The Marshall Plan: Rebutting the Revisionists

The Marshall PlanRebutting the Revisionists

Emily Leonard

The cult of Americanism, the belief that the United States is

unique among nations and has a God-given responsibility to make

this a better world, existed long before Teddy Roosevelt gave it

voice in 1894. De Tocqueville, Fanny Burney, Fanny Trollope,

Charles Dickens and other foreign visitors invariably commented

on the 'absurd' conviction prevalent among US citizens that this

was 'God's country,' and that, whatever it lacked in

sophistication and refinement, it was infinitely superior to any

European nation. This notion of moral and material superiority

has been a persistent factor in America's foreign policy for

almost 150 years. Too often, it has been the motivation for

misadventures, from the Mexican war in 1846 to the invasion of

Iraq in 2003. Nor is it a reliable predictor of the nation's

reaction to world events. As circumstances change, the impetus to

apply it to foreign affairs ebbs and flows. The press was loud in

its support of the 'crusade' known as the Spanish American War Emily LeonardCopyright©December 8, 2013

--- and equally vociferous in its denial of any US obligation to

support European democracies against Hitler in the Thirties. Most

historians consider it a national failing, an arrogant assumption

that America is "the manifestation of Truth, Justice and Freedom

placed on earth by a God whose purpose was to make of it an

instrument for extending His spiritual and material blessings to

the rest of humanity.”1 Revisionists like William Appleman

Williams, Gar Alperovitz and Walter LeFevre see at as a

propaganda device to enlist citizen support for nefarious

capitalist schemes to manipulate markets -- and nations -- for

higher and higher profits.

I disagree. I contend that this belief is not a construct of

political elites or the media, to be employed to mobilize

Americans to accomplish whatever they have in mind, but a deeply

felt conviction that this country, the only nation in the world

with "freedom of speech, press, assembly and worship guaranteed

by the Bill of Rights, the rule of law and system of checks and

1 Dianne Kirby. “Divinely Sanctioned: The Anglo-American Cold War Alliance and the Defense of Western Civilization and Christianity, 1945-48” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol 35, No. e (July, 2003) p.392 http://www.jstor.org/stable/261027 . Accessed: 10/03/2013

Emily LeonardCopyright©December 8, 2013

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balances authorized in the Constitution ...," is, indeed, the

Pilgrim's City on the Hill.2 This conviction, I admit, has been used to

manipulate the American people into supporting foreign adventures

they later came to regret, particularly those in Latin and South

America. But there was one short period in the 20th century when

the realization that "being American and having been lucky enough

to have avoided the worst of the (Second World) war, required

sharing our good fortune" inspired even third graders to do what

they could to alleviate the misery of the war-torn world.3 From

1945 through 1949, America and its people took up a unique

mission, to bind up the wounds of war for our enemies as well as

our allies, to stabilize the global society and create a lasting

peace. I will show that in this instance, the cult of Americanism

did, indeed, save the world.

I contend that the American people and their leaders, touched by

the plight of war-ravaged Europe and aware that chaos threatened

to engulf both victor and vanquished, did all in their power to

relieve suffering and restore the continent to economic

2 Lipsitz, George. Bonds of Affection: Americans Define Their Patriotism. John Bodner, ed. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996) p.2563 In this instance, collect and sell waste paper to pay for CARE packages for Europe and Asia. Nicolaus Mills. Winning the Peace: The Marshall Plan and America's Coming of Age as a Superpower.(Hoboken; John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2008) p. viii


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stability. That these efforts circumvented Russia's plans for

German reparations and hope for the eventual Sovietization of

Europe was, I maintain, a corollary of what Arnold Toynbee called

"the solicitude of the world’s most privileged people for its

less privileged" rather than a deliberate effort to isolate the

USSR and dominate the European economy.4 I will also show that,

concomitantly, these efforts fostered the 'cult of Americanism'

as evidenced in the way in which they were reported in the media.

Here I have a distinct advantage over the revisionists and

earlier commentators on the origin of the Cold War -- Twenty-

twenty hindsight. Scholars now have access to previously

classified American and British documents and the archives of the

former Soviet Union. Having graduated from high school just weeks

after VE day, I am also uniquely conscious of how that history

unfolded in the media and of the diversity of public response to

events as they occurred. 5

4 Miller, Merle. Plain Speaking: an oral biography of Harry S. Truman. (New York. Berkeley Publishing Company, 1973)

5 As one who had only contempt for Senator McCarthy and similar witch hunters I have been astonished, in the course of researching this paper, to learn that many of those they branded as Communists or 'fellow travelers' were, indeed, working for the USSR and that many of the accusations of Russian duplicity and global ambition I had considered propaganda or gross exaggerations were correct.


4

It is my belief, supported by Soviet documents, that it was

Russia, rather than America, as the revisionists claim, who hoped

to impose its ideology -- and control -- over all of Europe and

used every means at its disposal, including espionage,

assassination and military might to achieve its ends. America, on

the other hand, relied on economic assistance and negotiation to

achieve its goal -- lasting peace in a stable, democratic Europe.

Rather than an insidious plot to promote capitalism, as Gar

Alperovitz and his colleagues contend, the fact that the US, of

all the nations in the world, was the only one willing and able to

rescue Europe and attempt to relieve the suffering in Asia and

the Middle East, in and of itself authenticated America's post-

war programs. The same cannot be said of Russia's initiatives.

Twenty-twenty hindsight confirms that Cold War did not develop

from 'the inimical struggle of two competing ideologies.' It was

not the ideology, the political and economic theory devised by

two refugees in Victorian London that Americans found so

repugnant. "Communist' was what a vicious, totalitarian

government called itself and its agents, and used to justify an

agenda that probably had Marx and Engels rocking their

headstones. Moscow promoted its economic theory to justify its Emily LeonardCopyright©December 8, 2013

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expansionism. Communism, as Stalin and his successors defined it,

vests all power in the state, allowing the Soviets to control the

press, outlaw other political parties and arrest dissidents with

impunity in any of their client states. The list of Stalin's

crimes is endless, from the horrors of collectivization, the

Purge trials of the Thirties, the slaughter of the officer class

of the Red Army just before the War, the infamous pact with

Hitler, to his ruthless control over Communist agents and

organizations all over the world, calling them home to Moscow and

the Lubyanka if they deviated one iota from the ever-changing

party line. The housewife in Wenham MA who wrote to TIME in 1949

spoke for most of the nation: "It seemed only fair to give Stalin

a break; to say that he really was a friendly fellow, that he

honestly wanted peace. World developments have proved me to be

wrong..."6

Russian scholars see Stalin's 'insatiable quest for security',

coupled with Communist doctrine of ultimate worldwide hegemony,

as the chief motivation for all Soviet policies during his

lifetime. Stalin shared Tsarist concerns with 'the Baltic and the

6 "Letters." TIME Magazine, Jan 17, 1949Emily LeonardCopyright©December 8, 2013

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Balkans', to keep Russia safe.7 The Non-Aggression Pact with

Germany in 1939 initially gave him what he wanted, eastern

Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bessarabia, Northern

Bukovina and the Hertza region. As early as 1942, he was

insisting that Russia had a right to that territory, plus the

rest of Poland, and a special interest in Czechoslovakia,

Hungary, and the rest of the Balkan States. George Kennan quotes

him saying in that year, "As long as there is capitalist

encirclement, there will be the danger of intervention with all

the consequences that flow from that danger."8

By 1944, when the Red Army recaptured Poland, it was evident that

Stalin would use any means to keep that from happening. Although

Moscow issued the call for the Poles to rise against the Germans

in August of that year, the Red Army stopped shelling the City

and stayed in its positions on the outskirts of Warsaw while the

Polish Underground, loyal to the Polish government in exile in

London, fought the Germans for 63 days. After the Nazis defeated

the Underground, and razed a good portion of the city as they

7 Putin's recent efforts to keep Ukraine and other formerly communist nations out of the EU is just another manifestation of Russia's traditional policy of maintaining buffer states as a defense against invasion.8 George Kennan. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." by X Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25,No. 4 (Jul., 1947), pp. 572 http://www.jstor.org/stable/20030065. Accessed: 11/17/2013


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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hertza_region

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bukovina

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bessarabia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithuania

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latvia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estonia

retreated, the Russians, insisting that the uprising had been

'premature,' arrested Underground members and tried them as

saboteurs. During the same period, the Red Army, having

'liberated' prisoner of war camps in Poland, refused to turn over

the Allied soldiers imprisoned there, using them as bargaining

chips in the efforts to keep total control of the Polish

government, despite repeated pledges to the other Allies that

they would include representatives of all parties in the new

regime. US newspaper reports of these developments were

skittishly neutral, although the Hartford Courant printed a

passionate outcry against the Russians from one of its readers.

TIME Magazine, as might be expected from a Luce publication, was

snidely critical of the Russians, without attacking them

directly. The New Republic, true to form, called for a pox on all

their houses, contending that Europe wanted neither Communism nor

capitalism but liberal socialist governments like the one

recently installed in France, approved by General De Gaulle and

the French Communist Party. It would appear that the American

public was still trying to think of Stalin as "Uncle Joe" and the

Red Army as 'brothers in arms,' but was uneasy about the Soviet's

attitude towards 'freedom,' so far afield from theirs.


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When the Nazis surrendered in 1945, Russia, ravaged by the

Wehrmacht, was determined to make the enemy pay for the damage

they had done and demanded heavy reparations from Germany. The

war's toll on the Soviet Union was probably the highest in

Europe.9 Germany, Moscow maintained, must be deprived of any

capacity for a future invasion of the USSR. They demanded $200

million in reparations, to be paid by dismantling German industry

and shipping the plants and equipment to Russia and by annual

cash payments from the Germans themselves.

The US plan for the occupation of the former Third Reich, JCS

1067, supported this agenda. In addition to taking complete

control of government, the courts, education and the economy, the

Commander in Chief of United States Forces of Occupation was

ordered to 'seize, safeguard,' remove for reparations or

dismantle all shipyards, aircraft and munitions factories,

facilities for the production of synthetic rubber, oil, aluminum

and magnesium and anything else the Four-Power Control Council

set up to supervise the Occupation might see as contributing to 9 Recent Russian scholarship puts the death total at 26.6 million of whom only 8.7 million were members of the armed forces. Over 70,000 cities, towns and villages had been reduced to rubble by air and artillery bombardment, which alsodestroyed over 31,000 factories, 80% of the industrial production of the Ukraine, the pre-war center of Soviet industry. Nine of the 15 Soviet republics had been occupied by the Germans, who laid waste to 40% of the grain crop and slaughtered 60% of the total livestock, leaving the natives to starve.


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Germany's war-making abilities. The once mighty industrial nation

was to be reduced to an agricultural economy with only light

industry to supply the export market with 'crockery and cuckoo

clocks' to pay only for necessary imports to keep the German

standard of living on a par with its neighbors. Hitler's Reich

was to become a goat pasture.

This scorched earth policy was designed in the Treasury

Department in 1943. Secretary Henry Morganthau, determined that

the Germans be punished for their war crimes, instructed his then

Assistant Secretary, Harry Dexter White, to draw up a plan to

provide for the demilitarization, de-nazification and de-

industrialization of Germany, with the intent of making it

impossible for that nation ever to make war again. White, whom

the Venona decrypts identify as a Russian intelligence asset, may

well have been working under Soviet instruction, but his plan

closely reflected Morganthau’s thinking. The Treasury Secretary

was able to secure Roosevelt's and Churchill's approval for his

radical program at the Second Quebec Conference in September,

1944, over the strenuous objections of both State's Cordell Hull

and the War Department's Henry L. Stimson. Recognizing that the

punitive demands in the Treaty of Versailles had made Germany Emily LeonardCopyright©December 8, 2013

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ready prey for Hitler, they also felt Morganthau’s plan would not

allow Occupation authorities enough leeway to make Germany self-

sufficient. They were not alone in their objections. As Lee

Dutter has noted, "Americans, as a people are not ones to bear

collective grudges against others for very long..."10

Dorothy Thompson headed her column on the Morganthau Plan

"Delenda est Carthago," and compared it to the destruction of

Carthage by the Romans.11 Arthur Krock called Hull and Stimson's

position "a return to common sense."12 But it was the German

reaction to the plan, when it leaked to the press shortly after

the Quebec Conference ended, that caused the most furor: faced

with what amounted to annihilation as nation, the forces of the

Reich, which had been hastily retreating, were now holding their

ground and, in some areas, counter-attacking in force. This

became a campaign issue. Governor Dewey claimed that Roosevelt

had prolonged the war, at the cost of American lives, by

10 Lee E. Dutter. "The Seventy-Five Years War, 1914-1989: Some Observations on the Psychology of American Foreign Policy Making during the 20th Century." Political Psychology, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Sept., 1991) p. 532 http://www.jstorr.org/stable3791760 Accessed 10/14/201311 Carthage, a powerful city-state in North Africa, was Rome's great rival for control of the Mediterranean. When it was defeated in the Third Punic War, the Romans sold the surviving inhabitants into slavery, burned the city to the ground and supposedly salted the fields to make sure nothing would grow there again.12 Arthur Krock "The Value of Publicity." The New York Times, Sept. 29, 1944, p.20


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presenting it as the US position in Quebec. "This was as good as

ten fresh German divisions on the battlefront."13 It would seem

that most of the country -- 65% of veterans on the GI Bill at

Northwestern University supported a regulated industrial economy

for Germany -- had no interest in taking revenge on their

enemies. The cult of Americanism might be bumptious, but it is

rarely mean-spirited.

Unfortunately, once Cordell Hull left the Cabinet, opposition to

the Treasury's position faded. At Potsdam, to insure the USSR's

assistance in the war against Japan, the Allies agreed to

Russia's goal of a Germany stripped of the ability to make war,

which the Morganthau plan, possibly at Russia's direction, helped

to achieve. The final US position on post war Germany, as

defined by the orders given General Eisenhower in JSC 1067, was

nearly as severe as that proposed in Quebec. The results were

disastrous. As early as September, 1945, a panel of US experts

found that the loss of the agricultural output in Russian-

dominated Silesia and East Prussia, and the added burden of the

more than 10 million ethnic Germans who were driven out of the

Russian controlled states in Eastern Europe -- factors never

13 Feinberg, Alexander. "Roosevelt Errors Prolong the War, Dewey Says Here: Talkof Morganthau." The New York Times, Nov. 5, 1944 p.1


12

included in the original Morganthau plan on which the reparations

schedule was based -- so reduced the food supply that it would be

impossible to feed the defeated nation without exports to pay for

imported food. The winter of '45-'46 was the worst Europe had

seen in 80 years. By April, Lucius Clay, Deputy Commander of the

US Occupation forces, was warning the Hoover Commission that, as

things stood, the German people's ration of 1250 calories per day

would have to be reduced to 975. Even with the higher ration, the

miners of the Ruhr were unable to fulfill their already reduced

quotas of coal and all Europe was suffering from the shortage.

Alf M. Landon, Roosevelt's opponent in the 1936 campaign, called

it "barbaric and immoral."14 An Illinois woman, writing to the

editor of The Chicago Tribune, called it "the Morganthau plan of

perpetual hatred." The "Letters" section of TIME reflected the

thinking of ordinary Americans. From Springfield, Illinois." We

would rather go a little shabby, be a little less daintily fed,

than divide the world into haves and have-nots." From Battle

Creek, MI: "We must be willing to accept our moral

responsibilities. We must feed the bodies of Europe's people or

we shall never be able to feed their minds." An Iowan wrote, "We

are our brother's keeper, we can afford to be our brother's 14 Anon. "Landon Assails Acheson Views." The Los Angeles Times, Sept. 21, 1945 p7


13

keeper, we must be our brother's keeper. . . . "15. "The

Administration has ways at its disposal to get [U.S. surplus]

wheat and send it overseas. If things really get tough, we will

accept rationing... Let the Administration send the food

overseas. What are we paying them for, anyway?"16 Such

outpourings of compassion further strengthened America's vision

of herself "as the manifestation of Truth, Justice and Freedom

placed on earth by a God whose purpose was to make of it an

instrument for extending His spiritual and material blessings to

the rest of humanity.”17

Within months of the German surrender, the ideological

differences separating Russia from her former Allies -- not

capitalism vs. communism, but totalitarianism vs. democracy --

could no longer be denied. As early as February, 1946, Stalin

publicly denounced the capitalist system for causing both World

Wars and claimed: “The war proved that the Soviet social system

is...more viable and stable than the non-Soviet social system,

that the Soviet social system is a better form of organization of

15 "Letters to The Editor." TIME Magazine, October 1, 194516 Ibid, May 13, 194617 Kirby, "Divinely Sanctioned." p. 392


14

society than any non-Soviet social system.”18 Just a month later,

Winston Churchill, noting that the Communists, since VE day, had

taken control of Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland, claimed

that an "Iron Curtain" divided Europe into two armed camps and

that only a British/American alliance could save the world from

Stalinism. Within the week, Truman locked horns with the Soviet,

demanding the USSR remove its forces from Iran, where they were

supporting the Azerbaijan People's Government, their puppet

regime. In Berlin, where each of the big Four governed a zone

under their own government's directives, the Communists were

roundly defeated in the City elections, prompting the Russians to

dissolve the city government in their sector and organize an

alternative Communist-dominated administration, with its secret

police, state-run press and preferential treatment for party

members. From early September, 1945, the Soviet's obstructionist

tactics turned the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers,

charged with writing the peace treaties, into week-long

procedural battles that effectively divided the participants into

Eastern and Western blocs.

18 J. Stalin, "Speech Delivered By J. V. Stalin At A Meeting Of Voters Of The Stalin Electoral District, Moscow, February 9, 1946." From the Pamphlet Collection, J. Stalin, Speeches Delivered at Meetings of Voters of the Stalin Electoral District, Moscow,Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1950, Pp. 19-44. http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/SS46.html accessed 10/28/2013


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The same tactics paralyzed the Allied Control Council, the four-

nation body charged with monitoring Occupation forces. Soviet

hostility failed to ruffle Gen. Lucius Clay, Commander of the US

Army Occupation force, who made a practice of taking the Russian

Commander out for a drink after each abortive meeting of the

Control Council, but it did upset the many journalists who

visited Europe that winter and reported their findings to their

readers in the US. As a result, by the middle of 1946 "...almost

six out of ten Americans felt Russia's actions in Eastern Europe

and elsewhere portended an ambition to rule the entire world..."19

If Stalin was willing to see Germany starve until satisfactory

reparations had been delivered, Mother Nature seemed delighted to

arrange it. The bitter winter of 1945 - 1946 had depleted crops

and fuel all over the Northern Hemisphere. Torrential spring

rains and heavy flooding delayed and limited planting: seed corn,

fertilizer and farm equipment were in very short supply. What

harvest there might have been was further reduced by that

summer's fierce drought, and rations were cut everywhere on the

Continent. Even the US faced a wheat shortage that year.

19 Joseph G Goulden. The Best Years: 1945 -1950 (New York, Atheneum, 1976) p. 249


16

Production in Germany's Ruhr valley, Europe's major source of

fuel, fell even further than the limited output of the previous

year because the hungry miners couldn't work as hard. The

economic recovery that had held such promise earlier in the year

shuddered to a halt as nation after nation had to divert its

limited resources from rehabilitation and regrowth to obtaining

food for its people.

The political consequences of the food and fuel shortages were

enormous. Alastair Buchan claims that the US did not realize how

badly off England was until, in February, 1947, His Majesty's

Government informed President Truman that Britain could no longer

support the legitimate governments in Greece and Turkey against

the Communists and asked the US to take on the burden. At this

point, Stalin's aims were geopolitical rather than autarchic,

focusing on Russia's centuries-old determination to secure access

to the Mediterranean. In addition to seeking control of Greece

through the ELAS insurrectionists, funded by Yugoslavia's Tito,

then a Soviet client, the USSR was demanding bases in Turkey for

control of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles and additional

territory near the north eastern border. Only the most dedicated


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leftists could see this an 'ideological conflict:' such an

obvious power grab made it unnecessary for Truman to mince words.

According to the official history of the Department of State,

assisting Greece and Turkey would be a sharp departure from

America's tradition of avoiding conflicts not directly involving

the United States. But there was good reason for doing so. The

Official History cites the continued presence of Soviet troops in

Iran, a violation of the Teheran Declaration of 1943, their

demands for special oil concessions, their support of the ethnic

Azerbaijani's efforts to secede, their efforts to secure a naval

base in Turkey and their rejection of the Baruch proposal for

international nuclear energy control as the impetus for

supporting the Greek government. Add to this the litany of Soviet

obstructionism recited earlier in this paper, the 1946 discovery

of the spy ring which provided Russia with data on the atomic

bomb, their ongoing attempts to undermine the freely elected

government in Hungary and Truman's response to Britain's request

was inevitable.

On March 12, the President appeared before the US Congress to ask

for a $400,000,000 package for aid to Greece and Turkey, which


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included military advisors for the former, to combat the EAM. He

justified his position thus:

At the present moment in world history nearly everynation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. One way of

life is based upon the will of the majority, and is

distinguished by free institutions, representative government, freeelections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom

of speech and religion, and freedom from political

oppression.The second way of life is based upon the will of a

minorityforcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon

terror andoppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed

elections, andthe suppression of personal freedoms. I believe that

it mustbe the policy of the United States to support free

peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed

minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist

free peoplesto work out their own destinies in their own way. I

believe that our help should be primarily through economic andfinancial aid which is essential to economic stability

and orderly political processes.20

20 Truman, Harry S. " Address Before A Join Session of Congrees, March 12, 1947"Avalon Project. Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp Accessed 11/23/2013


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The gauntlet had been thrown. The Greeks and Turks were ecstatic;

Churchill waxed poetic, to dismay of Labour's back benchers.

Pravda was furious, as was most of the Soviet-controlled press.

TIME Correspondent Emmet Hughes reflected the position of most of

the pundits who "... greeted the dramatic appearance of the U.S.

in the center of the world arena with some hysteria, much

hyperbole, great hope— and a perceptible shudder."21

Although Truman's remarks were a pitch perfect declaration of the

cult of Americanism, the public was surprisingly silent on the

issue: only two letters to the editor come up in an on-line

search of major newspapers. Since one applauded the President's

position, and the other denounced it, only TIME Magazine's April

7th report that the latest Gallop poll, taken that week, showed

that 60% of the public thought Truman was running his office

well, and the results of another poll showing that the public

feared his remarks might provoke a war, provide insight into what

Americans thought. TIME itself seemed reluctant to credit the

President with the Greek/Turkish initiative, insisting that

Secretary of State George C. Marshall devised the policy and

21 THE NATIONS: New World: Time Magazine, March 24, 1947.


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approved the final draft before leaving for the Council of

Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow.

It is important to note here that, to his contemporaries, Harry

Truman was not the great president history has shown him to be.

An obscure Senator from Missouri, a member of the notorious

Prendergast machine in Kansas City, an unprepossessing 5'8", with

a receding hairline, owlish rimless glasses and the flat twang of

his home state, Truman was at a marked disadvantage as the

successor to the handsome, charismatic, aristocratic Roosevelt,

who had led the nation out of the Depression and to victory in

Europe. He had never been part of Roosevelt's circle, inner or

outer. Only after taking the oath of office did he learn of the

Manhattan Project and the atom bomb. The Democrat's devastating

defeat in the 1946 elections is attributed the public's

dissatisfaction with his domestic policy, especially his waffling

on price controls, but there were also voters who disapproved of

his foreign policy, conservatives for being too conciliatory

toward the Russians, liberals, for being too hostile. In

denouncing the 'Truman Doctrine,' the latter seemed to have

forgotten that Truman had said essentially the same thing in

October of 1945.Emily LeonardCopyright©December 8, 2013

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"Let me restate the fundamentals of that foreign policy of

the United States. We seek no territorial expansion orselfish advantage... We have no objective which need clash with the peaceful aims of any other nation... Weshall approve no territorial changes in any friendly

part of the world unless they accord with the freely

expressedwishes of the people concerned. We believe that all

peoples ... should be permitted to choose their own form of

government by their own freely expressed choice, without

interference from any foreign source.... We shall refuse to

recognize any government imposed upon any nation by the force of anyforeign power...We believe that full economic

collaboration between all nations, great and small, is essential to

the improvement of living conditions all over the world,

and to the establishment of freedom from fear and freedom

from want. We shall continue to strive to promote freedom of

expressionand freedom of religion throughout the peace-loving

areas of the world.22

Clearly, he was contrasting US policy with that of the Soviet

Union, which in the 10 weeks that had elapsed since the close of

the Potsdam Conference had already reneged on a number of

22 Harry S. Truman. "Navy Day Address (October 27, 1945) Miller Center University of Virginia http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3342 Accessed 11/30/2012


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commitments made there. The revisionists, and others, imply that

the Cold War was declared by the Truman Doctrine. I contend that

the Russians had declared it long before D Day, when they set up

the Lubin government in Poland and began arresting members of the

Polish underground. America did not fight the Second World War to

replace one totalitarian regime with another.

The revisionists also argue that the Administration deliberately

demonized the Russians in order to secure public support for

their interventionist agenda, and quote Senator Arthur Vandenberg

as

saying "Mr. President, you gotta scare the hell out of them " in

support of this contention.23

Certainly, if the cult of Americanism called for this nation to

go out and save the world, it had to save it from someone or

something. Russia needed no demonizing to prompt the American

people to want to save Europe from its control. The Communists

held that economic rights, a state-given entitlement to food,

shelter and employment, superseded political rights -- freedom of

speech, press, religion and the rule of law --- and the state's

role in ensuring those economic rights required it to have

23 Or "the people," "the American people" or some other object to the preposition 'of.' The exact wording of the qoute varies from text to text.


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exclusive control of society.24 In practice, this belief meant one

party rule, government control of almost every aspect of private

life and imprisonment or death for any opposition to the state.

Such a society was anathema to Americans: only the Devil himself

would impose it on free people. Since, according to his

successor, Nikita Kruschev, no man on earth was ever more

diabolical that Joseph Stalin, the demon was already there.

Senator Vandenberg's advice may have been superfluous: the

Congress and a good portion of the public were genuinely fearful

that taking too strong a stand against the USSR might lead to

war. Despite these reservations, in May, 1947, Congress

appropriated $400 million for Greece and Turkey.

That, however, did nothing for the starving people of Europe.

TIME Magazine tells of Congressional group touring Germany which

"looked hard at the barefoot children, at the surly men

and wretched women living in Essen's rubble... Georgia's

ultra-reactionary Eugene ("Goober") Cox was so moved that when he got back to the train he gave his

sweater, necktie, other odds & ends of clothing and all the

chocolate

24 Dorian Lambelet. "The Contradiction Between Soviet and American Human Rights Doctrine: Reconciliation Between Perestroika and Pragmatism." Duke Law Scholarship Repository http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1744&context=faculty_scholarship Accessed 11/30/2013


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he could buy to a group of Essen's children who had gathered

at the train shouting: "Uncle, uncle, chocolate, chocolate." 25

This was the situation General Marshall hoped to remedy when,

returning from the Council of Foreign Ministers Meeting in April,

1947, frustrated by Stalin's willingness to debate the peace

treaty with Germany ad infinitum and convinced that Moscow saw

opportunities for further expansion in the economic turmoil

engulfing Europe, he began developing a plan to assuage the

suffering and ensure stability on the continent.

In The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, (1959), William Appleman Williams

insisted that Marshall and the rest of the Administration were

chiefly concerned with building and sustaining the export market

for America's capitalist corporations. While mouthing pious

platitudes about freedom and democracy, they were really trying

to colonize less powerful nations without conquering them by

controlling their economies. He also contends that fear of

another depression made finding outlets for overproduction a top

priority. Nowhere does he note that in the spring of 1947,

America's factories were running at capacity, that Congress was

25 "The Congress: Uncle, Uncle." TIME Magazine, Sept. 15, 1947 Emily LeonardCopyright©December 8, 2013

25

worried about inflation arising from the ever-increasing demand

for consumer goods as the baby boom grew and grew or that,

traditionally, the export market contributed only a small

percentage to the GNP and that America's chief exports to Europe,

coal and grain, were in greater demand than ever before. (He

does admit, however, that "the humanitarian idealism of American

policy makers affected their decisions.")26

It is my belief that during this period the President and his

Secretary of State adopted a 'good cop,

bad cop' strategy to insure that the funds required for aid to

Greece and the far larger sums needed to restore the European

economy were appropriated by a hostile Congress. The press was

having second thoughts about the Truman Doctrine. Walter Lippman

called it "a hasty and ill-considered improvisation designed to

meet an emergency for which the State Department was not

prepared."27 The New Republic claimed "...in all the foreign

offices and among UN officials, the Truman Doctrine is becoming a

bad dream."28 Robert Taft withheld his support until the bill came

26 William Applelman Williams. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (Cleveland, World Publishing Company, 1959)27 "Lippman's Cold War." FOREIGN RELATIONS TIME MAGAZINE 10/27/194728 "The Marshal Program: News in Focus." The New Republic, June 16, 1947


26

to the floor and gave it only after the Vandenberg Amendment,

giving the UN the power to terminate the program, had been added.

Republicans, in general, attacked the President at every

opportunity. As spring turned into summer, the President's

ratings in the polls were dismal.

Marshall, on the other hand, had been a popular hero from the day

he took over the Joint Chiefs of Staff, twice TIME's "Man of the

Year." The Congress had every reason to respect and trust him;

his wartime testimony had always been fulsome and reliable. His

conduct of the war had ensured his acceptance as America's

foreign policy voice in London and Paris. While the President was

seen as impulsive and pugnacious, Marshall was famous for his

even-handedness and sound judgment. And he had Truman's complete

trust.

Truman brought his own gifts to the collaboration: he understood

the power of public opinion and he knew how the Congress worked.

He had taken Vandenberg's advice to heart and scared the

recalcitrant Republicans into supporting Greece and Turkey, then

stepped back so Marshall could present a far less belligerent

plan for Europe. It must have been evident to both men that the


27

Europeans would not accept dictation from the US and equally

evident that the Congress would not consent to another hand-out:

UNRRA was already being phased out because it was so expensive

and was, the legislators believed, being misused by the Russians

to tighten their hold on the satellite nations.29

Marshall set the stage for the plan he would propose in his

report on the Moscow conference on August 28, 1987. After

dwelling at length on the need for German coal to restart

Europe's engines, he concluded: "The recovery of Europe has been

far slower than had been expected... The patient is sinking while

the doctors deliberate... Whatever action is possible to meet

these pressing problems must be taken without delay."30 He was not

exaggerating. All of Europe was near starvation -- France

suffered 56 food riots in a two-week period that spring --and, in

the event of another unusually cold winter, in danger of freezing

to death. Something had to be done and only the United States had

the resources to meet the enormous need. 29 "They were rebagging our grain and putting the hammer and sickle on it and distributing it to Czechoslovakia." McKinzie, Richard D. and Wilson,Theodore A. "Oral History Interview withC. Tyler Wood." Harry S. Truman Library and Museum. http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/woodct.htm Accessed 12/01/201330 George C.Marshall. "Report: Fourth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Moscow, March 10 to April 24, 1947." A Decade of American Foreign Policy 1941-1949. The Avalon Project. Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade23.asp Accessed 12/101/2013


28

Even these would be inadequate unless the each of the European

nations contributed what it could and all resources were

allocated where they could do the most good. What was really

required was a complete overhaul of the continent's economy, but

such a drastic proposal could not come directly from the United

States. Instead, the Secretary of State first introduced the idea

to the public at Harvard's 1947 Commencement, June 5, 1947.

"It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence In his carefully worded statement, Marshal deliberately left room

for Russian participation in the new program. The revisionists

point this out, saying he knew full well that the Soviets would

never go along with a plan that required so much economic

information or one that would send precious resources in any

direction but east. Undoubtedly, but the Secretary of State also Emily LeonardCopyright©December 8, 2013

29

knew that for the plan to work, the information had to be

provided and the commitment to pool resources accepted; it would

be physically as well as financially impossible for the US to

meet all Europe's needs by itself. Marshall also knew that only

such a cooperative endeavor could secure Congressional approval

for such a long term commitment of so much money. The ball was in

Stalin's court.

Britain and France immediately recognized the great gift that was

being offered. The day after the

Harvard speech, the British Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevan,

publicly endorsed the idea, as did France's Georges Bidault.

These statesmen lost no time in organizing a Europe-wide

conference in Paris to review each nation's resources and needs

and draw up a plan for US assistance in restoring the continent's

economy. As the revisionists are delighted to point out, they

too, were hoping the Russians would decline, but their reasons

were hardly sinister, if concealed. The Soviet's famous delaying

tactics could talk the plan to death. It was already evident that

the harvests would once again be scanty: relief could not wait.

The French and the British also knew that failing to include the


30

USSR would be tantamount to a declaration of economic war that

would upset the Socialists in all of Western Europe.

According to Soviet documents available at the Cold War Project

of the Woodrow Wilson Center, Nikolai V. Novikov, Russia's

Ambassador to the US, was convinced that the Marshal Plan was

designed to forestall the depression that Stalin's favorite

economist, Evgenii Varga, had long predicted that the capitalist

leaders who needed outlets for their excessive production would

also use whatever assistance they supplied to control the

nation's receiving it31. Varga thought there might be some

advantage in attending the initial meeting, to see what Russia

might be able to get without providing any information or

offering any contribution to the cooperative venture. Molotov was

instructed to go to Paris on those terms and the satellite

nations were permitted to send delegates as well. When, three

days later it was evident that the Communists could not get their

way, Molotov walked out. Stalin then ordered his client countries

to stay home.

31 The Russian scholar who points this out in his review of the documents suggests that Novikov knew what happened to Ambassadors who were 'not sufficiently aggressive' in reporting the ulterior motives of their host countries in dealings with the USSR and was trying to protect himself from the retribution that would surely follow if his advice did not correspond with Comrade Stalin's views


31

Moscow's refusal to participate in the Marshall Plan is seen by

historians as a decisive turning point in the Cold War. From then

on, foreign policy in both east and west was designed to thwart

the other side's endeavors. For the American public, Molotov's

behavior in Paris reinforced their conviction that truth was on

the US side and that godless communism must be rolled back, or at

least contained, an opinion reinforced by the ill considered step

Moscow took later that year, the formation of the Cominform.

Documents reviewed by the Cold War Project show that Stalin felt

the Marshall Plan would be too attractive to the satellite

nations, also suffering from the deprivations of the war and the

two disastrous post -war harvests, and that the USSR would lose

control of these priceless barrier nations. In September, the

Soviet organized the Cominform to coordinate Communist activities

around the world. Primarily it was seen as an alternative to the

American relief program, providing the participants with food in

the months to come. In addition to government representatives

from Yugoslavia, Hungary, Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia and

Bulgaria, party leaders in Italy and France were told to work

together to undermine the American program. Almost immediately,


32

the Communist-controlled unions in the latter two countries

initiated violent strikes, confirming US public opinion that all

of Europe was in danger of being taken over by the USSR if food

and fuel were not quickly forthcoming.

In the meantime, the delegates of 16 European nations, Austria,

Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Great Britain, Iceland,

Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,

Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey, with occupation authorities

representing western Germany, met on July 12, 1947 and spent the

next two months drafting a comprehensive recovery plan.

Early reaction was positive. Even before the first meeting in

Paris the Boston Globe said ""No accountant can add up the value

of replacing hopelessness with hope, distrust with confidence."32

A Gallup poll, taken in the third week of July, 1947 showed that

of the 49% of respondents who had heard of the Marshall Plan, 57%

approved of it. Supporters, both in the government and out,

promoted the idea vigorously. Labor was strongly behind it: the

Longshoremen endorsed it at their Union's annual meeting. When

the CIO approved it two months later, President Phil Murray

acknowledged the objections of the union's leftists who followed

32 James Morgan, Daily Boston Globe, June 22, 1947 p A2Emily LeonardCopyright©December 8, 2013

33

the Soviet line, saying, "In this country we can criticize whom

we choose, when we choose to."33 Business leaders and former

government officials like William L. Clayton and Robert B.

Patterson formed the Committee for the Marshal Plan for European

Recovery to educate and enlist the general public. President

Truman's "Meatless Tuesday, Eggless Thursday" food conservation

program may have failed in its stated purpose but had great

success in making Americans aware of Europe's desperate need. So

did the private programs to collect clothing and food for

immediate shipment to Europe, shivering as winter approached. The

Friendship Train of food packages, which had only 12 cars when it

left the West Coast, reached its port in New Jersey with 153. By

the time the special session of Congress met on November 17th,

most Americans supported Secretary Marshall's initiative. In

December, the bill for interim aid to France, Italy and Austria

was passed with "a rousing voice vote" that the New York Times

attributed to an atmosphere of "of crisis and humanitarianism,"

sentiments that prevailed throughout the winter-long process as

the intricate, complicated and very expensive legislative

proposal was vetted by House and Senate Committees.34 33 "National Affairs: Taming of the Left." TIME Magazine, October 27, 194734 Cabell Phillips. "Long-Term Aid Faces A Fight in Congress." The New York Times, Dec. 14, 1947 p. E 7


34

It worked. The 'cult of Americanism,' the idea that the gifts of

freedom and plenty bestowed on this country by God must be shared

with the less fortunate, won out over the very real and fairly

widespread unvoiced opposition to the ERP in rural areas and

among die-hard isolationist worried about the Plan's

affordability, its impact on already high prices for food and

other items and the possibility that it might well provoke the

Soviet Union to go to war.35 Even Robert A. Taft, tax

cutter extraordinaire, voted for that equally American concept, "God

helps those who help themselves," and approved the initial

funding of the European Recovery Program. The enabling

legislation, the Economic Cooperation Act, passed the House 329

to 74, the Senate, 69 - 17.

By 1951, at the effective end of the Marshall Plan, Western

European industrial production was 64% higher than 1947,

agriculture, up 24% and total GNP, up 25%. Revisionists, like J.

J. Joseph, claim that the Plan's contribution of $15 billion (in

1946 dollars) was too small a sum to make any real difference in

the continent's swift recovery. However, as Charles Dickens’ Mr.

35 Stalin's virulent propaganda attack on the Marshall Plan, accusing the US of deliberately dividing Europe into two hostile camps, was widely reported in the American press, exacerbating such fears.


35

Micawber knew only too well, sixpence is the difference between

happiness and misery when it is all that is needed to balance the

budget. That $15 billion made it possible for the participating

nations to feed their people and rebuild their factories and

infrastructure. Modern economists note that, while the ERP played

a significant role in alleviating food and fuel shortages early

on, its long term value came from its requirement that the

participating countries eliminate tariffs, cartels, import

restrictions and currency controls that restricted the free flow

of commerce across the continent and from the input of American

technology in replacing or rejuvenating old production methods.

Much has changed since those desperate years right after the

Second World War. The European Union is stable and recovering the

prosperity in enjoyed before the Crash of '08. Almost a quarter

century has passed since the Soviet Union collapsed when glasnost

deprived it of the tyrannical props without which a totalitarian

state cannot survive36. Communism, too, has pretty much vanished

from the world, since "Communist" China adopted a modified

capitalism to spur its economy. Only the poor North Koreans

36 President Putin's move towards absolutism is typical Russian Czarism, withoutthe theoretical camouflage of "Communism."


36

continue to suffer under the yoke of the 'state socialism'

prescribed by the Stalin-like Kim Jong-il.

American exceptionalism, too, has, for the most part, fallen into

disrepute. Fox News and the Radical Republicans may call for

invasions of Syria 'to rid it of a tyrant,' and proudly exempt

the Pentagon from budget cuts that have gutted the Food Stamp

Program, but most Americans, ashamed of the wars in Iraq and

Afghanistan, are more concerned with insuring 'liberty and

justice for all' right here in the United States than

transmitting 'American values' to other regions of the world.

Still, they look back with pride to that brief period from 1945

to 1950, when George C. Marshall -- and Harry Truman --

translated 'the cult of Americanism' into action and spelled it

out in dollars and sense.37

In the final analysis, the Marshall Plan enabled Western Europe

to recover from the ravages of the Second World War, formed the

skeleton of the economic union upon which the EU was built and

gave the continent the longest period of peace it has enjoyed in

modern time. It can be argued that no other Nobel Laureate was

more deserving of the Peace Prize than George C. Marshall.37 Pun intended.


37

It can also be argued, convincingly, I believe, that American

exceptionalism, that sense of this country's unique place among

nations and its obligations to its fellow men, as embodied in the

Marshall Plan, did indeed, 'save the world.' It is unlikely ever

to happen again.


38

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"Report on Germany." January 31, 1948Emily LeonardCopyright©December 8, 2013

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https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence

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The New RepublicThe Marshal Program: News in Focus, June 16, 1947

TIME Magazine"Foreign News: Taps." Feb. 19, 1945 "The Nations: It's More Fun to Know" Aug. 02, 1948"International: Peace This Winter." Dec. 02, 1946 "Recession Redefined." July 14, 1947"Conferences: The Trouble with Horned Toads." August 25th, 1947"The Congress: Uncle, Uncle." Sept. 15, 1947 "International: Diagnosis." Oct. 20, 1947"Foreign Relations: Can Do!" Oct. 27, 1947"The Nations: New World," March 24, 1947"The Nations: Anxiety is Unbecoming." Jan. 26, 1948"Foreign Relations: We Will Not Be Coerced." August 2, 1948"Letters to The Editor." October 1, 1945 "Letters to The Editor." May 13, 1946"Khrushchev's Denunciation Of Stalin: The Historic Secret Speech," June 11, 1956


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The Marshall Plan: Rebutting the Revisionists

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Transcript of The Marshall Plan: Rebutting the Revisionists