Sample of Research Paper

The Influence of Individuals’ Political Orientations on

Framing Effects In Political Communication

byFebriliani (U1330266G)

Clarissa Chia Pei Shin (U1330041L)Annabel Tan Poh Gek (U1330660L)

Ng Yan Xiang (U1330348G)Faishal Luthfi bin Kamsani (U1130637D)

A RESEARCH PROJECT

submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the

module of

CS2057 MEDIA EFFECTS

[AY2014/15 Sem 2]

NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY

Wee Kim Wee School of Communication and Information

2015

© 2015 Wee Kim Wee School of Communication and Information

Abstract

Framing effect is an example of cognitive bias, in which people

react to a particular choice in different ways depending on how it

is presented. Although framing effects have been widely

demonstrated, few studies have examined whether or not the perceived

affinity of a news source to the recipients’ political orientations

could enhance framing effects. Therefore, the purpose of our study

was to investigate this phenomenon in the case of Singaporean

youths. Our study found no significant difference in framing effects

regardless of whether the participants were presented with a source

that match or clash with their political orientations  (p = .625).

Instead, we found that prior frame orientations and source

credibility were important predictors of framing effects.

Keywords: Framing effects, political orientation, source credibility,

Singapore, prior frame orientation, youth

1. Literature Review

Framing

One of the most cited definitions of framing was Entman‘s

(1993): “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality

and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as

to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation,

moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item

described” (p. 52). The key argument in the framing discussion is

that there are many ways of interpreting an issue (Chong & Druckman,

2007). By advocating a particular interpretation of an issue, each

frame serves as “a central organizing idea or story line that

provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a

connection among them” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, p. 143).

Subsequent studies reinforced this view even drawing a parallel

between frames and individuals’ cognitive schemata. Similar to

cognitive schemata, frames also function as heuristic structures

that guide, organise and influence considerations about an issue

(Bennett, 1993; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Nelson & Kinder, 1996).

Framing in Political Communication

In this study, we are interested in exploring framing in the

context of political communication. According to Chong and Druckman

(2007), framing provides a framework of interpretation for

individuals to organise their perception of political issues. One

type of framing frequently found in political news is issue framing,

which Slothuus and de Vreese (2010, p. 631) defined as a process

where “a communicator defines and constructs a political issue or

public controversy by emphasizing a subset of potentially relevant

considerations and thereby pointing the receiver to the essence of

the issue". This role of the communicator is often actively assumed

by the news media, which provide the framework for the audience to

make sense of public events (Tuchman, 1978). In executing this role,

it is important to note that news media is not impartial. Rather, it

is influenced by its ideology and political orientation in news

gathering and reporting (Gerbner, 1964). More recent news media

research strongly supported Gerbner’s finding, asserting the view

that news media is subject to political, social, and ideological

influences (Edelman, 1993; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Scheufele, 1999;

Shoemaker & Reese, 1996), a prominent scholar in framing research,

also posited that one of the factors influencing how journalists

frame an issue is their ideological or political orientations.

Singapore Media

The premise of freedom of press is to enable the media to

check on elected governments (Goh, 2005; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001).

However, the Singapore government believes that the press should

follow the ‘development journalism’ model (Fong, 1991; Lee 1987) by

assisting the government in nation building rather than acting as a

watchdog (Hachten, 1981; Goh, 1998; Lee, 1971). Singapore’s leading

broadsheet, The Straits Times, owned by the most prominent

mainstream news publication in Singapore - Singapore Press Holdings (SPH) -

tends to support government policies in its media coverage (Norris,

2008) and hence is often perceived as a tool of the government. The

general public is aware of this close press-government relationship

(Kuo, Holaday, & Peck, 1993). In fact, the government’s Feedback

Unit reported that 81% of the citizens perceived the media as the

government’s mouthpiece (Worthington, 2003).

As such, the Singapore press seems to lack an alternative

voice. Bokhorst-Heng (2002) describes this as a “virtual controlled

newspaper monopoly”, with newspapers of all four official languages

(English, Mandarin, Malay and Tamil) merging under one SPH umbrella

(Bokhorst-Heng, 2002, p. 564). This newspaper monopoly in turn

supports party monopoly. The government mainly consists of the

People’s Action Party (PAP) that has retained its dominance since

Singapore’s independence in 1965. According to Mauzy and Milne

(2002), the PAP controls the media to the point of repressing the

opposition. This has led to the opposition turning to alternative

media. Alternative media is “the media produced by the socially,

culturally and politically excluded” (Dowmunt & Coyer, 2007, p. 5).

In opposing the mainstream media on topics like race and politics,

alternative media exercises “contentious journalism” (George, 2006).

In Singapore, the Internet has contributed to the growth of

online discussion groups and websites which express alternative

views in relation to existing social arrangements and debates (Ho,

Baber, & Khondker, 2002). One alternative news site that has

arguably done so is The Online Citizen (TOC), a volunteer-run

online site reporting socio-political news and views on Singapore

issues. In the lead-up to the 2006 general elections, The Online

Citizen gained prominence in offering alternative commentary on

Singapore’s political scene. (Kenyon, Marjoribanks, & Whiting,

2013). Since 2007, it has become one of the most popular

alternative news sources with 8,147 fans by 28 September 2010. The

Online Citizen is not pro-opposition by policy and they believe in

providing a platform for voices underrepresented in mainstream

media (George, 2011), providing an opportunity for opposition views

to be published.

Political Orientation in Singapore Context

The independent variable (IV) of our study is the congruence

between the political orientation of participants and that of the

news source. This section aims to review how previous local studies

operationalised political orientation from a conceptual variable

into a set of measurable variables. A study by the Institute of

Political Studies and National University of Singapore (Tan, Chung,

& Zhang, 2011) explained that political orientation in academic

research is usually categorised into two diametrically different or

opposing ideologies. Some examples include “left / right-wing”,

“Democrat / Republican” partisanship and “Communistic /

Capitalistic” orientations.

In the past decade, a significant number of opposition

political parties have consistently garnered more than a quarter of

the votes in the general elections since 1984, reducing the PAP’s

dominance in the Parliament (Mutalib, 2003). This shows a transition

to a multi-party system, which has led to growing political

partisanship among Singaporeans. Right-wing Singaporeans tend to

identify with the PAP, while those of the left-wing and those who

favour progressive governance often side with the opposition parties

(Huang, 2013). Based on this understanding, we define political

orientation as pro-government, anti-government and for those who are

neither, as neutral.

Tan, Chung and Zhang (2011) operationalised political

orientation into measurable indicators of attitude that are

represented by these four statements: a. “Singapore should have a

powerful leader who can run the Government as he thinks fit.” b.

“There are too many rules against participating in political

activities in Singapore.” c. “Everyone should be given the freedom

to criticise the government publicly.” d. “It is more vital to have

good economic growth than freedom of speech.” The respondents are

asked to indicate their level of agreement to these statements

ranging from “Strongly Disagree” (1) to “Strongly Agree” (5) on a 5-

point scale. Pro-government and anti-government sentiments are

implied in the above statements, i.e. if you are pro-government, you

are more likely to agree with statement a. as you trust the

government to have greater control over the people. This set of

indicators were created to measure the political traits and media

use among Singaporean youth, making it highly relevant to our study.

However, we decided to use 7-point Likert scale instead of a 5-point

scale (See Methodology - Political Orientation). Reason being,

several studies found that scale sensitivity was improved when the

number of scale points increased (Diefenbach, Weinstein, & O’

Reilly, 1993;  Russell & Bobko, 1992).

In the earlier section, we showed how The Straits Times and

The Online Citizen are platforms for pro-government and anti-

government voices respectively. There seems to be a congruence in

political orientation between The Straits Times and Singaporeans who

are pro-government, and also between The Online Citizen and

Singaporeans who are anti-government.  

Framing Effects

A framing effect takes place when a frame’s emphasis on

particular considerations influences a person in his classification

and assessment of a political issue (Entman, Matthes, & Pellicano,

2009). Based on Nelson and Oxley (1999), framing effects occur by

adjusting “the importance individuals attach to particular beliefs”

(p. 1041). For example, when a news media frames the intake of

foreign workers as an economic issue, readers are persuaded to

construct their opinion of foreign workers based on economic

considerations instead of other concerns. This is irrespective of

whether the readers perceive the economic impact as positive or

negative.

Congruence in Political Orientation May Enhance Framing Effects

For framing effects to occur, individuals need to have the

motivation to accept the frame, as elaborated by the theory of

motivated reasoning. The theory of motivated reasoning explains how

people are not only motivated to make a deduction that is accurate,

but also by the the desire to preserve their personal attitudes,

beliefs and values (Mutz, 2007). Therefore, individuals are more

susceptible to a frame when the specific consideration emphasised in

the frame is applicable to the individual’s opinion of the issue

(Shen & Edwards, 2005; Chong & Druckman, 2007). Kunda (1990) also

found that in politics, citizens tended to be motivated by

directional more than accuracy goals. When citizens are motivated by

their inclination to make deductions in a certain direction, they

may “ignore or devalue contrary information, bias the perception of

credibility, or overlook important factors” (Taber, Lodge, &

Glathar, 2001, p. 208-209). Individuals are also motivated to

construct their opinion in a way that reinforces their partisan

beliefs. According to Slothuus and de Vreese (2010), when an

individual’s partisan belief is congruent with that of the source,

he is more likely to perceive the frame as applicable and use it to

form opinions. They found that citizens were more receptive to an

issue frame if it was attributed to a party they support.

Hence,

H1: When a pro-government reader is presented with a frame on The Straits Times, framing

effects will be larger as compared to when presented with the same frame on The Online

Citizen.

H2: When an anti-government reader is presented with a frame on The Straits Times,

framing effects will be smaller as compared to when presented with the same frame on The

Online Citizen.

Congruence in Political Orientation May Enhance Source Credibility

Previous studies mostly analysed the influence of different

aspects of source credibility — mainly that of “expertise and

trustworthiness” — on framing effects. (McGuire, 1969, p. 179). The

expertise of a source is determined by the degree to which the

recipient believes that the source has made accurate deductions

about an issue. A source is trustworthy if the recipient perceives

the source as communicating information that the latter believes to

be true (Sternthal, Phillips, & Dholakia, 1978). Based on Lupia and

McCubbins (1998), recipients attribute the expertise and

trustworthiness to the news source (i.e. the newspaper)  instead of

the author.

Meanwhile, our study focuses more on whether or not the

perceived affinity of a news source to its reader’s political

orientation can enhance the source’s credibility as a whole.

Individuals’ existing values, including their political

orientations, often slant their assessment of a source’s credibility

(Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, & Braman, 2011). As Kuklinski and Hurley

(1994) observed, citizens tend to place a large emphasis “on the

‘who’ that the ‘what’ recedes to the background” (p. 732).

Heuristics is a possible explanation for the relationship

between individuals’ partisan affinity with a source and their

perception of the source’s credibility. Self-confirmation heuristics

predispose individuals to perceive information as credible if it

confirms their preexisting beliefs (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983;

Klayman & Ha, 1987;). The use of heuristics is especially common

when it comes to consuming political news. Haider-Markel and Joslyn

(2006) contend that citizens use heuristics to make up for their

lack of political understanding.

By extension, Singaporeans who are pro-government are likely

to perceive The Straits Times as a more credible source than The

Online Citizen, due to the anticipated agreement with the source for

promoting their common ideology. On the other hand, individuals who

are critical of the government and sympathise with the opposition’s

views are likely to perceive TOC as more credible.

Source Credibility May Enhance Framing Effects

Several studies found that source credibility moderates

framing effects (Druckman, 2001; Kerner & Thomas, 2014). Druckman

(2001a) found that framing effects are only effective when an

individual is exposed to framing by a credible source. He reported

no effect for the individuals exposed to frames with very low level

of credibility. The applicability of these findings to our study is

limited because Druckman (2001a) defined credibility as expertise

and trustworthiness, leaving out the role of partisan loyalty in

influencing the perception of credibility. Moreover, he used two

sources that can be easily differentiated as credible and

noncredible. Consequently, recipients would tend to accept the frame

attributed to the credible source even if there is a mismatch

between the political orientation of the source and the

participants. We learned from this study that the sources’ level of

expertise and trustworthiness should not differ significantly in

order to attribute the variation in framing effects to partisan

loyalty. Similarly, Kerner (2014) defined source credibility as

expertise and trustworthiness. He also found that a credible source

enhances the framing effects while discovering no effects for the

less credible source. It is important to note that Kerner (2014)

based his research on the framing of wealth tax in Germany, limiting

his findings’ relevance to our study focusing on Singapore affairs.

Most importantly, he suggested that future studies should consider

the influence of “political interest and individual predispositions”

(p. 15) to increase external validity in examining the relationship

between source credibility and framing effects. This motivated us to

examine whether or not enhanced source credibility due to partisan

affinity strengthens framing effects.

Hence,

H3 : Source credibility is a significant predictor of framing effects

Prior Frame Orientation and Framing Effects

According to Chong and Druckman (2007), framing will not be

effective if the way an issue is framed deviates from the existing

understanding of a recipient. Moreover, the presented frame has to

be accessible and salient in the recipient’s mind. The frame must

trigger a pre-existing thought in an individual’s long-term memory

to be effective (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Based on Higgins (1996),

the pre-existing thought must also be accessible enough in memory

for someone to retrieve and utilise in constructing opinions.

Kaufman, Elliott and Shmueli (2013) defined the way someone

perceives a situation as a conceptual frame. They found that an

individual’s prior conceptual frame is relatively stable over time.

Trying to alter this prior cognitive frame is not easy as it can

cause psychological uncertainty and distress (Sherman & Updegraff,

2004). From these findings, we posited that the prior frame

orientation of participants is a significant predictor of framing

effects.

Hence,

H4: Prior frame orientation is a significant predictor of framing effects.

Message Credibility and Framing Effects

According to Hellmueller and Trilling (2012), research on the

construction of messages has yielded stable findings: unorganised

messages are perceived as less credible. Furthermore, an

individual’s perception of credibility is connected to elements of

message content such as message discrepancy, language intensity and

information quality. With regards to the definition of message

credibility, the tendency today is to assess it based on a message’s

perceived validity, reliability, accuracy, comprehensiveness and

currency (Metzger, Flanagin, Eyal, Lemus, & McCann, 2003). In

reviewing literature, we realised that limited studies had been done

in relation with message credibility and framing effects. However,

since message credibility falls under the general ambits of

credibility, together with source and media credibility (Metzger et

al., 2003), we posit that message credibility is also a significant

predictor of framing effects.

Hence,

H5: Message credibility is a significant predictor of framing effects

2. Methodology

Participants

A total of 92 Singaporeans between the ages of 18-25

participated in a 2 (source: The Straits Times/The Online Citizen) x 2

(message order: Foreign Labour/Central Provident Fund) between-subjects

design. Participants were randomly assigned into one of the four

conditions.

We assigned a unique number to each participant. Using random

number generator, we allocated each participant into one of the four

groups. The random assignment allowed each participant an equal

chance of being assigned to any of the groups. Each group was

exposed to a different treatment:

1. Group 1a was presented with two articles attributed to The

Straits Times. The order of presentation is the foreign labour

article first followed by the Central Provident Fund (CPF)

article.  

2. Group 1b was also presented with two articles attributed to

the Straits Times. The difference was that they were presented

with the CPF article prior to the foreign labour article.

3. Group 2a was presented with two articles attributed to The

Online Citizen. The order of presentation is the foreign

labour article first followed by the CPF article.  

4. Group 2b was also presented with two articles attributed to

The Online Citizen. The difference was that they were

presented with the CPF article prior to the foreign labour

article.

With the random assignment, we expected every group to contain

participants who were pro-government, anti-government and neutral.

This enabled us to observe whether or not the pairing of a pro-

government participant and The Straits Times would lead to stronger

framing effects versus when there was a mismatch (anti-government

presented with The Straits Times). Upon assignment, they were tasked

to complete a series of questions in which we expressed that the

results will be used to gain insight into the political orientation

of Singapore youth. We did not disclose the main purpose our study

to prevent participants from successfully guessing our hypotheses.

The participants’ awareness of what we were trying to measure could

influence their behavior, undermining the construct validity of our

study. Participants were allowed to read the article at their own

pace, and proceed to answering the questions once ready. At the end

of the survey, we asked the participants whether they were able to

deduce the actual purpose of the study. None of them was able to

guess it correctly. After all responses were collected, we proceeded

to debrief the participants. We sent them an email explaining the

actual objective of the study. In the email, we also informed them

to contact us if they had further queries about the study. The mean

age of the participants was 22.02 years old (SD = 2.88), with 54.2%

being females. Most of our participants are Singaporean Chinese

(74.04%), followed by Malays (13.46%) and Indians (12.50%). The

majority of participants had a monthly household income within the

range of  $4001 - $7000 (25.74%), followed by $7001-$10,000 (20.79%)

and $2001 - $4000 (17.82%). It should be noted that a majority of

our respondents were undergraduates from Wee Kim Wee School of

Communication and Information (WKWSCI) in Nanyang Technological

University (NTU).

Design and procedure

Predictor 1: Political orientation

Participants were first assessed on their political

orientation (pro-government, anti-government and neutral) when they

answered the following questionnaire items  adapted from Tan, Chung

and Zhang (2011) in our pre-test:

a) “Singapore should have a powerful leader who can run the

Government as he thinks fit”

b) “There are too many rules against participating in

political activities in Singapore”

c) “Everyone should be given the freedom to criticise the

government publicly”

d) “It is more vital to have good economic growth than freedom

of speech”

For these four items, we used a 7-point Likert scale. The

scale was rated as follows: 1 - ‘Completely Agree’ to 7 -

‘Completely Disagree’. The item was later converted into 3 levels;

pro-government (i.e., ratings 1, 2 or 3), neutral (i.e., rating 4)

and anti-government (i.e., ratings 5, 6 or 7).

Predictor 2: Prior frame orientation

Prior to showing the article on foreign labour and CPF to

participants, they were asked to indicate the perceived relatedness

of the issue of foreign workers with the word ‘Economy’,

‘Discrimination’, ‘Crime’, ‘Housing’, and ‘Empathy’ on 7-point

Likert scales (i.e., 1 - ‘Strongly Agree’ to 7 - ‘Strongly

Disagree’). These words represented the frames commonly used in the

discourse on foreign workers. For instance, a participant who was

predisposed to consider the economic aspect of the issue more than

crime might put 1 for ‘Economy’ and 4 for ‘Crime’. Similarly, they

were also asked to rate the perceived relatedness of the CPF issue

with the word ‘Welfare’, ‘Flexibility’, ‘Necessity’, ‘Fair’, and

‘Economy’, prior to reading the article on CPF. It should be noted

that the articles shown to the respondents are written in the

‘Economy’ and ‘Flexibility’ frame respectively for the issue on

Foreign Labour and Central Provident Fund (See appendix 1). Hence,

our final statistical analysis will measure framing effects by

considering only these two specific frames.

The Articles

We obtained one news article each on the topic of foreign

labour and CPF from The Straits Times (TST). The first article

talked about how foreign workers contribute to the general well-

being of Singapore’s economy. The second was on the use and

management of CPF funds by the government of Singapore. We

attributed these two articles to either The Straits Times or The

Online Citizen. For the articles attributed to TOC, we replaced

TST’s logo with TOC’s and tweaked the layout to match the appearance

of TOC news page.  This way, we could standardise the name of the

author, headline, and content, varying the attribution only. We also

made sure that all other aspects of the presentation were

standardised, such as the font-size and the advertisement banner

(See appendix 1). We also used this is to ensure that variation in

framing effects was not caused by the difference in the content or

style of the articles.  We conducted a pilot test to ensure that

both articles cannot be trace back to the original source (The

Straits Times) just by observation. In the experiment, we displayed

the articles in JPEG file format, which does not allow for the

selection of texts. This was to disable the copy and paste function

that could allow participants to track the origin of the source

using Google Search. We varied the message order across group

because the strength of framing effect may vary depending on which

framed argument is presented first or last (Buda & Zhang, 2000).

People were found to recall items listed at the end the best

(Murdock, 1962). This means that framing effect is likely to be

stronger when the exposure to the frame is more recent.  

Measures

Predictor 3: Source Credibility

Participants were asked to indicate the perceived relatedness

of the news source to the word ‘unbiased, ‘qualified’, ‘informed’,

‘trustworthy’, and ‘expert’ (Hellmueller & Trilling, 2012). The

total score was obtained by summing the 5 subscales across both

issues (Cronbach's α = .928) to give a score from 5 to 35.

Predictor 4: Message Credibility

Participants were asked to indicate the perceived relatedness

of the news content to  the word ‘accurate, ‘relevant, ‘complete,

‘factual, and ‘well-written (Hellmueller & Trilling, 2012). The

total score was obtained by summing the 5 subscales across both

issues (Cronbach's α = .870) to give a range from 5 to 35.

Dependent variable: Post-frame orientation

At the end of the questionnaire, participants were once again

asked to indicate the perceived relatedness of the issue regarding

foreign labour with the word ‘Economy’, ‘Discrimination’, ‘Crime’,

‘Housing’, and ‘Empathy’ and CPF with the word ‘Welfare’,

‘Flexibility’, ‘Necessity’, ‘Fair’, and ‘Economy’, using the

ascending 7-point likert scale (i.e., 1 - ‘Highly Disagree’, to 7 -

‘Highly Agree’). As mentioned earlier, since the articles shown to

the respondents are written in the ‘Economy’ and ‘Flexibility’ frame

respectively for the issue on Foreign Labour and CPF we are

interested in measuring the difference of both pre-post frame

orientations regarding these two specific frames to determine a

framing effect.

3. Results

First, an exploratory Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) was run

to determine the effect of political orientation and prior frame

orientation interaction on the strength of framing, after

controlling for source, prior frame orientation, message

credibility, and source credibility as covariates. Homogeneity of

variance was indicated by Levene's test (p = .061) as the p-value

went beyond the p = .05 threshold.

For the covariate main effects, prior political orientation (p

< .05), prior frame orientation (p < .001), and source credibility

(p < .001) has a significant main effect at the p = .05 threshold,

while Message Credibility (p=.076) and Source (p = .625) were not

statistically significant.

For the effect of political orientation and prior frame

orientation interaction on the strength of framing after controlling

for source, prior frame orientation, message credibility, and source

credibility, there was no statistically significant difference;

F(2,83) = 1.937, p = .151.

For the effect of political orientation alone on the strength

of framing after controlling for source, prior frame orientation,

message credibility, and source credibility, there was a

statistically significant difference; F(2,85) = 4.304, p < .05, but

with a relatively small effect size (partial η2 = .094).

A Bonferroni-adjusted post hoc analysis was also performed,

which found anti-government individuals having experienced greater

framing effect than pro-government as statistically significant (p <

.05), but no other statistically significant differences in means

between other orientations (see Table 1 below).

Table 1: Means for Framing Effect with Message Credibility, Source Credibility,Prior Frame Orientation, and Source as Covariates

Unadjusted Adjusted 95% ConfidenceInterval

N Mean Std.Deviatio

n

Mean Std.Error

LowerBound

UpperBound

pro-government

63 3.13 0.92 3.37a

0.10 3.16 3.57

neutral 11 3.91 1.20 3.77 0.24 3.29 4.24

anti-government

18 4.75 1.15 4.26a

0.22 3.83 4.68

Next, multiple ANCOVAs were set up as 2-way univariate

procedures to check for 2-way interaction effects. Like the previous

model, all of them controlled for source, prior frame orientation,

message credibility, and source credibility.

First, the interaction effect of political orientation and

source on the strength of framing was not statistically significant;

F(2,83) = 1.486, p = .232. Next, the interaction effect of political

orientation and message credibility on the strength of framing was

not statistically significant; F(2,83) = .061, p = .940. Finally,

the interaction effect of political orientation and source

credibility on the strength of framing was not statistically

significant; F(2,83) = 3.085, p = .051, although it was approaching

the p < .05 level.

Hence,

Finding 1: Prior frame orientation (p = .001) was found to be a

significant predictor of framing effects. This was consistent with

H4: Prior frame orientation is a significant predictor of framing effects.

Finding 2: Source credibility (p = .000) was found to be a

significant predictor of framing effects. This was consistent with

H3:  Source credibility is a significant predictor of framing effects.

Finding  3: Message credibility (p = .076) was found to be an

insignificant predictor of framing effects. This was contrary to H5:

Message credibility is a significant predictor of framing effects.

Finding  4:  Source (p = .625) was found to be an insignificant

predictor of framing effects. In other words, there was no

difference in framing effects regardless of whether one reads from

The Straits Times or The Online Citizen and political orientation.

This was contrary to H1: When a pro-government reader is presented with a frame

on The Straits Times, framing effects will be larger as compared to when presented with the

same frame on The Online Citizen and H2: When an anti-government reader is presented

with a frame on The Straits Times, framing effects will be smaller as compared to when

presented with the same frame on The Online Citizen.

Finding  5: Anti-government individuals experienced greater framing

effect than pro-government was statistically significant (p < .05).

4. Discussion

Our small sample  (n = 92)  was unlikely to be representative

of our population of interest- Singaporean youth aged 18 - 25.

Moreover, our study was based on a “convenient” student sample

comprising mainly undergraduates of WKWSCI pursuing communication

studies. Such nonrandom sampling methods would result in a sample

that was not representative of the broader population. Shen, Kiger,

Davies, Rasch, Simon, & Ones (2011) or “that the phenomenon under

investigation manifests itself differently in the case of students”

(as cited in Dickson, Naylor, & Phelps, p. 1). This is especially

true in the case of our sample that overrepresented media students

who were likely to respond to media content differently due to their

media training and education. This compromised our ability to

generalise our findings to our population of interest.

In the future, we aspire to replicate our study using a

nationwide random digit dialing (RDD) sample. This large-scale

probability sampling would generate a nationally representative

sample. Moreover, we should match the distribution of participants

who are pro-government, anti-government and neutral with that of the

population of interest to boost the representativeness of our

sample.

Why does congruence in political orientation not lead to stronger framing effects?

In this section, we aim to make sense of our finding: congruence

in political orientation does not lead to stronger framing effects. Using the self-

report method, we found that participants who are pro-government (n

= 63) far outnumbered those who are neutral (n = 11) or anti-

government (n = 18). The extremely small number of anti-government

participants in our sample was unlikely to be representative of the

wider population, resulting in a lack of external validity.

Moreover, this finding should not be taken at face value for the

following reasons.

Firstly, the PAP government leaders are known for its heavy-

handed approach in crushing opposition voices, such as filing

defamation lawsuits against people promoting anti-government views

(Gomez, 2005). This could have discouraged people from identifying

with the opposition, leading to the underreporting of anti-

government political orientation. This was possible because our

study relied on self-report.  Participants who misreported their

political orientation were likely to continue to behave according to

their real orientation, confounding our study.

Secondly, our survey was conducted in the same month as the

death of Lee Kuan Yew. Singaporeans refer to him as the founding

father of Singapore, acknowledging the role of his leadership in

transforming Singapore into a successful first world nation

(Allison, 2005; Weatherbee, 2008).  Zuraidah Ibrahim, an ex-Straits

Times editor believed that his death helped “crystallise in

Singaporeans' minds the benefits of strong leadership and good

governance” (Ibrahim, 2015), leading to a rise in support for the

PAP government that Lee has built over the years. This could have

encouraged some participants to move away from their anti-

government political orientation  and identify themselves as pro-

government in our study. However, some of these participants might

still behave according to their old political orientation,

confounding our study.

We recommend future studies to use implicit measures to verify

the information collected through self-report. Gawronski, LeBel and

Peters (2007) postulated that unlike self-reports, implicit

measures were not susceptible to the participants’ tendency to

underreport socially undesirable behavior (i.e., anti-government

political orientation).

Why are source credibility and frame orientations predictors of framing effects?

However, assuming that our findings were valid, the following

could explain why congruence in political orientation did not

enhance framing effects. We found that source credibility is a

predictor of framing effects. This could mean that in the case of

Singaporean youths, source credibility matters more than their

partisan affinity with the source in influencing their

susceptibility to a frame.In the literature review, we explained how

The Straits Times tend to be biased towards the government. (Tan,

Chung, & Zhang, 2012) found that Singaporean youth was more aware of

government control of media and media bias. As a result, Singaporean

youth may place less trust in The Straits Times and deem the news

source as less credible. Consequently, even if the youth are pro-

government, they may be more guarded when reading The Straits Times,

diminishing their susceptibility to its frame.

We also found that frame orientation was a predictor of

framing effects. This finding was in line with the literature we

reviewed on this topic. Moreover, Krosnick and Brannon (1993) found

that it was especially true in online medium; they posited that

attitudes constructed online “have a great deal of inertia... so new

pieces of information [e.g., a recent frame] have only a small

impact on them” (p. 965). Since a recent, online exposure to a frame

has a limited ability to alter our attitude (i.e., our

predisposition to a certain frame), prior frame orientation became

an important predictor.

Why do anti-government individuals experience greater framing effects than pro-

government individuals?

As mentioned earlier, this finding lacks external validity due

to the extremely small number of participants who identified as

anti-government (n = 11) in our sample. However, assuming this

finding was valid, there is a possible explanation for the observed

phenomenon. We realised that the CPF article (that we used in the

experiment) had the Workers’ Party, one of Singapore’s opposition

parties, advocating the ‘flexibility’ frame. According to Rodan

(2013), the Workers’ Party is among the few opposition parties in

Singapore that actively and consistently contest for political power

in the Singapore’s general election. Having a strong opposition

party proposing the “flexibility”  frame in the CPF article could

intensify the frame’s effect on our  anti-government respondents. In

this case, the increase in framing effect was not only due to the

source label, but also the content of the article. This had the

potential to confound our study.

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