the journal of the army war college nigeria

THE JOURNAL OF THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE NIGERIAVol. 1 No. 1, April 2018

Gold Press LimitedIbadan

Abuja • Owerri • Lagos

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For

Army War College Nigeria

First Published, 2018

© Army War College Nigeria

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ISSN: 2672-4081

Printed and bound in Nigeria by Gold Press Limited, Ibadan.Tel: 08035636473, 08073618748

Editor-in-Chief

• Maj Gen EJ Enenche: Commandant Army War College Nigeria.

Editors

• Brig Gen C Ofoche: Director of Coordination/Studies, Army War College Nigeria.• Prof OBC Nwolise: Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan and

Visiting Professor, Army War College, Nigeria.

Editorial Advisory Panel

Prof Idowu Olayinka: Vice Chancellor, University of Ibadan.

Maj Gen AG Okunlola (rtd) Former Commandant,Army War College Nigeria.

Prof Kyari Mohammed: Vice Chancellor, Modibbo AdamaUniversity of Technology, Yola.

Maj Gen JGS Hamakim: Director-General, Nigerian Army Resource Centre, Abuja.

Dr Aituaje Irene, Pogoson: Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan.

Prof Paul Adogamhe: Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, USA.

Brig Gen MA Uba: Director, Garrison Education, Nigerian Army(former Librarian, Army War College Nigeria).

Prof Ann Fitz Gerald: Director, Security Sector Management Programme,Cranfield University - Defence Academy of theUnited Kingdom, Shrivenham.

Subscription and Marketing

Annual subscription: Individuals #24,000.00, Corporate #36,000.00. These exclude cost ofpostage. Information about advertising and other marketing matters are obtainable from the MarketingManager, The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria, Abuja.

Marketing Manager, Maj OJ Osoba. Tel: +2348137533109. E-mail: [email protected]

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NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

About The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

The name of this journal “The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria” inspirationally reflects theconstitutional protective functions of the Nigerian Army. “The Journal of the Army War CollegeNigeria ” is a peer reviewed journal instituted by the Army War College Nigeria based in Abuja. It isaimed at promoting research and advancing the frontiers of knowledge. It is a platform for publishingoriginal, well researched, and especially ground breaking research outcomes in the fields of defence,security, peace and strategic studies.

The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria is published twice a year, in April, and October.Scholars and researchers who wish to have their articles published are encouraged to send original, wellresearched, well written, and well referenced papers to the Editors for publication consideration latestthree months before each outing month. Manuscripts sent to The Journal of the Army War CollegeNigeria are not to be sent to other outlets at the same time, and should not have been publishedelsewhere. All manuscripts received and adjudged to have assessable quality will be sent out for reviewby qualified intellectual authorities in the field. The referees’ comments will be sent to the author(s)where necessary. It therefore becomes important for authors to keep a copy of their manuscripts.Publishers of The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria do not take responsibility for inaccuraciesof data in manuscripts or for any consequences of their use. Opinions expressed in articles belong to theauthor(s), and do not represent in any way those of the Journal, the Army War College Nigeria, or theNigerian army. The author of any published article is entitled to a free copy of The Journal of the ArmyWar College Nigeria in which his or her article was published.

Guideline for Submission of Articles

i. An Article should have an abstract of not more than 150 words, with keywords, immediatelybelow it, having not more than five words.

ii. Each article should be divided into introduction or preamble, the main body with subdivisions, andconclusion.

iii. Articles are to be paged from 1 to the end consecutively. Page 1 should contain the title, author’sfull name, address and status. Page 2 should contain only the title, abstract with keywords, andpart of introduction. This is to enhance blind peer review. Authors should in the same line ofthought avoid using expressions that can link them to their papers eg. “As I stated elsewhere”.

iv. Articles should not be more than 18 pages of A4 size paper, (references inclusive) and should betyped 12 point font size and 2.0 line spacing, Times New Roman.

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v. The citation style of the journal is APA, using in-text citation of author’s surname, year, and page.e.g, (Gorge, 2017:10) or George (2017:10).In the out-text (ie compiled references at the end ofthe article), the author’s surname, initials, year of publication in bracket, title, place of publicationand name of publisher are to be provided. For example; George R. T. (2017), The Role ofIntelligence in Counter Terrorism Operations, London, Mayflower Publisher.

vi. Charts, diagrams, tables and figures should be placed on separate pages.

Submission of Articles

• Original, well-researched, and well-written articles may be submitted by postal or electronicmeans.

• Electronic copies may be sent through e-mail to: [email protected] [email protected]

Two hard copies should be sent to: The Editor, The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria,Mambilla Barracks Junction, off Maitama Avenue Asokoro, Abuja, Nigeria.

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EDITORS’ NOTE

It is with great joy that the Editorial Panel felicitates with our readers over the institution and publicationof the maiden edition of this journal The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria. On behalf of allthe distinguished members of the Panel, I welcome all our readers on board this intellectual platform ofthe Army War College Nigeria.

This maiden edition encapsulates fifteen articles, some of which were lectures delivered at the Collegeby seasoned authors, and which passed through the vigorous peer review process. The articles coverwide areas relevant to contemporary national and international issues and situations. The globe is in astate of flux and it has become a truism to think that we live in exceptionally unstable times. It is acommon belief that the world has never been more unpredictable. Our current worries could certainlybe much worse judging by the vicious nature of violent crimes and devaluation of societal values, virtuesand humanity. These fundamental changes would certainly alter our way of life, our future and that ofour children, irrespective of where we live.

Economic, social and demographic change, all linked to rapid technological change, have globalimplications which among other factors define the environment. Expectedly, these factors put a hugedemand on leadership thus making leaders think of better ways of managing crises. The articles in thisjournal attempt to interrogate these issues to provide better understanding. We hope that defence andsecurity personnel, leaders, scholars, students and researchers will find these papers useful in theirrespective fields of endeavour. The general reader and lovers of wisdom will also find this platform avaluable companion.

Preparation for the next edition is now in progress, and we invite authors to send in original and wellresearched papers that strictly follow the stipulated guidelines.

Brigadier General C OFOCHE

Professor OBC NWOLISE

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The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

ISSN: 2672-4081

Contents Pages

Notes for Contributors iv

Editors’ Note vi

Foreword ix

Preface x

Nigerian Army Leadership Vision and Envisioning– Lt Gen TY Buratai 1

The Role of Narcotics in Terrorism, Insurgency and Crime: The North East BokoHaram War in Focus

– Maj Gen AG Okunlola 22

Conflict Resolution Spectrum: Negotiation By Bargaining in Integrated ConflictManagement Framework.

– Maj Gen JGS Hamakim 34

The Hybridised Nature of the Boko Haram War Against the People and ArmedForces of Nigeria: The Spiritual Dimension

– Professor OBC Nwolise and Dr SB Owonikoko 50

Jomini in The Twenty-First Century– Maj Gen BM Shafa 68

Policy and Strategy Formulation Process and Nexus– Cdre A Kpou 81

Carl Von Clausewitz and Modern War– Cdre AO Ayobanjo 92

The History of The Nigerian Army: Analysis of its Genealogy and Development– Brig Gen OL Olokor 106

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Challenges of the Nigerian Military in Internal Security Operations inThe Fourth Republic

– Dr Jude Momodu 120

Exploring Alternatives in Asymmetric Wars in Nigeria– Dr Willie Eselebor 140

Prison Congestion, Fanaticism, and Terrorism: Case for Investing in Criminal Justice– Dr H Iwu and Prof OBC Nwolise 157

The Monster called Corruption: Any Silver Bullet To Kill This Threat to NationalSecurity and Development

– Professor AB Ekanola 173

Foreign Intelligence: Competition or Cooperation in the Face of ContemporaryAsymmetric Security Challenges Confronting The World?

– Dr Femi Olufunmilade 192

The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Crude Oil Theft, and Nigeria’sNational Security

– Dr Anne Ibobo-Eze and Chukwuemeka Jaja Nwanegbo 206

Contemporary Logistics Support Challenges in African Union Peace Support Operations– Brig Gen Adekunle Adeyinka 238

Book Review (1)

Gender-Based Violence in Contemporary Nigeria: Essays in Honour ofProfessor Alake Bolanle Awe

– Dr. Benjamin A. Aluko 245

Book Review (2)

Nigeria’s Anti-Terror War Against Boko Haram: The Turning Point and Lessons for NationalSecurity and Development

– Brig Gen Bello A. Tsoho 248

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FOREWORD

Napoleon spoke wisely when he asserted that three newspapers are to be feared more than a thousandbayonets, because at the end, ideas conquer the sword. It is true that military weapons can be awesome,and the money of the rich can be tantalisingly subduing to the lily-livered. But what really rules the worldis neither the soldier’s gun nor the rich man’s money. The world is ruled by ideas and knowledge, whichdrive creativity, resourcefulness and innovativeness. This is why serious organisations or nations promoteknowledge, research and innovation; and those who are in the field of research are always in need ofcredible outlets for the publication and dissemination of their research outputs. The institution of thisjournal increases these credible outlets.

I congratulate the pioneer Commandant, Army War College Nigeria, Major General AG Okunlola(rtd), whose wisdom gave birth to the concept and ground work for this journal, and his successor,Major General EJ Enenche who brought it to fruition and the College staff for achieving this academicfeat within such a short time of the College’s take-off barely two years ago. I also congratulate all theauthors whose papers made this maiden edition.

There is no doubt that this volume has a very rich menu for participants, lecturers, policy makers,law makers, scholars, researchers, defence and security personnel, and the general readers. To all theseand others, I recommend this maiden edition of THE JOURNAL OF THE ARMY WAR COLLEGENIGERIA.

TY BURATAILieutenant GeneralChief of Army Staff

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PREFACE

The Nigerian security environment has rapidly evolved and significantly increased the responsibilitiesplaced on the Military. These responsibilities have grown from the traditional protection of Nigeria’sgeographical territory against external aggression to addressing internal security challenges includingterrorism and insurgency. The duties of the military have tremendously expanded ranging from caring fordistressed citizens to defence and security research efforts aimed at promoting the safety and well-beingof Nigerians and the world, at large.

The institution of this journal flows from this line of thought. The military today in Nigeria andbeyond have several officers who are capable of advancing the frontiers of knowledge along with theircompatriots in tertiary institutions and research organisations. This journal provides an excellent meetingpoint and platform for cross-fertilisation of ideas and promotion of positive civil-military relations. TheArmy War College Nigeria does not only train military officers in warfare, but equally in strategic thinkingand research. Thus, we love, respect and advance knowledge. The Journal of the Army War CollegeNigeria is meant to empower and galvanise its readers in this quest, and we most humbly invite you tocome on board.

The College is very grateful of the Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Tukur Yusuf Buratai forthe great support and encouragement given to the College since its inception and specifically for thisjournal. We also thank and appreciate the Governing Board of the College for approving the journaland their steadfast support in its publication.

I must also not fail to acknowledge and appreciate the invaluable efforts of the pioneer Commandantof the College, Major General AG Okunlola (rtd) under whom this journal was conceptualised andcommenced. On behalf of the officers, participants and soldiers of the College, I thank and appreciateMajor General Okunlola and wish him long life, good health and success in his post-retirementundertakings. We are sure he will be glad to see the publication of this maiden edition of the journal, toserve the objectives for which it was conceived.

I greatly appreciate the editors, Brigadier General Charles Ofoche and Professor OBC Nwolise,who joined the College in July 2017 on sabbatical leave, for enabling the College pull this feat throughwithin the first two years of its existence. Finally, let me congratulate all the authors whose articlespassed through the rigorous peer review process.

EJ ENENCHEMajor GeneralCommandant and Editor-in-Chief

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The Journal of the Army War College NigeriaVol. 1 No.1 April, 2018

NIGERIAN ARMY LEADERSHIP VISION AND ENVISIONING

by

Lt Gen TY BurataiChief of Army Staff

HeadquartersNigerian Army

Abuja

ABSTRACT

Leadership is a critical factor in the life-wire of any organisation or society.The will, vision, and exemplary behaviour, attitude and actions of a goodleader motivate the followers to give their best in the achievement ofestablished goals. In this paper, the author interrogates Nigerian ArmyLeadership vision and envisioning, x-raying his leadership approach throughhis vision for the Nigerian Army, as well as the core values underpinningresponse to this vision.

Key words: Nigerian Army, Leadership, Vision, Envisioning.

INTRODUCTION

Leadership is the engine-house and most fundamental element in the life of any human association,from the family, through the group to the national and international levels. Its nature and qualitydetermine the progressive locomotion, stagnation, retrogression or even extinction of the association.In the group, society or nation, it is good leadership that makes things to happen. It catalyses theprocess of development in pursuit of established goals. In management, leadership is the heart of theorganisation. In both the nation and organisation, leadership is the propelling force. No surprisetherefore that Nwolise and Ohaemesi (2001:1) observed:

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That leadership is a crucial factor in organisational, group, national orinternational locomotion is a non-contestable assertion. Findings of severalstudies, as well as the experiences of men and nations, in human historyhave revealed either the cataclysmic or progressive role leaders play inthe affairs of men, nations and kingdoms. While for example, Germanswill always recall with sadness the destructions and humiliation broughtby Adolf Hitler to their nation during the Second World War, 1939 – 1945,the South Africans will always remember with joy the selfless and patrioticrole of Nelson Mandela, first in the struggle to liberate themselves fromthe stranglehold of apartheid, second in propelling their nation throughthe difficult period of transition to democracy, and third in giving theirnation the appropriate milieu needed to balance racial relations in the firstfew years of post-apartheid reconstruction as the first Black Presidentof South Africa.

The key active elements in leadership are character, courage, strategy and vision. As NormanSchwarzkopf (2001) noted and advised: “Leadership is a potent combination of strategy and character.But if you must be without one, be without strategy”.

Nations and human organisations, including military institutions that are lucky to have good leadership,especially visionary and courageous leaders with integrity, no doubt not only progress but do so muchmore easily, smoothly and speedily than those that do not. The task of this modest piece therefore is tointerrogate Nigerian Army leadership vision and envisioning. To a large extent, it x-rays my leadershipapproach through my vision for the Nigerian Army. The rationale for this is not far-fetched. First, is toemphasise the need for good leadership at all levels of the Nigerian Army, especially in these days ofmultiple threats to Nigeria’s national security and tasking Peace Support Operations. For the progressivedevelopment of the service, and for the NA to hold strong in its professional and constitutional duties tothe nation and humanity, at the national, regional, and global levels, giving credible leadership wherenecessary at all times is critical, for the maintenance of the Service’s integrity.

Second, Collin Legum once remarked that Nigeria is Africa’s most important country, especiallylooking at its large population (largest concentration of Black people in the world), natural resourcesand trained people which if well managed can give the continent focused leadership. In his words:

Properly developed and with a properly functioning political system, itcould provide decisive leadership for the entire continent (Legum, quotedin Ogunsanwo, 1986:24).

The Nigerian Army in particular, and the Armed Forces of Nigeria in general, have great role to playin ensuring that a properly functioning political system exists in the country to enable it continue topractise and promote democracy in the continent.

Third, ensuring good leadership in the NA in particular and the Armed Forces of Nigeria in generalat the domestic level is crucial for providing military leadership at continental and global levels. This

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virtue was clear to Nigeria’s political leaders early and the role of the military was embedded in it atindependence. For example, Chief Ayo Rosiji during a parliamentary debate in 1960 noted:

Nigeria should be prepared to give Africa not only political leadership butalso military leadership... what will entitle Nigeria to that leadership isthe dynamism with which we pursue our foreign policy and also themilitary forces which we have at our disposal will give us the respectwhich is due to Nigeria. (Rosiji quoted in Fawole: 2000: 27).

This is a statement of confidence in, and serious task assignment to the Nigerian military. It is veryimportant that this confidence is maintained through ensuring good leadership of the NA and the entireArmed Forces of Nigeria, given the fact that a nation’s armed forces constitute the teeth of its foreignpolicy, and also its flag showing entity at the world stage especially through Peace Support Operations,and foreign visits of its Navy.

The purpose of this paper is to highlight my humble contributions to the NA leadership as well as myvision for the service and envisioning the future of the service. The paper would therefore undertake aconceptual clarification and establish the nexus between the concepts. Subsequently, leadership andmanagement at strategic, operational and tactical levels of military activities would be discussed beforetouching on NA leadership and contemporary challenges. Thereafter, the constitutional roles and NAleadership vision, elements of my vision as the COAS, and core values underpinning the response toCOAS’ vision would be examined. Furthermore, NA leadership and strategic efforts in reviewing theNA ORBAT, operational issues for the NA, tactical matters and induction of new equipment would beconsidered. Finally, the welfare of personnel, and envisioning the future perspective for the NA wouldbe addressed.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

In order to enhance better understanding and appreciation of this modest piece, it is deemed necessaryto define or clarify concepts in the topic which are leadership, vision, and envisioning. Related to theseconcepts are military leadership, command and management which need to be understood in the light ofthe discourse.

LeadershipLeadership as a concept is difficult to define to the specificity of every one’s taste. Lippet (1990:131)underscored this problem when he wrote that: “Leadership is the worst defined, least understood personalattribute sometimes possessed by human beings.”

This problem notwithstanding, it is important that an author and his readers have a commonunderstanding of key concepts in a discourse. The separate definitions of leadership by three scholarsinterest us here. Pigors (1935) points out leadership in terms of the will, feeling, and vision of a leaderwhich direct others in pursuing a common objective. In his words:

Nigerian Army Leadership Vision and Envisioning 3


Leadership is a concept applied to the personality-environment relationto describe the situation when a personality is so placed in the environmentthat his will, feeling, and insight direct and control others in the pursuit ofa common course.

Drucker (quoted in D’souza, 1995:52-53), emphasises leadership in terms of higher vision,performance and responsibility, and ability of a leader to develop and motivate his subordinates:

Leadership is the lifting of a man’s vision to higher sights, the raising of aman’s performance to higher standard, the building of a man’sresponsibility beyond its normal limitations.

He goes further to add that “effective leaders have more confidence in their own abilities; expect agreat deal from themselves and from others, and have the ability to stimulate and to develop theirsubordinates”. Keating (1982:13) brings out the element of service in his own definition of leadership.For him:

Leadership is service, in the sense that it seeks to meet the needs ofanother or of the group by performing needed functions. Sometimes,strong directive power is effective leadership, such as when a group haslost its sense of direction, sometimes the group needs to be encouragedand supported; at other times, it may need to be re-orientated. Leadershipserves the needs of the group.

These three definitions are worth noting with their different areas of emphasis: “will, feeling andinsight direct and control others”, “lifting of man’s vision… raising of a man’s performance”, and “service”.The basic elements of leadership are: the leader, who is central to the direction, motivation, policyformulation and effective activities for accomplishing goals; the followers; the situation; and the taskconfronting the leader and followers. (Nwolise and Ohaemesi 2001:12).

A leader should have certain qualities to be able not only to perform his duties but also to motivatehis followers to bring out their best in pursuit and achievement of established goals. Different scholarshave their own lists: Cronin has 14 qualities, Arnold 7, Sucik 5, Stogdill 6, Lester 20, etc (in Nwoliseand Ohaemesi 2001: 31 – 37). The qualities that seem common among most scholars are vision, (senseof right direction and goal orientation), courage, integrity, discipline, loyalty, sense of justice, honour,selflessness, tact, decisiveness, moral character, good knowledge of his mission, enthusiasm, actionoriented, and being humane. D’souza summed up his submission on qualities of leaders by pointing outtwo most outstanding qualities that mark true leaders:

a. They have a dream that they are very determined and enthusiastic to achieve.

b. They are people of action.

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The summary therefore is vision and action.

Vision

A simple meaning of vision is “the ability to think about the future with imagination or wisdom’’ (Soanes,2001:1032). This links up with dreaming great dreams on how to give the best to the group or followers.In the realm of the military, the Masters of Huainan (quoted in Tzu, 1988 xx) assert that: “A general mustsee alone and know alone, meaning that he must see what others do not see and know what others donot know.”

In the same vein, Simon Sinek (2014) taught us that: “Great leaders must have two things: a visionof the world that does not yet exist, and the ability to communicate that vision clearly”.

Envisioning

To envision in everyday usage means “to visualise or envisage” which connotes seeing something as apossibility (Soanes, 2001:298). Envisioning is a mental process of anticipating the issues that are likelyto arise in future environment. Some elements of envisioning are pro-activeness as well as critical,creative and reflective thinking. The spirit of envisioning is pivotal to the attainment of a vision or goal.

Military Leadership and Command

Obiakor (2007:295) informs us that in the military:

Leadership is inseparable from command. Command, discipline, andleadership are the essence of any military system. At the head of thissystem stands the commander, the officer from whom all authoritiesradiate.

He observes that military leadership is “the projection of personality and character to get soldiersto do what is required of them’’. Quoting Slim, he notes that leadership attribute is “that mixture ofexample, persuasion and compulsion which makes men do what you want them to do” (ibid: 305).Quoting the Canadian Military Leadership Journal, he presents the definition of command as “thelegal authority to issue orders and to compel obedience”. He also presents NATO definition ofcommand as “the authority vested in an individual for the direction, coordination, and control ofmilitary forces’’. For Clausewitz, command is “leadership in war’’ (ibid: 296). Field MarshalMontgomery (1958) in his own view perceives command as “the capacity and the will to rally menand women to a common purpose, and the character which inspires confidence’’. The British ArmyDoctrine Publication on command identifies qualities of leadership relevant to military functions as thequalities required by commanders: professional knowledge, intellect, character, integrity, vision, ability to communicate, judgement, initiative, courage and resolve, intuition as well as self-confidence’’.

Master Tzu (1988:6), the legendary Chinese Philosopher, General, and strategist has five virtues orqualities that a military leader must have. In his words: “Leadership is a matter of intelligence,



trustworthiness, humaneness, courage, and sternness’’. The ancient kings of his time consideredhumaneness as the most important of these five, while the Martial artists chose intelligence. Du Mu (inibid) explains these five virtues thus:

Intelligence involves ability to plan and to know when to changeeffectively. Trustworthiness means to make people sure of punishmentor reward. Humaneness means love and compassion for people, beingaware of their toils. Courage means to seize opportunities to make certainof victory without vacillation. Sternness means to establish discipline inthe ranks by strict punishments.

These five virtues must flow in their right proportion and mix as intelligence alone will result inrebelliousness, humaneness alone will produce weakness, trust alone will produce folly, courage alonewill generate violence, while excessive sternness will result in cruelty. However, “when one has all fivevirtues together, each appropriate “to its function, then one can be a military leader”. (ibid).

Management

The word management in its everyday usage means “to manage’’, “to be in charge of an organisation orpeople “(Soanes, 2001:547), or “the action of managing”. A manager thus is “a person who managesstaff, an organisation or a sports team.” At a higher intellectual level, management is the art and scienceof achieving goals through people – making people do what they are supposed to do, to ensure greaterproductivity or continuous improvement. It is the process of planning and maintaining an environmentthat enables individuals working together in groups to accomplish set goals. Managers execute themanagerial functions of planning, organising, staffing, leading and controlling. Thus, management is thedevelopment of bureaucracy which derives its relevance from the need for strategic planning, coordination,directing, and controlling huge and complex decision making processes. Essentially, management involvesthe acquisition of managerial competence and effectiveness in problem solving, administration, humanresources management and organisational leadership. There has been a lot of debate as to whethermanagement and leadership are the same or not. The consensus is that the two mean different things.Baucom (1990:23) argues:

To lead has clear connotations of influencing behaviour by example, bybeing in front, by going before; to lead the way, to go in advance ofothers…to be at the head of command, direct... On the other hand, thereare aspects of management that have clear connotations of manipulation,administration, and supervision; leadership implies proximity to thosebeing led.

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Cronin in his view (in Lester and Morton, 1990:221) asserts that:

While it is true that an effective manager is often an effective leader, andleadership requires among other things, many of the skills of an effectivemanager, there are differences. Leaders are people who infuse visioninto an organisation or a society. At their best, they are preoccupied withvalues and the longer range needs and aspirations of their followers.Managers are concerned with doing things the right way.

Lester (1990: 339) informs us in summary that “Leaders focus on people, while managers deal withthings”. Quoting Sir William Slim, he concludes that:

...Managers are necessary, leaders are essential. Leadership is of thespirit, compounded of personality, and vision... Management is of themind, more a matter of accurate calculation, statistics, methods, timetableand routine.

Hodges (1977) observes that the study of Management has become necessary because of tworeasons: One is that society today depends on specialised organisations guided by the decisions of oneor more persons called “managers”. Two, many of the persons that find themselves in managerial poststoday are not trained as managers.

NEXUS BETWEEN LEADERSHIP, VISION, ENVISIONING,COMMAND AND MANAGEMENT

The systems led by strategic leadership are ponderous and complex. They change slowly and only withgreat expenditure of energy. Within this protracted time horizon, strategic performance requires vision,envisioning, and consensus building. Thus a visionary leader is a leader who possesses the quality,competence and capacity of creative thinking, planning and mapping the future of his organisation ornation to survive challenges and make progress. When the ideals of a leader become manifest byproviding guidance to impact the organisation positively, then he is regarded as a visionary leader.According to Roberts (n.d.), visionary leaders are effective at leading a team toward achieving a commongoal. These leaders promote organised learning, creativity, and the development of strong relationshipswithin the team. Visionary leadership is useful for institutions that are focused on the future. As the nameimplies, visionary leaders are successful in creating a positive and inspirational vision of the future andconveying that vision in an engaging manner that attracts committed followers. A visionary leaderunderstands the need for meaning and purpose in followers, and uses that need to inspire followers toachieve more and to build better futures. Followers feel motivated by the vision and often feel a sense ofsolidarity within the group because of the common cause.

Innovation is a vital part of vision, because to remain successful, the institution must continuallygrow, improve, and find new ways to achieve goals. Visionary leaders thrive on innovation and change.



These leaders encourage creative thinking and problem-solving skills to surmount complex challenges.A visionary leader embraces change and views the use of new ideas and processes as progress. Hestrives to find better and faster ways to achieve success, and surmount problems. This requires thevisionary leader to be pro-active and possess critical, creative, and reflective thinking abilities.

Leadership, Command and Management

There is no doubt that even though leadership, command and management mean different things, thethree are closely connected. Leadership is an essential part of command. Management lays the structurefor authority and creates responsibilities; while leadership provides direction, inspiration and vision, andcommunicates same to the followers or employees. The realm of management is abstract and anchoredon written communication, whereas leadership is hinged on charisma and verbal prowess in communicationto motivate and carry followers along. In the military organisation, command and leadership are inseparable,as noted earlier. On leadership and management, Massie (1987:V) notes that “leading is the final actionof a manager in getting others to act after all preparations have been completed”. Leadership here, henotes, concerns the total manner in which the manager influences the actions of his subordinates whichenables them carry out their assignments.

Command requires a lot of leadership skills and qualities. Leadership is concerned with the moralor human aspects of command – involving as noted earlier the projection of character and personality toget followers perform their tasks, motivated by examples they see in their leader. Management has todo more with the allocation and control of resources to successfully accomplish established goals.Obiakor (2007: 318 – 9) states that:

In the military environment, management is seen as the use of a range oftechniques to enhance the planning, organisation and execution ofoperations, logistics administration and procurement. Essentially, bothmanagement and command contain elements of leadership decision-making and control. It is the mix of these elements that makes for thedifferences between management and command, and explains why thenature of command changes with level. Whilst command must beexercised in differing conditions of peace and conflict, it is only fullytested under the extra-ordinary stress of conflict and war. It is thesecircumstances that differentiate between command and management.

He went further to add:

In principle, command (in identifying what needs to be done and why)embraces both management activities (allocating the means (resources)to achieve it), and leadership (getting subordinates to willingly achieveit). While management may not necessarily be a requirement ofcommand, resources allocation, budgetary responsibilities, and associated

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management techniques have become critical considerations in anincreasing number of military activities. Hence, the need for senior militaryofficers, aspiring to high commands and senior staff positions to studymanagement techniques.

In a recent review, the competencies of effective strategic leadership were distilled to three factors.Effective strategic leadership must create and maintain absorptive and adaptive capacity in addition toobtaining managerial wisdom. Absorptive capacity involves the ability to learn by recognising newinformation, assimilating it, and applying it. Adaptive capacity involves the ability to change due tovariations while managerial wisdom consists of discernment and intuition.

LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT AT STRATEGIC OPERATIONALAND TACTICAL LEVELS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES

This discourse comes at a time when Nigeria’s peace and security remains on a delicate balance. Theinternational environment remains volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous, while Nigeria’s geo-strategic influence is increasingly being threatened by non-state actors at home through terrorism, militancy,and separatist agitations. Although the nature of conflicts around the world have become largely asymmetric,non-state actors are becoming more audacious and showing greater capabilities to engage state forcesin near conventional scenarios. This has been demonstrated in the Middle East by the capability of theIslamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to defeat conventional armies on open battlefields. This was alsoattempted by the Boko Haram as it seized large swathes of our dear country between 2013 – 2014 tocreate a dubious caliphate based on terror, violence, intimidation and injustice. Accordingly, the NigerianArmy (NA) is saddled with the task of developing a ready mix of capabilities that can counter a widespectrum of threats. The vision of the NA leadership is therefore encapsulated to ensure a seamlessconnection between the ends, the ways and the means, as the NA continues to be the pride of the nationin safeguarding our national security. In the words of Bill Newman (1993), “The greatest tragedy tobefall a man is having a sight without a vision”. In other words, one of the core competencies of strategicleadership is envisioning a desired future for the organisation being led. Thus leadership and vision areinvariably two sides of the same coin. Leadership as seen in its conceptualisation is central to goal settingas it involves the subjection of a group or organisation to the will of one member of the organisation. Theword “group” or organisation ordinarily may sound academic, but in our military profession it refers toa command or unit with troop placed under command.

Military leadership as earlier conceptualised involves controlling officers and soldiers, providingthem purpose, direction, and motivation all geared to achieving organisational mission. In other words,for a military leader to achieve set goals or to accomplish assigned mission, such a leader must explicitlydefine his purpose, provide direction for his command, and must never underestimate the place ofmotivational factor for his troop. Therefore, military leadership, whether at tactical, operational orstrategic level like any form of leadership is dependent on certain attributes, or qualities as we sawearlier. The proper combination of these qualities with hard work, dedication and endurance will determine



to a large extent the effectiveness of military leaders. Noah Kagan (2014) succinctly alluded to this fact,when he posited that “Every great thing takes time to happen, and one must persist no matter thecircumstances. The willingness to go beyond where others stopped is the hallmark of leadership.”Effective leadership at all levels is pivotal to the success of any organisation and is the key toachieving collective excellence.

In the words of Gen Norman Schwarzkopf (2001), “Leadership is the ability to inspire people towillingly do that which they wouldn’t ordinarily do.” The quest for leadership predates modern history.Therefore, understanding the leadership process, as well as the strength and weakness of past leadersbecomes necessary in order to equip future leaders with the relevant leadership skills to enable themrender dedicated service to mankind. This is particularly important at this time when the yearning forpurposeful leadership has increased more than ever before. Leadership is an interactive process. Thecollective energy of a group, organisation, or nation is focused on the attainment of a common objectiveor goal. Through leadership, clarity of purpose, direction, and means are achieved. There is also aperception of shared commitment by members. However, leadership tasks at the top of a large-scalemilitary organisation are different from those at lower levels, because the nature and volume of workchange as an individual moves up through the hierarchy.

Leaders at the tactical level are responsible for getting things done; and are thus action-oriented.When compared with strategic level leaders, they have little discretion about the decisions they make,the procedures they use, and the degree of innovation they may implement. They may improvise butthey rarely invent, because, at their level, consistency of action is important. They are more of managersof men and resources placed under them. The operational level leaders are responsible for setting shortand mid-term goals and directions, and for developing the plans, procedures and processes used by thetactical level. This category of leaders is also responsible for prioritising missions and allocating majorresources to tailor capability at the lower levels.

Strategic level leaders are responsible for the strategic direction of their organisations within thecontext of the strategic environment, which is now increasingly global. The term “strategic” here impliesbroad scale and scope. It requires forward vision extending over a long time span. Therefore, strategicleadership is a process wherein those responsible for large-scale organisations set long-term directionsand obtain, through consensus building, the energetic support of key constituencies necessary for thecommitment of resources. Therefore, there is a nexus between leadership and management especiallyfrom the functions of the strategic level down to the tactical level. Typically, it is understood that leadersengage in the “higher” functions of running the organisation, while managers handle the more mundanetasks.

NIGERIAN ARMY LEADERSHIP AND CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES

The Internal Environment

Nigeria has over the last decade experienced a number of threats to its national security, which haveshaped the focus of the leadership of the NA. The NA has been involved in numerous operations bothinternally and externally in accordance with its constitutional roles as dictated by both domestic andforeign policy objectives. It is also noted that evolutionary trend in warfare and by extension global

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security threats, are being influenced by political, economic, social and technological factors. Thesefactors largely elicited the incidence and influence of non-state actors on the international scene,undermined national border limitations and reduced monopoly of power and freedom of action ofnation-states. Therefore, the need for regular improvement on the existing capability and resources ofthe NA to be able to deal with present and future security threats is most imperative.

It is crucial to warn and advise that the military generally and the NA particularly must firmly remainapolitical to defend our constitution by providing the needed security environment as a guarantee for thesurvival of our democracy. To achieve this as an effective military leader, it becomes paramount to carryout accurate threats assessment in the formulation of the nation’s security policies, which would enhancethe ability of the NA to acquire the needed capabilities and resources to deal with these emergingplethora of Internal Security (IS) Threats.

The External Environment

It is quite needless to state the obvious that some domestic threats from one nation or region oftentranscend national boundaries. This is particularly true and worrisome when the traditional notion ofabsolute sovereignty of states as conceived in the UN Charter (1945) is increasingly being eroded orchallenged by globalisation. Nigeria, like other state-actors in the global system is also grappling withthe menace of cross-border crimes, such as human and small arms trafficking, drugs peddling, smuggling,banditry, cyber threats, money laundering, espionage, terrorism and many others. In this vein, even theBoko Haram Terrorism (BHT) transcended our national borders with attendant devastating consequencesto our contiguous neighbours particularly those of the Lake Chad region. In other words, to tackle suchemergent threats, collaborative effort among neighbours, sub-regional and regional organisations becomesinevitable.

Regrettably, it is observed that even in the face of dwindling economic fortunes coupled with adramatic increase in global security threats, some contiguous neighbours continue to remain indifferentover issues of common security concern with Nigeria. This is where the NA leadership and the militaryas a whole in concert with the Grand strategic focus must continue to devise means of engagement withnations especially neighbouring countries towards the promotion of Nigeria’s national security. Despiteour domestic security challenges, the NA under my tenure has continued to meet considerable internationalobligations in UN peace keeping and regional peace enforcement efforts for the overall promotion ofglobal peace and security.

CONSTITUTIONAL ROLES AND NIGERIAN ARMY LEADERSHIP VISION

The roles and tasks of the NA are derived from the Constitution and the National Defence Policy.Section 217 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria tasks the Armed Forces ofNigeria (AFN) to defend Nigeria from external aggression, maintain its territorial integrity and secure itsborders from violation on land, sea or air. The AFN are to also suppress insurrection, and act in aid ofcivil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President, subject to such conditionsas may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly. Furthermore, the AFN are to perform such



other functions as may be prescribed by an act of the National Assembly. These purposes for which theNA was established were reduced to a mission statement, which is

To win all land battles, defend the territorial integrity of Nigeria, protectand advance her national interests and accomplish other tasks as may beassigned in aid to civil authority.

Vision in the face of such mission can be regarded as a pleasing imaginative plan for or in anticipationof future events which must be idealistic and a model of a future state of an organisation. Professor BurtNanus (1995) posited that a “vision must possess the proportion of appropriateness, standards ofexcellence, purpose and direction. A vision must be communicated, shared and understood by all withinthe organisation for a successful impact”. Added to this, it is believed, that a vision must be compelling,inspiring and credible. In the case of the Nigerian Army, the COAS’ vision must take cognisance of keyaspects of the constitutional provisions relating to the Nigerian Army, the National Defence Policy,Nigerian Army Doctrine and other extant policy documents on national security. This is because inmodern management, vision is a key concept to achieving organisational objectives.

On my assumption of office, a deep assessment of the Nigerian Army’s capabilities vis-a-vis itsongoing operations all over the country as well as the possible future challenges was undertaken. Threethings became very clear: poor state of equipment holding, manpower deficiency, and low morale.Therefore, the need to optimise existing capacity while strategising for all-round increased combatefficiency became very compelling. Consequently, I became infused with the intension to build a highlysustainable and functional Army that will be the most decisive land force in Africa.

ELEMENTS OF MY VISION AS CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF

This vision is hinged on two cardinals which are professionalism and responsiveness. Professionalism isabout doing things the way they should be done “based on the ability of skill expected of a professional”that should be noted for competence (Soanes, 2001: 716). The foundation of military professionalism ismilitary discipline. Its attributes include organisation, expertise, responsibility, corporateness and adherenceto professional code of conduct. On the other hand, responsiveness is the ability to respond adequatelyto situations by being proactive. Indeed, this is in line with the Nigerian Army offensive responsivedoctrine. In between these pillars are the core values that will drive the officers and soldiers to adequatelyimbibe the culture of professionalism and responsiveness.

Responsiveness is the quality or state of being responsive. It is the ability of an officer orsoldier to promptly respond, adapt and adjust to given instructions within a given time frame. This has todo with personal responsibilities especially as it relates to a group which in this case is the NA. Paramountto personal responsibility is being responsible for one’s own actions and well-being. In this scenario,consequences are suffered when one fails to do what is right. Being responsive refers to our ability tomake decisions that serve our own interests and the interests of the group. Typical examples of thepillars of professionalism and responsiveness are the NODUF exercises that the NA has been conducting

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in all the established crisis areas in the country. These exercises were aimed at exercising personnel inreal time operational scenarios as against simulated training situations. Ex HARBIN KUNAMA,CROCODILE SMILE and Ex CAT RACE, are typical examples and more of such NODUF exercisesare planned.

Professionalism and responsiveness are like joint ventures as they are interrelated and we mustaccept consequences, blame and retribution when we err. In the same vein, strict, conscious and consistentadherence should be recognised and rewarded. This means that we have to commit ourselves to lead,follow, solve problems and display situational awareness at all times. Indeed, it involves working hardand even taking risks, which could be daunting and also rewarding. Core issues that emanate fromprofessionalism and responsiveness in my vision include training, regimentation, welfare, operationalexigencies, logistics, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Inter-Agency Cooperation and observanceof core values. We shall examine these in a little more details.

Training

Training is discipline and instruction directed to the development and formation of character andacquisition of enhanced skills. Training, being a cornerstone of military professionalism underscoresthe importance of a sound, robust and standard engagement. The ability to be professionally responsiveto any operational situation therefore depends largely on the level and type of training of a nation’smilitary. Therefore, my vision envisages that training in all aspects of our professional duties must begiven its rightful place.

Regimentation

The NA has rich customs, traditions and ethics. These translate to the high level of regimentation aswitnessed in the NA from its inception up to late 1990s. Regimentation as practised during this periodwas built through a series of activities meant to reflect the essential elements of professionalism. Theseactivities include drills, parades, mess life, training and recreational activities. Resuscitation of regimentationthrough regular conduct of parades and restoration of declining mess life amongst others are now givenserious attention. Commanders at all levels are thus to ensure that orientation cadres are conducted foryoung soldiers and officers posted to units in order to enshrine aspects of unit regimentation early inthem.

Operational Exigencies

Operational exigencies are unforeseen emergencies which could disrupt and derail a Commander’soverall or original plan, if not properly managed. Our exposure in Internal Security (IS) has brought tothe fore the need for detailed consideration of operational exigencies in the planning and execution ofoperations. This is not unconnected with the fact that response to operational exigencies is supposed tobe instinctive. Therefore, my vision advocates innovative approach to prosecuting the counter-terrorism/counter insurgency (CT/COIN) and IS operations. In fighting insurgents and other sundry criminals, the



NA has adopted the offensive posture by taking the battle to the terrorists/criminals enclaves and defeatingthem. Hence, response must be quick, adequate and appropriate taking into cognisance our Rules ofEngagement.

CORE VALUES UNDERPINNING RESPONSE TO COAS’ VISION

Core values underpinning response to COAS’ vision and values in the NA are ethics and standardswhich compel personnel to fulfill their professional obligations with respect and honour. The valueswhich are implied within the pillars of my vision include loyalty, integrity, courage, knowledge,responsibility, discipline, availability and efficiency.

To implement the COAS’ vision, there is no doubt that there are key challenges before us that mustbe overcome. These include the current complex, competitive and unpredictable security environmentin which the Nigerian Army finds itself operating and may remain so for the foreseeable future. TheNigerian Army is at a turning point after a real test that seemed to have exposed so many of its frailties.Over the past seven years, the Nigerian Army had focused its resources and processes on fighting warof CT/COIN and maintaining its Peace Support Operations (PSOs) requirements. While meeting its(PSO) objectives, the achievements in CT/COIN operations have been less than desired until lately.This situation is largely attributable to inappropriate responsiveness to emerging events even when therewere clear indicators.

NIGERIAN ARMY LEADERSHIP AND STRATEGIC EFFORTSIN REVIEWING THE NIGERIAN ARMY ORBAT

It is pertinent to recall the words of General George Marshall that success at “the strategic level dependson the ability to persuade influential people and organisations, both in and out of government, to employtheir efforts to accomplish a vision.” This statement is manifestly timeless and incontrovertible. To bringpurposeful leadership for the NA and to actualise my vision, it became imperative to galvanise everycritical element both human and material from within and outside the NA to successfully drive throughstrategic actions. Some of these bold strategic initiatives deserve a cursory mention or highlight here.

Efforts on Review of the NA ORBAT

To achieve my vision, there are a few critical steps we adopted. The first step was looking at theprofessional disposition vis-à-vis our manifest constitutional responsibilities in the face of the unpredictablecontemporary security landscape. It became apparent to tinker with the NA Force structure byreviewing the NA ORBAT 2010. The Nigerian Army had to begin transforming itself from a forcethat gradually reacts, to one that is proactive in the face of emerging events. Indeed, we brought newfocus on counterinsurgency operational trends with an effective concept and flexible adaptable manner.This included the range of combat commander’s requirements as part of a Corps to deal with internalsecurity operations and irregular warfare, deterring and defeating aggression and providing supportto civil authorities, as well as, conducting humanitarian, disaster relief and other operations.

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The Nigerian Army has embarked on an aggressive recruitment drive. The NA ORBAT 2010(Revised) puts the Nigerian Army strength all rank to about 150,000. In order to address the shortfallin manpower, we have reviewed the recruitment procedure, increased the intake into Depot NA,modernised the training programme and improved the training facilities. In order to recruit trainablemanpower, the Nigerian Army is making aggressive recruitment process to shore-up the NA state ofmanpower. Thus, the recruitment of trainable young Nigerians through a transparent procedure consistentwith global best practices will enable us address the persistent manpower challenges in NA.

Similarly, there was the need to re-appraise the tactics of the degraded BHT in the North East(NE) in order to address the issue of mobility in the desert terrain. In this regard, we introduced the168 MC Bn as a novel innovation fully operational with powerful motorcycles to effectively outpacethe BHT during pursuit in difficult terrains. The unit has been fully incorporated into the revised NAORBAT and it has begun to yield positive dividends. The challenges of increased militancy, pipelinevandalism, kidnapping in the South-South have been accorded appropriate attention in the NA ORBATby the creation of 6 Div with HQ in Port Harcourt with 2 and 16 Bdes in Uyo and Yenagoa respectively.In the same light, the ORBAT has also brought in 8 TF Div in Monguno to synergise with 7 Div inMaiduguri. On completion of CT/COIN operations, 8 TF Div will move to its location in Sokotopermanently. We have equally made a bold attempt to establish the Nigerian Army University in Biu,Borno State and efforts are ongoing to secure Presidential approval to facilitate its take off. Theinstitution is to train service personnel to acquire adequate technical manpower that could meet up theincreasing scientific needs of the NA in this Twenty-first Century.

COAS’ STRATEGIC INITIATIVES FOR THE NIGERIAN ARMYThe desire to make the Nigerian Army more responsive within the imperatives of military actions demandsnew equipment and special training to some extent. While every soldier will not be trained for all missions,the Nigerian Army as a whole will be trained to be capable of accomplishing all the missions with whichit may be tasked. To do this the Nigerian Army must re-invigorate capabilities that have declined,develop new capabilities for the changing world and adapt processes to reflect the broader range ofrequirements. This will require leveraging the capacity and capabilities of the entire Army includingdeveloping an active reserve force. It will also require investments and changes in generating the neededforce to ensure it is organised to optimise resources, capture and implement lessons learned. Finally,operational adaptability requires appropriately managing and developing the leaders the Nigerian Armyneeds to face future challenges along these lines, giving the crucial role leadership plays in organisationalprogress and goal attainment.

It is an irrefutable fact in International Relations that no nation can exist in isolation of others orremain an island to itself in the global arena no matter how wealthy, influential or powerful. It is thereforeindispensable and incumbent on nations to maintain or win friendship and favourable opinion frommembers of the global community especially during armed conflicts. In our years of counterinsurgencyoperations, Nigeria has received some stringent criticisms over human rights violations by troops in theOperations Theatre particularly among powerful Western countries and the Amnesty International (AI).This resulted in frosty relationship with Nigeria leading to suspension of military support on intelligence



sharing and arms embargo from USA, UK and their Western allies. On my assumption of Command,we began to engage our foreign partners positively as well as looking into the various allegations ofrights’ violations by instituting independent investigations. Also, we began to open up our BHT detention/holding facilities for AI in line with the FG Change Agenda and global best practices.

LogisticsOver the years, logistics issues in the NA operations have been major challenges. Instances abound inthe ongoing NE operations whereby troops ran out of ammunition and resupply was not forthcoming,lack of spares and lack of inter-operability of equipment among others, thereby leading to unnecessarycasualties. The NA has been addressing this plethora of problems by ensuring sound logistics in the fieldthrough effective procurement and maintenance system. Emphasis has been placed on needs assessment,vendor evaluation, bidding and sample evaluation, professionally handled pre-shipment inspection andinclusion of life cycle maintenance, Memorandum of Understanding in contractual agreements forprocurement of new equipment.

Civil-Military and Inter-Agency CooperationThe nature and scope of military operations provide non-combat challenges across the entire spectrumof the theatre. This brings to the fore the significance of Civil – Military Cooperation. In training formilitary operations, formations and units must consider inter-agency cooperation and administration byunderstanding the nature of inter-agency bureaucracy as well as recognise other agency strengths andweaknesses. Cordial relationship between the NA and other security agencies must be maintained at alltimes. Other security agencies must be seen as partners meant to complement the efforts of the NA.The entire world has recognised and now emphasise the importance of effective synergy between everynation’s security agencies for better results. There is warning against unhealthy inter-agency rivalries.The Nigerian Army Resource Centre organised an international seminar on October 16 – 20, 2017 on“Managing Asymmetric Security Challenges in the 21st Century”, attended by 24 nations’ participants.One of the recommendations in the Seminar’s 19-point communique is that “It is imperative for securityagencies to synergise their efforts. The state should therefore ensure that no distractions are generatedfrom inter-agency rivalry. This will enhance intelligence gathering and sharing among stakeholders andbetter operation results”. Consequently, Commanders at all levels must take necessary steps to ensurethat healthy relationship is maintained with these agencies through joint training, informal and formalcontacts, social interactions and even sports among others. Currently, each formation and unit has beentasked to open a civil-military desk.

Establishment of Human Rights DeskOne of the fallouts of wars and troop involvement in Internal Security operations is accusation of humanrights violations. The complaints range from extra judicial killings to rape, torture, illegal detentions andviolations of the press amongst others. This is unavoidable as the Internet has turned the world into aglobal village with preponderance of social media in the society today. Owing to the incessant complaintsof human rights violations being perpetrated by own troop by both the international and local communities,

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I directed the immediate establishment of Human Rights Desks. Furthermore, a handbook on HumanRights was articulated to serve as a guide for personnel on code of conduct and general expectations onissues bothering on Human Rights both in conflict and peace times. Thankfully, these proactive measuresand general openness have assisted immensely in curbing the ugly trend. Subsequently, reports of humanrights abuses by own troops have dropped considerably.

OPERATIONAL ISSUES FOR THE NIGERIAN ARMY

We recognise the timeless and evergreen words of Gen Norman Schwarzkopf that “the more you sweatin peacetime, the less you bleed in war” (2001). Obviously, Gen Schwarzkopf drew great inspirationfrom that Great Chinese Military philosopher and thinker, Sun Tzu (1998) who in his Art of War statedthat the greatest victory is that which requires no battle and it is the acme of strategy by taking a city.Truly, that is impossible or unattainable without training. Indeed, we firmly believe that there is no substituteto training in all human endeavour particularly in the military. Thus, training has become the pivot to drivemy vision towards the attainment of operational goals and objectives. We started to evaluate our trainingin all the combat arms training schools to increase the depth, versatility, flexibility and adaptability of ourtroops and units to operational exigencies. In the same vein, training at unit and formation levels (divisionaltraining schools) became resuscitated. I have established an in-theatre training facility at Buni Yadi, YobeState to enhance in-theatre training of troop deployed for Operation LAFIYA DOLE. Many more suchtraining interventions are on the way. In this way, individual proficiency and group effectiveness will beenhanced for the overall better performance of our troop wherever they find themselves operating.

The Nigerian Army Resource Centre has been established and it is utilising some of the best brains(civilians, as well as both serving and retired military personnel) to look at the way we have been doingthings and evolve new efficient methods. I strongly believe that these changes will reinvigorate the forceand place the NA in a better shape to perform its constitutional roles.

Tactical Matters and Induction of New EquipmentAs earlier mentioned, tackling the numerous security challenges in the country necessitated the deploymentof multiple military task forces to combat them. While the conduct of most of the low intensity internalsecurity operations were largely successful as the NA deployment achieved the set objectives, embarrassingsetbacks were suffered initially in the battle to contain or neutralise the BHTs in the NE. Specifically, onmy assumption of Command of the NA, it was realised that the situation could not be reversed throughonly talks, and court martials especially in the NE theatre of operations.

The pre-occupation then was to reverse this trend by ensuring provision of efficient equipment,institutionalisation of regimentation and enforcement of realistic training. Therefore, in an effort to improveoperational capabilities, new platforms, surveillance and communication equipment were procured anddeployed into the theatre of operations. Some of these new platforms include BTR-4-APC, BMP-1APC, T-72 MBTs, Multi-Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL), ZSU-23 mm-4m Shilka, other artillerysystems and several engineer equipment including mine sweepers. Furthermore, Mine Resistance Anti-Personnel Vehicles (MRAPS) and gun trucks which are basically Toyota Bufallo or 4x4 jeeps fitted withheavy machine guns mounted were introduced and modern platoon and long range mortar tubes were



acquired. In a bid to always obtain accurate information of the BHT locations and dispositions, a UAVunit was created with sophisticated aerial surveillance systems and drones were purchased for thefrontline units.

Furthermore, plans have reached an advanced stage to deploy Army Aviation assets and an additionalExplosive Ordnance Device (EOD) regiment with Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED)capabilities to counter the demoralising danger posed by IEDs planted by the terrorists. These newtactical and innovative introductions proved to be game changers in the fight against insurgency and ledto the degradation and roll back of the BHT. However, mention must be made that as most of theseequipment were new in the NA inventory or Table of Equipment (TOE), there was the need to ensurethat personnel and crewmen were hurriedly trained to man them. To this end, training of personnel bothat home and abroad, in the operations and maintenance of the equipment, were given priority. SpecialForces training was equally intensified in a bid to best maximise the effects of these platforms in theconduct of operations. It can be said with all confidence and truthfulness that today the pride and imageof the NA have been restored, both in the eyes of the international community and Nigerians alike.

Welfare of PersonnelThis COAS’ office inherited an Army that was virtually operating in a rapidly changing environmentwhich was volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous. Therefore, steps were immediately put in placeto foster espirit-de-corps, well-being of personnel, regimentation and professionalism which wereenvisaged as panaceas to returning the force in good state to deal with the myriad of security challengesinherent in the country. Many welfare initiatives have been introduced in order to boost troops’ moralefor enhanced professionalism in the NA.

Review of School Fees in NA Command SchoolsThe NA Command Schools were established to provide affordable quality education to children andwards of military officers, soldiers and selected civilians. The rehabilitation of Command SecondarySchools in order to reposition them to render qualitative education to the children of service personnelhas been given priority. On my assumption of office, it was observed that most Command Schools werein a state of disrepair and disrepute. This was generally attributed to poor management over the years.Consequently, I ordered a downward review of school fees in order to lessen the financial burden facedby personnel towards the education of their children/wards. Thus, the review of the school fees wasintended to make education affordable to children/wards of service personnel thereby boosting schoolenrollment in the NA barracks.

KittingOn kitting, I have equally taken measures to systematically ensure that all personnel are adequatelykitted. Thus, kitting of NA personnel has received an unprecedented major boost in recent times.Personnel of units earmarked for PSOs are now well kitted ahead of induction into mission area, whichhitherto, was not the case. Additionally, all troop in the NE operational theatre are now well kitteduniformly in NA desert camouflage, while the systematic kitting of the rest of the formations is in progress.

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This systematic approach to kitting of personnel was hitherto not the case. In the same vein, AHQ hasbanned the use of any camouflage uniforms other than the approved ones.

Accommodation for NA PersonnelProvision of decent accommodation for NA personnel has been a perennial challenge. The situation hasbecome more pronounced as the strength of the NA has increased over the years. Added to the problemis that most barracks were constructed a long time ago and have suffered poor maintenance and areconsequently in varying degrees of dilapidation. In order to address the accommodation problem, Ihave embarked on the enormous task of constructing new accommodation blocks and also rehabilitatingthe old structures in some instances.

Barracks Investment Initiative ProgrammeI wish to state that my pet project as COAS is the Barracks Investment Initiative Programme (BIIP),which is another vital policy I initiated to enhance the welfare and morale of troop. The target participantsinclude officers, soldiers, their wives (barracks women) and dependant youths. The essential focus ofthe BIIP is to ensure that dependants of personnel in the barracks engage in agro-allied businesseswhich are suitable and viable within their local environments. This is expected to enhance income of theirfamilies and possibly reduce social vices and criminality in the barracks. The structure of the programmeis based on the establishment of agric-related ventures by participants organised in cooperative associationsor groups for ease of administration and monitoring. Indeed, a lot of our families are benefitting from thislaudable initiative.

Weight Control Policy for the Nigerian ArmyConsidering the well-being of NA personnel, the implementation of the NA Weight Control Policy(NAWCP) has been approved by the COAS’ office. This is in a bid to check the tendency for somepersonnel to take their appearances for granted. This control policy is based on Body Fat Measurement(BFM) which takes into consideration the weight, height, abdomen and neck measurements for maleswhile that of females include hips, forearm, neck and wrist measurements. The objective is to ensure amedically, mentally and physically fit NA that will not only portray a positive image to the populace butalso be in good shape to execute assigned responsibilities promptly internally and externally.

Improving Feedback MechanismConsidering the conscious and consistent efforts to enlighten officers and men on my vision and activitiesas well as directives from AHQ, it became imperative that an efficient feedback mechanism be put inplace. This mechanism permits the flow of information downwards and upwards, thereby gauging thepulse of the personnel as relating to the new policies. Operational commanders at all levels must notethat feedbacks are to be compiled in the form of reports or briefs and forwarded to appropriateheadquarters for review and further action. Therefore, the feedback mechanism should be seen as a toolfor reinforcing and balancing directives or policies and not an instrument for democratic debate.



Envisioning the Future Perspectives for the Nigerian ArmyThe past two years have been spent pondering on the future of the Nigerian Army as a critical nationalinstitution. At no other time than now has this nation come to depend on us men and women in uniformto rise to the occasion and champion the cause of unity, peace and stability of our dear country. Whateverthe future portends, the Nigerian Army will not be distracted from its primary purpose of discharging itsconstitutional role in the defence of Nigeria and its people. We would do all in our powers to defeat allforms of external aggression, maintain our territorial integrity and safeguard our democracy.

As we look to the future, our key priorities would be to maintain all-round operational readinessthrough improved training, modernisation of equipment, better welfare for troops and encouragement ofinnovation. These measures when diligently pursued would better equip and position the NA to take onpresent and future challenges. For a start, we will immediately begin the phased implementation of ourrevised ORBAT in order to enhance our posture to adequately respond to threats. This would go hand-in-hand with doctrinal review, and development of new strategies to perform our constitutional mandate.

To maintain robust and constant liaison with the Nigerian populace, the Nigerian Army InformationCall Centre (NAICC) recently established would provide platform to solicit for timely information andcooperation from Nigerians. This NAICC would enhance the existing quick response mechanismsthroughout the NA fmn/units in order to sustain the tempo of operational activities against contemporarythreats besetting the nation.

CONCLUSION

The leadership position that nature has bestowed on Nigeria in the West African sub-region, and indeedin Africa as a whole, has thrust upon us the additional responsibilities to pursue peace, security andstability in the region. This burden cannot be ignored or wished away. Therefore, our military, particularlythe Nigerian Army will continue to be strong and virile to meet our internal and external security challenges.The current security challenges demand the commitment of everyone in order to guarantee our collectivewell-being.

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Support Operations, Command and Professionalism: Challenges for The Nigerian ArmedForces in the 21st Century and Beyond, Ibadan, Gold Press Ltd.

Ogunsanwo A (1986), Our Friends, Their Friends: Nigeria’s External Relations 1960 – 1985 AlfaCommunications.

Pigors Paul (1935), Leadership or Domination, Boston, Hugoton.Roberts, C. (n.d.), Characteristics of Visionary Leadership (Available at http://yourbusiness.azcentral.

com/characteristics-visionary-leadership. Accessed 19 February, 2018.Saone’s C (2001), Oxford Dictionary of Current English. Oxford, Oxford University Press.Schwarzkopf (2001), “Armed Forces Epitomise Leadership and Sacrifice”, National Real Estate Investor,

Matt Valley, December 01. (http://www.nreionline.com/mag/gen-schwarzkopf-armed-forces-epitomize-leadership-and-sacrifice.

Sinex, S. (2011), Start with Why: How Great Leaders Inspire Everyone to take Action, London,Penguin Books.

Sinex, S. (2014), Leaders Eat Last: Why Some Teams Pull Together and Others Don’t, New York,Penguin Books.

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at http://www.nreionline.com/print/4432, Accessed 19 February, 2018).


The Journal of the Army War College NigeriaVol. 1 No.1, April 2018

THE ROLE OF NARCOTICS IN TERRORISM, INSURGENCY ANDCRIME: THE NORTH EAST BOKO HARAM WAR IN FOCUS

by

Major General AG Okunlola (rtd)Former Commandant

Army War College Nigeria, Abuja

ABSTRACT

A lot of the activities, war crimes and crimes against humanity carried outduring terrorism, and insurgencies are executed under the influence of harddrugs such as cocaine, and Indian hemp. Children, especially are placed onhard drugs to be “charged” or “stoned” to go into battle, and or to rape,kill, maim and burn without qualms as the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civilwar experiences show. This paper interrogates the role of hard drugs in theBoko Haram terrorism, Insurgency and Crimes in the North East of Nigeria.It concludes that for the war on terror to succeed in good time, it must proceedparipassu with war against narcotics in the Area of Operation.

Key words: Role, Narcotics, Terrorism, North-East, Boko Haram.

INTRODUCTION

A lot of the bizarre atrocities, war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated during terrorism, andinsurgencies are often attributed to radicalisation processes that so convince the adherents of the justifiednature of their cause that in their extreme violent frenzy, they can do any evil. However emerging factsare pointing to the contrary. The role of narcotics (hard drugs) and spiritual influences in these atrocitiesare becoming more glaring. In the Liberian, Sierra Leonean and Ugandan civil wars, hard drugs andspiritual manipulations played serious roles. In the case of narcotics, the confessions and case of a smallboy known as O.J. of the Small Boys Unit in the Liberian civil war is typical (Nwolise, 2007, 104 – 165,

22

from Omotoso, 1997). O.J. was in the primary school when the civil war broke out in Liberia in 1989,at which time, he was barely eleven years old. The risks spread everywhere, and the socio-economichardship generated by the war forced him to join the rebel army in 1990 as a survival strategy. On entryat the age of twelve years, he was deployed to the Small Boys Unit and was introduced to hard drugswithout delay to enable him operate, beginning with Indian hemp (“Joint”), and later “Blue pill” which isan amphetamine. He was made to smoke one big wrap (“family mold”) of Indian hemp in the morning,one in the afternoon, and one in the night. In between, hot drinks and blue pill were added to his harddrugs menu.

One day, the rebels wanted to execute two men whom bullets could not penetrate as they werebelieved to have “African insurance” (anti-bullet immunisation). The alternative was either to kill themwith a knife or through strangulation. Little O.J. who was placed high on hard drugs (“well stoned”) wasordered to execute the two men with a knife, and he did it very easily. He was later to confess that in hisdays in the rebel army, he killed many people on the orders of his superiors, and killed several others onhis own for the fun of it. He also raped several women, girls and children, all under the influence of harddrugs.

In 1992, he was moved from the Small Boys Unit to the Alligator Battalion, and the killing, maimingand raping continued. In 1993, he was debriefed, his eyes cleared and he ran away from the rebel armywith the help of an Irish Non-Governmental Organisation named DONBOSCO which is specialised inthe rehabilitation of former child-soldiers, child-prostitutes, and war victims. For long after O.J. wasweaned from war and atrocities, he could not sleep, because each time he lied down and closed his eyesto sleep, he saw men chasing him with big knives and he woke up screaming. Thus, several children andpersonnel involved in terrorism, and insurgencies, in which they perpetrate all forms of atrocities, arehigh on narcotics.

Olukolade (2015: 376) alluded to the role of drugs in crimes in his reference to Mexico under thesiege of hard drugs where many citizens are kidnapped and or murdered daily. In his words:

In Iguala, Mexico, about 43 students were kidnapped from school byPolice Officers under the command of a city leader who apparently alsomoonlights as an organised crime leader. This incident is the continuingnarrative of a nation under the siege of drugs and organised crime cartelsand in which tens of thousands of people have been brutally murdered.

The school shootings in classrooms and “lone wolf” terrorist phenomena in some (West) Europeannations are believed to be aided by narcotics consumption. Even most common criminals such asarmed robbers, kidnappers, cross-border bandits, car snatchers, and rapists are always “stoned” or“high on drugs” before going into operation.

In the area of spiritual influence, studies by Nwolise as collaborated by media reports of confessionsmade by arrested and repentant suicide bombers in Nigeria show that some of these boys and girlsoperate under the influence of hypnotism. As Nwolise (2015:4) noted:

The Role of Narcotics in Terrorism, Insurgency and Crime: The North East Boko Haram War in Focus 23


There has been adequate evidence that some of the suicide bombersused by Boko Haram in their bombing of soft targets (churches, mosques,markets, schools, recreation centres, etc) are hypnotised.

The spiritual book of the Boko Haram called GUDUMA (Gana, 2017) found by the Nigeria Securityand Civil Defence Corps in 2016 in an abandoned Boko Haram camp in a local government area ofBorno State is believed to be one of the sources of their (Boko Haram) charm industry and hypnotisingcapacities.

Objective and Rationale

It is clear that terrorists and insurgents in their fearless and ferocious attacks against military forces, aswell as in committing atrocities and crimes in conflict areas are often under the influence of drugs. Ourtask in this modest piece is to examine the role of narcotics in the Boko Haram war against the Nigerianpeople, military and state in the North East. The rationale for this intellectual enterprise is not far-fetched. One, if as it is now known, narcotics play crucial role in enhancing terrorism and insurgency, itmeans that for any counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency operation to succeed in good time, the waron terror must be waged pari-passu with war against hard drugs in the area of operation. It also meansthat the drugs supply sources and routes to the adversary must be located through effective intelligenceand knocked off.

Two, the point must be made, and made loudly in the society that placing children on drugs andmaking them to kill themselves and others, or commit war crimes and crimes against humanity such asrape, murder, and torture is not only the apogee of human wickedness but also savagery. In this wise,humanity needs to remind itself of Ferguson’s (2001:1) solemn words which hold that “civilisation definesitself in opposition to savagery”.

Three, the possible use of children or adults placed on drugs or hypnotism by terrorists and insurgentsfor suicide bombing missions raise moral issues for society that need to be addressed. Definitely, suchpersons cannot be said in all honesty to be fully conscious of what they are doing. This is dilemma forlaw enforcement. The situation thus places a burden on parents, school authorities, and law enforcementagents, and everyone in affected areas to be vigilant against abductions, kidnapping, and movement ofhypnotised persons.

Four, there is need for massive public education, enlightenment and mobilisation against the use andsale of hard drugs in the area of operation and surrounding environs. People and law enforcementofficials must watch out for “joints” and dark alleys, as well as drug barons and hawkers in the conflictarea particularly and the nation generally. This is as relevant for Nigeria as it is for the entire worldespecially nations such as Somalia, Kenya, Mali, USA, UK, India, etc that are combating terrorism andor insurgency.

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Theoretical Framework

Many researchers on terrorism and or insurgency have based their works on the Frustration – Aggressiontheory associated with Dollard, et al (1939). The theory stipulates that “aggression is always aconsequence of frustration” and as such, individuals become aggressive when their life aspirations andambitions are frustrated. The question is, the people that are hypnotised from the streets or homes, aswell as those who are coerced and or drugged and pushed into terrorist acts such as suicide bombing,can they in all good conscience be said to be aggressive out of frustration? The answer is obviously No.The thesis from this response therefore is that although Frustration – Aggression theory can explainsome cases of entry into terrorism e.g. as a result of poverty, unemployment, etc, it cannot explain allcases of terrorism and insurgency. Hard drugs or narcotics play serious role even in the recruitmentof members. Hypnotism also has a role to play as has been argued by Nwolise (2015). Hard drugsparticularly are responsible for a large part of these atrocities, crimes against humanity and warcrimes.

CLARIFICATION OF CONCEPTS

Key concepts in this paper require clear definitions to ensure better understanding and appreciation ofits content. They include terrorism, insurgency, national security and narcotics.

a. TerrorismTerrorism is a controversial and emotion-laden word, and therefore has no universally accepted onedefinition. Instead it is said that “One man’s terrorist is another man‘s freedom fighter”.This notwithstanding, we shall present some definitions. Laquer (quoted in Kegley 2007:429)conceptualise terrorism as:

The use or threat of violence as a method of combat or a strategy toachieve certain goals, that its aim is to induce a state of fear in the victim,that it is ruthless and does not conform to humanitarian means.

The United Nations perceives terrorism as “an anxiety inspiring method of repeated violent action,employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or politicalreasons, whereby in contrast to assassination, the direct targets of violence are not the main targets(quoted in Okpara, 2013:227).

This paper will adopt the definition given by Schmid (2012:158) which is regarded as the revisedacademic consensus on the concept of terrorism given as:

…..a special form or tactics of fear-generating, coercive political violenceand on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated,demonstrative, direct, violent action without legal or moral restraints,targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for itspropagandistic and psychological effects on various audience and conflictparties.



b. InsurgencyInsurgency is commonly understood as an organised armed insurrection aimed at weakening, delegitimisingand overthrowing a sitting government in order to introduce a new social or political order. As Osakweand Umoh noted, insurgency is:

….a protracted violent conflict in which one or more groups seek tooverthrow or fundamentally change the political or social order in a stateor region through the use of sustained violence, subversion, socialdisruption and political action.

Terrorism and insurgency are not mutually exclusive war tactics or strategies. They are both lowintensity warfare elements and can go together. In fact, Boko Haram used a combination of terrorismand insurgency in the North East. The move to capture and hold territory which they made for severalmonths hoisting their flag and declaring caliphate system in captured areas was an insurgency operation.In all the local Government Areas they occupied, they sacked the legitimate local government councils,and imposed their type of administration based on the caliphate system.

c. National SecurityEvery terrorist and insurgency action is a threat to national security; and all counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations are aimed at restoring or ensuring national security. Throughout the cold war era,national security was perceived in terms of state security. That is, the protection of the state throughfearful amassment of strategic weapons and military personnel. Thus scholars such as Morgenthau(1960) defined national security from the angle of protecting the integrity of the national territory as wellas its institutions. The successful terrorist attacks against USA on September 11 2001 with bare hands,as well as the disintegration of the USSR in 1991 both without arms or war changed the basing ofnational security on awesome arms.

Today, national security is seen more from the prism of human security – the safety and welfare ofhuman beings, the respect of human rights and others. McNamara’s linkage of security and developmentwhich was neglected since 1968 now has meaning. He had asserted:

Security is not military hardware, though it may include it. Security is notmilitary force, though it may involve it. Security is not traditional militaryactivity though it may encompass it. Security is development, and withoutdevelopment there can be no security (McNamara, 1968; 149).

The issue is that nations that experience unemployment, food shortages, injustices, poverty andother forms of socio-economic hardship cannot be secure. Terrorism and insurgency will find ready andeasy recruits in such nations. It is here that Nwolise’s (2009: 263) conception of national securitybecomes instructive. In his words, national security is:

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The prevalence in a nation, through conscious and adequate strategicplanning, actions, and coordination of all vital sectors, of conditions oflaw, justice, peace, order, safety and economic well-being in suchpreponderance as to effectively neutralise the internal harbingers offear ,want, violence and disintegration, as well as contain the externalharbingers of aggression, subjugation and plunder.

Today, the concept of national security has expanded vertically and horizontally to accommodateseveral more variables instead of just one variable (state security). Vertically, national security nowencapsulates the security of the individual, group (family, ethnic, religious), state, and the world.Horizontally, national security now accommodates political security, military security, economic security,societal security, and environmental security as identified by Buzan (1990: 7). Nwolise (2009: 267) alsoadded ten more dimensions of national security as he saw Buzan’s list as too narrow and eurocentric: theten new dimensions are:

• Physical Security

• Psychological Security

• Technological Security

• Spiritual Security

• Territorial Security

• Legal Security

• Treasury Security

• People’s Power Security

• Image Security, and

• Global Security

This study adopts Nwolise’s conception of national security as it is more encompassing. The intrusionof narcotics or hard drugs in warfare-terrorism, insurgency and associated crimes exacerbates thedestruction of lives, properties and infrastructure, and these are threats to national security.

d. NarcoticsFrom Greek root “narkotikos’’, the word narcotics represents addictive drugs that possess the capacityto affect the mood or behaviour of an individual (Soanes, 2005). Examples of narcotics are hard drugssuch as opium, Lysergic Acid Dethylamide, cocaine, heroin, Ecstasy, Methamphetamine, and Indianhemp. Marsh et al (2003) informs us that a drug is any chemical which if swallowed, breathed in,injected or consumed in any other way can affect the human body or mind.



USERS OF NARCOTICS

In war theatres, terrorism and insurgencies, both adults and children use or are made to use narcotics.It is however more pronounced in children for obvious reasons (which are discussed in the next sectionbelow) especially those used in suicide bombing. Traces of hard drugs, especially Indian hemp andcocaine were seen in several sacked or hurriedly abandoned Boko Haram camps. Militants also usenarcotics. Armed robbers are particularly friendly users of Indian hemp, before going on operations.They use cocaine mainly when they relax over booze, merriment and women after operations.

Sea pirates and sea robbers, kidnappers, abductors and hostage takers are also on the narcoticsbandwagon. Cultists in the streets and schools ride high on narcotics to be “high’’ especially beforeembarking on cult wars. Cross-border bandits and smugglers of various categories, as well as manytraffickers of arms, drugs and human beings also patronise narcotics.

In motor parks, careful nosing around reveal oozing odour of Indian hemp. Some artists who sufferfrom stage fright (musicians, drama actors etc) also belong. Sales boys and girls who dance ajasco andkokoma, on vehicles, and in the streets to advertise company products also get heavily “stoned” inorder to perform well and earn more money. Some long distance drivers take hot drinks or hemp beforetaking off to “Shine” or “Clear” their eyes so that they can “see well” on the highway. The new additionsto the list are boys and girls who shout out to attract customers to see and buy second hand clothes andshoes along streets and roads.

EFFECTS OF HARD DRUGS

Hard drugs as heroin and opium have sedative effects, and slow down the way the body and brain of theuser functions. This can also result in numbing effects which give rise to drowsiness (Marsh et al, 2003),making the user to lose power of effective mental coordination.

Drugs such as amphetamine, cocaine, caffeine, nicotine, crack, and ecstasy are capable of generatingstimulant effects, and make the user to be hyper alert because the drugs increase brain activity. Cannabis(hemp), magic mushrooms, and Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (LSD) have hallucinogenic effects on usersand alter the way they feel, perceive or see, hear, taste or smell. This is because they work on theCentral Nervous System, and affect the users’ thinking, mood, and action (Robins, 1995:12-13,Wikipedia, the true encyclopaedia). These can lead to erratic and very destructive actions.

Some hard drugs such as cannabis have depressive, hallucinogenic and stimulant properties. Nowonder it is very popular with common violent criminals such as armed robbers and kidnappers. It isalso the most used narcotic by fighters, terrorists, insurgents, and other irregular personnel.

ROLE OF NARCOTICS AMONG TERRORISTS AND INSURGENTS

Hard drugs play various roles for their various users. However, our task here is to interrogate their rolesin terrorism, insurgency and associated crimes. These roles include:

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a. Extricates sense of fear, and emboldens action

Hard drugs remove the sense of fear in fighters and embolden them for violent action. It was the historicalBuddha that once asserted that, “conflict would cease if we would be aware of our own death’’ (quotedin Tzu, 2005 ii). This expression captures the “locus classicus” of fear in all war situations. The superiorsor bosses, know fully well that human beings are afraid to die no matter the amount of money they arepaid. As a result, hard drugs are brought in to “kill” the sense of fear. Thus when they are consumed,and the fighters are adequately “charged’’ or “stoned’’, the sense of fear disappears, and when incombat, they charge at the opponents as if there is no death. This idea of “killing” fear, is the mostimportant role of narcotics in terrorism, insurgency, and other forms of warfare. Drugs play the samerole when a vehicle is loaded with explosives, and one or more people are ordered to drive it to alocation and explode it. The way and manner Boko Haram terrorists were charging at our troops in theNorth East during the battles over territory were not products of only weapons and radicalisation intoviolent extremism. Hard drugs were also in operation.

b. Deadening the sense of guilt

Hard drugs deaden the sense of guilt in their users in conflict situations. This is why child-soldiers areplaced high on drugs or “stoned’’ on Indian hemp before they are ordered to murder or execute peoplewith a knife. To shoot a rifle or pistol, in order to kill someone is a much easier thing to do, than toslaughter a human being like a chicken, goat or cow. It takes guts to do this. The guts are generated byhard drugs. It is in the same way a child will be strapped with explosives and told to go to the midst ofseveral people and detonate such explosives and kill the people.

The inhuman act of raping little girls or boys and old women as well as killing one’s neighbours oreven own family members by a terrorist, insurgent or criminal is also made easy and guiltless by harddrugs. Radicalisation alone cannot explain the glee and ease with which Boko Haram members slashedpeople’s throats, dumped living human beings into deep wells, and massacred hundreds of innocentpeople in Yobe, Adamawa and Borno states and other areas.

c. Loss of sense of humanity and morality

Hard drugs make the users lose their sense of morality and humanity. This is why it is easy for some mento rape their daughters and some cultists to rape old women of 90 years of age and above as happenedat Opi, Nsukka, in Enugu State a few years back. In the same way, terrorists and insurgents high ondrugs can massacre, maim, rape, burn houses, derail trains, or shoot down or crash planes loaded withcivilian passengers without qualms. Once they are high on drugs or completely “stoned’’, they joinNietzche (German philosopher quoted in Onwu 1986) in screaming that “God was dead”. The type ofatrocities Boko Haram terrorists committed and still commit in the North East do not portray them aspeople who believe in Allah (SWT) at all. This is why real Muslims do not regard them as fighting forAllah (SWT) or Islam.



d. Removes sense of shame

The influence of hard drugs can make a person go naked in the street without shame. It is in this way thata terrorist, insurgent, or even a robber can rape a woman with several eyes around him.

e. Makes subordinates susceptible to higher controlOnce a subordinate is well “stoned’’, his boss or superior finds him easier to command and control. Inthat state, he can be ordered to kill his own mother and he will readily and easily do it without qualms orquestion.

f. Ability to do things one would not have doneHard drugs render the user capable of doing things he or she would not do under normal circumstances.This is because the sense of judgement has been tampered with.

g. False sense of superiorityHard drugs imbue the user with a false sense of superiority against his or her victims in a conflict theatre.Once high on drugs or well “stoned’’ on Indian hemp, the user sees any human being on the other sideas a mere ant or animal worthy of being wasted.

h. Makes recruitment easierYouths or children to be recruited into the fold of terrorists, insurgents or criminals are gradually andsecretly introduced to hard drugs. When under the influence of drugs, a youth would accept withoutcritical thinking options and actions proposed to him or her. In the North East, Boko Haram used manytricks to recruit. Apart from abduction, and radicalisation, spiritual influences were also used. At a point,eating of date palm became a no go area for many. In fact, a youth corp member who visited Yobe andAdamawa states told me that the first warning he was given on arrival in Adamawa State was never toaccept or eat date palm from anybody as it was tool of hypnotism. Drugs were also in the terrorists’kitty.

CONCLUSION: THE WAY FORWARD

There is no doubt at all that narcotics play very serious role in terrorism, insurgency and associatedcrimes and activities. It is very handy in the recruitment, use and misuse of child soldiers, and suicidebombers. Thus, the war against terror can hardly be won without winning the war against narcotics inthe area of operation. These truisms make the following recommendations imperative. One, all counter-terrorism, and counter-insurgency operations need to be accompanied by anti-narcotics operations inthe war theatre and its environs. When there are no hard drugs, the terrorists or insurgents will be lessdaring, and less deadly. All routes and sources of supply of hard drugs to the terrorists and insurgentsmust be found out through joint effective intelligence and blocked. All local joints and dark alleys associatedwith drugs must be put out of service.

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Two, there must be massive public education, enlightenment and mobilisation about the deadlyeffects of hard drugs and for vigilance against the supply, hawking acceptance and consumption of harddrugs especially by youths and children. Whistle blowers can be used in the battle to track down thelocal and external drug barons and hawkers.

Three, the forests in and around the area of operation have to be searched for hemp farms, andonce found, they have to be destroyed. Four, all arrested suicide bombers and those who surrenderedvoluntarily should be thoroughly investigated to find out those who were innocently pulled into terrorismwith drugs, and to be treated accordingly. Such youths or children are victims of aggression rather thanbeing aggressors and need rehabilitation if they have been held for long by the adversaries.

Finally, it must be noted that war against hard drugs or narcotics is like war against the Boko Haramor corruption. It will take courage, political will, resources, and effective strategy, because the drugbarons will fight back. In Colombia, the government of President Barco fought the coke princes withdetermination, and they also fought him, the government and the nation. From August to December1989 for example, the government made 497 arrests, and confiscated weapons and properties worth$250 million. The coke princes in their reaction killed 187 civilians and government officials. Theycarried out 265 bombardments that damaged property worth over $500 million. Earlier in 1986, a halfton bomb was exploded outside a government office building in Bogota killing 52 people on the spot. Itsimply means that the coke princes themselves are also terrorists and as such must be configured intothe counter-terrorism equation (Nwolise, 2005: 14). As TIME magazine noted, at the period:

In his offensive against the coke princes, President Barco has dented thedrug pipeline, but hardly destroyed it. The barons lashed back by terrorisingthe innocent. (quoted in Nwolise, 2005; 14).

Drug barons are usually powerful and well connected. But they have moral burden in their heartsand the blood of innocents in their hands. Their power and connection will not deter a well-coordinatedwar against hard drugs in Nigeria and other nations currently facing terrorism and insurgency. The BokoHaram used and still uses hard drugs in the North East along with spiritual influence to recruit and launchterrorists into war, suicide bombing, and other atrocities associated with them. Knocking off the sources,routes, and dark alleys of these drugs supplies and consumption must go on pari-passu with the NorthEast counter-terrorism and counter - insurgency operations if the war is to be won with finality and ingood time.

REFERENCES

Dollard J., Millar N., Doob L, Mower O and Seers R (1939), Frustration and Aggression, NewHaven, Yale University Press.

Ferguson R.B ( 2001): 10,000 years of Tribal Warfare; History , Science, Ideology and the State ofNature; Excerpts from his keynote address, The Journal of the International Institute, Universityof Michigan, Vol.8, No 3.



Gana Muhammadu, (2017), “The place of NSCDC in National Security: The Role Played in the fightagainst Boko Haram, Cattle Rustling , Farmers/Herdsmen Conflict, Kidnapping and the Best wayto Achieve Inter-Agency Cooperation and Coordination of Operation”, Paper presented at theArmy War College Nigeria, July 2017.

Kegley W. (2007), World Politics: Trend and Transformation, Belmont Thomson Learning Inc.

Marsh P. et al (2003), “Attachment, Autonomy and Multifinality in Adolescent Internalising and RiskyBehaviour:, Symptoms Development Psychopathol, 15.

McNamara R (1968), The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office, New York, Harper and Row.

Morgenthau Hans (1960), Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York.

Nwolise OBC, (2007),’’ Perspectives on Africa’s Code of Honour in Relation to Conflict Theatres inthe Continent’’, The Nigerian Army Quarterly Journal, Vol. 3. No 2, June.

Nwolise OBC (2015),’’ Motion for Serious Focus of Research on The Spiritual Dimension of Humanand National Security’’, in Studies in Politics and Society, (Journal of the Nigerian PoliticalScience Association) Vol 3, No 1, December.

Nwolise OBC (2009), “Peace and Security”, in Isaac O Albert, (ed). Praxis of Political Conceptsand Clichés in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, Ibadan, Bookcraft.

Nwolise OBC (2005),’’ Terrorism: What is to be Done About an Emerging Threat to Democracy,Good Governance, Development and Security of Nations in the 21st Century?’’, Special Research,Issue Vol. 1., Ibadan, French Institute for Africa Research.

Okpara E. (2013), ‘’ Militancy, Terrorism and The Nigerian State’’, in Mbachu O. and Bature U (ed),Internal Security Management in Nigeria, Kaduna, Medusa Academic Pub. Ltd.

Olukolade Chris, (2005), Issues in the Mobilisation of Public Support for Military Operation inNigeria, Ibadan, Gold Press Ltd.

Omotoso Kole (1997), “Who Murdered Little OJ’s Sleep?’’, Woga Africa! Music Goes To War,Johannesburg, Ball Publishers.

Onwu N. (1986),’’ Religion and National Unity in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects”. The NigerianJournal of Social Studies, Vol. 3 No 1, October.

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Schmid A.P (2012), “The Revised Academic Consensus Definition on Terrorism”, Perspectives OnTerrorism, Vol. 2, No. 2.

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The Journal of the Army War College NigeriaVol. 1 No.1, April, 2018

CONFLICT RESOLUTION SPECTRUM: NEGOTIATION BYBARGAINING IN INTEGRATED CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

FRAMEWORK

by

Maj. Gen. JGS HamakimDirector General

Nigerian Army Resource CentreAbuja

ABSTRACT

Conflict is a concomitant phenomenon of human interaction, and thereforeinevitable. However, conflict does not have to be violent, and, the best optionis to prevent any conflict from becoming violent. Where violence howeverbreaks out, it is necessary to bring it quickly to an end through negotiationwhich involves bargaining. This paper discusses some tested techniques ofconflict resolution through non-violent processes as alternative to militaryforce.

Key words: Conflict resolution, Negotiation, Bargaining, Management.

INTRODUCTION

In every sphere of human endeavour, conflicts are unavoidable; be it at a global, continental, national,group, or individual basis. According to Nwolise (2004), a careful study of human history reveals thatconflict has been humanity’s unending affliction and this should be a cause of concern to all. Conflict isendemic to human society and often occurs between and among individuals and groups hence itsmanagement is important for human peaceful coexistence. Historically and indeed religiously, thereabound references to conflicts and conflict management in human society as conflicts have been recordedfrom the very early days of humankind. For instance, we find in religious books, accounts of conflicts

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that were resolved by various processes which include negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and adjudication.We also find accounts of various types of negotiations; between animals and humans, between twopersons, between an individual and a group, between two groups or between two states. According toElaigwu (2012), conflict is the spice of every state as it tests the fragility or otherwise of the state andcreates the basis of future amelioration or adjustments. However, conflicts beyond certain thresholdsare detrimental to the very survival of the state, precisely because they threaten the consensual basis ofthe association. Conflicts which emanate from the non-recognition of the claims of others to issues ofconflict could be very dangerous for the system. Such conflicts, mobilise total loyalties of the people andtend to defy all attempts at affecting desirable compromises, especially if the conflicts are over values.

On the other hand, conflicts which result from the nature of resource distribution are less dangerousto the survival of the state. Since the claims of others are recognised in this case, this form of conflict isless dangerous to the process of nation-building than those which totally exclude the claims of others(Elaigwu, 2012). Indeed, the end of the cold war has turned attention, among others, to two relatedissues; intra-state conflict as well as insecurity within nations especially the developing ones. Both connotean increasing lack of peaceful situation. Undoubtedly, the term “peace” has come to be very importantto all peoples in all parts of the world, with every one giving it his/her own definition and meaning,depending on which side of the political divide he/she belongs or empathises with. The need to return tostatus quo as far as peace is concerned is therefore germane for continuous human existence. For this tohappen, we can therefore reasonably assert that conflict resolution and negotiation are inseparable andthus infer that the reality of life and existence is that peace is not given by mere asking but a desire of alland for all, which often is a result of an effective negotiation process. Peace is relatively a function ofhow conflict situation is handled; therefore mankind requires commonly tested and trusted techniques ofpeace path, conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution through effective negotiation.Successful negotiation requires compromise from both sides that must gain something and lose something.One must be able to give part of something up which one believes one is entitled to for peace to reign(Tanford, 2000).

Conflict is a phenomenal product of clash of interests between one or two parties that may beindividuals, groups, states or a collection of any of these (Nwolise, 2004). According to Coser (1956),conflict is a struggle over values and claims of scarce resources (political power, raw materials, etc) inwhich the aims of the opponents are to neutralise, injure or eliminate their rivals. In this struggle orconscious operation, each party mobilises energy to obtain the goal at stake or desired object, perceivingthe other as a barrier or threat to that goal (Stagner, 1967). The means employed and the extent towhich the parties are ready to go in the struggle depend on the value attached to the goal or object andthe resources available. At times, violence is introduced, but conflict need not necessarily be violent.According to psychologists, whatever its specific nature, conflict arises basically from the deep-rootedsocio-economic struggles, contradictions, distortions, misperceptions, frustrations and unattainable goals.

In whatever form that conflict presents itself, the need to resolve it before it escalates into somethingunpalatable cannot be overemphasised. This feat can only be achieved by following some principles toarrive at a desired or “close to a desired” outcome, using the Integrated Conflict Management Frameworkas a platform in achieving relative peace. One cannot however expect to defeat his/her opponent or win

Conflict Resolution Spectrum: Negotiation by Bargaining in Integrated Conflict Management ... 35


a negotiation by either the power of negotiating skills or the compelling force of one’s logic. This is notto say that good negotiating ability is irrelevant. In most cases, a range of possible outcomes exists. Askilled negotiator often can achieve a settlement near top of the range. Preparation for negotiationmeans hard work. Intensive preparation will however not guarantee success but it is essential to it.Preparation for negotiation can be viewed as following an orderly and structured process and it can besystematised and segmented into series of logical steps, each of which inter-relates with the other.

The objective of this paper is to discuss some commonly tested and trusted techniques of conflictresolution through non-violent processes rather than military force.

UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Conflict

Conflict from its Latin root “conflictus” means ”clash” – clash of views, opinions, interests or forces.When forces clash, it becomes war. Coser (quoted in Nwolise, 2004:1) perceives conflict as: “…astruggle over and claims to scarce resources in which the aims of opponents are to neutralise, injure oreliminate their rivals”.

While we agree that conflict is a struggle, not all conflicts are violent and leading to injury andelimination of opponents.

Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf (1981:81) see conflict not necessarily as a struggle but a condition. In theirwords conflict is:

... a condition in which one identifiable group of human beings…isengaged in conscious opposition to one or more other identifiable groupsbecause these groups are pursuing what are or appear to be incompatiblegoals.

In focusing on the sources of conflict, Stedman (1991:368) asserts that:

...conflict arises from problems basic to all populations, the tugs andpulls of different identities, the differential distribution of resources andaccess to power, and competing definitions of what is right, fair, andjust.

CONCEPTS OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

It is important to note that every plural society experiences one form of conflict or another. If properlymanaged before they escalate into wider crises dimensions, conflicts may be beneficial. This implies thatunder normal circumstances, conflicts are supposed to be avenue for growth and development ratherthan routes to battle grounds (Covey, 2011). Thus, when conflicts become aggravated due to poormanagement, it is perceived as abnormal, dysfunctional and therefore detestable. Conflict needs notfollow a negative course if properly addressed, and can transform into an agent of growth and development

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for all concerned parties. As Burton (1987:137-138) argued, conflict “is an essential creative element inhuman relationship. It is the means to change, the means by which our social values of welfare, security,justice, and opportunities for personal development can be achieved...”. Efforts should therefore bemade not to demonise this phenomenon but to confront it in an efficient way through negotiation andbargaining {where applicable} (Lugga, 2016).The prevalence of conflict all over the world within thelast few decades has prompted a lot of scholarly works in conflict management. Available literature inthis regard is aimed at understanding the nature of conflict, identifying its causes and proffering solutions.These are aimed at its proper management, thereby creating an environment of peaceful co-existence,which will usher in growth and development of the society. Conflict is thus a dynamic phenomenon,which consists of five stages; Initiation, Escalation, Controlled Maintenance, Abatement and Termination/Resolution (Sandole, 1993). In this process, peace is the ultimate target of conflict through negotiation.

Peace is probably the most widely desired and the most longed for human condition after security.It is varied according to backgrounds, belief systems, scholarship or experiences. The teaching ofConfucius (approx. 551-479BC) maintains that the attainment of peace is the ultimate human goal andthat peace comes from “social harmony” and “equilibrium”. To buttress this perception, the Chinesephilosopher and religious leader, Mo-tzu (468-401BC) takes a more radical viewpoint. He extolspeace as an all-embracing love, and a universal human virtue or the highest earthly goal (cited in Barash1991:7). According to Mo-tzu, those who love others will be loved in return. In his view, “do good toothers and others will do good to you. Hate people and be hated by them and lastly, hurt them and theywill hurt you”.

It is pertinent to note that the paradox of peace is that, we live in a world of inevitable love and hate;hope and despair; agreement and disagreement, conflict and cooperation; war and peace. For thepurpose of this discourse, we will toe the line of Barash (1991) who classified peace into two viewpoints;negative peace and positive peace. We shall examine these two in greater detail.

Negative Peace: Negative peace is simply the absence of war, or a condition in which no active,organised military violence is taking place. The understanding is that there is peace wherever there isabsence of war, or organised violence. While this perspective is attractive, it does not say it all as itleaves out several lines of disharmonious issues and sentiments, which impact negatively on humans andtheir systems. There may therefore exist peace of the graveyard.

Positive Peace: Positive peace on the other hand, appears uncommon and more difficult to articulateand appreciate. It seems more difficult to achieve than negative peace because of the dynamics involved.Positive peace means (structurally) the absence of social injustice in a system (Gaya, 2006). Positivepeace results from considerable control or reduction of cases of fear or dread due to marginalisation,exclusion and neglect in a system. An American peasant was once quoted in the New York Times assaying “I am for peace, but not peace with hunger” (Barash, 1991). Positive peace is aboutpolicies, programmes and projects, which promote inclusiveness, equity and social justice. Peace is notonly absence of war, or extreme violence but also the presence of institutionalised mechanisms to check



impunity, oppression, repression and structural conditions of inequity and social injustice. It promotesenduring, tolerant and accommodating relationship and allows individuals and groups, the pursuit oftheir goals in life with human dignity and honour.

Conflict Resolution: A conflict can be frozen for years (e.g. when PSOs are introduced), terminated(by superior force as in the Nigerian civil war), transformed, or resolved. Conflict resolution impliesuprooting the root causes of the conflict. As Nwolise (2004:11) notes:

where conflict however inevitably breaks out, and becomes violent, thensteps should be taken immediately to keep the peace, including peaceenforcement. While these are on, or thereafter, peace-making sets theplatform for the actual resolution of the conflict. Once the root causes ofthe conflict are removed, peace-building follows to ensure a lasting peacebuttressed by confidence building.

According to Mitchael (1993), conflict resolution is essentially aimed at intervention to change orfacilitate the change of the course of a conflict. It is important to state that conflict resolution provides anopportunity to interact with the parties involved in the conflict, with the hope of at least reducing thescope, intensity and effects of conflicts. Conflict resolution in plural societies however, can be quitecomplex, principally because of dominant effects of cultural and language symbolisms. It is thus arguedthat it is quite dangerous to relegate culture to the background in conflict resolution (Black and Avruch1993). There are several modes of intervention in the integrated conflict management framework, whichinclude but not limited to Peace Building, Mediation, Conciliation, Power Politics, Arbitration, Adjudicationand Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).It is however very important to note that in as much as acombination of these modes could be used to resolve conflict, a final decider is always ‘situation specific’even if it means using minimal force.

It is agreed that the right to use force is a right of an individual, group, state or international authorityto handle conflict situation or to present certain actions by using force to dissuade another party orphysically intervene to halt another from a particular course of action. However, it should be noted thatonly necessary force proportional to the perceived threat or intended action of the other party is allowedin such rightful circumstances (Nwolise, 2014).

Conflict resolution, transformation and management as key elements of the integrated conflictmanagement framework, have been part of human experience for centuries. Wilmot and Hocker (citedin Lugga 2016), identified some crucial ideas for dealing with conflicts. These include: clarification ofcommunication and the checking of perceptions, which in turn involves: speaking out what is in one’smind or heart, listening carefully, expressing strong feelings, appropriately remaining rational, askingreasonable questions and maintaining a spirit of ‘give and take’ as well as avoiding harmful or combativestatements.

Conflict management must occur in a polite atmosphere and context; however, conflicts do notgenerally follow the demands of politeness, hence conflict managers must be skilful to overcome the

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generally chaotic and disorderly scenes associated with the behaviour of parties in conflict (Lugga,2016).

CONFLICT HANDLING

When a conflict is imminent or occurs, there are streams of workable strategies for handling it such as:

a. Aggressive strategies: The use of necessary minimum force comes in here especially whenthe party or parties involved are reluctant to make compromise thus creating an avenue for aviolent outcome. This model, often results in a win - lose situation. Conflicts that are managedthis way, have a high tendency of reoccurring later in a more severe form.

b. Passive strategies: These result in a lose-lose outcome where neither party gets the resultthey wanted, meaning the conflict will reoccur later. This approach however gives room forcooling of nerves and could make the next stage of conflict management easier.

c. Assertive strategies: These are the most successful approaches in conflict resolution, resultingin a win - win situation leading to a true resolution of the conflict.

FUNDAMENTALS OF PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

It is very important to note that a poorly managed conflict has the potential of escalating into destructivecrisis or war. Conflict therefore is a graduation from:

a. Early warning indicators.

b. The resistance level.

c. Escalation or explosive level, which is usually a case of badly managed conflict.

EARLY WARNING SYSTEM AND PEACE EDUCATION

Early warning system assumes that conflict does not take place automatically without conflict signals orindicators. It is insensitivity and delayed responses to conflict indicators that lead to resistant conflict orexplosive stage of conflict. The value of Early Warning System (EWS) is built around peace education(Akpuru-Aja, 2007). It involves proactive enlightenment of the people on knowledge and skills ofobserving and responding to early warning indicators or conflict signals. This is because if uncontrolledearly enough, the negative outcomes of conflict are likely to affect those who are not even directlyinvolved.

Peace education may take the form of public advocacy to promote appreciation of how rewardingpeace is to all. It is to recognise and cherish values and activities of peaceful co-existence. Someexamples of useful phrases are given as:

a. Peace is good for all.

b. Life is fulfilled in a peaceful atmosphere.



c. Conflict or crisis is evil for all.

d. There is nothing responsible in violence or war.

e. Conflict or crisis or war is a setback.

f. Embrace peace and not violence.

g. Make peace, Not War.

Early warning system requires:

a. High level of networking, collaboration and coordination between persons, institutions, expertsand authorities.

b. The pattern of response by authorities or those involved (directly or indirectly) determinesthe value of helpfulness of Early Warning System.

BASIC TECHNIQUES IN PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

NegotiationNegotiation is a non-violent and out of court process whereby two or more parties by mutual consentseek to discuss, settle or resolve differences or lines of dispute or conflict. Communication skills innegotiation such as good listening, openness, frankness and willingness to make concessions, if needed,are very important. Negotiation is the first embrace of dialogue as the supreme strategy of conflictresolution and management.

Negotiation techniques include:

a. Clear identification of issues involved.

b. Venue/physical setting.

c. Language of communication.

d. Listening habit.

e. Provocation control.

f. Issue based, not personalities.

g. Searching for common grounds.

h. Keeping avenue of retreat open.

Enabling Conditions/Factors for Conflict Handling Techniques. The starting point of negotiationbetween parties to a conflict situation is to gain clarity of insights on the nature of issues involved. Thishelps in identifying the nature of contending values, interests, aspirations and strategies.

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Venue/physical setting. Choice of venue for grievance ventilation is very vital, to stamp out fear ordread of attendance and participation. Parties involved should consent to any choice of time, venue andwhere applicable, the form of security measures put in place. It is important that seating arrangementthat avoids combative eyes contacts is preferable.

The place of communication. In understanding each other in a conflict situation, there is no alternativeto open and frank dialogue. Communication is therefore key to all forms of conflict handling and shouldbe mutually up-building. What parties say, and how they say “them” matter in sustaining the spirit ofconflict resolution. Hate speeches and personality attacks are counter-productive. It is therefore veryimportant to have frank and open communication instead of the use of combative words or givingdeadlines or ultimatums. Helpful communication identifies with the “fears” and “facts” of the other party.

Listening habit. Listening is the lifeblood of relationships and conflict handling (Ahuja and Ahiya,2006). Some parties tend to concentrate more on their emotions and viewpoints rather than goodlistening attention to others thus creating unnecessary distraction, hence, cognitive closure or rigiditymust be avoided. Even at the displeasure of the other party’s views, it is helpful to get a goodsense of them by listening. Efficient listening is active, dynamic, and requires hard work. The purposeof listening is an investment that pays important dividends to the listener as against ineffective listeningwhich causes serious problems, for example, in marriages, religion, business and inter-personal relations.

Provocation control. Emotion is necessarily involved in negotiation since there are expectedly lines ofvexation. However, to sustain listening attention, parties need to mind what they say; how to say them aswell as combative attitudes and actions because humility is often challenged. To help, everyone mustlearn to manage his/her provocation and those of others. Quite important to note is that display ofhumility is no sign of weakness, but strength put under control.

Issue Based, Not Personalities. In reality, it seems difficult to separate issues from personalitiesinvolved. It therefore needs persistence to focus more on issues involved because socio-psychological traits of individuals differ considerably. Understanding this will provide additionalguard against hate speeches and attitudes that tend more to demonise personalities.

Searching for Common Grounds. Werner and Yuen (2005) argue that negotiational decisions reachedthrough common accord is more durable than imposed, coerced or intimidated ones.

a. No matter the nature of conflict, there are bound to be common grounds of agreement orunderstanding.

b. Parties should seek to patiently understand the other side’s perspectives and, perhaps,constraints.

c. Openness to concession is mutually helpful.

d. Avoid time lines or ultimatum.



Keeping Avenue of Retreat Open: The adage that rats will fight back, if trapped in a corner oftenapplies to parties in a conflict (Rourke, 2008). It is very useful to leave yourself and your opponent an“out”, which is an exit way with honour. If a party accepts its own mistakes or over reactions anddecides to step down hard bargaining, it is unwise for the other party to insist on a “pound of flesh”.

TYPES OF NEGOTIATION

There are two broad types of Negotiation:

a. Positional or Distributive Bargaining.

b. Collaborative or Integrative Bargaining.(1) Positional Negotiation (Bargaining): In this type of negotiation, attitudinal traits

tend more to identify people as either soft bargainers or hard bargainers or even principledbargainers.

(2) A Hard Bargainer may adopt an attitude which is suggestive of a position of strengthrather than weakness, and will insist on dictating the tunes and terms. The mindset of ahard bargainer is to win rather than lose, and approximates a zero-sum game. (SeeTable1).

(3) A Soft Bargainer displays more trust and confidence in mutually beneficial way ofconflict settlement or resolution.

The unfortunate misconception is that a soft bargainer is weak in character. This is untrue. A softbargainer displays the virtue of humility and wholesome appreciation of the value of harmony, cooperation,collaboration and solidarity.

Collaborative Negotiation: The more principled bargaining is through collaborative efforts. (Fisherand Ury 1983; Imobighe, 2001, 2012; Akpuru-Aja 2007). The process is known as integrative bargainingbecause the parties show similar concerns and anxieties in the belief that they share a whole lot incommon and hopefully will continue to share more in the future. (See Table 2). In this type of negotiation,rather than focus on fault lines, parties should focus on bridge building; fence mending; things thatbenefit all in the long run. Having the same bargaining disposition, parties remain open and receptiveto a number of options or possibilities before arriving at end point decision criteria.

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Conflict Resolution Spectrum: Negotiation by Bargaining in Integrated Conflict Management ...

SOFT BARGAINER* He sees participants as friends* His goal is agreement.* Makes concession to cultivate the relationship.* He is soft on the people and the problem.* He trusts others.* He changes his position easily.* Makes offers.* He is prepared to disclose his bottom-line.* He is prepared to accept one-sided losses to

reach agreement.* He searches for the single answer the

opponent would accept.* He tries to avoid a contest of will.* He easily yields to pressure.

Table 1

COMPARATIVE VIEW OF SOFT AND HARD BARGAINERS

HARD BARGAINER* He sees participants as adversaries.* His goal is victory.* Demands concession for the relationship.* He is hard on the problem and the people.* He distrusts others.* He digs into his position.* Makes threats.* He misleads as to his bottom-line.* He demands one-sided gains as a price of

agreement.* He searches for the single answer that is

acceptable to himself.* He tries to win a contest of will* He applies pressure.

Source: Imobighe 2001.

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Source: Imobighe, 2001.

It will be naive for a hot-tempered person to lose a vital interest. In the same way, a mild-temperedperson should not hastily forgo a vital interest just to avoid trouble. Generally, parties are better off whenthey do not bury differences, but discuss them openly and frankly. Negotiation involves readiness tomake concessions, where applicable, so that peace reigns in a relationship.

HARD

Participants are adversaries* The goal is victory* Demand concessions to

maintain the relationship.* Are hard on the problem and

on the people.* Distrust others.* Dig into position.* Make threats* Mislead as to bottom line

demand one-sided gains as theprice of agreement.

* Search for the one solution youwill accept.

* Insist on position.* Try to win a contest of wills* Apply pressure

SOFT

Participants are friends* The goal is an

agreement.* Make concessions to

cultivate the relationship.* Are soft on the people

and the problem.* Trust others.* Change position easily* Make offers.* Disclose bottom line.* Accept one-sided losses

as the price ofagreement. Search forthe one solution theywill accept.

* Insist on agreement* Try to avoid a contest of

wills* Avoid pressure.

PRINCIPLEDCOLLABORATIVE

Parties are problem-solvers* The goal is a wise outcome.* Separate the problem from the

relationship problem.* Are soft on the people; hard

on the problem.* Proceed independently of

trust.* Focus on interests, not

positions.* Explore interests.* Avoid having a bottom line.* Invent options for mutual

benefit.* Develop multiple options to

choose from; choose later.* Insist on objective criteria.* Try to reach an agreement

based on interests, not wills.* Yield to principle, not pressure;

reason and be open to reasons.

Table 2

COMPARATIVE VIEW OF HARD, SOFT AND HARD COLLABORATIVE BARGAINERS

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THE INTEGRATED CONFLICT MANAGEMENT MODEL/FRAMEWORK

A conflict management model sees conflict management as a process embracing three levels of activities:a. Conflict prevention, peace promotion and consolidation.b. Conflict control and abatement.c. Conflict resolution.

The above three levels of activities constitute what is represented below as an integrated conflictmanagement circle.

Source: Thomas A. Imobighe, 2010, NIPSS, Kuru.

MediationMediation is a continuation of negotiation by the use of a third-party to help the people involved inpersistent conflict, or nagging conflict to get talking for an agreement (Barash, 1991: 309).

Key principles in Mediation:a. Define the problem.b. Lay down clearly the ground rules.

c. Help parties develop listening attention necessary to understand each other’s facts, fears,anxieties or concerns.

d. A third-party is unbiased and trusted by both sides as the “go-between”, and should notbetray trust.



e. A third-party can serve as a fact finder, and is allowed to make non-binding, but helpfulsuggestions that might be agreeable to both sides. Acceptance of suggestions is entirelyvoluntary.

f. A third-party is in a position to propose a solution that both contending parties find evenacceptable, but neither would be willing to propose for fear of being seen as too reconciliatoryand thus, weak.

g. Confidentiality is the hallmark of a third-party.h. Emphasis is on common grounds and future benefits rather than divisive emotions and short-

sighted interests.i. A third-party, has no final words on settlement or agreement. Hence, there is no room to

hand out authoritatively any option or solution.j. Free flow of communication is very vital to control, or avoid communication gap(s).k. Sitting position that places each party on balance rather than “low self-esteem” should be

considered.

Types of Mediators. Goodong, (2006), identifies three types of mediators:a. Social network mediator.b. Authoritative mediator.c. Independent mediator.

Social Network Mediatora. Social network mediator has increased with the emergence of age grade associations, political

groups, concerned friends, business or professional associations and faith-based organisations.b. Social network mediators come from the understanding that they too are involved; affected

for good or bad.c. A successful dispute settlement between parties would strengthen an existing social network

in a given environment.

Authoritative Mediatora. Authoritative mediators identify those whose personalities or positions would help in exercising

influence on the disputing parties at both the exploratory (early contact) stage and the negotiatingstage without necessarily handing out authoritative decision as judge.

b. The authoritative mediator is wholly an acknowledged influential office or authority, who onlyacts as the ice- breaker (Goodong Sam 2006: 35).

c. The process is no arbitration.d. Think of influential personalities as former and incumbent Presidents, religious leaders, traditional

monarchs, vice chancellors, director-generals, justices, service-chiefs in the armed forcesand the likes.

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e. In international politics, it includes super powers, great powers and highly influential powerblocs (The European Union).

Independent Mediatora. Independent mediator does not necessarily belong to a known social network, but shows

great concern on the conflict situation.b. Usually, independent mediators have a sense or feeling of possessing expertise needed for

social engineering by offering services, rather than “forcing them”.c. The parties have the ultimate option to accept or reject any intervention.

Other Functional Techniques and Variants

TECHNIQUE VARIANTSJudicial Method. Arbitration.Adjudication.Conciliatory Method. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)Power Politics (through Strength). Peacemaking.

Peacekeeping.Peace-enforcement.

Arbitration

Arbitration is a judicial variant of a third-party involvement in resolving a conflict, except in an authoritativemethod. The arbiter has the consent of the disputing parties to hand out authoritative decision or solution(Gaya-Best, 2006: 108-109). On an individual basis, an arbiter poses as a judge and listens impartiallyto both sides. In the end, an authoritative decision, which often may be acceptable to parties is made.The authoritative decision is called award. Arbitration may apply out of court or in court.

In the court of law, arbitration is commonly used to adjudicate over several inter-state borderdisputes, usually brought forward by the voluntary consent of parties. Prior to the final ruling, the court(such as International Court of Justice, at The Hague in the Netherland), would seek re-affirmativeconsent of parties to its rulings. Once ruling is made authoritatively, the parties are not under the coercionof the court to accept or reject. However, whichever party that enjoys the advantage of judgmentcommands more diplomatic recognition. A party may reject the judgment and is free to use political anddiplomatic means to seek further redress as the case may be.

AdjudicationAdjudication hands out its rulings based on evidence before the court of competent jurisdiction. Ineffect, judgment does not seek the consent of disputing parties. When negotiation and arbitrationprocesses fail, parties who decide to seek adjudication in court run the risk of a zero sum game outcome(winner takes all).

Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques. It is an out-of-court process of settling disputes withremedies, appeasements and needs assessment” (Imobighe, 2001). The mediators include, culturally:



a. The king’s council or paramount ruler,b. Council of elders,c. Council of chiefs,d. Age grade systems and village assembly.e. Any of the mediating systems may apply.

SUMMARY OF PREPARATION CYCLE OF NEGOTIATION

IX. CONCLUSION

Generally, the desire for honest, non-violent resolution of conflicts is getting stronger and more widespreadtoday than at any time in the past. Basic techniques of conflict resolution are not far-fetched. All that weneed is attitude change towards conflict, especially by controlling hasty resort to the employment ofviolence in the settlement of disputes or differences. Perhaps, peace education that promotes peace asa public good for all, and any violence as counter-value is helpful. Not to be forgotten is that theapplication of basic techniques of peace and conflict resolution is conflict situation specific. Choices ofthe most appropriate combination of techniques are key to success. The end state is not a “start stopevent”, but a process. Even when expected results are not forthcoming, there is need for patience; formore spirited efforts. No one can be more secure than the security of its social environment. This is theideal. It is the message! Perhaps, more than basic techniques, we all need good faith and goodwill topromote peace through conflict resolution, which in essence requires uprooting the real causes of agiven conflict to ensure that there is no relapse to violence, instead there will be lasting peace.

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Akpuru-Aja, A. (2009), Basic Concepts, Issues and Strategies of Peace and Conflict Resolution,Enugu-Nigeria, Kenny and Bros.

Barash, D. (P. (1991), Introduction to Peace. California, Wadsworth Publishing Company.Black, P.W. and K. Avruch (1993), Ideas of Human Nature in Contemporary Conflict Resolution

Theory, in Negotiated Journal, Vol. V.Burton, J. (1969), Conflict and Communication, London, Macmillan.Burton, J. (1987), World Society, New York.Coser, L.A. (1956), The Functions of Social Conflicts, The Free Press, Glerico III.Covey, R.S. (2011), The Third Alternative: Solving Life’s Most Difficult Problems, London: Simon

and Schuster.Dougherty J. and Pfaltzgraf R. Jnr (1981), Contending Theories of International Relations: A

Comprehensive Survey, New York, Harper and Row.Elaigwu, J.I. (2012), Security and Peace: The Imperatives for National Development in Nigeria,

Jos, Institute of Governance and Social Research.Fisher, R. and William, U. (1983). Getting to YES, Boston, Houghton, Mifflin.Gaya-Best, S. (ed), (2006). Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies, Ibadan, Spectrum Books.Goodong, S. (2006), “Mediation and the Mediation Process,” in Imobighe, T.A. (2001), Conflict/

Crisis Management Exercise, Kuru-Jos, NIPSS.Lugga, S.A. (2016), Towards Peace, Katsina, Lugga Press Ltd.Nwolise, O.B.C. (2004), The Nigeria Police in International Peace-Keeping under the United

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– 292.Wilmort, W.W. and J.L. Hocker (1998) Interpersonal Conflicts, WWC. Brown.



THE HYBRIDISED NATURE OF THE BOKO HARAM WAR AGAINSTTHE PEOPLE AND ARMED FORCES OF NIGERIA: THE SPIRITUAL

DIMENSION AND LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

by

Professor OBC NwoliseDepartment of Political Science,

University of Ibadan, and Visiting Professor,Nigerian Army Resource Centre,and Army War College Nigeria.

(Tel: +2348037013069; (E-mail: [email protected].

and

Dr. SB OwonikokoCentre for Peace and Security Studies,

Modibbo Adama University of Technology, Yola,(E-mail; owonikoko [email protected]).

ABSTRACT

War today has transmuted from between states that move regular armies tonon-state actors that wage asymmetric warfare. Anything and everything isthrown into this form of warfare by the non-state actors to make up for itsinferiority vis-a-vis the state in terms of size of armed forces and weaponsystems. In this article, the two authors highlight the hybridised nature ofthe Boko Haram war in the North-East with particular emphasis on thespiritual dimension. The paper draws lessons for the future especially theneed to watch the role of religious beliefs and symbols in asymmetric warfare,and the need to train the military to be able to engage the adversary in allspectrums of warfare.

Key words: Hybridised nature, Boko Haram, War, Spiritual Dimension, Lessons.

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INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, the security architecture of modern states has changed significantly.Rather than the conventional warfare pitting one or more states against another, what is often experiencedin contemporary period is internal insurrection by non-state actors that challenge a state’s monopoly ofthe legitimate use of force. In waging these wars, several tactics are used by armed irregular groupsagainst forces of the state. Such tactics include guerrilla war, terrorism and spiritual warfare. In confrontingthese enemies from within, the military organisations of countries face herculean task because of thehybridised nature of warfare mounted by these irregular adversaries. The herculean task of the militaryorganisation is made more difficult because national militaries are only prepared for conventional warsand they are far less prepared for terrorism and probably unprepared at all for spiritual warfare.

Since the outbreak of the Boko Haram crisis in 2009, the group has metamorphosed into a complexinsurgent group embarking on hybridised warfare against the Nigerian state and its forces. Although, theArmed Forces of Nigeria intensified efforts vigorously to put an end to the insurgency and terrorism ofthe group, it continues to bounce back wrecking serious havoc on lives and property. For instance, inspite of dismantling Camp Zairo in the Sambisa Forest and killing major commanders of the group byOperations Lafiya Dole and Gama Aiki, the group still carries out attacks. This points at the resilience ofthe group. This paper discusses the spiritual angle of the hybridised nature of Boko Haram war inNigeria and the need for Nigerian military force countering the group to also reinforce its strength andfactor spiritual power into its war effort especially the use of Strategic Spiritual Intelligence (SSI).Unfortunately, we tend to down play the place of spirituality in contemporary warfare because of thetoga of Science which emphasised that whatever cannot be seen, touched, measured or weighed doesnot exist. However, the fact remains that spiritual power is real and the spirit controls the physical.Anthropologists have highlighted the relevance of the spirit to perception of power in Africa (see Ellis,1999; Lan 1985; Weigert, 1995; Behren, 1999) but they are yet to show the role spiritual power playsin contemporary hybrid warfare and how the state can respond strategically to this. This will constitutethe focus of this paper using the Boko Haram insurgency and terrorism and government’s response to itas a reference point.

The paper has seven sections. Section one is the introduction. Section two is the conceptualisationof terms. Section three discusses spiritual warfare in historical perspective. Section four discusses spiritualwarfare in modern period. Section five discusses Boko Haram hybridised warfare. It vividly explainsthe evolvement of Boko Haram hybridised war from 2009 till date. Section six discusses lessons andstrategies that can be employed by the state. Section seven is the conclusion. The thesis of the paper isthat in countering Boko Haram terrorism, Nigerian troops need to be effectively prepared for the hybridnature of warfare prosecuted by Boko Haram. Boko Haram will not be conquered if the group wagesterrorism, guerrilla, and spiritual warfare and the Nigerian troops are responding with conventional warfare.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

Certain concepts are very germane to this paper and need to be effectively conceptualised for clarity.These concepts are: war/warfare, hybrid/hybridised warfare, guerrilla warfare, counter-terrorism and

The Hybridised Nature of the Boko Haram War Against the People and Armed Forces of Nigeria… 51


counter-insurgency. These concepts will be appropriately conceptualised one after the other in thatorder.

War/Warfare

The word “war” is derived from the old French word “were” which literarily means “to confuse”, “toperplex” or “to bring to confusion”. Therefore, war, defined from the etymology of the word is a situationof perplexity and confusion in a state or society. This definition of the term underestimates the destructivetendency of war. War, properly defined in military terminology, is a situation of armed conflict characterisedby extreme aggression, destruction and mortality using regular or irregular military forces. It entails adegree of confrontation between two or more belligerents in which weapons and other military technologyfeature. That is probably why Carl Von Clausewitz conceptualised wars as: “A duel on an extensivescale... an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds...directed upon the destruction of the enemy’spower.” (Clausewitz quoted in Fuller, 1968:47).

Humanity votes for peace and abhors war because as Nwolise rightly observed:

War destroys life and property, principles and values, and wakes up beastlyelements in man. War leads to environmental pollution and degradation.It kills human beings in their millions depending on the magnitude... andforces people to leave their homes... War diverts the developmentalresources of a state to defence and war-making. It retards the rate ofdevelopment of a people. It spreads pestilence, destitution, hunger, andstarvation. It creates gross insecurity and traumatises people. War is avery costly venture. (Nwolise, 2004: 7-8)

Despite these ugly features of war, Plato (quoted in Momah, 1993:35) informs us that there is noend of war in sight in human civilisation. In his words expressed over 2,400 years ago, “only the deadhave seen the end of war”.

In the same vein, Momah (1993:34-35) asserts that “war remains the greatest tragedy to have everbetaken mankind because to win a war, it must be fought not as we may wish, but as we must”. Heconcluded that:

War in its totality is evil... it destroys, ruins, maims, changes boundaries,topples governments, humiliates peoples, brutalises the human psyche,wrecks the precious family togetherness, and most regrettably, often sowsthe seeds of other wars.

Although, the origin of warfare among human groups and states is a subject of intense debate, sometheories have been put forward by scholars (for the discussion of these various theories (see Keith,

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1997; Dawson, 1996; Keeley, 1996; Stedman, 1991, Sanjide, 2004). Some scholars have alluded toinjustices, claims over scarce resources, pursuit of incompatible goals, personality (ego) clashes, etc.One major reality in the contemporary world is that hybridised warfare is more complex than the warmodern militaries were trained for.

Hybridised War/Warfare

The concept of hybridised war/warfare is relatively new in military/security studies. It was first used in2005 by US General James Mattis at the Defence Forum sponsored by the Naval Institute and MarineCorps Association on September 8. The concept was later popularised by General James Mattis andLt. Col. Frank Hoffman in their work titled “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Warfare” published inthe Naval Institute Proceedings in November, 2005 and later in numerous publications such as Hoffman(2006a; 2006b; 2007a; 2007b, and Nemeth (2002). Since this period, the concept began to be used,although some scholars believe that the concept is nebulous and vague (see Scott and Scott, 2014;Greg, 2008; Fleming, 2011). Hybrid warfare is a form of warfare in which the enemy uses variousavailable strategies and tactics including moving from conventional to non-conventional and betweenguerrilla warfare and terrorism to attain certain objectives from the state. Nemeth concisely define theterm as any warfare in which an adversary adaptively employs a fuse of conventional weapons, irregulartactics, terrorism and criminal behaviour in the battle space to obtain their political objectives. A newreflection of hybridised nature of threat to national security especially in Africa is the use of spiritualpower in the bid to overcome the state by non-state armed groups.

Guerrilla Warfare

This is a form of irregular warfare in which a small combatant group uses military tactics which mayinclude ambushes, sabotage, raid, petty warfare, hit and run, among others to engage a large traditionalor conventional military with a view to conquering or annihilating them. This is usually used in anasymmetrical warfare where the guerrillas try as much as possible to avoid any confrontation withenemy troop. Even when any confrontation occurs, it is a handful of the guerrillas against a large numberof the state’s regular forces. While the major means of achieving victory in conventional warfare is thestrength of arms of the military, in guerrilla warfare as in terrorism, terror tactics, violence, fear andpropaganda are relied upon.

Counter-insurgency/Counter-terrorism

Counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism refers to all the integrated measures, kinetic and non-kinetic,deployed by a state to quell an insurgency and resolve its underlying causes in order to make forenduring peace, security and stability.



SPIRITUAL WARFARE IN TRADITIONAL TIMES

Waging war and defending the territorial integrity of a people was one of the ancient practices of humansocieties in history before the development of technology as well as the evolution of social organisationsuch as the state (Holsti, 1967). Therefore, human societies from time immemorial have had to prosecutewar or use brute military force to deter enemies, defend their territory and achieve any other goal. Indoing this, the use of supernatural powers was often employed. Although, this is not limited to Africa, thecontinent before it came into contact with the colonial forces had rich records of martial spirit mixed withsupernatural powers used in waging war or defending the territory.

African pre-colonial societies can be essentially grouped into three broad categories: centralisedsocieties, semi-centralised and non-centralised (acephalous) societies. These forms of society practisedtwo different forms of military organisation. The first is the citizen-army or the “levee en masse” militaryorganisation. This is a form of military organisation in the society in which able-bodied men were conscriptedinto the military from the society during the period of emergency, at the end of which the army wasdisbanded and the warriors went back to their various (civilian) occupations. This was most practised inacephalous societies. For instance, among the Igbo in pre-colonial period, because of the republicannature of the society, there was no centralised source of power that could control the military. Therefore,there was no standing army that was clearly recognised. Everybody was a soldier in an emergencyperiod (Muraina, 2014). In this kind of society, the continuous training of the military to make themprofessionals could not be achieved because of the economic activities of the people. The second typeof military organisation in the pre-colonial period was the professional army which could be found inwell-established centralised or semi-centralised kingdoms and empires. Especially among the Oyo Yorubapeople, the Alaafin must demonstrate martial art to be considered a king. Oranmiyan used his bravery,martial art and war-like character to create a political federation which grew up to become known asOyo Empire. Alaafin Alaka was also deposed from the throne by the Oyo Mesi for his lack of militarismand was replaced by Sango who was known to have demonstrated warlike characteristics (Atanda,1975).

In waging war or defending the territorial integrity of all these societies, the use of spiritual powerwas often employed. Spiritual power was not only employed, it also contributed significantly to thedetermination of success or otherwise in warfare. There are at least five different ways by which spiritualpower was used in the prosecution of war or defence of the society. These are discussed below:

(i) Divination for Intelligence

This was often employed before going out for war to get information about the adversary and predictthe likely outcome of the war. It involved consulting the gods/God through its/His priests. This wasconsidered necessary to ensure that the right decisions were made before going out to war. One veryimportant function of divination was prediction of the probable outcome. Such prediction was often thebasis for the decision as to whether the army would engage in the battle or not. During the 19th CenturyYoruba warfare, the priestly diviner’s views had to be taken before waging or going to war. In somecases, Yoruba armies were accompanied by a contingent of priests and traditional doctors who regularly

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consulted Ifa oracle through Ifa priests called Babalawo (diviner) for them every morning and counselledthem before setting out (Fadipe, 1970). For instance, an ancient Oyo king- King Ajaka relied heavily onthe guidance of the oracle and medicine men as he prosecuted his expansionist war with his many chiefsand princes (Johnson, 1978). Ignoring the prediction of the oracle often meant a serious negativeconsequence for the army. This was the case with the Ibadan army after the Kiriji war which resulted instalemate. In their search for a clue as to why victory eluded them, they recalled that they disobeyed theinjunction of the oracle which suggested that they made Akintola the Balogun (war general) but refusedand picked Ajayi Osungbekun simply because Akintola was not a titled chief as at the time of the deathof Balogun Ajayi Ogboriefon (Johnson, 1976; Adefila and Opeola, 1996). Among the Modakeke too,a similar case of disobedience to divination was recorded. The incidence involved a great Modakekewarrior named Adepoju who fought many battles for Modakeke and became a hero as a result.Unfortunately, he was killed in a battle between Modakeke and Ile-Ife. According to the report of ChiefAmusan Popoola (cited in Adefila and Opeola, 1996), Adepoju was told by the Ifa oracle to sacrifice tohis ancestors before going to the battle-field but he said he was in a hurry to do that promising he wouldsacrifice a human being instead of a goat to his ancestors after the war. It was reported that before hegot to the battle-field his horse stumbled which was a bad omen enough to warn him that the ancestorsor gods were angry with his disobedience. However, he ignored the divine advice of the oracle and thewarning of the ancestral spirits. He went to the war and died subsequently as he was killed by the Ijebuarmy. Among the Igbo people of Nigeria, this was also a usual practice. There were traditional priests(Eze Mmoo) who contacted gods to elicit intelligence information on the war their armies were about toembark on (Anyawu, 1988). In the biblical period, the Israelites, before embarking on any warfare sortthe face of God through the prophets. This always served as assurance of possibility of success in thewar. At times, fake prophets deceived the kings into war with disastrous consequences, but kings whoobeyed the words of real prophets of God came out victorious.

Ritual Sacrifice

Performing ritual sacrifice before the commencement of war was one of the ways of inviting the supernaturalinto the conduct of war. An elaborate sacrifice was offered to the god(s) of war to appease him and toinvite their favour during the course of the war. Among the Oyo Yoruba, it was a standard practice tomake an elaborate sacrifice to the war god and smear their weapons of war with magical potion. Beforethe Balogun and his army went out to the war, a sacrifice was made as required from divination. Theobject of the sacrifice was pushed from one grove of one god to the other until it finally arrived at theOranmiyan grove. It would then be decapitated and the Balogun and his principal officers and armywould come forward to rub the blood of the object of sacrifice on their sword and war instruments.After this, the army will be led to the warfront by the Balogun with the belief that the outcome of the warwill be favourable. During the Kiriji/Ekitiparapo war, Ibadan did not consider the performance of ritualnecessary because much importance was not attached to it initially. As the war was getting out of controlof Ibadan army, the war chiefs of Ibadan found it expedient to offer the customary sacrifice but theywere overruled by the then Aare Latosa who happened to be a Muslim. It was after his death in August



1885 that a belated sacrifice was made. It was believed that the inability of the Ibadan army to conquerthe confederate force was due to neglect of the god of war by not making the eventual customarysacrifice to him. This is also common among the Igbo people in South-eastern Nigeria before theircontact with the colonial masters. As Anyawu (1988) reported, traditional priests usually offered sacrificesto the god of war on behalf of the armies to pray for a successful war engagement with enemy forces.

Use of Spiritual Herbs on Weapons and IncantationsThis involved the use of leafs and herbs in the prosecution of war. The primary objective of utilisingherbs on weapons was not only to render the users absolutely invincible at the battle front but also toneutralise the power of the enemy. Among the Yoruba people, afose (magical power to make utterancescome to reality), epe (curse), okigbe (magical power that disallow penetration by cutlass, sword etc),Isuju (magical power that conceals user’s physical presence from the enemies) and herbal bullet-proofsuch as “asakiibon”, “afoobon,” “ayoeta”, among others were used. Similarly, herbal weapons likeegbe and afeeri empowered the user to disappear at will. There was also the use of incantations tostimulate the potency of herbal weapons. Captain Jones (cited in Adefila and Opeola, 1998) observedthat the Egba armies in 1861 were used to wearing “gree-gree” or charm while the principal woreelaborately marked war dresses studded with cowries and teeth of wild animals. All these contributed tothe success of their warfare and defence. Similarly, among the Igbo people of South-eastern Nigeria,medicine men prepared protective medicine and charms for the army to embark on war in defence oftheir community (Anyawu, 1988). Special herbs, were rubbed on weapons and where backed withincantations to bring down adversaries that were proving powerful in the battle front.

Spiritual FortificationTo fortify is to protect a person or a place by making it strong against any attack. Spiritual fortification isthe use of supernatural power such as charm to provide strong invincibility for an object. One of themost used objects of spiritual fortification is witchcraft. Witchcraft is a form of spiritual power whichenables the witches to identify herbs both for killing and healing. The witches possess the secret of theknowledge of vital force. Many witches accompanied their husbands to the warfront to be of assistanceto their war efforts. To be spiritually fortified, the warriors had incisions made on their bodies. Someswallowed ritualised objects. All were meant to immunise them against enemy weapons and charms.

SPIRITUAL WARFARE IN MODERN TIMESAlthough, the development of technology as well as the evolution of state as a distinctive social organisationappears to have relegated the use and relevance of supernatural powers, it continues to be used inprosecution of war and defence in contemporary times. Many wars and armed conflicts fought in post-colonial African states are fraught with the use of occultic and magical powers. The use of magicalpower which comes in the form of charms, potions, and rituals, among others in these warfares performsome strategic functions for the users. Firstly, it offers fighters some kind of protection from the harmsthey may be inflicted with by the attacks or their enemies. Secondly, it is also used to imbue andenhance the ability of the fighters to fight. In other words, it serves as motivation for fighters to fight and

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intimidation for the enemy fighters. It is therefore very possible to see a fighter display ruthlessness inwarfront without fear for anything whatever because of reliance on the magical power she/he possesses.This is why Yoruba people usually have it in one of their proverbs that “okete jeun tele ikun koto senubembe solode”, meaning that a mouse must have used a magical power before it can withstand thehunter. Lastly, possession and use of magical power in contemporary warfare aid mobilisation andrecruitment of armed groups. Civil wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Kenya andin Uganda have seen conspicuous use of magical powers by either fighting forces or government forcesor both.

For instance, the Holy Spirit Movement in Northern Uganda placed spirit guidance and assistanceat the core of their military activities (Behren, 199; Wlodarczyk, 2009d). The Liberian war was anothercase in point. During the Liberian civil war, fighters on all sides wore protective charms to prosecute thewar. Among all these armed groups, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and the LiberianUnited Front for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) were notorious for the use of magical powers.President Samuel Doe was captured and the whole country was brought under ruin easily through themagical powers of the enemy armed groups. As Blahyi (cited in Nwolise, 2014) explained, Samuel Doehad all the symbols of authority of the Liberian state buried at the Nya-gbe-a-weh shrine in the GedeMountains and he was initiated into the cult. His death was the product of his entry into the Poro SecretSociety to which some of his enemies also belonged. Those who never forgave him for killing GeneralKiwanpa decoded him (Doe) spiritually, and revealed his spiritual powers to his enemies who capturedand killed him (Nwolise, 2014). In the civil war in Sierra Leone, the display of magical powers by theKamajor militia was well known. Members of the group were known for their efficacious and vigorousinitiation processes, and abundant use of charms as part of their dress. Members of the group were sospiritually fortified that they could walk into and out of barrage of bullets and artillery fire without ascratch on their body. An account by a Kamajor ex-combatant cited in Wlodarczyk (2009 :) illustratesthe magical powers possessed by the group during the Sierra Leonean civil war. In his words:

I led an attack on AFRC forces on the main road between the diamondarea in Kono and Makeni. The AFRC and the RUF attacked our positionwith heavy artillery. To prove that our society’s medicine really works, Idecided to go onto the road and face these guys. They were shooting atme, but I walked on towards them, and none of their bullets or artillery hitme. At a bridge there, I shot the driver of a rebel vehicle. There were sixrebels in the truck. I captured the vehicle with all the ammunition inside.I drove it back to our base. It was one of the key battles because itweakened the rebels in the northern area.

During the Mozambican civil war, Renamo fighters were seen carrying or wearing charms providedby witchdoctors as defence. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Mai Mai group alsoused magical powers for which they became very popular in the 1960s (Wlodarczyk, 2009). In all thecases cited above which occurred in not too distant past, use of spiritual powers involved performanceof a ritual and the administration of magical protection against enemy fire before going into battle. The



primary aim of this practice was to make fighters immune to enemy fire. All these are pointing to the factthat reliance on spirituality and spiritual powers continue to be relevant in contemporary armed conflictsas drivers. Personal interaction of one of the authors with men of the Nigerian armed forces shows thatbefore they also embarked on any major operations either within or outside the Nigerian state, prayer isoffered to God. Some even visit clergymen to offer prayer for safety and protection throughout theengagement. Even though this does not involve rituals as the cases mentioned above, it still showsspiritual beliefs and practices.

THE NIGERIAN CASE: MILITANTS OF THE NIGER DELTA ANDBOKO HARAM HYBRID WARFARE

Before the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria, the Niger Delta region used to be the hotspot of crisis in thecountry. The crisis reached its peak from 2006 and 2009 before the Yar’Adua-led Federal Governmentdecided to introduce the amnesty programme to ameliorate the crisis in the region after the militaryapproach could not resolve the crisis. Studies have shown that military approach was unable to vanquishthe militants because of their use of spiritual powers during the peak of the crisis. In order to spirituallyfortify the militant leaders against the offensive operations of the Nigerian military forces, a lot of charmsand ritual engagement were carried out by the leadership of the militant groups. One of such ritualsinvolved being bathed by menopausal women with spiritual concoction to make their bodies impenetrableto bullets. As explained by Oriola (2013) and validated by Owonikoko (2016), the post-menopausalaged women and militant leaders during the ritual process become one in nudity in the performance ofthe sacrifice to spiritually fortify them. In the process of the spiritual fortification, the militants took“gbere” (incisions) on their heads, back and under their eyes. They were forbidden from sexual encounterwith women and also prohibited from eating food cooked by a woman within the reproductive age(specifically because of menstruation). This was why most of the cooks in the militant’s camps were menand not women. This does not only make them spiritually strong, they were also well able to perceiveimpending dooms. Oriola (2013:15) reported that a major militant leader in Edo State who has retired“from active service” lives with an elder woman who often accompanies him everywhere he goes andeven tastes the food prepared by his wife before he can eat it. In addition to these personal spiritualfortifications, their camps were also spiritually fortified with rituals and charms. As a result, it was totallyforbidden to have sex in the camps. Women members of the group who were also getting close to theirmenstrual period were excused from the camp as it could break the spiritual consecration of the place.All these along with their significant martial art contributed to the inability of the military forces to vanquishthe groups before the introduction of the amnesty programme.

As the crisis of militancy in the Niger Delta was abating, the problem of Boko Haram started in theNorth East of Nigeria. Although, the group became well known from 2009, however the group has adeeper origin. The true historical roots of the group can be traced to 1995 when Abubakar Lawanestablished Ahlulsunnawal’jama’ahhijra or Shabaab group (Muslim Youth Organisation) in Maiduguri,Borno State. The group flourished as a non-violent movement until 2002 (Onuoha, 2014). Boko Haram’sorigin can be traced to 2002 and it is believed to have originated from a group of radical Islamic youth

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who worshipped at the Alhaji Mohammadu Ndimi mosque in Maiduguri, Borno State. The leader of thegroup was Mohammed Ali, a Nigerian who was radicalised by Jihadi literature in Saudi Arabia and wasalso believed to have fought with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan (Kyari, 2014). In 2002, an offshoot ofthe group declared the city of Maiduguri and the practice of Islam to be corrupt by the society. Ittherefore declared that it would move away from the city of Maiduguri to a small village called Kanamain Yunusari Local Government Area. The motive was to set up a separate community of people thatwould run basically on the principle of Islam. The choice of the place was strategic as it was remote andgood for defence. While operating at the Kanama village, Mohammed Ali, the leader of the groupexposed anti-state ideology and invited other Muslims to join him to return to what he considered to betrue practice of Islam. In December 2003, the group began an intensive conflict with the Nigeria PoliceForce regarding fishing right in a local pond. In the cause of the conflict, the group overpowered thepolice and took over their weapons. This led to the invitation of the army who invaded their camps anddislodged them. In the process, several members of the group, including the leader, Mohammed Ali,were killed while the group’s mosque was crushed.

The few survivors of the group returned to Maiduguri and lived with others from the youth groupthat had originated from Ndimi mosque. Mohammed Yusuf, the new leader of the group began theprocess of establishing a new mosque for the group known as Ibn Taimiyyah Masjid built on the landowned by Yusuf’s father-in-law, Baba Fugu Mohammed. During this period, the group expanded andcreated a state within a state without disturbance from state authority. As Mohammed puts it, the groupembarked on:

...intensive proselytisation, recruitment, indoctrination, and radicalisationof its members...extensive criticism of the extant secular system; debateswith opposing ulama (clerics) on the propriety or otherwise of Westerneducation, Westernisation, democracy, and secularism; and unceasingcriticism of the corruption and bad governance under Governor Ali ModuSheriff (2003-2011) of Borno State as well as the conspicuousconsumption and opulence of the Western-educated elite in the midst ofpoverty (Mohammed, 2014:16).

The extensive and intensive proselytisation of the group coupled with its offering of welfare handoutssuch as cash, food, shelter, among others enabled the group to attract many followers under its roof andexpand to other states like Bauchi, Yobe and Niger (Walker, 2012). Many of those attracted wererefugees and jobless Nigerian youths.

The commencement of arm-bearing and violent activities of the group can be traced to 2009 whenmembers of the sect who were riding on bikes to the funeral of a fellow member were stopped by themembers of Operation Flush II (the Borno State security outfit for tackling armed banditry) for notputting on crash helmet. Violence ensued in the process leading to the death of one of the members ofthe sect. Angry at how the police killed one of its members; the group launched a rebellious uprisingagainst the state following the order by Yusuf to retaliate the killing of his men (Sani, 2011). Thus,



members of the sect attacked police stations in Bauchi and Yobe States killing several police officers.When it had become obvious that the power of the Nigeria Police Force could no longer control thesect’s uprising, the Nigerian Army was deployed to assist the police overwhelm the sect. The involvementof the Nigerian Army led to the arrest of Yusuf and his father-in-law while several members of the groupwere scattered. Yusuf Mohammed was handed over to the police but was later declared dead in thecustody of the Nigeria Police. During the military onslaught on the sect in Borno State, members of thesect who were not apprehended by the soldiers fled Maiduguri even to outside the country. One yearafter this onslaught (2009-2010), Maiduguri was free from the violent activities of the Boko Haramsect. This period was a moment for members of the sect to regroup and undergo sophisticated trainingand seek technical support from other international terrorist groups outside the country. Walker (2012)cited Nigeria-based security sources as telling Reuters in January 2012 that several dozens of Nigerianswere tracked to insurgent training camps in Algeria, Mali and across the whole of the Sahel regionduring this period. In the mid-2010, Boko Haram returned to Maiduguri to commence its terroristcampaign which has been ongoing since then till date. Since the re-emergence of Boko Haram activitiesin 2010, and the assumption of leadership by Shekau, the group has undergone several changes andwaged hybrid war against the Nigerian state. This is represented by change in tactics of the group. Fromthe period of re-emergence of Boko Haram in mid-2010 till date, Boko Haram has undergone at leasttwo different changes swinging from non-conventional to conventional warfare. The first approach ofthe group was the use of guerrilla warfare approach which involved the adoption of hit and run tactics.This first approach ranged from the use of open armed operation/campaign, targeted killing/assassination,drive-by-shooting and use of improvised explosive devices.

Open-Armed Operation/Campaign

In a remarkable change from the use of crude implements under Mohammed Yusuf, the first of thetactics used by the group after the assumption of leadership by Shekau was open armed operation/campaign. This is similar to but slightly different from the traditional hit-and-run tactics. This involved theuse of a large number of operatives say between 10 to 60 to engage the security forces in gun battle orto mount a surprise attack on security establishment such as stations, barracks or prisons and/or softtargets such as gatherings like church and market. This tactic was usually used where there are a largenumber of security forces or people who can overpower the operatives of the sect.

Targeted Killing/Assassination

From open armed operation, the sect moved to targeted killing/assassination. This was adopted to trailand kill anybody who was considered an enemy. As a result of this approach, several people weretargeted and killed. This approach entailed the trailing of the target to a place where the individual wasvery vulnerable to being successfully killed by an assigned operative. Sometimes, cars or motorbikeswere used to trace such targets and shot at a very close range basically at the chest, head or abdomento ensure that the chance of the person surviving the attack was very narrow. Several civilians, politicians,religious leaders, security agents, community leaders especially those who spoke against the ideology

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and activities of the sect were killed using this tactic. This was basically used to kill village heads,community leaders and Islamic clerics who were speaking against the sect or conniving with securityagents. Mohammed (2014:20) explained this thus:

Once the sect was militarily crushed and their headquarters, the MarkazIbn Taymiyyah, burnt and razed to the ground, the remainder of theleadership went underground while most members either fled or meltedinto the local population. The state compelled traditional rulers not toconceal Boko Haram members in their domain and in the process manywere identified and handed over to security agencies. However, lack ofconfidentiality within the security system and Boko Haram’s intelligencenetwork ensured that they got to know who gave information on them tostate authorities. The first phase of resurgence was marked by targetedkilling of ward and village heads that had collaborated with state securityagents, prison officials whom they accused of torturing or poisoning theirmembers in detention, prominent politicians of the ruling All NigeriaPeoples Party (ANPP) government of Borno State, and all securityofficials.

Drive-by-shooting

Another approach used by the group was drive-by-shooting. This was in a way similar to targetedassassination. One reason for adopting this tactic is to kill the targets that have proven very difficult totrack down. It was usually used when target assassination was to be carried out in a busy city centre orbuild-up areas. With this method, the target could easily be shot at close range and the killer couldescape without being apprehended.

Use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

From this approach, the sect graduated to the use of IEDs. The IEDs were configured in such a way thatthey could be detonated when thrown or could be set off through a timer or a remote control. TheseIEDs were usually placed in peculiar places where they would have maximum effect when exploded.Such places are roads, bridges, rail lines etc. They may even be deposited in a bag or container left inpublic places such as church, drinking joints, lecture halls, car parks and bus stops. The size of the IEDsranged from a small contraption stuffed in used drink cans or large container such as drum fitted into theboot of a car. These IEDs were usually constructed using powerful explosive substances. The periodbetween when Boko Haram became sophisticated down to when the use of IEDs was adopted, thegroup found refuge in Sambisa Forest from where attacks were planned. Having been motivated by thesuccessful conduct of the various phases in their guerrilla operation, the group became bold to delve intoseizure of territories. By 2014, there was a significant transformation of Boko Haram from a groupadopting guerrilla strategy to an insurgent group controlling territories. Over 22 local government areaswere controlled in Yobe, Borno and Adamawa States. This made Boko Haram a mini-Islamic State



with its own territory covering about 20,000 square miles; an area put to be the size of Belgium. However,with the offensive effort of the Nigeria military forces, the areas were recaptured from the control ofBoko Haram. As a result, Boko Haram reverted to the use of guerrilla tactics. The group quicklyadopted suicide terrorism as its main tactics. This is a form of extremely committed violence carried outby someone who takes his or her life alongside killing or destroying a chosen target. This involved theuse of body-borne improvised explosive devices (BBIEDs). According to Onuoha (2014), some factorsaccounted for Boko Haram’s adoption of suicide terrorism. First is the emergence of a radical leadershipin Abubakar Shekau since the death of Yusuf. Second, increase in Nigeria’s counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency measures put in place by government to curtail the traditional tactics of the group such asopen armed confrontation or the use of vehicle-borne IEDs that obviously reduced the activities of thegroup. Third, is improved funding to the organisation and the affiliation of the group to deadly foreignterrorist networks which has increased the fanatical indoctrination of its members.

Boko Haram’s Spiritual Warfare

There is no doubt that the Boko Haram is engaged in asymmetric warfare. Asymmetric warfare in itselfis war by other means which are essentially non-conventional mainly between a state actor and non-state actors. The non-conventional means include crude and inhuman methods that generate fear,violence and intimidation which could enable the non-state actor achieve psychological and politicalvictory while the state actor pursues military victory.

The non-state actor screams and presents poverty, government neglect, injustice, inequality,discrimination and exclusionism to the populace to win their hearts, minds, sympathy and support againstthe state. These are laced with spiritual strategies, operations and tactics marshalled against the people,and armed forces. The Boko Haram was adept in these as highlighted below in several ways.

(i) The use or misuse of religion as veil

The Boko Haram used or misused religion as a veil to radicalise the youths, poor, unemployed andilliterate elements of the populace. These vunerable groups were given cash, promised jobs, etc toattract them into the terror fold. Religion is a spiritual phenomenon, and it was combined with coercion,deception, or life-threatening measures of forceful conversion. This was conceived at the strategic levelof leadership.

(ii) Use of Charms

(a) The Boko Haram fighters used charms of various types and purposes. This was mainly at thetactical level when fighters engaged each other. In this direction some Boko Haram fightershad themselves immunised against bullets, motars, mines, bayonets and machete cuts. Thuswhen our soldiers were firing bullets at such terrorist fighters, they kept marching forwardagainst our troop. This was part of the reason why our soldiers were running away frombattle in 2014. The other reason was the superior fire-power of the Boko Haram terrorists.

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(b) Boko Haram used charms in their recruitment process. Different methods were used here.For example people given date palm to eat, and then hypnotism that made victims susceptibleto kidnap or abduction, and then recruitment into the fold.

One evidence on the use of charms apart from what we gathered from some Nigerian soldiers thatfought Boko Haram in the North East is the discovery of a big book called “Guduma” in a hurriedlyabandoned Boko Haram camp in Dikwa Local Government Area of Borno State in 2016 by theNigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC). “Guduma” is a book used as manual for differentmagical or spiritual activities, including preparing charms to make members disciplined and obedient tothe leadership. This means that the idea of the use of charms is not limited to the tactical level but alsoat the strategic and operational level. Another evidence of the use of charms by Boko Haram is thatNigerian soldiers seized several charms from arrested Boko Haram members, and many were seen intheir camps. The pictures of these charms along with captured weapons are in the war museum at theNigerian Army Resource Centre, Abuja.

(iii) Powers to appear and disappear

Some Boko Haram members had powers to appear and disappear. With such powers they harassedour troop taking them unawares and evading capture.

(iv) Power to turn into animals for safety

Nwolise was told the story of four Boko Haram fighters who were being pursued to be captured bysome Nigerian soldiers. The four terrorists ran into a hut, and in few minutes, four dogs ran out of the hutto different directions. Our soldiers entered the hut to find nobody. That was when what happeneddawned on them.

(v) Hypnotism

(a) Hypnotism is a spiritual process of taking control of the mind, thinking and behaviour of anindividual. Many of the children whom Boko Haram deployed for its suicide bombing missionswere hypnotised. It’s not all of them that went on such missions on conviction of the causethey were fighting. This raises the issue of whether all the suicide bombers can be blamed. Itonly means that those who surrender, refused to detonate, or survive explosions should beheld innocent till proven guilty. (i.e. ensuring that they undertook missions voluntarily).

(b) Hypnotism as mentioned earlier was also used in the process of recruiting new membersespecially in the heydays of insurgency.

(c) Some of the girls the Boko Haram members forcefully turned into their “wives” werehypnotised. This explains why some of the girls who were liberated by the Nigerian Armypersonnel wanted to go back to their terrorist “husbands”.



(vi) Spiritual Fortification of vehicles and weaponsThe Boko Haram spiritually fortified vehicles meant for special operations. For example the car used toattack the United Nations Headquarters in Nigeria on August 27, 2011 was said to have been spirituallyfortified in a neighbouring country. The implication is that only an initiated person could stop the vehicle.

(vii) Performance of spiritual ritualsRituals were carried out by Boko Haram members for certain operations and activities.

(a) The most open example was the rituals they performed before copulating with the girls theyillegally and forcefully turned into their wives. Their purpose of performing such rituals was toensure that the children born from such copulation continue the terrorist struggle when theygrow.

(b) Rituals were also performed to imbue fighters with immunity against bullets.

(c) Some new recruits were also meant to undergo rituals to ensure their loyalty to the groupespecially unalloyed allegiance to the leadership.

(viii) Use of Strategic Spiritual Intelligence

Sun Tzu (in Cleary, 2005), the great and legendary Chinese philosopher, General and Strategist wrotethat foreknowledge (intelligence) could not be gotten from spirits and ghosts but from people (Spies)who knew the enemy very well. Nwolise (2012, 2013, 2015) has already proved that assertion to befalse given the great works of Nostradamus (in Hogue, 2003) and other prophets, and Imams, seers,and visioners. Nwolise (Ibid) insists that intelligence can be gotten from both empirical and spiritualsources. The empirical aspects are what the intelligence community of the world do such as the CentralIntelligence Agency (USA), MOSAD (Israel), Department of State Security, National Intelligence Agencyand Defence Intelligence Agency (Nigeria) and others. The spiritual sources and means come fromprophets, Imams, and Chief Priests of local deities. The intelligence from these Nwolise calls StrategicSpiritual Intelligence (SSI). The Boko Haram used and still uses SSI. It helped them a lot in their goldenera. (2011-2015) not only in Nigeria but also in their operations in Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Thiscovers the period the words ‘’cowardice”, and “sabotage” featured against Nigerian troops. EvenPresident Goodluck Jonathan at a point screamed that Boko Haram had penetrated his government.There were leakages of plans of military operations. The fact is that it is not all the leakages that werefrom black legs or insiders. Some were products of SSI. It was like the days of the King of Syria whowas fighting against the tribes of Israel. All his plans and ambushes were thwarted. At a point, he beganto suspect his military officers and civilian officials, until one of his trusted advisers told him that Elisha theprophet tells the Jewish King the words he (King of Syria) speaks in his bedroom.

It was part of the challenges the Nigerian military was not prepared for. If not, what the military highcommand would have done even if at the tactical level was to go for what Nwolise called Counter-Strategic Spiritual Intelligence, (C, SSI) and that would have neutralised Boko Haram’s SSI.

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The elements of spiritual warfare are not new in asymmetric warfares. They were used even ingreater depth by the Kamajors in Sierra Leone, General Butt Naked platoon in Liberia, the Lord’sResistance Army in Uganda, the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, and many others.

CONCLUSION: LESSONS FOR TODAY AND TOMORROW

There is a lesson for Nigerian military to learn from the hybridised nature of Boko Haram warfare.Nigerian military personnel are acquainted with conventional warfare. In their various participations inpeacekeeping operations, they have been appreciated as brave soldiers. However, unconventionalwarfare such as those of guerrilla warfare and terrorism were strange to them. This contributed to whythe Nigerian forces were unable to quickly handle Boko Haram terrorism at the early stage of itsevolution. The Nigerian military with upgraded training in counter-terrorism, and counter-insurgencyoperations have come to terms with military operations against unconventional war. But the military isyet to master the spiritual aspect of the hybrid war – an area the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF)covered very well. But the CJTF will not follow the Armed Forces of Nigeria to Peace SupportOperations when the country is invited to keep the peace in a nation where the belligerent groups applyspiritual powers. Moreover, terrorism is known as “the long war”. How long will the CJTF be involvedin the North East anti-terror war? The point is that the Armed Forces of Nigeria especially the NigerianArmy should raise and train its own special unit of personnel in the waging and countering of SpiritualWarfare. With the current move by the Chief of Army Staff, Lt Gen. TY Buratai, to have Special Forcesfor the Nigerian Army, Nigeria should have a spiritual warfare wing in the Special Forces Configuration.

REFERENCES

Adefila, J.A. and Opeola, S.M. (1998). “Supernatural and Herbal Weapons in the 19th Century YorubaWarfare”, in Akinjogbin and Adeagbo (eds), War and Peace in Yorubaland, 1793-1893,Heinemann Educational Books (Plc).

Anyanwu Ukachukwu (1988), “Warfare in Pre-colonial Igboland: The Case of the Obowo of ImoState, Nigeria” African Notes, 12(1 and 2).

Behren Heike (1999) Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirit: Wars in Northern Uganda, 1985-1997,Oxford J. Curry.

Clausewitz Carl Von, (1832), On War.

Dawson Doyne (1996), “The Origin of War: Biological and Anthropological Theories.” History andTheory, 35 (1).

Ellis Stephen (1999), The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimensionof an African Civil War, London, Hurst.



Fadipe, N.A. (1970), The Sociology of the Yoruba, Ibadan: Ibadan University Press Plc.

Fleming Brian (2011), Hybrid Threat Concept: Contemporary War, Military Planning and the Advent ofUnrestricted Operational Arts, United States Army Command and General Staff College

Fuller, J. E.C. (1968), War and Western Civilisation 1832-1993, New York, Books For LibraryPress.

Greg Grant (2008), Hybrid Wars: Government Executive, National Journal Group.

Hogue J. (2003), Nostradamus; A Life and Myths, The First Complete Biography of History’sMost Famous and Controversial Prophet, London, Element.

Hoffman Frank G (2006a), “Complex Regular War: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs”, Orbis.

Hoffman Frank G (2006b), “How the Marines are Preparing for Hybrid Wars”, Armed Forces JournalInternational.

Hoffman Frank G (2007a), Preparing for Hybrid War. Marine Corps Gazette.

Hoffman Frank G (2007b), Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Potomac Institutefor Policy Studies, Virginia, Arlington.

Johnson Samuel (1976), The History of the Yorubas, Lagos: C.S.S. Bookshop.

Keeley Lawrence (1996), War Before Civilisation: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage. Oxford:Oxford University Press.

Keith F. Otterbein (1997), “The Origin of War.” Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society,11(2).

Kyari Mohammed (2014), “The Message and Methods of Boko Haram” in Marc Antoine Perouse deMontclos (ed) Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria, West AfricaPolitics and Society Series, Vol. 2.

Lan David (1985), Guns and Rain: Guerrilla and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe, London, J. Curry.Momah S. (1993), Global Disorders and the World Order, Lagos, Vista Books.Muraina, A.I. (2014) “Adam Smith and Public Funding of Defence” in A.I. Muraina (ed), Changing

Roles of the Nigerian Armed Forces and Funding Implications. Ibadan: Gold Press Limited.Nemeth J. William (2002), Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare, Naval

Postgraduate School.Onuoha Freedom (2014) “Boko Haram and the Evolving Salafi Jihadist Threats in Nigeria” in Marc

Antoine Perouse de Montclos (ed) Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State inNigeria. West Africa Politics and Society Series, Vol. 2.

Onuoha, F.C. (2012b), “(Un) Willing to die: Boko Haram and Suicide Terrorism in Nigeria”, Report, AlJazeera Centre for Studies. 24 December.

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Oriola Temitope (2012), The Delta Creek, Women’s Engagement and Nigeria’s Oil Insurgency. BritishJournal of Criminology.

Sani, S. (2011), “Boko Haram: History, Ideas and Revolt,” The Constitution Vol. 11, No 4.

Sanjide O’Connell (2004), “Apes of War: Is it in our Genes?” The Daily Telegraph, London.

Scott Jasper and Scott Moreland (2014), The Islamic State as a Hybrid Threat. Why does that matter?Small War Journal.

Stedman, S. (1991), “Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa: A Conceptual Framework”, in F. Dengand I.W. Zartman, (Eds), Conflict Resolution in Africa, Washington DC.

Walker Andre (2012), What is Boko Haram? United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Special Report308.

Weigert Stephen (1995), Traditional Religion and Guerrilla Warfare in Modern Africa, London,Macmillan.

Wlodarczyk Nathalie (2009), Magic and Warfare: Appearance and Reality in Contemporary AfricanConflict and Beyond, New York, Palgrave Macmillan.



JOMINI IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

by

Maj. Gen. BM ShafaDirector of Operations,

Defence Intelligence Agency, Abuja, Nigeria.

ABSTRACT

Any nation or military General that goes into a war without strategy willdefinitely come out a loser. This is so because military theories and strategiesare crucial in warfare; and human civilisation and world history have thrownup several war theorists such as Sun Tsu, Carl Von Clausewitz, Alfred Mahan,Julian Corbett, Giulio Douhet, Billy Mitchell, and Antoine-Henri Jomini.Every officer or Commander that wishes to make a good career in the militarymust be schooled in the thoughts of these classical theorists on war. Thispaper engages Jomini’s theory of war, and its effects on land power in theTwenty-First Century. It covers a brief biography of Jomini, and the essentialelements of his theory, his ideals of war, strategy and operational art.

Key words: Jomini, Theory of war, Twenty-First Century.

INTRODUCTION

Military theories and strategies are of vital importance to the state and have great impact on warfare.Usually, the phenomenon place things already known into systems; provide ways to think about conflict,and provide advice on problem solving regarding wars and use of military forces. Generally, modernwar theories and strategies are based on strategic cultures, as well as historical lessons learned byobserving war behaviours and technology. Theories of war have existed from time immemorial beforethe principles guiding war fighting were published. But these theories do not exist in written treaties.Rather, they were confined to the understanding and born of imaginations of their authors. (Jomini inhttp://www.Clausewitz). Consequently, Marshal Saxe noted that war was a science shrouded in

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darkness, in the midst of which movements were done without assured steps; but by routine and prejudiceswhich were natural consequences of ignorance. He also observed that, all sciences but war have theoriesand that one has to be profound to comprehend a few documented theories of war. (Saxe, in http://www.Clausewitz).

The study of conflict is a search for certain truths and scientific rules to follow. This arises fromhuman desire for certainty, especially in human conflict – the most complex and perilous endeavour.There have been no shortages of thinkers offering iron and immutable rules of war. (Jomini in http://rethinking). Several military theorists and strategists have made tremendous contributions to war fightingand their thoughts have continued to guide the conduct and execution of military operations even in thisTwenty-First Century. Some of these strategists are Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, Alfred Mahan, JulianCorbett, Giulio Douhet, Billy Mitchell and Antoine-Henri de Jomini. Sun Tzu significantly influencedMao Zedong who subsequently wrote on revolutionary warfare. Sun Tzu stressed the unpredictabilityof battle and the importance of deception and surprise, the close relationship between politics andmilitary policy and high cost of war. Clausewitz’s ideas on war were heavily influenced by the masspopular warfare of the French Revolution period and Napoleon’s Prussian adversary Gerhard vonScharnhorst. According to Clausewitz, war was neither an art nor science, but a continuation of policyby other means and a form of social interaction. He also saw war as a wrestling match; an act of forceto compel our enemy to do our will. He however noted that, it is not unilateral but a contest between twoindependent wills. Additionally, Clausewitz noted that poor intelligence, chance, friction etc make war inpractice different to war in the abstract, and went further to argue that military efforts should be focusedagainst enemy’s centre of gravity.

Alfred Mahan considered sea power to include the overlapping concept of command at sea throughnaval superiority and that combination of maritime commerce, overseas possessions, and privilegedaccess to foreign markets produce national wealth and greatness. He also thought that the navy shouldbe used offensively, and that its principal object should be to destroy enemy’s fleet thus making the seauntenable for the enemy’s merchant fleet. He also argued that to be effective, fleet should not be dividedand should be autonomous. Alfred Mahan considered the navy to be a better instrument of nationalpolicy than the army. Giulio Douhet argued that air power added a third dimension that revolutionisedwarfare by granting new flexibilities and initiative. He considered air power to be supreme claiming thatwithout the control of the air, all operations; land, sea and even air were doomed. Giulio noted thatappropriate target was not the enemy’s planes in the air, but their airfields and air industry on the ground.

Antoine-Henri de Jomini, on his own part, sought natural laws to govern the conduct of war anddeveloped a very geometrical and scientific approach to war. He also stressed the principle ofconcentration, the strategic value of interior lines and the close relationship between logistics and combat.Additionally, Jomini emphasised that politicians must conclude whether a war is proper, opportune, orindispensable and determine the various operations necessary to attain the object of the war. Furthermore,Jomini stressed that statesmen must not interfere with a commander’s authority once a war had beendeclared. Not only did he thoroughly understand the nature of war, he knew the intercourse of societies;and the source of war to be continuously occurring. These beliefs of Jomini are major considerations

Jomini in the Twenty-First Century 69


even in contemporary military operations. Although, several military writers preceded Jomini, no onehas impacted on professional military thinking, doctrine, and vocabulary as his work remains relevanteven today.

Our Objective in this piece is to outline the essential elements of Jomini’s Theory of War and itseffect on Land Power in the Twenty-First Century. The paper will cover a brief biography of Jomini,essential elements of Jomini’s theory and Jomini’s ideals of war, strategy and operational art.

BIOGRAPHY OF ANTOINE – HENRI DE JOMINI: AN OVERVIEW

Jomini was born on 6 Mar 1779, at Payerne in the canton of Vaud, Switzerland, where his father wasminor official. As a child, he was fascinated by soldiers and the art of war and was eager to attend thePrince de Wurttemberg’s Military Academy in Montbeliard, but his family’s circumstances did not permitthis. His early life was spent in the armies of the French Revolution and Helvetic Republic. After the1801 Treaty of Luneville that ended hostilities between Hapsburg Austria and France, Jomini relocatedto Paris ostensibly to resume the business career interrupted by war and revolution.

More importantly, he wrote his first work on military theory, “Treatise on Grand Military Operations”which brought him to the attention of Marshal Ney and Napoleon. He was subsequently appointed onMarshal Ney’s staff, promoted Colonel and General de Brigade and awarded Legion of Honour. Afterthe 1806 – 1807 campaigns in Prussia and Poland, Jomini rejoined Marshal Ney as his Chief of Staff,until 1813. After Napoleon’s victory over the Russians and Prussians at Bautzen, Jomini quit FrenchArmy and joined the Russian Services at the end of armistice and got promoted to the rank of LieutenantGeneral, based on the reputation of his writings. He was also appointed aide-de-camp to CzarAlexander.

Jomini’s post-war career was primarily in the Russian Army where he was employed in the militaryeducation of Prince Nicholas and played a principal role in the organisation of the Russian Staff College.He retired from service in 1829 and spent his long retirement writing and commenting on military affairs.His work, The Art of War, comes from the early part of his retirement. The purpose of The Art of Warwas to primarily educate serving officers on military matters outside the regimental routines that were thebread and butter of most Nineteenth Century officers’ lives. The Art of War is based on simple, easilyunderstood maxims or principles which provide commanders with a clear framework by which to planoperations and eliminate the unpredictable variables involved in making war.

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF JOMINI’S THEORY ANDTHE EFFECTS ON LAND POWER

Jomini’s theory of war propounded seven elements of warfare which are statesmanship (or diplomacy)in its relation to war, military policy, strategy (or art of properly directing masses upon the theatre of war,either for defence or for invasion) and grand tactics. Other elements of Jomini’s theory are logistics (orthe art of moving armies), engineering (or the attack and defence of fortification) and minor tactics. Theknowledge of these is indispensable for a general and staff officer worth their salt. We need to discusssome of these in details.

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Statesmanship/Diplomacy

According to Jomini, statesmanship/diplomacy are those considerations for which a government concludeswhether a war is proper, opportune or indispensable and determine the type of operations necessary toattain the objective of the war. Accordingly, Jomini propounded that a state could go to war for any ofthe following reasons:

a. To reclaim certain rights or defend them.

b. To protect and maintain the great interest of the state, such as commerce, manufactures oragriculture.

c. To uphold neighbouring states whose existence is necessary either for safety of governmentor the balance of power.

d. To fulfil the obligation of offensive and defensive alliances.

e. To propagate political or religious theories to crush them out or to defend them.

f. To increase the influence and power of the state by acquisition of territory.

g. To defend threatened independence of the state.

h. To avenge insulted honour.

i. From a mania for conquest.

Also, Jomini’s theory espoused that war is always to be conducted according to the great principles ofthe art, but great discretion must be exercised in the nature of the operation to be undertaken whichshould depend upon the circumstances of the case as follow:

a. A state could simply make war against another state

b. A state could make war against several states in alliance with each other.

c. A state in alliance with another could make war upon a single enemy.

d. A state could be either the principal party or auxiliary.

e. A state could join a struggle at its beginning or after it has commenced.

f. The theatre of war could be upon the soil of the enemy, upon that of an ally, or upon its own.

g. If it is war of invasion, it could be upon adjacent or distant territory; it could be prudent andcautious, or it could be bold and adventurous.

h. It could be a national war, either against the state or against the enemy.

i. The war could be civil or religious war.



Military Policy

Military policy emphasises the importance of good intelligence. Accurate knowledge of the geography,demographics and military strength of an opponent are obviously necessary in order to prosecute a warsuccessfully, but such information, according to Jomini has often been ignored by generals andpolicymakers. Jomini discusses the form military institutions should take, the relationship between thehead of state and the principal military commander, organisation of military headquarters and militaryspirit of the nation and morale of the armies.

One of the most important aspects of the military policy of a state is the nature of its military institutions.According to Jomini, a good army commanded by a general of ordinary capacity may accomplish agreat feat; but a bad army with a good general may do equally well; but an army will certainly do a greatdeal more if its own superiority and that of the general are combined. He therefore propounded essentialconditions that makes a perfect army. The conditions are as follow:

a. A good recruiting system.b. A good organisation.c. A well-organised system of national reserves.d. Good instruction of officers and men in drill and internal duties as well as those of a campaign.e. A strict but not humiliating discipline, and a spirit of subordination and punctuality, based on

conviction rather than on the formalities of the service.f. A well-digested system of rewards, suitable to excite emulation.g. A well instructed special arms of engineering and artillery.h. An armament superior, if possible to that of the enemy, both as to defensive and offensive

arms.i. A general staff capable of applying these elements and having an organisation calculated to

advance the theoretical and practical education of its officers.j. A good system for commissariat, hospitals, and of general administration.k. A good system of assignment to command and of directing the principal operations of war.l. Exciting and keeping alive the military spirit of the people.m. A good system of clothing and equipment.

Strategy and Fundamental Principle of War

Strategy according to Jomini is the art of properly directing masses upon the theatre of war, either fordefence or for invasion. It is also the art of bringing the greater part of the forces of an army upon theimportant point of the theatre of war or of the zone of operations. Alternatively, strategy is the art ofmaking war on the map which results in campaign plan. In crafting strategy, Jomini explicitly noted thefollowing steps:

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a. Select theatre of war and discuss different combinations it admits.

b. Determine decisive points and most favourable direction for operations.

c. Select and establish fixed base and zone of operations.

d. Select objective points whether for offensive or defensive purposes.

e. Select strategic fronts, lines of defence and fronts of operations.

f. Select lines of operations leading to the objective point or strategic front.

g. Select best strategic lines and different manoeuvres necessary to embrace all possible cases.

h. Determine eventual bases of operations and the strategic reserves.

i. Consider the manoeuvre of the armies/forces.

j. Select fortresses to be used as refuge or those that could constitute obstacle and makeprovisions for sieges and recovery.

k. Select points for entrenched camps.

l. Consider diversions to be made and the large detachment necessary.

Jomini noted that there is a fundamental principle which must be followed in all good combinations.The principle embraces the following:

a. To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, successively upon the decisive pointsof a theatre of war, and also upon the communications of the enemy as much as possiblewithout compromising one’s own.

b. To manoeuvre to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of one’s forces.

c. On the battlefield, to throw the mass of the forces upon the decisive points or upon thatportion of the hostile line which it is of the first importance to overthrow.

d. To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the decisive point, but thatthey shall engage at the proper times and energy.

The fundamental principle is supported by the following principles:

a. The first means is to take the initiative of movement. The general who succeeds in gaining thisadvantage is the master of employment of his forces at the place where he chooses to takethem. On the other hand, the general who waits for the enemy can make no strategic decisionsince he has subordinated his movements to those of his adversary and since he does nothave time to stop the troops that are already in motion. The general who takes the initiativesknows what he is going to do; he conceals his movements, surprises and crushes an extremityor a weak point. The general who waits is beaten at one point before he learns of the attack.



b. The second means is to direct movement against the most important weak point of the enemy’sforces. The selection of this point depends upon the position of the enemy. The most importantpoint will always be the point that offers the most favourable opportunities and the greatestresults, for example positions that may lead to the severing of the line of communicationsbetween the enemy force and his base of operations.

c. The result of the preceding truths is that preference is given to the attack of extremities of aline, then care must be taken not to attack both of the extremities at the same time.

d. In order to be able to act in a combined effort on a single point, it is important to hold yourforces in an area that is very nearly square so that they will be highly dispatchable. Largefronts are as contrary to good principles as broken lines, large detachments and divisionsisolated beyond supporting distance.

e. One of the most efficacious ways to apply the general principle is to make the enemy commiterrors that are contrary to the principles.

f. It is very important when one takes the initiative to be well informed of the positions of theenemy and the movements that he is capable of undertaking. Espionage is a useful means.

g. It is not sufficient for success in war to skilfully bring masses to the most important points; itis necessary to know how to employ them there. If a force arrives at a decisive point and isinactive, the principle is forgotten; the enemy can counterattack.

h. If the art of war consists of bringing the superior effort of a mass against the weak points ofthe enemy, it is undeniably necessary to pursue actively a beaten army.

i. In order to make superior shock of a mass decisive, the general must give care to raise themorale of his army.

j. By this rapid review, it is seen that the science of war is composed of three general activities,which have only a few subdivisions and few opportunities of execution. The first is to hold themost favourable lines of operations, second is the art of moving masses as rapidly as possibleto the decisive point and the third is the art of simultaneously bringing the greatest mass to themost important point on the field of battle.

k. Order of battle or the most suitable dispositions for conducting troop to combat should havefor their object to secure at the same time mobility and solidity.

l. In a ground difficult to access, the defensive order of battle should be composed of troopdeployed in two ranks and covered by numerous companies of riflemen. But troops intendedfor the attack as well as the reserve should be arranged in columns of attack on the centre.For the reserve having fallen upon the enemy at the decisive moment, it should be done withforce and rapidly, this is to say in columns. A part of the reserve can be kept deployed untilthe moment of falling on the enemy for the purpose of imposing upon him an appearance ofnumbers.

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Grand Tactics and BattlesGrand tactics is the art of making good combination preliminary battles, as well as during their progress.It is also the art of posting troops upon the battlefield according to the accidents of ground, of bringingthem into action, and the art of fighting upon ground in contradistinction to planning on a map. Theguiding principle in tactical combinations, as those in strategy is to bring the mass of the force in handagainst a part of the opposing army and upon that point the possession of which promises the mostimportant results. Grand tactics relates to the following:

a. The choice of position and defensive lines of battle.b. The offensive in defensive battle.c. The different order of battle or the grand manoeuvres proper for the attack of the

enemy’s line.d. The collision of two armies on the march or unexpected battles.e. Surprises of armies in the open field.f. The arrangements for leading troop into battle.g. The attack of positions and entrenched camps.h. Coups de main.

Battles are the chief and deciding features of war. There are types of battles; defensive, offensiveand unexpected battles. Defensive battles or those fought by armies in favourable positions taken up toawait the enemy’s attack while offensive battles are the ones where one army attacks another in position.Unexpected battles are fought unexpectedly and resulting from collision of two armies meeting on themarch. According to Jomini, the results of a battle generally depend upon a union of causes which arenot always within the scope of the military art, but in the morale of armies and nations.

Logistics

Logistics is the art of moving armies. It comprises the order and details of marches and camps, and ofquartering and supplying troop. It is also the execution of strategical and tactical enterprises. Additionally,logistics comprises the means and arrangements which works out the plan of strategy and tactics. While,strategy decides where to act; logistics bring the troop to the point. According to Jomini, logistics is theplanning duties of a staff officer; arranging marches, drawing up orders and itineraries, directingreconnaissance, coordinating subordinate units and supplying an army. These duties entail the following:

a. The preparation of all materials necessary for setting the army in motion, or in other words,for opening the campaigns. Drawing up orders, instructions and itineraries for the assemblageof the army and its subsequent launching upon its theatre of operations.

b. Drawing up in a proper manner the orders of the general-in-chief for different enterprises, aswell as plans for attack in expected battles.



c. Arranging with the chiefs of engineering and artillery the measures to be taken for the securityof the posts which are to be used as depots, as well as those to be fortified in order tofacilitate the operations of the army.

d. Ordering and directing reconnaissance of every kind, and procuring in this way, and usingspies, as exact information as possible of the positions and movement of the enemy.

e. Taking every precaution for the proper execution of movements ordered by the general.Arranging the march of the different columns, so that all may move in an orderly and connectedmanner. Ascertaining certainty that the means requisite for the ease and safety of marches areprepared. Regulating the manner and times of halts.

f. Giving proper composition to advanced guards, rear guards, flankers, and all detached bodies,and preparing good instructions for their guidance. Providing all means necessary for theperformance of their duties.

g. Prescribing forms and instructions for subordinate commanders or their staff officers, relativeto the different methods of drawing up the troops in columns when the enemy is at hand aswell as their formation in the most appropriate manner when the army is to engage in battleaccording to the nature of the ground and character of the enemy.

h. Indicating to advanced guards and other detachments well-chosen points of assembly in casetheir attack by superior number and forming them what support they may hope to receive incase of need.

i. Arranging and superintending the march of trains of baggage, munitions, provisions andambulances, both with columns and in the rear in such manner that they will not interfere withthe movements of the troops and will still be near at hand. Taking precautions for order andsecurity, both on the march and when trains are halted and parked.

j. Providing for the successive arrival of convoys of supplies. Collecting all the means oftransportation of the country and of the army, and regulating their use.

k. Directing the establishment of camps, and adopting regulations for their safety, good orderand police.

l. Establishing and organising lines of operations and supplies as well as lines of communicationswith these lines for detached bodies. Designating officers capable of organising andcommanding in rear of the army, looking out for the safety of detachments and convoys,furnishing them good instructions, and looking out also for preserving suitable means ofcommunication of the army with its base.

m. Organising depots of convalescent, wounded, and sickly men, movable hospitals andworkshops for repairs, providing for their safety.

n. Keeping accurate record of detachments either on the flanks or in rear, keeping an eye upontheir movements, and looking out for their return to the main column as soon as their service

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on detachment is no longer necessary; giving them when required some centre of action, andforming strategic reserves.

o. Organising marching battalions or companies to gather up isolated men or small detachmentmoving in either direction between the army and its base of operations.

p. In case of sieges, ordering and supervising the employment of the troops in the trenches,making arrangements with the chiefs of artillery and engineers as to the labour to be performedby those troops and as to their management in sorties and assaults.

q. In retreats, taking precautionary measures for preserving order; posting fresh troops to supportand relieve the rear-guard; causing intelligence officers to examine and select positions wherethe rear guard may advantageously halt, engage the enemy, check his pursuit, that nothingshall be left behind and that they shall proceed in the most perfect order taking all properprecautions insure safety.

r. In cantonments, assigning positions to the different corps; indicating to each principal divisionof the army a place of assembly in case of alarm; taking measures to see that all orders,instructions and regulations are implicitly observed.

JOMINI’S IDEALS ON WAR, STRATEGY AND OPERATIONAL ART

WarJomini categorised war into offensive wars to reclaim rights, wars of invasion, wars of expediency, warswith or without allies, wars of intervention, wars of opinion (national wars, civil and religious wars) anddouble wars.

Offensive Wars to Reclaim Rights. The most just war is the one which is founded upon undoubtedrights, and which in addition promises to the state advantages commensurate with the sacrifices requiredand the hazards incurred. In wars of this nature, the most natural step is to occupy the disputed territoryand conduct military operations in accordance to the circumstances and respective strength of theparties. Successes in wars to reclaim rights depend largely on the alliances each party is able to securewith other interested states and their respective military resources. In this type of war, scrupulous caremust be taken not draw any other state to aid the enemy. Therefore, it is part of the duties of thestatesman to foresee this chance and obviate it by making proper explanation and giving proper guaranteesto other states.

Wars of Expediency. The invasion of Silesia by Frederick II and wars of the Spanish Succession werewars of expediency. Wars of expediency are undertaken by a powerful state to acquire natural boundariesfor commercial and political reasons, and to lessen the power of a dangerous rival or prevent hisaggrandisement. In most cases, wars of expediency involve coalition of countries of interest.



Wars with or without Allies. Military History teaches that no enemy is so insignificant as to be despisedand neglected by any power, however formidable. Therefore, in war, ally is to be desired all other thingsbeing equal. Alliances do not only furnish a contingent of troops, it annoys the enemy to a great degreeby threatening portions of its frontier which otherwise would have been secure.

Wars of Intervention. There are two kinds of wars of intervention; intervention in internal affairs ofneighbouring states and intervention in external relations. The first type is rarely successful, though astate could interfere in internal affairs of other state when the situation propagates disorder withconsequences on adjoining states. Intervention in external relations of states is more legitimate and moreadvantageous. There are three reasons for intervention in external relations; by virtue of treaty whichbinds to aid; to maintain political equilibrium and to avoid certain evil consequences of the war alreadycommenced to secure certain advantages from the war.

Wars of Conquest. War of conquest, unhappily are often prosperous. However, there are natural linesin these wars which cannot be passed without incurring great disaster. There are two kinds of wars ofconquest; attacking an adjoining state (invasion) and attacking from a distant point.

Wars of Opinion. Wars of opinion may be both internal and foreign. They may also be foreign orexternal without being internal or civil. National, civil and religious wars could originate from wars ofopinion. Wars of opinion between two states belong to the class of wars of intervention, for they resulteither from doctrines which one party desires to propagate amongst its neighbours or from dogmaswhich it desires to crush. These types of wars originate from religious or political dogmas and are mostdeplorable. They also enlist worst passions and are, vindictive, cruel and terrible.

Double Wars. A government may be compelled to maintain a war against two states; but it will beextremely difficult if it does not find an ally to come to its aid with a view to its safety and politicalequilibrium. A government’s decision to undertake double war is influenced by certain circumstances;localities of the wars, possibility of finding allies to restore and equality of strength between parties.Generally, double wars should be avoided, and if cause of war be given by the two states, it is moreprudent to dissimulate or neglect the wrongs suffered from one of them, until there is a proper opportunityto redress them.

Notwithstanding the arbitrariness of Jomini in categorising war, he warned that proper attentionmust be given to the general diplomatic situation and international opinions, and that public opinionsshould not be ignored. This is because, knowledge of domestic opinion is important so that leaders havean understanding of the level of sacrifice their people will be willing to accept. According to Jomini, anaccurate assessment of the popular opinion in enemy’s state is vital in evaluating the level of oppositionthat can be expected during war.

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Strategy

Strategy is about how leadership will use the power; means or resources available to the state toexercise control over sets of circumstances and geographical locations to achieve objectives (ends) thatsupports the state interests (Vicksburg, on-line). It simply means ways to employ means to achieveends. Traditionally, there are 3 military strategies; attrition, exhaustion and annihilation. Attrition, is thereduction of the effectiveness of a force caused by loss of personnel and materiel, while exhaustion is thegradual erosion of a nation’s means to resist. Annihilation on the other hand is the seeking of the immediatedestruction of the combat power of the enemy’s armed forces (Vicksburg).

Jomini’s view on strategy (ends, ways and means) is that strategic objectives need to be explicitlyexpressed and derived against the backdrop of issues, trends, and challenges. He also stressed thatends (the political objectives) should be ends driven and not resource driven (Hunsang, on-line). Also,“strategy is the key to warfare. That all strategy is controlled by invariable scientific principles; and thatthese principles prescribe offensive action to mass forces against weaker enemy forces at some decisivepoint if strategy is to lead to victory” (Jomini, in http://rethinking). Consequently, Jomini concluded thata good strategy must be relative to objectives, current realities, future, risk, costs, adversaries and allies(in Hunsang, on-line).

Operational Arts

Operational art is the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organisation,integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art helpscommanders use resources efficiently and effectively to achieve strategic objectives. Without operationalart, war would be a set of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of successor failure. Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and effective joint andmultinational cooperation. Operational art is practised not only by commanders, but also by senior staffofficers and subordinate commanders (JP 3-0).

Operational art looks not only at the employment of military forces but also at the arrangement oftheir efforts in time, space, and purpose. Operational art focuses in particular on the fundamental methodsand issues associated with the synchronisation of the various components of the force. Among manyconsiderations, operational art requires commanders to answer the following questions: What military(or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve thestrategic goal? (Ends); What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways); Howshould the resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means); andWhat is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions? (JP 3-0)

Operational art is characterised by the following fundamental elements: Synergy, simultaneity anddepth, anticipation, balance, leverage, timing and tempo, operational reach and approach, forces andfunctions, arranging operations, centres of gravity, direct vs. indirect approach, decisive points, culminationand termination. (J.P. 3-0).



CONCLUSION

Jomini’s theory of war has been the focus of this modest discourse, bringing out the essential elements ofthe theory and his ideas on war, strategy and operational art. His works along with other classicaltheorists such as Sun Tsu, Carl Von Clausewitz, Alfred Mahan, Billy Mitchell, and Giulio Douhet, presentevery military officer with fundamental intellectual menu and solid rock upon which to stand and forequipment for war.

REFERENCES

Jomini, Baron Antoine-Henri de, The Present War And its Utility, http://www. Clausewitz.com/readings/Jomini/JOMINIESS.htm

Jomini: Mass Science and Future Warfare, http://rethinking-nkingscurity.typepad.com/rethinkingscurity)2009/01/jomini-mass-ascience-and-future-warfare.html,accesed July, 3 2017.

Jomini, Antoine (2005), The Art of War, (G.H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill translation), Texas, EL PasoNorte Press.

Kim Hunsang (Lt Col.), Understanding The Nature of War and Theory Through Jomini’s View, https://sites-google.com (accessed July 3 2017).

Overview of Operational Art, JP 3-0, Chaps II and III.

Saxe Marshal in http://www.Clausewitz.com) readings/Jomini/JOMINESS.htm

Vicksburg Basic Military Doctrine, http://www.Scribd.com (accessed June 29, 2017).

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POLICY AND STRATEGY FORMULATION PROCESS AND NEXUS

by

Cdre A Kpou (rtd)

ABSTRACT

Policy and Strategy are twin concepts of common knowledge and greatimportance in governance and defence. While policy generally exudesstatement of intent for pursuit of national or public interest, strategy is thecomprehensive plan of action for the achievement of policy (objectives).This paper interrogates both the content and formulation processes of thesetwo concepts, as well as the nexus between them. It goes further todemonstrate how military strategy is formulated for national defence, andtransmitted to the operational level, with focus on Nigeria.

Key words: Policy, Strategy, Formulation Process, Nexus.

INTRODUCTION

Policy and strategy are two enduring concepts that managers and leaders of organisations and nationalsystems would surely encounter in furtherance of corporate or national goals. They both define thenature and character of organisations and nations. In spite of their conceptual and practical affinities,policy and strategy have their peculiarities. Policies are framed at the topmost echelon of human systemsas deliberate set of normative principles to guide decisions and reach rational outcomes. A policy is astatement of intent, sometimes defining the object but more often stating the procedure or protocol forthe conduct of the business of a nation, an institution, a group or an individual. Strategy on the otherhand, is a comprehensive plan of action formulated or designed in order to achieve a particular goal.Thus, it is obvious that strategy is a path to achieving the objects of policy.

There are a number of conceptual formulations to explain the policy making process. A commonframework is the “stages approach” typified by elements in a policy cycle. The concept of public policy

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cycles was first developed by Harold Lasswell in the 1950s and embodies “recurrent patterns shown byprocedures that ultimately lead to a public policy” (Fisher et al, 2007). A typical policy cycle has five keyelements namely: Agenda Setting; Policy Formulation; Decision Making; Policy Implementation as wellas Performance Measurement and Evaluation (PME) and Feedback (Howlett et al, 2003).

Policy Formulation is the development of effective and acceptable courses of action for addressingproblems placed in the policy agenda. It typically includes Statement of the Policy Problem(s), PolicyObjectives, Underpinning principles, values and philosophies, Strategic Outlook, Authority andPerformance Measurement Indicators (PMIs). Policy can be developed in a routinely, analogously orcreative manner (Jones, 1977).

Generally, strategy formulation or strategic planning emanates from the Strategic Outlook and enablesan organisation to evaluate its resources, allocate budgets and determine the most effective plan to attainthe objectives. It requires six basic steps. These are organisational definition, establishment of strategicmission and strategic objectives, analysis of choices, detailed definition of strategy, implementation strategyand evaluation.

Policy and strategy are very important instruments for goal attainment of nations, institutions, groupsand even individuals, but this presentation shall be delimited to national policy and strategy. Secondly,policy and strategy can be applied to all aspects of a nation’s life, and the discourse thus far gives thegeneral nature of both. However, the focus in this presentation shall be on policy and strategy fornational security, particularly defence. Thirdly, we need to note here the three levels of military engagementnamely strategic, operational and tactical. The discourse shall transit from the strategic level of defenceto the operational level. The purpose is to enable the average reader appreciate the linkages betweentheory and practice of both policy and strategy in the Vulnerable, Uncertain, Complex and Ambiguous(VUCA) national security environment in which they may operate, especial middle level commandersand senior staff officers.

The task of this discourse is to highlight the essential processes of policy and strategy formulation forthe defence of the nation. The discourse will cover the following:

a. National Security Architecture.

b. Formulation of National Defence Policy.

c. Transmission of National Defence Policy to Operational Level.

d. Guidelines for the Formulation of Military Strategy; and

e. SAFE Test for Military Strategy.

NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

The roles of defence derive from the overall security posture of a nation. Security is a multi-functionalrequirement in a nation and interconnects several themes. Indeed, the complex instruments for securitymanagement are depicted in the national security architecture in Fig. 1 which is discussed further below:

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Figure 1: National Security Architecture.

a. National Purpose: The imperatives for national security policy and strategy emanate first andforemost, from the national purpose. This is a culmination of the overall aspirations of a nation. Inother words, the national purpose captures what and where a nation wishes to be in the future.

b. National Interests: National Interests (NIs) are the shared enduring values and beliefs of anation. They represent the moral, philosophical and legal basis for the survival and continuance ofa nation. The NIs of nations are commonly categorised into core, vital, strategic and peripheral.The performance of the security instruments and measures are often measured against the NIs.

c. Elements of National Power: National Power (NP) refers to overall capabilities of a nationwhereas the Elements of National Power (ENP) define the factors that influence a state’s ability toattain its objectives in the light of environmental risks. The ENP are numerous and include geography,strategic population, leadership, quality of diplomacy, political style, natural resources, economicwealth, social order, military capabilities (Dunmoye, 2007).

d. Grand Strategy: Grand Strategy (GS) is the aggregation of all the ENP of a nation to attain itsnational purpose in times of peace or war. Mead (1971) noted that Grand Strategy is “that whichso integrates the policies and armaments of a nation that the resort to war is rendered unnecessaryor is undertaken with the maximum chance of victory”. It thus defines the nation’s overall real andpotential power such that it can prevail in conflicts even without committing military resources.

e. National Security: National Security (NS) is a nation’s ability to protect and preserve the state,its territory and people from physical, political, economic, social, environmental, human and naturalthreats from within and without, and the capability to project its abilities in the international arena.

Policy and Strategy Formulation Process and Nexus 83


f. National Security Policy: National Security Policy (NSP) is a dynamic, comprehensive andcoherent set of principles articulated by government to protect, preserve, promote and project thenational interests in the face of real, internal and external threats (National Defence College, 2012).

g. National Security Strategy: National Security Strategy (NSS) is a comprehensive documentoutlining the major security concerns of a nation and how it plans to deal with them.

h. National Defence: National defence is the ability of a nation’s armed forces and affiliated resourcesto protect, preserve, promote and project the national interests of a nation.

i. National Defence Policy: National Defence Policy (NDP) is a set of regulations, guidelines andstated intentions of government for the development and employment of military power in conjunctionwith affiliated resources for the protection, preservation, promotion and projection of the nationalinterests both within and without (Kpou, 2017).

FORMULATION OF A NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY

The formulation of a NDP typically reflects some fundamental and critical inputs. These include thefollowing:

a. Legal Framework: Legal framework indicates the authority to issue far-reaching policies in thedefence sector. It gives the NDP many advantages including governmental and non-governmentalbuy-ins, assurances of resource provision and public support.

b. Security Vision: A good starting point is a definition of the vision of security for the nation. Thiscould be derived from the NSP.

c. Defence Mission: The NDP must define the mission of national defence, derived from the visionof security for the nation.

d. Defence Objectives: Defence priorities and specific objectives including performance criteriabased on the stated mission.

e. Strategic Environment and Threats Analysis: Conduct of external/internal scan of strategicenvironment to identify and analyse threats to national defence interests. Threats could be analysedusing a flexible/dynamic framework to facilitate evidence based decision-making and provideinformed rationale for resource allocation.

f. Occasions for Military Force Deployments: Unambiguous determination of the types of threatsand occasions requiring military force deployments derived from the nation’s defence posture.

g. Authority for the Use of Force. Clear determination of the authority to use force, flow of suchauthority and procedures. This is to include the principles of Civil Military Relations (CMR),legislative controls and Higher Management of Defence (HMD).

h. Organisation of the Armed Forces: Comprehensive mid to long term planning perspectives onthe organisation of the armed forces and allied resources. This is to include force design and force

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levels particularly the number/type of armed services, their shape and sizes such as ORBAT andmajor platforms/hardware/equipment.

i. Military Doctrines: Outline of military doctrines consistent with NDP objectives. These wouldguide joint/inter-agency operational planning and the multi-track contributions of military forces tocampaigns, major operations, battles and engagements.

j. Resourcing: This involves principles for resource allocation, procurement, development,replenishment, sustainment and retention. The resources refer to financial, human, C4ISR, platforms/hardware, system/equipment and materiel. Critical issues such as Defence Economics, HumanResource Management and Defence Logistics.

k. Self-Reliance: Promotion of Science, Technology and Initiative or Innovation, (STI), Researchand Development (R and D), military productions, local content and Military Industrial Complex(MIC).

l. Ethical Issues: Statement on rule of law, human rights, environmental concerns, gendermainstreaming and Espirit De Corps.

m. Civil Support: Principle to win the “hearts and minds” of the local populace in times of conflict.This is to include Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), information and education strategies.

n. Military Transformation: Application of contemporary paradigms of Revolution in MilitaryAffairs (RMA). This is to enable continuous, regenerative and transformational change in the armedforces to ensure force modernisation in the light of future wars.

o. Measurement and Evaluation: Principles and processes for Performance Monitoring,Measurement and Evaluation (PME) against set objectives and standards.

p. Review. Periodicity/conditions for statutory/contingent review.

TRANSMISSION OF NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY TO THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

The NDP is transmitted to the operational levels through different layers as shown in Fig. 2 below:



The Presidency is required to give grand strategic direction on security. This is to be applied by theNational Security Council (NSC) to give strategic guidance and indeed, produce the NSP and/or NSS.The Ministry of Defence (MOD) is required to develop the NDP and formulate a National MilitaryStrategy (NMS) in conjunction with Defence Headquarters (DHQ) and the Services. It thereafterissues defence guidance. Depending on the type and scale of operations, the DHQ or services (Svc)HQs may issue operational directives in the form of Operational Orders to the operational commandersand/or theatre commanders.

Figure 2: Layers of Transmission of National Defence Policy.

Layers of Transmission of NDP

THE PRESIDENCY

(See Policy Dev’t and Strat Formulation

Strategic Guidance

NSP and NSS )

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE/DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS

Strategic Guidance

(Def Dev’t and Military Strat Formulation)

NDP and NMS

DEFENCE and SERVICE HEADQUARTERS

Operational directives

Operational orders

Multi-national Joint Task Force, Joint Task Forces,

Special Task Forces and single-Service Operations

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GUIDELINES FOR THE FORMULATION OF MILITARY STRATEGY

Having dealt with the super structure and security architecture of a nation, with reference to Nigeria, wemust now deal with the particular issue, military strategy. We have seen strategy as a generalist tool formobilising deliberate efforts to attain the objects of policy. But strategy in its pristine form was theexclusive preserve of generals. No wonder that a number of military thinkers and strategists had a lot tosay about strategy. In his often quoted definitive book, On War, the famous 19th Century military strategist,Carl Von Clausewitz (1976 Translation) stated that Strategy is “...the use of engagement for the purposeof war”.

While Clausewitz elaborated on the psychological and political meaning of war, it was hiscontemporary and perhaps, competitor, Jomini, who brought the idea of strategy to the table of thestrategic planner. He reflected deeply on the detailed vocabulary of geometric terms such as bases,strategic lines and key points. To Jomini (2005 Translation), Strategy is “...the art of making war upon amap...” Against the background of the ideological struggles in the Cold War era, Beaufre (1965),depicts the inherent contestations in strategic contemplation when he asserted that Strategy is “…the artof the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute”.

The policy-strategy nexus was aptly captured by Hart (2009) who defined Strategy as “the art ofdistributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy”. He also introduced the concept ofindirect approach and two fundamentals to strategy. A more contemporary definition of Strategy is givenby Edward (1971: Viii) as:

the art of controlling and utilising the resources of a nation, or a coalitionof nations, including its armed forces , to the end that its vital interestsshall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potentialor merely presumed.

This discourse shall adopt the definition of strategy given by the United States Army War College(USAWC) as “the skilful formulation, coordination, and application of ends, ways and means to promoteand defend the national interest”.

As a way of further elaboration,

a. Ends are policy objectives: In other words, what is the nation trying to achieve? For instance,for Nigeria, is it to overcome Boko Haram insurgency in the North East?

b. Ways are Courses of Action: In other words, how will the nation achieve its objective? Forinstance, using a military coalition of partners, and mobilising an optimal bouquet of non-kinetic elements of national power.

c. Means are the Resources: These may be tangible or intangible assets available (on hand orattainable) to use for the achievement of the desired objective(s).



It is to be noted that the formulation of strategy is often confronted with the consideration of internaland external risk factors. Consequently, strategy can be here defined as the skilful formulation,coordination, and optimum application of ends, ways and means in the face of environmental risks, topromote and defend the national interest.

The Guidelines: The guidelines for the formulation of a military strategy given by the USAWC are asfollows:

a. Identify and determine the National Interests (indicate the type of interest)

b. Determine the level of intensity of the national interests (Indicate if it is a core, vital, strategicor peripheral interest)

c. Evaluate the issues, trends and challenges in the internal and external environment concerningthe national interests. Identify the critical actors, their interests and policies. Identify the actorswith whom the nation has convergence of interests, and those with divergence. Indeed, conducta threats and opportunities analysis.

d. Identify the policy objectives (Ends). Indicate the current policy or precedent on this nationalinterest.

e. Identify the means available.

f. Consider the alternative courses (ways) that the means can be applied to the ends of policy.This should be comprehensive considering all amenable elements of national power incombination with military power. Use the SAFE Test.

g. Conduct a risk analysis.

h. Present and communicate the details of the strategy.

i. Indicate mechanisms for PME and feedback.

The strategy formulation outline above conforms with the Strategy Formulation Model adapted from theUSAWC shown in Figure below:

i Indicate mechanisms for PME and feedback

The Strategy formulation outline above conforms with the Strategy Formulation Model adapted fromthe USAW shown in Figure 3 below.

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DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY STRATEGYAT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

A crucial phase of the strategy development process is the conduct of the SAFE Test and risk assessment.The SAFE Test evaluates the Suitability, Acceptability, Feasibility and Ethics of the suggested strategy.This process is further examined below:

a. Suitability. Would the strategy achieve the ends of policy? What is the level of fit between thestrategy and the ends? Is the strategy adequately exploiting the identified opportunities and decisivelydealing with the identified threats?

b. Acceptability Test. Are the ways reasonable? Is the strategy agreeable to both local andinternational stakeholders? How predictable is/are the outcome(s)? Is it likely to meet the expectedbenefits of the stakeholders? How would the stakeholders react to the strategy?

Policy and Strategy Formulation Process and Nexus

Figure 3: Strategy Formulation Model

Ext’l Risks National Purpose Int’l Risks

Globalisation National Interest Judiciary

International Law Political Instability

Grand Strategy

NSAs Bureaucracy

Ideological

Struggles

National Policy Institutional Weaknesses

IPOs Strategy Formulation Process Marginalisation

Climate Change

Human Conditions

Neo-colonialism Rentier Economy

Common Security Unpatriotic Media

WMD System of Government

WTO Rules

GWOT Interest Groups

Alliances

STRATEGY

PME and Feedback

National Objectives (Ends)

National Power

(Means)

Strategic Concepts (Ways)

SAFE Test

Risk Assessment

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c. Feasibility Test. Do we have the overall means to execute the strategy? In other words, do theresources and competencies currently exist? If not, can they be obtained? Can the resources beintegrated into the overall strategic effort, for different phases of strategy implementation? Theresources here refer to Finance, Hardware, Equipment and Technology, Materiel, People andPartners, Information and Physical resources.

d. Ethics. Is the strategy legal and ethical? Does it embody the values of the nation? Does it meetinternational and local best practices? How durable and enduring is the strategy?

Risk assessment on the other hand, is in the realm of probability. It considers the chance that the chosenstrategy will attain the policy objectives and the likely second and third order effects of the implementationof the strategy. The effects could be estimated on politics, the economy, foreign relations and so on. Thereason for the risk assessment is that no strategy is likely to command all the resources required for a100 per cent assurance of success. Consequently, the risks assessment is anticipatory and proactiveand helps to reduce undue risks.

CONCLUSION

Policy and strategy are important instruments for security and defence management of any nation. InNigeria, we are yet to imbibe the security culture and develop the legal/policy imperatives to regularlydevelop these important national security and defence documents. It is hoped that discourses as thiswould help to develop this culture and consciousness. When that happens, the skills of policy andstrategy formulation would be helpful. The guidelines for strategy formulation given here would be usefulfor the development of strategy at any level of military engagement.As a checklist, it is important that Strategy:

a. Should always be holistic and comprehensive.

b. Should always balance ends, ways and means.

c. Is generally end-seeking while ways are always constrained by means.

d. Is always subordinate to the strategic environment.

e. Should focus on effectiveness rather than efficiency.

f. Is anticipatory instead of predictive. It is inherently risky and generates friction and its ownsecurity problematique.

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REFERENCES

Beaufre, A. (1965) Introduction to Strategy, New York: Praeger,

Clausewitz, Carl Von (1976), On War, translated by M Howard and P Parel, (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press,

Dunmoye, R. A. (2007), “Elements of National Power”, Lecture delivered to Participants of NationalDefence College Course 16, October.

Edward, M.E. (1971) Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler,Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Fischer, F.GJ Miller and MS Sander (eds) (2007), Handbook of Public Policy: Theory, Politics andMethod (New York: CRC Press, http://www.dictionnaire.enap.ca/ dictionnaire/docs/definitions/definitions anglais/policy_cycles.pdf assessed 26 Sep 16.

Howlett M. and M Ramesh, (2003), Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems,Toronto: Oxford University Press.

Jomini, .A.H, 2005), The Art of War, Translated by GH Mendell and WP Craighill Texas: El PasoNorte Press.

Jones, C.O. (1977), An Introduction to the Study of Policy, Massachusetts: Duxbury Press.

Kpou, A. (2017), lecture on “National Defence Policy Formulation”, delivered at the Air Force WarCollege, 10 March.

Liddell Hart, B.H. (2009), Strategy, London: BN Publishing.

National Defence College, “National Security Policy, 2012” being a contribution to the National SecurityPolicy formulation process by the National Defence College.

USAWC, “Guidelines for Strategy Formulation”, in National Security Policy and Strategy Module.

USAWC, Lesson 1, Theory of War and Strategy.



CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ AND MODERN WAR

by

Commodore Adeseye Oke Ayobanjo

ABSTRACT

Technology is a key influence in modern warfare, as its continuoustransformations make wars more destructive. But one key factor in warfarethat has not changed like technology is the body of theories of warfare. Theconcepts, methods, views and manoeuvres of classical war theorists continueto make their impact in contemporary wars, as if they were espoused justlast year.

This paper engages Carl Von Clausewitz’ theories on warfare, and examinestheir influences in modern wars. The author dutifully shows how the theoriesof this classical thinker influenced the Gulf War I, (1990-1991).

Key words: Carl Von Clausewitz, Modern War, Theories of War.

INTRODUCTION

Since the Industrial Revolution (1760 - 1840), war has been fashioned progressively more by technologicalchange. As a result, no major wars since the mid-nineteenth century have been fought with the sameweapons. From a technological point of view, wars are apparently different from each other, especiallywhen comparisons are made between the First and Second World Wars, the Vietnam War, the Arab-Israeli 1967 and 1973 wars, Nigerian Civil War (1967 – 1970), First Gulf War and even the LiberianWar 1990 among others in the modern era (New, 1996).

Modern warfare refers to warfare using the concepts, methods, and military technology that havecome into use during and after the Second World War (1939 - 1945), (Townshend, 2005:206). Theconcepts and methods have assumed more complex forms of the 19th and up till this 21st Century

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experiences, especially due to the extensive use of highly advanced information technology. Even thoughmodern warfare appears to be mainly characterised by changing weapons technology, other factorssuch as human nature, the political essence of war, the quality of leadership, national commitment,coalitions and diplomacy have remained the same (Creveld, in Townshend, 2005:349). This explainswhy modern strategists and military professionals can, despite revolutionary changes in the materialnature of warfare, derive great benefit from reading the classical works on war.

Of all the classic studies on war, The Art of War, by Sun Tzu (544 – 496 BC), and On War byClausewitz (1780 -1831) are still the most outstanding, “modern,” and relevant despite the passage oftime. According to Moran, no comprehensive paradigms or frameworks for the study of war have beenpublished that significantly modifies the works of Sun Tzu or Clausewitz, (Moran n.d:10). Not distractedby constantly changing technological, bureaucratic, organisational, and economic factors, as well asnew dimensions of warfare in the air, under water as well as outer and cyber space, the insights of SunTzu and Clausewitz identify the immutable human dimensions of warfare so essential for victory.

Carl Von Clausewitz was a Prussian (now Germany) General of the Calvary division who wasinvolved in numerous military campaigns during his life time. He was also a notable military theorist whowas passionate about the examination of war and he emphasised on the moral/psychological and politicalaspects of war. He wrote a methodical and philosophical examination of war in all its aspects and theresult was his principal book, On War. The book, On War is a classical work that has continued toinfluence the preparations and conduct of modern wars. Indeed, several military strategists havecommented that the theories of Clausewitz as contained in On War were critical factors that characterisedthe conduct of the First Gulf War 1990 – 1991. Also, several war colleges all over the world include itas a must study in their curricula with profound results following their application of the theories.

The purpose of this paper, is to interrogate some of the theories of war as propounded by Clausewitzin his book, On War. such as; definition and nature of war, absolute and real war, paradoxical trinity,strategy as well as attack and defence. Lastly, the paper will discuss the application of Clausewitz’theory of war in the First Gulf War 1990 – 1991.

BRIEF ON CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ

Carl Von Clausewitz was born on 1 June 1780 at Burg bel near Magdeburg in the defunct kingdom ofPrussia (in modern day Germany). Clausewitz joined the Prussian Army at the age of 12 and witnessedcombat at 13 against France. He was promoted lieutenant at 15 while serving at the garrison in Neuruppin.In 1801, Clausewitz at the age of 21 was admitted into the military academy in Berlin where he studiedthe writings of Immanuel Kant, a renowned military philosopher. He served during the Jena Campaignas aide-de-camp to Prince August of Prussia and was among the 25,000 Prussians captured at theBattle of Jena-Auerstedt on 14 October 1806, when Napoleon invaded Prussia. Clausewitz was heldprisoner in France and Switzerland from 1807 to 1808. On return to Prussia in 1810, he marriedCountess Marie von Brühl and socialised with Berlin’s literary and intellectual elite. In opposition toPrussia’s enforced alliance with Napoleon I, Clausewitz left the Prussian army and served in the ImperialRussian Army from 1812 to 1813.He fought in all major battles of the Napoleonic wars. He took part

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in the Battle of Borodino1812 and like many Prussian officers serving in Russia, he joined the Russian-German Legion in 1813. In the service of the Russian Empire, Clausewitz helped negotiate the Conventionof Tauroggen (1812), which prepared the way for the coalition of Prussia, Russia, and the UnitedKingdom that ultimately defeated Napoleon and his allies at the battle of Waterloo in 1815. Clausewitzdied of cholera which he contracted in the field in 1831. His famous book, Vom Kriege translated OnWar was first published by his widow in 1832.

The expose on the life and times of Clausewitz has been deliberately included in this paper in orderto bring out the humanity that could be brought to bear in war. In Clausewitz, a case of ‘catch themyoung’ could be observed, with the higher chance to imbue war-like passion and genius. It was suchpassion and perhaps genius that saw Clausewitz taking part in all the Napoleonic wars and in the courseof time reached an apogee of potency and experience that helped him to defeat Napoleon, whom hehad come to refer to as ‘the god of war.’ Additionally, it would be seen that Clausewitz was influencedby the politics, education, philosophy and socio-economic conditions of his days. Of course, the harmfulimpact of the environment (call it Biological Warfare) revealed the vulnerability of human life as choleraand not gun/ sword eliminated a hero of several battles. Lastly, the expose brought out the importanceof writing down personal experiences and even carrying a spouse along in order to influence futuregenerations.

THE BOOK: ON WAR

The book, On War originally, published as Vom Kriege in German is a compendium of the theories ofwar as set out by Clausewitz. It was written between 1816 and 1830, and as noted earlier was publishedposthumously by his wife, Marie Von Bruhl in 1832. It was translated into English and has been editedand reviewed by several authors. It is made up of eight chapters covering; the nature of war, theory ofwar, strategy in general, the engagement, military force, defence, attack, and war plans.

The book contains a wealth of historical examples used to illustrate its various concepts with NapoleonBonaparte being perhaps its central figure. Clausewitz used a dialectical method to construct his argumentin the book, leading to frequent modern misinterpretation because he explores various – often opposed– ideas before coming to conclusions. Modern perceptions of war are based on the concepts Clausewitzput forth in On War, though these have been very diversely interpreted by various leaders such asMoltke, Vladimir Lenin, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mao Zedong, thinkers, armies, and peoples. Indeed,Clausewitz and his proponents have been severely criticised by competing theorists, Antoine-HenriJomini in the 19th Century, Liddell Hart in the mid-20th Century, and Martin van Creveld and JohnKeegan more recently.

Again, the take away from this portion of the paper is that On War is a book on the theories of warwhich are not cast in stone. According to Azar Gat, (in Hoyt, 2014) the conduct of war must not bereduced to universal principles. Clausewitz also avers that the primary purpose of any theory is to clarifyconcepts and ideas that have become confused and entangled.

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SOME THEORIES OF WAR BY CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ

Several individuals before and after Clausewitz have propounded various theories on war. As earlierstated, the theories by Sun Tzu and Clausewitz continue to attract concurrence or criticisms and evencreate confusion. According to Clausewitz (Howard and Paret, 1976), theory is “intended to provide athinking man with a frame of reference for the movements he has been trained to carry out, rather thanto serve as a guide, whom at the moment of action lays down precisely the path he must take. It willfocus on the definition and nature of war, distinction between absolute and real war, paradoxical trinity,centre of gravity (CoG) as well as attack and defence.

Definition of WarWar has been defined variously by scholars and institutions based on their scale, purpose, duration andmeans among others. Clausewitz also defined or described war in various ways in different portions ofOn War. Avoiding a doctrinaire definition of war, he sprightly referred to war as, “... nothing but a duelon a larger scale” (Ibid: 75). He stated further that countless duels aggregate to make a war. He describedit as the interplay of physical forces between two wrestlers seeking to compel the other to do his will. Inessence, he held that “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”

In a theoretical sense, Clausewitz referred to war as fighting, which is the only effective principle inall activities that constitute war. He pointed out that the need to fight compelled man to invent appropriatedevices to gain advantages in combat, which in turn led to great changes in the form of fighting. Thisdefinition is however, limited in its scope and does not properly showcase the reality of war. Inconceptualising war on a larger generic scope, Clausewitz saw war as part of man’s social existence anddescribed war as “…a clash between major interests, which is resolved by bloodshed – that is the onlyway in which it differs from other conflicts” (Ibid: 149). This definition portends that even a duel betweenmixed martial artists of the US Ultimate Fighter Championship (UFC) is war, except that the meaning of‘major interest’ is left to the thoughts of those involved in the fight.

In consideration of the major interests of states and the natural tendencies of man to fight, Clausewitzconceptualised war as belonging to the realm of chance, which is incomparable to no other humanactivity, (Ibid: 104). He saw war as a very serious human activity and not as a pastime that brings joythrough daring and winning. Indeed, he saw the reason for war in a political situation that involves wholepeoples, especially the civilised ones, and the occasion is always due to some political object. Hetherefore described war as an act of policy. He continued further by asserting that, “...war is not merelyan act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on withother means,” (Ibid: 86-87). It therefore means that if the political object is the goal, and war the meansof attaining the goal, then the two can never be treated in isolation. Thus, if war springs out from somepolitical purpose, the natural expectation is that the prime cause of war will remain the supremeconsideration in conducting it.

Nature of WarThe nature of a war varies based on the emotive character of those waging it, the location, period ofoccurrence and the materials being used to wage it. Clausewitz avers that war essentially involves force;



force that is created through artistic and scientific enterprise, (Ibid: 75). He describes the force as,“Force – that is physical force, for moral force has no existence save as expressed in the state and thelaw – is thus the means of war ;…”( Ibid). Indeed, he views moral force as self-imposed, imperceptiblelimitation that scarcely impairs the physical force. He went further to assert that war is a very dangerousbusiness and that it is a fallacy to think that it could be waged without much bloodshed. However, theuse of force was to be compatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect. It could then be understoodwhy some wars are regarded as conventional, asymmetric, irregular, guerrilla, hybrid as they depend onthe art and science involved in the creation of the materials used to generate required physical force,manner of applying the force and regard to the accompanying moral force.

The motives of people and the developing or existing circumstance also influence the nature of war.Clausewitz posited that, “The more powerful and inspiring the motives for war, the more they affect thebelligerent nations and the fiercer the tensions that precede the outbreak…the more important will bethe destruction of the enemy… and the more military and less political will war appear to be. On theother hand, the less intense the motives, the less will the military elements natural tendency to violence,…and the conflict will seem increasingly political,” (Ibid). He also emphasised that, “…Wars must varywith the nature of their motives and of the situations which give rise to them. The first, the supreme, themost far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish bythat test the kinds of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into,something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive,”(Ibid; 88-89). Understanding the nature of a war to be waged is therefore a necessity during its preparation,conduct, termination and re-assessment.

Absolute War

The concept of absolute war is an abstract construct by Clausewitz, which is discussed only in the firsthalf of Book 8 in On War. He asserted that, “As policy becomes more ambitious and vigorous, so willwar, and this may reach the point where war attains its absolute form,” (Ibid: 106). It was characterisedby very high levels of energy and professional competence, and it aims at the destruction of the opposingforce and the attainment of a political decision by force of arms. Although it is presented as a philosophicalconcept, and thus probably not capable of perfect attainment in the real world, it is believed to havebeen modelled very closely on Napoleon’s most masterful campaigns and was intended to be pursuedor emulated by commanders when possible, (Ibid).

The paradox in the absolute war construct is brought to the fore where Clausewitz wrote that,“Since in war too small an effort can result not just in failure but in positive harm, each side is driven tooutdo the other, which sets up an interaction. Such an interaction could lead to a maximum effort if amaximum could be defined. But in that case all proportion between action and political demands wouldbe lost: means would cease to be commensurate with ends, and in most cases a policy of maximumexertion would fail because of the domestic problems it would raise. In this way the belligerent is againdriven to adopt a middle course. He would act on the principle of using no greater force, and setting himselfno greater military aim, than would be sufficient for the achievement of his political purpose,”(Ibid: 585).

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The absolute war construct is closely related to the “Ideal War” theory described in Book 1 of OnWar. Here, war is viewed in abstraction. Clausewitz stated that, “…in the field of abstract thought, theinquiring mind can never rest until it reaches the extreme…a clash of forces freely operating and obedientto no law but their own.” He stated further that, “…you might try to deduce absolute terms for theobjective you should aim at and for the means of achieving it; but if you did so the continuous interactionwould land you in extremes that represented nothing but a play of the imagination issuing from an almostinvisible sequence of logical subtleties…If we were to think purely in absolute terms, we…could…proclaimthat…since the extreme must always be the goal, the greatest effort must always be exerted. Would thisever be the case in practice?”(Ibid: 78).

The answer to the question on extreme exertion of effort was surprisingly a ‘Yes’ according toClausewitz. However, it was premised on three conditions, if: war were a totally isolated act, occurringsuddenly and not produced by previous events in the political world; it consisted of a single decisive actor a set of simultaneous ones; and the decision achieved was complete and perfect in itself, uninfluencedby any previous estimate of the political situation it would bring about,” (Ibid). A cursory look at thislogic of the Absolute War theory sadly, reveals that war is never an isolated act, does not consist of asingle short blow, and in war, the outcome is never final, but transitory. Absolute War, therefore, lies onlyin the realm of theory and is impracticable in the real world.

Real War

Clausewitz identified early that the requirement for the use of extreme force was not attainable in realwar. He posited that, “Once the antagonists have ceased to be mere figments of a theory and becomeactual states and governments, when war is…a series of actions obeying its own peculiar laws, realitysupplies the data from which we can deduce the unknown that lies ahead”, (Ibid: 80). Furthermore, heasserted that, “…war is not an exercise of the will directed at inanimate matter…In war, the will isdirected at an animate object that reacts,” (Ibid: 149). This action and reaction interplay in real war wasalso brought out in Clausewitz assertion that, “In war the result is never final…The defeated state oftenconsiders the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in politicalconditions at some later date”(Ibid: 80).

In distinguishing Real War from Absolute War, Clausewitz recognised that the effort to be applied inwar was subject to moderation as dictated by the political aim. He therefore averred that, “The politicalobject – the original motive of the war – will thus determine both the military objective to be reached andthe amount of effort that it requires…Thus it follows that without any inconsistency wars can have alldegrees of importance and intensity, ranging from a war of extermination down to simple armedobservation”(Ibid: 81).

The influence of political object on war and its outcome reveals that absolute or extreme exertion offorce was not a possibility in real war, which is an act of policy. Clausewitz noted that, “Were it acomplete, untrammelled, absolute manifestation of violence (as the pure concept would require), warwould of its own independent will usurp the place of policy the moment policy had brought it into being;it would then drive policy out of office and rule by the laws of its own nature, very much like a mine that



can explode only in the manner or direction predetermined by the setting…If we keep in mind that warsprings from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain thesupreme consideration in conducting it. That, however, does not imply that the political aim is a tyrant.It must adapt itself to its chosen means, a process which can radically change it…” (Ibid: 87). It wouldthen be seen that in real war, policy will have a continuous influence on military operations as far as war’sviolent nature will allow.

Paradoxical Trinity

Clausewitz’s theory of the paradoxical trinity is captured in his assertion that, “War is more than a truechameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon, its dominantcharacteristics always make war a remarkable trinity – composed of primordial violence, hatred andenmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability withinwhich the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy,which makes it subject to reason alone.” (Ibid: 89). This trinity is interpreted to mean the government,the commander and his army (the military), and the people as further posited by Clausewitz, that, “Thefirst of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second, the commander and his army; thethird the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people;the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance dependson the particular character of the commander and his army; but the political aims are the business of thegovernment alone” (Ibid).

He describes the trinity as “…three different codes of law, deep-rooted in the subject and yetvariable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any of them or seeks to fix an arbitraryrelationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it wouldbe totally useless. Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these threetendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets” (Ibid).

It could be seen that Clausewitz’s trinity is like a three-legged stool and all the legs; government,military and the people are indispensible. If one leg is missing or shorter than the other, the stool is notfunctional. The purpose and means of war are found in the trinity. The government defines the politicalpurpose, the military the instrument or means to achieve the political goal, and the people provide thewill. Indeed, all the three components are essential to Clausewitz’s strategic concept and could beemployed in any conflict or war.

Strategy and the Strategist

Strategy is another concept that has been explained by various theorists, some accurate, some wrongand some confusing. Clausewitz aptly brought out the meaning of strategy, stating that, “Fighting…consistsof a greater or lesser number of single acts, each complete in itself, which…are called ‘engagements’and which form new entities…tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement; strategy, theuse of engagements for the object of the war, (Ibid: 128). This implies that the strategist must define anaim for the entire operational side of the war that will conform to its purpose.

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Strategy in the words of Clausewitz also decides the time, place, and the forces with which theengagement is to be fought and once the result of the tactical has produced be-it victory or defeat,strategy will use it to serve the object of the war, (Ibid: 177-178). The implication of this is that thestrategist must draft the plan of the war, and the aim will determine the series of actions intended toachieve it. He must therefore shape the individual campaigns and decide the individual engagementswithin them. The further implication of the assumptions in the plan is that the strategist must go on thecampaign himself and maintain control throughout. If I may borrow the words of General Schwarzkopf,“It doesn’t take a hero to order men into battle; it takes a hero to be one of those men who goes intobattle” (Schwarzkopf and Petre, 1992). In essence, the strategist is a hero.

Defence and Offence

The political object of a war determines the strategy that will lead to the attainment of the object. Thestrategist is thus expected to draw up a plan that will conform to either defence or offence as set out bypolicy. The situation in the theatre could also dictate whether a change from either element to the otheris necessary and this must be clearly and promptly married with policy.

In reference to defence in the international system, Clausewitz posited that, “If we consider thecommunity of states…we do not find a systematically regulated balance of power…but we certainly dofind major and minor interests of states and peoples interwoven…The sum total of relations betweenstates thus serves to maintain the stability of the whole rather than to promote change…” (Clausewitz inHoward and Paret, 1976: 373). In a campaign however, he opined that there are two options andtherefore two kinds of reactions open to a defender; either the attacker is to perish by the sword or byhis own exertion. This he exemplified with the example of Fabius Verrucosus ‘Cunctator’ (280-203BC), a onetime Roman politician and General, who was noted for his strategy of pitched battles andavoidance of frontal assaults. Clausewitz averred that, “All campaigns that are known for their so-calledtemporising, like those of the famous Fabius Cunctator, were calculated primarily to destroy the enemyby making him exhaust himself” (Ibid: 385). It could be deduced that defence as a strategy mustnecessarily achieve the object of the war, victory over the enemy by the sword or through his ownexhaustion.

Offence or attack as a strategy involves the exertion from a belligerent against the defender. Thisoften leads to the exhaustion of the attacker that rarely attains the object of war. Clausewitz posits that,“If the superior strength of the attack – which diminishes day by day – leads to peace, the object willhave been attained. There are strategic attacks that have led directly to peace, but these are in theminority,” (Ibid: 358). Clausewitz however, leaves the decision to adopt either defensive or offensive tothe strategist. He posited that, “We have already indicated in general terms that defense is easier thanattack. But defense has a passive purpose: preservation; and attack a positive one: conquest…Ifdefense is the stronger form of war, yet has a negative object, it follows that it should be used only solong as weakness compels, and be abandoned as soon as we are strong enough to pursue a positiveobject,” (Ibid). Although this seems to show Clausewitz’s preference for a defensive strategy over anoffensive one, it behoves the strategist in the theatre of war to decide which way as a war progresses.



Centre of Gravity (CoG)

Clausewitz in the fourth chapter of Book 8 went down history lane to ponder on what could lead to thedefeat of an army, which he affirmed was the aim of war. He considered the Napoleonic wars from1792 – 1807 and averred that success was not due simply to general causes, rather particular factorscould be often decisive, the details of which could be known only to those on the spot. He furthersuggested that these could be moral factors that are not readily discovered and other issues could bedecided by chance and incidents that are so minute as to be observed or recorded. Yet, it is minutefactors that once discovered could lead to the enemy’s defeat.

In attaining the aim of war, Clausewitz emphasised that, “Small things always depend on great ones,unimportant on important, accidentals on essentials.” It is these considerations he expects should guidethe approach of the strategist that seeks to defeat the enemy. He therefore, affirmed that, “One mustkeep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics, a certaincentre of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That isthe point against which all our energies should be directed.” (Ibid). He subsequently suggested based onhis experience that the enemies’ CoG could be:

a. Destruction of his army/ military (if it is significant, then it’s easiest way to force an enemy tonegotiate).

b. Seizure of his capital city (if it is not only the centre of administration but also that of social,professional and political activity).

c. Delivery of an effective blow against his principal ally if that ally is more powerful than he).

Although it may be very difficult to discover the enemy’s CoG, yet the defeat of the enemy dependssolely on its neutralisation. It would also be noted that although Clausewitz’s CoG is based on theassumption of a single enemy CoG, whereas, in modern war, there could be multiple CoG depending onits nature and complexity. It is therefore, important for the strategist to painstakingly carry out thoroughanalysis of his and the enemies’ CoG so that he would defend his and concentrate appropriate energy onthat/ those of the enemies.

Civil-Military Relations

Clausewitz has clearly brought out the fact that war is a political instrument and that the strategist mustconduct the war only to attain the object of policy. These point to the need for an effective relationshipbetween the strategist and the statesmen. He therefore emphasised that “…when people talk, as theyoften do, about harmful political influence on the management of war, they are not really saying whatthey mean. Their quarrel should be with the policy itself, not with its influence. If the policy is right – thatis, successful – any intentional effect it has on the conduct of the war can only be to the good,” (Ibid:608).

Clausewitz also pointed out the harmful effect of the statemen’s interference with the conduct ofwar. He averred that “Only if statesmen look to certain military moves and actions to produce effects

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that are foreign to their nature do political decisions influence operations for the worse… statesmenoften issue orders that defeat the purpose they are meant to serve. Time and again that has happened,which demonstrates that a certain grasp of military affairs is vital for those in charge of general policy,”(Ibid). This assertion points at the unending difficulty that the strategist will encounter in conducting waras a result of the statesman’s interferences. So, while efforts are being made to help the statesmenimprove in their knowledge of military affairs, the strategist must endeavour to maintain a cordialrelationship with the policy maker.

CLAUSEWITZ AND THE FIRST GULF WAR

The First Gulf War (2 August 1990 – 28 February 1991), codenamed Operation DESERT SHIELD(2 August 1990 – 17 January 1991) for operations leading to the build up of troops and defence ofSaudi Arabia and Operation DESERT STORM (17 January 1991 – 28 February 1991) in its attackphase, was a war waged by US-led coalition from 35 nations against Iraq. The war was waged inresponse to Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait. The war is also known under other names, suchas the Persian Gulf War, Gulf War I, Kuwait War, First Iraq War, or Iraq War. It is sometimes confusedwith the 2003 Iraq War, which is named Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

The First Gulf War started based on a defensive doctrine, specifically to defend Saudi Arabia fromIraqi attack and invasion. However, the coalition changed to an attack doctrine when on 8 August, Iraqdeclared Kuwait to be Iraq’s nineteenth province and Saddam named his cousin, Ali Hassan Al-Majid,as its military-governor.

The initial conflict to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait began with an aerial and naval bombardmenton 17 January 1991, which continued for five weeks. This was followed by a ground assault on 24February. The ground forces advanced into Iraqi territory and within 100 hours, the Iraq RepublicanGuard, which was the last line of defence for Saddam Hussein surrendered. Subsequently, the coalitionceased its advance and declared a ceasefire. This was a decisive victory for the coalition forces, whichliberated Kuwait and declared a ceasefire on its terms.The war was marked by the introduction of livenews broadcasts from the front lines of the battle, principally by the US Cable News Network (CNN).The war has also earned the nickname Video Game War after the daily broadcast of images fromcameras on board US bombers during Operation Desert Storm.

According to Larry New, the US victory in the First Gulf War was extraordinary given that noarmed force had achieved such a great victory at such low costs with limited casualty. He averred thattheir victory laid in their tremendous technological advantages, coalition initiative and their ability tothink about war better than the Iraqis (New, 1996). He went further to affirm that “Without goodthinking, the best technology and the most capable men are useless perfunctory cogs in the machineof wartime violence” (Ibid). Also, he stated that Clausewitz’ war theories had a significant influenceon the use of the US military instrument in the First Gulf War. Having also read the book, It Doesn’tTake A Hero by Gen Norman Schwarzkopf (US Army), the Commander of the coalition force in theFirst Gulf War, now deceased, it is reasonable to concur with Larry New that the application ofClausewitz’ war theories by the US-led coalition in the First Gulf War was a principal factor for their



decisive victory. Therefore, it is expedient to consider some of these theories as they were applied in theFirst Gulf War.

The Paradoxical Trinity

The ingenious application of Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity theory by the US Government played apivotal role in orchestrating the outcome of the First Gulf War. Clausewitz contends that politics is theonly source of war, and war is an instrument. He is also emphatic that the military point of view issubordinate to the political, “No one starts a war or rather, no one in his right mind ought to do sowithout first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war, and how he intends toconduct it.” The US grand strategy involved the use of all the instruments of statecraft in response to theIraqi invasion of Kuwait. As Clausewitz stated, the political object is the goal, and war is the means ofreaching it. “The political objective will determine the military objective to be reached and the amountof effort it requires.” Therefore, observing this important Clausewitz concept, the US political objectivesin the region were clearly stated: “immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forcesfrom Kuwait, restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government, security and stability of Saudi Arabia andthe Persian Gulf, and safety and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad.

Clausewitz believed that the commander and his army should be concerned with the conduct of thewar. During the First Gulf War, President Bush recognised the military leadership, had faith in theirabilities, and gave them a “free” (military) hand to conduct the war. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, General Collin Powell was a capable general and well versed in the political arena. His understandingof the way political forces were formed in Washington was vital to the smooth relationship between themilitary and political leaders. Also, General Norman Schwarzkopf, the Commander of the coalitioninteracted frequently with General Powell throughout the prosecution of the war. This close workingrelationship is the epitome of what Clausewitz expected from the statesman and the general. The Presidentand his advisors sought and accepted the recommendations of the military commanders. At the terminationof hostilities, then President Bush commented that, “once and for all, the US had licked the VietnamSyndrome.” Also, General Schwarzkopf acknowledged President Bush for giving him what Clausewitzbelieved an imperative, the ability to advise and make recommendations to the statesman, and to beconcerned with “fighting” or executing the war. Since the US government clearly articulated the militaryobjectives, and ensured they remained subordinate to the political objectives, Clausewitz was againproven correct in his assessments. The use of military force to compel an enemy to do our will resultedin the ability to clearly win wars.

A properly balanced trinity will also garner the public support necessary for a nation to wage war.The national will is defined by a nation’s citizenry, and is key to the support needed to wage war andwin. In the First Gulf War, the “will” of the people affected the nature of war, and what was acceptablein terms of fighting. When whole communities go to war; whole peoples, and especially civilised peoples,the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object.This point was made clear to the American public by the government. Most Americans had an opinionon two distinct areas that would impact the way the generals planned to “win” the First Gulf War. One

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was to avoid a prolonged Vietnam-style war; rather they wanted a short, decisive war. Americansseemed unwilling to accept the cost in men, resources and material to support a protracted war. Theother important area of concern was American casualties. Although, the government had clearly articulatedthe vital interests of the US, which were threatened by Iraq, many citizens were not willing to accept highcasualties. This single factor proved to drive both military planners and politicians to ensure everyprecaution was taken to minimise US casualties in the war, domestic and international politicalconsiderations were consistent with sound military objectives. This link resulted in tremendous publicsupport for the use of military force. The media played a vital role in building public opinion, a contributionunmatched in any previous war or conflict. For example, CNN’s Peter Arnett and Bernard Shaw, fromtheir vantage point in the Al Rashid Hotel in downtown Baghdad, beamed the sights and sounds of thestart of Gulf War “live” around the world and in homes across America. Indeed, the world was treatedto a front row seat at press briefings from CENTCOM to trips throughout the theatre of operations.Close adherence to Clausewitz’s theory of the paradoxical trinity in the US strategy during the First GulfWar resulted in a swift resolution of the war, few American casualties and clear victory for the US-ledcoalition.

Centre of Gravity

The US-led coalition recognising, like Clausewitz, the CoG as the hub of all power and movement onwhich everything depends; it correctly identified its CoG and those of the Iraqis in planning and executingthe First Gulf War. Although Clausewitz believed in a single CoG and attacking it with great force, theincreasing complexity of modern wars such as the First Gulf War, multiple centres of gravity exist at thetactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. Nevertheless, Clausewitz’s broad notion of CoG remainsthe same today.

In the First Gulf War, the US correctly identified its strategic CoG as the strength of the alliance,which was hinged on international support, and the will of the American people. On the other hand, thestrategic CoG of Iraq was identified as the will of the Iraqi political leadership. At the operational level,the US CoG was the anti-missile systems deployed in defence of Saudi Arabia during Op DESERTSHIELD; while the combination of its sea, air and land capability was the CoG during Op DESERTSTORM. On the other hand, the Iraqi operational CoG was identified as the Republican Guard.

The US coalition, basing its offensive on Clausewitz’s theories of attrition and annihilation, effectivelyunhinged the Iraqi operational CoG with immense synchronisation, fury and precision. The attackscaused paralysis in decision making, destruction of command, control, and communications (C3),destruction of the Republican Guards, retardation of Iraq’s capability to wage future war, and ultimatelydampened Iraqi leadership and military’s will to fight.

Attack and Defence

Clausewitz believed that attack and defence formed a continuum. He believed defence was the strongerform of war because of positioning, gaining time, gathering strength like a coiling spring, and depletingthe strength of an attacking force. Clausewitz believed though, since attack and defence were a continuum,



at some time the defenders would unleash the “flashing sword of vengeance” and strike against a weakenedfoe. In this line of thought, the defender couldn’t hope to win without assuming the attack and attaininga decision.

The US-led coalition executed the attack-defence continuum in two phases; defence for Op DESERTSHIELD and attack for Op DESERT STORM. While the defence phase was meant to facilitate thebuild up of the allied forces and prepare for the attack, the attack phase was designed to be brief anddecisive in order to keep the trinity of war stable and ensure their political and military culminating pointswere not reached before war termination.

In addition to the application of Attack and Defence theories, the US coalition used Clausewitz’stheories of attrition and annihilation in their attack into Iraq and Kuwait. For example, they used airattrition to reduce the enemy to an acceptable force level and lower his will to resist. After reducing theenemy’s power and morale, they used mass violence on the ground and in the air to annihilate Iraq. Theattrition cum annihilation continuum meshed well with the limited nature of the war and the politicalobjectives.

CONCLUSION

The strength of Clausewitz’s theory is in its timelessness and relevance to modern and indeed futurewars. This fact has been revealed in various sections of this paper, especially as it was applied to theFirst Gulf War, which was conducted 159 years after On War’s first publication. A very clear understandingof Clausewitz trinity clearly brought out the role of the statesman, strategist and the people in the wagingof war. Indeed, the importance of a very effective CMR was identified as a necessity to attain the objectof war. It is crucial for the statesmen to comprehend this relationship and the strategist to facilitate theirunderstanding. There is need for the military strategists in Nigeria to not only understand the object ofthe nation’s wars, but also relate well with the statesmen, where the use of the military as its instrumentof war comes to light.

War is a very dangerous venture as postulated by Clausewitz and should not be planned as anabsolute war, which is purely an abstraction. The strategist is expected to translate the political object ofwar, which is the defeat of the enemy through well thought out strategy. The identification of his and theenemy CoG is a critical step towards waging the war that will end in the defeat of the enemy. It behovesthe AFN strategists to conduct appropriate CoG analysis before and during the conduct of the nation’swars.

To bring this paper to its end and indeed, in line with enduring Engineering principle, where an engineis not started without first knowing how to stop, it would suffice to quote Clausewitz again. He assertedthat, “No one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so – without first being clear inhis mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.” It therefore behovesthe political leaders, AFN strategists and the Nigerian people to establish the right balance that willtranslate to the effective conduct and positive outcome of the nation’s wars. But it needs to be borne inmind that it takes the strategist in the war theatre to be a hero.

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REFERENCES

Clausewitz, Carl Von (1976), On War, Edited and Interpreted by Michael Howard and Peter Paret,Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

Creveld, Martin Van. “Technology and War II: Postmodern War?”. in Charles Townshend, The OxfordHistory of Modern War.

Hoyt, T.H (2014), “Clausewitz, On War and the Foundations of Strategy,” Lecture delivered at USNaval War College.

Moran, D., Strategic Theory and the History of War, Naval Post-Graduate School, USA.

New, Larry D (USAF), (1996), “Clausewitz Theory: On War and its Application Today”, in AirpowerJournal.

Schwarzkopf, Norman Jr and Peter Petre, (1992), It Doesn’t Take A Hero.

Townshend C. (ed), (2005), The Oxford History of Modern War, New York, USA: Oxford UniversityPress.



THE HISTORY OF THE NIGERIAN ARMY: ANALYSIS OF ITSGENEALOGY AND DEVELOPMENT

by

Brigadier General OL Olokor PhDDirector of Museum

Nigerian Army Resource CentreAbuja.

ABSTRACT

It has often been said that a people without history, just like a people withoutculture are dead people. This assertion underlines the great importance ofhistory, and by extension military history. A military without good knowledgeof its history has no institutional memory. When it combines this with lack ofknowledge of the history of other key militaries and military campaigns,then that military is as good as dead too.

This author devoted intellectual energy on the history of the NigerianArmy, from 1863 to present. It highlighted the key milestones in the periodwith explanations of what happened, why and how. It is an interestingnarrative that should interest not only young Nigerian Army personnel, butalso those who have retired and disengaged long ago.

Keywords: History, Nigerian Army, Analysis, Genealogy, Development

INTRODUCTION

History occupies a significant part of human life. This all-important discipline is necessary for knowledge,understanding and a means of addressing the future. Gbor (2004) posits that history reveals knowledgeof the past which prepares us for a better understanding of the present, and subsequently provides us

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with lessons and facts to chart the course of the future. He further submitted that history as it concernsthe military, forms the bedrock of human strategic thinking in all spheres of life. To appreciate thehistory of the Nigerian Army of over 154 years, there is the need to be aware that the study of militaryhistory as an institution of memory cannot be jettisoned. This is due to its indispensable role in linkingpast military operations, institutional development and other relevant military associated activities tothe present.

The history of the Nigerian Army, one of the strongest and most resilient military forces in Africa isnot an exception. It derives its nucleus from a beginning associated with proof of strength, honesty andbravery as expressed by Glover. It will not be out of place to know that there was a large number ofindependent political organisations that thrived in both the northern and southern areas making upcontemporary Nigeria. Idress (2004) acclaimed that groups like the seven Hausa states, the Kane-Borno state, the Nupes, Igalas, Oyo empire and the Igbo political system among others possessed welldefined military systems designed for territorial defence, aggrandizement or external aggression andenforcement of internal social, economic and political order. Ukpabi (2004) alluded to the fact thatwhen Britain at the beginning of the nineteenth century, decided to make its power and influence feltalong the Niger littoral it therefore needed a military force with the capability to carry out its objectives.The conquest of territories by the British in Nigeria started from Lagos in 1851. This was made possiblewith the use of military personnel and ships of the Royal Navy supported by about 650 soldiers of theKing of Lagos. Lagos was made a British colony and this required expanding the frontier and makingsure all aggressive indigenous groups were subdued. The task of making sure that all groups consideredhostile to British interest were subdued, was not without its limitations in operations along the Nigeriancoast. British troops falling sick of malaria was an issue, as well as their inability to hold ground due tothe low strength. Ukpabi (2004) noted that the groundwork for the takeoff of a force which will formpart of the British military establishment was beginning to take shape. The plan to institutionalize a reliedupon force to solve minor problems and maintain order in and within the trade routes saw the beginningof the Nigerian Army.

The task of this paper is to discourse the history of the Nigerian Army, as a strategy of placing on thefront burner the relevance of not only history, but as it concerns us here, of military history.

3. The discourse covers the following:a. Nigerian Army History from the formative Years of Glover Hausas.b. The West African Frontier Force and Campaigns.c. Renaming and Nigerianisation Policy.d. Training for Replacements and Changes in Forms.e. Prelude to Crisis in the Nigerian Army.f. Outbreak of the Civil War and Establishment of Divisions.g. Explanation of the motif of Nigerian Army Cap Badge and logo (Lt Col Cap and below).h. Dark days and happy moments in the Nigerian Army.

The History of the Nigerian Army: Analysis of Its Genealogy and Development 107


i. Contemporary Challenges; andj. The need for History.

NIGERIAN ARMY HISTORY FROM THE FORMATIVE YEARS OFGLOVER HAUSAS

Lieutenant John Glover of the Royal Navy (British) on his way to Lagos had waterways challenge afterhis boat known as Dayspring capsized at Jebba and was put out of action. The need to seek forassistance from reliable and able-bodied dedicated young men arose when he decided to go by road.Glover on his way came across some indigenes of northern extraction and selected eighteen of them tocarry out this worrisome task of escorting him with his luggage to Lagos. He was so impressed with theshow of strength and zeal by the men that he formed them into a force known as “Glover Hausas” in1863. A notable event of importance that became altruism occurred in the course of moulding this earlyforce. This was the Glover’s farewell speech to his soldiers:

Remember that you are a small tree which I have planted, but you willgrow big and stretch forth far with wide spreading branches, and you willtake root in the ground. You must never let this tree wither but water itday by day till it grows and flourishes.

The force was used for both military and police duties. The force changed from its name at inceptionto “Hausa Constabulary” in 1865 when it became a regular force. The Royal Niger Company wasgranted a charter in 1886 empowering it to administer the Delta and the valleys of Niger and Benuerespectively and raised in the same year the Royal Niger Constabulary with its main base in Asaba.There was a struggle for ownership and control of some parts of the east of River Niger and this led toBritain exercising deliberate control by setting up a colonial force led by Sir Ralph Moor referred to as“Niger Coast Protectorate Force”. The mean posture and hard manners of treating enemies and friendsalike gave it the name “Oil Rivers Irregulars”. The various forces in the north and south were meant toserve the need of the colonial government in the localities as they remained independent of each other.However, the West Indian Regiment, an Imperial force stationed in Lagos was put to use specially in theconquest of Ijebu which was outside the area of responsibility of the Lagos government.

THE WEST AFRICAN FRONTIER FORCE AND CAMPAIGNS

The formation of the West African Frontier Force was initiated by Joseph Chamberlin, the ColonialSecretary. This was triggered off by the forming of the incipient body of what was later called WestAfrican Frontier Force in Jebba in Northern Nigeria in 1887 by Lord Fredrick Lugard. The Britishgovernment as a matter of fact needed a more formidable and effective force to combat the French whowere already laying claims to some British claimed territories in parts of Northern Nigeria. The claimsbecame competitive due to the Berlin West African Conference of 1884-1885 which stipulated that theoccupation of territories in order to be valid must be effective. To this end, each of the European powers

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was to maintain a stationed force in claimed areas. The West African Frontier Force was to carry outthis task for Britain that felt threatened by France occupation of areas in dispute and in the neighbouringFrench territories. The force in 1901 incorporated all para-military units in British claimed areas includingLagos Constabulary which became the Lagos Battalion. The merging of the Northern Nigeria Regimentand Southern Nigeria Regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel CHP Carter and Colonel J Wilcoxrespectively was due to the amalgamation in 1914. These two regiments were used by Lord Lugard forthe annexation of Nigeria. The 1st and 2nd Battalion of the Nigeria Regiment were under the NorthernNigeria Regiment while the 3rd and 4th Battalion of the Nigeria Regiment were under the SouthernNigeria Regiment. It is pertinent to note that a mounted infantry of the Northern Regiment became theordinary infantry Battalion as there also existed a field Artillery.

Marino (2017) stated that, the regiments participated actively in the World War I in the Cameroons,1914 to 1916, and in the East Africa and Abyssinia battle 1916 to 1918. It also played crucial roles inthe 2nd World War where the regiment carried out the fastest advance in military history against theItalian forces and in Burma with the provision of the main fighting force comprising of 81st and 82ndWest African Divisions. The attachment of 3 West African Brigade in the War effort in the 2nd Chinditsoperation of 1944 was commendable and applauded by the Colonial government. Gen Cunliffe whilebriefing Lord Lugard after the East African Campaign, noted “There is no doubt that it was the Nigerianswho won the campaign, they alone could stand the starvation and malaria and showed indomitablepluck in action.” Several individuals who fought on Nigerian side received medals for exhibiting braveryand gallantry. Few outstanding war veterans in this category include Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM)Chari Maigumeri, the most decorated soldier in the history of the Nigerian Army, Regimental SergeantMajor (RSM) MM Hamakin who was awarded the Military Medal (MC) for singlehandedly attackinga Japanese position in Burma (Father to Maj Gen JGS Hamakin; Director General Nigerian ArmyResource Centre, Sergeant Dambazau (Father to Lt Gen AB Dambazau former Chief of Army Staffand now Minister for Interior), and Alhaji Yusuf Buratai, father to the present Chief of Army Staff, LtGen TY Buratai. The trend from the preceding names shows the passing of baton to children by menwho sacrificed so much for the maintenance of peace and stability for mankind.

According to the History of the Nigerian Army 1994, the end of the World War II witnessed thenaming of military barracks in which the force gained distinction. The Barracks at Kaduna and Zariawere named Mogadishu, Dialet and Chindits while Abeokuta was named Nyangao and those in LagosAshanti, and Albalti, Myohaung, Arakan, Tamandu and Marda. Some of these names of significantareas were also used in military training schools and in naming newly constructed military cantonments.Demobilisation of troops was effected and many of the affected men were provided with jobs preservedfor them in government and private sectors. The size of the force was reduced to a manageable proportionin tandem with the rising cost of living. This resulted in having five infantry battalions and formed unitsand services for peace time functions. The Nigerian Army as described by Nwolise (2004) is a symbolof nationhood that has found itself in governance, economic production and developmental process.The NA in contributing to global peace engaged in its first peace-keeping operation in 1960 which wasthe Congo operation under the aegis of the United Nations (UN). The NA as mentioned earlier participated



in World War I and World War II and especially in Western Cameroon. The NA had continued to playthis role till date with outstanding records of successful participations in several UN peace-keepingmissions and others for assistance in training and leadership. Nwolise posits that the Nigerian contingents’operations in the Cameroons, World War I and World War II can be regarded as the forerunners ofmodern peace-keeping missions.

RENAMING AND NIGERIANISATION POLICY

The nomenclature of the West African Frontier Force changed (WAFF) when it was renamed the RoyalWest African Frontier Force in 1948 and thereafter became the Queens Own Nigeria Regiment (QONR)on the visit of Queen Elizabeth II to Nigeria in 1956. The same year also witnessed the regionalisation ofthe WAFF as each military force became autonomous. The new policy then made the name to changefrom Queen’s Own Nigeria Regiment (QONR) to Nigerian Military Force (NMF) in 1956. The BritishGovernment relinquishing control of the NMF to the Nigerian Government in June1958 prelude toindependence changed the name to the Royal Nigerian Army (RNA) and when Nigeria became aRepublic in 1963 it changed to the Nigerian Army. This has remained so for about 55 years now whichprobably may stand forever having reached a level of satisfaction and general acceptance. The NigerianArmy changed its uniform, rank, instruments and structure to reflect the new name accordingly. Gbor(2004) noted that the Nigerian Government inherited from the British an Army that was about 7,878 ofboth officers and men. The number of officers at independence was 283 out of which 61(22%) wereNigerians and 222 (78%) were British. Also a greater number of the non-commissioned officers wereBritish. The Nigerianisation or indigenisation of the officer corps resulted in the granting of a ShortService Commission in 1948 to Lieutenant LV Ugboma as the first Nigerian with a British servicenumber to attain that height. Four other Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) were commissioned asSSC as follows: WU Bassey, Seyi, JTU Aguiyi Ironsi and SA Ademulegun in 1949 and RA Shodeindeand Wellington in 1950 and 1952 respectively. For several different reasons many of the NCOscommissioned did not remain in service. Lt Seyi had resigned his commissioned in 1952 while Lt Ugbomaand Lt Wellington were out of service by 1953. Lt Bassey became the most senior Nigerian Armyofficer at this time as more Nigerians were granted the same type of commission. They include Lt BAOOgundipe, Lt RA Adebayo in 1953, Lt CDC Nwawo and Lt RA Fajuyi in 1954.

The officers were trained in the United Kingdom until in 1953 when the Colonial office establishedthe Regular Officers Special Training School (ROSTS) at Teshie, Ghana for a six-month training for allRWAFF Officer Cadets before proceeding to the United Kingdom for the remaining part of the trainingin any of the cadet training institutions. The SSC was meant for suitably serving soldiers with requiredqualification of the General Certificate of Education (GCE) and medical fitness and recommendationfrom the Commanding Officers. Other means of entry into the NA was through the Regular Commissionopen to interested young Nigerians with passed school certificate. The candidates must pass the writtenexam, medical test and the interviews at the Nigeria Sub-District and Hq Nigeria Regiment. Otherhurdles after this included Candidates who satisfy the aforementioned trained in Mons or Easton Hall forfour months and at the end, those successful at the regular officers commission board are admitted to the

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Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS) for an 18 months and at the successful end granted theKing’s or Queen’s commission as a regular officer in the Nigeria Regiment.

Cadets training schools were established in selected public schools in the country in order to fosterenlistment in the NA through the regular commission. The schools with cadet units included GovernmentCollege Zaria (Barewa College), King’s College Lagos, and Government College Umuahia. The cadetunits served as route through which many Nigerian Officers in the Nigeria Regiment came into the Army.The first in1950 from this group were Zakariya Maimalari and Lawan Umar both from GovernmentCollege Zaria. They were trained at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst and commissioned SecondLieutenants in 1953. Others trained in same manner in 1951 were Kur Mohammed and Abogo Lagemawho were from Government College Zaria and commissioned in1954. Ejoor (2003) stated that JY Pamand GT Kurubo from Government College Zaria and Government College Umuahia were trained in1953 and commissioned in 1955 while other group commissioned in 1956 from Sandhurst through thecadet programme include Victor Banjo, David Ejoor, Yakubu Gowon, Alexander Madiebo and A Unegbe.These officers were at various times documented for their roles as it affects the evolution of the NA.They were at a time in different camps and took up arms against themselves for reasons known tohistory. All the officers mentioned exited the scene through several means except for Gen (Dr.) YakubuGowon former Head of State and Maj Gen David Akpode Ejoor former Chief of Staff (Army) who arealive. It would not be out of place to continuously retrieve the iconology of the Nigerian Army formationand other aspects both in written, audio and visual forms before its dawn.

TRAINING FOR REPLACEMENT AND CHANGES IN FORMS

The training of Nigerians to be Commissioned Officers continued after 1956 in different cadet traininginstitutions. At this time it was evident that the reservation of places in training Nigerian cadets in Sandhurstwas not sufficient to meet the pace of the Nigerianisation policy. Nigerians with WASC were sent toMons and Eaton Hall for training for six months and granted SSC like the NCOs. The first batch of thisgroup commissioned in 1959 included Igboba, Sotomi, Obasanjo and Amadi. The second groupcomprised of Aniebo, Kyari, Ohanechi, Agbazue, Omanayi, Jalo, Orogbu and Odiwo. Nigerian graduateswere also trained for six months and granted SSC into the Army. In this group was Ojukwu who wascommissioned in 1957, Olutoye in 1959, Ifeajuna and Rotimi in 1960 and Ademoyega in 1962.

At independence on 1st October 1960, the Nigerian Army was then known as the Royal NigerianArmy (RNA) as hinted earlier. The size of the army was relatively small and not well equipped. Changestook place as the Nigerian Government took full control. Training started externally in many countries toget officers properly groomed both in staff and command. Depot Nigerian Army was already establishedby 1922 while the Nigerian Military School (NMS) was established in 1954 as a Boy’s Company tomake children of serving personnel develop interest in the military and possess a family tradition in theforce. Products of the two institutions especially NMS have contributed immensely to the history andachievements of the NA. The Royal Nigerian Military Force Training College (Infantry Centre Corpsand School) was established in 1959. In the same vein the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) wasestablished in 1964 to take care of the training of junior leader officers for the Armed Forces. The



establishment of training institutions in Nigeria became paramount considering the challenges in thebuilding of an army handed over by the British hurriedly. The building of an Ordnance factory (DefenceIndustries Corporation) was established in Kaduna to produce weapons and ammunition. There werechanges in weapon system and in the buildings and rehabilitations of barracks and depots. Remarkablechanges that occurred between1960-1963 were in the Army uniform and insignia as follows:

a. Green uniform of long sleeve jacket, long trousers and peak cap replaced the old colonial ceremonialdress of red fez, zouave jacket, red cummerbund and khaki shorts.

b. The six edged star and eagle replaced the old four edged star and crown for the officers’ badge ofrank.

c. The officers’ sword bearing the Nigerian Coat of Arms as against the former with the monogram ofQueen Elizabeth II of Britain was issued for use by officers.

d. The new logo of an eagle standing on a star superimposed on a scroll replaced the old RWAFFcap badge of a palm tree used by all British Territories in West Africa. (The former motto in Arabicscript – Nasrumnillah meaning – Victory is from God alone was retained).

e. Subsequent changes: There was also the introduction of new service and ceremonial dresses withchange from the brown shoes for officers to jungle boot. In 1974, green cremplene material replacedthe L&k material. Clothe epaulettes were introduced for Officers’ badges of rank while name tagwas introduced in 1977. Berets were introduced in that same year as green was for infantry andother members of the Army. Red berets for Military Police, Maroon berets for Medical Corps,sky blue berets for Education Corps, Finance and APRD (now using light black). Dark blue beretfor Signal Corps; Light black beret for Supply and Transport, Ordnance and Workshop Corps;Deep black beret for Engineers, Artillery and Armoured Corps and Dark green beret for IntelligentCorps.

The size of the Army however did not change much even though units were formed. The nucleus ofthe Guards Brigade was formed as Federal Guards Company mainly to perform ceremonial dutiesaround Lagos, and the existing five battalions provided men to make for the 6th Battalion in1966.Changes were also in the position of commanding officers of the battalions as the last expatriate BattalionCommander was changed in 1963. There were changes virtually in all the appointments at the ArmyHeadquarters except the GOC Maj Gen Welby-Everard who was replaced in 1965 by Maj Gen JTUAguiyi- Ironsi. Several changes occurred within the period and as at January 1966 the location andcommand of the main units including mascots were as follows:

The Nigerian Army Headquarters and other formations had the following Nigerian Army Officersoccupying offices as follows:

a. Army Headquarters Lagos:

(i) General Officer Commanding – Maj Gen JTU Aguiyi-Ironsi.

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(ii) Chief of Staff (Army) – Col K Mohammed.(iii) Training Branch (G Branch) – Lt Col DA Ejoor.(iv) Adjutant General Branch (A Branch) – Lt Col JY Pam.(v) Quarter Master General (Q Branch) – Lt Col Unegbe.(vi) Federal Guards – Maj DO Okafor.

b. Headquarter 1st Brigade Kaduna:

(i) Brig SA Ademulegun – Brigade Commander.

(ii) Lt Col JY Pam – CO 3rd Battalion-KADUNA (Bald-headed White Eagle).

(iii) Lt Col Odumegwu Ojukwu – CO 5th Battalion-KANO (The Antelop).

c. Headquarter 2nd Brigade Apapa:(i) Brig Zakariya Maimalari – Brigade Commander.(ii) Maj DS Ogunewe – CO 1st Battalion – ENUGU (Burutu Bird).(iii) Lt Col HA Igboba – CO 2nd Battalion – IKEJA (Crown Bird).(iv) Lt Col A Lagema – CO 4th Battalion – IBADAN (The Pelican Bird).(v) Lt Col FA Fajuyi – CO Abeokuta Garrison.

d. Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA):(i) Brig MR Verma (Indian) – Commandant.(ii) Col RA Shodeinde – Dy Commandant.

e. Regimental Depot Zaria:

Lt Col WU Bassey – Commandant.

PRELUDE TO CRISIS IN THE NIGERIAN ARMY

The political crisis experienced in Nigeria from 1965 to 15 Jan 1966 dovetailed into the first militarycoup d’état led by Maj Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, an Igbo from the then Midwest region nowmade up of Delta and Edo States of Nigeria. The Officer was born in Kaduna and attended St JohnCollege Kaduna. He however claimed to have organised the coup with four other Majors who herefused to mention. According to the History of the Nigerian Army, he was quoted as saying:

We wanted to get rid of rotten and corrupt ministers, political parties,trade union and whole clumsy apparatus of the federal system. We wantedto gun down all bigwigs on our way.

The coup took the lives of Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and Premier of NorthernRegion, Brig Gen SA Ademulegun, Commander 1 Brigade, Col RA Shodeinde Dy Commandant Nigerian



Defence Academy, Chief SL Akintola, Premier of the crisis-torn Western Region, Prime Minister AlhajiSir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, and Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh. Other military officers include BrigZakariya Maimalari; Commander 2 Brigade Apapa, Col Kur Mohammed, Lt Col JY Pam, Lt ColArthur Unegbe and Lt Col A Lagema. The coup succeeded in the northern part of the country but failedin the south. Maj Chukwuma Nzeogwu was arrested as the politicians and the Council of Ministershanded over power to Maj Gen JTU Aguiyi Ironsi, the General Officer Commanding the NigerianArmy. He became the first military head of state and appointed military governors for the four regions inhis first two days in office on 17th January 1966 as follows:

a. Maj HU Katsina – Northern Region.

b. Lt Col FA Fajuyi – Western Region.

c. Lt Col DA Ejoor – Midwest Region.

d. Lt Col C Odumegwu Ojukwu – Eastern Region.

Within the period, there was cause for discontent from the inability of the government to arrest andpunish according to known military traditions, those involved in the 15th January 1956 coup. Therewere also complaints about promotion and government non-chalant attitude coupled with plans torotate the battalions in the country. The situation at this time was tense and on the night of 28th to 29thJuly 1966, another coup erupted in Abeokuta Garrison. Maj Gen JTU Aguiyi Ironsi and his host Lt ColFajuyi were kidnapped and subsequently killed in Ibadan. Others killed in the counter-coup were theGarrison Commander Lt Col G Okunweze and Maj TI Obienu Commander 2 Recce Squadron. Severalother officers from the Eastern part were killed at Ikeja, Kaduna and Kano. Brig Gen BAO Ogundipe,the most senior officer after Ironsi retired and later became Nigerian High Commissioner to Britain. Themantle of leadership fell on Lt Col Yakubu Gowon, Chief of Staff (Army), who then became the newHead of State. Within two weeks after the coup, the decision to send soldiers to their respective regionsof origin began as this was a turning point in the history of the Nigerian Army. However, with littlemovement in Midwest region, the West and Lagos did not partake in the repatriation to the north andthose to the eastern region.

Lt Col C Odumewu Ojukwu refused to recognise Lt Col Yakubu Gowon as the new Head of Stateand Commander in Chief despite several reconciliatory measures. Some of the measures include theAd Hoc Constitutional Conference of September 1966 in Lagos and Aburi Conference in Ghana.There were several killings of easterners and northerners from both sides. A conference of EasternLeaders of Thought was held in May 1967 where Lt Col Ojukwu was given the mandate by Igboleaders to break away from the rest of Nigeria. In an attempt to stop the action, Maj Gen YakubuGowon created 12 states by decree out of the four regions on 27 May 1967, while Lt Col Ojukwureacted three days later by declaring the new nation of Biafra. The use of force by the Federal governmentto compel Biafra to revert and remain part of Nigeria was the only option.

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OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR AND ESTABLISHMENT OF DIVISIONS

The Nigerian Army was organised into four Area Commands resulting in the formation of about twelvedifferent units at the beginning of the civil war. Recruitment into the Army was carried out during theperiod especially at the peak without appreciating the duration and magnitude of the war. Many liveswere lost including those trained to replace the colonial forces. The war paved way for the establishmentof formations as several lessons during and after the hostilities were learnt. The Federal troops foughtand brought back the Biafrans to the fold with the verdict of “No victor no vanquished”. The endorsementby the Federal Government for acceptance of surrender by Biafran’s Maj Gen Philip Effiong on 15th

January 1970 officially brought the civil war to an end after thirty months.The logo and Cap Badge of the Nigerian Army (Lt Cols and below) with the eagle, two interlaced

triangle-like 6 pointed stars and Arabic script is explained as, Eagle – representing the graceful powerof the Nigerian Army. The army maintains keen surveillance in peace and strikes very swiftly and decidedlyonly when provoked beyond tolerance. Two interlaced triangle-like six pointed stars –First symbolof Nigerian unity. It was struck by Lord Lugard in 1914 when Northern and Southern Nigeria wereamalgamated to form one country. The Nigerian Army shall maintain the unity of Nigeria. Arabic script(Nasruminallah) – means – “victory is from God alone”. This motto was inscribed on the bannerunder which the Nigerian indigenous forces defended their fatherland against the colonial forces: TheNigerian Army stands to defend the territorial integrity of the country at all times.

The Nigerian Army I Area Command of 1st Brigade metamorphosed into the 1 Division NigerianArmy. It was moved from Kaduna to Makurdi, a boundary town between Eastern and Northern Regionsfor strategic reasons. This made the troops nearer to the Biafrans as they fired the first shot that wascountered by the Biafrans on 6th July 1967.This day is celebrated in solemn remembrance of the Nigerianfirst shot fired; marking the commencement of the thirty-month civil war as Nigerian Army Day yearly,starting from 6th July 1978. It is meant to commemorate fallen heroes and the contributions of distinguishedpersonnel in the development of the NA. The last celebration took a different dimension when art andmuseum artefacts were organised through exhibition to chronicle the 154 years history of the NA. Theuse of military and civil collaborating allied artists added colour to the outing. The logo of 1 Division is awhite horse on its hind legs on a sky-blue background. The charging appearance shows the premier andunique position it occupies. The white colour symbolises peace which is sought after every war. TheDivision is located presently at Kawo in Kaduna.

The unexpected invasion of Mid-West by the Biafrans when they used Col Victor Banjo asCommander of that operation led to the creation of 2nd Division. The Division was commanded by LtCol Murtala Mohammed, the then Inspector of Signal who later became a General and Head of State.Cooks, batmen, clerks and all manners of soldiers in Lagos area made up the nucleus of the Division. Itwas formed from the second Brigade. The Division halted the Biafran’s incursion that would havechanged the civil war story. The first logo was One finger sign to symbolise the liberated people of Mid-West raising one finger with the slogan “One Nigeria”, to celebrate Murtala Mohammed. Lt Col IBMHaruna changed it to a Leaping Tiger as a sign for preparedness and ruthlessness to counter the secessionistforce as a moral booster. Maj Gen Martin Adamu in 1975 changed it to the Snarling Tiger. The logo



represents the invoked strength, stealth and speed of that fear installing jungle land animal. The alertnessand ability to take on task readily is represented by the logo. Yellow is for creative thought of soldiers ininstalling optimism and energy while black signifies death, earth and stability. The Division is located atOdogbo in Ibadan Oyo State.

The 3rd Marine Commando changed to 3 Infantry Division, 3rd Armoured Division and 3 Divisionrespectively. The Division was created out of the 6th Battalion in Ikeja to handle the challenge of the Seaborne attack on Biafra from the Bight of Bonny formally (Bight of Biafra). The Commandos as theywere known was commanded by a Sandhurst trained Col Benjamin Maja Adekunle alias “BlackScorpion”. The Commando was renamed 3rd Infantry Division in March 1971 and moved from Port-Harcourt to Jos in 1975.The logo is the octopus that belonged to the intelligent group of water animals.It was chosen by Col Benjamin Maja Adekunle for the role the formation played during the war andterrain of operation. The effectiveness of the water animal in dealing with prey was a reason for itschoice. The colour of the octopus which appeared green was superimposed on red and later changed tosuperimposing the octopus on yellow and red colour (Colour of the Armoured Corps). The logo wasretired and subsequently changed by Maj Gen Saleh Maina to a rhinoceros, an animal that operates inthe savannah where armoured vehicles can also manoeuvre as against the old octopus that cannot whentaken out of water area. The colours were modified. The yellow colour signifies the savannah area ofoperation and ability to operate in nuclear, biological and chemical environment. The red signifiesdestruction and blood. A change of the red colour over the yellow was also made to show that deathcomes before dishonour. The Division is located in Rukuba, Jos in Plateau State.

The reorganisation in the Nigerian Army in 1975 was responsible for the formation of the 4 InfantryDivision now 82 Division. It took over the Headquarters of the Lagos Garrison Organisation (LGO)and changed from an infantry to a Composite Division and relocated to Enugu, its present location. Thelogo changed from the coconut with two crossed sword to a scorpion and later on assumption of acomposite role adopted the dragon, a mystical monster-like reptile as logo. Maj Gen OE Obada, aSandhurst trained officer was the first GOC.

The present Army Headquarters Garrison was formed in 1981 and named Army HeadquartersGarrison and Signal Group located in Lagos to take over the duties of the disbanded Lagos GarrisonCommand. It was to administer AHQ Directorates, Corps and Services in Lagos area. It has a Divisionstatus and at a time, it was called in 1991 AHQ Camp. The logo was a coconut and two crossedswords on red background. The present logo is the same with the Nigerian Army logo. The firstCommander was Lt Col AT Ayuba and is currently located in Abuja.

The Lagos Garrison Command now 81 Division was formed on 15th January 1992 as a result of theenvisaged movement of Headquarters Nigerian Army from Lagos to Abuja. The logo was a palm treeand crossed swords with yellow and green background. The palm tree represents the good roles playedby the Royal West African Frontier Force during the colonial era and the signification of the popularcash crop in its Area of Responsibility (AOR). The sword represents the might and the green colour thevegetation. The present logo is a charging hippopotamus. The green colour represents the vast anddominant mangrove vegetation while the blue represents the water body that criss-crossed the Area ofOperation (AO).

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Brigade of Guards now called Guards Brigade started as Federal Guards in 1963 with a Companymoved to Lagos to perform duties on three-month basis. Troops of the unit were sent to stop theBiafrans. The unit is responsible for the security of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria andthe Federal Capital with other security agencies. The logo is a black scorpion imposed on red and greenin a shield like shape. The red signifies the bloodshed during war while the green in the backgroundrepresents the vegetation where the troops operate. The first commander was Maj WU Bassey and theunit is presently located in Abuja.

The unlawful activities of terrorists in the North Eastern part of Nigeria in 2009 gave rise to theestablishment of 7 Division. It inherited the existing 21 Bde in Maiduguri and became operational on 22August 2013 while 5 Bde was created in Monguno. The logo is a wolf in an aggressive position facingright. It has numeral 7 on the left corner representing its nomenclature with a yellow at the edge. The useof the wolf was due to its tactics, nature and habitation. The yellow ochre represents the desert regionwhere the Division is located. Black represents stability and the earth. Green represents hope andsparsely forested green area in the desert region. Yellow for intellectual spirit, brightness and winningspirit, while red is for the bloodshed by fallen heroes. The logo was designed by Col OL Olokor whileserving in Maiduguri. The first GOC was Maj Gen OE Ethan.

The 8 Task Force Division with HQ in Monguno was established in January 2016. It was the NAstrategy to decimate the Boko Haram terrorists and deny them access of mobility and manoeuvre. Thelogo is a hawk which represents the resilience and toughness of the division to flush out the insurgents.The yellow ochre represents the terrain of the troops of the Division while red symbolises the bloodshedby fallen heroes. The first GOC was Maj Gen O Ejemai.

DARK DAYS AND HAPPY MOMENTS IN THE NIGERIAN ARMY

The Nigerian Army had recorded several dark days as well as happy moments in its history. The sadevents for the dark days range from road accidents, air mishaps to loss of lives in battle. The fallenheroes we celebrate during Nigerian Army Day Celebration fall into this category. The recently concludedNADCEL reminded NA personnel of some of the NA dark days with the list of victims of the ill-fatedCalie-130 aircraft in Ejigbo of 26 September 1992. The list of the 17 September 2006 Obudu air crashand photograph of a survivor (Maj Gen Nuhu Angbazo) and the road mishap of 8 March 2016 involvingMaj Gen YM Abubakar and Brig Gen MSA Aliyu along Damaturu- Maiduguri road. The survivor, BrigGen MSA Aliyu (now Maj Gen) was visited in a German Hospital while on treatment by PresidentMuhammadu Buhari. The NA happy moments include decoration ceremonies, award of COAScommendation, emerging winners in military Exs, successful completion of courses and breakthroughsin technological innovation like was done by Lt Col TM Opurum when he repaired and fabricated asingle Rocket Propelled Gun into double barrel launcher. This earned him COAS award. Photographsof fallen heroes and other museum items of significant relevance were exhibited during NADCEL 2017to show these moments of sadness, joy, hopefulness and determination. Paintings and sculptures depictingscenes of war and campaigns were also displayed. The event of conferment of the highest honour inBrazil on Lt Gen TY Buratai was reproduced on flex and exhibited in a special corner exclusively meant



for the COAS. A tour of the exhibition stand like was done during NADCEL 2017 will further clarifythis point.

CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES

The contemporary challenges in Nigeria as it affects the NA varies from one part of the country to theother. The post-civil war period was mainly characterised by armed robbery and other criminal vicesincluding illegal sales of firearms and involvement in coup d’état. The result culminated in serious securityproblems which the State had to battle with and leaving other areas of needs unattended. Other vicessuch as kidnapping, oil theft, cattle rustling, cultism and terrorism may not have taken place by chance.The Civil War may have contributed significantly to the many of the crimes against mankind and theState we experience today.

THE NEED FOR HISTORY

The need for the NA to make history a priority needs no debate. There is so much to gain from itespecially in this arena of unimaginable events of dangerous dimensions. Gbor (2004) stated that historyis relevant and an inevitable companion to humans in making choices available to us. The choicesavailable to leaders at all levels are products of history in which absence, analogy would be drawn.History as suggested by Foreman gave three major reasons for its inevitability as follows:

a. History separates myth from reality and saves us from making mistakes as problems can beapproached from basic historical foundation.

b. Understanding historical background to issues and events can save us the problem of policymaking in void.

c. Historical perspective can avail us an in-depth understanding of a problem thus allowing us abetter choice in decision making.

d. Policy makers can see and analyse the complexity of issues through a proper appreciation ofhistory and find a way out especially towards achieving peace.

CONCLUSION

The Nigerian Army has passed through several transformative stages. It has continued to develop overtime from the 19th century when men were bare footed to a mechanised and motorised fighting forcewith the establishment of training institutions. The Civil War that ended with the slogan “no victor novanquished” took several lives and properties worth millions of the currency then. Lessons were learntfrom the various operations. The NA has transformed from its early beginning to suit the threat perceptionof likely enemies in line with the Federal Government decisions. The NA is responding decisively toenemies of the State in whatever form they may appear. The Nigerian Army is a force to be reckonedwith today. It has a lengthy history with a lot of lessons, and lots of glory.

To bring this piece to an end, it is necessary to make four recommendations here:

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One, the genealogy of the Nigerian Army evolution should be included in the curriculum of NAschools. Two, the indigenous innovations discovered in the course of the civil war should bedeveloped for further technological development. Three, relics from the history of the NA shouldbe chronologically assembled in various forms of documentation to meet future demands and usedas reference for historical research. Finally, the NA needs to document all key campaigns andother significant events in innovative form using technology and other aesthetic means.

REFERENCES

Gbor W.T. (ed) (2004), Military History, Nigeria from Pre-Colonial Era to Present, Ibadan.

History of the Nigerian Army, Second Edition, Abuja.

Information from Major General David Ejoor, Former Chief of Staff (Army), 1971-1975. 10 May2003.

Makata D.E.O (2016), “The tree must not wither”, Kwality Printing and Packaging Ltd, Abuja.

Nwolise O.B.C. (2004), “The Nigerian Military in Peace keeping since Independence”, in Gbor (ed)Military History, Nigeria from Pre-Colonial Era to the Present, Ibadan.

Ukpabi S.C. (2004), “The Evolution of the Nigerian Army under Colonial Rule”, in Gbor (ed), MilitaryHistory, Nigeria from Pre-Colonial Era to Present, Ibadan.



CHALLENGES OF THE NIGERIAN MILITARY IN INTERNALSECURITY OPERATIONS IN THE FOURTH REPUBLIC

by

Jude A. Momodu, Ph.D.Centre for Peace and Security Studies

Modibbo Adama University of Technology, YolaAdamawa State

Email: [email protected]

ABSTRACT

The armed forces of a nation are established and maintained to defend itfrom external aggression primarily. Internal security duties belong to thePolice as the lead agency and other security agencies. However, when theseinternal security agencies are overwhelmed, the military are called in to renderassistance to civil authority. In the process they encounter certain challenges.This piece examines the participation of the Nigerian military in internalsecurity operations (ISOs) and the attendant challenges. It observes that themilitary despite being overstretched in these ISOs, have performed very wellin the Fourth Republic. The challenges found also include inadequate funding,corruption, accusations of human rights abuse, and poor motivation andwelfare. The paper recommends feasible measures to overcome the identifiedchallenges.

Key words: Challenges, Nigerian Army, Internal Security Operations, FourthRepublic.

INTRODUCTION

The engagement of the military in internal security operations (ISOs) has increased dramatically sinceNigeria’s return to democratic governance on May 29, 1999. This is mainly due to the liberalisation ofthe political space which was closed under successive military administrations that has now given the

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impetus for groups to express their deep-seated grievances. This is in addition to the emergence ofdifferent forms of crimes and domestic security threats like terrorism, insurgency, cattle rustling, militancy,commercialised kidnapping, armed robbery, cultism, electoral related violence, small arms and lightweapons proliferation among others. These internal security threats are often fuelled by the deepeningpoverty, perceived structural exclusion of individuals and groups, massive unemployment, an expandingdemography as well as ethnic, religious, social and economic grievances. The Nigeria Police and othertraditional internal security agencies that have the constitutional responsibility to tackle the numerousinternal security threats are largely ill-equipped, ill-trained and poorly motivated to handle them. As aresult, the military whose core duty is to defend the nation’s territorial integrity against external aggressionis often called upon by civil authorities to assist in the management of internal security threats. This isreinforced with the belief that its personnel are better trained and equipped, and in any case, ISOs is theArmed Forces’ (military’s) third function of “suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authoritiesto restore order” (Omede, 2005).

The main purpose of engaging the military in ISOs by the Nigerian state is usually to restore publicorder and national stability. This is important because “In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only ifsurvival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquillity, profit, and power” (Waltz,1979). In essence, it is only under a peaceful and orderly environment that the rule of law can prevail,democracy can flourish, and state can function optimally to achieve its corporate objectives amongwhich is to guarantee the human security of its citizens. Therefore, the axiom of the primacy of nationalsecurity among the responsibilities of government cannot be escaped. Governments, as a matter ofempirical fact, almost invariably commit as much resources and sacrifice as many other desiderata asthey feel necessary to preserve their national security (Smoke, 1993).The role of the Nigerian military inISOs is contained in Section 217 (2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) which expressly states that theArmed Forces of the Federation have the responsibilities of: (i) Defending Nigeria from externalaggression; (ii) Maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea, orair;(iii) Suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon todo so by the President; (iv) Performance of such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of theNational Assembly.

The military’s role in the management of internal security threats in the Fourth Republic needs tobe appreciated, especially because it has successfully subordinated itself to the civilian constitutedauthorities for almost nineteen years now (May 29, 1999 – 2018). It has also been able to preventthe Nigerian state from disintegration through the exercise of its coercive power. As at 2016, militarypersonnel were deployed on ISOs to thirty-two out of the thirty-six states of the federation (CrisisGroup, 2016) and currently, they are deployed to thirty-three out of the thirty-six states of the federation.This is an indication that its engagements in ISOs in the Fourth Republic have increased dramatically andit appears to be overstretched, by the activities of insurgent groups such as the Boko Haram sect, theNiger Delta militants, the marauding herdsmen and secessionist groups like the Indigenous People ofBiafra (IPOB), Arewa youths and others. The capacity of the military to be able to continue to tacklethese internal security threats needs to be strengthened as Feaver argues that the “military must bestrong enough to meet the threats as defined by the group and subservient enough so as not to endangerthe liberty of the group” (Feaver, 1996:149).

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The Nigerian military are seriously challenged operationally by factors such as personnel, logistics,equipment, funding deficits among other factors. Hence, the United States Department Office in August2017 noted that the Nigerian security forces’ handling of the counter-terrorism operations against BokoHaram lacks coordination and effectiveness. But the successful degradation of the terror group by theNigerian military places a question mark against such assertion. The military’s professional conduct inthe discharge of ISOs has also been consistently called into question both locally and internationally assome of its personnel are in the habit of committing human rights abuses on innocent civilians that theyare supposed to protect (see, Amnesty International, 2015, International Crisis Group, 2015).The aimof this paper, therefore, is to examine the successes and challenges of the military’s role in ISOs in theFourth Republic. This study draws on a combination of both primary and secondary sources of informationgeneration. Interviews were conducted by the author with key informants on the challenges of internalsecurity operations of the Nigerian Military in the Fourth Republic.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION: SECURITY

The term security is a vague and contested concept with many interpretations ascribed to it. For instance,during the Cold War era, security was dominantly conceived as being coterminous with military securityas against other states’ military power (Booth, 2005).This state-centric conception of security informedwhy states’ defence budgets were high as more monies were expended on defence procurements.However, since the end of the Cold War, the conception of the term security has moved away frommerely military concerns to include economic, societal, political and environmental issues, focusing onpeople rather than positing a state-centric perception in security studies (Sheehan, 2005, 44), whichundermines a proper understanding of security ‘when security is moved out of the military sector’(Sheehan, 2005).The concept of security must change from an exclusive stress on national security to amuch greater stress on people’s security, from security through armaments to security through humandevelopment, from territorial security to food, employment and environmental security (HumanDevelopment Report 1993 – www.undp.org/hdro/e93over.htm).

The expansion of the meaning of security from a state-centric one to the inclusion of human centeredsecurity, perhaps informed the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs’ definition of theconcept as a “condition in which States consider that there is no danger of military attack, politicalpressure or economic coercion, so that they are able to pursue freely their own development andprogress” (1986). It is a fact that since the end of the Cold War, threats to the state now emanates fromwithin and such threats are often engendered by human security issues such as: economic, political,social, environmental among others.

In a very practical sense, the term security as defined by Buzan refers to “the pursuit of freedomfrom threats” (1991). He maintains that: ‘Security can be approached both objectively (there is a realthreat) and subjectively (there is a perceived threat), and nothing ensures that these two line up’ (Buzan,1997). In the same vein, security also means ‘the absence of threats to acquired values’. The focus onvalues has made Baldwin (1997) to pose some very fundamental questions such as: security for whom,security for which values, how much security, from what threats, by what means, at what cost, in what

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time period? Answering these questions in the affirmative helps to determine the appropriate issues thatshould form the content of a balanced meaning of the concept of security. Therefore, in defining theconcept of security, there is the need to synergise the threat concerns of the state with that of the citizensas this will enable the concept to reflect the threat concerns of both the state and the citizens. Moreimportantly, the term security generally refers to a conscious perception of safety from danger andfreedom from existential threats. Such existential threats cover areas like: physical, economic, political,environmental, social, health, psychological and security of groups.

The various internal security threats in Nigeria include, sectarian agitations, armed banditry, humantrafficking, drug trafficking, armed robbery, border security, financial/economic crimes, threats tocritical state infrastructure, electoral violence, farmer-herder conflict, community clashes, ethno-religiousconflicts, kidnapping/abduction, assassinations, Boko Haram insurgency, and militancy/oil theft, civilunrests among others. According to The Law of Armed Conflict Internal Security Operations-Part A(International Committee of the Red Cross Unit for Relations with Armed and Security Forces 2002), thedocument highlights the activities carried out by the military while performing ISOs to include the following:

a. cordon and search operations (sealing off a village or an area to search for offenders, weaponsor equipment);

b. urban and rural patrols, possibly joint patrols with police or paramilitary Forces;c. manning observation posts;d. guard duties at key points or for very important personalities;e. road blocks or vehicle check points (VCPs);f. identity checks;g. controlling peaceful demonstrations;h. controlling or dispersing unlawful assemblies or demonstrations (riot situations);i. enforcing curfews;j. making arrests;k. detaining persons;l. acting as a reserve or reinforcement. i.e. quick reaction duties on standby for incidents;m. keeping sides apart (manning a “peace line” or “green line”);n. escort duties for the police, civil defense units, the fire brigade;o. hostage rescue;p. ambush;q. securing or picketing routes, for example to ensure safe passage of supplies through sensitive

areas; andr. bomb disposal, or dealing with improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Other ISOs activities include: counter terrorism and counter insurgency, cracking of armed bandits,participation in complex humanitarian emergencies or disaster management such as flooding, diseaseoutbreaks, wild fires management and election duties.



THEORETICAL INSIGHT

This paper is anchored on‘Social Contract theory’ propounded by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679),John Locke, and James Rousseau. The basic tenet of social contract theory is that security and ordercould only be achieved by a contract in which all citizens would give up all their individual powers to acentral power, the sovereign in return for the protection of life and property (Marshall, 1998).TheOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines “social contract” in thecontext of fragility and state-building which underline interactions among three elements: (1) expectationsthat a given society has of a given state; (2) the state capacity to provide services, including security,revenue generation and control of territory to provide these services; and (3) the presence of a politicalelite that manages state resources and has the capacity to fulfil social expectations (OECD, 2008).Under the social contract theory, the state is seen as the guarantor of security and the provider ofwelfare to the citizens.

In pursuant of the objective of providing security and welfare for its citizens, the state formulatesnational security policies to guarantee law and order as it has been observed that “it is only under asecured atmosphere that a state can develop, and direct its human and material resources towards aproductive end” (Willie, 2008).The main objective of national security is therefore to uphold a country’snational values, which include national survival, self preservation, territorial integrity and economic progress(Abidde, 2014). The military is a major instrument of guaranteeing national security and by law it issubordinate to civilian control to the extent that the civilian authorities decide when, why and where themilitary is to apply coercive force, but how to apply coercive force is determined by the military institutionsthrough their rules of engagement. Ball and Fayemi (2008) rightly observe, that “the quality andeffectiveness of protection for the territorial integrity of a nation state and its citizens are directlyproportionate to the level of subordination of the security organisations to democratically elected leadershipstructures and civil authorities”.

Notwithstanding, however, caution must be made here that the military must not carry out anydirective from civilian authorities that is unconstitutional and capable of threatening societal peace. Itneeds to understand that it has a constitutional responsibility to the society by protecting and preventingit from returning to Thomas Hobbes’ ‘state of the nature’, it needs to guarantee the society’s continuedexistence through the use of its coercive force to protect public order and national stability. Therefore,the theory of social contract is relevant to the extent that it explains the primacy of the role of the state inproviding security for its citizens through the security agencies. However, the responsibility of protectingthe state and its citizens from large scale violent domestic and external threats is best soothed for themilitary because it has the “unique, professionalising skill for the “management of violence” (Huntington,1957).

NIGERIAN MILITARY’S ENGAGEMENT IN ISOs IN THE FOURTH REPUBLIC

Tables 1 and 2 show the ISOs the Nigerian military have engaged in since the beginning of the FourthRepublic in 1999. While Table 1 shows the engagements by government, Table 2 shows the currentISOs.

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Table 1: Nigerian Military’s ISOs in the Fourth Republic (1999 – 2017)

Challenges of the Nigerian Military in Internal Security Operations in the Fourth Republic

Administration Period of Nigeria Army’s ISOs

Operational Areas and Dates of ISOs

Chief Olusegun Obasanjo

May 29, 1999 – May 29, 2007

a. Odi crisis, 1999, Bayelsa State. b. Zaki Biam invasion 2001, Benue State. c. Onitsha disturbances, 2006, Anambra State. d. Niger Delta crisis, 1999-2009, South-South States. e. Ikeja Bomb blasts, 2001, Lagos State. f. Ife-Modakeke crisis, 1999-2000, Osun State. g. Plateau State (Jos) crisis, Plateau State. h. Sharia crisis in parts of Northern Nigeria (1999-2004). i. Niger-Delta militancy (Operation Hakuri – 1998;

Operation Flush II, Rivers State – 2004). j. Zagon-Kataff riots, 1999-2001, Kaduna state. k. Umuleri-Aguleri communal crisis 1999-2000,

Anambra State. l. Kano religious crisis. m. Plateau state (Jos) crisis n. Itshekiri/Urhobo/Ijaw crisis of 2004, Delta State. o. Danish religious cartoon crisis, 2006, Bauchi, Kano

and Borno States. Alhaji Umaru Yar’Adua

May 29, 2007 – May 5, 2010

a. Quelling of Islamic insurgency in Borno (Maiduguri), 2009.

b. Niger-Delta militancy (Operation Restore Hope, Warri – 2008; Operation Pulo Shield – 2012; and Operation Delta Safe – 2016).

c. Invasion of Gbaramatu Delta State in 2009 by the Nigeria military with the aim of routing the militants.

d. Jos crisis, Plateau State. Dr. Goodluck Jonathan

2010 – May 29, 2015

a. Jos crisis (till date), Plateau State. b. Post-elections crisis (April, 2011) Northern States. c. Umbasse ethnic killings in Nassrawa State 2013. d. The Shiite crisis with the Nigeria Military and police in

2014. e. Wukari crisis 2000-2015, Taraba State. f. Boko Haram crisis till date, Adamawa, Borno and

Yobe States (Operation Restore Order I (ORO I); Operation – 12 June 2011 – 15 May 2013; Restore Order III (ORO III) –- 13 December 2011 – 15 May 2013; Operation BOYONA- May 2013 – August 2013 and Operation Zaman Lafia – August 2013 – to date).

President Muhammadu Buhari

May 29, 2015 – Present

a. Boko Haram insurgency. b. Niger-Delta militancy 2016 to date. c. Farmer and Herdsmen conflicts 2015 to date. d. Violent crisis between Muslim Fulani herders and

Southern Kaduna, 2016. e. The Shiite crisis with the Nigeria Military in Kaduna in

2016. f. Agitations of the indigenous people of Biafra (IPOB)

in South eastern states leading to Operation Python Dance II in October 2017.

g. Armed banditry in South western states. h. Commercialised Kidnappings in the South-south,

South east and North west regions.

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Table 2: Current ISOs of the Nigerian Military

S/no: Name of ISOs Mandate of ISOs Region

1. a. Operation Lafiya Dole

b. Operation Deep Punch

Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency Operations. It also has an expanded scope, scale and depth comprising three divisions and more than five states. This has dovetailed to other specialised operations like Operation Crack-down to wind down the war against insurgents and clear the remnants of the Boko Haram sect in Sambisa Forest; Operation Gama Aiki, which serves same purpose in the northern part of Borno state; and Operation Safe Corridor, set up for the de-radicalisation and rehabilitation of repentant Boko Haram terrorists. Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency Operations launched to clear the remnants of Boko Haram insurgents.

North-East region

2. Operation Safe Haven

To quell ethno-religious conflicts and other criminal activities. It is stationed in Plateau State with area of operation extending to Benue, Kogi, Nasarawa and Kwara States to quell ethno-religious conflicts and other criminal activities.

North Central

3. Operation Sara Daji and Operation Harbin Kunama

Established to battle the criminal activities of armed bandits, cattle rustlers and robbers operating particularly in Zamfara, Kaduna and fringes of Sokoto, Kebbi, Katsina and Kano states.

North West

4. a. Operation Delta Safe formerly Operation Pulo Shield.

It is now complemented by the Nigerian Army’s Operation Crocodile Smile, and Navy’s Operation TseraTeku. These operations are all aimed at crushing the resurgent Niger Delta militancy and other acts of criminality like oil theft, vandalism, and bunkering in the region.

South-South

5. Operation Awase To contain the criminal operations around Ogun-Lagos axis, particularly in Arepo where illegal oil bunkering and pipeline vandalism are regular occurrences. South East has Operation Iron Fence to combat armed robbers, hooligans and kidnappers.

South West

6. Operation Iron Fence

Established to combat armed robbers, hooligans and kidnappers.

South East

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Since the country’s independence on October 1st 1960, the military has successfully contributed toseveral internal security operations, assisting the police and other traditional internal security agenciesand the civil authorities to maintain and restore law and public order. The Fourth Republic has been verychallenging to the military and in spite of domestic threats the Nigerian state is confronted with, themilitary has prevented it from disintegration through its active engagements in ISOs. They have respondedto threats such as, sectarian violence, terrorism and insurgency, armed robbery and banditry, oil-theft,farmers-herdsmen conflicts and of recent, secessionist agitations. Colonel Sagir Musa, Deputy Director,Army Public Relations, highlights the achievements of the military’s engagements in ISOs as follows:

The Command Post and Field Training Exercises were initiated andexecuted with the major objective of addressing peculiar securitychallenges across the various regions of Nigeria. This idea assistedsignificantly in the huge successes achieved in all the areas where theExercises were conducted. The Buratai’s Approach – that of putting –realism/pragmatism and subterfuge into training, exercises and/oroperations strategically aimed or targeted to solving identified securitythreats across the nation has so far yielded the desired results (This Day,2016).

There is no gainsaying the fact that the military’s engagements in ISOs in the current republic haslargely assisted in tackling several internal security challenges. In this regard, the military has bustedmany criminal gangs and has also prevented the escalation of several ethno-religious and communityviolence such as: the Tiv-Jukun conflict in Wukari, Taraba State 1999-2000; Aguleri-Umuleri conflict in

Challenges of the Nigerian Military in Internal Security Operations in the Fourth Republic

Author’s field data

7. Operation Mesa It is a Joint Task Force (JTF) operation against all forms of criminal activities in all the states of the federation.

Nationwide operations

8. Operation Mambila

The military drafted on the directive of Acting President, Yemi Oshinbajo to maintain peace in Mambila Plateau between Fulani herdsmen and the Mambila people.

Taraba State

9. Operation Safe Conduct

It is to guide armed forces participation in electoral matters with a view to creating a conducive atmosphere for elections

Nigeria

10. Operation TsareTeku

It is to guard the Sea which was launched early this year by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). It’s being spearheaded by Navy to secure the maritime environment and it has been very successful in reducing hijacking of ships and piracy.

Coastal Areas of Nigeria

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Anambra State 2000; Ife-Modakeke conflict 1999-2000; Jos crisis 1999-2000; violent crisis betweenMuslim Fulani cattle herders and Christian farmers in Kaduna crisis 2016; Shiite crisis with the NigerianArmy in Kaduna in 2008 and many others. Some of the organised criminal groups busted are cattlerustlers in Plateau, Zamfara and Yobe States, armed robbery gangs in Lagos State and cult groups andkidnappers in Edo, Rivers, Delta and Kaduna States as well as some south east states among others.The military in conjunction with other security agencies sacked the Boko Haram insurgent group fromareas they captured and declared as caliphate in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states in 2014. Generally,the military, under the current republic have tirelessly struggled to ensure national stability and the continuedexistence of the Nigerian state. Its men and women have put their lives on the line in discharging theirconstitutional responsibilities of maintaining both the internal and external security of Nigeria. Frankly,the military has lost so many of its gallant officers and some have had their limbs and arms amputateddue to the injuries they sustained in the course of discharging their constitutional responsibility of keepingNigeria safe.

Military’s Response to Ethno-Religious Conflicts in the Fourth Republic

Several ethno-religiously motivated conflicts have occurred since the return to democratic governanceon May 29, 1999. Most of these conflicts are instigated by factors such as, bad governance, structuralexclusion, contest for land and other economic/environmental resources, unemployment, injustice, elitemanipulation, weak institution of governance and internal security architecture among others. The militaryhave been deployed by the federal government to respond to these conflicts and they have effectivelyprevented them from escalating further to threaten public peace. However, the army was alleged to beexcessive in some cases, committing human rights abuses, such as Zaki Biam and Odi Community. Inboth cases, several hundreds of innocent citizens were extra-judicially killed by the military.

Military’s Response to Boko Haram Insurgency/Terrorism

The military have been engaged in the counter-insurgency operations against the Boko Haram jihadistgroup in the north east region of Nigeria since 2009, when the sect waged a violent campaign against theNigerian government in Maiduguri the capital of Borno State. The Islamist group is popularly known asBoko Haram but it prefers to be called Jama’ atu Ahlissunnah Lidda’ awatiwal Jihad, meaning“people committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and jihad.”The group’s core objectiveis to replace the secular Nigerian State with a caliphate which will be strictly governed by the Shari’aIslamic laws. When the sect’s atrocities and violence overwhelmed the Police, the military was called infor Internal Security Operations.

Between 2009 and 2013, the military operations in the north east against the Boko Haram extremistgroup changed from internal security operations to a “full scale offensive against the BHT [Boko Haramterrorist] insurgents.”Amnesty International also reports that:

In 2013, as attacks by Boko Haram intensified, former President GoodluckJonathan declared a state of emergency, which was subsequently extended

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repeatedly, in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States. The state of emergencygave overly broad emergency powers to the security forces. FormerPresident Goodluck Jonathan set up a Joint Task Force to lead theoperations against Boko Haram, which included personnel from theNigerian Army, Police Force and other security forces. The army tookfull control of operations against Boko Haram in August 2013 (AmnestyInternational, 2015).

It should be noted that the military’s alleged highhandedness and repression of the sect in the July2009 uprising and the consequent declaration of emergency rule by President Goodluck Ebele Jonathanon May 2013 in the three states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa and its renewal after six months, largelycontributed to the escalation and intensification of the violence and the sect’s metamorphosis, first into aterrorist group (2010-2013). Later on in 2014, it graduated into an insurgent group due to the territoriesit captured and declared as part of its acclaimed caliphate in the BAY states, namely Borno, Adamawaand Yobe states. Also, from 2015 to date, the sect has shrunk back into a terrorist group after it had lostthe territories it captured due to a combined military offensive which include the Nigerian security forces,civilian joint task force, vigilantes, hunters and the Multinational Joint Task Force.

Several major operations have been launched by the Nigeria military and other security forcesagainst the Boko Haram sect since 2011. These operations are noted by Amnesty International thus:

Since 2011, there have been four major operations in the north-east tocounter Boko Haram. Operation Restore Order I (ORO I), from June2011 till May 2013, was the first. Some 4,000 troops served in BornoState and, together with the police and members of other security forces,formed the Joint Task Force (JTF). In Yobe State, ORO III wasestablished.... ORO I was replaced by Operation BOYONA, whichcovered Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states (the acronym derives fromthe names of the three states). Operation BOYONA was launched whenthe state of emergency was announced in May 2013 and had some 10,000troops. Both ORO I and its successor Operation BOYONA reported tothe Chief of Defence Staff. On 19 August 2013, operational command ofOperation BOYONA was taken over by the Chief of Army Staff (COAS)when the newly established Army Division 7 took over from the JTF andmilitary forces took over fully from the police in actions against BokoHaram. Operation Zaman Lafiya, with 10,000 troops, was launched asthe successor to Operation BOYONA. Including ‘Operation Lafiya Dole’which is currently ongoing in the north east against the Boko Haramterrorism (Amnesty International, 2015).

The military have been able to degrade the capabilities of the Boko Haram insurgents, forcing thegroup out of the areas they hitherto declared as caliphate. Since 2016, the violent activities of BokoHaram had increased with the group launching series of attacks and suicide bombings on rural communities,



civilian populations and military targets in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states, resulting in several deaths,injuries, and massive destruction of property. That resurgence of the group indicated that it still remaineda dangerous asymmetric threat to the north east region, the Nigerian state and its neighbours in the LakeChad region. In fact, a report of the Crisis Group (2016) warned that “the nature of Boko Haram’stactics and geographical reach would make the group’s comprehensive defeat difficult. But havingdegraded the terrorists in December 2016, the military went into mop-up operations, and on February4,2018, the Nigerian Army announced that the Boko Haram has been completely defeated (Rojers, inNew Telegraph, Feb. 5, 2018:51).

Military’s Response to Sectarian Agitations in the Current Political Dispensation

Sectarian agitations in the current political dispensation have been threatening Nigeria’s domestic security.Sectarian groups such as the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) from the South-East region, the NigerDelta Avengers (NDA) from the South-South region; AREWA Youth Movement from the northernregion, and Odua Movement from the South-West and of recent the Middle-belt association. Thesegroups have been issuing threats and counter threats on the Nigerian state. IPOB is an offshoot ofMASSOB, but it is led by Nnamdi Kanu, a British-Nigerian based in London. Despite the arrest andimprisonment of Kanu for about two years and his release in 2017, the group continued to demand forthe secession of the South East region from the Nigerian state until it was proscribed in October 2017.Of recent, the Arewa youths from the northern region of the country issued a quit notice to all southeasterners residing in the north to leave before 1stOctober, 2017.This was also followed by the issuingof a quit notice by a group from the Niger Delta, threatening that all northerners and Yorubas residing inthe region must leave before 1st October 2017.

Again, all the sectarian groups declared their own republics. These groups have continued to threatenthe Nigerian state with hate speeches which have been undermining the country’s peaceful coexistence.Recently, the Acting Vice President, Professor Yemi Oshinbajo, said that the federal government willhenceforth treat hate speeches as acts of terrorism, promising that the security agencies including themilitary will crack down on all those groups and individuals making hate speeches. The military havealso promised to monitor and sanction hate speeches on social media. The military have also beenclamping down on Biafra agitators.

CHALLENGES OF THE NIGERIAN MILITARY’S ENGAGEMENTS IN ISOs

(a) Long Neglect in the Days of Military Rule

The initial decline in the performance of the Nigerian military in ISOs is a function of the long years ofneglect of the institution under successive military administrations that tactically and strategically weakenedthe capability of military institution. According to President Olusegun Obasanjo’s inaugural addresswhich he delivered on May 29, 1999, he lamented that ‘Professionalism has been lost... my heart bleedsto see the degradation in the proficiency of the military (Herbert, 2001).The International Crisis Groupreport (2015) identifies the root causes of the inefficiency that plagued the Nigeria military as follow:

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The decline began during thirty-three years of military dictatorship thattook a serious toll on professionalism, operational effectiveness andaccountability. Return to democratic rule in 1999 raised hopes theinstitution could be restored, but successive civilian governments’ pledgesof much-needed reforms proved largely rhetorical. Presidents, defenseministry and parliament lacked the commitment and expertise to implementsignificant changes. They left the military badly governed, under-resourcedand virtually a drift. Administration and accountability deterioratedthroughout the sector. Poor, indeed lacking senior leadership has beencompounded by equally poor legislative oversight and defense headquarterscoordination and planning (ICG, 2015).

The decline only began to recede with the emergency of the Buhari government in May 2015 whennew platforms were purchased, and the morale of the troop boosted.

(b) Deployment for Police Duties and Associated Overstretching

The military is today overstretched and overused for internal security operations. They are deployed inabout thirty-two out of thirty-six states of the Federation. This has denied them enough manpower toface the Boko Haram menace. As Speaker of the House of Representatives, Yakubu Dogara lamented:

It is worrisome that Nigeria is effectively permanently in a state ofemergency as the Armed Forces are deployed in more than twenty-eightstates of the Federation in peacetime, the speaker said. The Armed Forceshave virtually taken over routine police work in Nigeria. It is no longeracting in aid of civil authorities but has become the civil authority itself.(Premium Times, 2017).

(c) Corruption in the MilitaryOne major impediment to the effectiveness of military engagements in ISOs in the current dispensationis corruption, which the International Crisis Group (2015) has also laid credence to. It observedaccordingly:

Corruption is system-wide. Legislators often manipulate the appropriationprocess at the National Assembly to serve private business interests ratherthan benefit the armed forces. Dubious procurement practices,fraudulently bloated payrolls, poor financial management and weakauditing systems at the national security adviser’s office, the defenceministry and armed services headquarters often mean funds are divertedto private or non-military purposes; arms, ammunition and other equipmentare sometimes substandard and not always delivered. Inadequate funding,corrupt procurement and poor maintenance result in serious equipmentand logistics deficits (ICG, 2015).



Some former and serving military officers have been arrested and charged to court for stealingmoney meant for defence purposes.

Also, in November 2007, military and media sources reported that a syndicate had, over a longperiod, allegedly sold arms, including AK-47 assault rifles and general purpose machine guns, as well asammunition, from the army’s Central Ordnance Depot in Kaduna. Investigations traced some of thearms to Niger Delta insurgents fighting the military (Sunday Punch, Lagos, 20 January 2008 and NigerianTribune, 15 January 2008.). A significant number of military personnel have been involved in othercriminal activities, from armed robbery to ransom kidnappings (Vanguard, 29 December, 2015).Corruption within the military has a tremendous direct negative impact on the efforts of equipping themilitary personnel with the right and up-to-date weapons and facilities to conduct ISOs. Corruption isalso the main problem affecting the capacity of the military to carry out effective ISOs in Nigeria.

In order to check the problem of corruption in defense sector, there is need for those institutions thathave oversight on the sector to develop their capacity and ensure that they consistently carry out robustoversight on the sector particularly, the executive, ministry of defence, military officials, contractors andall those actors engaged in the sector.

(d) Personnel Deficit

In the aftermath of the civil war, the much expanded size of the military, around 250,000 in 1977,consumed a large part of Nigeria’s resources under military rule for little productive return. Currently,the military is largely under-staffed, poorly trained and over-stretched. According to a report of InternationalInstitute for Strategic Studies, London (2014), Nigeria’s 1: 1,000 ratio of military and paramilitarypersonnel to overall population is lower than those of all its neighbours (Chad 3.4: 1000; Cameroon 1.2:1000; Benin 1.1: 1000), except Niger (0.7: 1000). The army’s reported 100,500 strength is less thanhalf the 18,966 officers and 190,139 soldiers which the defense headquarters, in 2010, projected asnecessary to meet its challenges in the near future (Crisis Group, 2015).

In a bid to address the problem of personnel deficit in the army, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), LtGeneral Tukur Buratai, has said that army planned to increase its personnel strength from its present100,000 to slightly above 200,000 in the next eight years. He explained that the army’s expansionprogramme was aimed at boosting its response capacity while stressing that its capabilities to effectivelydeal with its present challenges were however not in doubt (This Day, 14 January, 2016).

(e) Equipment and Logistics DeficitsAnother major challenge of the military is equipment deficit. This was so serious before the coming ofthe Buhari government that for many years, the military made no major acquisitions, at best takingdelivery of refurbished platforms (Leadership, 21 July 2014). Thus, to fight the Boko Haram, thecountry had to carry cash and cap in hand to beg for arms from South Africa. The cash running intomillions of dollars was seized. The limited equipment available is often poorly maintained (The Guardian(Lagos), 9 November 1999). For instance, the army’s 35mm anti-aircraft guns, imported from Switzerlandin 1979, became unserviceable in 2002 and were left in that condition until 2013 (This Day, 31 October2013). Crisis Group (2014) report observed that many soldiers deployed to fight Boko Haram in

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2013-2014 reported their equipment broke down frequently, and they had severe shortages or lack ofbody armour, radio equipment and night vision goggles. This was a major factor for the many desertionsin those years.

From 2000 to 2008, defense budget was less than 3 per cent of overall government expenditure.From 2009 to 2014, it increased to an average of 7.2 per cent of government spending ($5-$6 billion);but, as in the past, this was still allocated disproportionately to recurrent expenditures, leaving very littlefor crucial capital investment (ICG, 2015). According to the report of Stockholm International PeaceResearch Institute (2017), “military expenditure in Nigeria increased by only 1.2 per cent to $1.7 billionin 2016, despite its large-scale military operations against Boko Haram; while 2017 defense budget is465 billion naira. Generally, the deficit in equipment and logistics in the military became very visible in1999 when Nigeria returned to democratic governance. This was a calculated and deliberate attemptby the successive military administrations starting from the time of President Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1992) spanning to General Sani Abacha (1993-1998). Their aim was to demobilise the military so as toprevent military take over against their governments. The deficits in equipment and logistics have contributedsignificantly to the poor performance of the military in ISOs in the current political dispensation.

(f) Nigerian Military and Human Rights Abuse Accusations

The Nigerian military is a professional organisation trained in the application and management of violencein responding to both domestic and international security threats. With regards to its ISOs duties, theCode of Conduct for the Nigerian Armed Forces Personnel on Internal Security and Aid to Civil PowerOperations, enacted during the administration of then Chief of Defence Staff, Marshall Paul Dike, inFebruary 2010. Paragraph 6 of this Code provides with respect to Rules of Engagement of the ArmedForces in ISOs as follows:

In enforcing domestic law and order, members of the Nigerian ArmedForces shall use firearms as a last resort with maximum restraint, andrespect for the principle of minimum force even in situations of self-defense. Force may only be used when absolutely necessary and to theextent required to perform their duty. To this end, all operations must beguided by appropriate Rules of Engagement (ROE) to direct personnelon the use of force.

The above ROE explains the reason why military personnel on ISOs employ maximum or excessiveforce in responding to internal security threats. To borrow some words from the Armed Forces ROE“members of the Nigerian Armed Forces shall use firearms as a last resort with maximum restraint…Force may only be used when absolutely necessary and to the extent required to perform their duty”.These statements confer on the personnel of the military extensive discretionary powers to use ‘reasonableforce’ in the event that it is necessary. Unfortunately, however, this discretionary power is at timesabused and misapplied by some personnel, who flagrantly commit human rights abuses.

However, it is instructive to note that, the international human rights law applies during armed conflicts



and in peacetime. It also applies to both domestic and international armed conflict situations. The essenceof its application is to protect civilians as well as ensure that the security forces conduct themselveswithin the reasonable ambit of the law and their profession. In May 2009, over 500 people wereallegedly killed in a coordinated attack by a combined team of army, navy, and air force personnel inGbaramatu kingdom of Delta State (Francis, LaPin & Rossiasco, 2011). According to AmnestyInternational publication titled: “Stars on their Shoulders, Blood on their Hands: War CrimesCommitted by the Nigerian Military”. (2015):

the military engagements in the counter-terrorism operations against BokoHaram in north-east Nigeria, has resulted in the extra-judicial executionof more than 1,000 people; they have arbitrarily arrested at least 20,000people, mostly young men and boys; and have committed countless actsof torture.

The fact of the matter is that military engagements in ISOs cannot be conducted without its personnelsometimes crossing the threshold of violence in terms of recording excessive use of violence especiallywhen dealing with terrorists that do not obey any law other than their own, and do not respect anyhuman rights. What is important is that military personnel should be strictly guided by their ROE as thisis necessary to reduce to the barest minimum cases of infractions and human rights abuses during ISOs.Military personnel that violate the ROE on ISOs should be tried according to military laws and if guilty,they should be punished accordingly as this will serve as deterrence for others. It is heartwarming tonote that under the able leadership of Lt. Gen, Buratai as Chief of Army Staff, accusations of brutalitiesagainst civilians have drastically reduced as the Army always take up accusation cases for investigationand seeing personnel found wanting punished. There is also the moral issue of Amnesty Internationalfighting for the respect of the human rights of terrorists that not only do not respect the human rights ofthe people they kill and maim in mass, but also take delight in killing such innocent people!

(g) Poor Motivation and WelfareThe personnel of the Nigerian military, the army, navy and air-force, are still relatively poorly motivateddespite the great efforts of the current service Chiefs in the direction of personnel motivation. They areconfronted with poor welfare conditions such as, inadequate staff accommodation, poor health, educationaland recreational facilities, including poor remunerations, retirement packages, among others. For instance,discontent over welfare conditions aggravates relations between senior officers and junior ranks. Therewas unease in January 2008, when a group calling itself “Patriotic Majors” threatened to “act” by 15February if certain welfare needs and other demands were not met. There has been a lot of improvementsince 2008, but much still needs to be done, and much depends on defence budget size! No doubtthings have improved today beyond the 2008 level, but it is not yet Uhuru.

(h) Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs)

The proliferation of SALWs within the country has dramatically increased crimes and incidences ofviolent conflicts, thereby posing huge threat to national security (Keili, 2008). This is also evident in

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terms of the number of seizures made by the Nigeria Customs Service at the Lagos sea port, airports,border areas and other locations within the country, including those impounded by other security agencies.SALWs proliferations in the country have equipped many individuals and groups with weapons potentenough to challenge the coercive power of the Nigerian state. This is evident from groups like BokoHaram, militants in the Niger Delta, Fulani herdsmen, armed robbers, kidnappers, cult groups amongothers. SALWs have been contributing to the erosion of the Nigerian state authority by criminal andinsurgent groups in the current republic.

(i) The Need For Improved Civil-Military Relations

Civil military relations refer to the total gamut of interactions between soldiers and civilians as individualsor groups. It assumes the interdependence of civil and military sector based on the principle of civilcontrol of the military organisation as a fundamental requirement for a lawful free and democratic society(Nwolise, 2005:108). Civil-military relations is an aspect of national security policy, established byheads of state to protect the nation’s “social, economic, and political institutions” (Huntington, 1957).Basically, civil military relations deals with the strategic relationship that the military develops with boththe civilian authorities and the civil populace in order to gain the social capital that will assist it to deliverbetter and efficient security services to the country. There are two levels at which civil military relationstake place, which are: a. between military and civil authorities (i.e. interface between military and theexecutive and parliament) and b. between military and civilian relations (i.e. interface between militaryand the general public and civil society bodies).

The crisis of civil-military relations in the current political republic is as a result of the long years ofmilitary domination of the political space which lasted for about thirty-three years and has overtimepitched the military and civilians against each other. This ‘us’ versus ‘them’ syndrome between themilitary and civilians is what Janowitz‘s (1960) confirmed as “separate military and civilian worldsexisted”. The military perceives the civilians as weak and inferior to them and therefore calls them‘bloody civilians’. On the part of the civilians, they perceive the military as an enemy because they feelthat they are unnecessarily aggressive, domineering and ruthless. The military institution has a dentedpublic image owing to the way and manner its personnel at times arrogantly subject civilians to intimidationand inhuman treatments thereby making the public to develop trust deficit in the military. An Afro-barometer survey carried out in 2014/2015 across 36 African countries including Nigeria, revealed thatpublic trust in both the police and army was lowest in Nigeria. Only 21 percent and 40 percent ofcitizens indicated they trust the police or the army “a lot” or “somewhat” respectively (Buchanan-Clarke& Lekalake, 2016). This schism creates problems especially in the area of public support and cooperationwith the military which are needed for smooth flow of real intelligence during ISOs. This poses a seriouschallenge to the military, and has to be corrected. The NA strategies under Lt. Gen. Buratai in the NorthEast which have closed this gap should be applied in other parts of the country to shore up public trustand cooperation for the military.



CONCLUDING REMARKS

The role of the military in tackling internal security threats cannot be over-emphasised in a democraticnation as Nigeria. The military has shown compelling evidence of subordination and loyalty to theconstituted civil authorities since May 29, 1999 to date, including defending the corporate existence ofthe Nigerian state. Despite the dramatic increase in the number of internal security threats that have beenconfronting the Nigerian state, the military has done very well in terms of maintaining public peace andprotecting the country from disintegration.

The military’s effectiveness in ISOs in the current dispensation is challenged by factors such as,limited funding, corruption, poor welfare and motivation for its personnel, personnel deficits, equipmentand logistics deficits, civil-military relations among others. In addition, the military’s engagements inISOs in the current political dispensation have also been marked by unprofessional conducts such as:human rights abuses, extra-judicial killings, rape, extortions, torture among others. These misconductshave often negatively affected the public image of the institution both locally and internationally. It isimperative, therefore, that the military institution should try to re-invent and re-calibrate its strategies inorder to enhance the capacity and effectiveness of its men and women on ISOs towards securing theNigerian state from the enormous domestic threats seeking to terminate its existence.

Finally, it is important to stress at this juncture, that the regular engagements of the military on ISOsin the current republic, is reflective of the fragility of the Nigerian state and the inefficiency of its institutionsespecially the Police and Court. Therefore, the regular engagements of its personnel in ISOs, is only atreatment of the symptoms of these social and structural problems and not the cure. To address theseproblems, government at all levels should ensure social justice and good governance. This will help toassuage and engage most of the tendencies that instigate the current internal security threats overstretchingthe Nigerian military.

Policy Recommendations

Based on the major arguments that have been canvassed in this study, the following policy recommendationsare proffered: First, there is the need for the National Assembly, civil society bodies and media tostrengthen leadership and oversight of the military institutions in terms of ensuring accountability andtransparency in its leadership and in defense procurements. Secondly, the Federal Government, NationalAssembly and the military leadership need to ensure the provision of adequate welfare and motivationfor the personnel of the military so as to boost their spirit especially during ISOs. Thirdly, the military isa very hazardous profession and its men and women constitutionally bound to put their lives on the lineif it demands so. There is therefore the need for the government to develop a life insurance package formilitary personnel as this will help to commit them towards discharging their ISOs duties.

Fourth, government to provide adequate funding and equipment for the police and other traditionalinternal security agencies to be able to effectively discharge internal security duties. This will reduce theinvolvement of the military in ISOs and they will be able to prepare for their main duty of defendingNigeria’s corporate existence and territorial integrity. Fifth, government should adequately fund theDefence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) to produce both military hardware and software.

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It should also encourage the private sector investment in defence-related industries. This is to ensureproper and timely equipment of our troops to perform their duties always. Sixth, government shouldadequately fund and equip the police and other traditional security agencies so that they will be able toeffectively discharge their constitutional responsibilities of securing the Nigerian state from internal securitythreats. Seventh, military authorities should commit more resources into the training of its personnel oninternational best practices on ISOs. Eight, government and military authorities should also ensure thatmilitary personnel are adequately remunerated, including paying their ISOs allowances as and whendue. Ninth, at the root of most of the internal security threats in Nigeria is bad governance. In order toaddress this, it is important that government at all levels should ensure good governance especially in theprovision of economic empowerment opportunities, social amenities, educational opportunities amongothers. Tenth, the military should develop an efficient human rights framework which should bemainstreamed in the training of its officer corps and the rank and file. The same framework should alsobe mainstreamed into its rules of engagements (ROE) for its personnel’s engaged in ISOs.

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EXPLORING ALTERNATIVES IN ASYMMETRIC WARS IN NIGERIA

by

Willie Aziegbe Eselebor PhDInstitute for Peace and Strategic Studies,

University of IbadanEmail: [email protected]: +2348037188512

ABSTRACT

Intrastate and irregular wars are not new phenomena, but the search fordurable peace remains elusive much as conflicts continue unabated, usingavant-garde means by belligerents. The current surge of terrorism in Nigeriais contextualised as asymmetry, being war conducted through unconventionalmethods by irregular forces. This discourse aims to interrogate whyasymmetric warfare is deployed and utilised by non-state armed groups asan option to make demands upon the state and how the state is engagingthese problems through traditional counterinsurgency tactics. The paper reliedon grievance and greed framework to explain the motivation for intractableconflicts, while questioning the concept of responsibility to protect and humanrights violations in the context of abuses resulting from internal securityoperations. The utilisation of lethal tactics has resulted in wide scaledestructions, dislocation and harm to the military, civilian population andother targets in Nigeria. The irregular wars were found to be by-products ofinjustice, inequality, lack of freedom and struggle over power or scarceresources. Military interventions to restore normalcy are on-going in threeNorth Eastern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe under siege; but areunlikely to succeed, unless the basis for power sharing, equity and justice areaddressed, alongside peace education and peacebuilding to transform theactors and failed institutions. It is important to understand that in today’semerging asymmetric warfare, inclusiveness and good governance arealternatives to military intervention to restore peace.

Key words: Asymmetry, conflict, military, counterinsurgency, peacebuilding

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INTRODUCTION

War is the use of military means by state, non-state armed groups and others for political, cultural,religious and economic objectives. The end of wars is not in sight, but the practice keeps changing.History recorded in ancient times when bows and arrows, swords, mortars and gun powder alteredcombatants’ understanding of wars. The trend followed with the production of atomic bombs andnuclear weapons which enthroned Cold War hostilities. Where we are today is the era of horrific warsmade possible by the use of asymmetry means by the weak against the strong. The unfolding dynamicsare driven by the political economy and other normative innovations like the laws of war and the GenevaConventions on treatment of non-combatants, which also affects the conduct of wars. With globalisation,ease of communication, new governance structures, rogue states are now investing more in armedconflicts. These include the production of smart and sophisticated weapons, which has effectivelyrevolutionised the battlefield, leading to asymmetry in capabilities and operations; a new revolutionwhich poses challenge to the security of nations.

Asymmetry, though not new, has created fragmentary or frozen conflicts within, between and allover the world today. The security challenges include terrorism, insurgency, non-state armed uprisings,guerrilla movements and re-determination of state borders. The tragic list also includes proliferation ofarms, drug and human smuggling, weak and failing states, unstable democracies, faulty elections, economicand environmental crisis, gender and human rights violation. Democracy itself has not assisted in solvingthese intractable conflicts. Just as the reduction in Cold War was most welcomed, the global securityregime erupted into a new wave of asymmetry wars, a situation that is not abating, much as the battlefield has shifted to Africa. Nigeria, since return to democracy in 1999, is challenged by incessant religiousand ethnic violence in the northern parts, especially in most of the states confronted by porous borders withneighbours like Cameroun, Niger and Chad. The current crisis is heightened by the politicisation of religion,manipulation of ethnicity, poverty, corruption and other external factors related to activities of rogue states.

These among others and the deficit in governance, led to the emergence of Boko Haram Islamicreligious sect, formed in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri, Borno State in the north eastern partof Nigeria. Following a clash between the sect members and security operatives, resulting in extra-judicial murder of its founder, the sect went underground and has grown in sophistication, thus becominga terrorist brand in the like of Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab and Al-Qa’eda in the Maghreb. Theleadership of the sect is hard to pin down to an individual, which makes it difficult for any meaningfulnegotiation to take place. Boko Haram operations are mostly asymmetric, propelled by cells scatteredwithin and outside Nigeria, but not limited to Chad, Cameroun and Niger; that we share commonfrontiers with in Africa, but other terror networks that are regionally based, beyond identifiedlimits.

The group became deadly from 2010 upwards, graduating from using improvised explosives devices(IEDs) to grenades, bombs and artillery mounted on vehicles in attacking military formations, policebarracks, prisons, schools, churches, markets and other vulnerable targets. The response of thegovernment has been an admixture of military engagement, offer of negotiated settlement, consultationwith northern elders and the rebranding of almajiri educational system to cater for out-of-school youths

Exploring Alternatives in Asymmetric Wars in Nigeria 141


that are potential recruits of insurgency. In addition, the budgetary allocation to the security sector wasincreased, tighter border controls were introduced and anti-terrorism law was passed by the NationalAssembly. Despite these developments, Boko Haram horrific attack seems to be on the increase andnot abating, creating high level of insecurity, threat to lives and properties; which leave us with the optionto search for alternatives, if any, that will bring about sustainable peace in Nigeria. But what are theissues and background of insurgency in Nigeria?

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The global perspective of insurgency is important in understanding the debate on asymmetry. The timeline of events revealed that the late Osama bin Laden, one of the most sought after leaders of Al-Qa’eda, known as ‘the Base’ or Qa’idat al-Jihad, ‘the Base of Jihad’ declared a holy war on theUnited States and the rest of liberal democratic world on 23 February, 1998; yet the world did not takehim seriously. This declaration was in the form of fatwa to all Muslins calling for a jihad against non-muslims and western interests. What we can deduct from World Islamic Front Declaration of Waragainst the Jews and Crusaders is that a new phase and theatre of war based on asymmetry orunconventional means has commenced adopting non-traditional military tactics. Bin Laden’s Deputy-in-Command, Ayman al Zawahiri immediately after the 9/11 attack on US facilities, announced a two-phased strategy to prosecute this war which includes:

(1) A jihad plan that would focus on the Middle East, turn things around, and force the United Statesout of the sphere of influence and re-establish an Islamic caliphate in Egypt as a historical source ofspiritual Muslim authority which existed before the death of Prophet Muhammed in AD 632; and

(2) An aggressive plan to use the newly established caliphate as a launching pad for a jihad against theWest in a bid to re-shape the world order and place Islam in a dominant vantage point, which willrally all Muslins around it.

What has happened and unfolded with the Arab-Spring till date, and incidences of regime change inEgypt, Syria, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen, lend credence to the above agenda of strict adherence to theprinciples of Jihad or invariably, what can be termed terrorism and the theory of change, which wasnegatively induced through the process of radicalisation of youths and a segment of the idle population,using religion as a veil. Change can be peaceful and acceptable, if the people believe and are notcompelled by use of coercion, deception or life threatening circumstances of forceful conversion.

This scenario has gained prominence with the export of several cells of jihadist movements spreadall over the world; and most especially in weak regimes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somali, Mali,Niger, Morocco and Nigeria. The radicalised groups include Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, Al-Shabaab inSomalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria amongst others. Boko-Haram is sometimes referred to as Talibanof Nigeria. The formation of Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb and sustenance of Al-Shabaab in Somali cannotbe divorced from the doctrinal appeal of Osama bin Laden and the globalisation of transnational threats;which in furtherance of the ideology of Jihad, the aim is to capture vulnerable nations and foster regime

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types of ancient Islamic states. Al-Shabaab on September 21, 2013 attacked the Westgate shoppingmall, killing more than three scores and seven persons in an 80-hour hostage saga, which caught Kenya’ssecurity forces by a surprise. What is astonishing in these trade-offs are incidences of high civiliancasualties as result of the brutality of the insurgents and incompetence of African security forces, that areuntrained to meet emerging challenges of counter-terrorism.

AQIM readily adopted the global jihad rhetorics and carried out a major attack, by bombing theUnited Nations (UN) headquarters in December 11, 2007 in Algiers; which brings to the fore Ayman alZawahiri’s threat to attack a similar UN facility in Baghdad in 2003. Boko Haram, in following thistrend, carried out similar bombing of the UN headquarters in August 27, 2011 in Abuja, Nigeria to senda signal that it is no longer business as usual in security circles on Nigeria. AQIM under fair assessmenthas been far less militant and violent, compared to Al-Qaeda and its affiliates in the Arabian Peninsula.The response to emerging security challenges has been limited in scope to military options; and as longas the conflict is not de-escalating, the search for alternative solutions to the problem of asymmetry warsmust be considered in the foregoing discourse as an option.

The changing tactics, similarities and sophistication in attacks are evidences of linkages, includingAl-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab and AQIM franchise in Nigeria in terms of externalisation of the terror trendsand collaboration without borders. Boko Haram, which means “western education is a sin”, originatedin 2002 and had its bases fully implanted in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. Muhammed Yusuf, who isknown to be the founder of the sect, indoctrinated the members, mainly youths with his own teachings,which were based on purity and total rejection of Western modernity, thus seeking the full implementationof the shari’ah law to replace the country’s political and religious institutions that are morally bankruptand corrupt. Boko Haram insurgency, to a large extent, resembles the earlier Maitatsine uprising of1980, which was the first major attempt to impose a religious ideology on Nigeria. Al-Masifu, anIslamic sect led by Alhajib Muhammadub Marwa Maitatsine, who also hailed from Borno State,denounced Western ideals of capitalism and formal education. In 1999, during the tenure of PresidentOlusegun Obasanjo, there were calculated attempts at imposing shari’ah law variants of Islamic civiland criminal codes in the Muslim dominated northern states of Nigeria. How well these developmentswere managed remain to be addressed, but the state policy basically revolved around avoidance andsalient accommodation in conflict handling styles.

Boko Haram also known and called Jamaa’atuAhlus-sunnah lid-da’ watiwal jihad, cameinto existence in 2001, but became popular among its adherents in 2009, when Muhammed Yusufparticipated in sectarian violence and was subsequently killed by the Police. The operational base of thesect was Kanamma, northeast Nigeria. The sect has a strong disdain for anything Western that is atvariance with its brand of religion. After the death of its leader, Muhammed Yusuf, Abubakar Shekautook over the reins of leadership and he is supported by Abul Qaqa and Abu Zaid, regarded as mediacontact persons of the sect. In the light of the political instabilities that have engulfed the Arab states ofLibya, Syria, Tunisia, Egypt and Sudan; there are free flow of sophisticated weapons made possible bythe porous nature of Nigerian borders with Cameroun, Niger and Chad all in the northern axis ofAdamawa, Borno and Yobe where insurgencies are more intense. What we know of Boko-Haramtoday from intelligence sources is little, whereas their continued success in carrying out attacks on



military targets, confirm that it is not just a war of the weak against the strong, but a protracted and longdrawn battle, which requires global efforts to defeat.

It must be admitted that the operations of Boko Haram have grown in scale and sophistication.They network with Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab and AQIM, seeking assistance expressed through financing,weapons and ammunitions sourcing, military training in camps, provision of safe haven, escape routesand joint simulation in carrying out suicidal attack on schools, police stations, military barracks, governmentbuildings, newspapers, and banks. The sect attempted to smoke out the former Inspector-General ofPolice, IGP Hafiz Ringim in June, 16, 2011. The sect members successfully carried out jail break onMarch 30, 2014 at the Department of State Security (DSS) facility located in high security environment,which further confirm their high level of dexterity, intelligence and organisation. Unconfirmed accountreveals that about 21 sect members were killed in the encounter by the operatives of the DSS. Till date,the government of Nigeria has engaged this problem through military means as well as an offer exchangeof Chibok girls-hostages for high valued commanders. The offer of peace deal in the context of amnestyfor Boko Haram militants, an optional suggestion by northern elders for the insurgents to lay down theirarms was rejected, setting the stage for long drawn battle. Since May 2013, the hotspots and affectedstates of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe have remained under security watch due to turbulence and instability.The stalemate leaves us with no other option than to search for alternatives to peace, even when theNigerian Army announced February 4, 2018, that it has totally defeated the Boko Haram.

Source: Field work, 2014.

Figure 1: Map showing Conflict-prone states in Nigeria.

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ASYMMETRY

The concept of asymmetric warfare is not new, but had existed in the history books. Drawing ourattention to strategy in wars, Sun Tzu, the sage of warfare theory in his book The Art of War, writtenmore than 1,500 years ago, states:

All warfare is based on deception. When confronted with an enemy oneshould offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him.When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is strong, avoidhim. (Tzu, 1971:66-67)

Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria is nothing short of this strategy or tactics; and the exploits areasymmetric.

The German strategist, Carl von Clausewitz, (1976) believes that war is a means of reaching othergoals, which must not be intertwined with politics, but made subservient to politics and waged throughother means:

We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a truepolitical instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on withother means. War in general, and the commander in any specific instance,is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy shall not beinconsistent with these means. That, of course is no small demand, buthowever much it will affect political aims in a given case, it will never domore than modify them. The political object is the goal, war is the meansof reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from theirpurpose.

Clausewitz’s principles apply equally to conventional/traditional/symmetric warfare, like the opinionheld by Sun Tzu; but his assertion that war is an extension of politics through other means is germane toour understanding of asymmetry war in Nigeria.

Terrorism is a perfect fit in the matrix of threats employed by insurgents. Terrorism is a politicallymotivated violence, directed primarily against civilians or non-combatants, undertaken with the intentionto coerce societies through fear and submission. Whereas insurgencies are radicalised movements thatseek to overthrow the status quo through actions of subversion, political activity, insurrection andarmed conflict. The mode of operation is through irregular warfare, whereby any method not sanctionedby Laws of Armed Conflict are employed in combat with regular armed forces. Boko Haram in thiscontext seeks to overthrow the government of Nigeria with a view to establishing a caliphate through aprocess of extremism and insurgency. The ultimate goal is the adoption of Islamic shari’ah law asagainst the secular structure of the Nigerian state.

Although Nigeria faces some challenges in the build up to democracy, the existence of globalisedIslamist jihad network, geared toward the overthrow of weak structures in governance is made possibleby politics of disunity, corruption and flawed electoral system. The polity is full of distorted assertions,hate speeches and separatist quit notices, which reflect disillusionment in governance. These cannot beseparated from the events occurring in the north east states of Nigeria. The brand of global jihad



appears to be a strong movement that seeks to change the status quo through violence and subversion,made possible by asymmetry wars; in the guise of insurgency; and unfolding through terrorism as a keytactic. By extension, insurgency seeks to overthrow the status quo through armed unrest and insurrectionor/and jihad. The foot soldiers are sourced from neglected socio-economic groups, unemployed youthsand their leadership from radicalised elite, who, paradoxically, are beneficiaries of Western education.

Boko Haram: War or Insurgency?

In conception, three key terms - terrorism, insurgency and wars are used interchangeably. They allcome within the framework of either asymmetry or symmetry activities related to the conduct of wars. Inthe case of symmetry, war is acceptable if it is fought in consistent with international laws of armedconflict. What is most challenging in the case of Boko Haram is that it is beyond traditional asymmetry.Even our leaders who have assessed the situation have failed to agree whether these occurrences fallwith the classification of wars, insurgency or terrorism. The confusion over the ensuing debate is amplifiedby the Governor of Borno State, Kashim Shettima who enthused realistically on February 17, 2014 that“Nigeria is in a state of war”. Fielding questions from journalists after a visit to President GoodluckJonathan to brief him about the security situation in Borno, Shettima said Nigeria was facing a threat ofwar. He said the faster Nigerian leaders braced up to the challenge, the better it would be for the nation:

Well, in a nutshell what we are being confronted with is that we are in astate of war. It is what I came to update Mr. President; the sooner westop playing the ostrich and rise up to the challenges of the day, andmarshal all resources towards visualising the antics of Boko Haram, thebetter for all of us. But the bottom line is that we need more resources,more vote on ground. In all fairness to the officers and men of the NigerianArmy and Police, they are doing their best given, the circumstances theyhave found themselves in. But honestly Boko Haram is better armed andis better motivated than our own troops (in Premium Times, Feb. 17,2014).

The response of the government to the above was downplayed, when Doyin Okupe, spokesman tothe Presidency, insisted that:

It is wrong to assert that Nigeria’s armed forces cannot defeat BokoHaram or to insinuate that the insurgents are better armed. It is clear thatGovernor Shettima does not have the expertise to categorise or classifythe effectiveness of any weapon (in Premium Times, Feb. 25, 2014)

This situation have altered with the coming to power of the incumbent President M. Buhari in 2015,who being a past military President and a retired general in the Nigeria Armed Forces understands theintricacies of modern warfare. He quickly rallied regional allies Chad, Cameroun and Niger, backed up

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with intervention from France and changed the tide of defeat to partial success. While this advantagewas maintained and also witness de-escalation in the capacity of Boko Haram to carry out sporadicattacks, the danger still remains eminent.

Perspective from the seat of government believes that, despite the recent upsurge of attacks by thesect, the Nigerian military is winning the war against the insurgents, and that the Armed Forces ofNigeria and security agencies are on top of the situation; and if the insurgents have not been completelyrouted out, it is because the armed forces are constrained by the rules of engagement considering theco-location of civilians in conflict-prone areas. The inability of our leaders to properly situate and analysethe security challenges we face as a nation, leaves us more confused and helpless. Therefore, findingsolutions becomes more difficult and indeterminate.

The rationalisation for wars can be explained from several perspectives including classification ofconflict and insights on interrelatedness of conflict triggers. If we understand conflicts as derivate ofdisagreement over incompatible goals, then we must begin to look at failures in the bargaining process,according to Fearon (1995: 379-414) as a driver, which is premised on anticipated gains from wars interms of resources, power, glory, territory and otherwise which may necessarily exceed the cost of war;but not limited to harm, loss and damage to property. We cannot certainly divorce the May –August2017 upsurge in sporadic attacks from the faulty bargaining process that led to the release of keycommanders of Boko Haram in exchange for the Chibok girls.

Jackson and Morelli (2008:3) believe that there are five reasons for bargaining failures, whicheffectively justify wars:

1. Asymmetric information about the potential costs and benefits of war;

2. A lack of ability to enforce a bargaining agreement and/or a lack of the ability to credibly committo abide by an agreement.

3. Indivisibilities of resources that might change hands in a war, so that not all potentially mutuallybeneficial bargaining agreements are feasible.

4. Agency problems, where the incentives of leaders differ from those of the populations that theyrepresent.

5. Multilateral interactions where every potential agreement is blocked by some coalition of states orconstituencies who can derail it.

Wars can be dynamic and protracted; and a peace deal only becomes feasible when conflict becomesripe and parties to the disagreement become wary. This can take a long time as currently witnessed inBoko Haram feud with the government of Nigeria due to insincerity of purpose and the willingness toact proactively. It is observed that the asymmetric information about the relative strength of the insurgentsis misleading, and it explains why the government is unable to engage in rational bargaining process,considering prioritising the trade-offs. The Nigeria government appears to be under severe pressure todeliver on election promise to release the Chibok girls unharmed. The pressures are both external and



sustained internally by the #Bring Back Our Girls campaign group. In the light of the developments andwaning confidence in governance structure, the exchange was more of win-lose outcome, rather than awin-win situation.

The just war theory and its applicability to Boko Haram insurgency is difficult to mainstream inemerging scenario of instabilities in Nigeria. In the opinion of Orend Brian (2005), jus ad bellum setsforth the following six requirements, all of which must be met for a war to be considered conventionaland just:

1. Just cause – in self-defence of a nation that is physically and aggressively attacked by anothernation;

2. Right intention – a nation waging war must do so with the right intention; devoid of ulteriormotives such as racial, religious, ethnic cleansing or land grab;

3. Proper authority and public declaration – decision to go to war must be made by properauthority, following constitutional procedures. It must be made public to the citizens and the nationthat is an enemy state.

4. Last resort – war should be a last resort, if all options of diplomacy have been exhausted;

5. Probability of success – weigh all options, cost benefit and the likelihood of success and theconsequences of failures; and

6. Proportionality – Weigh also the universal good against the universal evil of death and destruction.

Simply put, the rationalisation of Boko Haram insurgency does not meet any of the aboverequirements to classify them as fighting for a just cause, be it a doctrinal cleansing or wars based onpurity of religious belief (jihad) which are unconventional and does not accommodate just causes inmodernity. This informed the designation of Boko Haram and its splitter group, Ansaru in the list ofgroups classified as Foreign Terrorist Organisations by the United States, Britain and Canada. Ironically,the United Nations whose facility was bombed and destroyed in Abuja, is yet to take a bold initiative toformally classify the insurgents as terrorists.

War in whatever dimension, produces human tragedies on a colossal scale, and creates humanitariancrises contributing to global, regional and local insecurity. Although the theoretical understanding ofcauses of war is still evolving, there are innumerable case studies of war and the challenge in analysingsuch war is that no one situation is exactly the same. Therefore, it is difficult to find a systematic frameworkthat analyses the origins and dynamics of wars across different platforms. A richer understanding of theorigins of wars can be discerned from the greed and grievances scholarship of Collier and Hoeffler(2004: 563-595), where it is widely believed that civil wars stem from the greedy behaviour of a rebelgroup in organising an insurgency against the government. Greed is about opportunities and the probabilityof success available to the rebel groups. The opportunities fall into three categories;

1. Financing - appropriation of captured natural resources, rents, donation from diaspora, contributionsfrom affiliates, laundered and drug money;

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2. Recruitment – Recruitment is about the availability of fighting manpower, school drop outs,poverty induced and vulnerable groups, unemployed and radicalised youths;

3. Geography – porous borders, mountainous and desert terrains and safe haven and escape routes.

In the context of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, central to the underlying root cause of theproblem is grievances over issues connected to identity, right to worship and group dynamics. Thedemands Boko Haram are making on the state are derived from widely held religious beliefs andcertain normative forms of behaviour appropriate to the identity of Islam but considered deviant byother groups, but they need a space to practise unhindered the brand of religion they proclaim.Again, constitutionally, Nigeria is a secular state. Attaining this type of behavioural paradigm shift ispractically impossible without organised large scale violence, dislocation and destruction; even ifthe insurgency is not motivated by greed. Grievances are purposely driven on three platforms:

1. Relative deprivation – discrepancy between what people feel they deserve and what theycan get or, simply put, disparity between aspirations and achievements. Frustrated youths arelikely to resort to violence if unemployed or if their needs are unmet. Feelings of being relativelydeprived provides arsenal for protests and violence.

2. Polarisation – it is related to the alienation that groups of people feel from one another, andsuch alienation is fuelled by the feeling of within-group identity. It is a situation when twogroups seem divided and exhibit greater intra-group homogeneity. There are situations ofeconomic, ethnic and religious polarisation; these have wide range implications for conflicts.

3. Horizontal inequality – the basis for horizontal inequality stems from classificationaccording to ethnicity, religion, linguistic differences and tribal affiliations which triggersectarian conflicts. Horizontal and vertical inequalities are not the same. Vertical operateswithin a homogenous group, whereas horizontal may overlap with the relative deprivationand polarisation of groups.

Taking into consideration that Nigeria is an ethnically divided, religiously polarised and a state whereinequality is the norm, the peace architecture of the nation is effectively challenged by varying degrees ofinsurgencies. If the unfolding dynamics of conflicts in Nigeria is anything to go by, the recent trends inFulani-Herdsmen’s and farmers’ clashes in Nassarawa, Benue and Plateau states reflect the changingnature of insurgencies in Nigeria. Interrogating these developments in the context of asymmetry ofchange is important to our understanding of the problems we seek alternatives in resolving.

ASYMMETRY AS OPTION IN WAR

Previous attempts to define asymmetry have not been very helpful in identifying the specifics in thecontext of its boundaries, and when it is best suited to assume that certain categories of wars aresymmetry. What is certain is that asymmetry is highly context-specific and may include reference topower, means, methods, values, time and ideology or belief. The changing nature, new tactics and



targets make it difficult to situate, and there are dissimilarities from region to region in terms of whatconstitute the entry levels. Simply put, asymmetry means war by other means, which effectively employscrude, but aggressive operational strengths against the weaknesses of the opponents, in the context ofthe ability of the state to respond and deter attacks. The aim is to instil fear, threaten, harm and destroyin order to achieve disproportionate effect of psychological victory. In classical sense, asymmetric warfareused to be a form of conflict involving two states with unequal overall military and economic power. Thisperspective has now been altered with the decline in interstate and escalation in intrastate wars; andmore especially as a response to the 9/11 attacks on United States (US) facilities. The shift has somesort of moral, doctrinal and value based impetus, far away from normative affinity involving non- statearmed groups, resistant fighters, rebels, insurgents and terrorists without borders.

Asymmetry occurs, when the incentive and triggers are sufficiently playing out in political systemunder weak leadership and poor governance. In divided societies with ethnic and religious discord,insurgency cannot be ruled out. There are other contending issues connected to political repression,exclusion, inequality and impunity of office. These problems combine to give rise to rebellion. Theobjective of rebellion expressed in violent dissent is to capture the machinery of state, secede from it or/and render it prostrate. Asymmetric rebellions are carried out to disrupt economic and developmentactivities, which constitute a threat to national security; and by extension, security of lives and properties.The enemy envisages victory and the probability of victory depends on the incapability of government todefend its position and secure the state from vulnerabilities. Why insurgencies remain unsolved in Nigeriahas to do with leadership, the capacity to act proactively and above all the willingness to transform theunderlying causes in terms of peacebuilding.

Constant reference to terms as inequality, exclusion and discrimination to justify the need to gainacceptance and sustain the war, explains how insurgents win the minds and soul of the population in asympathetic manner. Any intervention to reverse asymmetry must take this into consideration. Theemployment of unconventional means is made possible by global market trends in terms of launderedfunds, network financing, arms proliferation, which makes rebellion another form of occupation providingincome for the unemployed youths; left unattended to by the social security system of governance,absent in Africa. Since the majority of schools are closed in north east states of Adamawa, Borno andYobe under attack by terrorists; and under distress, they have a larger population of idle youths, whoare vulnerable to recruitment into Boko Haram rank and file.

When analysing the causes of asymmetry, it is informative to differentiate between the underlyingcauses that created the opportunity for the potential rebellion and also the more recent triggers. I like tonote that if asymmetry persists so long, it will be creating and enlarging its own causes, direction andhorizon; while the level of analyses will not clearly identify why the conflict started, but why it is continuingand what are the root causes. All of these relate to changes in the political system, war economy anddisputes over resources which may have created a radicalised group of criminal network ready tochallenge the legitimacy of the state system like in Nigeria and elsewhere around Africa. Enforceddiscriminatory policies, electoral fraud, economic disparity, unemployment and historic oppression areissues to contend with in transitional democracies; which explains why asymmetry persists and willcontinue to challenge established state structures and institutions; leading to security failures.

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The actors and stakeholders in asymmetry war in Nigeria are still shrouded in mystery, but they havea mission, strategy and structure designed to actualise their desire to seize control of the state structure.The command and control; including propaganda capacity of the non-state armed insurgents are constantlyupbeat, with periodic attacks and claims of victory over state military apparatus. In the conduct ofasymmetry, the distinction between combatants and civilians is obviously blurred, which makes all includingwomen, children, schools, hospitals and places of worship amongst others possible targets of attack.They enjoy robust collaboration with internal and external stakeholders, including linkages with Al-Qa’eda in the Maghreb (AQIM) or the global Qa’idat al-Jihad that are potent forces in global terrorismand cannot be disputed as financers. Therefore, the war against terror is beyond the physical boundariesof Nigeria, which effectually means that the search for solutions to this problem must go beyond ourborders and include other alternatives to reduce the capacity of insurgents to terrorise the innocent andlaw abiding citizens. These include the scores of school children murdered in cold blood and thosesurviving, but dislocated from the future opportunity of education, which the terror group believe, is ananathema to their goal objectives.

Internal security operationsThe internal security operations began with the deployment of military forces to the axis of Adamawa,Borno and Yobe in 2009. The collapse of the conciliatory peace deal and incidences of aggressionexhibited by the insurgents changed the rules of engagement from peacekeeping to outright field combat.The military high command became suspect with the politicisation of the treatment meted out to insurgentswho were arrested, detained and subsequently released or treated with kid-gloves; whereas the armysuffered heavy casualty from attacks carried out in the barracks and other military facilities. The changein tactics to full combat was to enable the army limit the terror activities, prevent a prolonged war andrestore confidence in the general populace that defeat is not imminent. These measures have not sufficientlyaddressed the problems, but helped in reducing the impunity of attacks to the periphery of towns. Thepie chart in figure 2 captures this trend and oscillation of Boko Haram death toll in Nigeria from 2009-2014.

The new wars are classified as low, medium and high intensity, and it will sometimes oscillate fromlow to medium and high intensity, depending on the security climate and the context, ranging fromidentity-based wars propelled by ethnicity and religion; or/and hinged on exclusion or radicalisation ofdispossessed segments of the population, all leading to the deliberate erosion of the capacity of the stateto respond appropriately. The diversity in terms of ethnic, religious and cultural pluralism makes itcomplex to deal with conflicts rationally. The responsibility to protect, who is to be protected and humanrights violation were among other considerations that effectively bogged down outright military operations.Amnesty International claimed that some 600 unaccounted Boko Haram suspects may have beenkilled after a jailbreak at a military detention facility in Maiduguri, the state capital of Borno, on March14, 2014. Sometimes these figures are doubtful and speculative.



Source: Nigeria Watch Database, 2014

Figure 2: Boko Haram Insurgency Related Deaths in Nigeria 2009-2014

Asymmetry of Change

Asymmetry is more about problem of change, and change comes in its dynamics as identifying who anenemy is and the activities that must change through terrorism or insurgency. Change is central to thestruggle in context and these translate to rejection of Western ideologies, institutions, politics and economicmodels. Even more fundamental, which makes the change radicalised, is the secular-causal linkageswhich past histories has not addressed adequately and will continue to manifest and projected in movementsonto insurgency. Therefore, adversary restiveness and rebellious attitudes, with apology to those whounderstand peace is all about power, are expressed in wide scale revolt, instead of non-violentconfrontations.

Asymmetric enemies do not respect rules and they are not bound by laws of warfare, including theGeneva Conventions. Insurgents routinely direct violent action against civilian population and militarytargets. They use unconventional tactics of terror and horrific images, and they are willing to sacrificetheir own lives for their cause in a suicide attack. All of these must be weighed when planning interventionto engage the asymmetric enemy. No atrocity is beyond this enemy’s capability, but it is not in tandemwith just cause in wars.

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In the search for alternatives, it is proposed to strategise along the thinking of Paul Lederach (2011),who advocated two approaches including isolation and engagement through a process of peacebuilding.Isolation in this continuum is conceived as a strategy of identifying, targeting and limiting individuals whoespouse violence defined as terrorism and insurgency; whereas engagement is not used in purely militaryterms. Engagement is used in the context of peacebuilding, which requires contact, consultation anddialogue. Engagement should be with a wider set of people, groups and stakeholders in the conflictarena. Initiating dialogue with the Boko Haram leadership has been difficult, if not impossible. But in theopinion of Lederach (2011:11-15), engagement with designated leadership of the group will:

Increase understanding of their key grievances, create potential opennessto alternatives and will augment capacity to identify opportunities forchange resulting in increased potential to build alternatives to violence.

In addition to the above, there is the need to conduct preliminary conflict assessment to know aboutthe key grievances of the sect, the justification for violence, history and context of the conflict; opportunityand capacity to respond and achieve constructive change. An increased capacity for dialogue remains aplausible option in de-escalation of violence. Islam is a religion of peace and on a fair assessment,bringing change to Islam or re-inventing purity does not intrinsically require insurgency and terrorism.The new wars are more of asymmetry, devoid of actual battle grounds and boundaries. It is fluid anddifficult to counter using traditional military approaches to war.

The Search for AlternativesThe alternative open to transform asymmetry is sustainable peace. Peace is a condition other than one oforganised armed conflict (war); and most often distinguished from a situation of non-war. Positive peacein the opinion of Burgess & Burgess (1997:230-23) consist of four core principles:1. Peace as harmony (stressing the absence of conflict);2. Peace as order (stressing stability and peace through strength);3. Peace as justice (stressing the absence of domination and poverty); and4. Peace as conflict management (stressing peace as a process for obtaining interests and needs,

rather than as an end itself.

Galtung’s (1967:238), positive peace relations include presence of cooperation, freedom from fear;freedom from want, economic growth and development. Other variables are absence of exploitation,equality, justice, freedom of action, pluralism and dynamism. The absence of these implies negativepeace.

Exactly how long the Boko Haram war will last depends on a number of factors, but since thepeace prospect appears ignored, and military solution to the problems of insurgency is becoming expandedand more complex, the search for alternatives must begin with the state in the context of confidencebuilding, law enforcement and peacebuilding. In consideration of military approach, the combination ofprevention, pre-emption and deterrence are likely to dictate whatever options are available in any



conflict reduction. Intelligence gathering and dissemination will remain critical to any success in counter-terrorism, just as technology will play a dominant role in contending with insurgency and limiting theadversary capacity to operate unhindered. Practical measures will necessarily include:1. Our vision, mission and budgets must be aligned to take care of future gaps, including national

interest, ideologies as well as science of living together as a nation. Let peace education be includedin school curriculums to prepare our youths for the battle of wits, mind and emotion in order not tomake terror and hate a primary income earner in our society.

2. Invest in and sustain tighter border controls to limit the insurgents’ access to slush funds, flow ofarms, ability to flee to safe haven and also to receive re-enforcement from transnational networks.Border patrol in this context must be technology driven and proactive to prevent and deter theenemy and illegality.

3. Reduce vulnerability of the people through a process of sustainable development, employmentgeneration and youth empowerment that will make financial inducement to the youths by theinsurgents insignificant, making recruitment drive unattractive;

4. Discourage impunity of office and disregard for the rule of law, which will necessarily makemarginalised, excluded and deprived citizens resort to violence in settling matters, especially in thespheres of elections and electioneering, census, resource allocation, sharing of sovereign wealth,and power sharing.

5. Managing complex asymmetry requires a wide range of internal and external actors, stakeholders,civil society and multinational agencies. The multi-track approach and the comprehensive approachto the management of security challenges will be of importance in the present circumstances ofinsurgency.

6. Peace education cutting across religion and ethnicity should be encouraged and this entails restrictionon separate schools and tight monitoring of the school curriculum.

7. Engagement in interfaith dialogue to regulate and limit the radical literature available to adherents ofboth religions. Government must stop funding religion and sponsoring pilgrimages in place ofdevelopment projects.

8. Mainstreaming good governance as a subset of governance, wherein public resources and problemsare managed effectively, efficiently and in response to the needs of society.

Although Nigeria is not at war, still the Boko Haram phenomenon is fundamentally unconventional,leaving in its trail high death toll, destruction and dislocation. The Nigerian brand of terrorism suffocatesand cannot be exported to any other sane society. It is abnormal in abducting, raping and murdering incold blood, innocent school children and harmless elderly statesmen. According to Madunagu, (2011:11):

“You cannot effectively respond to Nigerian terrorism with a single weapon; however welldesigned…Only a new social order, a popular democratic and emancipatory social order can create theconditions for an accelerated withering away of Nigerian terrorism.”

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CONCLUSION

The phenomenon of asymmetry in the context of war keeps changing over the years. Some of thesechanges are the result of technological advances, while others have to do with the emergence of non-state actors as contenders in contemporary warfare. Future wars are unlikely to be symmetrical and willbe described as asymmetrical in some form or another. Asymmetry, in this context, basically means oneparty in the conflict adopting different and morally controversial means, strategies, and tactics to gainadvantage over the adversary or exploit the opponent’s weaknesses in armed conflict. The puzzle weneed to find answer to is if war can be won through other means than by resort to arms; which makesnon-violence a plausible option. Other alternatives to war include justice, peacebuilding, peace education,technological advancement and good governance. Thinking of these alternatives requires no speciallens, or viewing things from the crystal balls; it must be scientific, rational and not incremental.

REFERENCES

Anneli Botha, (2008). Terrorism in the Maghreb: The Transnationalisation of Domestic Terrorism(Pretoria, South Africa: Institute of Security Studies, 2008).

Carl von Clausewitz, eds. /trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, On War (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1976), Book 1, chapter 1, section 25.

Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” Oxford Economic Papers56(4).

Fearon, J.D. 1995. “Rationalist explanations for war,” International Organisation, 49:3.

Galtung, J. 1967. Theories of Peace: A synthetic approach to peace thinking. Oslo, InternationalPeace Research Institute.

Jackson, M.O. and M. Morelli (2008) “Strategic Militarisation, Deterrence and War between Nations,”http://www.stanford.edu/jacksonm/gunsbutter.pdf

Lederach, J. P. 2011. Addressing Terrorism: A theory of change approach in J. P. Lederach et al eds.Somalia: Creating Space for Fresh Approaches to Peacebuilding. Uppsala, Sweden, Life &Peace Institute

Lederach, J. P. 2003. The Little Book of Conflict Transformation. Intercourse PA, Good Books

Madunagu, E. 2011. Reflections on Nigerian Terrorism. A Journal of Constitutional Development, 4:

Orend, B. 2005. War in The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Winter Edition) Edward N.Zalta (ed) http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/war

Schanzer, J. 2004: ‘Yemen’s War on Terror’, in Orbis, Summer 2004.



Schanzer, Jonathan 2003: The Egyptian Underground in National Review Online, October 29, 2003.

Schanzer, Jonathan 2004: “Inside the Zarqawi Network” in Weekly Standard, 16 August 2004.

Schanzer, 2005: Al-Qaida’s Armies; Middle East Affiliate Groups & the Next Generation of Terror(New York: the Washington Institute for Near East Policy).

Sun Tzu, trans. Samuel B. Griffith, The Art of War. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 66–67.

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PRISON CONGESTION, FANATICISM AND TERRORISM:CASE FOR INVESTING IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE

by

Dr Hyacinth IwuDepartment of Political Science,

Adekunle Ajasin University,Akumgba, Ondo State, Nigeria.

and

Professor OBC NwoliseDepartment of Political Science,

University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria.Visiting Professor

Army War College NigeriaAbuja.

ABSTRACT

Prisons in Nigeria, Africa and the world are overpopulated by Awaiting Trialinmates, leading to congestions. The congestions in turn result in inadequacyof food, uniform, medical needs, and even space. This paper argues thatfanaticism and terrorism that are emerging wide-spread phenomena willworsen prison congestion and conditions. It makes a strong case for investingin criminal justice to avoid this problem and the need and temptation ofprison expansion.

Key words: Prison Congestion, Fanaticism, Terrorism, Investing, Criminal Justice

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INTRODUCTION

A nation is peaceful, orderly, lawful, and internally secure to the extent that its criminal justice system isjust and fair, effective and efficient. That prison congestion which is actually court congestion is aprecursor of several prison maladies is an understatement. The fear today however is that the growingspate of fanaticism and terrorism in the world is no doubt going to worsen the over-crowding situationof prisons especially in African nations where criminal punishment centre mainly on imprisonment andraise the temptation to expand prisons which is retrogression.

The cry about prison congestion and the need to find lasting solutions to it is not only an Africanproblem. It is worldwide but more pronounced in Africa. For example in the United States, prisondesigned to hold 84,000 inmates, had 158,000 inmates crowded in them in California in 2009. About14,000 of the inmates were sleeping in very tight spaces, hallways or on floors. The enormity of theproblem and human suffering in United States’ prisons can be imagined when one recalls that the USAhas the world’s largest prison population with over 2.3 million in prison or jails (http://en.wikpedia.org/wiki/prison). In the same year, China’s prison population stood at 1.6 million, while that of India was332,112, all suffering overstretched facilities.

In Malawi, the Maula Prison meant for 800 inmates at a point held 1805 inmates (Wines, 2005).Malawian prisons were believed to have exceeded their capacity by 200 percent (http://www.penalreform.org). The consequences in that country include extremely unsanitary conditions, poornutrition and abnormal high death rate, as cells meant for 50 inmates had 150 people (Wines, 2005),cramped in them. Many inmates sleep on blankets on the floor, too tightly packed with most lying ontheir sides with serious difficulty in even turning. Prison uniforms and blankets do not go round, and nosoap for bathing or washing clothes; while the diet is monotonously beans and nsima. With theseconditions, diseases like scabies, tuberculosis (Africa News, 2005), and HIV/AIDS take their toll oninmates. Maula Prison lost an average of thirty inmates per annum in 2003 and 2004 (one per 60inmates), while Zomba Prison lost one in twenty inmates annually (Wines, 2005).

In Nigeria, the story of prison congestion is the same. For example, Nwokolo (2014:31) whovisited the Oba Prison in Abeokuta, Ogun State in June 2014 informs us of the view of a Sociologist,Sola Aluko Arowolo who observed that in Nigeria:

…It is not uncommon to see twenty people huddled together in a cellmeant for two or three inmates. This he reckoned, stretched theprison facilities thin, bred unhygienic surrounding, health challengespsychological problems, aggressive behaviour and peer influence thatsabotage the prisons reformative efforts on inmates.

In fact, the Governor of Ogun State, Senator Ibikunle Amosun who visited the Oba Prison inAbeokuta on May 29 (Nigeria’s Democracy Day), 2014 with the intention of releasing some deservinginmates shed tears publicly at the condition of the inmates, some of whom were mere skeletons that hadto be helped to stand on their feet. The prison housed 538 inmates, far above its capacity, with only 42being convicts and the rest 496 being awaiting trial persons (ATP) (Nwokolo, 2014).

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Prison congestion has been of long history in Nigeria. Nwolise’s first study of prison congestion inNigeria titled “Dynamics of Prison Congestion in Nigeria” was in 1988. In Table 1 below, Agomo givesus an update to 2000.

Table 1

Breakdown of Prison Population and Original Capacity in Selected Nigerian Prisons in 2000

Source: Adapted from Uju Agomo, “Prisons decongestion and Reforms in Nigeria-Issues.

Note: In 2014, Nigerian prisons had a total of 41,524 inmates, out of which 29,372 were Awaiting Trial Cases.In 2017, the figure rose to 74, 508 inmates out of which 50,427 were Awaiting Trial Cases.

Column 5 of Table 1 shows the excess number of inmates in each prison. For example, KirikiriMedium Security prison based in Lagos exceeded its capacity of 704 by as many as 1585 inmates! Thefive prisons exceeded their collective original capacity of 3,628 inmates by 3,528, almost 100% excess!Nwolise as a Visiting Professor at Igbinedion University, Okada (2008 – 2010) took his students on astudy tour of strategic establishments in Enugu (Enugu State) in 2010. Their tour took them to the EnuguPrisons, where the students interacted with the inmates. It was not a nice experience for the students –the congestion, sufferings, poor funding, inadequate manpower and others. For the first twenty minuteswhen the students returned to their vehicle, they remained speechless. The situation is even worse today,given the socio-economic hardship that has faced Nigerians since 2015, and more especially given thehundreds of arrests following Boko Haram terrorism, militancy in the Niger Delta, and Separatist agitationsin the South-East. For example, the Awaiting Trial Inmates figure as at November 2017 in Nigerianprisons as given by the Citizens United for the Rehabilitation of Errants stood at 50,427 out of 74,508prisoners (in Nnadi, 2017). This gives 44% increase in total inmates, and 42% increase in Awaiting Trialinmates from 2014 figures given earlier.

Prison Congestion, Fanaticism and Terrorism: Case for Investing in Criminal Justice

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

SN Name of Prison Original Capacity

Total Inmates

Excess Inmates

Convicts Awaiting Trail

Persons

1. Kano 690 817 127 225 592

2. Kirikiri Medium 704 2,289 1,585 521 1,768

3. Ikoyi 800 1,661 861 144 1,517

4. Port- Harcourt 804 1,344 540 379 965

5. Owerri 630 1,045 415 100 945

Total 3,628 7,156 3,528 1,369 5,787

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The task of this modest paper is to interrogate the nexus between prison congestion, fanaticism, andterrorism, and make case for investing heavily in criminal justice. The rationale for such discourse at thispoint in (Africa’s) history is not far-fetched. First, it is obvious as studies (See Byrne and Hummer,2007) have shown that prison congestion is the root of many maladies in contemporary prisons such asviolence, prison riots, jail breaks, shortage of essentials, hunger, etc. Second, contemporary worldexperience indicate upsurge in fanaticism and terrorism, which are capable of leading to explosion inprison population. It is thus timely to begin now to brainstorm and strategise feasible solutions. Third,fanatics and terrorists constitute a different breed of people from common criminals such as armedrobbers, rapists, pen robbers (corrupt politicians) and others. Fanatics and terrorists are die-hards.Those of them inside the prison always look out for the least opportunity to launch their escape, whiletheir colleagues outside always plan attacks on prisons to rescue their detained or imprisoned inmates.Nigeria’s experience with Boko Haram detainees who tried to escape from the facilities of the Departmentof State Security in Abuja recently is a case in point. Thus standard prisons in terms of security andfortification are needed to keep them. It is also dangerous to mix them with common criminals. Thesestandard prisons are rare in African states, including Nigeria.

Four, there is urgent need to isolate, focus on, and solve the problem of Awaiting Trial Persons whomainly populate Africa’s prisons. Institutionalizing convicts with Awaiting Trial Persons createspsychological, health, and physical ailment problems. It also produces more criminals in the society asminor offenders are converted into real criminals in prison. In Nigeria, 80% (http://www.Osunde...) ofprison inmates are awaiting trial, as the police and courts use the prisons as dumping ground to decongesttheir own congestions. Official government figure put the percentage at 70.7% when in January 2014the then Minister of Interior, Abba Moro during his inauguration of a twelve-man Presidential Committeeon Prison Decongestion put the figure at 41,524 inmates, in Nigerian prisons, out of which 29,372 wereawaiting trial inmates.(http://thepointer).

Five, there is urgent need to diversify punishment options in the continent, away from the monotonousand long over flogged imprisonment to other non-custodial methods such as probation, community/public service etc, for lesser offences. There is also need for greater “noise” to be made for separate jailor Bail Hostels to be established by governments for Awaiting Trial Persons. Prison service can also bemade a concurrent matter in Federal states to enable state and local governments establish jails outsidethe prison four walls, so that prisons can be set free to comfortably concentrate on their sacred correctionmandate on convicts.

Six, the criminal justice system in several African nations, especially Nigeria is currently very weak,with the result that hundreds of people commit crimes and walk freely, boldly and arrogantly in thesociety. The capacity of the criminal justice system therefore needs to be built, and its glory restored andthis requires huge investment.

Seven and finally, it is very necessary that we think about prison congestion today because by thetime the criminal justice system of several African nations is fully capacitated, thousands of citizens willbe behind bars, due to crimes even without the fanatics and terrorists.

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CONCEPTUAL DISCOURSE

To ensure better appreciation and understanding of this discourse, there is need for us to have a commonunderstanding of key concepts in the paper: Prison Congestion, Fanaticism, Terrorism, and CriminalJustice, in that order.

Prison is commonly understood as a “building where people are kept as punishment for a crimethey have committed or while they are waiting for trial” (Horn, 2005:1154). But we all know that aprison need not be a building. Also, this definition, totally neglected the task of reforming andrehabilitating (treating) the inmates while in prison. Thus as defined elsewhere by Nwolise, (2008:69), prison is:

…a specialised facility of the state where people who have infringed thelaws of the land are kept as punishment (not for punishment) for a givenperiod of time, and to make possible their reform and rehabilitation whichprepare them for reintegration with the society; and which where well-organised, adequately funded, and managed can become a national wealthspinner, security enhancer, and development catalyser.

Prison congestion has to do with the overcrowding of a prison. Once a prison holds inmates in excessof designated capacity, it becomes congested, and makes the sacred duty of prison staff difficult or evenimpossible when the degree of congestion becomes too excessive.

Fanaticism relates to the possession of excessive or extreme uncritical zeal especially when laced withviolent disposition for a political, racial, or religious Cause. A “fanatic displays very strict standards andlittle tolerance for contrary ideas or option’’ (Wikipedia). It goes on to state that” Fanaticism is a beliefor behaviour involving uncritical zeal or with an obsessive enthusiasm for a pastime or hobby’’ (Wikipedia).Philosopher George Santayana (in Wikipedia) defines fanaticism as “redoubling your effort when youhave forgotten your aim’’. Winston Churchill (Wikipedia). tells us in this direction that: “A fanatic is onewho cannot change his mind and won’t change the subject”. Fanaticism has its roots in the Latin word“fanaticus”, which means “of a temple”, which in turn means a “building devoted to the worship of a godor gods’’ (Soanes, 2001:323). This gives the insight that fanaticism roots from religion essentially. Theuncritical disposition or obsession of the fanatic with his activity or cause imbues him with the belief andconviction which propel him to violate prevailing social norms even without qualms, to abnormal ordisproportionate levels.

There are different types of fanaticism such as consumer fanaticism, emotional fanaticism, ethnic orracial fanaticism, nationalistic or patriotic fanaticism, ideological fanaticism, political (party) fanaticism,leisure fanaticism, atheist fanaticism, religious fanaticism, and sports fanaticism (football hooliganism).Each of these types of fanaticism can generate offences that can lead to mass arrests that may result inexpanding prison population. However, the key ones that ravage the contemporary world and havegrave implications for prison population are: ethnic or racial fanaticism that fans ethnic or racial conflicts,

Prison Congestion, Fanaticism and Terrorism: Case for Investing in Criminal Justice 161


riots and mini wars; political fanaticism that propels political thuggery and election rigging; and religiousfanaticism that fuels religious conflicts, riots, mini wars, and terrorism.

Terrorism is essentially the use of fear and violence to pursue (political) narrow objectives. The AfricanUnion Convention (1999) defines terrorism as:

Any act by an individual, group, organisation, a state, or its agents(excluding liberation struggles, armed struggles against Oppressivegovernments, colonisation, occupation, aggression and domination byforeign forces), which is a violation of the criminal laws of a state partyand international law instruments criminalising it, and which may endangerlife, physical integrity, or freedom of or cause serious injury or death toany person, any number or group of persons, or causes or may damagepublic or private property, natural resources, environment or cultureheritage and is calculated or intended to achieve those objectives.

Alexander (in Pogoson, 2013:29) sees terrorism as “the use of violence against random civiliantarget in order to intimidate or to create generalised fear for the purpose of achieving political goals’’.Terrorism can also be unleashed on military targets. The United Nations General Assembly (1999)Resolution 49/60 described terrorism as criminal acts which are intended or calculated to provoke astate of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purpose.

Of course, we all know that terrorism is a value laden word, because of issues of internationalpolitics, colonialism, racial domination and others, which make one man’s terrorist to be another man’sfreedom fighter. However, the dividing line must not be lost, and that is who is the person or group usingterror tactics (fear and violence) fighting for? Once terror tactics are not deployed for the common goodof the masses of the people, terrorism is it.

Criminal Justice can be understood from three angles: as a system, as a legal process, and as anacademic discipline. As a system, criminal justice is seen as “the system of practices and institutionsdirected at upholding social control, deterring and mitigating crime, or sanctioning those who violatelaws with criminal penalties and rehabilitation efforts” (Criminal Justice, Wikipedia). In this direction,three key agencies currently make up the criminal justice system of modern states:

i. The police that detects crime, investigates, and prosecutes suspects.ii. The court that decides innocence or guilt and sentences offenders as punishment.iii. The prison (correctional facility), which receives sentenced offenders, executes court’s decision,

classifies inmates, and reforms, rehabilitates and reintegrates them with society on discharge.

As legal process, criminal justice constitutes the interactions and coordination’s that occur betweenthe various components of the criminal justice system from arrest by the police, through trial by thecourt, to confinement and treatment (reform and rehabilitation) by the prison. In this process eachcomponent relates with and depends on the other.

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As an academic discipline, criminal justice studies and provides knowledge and skills about thecriminal justice system and processes of a nation. Its various aspects include law enforcement, legalstudies (criminal law, criminal investigation, security management), and imprisonment or correction. Forthe purpose of this study, criminal justice will be treated as a totality – a system, process, and academicdiscipline. This is because they all work together, and deserve investment reinvigoration.

WHY PRISONS ARE CONGESTED AND THE NEED FOR DECONGESTION

Factors in prison congestion

There are several factors responsible for prison congestion. These include:i. High rate of remand of suspects into custody.ii. Slow investigations by the police which lead to the presence of several Awaiting Trial Persons in

prison.iii. Indiscriminate arrests by the police in abuse of their arrest powers.iv. Abuse of bail conditions by the police.v. Too much reliance on the imprisonment (custodial) option by judges in neglect of other non-

custodial options, such as parole, fines, probation, community/public service, compensation andrestitution, etc.

vi. Too long prison sentences, some extending to ten years, twenty years. Small boys are sentencedto three years for stealing bread.

vii. High rate of recidivism, due to improper reform, rehabilitation, resettlement and reintegration; andpoor prison conditions that breed hardened criminals, and no job for them in society or rejectionby the society.

viii. Inadequate legal aid facilities.ix. Infrequent visits to prisons by judges (for case reviews) and chief executives, meant to exercise the

principle of prerogative of mercy.x. Corruption.xi. Lack of political will in leaders to take decisive steps to decongest prisons.xii. Inability of governments to construct new prison facilities fired probably by the wrong belief that

prisons are for punishment of inmates.xiii. Dumping of some people who are not supposed to be in the prison there. Police and greedy

relatives of some people connive to throw them in prison to make way for them (greedy) to claimproperty.

The Benefits of Prison Decongestion

It is very beneficial for prisons to be decongested.

i. There will be less tension and mental agony for staff.



ii. A lot of money will be saved for government from caring for so many people.

iii. The prison personnel will experience drastically reduced workload.

iv. Prisons will be better and more comfortably administered.

v. Prison conditions will improve drastically – more space for inmates, better feeding, and improvedhealthcare.

vi. Less number of inmates will share facilities and essential items such as soap, water, uniform, blanketsetc.

vii. There will be less tension in inmates, and this will drastically reduce indiscipline, aggressivebehaviours, violence, and negative peer influence.

viii. Less cases of jail breaks and prison riots.

xi. Drastic reduction in chances of criminal recruitment and socialisation in the prison.

NEXUS BETWEEN PRISON CONGESTION, FANATICISM AND TERRORISM

There is serious nexus between prison congestion on the one hand, and fanaticism and terrorism on theother hand. This nexus is reinforced by challenges in criminal justice. The phenomena of fanaticism andterrorism have the potentials for the arrest, detention, trial and imprisonment of an unusual number ofoffenders even in one swoop. From the point of arrest, to that of actual imprisonment, the accusedremain in the custody of the prison staff, being transported, fed, and medically treated by the staff. Thisis unlike the crime of armed robbery, kidnapping, rape, drug trafficking etc that involve one to fivepersons at a time. For example, in Nigeria, 486 northerners were in 2014 arrested while travelling inthirty-three buses in Abia State (South East). Initially, they were suspected of being dreaded BokoHaram members as the security agents stated that they identified one wanted Boko Haram leaderamong them. It was later that they were said to be mercenary voters being migrated to the South by anopposition party in preparation for the 2015 general election (Sunday Tribune, 2014:4). Whether these486 northerners are Boko Haram members or mercenary migrants, getting them arrested and placedunder trial would have worsened prison congestion in the country.

Again in March 2014, the Nigerian Army authorities stated that they had 500 Boko Haram suspectsin their custody yet to be prosecuted due to “lack of standard prisons where they can be kept in theNorth East” (in Saturday Punch, 2014:46-47). The problem here is much more than just prisoncongestion. Terrorists and fanatics are peculiar breed of people as noted earlier, especially terrorists.They are ever ready to strike whether inside the prison or from outside the prison when their colleaguescome for them. As a result, any prison keeping them must be standard in terms of security facilities andarrangements.

Another issue is that terrorists and fanatics grow from small number or size to large number, and asthey grow, the numbers arrested and placed under trial and subsequently imprisoned also grow. Apata(2014:64) informs us writing about the Taliban that:

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The Taliban grew from a small cell of fanatics until it became a verypowerful sect capable of imposing its extreme fundamentalist kind ofIslam on the whole of Afghanistan.

Even the Al-Qaeda that overwhelmed Yemen, and hit the United States seriously in 2001, grewfrom a small sect, just like Al-Shabaab that has overtaken Somalia and extending its destructive fires toKenya and other nations. As the fanatics and terrorists grow and carry out their disastrous attacks onsociety and get arrested, they worsen prison congestion in their states of operation.

THE CASE FOR INVESTING IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE

The most common understanding of the word “invest” relates to putting “money into financial scheme,shares, or property with the expectation of making a profit” (Soanes, 2001:479). For the purpose ofthis discourse, “investing” goes beyond putting money. It also embraces devoting energy, time, andthoughts to an undertaking (criminal justice), with the expectation of worthwhile results. In other words,investing here refers to the strategic and systematic application of human, material, and natural resourcesfor the optimum achievement of established ends. As the discourse here proceeds, it is necessary torecall that it was earlier stated that criminal justice is understood in this paper in its triangular form as asystem, a process, and a discipline. Our discussion on investment recognises these three aspects ofcriminal justice.

The Imperative of Investment in Criminal JusticeThe following reasons may be advanced for the urgent need to invest in criminal justice.i. There is very serious gap in funding criminal justice. The police, court, prisons and even law

schools are grossly underfunded and this results greatly in slow police investigations, slow courttrial processes, the inability of the prisons to carry out their sacred tasks of reforming, rehabilitating,and reintegrating inmates, and the production of adequate lawyers. One ultimate result of all theseis prison congestion. The police transfer their congestion (as a result of slow investigations) to thecourts, and the courts transfer their congestion (as a result of slow processes, inadequate judges,outdated equipment etc) to the prisons. Unfortunately, because the prisons must keep the inmates,they (prisons) have no place to transfer their congestion to other than the inmates, hence congestionin the prisons.

ii. There is urgent need to provide adequate qualified manpower in the police and prisons just asmore judges need to be appointed for the courts to handle cases speedily. These require investmentin recruitment and training for efficient and effective police, judges and prison staff.

iii. Obsolete facilities and equipment need to be rehabilitated or updated. Most African prisons arenot standard prisons; and many court judges use obsolete equipment instead of laptops andcomputers. Some write judgments with lantern. Court processes have to be modernised.

iv. There is shortage of lawyers in most African states. And this negatively affects legal aid. It spellsthe need for more law programmes in universities, and the establishment of more law schools. In



the same vein, more police colleges, and prison academics are needed for the training of relevantpersonnel on their peculiar job specifications.

v. The most risky public jobs in the world are in the (defence and) security sector. The wholecriminal justice system belongs to this sector; and the staff need to be adequately motivated to givetheir best in performance output.

vi. Legal aid needs to be enhanced so that very poor inmates who pay for lawyers can be assisted.

vii. The society has to be educated, trained, enlightened, and mobilised to be effective and efficientpart of the security calculus of the state, providing accurate and prompt information to securityagents, and cooperating with them during investigation of crime, prosecution of suspects, andreintegration of discharged inmates. The programmes for these have to be thought out, tested andmounted. People have to be educated too on the need to be law abiding and to avoid crime, inorder to enjoy their freedom.

viii. It is high time victims of crimes were given compensation as a matter of right. The situation, forexample, in which a female is raped, and the state sentences the rapist to jail, and abandons thevictim to bear her fate without compensation is unAfrican, and inhuman, and also destroys patrioticzeal in citizens. The criminal (rapist) and the state which failed in its primary obligation to protectthe female citizen must pay compensation to the victim. The same goes for victim of armedrobbery, kidnapping, ritual activities, terrorism, fanaticism, etc. The growing cases of ritual rape inAfrican states today make it imperative that the police must establish the motive for each rape casein order to save the lives of victims (Nwolise 2013, 2015).

ix. Intelligence is the heart of security calculus. Most African states do not invest adequately inintelligence, and this has made crime detection and prevention, as well as speedy investigationsuphill tasks. Europe rely heavily on both human intelligence (HUMINT) and technology-basedintelligence such as electronic intelligence (ELINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT). Africa isweak in both, and yet refuses to apply the very cheap, reliable, fast and predictive StrategicSpiritual Intelligence (SSI) which is even superior to both human intelligence and technology-based intelligence. Most African leaders and defence and security personnel still hold on to thefalse assertion of Sun Tzu, (2005: 165) the Chinese legendary philosopher, strategist, and warriorto the effect that: “foreknowledge cannot be gotten from ghosts and spirits……it must be obtainedfrom people.” Nothing can be farther from the truth. Studies by Nwolise (2012, 2013, 2015,2016) have challenged this position of Sun Tzu. There are millions of innocent people in prisons allover the world whom human and technological intelligence cannot help, but whom SSI can set freeto decongest hundreds of prisons. Investing in human and technology-based intelligence can assist,though in slow, and very costly manner in decongesting prisons.

x. Prison farms and industries not only help in the training of inmates, they also enable inmates to eatbetter food that increase their body immunity and make them live healthier lives. The money paidto inmates from their farm and industrial services and products, part of which is saved and given to

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them on discharge, empower them and give them that initial confidence they need to face the worldafter discharge. But most African prisons today do not have farms and industries. There is needfor investment in this direction, as a strategy for faster and better re-integration of the dischargedinmate, and to minimise recidivism, and rejection by society.

xi. Separate jails or bail hostels have to be built for Awaiting Trial Persons outside the prison premises.This will totally eliminate the ugly phenomenon of prison congestion.

xii. Separate facilities have to be established for mentally-ill inmates, who need treatment instead ofpunishment.

xiii. Separate facilities are also to be established for probation and parole run by separate agencies asfacilities operating under the law and for the maintenance of law and order, and upholding andpromoting standard human behaviour.

xiv. It is important to establish more and encourage extensive use of Alternative Dispute Resolutionhouses, where minor offences can be resolved without going to court and prison.

These fourteen points making investing in criminal justice imperative and necessary are not justrequiring money. Even though financial input is critical here, there is also need for hard thinking, properplanning and execution, and devotion of time and energy to ensure that criminal justice works effectively,efficiently and progressively. The investment is not also just in the police, court, and prisons which areseen as the three legs of the criminal justice system. It covers the wider society, law programmes andothers.

Investments in these areas are to tackle the control of prison population from the reception rate,duration in custody, and re-entry (recidivism). This is because the task of decongesting the prison has tobe faced at four stages:

i. Pre-arrest, trial and incarceration stage.

ii. Trial stage.

iii. Incarceration stage; and

iv. Post-incarceration stage.

Investment must cover these four stages for the battle against prison congestion to be meaningfuland successful. The Sunday Sun (2014:1) carried the story of a Nigerian, one Mr. Okorie Orie whosuffered double tragedy in the hands of unrepentant armed robbers. These robbers robbed him millionsof naira in 2004, and since he was able to identify one of them, the entire gang members were arrested,tried and imprisoned for ten years. For the ten years they were in prison, they nursed revenge on MrOrie, and on discharge from prison after ten years prison term, the gang reassembled, invaded hisresidence, and unknowingly killed his son whom they saw sleeping on Mr Orie’s bed. This revengemission spells real failure in the prison’s sacred duty of reforming inmates. It also shows that the post-



incarceration stage of their lives was not properly taken care of while in prison. Now the gang will returnto prison as they have been rearrested, to add to the existing overcrowding. This is where the observationof Orakwe (2011:9) becomes instructive to the effect that the “focus of criminal justice should be onhow to restore the ability of the system to rise up to the challenges of crime and its treatment….”

CONCLUSION

To bring this discourse to a close, the following clustered recommendation directed at the level ofgovernment, civil society, police, court, and prison are imperative for tackling the issue of prison congestion:

Government level

Tackling the causes of crime, terrorism, militancy, separatist agitations, and fanaticism. These are essentiallyexclusionism, social injustice, marginalisation, neglect, poverty, unemployment, lack of civic educationemphasising tolerance, and more dependence on use of force instead of dialogue.

Job creation to avoid idle, hungry and angry groups that constitute a pool for crime perpetration andrecruitment.

Focusing education on practical and short courses that impart skills required in industries, agriculture,etc; and reducing emphasis on bogus certificates, and theoretical teachings.

Combat poverty through payment of living wage, establishment of micro-credit facilities, and jobcreation.

Massive public education, enlightenment, and mobilisation on the need for political, religious, andethnic or racial tolerance to eliminate fanaticism.

Civil and moral education on the benefits of being law abiding and patriotic in order to remain a freecitizen.

Police level

Avoiding indiscriminate police arrests of people most of whom end up in prison while awaiting trial.Adoption of community policing to provide preventive policing.Ensuring adequate and completed investigation before charging a suspect to court. This will ensure

that suspects that have no business being taken to court are not in the court from where they are sent toprison to await trial while their cases are still being investigated by the police.

Court level

Establish and encourage people to use Alternative Dispute Resolution houses. Minor offences can besettled in these houses without going to court.

Judges to diversify punishment option away from monotonous imprisonment. Fines, community orpublic service, compensation or restitution, house arrest, etc can also be applied. Juveniles should besent to remand homes. These will reduce drastically the rate of inmates’ reception in the prison.

Court bail processes and conditions should be drastically improved.

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Modernisation of court equipment, proceedings to increase the speed of case disposal by judges.Increased application of probation under the supervision of well-trained probation officers.Appointment of more judges and magistrates to speed up trial to reduce Awaiting Trial cases and to

free the innocent.Increase legal aid to inmates through government Legal Aid Council, lawyers in the civil society, the

Bar Association, Lawyers Without Borders etc.Judges to avoid long prison sentences, which adversely affect duration in custody. First offenders

particularly and juveniles should be given room to reform quickly.Judges to avoid prolonged trials which keep suspects in custody for too long.Establishment of more courts to enhance speedy disposition of cases.

Prison level Another agency should be established to keep Awaiting Trial persons in Bail Hostels that are wellgarrisoned.

Increased use of parole for temporary or permanent release of inmates who are very old or havetransparently demonstrated remorsefulness and good behaviour before the completion of their prisonterms.

More frequent application of the use of prerogative of mercy facility for state pardon, the service ofPrison Decongestion Committees, and Prison Visits by Judges.

Establish half-way houses for inmates that have about six months to complete their sentences, andhave demonstrated good behaviour. There, the inmates can get more visitors, job placement, and properresettlement or reintegration briefing and training.

Establishment of prison overseeing or monitoring bodies especially Non-Governmental Organisationsconcerned with human rights, Church Ministries, Medical Associations, Legislative Committees, etc.These will frequently report on prison conditions, welfare of inmates, help in case reviews and ensuringthat no inmate overstays.

Establish Remand Homes and Borstal Institutions for youths and children where they can be protectedfrom abuse, and reformed more quickly and appropriately.

Movement of prison away from the exclusive list or preserve of the Central Government, so thatstates, regions or local governments can play their own custodial and reformatory roles as long as thecentral government sets the regulatory standard.

Society levelBe active and vigilant over security matters, and in crime prevention as it is the committal of crime thatleads a person to prison.

Provide prompt and adequate information to police to quicken investigations and prosecution.Assist in the smooth reintegration of ex-convicts through ready acceptance, job offers, avoiding of

stigmatisation, and empowerment to start something useful.Socialisation of children and youths into lawful life, patriotism, peace, order and security is necessary.

Finally, two more points need to be highlighted here. The first is that these authors do not support the



idea of expanding prisons or constructing more prisons in order to decongest prisons. It is uncalled for.It is retrogression. The root causes of crime should be addressed by governments. If the Awaiting TrialPersons are removed, things will improve, all things being equal. Moreover, we vote for zero prisoninmates level, which can lead to the closing down of some prisons, if government does the right thing –applying political power and national resources for the common good. Our advice to politicians andpolitical leaders is always “Get the power, do what the people want and there will be no criminals tosend to prison”. Thus we strongly stand with the argument of the Citizens United For the Rehabilitationof Errants (CURE-Nigeria) made through its Executive Director, Mr. Sylvester Uhaa, to the effect thatbuilding more prisons is not the ultimate solution to prison congestion. Addressing the root causes ofcrime is it. In his words:

Doing so without addressing the root causes of the rising crime rate inNigeria would not solve the problem and the new prisons would soon befilled up... and then we would need to build bigger ones. This would leadto prison expansion and mass incarceration in our country. The argumentthat we need to build more prisons, recruit more police, increase securitybudgets and buy more arms for law enforcement as the only way toreduce crime is false and does not serve the common interest, and mustbe rejected... Any effective and economically sustainable public safetystrategy must include investments that will help reduce recidivism andaddress the root causes of crime such as unemployment andmarginalisation (Quoted in Nnadi, 2017:5).

Second, it needs to be reiterated here that no national army has ever defeated a determined terroristgroup. The only case of Sri Lanka was achieved at a great human cost to the nation. The lesson here isdialogue even when holding the big stick. This is where advice of the United States Ambassador toNigeria, Mr. James Entwistle (in Sunday Newswatch, 2014:1) becomes instructive. He had told theNigerian government in July 2014, in reference to the Boko Haram menace that Nigeria needs morethan military might to dislodge insurgency. While assuring Nigerians that the United States is interested inseeing Nigeria win the war on terror and succeed as a nation, he advised the then President Jonathanadministration while fighting the insurgents through military strategy, to also develop impoverished areaswhere extremism takes root, make education accessible to all, empower free and fair press, protectcivilian population, encourage people to trust government, and engage the growing youth populationbeing swayed towards extremism as a result of lack of economic opportunities, education, and trust ingovernment. This advice is as good for all African States leaders facing terrorism, militancy, insurgencyor separatist movement, as far as prison congestion is concerned.

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REFERENCES

Africa News, UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, March 24, 2005.

African Union Convention On the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999 (Article 3).

Apata, Diran (2014) ‘‘Boko Haram Takes Bold Steps to the South West‘‘, Sunday Tribune, July 6.

Agomoh, Uju “Prison Decongestion and Reforms in Nigeria-Issues and Methods”.

Byrne J. and D. Hummer, “Examining the Impact of Institutional Culture on Prison Violence and Disorder– An Evidence – Based Review”, in J Byrne, D. Hummer, and F. Taxman, The Culture of PrisonViolence, Boston, Pearson.

Criminal Justice – Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/criminal justice (5/7/14)

Horn S.A. (2005), Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/prison.

http:/www.penalreform.org/central-east-and-south-africa.html.

http://thepointernewsonline.com/?p=22495(30/6/14)

http://www.osundefender.org/?p=74144(30/6/14)

Nnadi Chidi, (2017) “50,427 Awaiting Trial in Nigeria-Group”, Daily Sun, November, 17.

Nwokolo, Ernest (2014), “Sorry State of Oba Prison”, in The Nation. June 4.

Nwolise, OBC (2008), “Towards The Humanisation of Africa’s Prisons Currently Worse Than Zoos: AStrategic Discourse”, in African Notes, Journal of the Institute of African Studies, University ofIbadan, Vol. 32, Nos. 1 and 2.

Nwolise, OBC (2015), ‘’Motion for Serious Focus of Research on The Spiritual Dimension of Humanand National Security’’, Studies in Politics and Society, Journal of the Nigerian Political ScienceAssociation, Vol.3 No 1. December.

Nwolise, OBC, (2013) Is Physical Security Alone Enough for the Survival, Progress and Happinessof Man?, Ibadan, Ibadan University Press.

Nwolise, OBC, (2013b) ‘‘Forensics and Human Security in Nigeria: The Place of Strategic SpiritualIntelligence”, Strategic Periscope, Ibadan Exotic Dezines, 2016.

Orakwe, Ifediorah (2011), ‘‘Strategies for the Attainment of Total Prison Decongestion within the Contextof the Proposed Criminal Justice Reform”, Paper Presented to Nigerian Bar Association CriminalJustice Reform Conference, held at Abuja, July 18.

Pogoson, Irene (2013), Nigeria’s National Security in Age of Terrorism, Maiden Departmental Lecture,Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Ibadan.



Samuel, Walker, “Origins of the Contemporary Criminal Justice Paradigm: The American Bar FoundationSurvey 1953 – 1969” , Justice Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1;.

Santayana, G. (1905), Life of Reason in Common Sense, New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons.

Soanes, C. (2001), Oxford Dictionary of Current English, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Sunday Sun (2014), “Unrepentant Convicts: Jailed Robbers Return 10 Years After to Kill Victim’sSon”.

Sunday Tribune (2014), “Opposition Floods South with Northern Migrant Voters”. July 6.

Saturday Punch, (2014), Interview with the Minister of Interior, Abba Moro by F. Soriwei and A.Adepegba, ‘‘Nigerian Prison Facility Outdated – Moro‘‘, March 15.

Sunday Newswatch (2014), “US to Nigeria: ‘‘You Can’t Defeat Terrorism by Military Power Alone”,July 6.

Tzu Sun (2005), The Art of War, (Thomas Cleary translation) London, Shambhala.

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/60 Adopted December 9, 1994, Titled ‘‘Measure toEliminate International Terrorism”.

Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/fanaticism.

Wines, Michael, (2005), “Wasting Away, A Million Wait In African Jail”, New York Times.

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THE MONSTER CALLED CORRUPTION: ANY SILVER BULLETTO KILL THIS THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND

DEVELOPMENT?

by

Adebola B. EkanolaProfessor of Philosophy

and

Director, Office of International ProgrammesUniversity of IbadanTel: +234802346990

ABSTRACT

Corruption is a worldwide phenomenon currently devastating several nationsof the world threatening the security and development of nations, with apropensity and capacity to fight back. Effectively combating it needs wellthought out effective measures. The Buhari administration came on board in2015 promising to fight corruption which was in itself a major issue thatpropelled the January 15 1966 coup. This paper delves into the corruptionquagmire, x-raying its international character, its nature, and methods, beforeinterrogating its Nigerian context within which it threatened the nation’ssecurity and development. The author is of the view that killing corruptionwill require a combination of several measures.

Key words: Monster, Corruption, Silver Bullet, National Security.

INTRODUCTION

When national security is perceived not from the cold war era angle of mere state security based onmilitarism (Morgenthau, 1960; Lippman in Imobighe, 1998:14) but from the post cold war era prism of

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human security, welfare and development of the nation (McNamara, 1968, Hubert, 1999; Nwolise,2009), it becomes clear that corruption is not just a mere crime against the state, but a serious threat tohuman and national security.

Two claims can easily be made given our general experience of the phenomenon called corruptionin Nigeria. One, corruption underpins economic recession and there cannot be sustainable developmentin any society beset by corruption. Two, radical socio-political transformation is required to effectivelyaddress the problem of corruption in Nigeria, and neutralise its current threat to Nigeria’s nationalsecurity and development.

The broad objective of this presentation is to some extent define the direction of the dialogue oncorruption. Some views will seek to show the nexus between corruption and economic recession, aswell as, try to establish the necessity for socio-political transformation if the problem of corruptionwould be resolved in Nigeria. However, before these issues can be effectively addressed, the nature ofcorruption must first be interrogated and fully understood in its diverse manifestations. This is because agood understanding of the nature and manifestations of a problem is requisite to finding a viable solutionto it.

The need to have a clear and full understanding of the true nature of corruption comes particularly tofore by the fact that stakeholders in the Nigerian project, across its diverse social strata, seem tooperate different conceptions of corruption, most of which are obviously inadequate and unacceptablytoo narrow, thereby excluding a lot of instances and forms of corruption.

Three examples will drive home the point I am trying to establish very pungently:

(a) Some 34 years back, a teacher came to distribute some textbooks to my class. As he was aboutto conclude the exercise, he realised that a copy of the book was missing as he had brought theexact number of books that matched the number of students in the class. He immediately decidedto carry out a search on every student in the class. Before long, the missing book was found on oneof us. The ‘thief’ was brought to the front of the class and the teacher began to flog the boy with theinstruction that with each stroke of the cane delivered, the boy should say “I am a thief”. What wasshocking and quite remarkable was that the young lad refused to say that he was a thief, insistingthat he was just smart. The more he was beaten, the more he insisted that he was just smart. Theteacher had to take the erring boy to the office of the principal when he got tired of beating him. Henever agreed that he was a thief. If that boy was to find himself in an important political position, Iwonder how he would have defined corruption.

(b) It was a Monday in the month of February 2001. I had to take a bus from Dugbe to the Universityof Ibadan early in the morning to teach an early morning class. At a point during the journey, thebus was stopped by a police woman who demanded from the bus driver her “eto” (dues or right).The driver was not forthcoming with it. Before long, all the commuters in the bus, except me,became agitated by the delay and accused the driver of delaying them needlessly by refusing togive the police woman her dues. They all seemed to believe that the police woman had a right todemand and receive bribe from the bus driver. To these people, I wonder how they would definecorruption or fight it if they were in an official position meant for that.

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(c) An ex-governor of a state recently returned to Nigeria after he was jailed in the UK for corruptionand, more specifically, money laundering. Upon his return in pageantry, he organised a churchthanksgiving for himself and in the process remarked that he was neither a corrupt politician nor athief. He justified his claim that he was convicted for money laundering and not corruption, insistingthat there is a remarkable difference between the two. This brings up two important questions:what is money laundering and what is corruption? I will return to these questions later when Iclarify the notion of money laundering.

SETTING THE CONTEXT

Corruption is a global phenomenon that is as old as human society itself. Going by the world map andtable of the 2016 Corruption Perception Index generated by Transparency International(www.transparency, 2016), corruption is found in every part of the world. However, while no society isentirely free from it, corruption appears to be more entrenched and widespread in some countries thanin others.

Figure 1: Corruption Perception Index 2016

The Monster Called Corruption: Any Silver Bullet to Kill this Threat to National Security and... 175


Table 1

Corruption Perception Index 2016

2016 Rank

Country 2016 Score 2015 Score

2014 Score

2013 Score

2012 Score Region

1 Denmark 90 91 92 91 90 Europe and Central Asia

1 New Zealand 90 88 91 91 90 Asia Pacific

3 Finland 89 90 89 89 90 Europe and Central Asia

4 Sweden 88 89 87 89 88 Europe and Central Asia

5 Switzerland 86 86 86 85 86 Europe and Central Asia

6 Norway 85 87 86 86 85 Europe and Central Asia

7 Singapore 84 85 84 86 87 Asia Pacific

8 Netherlands 83 87 83 83 84 Europe and Central Asia

9 Canada 82 83 81 81 84 Americas

10 Germany 81 81 79 78 79 Europe and Central Asia

10 Luxembourg 81 81 82 80 80 Europe and Central Asia

10 United Kingdom 81 81 78 76 74 Europe and Central Asia

13 Australia 79 79 80 81 85 Asia Pacific

14 Iceland 78 79 79 78 82 Europe and Central Asia

15 Belgium 77 77 76 75 75 Europe and Central Asia

15 Hong Kong 77 75 74 75 77 Asia Pacific

17 Austria 75 76 72 69 69 Europe and Central Asia

18 United States 74 76 74 73 73 Americas

Europe and

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19 Ireland 73 75 74 72 69 Europe and Central Asia

20 Japan 72 75 76 74 74 Asia Pacific

21 Uruguay 71 74 73 73 72 Americas

22 Estonia 70 70 69 68 64 Europe and Central Asia

23 France 69 70 69 71 71 Europe and Central Asia

24 Bahamas 66 N/A 71 71 71 Americas

24 Chile 66 70 73 71 72 Americas

24 United Arab Emirates 66 70 70 69 68 Middle East and

North Africa

27 Bhutan 65 65 65 63 63 Asia Pacific

28 Israel 64 61 60 61 60 Middle East and North Africa

29 Poland 62 62 61 60 58 Europe and Central Asia

29 Portugal 62 63 63 62 63 Europe and Central Asia

31 Barbados 61 N/A 74 75 76 Americas

31 Qatar 61 71 69 68 68 Middle East and North Africa

31 Slovenia 61 60 58 57 61 Europe and Central Asia

31 Taiwan 61 62 61 61 61 Asia Pacific

35 Botswana 60 63 63 64 65 Sub Saharan Africa

35 Saint Lucia 60 N/A N/A 71 71 Americas

35 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 60 N/A 67 62 62 Americas

38 Cape Verde 59 55 57 58 60 Sub Saharan Africa

38 Dominica 59 N/A 58 58 58 Americas

38 Lithuania 59 61 58 57 54 Europe and Central Asia

41 Brunei 58 N/A N/A 60 55 Asia Pacific



41 Costa Rica 58 55 54 53 54 Americas

41 Spain 58 58 60 59 65 Europe and Central Asia

44 Georgia 57 52 52 49 52 Europe and Central Asia

44 Latvia 57 55 55 53 49 Europe and Central Asia

46 Grenada 56 N/A N/A N/A N/A Americas

47 Cyprus 55 61 63 63 66 Europe and Central Asia

47 Czech Republic 55 56 51 48 49 Europe and Central Asia

47 Malta 55 56 55 56 57 Europe and Central Asia

50 Mauritius 54 53 54 52 57 Sub Saharan Africa

50 Rwanda 54 54 49 53 53 Sub Saharan Africa

52 Korea (South) 53 56 55 55 56 Asia Pacific

53 Namibia 52 53 49 48 48 Sub Saharan Africa

54 Slovakia 51 51 50 47 46 Europe and Central Asia

55 Croatia 49 51 48 48 46 Europe and Central Asia

55 Malaysia 49 50 52 50 49 Asia Pacific

57 Hungary 48 51 54 54 55 Europe and Central Asia

57 Jordan 48 53 49 45 48 Middle East and North Africa

57 Romania 48 46 43 43 44 Europe and Central Asia

60 Cuba 47 47 46 46 48 Americas

60 Italy 47 44 43 43 42 Europe and Central Asia

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62 Sao Tome and Principe 46 42 42 42 42 Sub Saharan

Africa

62 Saudi Arabia 46 52 49 46 44 Middle East and North Africa

64 Montenegro 45 44 42 44 41 Europe and Central Asia

64 Oman 45 45 45 47 47 Middle East and North Africa

64 Senegal 45 44 43 41 36 Sub Saharan Africa

64 South Africa 45 44 44 42 43 Sub Saharan Africa

64 Suriname 45 36 36 36 37 Americas

69 Greece 44 46 43 40 36 Europe and Central Asia

70 Bahrain 43 51 49 48 51 Middle East and North Africa

70 Ghana 43 47 48 46 45 Sub Saharan Africa

72 Burkina Faso 42 38 38 38 38 Sub Saharan Africa

72 Serbia 42 40 41 42 39 Europe and Central Asia

72 Solomon Islands 42 N/A N/A N/A N/A Asia Pacific

75 Bulgaria 41 41 43 41 41 Europe and Central Asia

75 Kuwait 41 49 44 43 44 Middle East and North Africa

75 Tunisia 41 38 40 41 41 Middle East and North Africa

75 Turkey 41 42 45 50 49 Europe and Central Asia

79 Belarus 40 32 31 29 31 Europe and Central Asia

79 Brazil 40 38 43 42 43 Americas

79 China 40 37 36 40 39 Asia Pacific

79 India 40 38 38 36 36 Asia Pacific



83 Albania 39 36 33 31 33 Europe and Central Asia

83 Bosnia and Herzegovina 39 38 39 42 42 Europe and

Central Asia

83 Jamaica 39 41 38 38 38 Americas

83 Lesotho 39 44 49 49 45 Sub Saharan Africa

87 Mongolia 38 39 39 38 36 Asia Pacific

87 Panama 38 39 37 35 38 Americas

87 Zambia 38 38 38 38 37 Sub Saharan Africa

90 Colombia 37 37 37 36 36 Americas

90 Indonesia 37 36 34 32 32 Asia Pacific

90 Liberia 37 37 37 38 41 Sub Saharan Africa

90 Morocco 37 36 39 37 37 Middle East and North Africa

90

The FYR of Macedonia 37 42 45 44 43 Europe and

Central Asia

95 Argentina 36 32 34 34 35 Americas

95 Benin 36 37 39 36 36 Sub Saharan Africa

95 El Salvador 36 39 39 38 38 Americas

95 Kosovo 36 33 33 33 34 Europe and Central Asia

95 Maldives 36 N/A N/A N/A N/A Asia Pacific

95 Sri Lanka 36 37 38 37 40 Asia Pacific

101 Gabon 35 34 37 34 35 Sub Saharan Africa

101 Niger 35 34 35 34 33 Sub Saharan Africa

101 Peru 35 36 38 38 38 Americas

101 Philippines 35 35 38 36 34 Asia Pacific

101 Thailand 35 38 38 35 37 Asia Pacific

101 Timor-Leste 35 28 28 30 33 Asia Pacific

180

101 Trinidad and Tobago 35 39 38 38 39 Americas

108 Algeria 34 36 36 36 34 Middle East and North Africa

108 Côte d´Ivoire 34 32 32 27 29 Sub Saharan Africa

108 Egypt 34 36 37 32 32 Middle East and North Africa

108 Ethiopia 34 33 33 33 33 Sub Saharan Africa

108 Guyana 34 29 30 27 28 Americas

113 Armenia 33 35 37 36 34 Europe and Central Asia

113 Bolivia 33 34 35 34 34 Americas

113 Vietnam 33 31 31 31 31 Asia Pacific

116 Mali 32 35 32 28 34 Sub Saharan Africa

116 Pakistan 32 30 29 28 27 Asia Pacific

116 Tanzania 32 30 31 33 35 Sub Saharan Africa

116 Togo 32 32 29 29 30 Sub Saharan Africa

120 Dominican Republic 31 33 32 29 32 Americas

120 Ecuador 31 32 33 35 32 Americas

120 Malawi 31 31 33 37 37 Sub Saharan Africa

123 Azerbaijan 30 29 29 28 27 Europe and Central Asia

123 Djibouti 30 34 34 36 36 Sub Saharan Africa

123 Honduras 30 31 29 26 28 Americas

123 Laos 30 25 25 26 21 Asia Pacific

123 Mexico 30 35 35 34 34 Americas

123 Moldova 30 33 35 35 36 Europe and Central Asia

123 Paraguay 30 27 24 24 25 Americas

Sub Saharan



123 Sierra Leone 30 29 31 30 31 Sub Saharan Africa

131 Iran 29 27 27 25 28 Middle East and North Africa

131 Kazakhstan 29 28 29 26 28 Europe and Central Asia

131 Nepal 29 27 29 31 27 Asia Pacific

131 Russia 29 29 27 28 28 Europe and Central Asia

131 Ukraine 29 27 26 25 26 Europe and Central Asia

136 Guatemala 28 28 32 29 33 Americas

136 Kyrgyzstan 28 28 27 24 24 Europe and Central Asia

136 Lebanon 28 28 27 28 30 Middle East and North Africa

136 Myanmar 28 22 21 21 15 Asia Pacific

136 Nigeria 28 26 27 25 27 Sub Saharan Africa

136 Papua New Guinea 28 25 25 25 25 Asia Pacific

142 Guinea 27 25 25 24 24 Sub Saharan Africa

142 Mauritania 27 31 30 30 31 Middle East and North Africa

142 Mozambique 27 31 31 30 31 Sub Saharan Africa

145 Bangladesh 26 25 25 27 26 Asia Pacific

145 Cameroon 26 27 27 25 26 Sub Saharan Africa

145 Gambia 26 28 29 28 34 Sub Saharan Africa

145 Kenya 26 25 25 27 27 Sub Saharan Africa

145 Madagascar 26 28 28 28 32 Sub Saharan Africa

145 Nicaragua 26 27 28 28 29 Americas

182

151 Tajikistan 25 26 23 22 22 Europe and Central Asia

151 Uganda 25 25 26 26 29 Sub Saharan Africa

153 Comoros 24 26 26 28 28 Sub Saharan Africa

154 Turkmenistan 22 18 17 17 17 Europe and Central Asia

154 Zimbabwe 22 21 21 21 20 Sub Saharan Africa

156 Cambodia 21 21 21 20 22 Asia Pacific

156 Democratic Republic of Congo 21 22 22 22 21 Sub Saharan Africa

156 Uzbekistan 21 19 18 17 17 Europe and Central Asia

159 Burundi 20 21 20 21 19 Sub Saharan Africa

159 Central African Republic 20 24 24 25 26 Sub Saharan Africa

159 Chad 20 22 22 19 19 Sub Saharan Africa

159 Haiti 20 17 19 19 19 Americas

159 Republic of Congo 20 23 23 22 26 Sub Saharan Africa

164 Angola 18 15 19 23 22 Sub Saharan Africa

164 Eritrea 18 18 18 20 25 Sub Saharan Africa

166 Iraq 17 16 16 16 18 Middle East and North Africa

166 Venezuela 17 17 19 20 19 Americas

168 Guinea-Bissau 16 17 19 19 25 Sub Saharan Africa

169 Afghanistan 15 11 12 8 8 Asia Pacific

170 Libya 14 16 18 15 21 Middle East and North Africa



170 Sudan 14 12 11 11 13 Middle East and North Africa

170 Yemen 14 18 19 18 23 Middle East and North Africa

173 Syria 13 18 20 17 26 Middle East and North Africa

174 Korea (North) 12 8 8 8 8 Asia Pacific

175 South Sudan 11 15 15 14 N/A Sub Saharan Africa

176 Somalia 10 8 8 8 8 Sub Saharan Africa

Both the 2016 corruption perception map and table above show the extent to which the phenomenon ofcorruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians globally. Both show that nocountry is totally free of corruption. Over two-thirds of the 176 countries and territories in that year’sindex fall below the midpoint of the scale of highly corrupt to very clean countries in terms of corruption.This suggests that these countries are more than averagely corrupt. Indeed, the global average score,according to the corruption perception index indicates endemic corruption in more than half of thecountries of the world. Again, from the diagram above, the top-scoring countries (yellow in colour)are far outnumbered by orange and red countries where citizens face the tangible impact of corruptiondaily, with corruption threatening their existence and peace, and of their nation’s security anddevelopment.

A very saddening aspect of the 2016 report on corruption perception is that more countriesdegenerated than improved in the year’s results, showing the urgent need for more determination in theglobal efforts to thwart corruption. In most nations including Nigeria, corruption has permeated thedefence and security apparatus and diverted funds meant for national security and development intoprivate pockets. Thus, corruption all over the world is today a major threat to the security and developmentof peoples and nations.

THE NIGERIAN CONTEXT

By the 2016 corruption index, the perception of corruption in Nigeria is very high. It is ranked 136 ofthe 176 countries on the table with the implication that Nigeria is the 40th most corrupt of the 176-ranked countries. It is important to note that, historically, Nigeria has always recognised and at leastpaid lip-service to the urgency of the need to undermine corruption. It is for this reason that various anti-corruption laws, policies, strategies and parastatals have been established. Anti-corruption laws in Nigeriainclude:

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1. Banks and Other Financial Institutions (Amendment) Act 1991

2. Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Banks (Amendment) Act1994.

3. Independent Corrupt Practices & Other Related Offences Act 2000

4. Penal Code Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004

5. Criminal Code Law of Federation of Nigeria 2004

6. EFCC Est. Act 2004

7. Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act 2006

8. Fiscal Responsibilities Act 2010

9. Freedom of Information Act 2011

10. Money Laundering (Prohibition) (Amendment) Act 2012

11. Miscellaneous Offences Act

12. Code of Conduct Act

13. Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Act

Unfortunately, from the prevailing level of corruption in the country, it is clear that previous efforts toundermine corruption have not yielded desired level of results. Going by the 2014 corruption index,Nigeria ranked 136 out of 176 countries with a score of 27. It also reported the public perception ofcorruption to be very high with 85% of Nigerians surveyed holding that corruption in the country hasincreased between 2011 and 2013. Global Financial Integrity estimated as at 2014, that more than$157 billion had left the country illicitly. (www.gfintegrity.org)

The corruption score sheet for Nigeria, despite all the anti-corruption laws and parastatals, suggeststhat corruption cannot be easily legislated out of existence in Nigeria. Perhaps this is because corruptionis not primarily a legal problem. At least, it is clearly a universal human phenomenon, with diversedimensions, that is not peculiar to Nigeria and Nigerians.

Nonetheless, the truth about corruption in Nigeria is that it has been very visible right from itsinception. This claim was copiously made by such Nigerian scholars as O. B. C. Nwolise, ChinuaAchebe and Wole Soyinka who in various ways affirmed that the beginning of corruption in Nigeria islocated in its colonial foundation, especially the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectoratesto create the entity now known as Nigeria (Gashinbaki, on-line). The aforementioned scholars are allagreed that since its inception as a country, the seed for ethnic, religious and regional divides impregnatedwith corruption was sown in the country. Although, I hate to be a harbinger of sad news, but the realityis that corruption is now endemic in Nigeria, intricately woven into every sector and layer of the Nigeriansociety. And, despite the hype about the anti-corruption crusade of the President Buhari-led administration,



there has not been any significant change in our corruption ranking. It remains 136 of the 176 countriesranked. The only difference is that while it scored 27% in 2014, 26% was recorded in 2015, the yearBuhari took over governance, while the country recorded 28% in 2016.

That there has not been any remarkable change in the corruption status of Nigeria leads back tothe earlier assertion that before a problem can be resolved, there must first be a good grasp of its nature.Thus, before the problem of corruption can be effectively tackled in Nigeria (or anywhere), its characterand diverse manifestations must be fully understood. Thus, we are back to the question: what is the truenature of corruption?

THE NATURE OF CORRUPTION

The phenomenon of corruption by its complex and multi-dimensional character, has taken on the characterof a hydra-headed monster that does not afford a simple explanation or solution. Indeed, there is nosilver bullet for the beast called corruption. Nonetheless, it seems that there is the need to interrogate theconcept of corruption in a way that will enhance its understanding as well as the capacity to undermineits malaise. Corruption, in literal terms, connotes putrefactive decay, rottenness, perversion or deformationof the nature of a thing. It refers to a condition of filth, pollution or contamination (www.businessdictionary).However, when employed within the context of human social relations, it takes on a very strong moralconnotation to refer to any form of dishonesty leading to or manifesting in an abuse or illegitimateuse of bestowed power or position or official capacity to acquire a personal benefit. It might berightly described as a form of moral depravity, debasement or perversion of integrity. That acts ofcorruption are morally improper is shown in the mere fact that both the perpetrators and beneficiaries ofcorrupt actions usually want to keep their activities secret (2015dictionary, on line) That is, they willnormally want to veil the improper nature of this ugly exchange relationship.

An interesting account of the notion of corruption offered by Petrus van Duyne (2001:73-98),describes it as “an improbity or decay in the decision-making process in which a decision-maker consentsto deviate or demands deviation from the criterion which should rule his or her decision-making, inexchange for a reward or for the promise or expectation of a reward, while these motives influencing hisor her decision-making cannot be part of the justification of the decision.” As such, corruption, accordingto Ruzindana (in Oyinola, 2011) is a social and contagious (Gbenga, 2008) problem involving a routinedeviation from established standards and norms by public officials and parties with whom they interact.It is usually criminal in nature.

However, it is very important to note that all human decisions and activities are essentially determinedand driven by values and moral standards. It is in this regard that we need to appreciate the psychologicaldimension of corruption. It begins with a mindset characterised by the readiness and willingness todeviate from what is the proper and ideal standard of decision making and behaviour. No doubt,psychological, socio-political and socio-economic factors influence and determine how we think, thevalues we uphold and, in the final analysis, what we do. Within the context of our discourse on corruption,they determine the extent to which people will be disposed to corrupt practices. An instance of each ofthese factors will be highlighted below:

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i. Psychological: Basic human trait t inkers with rules: There is the human tendency not toobey rules or conform to what is considered standard behaviour. If we think back to thebiblical account of Adam, Eve and the serpent in the garden of Eden, it should be appreciatedthat there is something in human nature that tends to flout rules, regulations and establishedstandards, especially when there is a perceived gain and good prospects of avoidance ofdetection and punishment.

ii. Socio-Political Leadership: Just like fish that starts to rot from the head downwards,corruption frequently (but not always) develops gradually as a top-down disease. Whenleaders in society are corrupt, they become bad examples, and erode standards for properdecision making, and this will most likely encourage followers and members of society to alsobecome corrupt. Thus, defective leadership provides a viable top-down explanation of howcorruption festers into a societal disease (Petrus Van Duyen, 2001:89).

iii. Poverty/Socio-economic facts of income and subsistence: Economic history has shownthat people tend to resort to diverse forms of corrupt practices when income is grossly belowwhat is required for subsistence. Simply put, there is what is called poverty-induced corruption.This is exacerbated by the wide economic inequality between the ruling elites who havecorruptly amassed great wealth from public funds, and the bulk of the population that isgrossly underpaid and forced to live beneath the poverty line.

SCALES OF CORRUPTION

Corruption occurs at virtually all levels of social existence and in different forms. For our present purpose,I will discuss three major levels of corruption.

a. Petty/|Small Corruption: This manifests at a small scale, usually at the level of the executionof public services, when public officers interact directly with the public. It is common at thelevel of junior and middle level officers, who are usually significantly underpaid. It involves,for instance, an exchange of little or small improper gifts, which may be in cash or kind, orwhen people employ their personal connections or positions to obtain favours or to expeditea routine government procedure. A lot of this goes on in the public service and private sectorservices.

b. Grand/Major Corruption: This occurs at the highest level of private and public organisationsand involves a significant subversion of the economic, political and legal systems. This is thelevel at which high ranking political defence, security and business elites perpetuate corruption.Some ministers, military Generals, bank managers, etc have been found to have stolen fromthe national commonwealth. A lot of funds meant for arms purchase to fight Boko Haramelements in the North East were stolen by some Generals and their civilian accomplices,while the enemy took Nigeria’s territory, killing, maiming, raping, and burning houses!



c. Systemic Corruption: This is also called endemic corruption and it thrives basically on theinadequacies of existing political, economic and legal institutions or the internal weaknessesof an organisation. It is the form of corruption that has been woven into the very fabric ofsociety and its major institutions in ways that it has become part and parcel of the essence ofthe society (https//en.m.wikipedia). It should be noted that systemic corruption provides aplatform for both grand and petty corruption to thrive such that wherever it exists, corruptionwould also blossom at both the grand and petty levels. When corruption gets to this level, itbecomes accepted as the norm with no serious attempt to veil its nature or keep it secret.

FORMS AND METHODS OF CORRUPTION

Forms of Corruption

Corruption takes different forms in society to include abuse of discretion, favouritism, nepotism andclientelism borrowing from Gashinbaki:

a. Abuse of discretion consists of any misuse of authority or decision-making powers toillegitimately benefit oneself or any other party, directly or indirectly. This occurs, for instance,when a judge perverts the course of justice or when, as is common in Nigeria, custom officialsallow certain imported products to be cleared at entry ports without proper documentationand appropriate fees paid.

b. Favouritism, nepotism and clientelism refer to actions designed to unduly or illegitimatelybenefit an undeserving person or group to which the corrupt actor is related. This may be afriend (favouritism), member of family (nepotism), member of an ethnic group (ethnicity) ormember of an association (clientelism).

Methods of Corruption

Acts of corruption are carried out using diverse methods that include:

• Embezzlement and theft consist in a person having access to some public funds or assetsillegitimately converting such to his or her own personal benefit.

• Fraud involves the use of deception to convince a person or group to give an unauthorisedparty access to some funds or assets.

• Bribery consists of using some inducement, which may be in cash or kind, to achieve someillegitimate ends.

• Extortion and blackmail employ the threat of violence to get certain individuals or parties togive up money or assets to the extortionists or blackmailers.

• Money laundering is the process of “washing” money acquired through illegal and corruptmeans to cleanse it. It is a process by which illegitimately acquired money is passed through

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legitimate channels to give it an appearance of legitimacy. By its nature, money launderingpresupposes corruption and facilitates it.

POLITICAL CORRUPTION: A MAJOR GLOBAL/NIGERIAN CHALLENGE

No doubt, corruption takes place in virtually all social sectors: the judicial, educational, political, military,security, economic, health, non-governmental and others. However, corruption in the political sectorhas a more devastating effect on society due to the ripple effect it has on virtually all other social sectorsas well as its negative implications for the much-desired social development. In this regard, Oyinlola(2011) affirmed: “the growing corruption in Nigeria can be traced to people holding power at thefederal, state, and local government levels”. He, however, recognises that the problem has spread fromthe principal actors in the political arena to include people in both private and public positions and eventraditional rulers.

Described simply, political corruption involves the abuse, misuse or illegitimate use of a politicaloffice, power, or resources, by (elected) government officials either for personal gain or to undulybenefit any other party. Methods employed to perpetrate political corruption can be embezzlement,fraud, outright theft, bribery, extortion, blackmail or money laundering.

With the prevalence of corruption in Nigeria’s political sector and its spread to virtually all othersectors, the general opinion in recent times is that corruption is a major bane of socio-economic andinfrastructural development in Nigeria (Ogundiya, 2009). This is a deadly threat to human and nationalsecurity. Following the same line of thought expressed above, the welcome statement on the ICPCwebsite is that corruption in Nigeria, especially in its political arena and governmental circles,

undermines democratic institutions, retards economic development andcontributes to government instability. Corruption attacks the foundationof democratic institutions by distorting electoral processes, pervertingthe rule of law, and creating bureaucratic quagmires whose only reasonfor existence is the soliciting of bribes.

Other grievous effects of corruption on social and economic development and in building a nation asnoted by Oyinlola (2011) include:

• Diversion of defence and security resources to personal pockets.

• Diversion of development resources for private gain

• Misallocation of talent

• Lost tax revenue

• Negative impact on quality of infrastructure and public services

• Slowing of economic growth.



CONCLUSION: THE URGENT NEED TO ADDRESS THEPROBLEM OF CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA

The above suggests that the core of corruption in Nigeria is in the political arena and governmentalcircles. This being so, it appears quite reasonable to hold that addressing the problem of corruption atthis sphere of our social existence would go a long way in addressing it in all other social sectors.

The present government under the leadership of President Muhammadu Buhari claims to be radicallyanti-corruption. Indeed, one of the most touted ideals of President Buhari and a cardinal promise of hisregime is that of zero-tolerance for corruption. However, the extent to which the present regime inNigeria has been faithful to this ideal and promise will have to be carefully determined. It is hoped andprayed that his government succeeds in this war on corruption which needs total national mobilisation.As rightly noted by Nwolise (2015), government fights battles, but the entire nation fight wars.”

No doubt, for the diverse and seemingly complicated socio-economic, political and security problemsbesetting Nigeria to be effectively addressed, and for our dear country, Nigeria, to be firmly positionedon the path of holistic and sustainable development, the hydra-headed monster of corruption, especiallypolitical corruption, often manifesting in economic and financial crimes, must be tackled decisively. Thisrequires: a clear understanding of what needs to be done; what should not be done; how to do whatshould be done; and firm and consistent political will and determination to effectively combat the monster.

It was stated earlier that because of its complex nature, the problem of corruption does not seem tohave a silver bullet to kill it. Hydra-headed problems require hydra-headed solutions. The following aresome viable steps towards the resolution of the corruption problem in Nigeria. First, sweeping thestairs from the top: if corruption, as indicated earlier in this paper, is largely a leadership problem, itsresolution must begin with the leadership. The war against corruption must begin with the legal, moraland practical entrenchment of the principles of transparency and accountability in politics and governance.There must also be in place adequate deterrent structures that will discourage corruption. However, wemust realise that the problem is not primarily the lack of principles, rules and structures to check corruption,but their systematic neglect and the lack of political will to insist on them.

Second, Attitudinal Change: There must be an attitudinal change in the society from one thatcondones and accepts corruption to a radical rejection of all manifestations of corruption. This can befacilitated by an intensive moral re-orientation project across all spheres of social existence and levels ofeducational structure. Citizens must be ready to question illegal wealth. Third, Systematic Interferencewith Basic Human Tendencies: As legal principles and judicial structures are put in place to discouragecorruption, there should also be a robust moral re-orientation programme directed at undermining thebasic human tendency to flout rules and regulations. Legal cum judicial structures should be such thatensure that offenders are not only promptly apprehended, but also promptly tried and punished. Fourth,Poverty Alleviation: poverty alleviation and elimination programmes as well as the goals of sustainabledevelopment must be vigorously pursued. The more people are empowered economically, the lesswill be the tendency to resort to corruption. Governments and private organisations can not oweworkers salaries or pay them peanuts in the name of salaries in a period of war against corruption. Itdoes not add up.

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The following questions are pertinent as this paper is concluded: Do we really want to kill themonster called corruption? Do we have the will and determination to fight the monster? As is hyped inrecent times, if we do not kill corruption, it will eventually kill us as a nation and will, in literal terms, killmany of us as individuals. As Nigerians, as moral agents, as rational agents, the choice is ours. However,what is clear is that several silver bullets fired with the greatest strength of the nation are today requiredto kill corruption to save the people and the nation and catalyse its national security and development.

REFERENCES

Dictionary.com, 2015, LLC.

Duyne. Petrus C. van, (2001), “Will Caligula go transparent? Corruption in acts & attitudes”. Forumon Crime and Society. Vol. 1, No. 2: 73-98

Gashinbaki. Iliyasu, B., Anti-corruption: An evaluation of strategies, legislations and systems inNigeria. www.commentary.com/nigeria.htm. Accessed on 12 August 2017

Gbenga, O. A. (2008), Service Delivery Surveys: Applying the Sentinel Community SurveillanceMethodology, Country Overviews, EDI. London: Sage Publications https//en.m.wikipedia.org.wiki.corruption.

Herbert O. (1999), “Small Arms, Demand Reduction and Human Security”, Ploughshares Briefing.Imobighe T. (1998), The Management of National Security, Inaugural Lecture, Edo State University,

Ekpoma.McNamara R. (1968), The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office, New York, Harper and Row.Morgenthau H. (1960), Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York.Nwolise OBC (2009), “Peace and Security”, in I. O. Albert (ed), Praxis of Political Concepts and

Cliches in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, Ibadan, Bookcraft.Nwolise OBC (2015), Nigeria Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: Combating Corruption in President

Buhari’s Era of Change: Input To Strategy, Ibadan, Gold Press Ltd.Ogundiya, Ilufoye S., (2009), Corruption in Nigeria: Theoretical Perspectives and Some Explanations.

Anthropologist. 11 (4): 281-292.Oyinola Oluwagmamiga Ayobami. (2011) Corruption Eradication in Nigeria: An Appraisal.http://

unllib.unl.edu/LPP/Library Philosophy and Practice.www.businessdictionary.com/definition/corruption.html#ixzz3oRabANVv and http://www.your

dictionary.com/corruption#mxuyDSAf6VrUSR2H.99. Retrieved on 18/10/2015See www. Gfintegrity.org.or www.opinion.prermiumtimesng.com/tag/global-financial-integrity-report-

2014See www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016.



FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: COMPETITION OR COOPERATION INTHE FACE OF CONTEMPORARY ASYMMETRIC SECURITY

CHALLENGES CONFRONTING THE WORLD

by

Femi Olufunmilade, Ph.D.Head, Department of International Relations

and Strategic Studies,Igbinedion University,

Okada, Edo State.Email: [email protected]

ABSTRACT

This author examines the changing face of foreign intelligence in theinternational system. In the cold-war era and immediately thereafter, nationspursued foreign intelligence on a competitive basis. The emergence ofasymmetric security challenges today is changing this to cooperation andcollaboration. This is because terrorism has become a world-wide threat,requiring a collective response of world nations since no one nation cancombat it alone.

Key words: Foreign Intelligence, Competition, Cooperation, Asymmetric SecurityChallenges.

INTRODUCTION

The importance of timely and accurate intelligence to security operations cannot be overemphasised,especially in a world where emerging threats are complex in nature and the task of surmounting themcalls for innovative approaches. Having a well-equipped military and police is no longer enough tosecure or defend any country. This was the lesson a shocked world was jolted to learn with the 9/11

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attack on the United States in 2001. Prior to this time, except, perhaps, with the use of an intercontinentalballistic missile primed to defy detection by the most sophisticated anti-missile asset of the US, a successfulaerial attack on the US, a country that possesses a redoubtable air defence system, was difficult toimagine. Yet, over 3,000 lives, in addition to properties worth billions of dollars, were lost to an al-Qaeda terrorist attack that converted passenger aircrafts to bombs of sorts right within the US homeland.

This attack was unconventional both in conception and execution. There were no noticeable movementof troops or arms and ammunition to any theatre of war that could have been intercepted. Until themoment of attack when the terrorists who had purchased their flight tickets and had boarded theirrespective passenger aircraft hijacked the planes and redirected them to the World Trade Centre,among other targets, nobody, except the terrorists and their sponsors, knew those planes would soonbe deployed to cause deaths and destruction on a scale that could only be linked to war scenariobombing in the movies or anyone’s imagination. Worse still, that was just one out of many possibleunconventional terrorist modes of attack, including suicide bombing. This development has underscoredthe point that real time intelligence holds the key to effectual counterterrorism strategy. Unless intelligenceis available and used in real time to nip terrorist attacks and their horrendous consequences in the bud,possession of an intimidating fighting force with state-of-the-art arms and ammunition will not availmuch. However, the intelligence required is not confined within the borders of any nation under thethreat of terrorism. This is a threat that is cross-border in nature and, in fact, intercontinental in its reach.9/11 was only executed in the United States but it was conceived and planned in Afghanistan by al-Qaeda, working in cahoots with the Taliban, thousands of miles away. In essence, the type of intelligencerequired to pre-empt al-Qaeda’s attacks by the United States is foreign in nature as al-Qaeda has itsoperational headquarters outside American shores.

This situation then compels a special attention to what we may call Foreign Intelligence. Traditionally,typologies of intelligence are anchored on two distinctive features: sector and method. Sector has to dowith the field of human endeavour about which intelligence is sought. This may range from security ordefence to economy, politics to technology; hence, we are conversant with intelligence being qualifiedwith such terms as security, defence, economic, political, and scientific/technological. Method is aboutthe mode of intelligence collection: human intelligence (HUMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT),imagery intelligence (IMINT), signal intelligence (SIGINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), and ofrecent Strategic Spiritual Intelligence (SSI) as espoused by Nwolise (2009, 2012, 2013, 2016). It isindeed rare to find intelligence being categorised in terms of its location. But with the advent of globalterrorism, this is a categorisation that is inevitable largely because intelligence on the motives, capabilities,vulnerabilities, and plans of a terrorist organisation with international networks cannot be obtained withinone nation. Two broad strands of intel are needed: local and foreign. Thus, the basic question aboutintelligence collection in this era can be framed as follows: Is it locally collected or externally sourced? Ifit is local, it means it is obtained within the territorial jurisdiction of the government of a nation that utilisesit and we may call it Local Intelligence (LOCINT). If, on the other hand, it is sourced from anothernation or a foreign jurisdiction, it becomes Foreign Intelligence (FORINT). FORINT, if novel conceptually,has long been in engagement in praxis. In the Bible, when Moses sent spies to Jericho to spy out the land

Foreign Intelligence: Competition or Cooperation in the Face of Contemporary Asymmetric ... 193


against a planned invasion of the city, it was an exercise in FORINT gathering. Also, albeit bearing adifferent label, FORINT has been in the corpus of intelligence literature since classical times. Sun Tzu inthe section of his classical masterwork, The Art of War, titled “The Use of Spies”, identifies five categoriesof human intelligence (HUMINT), namely: (1) Local spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies; (4)doomed spies; (5) surviving spies. The second category – inward spies – refers to spies recruited fromwithin the ranks of a rival nation’s officials, while the third category – converted spies or intelligenceoperatives of other nations, who, for reasons which may range from the pecuniary to the ideological,agree to be double agents for a rival nation. Both categories are recruited for the purpose of collectingand transmitting FORINT.

There are at least three characteristics that distinguish FORINT from LOCINT, depending on thecontext. First, as we have earlier noted, is location: one is undertaken locally, and the latter abroad.This engenders the other features. Second, is illegality. In other words, intelligence collection in aforeign jurisdiction, albeit authorised by a government, is illegal inasmuch as it is undertaken secretlywith the knowledge that the host government will criminalise the incursion in the event of exposure. Inthis regard, embassies constitute veritable hideouts of spies operating abroad under diplomatic cover asdefence attaches, consular officers, ambassadors and so on. Third is the personnel. Whereas, LOCINTis, invariably, undertaken in all ramifications, from collection to utilisation, by the local intelligence personnelof the country in whose jurisdiction the intelligence is being sourced, FORINT can be undertaken eitherby intelligence operatives deployed into a foreign jurisdiction or by the personnel of a country fromwhose jurisdiction intelligence is needed. The latter instance could be the case through an intelligencecooperation between two nations or more. For example, Pakistan’s ISI could furnish America’s CIAwith vital intelligence on the activities of an al-Qaeda cell domiciled in Pakistan and plotting againstAmerica’s interest. This then makes FORINT to be of two kinds. The type we have thus described,having three distinguishing characteristics – location, illegality, and personnel – which we may callClandestine FORINT, and the one obtained through intelligence cooperation that could be labelledCooperative FORINT, which does not share the characteristic of illegality with the former but does interms of location because it is collected from a foreign territory and personnel; the collectors could beoperatives of the host nation acting unilaterally or in concert with their counterparts from another nationwhich, perhaps, is allowed to participate because of their special skills or advanced technology.

While global terrorism makes the collection of FORINT imperative for nations combating terrorism,we should not erroneously confine the importance of FORINT to counterterrorism. Its utility certainlygoes beyond security or defence to encompass other pursuits a nation might construe as an element ofits national interest, which has to be advanced in foreign jurisdictions. FORINT can be geared towardsthe protection or promotion of economic, political, scientific/ technological interests. It is a commonrefrain among development experts in the developing world that no country donates technology toanother but rather the way to acquire technology is either through research and development (R and D)or by stealing same from advanced nations. Stealing technology from other nations is a form of FORINTcollection. Having made this clarification, the scope of this article is FORINT in relation to combatingglobal terrorism. The main problem for interrogation is ascertaining the extent of intelligence accessed

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by nations engaged in the fight against global terrorism, having asserted at the outset that the key toeffectual counterterrorism is access to intelligence in real time. In this connection, we proceed from thepremise that FORINT is accessed clandestinely and through cooperation with foreign governments.The first salient question we pose is: how effective has been Clandestine FORINT by state actors in thefight against terrorism? Next we ask: how widespread and effective is Cooperative FORINT amongnations fighting terrorism? And, finally, which is the most suitable option in counterterrorism? The rest ofthe article is divided into two sections. The first section furnishes a theoretical explanation that undergirdsClandestine FORINT and assesses the effectiveness of clandestine collection, while the second discussesthe extent of the popularity and effectiveness of Cooperative FORINT in the fight against terrorism.

REALISM, CLANDESTINE FORINT AND COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS

Whereas, the United Nations Charter to which most nations are signatories enjoins the inviolability ofthe territorial integrity and sovereignty of member nations of the world body, nations consciously anddeliberately do cross their respective borders into the territories of sister nations to perpetrate acts thatamount to violation of the letter and spirit of the Charter. One area that has become a recurring decimalin this regard is clandestine intelligence activities undertaken without approval by nations in one another’sjurisdiction. This fact underscores the mutual distrust and antagonism that persist among nations in anera when the United Nations, established in 1945 as an interactive forum among nations for the promotionof peace and security, is expected to eliminate the kind of communication disconnect that provided afertile ground from which both the first and second world wars sprouted. The unrelenting pursuit ofpower, according to realists, is the factor responsible for clandestine intelligence. Power, for the realists,is the currency of international politics. The more power a nation has, the more secure it becomes andvice versa. Power remains a dominant quest for nations generally because there is no supra-nationalgovernment to enforce such international laws as could guarantee a peaceful, war-free world. Internationallaws can be broken by powerful nations and even smaller ones like Israel that enjoy the protection of apowerful nation – the United States. Israel for example has violated several UN resolutions on Palestineto no consequence, while the United States has invaded sovereign states like Panama, Iraq, and Vietnamwithout the imprimatur of the UN and without any sanction following save the usual denunciation by acouple of nations and the Secretary General of the United Nations. In this anarchic international systemwhere might is right, realists are of the strong persuasion that the best defence of its sovereignty a nationcould muster is power of such magnitude redoubtable enough to deter a potential adversary nation fromattacking its interests.

This is the position of those Mearsheimer (2006) has classified as Defensive Realists. On the otherside of the pole are those he described as Offensive Realists. For this category of realists, a nationhaving the capacity to defend itself against external adversaries is not enough guarantee of security. Inany case, what is considered enough to deter may suffer from error of miscalculation of one’s power onthe one hand and the enemy’s on the other. A better approach therefore is to amass such power aswould put one at an advantage in the event of an offensive engagement of an adversary. In other words,



it is better to err on the side of caution. The basis of the pursuit of power by nations is aptly summarisedby Mearsheimer (2006) as follows:

…States can never be certain about the intentions of other states. Statesultimately want to know whether other states are determined to use forceto alter the balance of power (revisionist states), or whether they aresatisfied enough with it that they have no interest in using force to changeit (status quo states). The problem, however, is that it is almost impossibleto discern another state’s intentions with a high degree of certainty. Unlikemilitary capabilities, intentions cannot be empirically verified. Intentionsare in the minds of decision-makers and they are especially difficult todiscern…But even if one could determine another state’s intentions today,there is no way to determine its future intentions. It is impossible to knowwho will be running foreign policy in any state five or ten years fromnow, much less whether they will have aggressive intentions. This is notto say that states can be certain that their neighbours have or will haverevisionist goals. Instead, the argument is that policy-makers can neverbe certain whether they are dealing with a revisionist or status quo state.

What Mearsheimer did not add to his submission is the fact that nations do make serious attemptsto unravel the intentions and capabilities of other nations in their quest for power. This is done throughforeign intelligence. In fact, the fulcrum of the pursuit of power by competing nations is ClandestineFORINT. It is on the basis of such intelligence that a nation is able to have estimates of the militarycapabilities of rival nations and the intentions of their leaders as a prerequisite to acquiring such militarycapabilities as would dwarf the latter’s as well as thwart their hostile plots. This leads us to an interestingparadox. Clandestine FORINT - albeit illegal, immoral, and unacceptable by international law, as wellas norms and mores of inter-state relations – is not strictly a covert endeavour anymore. The importanceattached to it is such that nations overtly establish agencies for its collection. The table below furnishesa list of foreign intelligence agencies of nations we reckon to be the most powerful in their respectiveregions.

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S/N REGION/ COUNTRY

AGENCY SCOPE OF INTELLIGENCE

YEAR FOUNDED

North America

1. USA Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Foreign 18 Sept. 1947

2. Canada Intelligence Branch (Canadian Forces)

Local/ Foreign 1982

3. Mexico Centre for Research and National Security

Foreign 13 Feb. 1989

South America

4. Brazil Brazilian Intelligence Agency

Local/Foreign

7 Dec. 1999

5. Argentina Federal Intelligence Agency

Local/Foreign 5 March 2015

6. Chile National Intelligence Agency

Local 2004

Europe 7. Russia Foreign Intelligence

Service (successor to KGB)

Foreign Dec. 1991

8. UK Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) or (MI6)

Foreign 1909

9. France Directorate-General for External Security (DGSE)

Foreign 2 April 1982

Asia 10. China Ministry of State Security

(MSS) Foreign July 1983

11. India Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)

Foreign 21 Sept. 1968

12. Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)

Foreign 1 Jan. 1948

Africa 13. Nigeria National intelligence

Agency (NIA) Foreign 5 June 1986

14. South Africa State Security Agency Local/Foreign 2009

15. Egypt General Intelligence Directorate (GID)

Local/Foreign 1954

Table 1

Selected Forint Agencies



Middle East

16. Israel Mossad Foreign 13 Dec. 1949

17. Iran Ministry of Intelligence of the Islamic Republic of Iran (VAJA)

Local/Foreign 18 August 1984

18. Saudi Arabia General Intelligence Presidency

Local/Foreign 1955

Australasia

19. Australia Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS)

Foreign 1952

20. New Zealand New Zealand Security Intelligence Service

Local/ Foreign 1956

21. Papua New Guinea

National Intelligence Organisation (NIO)

Local/Foreign 1984

Source: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_intelligence_agencies

The above table comprises extracts from an online database with 117 countries and their respectiveintelligence agencies. There are countries, like Cyprus, Tanzania and Qatar, that have just one intelligenceagency listed for them while some, like India, US, and Iran have 23, 17, and 11 respectively. In thisdatabase, the listed intelligence agencies vary in scope, including those focused on local and foreignintelligence collection, and subject, ranging from those specialised in security intelligence to those whosemandate is strictly economic intelligence. What all these underscore is the point that intelligence activityis a global endeavour that involve small and great nations alike. Whereas, some limit their interest toLOCINT, perhaps, because they do not reckon themselves prone to external threats to warrantestablishing a foreign intelligence agency or they simply lack the resources to do that, some have theirinterests straddling both the local and foreign environments.

And, while some give dual mandates of local and foreign intelligence to one agency, others like theUnited States and Nigeria have established agencies specialised in foreign intelligence collection. It ispossible that the database in view is not exhaustive. For purposes of effectiveness, the element ofsecrecy so crucial to clandestine operations may have impelled some nations to keep their foreignintelligence agencies away from public knowledge or, if their concern is limited to security, leavingClandestine FORINT collection entirely to their military forces, which, normally, would have theirrespective intelligence units. Yet, it stands to reason that any agency that would undertake large scaleforeign intelligence activities on a continuous basis like the MI6, the CIA, and the Mossad cannot bekept secret on account of their huge annual budgets, especially in liberal democratic systems where thelegislature is involved in budget approvals. For example, the CIA, as of 2013, had an annual budget of

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15 billion US dollars (BBC, 2013) while the MI6 in the financial year 2014-2015 had a budget of 2.6billion British pounds (House of Commons, 2016).

In spite of their existence being public or global knowledge, no FORINT agency operates openly.Their operatives hide their identity under a cover. In most cases, they are posted abroad to the embassiesof their countries as diplomats. Using diplomatic cover for espionage not only affords intelligence operativesin foreign jurisdictions some measure of secrecy in their clandestine work, it also protects them fromfacing the sanctions of the laws of their host countries in the event of exposure because, as diplomats,they enjoy immunity. The worst treatment they are likely to get when caught in the act is expulsion totheir home country. But there is a flip side to this.

There is a pervasive and general assumption globally that diplomats are spies. Thus, every diplomatis a suspect in his host country. The degree of suspicion is invariably a function of the threat perceptionof a host country in relation to specific countries. It is this limitation of diplomatic cover that makes non-official covers attractive options or complement in foreign intelligence-gathering. In this regard, intelligenceoperatives can work in host countries as company executives, visiting scholars, students, tourists and soon. Inevitably, tracking suspected foreign spies has become an inseparable component of host countries’intelligence preoccupation under the rubric of counter-intelligence.

Of all the elements of national interests that a nation might want to promote or safeguard throughClandestine FORINT, protecting the homeland from terrorist attacks poses a unique challenge. Theuniqueness lies in the fact that terrorists and terrorist organisations are non-state actors. Though, therehave been allegations of state-sponsored terrorism, terrorism as a global security menace is trans-border and migratory. It does not have a fixed territory. Terrorism being a form of asymmetric warfare,requires incessant shifting of operational base. Tracking terrorists thus poses dual risks of apprehensionby host nations that are not in the know of the purpose of intelligence-gathering by operatives of anothernation and counter-intelligence actions of the terrorists being tracked. In essence, the “struggle forpower”, to employ Morgenthau’s phrase, is no longer the exclusive preserve of states, non-state terroristorganisations like al-Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have joined the fray. Both al-Qaeda and ISIS share similar radical Islamic ideologies whose goal is the establishment of a Caliphatewith trans-national authority, and the attainment of which is pursued through Jihad i.e. religious war. TheBoko Haram Islamic sect that began its onslaught in Nigeria in 2010 is similarly disposed in terms ofgoal and method.

Regardless of the fact that terrorists lack fixed territories, their nefarious activities have to be trackedin whatever foreign territories they may choose as their base of operation, even if it is temporary. Giventhis scenario, what then has been the state of Clandestine FORINT collection in aid of counterterrorism?We proceed by classifying tradecraft into two broad categories: technical and human or HUMINT. Theformer category is the latest obtrusive as, in most cases, its deployment does not require physicalinvasion of the territory of another nation. In this respect, geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) is mostcommon. GEOINT can be deployed by any country with satellites or drones specifically designed forintelligence collection. Usually, the collected intelligence begins with aerial images taken of military facilities,buildings, infrastructure, installations, human beings etc before they are subjected to processing and



analysis. In addition to this, other means of technical collection include ELINT, SIGINT, which entailswire-tapping. Since all these are deployed covertly it is difficult to discuss their effectiveness or otherwise.Same applies to HUMINT.

Being all clandestine, it is not easy to even guesstimate the effectiveness of technical or humanintelligence collections, let alone making an accurate assessment. Nevertheless, it is possible to extrapolatefrom developments that are in the public domain in major theatres of counterterrorism. Two countrieswill be interrogated on this score: Nigeria and the United States.

The Case of Nigeria

Nigeria will be interrogated in relation to its fight against Boko Haram while the US will be juxtaposedwith al-Qaeda. In Nigeria’s case, the war against Boko Haram terror began in 2010 but no significantsuccess was recorded until 2016. The sect was able to transform its asymmetric warfare from terrorismto insurgency between 2010 and 2015 such that some major cities in the North Eastern zone ofNigeria were under its control. They included Gwoza (the location of the training college of Nigeria’smobile police), Bama, Madagali and so on. Boko Haram’s resilience while confronted by the might ofthe Nigerian military that has a reputation globally as a highly effective force, whose role in the restorationof peace to countries embroiled in civil wars like Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and so on has beendecisive, is, among other factors, due to its cross-border reach. Its recruitment and training bases aswell as sources of arms and encompass such contiguous neighbours of Nigeria as Niger, Chad, andCameroon.

The fact that the sect could not be defeated for five full years and, in fact, was able to seize parts ofNigeria’s territory was indicative of the failure of foreign intelligence-gathering. In other words, theNigerian military appeared not to have been in possession of such intelligence as could enable it cut offthe external lifelines of the sect in the areas of recruitment of fighters, their training, and arms procurement,among other logistics. On the other hand, even if it had such intelligence, it could not act on it by way ofcovert action that inevitably would entail crossing the Nigerian border into neighbouring countries tofight the terrorists. “Collaboration across borders had long been seen as key to ending Boko Haraminsurgency, which started in Nigeria but has since spread through the country’s porous borders intoneighbouring Niger, Chad and Cameroon” (www.globalsecurity.org). It was against this backgroundthat upon his assumption of power as President and Commander-in-Chief of Nigerian armed forces on29 May, 2015, Muhammadu Buhari’s immediate priority was negotiation of the creation of a MultinationalJoint Task Force (MJTF) including troops from Nigeria and all its neighbouring countries, namely,Niger, Chad, Cameroun, and Benin Republic. The MJTF enabled Nigerian troops to cross the Nigerianborder to fight the terrorists in concert with troops of allied nations, leading to the dislodgement of theterrorists from their territorial bases. A quick lesson to be drawn from this is that Clandestine FORINTon its own may be of no consequence if there is no enabling environment to act on it through covertaction. In the Nigeria’s case, covert action would entail a full-scale war against the terrorist in othernations’ territories, which was not a feasible option as it would amount to an act of war against affectednations. It is then safe to conclude that Clandestine FORINT did not avail much in Nigeria’s

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counterterrorism. The country has satellites in space but it is unclear if they were deployed towardsintelligence-gathering against Boko Haram or towards any security purposes at all.

The Case of the United States

The killing of al-Qaeda’s leader, Osama bin Laden, by US Navy Seal 6 Unit offers a good case for theassessment of the superpower’s deployment of Clandestine FORINT in its war on terror. Both technicaland human tradecraft were deployed in this instance. According to a British Broadcasting Corporation(BBC) Report (2012), the plot to apprehend Bin Laden in Abbottabad, a Pakistani town, actuallybegan with intelligence picked by the CIA through the interception of a telephone call placed to a closelieutenant of Bin Laden called Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti. The CIA was able to use his phone number totrack him to the compound in Abbottabad where he lived. The BBC report is worth quoting at length atthis juncture as a section of it encapsulates the diversity of tradecraft deployed into apprehending BinLaden:

US intelligence soon began an intensive period of surveillance. Whilesatellites watched from the sky, a CIA safe house was set up nearby.From the safe house, agents were able to observe the comings and goingsfrom the compound in order to establish a “pattern of life” at the buildingsome details of how they tried to obtain key information about the buildinghave emerged.

Locals told the BBC that in the weeks leading up to the raid, people in“simple, plain clothes” knocked on doors in the neighbourhood posing asprospective buyers. They would admire the homes and ask for anyarchitectural plans, saying that they wanted to build something similar.One of the men even went to Bin Laden’s compound, they said.

The CIA also employed a sophisticated stealth drone that could float highabout the compound without detection by the Pakistani authorities.With its distinctive bat-winged shape, the RQ170 sentinel is capable offlying undetected at high altitude taking photographs and sending realtime video. The aircraft can also capture images shot at an angle. Thishas the advantage of not having to fly directly over its target.

The foregoing deployment of assortments of tradecraft set the prelude for covert action. Here wesee a difference from the Nigerian effort which drew a line at the point where waging a war against BokoHaram on the territory of its neighbours seemed to be inevitable if its anti-terror campaign would beconsequential. The US, in its determination to put Bin Laden out of action, launched a raid on hiscompound by its special forces that flew 192 kilometres into Pakistan from Afghanistan, killed the targetand made away with his body, which they claimed was buried in the Islamic way sea-deep. Though theBBC report (2012) quoted a source as saying the Pakistani authorities were informed just as the raidwas commencing and that explained why Pakistan’s airforce unscrambling of some of its fleet for defensive



attack was stood down, the description of the action as “an act of war” by the Pakistanis (Strange,2013) made the claim of prior warning suspect. The critical issue here is that while Clandestine FORINThad recorded remarkable success in the US case, acting on it was bedevilled by the risk of what couldhave been a catastrophic counterintelligence action by the Pakistanis.

COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE AND INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION

In spite of the struggle for power among nations that remains a major basis for investment in FORINT,the global menace of terrorism has become a force compelling nations to move in the direction ofintelligence cooperation. This represents a validation of the critics of realism who posit that complexinterdependence exist among nations and just as nations compete for power, there are factors that impelthem to cooperate (Keohane and Nye: 1977).

Adapting this thesis to the issue of FORINT and counter-terrorism, cooperation is at multilateraland bilateral levels. Multilateral cooperation takes place among a group of nations with common adversariesin one or more terrorist organisations. Similarly, bilateral cooperation takes place between two nationsthat have common adversaries in one terrorist group or the other. While there are diverse multilateralplatforms for intelligence cooperation, suffice it we cite four here. First is the International PoliceOrganisation (INTERPOL) that was established on 7 September, 1923, in Lyon, France, to tacklecrimes such as illegal trading in arms and narcotics that had similarly warranted inter-state securitycooperation. While the INTERPOL has, over the years, tackled a wide range of trans-border crimes, ithas lately accorded counter-terrorism a special focus. It has set up a Counter-Terrorism Fusion Centre(CTF) which investigates the organisational hierarchies, training, financing, methods and motives ofterrorist groups (INTERPOL: 2017a). More important is the fact that INTERPOL collects, processes,and shares intelligence with member nations on terrorism and other threats:

INTERPOL circulates alerts and warnings on terrorists, dangerouscriminals and weapons threats to police in member countries…Additionally, the INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Specialnotice is used to alert member countries to individuals and entitiesassociated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban, as listed by the 1267 Committeeof the UN security council, and to help countries implement the freezingassets, travel bans and arms embargo…(INTERPOL: 2017b).

A second multilateral initiative towards intelligence sharing as part of counter-terrorism strategysimilar to the INTERPOL’s was the launch of the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) atEuropol in January 2016. A major stimulus towards this initiative was the attack on Charlie Hebdonewspaper in France in January 2015, which signalled the emergence of “a broader strategy of Jihadistterrorism and the so-called IS (Islamic State) in particular, to intimidate western countries with successiveterror attacks across Europe” (www.europol.europe.eu). It is noted that “the function of the ECTC asa hub to exchange information, conduct analysis, and coordinate operational support is being exploitedby EU member states and relevant third parties, indicating a significant trust and awareness across

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national counter-terrorism authorities concerning Europol’s support services” (www.europol.europe.eu).The third is in Africa, a continent that has also suffered severely from terrorist groups – ranging from Al-Shabab to Boko Haram, jihadists of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA) toal-Qaeda – where the Heads of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa, under the auspices of theAfrican Union (AU), has deemed it necessary to establish an organisation called Committee of Intelligenceand Security Service in Africa (CISSA). The CISSA is mandated to discharge the following duties:

• Strategic intelligence analysis on all threats (including terrorism) to peace and security on thecontinent;

• Collection/acquisition, processing, analysis and transmission of intelligence through the Secretariat;

• Facilitate capacity building interventions;

• Harmonise approaches to common security threats (including terrorism);

• Coordinate strategies to provide advice on appropriate course of action on matters within itsmandate;

• Promote the development of an African endogenous intelligence and security doctrine;

• Any other function as may be assigned by the CISSA Conference.

(cissau.org)

Currently 51 intelligence and security services are signatories to the Constitutive Memorandum ofUnderstanding of CISS and, ipso facto, its members (cissau.org/members).

Perhaps, it would not be incorrect to add the counter-terrorism efforts of the Multinational JointTask Force (MJTF) earlier mentioned as a fourth illustration of intelligence cooperation on a multilaterallevel. It is a known fact that intelligence gathering about the enemy is a crucial and constant element ofmilitary operations. Hence, we can reach the deduction that intelligence sharing among the troops of thefive countries that made up the MJTF is a form of active FORINT-sharing in aid of a major counter-terrorism operation in West Africa.

In light of the foregoing, it is clear that Cooperative FORINT is indeed widespread. Out of 54nations on the African continent only three are yet to join the CISSA. We have also seen a near continent-wide platform in Europe under the auspices of ECTC for Cooperative FORINT in aid of counterterrorism.Aside these are bilateral intelligence cooperation. The next question is: how effective are these platformsin relation to fighting terrorism? The point to note is that Cooperative FORINT is geared more towardspreventive action than the offensive. A regime of intelligence-sharing pre-empts terrorist attacks.

It is therefore difficult to be exact in measuring the level of effectiveness unless it is possible to havea catalogue of attacks that would have occurred but for Cooperative FORINT. But in terms of offensiveaction, again, the performance of the MJTF in West Africa is a testimony to the fact that when nationspull their intelligence resources together to fight terrorists, better outcomes are recorded. In the offensivecampaigns of the MJTF, countries like the US, France and Britain have been supportive with their



intelligence expertise. The outcome has been the degrading of the Boko Haram sect (“Boko HaramDegraded”, 2017). At the bilateral level, the utility of Cooperative FORINT was underscored by theefforts the US made to preserve its intelligence cooperation with the UAE when the latter threatened tojettison the cooperation if some Americans were allowed to sue its government over the 9/11 attacks onthe untenable allegation that its banks were complicit in the attack because they were the channelsthrough which funds were channelled to the attackers (Malnick and Heighton, 2017). The US hasintelligence cooperation with such countries as Pakistan, UAE, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Britain and so on.

CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, owing to the dangers of possible exposure, Clandestine FORINT is not advisableas an option in combating terrorism except in cases where cooperating with authorities in whose territoriesFORINT is being sought is absolutely impossible. Cooperative FORINT is the best approach as itenables nations to pull their intelligence resources together to fight terrorists who are their commonenemies rather than dissipate energy on infiltrating one another’s territories to obtain what can be donethrough negotiated cooperation in intelligence-sharing.

REFERENCES

“Boko Haram Degraded, FG Assures Global Community”, (Vanguard, 16 September, 2017).

British Broadcasting Corporation (2012). “Osama Bin Laden: How it Happened”, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-13257330

Committee of Intelligence and Security Service of Africa, cissau.org

EUROPOL (2017). “Information Sharing on Counter-Terrorism in the EU has Reached an All-TimeHigh”, Press Release, 30 January 2017, www.europol.europa.eu

GlobalSecurity.org (2016). “Multinational Joint Task Force”,www.globalsecurity.org

INTERPOL (2017a). “Counter-Terrorism Fusion Center”, www.interpol.int

———— (2017b) “Terrorism”, www.interpol.int

Keohane, R.O. & Nye, J.S. (1997). “Interdependence in World Politics.” In Crane, G.T. & Amawi, A.,The Theoretical Evolution of International Political Economy: A reader. New York: OxfordUniversity Press.

Malnick E. and Heighton L. (2017), “UAE warned US it could end intelligence cooperation over 9/11victims claims”, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/21/uae-warned-us-could-end-intelligence-cooperation-911-victims/

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2006). “Structural Realism”, mearsheimer.uchicago.edu>pdfs

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Nwolise OBC (2009), “Peace and Security”, in Isaac Albert, Praxis of Political Concepts and Clichésin Nigeria Fourth Republic, Ibadan, Bookcraft.

Nwolise OBC (2012), “Spiritual Dimensions of Human and National Security”, Ibadan, Faculty of theSocial Sciences.

Nwolise OBC (2013), Is Physical Security Alone Enough for the Survival, Progress, and Happinessof Man, Ibadan, Ibadan University Press.

Nwolise OBC (2016), “Forensics and Human Security in Nigeria: The Place of Strategic SpiritualIntelligence”, Strategic Periscope, Ibadan, Exotic Dezines.

Stange Hannah, (2013), “US Raid That Killed Bin Laden was an Act of War” says Pakistani Report”.The Telegraph (UK), July 9.



THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES COMMISSION,CRUDE OIL THEFT AND NIGERIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY

by

Anne U. Ibobo-EzeResearch Fellow, Centre for Strategic Research and Studies,

National Defence College, Abuja.

and

Chukwuemeka Jaja NwanegboDepartment of Political Science

Federal University Wukari, Wukari Nigeria

ABSTRACT

This study evaluates the nature and scope of crude oil theft in Nigeria;identifies the political economy of crude oil theft in Nigeria; examines thesignificant impact of crude oil theft on Nigeria’s National Security andevaluates the intervention of EFCC in the areas of investigation, prosecutionand obtaining conviction. Using expo-facto research design, with the randomsampling method of data collection, the study finds that the little impactmade by the EFCC in fighting crude oil theft are through effectivecollaboration and domestic cooperation with the other Law enforcementagencies. Secondly, that there is a significant relationship between crude oiltheft and National Security as crude oil theft with negative impact ongovernment generated revenue and resources, negatively affects peace andsecurity in the Niger Delta and on the socio-economic status of the Nigerianstate. The study also establishes that tackling crude oil theft must beaccompanied by actions against other vices like money laundering, eventhough the delay/ineffectiveness of the judicial system in handling crude oiltheft cases and lack of modern technological equipment serve as majorchallenges faced by the EFCC in their fight against crude oil theft in Nigeria.

Key words: Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Crude oil theft, Nigeria’sNational security.

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INTRODUCTION

Over the years, especially since the advent of the current civilian dispensation in 1999, records haveshown that there are increases in crude oil production which do not show commensurate record with theofficial crude oil export and government generated revenue. Wilson (2014) explained that the disparityin the figure are sufficient proofs that not all the crude oil produced in the Niger Delta region are utilisedand accounted for by the Nigerian State, and the inaccuracy in oil figure and revenue is as a result of oiltheft in the region. Illegal oil bunkering has been identified as the main source of stealing crude oil in theregion for both domestic and export consumption. Explaining further, Ayanruoh (2013) posits that Nigerialosses over $3.65 million annually to oil theft and that these activities are carried out at small scale levelfor the local markets and at larger scales involving international marketers through the excess lifting ofcrude oil beyond the licensed amount.

Crude oil theft in the context of this paper means any activity relating to illicit tapping of crude oilfrom pipelines, barges, tankers by individuals or group through the form of illegal bunkering and pipelinevandalism which is usually done at the detriment of the nation. Economic crimes like oil theft, moneylaundering, illegal bunkering, and pipeline vandalism, are acts that threaten national security. Beyondchallenging the security integrity of the country, they deny the country the use of a reasonable percentageof its revenue which derives majorly from oil with the enormous implication on the capacity of the stateto fulfil its basic responsibilities and hence creating problems for governance. It also has direct effect onits budgetary implementation capacity and increases the cost of maintaining national security.

Nigerian government, at one time or the other has made aggressive efforts to fight crude oil theftbasically because of its negative impact on the country’s major source of revenue (crude oil). Accordingto Boris, (2015:569):

... the successive Nigerian governments have undertaken some policy measures inresponse to tackling the menace of oil theft over the years. The government hasequally sought to address escalating oil theft through the establishment of a specialsecurity outfit and mobilisation of the Niger Delta region, increased enforcementmeasures against the maritime trade in stolen oil which involved the Nigerian Navybeing tasked with the responsibility for registration of vessels in Nigerian waters.Closing markets for illegal oil, a hotline for reporting oil theft, introduction of theNigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI), enforcement andpublic education efforts against artisanal refining and granting of amnesty to theNiger Delta militants.

In order to put a stop to oil theft and illegal oil bunkering, the Nigerian government equally increasedits military presence in the Niger Delta region in 2003; this culminated in the deployment of a Joint TaskForce (JTF) in 2008. The JTF with the mandate to curb and possibly put an end to illegal oil bunkeringin the oil-rich Niger Delta Region (Boris, 2015). As Social Action (2014) reports, in addressing illegaloil bunkering and artisanal refineries, government mainly takes action through the military Joint TaskForce drawn from the Nigerian Army, Navy, Air force, Police, NSCDC and the State Security Service(SSS). The JTF is particularly concerned with ensuring the security of the area, including discouragingoil theft, illegal refining and tampering with pipelines.

In the respective opinions of Ugwuanyi (2013) and Mernyi (2014), despite all the efforts of theFederal Government to curtail the illegal diversion of oil in the Niger Delta by increasing its security

The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Crude Oil Theft and Nigeria’s National Security 207


spending in recent years and devoting millions of naira annually to hire private security firms as well asequipping men and officers of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC) and other lawenforcement agencies, incessant destruction of pipelines and other oil facilities across the country as wellas trade in stolen oil by criminal cartels with international connections have continued unabated. Thismust have informed Dalby’s (2014) position that the Nigerian economy is in a precarious situation(facing an economic emergency) unprecedented among the oil producers of the world and that somethingurgent needs to be done to reverse the ugly trend.

Crude oil theft is a challenge that threatens the foundation of the Nigerian oil industry and nationalsecurity. Some of the negative impact of crude oil theft on national security are government loss ofrevenue and resources; environmental degradation; insecurity; arms proliferation to mention a few. AsBoris (2015) affirms, factors engendering the persistent thriving of oil theft activities in the Niger Deltainclude: poverty, ignorance, greed, lack of care for national economic survival, get-rich-quick syndrome,lack of gainful employment, exploitation of the loopholes in the criminal justice system to circumvent thelaw, evolving culture of impunity from the wrong perception that some people are above the law, weakinstitutional structure to checkmate criminals, malice and bad governance. Others are the high level ofinvolvement of oil company representatives, oil foreign trade shippers, youths in the host community, topgovernment officials, politicians, serving and retired security officers in crude oil theft trade. As Ufuomaand Omoruyi (2014) maintains, it is indeed only locales that cannot be involved in illegal oil bunkering as“militants, gangs, pirates” from the Niger Delta are directly involved” and that has the capacity to keeplocals away.

Crude oil theft is a form of economic crime of which the typology of crimes fall mainly under EFCCmandate and to some extent other conventional law enforcement agencies (LEAs) as their functionsrange from investigation, prosecution, and raising awareness and consciousness of the populist to theseeconomic crimes.

The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), an anti-graft agency created in 2003has the responsibility of prevention, investigation and prosecution of economic and financial crimes(EFCC Annual Report, 2013). The Commission is also empowered to cause investigation to be conductedas to whether any person, corporate body, or organisation has committed any offence under the act orother law relating to economic and financial crimes under Section 7 Subsection 1 (a) of the EFCCEstablishment Act 2004. The EFCC intervention on crude oil theft is therefore in line with the Commission’smandate to ensure that any person(s) or group involved in any form of economic sabotage (includingcrude oil theft) are properly investigated and prosecuted. Its duties span through very many fronts thatbother on or that affect the integrity of government or state business and or challenges national security.

National security on the other hand is a nation’s effort to protect and preserve the State, its institutionsand well-being of its citizens. This connotes deliberate measures to identify and ward off perceived,potential and real threat to the nation-state (Jonah, 2010). In the context of this paper, national securitycould be understood to mean the ability of the nation-state to protect and preserve its resources, dominantof which in Nigeria comes from oil resources. Understanding the configuration of Nigerian economy, itcan be seen that whatever threatens the country’s oil activities or oil revenue is indeed at the nerve of thecountry’s existence and survival. Hence, it is a national security matter. Matter of do or die.

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Bearing in mind the enormity of the challenges the Federal Government is having in restraining crudeoil theft and being aware of the overt fight by the military and other paramilitary bodies which have stillnot taken the fight to good end, and being aware of the mandates of EFCC in such fight against economicsabotage; this study commits itself to finding out the extent the EFCC activities have contributed in thewhole fight against crude oil theft in Nigeria. It seeks to find out if EFCC has been able to record somemeasure of success, despite the multifarious challenges bedevilling the oil sector.

This paper focuses on crude oil theft (in the area of illegal oil bunkering and pipeline vandalism) inNigeria and its implication for national security, evaluating the intervention processes of the EFCC withinthe period of 2010-2015. Only the statistics of cases prosecuted and conviction obtained are includedin this study, cases that were withdrawn out of court or EFCC investigation are not part of the work dueto inability to access the data.

For ease of presentation and understanding, this paper is divided into five parts. Part one is thisintroduction, part two focuses on the conceptual and theoretical discourses. Part three explains themethods employed in annexing and analysing data for the work. Part four discusses data presentation,analysis and interpretation. Part five contains the summary of findings, conclusion and recommendations.


Crude oil theft is the act of stealing Crude. It takes from the general meaning of theft, which is the actionor crime of stealing. Crude oil theft encompasses any activity relating to the theft or sabotage of crude oilin form of illegal bunkering and pipeline vandalism. Bunkering on the other hand is the transference ofcrude oil from one tanker/ship to another with legal government licensed document/approval. Illegal oilbunkering is a form of crude oil theft that involves the direct tapping/transferring of crude oil producteither from pipelines or tanker/ship without a licensed document/approval from the Government regulatorybody. As the Nigerian Navy (2013) posits, though oil bunkering is a necessity for maritime shippingwithin the maritime sector, it becomes an illegal oil bunkering when it is carried out without requisitestatutory licenses or valid documents, or in violation of the Nigerian Maritime Sector and the guidelinesmade by the statutory institutions regarding it.

While crude oil theft has been a delicate crime all over the world, it is easy to perpetrate in the NigerDelta because different actors have special roles to play at several levels of its operation. While thesmall-scale level is coordinated by the restive youths (both former and current militants) and securityforces, the larger-scale cannot be successful without the high involvement of top government officials,politician’s and international cartels to mention a few. This must have informed the Social Action (2014)’sstatement that crude oil theft is being carried out: first, on large scale by syndicates connected to thehighest level of officials in transnational oil companies, government establishments and security agencies;and second, through illegal bunkering involving, lifting or siphoning of crude oil without valid licenseissued by the Nigerian Federal Government. Omoyibo (2014) posit that there is likelihood that illegal oilbunkering is conveniently the most profitable private business in present-day Nigeria.

Of all the challenges of crude oil bunkering, the greatest of the worries should be on the implication



of the act to national security. This is because of the level of concern any one should have about itssecurity and indeed the different but serious attentions that nation states have shown on anything thatthreatens its existence as a corporate existence. While the word security means the total protection ofindividual/group in every aspect of life and endeavour, the basis upon which nation-states exist, nationalsecurity is the totality of measures put in place by a nation-state to protect and preserve its citizens andresources (including crude oil, etc) from harm and all forms of defencelessness. As Shinkaiye (2004)states, security means the sum total of actions and measures, including legislative and operationalprocedures, adopted to ensure peace, stability, and general well-being of a nation and its citizens. Thisindicates that indeed, security is a very vast concept but limited to certain activities. Perhaps whatdistinguishes national security is the focus and particular concern of the security and what is achievablethere from. This probably informs the confirmation of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (2006) thatnational security is the safekeeping of a nation that entails both national defence and the protection of aseries of geopolitical, economic, and other interests. National security in a short but deep manner is theprotection and preservation of territory, sovereignty, and stability of a country from threats. It means thatNational security can and does exist in two domains; the internal and the external security. The internalsecurity of a country is affected from within by a considerable number of political, economic, and socialfactors like political strives, the state of the economy, intra and inter-ethnic animosities, the conduct ofgovernment affairs, the issue of resource allocation and management, all acts on the equilibrium of thestate, while the external domain has to do with how the country’s security is affected by its foreign policyand the nature of the geo-political circumstances surrounding it. In his explanation, Alemika (2015)rightly identifies, as the prerequisites for sustainable national security:

democratic governance (social democratic countries are more securedthan liberal democratic systems), strong and accountable government,public services, cohesive communities in territorial and associationaldimension governed by democratic principles, personal security and publicorder (armed forces, intelligence agencies safety regulations agencies),economic security, social security (agencies responsible for ensuringaccess to adequate food, health care, shelter, education, water etc) andpolitical security (human rights enforcement agencies, credible electoralmanagement bodies, democratic electoral system and process, efficientjudiciary).

National security is an ensemble of two broad focal elements: state security and human security,which entails the preservation of the safety of (Nigerian) citizens, at home and abroad, the protection ofthe sovereignty of the country and the integrity of its assets. Mbachu & Eze (2009:7) reiterates that thereare more realistic and comprehensive approach to national security, which includes economic strength,internal cohesion, and technological ability. Drawing from above, whatever hinders any of the country’seconomic conditions or distorts its internal cohesion, even hinders its potential for advancement or triesto disorganise the ability of the country to solve its problems through innate capacity (technology) affectsthe country’s national security. What it implies is that the economic sabotage of crude oil theft that costs

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the country huge loss in oil revenue (even with oil as the major contributor to the country’s economy) isa major threat to national security. As has been established, its implication to national security can beoutlined as follows:

a. Environmental degradation/impactAmong the many factors responsible for the degradation of the environment, include oil spillage resultingfrom oil theft especially the hacking of pipelines and the activities of illegal refineries, which is responsiblefor the uncontrolled emission of carbon into the atmosphere. The entire process generates huge oil spillsand waste, dumped in the environment. It is estimated that in illegal oil refining, only 30% of the refinedoil is recovered, while the remaining 70% is spilled in the environment (Assi, Amah & Edeke, 2016). Oilspills result in Ground Water Poisoning, destruction of agricultural land, fishery and livestock and fastdisappearing mangrove forests (Nigerian Navy, 2013). As Onuoha (2012) conceives that acts ofvandalising oil pipelines and illegal refining of crude oil are as hazardous as they are illegal. Explosionsfrom the illegal activities have often resulted in the loss of lives, fracturing family ties, and destroying thelocal environment. Ogbeni (2012) opines that the brazen destruction of illegal refineries by the JTF alsoadds to the level of environmental degradation. It has led to massive crude oil spillages and pollutions inthe region, destroying host communities farm lands, vegetation, polluting rivers and thus destroying thepeople’s means of livelihood (see also Wilson, 2014).

b. Loss of human and material resourcesMany persons and groups of people benefit from the activities and proceeds of the oil theft in the region.Also too, many are affected by the activities in the illegal operation. This includes both the actors andnon-actors, even as many (including individuals and the state) suffer losses from the oil theft. People losttheir lives and properties worth fortunes to oil theft activities, either during a gun battle between a hostcommunity youths militants and state security agents while siphoning the crude oil from the oil pipelinesand well heads, or in a fire disaster during the local refinery work by the local criminals. Casualtiesinclude the militants, the youths, the properties of the natives of the host communities, security agents,and oil company personnel and installation (see Wilson, 2014).

c. Decrease in Nigerian oil revenueOil theft results in heavy loss of revenue to the country. As captured in the “informed” press release ofNigerian former Minister of Petroleum Resources, Diezani Allison-Madueke, Nigeria loses 180,000barrels of crude oil per day, valued at $7 billion yearly due to oil theft activities in the region (Mernyi,2014). Others have also explained the depth of losses of revenue and effect of crude oil theft in Nigerianeconomy (see Dalby, 2015; Onoja, 2013; Nigeria Navy, 2013; Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala in PremiumTimes, 2012, etc). In addition to that, the country loses a huge amount of resources on provision ofsecurity to the oil facilities. According to Nasir Imodage, Nigeria has lost over #8billion on providingsecurity for oil personnel and installations, and environmental clean-up arising from oil theft activities inthe Niger Delta region between 2009 and 2012.

d. Arms proliferationCrude oil theft has been the major cause of violent conflict in the Niger Delta. As a result, small and



heavy arms are proliferated thereby compounding the state of insecurity in the region; leading tokidnapping, hostage taking, etc (Assi, Katsouris, and Sayne, 2013). It has been established that mostoil thieves exchange crude oil for heavy arms at the high sea, while others use the proceed to importsophisticated arms into the regions, with the principal aim of using the arms for attacks and counterattacks from any gang or groups and military or security agents (Amah, & Edeke, 2016) to enable themremain in the business. As Onuoha (2012) reported, proceeds from illegal bunkering have enabledmilitants operating in the Niger Delta to procure weapons that are more sophisticated, technologicalgadgets and speedboats. In turn, this has helped the militants to expand their range of attacks on securitypersonnel and critical offshore energy infrastructure.

e. Threat to national and regional peace and securityAs Wilson (2014) explained, larger part of oil theft is carried out in high seas and oil export terminals,and this has increased the activities of the sea pirates in the sub-region. The sea pirates serve dualpurposes, as they are on one hand used as non-state security agents to secure oil vessels carrying illegalcrude oil, and on the other hand used as agent to offshore oil workers and attack oil vessels carryinglegitimate crude oil along the high sea with the aim of stealing the oil. In their opinion, the sea piratesbenefit from oil theft, bridge free movement of goods and services in the sub-region, and escalateviolence as they attack and are attacked by state security agents. This violence perpetuated by oil theftactors and sea pirates is threatening the peace and security of the West African states, particularly thosealong the coastal areas, where the oil vessels pass through to Europe, America, and Asia.

f. Socio-economic implicationsCrude oil theft and militancy constitute major inhibitors to the socio-economic development of Nigeriaand the Niger Delta. As a result the responsibility towards the area has been largely neglected byadministrations, organisations and companies. Another worrisome trend is the increasing percentagesof school aged children who are denied access to formal education and aspiration by the various militantgroups who see them as potential recruits for their illegal trade thus initiating them into a criminal lifestylecharacterised by violence and restiveness, teenage parenthood and anti-societal tendencies (NigerianNavy, 2013).

All the above listed vices convincingly constitute challenges to national security. Hence, the contributionof EFCC in the fight is seen as a contribution towards national security.

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL DISCOURSEA number of theories have been developed by scholars in the explanation of criminal act of concurrentcrude oil theft and its negative impact on national security in Nigeria. For the purpose of this study, theQueer Ladder Theory (QLT) is adopted.

The Queer Ladder Theory was influenced by an American sociologist, Daniel Bell (1919-2011),who coined the idea of “queer ladder” in an attempt to explain the functional significance of organisedcrime as a desperate tactic for socio-economic empowerment and social climbing. This analytical constructhas since fertilised into a popular theoretical framework widely used in contemporary crime studies(Assi, Amah & Edeke, 2016).

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The Queer Ladder Theory has three basic assumptions:

i. Organised crime is an instrumental behaviour/practice; it is a means to an end.

ii. It is an instrument of social climbing, fame and socio-economic advancement.

iii. It is a means to accumulate wealth and build power (Mallory, 2007).

The QLT assumes that organised crime thrives in context where the government’s capacity to dictateand sanction abnormality and crime is poor, where public corruption is endemic and where legitimatelivelihood opportunities are slim (Nwoye, 2000; Lyman, 2007). Under these circumstances, the incentiveto indulge in life of crime is high, while deterrence from criminal living is low (Okoli, Chukwuma andOrinya, 2013).

The Queer Ladder theory helps us to locate the occurrence of illegitimate act and organised andother forms of criminality in Niger Delta to poverty, unemployment, corruption more so, to the weaknessin the capacity of the government and its security agencies to track them because of some other complexweb of activities that vitiates the effort. Most established of them being the sabotage to the effort by theofficers of the state themselves and the greed to multiply acquisition of wealth and power. This is rootedin weak socio-political culture in the society. Owing to this, it is noted that incidence of crude oil theft asit affects national security has been driven by rat race for material enlargement at the detriment of thedevelopment and well being of the people of Niger Delta and Nigeria as a nation. Those in governmentsupport others in the cabal outside the system to make wealth. Worst still, they collaborate. Otherwise,how do we explain the government action of handing over security of the oil installations in the Niger-Delta region to militant warlords or “ex-militants” as they refer to them, who themselves run the cartelfor oil theft. This has been made worse by the prevailing socio-economic depression and related livelihoodcrisis in the region.

The notion of “ladder” in Queer Ladder theory signifies social climbing or mobility. The aggrievedand deprived people of the region results to illegal oil bunkering/vandalism etc as warmly called in orderto advance their socio-economic status in the society prevalent with palpable poverty. Hence, thosewho take to crude oil theft as a means of social climbing (mobility) are thought to be toeing the awkward,unconventional (queer) path and government is unable to curb the situation. The adoption of this theoryfor this study is informed by its analytical utility in providing insights into the sociological foundations oforganised crime in developing nations like Nigeria.

This study employed the positivist research approach, which lays emphasis on measurement andevaluation of phenomena to arrive at rational explanation for such phenomenon. Thus, based on numericalstrength, the approach applied attempted establishing causal links and relationships between the differentelements (or variables) of the subject in this study, and as well, relate them to theories, its applicabilityand practices.

The study was an expo-facto research as it is an “… investigation of possible cause and effectrelationship by observing existing state of affairs and researching back in time for plausible causal factors”(Mangal, & Mangal, 2015:143). Primary and secondary methods of data collection were used. Primarydata was generated through observation, questionnaire, and site visits. Secondary data, on the other



hand, were derived from academic literatures, published local and international journals; materials receivedfrom the EFCC archive, other LEA such as the NSCDC, JTF as well as internet sources.

The study mainly covers the activities of EFCC with an extension to the support advancing activitiesof National Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC). The study thus revolved around EFCC andNSCDC office in Abuja and Port Harcourt. More attention was focused on the investigators andprosecutors at the EFCC operation and legal sections who are more directly involved in handling thecases, Directorate of Legal and Prosecution, as well as the operatives at the NSCDC Oil and GasDepartment (OGD) and its Legal department (LD). The population of EFCC staff is 1,989. Thispopulation is distributed among its operations, Legal and Prosecutions, Administration and PublicEnlightenment Directorate, departments scattered around the two geographical locations (Port Harcourtand Abuja). The focus populations are the senior and junior staff of EFCC and NSCDC. Numerically,distribution of EFCC in terms of management, senior and junior cadres from EFCC Annual Report,(2013) are as follows: management level 39; senior cadre 1,165 and junior cadre 785.

The sample size drawn for the study population was 120 samples using random sampling selectionfrom the total population. In determining an appropriate sample size for this study, the study took intoconsideration the importance of representativeness, accuracy, and precision. Structured questionnaire,applying linked scale method were used to collect the primary data. This questionnaire was subjected torigorous peer review to raise its reliability and validity before deployment and administered to the samplesdrawn from the study population. The collected data were statistically analysed using descriptive andinferential statistics.

THE EFCC AND THE FIGHT AGAINST CRUDE OIL THEFT:CONTEXT AND CHALLENGES

A study of the EFCC Act reveals that the commission is empowered to investigate, prevent, detect,arrest, and prosecute persons alleged to have indulged in corrupt practices and most importantly,coordinate the activities of other agencies charged with the responsibility of fighting corruption andeconomic crimes (Zabadi and Sampson, 2009). Under an amendment to its enabling law passed in2004, EFCC is mandated to investigate and prosecute matters such as Advanced Free Fraud, moneylaundering, embezzlement, tax evasion or fraud, illegal oil bunkering, illegal arms dealing, illegal mining,counterfeiting, illegal charge and transfers, future market fraud, bank fraud, foreign exchange malpractices,computer credit card fraud, all cybercrimes, contract scam and terrorism. The key responsibilities of thecommission under section 6 and 7 of the Establishment Act are as follows:

Section 6(c) coordination and enforcement of all economic and financialcrimes laws and enforcement functions conferred on any other personor authority;6(h) the examination and investigation of all reported cases of economicand financial crimes with a view to identifying individuals, corporate bodiesor groups involved;6(m) taking charge of, supervising, controlling, coordinating all theresponsibilities, functions and activities relating to current investigation

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and prosecution of all offences connected with or relating to economicand financial crimes;7(a) Cause investigations to be conducted as to whether any person,corporate body or organisation has committed any offence under thisAct or other law relating to economic and financial crimes7(b) Cause investigations to be conducted into the properties of any personif it appears to the commission that the person’s lifestyle and extent ofthe properties are not justified by his source of income. (see EFCC ZeroTolerance, 2008; Social Action, 2014; The EFCC Annual Report, 2013).

Specifically, Section 7 subsection 2a-f of the Establishment Act 2004, charged the Commissionwith the responsibility of enforcing the provisions of 2(a) The Money Laundering Act 2004; 2003 No.7 1995 No. 13 (b) and host of other offences related to economic and financial crimes, including thecriminal code of penal code. According to the EFCC Annual Report (2013), the commission has notbeen fighting the war alone. It states inter alia;

We have continued to benefit from the collaborative efforts of our partnersin the public and private sectors, locally and internationally. The spirit ofcollaboration is reflected on our partnerships with the Nigeria Police Force,Nigeria Customs Service, the Nigerian Navy, Nigeria Security and CivilDefence Corps, the Corporate Affairs Commission, the Nigeria DepositInsurance Corporation, the Department of State Services, the FederalMinistry of Industry, Trade and Investment, the Central Bank of Nigeria,the Security and Exchange Commission, the Banking Sector, and otherprivate sector.

Even at this, a lot of challenges are still faced by the Commission in performing its own functionstowards fighting the crude oil theft in Niger-Delta. Primary among them is that the volatile nature of theNiger Delta region makes it difficult for EFCC operatives to visit the scene of the crimes. This is inaddition to the threats EFCC operative receive from the militants that are into illegal bunkering in thearea (see EFCC Zero Tolerance, 2008). Bureaucratic bottlenecks in the oil companies (delay in replyingto letters) is also a vital challenge that affects investigations and some of the arresting officers especiallyfrom oil companies that shy away from coming to testify in court matters, thereby restraining the successfulprosecution of a case in court (ibid). While Social Action (2014) submits that despite the fact that theEFCC is required to collaborate with key society and industry stakeholders to curb artisanal mining andillegal crude oil bunkering all of which come under the rubric of economic sabotage, duplicity and lackof efficient coordination in the enforcement functions among state agencies also make effectivecollaboration difficult to attain. Legal bottlenecks which ensure that arrests, especially those connectedto powerful sponsors operating behind the scenes, did not achieve legal accountability. Social Action(2014) reiterates that the entire political and social infrastructure of production in Nigeria’s Niger Deltaregion aids and abets corruption, crude oil theft and artisanal crude oil refining in the region due to lackof effective law enforcement and weak regulatory framework which incentivises corruption and large-



scale resource theft. Criminal activities thrive as their perpetrators realise they are unlikely to face legalretribution for their actions.

As the international spotlight beams on Nigeria due to the various activities of crude oil theft andillegal bunkering, as government faces the challenge of protecting its credibility and reputation. Theillegal activities and coercive operations against them have the potentials of threatening Foreign DirectInvestment into the various sectors of the economy (Asuni, 2009; Uwotu, 2013).

Data Presentation, Analysis and Interpretation

Aggregate issue Response Analysis

This section elicits responses on specific issues concerning the activities of the EFCC in relation to otherLEAs in the fight against crude oil theft. This section has 16 questions (Q) in all. Q1 – 4 investigates themethods employed by EFCC in the fight against crude oil theft. Q5 – 8 evaluates various crude oil theftthreats to National Security. Q9 – 12 examines the extent to which EFCC activities have reduced crudeoil theft in Nigeria and Q13 – 16 ascertains the challenges recorded by EFCC in the fight against crudeoil theft. Responses were structured along Likert format. Table 5 in the appendix shows the summary ofthe responses on the sixty-three questionnaire that returned from the field survey conducted. Along theline of our objective in this paper, the analysis centres on four main issues which are also mirrored insection B of the questionnaire as stated earlier. While the first showed the method of fighting crude oiltheft by basically other LEAs including of course EFCC, the second section looked at the identifiedimplication of the crude oil theft to national security. The third part of the analysis centres on the criticalassessment of the activities of EFCC and its impact on the reduction of otherwise of crude oil theft.Challenges faced by EFCC in the fight were subjected to test in part four of the analysis.

Methodology of Fighting Crude Oil Theft

Essentially, the study identified and focused on four methods used by EFCC in the fight against crude oiltheft. These range from employing the EFCC Establishment Acts 2004, collaborative efforts of EFCCwith LEAs, diligent investigation and prosecution as well as the use of modern technology.

The EFCC Establishment Act 2004 in Section 6 states that the commission shall be responsible for:6(h) the examination and investigation of all reported cases of economic and financial crimes with a viewto identifying individuals, corporate bodies or groups involved; 6(m) taking charge of, supervising,controlling, coordinating all the responsibilities, functions and activities relating to current investigationand prosecution of all offences connected with or relating to economic and financial crimes. Furthermore,Section 7 subsections 1(a) states that the commission has power to: cause investigations to be conductedas to whether any person, corporate body or organisation who has committed any offence under thisAct or other law relating to economic and financial crimes. It is on the provision of this Act that EFCCrelies on to fight against crude oil theft in Nigeria. Understanding the nature of the activities of the cartelsthat run the illegal oil businesses in the Niger Delta and the makeup of staff of EFCC, it could be seenthat the kind of face-off that would be involved in controlling them cannot be fought overtly by the

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EFCC. It becomes potent for EFCC to engage in collaborative exercises with other LEAs in order tomake the needed impact. The functioning of that activity was attested to by the respondents. A total of56 (88.89%) of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed that EFCC collaborative methods withother LEAs in the fight against crude oil theft assists the commission to achieve significant result. However,5 (7.94%) fairly agree, as a simple minority of 2 (3.17%) respondents disagree with the above assertion.

Figure 1 below represents a bar chart of the above-interpreted data of the respondent’s responseson percentage bases on the methods employed by EFCC in fighting crude oil theft.

It was noted further that in spite of its shortcomings, the method of diligent investigation and prosecutionof cases have yielded positive result in the EFCC fight against crude oil theft. 31(49.2%) agreed andstrongly agreed with the question, 26 (41.3%) were biased or fairly agreed while, 6 (9.5%) disagreedand strongly disagreed.

Theft is a traditional crime, but crude oil theft is a modern crime and should be fought with relevantmodern technological intelligence gadgets/tool to win the war (EFCC Annual Report, 2013). Bearing inmind the calibre of persons (top government officials, politicians, oil trade shippers, bankers, bothretired and serving security operative and so on) involved in the trade, the struggle is a tough one andneed to be fought, properly equipped. In spite of this, it was observed that the commission and even the

Figure 1: Methods employed by the EFCC in the fight against crude oil theft



collaborative agencies are barely equipped to fight the war. The case is widely acknowledged by theoperatives themselves in their responses to the question on the preparedness of the commission to dothe work. As can be seen in the Table 5 in the appendix, EFCC operatives are adequately equippedwith modern technology to fight crude oil related cases. 16 (25.4%) of the respondents agreed andstrongly agreed to this; 26 (41.27%) fairly agreed while 21(33.33%) disagreed and strongly disagreedwith this assertion that the EFCC is properly equipped. Table 1 below shows clearly, the main actorsand their roles in crude oil theft activities in Nigeria.

Table 1

Actors and their roles

Source: Research Summary (Onuoha, 2012:15)

S/No Main actors Nationality (Alleged) roles and activities

1. Militant leaders Mainly Niger Deltans

Delimit or control territories for cold/hot-tapping into oil pipes

2. Youths (especially former militants)

Mainly Niger Deltans

Tap into pipes to steal oil as well as escort oil barges to the high seas

3. Shipping Lines

Mainly foreigners

Provide ships for the transportation of stolen oil conveyed in barges to the high seas or destination of sale

4. State Security forces

Mainly Nigerians

Collect ‘passage fees’ to allow militants and other oil cartels to siphon oil.

5. Government/NNPC officials

Mainly Nigerians

Forge official receipts and documents for lifting oil illegally, and provide skills on hot-tapping into bunkers

6. International cartels

Mainly foreigners

Provide arms or money to oil thieves in exchange for stolen oil, and sell the stolen oil on the international market or in the destination state

7. Politicians

Nigerians Provide militant leaders and other bunkers political coverage from prosecution when apprehended

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Crude Oil Theft and National Security

From all manner of aggregations, crude oil theft was accepted as constituting a major threat to nationalsecurity. As earlier alluded to in the literature, crude oil theft is a big programme to the security ofNigerian nation. From the informed responses of the population surveyed, it was a major basis ofmoney laundering in Nigeria and of course, cannot be won without tackling organised crime like moneylaundering.

There is a strong connection between crude oil theft and acquisition of assets by oil thieves. It has anegative impact on government generated revenue. To establish the level of agreement to the aboveassertion, none of the respondents disagreed to the question on whether it impacts negatively ongovernment revenue. While 52 (82.54%) agreed and strongly agreed that crude oil theft has negativeimpact on government generated revenue 11 (17.46%) fairly agreed.

Perhaps, one of the most affected places is the socio-economic situation of the Niger Delta regionand Nigeria in general. Figures 2 and 3 below clearly present the negative implications of oil theft to thecountry’s socio-economic situation through the losses incurred on other crude oil product and revenuefrom 2006 – 2013.

Figure 2: Cash equivalent of other petroleum products lost from 2006 – 2013



Source: International Institute for Petroleum, Energy Law and Policy (IIPELP)

Figure 3: Cash equivalent of crude oil lost from 2006 – 2013

Taking from the above, it could be inferred that the activities of oil theft has very negative impact onsome fundamental attributes of national security, especially in the country’s capacity to sustain its revenue.As contained in Table 2 and Figure 4 below, the implication of these are quite obvious corroboratingwith the basis of national security defined by Federal Republic of Nigeria (2006) as the safekeeping ofa nation that entails both national defence and the protection of a series of geopolitical, economic, andother interests. Crude oil theft negatively affects the economic interest of the country and hence botheron national security; the security of the country. Table 2 below highlights some of the negative effects ofoil theft to Nigerian National Security.

Table 2:Negative implications of Nigerian oil theft on National Security

IMPLICATIONS NIGERIAN OIL THEFT

Value of the oil theft

The estimated annual value of oil stolen from Nigeria is between $3 billion and $8 billion.

Direct casualties There has been an estimated 1,000 deaths each year as a result of conflict in the Niger Delta Region – though not all of these would be directly related to oil theft.

Public cost of oil theft

The Nigerian Government was estimated to have lost revenue worth several billions of dollars. The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation spent $2.3 billion on pipeline security and repairs from 2010 - 2012.

Environmental cost As a result of oil theft in the Niger Delta Region, there have been pollution of water and soil which also have secondary impacts on human health, livelihoods, food and food stuffs

Source: Assi V.E, Amah O.I. & Edeke S.O. (2016:74)

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Figure 4 below represents a bar chart of the above-interpreted data of the respondent’s responses onpercentage bases on the negative impacts of crude oil theft on national security.

Source: Compiled by the researchers from field survey.

Figure 4: Negative impact of crude oil theft on national security

EFCC’s Activities and Reduction in Crude Oil Theft

Perhaps, the area where the functioning of EFCC and its activities has been felt most is in providingadditional impetus to the commission’s activities by the activities of other LEAs operating in the Niger-Delta. Considering the inhibitions on the commission, it makes valid contributions through its investigationand prosecutions and through that strengthening the hands of the other agencies involved in enforcement.The operatives sampled attested to that in their responses (see Table 5 in the appendix). If not for anyother thing, it has increased domestic cooperation among LEAs in the Niger Delta and with suchcooperation, the performance of those other agencies have been appreciable, even though it is equallydwindling.

Such manifest successes of the cooperation as attested to by the operatives and even some of theNSCDC interacted with was attributed to the information extracted by the agencies working togetherand from suspects during some EFCC operations in the crude oil theft activities.



Whereas Figure 5 below represents a bar chart of the above-interpreted data of the respondent’sopinion on percentage bases on EFCC activities and reduction in crude oil theft, Table 3 below, showsa summary report of the NSCDC anti-vandalism and bunkering activities (oil pipelines/gas Installations)in Nigeria from 2010-Jan 2016.

Source: Compiled by the researcher from field survey.

Figure 5: The EFCC Activities and Reduction in Crude Oil Theft

The success and accomplishment of high number of illegal refineries destroyed, boats and barges seizedon anti-vandalism and bunkering activities was achieved even though through NSCDCs effectiveness,but more so, through domestic cooperation (sharing of intelligence, information trading and so on) withthe Joint Task Force (JTF) and other LEAs.

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Table 3Report on NSCDC Anti-vandalism and Anti-bunkering activities

(pipeline and gas installation) in Nigeria 2010 – Jan 2016

Source: Derived by the researcher from NSCDC Headquarters Abuja.

The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Crude Oil Theft and Nigeria’s National Security

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 JAN. 2016

Total Number of Arrests 150 225 1069 1062 693 641 186

Total number of Prosecution 123 200 1020 1020 634 634 161 Total number of Convicted 27 25 49 42 3 7 25 Total number of Vehicles/ Trucks/Motorcycles recovered 245 130 240 96 177 262 45 Total number of illegal Refineries destroyed 245 256 305 43 364 391 69 Total number of Drums of PMS/AGO 2500 6500 8500 2323 1387 7038 5348 Total number of Kegs of PMS/AGO 3000 6200 10200 72534 1635 2296 6361 Total number of Boats recovered 15 10 62 105 129 242 24 Total number of Barges recovered 6 5 13 26 8 127 3 Total number of Tanks (AGO/PMS) 95 5072 695 69 Total number of AGO in (Litres) Recovered 821220 1142060 98665 Total number of PMS in (Litres) Recovered 326000 181000 99000 Total number of Litres of Kerosene recovered 45000 45000 45000 1250 1250 Total number of Kegs of Kerosene recovered 50 221

Drums of crude oil recovered 12 Crude oil in litres recovered 156000 435000

Cash Recovered 400000 602050

Total number of empty drums recovered 36000 2064 297 Total number of Vessels Recovered 4 3 Total number of Empty Tanks recovered 26 86

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Figures 6 and 7 below show the bar chart summary of the total number of illegal refineries destroyed, aswell as boats and barges seized between 2010-Jan 2016 by NSCDC.

Total number of illegal Refinaries destroyed

Source: NSCDC Headquarters, Abuja

Figure 6: Total number of illegal refineries destroyed from 2014- Jan 2016

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Total Number of Boats and Barges Seized

Source: NSCDC Headquarters, Abuja

Figure 7: Total number of boats and barges seized from 2010 – Jan 2016

EFCC’s Challenges in Fighting Crude Oil Theft

EFCC intervention processes on crude oil theft appear not to have recorded the expected successesfrom 2010 – 2015 and this is rooted in the fact that a lot of factors combine to work against theCommissions operation on the crude oil theft war. Primary among them is the ineffectiveness of theNigerian judicial system in the handling of crude oil theft cases. The non-supportive posture of thejudiciary has commensurate effects on almost all agencies involved in arrest and prosecution, especiallyEFCC and NSCDC. The consequence is that the fear of repercussion is taking away from the actorsstrengthening up the activities of the crude oil thieves and weakening the security operations and operates.

The responses of the respondents on the delay from the judiciary in attending to Crude oil theftcases correlates with figure 8 and 9 analyses below. Figure 8 shows the ineffectiveness of the judiciaryfrom the disparity in the number of arrests, prosecution, and judgments secured in oil theft cases byNSCDC from 2010-Jan 2016 as follows: Total no. of arrests = 4,026, total no. of prosecution (filedcourt cases) = 3,792, total no. of conviction secured = 178, total no. of pending cases in court = 3,614.



Figure 9 indicates the huge gap between the number of economic and financial crimes cases filed inthe court by EFCC and the number of convictions secured from 2010-2014 as follows: Total no. ofcases filed in court = 1,998; total no. of conviction secured = 465; total no. of pending cases in court =1,533.

Total Arrest, Prosecution and Conviction Secured from 2010 – January 2016 by NSCDC

Source: Derived by the researcher from NSCDC Headquarters, Abuja

Figure 8: Total number of arrests, prosecution, and conviction secured from 2010 – Jan 2016

Total Number of Prosecution

Total Number of Arrest

Total Number of Conviction

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Cases Filed in Court and Conviction Secured from 2010 – 2014 by EFCC

Source: EFCC Annual Report 2014

Figure 9: Total number of EFCC filed financial crimes court cases andconviction secured from 2010 – 2014



CONCLUSION

From the study the following findings were made:First, it was clearly established that the EFCC Establishment Acts 2004 empowers the commission

to intervene in economic and financial crimes which includes crude oil theft as seen under section 6 (h &m) and section 7 subsections 1(a & b).

Second is that the most impactful technique employed by the EFCC to achieve significant result onthe intervention processes (investigation, prosecution, and securing conviction) is through effectivecollaboration and domestic cooperation with LEAs. EFCC Annual Report (2013) backs up the claimby stating that the war against economic and financial crimes has a wide stake holding, and the commissionhas continued to benefit from the collaborative efforts of partners in the public and private sectors,locally and internationally, and that the spirit of collaboration is reflected on EFCC partnerships with theNigeria Police Force (NPF), Nigeria Customs Service, Nigeria Navy (NCS), Nigeria Security andCivil Defence Corps (NSCDC), the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), Nigeria Deposit InsuranceCorporation (NDIC), Department of State Services (DSS), Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade andInvestment (MITI), Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), theBanking Sector, and other private sectors.

Third, from the field interaction we found that the EFCC is not satisfactorily equipped with moderntechnological equipment to fight crude oil theft bearing in mind the level of persons/groups involved inthe illicit trade.

Fourth, there appears to be a reasonable connection between the fight against crude oil theft and thefight against money laundering in Nigeria, as crude oil theft activities cannot be defeated without dealingwith organised crime like money laundering. Asuni (2009) confirms that crude oil theft cannot be dealtwith alone: efforts against it must be accompanied by actions against other evils that go hand-in-handwith it like corruption, illegal arms importation, and money laundering.

Fifth, it is generally accepted that crude oil theft has a negative impact on government’s revenue.Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI) annual report indicates that Nigeria lost atotal of $10.9 billion to oil theft between 2009 and 2011 (Onoja, 2013).

Sixth, crude oil theft has negative effect on the socio-economy of the Niger Delta region as highunemployment rate amongst the youths giving rise to restiveness and with serious implications on nationalsecurity. Even as Social Action, (2014) adds that crude oil theft is a devastating threat to the socio-economic well-being of the majority of Nigerians who still live in poverty and destitution.

Seven, it was also gathered that EFCC activities have increased the effectiveness and domesticcooperation among LEAs in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria. The intervention processes empowers thecommission to advance in recovering government revenue and resources from crude oil thieves.

Finally, it was found that the judiciary has not been effective in handling crude oil theft cases, therebycausing delay in the intervention processes of the EFCC prosecutors, as a result, restricting the EFCCfrom recording successes as expected. Table 4 below, shows that out of 1,998 cases filed in court from2010 – 2014, only 465 conviction were secured, leaving about 1,533 pending economic and financialcrimes cases in the judiciary.

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Table 4

Comparison of Conviction (2010-2014)

Source: EFCC 2014 Annual Report.

Consequently, evaluating Table 4 above and juxtaposing it with Figure 8, the outcome points out thatcrude oil theft criminality will continue to grow stronger by day due to ineffectiveness/delay from thejudicial system. This must have informed Osaneku (2013) statement that the inability/weakness of theNigerian legal framework to create enabling opportunity for oil theft cases in the region to scale throughplays out in the lacunas of arrests and prosecution process of the oil theft suspects. In most cases, thearrested crude oil suspects by the joint task force and/or NSCDC are released by the judiciary onintervention of their political masters, without adequate prosecution. This has multiplied effects of attractingmore participants and continuity of oil theft in the state/nation.

The paper recommends that the Nigerian Government should:First, adequately empower the EFCC and LEAs with modern technological surveillance equipment

to monitor the oil pipelines/installation, both in the sea, and at the creeks where the pipelines crisscross.They should also introduce the use of Technology Tracking System for crude oil vessels and moneylaundering outlets bearing in mind the calibre of persons or groups involved in the illicit trade.

Second, as part of methods of resources and revenue recovery, and fighting crude oil theft activities,government should seek for international assistance and collaboration from countries where crude oilstolen from Nigeria are sold. As Assuni (2009) states that government is well placed to offer carrots aswell as sticks, and can set up legitimate oil export contracts with countries such as Côte d’Ivoire thathave previously benefited from the receipt of stolen crude.

Third, to win the war against crude oil theft in Nigeria, government must tackle money laundering, asthe fight to end crude oil theft is to accompany actions against money laundering and acquisition ofassets by oil thieves in Nigeria.

Fourth, government should proceed towards a speedy development of the Niger Delta region topacify its inhabitants for the marginalisation done to them over the years. In Adeboboye, Duru andOgodo (2013), the Chief of Naval Staff, Nigerian Navy, advocated for constant review of corporate

Year Cases Filed in Court

Conviction Secured

Percentage Changes

2014 388 126 0

2013 485 117 7.14

2012 502 87 30.95

2011 417 67 46.83

2010 206 68 46.03



social responsibilities of oil major host communities and improve opportunities for the restive youths aswell as massive environmental resuscitation of crude oil products available to the people of the NigerDelta in order to give them a sense of belonging.

Fifth, special courts for oil theft cases should be created to enable swift prosecution and obtainingconviction of oil criminals and their backers. This process will enable the successful arrests, prosecution,and conviction of high-profile key players and send out a powerful message to the world that NigerianGovernment is out to fight and conquer oil theft activities.

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Assi, V. E. Amah, O. I. & Edeke, S. O. (2016), Oil Theft and Corruption: Pathways to underdevelopmentin the Niger Delta, Research on Humanities and Social Sciences Journal, ISSN 2224-5766,Vol. 6, No. 3.

Asuni, J.B. (2009), Blood Oil in the Niger Delta, in V.E. Assi, O.I. Amah, & S.O. Edeke (Eds.), OilTheft and Corruption: Pathways to Underdevelopment in the Niger Delta, Research on Humanitiesand Social Sciences, ISSN (paper) 2224-5766, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2016, pp 71. Also published in theSpecial Report 229 of United States Institute of Peace, 1200 17 Street NW, Washington, DC20036, 202.457.1700.

Ayanruoh, F. (2013), Nigeria-cold facts of crude oil theft in G. Wilson, (Eds.), The Nigerian State andOil Theft in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria, Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa(Volume 16, No.1, pp 70), ISSN: 1520-5509, Clarion University of Pennsylvania, Clarion, andPennsylvania, 2014.

Boris, O.H. (2015), The Upsurge of Oil Theft and Illegal Bunkering in the Niger Delta Region ofNigeria: Is there a way out?, Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, MCSER Publishing,Rome-Italy.

Dalby, C. (2015). These Are the 5 Countries Most Plagued by Oil Theft, http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/These-Are-The-5-Countries-Most-Plagued-by-Oil-Theft.html, accessed 4th Oct2015.

Dasuki, S. M. (2013), Nigeria’s Security Challenges: The Way Forward, Constructive Engagement,Journal of Alumni Association of National Defence College Nigeria, Vol. 1, No. 5.

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Duru, A. E. (2013), Addressing oil theft, illegal bunkering in Niger Delta, in O.H. Boris, (Eds.), TheUpsurge of Oil Theft Bunkering in the Nigeria Delta Region of Nigeria: Is There a Way Out?,Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, MCSER Publishing, Rome, Italy.

EFCC Establishment Act, (2004) Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, http://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Nigeria/NG_Nigerian_MaritimeAdmin_Act_2007.pdf, accessed28th June, 2016.

“EFCC Zero Tolerance, (2008) Criminal Economy of Oil Thieves,” The Magazine of Nigeria’s Economicand Financial Crimes Commission, pp 25-25, ISSN 0795-2457.

EFCC Annual Report, (2013) Pipeline Vandalism and Illegal Bunkering, Federal Republic of Nigeria,EFCC Headquarters’, No. 5 Fomella Street, Wuse II, Abuja, Siddwell Production.

EFCC Annual Report, (2014) Legal practice, Federal Republic of Nigeria, EFCC Headquarters’, No.5 Fomella street, Wuse II, Abuja, Siddwell production.

Ejiofor, A. (2012) Fiscal Crisis Looms as Oil Theft Ravages Niger Delta, in K.U. Omoyibo (Eds.)Political Economic Diagnosis of Crude Oil Theft in Nigeria: The Way Forward, MediterraneanJournal of Social Sciences, MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy, Vol. 5, No. 2.

Federal Republic of Nigeria, (2006) National defense policy, in F. C. Onuorah, (Eds.), Oil PipelineSabotage in Nigeria: Dimensions, Actors and Implications for National Security, African SecurityReview, 2008.

Gaiya, A. B. (2013) Economic Dimensions of National Security in Nigeria, Africa Peace Review Journalof Strategic Research and Studies, National Defence College, Nigeria, Vol. 11-12, No.1.

Jonah, G.J. (2010) Maritime Dimension of Nigeria’s National Security: Challenges for Nigeria,Constructive Engagement, Journal of Alumni Association of National Defence College Nigeria,Vol. 1, No. 2.

Katsouris, C., & Sayne, A.(2013) Nigeria’s criminal crude: International options to combat the Exportof stolen oil, in V.E. Assi, O.I. Amah, & S.O. Edeke (Eds.), Oil Theft and Corruption: Pathwaysto underdevelopment in the Niger Delta. Research on Humanities and social sciences, ISSN:2224-5766, vol.6, No.3. also published in the Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa(Vol. 16, No.1, 2014, pp 75), ISSN: 1520-5509, Clarion University of Pennsylvania, Clarion,and Pennsylvania.

Lippmann, W. (1943), “U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic,” in O. Mbachu and C. M. Eze(Eds.) Democracy and National Security: Issues, Challenges and Prospects, Medus AcademicPublishers.

Lyman, P.M.G. (2007) Organised Crime, Prentice-Hall Person Education Inc.

Mallory, (2007) Theories on the Continued Existence of Organised Crime, Sudbury Massachusetts,Jones and Bartlet Publishers.



Mbachu, O., & Eze, C. M.(2009) Democracy and National Security: Issues, Challenges andProspects, Medusa Academic Publishers.

Mangal, S.K.,& Mangal, S. (2015) Research Methodology in Behavioural Science, PHI learning privateLimited, Published by Asoke, K. Ghosh, Rimjhim House, 111, Patparganj Industrial Estate, Delhi-110092, and New Delhi-110020.

Menyi, D. (2014) “Crude Oil Theft, Pipeline Vandalism Cross Over”, in V.E. Assi, O.I. Amah, & S.O.Edeke, (eds.), Oil Theft and Corruption: Pathways to Underdevelopment in the Niger Delta,Research on Humanities and Social Sciences, ISSN (paper) 2224-5766, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2016,pp 74. Also published in the Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa (Volume 16, No.1,2014, pp 76), ISSN: 1520-5509, Clarion University of Pennsylvania, Clarion, and Pennsylvania.

NAN, (2014) Oil theft: EFCC recovers 11 vessels, 16 trucks from suspects, The News,http://thenewsnigeria.com.ng/2014/06/oil-theft-efcc-recovers-11-vessels-16-trucks-from-suspects/, assessed 27June, 2016.

NSCDC, (2016) Summary of anti-vandalism activities (oil pipeline/gas installations) 2010- Jan 2016,NSCDC Report, NSCDC Headquarters, Abuja.

Nigerian Navy, (2013) No Crude Oil theft, http://www.cot.navy.mil.ng/crude-oil-theft#. V4WyLtIrLIUassessed 13th July, 2016.

Nwoye, K. (2000) Corruption, Leadership, and Dialectics of Development in Africa, EnuguAssociated Printers

Ogbeni, O.O. (2012) Fuel Pipeline Vandalism in Nigeria, in A.C. Okoli, & S, Orinya, (Eds.) Oil PipelineVandalism and National Security, Global Journal of Human Social Science and Political Science,Vol. 13, Issues 5, Version 10, pp 67, Global Journals Inc. USA.

Ogodo, D. (2013) Oil Bunkering in the Niger Delta Nigeria’s Oil & Gas, in O.H. Boris, (Eds.), TheUpsurge of Oil Theft Bunkering in the Nigeria Delta Region of Nigeria: Is There a Way Out?,Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, MCSER Publishing, Rome, Italy.

Okoli, A. C. & Orinya, S. (2013) Oil Pipeline Vandalism and National Security, Global Journal ofHuman Social Science and Political Science, Vol. 13, Issues 5, Version 10, pp 67, GlobalJournals Inc. USA.

Omoyibo, K. U. (2014) Political Economic Diagnosis of Crude Oil Theft in Nigeria: The Way Forward,Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy, Vol. 5, No. 2.

Onoja, N. (2013) Niger Loses $11bn to Oil Theft, Vandalism-NEITI, in A.C. Okoli, & S. Orinya,(Eds.). Oil Pipeline Vandalism and National Security, Global Journal of Human Social Scienceand Political Science Inc, Vol. 13, Issues 5, Version 10, USA.

Onuoha, F. C. (2012) Illegal oil bunkering: Nigerian Context and Transnational Ramifications for theGulf of Guinea, Articles, Politeia Vol. 31, No. 2, Unisa Press.

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Premium Times, (2012) Nigeria Loses @155bn Monday to Oil Theft, Others, http:www.premiumtimesng.comassessed 28 June 2016.

Shinkaiye, J. K. (2004) National Security and Challenges of the 21st Century, in O. Mbachu, & C.M.Eze, (Eds.), Democracy and National Security: Issues, Challenges and Prospects, MedusAcademic Publishers, 2004.

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Uwotu, K. (2013) Does Nigerian Government Have the Political Will to Combat Oil Theft?, in O.H.Boris, (Edition), The Upsurge of Oil Theft and Illegal Bunkering in the Niger Delta Region ofNigeria: Is There a Way Out? Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, MCSER Publishing,Rome-Italy 2015.

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Appendix

Table 5: Total Response Pattern to Specific Issues and PercentageDistribution of Respondents (No. 63)

Question Response Count Percentage

Q1. The EFCC Establishment Act adequately empowered the commission to fight crude oil theft.

Strongly disagree 0 0.0% Disagree 9 14.3% Fairly Agree 10 15.9% Agree 23 36.5% Strongly agree 21 33.3% Total 63 100.0%

Q2. Effective collaboration with other LEAs has impacted on EFCC fight against crude oil theft.

Strongly disagree 0 0.0% Disagree 2 3.2% Fairly Agree 5 7.9% Agree 37 58.7% Strongly agree 19 30.2%

Total 63 100.0%

Q3. Diligent investigation and prosecution of cases have yielded positive result in the EFCC fight against crude oil theft.


Q4. EFCC operatives are adequately equipped with modern technology to fight crude oil related cases.


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Q5. The fight against crude oil theft is the fight against money laundering in Nigeria.


Q6.There is a connection between crude oil theft and acquisition of assets by oil thieves.

Strongly disagree 0 0.0% Disagree 2 3.2% Fairly Agree 19 30.2% Agree 24 38.1%% Strongly agree 18 28.6% Total 63 100.0%

Q7.Crude oil theft has a negative impact on Government generated Revenue.


Q8.Crude oil theft has a negative effect on the socio-economy of the Niger Delta Region and Nigeria.


Q9. EFCC activities on crude oil have reduced illegal oil bunkering in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria.




Q10. EFCC activities have improved government revenue generation base.

Strongly disagree

0

0.0%

Disagree 6 9.5% Fairly Agree 20 31.7% Agree 18 28.6% Strongly agree 19 30.2% Total 63 100.0%

Q11. EFCC activities have increased the effectiveness of LEAs in Nigeria.


Q12. EFCC activities on oil theft have increased domestic cooperation among LEAs in Nigeria.

Strongly disagree 2 3.2 Disagree 3 4.8 Fairly Agree 22 34.9 Agree 33 52.4 Strongly agree 3 4.8 Total 63 100.0%

Q13.EFCC intervention processes on crude oil theft have not recorded many successes between 2010 to 2015


Q14.Nigerian judicial system has not been so effective in the handling of crude oil theft cases.


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Q15.The delays from Judiciary were as a result of inadequate investigation of crude oil cases by the EFCC.


Q16. The delays from Judiciary on crude oil theft cases have been because of inadequate prosecution by EFCC prosecutors.


Source: Compiled by the researcher from the field survey



CONTEMPORARY LOGISTICS SUPPORT CHALLENGES INAFRICAN UNION PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

by

Brig Gen Adekunle AdeyinkaDirecting Staff

Army War College Nigeria, Abuja

ABSTRACT

Peace Support Operations have become effective tools in the maintenanceof international peace and security, and resolution of violent conflicts betweenand within nations. These operations require logistics support to achievetheir goals. This piece interrogates the issue of logistics support challengesin African Union Peace Support Operations. It identifies gaps in the Union’slogistics planning which limits its capacity to sustain its forces for a longperiod. The paper recommends logistics training support programme, andthe adoption of force logistics support group model to ensure prompt andsafe logistics support for the Union’s peace operations personnel.

Key words: Contemporary, Logistics Support Challenges, African Union, PeaceSupport Operations.

I. INTRODUCTION

The security environment in Africa remains characterised with several conflict situations. These widespreadconflicts attract the attention and response of the AU at the continental level and regional mechanisms atthe regional level. On its part, the international community, led by the UN, has increasingly referred tothe AU and regional mechanisms as first responders and subsequently anchored the international responseon the continental effort. This trend highlights the increasing importance and relevance of AU PeaceSupport Operations (PSOs) in addressing and managing conflicts on the continent.

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The severity of the conflicts in some African countries has necessitated the deployment of continentaland regional PSOs as a precursor to the deployment of UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). Despitethe achievements of the AU PSOs, the experiences in Somalia and Sudan and more recently in Mali andCentral African Republic (CAR) highlight significant logistics support challenges. These experiencesreveal salient gaps in the ability of the AU to effectively plan, deploy, manage and sustain as well asefficiently and effectively support troops in the field. These capacity and capability challenges have hadsignificant impacts on the operational effectiveness of AU missions and their ability to effectively deliveron their mandates. Notwithstanding, it is pertinent to appreciate that there have been significantimprovements in mission support. However, much is still required in light of the evolving operatingenvironment and the realities of contemporary PSOs.

This paper therefore seeks to appraise the current approach to planning and delivery of logisticssupport in AU PSOs with a view to proposing suggestions on the way forward. Consequently, it willbegin with a conceptual discourse and provide an overview of logistics support and contemporary PSOenvironment in Africa. The paper will thereafter highlight the current realities of logistic support in AUPSOs and thereafter propose an alternative logistics support model for AU PSOs. The paper will focuson lessons drawn by the author from experiences garnered on recent AU missions in Mali and CAR aswell as the ongoing AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The rationale is to ensure adequate logisticssupport for all future AU PSOs to facilitate successful implementation of the mission mandate.


As a background, it will be useful to establish a conceptual basis for the major concepts in this paper.Accordingly, the concepts of logistics and PSO will be subsequently discussed.

(a) Logistics

Logistics is not a new idea and has been defined in several ways depending on the context and viewpointof the author. It can be simply described as the ‘art of moving armies’ as well as ‘the science of planningthe movement and maintenance of a force’. Although these definitions give credence to its militaryorigin, logistics has increasingly gained wider attention, especially within the business community, as aconcept for managing organisational efficiency and competitiveness. We could therefore consider amore complex description of logistics as ‘the process of strategically managing the procurement, movementand storage of materials, parts and finished inventory through the organisation and its marketing channelsin such a way that current and future profitability are maximised through the cost-effective fulfilment oforders’.

Essentially, these definitions highlight the critical attributes of supporting organisational goals as wellas promoting organisational efficiency and competitiveness through the integration of activities involvinga wide array of stakeholders. These attributes are aptly captured in the definition that succinctlyencapsulates logistics as positioning of resources at the right time, in the right place, at the right cost andright quantity. This perspective is equally relevant to understanding logistics support in PSOs whichseeks to ensure that the ‘peacekeepers’ and all other stakeholders receive what is required for effective

Contemporary Logistics Support Challenges in African Union Peace Support Operations 239


mandate implementation at the right time and in the right quantity. This definition will be adopted in thispaper.

(b) Peace Support Operations

PSOs have evolved from the cold war era peacekeeping concept. The traditional peacekeeping modelwas conceptualised to monitor ceasefires and buffer zones by inter-positioning between belligerents aswell as observe, verify and report on adherence to or violations of agreements. This approach washugely static in posture and anchored on the UN principles of consent, impartiality/neutrality and non-use of force, except in self-defense.

The British Joint Warfare Publication conceptualises PSO as multi-functional operations involvingmilitary forces, diplomatic and humanitarian agencies designed to achieve humanitarian goals or a long-term political settlement conducted impartially in support of an appropriate mandate. This broad viewencompasses all the major areas of action including conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping,peace enforcement (where necessary), peacebuilding and humanitarian operations, in the pursuance ofpeace. It affords a comprehensive multi-dimensional approach to addressing the complexities ofcontemporary conflicts and efforts to reform and rebuild a nation. This wide-ranging perspective espousedby the AU and regional mechanisms will be adopted in this paper.

LOGISTICS SUPPORT AND THE CONTEMPORARY PEACE SUPPORTOPERATIONS ENVIRONMENT IN AFRICA

The current PSO environment is generally more hostile with wide-ranging threats including terrorism,transnational organised crime and poor local infrastructure. The operating environment is also increasinglyasymmetric in nature thus necessitating offensive and mobile operations with the attendant consequenceof extended Lines of Communication (LoCs). This reality raises critical questions on the ability of thehugely static PSO logistics framework to effectively and timely support the implementation of PSOmission mandates.

The current framework prescribes the establishment of static logistics support bases with fixedsupport frameworks that cannot cope with the increase in in-theatre administrative and operationalmovements. This strain is compounded by the limited availability of aviation assets and rail infrastructurethat would have been used to augment the regular road movements. Consequently, AU PSOs areheavily reliant on road networks as the primary and in most instances, the only means of resupply. Theincreased road movements, present attractive targets for hostile elements thus highlighting an additionalchallenge of insecurity along the already extended LOCs. These constraints, particularly, the securityconcerns have hugely restricted the interest and availability of commercial contractors for in-theatrelogistics support in AU PSOs.

For instance, some AU PSOs such as AMISOM experience significant Improvised Explosive Devices(IEDs) attacks with substantial impact on the supply chain. Similarly, UN Multi-dimensional IntegratedStabilisation Mission in Mali lost 23 and 25 personnel in 2015 and 2016 respectively from IED attacks.The fatal and adverse impact of these attacks underlines the growing complexity of the PSO environment

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in Africa. These realities raise critical questions on the suitability of contractors/civil logistics capabilitiesin preference to the more expensive military second and third line logistics support enabling units.

CURRENT REALITIES OF LOGISTICS SUPPORT INAFRICAN UNION PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

The development of timely, detailed and robust logistics plans is crucial to the delivery of effective andefficient logistics support to AU PSOs. The AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) is responsiblefor planning, deploying, managing and liquidating AU PSOs. Within the division, the Mission SupportUnit (MSU) is tasked with addressing logistics support and related issues. The MSU, like most unitswithin the AU PSOD, remains grossly understaffed to effectively provide strategic level support acrossthe spectrum of planning, deploying, managing and liquidating AU missions. This situation is furthercompounded in the field by the difficulties in timely recruitment of mission logistics planning and operationofficers, most of whom are civilians. These capacity gaps negatively impact on the ability of the AUmission support elements to plan and coordinate the efficient and effective delivery of logistics supportto AU missions.

In its recent PSOs in Mali and CAR, the AU took over missions from the regional forces of theEconomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Standby Force and the Economic Communityof Central African States (ECCAS). The transition in both situations revealed a huge capacity gap inlogistics planning. Although, expertise generally existed in functional areas such as supply, engineeringand transport, limited capacities could be observed in strategic and to some extent, operational levellogistics planning. Unfortunately, these gaps cut across the AU and regional planning elements as well asthe Troop/Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs). This situation has significantly limited the capacityof the AU, regional mechanisms and T/PCCs to effectively sustain forces over long periods, especiallyunder a wet lease arrangement. It would thus be necessary to focus logistics training support programmesat developing requisite continental planning capacities at the strategic and operational levels. Theseefforts could begin with an initial focus on the planning elements at the AU and regional mechanisms.

Most of the AU PSOs are heavily dependent on donor support, either financially, materially orotherwise. These donations are highly unpredictable in terms of redemption period, usage and sometimestype and quality, especially in case of donated equipment. In many instances, the funding provided bypartners are caveated which gives the AU little or no room for flexibility in expenditure. Another negativeimpact of the inability of the AU to fund its operations, is the lack of clear understanding of the financialrequirements for its missions right from the initial planning stages. This results in unrealistic budgets thatfall short of requirements in the field. These uncertainties make it difficult to develop clear, concise andconcrete logistics support plans. This reality has to a large extent institutionalised an unsustainable ad-hoc approach to logistics planning with its obvious complications. A more predictable funding mechanismespecially at mission start-up will have to be developed to ensure that definite plans and support mechanismscan be put in place for the initial period of about six months, while donations are being harmonised andput together for use in an organised manner. Similarly, the AU could request that donations are madewith minimal caveats, redeemed timely and provided in line with AU needs.



The current approach to mission support planning within the AU encourages “stove piping” withinthe supply chain rather than having an integrated system with necessary visibility and cooperation amongstall the stakeholders. For instance, delays in the activities of stakeholders such as procurement andhuman resources have sometimes impeded the successful implementation of logistics support plans. Itwill be necessary to carry along all supply chain stakeholders early enough whilst also counting on thecommitted involvement of these stakeholders in the successful attainment of set goals. To this end, it willbe useful to ensure that partners that would support future AU missions are brought into the AU planningprocess early enough to ensure that they have the required visibility of the AU initiative and how best toprovide support. In the same vein, working policies and guidance documents of other supporting AUdepartments and divisions, outside PSOD, will have to be reviewed to enable and guarantee timely andeffective support to AU PSOs.

The current challenges that T/PCCs face with securing reimbursements under AU PSOs remains amajor disincentive to the generation of the logistics enabling capacities and deployment of adequateContingent Owned Equipment (COE) to the missions. For instance, the reimbursements to T/PCCs forthe AU missions in Mali and CAR has not been concluded. Consequently, most of these T/PCCs, aswas observed in Mali, become more willing to provide the required COE under the banner of a UNmission rather than an AU mission. The non-deployment of requisite COE obviously has a negativeimpact on the capacity of the T/PCCs to effectively achieve their mandates and the absence of theenabling capabilities further compounds the capacity of the AU to effectively sustain and manage theforces. It is therefore expedient that the T/PCCs participating in AU missions have access to similarreimbursement conditions as those operating under the UN missions to encourage effective participation.Similarly, the peculiarities and sometimes more hazardous operating conditions should be adequatelyconsidered in the compensation package to the T/PCCs. The AU will therefore need to develop clearguidelines that will address the peculiarities of its missions, such as COE issues, with a view to engenderingeffective T/PCC participation and mandate implementation.

THE WAY FORWARD: FORCE LOGISTICS SUPPORT GROUP MODEL

As elucidated above, the AU will have to develop a realistic logistics support model that will address thepeculiarities of its missions in the current operating environment. It will also need to address the currentlogistics support challenges facing AU PSOs such as capacity and capability gaps as well as thoseimposed by the contemporary operating environment and PSO management practices. This calls for aparadigm shift from the current”Civilian/Contractor Based Model”, to a logistics support model thatguarantees improved support to offensive/non-offensive and mobile operations. The Force LogisticsSupport Group (FLSG) Model is thus suggested as a viable alternative in this regard. The FLSG wasoriginally proposed as the fulcrum of the logistics support concept for the African Standby Force.However, the impetus for a civilian led multi-dimensional approach encouraged the adoption of the UNcivilian heavy framework.

In the FLSG framework, the AU will provide second and third line support to T/PCCs throughmilitary logistics enabling units under the command of a military logistics officer who will also double as

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the mission Chief Logistics Officer (CLO). In the model, the use of civilian capacities and contractorassets, especially at mission start up, will be hugely minimised. As the operation progresses and thesecurity situation improves these military assets would be gradually replaced with civilian contractedassets. Similarly, the staffing of the logistics support organisation will reflect a gradual correspondingshift from a military heavy entity to a civilian heavy entity. Particularly, the leadership of the missionlogistics organisation will move from the CLO to the Head of Mission Support, a civilian. The FLSGModel will align with the cardinal spirit of multi-dimensional civilian led integrated PSOs by allowingenough time for the recruitment of civilians. It will permit the conduct of logistics operations in hostileenvironments and engender improved security along the LOCs. Consequently, the FLSG will ensureadequate and timely delivered support in the field, especially at the start of operations.

To successfully implement the FLSG model, the AU will need to also address the poor logisticssupport management practices earlier identified. These include facilitating logistics planning capabilitydevelopment programmes with an initial focus on the planning elements at the AU and regionalmechanisms. It is also critical that a more predictable funding mechanism is developed and employed forAU PSOs. It is also key to ensure that donations made to the AU for PSOs come with minimal caveatsand are timely redeemed in line with AU priorities. Furthermore, the working policies and guidancedocuments of other AU departments and divisions, outside PSOD, need to be reviewed to enable andguarantee timely and effective support to AU PSOs. Finally, the AU will need to develop clear COEguidelines that take due cognisance of the peculiarities of the AU PSO environment.

CONCLUSION

AU PSOs are increasingly characterised by a new operating environment involving the conduct ofcombat offensive operation to address the ever-increasing challenges of terrorism and other trans-national crimes. This new environment requires better planning, new logistics support models and conceptswith probably more use of robust military capabilities and implementation of unique procurement andadministrative mechanisms.

Undoubtedly, most of the T/PCCs still lack adequate capabilities to provide the necessary enablingunits and would require some support in this regard. The lack of predictable funding for AU missionsand the over-reliance and over-dependence on partners/donors support will also continue to underminecurrent efforts aimed at aligning developed strategic plans to missions support activities unless thesechallenges are also addressed. To this end, the FLSG Model that will ensure the delivery of adequateand timely support in the field, especially at the start of operations is suggested. As, the mission progressesand normalcy returns, the second and third line support would embrace an increased use of civiliancontractors in line with the cardinal spirit of multi-dimensional civilian-led integrated PSOs. The successfulimplementation of the FLSG Model will require detailed attention to the identified poor logistics supportmanagement practices such as the COE reimbursement policy.



REFERENCES

African Union (2000), Constitutive Act of the African Union. Lome, Togo. http://au.int/en/sites/default/files/Constitutive Act en 0.htm

African Union (2006), Draft ASF Logistics Manual, AU PSOD, Addis Ababa.

African Union (2008), ASF Doctrine. http://civilian.peaceau.org/index.php?option= comdocman&task=catview&gid=53&Itemid=61&lang=en.]

African Union (2013), Report of Independent Panel of Experts Assessment of the African StandbyForce. http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/report-independent-panel-of-experts-assessment-of-the-asf-latest-pdf

African Union (2016), Press Release on 4th African Logistics Forum. http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/press-release-the-4th-african-logistics-forum-alf-2017-28april.pdf

Berdal M (2001), “What is Traditional about Traditional UN Peacekeeping?” in Peace SupportOperations: Lessons Learned and Future Perspectives, Oxford, Peter Lang.

Christopher M. (2005), Logistics and Supply Chain Management: Creating Value Adding Networks,London. Financial Times Management.

Rushton A, Croucher C and Baker P. (2006)., The Handbook of Logistics and DistributionManagement, London, Kogan Page Limited.

United Nations (2003), Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations.DPKO/Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (PBPU). http://www.peacekeeping bsetpractices.unlb.org/library/Handbook on UN PKOs.pdf

United Nations (2011), Review of Ten Year Capacity Building Program for the African Union. https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/2nd_triennial_review_rcm15_eng.pdf

United Nations (2011), Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/65/19).http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF969%7D/POC%20A%2065%2019.pdf.

United Nations ((2017), Press Release on United Nations Personnel Killed or Deliberately Attacked inPeacekeeping Operations in 2016. https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/org1643.doc.htm

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BOOK REVIEW

GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN CONTEMPORARY NIGERIA:ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR ALAKE BOLANLE AWE

Editors: Isaac O. Albert, Sharon A. Omotoso and Alero Akeredolu

Publisher: Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies,University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria

Pages: viii + 502

Reviewer : Dr. Benjamin A. AlukoInstitute for Peace and Strategic Studies,University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria.

TEXT OF REVIEW

The twenty-seven chapter well-edited and beautifully-packaged book makes quite interesting reading.In this volume, the contributors attempt what could be referred to as a comprehensive and insightfuldiscourse of an issue that is of tremendous relevance and interest to the global community. The point isthat the various topics discussed therein by scholars, policymakers and activists, who obviously arefrom diverse intellectual backgrounds and ideological orientations, cover a plethora of issues: definitionalissues, theoretical frameworks, emerging change in gender role, the intersection of religion, violence andgender, democracy, gender and peacebuilding, legal instruments and gender-based violence, emotionalintelligence and its implications for gender relationships. Indeed, the perspectives from which gender-based violence were interrogated in the book are so wide that even the emerging disheartening incidencesin Nigeria of spouses killing one another was captured in some of the papers in the volume.

One theme that runs through the volume is that women constitute the largest group of victims whenit comes to gender-based violence. This comes out very sharply in Chapter one, titled, ‘Contexts ofGender-based Violence’, obviously a synopsis of the book, authored by a world renown scholar inPeace and Conflict Studies, Isaac O. Albert, in his attempt at defining gender-based violence. Accordingto him, “gender-based violence is an umbrella term for any harm that is perpetrated against a person’swill and that results from gender-related power inequities at both public and private spheres”. That thescale of the victims of gender-based violence tilts more to the side of women is captured when he posits:

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“Though this problem is experienced by both the feminine and masculine gender it is more peculiar towomen and girls”.

It must be emphasised that apart from the fact that all the chapters in the book are obviouslyproducts of intense research, their penetrating interrogation of gender-based violence in the context ofuniversal values such as democracy, human rights, globalisation, development and peacebuilding isremarkable. Albert sets the ball rolling with an insightful introduction which, in all intent and purpose, laidbare the central thesis advanced in all the remaining chapters of the book. The second chapter, authoredby Eze, Executive Director, West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) provides an insight intothe trajectory of the civil society engagement with gender-based violence in the West Africa sub-region.Leveraging on his fertile analytical mind and robust understanding of the relevant normative frameworksin place to address gender-based violence-namely, Beijing + 20 (Agenda 2030) “Violence againstWomen”; Agenda 2063 “An Agenda of good governance, Democracy, Respect for Human Rights,Justice and Rule of Law”; Peaceful and Secure Africa and SDG G16; “Peace and Justice, StrongInstitutions”; G9 “ Reduce Inequality”, Eze discusses how these international frameworks can bedomesticated to promote effective women participation in addressing gender- based violence andinequality in West Africa.

In the third and fourth chapters, the authors discussed the emerging trend of women becomingbreadwinners of the family and the implications of this change in gender role on gender relationship. Inthe fifth chapter, the author provides what could be regarded as a way of managing the challengesthrown up by the change in gender role occasioned by the emergence of women as breadwinners of thefamily in her exposition on the emotional intelligence status of perpetrators and victims of gender-basedviolence, where she brilliantly articulates “the need for curriculum integration of emotional intelligence atall levels of the education and incorporation of EQ training into rehabilitation programmes of victims ofgender-based violence (GBV).” The imperativeness of reinventing the Nigeria’s educational curriculumtowards the promotion of gender equality and equity for mutual respect and harmonious relationshipbetween the two sexes resonates in Odebode’s paper in the twenty-sixth chapter of the book. Thepaper which takes its bearing from the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action 1995, makes a casefor conscientious and systematic mainstreaming of gender issues into the Nigeria’s tertiary educationalsystem.

In the sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth chapters, the intersection of religion, violence and gender,especially with respect to the Boko Haram crisis in the North-East of Nigeria was examined from twoperspectives. While chapters six, seven and nine focus on the various forms of indignities and challengeswomen are experiencing following the insurgency and counter-insurgency in the affected areas, chaptereight, authored by Albert takes a critical look at the modus operandi of the Ezekwesili led #Bring BackOur Girls# movement and its implications on the nation’s image and the fight against terrorism. It is hiscontention that the campaigns of the movement for the return of Chibok girls are having negative impacton both the image of the nation and efforts at reining in the insurgents.

In chapter ten, the authors call attention to the neglect of the provisions of the various legal instruments– the 1999 Nigerian constitution and the plethora of international conventions on the elimination of all

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forms of discrimination against women – in the management of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)camps created following the humanitarian crisis generated by the Boko Haram insurgency. The authorsadvance the need for the strengthening of relevant institutions constitutionally saddled with the protectionand promotion of individual rights in the nation.

Indeed, the chapters in the book provide invaluable insight into understanding the contexts, theories,dynamics, consequences, management and elimination of gender-based violence in contemporary Nigeria.At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that the book would have enjoyed global appeal if some of theauthors of the papers published in the book were drawn from across the globe with a view to reflectingthe experiences in other climes.

By and large, the book thoroughly presents the various perspectives that define the discourse ongender-based violence. The book should be seen and read as an important contribution to an emergingbody of knowledge and as a reference point for further research in the area.

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BOOK REVIEW

NIGERIA’S ANTI-TERROR WAR AGAINST BOKO HARAM:THE TURNING POINT AND LESSONS FOR NATIONAL

SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

Author: OBC Nwolise

Publisher: PYLA – Mark Services, Kaduna.

Year of Publication: 2017.

No of Chapters: 15.

No of Pages: 405.

Book Reviewer: Brig Gen Bello A. Tsoho,Director, Department of Research, Innovation and Campaigns,Nigerian Army Resource Centre, Abuja.

FOCUS AND ESSENCE

The book focused on the counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations of the Armed Forces ofNigeria against the Boko Haram in Nigeria’s North East states of Yobe, Borno and Adamawa. It is thefirst book to recognise the turning point in the anti-terror war in 2016, and document it. It is a publicationin honour of the Chief of Army Staff, Lt Gen TY Buratai who has been the leader and commander of theground forces that fought gallantly to: first bring about a turning point in the war in 2015, second todegrade the Boko Haram in 2016, and third to defeat the Boko Haram completely in 2018.

THE REVIEW

The book opened with a chapter titled “National Security and Its Relevance to National Development”.In this chapter, the author interrogated the concepts of national development and national security, andhighlighted the relevance of the latter to the former. From the chapter, the reader will easily comprehendwhy there can be no meaningful development in Nigeria or any other nation for that matter withoutpeace, security, and stability. The author’s perception and conceptualisation of national security drivesit beyond the cold-war era view of state centeredness. He not only focused the understanding of

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national security on human security of the contemporary era, but went ahead of other authors to bifurcatehuman and even national security into physical security and spiritual security. The current upsurge inritual killings, ritual rape, yahoo-plus (spiritual aspect of yahoo), and cult killings by Badoo, amongothers justify the author’s novel focus on spiritual dimension of human and national security.

Chapter two titled “Terrorism as the Long War: The Siege of the Contemporary World”,conceptualised terrorism, traced its historical roots to the late 18th century and examined its types,before presenting it as the long war. The idea of the long war is meant to alert government and ourmilitary that terrorism does not often lend itself to quick termination like conventional warfare. Themessage is for the nation to either be prepared for a long wrestle with Boko Haram, or vote the resourcesneeded to speedily wipe out all its traces. In chapter three, titled “ Anti-Terror War as a Different Typeof Warfare: The Limits of International Humanitarian Law”, (IHL) it is argued that terrorists who do notrespect human life, human rights and any law should not expect their rights to be respected. It called forUN revisit of the provisions of IHL in view of the emergence of terrorists waging asymmetric warfare incontemporary times. Chapter four on “Relevance of Media and Public Support in Anti-terror War”,highlights the importance of the media and populace being on the side of the army and government in ananti-terror war, while chapter five is titled “Africa As a New Terrorism Theatre” argues that Africa wasnot home to terrorism, and that foreign terrorists only pursued their foreign enemies to Africa. In chaptersix entitled “Evolution of Terrorism in Nigeria”, the author opines that the seed of terrorism in Nigeriawere sown in the 1960s with political thuggery, but Nigerians ignored these early signs.

Chapter seven examined “Boko Haram’s Origin, Leadership and Objectives in Nigeria”, focusingon how it commenced and transformed from non-violent group to a war machine; while chapter eight on“Boko Haram’s Full Scale War Against The Nigerian State and The Government’s Response” gavedetailed account of the groups battles and destructions. In chapter nine titled “The War on Terror inNigeria and The Human Rights Question: Amnesty International and Others”, the issue of AmnestyInternational’s (AI) reports accusing Nigerian Army of abusing human rights was taken. The authorhighlighted the aims of AI’s, and its good works but queried whether terrorists with their brutality andlawlessness deserve the protection of the law.

Chapter ten, titled “The Turning Point in The Anti-Terror War in The North East”, documents vastdata on Boko Haram’s atrocious destruction of lives, properties, values and infrastructure in the NorthEast from 2002 to 2017. The chapter also documented “wind” of change that blew with the emergenceof the Buhari administration and new Service Chiefs especially the Chief of Army Staff, Lt Gen TYBuratai whose leadership by example, and new operational, administrative and logistics strategies broughtabout the turning point in the war in favour of Nigeria. His efforts regenerated the morale and fired thefighting spirit of the troops, aided by the entry of the Multinational Joint Task Force, and Civilian JointTask Force. Chapter eleven discussed “The Results of the Turning Point”, which included thedemystification, and degrading of the Boko Haram and reclamation of occupied territories. Chaptertwelve focused on “The Nigerian Media, The Local Populace and The Anti-Terror War”. It examinedhow our national media handled the anti-terror war, pointing out that the media constitute a force multiplierin warfare, and that this should be done on the side of Nigeria and its armed forces. The local populacedid not stand with the Nigerian Army at the beginning of the war in the North East. This situation, the

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book points out is a lesson for the military as no counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operationever succeeds without the support of the local populace. Chapter thirteen, “National Recognition: SaluteTo The Joint Forces and Fallen Heroes”, is an appreciation for the Multinational Joint Task Force,personnel of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, members of the Civilian Joint Task Force, and other personnelthat made the supreme sacrifice.

Chapter fourteen, “Challenges of Terrorism Today and Strategies for Tomorrow”, examined theproblems created by terrorism in the nation, and examined the relief operations going on in the NorthEast. Chapter Fifteen on “Reflections and Conclusion”, concluded the work with feasiblerecommendations.

Overall, the book is well published. The few printer’s devils in it can be taken care of in the nextedition.

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the journal of the army war college nigeria

Documents

Transcript of the journal of the army war college nigeria