, deception, leaders and group advancement are all combined in the way some people see the election process, as distin- guished from those who have more of an accountability focus. These components of factor 2 may be linked to one another by their emotive nature, in contrast to the more instrumental character of factor 1.

A Multivariate Analysis

The factor analyses have shown us that there is a considerable amount of cohesive- ness to public opinion about the meanings of elections in all the countries for which we have data, even if the factors have somewhat different components in the three countries. But what is their role in producing enhanced levels of political interest?5 We will proceed to examine this question in a multivariate analysis. Since the dependent variable is ordinal in nature, we will report the results of an OLS regression analysis (Table 4). For confirmation, a probit analysis was also


TABLE 4. Regression analysis (p) of predictors of political/election interest, Russia and Ukraine*

Russia Ukraine

Age Education Sex Income Material satisfaction in 3-4 years Government role in satisfaction Leader thermometer (Yeltsin; Kravchuk) Support government economic programme Meaning of elections

Factor 1 (score) Factor 2 (score)

Multiple R Adjusted RZ

0.19** 0.05 0.07

-0.02 0.17** 0.13** 0.16” 0.12**

0.24** 0.27** -0.06 -0.03

0.49 0.40 0.22 0.15

0.17** -0.20**

0.16** -0.03

0.03 0.03 0.07**

-0.01

*Pairwise deletion of missing data. Residuals: Russia, 422; Ukraine, 1166. **Significant at 0.01 level.

undertaken, which identified the same predictors as significant. As predictors we will use three kinds of variables.

1. A Group of Sociodemographic Vuriables (Age, Education, Sex, Income) Together with Meusures of Material Satisfaction. We hypothesize that the ‘better off’ sectors of society, and/or the more highly educated, were more interested in the election process as it operated in the two countries. We will measure the degree of material satisfaction with two variables, one asking about people’s expected standard of living 3 or 4 years in the future, and the second tapping people’s opinions of how important the role of government will be in producing that situation. Age may also be important, in that older voters prove in many countries to be more interested in politics.

2. Political Variables, to Measure the Suppoti.for the Present Government and its Policies. In Russia, we have included the thermometer score rating of President Yeltsin and the degree of support expressed for the economic programme of the government as these two factors, hypothesizing that people who were more positive about either of those would be more likely to be interested. In Ukraine, our two variables are support for President Kravchuk (still in office at the time of the survey) and support for the government’s economic programme. These items are measured in an identical manner in the two countries.

3. Factor Scores for Each County Produced by the Factor Analysis Reported i?z Table 3. In both cases, we hypothesize that scores on factor 1 (accountability, self-interest) would be positively related to interest. With regard to factor 2, the situation is more problematic, since, at least in the Russian case, the factor was not clear-cut and included a high positive loading for the item on elections being a way to deceive the people.

Table 4 shows that, in both Russia and Ukraine, variables in all three categories contribute to the explained variance in the level of political and election interest.

JON H PAMMETT ANI) JOAN DEBARDELEBEN 5”

In Ukraine, but not in Russia, the sociodemographic variables of education and sex are significant, with more highly educated and male respondents expressing more political interest. There is also a significant relationship in both countries with age, in which older respondents display higher levels of political interest. Expectations of improvement in the standard of living in future years, and the importance of the government to this, are significant in Russia. To the extent Russian respondents felt they would be improving economically in the future, they were prepared to pay attention to the elections. However, this relationship is not present in Ukraine, indicating that interest is not tied to expectations of personal well-being but is more general in the society. The ‘political’ variables contribute somewhat to the analysis as well, particularly in Russia, where support for Yeltsin, and the government’s economic programme, was associated with election interest.

The most important predictor of political and election interest in both countries is the first factor, representing accountability and self-interest, from the questions measuring the meaning of elections. Thus, over and above people’s personal characteristics or circumstances, and in addition to their political attitudes about the government, a feeling that elections themselves provided a way of holding the government accountable to the people, a way of keeping politicians honest and a way of advancing personal self-interest contributed substantially to the structure of opinion on the elections of 1993 and 1994.

This analysis has been stated in the statistically ‘positive’ direction; that is, we have identified a number of attitudes and factors that have been associated with higher levels of political and election interest in Russia and IJkraine. We should not lose sight of the fact, however, that the reverse relationship holds and, in the Russian case, holds for more people: the overall level of interest was quite low and people were generally dissatisfied with the state of democracy. In Russia, substantially more people did not believe that the elections would move the country toward democracy than felt this would happen. At least in that country, the negative evaluation of electoral institutions is partially produced by the items we have identified in Table 4: dissatisfaction with the standard of living, a low opinion of Yeltsin and the government’s economic programme and a lack of belief that elections perform the functions of rendering government accountable, keeping politicians honest, and gaining things for people and their families. Rather than seeing elections as a way to correct these inadequacies, these people are inclined to express scepticism toward the utility of the electoral mechanism as a whole and turn away from the political process.

Conclusion

The present study suggests that elections, as carried out in 1993 and 1994, enjoyed only limited support as basic democratic institutions in Russia and likraine. Measures such as voter turnout, as well as levels and stated reasons for interest/disinterest in the recent parliamentary elections, support this conclusion. However, one should not interpret these findings to indicate either an absence of commitment to basic democratic values in these countries or to reflect simple dissatisfaction with the honesty or fairness of these specific electoral contests. Further investigation suggests that the source of the ambivalence also lies in the meaning or significance that Ukrainians and Russians attribute to elections themselves.

378 Be Meaning of Elections in Transitional Democracies

In 1993, a large proportion of the respondents in Russia did not view elections as having meanings typically emphasized in Western liberal democracies, namely as mechanisms to assure accountability, to influence policy or to acquire concrete benefits. Nor were elections widely understood as means to realize class or communal interests. More commonly, in 1993, elections were viewed as a way to choose between leaders’ personalities or as a mechanism utilized by those same leaders to deceive the people. This more cynical view of elections was more often held by people dissatisfied with the government and its outputs (especially in the economic sphere). These findings suggest that diffuse support for electoral institutions is only weakly developed. While levels of dissatisfaction with the electoral process are not as evident in Ukraine as in Russia, public attitudes there still do not exhibit a strong endorsement of existing electoral institutions.

It has been suggested that one of the cardinal features of a democratic system is the uncertainty of outcomes: “democracy is a system of ruled open-endedness, or organized uncertainty” (Przeworski, 1991, p. 11). In this view, stable support for electoral institutions cannot rest on satisfaction with any particular election outcome or on the results of the government’s economic policy. However, our research suggests that, for many Russians and Ukrainians, evaluation of the electoral institutions is closely linked to satisfaction with political/economic outcomes and outputs. If this is so, then one can expect that alienation from the electoral process will continue to grow for a significant proportion of the electorate if the character and policies of the elected government are not deemed more satisfactory.

Postscript

In December 1995, new elections were held for the Russian parliament. While data from our post-election survey is not yet ready for analysis, we will venture a brief comment on the results in the light of the thesis advanced in this article. The overall turnout rate was 65 per cent, a substantial increase from 1993. Since electoral participation is normally positively correlated with interest in the election, we can hypothesize that interest in the 1995 election was at least as high, probably higher, than in the 1993 vote. Findings from this paper suggest that in 1993 voters interested in the election were more likely than other voters to view the electoral mechanism as a means of holding politicians accountable, affecting policy directions and gaining benefits for themselves. The pattern of results from the 1995 election shows that voters who were dissatisfied with the current government and its policies turn out out to vote in high numbers. The opposition Communist Party, in particular, made substantial gains. We might hypothesize, therefore, that in 1995 dissatisfied voters put aside their doubts and were willing to turn to the electoral mechanism as a means to achieve results.

The situation shortly after the 1995 election evidenced some adjustments in the government’s policy direction. Examples are removal of some of the more liberal ministers in the government and the government’s increased attention to the issue of wage arrears. Almost all of the major parties, including those continuing to form and support the government, have tempered their advocacy of free-market policy positions and have also become more nationalistic. While the ‘victorious’ Communist Party was not asked to form a new government (and perhaps did not welcome such an approach), shifts in the cabinet did reflect the more conservative tenor of the election outcome. On the other hand, Victor Chernomyrdrin, whose

JON H PAMMETT AND JUAN DEBARDELEBEN 379

Our Home is Russia party obtained less than half the votes of the Communists, remained Prime Minister. Furthermore, despite the attention to wage arrears, there is little reason to expect that a sustained and significant improvement in personal benefits will accrue to individual Russians as a result of their votes in the December election. Given the constitutional structure, which grants the President of Russia the bulk of power, the change in the composition of the Duma resulting from the 1995 election is likely to produce only minimal effects on policy. However, the 1995 vote suggests that Russian voters have not abandoned elections as a means of policy influence. The legitimacy of electoral institutions will be given yet another, and perhaps more signiticant, test if and when the presidential election, scheduled for June 1996, goes forward. If this election also produces an opposition victory or a significant correction in the government’s course, electoral institutions could achieve new legitimacy with citizens by persuading them that they are a way to fulfil the function of ensuring accountability to citizens.

Appendix:The Surveys

Russia

The survey was administered in three regions of Russia, involving approximately 300 respondents in each region. As is well known to researchers in the field, development of an all- Russian survey sample poses numerous methodological problems. Due to funding limitations we decided to study attitudes in three regions, chosen to reflect a variety of different types of political environments, rather than to attempt to generate a national sample. The regions included were the city of Moscow, Stavropol krai (an agricultural region in southern Russia) and Komi republic (a northern region with both extractive and industrial sectors, but also representing an ethnically defined federal unit). As we are primarily concerned with explain- ing interrelationships between the variables characterizing our respondents rather than with getting a representative picture of distribution of the population, we feel that the purposive nature of our sampling methods is not a significant problem.

Within our three regions, we used a combination of cluster and random sampling. Three sub-units were selected within each region to assure representation of urban and rural population groups and, in Komi, to assure an ethnic mix in the sample. Within the three sub-units, respondents were picked randomly from voter lists. Our research was conducted in the 2 to 3 weeks following the announcement of the results. The study involved use of an in-home, self-administered survey. The interviewer was present while the respondent filled out the questionnaire and was available to answer questions. Questionnaire construc- tion and fieldwork were carried out in conjunction with the Moscow-based Institute of Complex Social Studies under the direction of V. Boikov and A. Kazakov.

Ukraine

The survey of 1590 respondents was undertaken in April 1994, immediately after the second round of parliamentary elections but before the presidential election. It was organized by Dominique Arel, then of McGill University, Jerry Hough of Duke Iiniversity, and the present authors. The surveys were administered in the cities of Odessa and Lviv and the rural oblasts of Lviv and Vinnytsia. Thus, the survey represents only the south, west and centre-west of the country. It should not be considered a representative survey of Ukraine in its entirety.

The survey was carried out by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) together with the Department of Sociology at the University Mohyla Academy, Kiev, under the direction of Valet% Khmelko and Vladimir Paniotto. Samples of 500 were taken in each of the two cities and 300 in each of the two rural areas. The sampling was done from postal lists, considered more accurate than voting lists. Neighbourhood postal stations were selected randomly, ‘postal routes’ were selected randomly from these and respondents were selected randomly from the routes.

380 Tlx Meaning of Elections in Trunsitional Democracies

Notes

1. In the text, we use the term ‘reform bloc’ to refer to the following parties: Russia’s Choice; YaBloko; Russian Movement for Democratic Reform; Party of Russian IJnity and Concord.

2. The parties termed ‘centrist’ in the text are the following: Future of Russia New Names; Civic Union; Democratic Party of Russia.

3. The wording of the original question used in the British survey contained the following preamble: “Here are some things that elections mean to different people. As I read each one, please tell me whether it has a lot, something, or not much to do with what elections mean TO YOU”. In the Russian case, a translation of the question as close to the original as possible was utilized, adjusting the wording for the self-administered nature of the questionnaire. In the Ukrainian version, the response categories were altered to read ‘agree’ ‘agree partially’ or ‘disagree’. In order to make the question read properly with those response categories, a few small alterations were made in the wording of the preamble.

4. The referendum on Ukrainian independence, held on 1 December 1991, produced a 90 per cent vote in favour of independence (Potichnyi, 1991). This was an important factor in bringing about the final collapse of the Soviet Union later that month. In contrast, referendums held in Russia have had very unclear effects. The March 1991 referendum on maintenance of the USSR was passed, but the Soviet Union collapsed shortly thereafter. (That referendum also passed in Ukraine, but was superseded by the later vote.) The April 1993 referendum on Yeltsin and his economic reform received public approval, but it produced no visible increase in the government’s capacity to govern or carry through its programme.

5. The Ukrainian survey measured both general political interest and interest in the elections, and so the dependent variable was created by additively combining the two measures. In Russia, general political interest was not measured in the survey; consequently, only the election interest variable is used in this analysis.

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The meaning of elections in transitional democracies: Evidence from Russia and Ukraine

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