Candidate No: V41672

Degree: MA Contemporary CatholicTheology

Dissertation Title: The Knowledge of God inChristian Theologywith particular reference to StThomas Aquinas and Karl Barth.

Word Count: 9997

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Heythrop College, University of London

September 2005

Contents

Introduction 3

Chapter One---An Introduction to the Doctrine and its History

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Chapter Two---The Knowledge of God--- In the works of St Thomas Aquinas

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Chapter Three---The Knowledge of God --- In the works of Karl Barth

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Conclusion 37

Bibliography 40

Introduction

This work will be concerned with the Doctrine of theKnowledge of God. The work itself is primarily anexcursus in what is known as Historical Theology. Thisstudy will examine in depth the works of St ThomasAquinas and Karl Barth as they relate to the Doctrine,and it will seek to place these Theologians in context byexamining the history of the Doctrine itself.

Chapter One will seek to expound the history of theDoctrine within the whole sweep of Christian Theology andin the course of so doing it will seek to show how theWork of St Augustine prepared the way for the work of StThomas Aquinas. It will do this by examining in depthnot only the work of St Augustine, but also of his

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predecessor Irenaeus who formed the thinking of StAugustine not only in the areas of original sin andsalvation through Christ alone, but also in his doctrineof the knowledge of God.

Chapter two will seek to build upon the work of chapterone and will show how the work of St Thomas Aquinasbuilds upon the work of St Augustine. The first have ofthe chapter will seek to expound how understands thephrase ‘the likeness of God within us’ in the context ofthe doctrine of analogy, namely, analogia entis. Thechapter will also deal with the criticisms of Protestanttheologians on this doctrine, namely, that of KarlBarth and at the same time will furnish the response ofCatholic scholars to that criticism. The second half ofthe chapter will seek to show how the supernaturalknowledge of God is contained in Holy Scripture and isthen infused by the teaching or preaching of thesuccessors to the Apostles, namely, the Bishops. Itwill conclude by showing that the knowledge of God isadvanced by the preaching of Holy Scripture.

Chapter three will seek to expound the doctrine of theKnowledge of God based on the way he has outworked thedoctrine in his Church Dogmatics. In the ChurchDogmatics Vol. 2 part 1 Barth begins his treatment of theKnowledge of God in §25 which is entitled, ‘TheFulfilment of the Knowledge of God. This is furtherdivided into two subsections, the first of which isentitled, ‘Man before God.,’ in which Barth begins hisdoctrine by saying that Man can only know God as hestands before God and that God is to be understood as anabsolutely unique object. This is followed by a treatmentof the ‘Readiness of God, ‘ in which he considers theknowability of God. In this study Barth is at painsto show that there is no such thing as natural theologyand this is further brought out in the fact that man hasno disposition to the grace of God. This is developedin the section entitled, ‘Man’s Readiness for God,’which in fact shops that man has no disposition for God.This can only be remedied in Christ who makes man to havereadiness for God and the Knowledge of God.

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The work will be rounded off with an appropriateconclusion.

Chapter One

An Introduction to the Doctrine and its History

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The beginning of this Doctrine may be said to be found in

Holy Scripture. It was stressed in the beginning that

this work is an exercise in Historic Theology and so all

that can be provided within the compass of this study

here is merely an outline of the contents of Holy

Scripture. It may be said that to “Know” Yahweh and

“knowledge” of Yahweh is a basic religious virtue in the

Old Testament; however, the breadth of the concept of

knowledge makes it somewhat difficult to define.

Scholars usually assert that we should distinguish

between knowledge of God (µyhla) and knowledge of Yahweh

(hyhy), since these two terms are not synonymous. It

should be noted that knowledge of µyhla is not a common

phrase; where it is used it seems to be used as a

technical term, practically synonymous with the content

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of the priestly instruction, which deals with the way in

which one should conduct oneself before God. On

the other hand scholars generally take the view that as

the name hyhy is a personal name in contrast to the more

general µyhla, so the knowledge of hyhy is a personal

experience. J.A.Mackenzie defines that experience as

follows:

‘It includes the elements we have seen: experience ofthe reality of Yahweh, acknowledgement that He is God,acquaintance with what he is and the way in which He actsand in particular of His will. The knowledge of Yahwehmay be summed up in experience and response. The landwill be filled with the knowledge of Yahweh in the peaceof the Messianic reign (Isa. 11.9). Similarly Jeremiahaffirms that each individual will know Yahweh in therevelation of the new covenant (Jer. 31.33). Wisdomliterature states that the essence of the knowledge ofthe wise man is the fear of Yahweh (Prov. 1.7), andknowledge of the Holy is discernment (Psa. 9.10). Theresponse of the knowledge of Yahweh is stated in Jer.22.16: to know Yahweh is to do justice and righteousnessand to defend the poor and needy.’1

As far as the New Testament is concerned scholars take

the view that the knowledge of God is conceived mostly in

Old Testament terms. Once again Mackenzie summarizes

the thought of the New Testament thus:

1 J.L. Mackenzie, The Dictionary of the Bible, New York 1965, p. 486.

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‘The knowledge which no-one perceives (Rom. 11.33) is thedynamic knowledge by which He has chosen the Gentiles andrejected Israel. In the NT also God knows in the sensethat He recognises as His own, chooses (Gal. 4.9; 1 Cor.8.3; 13.12; 2 Tim. 2.19). This gives additionalfullness to the mutual knowledge of God and the believerin 1 Cor. 13.12. To know as one is known is to acceptGod with the same totality with which God accepts thebeliever. The perfection of knowledge and theperfection of love merge into one; to know fully onemust choose without reservation.’2

Yet it is true to state that in the NT the knowledge of

God does penetrate into the soul at a deeper level.

This is ably stated by Mackenzie again:

‘The dynamic conception of knowledge is nowhere moreexplicit than in Phil. 3.8-10 where to know Christ is togain Him, to be united with Him, to share in Hisholiness, and through sharing in His suffering to attainto his resurrection.’3

This is the substance of the Doctrine of the knowledge of

God that one finds in Holy Scripture and all that has

been given here is the barest of outlines, since space

does not permit a fuller treatment. For a fuller

treatment one must consult the varying Theologies of Both

Old and New Testament. Yet it has to be said that it is

the data of Holy Scripture that theologians of all ages

have had to grapple with.

2 J.L. Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 487.3 J.L. Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 487.

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To deal with the immediate post-Biblical development one

must consult the works of the Patristic Fathers. Now

according to McGrath the main theologians of the

Patristic period are Justin Martyr, Irenaeus of Lyons,

Origen, Tertullian, Athanasius and Augustine of Hippo.4

It may prove helpful to provide a summary of the leading

doctrinal developments of this period prior to studying

these theologians in depth. In the Patristic age three

principal factors determined the development of the

doctrine of God: (1) the data of Scripture; (2) the

controversies with pagans, Jews, and heretics; and (3)

the Greek Philosophy which was the foundation of the

education of most of the Fathers. The Apologists of the

2nd and 3rd centuries sought to make their case for

Christianity in the cultured world around them by making

extensive use of reason and philosophy. One of the

most notable of these, Justin Martyr, who was much

influenced by Platonist teaching, stressed the

ineffability, omnipotence, and impassability of God.

4 A.E. McGrath, Christian Theology: An Introduction, Oxford 2001, pp. 10-13.

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These concepts were also shared by Tatian and many

others; whereas other scholars such as Athenagoras and

Theophilus stressed His simplicity, indivisibility, and

universal providence. By contrast St. Irenaeus developed

his doctrine especially against the Gnostics, to whose

dualism and emanationism he countered with the truths of

the absolute self-sufficiency and perfection of God.

The theology of the Alexandrian Fathers, such as Clement

and Origen, is characterised by their vigorous

affirmation of the Divine transcendence,

incomprehensibility and ineffability. Despite such an

emphasis, however, they upheld the natural knowability

of God through creation. This latter nuance is also

stressed by Tertullian, who added to it the testimony

of the human soul and deduced from the conception of God

as the First Cause His possession of all perfections.

Thus by the time of Nicea (325) the great lines of

Christian thought had been fixed, and such Divine

attributes as eternity, immutability, omniscience, and

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omnipotence had become the undisputed belief of all

Christians.5

It is worth noting that the doctrine of the pre-Nicene

age was deepened by the great speculative theologians of

Alexandria, such as Athanasius, St Didymus, and St

Cyril. These latter scholars insist that God, though

incomprehensible in His inner Being, can be known

through the human soul, made in His image, and through

the visible creation. The last named, St Cyril of

Jerusalem, dealt with the subject implicitly in his

‘Catecheses,’ especially with the unity, sovereign

dominion, and creative action of God. The Cappadocian

Fathers were led to an explicit examination of the Divine

nature and our knowledge of it in their call to reply to

Eunomius, who had asserted that the full Being of God is

adequately expressed by the word ‘Unoriginate’

(agennhto~), to which all other designations can be

reduced. It was against him that St Gregory of

Nazianzus maintained that negative attributes are not

5 F.L. Cross, The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, 3rd Edition Oxford 1997, p. 685.

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enough, and that such positive names as love, wisdom,

justice, etc., should be added, though the name most

suitable for God is Being.6

The speculations of the Fathers were gathered up into a

powerful synthesis in the various works of St Augustine.

He gave several proofs for the existence of God, e.g.,

from contingency, from the order and beauty of the

world, from the eternal principles of human reason, and

the moral argument from conscience. The influence of

Plato is also to be found in the works of Augustine,

namely, in his idea of God as the First Principle,

cause of all truth and all goodness. Though God is

above all human thought and language, He is not abstract

and indeterminate being, but concrete and actual,

‘above whom, outside whom, and without whom nothing

exists.’ (Soliliquia 1.1.4). Having arrived in this

summary at the work of St Augustine it now seems

appropriate to examine the thought of St Irenaeus and St

Augustine in more detail, since the latter makes a

convenient link to the thought and theology of St Thomas6 F.L. Cross, op. cit., p. 686.

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Aquinas. The authority for this latter statement is to

be found in no less a scholar than Adolf von Harnack.7

The subject of the inter-relation between Augustine and

St Thomas Aquinas, although certain, is one that is too

complex to develop in this present work. It now seems

appropriate to examine the work of St Irenaeus which

relates to the doctrine of the knowledge of God. In his

work entitled, Textbook of the History of Doctrines,

Seeberg deals with the theology of the Antignostic

Fathers, in which Irenaeus is included. Taking his

stand on the Gospel of John, Seeberg notes that Irenaeus

holds that, ‘God is not known through speculation, but

from revelation.’8 What this means in practical terms

according to Irenaeus is that we should not concern

ourselves with idle questions as to what God did before

creation, or how the Son was begotten, or the like.

For this assertion Seeberg cites Irenaeus Adversus

Haereses (2.28. 3,6f.; cf. 25.4; 26.1; 28.1).

7 Adolf von Harnack, The Essence of Christianity, London 1901, p.14.8 R. Seeberg, Textbook of the History of Doctrines, Vol 1, Orlando1927, p. 120.

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In this latter work Irenaeus states, ‘Without God, God

is not known.’ (Ir iv.6.4). When examined critically

it can be seen that this clearly a concept that is formed

on the Theology and writings of John in the New Testament

(cf. 1 John 1.2-4). Thus what Irenaeus is teaching is

that in his greatness God remains incomprehensible; but

in his love we learn to know him in Christ. ‘Who is

unknown according to his greatness by all those who have

been made by him … but according to his love he is always

known through him through whom he formed all things.

But this is his Word.’ (Ir iv.20.4). Irenaeus is of

the view that, we learn to know God by way of revelation

and experience, not through speculation. So that he

states, ‘Just as those who look upon the light are

within the light and partake of its brilliance, so those

who look upon God are within God, partaking of his

brilliance.’ Thus the doctrine of the Knowledge of God

according to Irenaeus is one that has as its fountain

head the Incarnation of the Word as stated in the Gospel

of John 1.1-14. He is of course responding to the

teaching of Gnosticism, but nevertheless, Knowledge of

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God is only possible by the revelation of God himself.

It is now necessary to examine the development of this

doctrine further, since with Irenaeus we are at the

beginning of the process, his work being dated to about

190 AD. It, therefore, seems appropriate to consider

the work of St Augustine which by itself will prepare us

for the work of St Thomas Aquinas to be considered in the

following chapter.

As far as the link between Irenaeus and Augustine is

concerned Clarke has noted the following:

‘In Contra Julianum Augustine referred to Irenaeus as thefirst in a line of doctors of the Church who had taughtthe doctrine of original sin and salvation through Christalone.’9

This statement clearly means that Augustine built upon

the earlier work of Irenaeus; although differences are

to be noted , especially in their interpretation of

Genesis. As far as his doctrine of the Knowledge of God

is concerned, Augustine’s theory of knowledge involved

many complex and controversial aspects, but his basic

orientation, which remained unaltered throughout his

9 Mary T. Clarke, ‘Irenaeus’ in Augustine Through the Ages, A.D. Fitzgerald (ed.), Grand Rapids 1999, p. 456.

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life was stated in the Soliloquia 1.2.7 thus: ‘I desire

to know God and the soul. Nothing besides? Nothing

whatsoever.’ In pursuit of that objective, the pattern

of his thought is always the same, namely, ‘from the

things which are external to the things which are within,

and from those inner things to the things above.’ (En. Ps

145.5). From this statement we may deduce that self-

knowledge is an essential moment in the ascent to

knowledge of God.10

The type of approach which Augustine has employed owes

much not only to the Socratic “know thyself,” but to the

whole Platonic and Neoplatonic tradition of thought about

the soul and its relation to the external world, to

itself, and to God, as adumbrated initially in the

famous allegories of the sun, the line, and the cave,

according to which Plato, in the Republic, described the

soul’s ascent to knowledge of the Good, which he sees as

both source of truth and source of being. (rep. 6 and 7;

cf. Dei 11.25; sol. 1.13.23).11 For Augustine, as for

10 Robert Crouse, ‘Knowledge’ in Augustine Through the Ages, A.D. Fitzgerald (ed.), Grand Rapids 1999, p. 486.11 Robert Crouse, op. cit., p. 486.

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that Platonic tradition, knowledge has a basis in

sensation, in things sensed, or imagined; but he

shares also with the Platonists the conviction that the

objects of sensation, mutable as they are, cannot

furnish certain knowledge. Truth must be on the side of

the soul. The young Augustine has been moved by the

books of the Platonists to turn inward to his own soul,

to seek there the truth which cannot be found in external

things. (conf. 7.10.16). But neither can the truth,

which is necessarily eternal and immutable, have its

locus in the mutable soul as the soul’s own possession;

and thus for Augustine, as for the Platonists, the

source and guarantee of truth has had to be sought beyond

the soul, in the light of the intelligible Sun, the

Good, the divine light illuminating the soul by its

transcendent presence (conf. 7.10.16).12

In the work of Augustine memory is the locus of divine

illumination, and it is in the theory of memory that he

had made the most significant advances over his Platonic

predecessors. Especially of note is book 10 of the12 Robert Crouse, op. cit., p. 486.

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Confessions, in which he has developed the conception of

memory as the very ground of the self-conscious life,

and the continuity of personality. For Augustine memory

is also the basis of the desire for a happiness never yet

possessed, and the very desire implies some certain

knowledge of it (Conf. 10.21.34). Moreover, because

happiness is a rejoicing in truth, the knowledge of

happiness is also a knowledge of the truth, which is

God, the sole truth by which all else is true (Conf.

10.23.33). Thus God is present to memory as its

illumination, but as transcendent over its mutability

(Conf. 10.26.37).13

For Augustine, it belongs to the very nature of the

intellectual soul that it should see intelligible things

in a certain light, incorporeal light itself (Trin.

12.15.24); the divine Word is the light of every soul

(civ. Dei 10.2); such illumination is the essential

precondition of all true and certain knowledge. Yet the

fact is that the human soul in its present state falls

short of the highest knowledge; not because the divine13 Robert Crouse, op. cit., p. 487.

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light is insufficient, but because ‘the eye of man’s

mind does not focus in so excellent a light, unless it

be enlivened by the justice of faith.’ (Trin. 1.2.4).

Thus it is the work of faith to correct and nurture the

mind, to bring it to that enlivened perspective which

allows the attainment of wisdom.14

Nowhere in Augustine’s works are his views about self-

knowledge and knowledge of God (and the relationship

between them) so fully worked out as in De Trinitate. In

that treatise he begins by dismissing all arguments by

way of analogy from created things, whether from

corporeal things or from the nature of the human soul;

he rejects all analogical argument which seeks to know

God by an intellectual transcendence of all mutable

things (1.1.1). According to Augustine, the argument

must begin with the purgation of the mind (1.1.3), with

the nutriment of faith. The work thus begins by

Augustine’s exposition of the scriptures from the

standpoint of Trinitarian doctrine. In divine

revelation the eternal Word speaks externally and14 Robert Crouse, op. cit., p. 487.

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temporally, in order that the soul, lost amid the

distractions of external and temporal things, might be

recalled to the Word within. Augustine makes this point

clear thus:

‘Thus, in the Gospel, he spoke through the flesh, thishe addressed to human ears externally, that it might bebelieved, and sought and found inwardly in the eternaltruth, where the good and only master instructs everydisciple … ‘ (Conf. 11.8.10).

The way of knowledge is a matter of dialogue between the

illuminating Word of God spoken foris in the speech, and

deeds and example, of the Word incarnate, proclaimed in

the Scriptures and the preaching of the church, and the

Word of God intus, as the principle illuminating the

soul’s understanding. The external Word serves as

admonito, recalling the soul to its Inner Master, where

its acquired concepts are referred to the eternal

reasons, which are the rules of judgement, present to

the memory.15

The argument which seeks knowledge of God must,

therefore, move beyond the useful temporalia of the

external Word and seek the Word within. In that inner15 Robert Crouse, op. cit., p. 487.

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reflection upon the Word, the soul discovers itself as

an image of the Trinity, as like in species to that

which it knows (Trin. 7.6.12); and that discovery

constitutes the basis of the argument of the last eight

books of De Trinitate. The argument is not by way of

analogy from the soul to God (an approach explicitly

rejected at the beginning of the treastise), but from

God to the soul. On the analogy of the Holy Trinity the

soul comes to know itself as the unity of its distinct

personal powers of being, knowing, loving, or memory,

intellect, and will.16

From that standpoint the succession of analogies of the

later books of De Trinitate should be regarded as a

progressive reflection of images, whereby the mind seeks

to dispose itself more and more toward its own true

centre, reforming itself to the divine image, which is

its own true nature, until it comes to know itself as

nothing other than memoria Dei, intellectus Dei, voluntas Dei

(14.15-18). Thus self knowledge and knowledge of God

stand in a dialectical relationship; the soul turns16 Robert Crouse, op. cit., p. 487.

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inward, to itself, in order to ascend to the knowledge

of God; but that knowledge, in turn, involves a

profoundly reformed self-knowledge, a radically new

conception of the essential unity and equality of the

personal powers of memory, intellect and will.17

When we compare what Augustine has to say about the

knowledge of God with that of Irenaeus it can clearly be

seen that Augustine has built upon the work of his

illustrious predecessor. While it is true that the work

of Augustine has been deepened by his understanding of

Platonism, which he adapted for Christianity, it is

equally true that for Augustine as with Irenaeus

Knowledge of God can only happen by the divine act of

revelation the medium for which is the divine word. It

has already been noted that there is a definite link

between Irenaeus and Augustine in the areas of original

sin and salvation through Christ alone; however now that

a comparison has been proffered on the doctrine of the

knowledge of God it can be seen that such a link is to be

established here also.17 Robert Crouse, op. cit., p. 488.

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It has been worthwhile spending so much tine in examining

Augustine’s doctrine in depth, because as has already

been noted St Thomas Aquinas himself incorporated much of

Augustine’s theology into his own system. It in this

sense that Augustine may be said to have formed the

thinking and theology of St Thomas Aquinas to whom we now

turn.

Chapter Two

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The Knowledge of God in the Work of St Thomas Aquinas

At the beginning of this chapter we may note that St

Thomas Aquinas lays the foundation in the Summa for his

understanding of this doctrine thus:

Knowledge of God occurs through Union with God.‘We can know God because there is some likeness of Him inside us. The created intellect cannot see the essenceof God, unless God by His grace unites Himself to the created intellect.’ (1.12.4).

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At the outset one may note that how similar this teaching

is to that which has already been found in Irenaeus and

Augustine which was outlined in the previous chapter.

In the quotation noted above from the Summa a dialect is

being proposed which is to the effect that it is possible

for human beings to know God because of the like ness of

God which we possess; yet at the same time Aquinas

posits the impossibility which also exits which is that

unless God unites us to Himself by His Grace then we can

never know God. How can we understand his teaching in

the Summa?

If we take the first point that Aquinas has made,

namely, ‘we can know God because there is some likeness

of Him inside us.’ (Summa 1.12.4). It would appear that

St Thomas Aquinas has grounded the possibility of our

knowledge of God in that similitudo Dei which is ours (and

the world’s) by virtue of our (and its) createdness.

This view was termed by the Jesuit scholar Erich Przywara

analogia entis which was not original to him, but derived

from the late scholasticism of the 15th. Century.

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According to this view the possibility of our knowledge

of God rests in the fact of our being and in our

createdness. This is such an interesting concept that it

worthy of further investigation. Austin Farrer has ably

summarized the teaching thus:

‘According to St Thomas’s Aristotelianism, sentenceswhich, when put into their most appropriate from, havethe verb “to be” as their verb express in some way thebeing of their subjects. To say that God is wise is toplace wisdom in the being of God. Now the sense inwhich a predicate is to be understood is always relativeto the sort of being its subject has. I may say that aman is wise and that a project is wise. “To be wise” isa different thing for a man and for a project, because“to be” is a different thing for a man and for a project.A man has the being of a finite self-subsistentindividual; a project has the being of a form taken byan interior act of a man’s mind. To understand thatdifference is to understand the difference between “beingwise” in the one case and in the other. If, then, itis right both to say that a man is wise and that God iswise, the difference between “being wise” for God andfor man will be determined by the difference between whatit is for God to be, and what it is for man to be. Wecan therefore say, “As human wisdom is to be man’sbeing, so divine wisdom is to be God’s being,” and thisis called the analogy of proportionality. When we are talkingabout God’s wisdom we are talking about something whichwe do not directly or properly know, and of which we areforced to judge from our knowledge of our own. So tosay that God is wise is to say that something stands toGod’s being as our wisdom stands to our being. It wouldmean nothing to say this, unless we had someunderstanding (however formal) of the relation or“proportionality” between our being and God’s. But,

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according to St. Thomas, we have such an understanding.We have understanding of God’s being by analogy ofproportion with our own, and therefore we can haveunderstanding of his attributes and acts by analogy ofproportionality.’18

This may be said to be an adequate statement of the

doctrine of analogy as taught by St Thomas Aquinas and

goes a long way to show how such an analogy was used in

the doctrine of analogia entis. Farrer again shows how

the doctrine of analogy was used by St Augustine and St

Thomas Aquinas.

‘Most of the fathers of the Greek Church, and StAugustine among the Latin, were deeply influenced by theNeo-Platonic doctrine. But they substituted creationfor emanation: the primary Being did not give rise tosecondary being by natural extension, but by freechoice. The Latin scholastics, notably Thomas Aquinas,carried on this synthesis between the philosophy of beingand the doctrine of creation with the aid of Aristotelianideas. Thomas taught that in God alone essence isreally inseparable from existence. From all otheressences their existence is separable; and a determiningcause, viz., God’s will, is required for the puttingtogether of the two, i.e., for the creation of allother beings outside God himself. A Biblical basis forthe doctrine was found in God’s self description toMoses, “I am what I am.”’19

18 Austin Farrer, ‘Analogy’ in Twentieth Century Encyclopaedia of Religious Knowledge, L.A. Loetscher (ed.), Vol. 14, Grand Rapids 1955, p. 39.19 Austin Farrer, ‘Being’ in Twentieth Century Encyclopaedia of Religious Knowledge, L.A. Loetscher (ed.), Vol. 14, Grand Rapids 1955, p. 121.

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The purpose of these extended quotes is to show the basis

for the doctrine of the analogy of being, the practical

implications of which are that the possibility of our

knowledge of God rests in the fact of our being and in

our createdness. Thus, St Thomas Aquinas would appear

to teach that the possibility of our knowledge of God is

grounded in that similitudo Dei which is ours (and the

world’s) by virtue of our (and its) createdness. It

should be noted that this doctrine has been opposed by

Protestant Theologians, notably among whom is the figure

of Karl Barth. Barth has responded to this doctrine is

his now famous dictum as follows:

‘I regard the analogia entis as the invention of theAntichrist, and think that because of it one can notbecome Catholic.’20

Now the question may be asked as to why Barth responded

in this way? In order to answer the question it is

first of all necessary to understand Barth’s doctrine of

revelation and how it bears upon his critique of

Catholicism. For Barth his doctrine of revelation

consists in the fact that God cannot not be known unless

20 K. Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol. 1 Part 1, The Doctrine of the Word of God, Edinburgh 1936, p. X.

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He gave himself to us via the media of revelation such as

the humanity of Christ, the Bible, preaching. Whereas

for the St Thomas Aquinas (as Barth understands him), he

grounds the possibility of our knowledge of God in that

similitudo Dei which is ours (and the world’s) by virtue of

our (and its) createdness. This view was termed by the

Jesuit scholar Erich Przywara analogia entis which was not

original to him, but derived from the late

scholasticism of the 15th. Century. According to this

view the possibility of our knowledge of God rests in the

fact of our being and in our createdness. Barth saw

this principle as being rooted in all Catholic Theology,

but rejected it for the simple reason that the fact of

creation establishes only a Creator-creature distinction

and therefore discontinuity.21 In other words, if

knowledge of God is possible through an analogy built

into the world, then there would be no need for

revelation. The media of revelation do not act by

themselves, but by the gracious act of God. Coming

from this perspective Barth wants to stress the

21 B. McCormick, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology, Oxford 1997, p. 390.

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dissimilarity of God to the world and as McCormick has

noted he cites the formula of the fourth Lateran Council:

‘Similitudo Dei et major dissimilitudo.’ 22 However, it should be

noted that following Vatican II Barth changed his mind on

this subject and retracted the earlier statement he had

made about it and went as far as to state that, ‘It is

now no longer necessary to discuss this theory, … we are

in unity about what can be meant by it.’23

It is also necessary to note that Catholic scholars have

responded to Barth’s dictum, among is Per Erik Person,

who reasons as follows:

‘Thus in Thomas the analogy between God and the world isalso ultimately and expression of God’s inaccessibletranscendence, but this important emphasis is oftenoverlooked, especially in Protestant theology where itis usually held that analogy in Thomas is an expressionof the continuity between God and the world and,therefore, a means of attaining positive knowledge aboutGod. It is on the basis of such an interpretation thatKarl Barth makes his well known statement: “I regard theanalogia entis as the invention of the Antichrist,” ChurchDogmatics, Vol. 1, The Doctrine of the Word of God, part 1,p. X.’24

22 B. McCormick, ibid., p. 388.23 G. Hunsinger, ibid., p. 3.24 P.E. Person, Sacra Doctrina, Oxford 1970, p. 153.

30

Person the relates what he feels to be the true function

of the doctrine of analogy by referring to the work of

Mascall who stated thus:

‘It is not to furnish us with knowledge of God, but toexplain how we come to have it.’25

When one considers the response of Mascall to the

criticisms of Protestant theologians it seems that his

response is little different from the concepts that he is

trying to answer, since it seems that to have the

knowledge of God is virtually the same as being provided

with it. His explanation must, therefore, be judged

as being somewhat naïve.

Having spent some time on explaining what Thomas means by

‘the likeness of him within us,’ and its apparent

application it is now appropriate to consider what he

means by the concluding statement: ‘The created

intellect cannot see the essence of God, unless God by

His grace unites Himself to the created intellect.’

However, in order to understand this latter statement

fully it is necessary to establish the kind of knowledge

25 E.L. Mascall, Existence and Analogy: A Sequel to ‘He Who Is’, London 1949, p. 124.

31

that the created intellect can possess by itself as

opposed to revealed knowledge. Happily for our purposes

this question has already been addressed by Person as

follows:

‘As a creature endowed with reason, ratio, man may alsopossess in his soul a light, given in and with thisreason, whereby he “sees” and comprehends both himselfand the things around him. This lumen naturale rationis(natural light of reason) is a participation or participationon the human level in the light in which God sees andknows all things. According to Thomas, the attainmentof knowledge or cognitio is contingent on two things whichhe defines as phantasmata ex sensibilibus accepta (images derivedfrom the sensibile world) and the lumen naturale intelligible,cuius virtute intelligibles conceptions ab eis abstrahimus (naturalintellectual light by which we make abstract intelligibleconcepts from these images). As intellectus possibilis theintellect is receptive and can acquire knowledge. Butthis knowledge is not derived from within the intellectitself, which from the first is a tabula rasa. Thestarting point of knowledge is found rather in senseperception, naturalis nostra cognitio a sensu principium sumit (theknowledge that is natural to us has its source in thesenses), and through it we receive impulses whichproduce “impressions” or phantasmata in the soul.’26

The point of this extended quotation from Person is to

show how St Thomas Aquinas deals with what might be

called man’s natural knowledge the purpose of which is to

discern the world around him. Yet the salient point

which must now be addressed is whether this natural

function of man’s reason will give him any knowledge of26 P.E. Person, op. cit., p. 21.

32

God? In attempting to answer this question Person makes

the following statement:

‘There is also a naturally given knowledge of thesethings---thus for Thomas there is a cognitio naturalis of Godgiven independently of revelation, and in his frequentdiscussion of this point Thomas refers to Rom. 1:19,invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur.’27

Although this statement would seem to give grounds for

the fact that Thomas taught that there is a such a thing

as a natural knowledge of God which is the product of the

human intellect---yet this a statement which requires to

be qualified.28 In the quotation noted above Person says

that, ‘There is also a naturally given knowledge of

these things,’ so that the question remains as to

exactly what are the ‘these things’ that he is referring

to? In the previous sentence in his work Person relates

that, ‘At first glance it might seem as though the

revealed knowledge which is given to us in Holy Scripture

extends to the whole of human experience, tam divina quam

humana, tum spiritualia quam corporalia (things both divine and

human, both spiritual and bodily). Thus what Person is

27 P.E. Person, op. cit., p. 30.28 This is a question which cannot be dealt with adequately within this work; for further information one should consult E.F. Rogers, Jr., Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth, Sacred Doctrine and the NaturalKnowledge of God, London 1995.

33

asserting that Thomas taught by a natural knowledge of

God is that which is also to be found in Holy Scripture

which comprises things both divine and human, things

both spiritual and bodily. It would seem that what

Thomas is referring to here is that which the educated

know by demonstration and do not require to be revealed.

It is, therefore, necessary to demonstrate the

difference between natural knowledge and divine knowledge

and Person does this in the following quotation:

‘Nevertheless, revelation does impart a knowledge whichtranscends what is accessible to human reason, even themost highly developed reason, e.g., God’s triune natureor futura contingentia (contingent events in our future).For Thomas the unifying concept which holds togetherthose many varieties of revelation is salus, for what isrevealed can be defined as knowledge of omnia illa quorumcognitio potest esse utilis ad salutem (all those things theknowledge of which can be useful for salvation).29

Thus for Person, the difference between the two is that

divine revelation will grant an understanding of those

truths which would otherwise have been inaccessible to

reason because of the utter inadequacy of the human

intellect. It is interesting to note that in this

context Thomas does not connect the necessity of

29 P.E. Person, op. cit., p. 30.

34

revelation with the fact of sin. Person again makes

this clear:

‘In accordance with the medieval tradition he includesamong the wounds inflicted by sin on human nature thevulnus ignorantiae (wound of ignorance), but he neverrelates the supernatural knowledge of God to a lack ofknowledge caused by sin. It is characteristic of Thomasthat he can answer the question, utrum homo sine gratiaaliquod verum cognoscere posit (whether without grace man canknow any truth), without reference to sin or any of itseffects.’30

This omission on the part of Thomas is also to be found

in the theological work of Karl Rahner. Having

established in Thomas that there are truths relating to

salvation which the human mind cannot comprehend and

which are not part of the cognitio naturalis of God, the

question now to be addressed is how such truths are

communicated to man, or in other words how does man have

a knowledge of God?

Person again addresses this question in the following

remark:

‘This cognitio, which conveys within the soul of therecipient of revelation and impression of God’s ownknowledge of himself and the context of existence, isgiven moreover in order to be communicated to others.’31

30 P.E. Person, op. cit., p. 34.31 P.E. Person, op. cit., p. 41.

35

The outward-directedness of revelation is consequent upon

the fact that revelation is one of the gifts of grace,

all of which have been given for instruction and the

communication of knowledge, as Thomas stated himself:

‘gratia gratis data illa sub se continet quibus homo indiget ad hoc quodalterum instruat in rebus divins, quae sunt supra rationem.’32

This by itself has implications for the concept of

revelation as an event, since Thomas can speak at times

of the revelation event as instruction given by God,

e.g., when he says that the prophet’s mind is instructed

by God, or that revelation is given by means of

teaching.33 This last statement is of tremendous

significance in understanding Thomas’s definition of how

this revelation is communicated. According to Thomas

Revelation is primarily a cognitive act, a cognitio, but

since it involves a knowledge on which the salvation of

all men wholly depends, it must have a secondary

expression in the communication of this knowledge, in a

locutio. This was stated by Thomas in the Summa:

32 St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Rome 1948, 1a2ae, III, 4.33 P.E. Person, op. cit., p. 41.

36

‘prophetia secundario consistit in locutione, prout prophetae ea quaedivintus edocti cognoscunt, ad aedificationem aliorum annuntiant.’34

As far as Thomas is concerned all teaching or doctrina, to

use the term that he himself preferred---consists in the

communication of knowledge by use of words. This

knowledge which has been given to certain chosen

individuals by means of an infusion into the soul of the

recipient of salvation which has taken place by a divine

address or locutio Dei. This in turn is then passed on to

others by means of a locutio exterior, which may be taken to

be understood in Thomas to mean oral, rather than

written teaching. Person has noted the following in

this regard:

‘He regards the oral form of teaching, indeed, as moreperfect than the written form, which explains whyChrist---whose teachings may be said to represent thehighest revelation of the knowledge of God in via---did notleave any writings behind him. The same is true ofother great teachers---Pythagoros and Socrates, forexample.’35

How then for Thomas does this tradition of teaching

mediate the content of revelation? The answer to the

question is that Christ, who is the first and chief

teacher of the faith, taught the Apostles, and through

34 St Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., 2a2ae, 171, 1.35 P.E. Person, op. cit., p. 43.

37

them this teaching was handed down in both oral and

written form. What this means in turn is that the

teaching thus delivered to those who received revelation

is now found in the Canonical Scriptures. The

conclusion, therefore, is that through the Canonical

Scriptures the knowledge of the supernatural truth which

is necessary for salvation is transmitted in the Church

to each new generation.36

In passing it is worth noting that, for Thomas Holy

Scripture does not coincide with revelation, since he

does not understand revelation as a spoken or written

word, but regards it primarily as an event which takes

place in the depths of the soul. Indeed, for Thomas,

Scripture is not to be identified with revelation, but

may be said to presuppose and build upon it, so that

Thomas can indicate the connection between them by

speaking of a revelatio … super quam fundatur sacra scriptura.37

36 P.E. Person, op. cit., p. 45.37 P.E. Person, op. cit., p. 50.

38

However, although Thomas regarded Holy Scripture as

being both normative and in itself clear and sufficient,

it should not be thought that the truth which is revealed

within it is readily accessible. Person notes as

follows:

‘But its very difficulty also means that truth can befound in Scripture only after long and painstaking study.If revelation had been attainable only in this form,only the studiosi would have access to it, while the greatmajority of men, who have neither the time nor theopportunity for study, would have been excluded fromsaving knowledge.’38

According to Thomas, the factors noted above by Person

give the reason for the explanation of the origin of the

Apostles’ Creed. The truth of which the Holy Scriptures

speak is essential for the salvation of man, so that in

order to make faith available to all it became necessary

at a very early period to prepare a brief and convenient

summary of what had been given in revelation.

Understood in this fashion the Apostles’ Creed is a

confession of faith which may, therefore, be regarded

as a kind of popular Bible in which the Content of

Scripture is summarized in a way that may be plain to

all.38 P.E. Person, op. cit., p. 58.

39

The final question to be addressed in this chapter is how

human beings are to receive the knowledge of God? The

answer to this question is developed by Person thus:

‘Knowledge of the content of revelation is transmittedwithin the church through teaching, doctrina, but we havealso seen how revelation itself, according to Thomas,may be said to have been given per modum cuiusdam doctrinae(after the fashion of a certain teaching). Thus Thomascan include within the concept of doctrina the originalrevelatio and the continuing transmission of doctrine withinthe church.’39

From this quotation we are led to understand that the

task of instructing human beings about salvation and the

means of attaining it has been entrusted to the church,

and in particular to the successors of the Apostles,

namely, the Bishops. What is required of such

officiants is that they should have and understanding of

revelation which corresponds to their ministry, and

which, by conclusion, is greater than the majority of

believers. This deeper knowledge which they possess may

be regarded as a participation in God’s own knowledge---

whether they received it directly by revelation from God

or by study of the Holy Scriptures. Thus the Bishops

are to be regarded as having the Knowledge of God

39 P.E. Person, op. cit., p. 71.

40

themselves by virtue of their calling and it is this

knowledge of God which they seek to infuse in others by

their ministry in Holy Scripture. Person again

concludes as follows:

‘As we have seen above, this knowledge of God isfound---at least as much of it is necessary forsalvation---in the Holy Scriptures, and these werepassed on by those who had received the revelation adinstructionem omnium futurorum (for the instruction of allthose who were to come).40

Thus from this quotation and others like it which have

considered above the medium of the knowledge of God for

Thomas is Holy Scripture. It should be noted that Holy

Scripture conveys a supernatural knowledge of God which

is far beyond the powers of the human mind and is

inaccessible to it. Equally, it should also be noted

that there is nothing in this knowledge of God which is

derived by means of Holy Scripture that can be equated to

the cognito naturalis, which Thomas based on his exegesis of

Rom 1:19, which in turn was also based on the senses

that human beings possess.

40 P.E. Person, op. cit., p. 83.

41

By way of conclusion we can note that there is much in

Thomas which one can also find in St Augustine, but that

Thomas has not only built upon these concepts, but has

deepened their meaning in so doing.

42

Chapter Three

The Knowledge of God in the Work of Karl Barth

43

At the outset it would seem that to follow a chapter that

has been devoted to the work of St Thomas Aquinas with a

chapter on the work of Karl Barth on the same doctrine

would bring in an element of discontinuity to this work.

Of course it could be argued that Barth has been included

for the purposes of comparison and there would be more

than an element of truth in this statement. However, I

would like to show that there is more than an element of

continuity here, since Barth’s knowledge of the works of

the Reformers is impeccable as might be expected, but

this is also true of his knowledge of the Patristic

Fathers and of Aquinas in particular.

His doctrine of the Knowledge of God is contained in

Volume 2, part 1 of his Church Dogmatics. 41 Since his

work is so voluminous, what can be offered in this

41 K. Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol 2 Part 1, Edinburgh 1957, pp.1-254.

44

chapter is little more than an outline, in which

attention will be drawn to the salient points. In the

volume referred to above Barth begins his treatment of

the Knowledge of God in §25 which is entitled, ‘The

Fulfilment of the Knowledge of God. This is further

divided into two subsections, the first of which is

entitled, ‘Man before God.’ These two subsections are

summarized by Barth as follows:

‘The Knowledge of God occurs in the fulfilment of therevelation of His Word by the Holy Spirit, and thereforein the reality and with the necessity of faith and itsobedience. Its content is the existence of Him whom wemust fear above all things because we may love Him aboveall things; who remains a mystery to us because HeHimself has made Himself so clear and certain to us.’42

According to Barth, Knowledge of God occurs, it has its

‘consummation,’ in that God’s Word places man before

God. This is the starting point for Barth in his

doctrine. As He himself states:

‘We start out from the fact that through His Word God isactually known and will be known again. On principle wehave to reject any anxiety about this occurrence as notonly superfluous but forbidden. Knowledge of God withinthe Christian Church is very well aware that it isestablished in its reality and to that extent also calledin question by God’s Word, through which alone it can be

42 K. Barth, op. cit., p. 3.

45

and have reality, and on the basis of which alone it canbe fulfilled.’43

So that what Barth is actually saying is that Man can

only know God as he stands before God. Barth wants to

make clear that, we are not speaking about God ‘in

himself,’ but about ‘God in his relation to man,’ which

also means: ‘in his distinction to man.’ Knowledge of

God, therefore, is not ‘to be understood as man’s

oneness with God,’ but in it, on the contrary, an

objective comprehension is posited, as Barth is keen to

emphasize again and again. But what does Barth mean by

objective? Clearly he does not mean that God could be

or would be an object like other objects, so that Barth

is arguing for is an ‘absolutely unique objectivity,’ so

that we do not suppose that we have God in the way we

have other objects---yet in the sense Barth is arguing

for God becomes an object for us. What this means in

Barth’s thinking is made clear in the study by Otto

Weber:

‘This means that first of all that in the faith, inwhich alone we have a knowledge of God, we make a firmdistinction between God and ourselves. God is not ourfaith. Neither is he our knowledge of God, nor even43 K. Barth, op. cit., p. 4.

46

our experience of God. He is not our religious feeling.If this were misunderstood, there would be no more talkof Christian faith. “God speaks, he makes demands, hepromises, he acts, he is angry, he is gracious.Remove the objectivity of this “he,” and faith as love,trust and obedience also collapses.’44

Thus, according to Barth, this ‘objectivity’ of God,

as it is given to faith, has its original ground in the

Divine Trinity. Accordingly, Barth argues that,

Objectivity is in his triune life as such, and with it

knowledge is a divine reality before there is a

creaturely objectivity and knowledge.45 Expressed in a

different way, what this means is that, as the triune

God, as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, God is not an

undifferentiated ‘being’ to himself and in himself, but

he ‘confronts’ himself. More than that, he reveals

himself to us as the triune God. He makes himself to be

an ‘object’ for us in his revelation, to be our

‘counterpart,’ so that he does not meet us as an eternal

idea we could appropriate, as it were to ourselves, but

as an active ‘I’ and insofar as an absolutely unique

‘object.’

44 Otto Weber, Karl Barth’s Church Dogmatics, London 1953, p. 74.45 K. Bart, op. cit., p. 12.

47

We have now concluded and summarizes what Barth says in

this first subsection entitled, ‘Man before God, and

move onto the second subsection entitled, ‘God before

Man.’46 In this second subsection we will find out how

true the designation ‘absolutely unique object’ is when

the opposite side of what has already been considered is

now summarized. In this subsection Barth shows very

clearly why it is important that God’s ‘primary

objectivity’ be Trinitarian. God is the object, of

which we in no way take possession in the act of knowing.

From God’s objectivity, as it is granted to us in faith,

we are continually directed to that other Trinitarian

objectivity. Weber draws attention to this feature thus:

‘But that means that his unveiling in his works and signsalways implies for us his veiling as well; hisrevealedness also implies his hiddenness; and love forhim can never be without fear of him … We cannotcelebrate and receive the sacrament he instituted withoutseeking and finding him just in the sacrament over andabove the sacrament as such ….’47

Barth is of the view that God is never that kind of

‘object’ that we could think of ourselves as an

independent subject over against him. The reason for

46 K. Barth, op. cit., pp. 30ff.47 Otto Weber, op. cit., p. 74.

48

this is that, whoever knows him loses himself, for the

simple reason that, the fact that we know God is his

work and not ours.48 Barth argues that, He is and

remains the One whom we only know because he makes

himself known; he is and remains the light that is

visible and seen only in his own light. What this means

in practical terms is that he is also a mystery just in

his becoming known. He remains ‘so’ because he himself

makes himself so clear and certain to us.49

As we have already seen God’s objectivity is primarily

Trinitarian; however, what we receive in contrast to it

is a ‘second objectivity.’ This second objectivity

consists in the fact that, ‘of his works and signs in

our creaturely sphere, before our eyes and ears, and in

our hearts. As such, and of themselves, they are not

capable of yielding a knowledge of him.’50 It is from

this point that Barth can designate as a ‘sacrament’ this

objectivity in which God lets us ‘participate’ in his

truth, in short, this his ‘revelation.’ It is just

48 K. Barth, op. cit., p. 40.49 K. Barth, op. cit., p. 43.50 K. Barth, op. cit., p. 52.

49

from this standpoint that he explains how our knowledge

of God is ‘limited’ (‘knowing in part,’ ‘mirror,’

‘riddle;’ cf. 1 Cor. 13:8ff.). ‘The real basis and

essence of the sacramental reality of his revelation is

the existence of the human nature of Jesus Christ.’

Barth is of the view that, the humanity of Jesus Christ

as is the first sacrament, the foundation of all that

has been instituted and used by him even before and after

the epiphany of Jesus Christ as God’s secondary

objectivity in his revelation.51 What this signifies is

that, in the humanity of Jesus Christ there takes place,

on the one hand, the special, unique ‘eminence of a

creature,’ but on the other hand, it is also ‘God’s

self-abasement and self-estrangement.’ Both in one!

Yet, this ‘is true … of the whole sacramental reality

which has been instituted and used to attest his

revelation, and to that extent, as the means of the

knowledge of himself.’52 More than this, it is ‘neither

identical with revelation, nor with the real knowledge

of God.’ Rather, the sacramental reality ‘serves’

51 K. Barth, op. cit., p. 55.52 K. Barth, op. cit., pp. 56ff.

50

revelation ‘when God reveals himself and is known;’

however, it can ‘not serve … indeed, it can hinder and

prevent it’ (the offence).53 Yet, seen from another

side, precisely in this ‘sacramental reality’ God’s ‘I’

may become for us a ‘Thou and He,’ but in such a way

that we no doubt ‘really and truly,’ but nevertheless,

only ‘indirectly,’ participate in his own self-knowledge

(as I).54 Thus God’s revelation is quite genuinely his

own revelation, but it certainly does not become

immediately perceptible to us, something we could manage

as it were. God remains the Lord in his revelation.55

Only on the ground of the reality of such a valid and yet

indirect knowledge of God can we speak about its

possibilities. This treatment offered above is in

effect a summary of Barth’s first subsection under the

topic of the Knowledge of God which he has entitled: ‘The

Fulfilment of the Knowledge of God.’

In the next subsection, §26, which he has entitled,

‘The knowability of God,’ he offers two further

53 K. Barth, op. cit., p. 57.54 K. Barth, op. cit., p. 61.55 K. Barth, op. cit., p. 62.

51

subsections, namely, ‘The Readiness of God,’ and ‘The

Readiness of Man.’ In asking the question, what does

God’s readiness mean, Barth first of all answers, ‘He

is in his nature, and as he confronts us in his action,

so constituted that he can be known by us.’56 This

concept may be expressed differently and more concretely,

‘God is the truth, and just therein lies his readiness,

his knowability.’57 However, it is impossible to

express this at all---we need only to think of John

1:14---without immediately adding, ‘We are mindful of

God’s grace when we say that God is knowable.’ If we do

not pay sharp attention to that, then we inevitably fall

into a speculative truth, in virtue of which we

transcend our own nature and being into the infinite and

call this ultimate transcendence ‘God’ and ‘God’s truth.’

Barth now wishes to show that by means of a detailed

proof 58 that actually we have no ‘analogy,’ on the basis

of which we somehow could make intelligible to ourselves

God’s Lordship, his being the Reconciler, and the

56 K. Barth, op. cit., p. 67.57 K. Barth, op. cit., p. 70.58 K. Barth, op. cit., pp. 79ff.

52

Redeemer.59 At this point in his treatment of God’s

Readiness, Barth engages with Roman Catholic theology

and in particular with the doctrine of analogia entis;

however, since this topic has already been dealt with

above60, we will ignore it in this present context. It

is at this point where Barth is dealing with the doctrine

of analogia entis Barth asks the question: why the problem of

natural theology cannot come to a rest?61 The

explanations to this problem are arranged in a critical,

and so to speak, positive part, the first of which is

found in the present section ‘God’s Readiness,’ and the

second in the other subject of ‘Man’s Readiness.’

In the first part, Barth critically enters into the

reasons usually advanced in favour of ‘natural theology.’

First, there is the assertion that a natural knowledge

of God actually exists.62 Secondly, there are

pedagogical and pastoral points of view as, for example,

effecting a basis for discussion between Christians and

59 K. Barth, op. cit., pp. 80ff.60 see above p.18.61 K. Barth, op. cit., p. 90.62 K. Barth, op. cit., pp93ff.

53

non-Christians, establishing a ‘point of contact,’

indicating man’s responsibility.63 Thirdly, there are

Scriptural passages that do refer to a natural knowledge

of God. From this standpoint, Rom. 1.18ff.; 2.12ff.;

Acts 17 are discussed in detail, in which it is

forcefully brought out that all three passages are

closely connected with the judgement announced and the

gospel proclaimed.

At the conclusion of the critical expositions Barth asks

himself how it is that in spite of all counterarguments

‘natural theology’ throughout the centuries of Church

history has proved and still proves to have such a

persistent vitality. He now gives an answer to this in

the beginning of the next section which is entitled

‘Man’s Readiness.’64

‘Man’s Readiness,’ ‘his openness for grace,’ would also

include, besides his neediness, a definite knowledge

(of this neediness as of the reality of grace) and a

63 K. Barth, op. cit., p. 96.64 K. Barth, op. cit., pp. 138ff.

54

willingness (to accept grace).65 Barth, however,

wishes to make clear that, certainly, ‘nowhere does the

reality of the Christian, of the Christian in the

Church, of even the good Protestant Christian, give

evidence of ‘an openness of man for grace.’ What this

does bear witness to is exactly the opposite, the fact

that man being closed (to grace). It attests man’s

religious self-sufficiency and enmity to grace. What

Barth finds remarkable is the circumstance that natural

theology ‘can, nevertheless, tolerate beside it in the

area of the Church, at least, apparently, another

theology, a theology of revelation.66 For Barth,

natural theology is the perfect expression of man’s

enmity to grace---this is Barth’s positive answer to the

question cited above.

Barth now addresses the question---is there no man at all

who is open for God, for God’s revelation and grace?

If this were to prove true, then indeed, ‘natural

theology’ would be the only one still remaining. It

65 K. Barth, op. cit., p. 140.66 K. Barth, op. cit., p. 149.

55

‘would doubtless be the proper theology within the reach

of man not knowing the true God.’67 As far his question

is concerned Barth answers in the negative: ‘God’s

knowability … cannot be made intelligible as a predicate

of man as such;’68 however, there is another aspect.

The man who is ready for God is truth and life; but he

is not identical with man as such. Barth is of the view

that, the only way that one can speak of such a man is

Christologically.69 In Christ, therefore, ‘man is

ready for God.’ Jesus Christ is the ‘real man,’ and he

alone ‘sees to it that in and through him we are not

outside, but within.’70

Yet, now ‘as a rule’ ‘the Bible expressly’ describes

‘our participation in the existence and work of Jesus

Christ,’ by ‘calling it a work of the Holy Spirit.’

And ‘as a work of the Holy Spirit faith is man’s new

birth from God, on the basis of which even here man may

already live from what he is there in Jesus Christ and so

67 K. Barth, op. cit., p. 157.68 K. Barth, op. cit., p. 159.69 K. Barth, op. cit., p. 163.70 K. Barth, op. cit., p. 171.

56

in truth.’71 This, therefore, is the true ‘readiness

of man’ in opposition to which ‘natural theology’ seeks

to maintain the ‘illusion’ of ‘man’s independent

existence as such’ --- and it does so with conspicuous

vitality.72 Barth brings this subsection to a conclusion

with an exhaustive evaluation of the first article of the

Barmen Declaration. Barth brings his doctrine of the

knowledge of God to a conclusion with a further

subsection which deals with its limits; however, the

dictates of space present its summary here.

As can be seen from the summary of his work above, his

doctrine of the Knowledge of God is built upon his

doctrine of revelation which for Barth is the foundation

stone of his theology. It is also built upon his

dialectic that Man not only does have a readiness for

God, but is also opposed to the grace of God. Only

through the saving act of God in his grace can man ever

know God in his revelation. This latter is a work of

71 K. Barth, op. cit., p. 174.72 K. Barth, op. cit., p. 182.

57

the Holy Spirit which alone can enable man to exhibit a

true readiness for God through Jesus Christ.

58

Conclusion

59

This work has been a study in historical theology as it

relates to the doctrine of the Knowledge of God. Its

major intent has been to review the works of St Thomas

Aquinas and Karl Barth as they relate to this doctrine.

In so doing the prehistory of the doctrine as it was

expounded by Ireneaus and St Augustine have also been

examined in some depth. When, however, the works of

the St Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth have been compared

it was found that they had a great deal in common. Not

that Karl Barth would have agreed with everything that St

Thomas stated; on the contrary, Barth would never have

agreed with St Thomas’ doctrine on grace perfecting human

nature; however, it was Barth who noted that for the

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most part the work of St Thomas Aquinas had been ignored

by the Reformers.73

What they share in common is that knowledge of God is not

something that been gained by human beings by means of

their own intellect. St Thomas’s way of putting that is

to state that there are spiritual truths which the human

intellect by itself cannot enter into and this for him

certainly includes the Knowledge of God. In Barth’s

theology he is keen to stress the dialectic that exits

between God and human beings, so that in the portion of

his Church Dogmatics reviewed above he was found to be

asserting that mankind has no disposition for grace and,

therefore, Knowledge of God can only be gained as God

placed human beings before his word. Knowledge of God

can only be gained by revelation which is a work of the

Spirit of God. For his part St Thomas would have

concurred that revelation can only take place by means of

Holy Scripture, although it should be noted that St

Thomas held that revelation was not synonymous with Holy

73 K. Barth, The Theology of John Calvin, Grand Rapids 1995, p. 22.

61

Scripture, but that Holy Scripture made it known. This

by itself was a view that Karl Barth many centuries later

was to develop in his own theological work. Knowledge

of God, therefore, by both theologians is something

which God grants to us by his own initiative through the

pages of Holy Scripture. It is, therefore, by our

study and reading of Holy Scripture that we are to obtain

our own particular knowledge of God.

Strangely, St Thomas does not make any comment on the

necessity of revelation as a result of original sin,

although he certainly has taught this latter doctrine.

Barth, from his own standpoint has built that necessity

into his scheme and this is worked in his dialectical

theology, in which he posits that human beings have no

disposition for God, unless God by his mercy grants

grace, and also, by deduction the knowledge of God to

him.

62

‘That I may know him and the power of his resurrection,

and may share his sufferings, becoming like him in his

death,’

Philippians 3:10.

63

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64

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65

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