THE FACTORS INFLUENCING THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE ORGANISATION IN HOMELAND

SECURITY ROLES SINCE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001

ANDREW SMITH

A thesis submitted to the University of New South Wales in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

2007

i

ORIGINALITY STATEMENT

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial proportions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged. Andrew Smith Brisbane June 2007

ii

COPYRIGHT STATEMENT

I hereby grant to the University of New South Wales or its agents the right to archive and to make available my thesis or dissertation in whole or part in the University libraries in all forms of media, now or hereafter known, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968. I retain all proprietary rights such as patent rights. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all of part of this thesis or dissertation. I also authorise University Microfilms to us the abstract of my thesis in Dissertations Abstract International. I have either used no substantial portions of copyright material in my thesis or I have obtained permission to use copyright material. Andrew Smith Brisbane June 2007

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AUTHENTICITY STATEMENT

I certify that the Library deposit digital copy is a direct equivalent of the final officially approved version of my thesis. No emendation of content has occurred and if there are any minor variations in formatting, they are the result of the conversion to digital format. Andrew Smith Brisbane June 2007

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This thesis is the result of a research project undertaken over more than five years. That project could never have been brought to conclusion without the assistance, forbearance and persistence of a wide range of people whose contributions must be acknowledged. First among these are my many colleagues within the Australian Defence establishment and its overseas partners, from whose day-to-day professional pursuit of national security business I have drawn many of the insights reflected in this work. I must particularly acknowledge those – too many to name – who blessed me with their time and patience as I plied them with endless questions about a relatively arcane field. Special thanks go to Major General Ian Gordon, Deputy Chief of Army, who arranged access to the Service Chiefs of the Australian Defence Force, whose perspective was indispensable to my research work. I must also acknowledge my supervisors, Associate Professors Hugh Smith and Anthony Bergin and Professor David Lovell, who persevered with me as I struggled to maintain progress through the highs and lows of an overseas posting, a six-month operational deployment to Iraq and other demanding full-time roles as a member of the Australian Defence Force. Their input and advice on various drafts have vastly improved the final product. I am especially appreciative of the flexibility of the University College at the Australian Defence Force Academy, which accommodated all of the demands and disruptions that my work imposed on the project. To Anthony Bergin must also go thanks for encouraging and facilitating the publication of a co-authored paper through the Australian Strategic Policy Institute – the first public exposure of much of my research. Finally, and most importantly, I must thank my wife Jillian for her tolerance and sacrifices as the demands of my work and the project consumed more and more of my time, leaving less and less for her. Without her efforts as my faithful research assistant I could never have concluded the work.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis makes an assessment of the factors influencing the involvement of the

Australian Defence Organisation (ADO) in homeland security roles since 11 September

2001 (9/11). This is approached on a largely empirical basis, using document analysis

and case studies supported with interviews with key individuals and experts.

The thesis commences with an Introduction that provides brief context for the thesis and

specifies its central question as ‘what factors have shaped the role of the ADO in

Australia's response to the homeland security environment that has emerged since 11

September 2001.’ Chapter One provides an historical and theoretical context for the key

concepts of homeland security and the challenges confronting Western governments in

the homeland security arena. Chapter Two explores the implications of those challenges

for Australia, before outlining the research method and providing a literature review.

Chapter Three is an historical exposition of homeland security in Australia from British

settlement in 1788 until 2001. The Chapter examines events in increasing detail in the 30

years immediately prior to 2001, including a detailed case study of ADO support to the

Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games, before drawing some broad conclusions

on the Australian experience of the involvement of its Defence Organisation in homeland

security pre-9/11. Chapter Four establishes the pre-9/11 status quo in relation to the

ADO’s involvement in homeland security role before analysing the general pattern of

those roles. Chapter Five analyses and draws conclusions about the reasons for the

ADO’s pre-9/11 involvement in homeland security roles, introducing an hypothetical

construct to explain causal factors.

Chapter Six examines the ADO’s involvement in homeland security roles post-9/11,

including cases studies of ADO support to the conduct of the 2002 Commonwealth

Heads of Government Meeting and the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games.

Chapter Seven analyses and identifies the factors led to the ADO’s pattern of

involvement in homeland security post-9/11, further developing the hypothetical

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construct introduced in Chapter 5. Chapter Seven also contains supporting case studies

on the ADO’s contribution to Australia’s national chemical, biological, radiological and

nuclear response capability and on the state of New South Wales’ homeland security

capabilities. Chapter Eight draws overall conclusions, including recommendations for

Australian policy development and areas for further research. The essential conclusion

reached is that the ADO’s involvement in homeland security roles, both before and since

9/11, has been shaped mostly by pragmatic political and managerial considerations of

governments. Developments have normally occurred in an episodic and incremental

fashion in response to ‘trigger events,’ although 9/11 altered this pattern somewhat by

acting as a ‘threshold’ event that re-calibrated demands and expectations for ADO

involvement.

Supporting Appendices provide detail on the Australian Government’s strategic guidance

on ADO involvement in homeland security since 1973; on Australia’s policy for Defence

Assistance to the Civilian Community and Defence Force Aid to the Civil Authorities;

and on the involvement of former Department of Defence employees in non-Defence

homeland-security related roles. A Bibliography provides details of sources used.

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PUBLICATIONS

In the course of the research towards this thesis, the author published or co-published

parts of the material that is or was either:

now incorporated in the thesis, or

developed during research, but subsequently discarded from the final document.

These publications are:

‘Combating Terrorism,’ Military Review, Vol. LXXXII, No. 1, January-February

2002, Leavenworth: US Army Command and General Staff College, pp. 11-18

(subsequently republished as ‘Preparation, Crisis and Consequence: Combating

the New Threat of Mass-casualty Terrorism’ in Australian Army Journal, Vol.1

No. 1, June 2003, Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, pp. 47-58).

‘Detecting Terrorist Activity: Defining the State’s ‘Threshold of Pain,’’

Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 168, 2005, Canberra: Australian Defence

College, pp. 30-43.

Australian domestic security: The role of Defence, Strategic Insights Paper No.

31, November 2006, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (co-authored

with Dr. Anthony Bergin).

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CONTENTS

Page Originality Statement

i

Copyright Statement

ii

Authenticity Statement

iii

Acknowledgements

iv

Abstract

v

Publications

vii

Glossary

xv

Abbreviations and Acronyms

xvi

Introduction

The Australian Defence Organisation and Australia’s Homeland Security

1

Chapter One

The New Homeland Security Imperative

6

History

6

Defining the homeland

7

The civil realm and civil power

9

The human dimension of the homeland – protecting the people

11

Military threats

13

Civil defence

15

The political power of the homeland

16

The bounds of conventionality

17

Scale and source

18

Methods and targets

18

ix

Responses 19

Homeland Security and Terrorism

20

A political phenomenon?

20

Responses

25

The challenge of ‘normality

27

Conclusion

28 Chapter Two

Implications for Australia

30

Research Method

35

Literature

37

Material specific to the topic

37

Government sources

37

Non-government material

40

Material peripheral to the topic

42

Non-government literature

43

Popular literature

47

Chapter Three

Defence and Australian Homeland Security 1788 - 2000

53

Colonial experience

53

The Federal Era

58

The Constitution

58

The Defence Act

63

1901-1945

64

The post-war era

67

Terrorism

69

Case Study: ADO Contributions to Australia’s Homeland Security in the Context of the Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games

76

x

Final Pre-9/11 Developments

110

Summary Conclusion

111

Chapter Four

The Status Quo Ante: ADO Roles in Homeland Security Pre-9/11

114

The Policy Environment

114

The Model

118

Homeland Security Missions

122

Missions with no involvement

149

Enabling functions

149

ADO Engagement in Homeland Security Functions

151

Analysis of pre-9/11 involvement

152

‘Trigger Events’

152

Unique national capability

154

Pre-existing ‘like’ capability

155

High Risk

155

ADO engagement

155

Summary Conclusion

156

Chapter Five

Factors Leading to the Status Quo Ante

157

Legal Factors

158

The Constitution

159

The influence of legal factors

164

Political Factors

169

Responsibilities and expectations

170

Threat perceptions

172

Options

181

xi

Managerial Factors 182

Resources

182

Synergies

188

Priorities

190

The Influence of the ADO

191

Summary Conclusion

192 Chapter Six

Defence and Australian Homeland Security 2001 – 2006

195

The Post-9/11 Experience

195

Case Study: ADO Contributions to Australia’s Homeland Security in the Context of the 2002 Commonwealth heads of Government Meeting

197

Post-CHOGM Developments

204

Case Study: ADO Contributions to Australia’s Homeland Security in the Context of the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games

209

The Policy Environment

219

National Security Architecture

224

The New Status Quo: ADO Roles in Homeland Security Post-9/11

227

Missions with no involvement

251

Enabling functions

251

Analysis of Post-9/11 Involvement

255

Trigger events

255

Unique national capability

258

Pre-existing ‘like’ capability

258

High Risk

259

Intelligence contributions

259

xii

Summary of ADO Involvement in Australia’s Homeland Security Post-9/11

260

Chapter Seven

Factors Leading to the Post-9/11 Status Quo

263

Legal Factors

263

Political and Managerial Factors

266

Responsibilities and expectations

266

Case Study: Development of New South Wales’ Counter Terrorism Capabilities Since 11 September 2001

272

Other Political and Managerial Factors

286

Threat perceptions

286

Resources

289

Synergies

291

Options

292

Priorities

294

New Political Factors

295

Effective response

295

National security ‘theatre’

296

Case Study: The Contribution of the Incident Response Regiment to the National Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Response Capability

296

Other New Political Factors

311

Brand differentiation

311

Revision of federalism

313

Summary Conclusion

314

xiii

Chapter Eight Conclusions 315

Conclusions

315

History

315

Trigger, threshold and sustaining events

316

The policy environment

318

ADO involvement in homeland security

319

Categories of involvement

319

Surge support

320

Unique national capability

320

Pre-existing ‘like’ capability

320

High Risk

320

Factors Influencing the ADO’s Involvement in Homeland Security

321

Legal factors

321

Political factors

322

Responsibilities and expectations

322

Threat perceptions

323

Options

324

New political dimensions

325

Managerial factors

326

Resources

326

Synergies

327

Priorities

328

Theoretical consistency

329

Summary Conclusion

329

xiv

Likely Developments 329

Policy Recommendations

331

Areas for Further Research

335 Appendices

338

Appendix 1 - Homeland Security-Related Defence Strategic Guidance 1973-2005

339

Appendix 2 - Defence Assistance to the Civilian Community and Defence Force Aid to the Civil Authorities

347

Appendix 3 - Current or Former ADO Personnel Serving in Non-Defence Homeland Security-Related Areas

351

Bibliography

355

Books

355

Book Chapters

358

Journal Articles

358

Occasional and working papers, monographs and theses

360

Conference papers and proceedings

361

General electronic sources

362

Films

364

Fiction

364

Australian government sources

365

Australian non-government political statements, announcements and releases

382

International government sources

382

Newspaper, magazine and internet media articles

384

Broadcasts

386

Interviews and personal conversations

387

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GLOSSARY

Term Definition 9/11 11 September 2001 and the terrorist attacks executed in the

United States by Al Qaeda on that day. Australian Defence Organisation

The Commonwealth Department of Defence in its entirety, consisting of the ADF and all supporting agencies, including the Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Defence Materiel Organisation, Defence Intelligence Organisation, Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation, Defence Signals Directorate and Defence Support Group.

Defence of Australia The principal strategic theme of Australian Defence policy

from 1987 until around 2000. Under this strategy, the focus of Australia’s military capabilities was the defence of Australian territory by denying the air and maritime approaches to the continent of Australia – the ‘sea-air gap.’ Defence of Australia emphasised air and maritime capabilities, with land capabilities optimised for the defeat of small incursions onto Australian territory. The ability to conduct land operations in high-threat environments or ‘expeditionary’ land operations at significant distances from Australia commanded a low priority under Defence of Australia. Although still proclaimed by Government as the basis for Australia’s Defence policy, Defence of Australia has undergone re-conceptualisation since 2000.

Homeland Security Measures to prevent, protect against, and respond to and

recover from acts of violence against national territory, especially violence caused by acts of terrorism. This usually excludes threats posed by the ‘conventional’ military forces of other nations that originate outside national territory, but can include hazards caused by natural disasters. The term has most currency in the United States, where it constitutes the mission of a cabinet-level government department (the Department of Homeland Security). Since 2001, the term has been adopted progressively in the debate on domestic aspects of national security.

xvi

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ABCA Australia, Britain, Canada and America (referring to a

standardisation program involving those countries’ armies) ADF Australian Defence Force ADO Australian Defence Organisation AFP Australian Federal Police AGCTC Australian Government Counter-Terrorism Committee AGCTPC Australian Government Counter-Terrorism Policy Committee AGD Attorney-General’s Department (Australian Commonwealth

Government) AHSRC Australian Homeland Security Research Centre AIC Australian Intelligence Community ANZUS Australian New Zealand and United States (Treaty) APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Forum) ARP Air raid precautions ASDEST Australian Space Debris Emergency Search Team ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASIO Australian Security Intelligence Organisation ASIS Australian Secret Intelligence Service ASPI Australian Strategic Policy Institute AT Ammunition Technician ATG Air Task Group ATO Ammunition Technical Officer AUSCONPLAN Australian Contingency Plan BMCC Bomb Management Coordination Centre BPC Border Protection Command C2 Command and control CAP Combat air patrol CAPE Crisis Action Panel of Experts CBR Chemical, biological and radiological CBRN Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear CBRNDC Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence centre CBRNR Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear response CBRNE Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive CBRNER Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive

response CBRR Chemical, biological and radiological response CD Clearance Diver CDF Chief of Defence Force CDPP Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions CER Combat Engineer Regiment CEXC Coalition Explosives Exploitation Cell

xvii

CHOGM Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting CHOGRM Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting (referring

to the meeting that occurred in New South Wales in 1978) CM Consequence management COAG Council of Australian Governments COMDISPLAN Commonwealth Disaster Plan CRRT Chemical and Radiological Response Team CT Counter-terrorism, counter-terrorist CTG Ceremonial and General Support Task Group (for Operation

ACOLYTE) CWC Chemical Weapons Convention DACC Defence assistance to the civilian community DACP Defence aid to the civil power DCA Defensive counter-air DCP Defence Cooperation Program DEFIEDD Defence Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (Course) DERA Defence Engineering and Research Agency (United Kingdom

Ministry of Defence) DESO Domestic event support operation DFACA Defence Force aid to the civil authorities DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australian

Commonwealth Government) DIGO Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation DIMA Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (Australian

Commonwealth Government, 2006 onwards) DIMIA Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous

Affairs (Australian Commonwealth Government, pre-2006) DINTC Defence Intelligence Training Centre DIO Defence Intelligence Organisation DISPLAN Disaster Plan (Australian Commonwealth and State Governments) DoA Defence of Australia DoE Department of Energy (United States Government) DOTARS Department of Transport and Regional Services (Australian

Commonwealth Government) DSD Defence Signals Directorate DSG Defence Support Group DSTO Defence Science and Technology Organisation ECP Enhanced Cooperation Program EDD Explosive detection dog EOD Explosive ordnance disposal EMA Emergency Management Australia FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation (United States Government) FCPB Fremantle Class Patrol Boat FEG Force Element Group (of the Australian Defence Force) FOB Forward operating base

xviii

GSG-9 Grenzschutzgruppe-9 (Federal Republic of Germany counter terrorist force)

HAZMAT Hazardous materials HLS Homeland security HQADF Headquarters Australian Defence Force HQAST Headquarters Australian Theatre HRS High risk search IATA International Air Transport Association ICAT International Coalition Against Terror IED Improvised explosive device IEDD Improvised explosive device disposal IMINT Imagery intelligence INTERFET International Force in East Timor IRR Incident Response Regiment IRU Incident Response Unit ISR Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance JCLAC Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation JIRU Joint Incident Response Unit JOPC Joint Offshore Protection Command JORN Jindalee Operational Radar Network JTF Joint Task Force LTG Logistics Task Group MANPADS Man-portable air defence systems MECV Mobile explosive containment vessel MJEX Multi-jurisdictional exercise MPTG Military Police Task Group MTG Maritime Task Group NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NBC Nuclear, biological and chemical NBCD Nuclear, biological and chemical defence NCTC National Counter-Terrorism Committee NCTP National Counter-Terrorism Plan NDO Natural Disasters Organisation NORCOM Northern Command (Australia and United States) NSC National Security Committee of Cabinet (Australian

Commonwealth Government) NSD National Security Division (of the Department of Prime Minister

and Cabinet) NSW New South Wales NSWFB New South Wales Fire Brigades NSWPS New South Wales Police Service NTAC National Threat Assessment Centre NTS National Terrorist Situation OPRO Olympics Precinct and Regional Operations (Centre) ORTA Olympics Road Transport Authority OSB Operational Search Battalion

xix

OSP Olympics security period PM&C Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Australian

Commonwealth Government) PNI Protection of national interests PSCC (Initially) Protective Services Coordination Committee, later

changed to Protective Security Coordination Centre QPS Queensland Police Service R&D Research and development RAE Royal Australian Engineers RAAF Royal Australian Air Force RAN Royal Australian Navy RAAOC Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps RAMSI Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon ISlands RAR Royal Australian Regiment RCIED Radio controlled improvised explosive device RFSU Regional Force Surveillance Unit RE Royal Engineers (British Army) RPD Remote positioning device RRF Reserve Response Force S&T Science and technology SAC-PAV Standing Advisory Committee on Commonwealth-State Co-

operation for Protection Against Violence SASR Special Air Service Regiment SATO Senior Ammunition Technical Officer SCD Strategic Command Division (of Headquarters Australian Defence

Force) SCNS Secretaries’ Committee for National Security SETU Science, Engineering and Technology Unit SFTG Special Forces Task Group SIDC-PAV Special Inter-Departmental Committee for Protection Against

Violence SITF Special Incident Task Force SOCAUST Special Operations Commander Australia SOCOG Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games SOCOMD Special Operations Command SPRED Space re-entry debris SR Special recovery SUR Ship underway recovery TAG Tactical Assault Group TECHINT Technical intelligence THRS Technical High Risk Search TSSG Technical and Scientific Support Group (of JIRU) UCP Unified Command Plan

xx

UK United Kingdom UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission (investigating WMD programs

in Iraq) USAR Urban search and rescue UWTG Underwater Task Group VAP Vital asset protection VBIED Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device VIP Very important person WMD Weapon(s) of mass destruction

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INTRODUCTION

THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE ORGANISATION AND AUSTRALIA’S HOMELAND SECURITY

On 11 September 2001 (9/11), terrorists used commercial airliners as ‘guided missiles’ to

make a coordinated and highly destructive attack on three buildings in the United States

of America. Although two of the buildings were privately owned, this event has been

popularly interpreted – by the United States Government, as well as many others - as an

attack on the United States itself. Despite a significant and sustained investment in its

intelligence capabilities, the destruction of the New York World Trade Center towers and

damage to the Pentagon constituted a strategic surprise for the United States, killing over

two thousand Americans and several hundred other nationals on American home soil.

That surprise has resonated throughout the world ever since and has affected Australia’s

national security policy and arrangements.

The 9/11 attacks are the most chilling example of a disturbing trend in acts of terrorism

that emerged during the 1990s – a trend of large-scale attacks on civilian targets. The

attacks on the World Trade Center (1993), the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City (1996)

and the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (1998) killed hundreds of people

with very large explosive devices and had the potential to kill many more.1 Unlike most

earlier terrorist bombs, these were intended to demolish entire large buildings and kill or

injure large numbers of people. In 1995 the Aum Shinrikyo (Aleph) sect staged an attack

on a Tokyo underground railway station, using a chemical warfare agent, that had the

potential to kill thousands of people.2 In almost every case, these attacks were mounted

1 The collective death toll from these bombings was 399 (five at the World Trade Centers, 169 at Oklahoma City and 224 in the East African Embassies). The intent of the first World Trade Center bombing was to topple one tower into its neighbour, potentially killing thousands. World Trade Center Bombing Suspect Apprehended in Pakistan, US Department of Justice, 1995 [cited 16 April 2006]. Available from http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/Pre_96/February95/78.txt.html. Tony Clark, The Worst Terrorist Attack on U.S. Soil: April 19, 1995 CNN, 30 December 1995 [cited 16 April 2006]. Available from http://www.cnn.com/IS/OKC/daily/9512/12-30/index.html. John Mintz, “Panel Cites U.S Failures on Security for Embassies,” Washington Post, 8 January 1999, p. A01. 2 Aum’s attack killed only 12 people but created several thousand casualties. Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, London: Cass, 2001, p. 50.

2

from within the country attacked and used means (airline flights, home-made explosives,

toxic chemicals) originating from that country.

In the 1990s the security planners of several Western nations began to turn their attention

to the possibilities of even more devastating terrorist attacks on their respective

homelands. For example, the Phase 1 Report of the United States’ Hart-Rudmann

Commission on 21st Century security threats predicted that, due to terrorism, ‘Americans

will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers…’3 Increasing sums of

money began to be spent, especially in the United States, to develop ‘homeland defense’

capabilities to address dire predictions of an imminent, massively destructive terrorist

attack on home soil. The term ‘homeland defense’ first appeared in American military

documents and open literature from the mid-‘90s and was quickly picked up in

professional discourse in Australia.4 Well prior to 9/11, the United States had

contemplated sweeping force structure and role changes to its National Guard to make

homeland security its primary mission.5 In Australia, preparations to address such threats

in the context of the Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games consumed tens of

millions of dollars, even though Australia had never experienced a significant terrorist

threat.

In the aftermath of 9/11, the United States created a new Cabinet-level institution to

coordinate national efforts. The Office of Homeland Security, directed by former

Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge, was created by Executive Order of President George

W. Bush on 11 October 2001. On 1 March 2003, it became the Department of Homeland

Security, amalgamating 22 Federal Government agencies in the largest re-organisation of

3 Hart, Gary, and Warren B. Rudman. "Phase I Report: New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century." Washington: US Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission), 1999. 4 ‘Homeland defence’ continues to be used in the context of defence against external threats in Australia. See, for example, John Donovan "A Principal Role for the Army Reserves: A Capability for Australian Homeland Defence." Australian Defence Force Journal, no. 169 (2005): p. 43. 5 For example, this had been proposed by Hart and Rudman in February 2001: ‘The Secretary of Defense, at the President’s direction, should make homeland security a primary mission of the National Guard, and the Guard should be organized, properly trained, and adequately equipped to undertake that mission.’ Hart, Gary, and Warren B. Rudman. "Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change: The Phase III

3

the United States Civil Service since 1947.6 Perhaps because of the prominence of the

American Department, the term ‘homeland security’ has now largely supplanted

‘homeland defence’ in the popular debate on the topic, although distinctions are still

drawn in some circles.

The creation of the Department of Homeland Security illustrates how the homeland

defence ‘movement’ of the 1990s has been energised by, and subsumed as a campaign of,

a global ‘war on terror’ waged by a Western-centric coalition. A considerable part of the

activity in that war has been performed by the military forces of Western nations, in

theatres well removed from those nations’ shores. A great deal of energy is also being

devoted to ‘domestic’ security measures within homelands and military organisations are

making significant contributions to those efforts.

The post 9/11 environment has confronted Western nations with, at least, a strong and

widely-held perception of a new and enduring level of threat to their homelands. Nations

are responding to that perception by developing new national security arrangements and

new levels of preparedness. With those new responses come new dilemmas. Among the

challenges nations face in addressing the new security situation is determining which

organisations can contribute to national security and what roles they should play. Among

the most sensitive issues are those that relate to the involvement of defence forces in

domestic security roles: for many Western nations, such involvement impinges the

historical bases of civil liberties and national organisation.

Australia, like some other Western nations, has significantly revised its homeland

security arrangements since 9/11. Homeland security has become a subject of

considerable political debate and government rhetoric would suggest that it is a major

focus of policy. Given the demands of homeland security, Australia seeks to apply all the

elements of its national power effectively. There are significant risks in failing to direct

Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century." Washington: U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission), 2001, pp. ix, 10, 14, 17, 20, 22, 24-26. 6 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5, [cited 30 June 2005]. Available from http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4331.

4

national efforts optimally. In the worst case, Australia could be left fatally unprepared

and vulnerable in the face of dangerous threats. Even an effective homeland security

solution, however, might be very costly if it is inefficiently organised or if too many

scarce resources are diverted from other important needs. A nation that achieves a high

level of domestic security at the expense of sustainable economic development, adequate

human services, appropriate foreign policies or basic civil liberties will have lost a great

deal. The optimal national approach to homeland security is therefore a matter of

balance.

One of Australia’s greatest challenges in striking this ideal balance is deciding on the

employment of the Australian Defence Organisation (ADO), including both its uniformed

and civilian components, in homeland security roles. That challenge provides the context

for the central question of this thesis:

What factors have shaped the role of the ADO in Australia's response to the

homeland security environment that has emerged since 9/11?

Understanding the factors that have influenced the ADO’s involvement in homeland

security is important in assessing whether that involvement is appropriate, what the

associated costs and risks are, what the alternatives are and how the ADO’s role could

and should evolve in the future. While there is an extensive literature on the policy and

practice of Australia’s national security and defence strategies, relatively little has been

published on the specific subject of the ADO’s involvement in homeland security since

9/11. Much of what exists is normative and does not cover the detail of ADO roles or the

reasons for them. The emerging and rapidly-evolving nature of this field poses

significant challenges to research, as does the classified nature of much of the associated

government material. As with any research in a dynamic and topical field, there is a risk

that emerging material will contradict the conclusions reached in this work. This thesis

seeks, nevertheless, to overcome these challenges and to contribute to knowledge in this

important area.

5

The impetus for this work came, initially, from the author’s personal professional

involvement in the ADO’s contribution to the running of the Sydney 2000 Games. That

involvement provided an insight into the ADO’s wider contribution to homeland security

and established a network of contacts within Australia and internationally in key areas

related to homeland security. From this basis, the author has observed the subsequent

evolution of the ADO’s homeland security roles in the aftermath of 9/11. That

experience culminated in early 2006 with the opportunity to command the ADO’s

support operation for the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games. Throughout this

period, the author’s official position and contacts have afforded invaluable access to key

experts within Australian state and federal governments and industry, some of whom are

cited in this thesis. The author has also had the benefit of insights into privileged

information that have guided open source research.

6

CHAPTER ONE

THE NEW HOMELAND SECURITY IMPERATIVE

This chapter examines the background to the homeland security policy environment that

has emerged since 9/11, explaining the main theoretical and conceptual developments

within the topic.

History

Perhaps the most fundamental, and most ancient, duty demanded of governments is

ensuring the security of the societies they rule. A key element of this duty is the

protection of citizens and their property against violence. From an early stage,

governments have organised their efforts to counter violence into two distinct functions: a

domestic ‘law and order’ capability to counter internal threats (such as criminal violence,

rebellion, insurgency and even industrial unrest) and a ‘defence’ function to protect the

collective society against external aggression. The preservation of the domestic political

order was the focus of the first function, while the conduct of warfare was the chief

means of the latter. Indeed, in the governmental language of most nations, the term ‘war’

is the antecedent of ‘defence’: for example, the titles ‘War Office’ and ‘War Department’

preceded, respectively, the British Ministry of Defence and United States Department of

Defense until the mid twentieth century. In the United Kingdom, a unified Ministry of

Defence was formed in 1964 by combining the Admiralty, the War Office, the Air

Ministry and the original Ministry of Defence itself, although the Ministry only became

completely unified in 1971 when the Ministry of Aviation Supply was absorbed.1 In the

United States, the National Security Act of 1947 was amended in 1949 to change the

name of the National Military Establishment to the Department of Defense.2

1 History of the Ministry of Defence, UK Ministry of Defence, [cited 9April 2007]. Available from http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/History/HistoryOfTheMOD/. 2 DoD 101: An Introductory Overview of the Department of Defense Washington: United States Department of Defense, [cited 9 April 2007]. Available from http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/dod101/.

7

This somewhat arcane fact helps to explain why, after thousands of years of human

experience, homeland security might seem a novel concept among Western nations.

Although civil wars and military suppression of insurrections have been relatively

common until recent times, the consolidation of central power has tended to diminish

internal conflict among those nations. In the popular consciousness, defence had, by the

mid-twentieth century, come to be associated with war: something waged between

nations. By implication, therefore, defence efforts were directed at external threats.

This is not to suggest that warfare was always conducted remotely from the homeland, or

that threats to the homeland are a new phenomenon. The existence of ancient walled

cities proves that martial violence from external sources has long threatened the homes

and livelihoods of urbanised civilian populations. The use of walls to exclude threats,

however, suggests two further conclusions. First, it confirms that the most serious threats

– those that could motivate people to commit the effort and resources to build walls -

emerged from outside the homeland. Second, it suggests that it is difficult, if not

impossible, to build walls against internal threats – these require more sophisticated

defences. A corollary conclusion is that people identifying themselves with a particular

homeland would accept organisation for the purpose of protection and that this tended to

define political units:

…that unit which affords protection and security to human beings has tended to become the basic political unit; people, in the long run, will recognize that authority, any authority, which possesses the power of protection.3

Over time, the size and organisation of the political units that can contain – and protect -

a homeland have changed. As a consequence, the boundaries that delineate what is

viewed as ‘internal’ or ‘external’ have also changed. In Europe, for example, ‘homeland

protection units’ have evolved, in some cases, from local feudal fiefdoms to larger nation

states that subsumed them.

3 John H. Herz, "Rise and Demise of the Territorial State." World Politics IX, no. 4 (1957): pp473-93, p. 474.

8

Defining the homeland

‘Homeland’ is a term so familiar-sounding and commonsense that its examination in

detail might seem superfluous. The concept of the homeland is so fundamental to the

topic of this work, however, that this risk must be borne. The concept is also more

complex than it appears. A good place to start is in the theoretical basis of states’ claims

to their lands.

Germany’s disastrous Thirty Years War was concluded in 1648 by two treaties known,

collectively, as the Peace of Westphalia. This settlement is widely regarded as

establishing the modern concept of state sovereignty. The ‘Westphalian model’ includes

the principle that states have absolute and independent authority over matters within their

‘sovereign’ territory – including the ability to make laws within that territory.4

Corollaries to this principle include the expectation that states mutually respect each

other’s sovereign territories and autonomy; and the idea that within their sovereign

territory, governments are responsible for the maintenance of order: indeed, the inability

to maintain order is considered a loss of sovereignty.5

Sovereign autonomy within a specified territory is thus a cherished element of statehood.

Its importance stems from the fact that it is within that territory that the state pursues its

collective life: economic activity proceeds and people are housed, interact, work and

worship according to their culture, laws and religion. What is sought within a state’s

territory, therefore, is an environment conducive to the pursuit of national aims, in which

citizens’ activities are not excessively constrained by security concerns. In this

environment, peace and order are preferred, not only because life is more pleasant under

those conditions but also for the practical reason that warfare and disorder make it hard

for economic activity to flourish.

4 Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Compromising Westphalia,’ in International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1996, pp. 115-151, p.115. 5 Krasner, ‘Compromising Westphalia,’ 1996, p.118.

9

If the pursuit of life is the goal of ordered autonomy within a (Westphalian) state’s

territory,6 then non-productive endeavours (such as military activities in ‘peacetime’)

should be tolerated only to the extent that they contribute to that order. Many societies,

therefore, have evolved a practice of minimising martial activity within their sovereign

territory, using their military forces primarily to preserve a notional barrier around that

territory. In these societies, the principal role of military power has thus become the

safeguarding of the national life by protecting it from threats originating outside its

sovereign territory. Dangers operating within that territory are the responsibility of non-

military authorities in the first instance and the internal use of military force is seen as a

last resort. Indeed, government abuses of military force in internal security situations

have led to some suspicion of military activities within the homeland. This is not to

suggest that military endeavour has come to be viewed universally as dangerous to

nations’ internal freedoms. Some democracies value military virtues and believe they

should be maintained and even encouraged in society – this is especially true of states

that have experienced failures of military defence. A focus of military activity on

external threats is nevertheless a consistent characteristic of Western democracies. This

may be, in part, because lately these have been blessed with internal order. For nations

with such a history, the need to apply military power internally comes as a shock.

The civil realm and civil power

The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines ‘civil’ as ‘…of or proper to citizens…Not naval,

military, etc…Not ecclesiastical…Not criminal or political; pertaining to civil law…’7

Civil life is thus the fundamental existence of people pursuing their respective lives

independently of political authority or (as much as possible) the Government institutions

that exercise it. This recalls the Hegelian notion of ‘civil society:’ ‘…the framework

within which those without political authority live their lives.’8 A deep consideration of

civil society is beyond the scope of this study but it is significant that, in Western

6 The ‘self evident’ rights postulated in the United States’ Declaration of Independence are instructive in this regard: ‘…life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.’ 7 Concise Oxford Dictionary (Sixth Edition), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1976. 8 David Robertson, The Dictionary of Politics, Penguin, London, 1993, p. 69.

10

societies such as Australia’s, there is a concept of a civil existence into which

Governments should not normally intrude.

This civil existence, however, cannot long survive without those institutions – and

political authority – that exist to support it.9 Civil life depends on one of the key features

of the sovereign state - its legal authority. The term ‘civil power’ usually refers to legal

authority that stems from legitimate political authority. Western democracies generally

wield this power within their sovereign territory through civilian agencies, such as

constabularies. These agencies are usually organised under separate ministerial authority

from the military defence forces, which participate in the internal application of power

only in exceptional circumstances. When military power is needed within the homeland,

it is typically applied in support of and closely controlled by the civilian authorities: in

the parlance of most British Commonwealth nations, military support is provided literally

as ‘aid to the civil power.’ Most Western states impose elaborate legal safeguards on the

use of military force in civilian law enforcement roles by written conventions and/or

formal legislation – the United States’ often-cited Posse Comitatus Act is a good example

of the latter.10

The Westphalian concept of sovereign territory thus provides a practical basis for

distinguishing between the state’s civil and military functions and powers. This

distinction tends to be emphasised in democracies, especially those that seek to limit the

power of governments to coerce their populations. In these, the civil power predominates

in affairs within the state’s sovereign territory, if only as a safeguard against government

abuse of military power. This discipline of restricting the government’s application of

coercive power within the state’s sovereign territory suggests that a special political

importance attaches to the life of people within that territory. The source of that

importance – nationalism, identity or love of freedom – is less important than the fact that

it exists.

9 Robertson, The Dictionary of Politics, 1993, p. 69. 10 Title 18, United States Code, Section 1385, available http://uscode.house.gov.

11

The human dimension of the homeland – protecting the people

The concept of the homeland and the need to protect it has long been linked with

population centres. Concern for the military vulnerability of towns was demonstrated by

ancient wall-builders and persisted into the modern era, as illustrated by the frenzy of

coastal fortification that gripped the colonial outposts of the British Empire in the

nineteenth century. Even in Australia, for example, perceived threats from maritime

enemies justified expensive and elaborate defensive preparations such as the harbour

defences of Sydney and Melbourne. Sydney’s defences were planned and provided for

even before the colony was established, with guns for static batteries included in the

cargo of the First Fleet.11 In the early colonies, the usual response to coastal security

scares was ‘a frenzied period of activity in which fortifications were begun or

upgraded...’12

It has long been appreciated, therefore, that settlements (cities, in particular) can be

threatened with deliberate, large-scale violence. These threats acquired strategic

importance because of the significance of cities to their respective states: cities, in many

ways, were centres of gravity in wars between states. Historical threats to urban

homelands, however, usually came in the form of the adversary’s recognisable military

forces, projected from a base outside the homeland. Defence was thus conducted against

things external and, in a general sense, conventional.

Obviously, populations have lived with violence and other physical hazards in their midst

from the earliest days of civilisation. ‘Normal’ criminal activity and violence associated

with domestic disputes, mental illness and rebellion have always been a threat to

societies, while natural and man-made disasters (especially structural fires) are a constant

danger. As governments have evolved, they have developed institutions and structures

for protecting the public, maintaining domestic law and order and responding to and

recovering from disasters.

11 R.H.E. Harvey, "The Artillery Defences of Sydney." Despatch XXX, no. 5. Sydney: New South Wales Military Historical Society, 1995: p. 10.

12

In the field of law and order, these means have usually been designed to counter the

lower levels of violence normally generated from domestic sources. Local constabularies

could wield a certain amount of force, but when the level of force needed to secure the

community exceeded this, the military was sometimes brought in: indeed, before

organised police forces were established, only armies or navies were available when the

application of significant force was necessary for domestic law and order. This principal

has been maintained to the present day. Modern domestic police forces, which evolved

from the office of ‘Constable’ (or its equivalent) in the early nineteenth century, are thus

normally capable of applying, and protecting themselves from, much lower levels of

lethality than military defence forces. One of the earliest ‘modern’ police forces was the

Metropolitan Police of London, established by Robert Peel in 1829.13 Emergency

services such as fire brigades and ambulances arose to address other ‘normal’ risks

associated with human habitation and the environment.

As the home of one of the first modern police forces, it is appropriate that an incident

from London’s history should serve to demonstrate the role that military forces might

play in support of civilian domestic security agencies. In the first few days of 1911, a

group of Latvian refugees in London, allegedly led by a shadowy Marxist figure named

Peter Piatkow (‘Peter the Painter’), bungled a burglary that may have been intended to

provide funds for their revolutionary activities.14 The ensuing police chase resulted, by 3

January, in the Metropolitan Police laying siege to premises in Sidney Street, East

London. The Latvians proved to be much better armed than the Police, who soon found

themselves outgunned. A request for military support was quickly approved by the

Home Secretary, Winston Churchill, and was satisfied in the form of a company of the

12 Jeffrey Grey. A Military History of Australia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 20. See also the discussion of the influence of the Crimean War on decisions to upgrade Sydney’s harbour defences, p. 21. 13 ‘ Police Forces,’ The Reader's Companion to American History, [cited 13 January 2006]. Available from http://college.hmco.com/history/readerscomp/rcah/html/ah_069700_policeforces.htm. 14 Unattributed article. The Sidney Street Siege, London: Eastlondonhistoory.com [cited 7 April 2007]. Available from http://www.eastlondonhistory.com/peter%20the%20painter.htm.

13

Scots Guards.15 The Guards’ more robust firepower quickly resolved the siege, but in the

process a fire started within the premises, to which the Fire Brigade responded.

Churchill, who was on site, personally intervened to prevent the Fire Brigade

extinguishing the fire. This action allegedly led to unnecessary damage to neighbouring

buildings and the death of one of their occupants – for which Churchill was criticised.16

This incident, and its aftermath, have a number of features that are consistent with

contemporary events. First is the need to resort to military resources when a security

challenge exceeds the capacity of civilian security agencies. Second is the need for high-

level political approval for that support, especially when the use of force by the military

is likely. Third is the inter-agency environment that quickly evolves around the incident,

with multiple civilian agencies (in this case, Police and Fire Brigade), the military and

government authorities (the Home Secretary) all bearing some responsibility and

exercising some influence over events – with potential for confusion, poor decision-

making and adverse political consequences. Finally, in leading to enhancements in

weapons and training for the Metropolitan Police, the incident demonstrates the tendency

for domestic security capabilities to be adjusted after a significant failure, rather than in

anticipation of one.17

Military threats

Turning to military threats to the homeland, it is significant that, until the early twentieth

century, technological realities bound military forces closely to the surface of the earth:

armies marched or rode, navies sailed and the ranges of their weapons systems were quite

limited. Effective barriers could therefore exclude these threats from the homeland.

Natural barriers, such as mountain ranges or the English Channel, have been key to the

defence of some homelands. Where nature did not provide convenient obstacles,

artificial ones could be erected. The great wall-builders of antiquity provide, in China

15 Stanley Smith. The Siege of Sidney Street: A Bizarre Escapade of Churchill Derring-Do Washington: The Churchill Centre, [cited 7 April 2007]. Available from http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=724.16 Stanley Smith. The Siege of Sidney Street: A Bizarre Escapade of Churchill Derring-Do. 17 Metropolitan Police Service. Siege of Sidney Street - 1911 London: Metropolitan Police Service, [cited 7 April 2007]. Available from http://www.met.police.uk/history/sidney_street.htm.

14

and Britain, some awe-inspiring examples of this approach, which has been demonstrated

more recently by Israel (by walling off the Palestinian territories) and the United States

(along the Mexican border).

Once the possibilities of aviation began to dawn, however, military threats achieved a

new pervasiveness. During the First World War, this was demonstrated by German

Zeppelin and bomber raids on Great Britain. An anecdote from these first air-raids puts

into sharp perspective the new accessibility of the homeland to these threats:

One sprightly morning in the early summer of 1916 ten or twenty small German bombers appeared over London, looking like knats (sic). We rushed up to the roof of the warehouse where I worked to watch this novelty, with excitement. They dropped a few bombs… On this morning Great Britain ceased to be an island.18

The observer’s final assessment is telling: at one stroke, air power had invalidated the

traditional presumption that substantial violence could only be visited on the homeland

after an enemy’s surface forces had penetrated a country’s frontiers or coastline (John H.

Herz’s territorial ‘hard shell’19). Britain’s conventional land-based defences could not

protect the island against aerial attacks and her traditional emergency management

capabilities were soon found inadequate to deal with their consequences.

Air raids achieved limited effects in the First World War - Germany conducted 103 air

raids on Britain, killing a total of 1,413 people - but their destructive potential was well

appreciated and prompted the establishment of ‘civil defence’ organisations in many

countries.20 Significantly, in the United Kingdom this became the responsibility of the

Home Office. New institutions had to be established to respond to this threat. Military

18 V.S. Pritchett, London Perceived [cited 11 July 2002]. Available from http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWairwar.htm. 19 Herz, “Rise and Demise of the Territorial State.” World Politics IX, no. 4 (1957): p. 474. 20 Air Raid Precautions 1924-39, [cited 11 July 2002]. Available from http://www.fortunecity.co.uk/meltingpot//oxford/330/arp/arp1.html . Also http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWairwar.htm [cited 11 July 2002].

15

forces were dedicated to the aerial defence of the homeland and new resources found to

cope with bomb damage.21

Civil defence

Given the well-guarded distinction between the civil and military (or defence) realms, the

term ‘civil defence’ could be self-contradictory: defence of things which are non-military,

by people who are not members of a military force.22 Most civil defence measures are

also only applicable post-attack, making them more like consequence management than

truly defensive (notwithstanding the deterrent value of effective consequence

management capabilities). Civil defence, emerging in the 1930s in response to the threat

of long-range bombing, is nevertheless the closest antecedent to the modern homeland

defence phenomenon and the combination of terms actually encapsulates the dilemma

posed by contemporary terrorist threats. These threaten casualties and damage in

‘peacetime’ and in the civil realm, on a scale that could demand levels of response

normally associated with military forces.

Civil defence has remained on the agenda of most Western nations since the First World

War. Interest in ‘air raid precautions’ (ARP) and similar capabilities have waxed and

waned according to perceived threats during the Second World War and the Cold War.

Strategic nuclear attack largely replaced air raids as the danger to the homeland, but to

the extent that these were wielded by state actors they possessed a certain familiarity.

Importantly, states control all significant airpower and missile (as distinct from rocket)

capabilities. The ‘signature’ of these capabilities (bases and platforms) generally makes

them readily detectable by even the most rudimentary state intelligence capabilities, and

hence unsuitable for clandestine acquisition by terrorists. This principle is contradicted

to some extent by the recent success of Hizbollah and Hamas in using rockets to attack

Israel from Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, although Hizbollah’s capability was

only achievable with state support. 9/11 demonstrated that, in order to mobilise an air

21 Raymond Fredette, The Sky on Fire: The First Battle of Britain 1917-1918. New York: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1976, pp. 144, 146, 261. 22 The Dictionary of Politics, 1993, p. 60.

16

threat, terrorists need to take control of government- or privately-owned air assets. New

aviation security regimes have now made this much more difficult.

The new ‘permeability’ of the homeland to external threats was mirrored after the First

World War by the development of public broadcast radio. Radio allowed foreign

information and ideas to penetrate the sovereign state irresistibly, giving rise to fears of

subversion by propaganda. Technology has made information increasingly pervasive and

uncontrollable, with significant political and security consequences. The ready flow of

information has also simplified the command and control of terrorist activities, by

allowing orders, intelligence, technical expertise and even financial support to be passed

across state borders and between ‘cells’ of operatives.

The political power of the homeland

The preceding discussion suggests that, simplistically, ‘homeland’ is merely vernacular

for ‘sovereign territory.’ Its derivation from the word ‘home,’ however, makes the term

many times more powerful psychologically. For most people, ‘home’ triggers an

automatic association with concepts of safety, peace and happiness. The home, in many

cultures, also carries with it an almost primeval concept of inalienable, individual ‘micro-

sovereignty.’ The notion that ‘a man’s home is his castle,’ for example, has probably

existed for as long as castles themselves (predating the Peace of Westphalia by thousands

of years). The homeland is also the place that vanquished people are forced back to –

Winston Churchill, for example, used the term in this sense when he said the allies would

‘drive Japan back to her homeland.’23 In this context, the homeland is a place of

regrouping or of the defensive ‘last stand.’24 It is a natural conclusion for most people,

therefore, that the home(land) is eminently worth defending – indeed, to do so is a both

an inalienable right and a sacred duty.

23 Homeland Security Overview and Statutory Authority [cited 3 July 2006]. Available fromhttp://faculty.ncwc.edu/toconnor/431/431lect01.htm. 24 Homeland Security Overview and Statutory Authority [cited 3 July 2006]. Available from http://faculty.ncwc.edu/toconnor/431/431lect01.htm.

17

This instinct to preserve the homeland lends extraordinary political power to appeals for

‘homeland defence’ or security. Not only is this a natural reflex for most people, but the

political danger of questioning its value would silence most rational critics. Who could

argue against it? In a similar vein, the naming of the 2001 ‘USA Patriot Act’ (an

acronym - Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required

to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) was an interesting piece of political gamesmanship.

Coming as it did in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, considerable political courage was

needed to oppose a bill bearing that name.25 The disturbing possibility of such political

ploys, however, is that they may scotch opposition at the expense of due deliberation on

the proposed legislation. Governments can therefore exploit perceived threats to the

homeland to garner strong support for measures to protect it.

The objective of homeland security, therefore, appears to be more related to concepts of

the ‘home’ than of the ‘land.’ It is less concerned with protecting sovereign territory as

such – a traditional role of military forces - than with securing the way of life that is

practiced within that territory.

The bounds of conventionality

In the preceding discussion of violence and measures to counter it, words such as

‘normal,’ ‘usual’ and ‘recognisable’ recur. This suggests that our understanding of these

things has many features that are expected: that are, in some sense, ‘conventional.’ This

concept of ‘conventionality’ may therefore be important in understanding the apparent

novelty of the current homeland security phenomenon.

As it applies to violence and warfare, conventionality has many dimensions. The

Concise Oxford Dictionary defines conventional as, inter alia:

‘Depending on conventions,…following tradition…’26

25 USA Patriot Act. Available from http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/hr3162.html. 26 Concise Oxford Dictionary (Sixth Edition), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1976.

18

The implication of this definition, born out in common usage, is a strong association of

conventionality with norms, orthodoxy and predictability. The conventional will be

expected and, to some extent, familiar. Where violence is concerned, conventionality

imposes expectations of scale, source and methods.

Scale and source

Most violence encountered in Western homelands (including Europe, the United

Kingdom North America and Australia) in the last 20years has originated from

non-military sources (eg., crime or terrorism) and has conventionally been of a

lower order than that generated by military forces. There have been exceptions,

such as the internal conflicts in the Balkans, but generally Western countries have

not been afflicted by conventional warfare on their own soil since the Second

World War. Conventional military violence may be extreme, but it is inflicted by

the organised, recognisable forces of a state, operating from that state’s territory.

Normally, only states have military forces and, under international law, only

states have the right to wage war. Conventionality thus also has state-focused

spatial and legal dimensions, affecting the basing and operation of military forces

in relation to sovereign territory and their use in relation to other states.

Methods and targets

The conventions of violence also apply to who or what is targeted with violence

and the means used to apply it. In military practice, strong norms dictate the

legitimacy or otherwise of both targets for violence and the means used to

generate that violence.

Conventionality has a special significance in its application to weapons systems:

‘conventional’ weapons are distinguished from ‘weapons of mass destruction’

(WMD), with the latter evoking special feelings of fear and awe and inspiring

strenuous – and contentious - international control efforts. This distinction

constitutes a special orthodoxy in relation to the destructiveness of the methods of

19

violence: ‘conventional’ weapons and their effects are somehow acceptable,

while WMD are not.

Conventionality also applies to military methods. In some circles, medium-

intensity mechanised ‘air-land battle’ operations are the benchmark for

conventional land warfare: anything else (‘light,’ airborne, air-mobile, jungle etc.)

is a specialisation of some sort. ‘Special Operations’ could be considered the

ultimate example of unconventional warfare (even if they are controlled

‘conventionally’ by states and the weapons they use are conventional by the

WMD criterion).

Responses

This bounding of conventional threats has produced a tendency for nations to

develop equally conventional (predictable) responses to them. Technological,

methodological and conceptual congruity between threats and countermeasures is

described as ‘symmetry:’ incongruity, or ‘asymmetry,’ is the basis of a body of

theory on how to defeat conventional capabilities and responses. It is debatable

whether ‘asymmetric warfare’ is a new concept or simply a pat phrase to describe

what militaries have always done: match strengths to weaknesses to render the

adversary’s capabilities irrelevant. The idea’s contemporary significance lies in

the existence of a major asymmetry in the levels of ‘conventional’ military

capability among nation-states, when compared with non-state actors. The United

States, in particular, maintains an unquestioned conventional military supremacy.

In this environment, a rational adversary will select unconventional methods to

oppose conventional strengths.27 This rationale is the basis of the contemporary

Western concern with terrorism.28 While conventional threats are well

understood, responses to unconventional ones are less obvious.

27 See the Australian Army Future Land Operating Concept, Complex Warfighting, Canberra: Australian Army, 2004. 28 David Kilcullen, address to the Centre for Independent Studies Annual Consilium, 6 August 2005, as reported in Paul Kelly, ‘Ideas will be crucial to victory’, The Australian, 10 August 2005, p. 12.

20

Homeland Security and Terrorism

A political phenomenon?

‘Homeland security’ constitutes a significant departure from the ‘traditional’ counter-

terrorist capabilities developed by Western nations since the mid-1970s. Typically, these

are optimised for resolving the ‘classical’ siege-hostage situation. Such situations

involve an acute ‘crisis’ phase (which the counter-terrorist capabilities are designed to

address) but their ‘consequence’ phase generally involves only political issues. Since the

1990s, terms such as ‘macro-terrorism’ have evolved to describe the mass-casualty tactics

demonstrated in some recent terrorist attacks. 29 Macro-terrorism scenarios, particularly

those involving chemical, biological or radiological weapons, have potentially massive

physical consequences that would take months or years to address. Traditional counter-

terrorist structures that are optimised for siege-hostage scenarios seem woefully ill-suited

to address such threats, yet their ‘capture’ of the counter-terrorism ‘business’ may make it

difficult for some countries to evolve more suitable ones.

Terrorism, as part of the spectrum of politically-motivated violence, has existed for

thousands of years. Although the term itself is only traceable in English to around

1795,30 the intent and methods of terrorism can be perceived in the activities of, for

example, the Hebrew Zealots of Roman times. During the 1960s, the boom in telemedia

created a new means by which otherwise unempowered people could focus attention on

their cause. In the ‘60s, ‘70s and ‘80s, ‘international terrorism’ arose and began to

threaten, in particular, Western countries: ‘Contemporary terrorism has such a broad

international reach that it has become a global concern.’31 The international dimension

of this manifestation of terrorism derived from three characteristics. First, attacks could

be staged well outside the geographic locus of the terrorists’ cause – for example, the

1972 ‘Black September’ attack on Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics was motivated

by the Palestinian issue but conducted in Germany. Second, some terrorist groups began

29 ‘Macro-terrorism’ has been proposed by Clive Williams and was used by him in a presentation to the University of Adelaide’s Exploring Asymmetric Warfare Forum, Adelaide, 1 October 2003. 30 And then only in the context of state terror during the French Revolution. Oxford English Dictionary.

21

to ‘professionalise,’ training and even conducting operations cooperatively, across

national borders. For example, the Japanese Red Army carried out a massacre at Lod

Airport in 1972 on behalf of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, while the

Al Fatah faction of the Palestine Liberation Organisation provided training for

individuals from the Red Army Faction in Germany.32 Finally, this form of terrorism

usually involved non-state groups seeking ‘to achieve political ends through the use of

violence in the international arena.’33

‘International’ terrorist tactics included the traditional ones of assassinations, bombings

and small-scale attacks but also expanded to include aircraft hijackings (virtually always

international, because of the nationalities of passengers and the origins or destinations of

the flights34) and prolonged siege-hostage operations.35 The latter were highly visible

and effective in drawing attention to the terrorists’ activities, if less successful in securing

concessions or garnering sympathy for their cause.

Western countries responded to the terrorism of this era by developing counter-terrorist

strategies, counter-measures and capabilities to suit. By the late 1980s, this had led to a

marked reduction in hijackings and sieges, as terrorists came to accept that these

activities were unlikely to be successful. Until the 1980s, the scale of casualties or

damage inflicted by terrorist activities tended to be limited, both by the methods used and

by the intent of the terrorists. Although some incidents had the potential to generate

massive casualties, there were few examples of activities causing large numbers of

civilian casualties until 1988. With the exception of the suicide vehicle bomb attack on

the United States Marine facility in Beirut in 1983 (killing 241 American service

31 Yevgeny Primakov, A World Challenged: Fighting Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2004, p. 3. 32 These particular individuals have become known as the ‘Baader-Meinhoff Gang.’ Wilkinson, Paul. Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. London: Cass, 2001, pp. 28-9, 54. 33 Tony Coady, and Michael O'Keefe, eds. Terrorism and Justice: Moral Argument in a Threatened World. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2002, p. 97. 34 The 1960s trend in hijacking United States domestic airline flights to Cuba provides an example of a domestic hijacking becoming international. 35 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. London: Cass, 2001, p. 28.

22

members36), the largest death toll was from an airline bombing which killed 115

people.37 The 1984 bombing of the UK Conservative Party convention at the Grand

Hotel in Brighton had the potential to generate massive casualties, but failed to do so.

With the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie in 1988, some new trends in

terrorist activities began to emerge. The potential lethality of terrorist attacks (defined as

the number of fatalities generated per attack) began to increase, with the upper end of the

range of casualties rising dramatically with the targeting of large aircraft. Many of the

most deadly attacks now appeared to be motivated by ideologies with religious

dimensions, rather than purely political or ethnic ones.38 While terrorists may always

have de-humanised (or demonised) their enemies, something in their new motivations

seems to have enabled them to justify actions with the most appalling consequences.

This is not to say that religion has been a primary motivator for highly lethal terrorist

attacks, but it is significant that identifiable religious characteristics have been present in

the majority of ‘mass-casualty’ terrorist attacks since the 1990s. Robert Pape, in an

analysis of every known case of suicide terrorism from 1980 until 2003, observes that

Islamic fundamentalism is associated with about half of those attacks.39 Pape goes on to

demonstrate convincingly that, despite this, the modern phenomenon of suicide terrorism

is a response to foreign occupation, rather than a manifestation of Islamic

fundamentalism.40 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to resolve the issue of

contemporary terrorist motivations, but it is significant for the purposes of later analysis

that the lethality of individual international terrorist attacks appears to be rising.41

Attacks also became more widespread, particularly in the continental United States,

which had hitherto been largely spared such violence. This pattern began to emerge with

36 Arlington National Cemetery. Terrorist Bombing of the Marine Barracks, Beirut Lebanon 2006 [cited 18 November 2006]. Available from http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/terror.htm. 37 Occurring on 29 November 1987, this was arguably not a terrorist attack but an asymmetric attack carried out by state agents of North Korea. R. Jeffrey Smith, "New Devices May Foil Airline Security." The Washington Post, 21 July 1996, p.A01. 38 Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, 2001, p. 50. 39 Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. Melbourne: Scribe, 2005, p.17. 40 Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, 2005, p. 237. 41 Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, 2001, p. 50.

23

the 1993 attack on New York’s World Trade Centres, which had massive destructive

potential. The 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, although not religiously motivated, was an

indication that United States ‘domestic’ terrorism might be following the same pattern of

massively destructive methods. The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the

Pentagon confirmed a dramatic change to the pre-1990s pattern – both in their location

(within the United States homeland) and in the scale of casualties inflicted. With the 9/11

attacks may also have come a major shift in Western perceptions of who the terrorist

enemy was (an Islamic terrorist) and the determined and ruthless nature of his character.

In the United States, Bush’s establishment of a Cabinet-level portfolio for Homeland

Security constituted the biggest re-organisation of the United States Government since

the Second World War, amalgamating a vast range of Government agencies and

appropriating an extraordinary level of Federal funding for homeland security

requirements. At the same time, Bush issued a radical revision of the fifty year old

Unified Command Plan (UCP). Under the UCP, first issued in 1946, the United States

divides the world into ‘Unified’ military commands. Prior to 2002, responsibility for

North America was assumed directly by the Pentagon. The 2002 UCP revision created a

military Unified Command (Northern Command) responsible for the North American

continent.42

The 9/11 attacks occurred at a time when the conventional military capabilities of many

Western nations (especially the United States) seemed to be achieving such battlefield

dominance as to deter direct engagement by prudent enemies. Tactics normally

associated with terrorism became an option to ‘out-manoeuvre’ this conventional pre-

eminence by presenting an asymmetric threat. The 1996 Khobar Towers and 2000 USS

Cole bombings, although classified as terrorist actions by the United States, are examples

of ‘asymmetric’ attacks on the United States Armed Forces (because these were offshore

42 Franklyn Freeman, ‘The Division of the World into Commanderies’ 2006 [cited 12 April 2007]. Available from http://www.geocities.com/libertystrikesback/uniplan.html.

24

attacks on US military targets, some commentators do not classify them as terrorist

actions.)43

At the same time, the progressive globalisation of the world economy, with its

concomitant mobility of individuals and porosity of borders, facilitated terrorists’ access

both to more sophisticated and destructive weapons and to lucrative targets. The

‘information revolution’ also facilitated access to weapon technology. Aum Shinrikyo’s

1995 attack on the Tokyo subway system raised the destructive potential of terrorist

tactics spectacularly, by adding WMD to the terrorists’ inventory. The progressive

deterioration of the former Soviet Union after 1989 and the possible temporary loosening

of its control over nuclear and biological materials may even have created opportunities

for the most dreaded weapons of all to fall into terrorist hands.

The climate of the 1990s could have added another threat to Western homelands: just as

it did for WMD, the end of the Cold War may have made missile technologies more

accessible to terrorists. The Cold War missile threat was held in check by deterrence

strategies, but there is concern that long-range missiles might soon be in the hands of

groups who cannot be influenced by ‘traditional’ deterrence. This would give such

groups (terrorists or ‘rogue states’) a stand-off capability to attack Western homelands.

Even a single missile carrying a WMD warhead could inflict massive consequences. A

misappropriated or improvised cruise missile, launched from a ship at sea, is the most

realistic form of terrorist missile attack against a Western country.44 This approach

would obviate the signature problems of large land-based systems. Although it has not

linked its policy specifically to terrorist missile potential, the United States is sufficiently

concerned about its vulnerability to missile attack that it has withdrawn from the 1972

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to pursue a limited missile defence capability for

the United States homeland.

43 See Ted Lapkin’s comments in Jenny Brockie, “What Is Terrorism?” in Insight. Australia: SBS, 9 March 2004. Also Ted Lapkin, “Defining Terror: Age of Moral Equivalence,” The Review 29, no. 10 (2004). 44 Hezbollah’s success with rocket attacks against Israel appears to contradict this, unless recognition is given to the unique circumstances of (a) Hezbollah’s state sponsorship by Lebanon, (b) (previously) secure base in neighbouring Lebanon, and (c) political legitimacy within Lebanon. Significantly, virtually all Hezbollah attacks have utilized free-flight rockets, rather than missiles.

25

Responses

‘Western’ countries can be divided into two camps with respect to the perceived threat to

their homelands: the United States and ‘the rest.’ The United States is clearly in a class

of its own so far as being a target for international terrorist action (although it ranks

somewhat lower in terms of actual attacks) and has reacted by implementing the most

extensive ‘homeland defence’ programs.45 The United States has also, until recently,

been largely free of international terrorist activity in the ‘homeland.’ Although small-

scale ‘indigenous’ terrorism has been endemic in the United States for most of its history

(ranging from John Brown’s abolitionist activities of the 1850s to those of the Ku Klux

Klan in the 1950s and ‘60s and the Simbionese Liberation Army in the ‘70s), prior to

1995 it lacked either the scale or international nature of activity experienced in the United

Kingdom or Europe from groups such as the Irish Republican Army. The events of 11

September 2001 have completely altered that pattern.

Some other Western nations have long histories of terrorist activity in the homeland and

have well-developed capabilities to address these ‘traditional’ threats. The United

Kingdom, for example, has been dealing with Irish Republican Army activity since the

1970s and the history to that problem goes back much further. Although these countries

include some that are less likely or attractive targets than the United States, they share

that nation’s vulnerability to the new terrorist methods and are enhancing their homeland

defence capabilities accordingly, especially in relation to WMD. For example, the

United Kingdom has issued chemical agent detectors down to station level on the British

railway system and conducts regular exercises involving chemical, biological,

radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incident scenarios.46 Japan (perhaps not a Western, but

certainly a first world nation) has developed extensive chemical, biological and

radiological (CBR) incident response capacities. Australia has established a dedicated

Army unit, the Incident Response Regiment (IRR) to provide a CBR counter terrorist

capability. A new terminology has arisen, including terms such as ‘chemical, biological,

45 The term ‘domestic preparedness’ (for terrorist WMD attack) is also extensively used in the USA.

26

radiological, nuclear and [high-yield] explosive’ (CBRNE) and ‘consequence

management’. The new field also appears to support its own industry, which

manufactures and sells equipment to counter various CBRNE threats.47

If it is accepted that Western countries need to improve their security against terrorist

attack within the homeland, then the next logical question relates to what the associated

capabilities should consist of. Many new capabilities under development relate to

managing the consequences of a successful terrorist WMD attack, hence the new term

‘consequence management’. Because of the scale and complexity of the response

involved, consequence management in Western countries crosses many jurisdictional and

functional boundaries and requires careful planning and implementation. Consequence

management, however, is fundamentally reactive and is addressed by existing emergency

management resources (fire brigades, ambulance services, public health agencies) that

have not traditionally been considered part of the ‘counter-terrorist community.’ In many

nations, ‘tactical-level’ counter-terrorism capabilities and plans still focus on the siege-

hostage situation, which may now be a much less likely or significant threat.

Although effort is being devoted to enhancing consequence management capabilities,

these are not always incorporated in overall counter-terrorism plans. Populations are not

being ‘trained’ in consequence management or other homeland security measures. This

may be partly to avoid unnecessary public hysteria, but it contrasts significantly with the

very public civil defence measures rehearsed in the United Kingdom and United States in

the early part of the Cold War (when they faced a ‘real’ missile threat) or the measures

practiced in Australia during the Second World War. The consequence management

capabilities being pursued also seem to be tailored to CBRN threats, perhaps ignoring the

statistically (and technically) more probable large ‘conventional’ bomb. This suggests a

policy dilemma in deciding whether to address the more likely threat or the more

potentially disastrous. Reactive, ‘tactical’ capabilities for response to terrorist action are

46 Select Committee on Science and Technology. "Select Committee on Science and Technology, Eight Report: Research, Development and Procurement." London: Parliament of the United Kingdom, 2003.

27

usually developed in isolation from ‘strategic’ measures, which attack terrorism at its

roots. Overall, there would be appear to be a lack of coordination in Western nations’

attempts to adapt to the perceived new ‘terrorist’ threat to their homelands.

The conceptual similarity between ‘terrorist’ threats to Western homelands and

‘asymmetric’ threats to Western military forces may mean that distinctions between the

responsibilities (and capabilities) of the various national and domestic security agencies

are blurring. Defence forces, although historically focused on external threats, are being

drawn into domestic security roles at home while at the same time being forced to pursue

police-like forensic and investigative capabilities to address overseas operational

challenges, such as insurgency in Iraq. For example, the ADF has contributed to the

operation of the Coalition Explosives Exploitation Cell (CEXC) in Iraq, in order to

increase its capabilities for post-blast analysis of evidence from improvised explosive

devices.48 Conversely, some nations (including Australia) are increasing the capabilities

of their domestic police forces to para-military levels and seeking to project the influence

of those police forces abroad. These changes are evidence of a re-conceptualisation of

national security and of the defence function in particular: there is a growing literature

and debate on this topic.49

The challenges of ‘normality.’ Distinct from the concept of ‘conventionality,’

‘normality’ raises challenges in the achievement of homeland security. Normality arises

as an issue in two ways. First, if heightened threats to the homeland are to be a long-term

effect of the global terrorist threat, then living with them will become ‘normal.’ This will

make it difficult to rationalise the inconvenience or cost of extraordinary security

measures as merely a short-term sacrifice or ‘surge:’ instead, a heightened security

posture will become the ‘steady state.’ In the United States, for example, debate has

47 See, for example, Athol Yates, Australian Developers and Distributors of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) Sensors. Canberra: Research Network for a Secure Australia, 2006. 48 Personal conversation with General Peter Cosgrove, Canberra, 14 June 2005. Also Senator Robert Hill, "Ministerial Media Release No. 138/2005: Explosive Specialists Return Home From Iraq." Canberra: Department of Defence, 2005. 49 See Ian Wing, "Australian Defence in transition: responding to new security challenges," PhD Thesis, University of New South Wales - Australian Defence Force Academy, 2002.

28

recognised a ‘new normalcy’ in the domestic security environment.50 The design of the

homeland security posture will be influenced by a desire to make this new normalcy as

palatable as possible for liberal societies. This could affect the visibility, intrusiveness

and impact of homeland security measures, such as the presence of uniformed security

personnel; the balance between preserving civil liberties and effective security; or the

Government’s ability to divert resources from other programs to support homeland

security.

Second, unlike threats to the homeland that might arise in extraordinary circumstances,

such as ‘conventional’ state-on-state conflict, the new threats to homeland security arise

in ‘normal’ circumstances. The perpetrators of the July 2005 bombings of the London

transport system, for example, were ‘normal’ British citizens who acquired their weapons

from ‘normal’ sources in otherwise ‘normal’ times.51 Detecting and responding to threats

that are thus characterised by their normality is a particular challenge.

Conclusion

It appears that the security of sovereign ‘homelands’ has been a powerful political issue

for most of human history. From a very early stage, security has been needed against

threats that originate both externally and internally to those homelands. In Western

countries, powerful conventions have evolved to classify those threats and to delineate

responses to them as military (for external threats) and civilian (for internal ones). At

times, military resources have been needed to support security within the homeland, but

over history this came to be regarded increasingly as exceptional and requiring careful

control. Countries’ structural arrangements for the control of civil and military security

apparatus have complicated this.

50 ‘Gilmore Commission Calls for Improved Homeland Security Strategy,’ RAND Corporation News Release, 15 December 2003, [cited 11 January 2006]. Available from http://www.rand.org/news/press.03/12.15.html. 51 Bombings occurred on 7 July (four devices functioned, resulting in 56 fatalities including the suicide bombers themselves) and 21 July (four would-be bombers attempted unsuccessfully to detonate four devices, causing no fatalities). Frank Gregory. The London Bomb Incidents of 7 and 21 July 2005: ‘New Normality’ or Just as Predicted? Madrid: Elcano Royal Institute of International and Strategic Studies, 2006 [cited 9 April 2007]. Available from http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/245.asp.

29

There is evidence that developments in international terrorism over the past 20 years, and

particularly since 11 September 2001, have induced in some Western nations a new sense

of the vulnerability of their domestic environments – their ‘homelands’ - to threats of

violence originating from unconventional sources. There is further evidence that such

perceptions are influencing states’ national security efforts, creating a political imperative

to demonstrate adequate security within the homeland. In some cases, this is challenging

conventional employment of national defence apparatus in homeland security roles. The

next chapter explores the implications of this new homeland security imperative for

Australia.

30

CHAPTER TWO

IMPLICATIONS FOR AUSTRALIA

Australia has striven hard since September 2001 to achieve a suitable balance in its

national approach to homeland security. Although geographically vast and well endowed

with natural resources, Australia’s economic power is constrained by the realities of

climate, distance and a relatively small population (albeit a well educated and generally

healthy one), while constitutional factors and the federal system direct the shape of the

national response. Climate challenges agricultural production: as the world’s driest

continent, Australia is always vulnerable to drought and uncertainty. While distance

aids Australia’s security through remoteness from external threats and the relative

isolation of some domestic targets, it also imposes challenges through the difficulties of

communication and the movement of people and goods between centres within Australia

and to markets overseas. Distance also creates long and porous borders. The population

provides a limited national workforce, but wants and expects a high level of private

consumption and social welfare, placing a high demand on national wealth. Geography

is thus a mixed blessing for Australia’s security that, combined with the characteristics of

the country’s population, will ensure that homeland security always competes hard for its

share of national resources.

Australia’s federal system divides powers, responsibilities and capabilities between

federal (or Commonwealth), state and local levels of government. The Commonwealth

and the states share responsibilities for national security under arrangements that changed

little during the twentieth century. The post-9/11 security environment is testing those

arrangements, which have already begun to change.

In Australia, the national defence function resides at the Commonwealth level and is

exercised by the Department of Defence, which contains the Australian Defence

31

Organisation (ADO).1 As in most Western democracies, the ADO’s traditional ‘core’

business involves exercising military power externally to Australia. Although this tends

to associate it automatically with military forces, the ADO comprehends a much broader

range of agencies and functions. It consists of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and

the civilian and ‘integrated’ elements of the Department of Defence, such as the Defence

Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) and Defence Intelligence Organisation

(DIO).

Legal provisions (discussed later) restrict the use of Commonwealth military power in

‘domestic’ matters and, while Australians will demand a secure domestic environment,

the community would be suspicious of a government that could easily wield military

force within the homeland. The military profession, for its part, would have a reciprocal

concern about damaging its relationship with the Australian people should it be used

heavy-handedly at home. It would also be wary of its resources and operational focus

being drawn too far away from its core business of ‘warfighting.’

Despite this, Australia’s Department of Defence has contributed to homeland security

efforts and has assumed a larger role in them post-9/11. That involvement is one of the

many areas in which a balance must be struck between the need for security, efficient use

of scarce national resources and maintenance of a domestic environment in which

Australians’ preferred lifestyles can flourish. As outlined in the Introduction, that

challenge provides the context for the central question of this thesis:

What factors have shaped the role of the ADO in Australia's response to the

homeland security environment that has emerged since 9/11?

In achieving an understanding of these factors, a number of subordinate questions must

be answered. These include:

1 Although the term ‘ADO’ has only come into general use since the 1990s, it neatly encapsulates the concept of the Australian Defence establishment and is therefore used as a general term in this thesis. This

32

How was the ADO employed in homeland security prior to 9/11 and why?

How has the use of the ADO changed since 9/11?

How novel are the factors that have influenced the employment of the ADO since

9/11?

Will the new post-9/11 influences on the use of the ADO persist into the future?

What other agencies and functions contribute to homeland security?

What alternatives are there to employment of the ADO in homeland security?

What implications are there for the long-term future of the ADO?

In tackling these questions, consideration will be restricted to the ADO’s role in

addressing threats of violence against the Australian homeland, whether from internal or

external sources. This limitation is imposed to make the scope of the research

manageable and to focus it on those things that have changed as a result of the new

conceptualisation of the security environment ushered in by 9/11. Other ADO roles in

homeland security, such as civil disaster response, are not ignored, but in the interests of

completeness are addressed briefly rather than as central issues.

This thesis argues that 9/11 represents a ‘threshold event’ in Australia’s approach to

homeland security generally and the ADO’s employment in homeland security

specifically. Prior to 9/11, homeland security had a much lower profile on the national

security agenda at both the Commonwealth and state levels and the ADO’s involvement

in it had evolved in an incremental and episodic fashion. Major shifts in ADO roles

usually occurred in response to actual events on Australian territory: Australia was

judged to be largely isolated from overseas problems and homeland security capabilities

leads inevitably to some anachronistic applications.

33

therefore did not command the same priority, in terms of resources or proactive

development, as, say, the warfighting abilities of the ADF. Although international

developments provided some impetus for change, in the pre-9/11 period homeland

security capacity was generally matched to real homeland events as they happened.

Generally, that capacity was adequate: where it proved inadequate, it was incrementally

adjusted in the aftermath of an incident.

Since 9/11, homeland security has presented a much higher profile and involved a far

broader range of government agencies than previously. The policy and practice of ADO

employment in homeland security post-9/11 has some distinct characteristics:

Policy-making is much more ‘whole of government’ than previously. Defence is

now part of a national security ‘orchestra’ with numerous other participants, many

of whom have increased their capabilities significantly since 9/11.

Homeland security decisions are now taken proactively, in anticipation of

challenges, rather than reactively in their aftermath.

There is a greater readiness to use Defence resources in homeland security

missions.

Despite the post-9/11 growth in capabilities of other agencies, Defence still has much to

contribute to homeland security, including some capabilities that are unique in Australia.

In making that contribution, however, there are risks that the ADO’s finite resources

could be diverted from the development of ‘warfighting’ capacity, with negative

consequences for the country.

As an agency of the Commonwealth, the extent and nature of the ADO’s involvement in

homeland security is decided by the Commonwealth government. Legal, philosophical,

historical, economic and political factors bear on those decisions. The conclusion

reached in this thesis, however, is that, ultimately, the employment of the ADO in

34

homeland security has been driven by pragmatic political and managerial considerations,

both before and after 9/11. Prior to 9/11, this underlying pragmatism meant that changes

in the pattern of ADO employment tended to be episodic and evolutionary, rather than

radical. Post-9/11, the same pragmatism produced much more rapid change. Political

and managerial pragmatism will continue to determine the employment of the ADO into

the foreseeable future. As Australia’s homeland security architecture matures, changes in

the balance of factors will bring consequential changes in ADO involvement but the

Organisation is likely to retain a significant role indefinitely.

Several difficulties are intrinsic in researching this topic. Chief among these is the

relative newness of the subject. Less than six years have elapsed since 9/11 and

Australia’s response is still evolving, especially where the ADO is concerned. In order to

establish a firm baseline for the evidence considered, a publication date of 30 June 2006

has been set as the arbitrary limit to the documentary material analysed. Later material

has been considered wherever possible, but there is a risk that emerging material will

contradict some conclusions. This is a perennial danger of work in a highly topical area

and there are few effective ways of mitigating it.

A further difficulty has been the classified or sensitive nature of much of the subject

matter, especially where operational response capabilities and procedures are concerned.

All material cited in this thesis has been derived from open sources. This automatically

introduces uncertainty as to the accuracy and completeness of data. The entire period

under close examination, from 1978 onwards, falls within the normal ‘30-year rule’ for

release of classified information and therefore even archival sources are of limited use.

The recently-released 1976 Cabinet Papers have provided some timely information, but it

seems likely that further information will trickle out slowly under the 30-year rule. This

poses a particular problem in relation to threat assessments, which are important to

understanding government policy motivations. In the course of research, the author’s

status as a serving member of the Australian Defence Force allowed access to relevant

classified material or to sensitive expert opinions that could be neither used nor

attributed, especially where they related to the effectiveness of different government

35

agencies or the efficacy of government policy. In these cases, classified or sensitive

insights have guided the search for open source corroboration. Open sources that were

known to be incomplete or incorrect, as a result of classified knowledge, were not used.

Research has revealed indicators as to how the ADO’s involvement in homeland security

should develop and the further research that is needed to support that development. The

conclusion to the thesis therefore includes some prescriptive ideas and recommendations

for further work.

Research method

In order to answer the central question of this thesis, it is necessary to understand exactly

what roles the ADO does perform in Australia’s homeland security and how those roles

have changed since 9/11. From an understanding of what the ADO actually contributes

to homeland security, the factors that have influenced that contribution, both before and

after 9/11, must then be identified. The analytical approach used in this study addresses

the seven subordinate questions of the thesis in five stages.

The first subordinate question of the thesis is addressed in the first two analytical stages.

The first stage of analysis consists of achieving an understanding of the background to

ADO involvement in homeland security, establishing the status quo prior to 9/11. The

second stage of analysis involves determining the reasons why that status quo emerged.

The third stage of analysis explains the context for post-9/11 developments in ADO

involvement in homeland security, including legislation and Government guidance. This

stage addresses the second, third and fourth subordinate questions by determining how

the use of the ADO in homeland security has changed since 9/11, assessing the novelty of

the factors influencing this involvement and gauging the likely persistence of these new

factors.

36

The fourth stage of analysis examines the ADO’s homeland security roles as they have

evolved since 9/11, including their relationships with roles performed by other Australian

entities. This stage addresses the fifth subordinate question by considering the other

agencies and functions that contribute to homeland security.

The final analytical stage addresses the central question of the thesis by identifying the

factors that have influenced ADO roles. This stage also proposes answers to the sixth

and seventh subordinate questions by considering alternatives to the employment of the

ADO in homeland security and assessing the implications for the ADO’s long-term

future.

A range of metrics is employed to gauge the extent of ADO involvement in homeland

security functions relative to other government agencies and in terms of changes after

9/11. Where appropriate, the involvement of the ADO is compared with practice in

selected other nations although this is not a major theme of the work.

The principal research technique has been document analysis, supported where necessary

by personal conversations with individual experts, some of which were in the form of

focused interviews. Discussion and interview subjects are listed in the Bibliography.

Case studies were undertaken of Defence involvement in the security of the Sydney 2000

Olympic and Paralympic Games in the pre-9/11 period; and of the 2002 Commonwealth

Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) and the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth

Games after 9/11. Because these are all examples of the same category of ADO support

to homeland security (that is, support to the conduct of domestic events), they provide a

useful basis for comparison of pre- and post-9/11 practice. A further case study was

undertaken of the contribution to national capabilities of the Incident Response Regiment

(IRR), in order to inform a comparison of actual ADO homeland security capability with

that claimed for it by Government. As Australia’s federal model of government has a

major impact on its response to security challenges, the homeland security capabilities of

the states are also a significant consideration. Because of their scale and historical

continuity, the homeland security arrangements of New South Wales were selected as a

37

benchmark for state capabilities and these are visited at appropriate points in the thesis

and the specific enhancements that that state has undertaken since 2001 are the subject of

a representative case study. All case studies are embedded within chapters where they

are needed to support analysis.

Literature

The literature associated with homeland security is diverse and has accumulated rapidly

since 9/11. Although work dealing specifically with the ADO’s role in Australia’s

homeland security is sparse, full consideration of the topic of this thesis must

comprehend a much broader range of material.

Material specific to the topic

Relatively little has been published to date about the factors influencing the employment

of the ADO in Australia’s homeland security since 9/11. No substantial works have been

produced, with most academic treatments of the topic appearing as conference or

working papers, journal articles or media commentaries. The existing material on the

topic falls into these categories:

1. Government policy documents, Ministerial and Departmental statements,

Parliamentary records and other Government and Parliamentary sources.

2. Non-government material, including:

a. academic conference papers and journal articles, and

b. opinion voiced in print and telemedia commentaries.

Government sources. The principal sources of Government policy on the

employment of the ADO in homeland security roles are formal policy documents

such as ‘White Papers.’ Analysis of these documents is important, as they

constitute an official articulation of Government policy and provide the strategic

38

guidance for ADO involvement in homeland security. Given the relatively recent

nature of the events and decisions under examination, classified material such as

Cabinet Papers and Ministerial Submissions is not yet available.

An extensive series of Federal Government policy documents exists, but those of

particular relevance date from 1973. These include the 1976 Defence White

Paper, the last one prior to the 1978 Hilton bombing that accelerated the deliberate

pursuit of counter terrorist capabilities in Australia; and Justice Hope’s Protective

Security Review of 1979, which was itself triggered by the Hilton bombing.

Documents of special relevance are those released since 9/11:

Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2003,2 a Department of

Defence (Defence) documenting updating the Howard Government’s 2000

Defence White Paper.

Protecting Australia against Terrorism 2004,3 a Department of Prime

Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) document.

Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia,4 a Department of

Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) White Paper issued in 2004.

Winning in Peace, Winning in War5, a Defence document issued in 2004.

Although not a policy document, this provides useful information on post-

9/11 thinking.

2 Hereinafter referred to as Defence Update 2003, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2003, [cited 27 June 2005]. Available at http://www.defence.gov.au/ans2003/Report.pdf. 3 Hereinafter referred to as Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Canberra, 2004. 4 Hereinafter referred to as Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia 2004, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 2004, [cited 25 June 2005]. Available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/terrorism/index.html. 5 Hereinafter referred to as Winning in Peace, Winning in War 2004, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2004.

39

Weapons of Mass Destruction, Australia’s Role in Fighting Proliferation:

Practical Responses to New Challenges6, a DFAT paper issued in October

2005.

Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 20057, a Defence

document similar to the 2003 update, released in December 2005.

All of these documents contain references to ADO contributions to homeland

security requirements: although this might be counter-intuitive, the PM&C and

DFAT documents are much more detailed and prescriptive in specifying ADO

involvement than the Defence ones.

Other Government sources include documents such as the National Counter-

Terrorist Plan (NCTP),8 which contains broad details of ADO involvement in

homeland security, going down to the level of generic capabilities. This

document also begins to explain the expected interaction of ADO capabilities with

those provided by civilian authorities. Classified documents subordinate to the

NCTP deal with the role of the ADO in more detail but are not used in this thesis.

Relevant Cabinet papers that relate to the period in question have only recently

begun to be released, with those for 1976 containing some useable information.

Significantly, this contains a de-classified threat assessment that is virtually the

only one of its type available.9 Papers from the period of most interest to this

study (from 1978 onwards) will not be available for some years. Overall, the lack

of useful information on the threat information that has informed Australian

government decisions is a significant obstacle to research in this area.

6 Hereinafter referred to as Weapons of Mass Destruction, Australia's Role in Fighting Proliferation 2005, Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2005. 7 Hereinafter referred to as Defence Update 2005, Canberra: Department of Defence, 2005. 8 National Counter-Terrorism Plan, National Counter-Terrorism Committee, Attorney-General’s Department, Canberra, June 2003, [cited 27 June 2005]. Available from http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/rwpattach.nsf/personal/8142A6DCC44C2B44CA256E39000C7CD7/$FILE/NCT+PLAN.pdf. 9 R.J., Ellicott, and R.G. Withers. "FAD Policy Paper No. 23 - Policy and Organization to Counter International Terrorism." Canberra: National Archives of Australia, 1976.

40

Annual reports of federal and state government agencies, such as those produced

by the Department of Defence, state police services and emergency response

agencies, are a source of data on force dispositions, capabilities, expenditures and,

to a lesser extent, policies.

In addition to these formal documents, public pronouncements by Government

ministers and officials contain indications of Government policy and reasoning in

determining how the ADO should be employed in homeland security roles.

Documents such as ADF service newspapers provide unclassified data on ADF

involvement in homeland security missions.

Non-government material. The term ‘non-government material’ here refers to

‘independent’ academic commentary and analysis as well as the products of

funded research centres and ‘think tanks.’ To date, no substantial books dealing

specifically with the topic of this research have been encountered. Analysis

produced to date has appeared in the form of conference papers, journal articles,

‘occasional’ or working papers, book chapters and incidental commentaries

published in the print or telemedia. The latter are difficult to distinguish from

some material considered later in the ‘popular debate’ category, except through

the context in which remarks are made or their content.

No theses dealing specifically with the post-9/11 period have been discovered,

although some work has been done on similar themes in the pre-9/11 period. For

example, Ian Wing’s doctoral thesis, Australian Defence in transition: responding

to new security challenges, deals with the re-conceptualisation of Australia’s

defence needs in the late twentieth century.10

Useful material on the history of ADO involvement in homeland security roles is

provided by works such as The Australian Centenary History of Defence (seven

10Ian Wing, PhD thesis, University of New South Wales - Australian Defence Force Academy, 2002.

41

volumes), especially David Horner’s Making the Department of Defence (Volume

IV).11 Although this ends its consideration before 9/11, it covers developments

from 1976 until 2000 in some detail, especially the structural changes to the ADF.

In making assessments of ADF effectiveness over that period, however, it

considers only performance on overseas operations. Homeland security

implications arise in treatment of support to the Sydney 2000 Olympic and

Paralympic Games and in the development of domestic counter terrorism

capabilities within the Special Air Service Regiment, but these receive much less

attention than the ADF’s overseas operations over the same period. Similarly,

Horner’s SAS: Phantoms of War provides valuable detail on the development of

the ADF’s domestic counter terrorism capabilities over the period 1976-2002,

including some discussion of the associated Defence and government decision-

making. Treatment of the post-9/11 period, however, is necessarily limited by the

2002 publication date.12

Of the available critical material, most concerns itself with either identifying

issues associated with the employment of the ADO in homeland security roles or

with prescriptive suggestions as to what that employment should be. A literal

example of the ‘Issues Paper’ genre is Aldo Borgu’s Australia’s Defence after

September 11: A Quick Guide to the Issues.13 Clark Jones’ Military as Law

Enforcers? Coming to Terms with the New Security Environment explores the

post-9/11 domestic security environment in some detail and canvasses a number

of issues associated with the employment of the ADF in domestic law

enforcement roles, but does not deal in any depth with the national decision

making associated with the use of the ADF in those roles or examine the

involvement of other elements of the ADO.14 Christopher Flaherty has examined

Australian national security from the perspective of United States changes in the

11 David Horner, Making the Australian Defence Force. Edited by Peter Dennis and John Coates. 7 vols. Vol. 4, The Australian Centenary History of Defence. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001. 12 David Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2002. 13 Aldo Borgu, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2001. 14 Clark Jones, Working Paper Australian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, December 2002.

42

post-9/11 period. His writing considers homeland security as a theme in national

security thinking, but does not pay particular attention to the ADO’s role in it.15

A recurring theme in some material dealing with the post-9/11 environment is a

concern about the inappropriate use of the ADF in domestic security roles. Much

of this is normative, in the sense that it identifies the potential dangers of such

use.16 Some material, however, draws on historical (if very recent) events such as

the ‘Children Overboard’ affair to provide evidence of the risks of misusing the

ADF in homeland security matters.17 This material, however, does not provide a

comprehensive account of the involvement of the ADO in homeland security roles

since 9/11 or of the reasons for it.

The sole source that deals specifically with the topic of this thesis emerged late in

the course of this project, as a product of the research undertaken. This was a

Strategic Insights paper produced by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute

(ASPI) and co-authored by this author, with Dr. Anthony Bergin.18

The extant academic literature that deals closely with the topic of this thesis,

therefore, is limited in quantity and breadth. Further, it does not consider the full

extent of ADO (as distinct from ADF) involvement in homeland security since

9/11, or the reasons for it.

Material peripheral to the topic

Literature peripheral to the thesis topic can be classified in ‘academic’ and ‘popular’

categories.

15 Christopher Flaherty, ‘Australian National Security Thinking,’ Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 160, June 2003, pp. 3-10. 16 For example, Hugh Smith Homeland Security and the Defence Forces, paper delivered to the 2004 Fullbright Symposium, Sydney, 6 July 2004, [cited 27 June 2005]. Available from http://www.polsis.uq.edu.au/fulbright/abstract-smith.html. 17 Hugh Smith, ‘Border protection and the limits of obedience,’ Defender, Autumn 2004, pp. 24-6. Also Hugh Smith, ‘A Certain Maritime Incident and Political-Military Relations,’ Quadrant, June 2002, pp. 38-43. 18 Andrew Smith and Anthony Bergin, Australian domestic security: The role of Defence, Strategic Insights Paper No. 31, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2006.

43

Non-government literature. The non-government literature peripheral to the

topic is broad, but consists mainly of material dealing with terrorism and counter

terrorism in general. This literature is huge, with the bulk of it dating back to the

mid-sixties. The significance of this material to the topic of this thesis lies in

establishing context by documenting the ‘trigger’ events that influenced

Australia’s policy prior to 9/11, analysing global trends in terrorism and counter

terrorism and canvassing issues associated with terrorism and state responses to it,

including the employment of military forces in domestic security scenarios.

Jenny Hocking’s Beyond Terrorism is a specific analysis of Australia’s response

to the international terrorism of the 1970s, focusing particularly on the call-out of

the ADF to protect the 1978 Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional

Meeting (CHOGRM).19 Despite the ADF’s involvement in this central event,

Hocking’s work pays more attention to the politics of the development of an

‘Australian security state’ than it does to the factors influencing the use of the

military. Most mention of the ADF relates to normative suggestions as to how it

should not be used. In providing a discussion of part of the pre-9/11 picture,

however, this book informs a comparison with post-9/11 factors.

Some historiographical material provides useful data in relation to capabilities and

decisions. David Horner’s SAS: Phantoms of War contains an important chapter

dealing with the development of a national counter terrorism capability within the

ADF from the 1970s.20 Historiography on post-9/11 developments, however, is

understandably scant.

The general subject of military ‘aid to the civil power’ in an Australian context is

the subject of some focused academic analysis. Beddie and Moss’ Some Aspects

of Aid to the Civil Power in Australia is a useful historical analysis of this subject

19 Jenny Hocking, Beyond Terrorism: The Development of the Australian Security State, Canberra, Allen & Unwin, 1993. 20 David Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2002.

44

up until 1982.21 Andrew Hiller has produced a number of pieces on the legal

aspects of aid to the civil power, including his book Public Order and the Law

and a range of articles.22 These are useful factual sources that inform judgements

as to the influence of legal factors on the employment of military forces in

domestic security roles.

Most of the contemporary non-government literature is ‘international’ in

character, and even material of Australian origin bases its analysis on terrorist

problems existing well outside Australia’s region. Clive Williams’ and Brendan

Taylor’s (eds.) Countering Terror is an example.23 The production of terrorism-

related material has increased significantly since the mid-1990s and exponentially

since 9/11. Literature with an Australian focus is scarce before the late 1990s,

although some that is classified in the ‘popular’ category (see below) has

characteristics of academic discourse. Alan Thompson’s Management of

Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Program covers a 1993 Government review of

counter-terrorism processes, but without dealing specifically with the role of the

ADO.24 Terrorism and the 2000 Olympics covers the proceedings of a 1996

academic conference on that topic, although none of the papers contained in it

deal specifically with the ADO’s role in that event.25 In some material,

significance to Australia derives ‘incidentally’ from an Asia-Pacific focus: for

example, Rohan Gunaratna’s (ed.) Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific: Threat and

Response.26 Works dealing with Australian defence and security policy generally

sometimes also touch on the role of the ADO: for example, Hugh Smith’s chapter

‘The Defence Force and Australian Society’ in Desmond Ball and Cathy Downes

21 B.D. Beddie and S. Moss, Some Aspects of Aid to the Civil Power in Australia, Department of Government, Faculty of Military Studies, University of New South Wales, 1982. 22 Andrew Hiller, Public Order and the Law, Sydney: Lawbook Company, 1983. Also ‘New Defence Force Powers to Aid Civil Authorities and Related Matters’ (Part 1 of 2), Australian Police Journal 61, no. 1, Sydney: Australian Police Journal Limited, March 2007, pp.30-9. 23 Clive Williams and Brendan Taylor (eds). Countering Terror: New Directions Post ‘911,’ Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 2003. 24 Alan Thompson, Working Paper No. 23: Management of Australia's Counter-Terrorism Program, Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1994. 25 Alan Thompson, (ed.), Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1996.

45

(eds) Security and Defence.27 John Donovan’s 2005 article ‘A Principal Role for

the Army Reserves: A Capability for Australian Homeland Defence’ is unusual in

dealing specifically with an aspect of ADO involvement in homeland security,

although it does so in the more conventional context of ‘those circumstances

where foreign individuals or organisations act in ways that threaten the security or

stability of Australia and its people’ (emphasis added) and limits its consideration

to the ADF, excluding most of the broader contemporary dimensions of homeland

security.28 Homeland security implications can also be extracted from general

studies of Australian security policy: for example, Desmond Ball and Pauline

Kerr’s Presumptive Engagement (1996) provides insights into Australia’s regional

engagement policy and practice that are relevant to this thesis.29

The ‘international’ literature is of some value to the topic of this research, in that

it provides some reliable data and analysis of ‘generic’ terrorist threats and

capabilities as well as significant international trends: for example, the vast

literature on Islamist terrorism is useful background to developments in

Australia’s region. Even books as tangential as Andrew Wheatcroft’s Infidels30

are helpful in this regard.

Some opinion poll and survey data is available that touches on aspects of the

topic. Examples include the Lowy Institute’s Australians Speak 2005 and the

Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Attitude Matters (2005). 31,32 These are

concerned broadly with public opinion on defence and strategic policy but tend to

26 Rohan Gunaratna (ed.), Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific: Threat and Response, Eastern Universities Press, Singapore, 2003. 27 Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990. 28 John Donovan, "A Principal Role for the Army Reserves: A Capability for Australian Homeland Defence." Australian Defence Force Journal, no. 169 (2005): 40-51, p. 43. 29 Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr. Presumptive Security: Australia’s Asia-Pacific Policy in the 1990s. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1996. 30 Andrew Wheatcroft, Infidels: A history of the Conflict Between Christendom and Islam, Random House, New York, 2003. 31 Ivan Cook, Australians Speak 2005: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2005. 32 Ian McAllister, Peter Jennings and Brendan McRandle. Attitude Matters: Public opinion in Australia towards defence and security. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2004.

46

focus on traditional international aspects of national security. Threats, for

example, are usually appreciated in terms of foreign countries although recent

polls consider the threat from terrorism. There is little coverage of homeland

security issues and few, if any, poll questions deal directly with the involvement

of the ADO in such roles. Overall, the available poll data is of limited value to

this thesis.

Although not related directly to homeland security, the general span of literature

in the strategic studies and public policy areas provides a useful basis for some

ideas as well as tools for identifying influences on decisions affecting to ADO

involvement in homeland security. General treatments of basic political and

social concepts, such as Stephen Krasner’s coverage of sovereignty in his article

"Compromising Westphalia" or John H. Hertz’s “Rise and Demise of the

Territorial State”, although in some cases written well prior to the period under

study, are essential to understanding key ideas such as the homeland and its

political power.33,34 Although the approach of this thesis is more from a defence

and strategic studies perspective, public policy theory is also useful in

understanding homeland security decisions. In particular, the notion of

incrementalism has particular application to the material studied and standard

texts, such as Lindblom’s “Still muddling, not yet through,’ are useful sources.35

Theories such as constructivism also have value in understanding the influence of

homeland security orthodoxies, such as the general proscription of the use of

military force in the homeland except as a last resort. Although no examples with

specific relevance to the topic were found, general texts such as Keith Krause and

Michael Williams’ Critical Security Studies provide useful theoretical

background.36 The standard literature of politics and public policy theory has

33 Stephen D. Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia." International Security 20, no. 3 (1996): pp. 115-151. 34 John H. Hertz, "Rise and Demise of the Territorial State." World Politics IX, no. 4 (1967): pp. 473-493. 35 C.E. Lindblom, "Still muddling, not yet through." Public Administration Review 39, no. 6 (1979): pp. 517-26. 36 Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams. Critical Security Studies. London: University College London Press, 1997.

47

little direct application to the topic of this thesis, but has some general heuristic

value.

As a general comment, despite its volume the academic literature on homeland

security has yet to yield a body of coherent theory on the subject. Although much

thought has clearly been devoted to the topic, there is as yet no identifiable

theoretical scheme that could compare with those that have evolved in, say, the

strategic studies discipline. There is no analysis of homeland security equivalent

to nuclear deterrence theory, for example. Thus far, the nearest thing to theory

seems to be the attachment of some dogmas to the solving of homeland security

challenges. For example, the non-involvement of military forces in domestic

security tasks is proposed by several authors as a guiding principle, but this seems

to be directed more by historical usage and orthodoxies than by a first principles

analysis of the new security environment. A key indicator of maturity in the

homeland security debate might be the emergence of a distinct and recognisable

body of theory on the subject.

Popular literature. The intriguing nature of terrorism and counter-terrorism is

witnessed by the vast amount of ‘general interest’ material that has been

published on those subjects, dating back to the 1970s. Production of this material

since 9/11 has mirrored the trend in academic literature, although its volume

seems somewhat greater. The popular literature can be grouped into two sub-

categories:

The popular ‘debate.’ Most material in this category appears to be

authored by journalists and presents relatively ‘lightweight’ factual or

discursive material covering homeland security issues. As with the

academic literature, most of the work in the ‘popular debate’ category is

international in scope. Some material of Australian origin dates as far

back as the mid-1980s: for example, James Crown’s Australia: The

Terrorist Connection, was written to inform thinking about Australia’s

48

vulnerability to international terrorism.37 More recent material is clearly

inspired by the post-9/11 ‘war on terror:’ authors seem likely to have been

motivated by financial opportunism in some cases, ‘cashing in’ on

heightened public interest in homeland security. This may account for the

alarmist flavour of some books, especially the large number that deal with

CBRN threats.38 Some of the material in this category overlaps with the

academic literature described above and, as already mentioned, can be

difficult to distinguish from it. To the extent that it informs popular debate

(often through its accessibility, in the case of ‘incidental’ newspaper or

telemedia commentaries), such material nevertheless belongs in this

category.

The significance of this popular material to the research topic is twofold.

First, despite their somewhat lightweight nature, some books are useful

sources of reliable technical or historical data that are unavailable

elsewhere. Second, the availability of this material may explain public

and political concerns and the resultant policy agendas that surround the

homeland security debate.

The fiction and drama of homeland security. Paralleling, and in some

ways presaging, the post-9/11 security agenda is the considerable volume

of fiction and drama (mainly films) dealing with terrorism in Western

homelands. The sheer mass of this material would suggest a long-standing

public fascination with ‘unconventional’ threats to the homeland, dating

from the early twentieth century: for example, Joseph Conrad’s 1907

novel The Secret Agent. More recently, there is a special fascination with

37 James Crown, Australia: The Terrorist Connection, Sun Books, Melbourne, 1986. 38 For example, Michael Osterholm and John Schwartz, Living Terrors: What America Needs to Know to Survive the Coming Bioterrorist Catastrophe,’ New York: Delacorte Press, 2000; Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats From Weapons of Mass Destruction, New York: Tauris, 2002; Fran Barnaby, How to Build a Nuclear Bomb and other weapons of mass destruction,’ London: Granta, 2004; and Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, New York: Times Books, 2004. These titles reveal an alarmist public policy agenda and, arguably, a clear political objective.

49

the apocalyptic threats associated with weapons of mass destruction. The

horror of nuclear devastation of the homeland, in the state-on-state context

of the Cold War, has been the subject of ‘entertainments’ dating from the

very beginning of the nuclear stand-off: Columbia’s 1952 film Invasion

USA39 and Neville Shute’s 1957 novel On the Beach (later a film, shot in

Australia) are examples of the ‘nuclear aftermath’ genre. Biological

apocalypse also made a relatively early appearance: examples are Michael

Crichton’s 1969 novel The Andromeda Strain and Warner Brothers’ 1971

film Omega Man.40 The Australian Mad Max series is also based on a

similar apocalyptic aftermath theme.41 Plots involving nuclear terrorism

are a slightly more recent development, emerging in the mid-80s with

Frederick Forsyth’s The Fourth Protocol, which depicts the smuggling of

a nuclear device into the UK. Although the plot centres on an inter-state

conflict, the techniques associated with the deployment of a nuclear

weapon are distinctly terrorist.42

Terrorism in general has also been a popular theme for novels and films

since the 1960s. In general, however, the attraction of these seems to have

relied on their human or political interest or their appeal as part of the

crime or thriller genres, rather than playing on a compelling or credible

sense of threat to the homeland. Novels such as Frederick Forsyth’s The

Day of the Jackal (1971)43 and films such as Gillo Pontecorvo’s historic

The Battle of Algiers (1966)44, depicting the insurgency in Algeria; or

Steven Spielberg’s Munich (2005)45, dealing with the aftermath of the

39 Alfred Green, Invasion USA, USA: Columbia, 1952. 40 The Andromeda Strain, Avon Books, New York: also a Universal Pictures film in 1971. 41 George Miller, Mad Max, Australia: Village Roadshow, 1980. There are now a total of three films in the Mad Max series. 42 Frederick Forsyth, The Fourth Protocol, Bantam Books, London, 1985 (later a film by Timothy Burrill, 1987). 43 Frederick Forsyth, The Day of the Jackal, London: Bantam Books, 1971 (later a film by Warwick Films and Universal Pictures, 1973). 44 Gillo Pontecorvo, The Battle of Algiers, Rizzoli, 1966 (co-produced by Sadi Yacef, who wrote the book on which the film is based). 45 Steven Spielberg, Munich, USA: Universal, 2005.

50

1972 Black September attack, are examples of this category of material.

Only more recently has the dimension of extraordinary threats to the

homeland, and extraordinary measures in response, begun to feature in

popular fiction or films. Edward Zwick’s The Siege (1998)46, for example,

depicts a state of martial law in New York City in response to a perceived

terrorist threat. Hollywood has been slower to produce films dealing with

the events of 9/11 and the subsequent ‘War on Terror,’ perhaps out of

consideration for public sensitivities (especially in the United States).

Examples are now emerging, however: examples include Universal

Pictures’ United 93 (dealing with the ‘fourth airliner’ that crashed in

Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001); and Paramount’s World Trade

Centre, both released in 2006.47

Since the early 1990s, scenarios involving biological and, to a lesser

extent, chemical attacks have become much more common, although

nuclear terrorism has remained on the agenda. For example, the 1996 film

The Rock featured a terrorist/criminal extortion threat against San

Francisco with stolen VX nerve agent missiles.48 Robert Preston’s 1997

novel The Cobra Event revolved around the dissemination of a genetically

engineered virus by a disenchanted and vengeful scientist. John Case’s

The First Horseman (1998), Robin Cook’s Vector (1999) and Tom

Clancy’s Rainbow Six (1999) all depicted apocalyptic biological threats

from ideological groups, which are defeated by a combination of

sophisticated science and, in Clancy’s case, ‘super-elite’ counter-

terrorism. Topically for this thesis, Rainbow Six involved a threat to

Australia - a biological attack on the closing ceremony of Sydney 2000

Olympic Games. During the same period, Clancy’s novel The Sum of all

Fears (1992), Patrick Robinson’s Nimitz Class (1997) and Dreamworks’

46 Edward Zwick, The Siege, USA: Twentieth Century Fox, 1998. 47 "Operation Hollywood," SBS, 7 January 2006; World Trade Centre, Paramount Pictures, 2006. 48 The Rock, John Simpson/Jerry Bruckheimer Films, 1996.

51

1997 film The Peacemaker all continue variations on the nuclear terrorism

theme.

No strong conclusion can be drawn from the existence of this fictional

material. Its significance lies in its possible role in keeping terrorist

threats, especially the more frightening ones, before the attention of the

public and, to a lesser extent, policy makers. The consistency of public

demand for such material suggests that people find the subject interesting,

if only for its entertainment value. In its influence on threat perceptions,

such material could be a minor factor in determining the policy agenda.

For example, US President Bill Clinton’s support for domestic

preparedness for chemical and biological attacks is attributed to his having

read The Cobra Event.49

A bizarre development in the role of popular material in the homeland

security debate has been the collaboration of Hollywood and the US

Government in the planning for terrorist attacks. This has involved the

‘enlistment’ of Hollywood scriptwriters to produce scenarios for counter

terrorism exercises and planning.50 While no strong conclusion can be

drawn from this fact, it suggests that the new threat environment possesses

a degree of unconventionality, leading the US Government (at least) to

seek ideas from unconventional sources.

In summary, the body of existing literature that surrounds the topic of this thesis is

extensive, diverse and growing. From the 1990s onward the rate of production of that

material has increased, with a dramatic upswing in publications since 9/11, but as yet

49 Interview with Robert Preston, [cited 30 June 2005]. Available at http://www.pomona.edu/Magazine/pcmf99/18pcmf99.shtml. Also David Claridge, ‘Exploding the Myths of Superterrorism,’ in Max Taylor and John Horgan, eds. The Future of Terrorism. London: Frank Cass, 2000, p. 134. 50 Peter Carlson, “The Pentagon's Homegrown Theater of War,” Washington Post, 3 January 2006, p. C01; also Diego Gambetta,Of Truth and Terror, Columbia University, 2003 [cited 16 April 2006]. Available from http://c250.columbia.edu/c250_events/symposia/constitutions/papers/gambetta_paper.pdf.

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little material has been published that deals specifically with the factors affecting the

employment of the ADO in Australia’s homeland security.

53

CHAPTER THREE

DEFENCE AND AUSTRALIAN HOMELAND SECURITY 1788-2000 In order to determine the factors that led Australia to employ its Defence Organisation in

homeland security as it did, it is necessary to understand what that employment actually

consisted of. This chapter provides a chronological account of the ADO’s pre-9/11

involvement in homeland security and a comprehensive case study of ADO support to the

security of the Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games (the Sydney 2000 Games).

A following chapter will seek to identify the principal factors that shaped that

involvement.

Colonial Experience

The involvement of what we now know as ‘Defence’ assets in Australia’s homeland

security dates from the commencement of European settlement in 1788. The early

Colony of New South Wales relied on the Royal Navy and Marines and the British Army

to provide for its security: it existed, in fact, to support a military prison.1 The first

Governors were military men, as were the commanders of the various garrisons that were

established as settlement spread.2 Law and order was thus, initially, a military function,

even after the first constabulary was established.3 The ‘Defence organisation’ of the

early colonies had no governing bureaucracy associated with it, and consisted simply of

the British military forces stationed there. In 1819, the land forces of the Colony,

including a small citizen ‘Volunteer’ component initiated in 1800, totalled ‘an effective

body of about seven hundred firelocks.’4

The presence of significant numbers of convicts in most of the colonies of New Holland

was a major influence on the early domestic security environment and on the resources it

1 Peter Grobosky,"Violence in Australian Society." In Terrorism and the 2000 Olympics, edited by Alan Thompson, 49-65. Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1996, p.51. 2 Jeffrey Grey, A Military History of Australia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 10. 3 William Wentworth, Statistical, Historical, and Political Description of The Colony of New South Wales and Its dependent Settlements in Van Diemen’s Land (1819), Griffin Press, Adelaide, 1979, p. 338. 4 Wentworth, 1819, p.32; Jeffrey Grey, The Australian Army, Vol. 1, The Australian Centenary History of Defence, Peter Dennis and John Coates (eds) (Seven Vols) Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.5.

54

demanded. A civilian Police Force was established by Governor Arthur Philip in 1789

and 1819 the ‘Police Establishment of Sydney’ had grown to consist of a Superintendent

and two staff, two Coroners, a Gaoler and a total of 59 Chief, District and Ordinary

Constables.5 Even with these resources, controlling the convict population and

protecting the civil community from the associated lawlessness kept the garrison forces

busy. A significant example of this effort was the suppression of the Vinegar Hill convict

insurrection of 1804, an event which, according to William Wentworth, weighed heavily

on the popular consciousness for some time.6 In his description of New South Wales in

1819, Wentworth expresses disquiet that military forces had lately been reduced to the

point that they were inadequate for the Colony’s domestic security needs:

Why a diminution has thus been made in the means of protection and defence, when there appear to be strong grounds for their augmentation, merely with reference to the internal state of the colony, it is no easy matter to conjecture.7 (my emphasis)

In Van Diemen’s Land (Tasmania) in 1816, convict banditry caused Lieutenant Governor

Davy to ‘declare the whole island under the operation of martial law.’8 Garrison forces,

sometimes assisted by civilian settlers, mounted extensive operations against the ‘banditti

of bush-rangers’ before this emergency was contained. In concluding his extensive

account of the Van Diemen’s Land situation, Wentworth eloquently states the importance

of domestic security to the Colony’s prosperity:

And can the pursuits of industry quietly proceed under the harassing dread which this constant liability to outrage and depredation must inspire? There is no principle less controvertible than that the subject has the same claims on the government for support and protection, as they have on him, for obedience and fidelity…and it is really discreditable to the established character of this country, that any part of its dominions should have continued for so long a period, the scene of such flagrant enormities, merely from the want of a sufficient military

5 New South Wales Police Service website [cited 24 July 2005]. Available from http://www.police.nsw.gov.au/about_us. Also Wentworth, Description of The Colony of New South Wales 1819, pp. 436-7. 6 Wentworth, Description of The Colony of New South Wales, 1819, p.33. 7 Wentworth, Description of The Colony of New South Wales, 1819, p. 34. 8 Wentworth, Description of The Colony of New South Wales, 1819, p. 134.

55

force to ensure the due administration of the laws, and to maintain the public tranquility.9 (my emphasis)

Wentworth’s apparent preference for a military contribution to domestic law and order

may be attributable to his low opinion of the ‘Police Establishment,’

…which even in Sydney is badly organised, because not sufficiently numerous, and to which in the interior towns and districts it would be a farce to apply the name of “Police” at all.10

Notwithstanding his reservations about the effectiveness of the civil police function and

obvious preference for a military guarantee of domestic security, Wentworth expresses a

real concern at the employment of military officers within the colonial judicature. In

arguing the dangers of allowing an exclusive military sub-culture to dominate the

judiciary, he shows a sophisticated understanding of the distinction between the military

and civil domains that resonates with the modern understanding of the separation of

government powers:

It is disgusting to an Englishman to see a culprit, however heinous may be his offence, arraigned before a court clad in full military costume; nor can it indeed be readily conceived that a body of men, whose principles and habits must have been materially influenced, if not entirely formed, by a code altogether foreign to the laws of this country, should be able on such occasions to divest them of the soldier, and to judge as a citizen.11

Although the Colony’s early history did include some events (riots, insurrections and

strikes) that had political dimensions, Wentworth’s description of the domestic security

situation is interesting in that it focuses on convict-related internal criminal threats rather

than politically motivated or international ones. With the substantial reduction of

transportation after the 1840s and the growth of the colonial police forces, the importance

of military forces to domestic security reduced. Although banditry (in the form of

bushranging) remained a significant problem until the 1880s, the use of military forces in

policing roles diminished through the latter half of the 19th century as the new colonies

9 Wentworth, Description of The Colony of New South Wales, 1819, pp. 147-8. 10 Wentworth, Description of The Colony of New South Wales, 1819, p. 225. 11 Wentworth, Description of The Colony of New South Wales, 1819, p. 365.

56

developed more capable police forces. In some areas, garrison forces were employed in

the suppression of aboriginal groups but this role, too, increasingly became a police

function.12

The most spectacular application of British military resources in a domestic security role

was in the containment of the 1854 Ballarat gold miners’ rebellion, culminating in the

storming of the Eureka Stockade. This was an example of a law and order situation that

exceeded police capacity, requiring a military contribution. While Eureka has, more

lately, become symbolic of popular resistance to overbearing government, it was an

aberration in the employment of garrison forces.13 By the 1850s, therefore, the primacy

of the civil power in domestic security had been established in the Australian colonies,

although significant military capacity was available to bolster police resources where

necessary.

With the withdrawal of the last British garrison regiment in 1870,14 the colonies fell back

on their own military resources with the exception of the Royal Navy ships that remained

assigned to the Australia Station.15 Colonial Defence establishments had been evolving

since the 1850s, impelled by the ‘scare’ of the Crimean War.16 The colonies’ forces

consisted mainly of paid militia and unpaid Volunteers. The threats against which these

forces were mainly focused were external and maritime ones, as evidenced by the

common interest in coastal fortification. To a great extent, the Australian colonies

followed national defence practice in Britain, with institutions such as a citizen rifle

movement, volunteer forces and school cadets originating at about the same time.

Understandably, military doctrine, organisation, traditions and equipment acquisitions

were distinctly ‘Anglophile’ in nature and, in time, the various colonies contributed

contingents to Imperial expeditions.17

12 Grey, A Military History of Australia, 1990, pp. 14, 29-39. 13 Grey, A Military History of Australia, 1990, p. 18. 14 Grey, The Australian Army, 2001, p. 5. 15 Grey, A Military History of Australia, 1990, p. 23. 16 Grey, A Military History of Australia, 1990, p. 21. 17 Grey, A Military History of Australia, 1990, p. 55.

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During the later 19th century, there were few occasions when military resources needed to

be employed in a domestic security role. The most famous example was Queensland’s

deployment of 1,442 militiamen and ‘special constables’ during the shearers strike of

1891.18 The Australian manifestation of an international maritime strike, occurring

around the same period, also saw some military forces deployed. These were other

situations in which domestic law and order challenges exceeded civil police resources.

The Australian colonies thus ended the 19th century with a varied but unremarkable

experience of domestic security challenges and the involvement of ‘defence’ resources in

their resolution. Throughout the colonial era, the trend in the employment of military

capabilities in homeland security functions had been a declining one, as civil institutions

grew and internal threats diminished (although both the shearers and maritime strikes,

and their military responses, occurred in the last decade prior to Federation). One

outcome of this rather low-key history was that Australians had little adverse experience

of the use of military force in their homeland. This contrasts with, say, the United States,

in which two local wars against Britain, a civil war and its post-war occupation had

impressed the popular consciousness with a suspicion of military involvement in civil

situations. It is significant that among the first provisions of the ‘Bill of Rights’ (the first

ten amendments to the United States Constitution) is one limiting the Government’s

power to force citizens to billet troops: a literal intrusion of military forces into the very

home, even more than the homeland.19 The much-touted Posse Comitatus Act of 187820

is widely believed to prohibit the use of US Federal military forces for domestic security

tasks. The Posse Comitatus Act was passed in the aftermath of the post-Civil War

‘Reconstruction’ period, during which Federal forces had been used in constabulary

functions in the occupied South. The conventional view is that the Act was passed as a

reaction to the troops’ heavy-handed approach to domestic policing, especially in the

security of polling places. John Brinkerhoff contests this view, arguing that an equally

18 Stuart Svensen, The Shearers' War, Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1989, p.296. 19 ‘Amendment III to the Constitution of the United States of America,’ ratified 15 December 1791, The Declaration of Independence and The Constitution of the United States of America, Bantam, New York, 1998, p. 78. 20 Title 18, United States Code, Section 1385, available http://uscode.house.gov/.

58

important aim of the Act was to prevent the misemployment of Federal forces in

domestic security roles by under-resourced local law enforcement jurisdictions.21

The Federal Era

With Federation in 1901, Australia assumed independent responsibility for its own

security against both domestic and external threats – in fact, in the public debate on

Federation, defence considerations had provided one of the strongest arguments in favour

of linking the colonies.22 The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (the

‘Constitution’) established the distinction between the state and federal levels of

government and assigned them exclusive responsibility for domestic security and defence

against external threats, respectively. The former colonies (the new states) lost their

independent military forces, which were amalgamated into the Commonwealth Naval and

Military Forces. The Constitution’s effect on the new nation’s defence arrangements was

addressed two years later in An Act for the Naval and Military Defence and Protection of

the Commonwealth and of the Several States 1903 (the ‘Defence Act’).23 Given the

centrality of both the Constitution and the Defence Act to the topic of this thesis, it is

appropriate now to examine each in detail.

The Constitution

The Constitution was originally passed as an Act of the British Parliament in 1900 to

amalgamate the six Australian colonies into the Commonwealth of Australia as a self-

governing dominion of the British Empire. The Constitution defines the powers of the

Commonwealth Government and divides responsibility for governmental functions

between the Commonwealth and the states. Although it has been amended several times,

no Constitutional amendment has affected any provision of the Constitution that relates to

homeland security.

21 John Brinkerhoff, The Posse Comitatus Act and Homeland Security, February 2002. Available from http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/brinkerhoffpossecomitatus.htm. 22 Grey, A Military History of Australia, 1990, p. 53. 23 Its official short title is The Defence Act 1903. Office of Legislative Drafting and Publishing, Attorney-General’s Department, Canberra, 2005.

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In matters of national security, the Constitution assigns broad responsibility for defence

against external threats to the Commonwealth and for domestic security to the states.

Although the states theoretically retain some residual power in matters of defence, in

practice they have almost always yielded that power to the Commonwealth.24 The most

significant provisions in this regard are:

Section 51. Section 51 establishes the legislative powers of the Commonwealth

by authorising the Parliament to make laws governing specific matters that are

defined in subordinate sub-Sections (‘heads of power’).25 Those significant to

national security are:

Sub-Section 51(vi). This sub-Section grants the Parliament the power to

legislate for ‘the naval and military defence of the Commonwealth and of

the several States, and the control of the forces to execute and maintain the

laws of the Commonwealth.’

This provision effectively makes the Commonwealth responsible for the

national defence function and gives it control of the country’s military

forces, which later became the ADF.26

Sub-Sections 51(xix, xxvii and xxviii). Sub-Section 51 (xix) gives the

Commonwealth exclusive responsibility for matters relating to

naturalization and aliens, 51(xxvii) makes it responsible for immigration

and emigration and 51(xxviii) empowers it to regulate ‘the influx of

criminals.’ While the latter provision was probably written with the

history of convict transportation in mind, all have similar contemporary

24 Garth Cartledge, The Soldiers' Dilemma: When to use force in Australia. Canberra: Directorate of Publications, 1992, pp. 128-9. 25 Cartledge, The Soldiers’ Dilemma,1992, p. 127. 26 At the time, the defence forces of the colonies were limited to naval and ‘military’ (army) forces. The Air Force was obviously a later creation and the term ADF only entered general use after the ADF was created as a new entity in February 1976. David Horner, Making the Australian Defence Force. Vol IV, Peter Dennis and John Coates (eds) The Australian Centenary History of Defence (Seven Vols). Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 7.

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value by allowing the Commonwealth to control the entry of persons

suspected of terrorism.

Sub-Section 51(xxix). Sub-Section 51 (xxix) establishes the

Commonwealth’s responsibility for ‘External Affairs,’ making the

international engagement aspects of homeland security a federal

prerogative. The Commonwealth Crimes (Internationally Protected

Persons) Act 1976, which imposes responsibilities on the Commonwealth,

relies on this power.

Sub-Section 51(xxxii). Sub-Section 51(xxxii) allows the Commonwealth

to control railways ‘with respect to transport for … naval and military

purposes.’ Essentially an emergency provision, this power reinforces the

authority of the Commonwealth in matters of national defence. Although

of little significance to the wider issue of the employment of the ADO in

homeland security roles, it is interesting in the light of contemporary

threats to means of mass transport.

Sub-Section 51 (xxxix). This is almost a catch-all provision, giving the

Parliament the ‘incidental’ power to legislate in relation to any of its

Constitutional responsibilities (‘Matters incidental to the execution of any

power vested by this Constitution…’). This provision could enable a very

broad application of power by the Commonwealth Government in

fulfillment of its homeland security responsibilities.

Section 51 is therefore key, in that it establishes a significant Commonwealth

responsibility for meeting threats but allows it broad power to respond to those

threats.

Section 52. Section 52 grants the Parliament ‘exclusive power to make laws for

the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth...’ in several matters

essentially related to governance. The powers include the administration of

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public service departments transferred from the former colonies and of

Commonwealth lands. Sub-section 52 (iii) also provides broad authority to make

laws in relation to other matters that the Constitution places within the

Commonwealth’s power. This reinforces the incidental power conveyed in sub-

Section 51(xxxix).

Section 61. This Section establishes the executive power of the Commonwealth

and extends that power to ‘the execution and maintenance of this Constitution,

and of the laws of the Commonwealth.’ The executive power is vested in the

Sovereign and exercised by the Governor General as his or her representative.

The effect of Section 61 is to grant the Commonwealth executive power to do

whatever it deems necessary to uphold the Constitution. This allows the

Commonwealth, in extremis, to take action necessary to maintain the Constitution

or enforce federal laws within a state’s boundaries, with or without the consent of

that state. This applies particularly when property or a function of the

Commonwealth are under threat, as when military personnel were deployed to

secure Commonwealth facilities in Melbourne during the 1923 police strike.27 In

other words, the Commonwealth may act unilaterally to protect its own interests

without a request from a state.28 That authority extends to action in pursuit of

homeland security objectives.

Section 68. This Section appoints the Governor-General Commander-in-Chief of

the armed forces. It has been argued that this symbolises a constitutional

principle of ‘the subjugation of the military to the civil authority.’29

Sections 69 and 70. Section 69 provides for the transfer to the Commonwealth

of, inter alia, the naval and military forces of the former colonies, while Section

27 Joan Beaumont, Australian Defence: Sources and Statistics, Vol VI, Peter Dennis and John Coates (eds) The Australian Centenary History of Defence (Seven Vols), Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 382. 28 Elizabeth Ward, ‘Call Out the Troops,’ 1998, p. 7. 29 Elizabeth Ward, ‘Call Out the Troops,’ 1998, p. 4.

62

70 vests power relating to that function in the Commonwealth. This provision

reinforces the effect of sub-Section 51(vi) in making the Commonwealth

responsible for the naval and military defence of Australia and its states and in

granting it all the power necessary to affect the defence function.

Sections 107 and 108. These Sections establish the legal basis whereby the states

have responsibility for maintaining domestic security within their jurisdictions.

Section 114. This Section prohibits the states from raising or maintaining any

military forces ‘without the consent of the …Commonwealth.’ The Section does

not refer to non-military aspects of defence and provides an option for States to

raise military forces if the Commonwealth agrees. Cartledge argues that this is

evidence that the architects of the Constitution did not intend to irrevocably

extinguish states’ access to a Defence power.30 In effect, however, Section 114

significantly limits the scope of that power under normal circumstances.

Section 119. Section 119 uses active language to impose on the Commonwealth

a specific responsibility to ‘protect every State against invasion and, on the

application of the Executive Government of the State, against domestic violence.’

This is one of the Constitution’s most significant provisions in relation to

homeland security, not only making the Commonwealth responsive to State

requests for protection against domestic violence, but assigning a duty to provide

that protection. This creates an implicit requirement for the Commonwealth to

maintain capabilities for the States’ protection.31 This was a quid pro quo for

Section 69, requiring the handover of forces; and Section 114, constraining the

States from maintaining military forces. The effect of Section 119 is to empower

the states in gaining reliable access to Commonwealth military capabilities for

domestic security purposes. Significantly, Section 119 does not restrain the

Commonwealth’s discretion in the use of those capabilities.

30 Cartledge, The Soldiers’ Dilemma, pp. 128-9.

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The Defence Act

The Defence Act and its subordinate Regulations codify Defence institutions and

arrangements, including those circumstances under which Commonwealth military

resources could be employed in domestic security duties within the states’ jurisdictions.

These arrangements formalised the principle of civil primacy in domestic security and

law and order matters, recognising that the states bore the initial responsibility for

domestic security matters within their territories. The Defence Act also introduced

procedural requirements for the states to gain access to military resources. The Act has

been subject to numerous amendments since its original passage, a few of which have

specific bearing on the employment of the ADO in homeland security roles.

The Defence Act as passed in 1903 reflected Section 119 of the Constitution in its own

Section 51. This Section reflected reasonably closely the sense of Section 119 of the

Constitution by recognising the need for an application from the Executive Government

of a state before allowing the use of military forces in cases of domestic violence.

Arguably, it provided the Commonwealth with an additional safeguard against requests

for support in trivial circumstances, by imposing a requirement for the Governor of the

state to proclaim the existence of a state of domestic violence before Commonwealth

forces can be called out to respond. It has been suggested that, to the extent that it is

inconsistent with the sense of Section 119, this additional requirement was

constitutionally invalid.32

Section 51was the subject of an early amendment to the Defence Act of considerable

significance to the use of the country’s military forces in homeland security tasks. That

amendment, first proposed in 1911 and passed in 1914, included a prohibition on the use

of the Emergency Forces or the Reserve Forces in connection with industrial disputes.33

This recognised the difficulty that part-time members of the military forces might face if

31 R.M. Hope, ‘Protective Security Review’, Parliamentary Paper No. 397/1979, para 10.25. 32 Justice R.M. Hope, Protective Security Review, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1979, p.145. Also Elizabeth Ward, ‘Call Out the Troops,’ 1998, p. 6. 33 B.D. Beddie and S. Moss, Some Aspects of Aid to the Civil Power in Australia, Department of Government, Faculty of Military Studies, University of New South Wales, 1982, p. 20.

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used in the highly contentious role of strike-breakers, as well as the likely adverse impact

on a compulsory military training scheme if conscripts were directed to use force against

their fellow citizens:

…under no circumstances should any person (enrolled in compulsory military training or service) …be compelled to bear arms against any fellow citizen notwithstanding anything contained in the oath of allegiance or in any other conditions of compulsory service.34

Considering the relatively tiny size of the permanent forces at that time, this provision

imposed a potentially significant limitation on the use of military force in these situations.

By omission, however, the amendment implied that a government would be entitled to

use permanent military personnel in such a role.35

1901-1945

From Federation until the late 1930s, the Department of Defence had little involvement in

Australia’s domestic security. Participation in the South African War, the First World

War and the organisation of a national Defence establishment consumed the efforts of the

new Department, its Ministers and staff. The period 1901-1914 did not generate any

requirements for military involvement in domestic security matters, although states did

request such assistance unsuccessfully.36,37

The ‘war scare’ phase at the outset of the First World War saw some security activity by

military forces at home, with a port defence battery engaging an escaping German

freighter38 and some militiamen being deployed to secure vital assets around Sydney.39

34 Motion to amend the Defence Act moved by Senator Arthur Rae (Labor, New South Wales) in November 1911, as quoted in Beddie and Moss, Some Aspects of Aid to the Civil Power in Australia, 1982, p. 18. 35 Elizabeth Ward, ‘Call Out the Troops,’ 1998, p. 31. 36 For more detailed coverage of this period, see Eric Andrews, The Department of Defence, Vol V, Peter Dennis and John Coates (eds) The Australian Centenary History of Defence (Seven Vols). Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 9-19. 37Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act 2000, Bills Digest No. 13 2000-01. 38 The Melbourne’s port defence forts fired to halt the steamer Pfalz on 5 August, 1914. C.E.W. Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. 1, The Story of ANZAC, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1941, p. 27.

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The ‘Defence Scheme’ developed by the embryonic Australian General Staff prior to the

war incorporated some measures with a homeland security dimension, such as press

censorship, and these were adopted. In general, however, Australia did not experience

threats to the homeland to equal those imposed on Great Britain by German air power or

by saboteurs, or elsewhere in the Empire by francs tireurs. Accordingly, the involvement

of the Defence organisation in domestic security matters remained insignificant.

After the war, there was little need to employ Defence capabilities in internal security

matters other than rare requirements to guard Commonwealth facilities during times of

civil insecurity. Between 1912 and 1928 six state requests for protection against

domestic violence were received by the Commonwealth, all of which were refused.40

The Commonwealth refused each request on the grounds that, in its independent

assessment, the degree of violence involved should not exceed the states’ capacity to deal

with.41 In the majority of cases, the domestic violence anticipated was associated with

industrial disputes. This may also have made the Commonwealth reluctant to intervene

militarily, for fear of fomenting ill will. In each of the few cases in which the ADF was

used to provide protection against domestic violence, that action was taken under the

Section 61 executive power provision for the Commonwealth to protect its own

interests.42 For example, during the Melbourne Police strike of 1923 Commonwealth

military personnel were deployed to secure Commonwealth buildings, but the

Government preferred to use ‘special constables’ to perform law and order roles among

the general public.43

In the 1930s, the rising strategic threat environment caused Australia to revise its defence

plans and to contemplate, for the first time, the threat to Australian sovereign territory

posed by enemy air power and weapons of mass destruction (specifically, chemical

weapons – ‘poison gas’). Beginning in 1935, conferences between federal and state

39 The author’s grandfather told of being deployed to guard a railway bridge crossing the Hawkesbury River, north of Sydney, on the declaration of hostilities in 1914. This protective deployment was not sustained for long. 40 Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act 2000, Bills Digest No. 13 2000-01. 41 Elizabeth Ward, ‘Call Out the Troops,’ 1998, Appendix A. 42 Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act 2000, Bills Digest No. 13 2000-01, 43 Joan Beaumont, Australian Defence: Sources and Statistics, 2001, p. 382.

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ministers began to be held to consider the whole range of measures that Australia would

need to take in the event of mobilization, including what are now understood as ‘civil

defence’ measures. Initially these involved air raid precautions, but soon expanded to

include ‘the protection of the civil population against the result of gas attacks.’44 The

Department of Defence took a leading role in coordinating the development of civil

defence capacity, incorporating such measures in the Commonwealth’s ‘War Book.’45

Papers produced by Defence suggested that the Army would provide technical advice to

the states in developing integrated civil defence arrangements that would coordinate local

Defence elements as well as ‘police, first aid detachments, fire brigades and members of

the public recruited or volunteering for the purpose.’46

Progress in the development of real capabilities was slow, however, and marked by

‘jurisdictional’ debates between the states and Commonwealth over matters such as

financial responsibility. It was not until 1938, when the deteriorating security situation in

Europe lent some urgency to matters, that practical agreement was finally reached and

real preparations began. These included the establishment within Defence of a Civilian

Defence and State Cooperation Section, with authority to liaise directly with counterpart

agencies in the states.

The War Book that was handed to state Premiers in April 1939 contained a

comprehensive list of measures to be introduced on the outbreak of war, many of which

had a homeland security dimension. Of these, only Air Raid Precautions (ARP) made

any rapid progress toward implementation.47 Sustained interest in ARP was probably

encouraged by the 1942 air raids on Darwin.

The demands of homeland security during the Second World War eventually led to the

establishment of a cabinet-level Commonwealth Government Department to coordinate

efforts. The Department of Home Security was created on 26 June 1941, with the

44 Paul Hasluck, The Government and the People, 1939-1941, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1952, pp. 125-6. 45 Hasluck, The Government and The People, 1939-1941, p. 125. 46 Hasluck, The Government and The People, 1939-1941, p. 126. 47 Hasluck, The Government and the People, 1939-1941, p. 135.

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Honorable J.P Abbott as Minister.48 The new Department took over the coordination

responsibilities of the Department of Defence, with a special focus on civil defence and

such measures as camouflage against aerial reconnaissance and air attack.

The Second World War thus left Australia with some experience of living with

significant threats of violence against the homeland. Those threats, however, were of a

‘conventional’ international kind and tended to emphasise such things as air raids.49 For

the first time the use of WMD (in the form of chemical weapons) against the Australian

homeland was considered and active measures to cope with such threats were

adopted.50,51 The Defence organisation contributed to these efforts by providing the

initial leadership and technical advice, as well as some of the equipment and specialist

personnel required. The state civil authorities, however, retained primacy in the

execution of most homeland security functions, with significant federal assistance.

The post-war era

Following the War, Australia found itself part of the international dynamic that rapidly

became the Cold War. While concern with homeland security abated significantly

(sufficient to allow the abolition, on 1 February 1946, of the Department of Home

Security52), elements of the wartime civil defence apparatus survived. In the new

environment, civil defence needed to cope with the threat to the homeland posed by

nuclear weapons. The federal responsibilities for civil defence reverted to the

Department of Defence. The states also began to develop civil defence apparatus during

this period, partly motivated by the threat of nuclear warfare, although the priority on this

varied between the jurisdictions.

The experience of New South Wales provides a useful example of state civil defence

arrangements. New South Wales had maintained community-based groups for response

to civil emergencies (mostly to do with flooding) for nearly a century. During the Second

48 Hasluck, The Government and the People, 1939-1941, p. 368. 49 Protection of the Civil Population against Air Attack, Sydney: New South Wales Emergency Services, 1939. 50 Hasluck, The Government and the People, 1939-1941, pp. 382-3. 51 First Aid Treatment for Gas Casualties. Sydney: New South Wales Emergency Services, 1941.

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World War, the state’s Emergency Services were coordinated as part of the National

Emergency Services (my emphasis) under a State ‘Minister in Charge.’53 The inclusion

of the word ‘National’ in the portfolio’s title is significant, acknowledging that the state’s

emergency services were part of a national effort at that time. New South Wales

formalised its post-war civil emergency arrangements by establishing the State

Emergency Services in April 1955 (my emphasis).54 Recognising that the Cold War

environment posed threats that could exceed a response capacity designed for natural

disasters, New South Wales went on to establish a Department of Civil Defence in

September the same year ‘to take over and expand the functions of the State Emergency

Services.’ This included ‘taking all steps to minimise loss of life and property within the

civil population in the event of a nuclear war.’55 A retired Army officer, Major General

Sir Ivan Dougherty, was appointed as the first Director of Civil Defence.56 Dougherty

soon selected other former military officers to fill key appointments in his staff.57 In 1972

the New South Wales Parliament passed the State Emergency Services and Civil Defence

Act to further formalise these arrangements. That Act was replaced in 1989 by the State

Emergency Service Act.58

Apart from the spectre of nuclear warfare, the peaceful post-war domestic environment

saw little need for extensive Defence involvement in homeland security matters, except

for an enduring involvement with civil defence. The 1949 New South Wales coal

miners’ strike and the 1953 Bowen wharf dispute saw the Army mobilise significant

manpower to maintain, respectively, coal production and commercial ship loading.59

52 Hasluck, The Government and the People, 1939-1941, p. 581. 53 This title is cited as the issuing authority for training manuals issued during the war. See, for example, Protection of the Civil Population against Air Attack, Sydney: New South Wales Emergency Services, 1939. 54 A Short History of the SES, Sydney: New South Wales State Emergency Service, 2005 [cited 10 April 2007]. Available from http://www.ses.nsw.gov.au/infopages/2379.html. 55 G.H. Fearnside and Ken Clift. Dougherty. Sydney: Alpha Books, 1979, pp. 196-7. 56 A Short History of the SES, 2005. 57 Fearnside and Clift, Dougherty, 1979, p. 199. The selection of people with military experience for such security-related positions reflects a practice that has re-emerged in the post-9/11 era. This is explained further in a later chapter. 58 A Short History of the SES, 2005. 59 Beaumont, Australian Defence: Sources and Statistics, 2001, p. 283.

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Natural disasters also called on varying levels of Defence resources. In 1974, Defence

established a new agency to provide national coordination of civil defence and disaster

response efforts. This had been proposed by the Permanent Head of the Department of

Defence, Sir Arthur Tange, in his 1973 report recommending a reorganisation of the

(then) Defence group of Departments. Tange had recommended the new agency be

named ‘National Disasters Organisation,’ but it was eventually created as the ‘Natural

Disasters Organisation’ (NDO).60 NDO absorbed the functions of the existing

Directorate of Civil Defence, adding disaster management responsibilities to the

traditional requirements for civil defence. The most significant Defence disaster relief

effort came after Cyclone Tracy in Darwin in 1974-75. The head of the NDO, Major

General Alan Stretton, was a controversial figure in the politics of the relief effort.61

Involvement in matters of a ‘law and order’ nature, however, was minimal until the late

1970s. Up until that time, Defence’s major role in addressing violent threats to the

homeland was associated with real or potential inter-state conflict – a very ‘conventional’

employment for a Defence organisation.

Terrorism

International terrorist incidents during the early 1970s had been noticed by Australian

governments and, on 27 September 1976, the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee of

Cabinet decided on a range of measures to for ‘Policy and Organization to Counter

International Terrorism.’62 Key decisions were that:

…the Minister for Defence take immediate steps to train specialist elements of the Defence Force in counter-terrorism operations…(and)

60 Arthur Tange, Australian Defence: Report on the Reorganisation of the Defence Group of Departments, Department of Defence, 1973, pp. 52-3. ‘History (of Emergency Management Australia),’ [cited 28 March 2005] . Available at http:/www.ema.gov.au/agd/emaInternet.nsf/Page/RWPBB5FRD14408BBCD8C…61 See Alan Stretton, Soldier in a Storm. Sydney: Collins, 1978. 62 Cabinet Minute: Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, Decision No. 1657 (FAD), 18 October 1976. Available from National Archives of Australia. Also R.J. Ellicott and R.G. Withers, "Foreign Affairs and Defence Policy Paper No. 23: Policy and Organization to Counter International Terrorism." Canberra: Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, 1976. Available from National Archives of Australia.

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…the Attorney-General examine and report to the Committee on the need for legislative amendments that would ensure the prompt and effective call-out of Defence Force personnel, in the event this was required…’63

These decisions were based on the judgement that ‘it would be unrealistic to plan on the

basis that police forces alone would be adequate to deal with all possible acts of

terrorism.’64

In 1977, work began to establish capabilities within the ADF that might be used to

support of civilian authorities in the event of a terrorist attack in Australia.65 Initially, the

ADF may not have embraced this task: in 1976, the Commanding Officer of the Army’s

Special Air Service Regiment, which was soon to assume leadership in the counter

terrorist (CT) role, had said that he saw little need for the sort of close quarter battle skills

that the British Army’s SAS had been developing for domestic CT missions.66

Little progress had been made in establishing the new capabilities by 13 February 1978,

when an explosive device detonated outside the Sydney Hilton Hotel, killing two council

workers and a policeman.67,68 The Fraser government’s response to this attack had two

significant dimensions. The first was motivated by the reasonable suspicion that the

bomb was targeted against the Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting

(CHOGRM) then being held in Sydney. To guard against the possibility of further

attacks, the government ‘called out’ (under the executive powers provisions of the

Constitution) the Defence Force.69 This produced the unprecedented spectacle of armed

soldiers and a substantial number of armoured personnel carriers and other military

equipment deployed between Sydney and the New South Wales country town of

Bowral.70,71 1,840 Army personnel were committed to the operation, of whom 1,085

deployed to the field. 58 RAAF personnel were involved in providing helicopter support.

In addition, the NSW Police called in Army bomb disposal support at the Hilton. Due to

63 Cabinet Minute: Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, Decision No. 1657 (FAD), 18 October 1976. 64 Cabinet Minute: Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, Decision No. 1657 (FAD), 18 October 1976. 65 David Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2002, p. 420. 66 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, p. 411. 67 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, pp. 420-1. 68 James Crown, Australia: The Terrorist Connection, Sun, Melbourne, 1986, p. 5. 69 B.D. Beddie and S. Moss, Some Aspects of Aid to the Civil Power in Australia, Department of Government, Faculty of Military Studies, University of New South Wales, 1982, p. 62. 70 James Crown, Australia: The Terrorist Connection, 1986, pp. 77-9.

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a shortage of Police resources, soldiers were placed on security duty in the streets of

Bowral. The remainder of the CHOGRM passed without incident and the call out was

stood down within days.72

The ADF’s successful deployment at very short notice was a significant achievement, but

its haste revealed a vulnerability in terms of the legal basis for the involvement of

military resources in the application of force within the homeland. The deployment of

armed troops, with live ammunition, implied an acceptance that force would be applied if

necessary, but the legal safeguards for the use of force had not been thought through.

Rules of engagement were hazy, at best, and there was a sense that the legalities of any

violent incidents would be ‘sorted out later.’73 The absence of any such incidents

allowed this issue to remain dormant for some time, but the inadequacy of arrangements

for the use of military force in domestic security missions had registered with the

country’s senior leadership. Kim Beazley, when Minister for Defence under the Hawke

Labor Government, acknowledged the problems in the legislation in a speech to the

Australian Defence Force Academy on 17 September 1986.74

The second branch of the government’s response was the commissioning of an inquiry,

under Mr. Justice Hope, into the terrorist threat facing Australia and the measures that

could be taken to address it.75 Significantly, the inquiry was to comment on ‘the

relationship between the defence forces and civilian authorities…’76 Hope’s report,

presented in 1979 as the Protective Security Review, predicted that violent acts motivated

by politics (‘terrorism’), criminal gain or personal grievances would remain a part of the

Australian domestic security environment for the foreseeable future.77 Events over the

next few years were to support that finding. These included the assassination of a

71 Defence Report 1978, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1978, p. 12. 72 The call-out order was revoked by the Governor-General in Council on 20 February 1978. Beddie and Moss, Some Aspects of Aid to the Civil Power in Australia, 1982, p. 63. 73 Mr. Don Williams, Army Ammunition Technical Officer during the employment, in an interview recorded 4 March 2005. 74 Compendium of Speeches by the Hon Kim C. Beazley, MP Minister for Defence, 1985-1989, Department of Defence (Policy Coordination Division, p. 73. 75 Defence Report 1978, p. 12. 76 James Crown, Australia: The Terrorist Connection, 1986, pp. 18-9. 77 R.M. Hope, "Protective Security Review: Parliamentary Paper No. 397/1979." Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 1979.

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Turkish diplomat and his bodyguard, the bombing of a Japanese-owned resort hotel and

the murder of a Family Court judge’s wife in a botched assassination attempt.78

Significantly, Hope also flagged the importance of thorough consideration of the role of

the ADF in homeland security roles:

Use of the military other than for external defence, is a critical and controversial issue in the political life of a country and the civil liberties of its citizens. 'An armed disciplined body is in its essence dangerous to liberty: undisciplined, it is ruinous to Society'. Given that there must be a permanent Defence Force, it is critical that it be employed only for proper purposes and that it be subject to proper control.79

A further response to the Hilton bombing was a concerted effort to improve Australia’s

counter terrorist capabilities. The need for national coordination of counter terrorism

capabilities was recognised at a meeting between the Commonwealth and the states in

1973 and a Special Interdepartmental Committee on Counter Terrorism was established.

By 1976, this Committee has made some progress towards a ‘Commonwealth/State Anti-

Terrorist Plan.’80 Coordination efforts were enhanced by the establishment, in 1976, of

the Protective Services Coordination Committee (PSCC) under the sponsorship of the

Department of the Special Minister of State. Sponsorship of the PSCC transferred in

1977 to the Department of Administrative Services.81 At its inception, the PSSC’s

primary role was ‘to co-ordinate security procedures for Australians in high office and for

foreign VIPs visiting this country.’ In 1977, the PSCC assumed responsibility, from the

Attorney-General’s Department, ‘for the coordination of counter-terrorism and domestic

violence matters.’ This coincided with the amalgamation of two other committees into

the Special Interdepartmental Committee for Protection Against Violence (SIDC-PAV),

which was chaired by the PSCC chairman.82

78 James Crown, Australia: The Terrorist Connection,1986, pp. 31-9. 79 Hope, "Protective Security Review: Parliamentary Paper No. 397/1979.", 1979, p. 142 (quoting Edmund Burke). 80 "Foreign Affairs and Defence Policy Paper No. 23: Policy and Organization to Counter International Terrorism," 1976, p. 2. 81 Alan Behm, "Prevention/Response: How to Get the Mix Right." In Terrorism and the 2000 Olympics, edited by Alan Thompson, 67-80. Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1996, pp. 71-2. 82 James Crown, Australia: The Terrorist Connection, p. 141.

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The PSCC oversaw a number of developments to address the shortcomings identified by

the Protective Security Review. These included the channeling of federal funds to

enhance state capabilities in areas relevant to terrorism and violence, such as bomb

response. It also developed national crisis management procedures and a national

counter-terrorism exercise program.

A further development that followed from the Hilton bombing was accelerating and

focusing efforts to create a dedicated national CT capability, for use in managing the

crisis phase of a terrorist incident. This problem had been undergoing study by Defence

staff since 1977 and from an early stage the focus of capability development was on the

ability to conduct ‘siege/assault’ operations to rescue hostages.83 The capability also

seemed destined to be established within the Army’s Special Forces – significantly, a

Colonel-level appointment of Director of Special Forces was created in May 1979,

justified partly by the workload associated with the new CT role.84

Work to establish the capability within the SASR began in earnest in 1978.85 The

raising of SASR’s capability, which became known as the Tactical Assault Group, was

authorised on 31 August 1979 and was focused, initially, on a hostage rescue

capability.86 In 1980, a requirement was added to be able to re-take a Bass Strait oil

platform that had been seized by terrorists.87 These capabilities were intended to provide

high-level options to resolve situations that exceeded the resources of local police

forces.88 Significantly, it represented the first example of an ADF capability that was

maintained continuously for homeland security missions. A significant investment was

made in training, the acquisition of specialist equipment and the construction of specialist

training facilities to support the CT role.89 In order to absorb its new responsibilities

without detriment to its ‘war roles,’ structural adjustments needed to be made to the

SASR. These included the inclusion of Royal Australian Navy Clearance Divers to

83 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, pp. 420-1. 84 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, pp. 420-24. 85 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, p. 416. 86 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, p. 427. 87 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, p. 429. 88 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, p. 422. 89 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, pp. 443-4

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augment the Tactical Assault Group and, in 1981, the re-raising of an additional

Squadron of the SASR to provide additional personnel to support the CT role.90

The SASR’s CT capability evolved throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and was honed in

the annual PSCC exercise series. Capabilities were extended added: for example, by

1988 the oil platform recovery capability had been exercised on the North West Shelf oil

fields.91 By the mid-1980s, procedures for the call out of ADF assets in aid of the civil

power had been refined.92 Although most state police forces developed and maintained

Special Operations capabilities that would have application in terrorist incidents, there

was a clear understanding that ADF assets were available at short notice to supplement

state resources. A crisis management architecture reaching all the way to Federal Cabinet

level supported decision making – in 1990, the special role of the Special Forces in CT

operations was recognised when the Directorate of Special Action Forces became

Headquarters Special Forces and a direct link was created between its commander – a

colonel - and the Chief of Defence Force during CT incidents.93 During this period, the

PSCC also underwent a subtle name change, from Protective Services Coordination

Committee to Protective Security Coordination Centre (my emphasis). This reflected a

harder organisational edge to the agency’s role, along with a greater sense of

permanence.

In the ‘post-Hilton’ environment, expectations of the ADO’s contribution to homeland

security clearly increased. The development of the SASR CT capability and the

associated national crisis management processes are the starkest example of this, but

contributions were made, and came to be relied on, in other areas. Until the early 1990s,

for example, local Army ammunition technical specialists also provided an improvised

explosive device (IED) response capability, which in some cases was the only one

available to police.94 These personnel belong to the Royal Australian Army Ordnance

Corps’ (RAAOC’s) ammunition technical stream. Commissioned officers with

90 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, pp. 4430-31. 91 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, p. 445. 92 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, pp. 436, 441. 93 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, p. 452. 94 Bert Scharwz, "New task force faces biggest killer." Defender XXIII, no. 3 (2006): 32-3, p. 33.

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ammunition technical qualifications are referred to as Ammunition Technical Officers

(ATOs): other ranks are referred to as Ammunition Technicians (ATs).

The role of the RAAOC personnel in domestic IED disposal (IEDD) was expanded by

the provision, through the RAAOC training school (the RAAOC Centre), of IEDD

training to policemen. For a time, all Australian civilian police IEDD technicians were

trained by the Army and police procedures and equipment consequently mirrored the

ADF’s. With the rationalisation of ADF ammunition logistics in the mid-1990s, the

ADF’s IEDD capability atrophied to the extent that police began to do their own training

and capability development.95,96

Developments in the ADO’s homeland security roles continued during the 1990s.

Mostly, these were of an evolutionary nature. For example, NDO changed its name to

Emergency Management Australia in 1993, but remained an ‘outrider’ organisation of

Defence.97 1993 also brought a second major milestone in ADF involvement in

homeland security when Sydney won the privilege of hosting the 2000 Olympic and

Paralympic Games. The importance of the Games was not immediately obvious,

although implications for the ADF were anticipated immediately.98 By 1998 these had

coalesced into plans for significant involvement in the Games security effort. A

comprehensive case study of ADO support to the Games’ security follows. This case

study serves two purposes: first, it establishes in detail the background to a range of ADO

roles in Domestic Event Support Operations (DESO) within Australia.99 In doing so, it

provides information and context that are useful in later analysis. Second, it establishes a

baseline for pre-9/11 DESO against which post-9/11 operations, described in later

chapters, can be compared. DESO have been selected for detailed study because the

analytical advantages they offer: specifically, they constitute concentrated examples of

95 Personal conversation with Mr. Bruce Schiefelbein, former Officer Commanding, Ammunition Wing, RAAOC Centre, Canberra, 1 April 2005. 96 Bert Scharwz, "New task force faces biggest killer,” p.33. 97 ‘History (of Emergency Management Australia),’ [cited 28 March 2005]. Available from http:/www.ema.gov.au/agd/emaInternet.nsf/Page/RWPBB5FRD14408BBCD8C…98 The 1994 White Paper, for example, anticipates ADF support to the Games. Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, AGPS, Canberra, 1994, p. 13. 99 ‘DESO’ is a term devised by the author during the course of his official duties. By late 2006 it had begun to be adopted within the ADF.

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ADO support to homeland security and enable comparison of pre- and post-9/11

approaches to the same type of operation.

Case study:

ADO Contributions to Australia’s Homeland Security in the Context of the Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games

Introduction

On 23 September 1993, the International Olympic Committee announced that Sydney

would host the 2000 Summer Olympic Games (the Summer Games).100 This was

accompanied by host city responsibilities for the 2000 Paralympics. In the terms of the

Protective Security Coordination Centre, the 2000 Games would be a State-led,

Commonwealth-supported activity.101 Very quickly, the Australian Federal Government

anticipated that the security of the Games102 – by definition, a homeland security function

- would be beyond the resources of the host jurisdiction (New South Wales) and would

require the pooling of resources from other jurisdictions.103 This would include a

contribution from Defence that would be greater than its normal involvement in

‘homeland security.’104

ADO support to the Games – named Operation GOLD – commenced in 1998, and was

reported as completed in the 2000-2001 Defence Annual Report. Operation GOLD was

announced publicly on 16 March 2000.105 It employed a total of 5,622 ADF personnel in

a range of security and non-security roles, although the figure of 4,000 personnel (the

100 Official Report of the XXVII Olympiad: Vol. 1 – Preparing for the Games, p.12 [cited 8 August 2005]. Available from http://www.gamesinfo.com.au/postgames/en/pgooo748.htm. 101 The PSCC categorises the security for events as either ‘State-led, Commonwealth-supported,’ or vice versa ‘Commonwealth-led, State-supported.’ Leonie Mack, PSCC, presentation to the 2006 Homeland Security Summit, Canberra, 12 July 2005. 102 The Olympics and Paralympics came to be referred to, collectively, as the Sydney 2000 Games. Commonwealth Agencies’ Security Preparations for the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, Australian Government Audit Office, 1998 [cited 6 September 2005]. Available from http://www.anao.gov.au/WebSite.nsf/Publications. 103 Alan Thompson, "Working Paper No. 23: Management of Australia's Counter-Terrorism Program." Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1994, p. 13. 104 Defending Australia 1994, p. 138. 105 John Moore MP and Daryl Williams MP, Joint Media Statement, 16 March 2005, available http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2005/05100.html.

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average force size during the Games operational period) is most often quoted. This

figure was first mentioned publicly by Brigadier Philip McNamara, Commander, Special

Operations, in an address to the Royal United Services Institution of NSW early in

2000.106 It was subsequently repeated by Defence Minister John Moore and Attorney

General Daryl Williams in April 2000.107 In subsequent media coverage up until the

Games the figure did not vary.108 This made Operation GOLD the second-largest ADF

deployment since Vietnam (after the INTERFET deployment to East Timor in 1999-

2000). Security tasking involved unprecedented contributions from the ADO, requiring

the development of new capabilities with special application to homeland security, some

of which endured after the Operation. The Games also constituted the largest homeland

security effort Australia had mounted since the Second World War, establishing

capabilities, experience and inter-Governmental relationships that would influence the

national approach to subsequent special event security requirements in the post-9/11

period. For a number of reasons, therefore, Operation GOLD was a significant event that

is worthy of detailed study.

Due to its recentness and the sensitive or classified nature of much of the ADO

involvement, open source information on Operation GOLD is sparse. The information

contained in this case study is obtained from open source material to the greatest extent

possible, supplemented by personal conversations and observations as a participant.

The non-security support provided under Operation GOLD included support to

ceremonial, administrative, communications and logistic functions and the use of

facilities. This support was extensive and important but, because it did not relate to

homeland security, it is not considered further here.

106 Quoted in Martin Chulov and David Kennedy, ‘Games security revealed,’ The Australian, 1 March 2000. 107 Army newspaper, 13 April 2000, p. 7. The Defence Annual Report 2000-2001 states that 5,622 ADF personnel supported the Games, with a force size of around 4,000 at any one time. Department of Defence, 2001, p. 81. 108 The Defence Annual Report 2000-2001 states that 5,622 ADF personnel supported the Games, with a force size of around 4,000 at any one time. Department of Defence, 2001, p. 81.

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Threat environment

Threat assessments for the Sydney 2000 Games were broad, addressing a range of issues

from credit card and ticket fraud (potentially, a serious impact on the event’s

profitability) to terrorism.109 This reflects the nature of the event. The environment in

which threat judgements were made included recent incidents of international Islamist

terrorism, some involving sophisticated capabilities and with mass casualty

implications.110 While no specific threat was assessed as being particularly high,

requirements for some new capabilities to counter threats of violence, including terrorist

threats, were identified (see discussion below). The classified assessments on which

Government decisions on the ADO’s involvement were based are not available, but,

overall, security decisions appear to have been informed by a threat picture that was more

serious than normally prevailed in Australia. This appears to have justified significant

utilisation of the ADO in homeland security roles in support of Games security.

The ADO’s responsibilities

Under Australia’s constitutional model the primary responsibility for the security of the

Games fell to those states in which Games activities were held. As Sydney was the host

city, the principal responsibility fell on New South Wales but all states bore some

requirements. The most significant of these fell on the other ‘Olympic States’ –Victoria,

Queensland, South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory. These became

Olympic ‘jurisdictions’ by providing venues for the Olympic Soccer competition, the

only Olympic sport contested outside the Sydney area.111 The Olympic Torch Relay also

brought a Games-related security liability as it passed through every Australian

jurisdiction. Defence, as part of the Federal Government, was technically in a supporting

role in all these efforts. ADO contributions to Games security should therefore have been

made in response to requests from state authorities for assistance in areas in which State

resources or capabilities were inadequate.

109 Sydney 2000. ‘Security’. from Official Report of the XXVII Olympiad: Volume 1 - Preparing for the Games 2000 [cited 8 August 2005]. Available from http://www.games.info.com.au/postgames/en/pgooo748.htm. 110 For example, the 1995 Aum Shinrykio Tokyo subway attacks or the 1998 bombings of the United States’ Embassies in East Africa.

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Operation GOLD

Despite the ‘early warning’ provided in 1993 by the naming of Sydney as the Games’

host city, detailed ADO planning for the Olympics did not begin until 1997. From that

year, personnel began to be assigned full time to liaison duties with New South Wales

authorities and to a small planning staff.112 The Australian National Audit Office’s 1998

review of Commonwealth agencies’ security preparations for Games security did not

reveal any extensive planning by Defence up to that point, although 59 items ‘related to

ADF support’ were identified in a September 1997 request from the Sydney Organising

Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG) to the Department of Prime Minister and

Cabinet.113 Although detailed plans were not formulated until 1998, Defence remained

aware of potential Olympics tasking, such as bomb response, throughout the period from

1993.114 A one-star officer was appointed within Strategic Command Division (SCD) of

Headquarters ADF (HQADF) to oversee planning efforts at the strategic level. This was

Brigadier Adrian d’Hage, a former head of Defence’s Public Affairs agency. A very

senior officer, he was due for retirement but was retained for the Olympics coordination

role.115

Given the ADO’s supporting role in Games security, detailed planning could not

commence until information on support requirements became available. That

information began to emerge during 1997, from two sources:

national requirements, identified through Protective Security Coordination Centre

(PSCC) processes, and

state requirements, generated directly by states.

National requirements. Two important areas of security support were identified by a

1997 review of national protective security capabilities conducted by the PSCC. This

111 Commonwealth Agencies’ Security Preparations for the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, 1998, para. 1.27. 112 Defence. Operation Gold. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2001, p. 18. 113 Commonwealth Agencies’ Security Preparations for the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games.1998, para. 2.7. 114 See, for example, The Australian Army in Profile 1997, p. 104. 115 ‘The D’Hage Code,’ The Bulletin, 6 September 2005, p. 67.

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revealed a shortfall in the national capabilities to respond to chemical, biological and

radiological (CBR) threats or incidents and to resolve a terrorist incident taking place on

board a ship underway (ship underway recovery – SUR). These shortfalls were assessed

as substantial and needing to be addressed quickly. The nature of the SUR capability

meant that that shortfall should best be addressed by the ADF. This capability was

pursued by the Special Air Service Regiment (SASR).116 In the CBR area, the shortfall

required capability development by both State authorities and the ADF. The chemical,

biological and radiological response (CBRR) shortfall was identified through an audit of

nuclear, biological and chemical defence (NBCD) capabilities conducted within the ADF

in 1997-98. This was approached very much from an ADF operational perspective, but

identified key risks associated with anticipated ADF roles in the security of the

forthcoming Olympics. The National Security Committee of Cabinet approved the

establishment of a specialist CBRR capability in June 1998.117 Within Defence, the key

decisions relating to addressing the CBRR deficiencies had been made by September

1998.118

State requirements. Also during 1997, the New South Wales Police Service (NSWPS),

as the agency responsible for Games security, began to identify capability shortfalls for

which ADO support was requested.119 These existed principally in the areas of bomb

search and response. Similar support, at much smaller levels, was also requested by

some of the other Olympic States.

As security support requirements became clearer during 1998, planners merged state and

national requirements into a consolidated ‘bill’ for ADO support. This enabled some

judgements to be made on the feasibility of providing each type of support and on the

best means of delivering it. The support requirement that emerged by the end of 1998 did

not vary greatly in scope over the period up until the Games, although estimates of the

quantity of some types of support did change.

116 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, p. 513. 117 The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 20 No. 2, May 2005, p. 19. 118 Personal conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Craig Petrie, Project Officer for CBRR capability 1997-99, Canberra, 6 September 2005.

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In outline, the security support requirement that had crystallised by the end of 1998 was:

A counter-terrorist capability pre-positioned in the Sydney area, consisting of:

A Tactical Assault Group, with helicopter-insertion capability.

A SUR capability.

A CBRR capability, consisting of:

the capability to render safe a CBR agent dispersal device,

the capability to conduct special recovery in a CBR hazard (‘dirty’)

environment,

the capability to recover people, including casualties, from a

contaminated area and to medically treat casualties caused by CBR

agent,

the capability to support civilian emergency services agencies in CBR

incident consequence management, and

a complementary technical and scientific, including analytical,

capability.

A bomb response capability (improvised explosive device disposal - IEDD) to

supplement the NSWPS IEDD capability, sufficient to provide 11 IEDD teams

full time for the entire Games period.

119 Peter Rath, ‘Olympic Security Planning Committee,’ in Alan Thompson ed. Terrorism and the 2000

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A high risk bomb search capability, estimated at about 100 searchers.

20 explosive detection dogs (EDDs) and handlers.

A low risk bomb search capability, estimated at about 800 searchers.

An underwater bomb search capability.

The ability to provide CBRR and Tactical Assault Group coverage Australia-wide

at short (classified) notice, with emphasis on the Olympic cities. This involved

developing a ‘fly-away’ capability, requiring airlift support at a commensurate

degree of notice.

Command and control (C2) resources to facilitate the operational employment of

ADO support.

Equipment support to supplement NSWPS capabilities, especially in bomb

response.

Training support in CBRR ‘first responder’ skills for State emergency services

personnel.

This support was to be provided for what became known as the Olympics Security Period

(OSP). This was eventually specified as beginning on 1 September 2000, in time for

athletes for the Summer Games to occupy the Olympic Village, and ending on 31

October, after the Paralympics. The Summer Games Opening Ceremony was scheduled

for 15 September 2000.

Olympics, Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1996, p. 187.

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The emergence of New South Wales’ support requirement allowed some initial

judgements to be made on the sourcing of the necessary capabilities within the ADF,

their organisation and the C2 arrangements that would be used.

Organisation and C2 of ADO support

ADO support to the Games was commanded through Headquarters Australian Theatre

(HQAST), the ADF’s standing operational-level joint headquarters based in Sydney.

Support was classified in three categories:

Security support. This referred to all non-counter terrorist security support.

General support.

Counter-terrorism support.120

Assets providing this support were organised into and commanded through two Joint

Task Forces (JTFs):

JTF 112, for security and general support; and

JTF 114, for counter terrorism support.121

Responsibility for the JTF 112 functions was assigned to the Army’s Land Command,

while JTF 114 responsibilities were assigned to Headquarters Special Operations.

JTF 112

Headquarters JTF 112 (HQ JTF 112) was created in January 1999 within Army’s Land

Command, subsuming a small Olympics support planning staff that had been established

120 Operation Gold: Joint Task Force 112 Handbook, Australian Army, 2000, p.3. 121 Operation Gold: Joint Task Force 112 Handbook, p.3.

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during 1998.122 JTF 112 had no assets assigned to it initially, but grew progressively as

the Games approached. HQ JTF 112 was disbanded in January 2001.123

JTF 112’s security support responsibilities included:

Support to New South Wales Police Service (NSWPS) bomb management

operations, consisting of:

low risk search,

clearance diving,

IEDD, and

technical high risk search (THRS).

Venue security, in the form of ongoing operational search.

CBRR and support to civilian consequence management (a ‘white’ role).124

Aviation support.

General support responsibilities of JTF 112 included logistics, ceremonial (including

Defence bands), transport (including providing a Bus Squadron for the Olympics Road

Transport Authority – ORTA), venue management and communications.125,126 As part

of the preparations for the Games, HQ JTF112 also performed a coordination function for

122 The Australian Army in Profile 2000, pp. 78-9. Also Defence. Operation Gold. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2001, p.18. 123 Defence. Operation Gold. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2001, p.120. 124 Three types of roles are identified for ADF CBRR capabilities. ‘White’ roles refer to support to civilian authorities in a domestic incident response capacity. ‘Green’ roles refer to support to other ADF elements in a ‘normal’ warfighting capacity. ‘Black’ roles refer to support to the Special Forces’ dedicated domestic counter-terrorism capabilities. 125 The Australian Army in Profile 2000, pp. 90-103. 126 Operation Gold: Joint Task Force 112 Handbook, Annex 6.

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ADO support that did not require forces: for example, access to Defence facilities in the

Sydney area or loans of Defence equipment. JTF112 also had sustainment

responsibilities for all forces eventually assigned to it, which necessitated the activation

of accommodation, feeding, transportation and welfare arrangements for assigned

personnel.

JTF 112 organisation. JTF 112’s security support responsibilities were met by a

command and control architecture and assigned forces.

Command and control. HQ JTF 112 commanded assigned forces from two

locations. The HQ JTF 112 ‘Main’ was located at Sydney’s Victoria Barracks,

while HQ JTF 112 ‘Forward’ constituted the ‘ADF Desk’ in the NSWPS Olympic

Precincts and Regional Operations Centre (OPRO), at the Sydney Police

Centre.127 The Main HQ conducted routine administrative and command

functions, while the Forward HQ was responsible for operational tasking

decisions. The decision to co-locate the Forward HQ with the OPRO was taken

to enable ‘seamless’ tasking of ADO assets in support of the NSWPS, while

preserving the legal principle that ADF assets must remain under ADF command.

Co-location of an ADF command element with the OPRO enabled immediate

consultation between ADF and NSWPS personnel and prompt tasking of all

required assets.128

Assigned forces. Assignment of forces to JTF 112 for security tasks was

generally made along functional lines, according to the tasks that had been

identified. This led to the following ‘order of battle:’

Low risk search (including ongoing venue security): An Operational

Search Battalion (OSB – an ad hoc Army unit).

127 Operation Gold: Joint Task Force 112 Handbook, p. 59. 128 Official Report of the XXVII Olympiad: Security, p. 1, [cited 4 September 2005]. Available from http://www.gamesinfo.com.au/postgames/en/pg001489.htm.

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Clearance diving: A Clearance Diving Team (Royal Australian Navy).

IEDD: An Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Squadron (an ad hoc

element organised by Army and composed of individuals from all three

Services). Established within the Joint Incident Response Unit (JIRU).

THRS: A High Risk Search (HRS) Squadron (an ad hoc Army element).

Established within the JIRU.

CBRR: A CBRR Squadron (a new capability established by Army).

Established within the JIRU.

Aviation support: A Joint Aviation Group (an ad hoc helicopter capability,

drawn from Army and Navy).

Each security force element of JTF 112 is examined in detail below.

Operational Search Battalion

The OSB was raised to provide a low risk search capability in support of the NSWPS.

Low risk search is the performance of simple visual searches of venues, vehicles or

individuals where there is no anticipation of a hazard to the searcher. The usual ‘targets’

of searches are explosive devices or threat-related ‘contraband,’ such as firearms.

Despite the potential hazards of these items, searches in the Games security context were

‘low risk’ because they were conducted in order to confirm that such items were absent,

rather than because their presence was suspected. Low risk search was employed for two

purposes:

To ‘sanitise’ Games-related security locations, such as competition venues and

athlete accommodation, prior to their use. This was a precaution, to provide an

assurance that locations were free of bombs or other hazards. Following an initial

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thorough search, locations were sealed or ‘locked down’ to prevent ingress of any

new hazardous items.129 The whole initial search and lockdown process was

referred to as a ‘search and seal’ operation.

To maintain the security ‘seal’ on a location. Low-risk searchers contributed to

this by conducting searches of all vehicles entering Games locations. This

involved OSB personnel maintaining 24 vehicle checkpoints around the clock and

performing an estimated 250 000 vehicle searches throughout the period of the

Games. 130, 131

ADF searchers were not required to search people.

Low risk search support to the NSWPS was an example of ‘quantitative surge’ support:

that is, it was support in an area in which the NSWPS did possess an equivalent

capability, but not in sufficient quantity for the task at hand. ADF support enabled the

NSWPS to ‘surge’ to a higher quantity of capability, at the same technical standard.

Low risk search was performed by Army Reserve personnel, who were attached to a

dedicated unit on a voluntary basis. In order to increase the attractiveness of Olympics

service, the term ‘operational search’ was substituted and this term was incorporated in

the unit’s title – hence, “Operational Search Battalion.’

The OSB was manned largely by Army Reserve members drawn from units across

Australia on a rotational basis over the Games period. Those volunteering for service

underwent a specially developed seven day training package to qualify as searchers.

Training was delivered on a distributed basis in home locations by centrally trained

instructors. Because of the simple nature of low risk searching, equipment requirements

were unsophisticated and were largely restricted to mirrors and hand-held torches, but

because of the volume of equipment required some large purchases were made.

129 Official Report of the XXVII Olympiad: Security, pp. 3-4. 130 The Australian Army in Profile 2000, pp. 82-83. 131 Official Report of the XXVII Olympiad: Security, p. 5.

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The unit’s core planning and staff capability was provided by the Army Reserve’s 2nd

Division and was established about 12 months prior to the OSP. The OSB’s strength

varied on a pre-planned schedule that was based on task requirements. At its peak

strength, the OSB consisted of about 1,800 personnel and a total of 2,200 individuals

participated in it over its life.132 Most of these were searchers, but the unit also had small

operations, logistics and administration elements. The OSB was based at the East Hills

Barracks in Sydney’s Western suburbs.133

Most OSB tasks were pre-planned, although the unit maintained a small reserve of

capability for short-notice response.134 Personnel deployed from East Hills to task sites

in the Sydney area on a daily basis.

The OSB disbanded at the end of the OSP.

Joint Incident Response Unit

The JIRU was raised to provide the ‘high end’ security support capabilities that were

required of JTF 112. The provision of CBRR support was a particular challenge, as the

required capability did not exist within the ADF. A rudimentary capability had existed in

a ‘Chemical (and) Radiological Response Team’ (CRRT) established as a part-time

function within the Army’s School of Military Engineering, but this was so limited as to

provide virtually no basis for the building of a ‘high-end’ CBRR capability.135 The

creation of the CBRR capability became the focus of a dedicated major acquisition

project that was initiated during 1998 and for which $23 million was allocated in the

1999-2000 Budget (this came to be known as Project Bloodhound). 136 A decision was

made in late 1998 to combine this capability with the requested bomb response and

132 The Australian Army in Profile 2000, p. 82. Also Defence. Operation Gold. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2001, p.28. 133 Defence. Operation Gold. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2001, p.28. 134 The Australian Army in Profile 2000, p. 82. 135 The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, May 2005, pp. 18-19. 136 Ian McPhedran, ‘Games counter-terrorism costs $23m,’ The Courier Mail, Brisbane, 12 May 1999, p.33. Also Budget Speech, Australian Parliament, 11 May 1999; and Budget Paper No. 2, 1999.

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technical high-risk search capabilities (including EDDs) into a single new unit – the

JIRU. 137

The JIRU was to be raised progressively during 1999 and 2000, becoming operational in

time for the OSP. The unit was to disband when its tasks were complete, less a small

residual CBRR capability.138 Responsibility for raising JIRU rested with Army, through

Land Command. Personnel and equipment for the unit, with the exception of equipment

purchased under Project Bloodhound, were to be sourced on a temporary ‘loan’ basis

from the wider ADO and, where necessary, from overseas specialist agencies. At its

peak strength, JIRU contained 501 personnel.139 JIRU was based on the 2nd Combat

Engineer Regiment (2 CER), a Brisbane-based Army unit that was manned by a

combination of regular and Reserve personnel. Personnel began to be posted to 2 CER,

specifically for service with JIRU, in January 1999. The unit effectively grew in two

locations, Brisbane and Sydney, until beginning to concentrate in Sydney (Holsworthy)

in May 2000. Final concentration for the OSP occurred in August 2000. In all, JIRU

completed 480 security tasks in support of Games security by the end of the OSP.140

JIRU was organised into a HQ and four functional Squadrons, three of which each

provided one of the unit’s core operational capabilities (CBRR, IEDD and THRS).141

The fourth Squadron, the Operational Support Squadron, provided the unit’s logistic and

communications support.142 A Technical and Scientific Support Group (TSSG),

organised directly under the JIRU HQ, provided scientific support to all elements of the

unit.143 During the OSP, JIRU elements deployed on tasks either from the JIRU base at

137 The Australian Army in Profile 2000, pp. 80-81. 138 The Australian Army in Profile 2000, pp. 80-81. 139 ‘The Incident Response Regiment,’ The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, May 2005, p. 19. Numbers drew down during the Paralympics, which had less extensive security requirements. Personal conversation with Mr. Nigel Catchlove, Executive Officer JIRU 1999-2000, Canberra, 10 July 2005. An aerial photograph of JIRU at its height shows a very extensive array of personnel and equipment. The Australian Army in Profile 2000, p. 80. 140 Official Report of the XXVII Olympiad: Security, p. 5. 141 JIRU Scrapbook, maintained by the Incident Response Regiment, Holsworthy Barracks. Also Defence. Operation Gold. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2001, p. 58. 142 Jirumours (JIRU unit newsletter), Vol.1, No. 3, August 1999, p. 1. 143 Defence. Operation Gold. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2001, pp. 50-8.

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Holsworthy or from forward operating bases (FOBs) located throughout the Sydney area.

The HQ, TSSG and three operational Squadrons are described in detail below:

HQ JIRU. HQ JIRU was based on HQ 2 CER, ‘standing up’ initially in Brisbane

but re-locating to Holsworthy Barracks in Sydney in May 2000. For the OSP, HQ

JIRU mirrored the organisation of HQ JTF 112 with its ‘Main’ at Holsworthy and

‘Forward’ at the OPRO. Robust secure communications connected both HQ

locations and all deployed elements, providing voice, data and image transmission

capabilities between most nodes. Due to space and security limitations in the

OPRO, the Forward element was kept small but had the ability to ‘reach back’ via

secure communications to elaborate advice capabilities at JIRU Main.

TSSG. The TSSG was chiefly comprised of the high-end scientific resources that

supported JIRU’s CBRR capabilities. The precise competencies of the TSSG

remain classified, but included detection, analysis and modeling capabilities for

CBR materials.144 Photographs of chemical analysis equipment shown in the

unit’s newsletter (Jirumours) show sophisticated mobile equipment. Most TSSG

members were civilian scientists or technical specialists from DSTO or overseas

agencies, including the UK Defence Engineering and Research Agency (DERA)

and the United States’ Department of Energy (DoE).145 Because these constituted

a unique source of scientific support and advice for the entire Games ‘security

community,’ they were concentrated into a specialist group located adjacent to the

JIRU Main HQ. This ensured the prompt availability of advice for operational

requirements. All TSSG elements had a ‘reach back’ capability, allowing them to

access further expertise from their parent organisations via secure

communications. The TSSG drew heavily on DSTO expertise that had been

developed through the Defence and Arms Control Programs of Combatant

Protection and Nutrition Branch.146

144 Defence. Operation Gold. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2001, p. 58. 145 The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, May 2005, p. 19. Also Defence. Operation Gold. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2001, p. 50.

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CBRR Squadron. The CBRR Squadron was formed to establish the ADF’s new

CBRR capability, which would see its first operational tasking with the Games.

The CBRR Squadron actually began to ‘stand up’ as an independent organisation

in January 1999, moving under command of the JIRU when that unit was

officially raised on 1 June 1999.147 This was because:

the requirement for a CBRR capability was identified before the other JIRU

capabilities; and

CBRR, as a new and extremely complex capability, would take the longest

time to develop.

Unlike other JIRU capabilities, CBRR would remain in an independent form after

the Games.148

Details of the CBRR capability remain classified, but its focus was the detection,

location, diagnosis and rendering safe (‘disposal’) of devices designed to

disseminate CBR agents.149 CBRR Squadron also supported a new TAG

capability for Special Recovery in CBR hazard environments.150 The Squadron

was optimised for these relatively narrow tasks, but even so the development of a

comprehensive capability necessitated the assembly of a large number of

demanding and perishable skills that were in short supply in the ADF. Examples

include EOD Technicians, doctors, nurses and signalers. The capability also

needed dedicated support from DSTO, which was eventually ‘brigaded’ with

other technical capabilities into the TSSG.

Developing the CBRR capability was made more difficult because it was not only

new to the ADO: it was new world-wide. Suitable benchmarks from overseas

146 Defence. Operation Gold. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2001, p. 58. 147 Jirumours, Vol. 1 Issue 1, 1 June 1999, p. 1. 148 The Australian Army in Profile 2000, p. 80. 149 McPhedran, The Amazing SAS, p. 120. 150 McPhedran, The Amazing SAS, p. 120.

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were not available, so much of the capability design needed to be done within the

Squadron. This was complicated by the relatively low level of existing capability

in the ADF. While a rudimentary nuclear, biological and chemical defence

(NBCD) capability had been maintained, this was based on NATO Cold War

doctrine and equipment and was procedural in nature: there were relatively few

ADF personnel with the specialised training necessary to develop a sophisticated

CBRR capability ‘from scratch’, and that training was sourced from overseas.151

Furthermore, the Squadron’s equipment was still being procured: some key

equipment solutions were not even selected until mid-1999, which meant that

training was often conducted ‘at the last safe moment.’ Although the dedicated

acquisition project staff performed admirably, the time pressures added

significantly to the risks in raising the CBRR capability in time for the Games.

Smart buyer’ advice from DSTO was critical in minimising those risks in relation

to sophisticated and rather arcane CBRR equipments, such as agent detectors.

CBRR Squadron’s training was extremely sophisticated. Although particulars are

not available from open sources, there are indications that it included training

with live CBR agents at the Canadian Defence Research Establishment at

Suffield, in Alberta.152 This may reflect the relationship established with the

Canadian CBR defence ‘community’ through the sourcing of ADF training in

Canada over many years. Photographs in open source documents reveal unique

equipment in special applications: for example, protective ‘bomb suits’ worn with

compressed air breathing apparatus, electronic detection equipment and rapid-

erection decontamination and medical facilities.153

151 The ADF had traditionally trained its NBCD specialists in either Canada or the USA. Since the late 1990s, virtually all specialist training had been done at the Canadian Forces NBCD School. 152 The Defence Research and Development Canada – Suffield website refers to training by the Joint Incident Response Unit in preparation for the Sydney Olympics having been conducted at Suffield. http://www.suffield.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/ResearchTech/Products/CB_PRODUCTS/RD950... [cited 15 August 2005]. Overseas training in CBRR is acknowledged in The Australian Army in Profile 2000, p. 81. An ADF contingent of about 100 personnel was at Suffield in April 2000. Rod Edwards, ‘Aussies visit Suffield,’ Medicine Hat News, Medicine Hat (Alberta), 10 April 2000, p. 2. 153 The Australian Army in Profile 2000, pp. 81, 85; Jirumours, Vol. 2 Issue 5, 1 June 2000, pp. 3-4; Vol. 2 Issue 6, 1 July 2000, p. 5; Vol. 2 Issue 7, 1 August 2000, p. 5.

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The ‘white’ role of the CBRR Squadron necessitated close working relationships

with all civilian emergency services.154 These relationships were established

through combined training and interaction as all agencies developed CBRR

capabilities in preparation for the Games.155 The nature of CBRR incidents meant

that CBRR Squadron needed to have close relationships with civilian police (for

incident control and advice), fire (for hazardous material [HAZMAT] response),

ambulance (for casualty evacuation) and public health (for hazard warning)

services. The critical relationship was with the NSW Fire Brigades and this was

enhanced during the OSP by an exchange of liaison officers between response

elements of the CBRR Squadron and NSW Fire Brigades HAZMAT,

respectively.156,157 To minimise response times during the OSP, CBRR Squadron

operated from two ‘forward operating bases’ in the Sydney urban area. These

were located at Garden Island Naval Dockyard, close to critical Games’ sites neat

the central business district, and Timor Barracks in Dundas, which covered

Sydney Olympic Park and Western Sydney sites.158 Both were maintained

throughout the Summer Games, reducing to just the Dundas FOB for the

Paralympics.

A final key ADO contribution to the overall CBRR capability for the Games was

overseas expertise. This was mainly sourced through DSTO contacts or through

established Australia, Britain, Canada and America (ABCA) frameworks. For

reasons that are mainly associated with their Cold War involvement in NATO, the

UK, Canada and USA collectively had a more comprehensive range of CBRND

science and technology capabilities than Australia. This allowed Australia to

address any gaps in local expertise by sourcing the necessary capability overseas.

154 Defence. Operation Gold. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2001, p. 52. 155 For example, Exercise Golden Flame, the major inter-agency exercise held in May 2000, involved scenarios combining CBRR Squadron with elements of NSWPS, NSW Ambulance and NSW Fire Brigades. The Australian Army in Profile 2000, p. 85. 156 Personal conversation with Chief Superintendent Jim Hamilton, Assistant Director Specialised Operations, NSWFB and HAZMAT Chief, Sydney 2000 Games, 6 April 2005. The JIRU official unit photograph of 1 October 2000 also shows uniformed NSWFB officers. 157 New South Wales Fire Brigades, Protecting the People's Games: New South Wales Fire Brigades Post-Olympics Report Sydney: NSWFB, 2000, p.61. 158 Defence. Operation Gold. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2001, p. 52.

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HRS Squadron. The HRS Squadron was formed to provide a THRS and EDD

capability for Operation Gold. HRS is conducted when there is a realistic

expectation of risk to the searcher or when the consequences of an inadequate

search (ie, of ‘missing something’) are particularly high: for example, in

preparation for a VIP visit. The HRS discipline was developed by the UK Army

as a result of experience with terrorism in Northern Ireland. The normal ‘targets’

of high risk searches are explosive devices or contraband caches that may have

been protected by booby traps. HRS involves significantly higher skill levels and

equipment sophistication than low risk search and is the task of military

engineers.

THRS is an Australian Army term used to describe a specialised form of HRS that

involves the use of advanced techniques and technologies to provide the highest

possible level of confidence that an area is devoid of explosives or contraband.

This level of search was developed by the Royal Engineers (RE) in response to

the long-delay explosive device threat that was demonstrated in the 1984 bombing

of the Conservative Party Convention at the Grand Hotel in Brighton. The UK

maintains its THRS capability within 33 Regiment Royal Engineers (RE).

Prior to 2000, a basic high risk search capability had existed within the Royal

Australian Engineers (RAE) for some years: Army search teams had been

provided in support of state police forces in the security preparations for visits by

foreign Heads of Government.159 This search capability was only maintained as a

secondary role and had never been developed to the level of THRS. In defining

the new CBRR capability a requirement was identified for a supporting HRS

capability with THRS characteristics (but able to be employed in a CBR hazard

environment). Independently, analysis of search requirements for Games security

identified a requirement for a ‘conventional’ THRS capability. The funding

available under Project Bloodhound provided an opportunity to address this

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capability shortfall by equipping a THRS sub-unit. A HRS Squadron was

therefore incorporated in the JIRU structure as it was developed in late 1998.

Planning for the establishment of the HRS Squadron proceeded during 1999, with

a Squadron Commander and other key staff being posted to JIRU. It was quickly

determined that Australia did not possess the skills to develop a THRS capability.

Contacts with the UK were exercised to obtain a place for the Squadron

Commander on an appropriate course at the UK National Search Centre in the

second half of 1999. This was followed by an attachment to 33 Regiment RE,

which provided the opportunity to observe operational searches being conducted

in the UK. This training opportunity allowed a benchmark for the JIRU’s THRS

capability to be set and established a relationship with UK agencies that could be

drawn on for advice as training progressed. Given the state of Australian

knowledge of the THRS discipline, it is doubtful if the capability could otherwise

have been raised successfully in time for the Games.

The HRS Squadron initially stood up in Brisbane, using 2 CER facilities.

Manning was problematic. The threshold skill set for THRS personnel was

identified as the existing HRS skill, which was held by the Combat Engineer

trade. The additional THRS skills were expected to require a further six months

full time training. With the operational period for the Games, this meant that

service with HRS Squadron effectively required a year of full time service. 2

CER, as an integrated unit, had only a limited number of full-time Combat

Engineers, so additional personnel needed to sourced from elsewhere. With much

of the Army’s regular Combat Engineer asset deployed to East Timor for the

INTERFET operation, an alternative source of personnel was needed. This was

eventually found in the Army Reserve, with approximately 50% of the

Squadron’s final strength of Searchers consisting of Reservists who volunteered

for 12 months full time service.160 These personnel were sourced from the

Reserve members of 2 CER and from 4 CER, a Melbourne-based Reserve unit.

159 The Defence Report 1992-1993, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1993, p. 61.

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Other specialist members of HRS Squadron were posted in to the unit in January

2000.

Training for HRS Squadron faced many of the same challenges as CBRR

Squadron, especially in relation to the ‘last safe moment’ acquisition and delivery

of equipment. Training was completed only days before the commencement of

the OSP. The final stages of training were assisted by the attachment of two RE

Search Advisers. This was arranged under the terms of Exercise Long Look, a

long-standing short-term exchange program, and relied heavily on relationships

established during the Squadron Commander’s training the previous year.

Because of the requirement to provide a search capability for CBR incidents,

training included a significant CBR element. HRS Squadron personnel were also

trained to provide ‘labour’ for CBR consequence management tasks: for example,

the recovery and evacuation of CBR casualties from a contaminated area. This

support relationship with CBRR Squadron was practiced during exercises.

HRS Squadron’s explosive detection dog (EDD) capability was established by

brigading virtually the entire EDD asset of the Australian Army into the unit for

the OSP.161 The provision of EDD support to State agencies for security search

purposes was a well-established ADF task: for example, EDDs had supported the

Queensland Police during the Brisbane 1982 Commonwealth Games.162 As an

established capability, achieving the necessary EDD support was relatively

straight forward although some additional dogs and handlers needed to be trained

in order to achieve the number of 20 dog teams that had been agreed with the

NSWPS. Some new equipment, such as specialized EDD vehicles, was also

provided under Project Bloodhound.

Most of HRS Squadron’s operational tasking during the Games was in the form of

pre-planned searches during the ‘search and seal’ phase. A ‘response’ element

160 Defence. Operation Gold. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2001, p. 50. 161 Defence. Operation Gold. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2001, p. 57. 162 Defence Report 1982-1983, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1983, p. 20.

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was maintained throughout the OSP for short-notice tasks. Command and control

for HRS Squadron mirrored HQ JIRU arrangements, but with a minimal presence

forward in the OPRO and the principal node in JIRU Main.

No dedicated THRS capability was retained after the Games. HRS Squadron

disbanded after the OSP, with personnel either returning to ‘parent’ units or

moving to new postings. Most new THRS equipment was retained by the newly

raised independent CBRR Squadron for use in future operations. The skills and

training packages developed by HRS Squadron were also absorbed by that unit,

although no personnel had THRS as a primary responsibility.

EOD Squadron. The JIRU’s EOD Squadron was formed to provide the ADF’s

IEDD support to the NSWPS. As the ADF’s established capability was

understood to be fully operational and very similar to that of the NSWPS, the

initial intention for EOD Squadron was simply to concentrate virtually the entire

ADF IEDD asset in Sydney for the Games. An audit of the ADF’s capability

benchmark, the existing equipment fleet and the training and currency standards

of operators revealed that there was much more work to be done to bring deliver

the capability at the required standard.163 To understand the challenges involved,

an appreciation of the history and status of the ADF’s IEDD capability in 2000 is

useful. Two elements of that capability, skills and organisation, are analysed

below.

Skills. In 2000, the ADF’s IEDD skills were vested in four different

personnel trades:164

The Ammunition trade of the Royal Australian Army Ordnance

Corps (RAAOC). This trade focuses on the explosives engineering

aspects of ammunition logistics, but significant components of

163 Personal conversations with (then) Major Bruce Schiefelbein, Officer Commanding EOD Squadron, JIRU, July-August 2000.

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explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and IEDD have been included

since the 1920s. Personnel are referred to as Ammunition Technical

Officers (ATOs – the commissioned officers) or Ammunition

Technicians (ATs – the non-commissioned personnel). ATOs and

ATs undertook the four-week Defence IEDD (DEFIEDD) Course at

the conclusion of their very comprehensive ‘core’ training in

explosives engineering and the technical aspects of ammunition

logistics. The DEFIEDD Course was developed during the 1970s and

was based heavily on British experience from Northern Ireland.165

The skills involved were focused on non-combat scenarios166 and

support to civilian police forces in Australian ‘peacetime’ settings and

emphasised the use of the in-service ‘Echidna’ remote positioning

device (RPD).167,168 The training provided on the DEFIEDD Course

closely resembled that delivered to civilian police bomb technicians

until the mid-1990s.

The EOD Technician trade of the Army’s Royal Australian

Engineers (RAE). EOD Technicians were drawn from the ranks of

the Combat Engineer trade. In 2000, most were commissioned

officers or senior non-commissioned officers. To be selected for EOD

Technician training, Engineers needed to hold at least junior non-

commissioned officer rank and be qualified as demolition supervisors.

A small module of IEDD training, focused on operational or combat

164 ‘Trade’ is the Australian Army’s term for an occupational specialisation. These are referred to as ‘categories’ by the Royal Australian Navy and ‘musterings’ by the Royal Australian Air Force. 165 For an insight into that experience, see Chris Ryder, A Special Kind of Courage: 321 EOD Squadron – Battling the Bombers, London: Methuen, 2005. 166 These scenarios included operational scenarios in ‘lines of communication’ and civil disturbance or counter-insurgency settings, but did not include ‘battlefield’ scenarios. 167 RPD or the alternative, Remote Positioning Vehicle (RPV), are used to refer to ‘bomb disposal robots.’ These allow disposal technicians to deal with a suspected IED from a safe distance – a technique known as a ‘remote approach.’ This technique is preferred to the ‘manual approach’ for obvious safety reasons. In a ‘peacetime’ setting, modern occupational health and safety requirements demand that a remote approach be used wherever possible: the availability of that option is therefore a minimum requirement for an IEDD capability for homeland security missions. Personal conversations with Mr. Terry Vincent and Mr. Bruce Schiefelbein, Australian Bomb Data Centre, 1 April and 11 August 2005. 168 Defence Report 1988-1989, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1989, p. 31.

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scenarios and not involving the use of RPDs, was included in the EOD

Technician course. By 2000, most EOD Technicians also undertook

the DEFIEDD course after obtaining their initial qualification.

The Clearance Diver category of the Royal Australian Navy.

Clearance divers have always provided the Navy’s EOD capability

and are trained in ‘conventional’ EOD as part of their core skills. By

2000, IEDD training was obtained by attending the DEFIEDD course,

which represented the benchmark for IEDD skills.169

The Armament Fitter mustering of the Royal Australian Air

Force. These personnel, who included both officers and junior and

senior non-commissioned officers, possessed a range of differing

EOD skill levels from basic to advanced. In 2000, the IEDD skills

within the mustering were held by small teams who provided a basic

IEDD response capability at some Air Force bases. Air Force IEDD

training consisted of a two-week ‘in-house’ course delivered at the

ammunition logistics facility at Orchard Hills, near Sydney. This

course was focused on IEDD tasks that might arise on an Air Force

base and did not seek to address support to the civilian police. It did

not include the use of RPDs.170 In 2000 the Armament Fitter

mustering was in the process of being amalgamated with the Avionics

Technician mustering as part of a skills rationalization, further

diluting the mustering’s focus on the IEDD capability.171

In summary, then, in 2000 IEDD skills within the ADF were held by four

different occupational specialisations, none of which was centrally

169 Personal conversation with Captain Mike Angus, RAN, Commander, Australian Navy Mine Warfare and Clearance Diving Force Element Group 2000-2003, Canberra, 27 August 2005. 170 RAAF IEDD Operator Course Block Syllabus, 1999. 171 Personnel conversations with Group Captains Geoff Brown (former Officer Commanding 82 Wing) and Margaret Staib (senior RAAF logistics officer), Canberra, 18 August 2005.

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concerned with IEDD.172 Training levels differed between specialisations.

The DEFIEDD Course probably provided the skill set best suited to

homeland security scenarios or for support to civilian police forces, but that

course was not undertaken by all ADF IEDD operators.

Organisation. In 2000, a common characteristic of IEDD capabilities

throughout the ADF was that they did not constitute a primary mission for

any part of the force. With the exception of small instructional staffs at the

some service schools, in every case IEDD was a secondary responsibility.173

Historically, the ADF’s principal IEDD capability resided with the Army’s

regional Senior Ammunition Technical Officer (SATO) cells. These were

located in most state capitals and were chiefly concerned with the technical

oversight of ammunition logistics functions within their respective regions.

Other responsibilities included disposal of military explosive ordnance that

was recovered within the region (‘conventional’ EOD) and IEDD support to

local police forces on an ‘on call’ basis. SATOs were issued with a

reasonably comprehensive suite of IEDD equipment including ‘bomb

trucks’ and RPDs although the technology level of that equipment had not

been refreshed since the late 1980s with the introduction of the Echidna

RPD.174 Until the early 1990s a robust technical supervision network

existed for the SATOs within the Army’s Logistics Command. This

included a dedicated SATO EOD, responsible for technical regulation of

EOD and IEDD practices. This network was progressively eroded as the

ADF moved to more joint logistics arrangements from 1994 onwards. By

2000, the SATOs were part of the Joint Ammunition Logistics Organisation

and the technical supervision framework for EOD and IEDD had been

effectively dismantled.175 Over the 1990s, civilian police force IEDD

172 Bert Scharwz, "New task force faces biggest killer." Defender XXIII, no. 3 (2006), p.32. 173 Although EOD is a core element of the skills of Navy Clearance Divers, IEDD is a relatively small component that, up until 2000, was practised much less often. Personal conversation with Captain Mike Angus, RAN, Commander, Australian Navy Mine Warfare and Clearance Diving Force Element Group 2000-2003, Canberra, 27 August 2005. 174 The Army in Profile 1997, p. 103. 175 Personal conversation with Mr. Terry Vincent, Director, Australian Bomb Data Centre, 11 August 2005.

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capabilities also matured, resulting in fewer requests for ADF support and a

consequent decline in experience levels of ADF personnel.176 This decline

is detectable in annual Defence Reports. Although reporting of IEDD

tasking is patchy, Reports between 1983 and 1988 show a decrease in the

number of IEDD tasks undertaken by ADF EOD teams in support of police

forces, declining from 55 in 1983-84 to 12 in 1987-88. After 1988, IEDD

tasks were no longer reported. In comparison, the number of ‘conventional’

EOD tasks attended increased from 272 in 1983-84 to over 1,000 in each of

the last two years of the same period. When it is considered that this

number of tasks must be distributed over teams operating across the States

on a ‘shift’ basis, it is reasonable to conclude that the ADF’s IEDD

experience level was declining.177,178

By 2000, therefore, the ADF’s most sophisticated IEDD capability - that of the

regional SATOs - reflected a 1980s capability benchmark and had probably

atrophied considerably from that level, due to a lack of technical supervision and

operational experience.179 Other capabilities vested in the Army’s Engineer units,

Navy Clearance Diving Teams and Air Force Armament Fitter elements were less

sophisticated, especially in that they did not include a RPD capability, and in

some cases probably reflected a lower training level.180

Forming the Squadron. A ‘cadre’ staff for the Squadron, consisting of the

Officer Commanding and key Headquarters personnel, was established in January

1999.181 These conducted the planning for the raising of the full capability the

following year. One of the legitimately ‘joint’ elements of the JIRU, EOD

Squadron was to be manned with personnel from all four of the ADF’s IEDD-

176 Bert Scharwz, "New task force faces biggest killer." Defender XXIII, no. 3 (2006), p.33. 177 Defence Reports: 1983-1984: p. 118; 1985-1986: p. 40; 1986-1987: p. 35; 1987-1988: p. 10. 178 Personal conversation with Bruce Schiefelbein, former Officer Commanding EOD Squadron, JIRU, 1 April 2005. 179 Bert Schwarz, "Blown into proportion." Defender XXI, no. 2 (2004), p. 12. 180 For example, the two week duration of the Air Force training compared with the four weeks of the DEFIEDD Course. 181 Defence. Operation Gold. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2001, p.53.

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related specialisations.182 To provide flexibility in the employment of IEDD

operators there was a need to standardise skills across the sub-unit. This was

achieved by adopting the DEFIEDD Course as the ‘entry’ standard for IEDD

training in the Squadron. As not all personnel identified for service with the

Squadron had undergone the course, this required significant coordination and the

conduct of additional courses at the RAAOC Centre in the first half of 2000.

The core of the Squadron’s capability was the IEDD equipment held by the

regional SATO offices. This was audited against a benchmark of ‘world’s best

practice’ set by the Commanding Officer of JIRU and was researched by EOD

Squadron staff. Although arguably a higher benchmark than that used by the

NSWPS for its IEDD capability, this was considered necessary because of the

strategic importance to Australia of the Games and because Government and

public expectations of the ADF were perceived to be high. The benchmarking

activity included some specialised training in the US by the Squadron Operations

Officer in 1999 and a study tour of Canadian and US IEDD capabilities in early

2000. The audit, conducted by EOD Squadron key staff in 1999, identified a

number of deficiencies.183 Some of these were attributable to a deterioration of

the current capability through lack of maintenance and attrition over time, while

some were due to the dated benchmark for that capability, which did not reflect

developments in the IED threat. The full scope of these deficiencies, and their

subsequent solutions, is classified but they included the replacement of the

Army’s entire fleet of ‘bomb suits,’ which had deteriorated to the point that there

protective value could not be assured.184 Funding to address these deficiencies

was not provided within either current Army allocations or the scope of Project

Bloodhound. Submissions for the remediation of the capability submitted by

JIRU through HQ JTF 112, eventually secured the necessary funding through a

combination of Army maintenance money and funds from the major capability

182 Defence. Operation Gold. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2001, p.50. 183 Personal conversation with Bruce Schiefelbein, former Officer Commanding EOD Squadron, JIRU, 1 April 2005. 184 Personal conversation with Bruce Schiefelbein, former Officer Commanding EOD Squadron, JIRU, 1 April 2005.

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program. These were applied to an increase in the scope was of Project

Bloodhound, which enabled the experienced Project Team to source the necessary

equipment in time to remediate the capability prior to the Games.

The Squadron’s principal equipments were concentrated at Holsworthy during

July 2000, where they were technically inspected, serviced and repaired as

necessary.185 Much of the equipment that arrived from the regional SATO offices

was in a neglected state and could scarcely have been considered operational.186

Squadron personnel assembled by late July, in time to undertake a four-week

preparatory training package.187 The purpose of this training was to establish

skills currency, qualify personnel in the new equipment and techniques that were

introduced as part of the capability remediation, and to provide Games-specific

training (such as geographic orientation to Sydney for out-of-town members).

This was completed by the end of August, in time for the OSP. By the time it

became operational, the Squadron’s capability represented a significant

qualitative and quantitative improvement over the ADF’s ‘normal’ level of IEDD

capability.

During the OSP, the Squadron’s teams operated from Holsworthy and three FOBs

located at police stations in the Sydney urban area. Some scarce and highly

specialized equipment was also held at each base location, for distribution to EOD

teams if necessary for especially demanding tasks. The FOBs were shared with

Police IEDD teams and other capabilities. To ensure a seamless dispatch process

for ADF IEDD teams, without compromising ADF command authority, EOD

Squadron provided command and control personnel at the NSWPS Bomb

Management Coordination Centre (BMCC) at the OPRO, as well as at

Holsworthy and at each FOB. This imposed a personnel overhead but offered

important advantages in control and visibility of ADF tasking and the

coordination of intelligence and logistical support to operational elements. In

185 Defence. Operation Gold. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2001, p.53. 186 Personal conversation with Bruce Schiefelbein, former Officer Commanding EOD Squadron, JIRU, 1 April 2005.

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addition to the standard truck-mounted IEDD teams, the Squadron also

maintained a helicopter-deployable ‘flyaway’ capability for response to otherwise

inaccessible areas or short-notice support outside the Sydney area.

The EOD Squadron began to draw down in strength following the Summer

Games due to a planned reduction in NSWPS support requirements for the

Paralympics. Personnel began to be released back to parent units from early

October. The Squadron finally disbanded in November 2000. Equipment that

had been concentrated from SATO offices was returned, having been fully

remediated to the notional operational standard that applied pre-Games. New

IEDD equipment procured for the OSP was retained by the CBRR Squadron for

safekeeping until its eventual disposal could be determined: distributing it to

SATO offices was not an option, due to a lack of ongoing training and

maintenance support as a result of its rushed acquisition.

Clearance diving

Clearance diving support for the Games was provided by a composite Mine Clearance

Diving Team drawn for the Royal Australian Navy’s Mine Warfare and Clearance Diving

Force. A total of 95 Clearance Divers (equal to two Clearance Diving Teams) supported

the Games.188 The Clearance Divers (CDs) provided an underwater HRS and IEDD

capability for the NSWPS and interstate police services.189 The principal tasks

undertaken by the team were underwater searches of vessels carrying VIPs or members

of the ‘Olympic Family’ who were entitled to special security support. Searches were

also conducted of some marine Olympic venues, such as the triathlon swim leg course

and the sailing marina.190

Aviation support

Aviation support for the Games was provided by a Joint Aviation Group that was

assembled from elements of the Army’s 1st and 5th Aviation Regiments and the Navy’s

187 Defence. Operation Gold. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2001, pp.50,53. 188 Defence Annual Report 2000-01, p. 104. 189 Defence. Operation Gold. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2001, p.81.

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817 Squadron.191 The aircraft types involved were Kiowa, Iroquois, Black Hawk,

Chinook and Sea King helicopters and King Air fixed-wing aircraft.192 The principal

tasks for the Aviation Group were aeromedical evacuation, ‘contingency’ support for

Defence or civilian response elements and support to the Special Forces TAG.193 This

included an airlift capability for interstate response tasks. The Group utilised spare

capacity to transport Defence personnel around the Sydney area. Most aircraft were

based at RAAF Base Richmond,194 with a few based at Holsworthy. Aircraft noise over

urban areas was a constant and sensitive issue for the Aviation Group throughout the

Games.

JTF 114

JTF 114, based on the Army’s Special Operations capabilities, provided ‘high end’ ADF

counter terrorism support for the Games. The JTF included elements of the Special Air

Services Regiment, 4th Battalion the Royal Australian Regiment (Commando), 5th

Aviation Regiment, 10th Force Support Battalion and No. 3 Airfield Defence Squadron

(RAAF).195 The JTF was based at Holsworthy, where special temporary facilities were

constructed to provide the TAG personnel with secure training areas so that their highly

perishable skills could be maintained over the OSP.

JTF elements underwent an intensive but highly compressed preparation for the

operation, which included elaborate helicopter assault exercises within the Sydney urban

area. The support available to the NSWPS from JTF 114 covered the entire spectrum of

Special Forces’ counter terrorism capabilities included the newly-developed ship

underway recovery (SUR) capability and the ability to conduct a hostage rescue assault in

a CBR hazard environment – the latter requiring support from the CBRR Squadron of

JIRU.196 Both SUR and CBR assault are examples of sophisticated capabilities that

190 Official Report of the XXVII Olympiad: Security, p. 5. 191 The Australian Army in Profile 2000, p. 88. Also Defence. Operation Gold. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2001, pp. 86-92. 192 Defence Annual Report 2000-01, pp. 100, 111. 193 The Australian Army in Profile 2000, p. 88. 194 The Australian Army in Profile 2000, p. 89. 195The Australian Army in Profile 2000, p. 84. 196 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, p. 513.

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would have been beyond the resources of a civilian agency, but which the ADF was able

to develop reasonably quickly.

Assignment to JTF 114 effectively meant that the TAG was unavailable for counter

terrorism response coverage outside the Sydney area. In order to ensure adequate

coverage was available in the event of non-Olympics related incident, a second TAG was

established for the duration of the OSP, based in Western Australia.

Equipment support

Loans of ADF equipment were requested by the NSWPS to enable it to field additional

resources during the Games. Most requests related to bomb response equipment, such as

water-column disruptors, which would have allowed additional bomb response teams to

be deployed. Most requests were not met, due to the ADF needing all available

equipment to meet its own ‘surge’ requirements.

Training support

ADF training support to civilian agencies in preparation for the Games focused largely on

assisting those agencies to acquire capabilities in the relatively new field of CBR

response. The support included:

CBR ‘First Responder’ training. CBR first responder training was delivered to

civilian police, fire and ambulance services from all states. Training consisted of a

three-day course conducted by the Army’s School of Military Engineering (then

known as Mobility and Survivability Wing of the Combat Arms Centre) at the

School’s Moorebank (New South Wales) site. Attendance of State personnel was

coordinated by Emergency Management Australia. The training was very much

‘entry level,’ aimed at familiarising Emergency Services personnel with CBR

hazards and the wearing of the Army’s in-service NBC protective ensemble. The

intent of the training was to create awareness of the CBR dimension of emergency

management and to establish a rudimentary level of capability that would enhance

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the effectiveness and survivability of CBR first responders.197 In all, over 300 New

South Wales policemen and an unknown number of other emergency services

personnel were trained.198,199

Bomb Technician CBR Awareness Course. In the same way that ‘normal’ first

responders might be the first emergency services personnel on the scene of a CBR

incident, normal police bomb technicians might be the first to encounter a CBR

device. The aim of the Bomb Technician CBR Awareness Course was to instill

awareness of the CBR threat and a basic grasp of the technical implications of a

CBR device. A key objective was to enable police bomb technicians to recognise

the indicators that a device or situation might contain a CBR hazard, in order to

request the appropriate specialist support (such as Fire Brigades HAZMAT and

JIRU CBRR teams) and to avoid applying ‘conventional’ disposal techniques that

might worsen a situation. The CBR Awareness Course was developed and taught

by the JIRU CBRR Squadron to NSWPS and Australian Protective Services

personnel, at Holsworthy Barracks.

Intelligence support

Defence support to Olympic intelligence efforts is difficult to gauge from open source

material, but some references indicate that Defence personnel were ‘embedded’ in

Olympics intelligence agencies. For example, JTF112 included ‘personnel seconded to

the Olympics Intelligence Centre, providing a link between police and national

intelligence agencies.’200 Closer to the Games, this link achieved an unprecedented

closeness. The sense conveyed by conversations with personnel exposed to the

intelligence arrangements is of a very effective level of coordination among all Australian

197 The term ‘first responder,’ although common now, was relatively new in 1999. It recognises the reality that the first emergency services personnel to respond to a security incident will most probably be ‘normal’ police, fire or ambulance personnel with no specialised skills or capabilities (rather than sophisticated specialised capabilities, such as the JIRU). 198 Personal conversations (various) with Acting Inspector Mark Sowter, New South Wales Police Service, 1999-2000; personal conversation with Mr. Don Patterson, Emergency Management Australia, 24 March 2005. 199 New South Wales Fire Brigades, Protecting the People's Games: New South Wales Fire Brigades Post-Olympics Report Sydney: NSWFB, 2000, pp.74-5. 200 Defence. Operation Gold. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2001, p. 18.

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intelligence agencies.201 The contribution of Defence agencies does not seem to be a

dominant feature of Games’ intelligence measures, however: rather, these were a

proportionate part in the whole-of-government intelligence effort.

Post Games situation

After the Games, JTFs 112 and 114 were disbanded and the associated resources mostly

returned to their pre-Games use. Some new capabilities developed for the Games

provided a residual capability for the ADO, however: these included the CBRR

capability, which remained in a new CBRR Squadron and a revitalised domestic

preparedness capability within DSTO; and SUR, which was retained by the SASR.

Case study conclusion

Operation GOLD was a major ADO operation that made a significant contribution to the

successful conduct of the Sydney 2000 Games. Most of that contribution was in

homeland security roles and involved capabilities that were similar to those normally

possessed by state authorities. In general, Operation GOLD allowed the relevant civilian

authorities, notable those of New South Wales, to ‘surge’ to higher levels of capability

than normally needed for ‘day to day’ security requirements in order to meet the transient

demands of the Games. In this regard, the use of the ADO was an economical means of

generating the necessary surge. The Operation also constituted a significant trigger for

the development of new homeland security capabilities by the ADO. These included new

capabilities in ‘conventional’ counter terrorism, such as SUR, as well as an extensive

investment in the novel field of CBRR – some of it sourced from overseas by exercising

using Defence contacts.202

As well as providing the ‘usual’ support at short notice, the 2000 Games stimulated the

development of significant new ADF capabilities with specific application to homeland

security. This capability needed to be acquired within the short time-frame of 18

months (an estimate derived from an indication given by Brigadier Philip McNamara in

201 Personal conversation with Colonel Michael Kelly, July 2005. 202 Brigadier Philip McNamara address to the Royal United Services Institute of NSW, 2000. Quoted in Martin Chulov and David Kennedy, ‘Games security revealed,’ The Australian, 1 March 2000.

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an address to the Royal United Services Institute of NSW early in 2000, and on the

timing of the 1999 Budget announcement).203 This was a demanding task that could

probably only be met by Defence because of its personnel resources and in-house

training, procurement and research and development capacities.204

Operation GOLD involved an escalating commitment over two years from late 1998. It

remains the largest single commitment of ADO resources for a homeland security task in

peacetime. Although its scale was unprecedented, it was nevertheless a traditional

commitment in that it represented ADO support to the civil authorities in a task that

exceeded their resources. In that respect Operation GOLD was like the Eureka Stockade

assault or any other employment of the ADO on homeland security duties during

‘peacetime.’ At the Operation’s end, most of the additional capability established was

dispersed, with only a residual CBRR capability being retained in an independent

Squadron, based at Holsworthy.205

The ADF’s contribution to Games security was not tested by a significant incident and

therefore an assessment of the effectiveness of that contribution is difficult to make. The

satisfaction of high workloads by the Operational Search Battalion and elements of the

Joint Incident Response Unit suggest that the related capabilities (low- and technical high

risk search) were robust and effective: other analysis in this Case Study supports an

assessment that that capability could not have been developed elsewhere in the Games’

security force. Regardless of their effectiveness, those contributions were indispensable.

The effectiveness of other aspects of ADO support are even more difficult to gauge in the

absence of a real incident. Preparations appear to have been as thorough as possible,

given the ADF’s competing focus on operations in Timor. Counter-terrorist capabilities

were exercised thoroughly prior to the Games and no identified deficiencies are on the

public record. In the absence of any contrary data, it seems reasonable that the ADO’s

contribution would have significantly improved New South Wales’ ability to deal with a

203 Quoted in Martin Chulov and David Kennedy, ‘Games security revealed,’ The Australian, 1 March 2000. 204 Mr. Don Patterson, Assistant Director Special Operations, Emergency Management Australia, in an interview recorded 24 March 2005.

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real incident, or the threat of one, compared with a situation in which they were not

available. Whether the scale of ADO commitment was necessary to address the level of

demonstrated threat is a judgement that must be informed by the classified threat

assessments used, and these are not available. As part of the national security effort, the

ADO’s contribution seems proportionate and in keeping with contemporaneous practice

elsewhere in the world.

Final Pre-9/11 Developments

One important event of the ‘pre-9/11’ homeland security landscape went almost

unnoticed in 2000. This was the passage of the Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to

Civilian Authorities) Act 2000. This expanded the original Section 51 by inserting a new

Part IIIAAA. In one regard, this constituted a sensible update to the original Section by

including the self-governing Territories in the same category as the States with regard to

the guarantee of Commonwealth protection. More significantly, it made specific

provision for the employment of Commonwealth military forces to protect the

Commonwealth’s own interests against threats from domestic violence (as well as to

protect the States in the original sense of Section 51).206

The 2000 amendment legislation also codified the procedures for ‘calling out’ the ADF.

These procedures clarified the role of the Commonwealth’s Executive Government in

call out decisions – especially the Prime Minister, Minister for Defence and Attorney-

General.207 An important effect of this change was to reinforce the Commonwealth’s

discretion in agreeing to a Section 119 request: the Executive must be satisfied that a

sufficient state of domestic violence exists to justify the call out of the ADF.

Of most concern to some commentators and civil liberty advocates, Part IIIAAA codified

an elaborate framework for the exercise by the ADF of ‘police powers’ in domestic

security situations. These included:

205 The Australian Army in Profile 2000, p. 81. 206 Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act 2000, Bills Digest No. 13 2000-01. 207 Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act 2000, Bills Digest No. 13 2000-01.

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The definition of specific areas within which ADF members could take certain

actions (‘General Security Areas’ and ‘Designated Areas’).

Specific powers for members of the ADF ‘to recapture buildings and free

hostages’. 208 These codified the ‘working-level’ protocols that had evolved over

the previous 20 years as the ADF’s domestic counter terrorism capabilities

(represented by the SASR TAG) had developed.

The ADF activities that could take place within General Security and Designated Areas

tended to emphasise searches for violence-related contraband and included the

establishment of cordons. Some were concerned that the new legislation went too far in

this regard, by effectively granting the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) judicial powers

through the authority to issue search warrants.209 Part IIIAAA retained the previous

proscription on the use of Reserve personnel in responses to industrial disputes.

Enacted as a delayed response to the shortcomings identified with the employment of the

ADF in the aftermath of the 1978 Hilton bombing and to provide domestic security

options in time for the Olympics,210 the Part IIIAAA legislation caused some disquiet

both within the ADF and in civilian circles. Part of this was attributable to its

interpretation by some as an expression of the Government’s willingness to employ the

ADF to apply force within the homeland – a notion unfamiliar to most Australians.

There was, however, no ‘public outcry’ over the legislation.211 Most debate occurred in

Parliamentary and academic circles, and abated quickly.

Summary Conclusion

By the end of 2000, Australia had some experience in the employment of Defence

resources in homeland security roles. Certain principles had been established to govern

208 Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act 2000, Bills Digest No. 13 2000-01, Division 2. 209 Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act 2000, Bills Digest No. 13 2000-01. 210 Personal conversation with Colonel Michael Kelly, Australian Army legal officer, Canberra, July 2000. 211 Andrews, The Department of Defence, 2001, p. 301.

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that employment. Among these were the primacy of civilian authorities in domestic

security matters, with its corollary that Defence resources should only be employed in

homeland security tasks when the demands of those tasks exceeded civilian resources.

Notwithstanding those principles, a practice had developed whereby Defence led the

development of homeland security measures in the context of international conflict (civil

defence) and provided a national coordinating function for response to disasters. In

relation to CT capabilities, Defence had developed and maintained the national ‘high

end’ response capabilities for siege-hostage situations and incidents involving CBR

agents and had assisted the states in developing certain capabilities of their own (for

example, IEDD).

Outside Defence, a national architecture had evolved for the coordination of homeland

security measures, managed by the PSCC. By the 1990s that body’s name reflected a

harder edge by changing from Protective Services to Protective Security Coordination

Centre. Defence was a key player in the ‘protective security community,’ through its role

in high end CT capabilities and national emergency management.

Australia’s experience of military involvement in homeland security, over more than 200

years, had centred on the Army. Although Navy and Air Force contributed, the terrestrial

nature and manpower demands of most requirements necessarily made the ADO’s

response Army-centric. The overall trend in Defence involvement in homeland security

from 1788 until 1901 was a declining one. Notwithstanding some large commitments to

meet ‘surge’ requirements (such as Operation GOLD), over the following century until

2001 Defence involvement remained limited. Since the establishment of the first colony

as an almost entirely military affair, civilian agencies had grown to perform a greater and

greater proportion of the nation’s domestic security tasks and Constitutional

arrangements had enshrined that principle in law. Towards the end of the pre-9/11

period, however, the 1978 Hilton bombing and the Sydney 2000 Games triggered

uncharacteristic development in the ADO’s role that indicated a shift in the established

pattern.

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Another key feature of Australia’s pre-9/11 experience of Defence involvement in

domestic security was a general lack of adverse experience.212 Although force had been

used or threatened against civilians on a few occasions (such as at the Eureka Stockade or

in the 1891 shearers’ strike), those events occurred a long time ago and do not dwell in

the general public consciousness. Unlike the United States or many European countries,

where periods of martial law or domestic unrest had seen systemic military abuse of civil

liberties, there is little in Australia’s past to make the general population especially wary

of a military role in the homeland:

Aid to the civil power by the armed forces is not a subject in which there has been sustained interest in Australia. When, from time to time, the issue has arisen, it has been dealt with in an ad hoc manner and then been largely forgotten.213

The lack of debate on the military’s use in the homeland could be attributable to a general

acceptance of the fundamental principle that this would be an absolute last resort. This

principle was observed in the employment of the Army in the post-1945 strikes, when a

careful line was drawn between soldiers providing essential services and suppressing

industrial action. There is no evidence that the issue was ever prominent on the twentieth

century and political agenda. This would contribute to a general social mood, in relation

to the employment of the ADO, that would accept reasonable uses that did not infringe

individual liberties or lifestyles. The low profile of the issue could be expected to afford

Australian governments considerable freedom of action in deciding the involvement of

the ADO in homeland security roles.

This chapter has described the pre-9/11 history of ADO involvement in homeland

security roles. The next chapter will analyse the status quo in relation to ADO roles in

the period immediately prior to 9/11. The reasons for that involvement will be analysed

in Chapter Five.

212 Elizabeth Ward, ‘Call Out the Troops: an examination of the legal basis for Australian Defence Force involvement in ‘non-defence’ matters,’ Parliamentary Library (Law and Bills Digest Group), Research Paper 8/1997-98, 1998, p. 4 of printed web document [cited 10 August 2005]. Available from http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/1997-98/98rp08.htm. 213 Beddie and Moss, Some Aspects of Aid to the Civil Power in Australia, 1982, p.72.

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE STATUS QUO ANTE:

ADO ROLES IN HOMELAND SECURITY PRE-9/11

The central question of this thesis relies on an understanding of the changes that have

occurred in the employment of the ADO in homeland security roles since 9/11. This

chapter will first establish the pre-9/11 status quo, as a basis from which to identify what

has changed, and then analyse the general pattern of pre-9/11 ADO homeland security

roles. Chapter Five canvasses the reasons why those roles were adopted.

As the preceding historical summary shows, Australia has a history of Defence Force

involvement in homeland security roles stretching back over 200 years. Much of that

period is not relevant to a consideration of the status quo as at 2001, but at the same time

some roles are exercised only infrequently and therefore a survey based on a fixed point

in time will be misleading. To do justice to the pre-9/11 realities, consideration of ADO

contributions in that period will comprehend events stretching back to the 1970s because

that period contains most of the events that influenced the 2001 status quo.

The Policy Environment

The principal formal sources of Government policy on the employment of the ADO in

homeland security roles are Defence White Papers. More recently, Foreign Affairs White

Papers have included homeland security content. The range of governments’ ‘strategic

guidance’ to Defence includes other documents that are not, strictly speaking, policy

papers but which are nevertheless important indicators of government thinking. These

include Defence ‘strategic basis’ papers. Finally, Departmental structure reviews, public

pronouncements and information papers also offer insights into policy thinking.

An analysis of documents satisfying these criteria, dating back to 1973, is at Appendix 1.

The analysis was based on the interrogation of each document for references relevant to

homeland security, under the following categories:

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Direct references to ‘homeland security’ or conceptually similar terms.

Nuclear, biological and chemical defence (NBCD). This criterion was selected

because it is the military antecedent of the chemical, biological, radiological and

nuclear (CBRN) field that plays such a major part the ADO’s post-9/11

contribution to homeland security.

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This criterion was selected because it is

also a major part of the ADO’s post-9/11 contribution to homeland security, as

well as being relevant to the CBRN field.

Homeland security-related DSTO roles and capabilities. This criterion was

selected because of its relevance to DSTO’s post-9/11 contribution, especially in

the CBRN field.

Homeland-security related ADO tasking and force structure prescriptions.

Terrorism and counter terrorism.

Civil defence. This criterion was selected as the historical antecedent to the

consequence management role that has emerged post-9/11.

Defence Aid to the Civil Power (DACP) or Defence Force Aid to Civilian

Authorities (DFACA). These terms refer to the same thing: DFACA is the

current term, replacing DACP with the passage of the Defence Legislation

Amendment (Defence Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act 2000. DACC and DFACA

are covered in detail in Appendix 2.

The pre-9/11 policy material can be considered in two general categories: that produced

prior to the first articulation of the ‘Defence of Australia’ (DoA) strategic paradigm (‘pre-

DoA,’ referring to policy issued prior to 1987)) and that produced during the DoA era

(1987 and subsequently). The average periodicity of all pre-9/11 documents analysed is

just under 30 months, with substantial policy papers being produced at about three-yearly

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intervals from 1987.1 The pre-DoA material is scant and, given its age, does not warrant

deep analysis but it does acknowledge Defence’s responsibility for civil defence,

although the 1973 Tange Report indicates that this function was more realistically one of

peacetime natural disaster management.2 Tange actually recommended changing the

name of the Directorate of Civil Defence to ‘National Disasters Organisation.’ All of this

would suggest that, even during the Cold War, violent threats to the homeland were not

of great concern. The 1976 White Paper’s reference to the Soviet nuclear build-up is, at

best, a peripheral acknowledgement of such threats, and then only in the context of a

state-on-state nuclear exchange.3 The same document’s reference to the ADF providing

a counter terrorism response in a DACP capacity is noteworthy: coming before

Australia’s terrorism ‘baptism’ in 1978, this was genuinely prescient, although this might

be explained by the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee’s consideration of terrorism

in the course of its classified business in 1976.4

With DoA established as the driving principle for Australian Defence policy, strategic

guidance does not see international terrorism as a potential threat to Australia until 1994.

The homeland security challenges mooted in the early documents of the DoA era are

associated with the protection of vital assets, usually in remote areas of northern

Australia, in the context of a low-level foreign incursions onto Australian territory.5 To

the extent that these would arise in the context of a state-on-state conflict, they are not

consistent with the contemporary conceptualisation of homeland security tasks. The role

of NDO in civil emergency management is mentioned in all early DoA documents.

In policy documents released since 1994, the role of Defence in providing high-end

national counter terrorism capabilities is acknowledged more or less consistently.6 The

existence of terrorist and unconventional threats to Australia and its interests also begins

1 Substantial papers consist of Defence White papers and ‘strategic basis’ papers. 2 Arthur Tange, ‘Australian Defence: Report on the Reorganisation of The Defence Group of Departments,’ Department of Defence, Canberra, 1973, p. 53 and Annexes A and E. 3 Australian Defence, 1976, p. 11. 4 R.J. Ellicott and R.G. Withers. "FAD Policy Paper No. 23 - Policy and Organization to Counter International Terrorism." Canberra: National Archives of Australia, 1976. 5 The Defence of Australia 1987, paras. 3.14, 3.24, 4.91; Australia’s Strategic Planning in the 1990s, paras 4.31, 5.9, 5.23-30; Force Structure Review 1991, pp. 22-3; Strategic Review 1993, paras 5.32, 5.34. 6 Defending Australia 1994, paras 13.12-3; Australia’s Strategic Policy 1997, p. 35; Defence 2000, paras 2.18, 2.20, 6.25, 8.18.

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to be recognised, although this is inconsistent.7 The Sydney 2000 Olympics are

identified as a source of security tasking for the ADF.8

Throughout the pre-9/11 period, NBCD, WMD and DSTO’s role in homeland security

receive little, if any, mention. The significance of NBCD is marginalised: references to it

are absent until 1987 and it is mentioned as an ADF capability only in the sense of

maintaining a minimal professional awareness of the subject.9 DSTO’s NBCD/WMD

expertise is acknowledged more in the context of support to the Department of Foreign

Affairs and Trade’s (DFAT’s) non-proliferation work than in its importance to any threat

to the homeland or operational capability.10 WMD concerns arise in the context of state

proliferation (including in the region) rather than non-state use.11

The relative lack of pre-9/11 interest in homeland security appears to extend to Australian

Foreign Affairs policy as well as Defence policy. The theme of WMD non-proliferation

is also strong in foreign policy and terrorism is acknowledged as something that should

be contained, but otherwise there is little concern with things that could pose violent

threats to the Australian homeland.12

Prior to 9/11, therefore, homeland security as it is now conceptualised was not a high

priority in either Australia’s Defence or foreign policy. There is little evidence that

policy makers perceived any serious threats of violence to the homeland from non-state

actors: the greatest threats were thought to lie in the context of state-on-state conflict.

Even though the DoA paradigm foresaw some violence occurring on the Australian

mainland, this was still characterised by inter-state ‘conventionality.’ Despite its focus on

state threats, DoA began to focus attention on some of the issues that would arise later in

the context of homeland security. For example, ‘low level contingencies’ involved

saboteurs as well as clandestine and covert guerilla forces. This caused some

7 Australian Perspectives on Defence 2000, p. 27; Defence 2000, p. vii, paras 2.13, 6.25. 8 Defending Australia 1994, paras 13.12; Defence 2000, para. 6.25. 9 The Defence of Australia 1987, para. 4.36; Strategic Review 1993, para. 2.22; Defending Australia 1994, para. 12.31. 10 The Defence of Australia 1987, para. 4.36; Strategic Review 1993, para. 2.22; Defending Australia 1994, para. 12.31. 11 Australia’s Strategic Planning in the 1990s, pp. 2, 18; Strategic Review 1993, para. 2.15; Defending Australia 1994, para. 10.24; Australia’s Strategic Policy 1997, p. 31; Defence 2000, p. x, paras 2.2, 3.18, 3.52, 4.12.

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examination of the relative roles of the police, ADF and other agencies. Terrorism was

acknowledged sporadically as a threat, although with some greater consistency towards

the end of the period. There was little direction for DSTO to develop or maintain any

capabilities to support homeland security.

The Model

Identifying the ADO’s roles in homeland security requires some method of ensuing that

all possible avenues of involvement are considered. The means selected in this study is

to map involvement against a model depicting the full spectrum of homeland security

functions. Considerations for the design of that model are that it should:

remain consistent across the two time periods being surveyed (pre- and post-

9/11), in order provide a degree of empirical ‘control’ as a means of gauging

differences between the pre-and post-9/11 situations;

be comprehensive, to ensure that possible roles are not overlooked; and

resolve missions and functions in sufficient detail to track changes over time.

The recent literature on homeland security contains several such models. For example, a

six-point list of US Department of Defense (DoD) roles and missions in homeland

security has been developed by the Defense Science Board.13 That list has been largely

reflected in the subsequent Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support of the US

DoD. 14 Both the Defense Science Board papers and the Strategy for Homeland Defense

narrow consideration quickly to a prescriptive analysis of what the DoD’s roles should

be, based on legal principles and governmental guidance.15 In addition, the ‘Capabilities

for Homeland Defense and Civil Support’ identified for DoD are very broad and generic,

consisting of: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Capabilities;

Information-Sharing; Joint Operational Capabilities for Homeland Defense; and

12 In the National Interest, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 1997, pp. vii, 2, 40. 13 Department of Defense Roles and Missions in Homeland Security, Defense Science Board Summer Study 2003 Report, Office of the Under-Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Washington, 2003. 14 Strategy for Homeland Defence and Civil Support, US Department of Defense, June 2005, p.1. 15 Strategy for Homeland Defence and Civil Support, 2005, p.1.

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Interagency and Intergovernmental Coordination.16 Combined, these two characteristics

create a risk that use of the US DoD model could lead to important ADO homeland

security roles being overlooked.

The Australian National Counter Terrorism Plan contains a national ‘strategy’ for

counter-terrorism which could serve as a model for homeland security functions. This

strategy is summarised by its fours pillars of Prevention, Preparation, Response and

Recovery.17 These areas are extremely broad and therefore, if used in isolation, also

pose a risk that important ADO roles might be ignored.

The model developed by the Australian Homeland Security Research Centre (AHSRC),

a non-government body undertaking independent research in homeland security, is

depicted in Figure 1.18 This model recognises the four pillars of the official

Commonwealth Government Counter-Terrorism ‘strategy’ (prevention, preparation,

response and recovery) but adds a number of homeland security missions, under the

broad categories of:

international security,

intelligence,

law enforcement,

border security,

transportation security,

infrastructure protection,

protecting people, and

emergency services.

16 Strategy for Homeland Defence and Civil Support, 2005, pp.3-4. 17 National Counter-Terrorism Plan, [cited 20 August 2005]. Available from http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/NationalSecurityHome.nsf/Page/RWPCD8501294925DA06CA256D42001C1A4C?OpenDocument#responsibilities.

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Each of these categories is further divided into more specific missions, totaling 26 in all.

Underpinning those missions are also two broad categories of ‘enablers:’

leadership enablers, and

operational enablers.

Similarly, these broad categories are also divided in more specific enablers.

18 Australian Homeland Security Insight, August 2004, Canberra: Australian Homeland Security Research Centre (Insert)

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The AHRSC model is clearly a product of the post-9/11 era: this is demonstrated in two

ways. First, in listing missions such as ‘International coalition against terrorism & the

US alliance’ it refers to international concepts which either did not exist pre-9/11 or

existed in a different form. Second, it reflects a comprehensive conceptualisation of

Australia’s homeland security – something approaching a policy – that has only emerged

since 9/11. This includes, inter alia, the inclusive governmental involvement often called

a ‘whole of government’ approach. Some missions, however, may not be performed by

Government agencies: industry may be better suited to these. The application to

homeland security of many of the missions defined in the AHRSC model would simply

not have been recognised in Australia prior 9/11.

The relatively recent formulation of the AHRSC model means that some of its details

may not be applicable to the pre-9/11 situation. Testing pre-9/11 ADO activities against

all missions is nevertheless useful, as it may help to determine the extent to which the

ADO’s experience in these activities pre-disposed it to successful involvement in

homeland security roles that emerged later. The very contemporary list of roles

contained in the model make it a more precise means of capturing post-9/11

developments. On the basis of its comprehensiveness and resolution, the AHRSC model

was selected for this study.

The approach taken in applying the AHRSC model was to assess ADO activities from

1990 until 9/11 according to their applicability to the missions identified, taking each

mission in turn. Following the assessment of missions, ADO contributions to homeland

security enablers were considered.

Homeland Security Missions

1. Regional cooperation

Regional cooperation is significant to Australia’s homeland security in several ways. In

the broadest sense, cooperating in regional issues promotes Australia’s reputation as a

‘good regional citizen’ and should reduce the likelihood that violent antipathy to

Australia will arise in regional countries. Even when the subject of cooperation is not

security related, a favourable view of Australia should reduce the likelihood of threats to

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Australia originating in the region. In a more specific sense, cooperating with regional

countries to pro-actively identify, target and stop terrorists and their activities can directly

improve the security of the Australian homeland.

The ADO has had a long involvement in regional cooperation efforts as part of a

deliberate policy. ‘Defence Cooperation’ originated in 1963-64 with military assistance

to Malaysia and Singapore, and grew to include Indonesia (1968) and the remainder of

the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1972-73).19

Defence Cooperation was made the focus of a discreet Program – the Defence

Cooperation Program (DCP) in 1974-75.20 Established to ‘contribute to Australia’s

defence and security needs in the Asia-Pacific region, especially South-East Asia and the

South Pacific, through cooperative defence activities with selected countries,’21 the DCP

applied to a carefully circumscribed set of countries whose composition changed from

time to time. Overall, the pre-9/11 DCP seems to have been designed on a presumption

that Australia needed to achieve security from external threats, mainly from national

sources – for example, weapons of mass destruction possessed by nations. 22 This is

probably largely attributable to the reigning ‘defence of Australia’ strategic rationale, as

articulated by Paul Dibb, that security policy should protect the nation ‘from armed attack

and from constraints on independent national decisions imposed by the threat of such an

attack.’23 The security benefit to Australia of DCP activities, therefore, lay in reducing

the likelihood of these threats, rather than in terms of what would now be defined as

homeland security.

DCP activities have taken many forms, from the delivery of individual training to

members of regional defence forces at ADF schools, to combined exercises both in

Australia and overseas and the construction of facilities for regional defence forces in

their home locations. Examples of the latter include the construction of a National

Surveillance Centre in Western Samoa in 1990-91, facilities for the Tonga Defence

19 Defence Cooperation, Inspector General Division, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1995, pp. 2-1, 2-2. 20 ‘Defence Cooperation Program,’ Report by The Australian National Audit Office, 2001 [cited 24 July 2005]. Available from http://www.anao.gov.au/WebSite.nsf/Publications. 21 Defence Cooperation, 1995, p. 1-2. 22 See Ball, Desmond, and Pauline Kerr. Presumptive Security. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1996, p. 90.

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Services (by Australian Army Engineers) in 1985 and 1999 and patrol boat bases in

several South Pacific nations.24 Linked to the DCP have been other efforts that have

provided significant security capabilities: for example, the equipping of some regional

nations with patrol boats under the Pacific Patrol Boat Program.25 The relationship of

most pre-9/11 ADO regional cooperation to Australia’s homeland security, however, was

of the peripheral ‘good regional citizen’ type with relatively little emphasis on

development of direct benefit to Australia. Defence itself has shown little interest in

cooperation with regional states to enhance their ‘resilience’ where this is concerned with

non-military functions, such as governance or economic development.26

In addition to training, construction and equipment efforts, the ADO has a long history of

cooperation with regional countries in intelligence matters. Bi-lateral conferences

between intelligence officers have been a form of engagement with some countries for

many years, although the level and significance of information shared varied

considerably according to the nature of relations with the specific nations involved.

Nevertheless, the professional relationships established between Defence intelligence

staffs facilitated information exchanges and added to Australia’s national intelligence

capabilities within the region.

Overall, it is fair to say that the ADO did play a role in Australia’s homeland security

through regional cooperation in the pre-9/11 period, although this was more through

participation in a national ‘good regional citizen’ strategy than through any measures

designed to specifically target potential threats. Although cooperation did contribute to

the development within the region of operational capabilities with homeland security

application, such as tactical counter-terrorism and intelligence, this was done more to

enhance the general stability of the region by improving neighbours’ resistance to threats

to themselves than to avert attacks against Australia.

23 Paul Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986, p. 36. As cited in Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Security, 1996, p. 58. 24 Defence Annual Report 1990-1991, p. 63. Also Allan Shepherd, "Australian Defence Cooperation Program," (Parliamentary Research Paper No 4 1993), edited by Parliamentary Research Service. Canberra: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1993, pp.29-41. 25 The Pacific Patrol Boat Program is a component of the DCP. ‘The Defence Cooperation Program,’ (ANAO Report) 2001. 26 Ball and Kerr. Presumptive Security, 1996, p. 59.

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2. Strengthen regional CT capabilities

Improving the CT capabilities of regional countries promises to enhance Australia’s

homeland security by reducing potential attackers’ abilities to base themselves in those

countries. Although arguably not a homeland security objective, the personal security of

individual Australians abroad in the region is also enhanced if the countries through

which they travel are better able to counter terrorism threats within their respective

territories.

The ADO played a practical role in the enhancement of regional CT capabilities for some

time prior to 9/11, usually through training. The Special Air Service Regiment, for

example, conducted a reasonably extensive combined exercise and reciprocal training

program throughout the region. Combined CT training exercises involving the SASR

began to be reported in annual Defence Reports from the mid-1980s. ‘War roles’

exercises with the Special Forces of regional countries had been conducted from the

1970s and, beginning around 1990, these began to occur regularly with Brunei, Malaysia,

Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and, eventually Indonesia. 27,28 Most of these exercises

were scheduled on an annual or bi-annual basis.29 Although much of this was an

extension of broader ‘Defence Cooperation,’ it often included training and exercises with

a counter-terrorism dimension. During the 1990s, the emphasis on counter-terrorism

training increased gradually, in recognition of a growing terrorist threat in the region.

Countries involved in combined counter-terrorism training and exercises included

Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia.

The SASR’s impressive reputation among the elite Special Forces ‘community’ may

have increased its effectiveness as a means of building regional CT capabilities. The

opportunity to train with the SASR, including the chance to experience its elaborate CT

training facilities within Australia, would be an attractive draw card for forces with

similar aspirations and may have broken down barriers to this form of engagement. By

facilitating cooperation in this way, the ADO’s CT capabilities may have performed an

27 Horner, Phantoms of War, 2002, p. 416. 28 Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Security, 1996, pp. 137-40. 29 Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Security, 1996, pp. 137-40.

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important role in the development of regional CT capabilities. Pre-9/11, however,

regional capabilities would have been seen as having only peripheral implications for

Australia’s homeland security.

3. Build political will among regional governments

The political will of regional governments is of benefit to Australia’s homeland security

when it is turned to addressing challenges that involve mutual threats. In Australia’s

region, such challenges include internal security problems that create environments in

which terrorists can shelter or even grow, and from which they can threaten Australia.

The nurturing of political will is traditionally a role for Australia’s political leaders or

diplomats, but the ADO has played an important role as a ‘collateral’ effect of Defence

Cooperation and other activities. This role operates in a number of ways:

By providing political access through military-to-military engagement: especially

effective in countries in which the military plays a political role. This form of

engagement often occurs in the course of regional defence cooperation, which, if

sustained, can allow professional relationships to develop that can be useful in

strengthening political will.30

By encouraging political confidence in other national security institutions. This

can be achieved by improving the capabilities and professionalism of security

forces through combined training and other forms of capability development.

Whether the ADO has contributed positively or negatively to this mission is arguable.

Australia’s involvement in East Timor from 1999, for example, may have antagonised

Indonesia and reduced its political will to combat anti-Western terrorism.

4. International coalition against terrorism & the US alliance

Although the ‘International Coalition against Terror’ (ICAT) and the counter-terrorism

context of the US alliance are post-9/11 phenomena, this mission area does have some

relevance to the pre-9/11 period and overlaps to an extent with the earlier mission to

30 Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Security, 1996, p. 92.

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‘Strengthen Regional CT Capabilities.’ The ADO was involved in focused international

counter-terrorism efforts with application to homeland security, well before 2001. The

combined CT training described above provides examples of this and may have

contributed to effective coalition-building post-9/11 in two ways:

By improving regional capabilities, enabling countries to be more comfortable

committing resources to coalition efforts.

By establishing professional relationships that greatly facilitate coalition making

and function.

The significance of the US alliance to homeland security efforts within Australian

territory in the pre-9/11 period, and the ADO’s role in promoting that alliance, is not

clear. CT training was conducted with a range of US agencies from the 1980s which may

have contributed to Australia’s homeland security by allowing local capabilities to be

benchmarked against overseas practice and useful techniques to be imported back into

Australia. For example, the SASR trained with the FBI Hostage Rescue Teams – the US

Federal Government’s high-end ‘TAG’ capability.31 This professional contact may also

have contributed to the ‘offshore’ dimension of homeland security that emerged post-

9/11 - finding and defeating threats before they can arrive in Australia – by facilitating

successful coalition-building ‘on the ground.’ For example, during the early phases of

Operation Enduring Freedom (Australia’s Operation SLIPPER – involvement in the

Coalition attack on Afghanistan in 2001-2002), Australian Special Forces conducted

missions as part of a campaign plan devised and implemented by the US. Aided by a

long history of combined training, Australian and US forces had developed a degree of

mutual respect that may have facilitated the incorporation of Australian contributions into

US-led operational plans.

The US, UK and Canada are Australia’s partners in a quadripartite arrangement -

colloquially, the ‘four-eyes’ community - that shares a mutual ‘most favoured nation’

relationship. In practice, this relationship is actually ‘five-eyes,’ with New Zealand

31 Personal Conversation with Colonel Peter (‘Gus’) Gilmore, former Commanding Officer, SASR, 18 May 2005.

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effectively a member through a generous interpretation of ‘observer’ status since 1965

and full membership since 2006.32 The community manifests itself as the Australia-

Britain-Canada-America (ABCA) Armies Program and its equivalents in the other

services as well as technical and intelligence fora.33 The aims of the five-eyes

relationship are cooperation across the spectrum of Defence functions and

interoperability. The other five-eyes countries were significant partners in information

and training exchanges and sometimes provided Australia with important research data or

capabilities: for example, some of the Joint Incident Response Unit’s technical

capabilities for CBRN response during the Sydney 2000 Games were provided by the US

and UK and specialist training was provided by Canada. Access to this assistance was

facilitated by long-established ADO relationships, especially those formed within The

Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP) - the Science & Technology manifestation of the

wider five-eyes community.34

As a general conclusion, the ADO’s contribution to the national homeland security

mission of supporting the ICAT and the US alliance, in the pre-9/11 period, was one of

investing in the establishment and maintenance of relationships. While this yielded some

very significant benefits pre-9/11, its true value needs to be gauged against the post-9/11

setting.

5. Countering WMD proliferation

Countering the proliferation of WMD, especially in Australia’s region, first appeared as a

Defence policy issue in the Strategic Basis paper, Strategic Review 1993, which

identified counter-proliferation as an important Defence task.35 WMD had been

mentioned in earlier strategic guidance: the 1976 White Paper had noted the Soviet

nuclear buildup.36 The Defence of Australia 1987 determined that no regional threat from

WMD was in prospect.37 Australia’s Strategic Planning in the 1990s identified the

32 ABCA Armies Program [cited 11 April 2007]. Available from http://www.abca-armies.org/Default.aspx?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1. 33 ABCA Armies Program [cited 11 April 2007]. 34 Defence Report 1969, p. 7. 35 Strategic Review 1993, Directorate of Publications, Canberra, 1993, para. 2.17. 36 Australian Defence 1976, Australian Government Printing Office, Canberra, 1976, p.11. 37 The Defence of Australia 1987, Australian Government Printing Office, Canberra, 1987, para. 4.35.

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possibility of proliferation in Southeast Asia associated with Indian-Pakistani

competition.38

Nevertheless, Defence had been involved in counter-proliferation efforts much earlier.

DSTO specialists took part in international investigations of alleged used of chemical

weapons during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. A notable contribution was made by Dr.

Peter Dunn, later head of the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence (NBCD)

research area of DSTO. Dr. Dunn was a member of the first international investigation

team in 1983.39 DSTO scientists continued to support UN investigations on the use of

chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War during the 1980s.40 Both ADF and DSTO

personnel supported the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) investigating Iraq’s WMD

programs after the 1990 Gulf War. The very significant Australian involvement in

brokering the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was assisted with technical advice

from DSTO scientists, one of the most notable of whom was Dr. Bob Matthews, who was

a key participant in disarmament efforts from the late 1980s.41 The Defence Intelligence

Organisation (DIO) also contributed to national awareness of WMD threats.

Although Defence has clearly had a lengthy association with national efforts to curb the

proliferation of WMD, this was mainly in a supporting role, with the Department of

Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) taking the lead as part of a diplomatic agenda.

Nevertheless, the indispensability of Defence’s unique technical expertise was recognised

in the 1987 White Paper, which noted that Defence maintained scientific competence in

nuclear, biological and chemical defence (NBCD) for policy advice purposes.42

The significance of WMD counter-proliferation as a homeland security role pre-9/11 can

only be inferred, although the potential problem of ‘loose nukes’ certainly arose in

security debates from the 1980s. WMD proliferation must, therefore, be extrapolated

into a threat to the Australian homeland. While this is not unreasonable, the available

38 Australia’s Strategic Planning in the 1990s, Government Printing Office, Canberra, 1990, pp.2,18. 39 Defence Report 1983-1984, p. 19. 40 Defence Report 1985-1986, p. 99. 41 Numerous personal discussions with Dr. Matthews, 1993-1998. 42 The Defence of Australia 1987, para. 4.36. This was reiterated more specifically in Strategic Review 1993, para. 2.22; and in the 1994 White Paper, Defending Australia 1994 (DA 94), Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1994, paras. 10.24 and 12.31.

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Government documents do not indicate that homeland security was a principal motivator

of the counter-proliferation policy. Rather, counter-proliferation was pursued because it

was assessed that the appearance of WMD in the region would be de-stabilising.

Whatever the reason, it is clear that, from the late 1980s, Defence had a clear role in

policy development and implementation because of its unique technical expertise.

6. Fusing intelligence

Since 9/11, several there have been several investigations in Australia and overseas of the

effectiveness of national intelligence systems, especially in relation to apparent failures to

accurately predict significant threats (such as the 9/11 attacks themselves, or the status of

Iraq’s WMD programs).43 A common finding of those investigations was that the ability

to ‘fuse’ information from various sources is critical to developing timely, actionable

intelligence.44

Prior to 9/11, national responsibility for intelligence on homeland security threats rested

with the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). ASIO’s mission is ‘To

provide advice to protect Australia and its people from threats to national security.’45 By

implication, ASIO was thus also responsible for fusing all-source information to develop

that intelligence. Given ASIO’s primacy in this area, the ADO could only perform a

supporting or contributing role in intelligence fusion.

Evidence of Defence’s role in the development of homeland security intelligence pre-

9/11 is necessarily scant, due to the classified nature of such work. The unique nature of

certain Defence intelligence capabilities, however, indicates that they would make

valuable contributions to the intelligence effort. The signals intelligence (SIGINT)

capabilities of the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), while optimised for looking

outside Australia, provide one example of powerful capabilities with potential application

43 Examples are the ‘9/11 Commission,’ which investigated the failure of the US intelligence community to predict those attacks; and the Flood Report into Australia’s intelligence community. 44 For example, US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and US House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Report of the Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001." Washington: Congress of the United States, 2002, pp. xi-xvii. Also Philip Flood, "Report of the Inquiry Into Australian Intelligence Agencies." Canberra: Australian Government, 2004: Chapter 8 “Findings and Recommendations.” 45 ASIO website, http://www.asio.gov.au/About/comp.htm viewed 20 August 2005.

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to homeland security. The imagery intelligence (IMINT) capabilities of the Defence

Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO) could be similarly useful. The

employment of these capabilities in domestic security situations raises significant legal

issues, however, especially where ‘eavesdropping’ techniques are concerned.

The third member of the Defence intelligence triumvirate, the Defence Intelligence

Organisation (DIO), could also be expected to make valuable contributions to the

national homeland security intelligence picture because of its unique capacities. Two

important contributions are likely. First, by exercising its international connections, DIO

could act as a conduit for data from allied nations. Second, DIO could assist with data

requiring special technical analysis through its technical intelligence (TECHINT)

capabilities. DIO could also be useful in bringing the deep scientific expertise of DSTO

into play where necessary.

The ADO’s role in intelligence fusion in support of homeland security pre-9/11 is

therefore likely to have been a supporting one, in which it contributed unique capabilities

developed for other purposes as well as information obtained through its own intelligence

networks. The actual fusion of intelligence was ASIO’s responsibility, but the ADO was

clearly a player in the process.

7. Assessments of threats, risks & vulnerabilities

Prior to 9/11, Australia did not have a sophisticated threat assessment and warning

system. As with all aspects of intelligence for homeland security, responsibility for threat

assessments rested with ASIO. Because of its unique capabilities, however, the ADO

was a contributor of information and specialist advice to the threat, risk and vulnerability

assessment process as it was to the intelligence fusion function, with the same agencies

involved.

An example of an ADO contribution to threat assessment was provided during Operation

Gold (support to the Sydney 2000 Games). For Operation Gold, the ADO integrated

closely with the dedicated Olympics intelligence organisation and provided some

specialist threat assessment tools. On such tool was a blast modeling capability that

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could be used to assess the damage that could be inflicted on buildings and people by

bombs. This was sourced by the ADF through international connections.

8. Collection and dissemination of intelligence

As with other aspects of intelligence for homeland security, ASIO has primary

responsibility for collection and dissemination. The ADO nevertheless contributes to

collection through its unique capabilities and sources, as described above.

11. Immigration

Responsibility for immigration management as a homeland security function lies with the

Department of Immigration, Multi-cultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA). Prior to

9/11, the ADO’s major contribution to this function was, fundamentally, support to

border security in relation to illegal immigration.

Substantial illegal immigrant arrivals – or attempted arrivals – via sea vessels have

occurred periodically since the fall of South Vietnam in 1975.46 ADO involvement with

this phenomenon is best demonstrated by the Navy’s ‘constabulary’ role in maritime

security, whereby patrolling naval vessels might detect and apprehend a vessel suspected

of carrying illegal immigrants where such a task was beyond the capabilities of civilian

agencies.47 Air Force maritime patrol aircraft might also be involved in the detection and

subsequent interrogation of vessels suspected of carrying illegal immigrants.

Illegal immigration is one means by which criminals or terrorists could enter Australia

undetected. As such, it constitutes a homeland security threat. The danger posed by

illegal immigration was realised in the late 1990s, when organised ‘people smuggling’

operations began delivering increasing numbers of people directly onto Australian

sovereign territory, usually by sea.

The incident involving the MV Tampa in August 2001 illustrates a shift in Government

policy in this area of homeland security which has amplified the ADO’s role. Tampa, a

46 The first wave of ‘boat people,’ 1976-1981, consisted of 56 boats containing about 2100 people. ‘The Detention of Boat People,’ Current Issues Brief 8 2000-01, Parliamentary Library [cited 20 August 2005]. Available from http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/2000-01/01cib08.htm.

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Norwegian-flagged ship, had rescued a large number of people from a sinking people-

smuggling vessel that was attempting to reach Australia. The Tampa’s captain

subsequently attempted to disembark the survivors at the Australian territory of

Christmas Island. At that point, the Australian Government decided not to allow the

survivors onto Australian soil as either refugees or immigrants until they had been

screened and their status determined.48 This led to the development of the ‘Pacific

Solution,’ whereby holding areas for suspected illegal immigrants were established on

neighbouring Pacific islands. People could be held in these areas while their immigration

applications were processed.

The ADO’s involvement in the management of illegal immigration, including the

implementation of the ‘Pacific Solution,’ was extensive. In addition to its long-standing

contribution to ‘routine’ maritime security and patrol duties in a ‘constabulary’ role, the

ADO provided transportation for illegal immigrants to holding areas on naval vessels and

was involved in the actual construction of holding facilities on the island of Nauru.49 On

3 September 2001, the commitment of ADO resources to the interception of suspected

illegal immigrant vessels was formalised in Operation RELEX. Operation RELEX

involved the deployment of Royal Australian Navy vessels and Air Force maritime patrol

aircraft.50

13. Border surveillance

As an island nation, surveillance of Australia’s borders occurs either at ports of entry, or

in the surrounding littoral. Australia does have ‘sea borders’ with Papua New Guinea,

(across the Torres Strait), Indonesia (across the Arafura Sea) and Timor Leste (across the

Timor Sea), while the coastline and surrounding territorial sea constitute a more general

47 Australian Maritime Doctrine (RAN Doctrine 1), Defence Publishing Service, Canberra, 2000, p. 69. 48 Secret file: Operation Relex, Sydney Morning Herald, 27 October 2002 [cited24 July 2005]. Available from www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/10/27/1035683303429.htm. 49 An element of 21 Construction Squadron, an Army Engineer unit, deployed for this task. 50 This continued into 2006 as Operation RELEX II. ‘Australian Defence Force Operations,’ [cited 5 September 2005]. Available from http://www.defence.gov.au/globalops.cfm#relex2. RELEX II has subsequently been combined with Operations CRANBERRY, CELESTA and MISTRAL to form Operation RESOLUTE Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston, "High organisational tempo" Defence, September 2006, p. 7.

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form of maritime border. In the remote areas of northern Australia, the immediate

hinterland can also be included as a ‘border area.’

Surveillance at ports and airports is the responsibility of the Customs and Immigration

services and has not been a task for the ADO in recent decades. The ADO has, however,

long been involved in surveillance of the sea borders, maritime approaches and remote

coastal areas.51 As the previous section indicates, maritime patrol (by both naval vessels

and aircraft) is a ‘traditional’ task for the ADF which makes a significant contribution to

border security. To a degree, the ADF has even structured to perform this task – the

Royal Australian Navy’s Patrol Boat Force Element Group (FEG) exists primarily for

maritime patrol of Australia’s coastline.52

Less well known ADF contributions to border surveillance are made by the Army and Air

Force. The Army’s Regional Force Surveillance Units (RFSUs)53 are Reserve units that

were established in the 1980s as part of the ‘Defence of Australia’ paradigm of low-level

contingencies. Their original purpose was to provide a ground surveillance capability in

remote areas across the north of Australia in order to detect and monitor foreign military

incursions. In their every day operation, the RFSUs provide periodic surveillance

coverage of the north that draws heavily on the local knowledge of their members. RFSU

patrols have been employed in detecting unauthorised incursions onto Australian territory

by criminals and illegal immigrants.54 Although not intended for homeland security as

the concept has emerged since 9/11, the function of the RFSUs has been, from their

inception, fully consistent with that idea.

In addition to maritime patrol aircraft, Air Force has surveillance of Australia’s borders

through the Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN). Although intended as an air

defence sensor, JORN has nevertheless proven capable of detecting a range of other

51 References to ADF ‘civil coastal surveillance’ tasks can be found in Defence Reports as far back as the 1970s. 52 Personal conversation with Vice Admiral C. Ritchie, Chief of Navy, 20 May 2005. 53 These consist of NORFORCE (Darwin/Top End), The Pilbara Regiment (Karatha/Pilbara) and 52nd Battalion, The Far North Queensland Regiment (Cairns/Cape York). 54 Warren Snowdon, Border Protection: The Border Protection Legislation Amendment (Deterrence of Illegal Foreign Fishing) Bill 2005 (speech to the House of Representatives, 17 March 2005), Parliament of Australia, 2005 [cited 15 January 2006]. Available from http://www.warrensnowdon.com/speeches/050317a.htm.

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signatures that could be used to cue other surveillance measures. JORN is another

example of a Defence capability that contributed ‘incidentally’ to Australia’s border

security as a secondary role.

The coordination of all ADF ‘border security’ efforts in northern Australia is the

responsibility of Northern Command (NORCOM), which was established in the late

1980s as part of the re-focusing of Defence attention on the northern approaches.

Located in Darwin, NORCOM’s principal concern was military threats to Australia but it

nevertheless provided a coordinating function for all Defence activities in its area of

operations, including those associated with ‘incidental’ homeland security missions.

Prior to 9/11, therefore, the ADO had a long history of direct involvement in surveillance

of Australia’s maritime borders through the maritime patrol function. Other capabilities,

such as NORCOM, the RFSUs and JORN, which were designed for more conventional

surveillance missions against military threats, evolved an incidental contribution to

homeland security because of their utility.

15. Aviation transport

The security of civilian air transport was a relatively low-key affair in Australia prior to

9/11. Although Australia complied with all standards of the International Air Transport

Association (IATA), security was principally a matter of passenger, baggage and cargo

screening at airports and monitoring of flight progress through the air traffic control

system. The ADO had no specific role in aviation transport security prior to 9/11,

although an ‘incidental’ role could be inferred because of the broad utility of capabilities

such as JORN.

An implied aviation security role existed for the Air Force. As the only Australian

Government agency with the ability to intercept and, if necessary, apply force against an

aircraft, the Air Force could have been tasked with an air intercept mission if one were

required. The only example of such a mission having been performed in an aviation

security role was the shooting down of a ‘rogue’ pilotless civilian aircraft in 1955. This

was undertaken as a no-notice task for safety reasons, to prevent the aircraft crashing in

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the Sydney urban area.55 With the exception of such contingencies, aviation transport

security was not a role for the ADO prior to 9/11.

16. Maritime transport

The ADO’s involvement in maritime transport security, as a homeland security role, can

be gauged from the examples already discussed under the Border Surveillance and

Immigration functions. The Royal Australian’s Navy’s operational doctrine has long

identified a ‘constabulary’ role in maritime security, which is the primary task of the

Patrol Boat Force Element Group (FEG).56 In addition to this role, since July 1999 the

Navy has provided a serving Rear Admiral to serve as the Director General of

Coastwatch, the Federal Government’s coastal surveillance agency.57

The Navy’s contribution to maritime transport security was especially important prior to

9/11, because it included a robust patrol and intercept capability. Although maritime

security was also provided by Customs vessels and, closer to shore, by state police assets,

only the Navy had the ability to forcibly stop a vessel and conduct a non-permissive

boarding.

Another arcane ADO contribution to Australia’s maritime security was safety coverage

for visits by nuclear-powered ships. Defence is a key participant in the interdepartmental

Visiting Ships Panel (Nuclear) that is responsible for planning and coordinating all safety

measures associated with such visits and Navy assets provide emergency response

capabilities.58

55 Auster aircraft VH-AET, which took off pilotless from Bankstown Airport after a start-up mishap, was eventually shot down by two Royal Australian Navy Sea Fury fighters on 30 August 1955. An interesting account of the ‘intercept’ is available at http://www.navy.gov.au/units/805sqn/Auster_Shootdown.pdf, [cited 21 July 2005]. 56 Andrew Forbes. Protecting the National Interest: Naval Constabulary Operations in Australia's Exclusive Zone. Canberra: Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre, 2002, p.4. 57 Coastwatch – Organisation. Australian Customs Service website [cited 20 August 2005]. Aavailable from http://www.customs.gov.au/site/page.cfm?u=4297. 58 Department of Environment and Health website [cited 20 August 2005]. Available from http://www.deh.gov.au/about/annual-report/00-01/ss5participation.html.

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19. Physical security (of infrastructure)

Under Australia’s Constitution, the physical security of infrastructure is the responsibility

of either State or Federal Governments, according to the ownership of the infrastructure

in question. For the purposes of this study, ‘infrastructure’ is defined as structures and

facilities that have economic, social or military importance for Australian society.

Examples would include:

Transport nodes and networks, such as ports, airfields and road and rail systems.

Public utilities centres and networks, such as power stations, distribution grids

and dams.

Government service centres, such as hospitals.

Prior to 9/11, the ADO’s role in the protection of Australia’s infrastructure in ‘peacetime’

was limited to the security of Commonwealth Government facilities (especially Defence

assets) during periods of security threat – for example, the deployment of Defence Force

personnel to secure Government buildings during the Victorian Police strikes of the

1920s.59 In times of conflict, especially the scenarios of ‘low-level contingencies’ in the

north of Australia posed as part of the ‘Defence of Australia’ doctrine, the ADF might

have a more specific role in the protection of ‘vital assets.’ In the late 1980s, Vital Asset

Protection (VAP) became a formal role for some Army Reserve units. The intention was

that units would train and organise so that, in the event of a hostile incursion onto

Australian territory, they could deploy to and protect designated assets within their areas

of operations.

The expertise of Defence personnel was also called on from time to time to conduct

security assessments for key assets, including some in Southeastern Australia. Prior to

9/11, however, infrastructure security was not seen as a significant Defence role other

than in times of ‘conventional’ conflict.

59 Joan Beaumont, Australian Defence Sources and Statistics, The Australian Centenary History of Defence, Vol. VI, Oxford: Melbourne, p. 382.

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21. Disease control, health & medical services

As with most other human services, support to the health of the general population is a

State and Federal Government responsibility in Australia. Australia has a long history of

Government-funded public health care, in which the ADO has rarely played a part except

during emergencies. That support is usually provided for a limited period under Defence

Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC) provisions.60 Apart from support to natural

disaster management, an unusual example of Defence support to a disease-related

emergency was the deployment, in 1999, of a number of Navy personnel to assist with

the containment of an avian disease outbreak in the New South Wales poultry industry.61

Prior to 9/11, therefore, the ADO had only a limited role in the day-to-day provision of

health-related services for homeland security purposes. One important role was played,

however, by the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) and, to a lesser

extent, by the ADF’s medical services. This role emerged during the 1990s as civilian

jurisdictions began to consider threats from WMD. The ADO’s unique expertise in the

medical aspects of WMD use and protection was useful in developing medical response

capabilities among various State health services. DSTO personnel were also included on

the Crisis Action Panel of Experts (CAPE) for significant medical events, and DSTO’s

laboratory capabilities were available to the Public Health Laboratory Network for

WMD-related threats. The WMD-related aspects of public health, therefore, did provide

a role for the ADO based on unique capabilities.

22. Mass gatherings

As with all events that occur within the ‘civilian’ domain, the security of mass gatherings

is ordinarily a State responsibility. ADO roles in mass gathering security are usually

associated with assisting civilian authorities to meet ‘surge’ requirements for short

periods. In most cases, prior to 9/11, this support did not involve the use of force and

could be as simple as providing loans of tentage or barrier materials or the operation of

special communication networks. In a number of cases associated with major ‘special

60 DACC is explained in more detail in Appendix 3. 61 Animal Health Australia, Animal Health in Australia 1999, p. 51, [cited 19 August 2005]. Available from http://www.aahc.com.au/status/ahiareport/1999/other_significant.pdf.

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events,’ however, sustained support was required over long periods. The most obvious

example of this ADO role pre-9/11 is the support provided to the Sydney 2000 Games.62

23. Dignitary protection

The protection of Australian and visiting foreign dignitaries is a well-established State

and Federal Government responsibility: as noted above, it was one of the reasons for

establishing the PSCC in 1976.63

Pre-9/11, the ADO’s role in dignitary protection was usually in the context of surge and

specialist support, much as was also required for special event or mass gathering security.

The 1978 Bowral deployment for the CHOGRM is a spectacular example of ADF

support in extremis, and Operation Gold generated significant tasking for specialist ADF

bomb search capabilities. The ADO’s role in dignitary protection on Australian territory,

however, was generally a supporting one.64

24. Public awareness

The homeland security mission of public awareness has many dimensions. One

important effect is to encourage public support for security measures through an informed

appreciation of realistic threats. Public awareness is also useful when it emphasises the

effectiveness of security measures. This offers two benefits: first, it can create a ‘denial’

effect on terrorist activity by discouraging attacks. This requires sophisticated

management of the information released, giving just sufficient visibility to security

measures to convince would-be terrorists of their effectiveness without compromising

operational security. This aspect of public awareness could be considered an element of

defensive ‘information operations.’ Second, it can promote public confidence in security

measures. Finally, raising public knowledge of threat indicators enables the population to

be enlisted as ‘sensors’ or intelligence sources.

62 A major case study of Operation Gold, the Defence support to the 2000 Games, is contained in the preceding chapter. Other examples of mass gatherings or special events that received significant ADO support include the 1982 Commonwealth Games and Expo ’88 in Brisbane. 63 James Crown, Australia: The Terrorist Connection, p. 141. 64 Support has included the provision of bomb search teams and explosive detection dogs to assist State police forces. Defence Report 1992-1993, p. 61.

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Primacy in public awareness campaigns has always rested with non-Defence Government

agencies as a matter of policy. For example, at the Federal level the Attorney General’s

Department or the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet might be responsible for

homeland security-related public information. Prior to 9/11, Defence played, at best, a

supporting role by participating in media events and providing technical advice to public

statements. For the Sydney 2000 Games, for example, the Attorney General’s

Department was responsible for public information in relation to all Commonwealth

contributions to Games security.65

25. Preparedness & prevention

The grouping of ‘preparedness’ and ‘prevention’ as homeland security missions is a

reflection of the post-9/11 National Counter-Terrorism Plan, which lists these as two

pillars of the four-part counter-terrorism strategy of ‘Preparedness, Prevention, Response

and Recovery.’66 Although this construct post-dates 9/11, it is nevertheless a relevant

‘check list’ item for the ADO’s contribution to homeland security prior to that time.

Preparedness and prevention necessarily speak to the operational side of homeland

security. The ADO’s involvement in these roles pre-9/11 was significant. This is

demonstrated by fact that the national agency responsible for disaster preparedness,

EMA, was originally a branch of the Department of Defence.

Preparedness and prevention suggest things that are done in anticipation of an event.

They therefore comprehend not only preventive measures, but also preparations to

respond should prevention fail. Preparedness thus includes planning for response and

recovery and the design, establishment, training and equipping of response capabilities.

Prior to 9/11, the ADO maintained some of those capabilities itself (for example, the

SASR Tactical Assault Group) but it also played a major role in planning for homeland

security incidents and in training and equipping state and federal response capabilities.

65 Personal conversations (various) with Joint Task Force 112 (‘Task Force Gold’) staff, 1999-2000. 66 National Counter-Terrorism Plan, [cited 20 August 2005]. Available from http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/NationalSecurityHome.nsf/Page/RWPCD8501294925DA06CA256D42001C1A4C?OpenDocument#responsibilities.

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Examples of ADO involvement in homeland security preparedness and prevention

missions include:

Planning for, coordinating and, in some cases, funding national emergency

response capabilities, through EMA. EMA was responsible for developing and

maintaining the national Disaster Plans (DISPLANs), which included some for

efforts of a ‘civil defence’ nature that now fit under the general description of

homeland security. These are known as Commonwealth Disaster Plans, or

COMDISPLANS; or Australian Contingency Plans (AUSCONPLANS). For

example, AUSCONPLAN SPRED (Space Re-Entry Debris), which has a

significant radiological hazard dimension.

Maintaining national stocks of specialist equipment for disaster response. For

example, EMA held the national stock of radiological detection equipment for use

in the event of a nuclear attack on Australia or other significant radiological

hazard incident and coordinated its maintenance through Defence.67

Providing training to civilian agencies in homeland security-related fields in

which Defence had special expertise. For example:

Improvised explosive device disposal (IEDD). Australia had no

significant IEDD capabilities, at either state or federal levels, until after

1978. The Defence Report 1973 mentions Army supplying explosive

ordnance expertise in response to ‘numerous requests for assistance’ from

the states.68 Little documentary detail exists as to what the Army’s IEDD

capability then consisted of, but it was most likely of an unsophisticated

nature although the British Wheelbarrow remote positioning device (RPD –

a bomb disposal ‘robot’) was introduced into the ADF during the 1970s.69

Support tasks involved mostly conventional explosive ordnance disposal of

ex-military munitions that were found in the community, rather than

67 Personal conversation with Mr. Don Patterson, EMA, 24 March 2005. 68 Defence Report 1973, p. 12. 69 Defence Report 1988-1989, p. 31.

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IEDD.70 Although police and ADF ‘bomb squads’ did exist, their

capabilities were limited to those needed to address the unsophisticated

domestic bombing threats that had existed up until that time.71

After the 1978 Hilton bombing, a more elaborate capability was pursued by

Defence, led by the Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps’ (RAAOC)

Ammunition Technical trade. The Army was able to exercise professional

linkages with the British Army to acquire reasonably rapidly a modern

capability based on the UK’s, which was informed by Northern Ireland

experience. Police training in IEDD was delivered by the ADF through the

RAAOC Centre’s Ammunition Wing until at least the late 1980s. A

transition of responsibility for police bomb technician training from the

ADF to the police began in 1985-86 and continued the following year,

although some ADF instructor and facilities support was still required.

From then onwards police forces progressively assumed responsibility for

training their own bomb technicians.72 Even after 1995, Defence supported

police training by supplying equipment.73

Special recovery. ‘Special recovery’ is the ADF term that has evolved to

refer to the ‘classical’ CT capability for the forcible resolution of hostage-

siege situations.74 No sophisticated special recovery capability existed in

any Australian jurisdiction prior to 1978. An ADF role in support to civilian

police forces for counter terrorism response, in a Defence Aid to the Civil

Power, was identified in the 1976 Defence White Paper. 75 The Foreign

Affairs and Defence Committee of Cabinet had decided in 1976 that a

specialist counter terrorist capability should be developed within the

70 Defence Reports from the period consistently report seven or eight times the number of conventional explosive ordnance disposal tasks as IEDD tasks. 71 Personal conversation with Mr. Terry Vincent, Director, Australian Bomb Data Centre, 11 August 2005. 72 Defence Report 1985-1986, p. 40; and 1986-1987, p. 36. 73 Although responsibility for training had notionally passed to the police, significant ADF instructor support continued to be provided up until 1995 and equipment and facilities support after 1995. Personal conversation with Mr. Bruce Schiefelbein, former Officer Commanding Ammunition Wing, RAAOC Centre, 1 April 2005. 74 Ian McPhedran, The Amazing SAS, Sydney: Harper-Collins, 2005, p. 116. 75 Australian Defence 1976, p. 27.

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Defence Force.76 The ADF began moving to establish regional ‘Response

Forces’ for CT support during 1977 but the first training was only delivered

in November of that year.77 Acquisition of a sophisticated capability began

to be studied in 1977 (accelerating after the Hilton bombing in February

1978), was subsequently recommended by the Hope Royal Commission,

was directed by Government on 3 May 1979 and was pursued by the SASR,

which exercised its connections with the British Army to develop a

capability quite rapidly.78 Like the IEDD capability, this was heavily based

on a UK model: in this case, the UK special recovery capability.79 Counter

terrorist special recovery training and exercises, including training with state

and territory police forces, began to be reported formally from 1981.80 State

police forces also pursued a special recovery capability, albeit it at a lower

level than SASR’s, and training was delivered to the states by SASR up

until the mid-1990s.81,82 As with IEDD training, the ADF’s role in police

special recovery training declined during the late 1990s.83 The reason for

this is unclear, but it is probably attributable to two factors. First, the Police

had accumulated sufficient expertise, equipment and experience to conduct

training independently. Second, the police may have perceived a need to

incorporate their ‘minimum force’ philosophy into the training, rather than

the ADF’s more aggressive approach.84

Search. ‘Search’ describes a set of capabilities developed by the British

Army in response to terrorist threats associated with the troubles in

Northern Ireland. As the term implies, it involves looking for items of

concern, such as explosive devices, weapons or other contraband. The

76 "Cabinet Minute: Decision No. 1657 (FAD): Policy and Organization to Counter International Terrorism." 1976., p. 1. 77 David Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2002, p. 420. 78 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, pp. 421, 423. Also Defence Report 1978, p. 12; and 1984-1985, p. 26. 79 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, p. 427. 80 Defence Report 1981, p. 26. 81 William Dodson, The Sharp End, Sydney: Pan MacMillan, 2001, pp. 67, 151, 166-177. 82 Personal conversation with Colonel Peter Gilmore, Commanding Officer SASR 2001-02, 18 May 2005. 83 Dodson, The Sharp End, p. 180. 84 Personal conversation with Colonel Peter Gilmore, Commanding Officer SASR 2001-02, 18 May 2005.

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range of search disciplines consists of ‘low risk’ search, which involves

simple physical searching where there is little or no danger from threats

such as explosive devices; ‘high risk’ search, where a physical danger exists

or where the consequences of inadequate searching are significant; and

‘technical’ or ‘specialist’ search (THRS), which uses sophisticated

equipment and highly skilled operators to provide the most thorough

possible level of searching. Physical searches by people can be assisted by

‘sniffer’ dogs, which are usually explosive detection dogs (EDDs) but can

include dogs trained to detect other things. Search capabilities have

normally been employed in Australia in association with major public

events or VIP visits, such as the Brisbane 1982 Commonwealth Games or

the Sydney 2000 Games.85,86

A search capability requires training for operators (‘searchers’) as well as

‘search advisers’ who plan and control search operations. Most civilian

police jurisdictions in Australia maintain a low-risk search capability as well

as an EDD capability. The ADF provided training for Police search

advisers until the late 1990s, through the Army’s School of Military

Engineering. Significantly, that training was based on the skill set

developed for Army Search Advisers up until that time, which did not

incorporate the THRS capability. The NSWPS developed the most

extensive Search Adviser capabilities, probably due to the close proximity

of the School of Military Engineering, in western Sydney. 87 Other states

had less sophisticated capabilities.

CBR ‘first responder’ skills. The ADO has maintained a low level of

nuclear, biological and chemical defence (NBCD) capability since the First

World War. In more recent years, this has consisted of little more than a

‘familiarisation’ level of operational capability, with a small cadre of

85 Defence Reports 1982-1983, p. 20; and 1992-1993, p. 61. 86 The Australian Army in Profile, 2000, pp.80-1. 87 Various personal conversations with Senior Sergeant Mark Sowter, NSWPS Search Adviser with the Sydney 2000 Games Bomb Response Project, 1999-2000.

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technical specialists in the ADF and a more extensive science and

technology base within DSTO.88 EMA also maintained plans and some

equipment for civil defence responses to radiological hazards associated

with nuclear warfare and space re-entry debris.89 A precautionary response

to the latter category of incident was first coordinated by NDO in 1982-83,

caused by the malfunctioning COSMOS 1402 satellite. The possibility of

radioactive contamination from that incident created the potential for ‘a

national disaster in circumstances where only the Commonwealth possessed

sufficient resources and expertise for a rapid and effective response.’ 90 This

is significant, in that it necessitated a lead role for the Commonwealth

Government in a domestic safety matter that would, strictly speaking, have

been a State responsibility to resolve.

As CBR threats began to rise in the perceptions of security planners,

especially in the lead-up to the Sydney 2000 Games, the ADO began to

deliver some training to ‘first responders’ among the civilian Emergency

Services, especially Police, fire and ambulance services. This consisted of

short courses conducted at SME, coordinated by EMA. In preparation for

the 2000 Games, EMA also conducted some courses in the management of

CBR incidents at its Macedon training facility, which were supported by

demonstrations of advanced CBR response capabilities by the Joint Incident

Response Unit.91

Providing science and technology support for:

Civilian capability development. The specialised capabilities of DSTO

have been employed in the provision of ‘smart buyer’ advice for civilian

agencies seeking to acquire technical equipment. The best example of this

is in the CBR field, in which DSTO has advised on the capabilities of

88 The Defence of Australia 1987, para. 4.36; Strategic Review 1993, para. 2.22; Defending Australia 1994, para. 12.31. 89 Personal conversation with Mr. Don Patterson, EMA, 24 March 2005. 90 Defence Report 1982-1983, p. 22. 91 Personal conversation with Mr. Don Patterson, EMA, 24 March 2005.

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chemical and radiological detection equipments.92 DSTO has also provided

advice on operational procedures, especially in the CBR field. DSTO’s

unique CBR capabilities make it the only national source of expertise in that

area.

Incident management. DSTO expertise was employed by civilian

emergency services in developing incident management procedures,

especially for CBR events. In preparation for the 2000 Games, the ADF

also provided modeling capabilities for explosive incidents.

Training. DSTO supported specialist training to civilian agencies,

especially in the CBR field. Examples include the provision of visiting

lecturers for specialist courses.

Specialist forensic advice. The ADO’s specialist expertise was

occasionally drawn on by civilian authorities investigating significant

incidents. Good examples are the examination of a rocket that was involved

in the January 1983 Trans Australia Airlines extortion attempt; the analysis

of bomb components associated with two Sydney IED incidents in 1982-

83;93 and the provision of DSTO support to the investigation of a fatality

that resulted from the Canberra Hospital implosion in 1997.94

26. Response & recovery

The ADO has long contributed to national capabilities to respond to and recover from the

consequences of physical dangers in the homeland. Because Australia has had no

significant experience of terrorist incidents at home, those contributions have historically

been demonstrated in relation to natural disasters: for example, the substantial Defence

involvement in the management of the Cyclone Tracy aftermath in 1975, or the periodic

responses to bushfires or floods. This support was, and continues to be, provided under

92 Personal conversation with Chief Superintendent Jim Hamilton, NSW Fire Brigades, 6 April 2005. 93 Defence Report 1983-1983, p. 23. 94 Personal conversation with Dr. Norbert Burman, Research Leader, Land Weapons Systems. Weapons Systems Division, Defence Science & Technology Organisation, 24 August 2005. ‘Manner and Cause of

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standing arrangements for ‘Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (see Appendix

2). Although less well known, in the pre-9/11 period ADO capabilities were also held in

readiness for threats of violence. These included:

Provision of the national ‘high-end’ counter terrorism response capability,

represented by:

The Tactical Assault Group provided by the Army’s Special Air Service

Regiment. This capability could also rely on the support of:

A squadron of Black Hawk helicopters.95

Airlift capability sufficient to move the Tactical Assault Group and its

critical equipment anywhere in Australia at very short notice. The

details of this capability are classified, but a significant airlift

capability can be inferred from the fact that the SASR Tactical Assault

Group was (and continues to be) based at the SASR Base at

Swanbourne in Western Australia but required to respond to incidents

anywhere in Australia.

The national capability to assault and re-capture an offshore oil

platform. Development of this capability was directed in July 1980.96

The national ship under way recovery capability.97 This consists of

the ability to place personnel on board and gain control of a ship under

way at sea, by force if necessary.

Death – Katie Bender’ (finding of the ACT Coroner), [cited 24 August 2005]. Available from http://www.courts.act.gov.au/magistrates/dec/bender/Sect05.htm. 95 A capability that was being exercised near Townsville in 1996 when a tragic training accident resulted in the loss of 18 lives. Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War,2002, p. 468. 96 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War,2002, p. 429. It was first reported publicly in Defence Report 1988-1989, p. 15. 97Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, p. 513. First mentioned publicly by Brigadier Philip McNamara, Commander, Special Operations, address to the Royal United Services Institute of NSW, 2000.

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Terrorist incident command and control and liaison capabilities,

sufficient to insert ADF command and control ‘nodes’ into all levels

of the national CT crisis management architecture.98

The national chemical, biological and radiological incident response

capability, sufficient to respond to one incident simultaneously,

represented by the CBR Response Squadron.99

A number of highly classified technical capabilities associated with

surveillance and electronic interception.

IEDD. The ADF has routinely provided an IEDD capability in support of civilian

police, although calls on this capability have declined since the early 1990s as

police capabilities have increased.100

DACC support to consequence management (CM) following terrorist

attacks. In some ways similar to the DACC support to natural disasters, this

support is differentiated by the nature of dangerous consequences, which might

include residual hazards such as unexploded bombs or CBR agents. This type of

support rose in significance with the development of CBR response capabilities,

especially in preparation for the Sydney 2000 Games.

Support to the States and Territories for ‘surge’ requirements. This category

of involvement refers to situations where civilian authorities’ resources are

qualitatively adequate but quantitatively insufficient: that is, the civilian

authorities possess the necessary capabilities but not necessarily in sufficient

quantity for a particular short-term requirement. In these cases, the ADO could

provide additional resources to cover the temporary need. Natural disasters are

one example that has already been discussed, but another important type of

‘surge’ support includes special event security (for example, for the Sydney 2000

Games). Civil emergencies, including ‘acute’ terrorist threats, are another

98 This capability has matured over time, but was first reported in the Defence Report 1981, p. 17. 99 The Australian Army in Profile 2000, p.80.

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situation in which ADO support would have been expected across a very broad

spectrum of capabilities, qualitative and quantitative. The security effort for

CHOGRM following the 1978 Hilton bombing is an example of such a response.

Missions with no involvement

The preceding discussion describes the ADO’s involvement in Australia’s homeland

security prior to 9/11 against certain of the missions identified in the AHSRC model.

There are a number of missions, however, in which the ADO had no involvement prior to

9/11. These were:

9. Business & community engagement. There was no direct ADO

involvement in this mission, although a ‘soft’ involvement could be argued

through the employment of ex-ADO personnel in business or the community,

where their ADO experience might contribute to this mission.

10. Attribution & prosecution.

12. Cargo & people screening.

14. Quarantine & biosecurity.

17. Land transport.

18. Hazardous material transport & storage.

20. Information security.

24. Public awareness. As discussed above, the ADO was deliberately excluded

from this role prior to 9/11.

Enabling Functions

ADO support to homeland security enabling functions has generally been in the areas of

People, Technology and Partnerships.

100 Defence Reports/Defence Annual Reports, 1973-1993. See also the more comprehensive treatment of

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People. In addition to those direct contributions that can be mapped against the

homeland security missions defined in the AHRSC model, the ADO also performs an

enabling function through the involvement ex-ADO personnel in the civilian agencies

(both Government and commercial) involved in those missions. This is an area of ‘soft’

ADO involvement in homeland security. The participation of ex-ADO personnel in

homeland security missions can be considered an ADO contribution to the extent that the

roles they perform rely on expertise gained as members of the ADO, especially where

that expertise is not readily available from other sources. For example, the employment

of ex-ADF IEDD personnel in an IEDD-related civilian field would draw on ADO

training and experience that few civilians might have: the only civilian employment

likely to provide these skills would be police bomb technician. The ‘penetration’ of ex-

ADO people into civilian homeland security areas is illustrated at Appendix 3. The

extent of that penetration suggests that ADO expertise was relied on by civilian agencies,

to some extent.

Technology. ADO support to the Technology enabling function through most of the pre-

9/11 period was typically in the form of ad hoc DSTO support to various civilian

agencies. The preparations for the Sydney 2000 Games, however, brought a sharp

increase in the significance of the ADO’s contribution to homeland security technology,

especially in the CBRR area. The ADO provided the national high-end capability for

CBRN science and technology through the JIRU TSSG (see previous chapter), while

DSTO provided a number of members of the Crisis Action Panel of Experts (CAPE) for

major security incidents. The acquisition of sophisticated response and recovery

capabilities by some civilian agencies also created a DSTO role for training support and

‘smart buyer’ advice on equipment acquisitions.

Partnerships. Prior to 9/11, the major ADO contribution to the Partnerships enabling

function was its provision of specialist training to civilian agencies. The best example of

this is the training in advanced counter-terrorism techniques provided by the SASR.

the ADF IEDD capability in Chapter 3.

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ADO Engagement in Homeland Security Roles

The extent to which the ADO embraced homeland security roles as part of its core

business could be expected to influence its involvement in those roles in two ways. First,

homeland security roles that were readily embraced would be readily accepted and

resources, training and other effort would be devoted to them to ensure their success.

This could be expected to produce an ADO postured to perform these roles. Second, an

ADO that perceived homeland security as core business would seek the necessary

capabilities and make capability arguments accordingly. This would include advocating

to government the development of homeland security capacity.

The likely indicators of an ADO that fully embraced homeland security roles would

include:

Comprehensive supporting policy.

Force structure reflecting homeland security roles. This would involve some units

optimised for homeland security tasks.

Well-developed doctrine dealing specifically with homeland security.

Training and education programs aimed at developing homeland security skills.

Standing command and control arrangements dedicated for homeland security

roles.

The pre-9/11 state of the ADO reveals few of these characteristics. Policy was limited to

slim documents that defined DACC and DFACA. There were virtually no units

dedicated to homeland security roles – at best, this was a secondary responsibility or a

temporary, rotational one (for example, in the rotational CT Squadrons of the SASR).

When units were established specifically to perform homeland security missions (such as

the JIRU or OSB for the Sydney 2000 Games), this was on a temporary basis and they

were dissolved or re-roled once the mission was complete. There was virtually no high-

level doctrine on the subject: most of the available ‘doctrine’ existed in the form of unit

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tactics, techniques and procedures (for example, the Tactical Assault Group had very well

developed tactical doctrine for special recovery tasks, but this was highly classified and

received only limited circulation). Similarly, there were no courses on homeland security

conducted at officer training establishments. Standing command and control

arrangements did exist, but these were optimised for CT tasks under the NATP or for

regional DACC missions. Typically, the individuals assigned to local coordination and

liaison duties, who would have been key people in a homeland security crisis, were not of

the highest calibre, suggesting that only limited importance was attached to their duties.

In general, there is little evidence that, pre-9/11, the ADO perceived homeland security as

its full-time core business.

Analysis of Pre-9/11 Involvement

Taken together, the homeland security missions to which the ADO contributed prior to

9/11 reveal certain characteristics of that involvement. These are discussed below.

‘Trigger events.’

The significant changes in the involvement of the ADO in homeland security missions

prior to 9/11 seem to be attributable to ‘trigger events.’ These events somehow alter the

homeland security environment or its perceived requirements. Two events that had a

major impact on ADO involvement in the 25 years prior to 9/11 were the 1978 Hilton

bombing and Sydney’s winning of the right to host the 2000 Olympic and Paralympic

Games. The Hilton bombing led to the Hope Protective Security Review, which

recommended the establishment of counter terrorist capabilities within Australia.101

Some of those capabilities - notably special recovery and sophisticated IEDD - were

developed initially within the ADO. Similarly, new security capabilities required for the

successful delivery of the Sydney 2000 Games acquired national strategic importance.

Some of the more demanding capabilities (notably ship under way recovery, CBR

response and technical high risk search) were developed by the ADO.

101 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Canberra, 2004, p.6.

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For each of these trigger events, a requirement for the associated new capabilities (in

general terms) had been identified one or two years previously and a ‘deliberate’ process

to acquire those capabilities had been initiated. In the case of the Hilton bombing, this

involved a sophisticated counter terrorist capability involving hostage rescue and work to

acquire this capability had begun in 1976-77.102 In the case of a CBR response capability

for the Sydney 2000 Games, the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo chemical attacks on the Tokyo

subway had initiated the acquisition of a rudimentary CBR response capability, based on

the existing Chemical and Radiological Response Team.103 The effect of both trigger

events was to accelerate capability acquisition and broaden the scope of the capabilities

sought. This would suggest that terrorist threats arising elsewhere in the world were

appreciated by policy makers, but that policy responses to those threats could be

addressed through ‘normal,’ deliberate bureaucratic and governmental processes unless a

local event brought them somewhat closer to home. This supported by the fact that, even

in the months following the bombing in 1978, the staff study process for the development

of the counter terrorist capability was still addressing fundamental questions such as

where the capability would be established and managed (within the School of Infantry or

the SASR).104 This was quickly resolved once the Government’s priorities were

understood.

Both trigger events required the development of sophisticated new capabilities very

quickly and to a high standard. In the case of CBR response for the Olympics, for

example, a new and demanding capability needed to be developed to an operational

standard in little more than 18 months. The first funding for Games-specific specialist

security requirements, including CBRR, appeared in the 1999-2000 Budget, for

capabilities that needed to be operational by the start of the Games security period in

September 2000.105 This was despite Australia having received seven years’ notice of

the event (Sydney won the privilege of hosting the Games in 1993). There was little

102 "Cabinet Minute: Decision No. 1657 (FAD): Policy and Organization to Counter International Terrorism." 1976. Also Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, pp. 420-1. 103 The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, May 2005, pp. 18-19. Personal conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Craig Petrie, Project Officer for CBRR capability 1997-99, Canberra, 6 September 2005. 104 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, pp. 421-2. 105 Commonwealth Budget 1999-2000, Budget Paper No. 2 [cited 20 August 2005]. Available from http://www.budget.gov.au/1999%2D00/bp2/bp2full_pdf.pdf.

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‘margin for error’ in the attainment of the desired capability - in the case of the Games,

this was because the date by which the capabilities were needed was fixed and because

international expectations, among other things, demanded the highest security standards.

In these circumstances, the ADO’s selection as the agency to acquire the capability may

have reflected the Government’s confidence in its ability to do so, compared with other

potential candidates. The Government’s choice of the ADF as the base for elaborate

counter terrorist assault capabilities may have been influenced by expert international

advice, such as that from Sir Robert Mark.106

In the case of both trigger events mentioned above (the 1978 Hilton bombing and the

Sydney 2000 Games), the national response was somewhat delayed. For example, the

legislative amendments identified as necessary by Hope in 1979 were not enacted until

2000, while the capability development for the Sydney Games was achieved at ‘the last

safe moment,’ despite substantial notice. This suggests that, while both events were

powerful motivators for government, they were sufficiently low in public priorities that

they allowed government some discretion in terms of the speed or scale of response.

There may also be a limit to the longevity of a particular threshold event’s effect, unless

it is sustained by subsequent ‘sustaining events.’ Examples of sustaining events might be

recurrent incidents or events of the type involved in the initial trigger event, which, while

not necessarily producing disastrous consequences for Australia, serve to sustain a

demand for the types of ADO involvement needed in response. This might explain the

continued (although low profile) development and incremental enhancement of the

SASR’s counter terrorist capabilities during the 1980s and 1990s, as international

terrorist attacks continued to occur overseas. This characteristic will be compared with

the response to 9/11 in a later chapter.

Unique national capability

A second feature of pre-9/11 ADO homeland security roles is that they often arose in

areas in which the ADO possessed capabilities that were unique in Australia – for

example, those associated with CBRN defence or some areas of science and technology,

106 Hornet, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, p. 420.

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such as the response to a radiological SPRED incident. Prior to 1978, this might also

have included IEDD. In the lead-up to the Sydney 2000 Games, CBR incident response,

ship underway recovery and technical high-risk search were added to this list. In these

cases, there was little option but to employ the ADO capability if a relevant homeland

security task arose. In some cases, the ADO was directed to maintain a unique capability

with more specific homeland security application: for example, the training and

coordination capacities of Emergency Management Australia.

Pre-existing ‘like’ capability

Other ADO roles arose in areas in which its ‘normal’ military capabilities were similar to

those needed for a particular homeland security mission. For example, a maritime patrol

capability was essential to the Navy’s warlike roles and the same capability was

applicable to coastal security tasks. Likewise, the Army’s low-risk search capabilities

could also be useful to civilian police while airlift and other aviation assets had very

broad application to homeland security.

High risk

A final category of pre-9/11 ADO roles are those associated with threats that posed high

risks to Commonwealth Government interests, even if addressing those risks was not

primarily a Commonwealth responsibility. For example, failure to satisfactorily resolve a

terrorist incident within Australian sovereign territory, regardless of the state jurisdiction

in which it occurred, could be expected to cause a backlash for the Commonwealth

Government even though its resolution was, strictly speaking, a ‘law and order’

responsibility of that state. In these cases, ADO capabilities provided important options

in the event that the responsible state was unable to deal with the incident within its own

resources.

ADO engagement

Characteristically, even though it was extensively involved in homeland security

missions, the ADO did not embrace homeland security as part of its core business.

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Summary Conclusion

In the 23 years between the 1978 Hilton bombing and 2001, the ADO’s involvement in

Australia’s homeland security had been increasing slowly, especially in relation to

counter terrorism. By 2001, the ADO had relatively broad involvement in roles that

contributed to Australia’s homeland security (18 of the 26 missions identified in the

AHSRC model), although some of these may not have been perceived as homeland

security efforts at that time. Rapid developments in ADO roles seemed to be triggered or

at least accelerated by events that revealed deficiencies in the national capacity to

perform those roles, either retrospectively (in the case of Hilton 1978) or prospectively

(in the case of the Sydney Games). Once the initial developed had been triggered,

continued development could be sustained by recurrent incidents that demonstrated the

need for the roles involved (‘sustaining’ events). In most cases, the ADO found

employment in roles in which it already had some basis for the necessary capability (in

some cases, it possessed the only suitable capability in the country) or in which its

involvement reduced the political risk for the government. The next chapter will examine

in detail the reasons for the ADO’s pre-9/11 involvement in homeland security roles.

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CHAPTER FIVE

FACTORS SHAPING THE STATUS QUO ANTE The preceding two chapters detailed the ADO’s contributions to a range of homeland

security missions before 9/11, focusing on the ten years or so immediately prior to that

date. This chapter analyses the factors that led to that pattern of involvement.

As a basis on which to begin to identify causal factors, it is proposed that any such factors

will belong to one of three hypothetical categories:

Legal factors. This category rests on the hypothesis that, as a modern Western

state, Australian Government decisions are governed by the rule of law -

including decisions on the employment of the ADO in homeland security roles.

Analysis of the applicable laws should therefore explain the legal factors

influencing those decisions.

Political factors. This category proceeds from the hypothesis that, within the

freedom allowed by the law, decisions on the employment of the ADO in

homeland security roles will be driven, in part, by political considerations that

will relate to options and priorities.

Managerial factors. This category proceeds from the hypothesis that, within the

range of options afforded by legal and political factors, decisions on the ADO’s

use in homeland security roles will be driven by a desire for efficient policy

implementation in terms of cost, organisational simplicity, risk mitigation and

reliability of outcome.

Legal factors tend to be governed by the ‘black letter’ dictates of extant law, defining the

freedom of action for Government decision making. The latter two categories are

essential pragmatic in nature and are likely to be the areas in which there is greatest

discretion available to governments.

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Legal Factors

The open literature contains a number of analyses of the specific legal factors that might

impinge on the employment of the ADO in homeland security tasks. Most analysis has

focused on the use of force by the ADF on Australian territory, including but not

exclusively in homeland security scenarios. Garth Cartledge’s The Soldier’s Dilemma,1

for example, is a very thorough examination of the legal implications of employing the

ADF in a ‘defence’ role on Australian territory in the ‘low-level conflict’ scenarios

proposed under early iterations of the DoA policy. The utility of this analysis for present

purposes is diminished by its emphasis on the use of force by the ADF (as distinct from

other forms of ADO involvement) and by the inter-state conflict dimension of DoA

scenarios, especially those that are painted in remote areas of northern Australia. That

dimension gives the scenarios a degree of ‘conventionality’ which differentiates them

from the contemporary understanding of ‘homeland security.’

Some analysis has been directed at pre-9/11 ADF involvement in the law enforcement

aspects of homeland security. This includes official inquiries, such as the Hope Report,

as well as retrospective examinations of the legal aspects of particular events. An

example is Blackshield’s ‘The Siege of Bowral’,2 which analyses the 1978 CHOGRM

call out. The Bowral deployment received considerable attention in the literature, making

it a trigger event in a legal as well as an ‘environmental’ sense.

In other discussion of homeland security, legal issues have certainly been debated, but

more in terms of how they bound ADF involvement (that is, as limiting or enabling

influences) than in how they might have directed it.3 Legal issues affecting the

involvement of the wider ADO have not received significant attention.

1 Garth Cartledge, The Soldiers’ Dilemma: When to use force in Australia, Canberra: Directorate of Publications, 1992. 2 A.R. Blackshield, ‘The Siege of Bowral – the Legal Issues,’ Pacific Defence Reporter, March 1978. 3 See Jenny Hocking, Beyond Terrorism. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993.

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Australia’s model of government recognises three levels: federal, state and local. Bodies

of legislation are enacted at each level within each jurisdiction (for example, within each

State and local government division). As an instrument of the Commonwealth

Government, the employment of the ADO is governed by Commonwealth legislation.

The two most significant pieces of legislation are the Constitution and the Defence Act,

both of which were discussed in detail in Chapter Three.

In addition to this legislation, international agreements, such as the ‘Convention on the

Protection and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons including

Diplomatic Agents,’ which is implemented in Australia by the Crimes (Internationally

Protected Persons) Act 1976, could act as legal obligations on the Federal Government

with a consequent influence on the employment of the ADO.4

In this section, it is proposed to first identify the legal factors that might have influenced

the employment of the ADO in homeland security roles up until 9/11, then to determine

the extent to which that involvement was influenced by those factors in reality.

The Constitution

The key provisions of the Constitution were described in Chapter Three. The direct

influence of the Constitution on the employment of the ADO in homeland security roles

is that it:

Effectively assigns primary responsibility and authority for domestic

(‘homeland’) security to the states, with secondary responsibility assigned to the

Commonwealth.

4 Elizabeth Ward, ‘Call Out the Troops: an examination of the legal basis for Australian Defence Force involvement in ‘non-defence’ matters,’ Parliamentary Library (Law and Bills Digest Group), Research Paper 8/1997-98, 1998, p. 20 and note 46 of printed web document [cited 10 August 2005]. Available from http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/1997-98/98rp08.htm.

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Imposes on the Commonwealth a duty to protect the states against domestic

violence when, in the view of the Commonwealth, a credible and sufficient threat

exists. This protection may be provided in response to a request from a state.

Makes the Commonwealth responsible for the military defence of the

Commonwealth, and its states, against external threats.

Vests control of the ADO in the Commonwealth. The Constitutional antecedents

of the ADO were the naval and military forces of the Commonwealth (Section.

51vi) and the colonial ‘Defence’ administrations that were transferred to the

Commonwealth on Federation (Section 69).

Effectively prohibits the states from possessing military power.

Empowers the Commonwealth to act unilaterally to protect its own interests,

including against threats of violence, within Australian territory.

Assigns responsibility for the international aspects of national security to the

Commonwealth, including those aspects that might influence domestic security

(such as the influx of terrorists).

As a second order effect, the key Constitutional provisions may also have created a

condition of ‘normalcy’ with regard to the performance of homeland security functions

by Australian Governments. The characteristics of that condition are that, normally:

The states are responsible for protecting themselves from domestic violence. The

Federal Government has little primary responsibility for domestic security within

state boundaries.

The previous point notwithstanding, the resources that states can apply to protect

themselves from domestic violence are inherently limited by both economic and

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legal factors. Where a particular threat involves a ‘military’ scale of violence,

requiring a military response, that challenge is likely to exceed state resources

because of the constitutional limitation on states’ military power.

Should their domestic security requirements exceed their resources, states may

request protection from the Commonwealth, which must provide that protection.

A responsible Commonwealth Government will therefore make reasonable

provision to meet states’ protection requirements.

The Commonwealth controls the ADO and can employ it in responding to states’

requests for protection.

The ADO is likely to be the sole national source of most ‘military’ capabilities.

The Commonwealth can, under the executive power, take such action as it deems

necessary to ensure Australia’s security, with or without a state request for

protection.

The Commonwealth is responsible for the ‘external’ aspects of domestic security,

such as immigration, border control, the sourcing of intelligence on foreign

threats and the ‘conditioning’ of the regional environment.

Australian electorates understand the Constitutional division of responsibilities

between the Commonwealth and the states and their expectations of both state and

Federal Government performance in domestic security matters is informed

accordingly.

This state of normalcy should lead the ADO’s involvement in homeland security to have

the following characteristics and features:

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Little obvious ADF involvement in domestic security tasks.5 These tasks are

performed by appropriate civilian agencies (police and emergency services)

except in unusual circumstances, such as a natural disaster or special security

event. State Governments emphasise publicly their primacy in domestic security

matters and the Federal Government acknowledges this.

State domestic security capabilities are maintained at a level suitable for ‘normal’

threats, such as those associated with crime and common emergencies. States

might have the ability to ‘surge’ quantitatively in order to mobilise larger security

workforces for brief periods, but have a limited capability to surge qualitatively to

more sophisticated levels of capability. Response to higher levels of threat or

more sophisticated tasks require assistance, either from another state jurisdiction

or from the Commonwealth.

The ADO develops and maintains contingency plans to respond to state requests

for protection against domestic violence, in recognition of the Commonwealth’s

Section 119 obligations. Where necessary, these contingency plans involve the

maintenance of resources (ADF and Departmental, such as DSTO) at prescribed

degrees of notice to respond to requests. Where assets with the necessary

capabilities do not exist within the Department’s ‘order of battle’ for traditional

defence tasks, these might be developed and maintained specifically for domestic

security tasks. The contingency plans include a process for states to request

Commonwealth support, and for the Executive function to authorise that support.

An exercise program whereby Commonwealth involvement in domestic security

tasks, including ADO involvement, is practiced.

A process to facilitate Commonwealth Government involvement in domestic

security matters, especially the management of security crises. This is especially

5 Given its distinctive ‘visual signature’ (uniformed personnel and unique equipment, etc.) the ADF would probably constitute the only ADO involvement capable of being ‘obvious.’

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important in informing decisions to involve the Commonwealth in a domestic

security incident without a request from a State, exercising the executive power

under Section 61 of the Constitution.

A process to coordinate the involvement of the ADO in ‘offshore’ aspects of

domestic security with the involvement of other branches of Government.

The status quo ante depicted in the previous chapters is highly consistent with these

characteristics. The ADF’s profile in things related to domestic security was low in the

‘steady state’ and was kept low deliberately even during ‘surge’ periods such as the

Sydney 2000 Games: state primacy was unquestioned.6 State security capabilities tended

to be optimised for ‘every day’ threats and required qualitative and quantitative

supplementation for surge requirements. Contingency plans for ‘high end’ scenarios

existed and some capabilities needed to implement those plans were maintained by the

ADO - including some that were peculiar to homeland security. Those contingency plans

were practiced through a national exercise program. The PSCC/SAC-PAV processes

were also well developed by 2001, enabling a satisfactory level of intra-Governmental

coordination. Finally, the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC) and its

subordinate Secretaries’ Committee for National Security (SCNS) had emerged to

provide a coordinating function for ADO contributions to the ‘offshore’ aspects of

homeland security.

It therefore seems that the Australian homeland security environment and apparatus that

had evolved up until 9/11 reflected to a great extent the influence of the Constitution.

The extent to which the Constitution may have influenced the employment of the ADO in

specific cases will be discussed later.

6 Daryl Williams (Commonwealth Attorney-General), ‘Dignitary and Athlete Protection Olympic Conference Welcome Address,’ Sydney, 24 July 2000, para. 10 [cited 6 September 2005]. Available from http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/attorneygeneralHome.nsf/Page/Speeches_2000_Speeches_Dignitary_and_Athlete_Protection_Olympic_Conference.

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The influence of legal factors

With the exception of the 1914 amendment prohibiting the use of citizen forces in

response to industrial disputes, the Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian

Authorities) Act 2000 constitutes the only significant change to the federal legislation

affecting the ADO’s involvement in homeland security roles in the full century of

Australian history prior to 9/11. It came only at the very end of that century. No

changes were made to the Constitution that could impact on the ADO’s involvement in

homeland security. This indicates that one or both of the following applied:

any shortcomings in the previous legislative arrangements were not sufficiently

serious to motivate governments to seek changes earlier (or allowed them to

justify tardiness), and

a change to the domestic security environment, necessitating a legislative

amendment, had occurred only late in the period.

In any event, it would not appear that Australian Governments considered that the

Constitution required modification with respect to the employment of the ADO in

homeland security roles.

The Constitution has two significant effects on Australia’s homeland security

arrangements and the ADO’s role in them. These are the combined outcome of sub-

Section 51(vi), in making the Commonwealth exclusively responsible for national

defence; Sections 69 and 70, in giving the Commonwealth exclusive control of the

ADO; Sections 107 and 108, in making domestic security a state responsibility; Section

114, in limiting the security capabilities of the states by ensuring that none would have

its own Defence organisation; and Section 119, in obliging the Commonwealth to protect

the states from domestic violence if necessary. The first effect is to make the

involvement of the ADO in domestic security matters an extraordinary rather than a

normal situation, requiring a deliberate Commonwealth Government decision to employ

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the ADO in every case. The second effect is to ensure that serious homeland security

challenges, beyond the resources of the states, automatically involve the Commonwealth.

With regard to the Defence Act, the timing of the 2000 amendment legislation suggests

that, for most of the 20th century, no Australian Government felt the need to modify the

Act with respect to homeland security roles. The 1914 amendment in relation to the use

of part-time personnel in industrial dispute situations is an exception to this observation

and its effect was to limit, rather than increase, the Commonwealth’s ability to use the

ADF. The mere fact that the 2000 amendment was sought does not, however, indicate

that governments felt that the Act constrained them unduly in their employment of the

ADO:

…the view of the Government’s legal advisers is that, where domestic violence is of such a character that the operations of the Commonwealth Government are affected, the Commonwealth Government may, without request from a State, intervene with all the force at its disposal, not to protect the State but to protect itself…7

Before drawing any conclusions about the extent to which the involvement of the ADO in

homeland security roles was influenced by legal factors it is therefore useful to examine

the motivation for the 2000 amendment.

Prior to 2000, analyses of the legal factors surrounding the employment of the ADF in

homeland security roles consistently concluded that the legal status of personnel acting

in those roles was uncertain, especially in relation to the legal protections that might

apply to them. This was highlighted by the 1978 CHOGRM deployment, both in Hope’s

official Protective Security Review8 and by unofficial commentators such as Blackshield,

who refers to “the government’s cavalier disregard for the legal position of army

7 Senator Peter Durack, Commonwealth Attorney-General, 1978, as quoted in B.D. Beddie and S. Moss, Some Aspects of Aid to the Civil Power in Australia, Department of Government, Faculty of Military Studies, University of New South Wales, 1982, p. 63. 8 R.M. Hope, "Protective Security Review: Parliamentary Paper No. 397/1979." Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 1979.

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personnel.’9 In 1986 the Minister for Defence, Kim Beazley, stated that work to correct

the legislation was under way.10 The fact that the amendment legislation was not passed

by Parliament until 2000 certainly indicates that it was not seen to be urgently needed

and suggests that another motivation existed for advancing it at that time.

The timing of the legislation in relation to the impending Sydney 2000 Games suggests

that the real motivation for the amendment was to improve processes for the employment

of the ADO in the homeland in time for that event.11 This is supported by Government

statements:

The legislation was introduced before the Sydney 2000 Olympics to ensure appropriate consideration is given before any use can be authorised for the most deadly force that can be brought to bear in Australia.12

It is also supported by evidence from personnel involved in the drafting process.13 This

pretext may also, conveniently, have diverted attention from the fact that nothing had

been done for 20 years since Hope’s initial recommendation.

The precise timing of the passage of the legislation does not, however, support a view

that the legislation removed an undesired constraint on the employment of the ADO in

relation to Games security. The Bill finally passed Parliament on 28 June 2000 – only

two months before the commencement of the Olympics Security Period.14 By that time,

some Games-related ADO capabilities on which the legislation might impact had been

under development for nearly two years. Examples include the High Risk Search

Squadron of the JIRU, for which a requirement was first identified in August 1998; and

the Operational Search Battalion, planning for which commenced in early 1999. The

9 A.R. Blackshield, ‘The Siege of Bowral,’ 1978, p.10. Also Elizabeth Ward, ‘Call Out the Troops,’ 1998, pp. 39-42. 10Kim Beazley, Speech to the Australian Defence Force Academy, 17 September 1986, Compendium of Speeches by the Hon Kim C. Beazley, MP Minister for Defence, 1985-1989, Department of Defence (Policy Coordination Division),1989, p. 73. 11 Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act 2000, Bills Digest No. 13 2000-01. 12 Department of Defence, ‘Defence Response to a Terrorist Threat in Australia,’ [cited 7 September 2005]. Available from http://www.defence.gov.au/terrorism. 13 Personal conversation with Colonel Mike Kelly, Army Legal Officer, 22 April 2005. 14 See the case study in Chapter Three.

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Minister for Defence and the Attorney General stated on 16 March 2000 that ‘Olympics

security (capabilities) were developed to a state of operational readiness.’15 The most

complete rehearsal of Defence support to Games security, Exercise GOLDEN FLAME,

was conducted in May 2000, a month before the legislation passed Parliament and three

months before it received assent on 12 September 2000. That Exercise did not practice

any of the new powers provided by the legislation. It would appear, from public

statements by the responsible ministers and relevant agencies, that all capabilities were

fully incorporated into Games security planning well before the enactment of the

amendment legislation.16 Given the extent of ADF preparations, a suggestion that any

ADF support would have been withdrawn or withheld had the legislation failed to come

into effect is not credible. There is no evidence that any of the operational concepts

developed for ADF contributions to Games security depended on the new provisions.

Had a situation arisen in which the new Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act was invoked,

there is no doubt that the employment of the ADF would have been improved but it is

unlikely that the absence of that legislation would have changed the use of the ADF, just

as it had not obstructed the use of the ADF in support of security for CHOGRM in 1978.

It cannot, therefore, be concluded that the original provisions of Section 51 of the

Defence Act had influenced undesirably governments’ employment of the ADO in

homeland security roles. Rather, the amendment legislation reinforced the

Commonwealth’s discretion in agreeing to states’ requests for protection against

domestic violence, while facilitating government freedom to employ the ADF on

domestic security tasks when it decided to do so:

The Prime Minister, Attorney-General and Minister for Defence must be satisfied that the State or Territory cannot protect itself before they authorise the ADF to be called out.17

15 John Moore, Minister for Defence, and Daryl Williams, Attorney General, Joint Media Release, 16 March 2000, [cited 20 August 2005]. Available from http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2000/05100.html. 16 The Australian Army in Profile 2000. p. 85; Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act 2000, Bills Digest No. 13 2000-01. 17 Department of Defence, ‘Defence Response to a Terrorist Threat in Australia,’ 2005.

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The above provision gives the responsible ministers discretion in determining whether

the relevant state or territory genuinely faces a threat of domestic violence that is beyond

its resources. This codifies practice that had been in operation since 1912 in relation to

states’ requests to the Commonwealth for protection against domestic violence. The

Commonwealth invariably refused such requests on the grounds that handling the

violence was within states capacity.18 The most important effect of the new legislation,

however, was in codifying the employment of the ADF and specifying the protections

applying to ADF members.

It is more likely that governments from both sides of Australian politics had for some

time appreciated a need to provide appropriate legal protections to ADF personnel

engaged in homeland security tasks, but that need was insufficiently urgent to gain a

place on the normal political agenda. Labor, for example, had noted the need for an

amendment in 1986 and had indicated a role for the ADO in Games security in 1994.19

The change was eventually completed by a Liberal/National Coalition government. The

Games supplied both a motivation and a window of opportunity to see the amendment

through. To that extent, the amendment legislation represents a development in the

Australian homeland security environment that rested on two trigger events: the 1978

Hilton bombing, which provided the initial impetus for the change; and the Sydney 2000

Games, which provided the opportunity to implement it.

One impact of legislation on the employment of the ADO in homeland security roles

prior to 9/11 may have been to reinforce Commonwealth Government’s discretion in that

employment. The Constitution provides some salutary reminders of ‘where the buck

stops’ in relation to responsibility for Australia’s security, while allowing the

Commonwealth to exercise judgement in complying with states’ requests for protection.

The Commonwealth Government certainly occupied a prominent position in the national

domestic security architecture that had evolved up until 2001. Prior to 9/11, there are no

examples of a Commonwealth Government being forced by Australian legislation to

18 Elizabeth Ward, ‘Call Out the Troops, ‘ 1998, Appendix A.

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employ the ADO in a way that Government did not wish, nor to refrain from using it in a

way in which it did. All laws, however detailed, require interpretation and, while there

were (and may still be) legal risks associated with the employment of the ADO in the

homeland, governments have consistently shown themselves to be either oblivious to

those risks or prepared to take them. Either way, these do not seem to have influenced

how governments have decided to employ the ADO.

International obligations, as an ‘external’ force, may provide the sole example of a legal

influence directing the employment of the ADO in homeland security missions. It is

significant that both the trigger events posited thus far (Hilton/Bowral 1978 and the

Sydney 2000 Games) involved a significant obligation for the protection of

‘internationally protected persons’ - an obligation that rested squarely on the

Commonwealth Government. Given that the ADO figured prominently among the

Commonwealth’s resources to provide for the security of those events, it is reasonable to

conclude that the Government’s international legal obligation - ratified by a domestic

law - significantly influenced its decisions to employ the ADO in both cases.

Notwithstanding the discretion afforded to the Commonwealth by Australia’s own

legislation, international obligations may therefore restrict that discretion in some cases.

Political Factors

Accepting the above-noted conclusion that the applicable legal factors afford a

Commonwealth Government broad discretion in the employment of the ADO in

homeland security missions, it seems likely that political factors will influence how that

discretion is used. This section will analyse the ‘status quo ante’ of the ADO’s

involvement in homeland security to identify those factors. To provide initial guidance

for that analysis, political factors will be sought under broad categories of

responsibilities and expectations; threat perceptions; and options.

19 Kim Beazley, Speech to the Australian Defence Force Academy, 17 September 1986; Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, AGPS, Canberra, 1994, p. 13.

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Responsibilities and expectations

For the purposes of this analysis, responsibilities are those functions that Governments

hold themselves accountable for performing. As the preceding discussion has shown,

the legal source of Governmental responsibilities is the Constitution. In some cases,

those responsibilities are expanded upon by federal legislation that is made under powers

granted by the Constitution. For example, the Crimes (Internationally Protected

Persons) Act 1976, made under the Section 51 powers to make laws for the ‘peace, order

and good government of the Commonwealth,’ places responsibilities on the Federal

Government to ensure the security of internationally protected persons visiting Australia.

Governments’ understanding of their responsibilities should therefore include these

explicit legal obligations as minima, but this would not preclude the acceptance of

responsibilities that are implicit in a wider sense of duty.

That wider sense of duty could be influenced by expectations that a government feels it

must meet. Expectations are complementary to responsibilities, being things for which

others hold governments accountable. To the extent that a government considers itself

obliged to fulfil an expectation, that expectation becomes, in effect, a responsibility.

Under normal political arrangements, at least two ‘constituencies’ could be expected to

impose expectations on an Australian Commonwealth Government in relation to

homeland security: an internal one, consisting of the Australian electorate; and an

external one, consisting of the international community.

A cynical view holds that a democratic government will be motivated to meet those

expectations that are necessary to its political (electoral) success. International factors

that impinge on the electorate could affect that electorate’s impression of the

government’s performance, with consequent electoral influences. Overseas countries’

impressions of Australia’s homeland security environment could have real economic

impacts: for example, foreign investor confidence or tourism could both be negatively

influenced by perceptions of a poor domestic security environment - such impressions

are simply ‘bad for business.’ To that extent, international and domestic expectations are

linked. A government’s success could be measured by the extent to which it allows the

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electorate to enjoy a sense of security and economic prosperity within the homeland,

while that economic prosperity will depend, in part, on the international community’s

confidence in interacting with Australia.

A cynical pursuit of political longevity need not be the only - or even a significant -

determinant of how a government addresses Australia’s homeland security.

Governments may also be motivated by a more altruistic sense of duty. There is

evidence that governments take their national security responsibilities very seriously.

Official pronouncements certainly assert this in relation to the ‘traditional’ responsibility

for national defence. Near the beginning of most Defence White Papers, for example, is

a statement along the lines that ‘The Government has a fundamental responsibility to

ensure Australia’s defence.’20 Foreign Affairs policy documents also place high

importance on national security: ‘The first duty of any Australian Government is the

protection of our physical integrity…’21 It would be politically risky for a

democratically elected government to state otherwise, especially at times when the

electorate might perceive a realistic security threat. For this reason, official policy

statements may not be completely reliable indicators of how governments view their

responsibilities, or of the extent to which these influence their decisions. More

convincing evidence of governments’ commitment to fulfilling homeland security

responsibilities should be found in their actions.

In creating a duty for the Commonwealth to protect the states against threats of domestic

violence that exceed their resources, Section 119 of the Constitution both imposes a

responsibility and creates an expectation. The responsibility rests on the

Commonwealth, as an obligation to maintain capabilities that can provide the necessary

protection. From a state perspective, Section 119 establishes an expectation that those

capabilities will be maintained and exercised when necessary. In this 'responsibility-

expectation dynamic,’ the level of Commonwealth capability is influenced by the states’

20 Defending Australia 1994, p. 3. Similar statements are made in The Defence of Australia 1987, p. vii; Strategic Review 1993, p. iii; Australia’s Strategic Policy 1997, p. iii; and Defence 2000 p. vii. 21 Gareth Evans, Australia’s Regional Security, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 1989, p. 1.

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efforts because the Commonwealth is obliged to meet the ‘delta’ between state resources

and threats to domestic security. The level of capability that the Commonwealth needs

to maintain could therefore vary from time to time, according to changes in the perceived

threat level and states’ responses to it. This effect is observable in the ADO’s domestic

IEDD capability, which appears to have atrophied during the 1990s as state capabilities

have improved.22

Despite the firm Constitutional basis of the Commonwealth’s responsibility to the states,

there is relatively little evidence that that responsibility has ever driven the

Commonwealth’s actions. It is significant that, in practice, the Commonwealth has never

used the ADF to protect the states from domestic violence.23 All requests from states for

protection against domestic violence under Section 119 of the Constitution have been

refused and every historical use of the ADO has been a case of the Commonwealth

protecting its own interests under Section 61. While this suggests that the

Commonwealth’s interests are dominant, it is unlikely to leave the Commonwealth

unable to protect the states. This is because Commonwealth interests are quite far-

reaching and, in maintaining the capability to protect its own interests, the

Commonwealth would discharge its obligation to protect the states incidentally.

Threat perceptions

Regardless of what motivates governments to make provision for Australia’s homeland

security, it is reasonable to presume that the manner in which they address that task will

be influenced by the threat to security that they perceive. Extending that assumption,

there should be a direct relationship between the immediacy and credibility of a threat

and the speed and level of resources with which it is met.

22 See the case study in Chapter Three. 23 Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act 2000, Bills Digest No. 13 2000-01, [cited 20 August 2005]. Available from http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2000-01/01BD013.htm#Passage.

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For a range of well understood geographic and historical reasons, Australia has enjoyed

a relatively high level of territorial and domestic security for most of its history. 24

Generally speaking, domestic security challenges have been within the resources of the

various State and Territory jurisdictions to address. As explained in Chapter Three, prior

to 9/11 this generated little need for a heavy Commonwealth focus on domestic security

except during wartime (in the context of civil defence)25 or in response to events that

altered the status quo of perceived threat, triggering an incremental change in policy.

Initially, those changes might be made deliberately, by exercising ‘normal’ bureaucratic

or governmental processes, but occasionally an event might prompt a government to

engage more directly, causing more rapid change. The involvement of the ADO in

homeland security roles prior to 9/11 demonstrates this ‘trigger event’ phenomenon.

The Fraser Government had decided to develop a national counter terrorism response in

September 1976, although an Interdepartmental Committee had been established in late

1973 to coordinate existing Commonwealth and state arrangements.26 The first

decisions to establish the capability were taken in the early to mid-1970s environment of

international terrorism, in which hostage siege situations had become an alarming

terrorist tactic. Examples include the 1972 Black September attack on the Munich

Olympic Games or the 1976 Entebbe hijacking and siege incident – the 1976 Committee

decision was taken just three months after the Entebbe attack, which had been resolved

by an Israeli ‘special recovery’ operation. In making its 1976 decision, the Foreign

affairs and Defence Committee considered a list of 69 ‘Palestinian and allied’ terrorist

incidents that had occurred since 1968, of which 20 had involved hostage taking.27 The

Committee was advised that ‘A pro-Palestinian terrorist attack could take place in

Australia.’28 The threat assessment paper considered by the Committee, which was

24 Daryl Williams, ‘Dignitary and Athlete Protection Olympic Conference Welcome Address,’ Sydney, 24 July 2000, para. 5. 25 Leading to the creation of the Department of Home Security in 1942. 26 "Cabinet Minute: Decision No. 1657 (FAD): Policy and Organization to Counter International Terrorism,” 1976. Also "FAD Policy Paper No. 23 - Policy and Organization to Counter International Terrorism," 1976, p. 1. 27 "FAD Policy Paper No. 23 - Policy and Organization to Counter International Terrorism," 1976, Appendix A. 28 FAD Policy Paper No. 23 - Policy and Organization to Counter International Terrorism," 1976, Summary, p. 2.

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classified SECRET, also dealt specifically with potential Palestinian terrorist activity in

Australia. The Committee’s decision to begin a rather deliberate pursuit of an advanced

counter terrorist capability was therefore informed by specific threat information and

was taken in the immediate aftermath of an incident that had been resolved by such a

capability. The pursuit of such a capability would seem logical in the light of a credible

threat assessment, even though Australia itself had not been touched directly by these

incidents. A final noteworthy element of the 1976 decision is that it was taken by the

Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee and did not come before the full Cabinet. This

suggests that international terrorist threats had still not achieved the highest level of

national importance, possibly allowing a more deliberate pursuit of counter terrorist

capabilities.

The Defence Force was tasked with developing that capability and the first rudimentary

training for ‘Response Forces’ was conducted by SASR in late 1977.29 While the ADF

was purposeful in its initial pursuit of the new capability, it was also deliberate, with

considerable staff study and analysis planned for 1978 before final capability

development decisions were made and the raising of the capability begun in earnest.30

Nevertheless, by early 1978 there was, within both the Australian Government and the

Defence Force, an understanding of the need for a counter terrorist response capability

and some momentum towards its achievement.

This approach was clearly accelerated by the 1978 CHOGRM security problem.31 This

was despite the fact that other Western countries had been developing elaborate

capabilities since 1972, in the wake of the Black September attack on the Munich

Olympic Games, and some already had them in place. For example, Germany’s

Grenzschutzgruppe-9 (GSG-9) was developed as a specific result of the demonstrated

inadequacy of existing German police capabilities to deal with the Munich hostage

incident. GSG-9 demonstrated its capabilities very convincingly in the 1977 resolution

29 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, p.420. 30 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, p.420-1.

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of an airliner hijacking in Mogadishu, Somalia.32 The UK capability, developed within

22 Special Air Service Regiment, evolved at the same time.33 Australia, through the

close professional relationship between the Australian Special Air Service Regiment

(SASR) and Britain’s 22 SAS Regiment, must have been aware of these developments.

For example, Australian SASR members participating in personnel exchanges with 22

SAS Regiment in 1976 had the opportunity to train in the new counter terrorism-related

skill of close quarter battle (CQB).34 This conclusion is supported by the Australian

SASR’s subsequent ability to draw readily on UK expertise in developing its own

capability.35 Australia had been slowly developing a national counter terrorism structure

since 1976, but a clear focus on a high-end special recovery capability (as represented by

GSG-9 and 22 SAS Regiment) did not emerge until 1978.36,37 This suggests that, while

Australian governments assessed that events elsewhere in the world warranted some

adjustment to the military aspects of Australia’s homeland security settings, those

adjustments could be evolutionary rather than revolutionary. The bombing of the Hilton

Hotel would appear to have changed that perception by demonstrating a threat that was

both credible and immediate (it had actually happened). As Lieutenant General Donald

Dunstan, the Chief of the General Staff, observed:

Although the threat of international terrorist operations in Australia is assessed as being low it is accepted that the situation can change rapidly, as was graphically demonstrated by the Hilton bombing…The requirement is therefore for us to develop an effective counter terrorist response force as soon as possible against the contingency that it will be called out in aid to the civil power.38

31 Defence Report 1978, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1978, p. 12; Defence Report 1984-1985, p. 26. Also Duncan Lewis, ‘Guarding Australians Against Terrorism,’ Australian Army Journal,’ Vol. 1, No. 2, December 2003, p. 47. 32 ‘GSG-9,’ [cited 4 September 2005]. Availablefrom http://www.specwarnet.com/europe/gsg9.htm. Also Ulrich Wegener, ‘The Evolution of Grenschutzgruppe (GSG) 9 and the Lessons of “Operation Magic Fire” in Mogadishu,’ in Bernard Horn, J. Paul de B. Taillon and David Last (eds) Force of Choice: Perspectives of Special Operations, Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004, pp. 107-118. 33 J. Paul de B. Taillon, The Evolution of Special Forces in Counter-Terrorism: The British and American Experiences, Praeger, 2000, p.38. 34 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, p. 411. 35 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, p. 420. 36 Hocking, 1993, p. 190. 37 Personal Conversation with Colonel Peter Gilmore, former Commanding Officer SASR, Canberra, 18 May 2005. 38 Lieutenant General Donald Dunstan, as quoted in Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, pp. 420-1.

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The extensive changes to Australia’s homeland security arrangements that followed

(including those involving the ADO) support the inclusion of threat perceptions among

the political reasons on which government homeland security decisions are based.

The longevity of a change in threat perception as an influence on Australian homeland

security policy settings can be gauged from the record of changes or adjustments to those

settings. Returning to the 1978 CHOGRM example, the significant changes appear,

from the open source evidence, to have been confined to the five or six years following

that event. Given the demanding nature of the capabilities to be acquired by the ADO

and the relatively low base from which they were grown initially, their development to a

mature state could easily have taken that long. Beyond that time, further change was

largely evolutionary up until the next trigger event (the Sydney 2000 Games). This

assessment is based on the following evidence:

1. There was no major addition to the suite of government-directed ADF

counter terrorism capabilities after 1984-5, until the addition of SUR and CBRR

in 2000. Clearly, the classified nature of ADF CT capabilities makes the open

source information in this area unreliable, but if the initial suite of ADF domestic

CT capabilities is described as special recovery/hostage rescue capabilities in

building or aircraft scenarios, then the only significant addition to this before

2000 was a capability to respond to terrorist incidents on offshore oil platforms

(added in July 198039). Given the SASR’s pre-existing Water Operations

capability, the acquisition of that capability could be considered consistent with

evolutionary development. SASR did need to address capacity issues imposed by

the full-time CT role, which it did by including Royal Australian Navy Clearance

Divers in its specialist assault forces and by re-raising an additional Sabre

Squadron.40 Once the basic capabilities were established, incremental qualitative

39 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, pp. 429. 40 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, p. 431.

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improvements could be expected through absorption of new technologies and

periodic importation of overseas innovations.41

2. The national benchmark for IEDD capabilities does not appear to have

been updated from that established by the ADF by the early 1980s. The first

evidence that counter measures for IED threats frequently seen overseas, such as

large car bombs (vehicle-borne IEDs – VBIEDs) or radio controlled IEDs

(RCIEDs), were being incorporated into Australian IEDD capabilities appears in

association with ADF preparations for the Sydney 2000 Games.42

3. There was no major alteration to the national crisis management

architecture after the adjustments to the PSCC/SAC-PAV processes in the years

following 1978. Those arrangements continued to evolve until the mid-1980s,

especially in terms of the command and control architecture employed by the

ADF during terrorist incidents. For example, there were several incremental

changes in the way ADF commanders and advisers inserted themselves into the

national management architecture for terrorist crises. These, arrangements,

however, were largely mature by 1984.43

4. Despite the Hope Report’s recommendations for amendments to the

Defence Act to improve the provisions for the use of the ADF in domestic

security roles, there was no impetus for the necessary legislative change.

5. ‘Strategic guidance’ and policy issued by Australian Governments to

direct efforts in the Defence and Foreign Affairs functions do not begin to

mention terrorism among the ‘non-military’ threats that the ADF may need to face

until 2000.44

41 Defence Report 1981, p. 17; Defence Report 1984-1985, p. 26; Defence Report 1988-1989, p. 15. 42 Phil Black, "Newscast - Joint Incident Response Unit." In Channel Seven News. Australia: Channel Seven, 29 July 2000. 43 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, pp. 4338, 441. 44 Defence 2000, p. viii and para. 2.13. See also the discussion of ‘The policy environment’ in Chapter Four, and Appendix 1.

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It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the 1978 CHOGRM event ‘calibrated’

Australian government threat perceptions, insofar as those perceptions influenced

decisions on the employment of the ADO in homeland security missions, until the

Sydney 2000 Games. This is not to suggest that Australia lost interest in counter

terrorism: there were significant developments in terrorist activities and techniques

overseas in the interregnum between the mid-1980s and 2000 and these clearly kept both

the Government’s and Defence’s interest. For example, the terrorist siege of the Iranian

Embassy in London in 1984 showcased sophisticated CT assault capabilities to the world

(in this case, those of 22 SAS Regiment). These incidents, especially during the 1980s,

appear to have had a ‘sustaining’ effect on Australia’s CT efforts and force development,

in that they encouraged the maintenance of the capability at a high level, justified

continued enhancements and attracted the associated funding. Insofar as the continued

development was evolutionary, however, these events were insufficient to trigger

subsequent revolutionary changes. The experience of Australia’s CT capability during

the 1990s suggests, therefore, that a ‘sustaining event’ phenomenon may operate in the

aftermath of a trigger event.

Another example of this behaviour is provided by the timing of the decision to raise a

CBRR capability. In this case, the international event that might have triggered that

decision was the Aum Shinrikyo sect’s 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway

system. Despite this demonstration of the feasibility of a terrorist attack using CBR

agents, Australia did not decide to develop a ‘high end’ CBRR capability until 1998, and

then only in preparation for the 2000 Games. The only response, in capability terms, to

the 1995 Aum attacks was a modest increase in resources to the rudimentary Chemical

(and) Radiological Response Team (CRRT) capability maintained by the Army’s School

of Military Engineering.45 Australia’s threat perception behaviour before and after 1978

is therefore consistent, in that international developments were monitored and could

prompt adjustments to ADO involvement in homeland security roles, but these would be

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undertaken deliberately and probably slowly. Once initiated, such adjustments could be

accelerated by significant incidents or security demands (such as special event hosting

responsibilities) within Australia.

If the 1978 CHOGRM episode was a trigger event that re-calibrated threat perceptions

with a consequent effect on homeland security decisions, then the next trigger event

must be examined from a threat perception perspective also. Official statements

consistently declared that no special threat to the security of the Sydney 2000 Games had

been identified.46 Nevertheless, a massive security effort was mounted to which the

ADO made a significant contribution that included the acquisition of novel homeland

security capabilities by the ADO. 47,48 Clearly, the Games caused an adjustment to the

1978 settings for ADO involvement in homeland security, although the reason for this

may not have been a change in threat perception.

Major international events, such as the Olympic Games, create requirements for

heightened security in several ways. To begin with, the high media profile and large

crowd concentrations that typify such events could encourage terrorist attacks by

providing a ready-made ‘stage’ from which to reach a large audience:

…we are conscious that the Games will be the biggest series of events ever held in Australia. And these events could provide an international stage on which some groups could seek to advance their cause through acts of violence.49

Second, such events could draw citizens from terrorist targets into less secure ‘neutral’

territory where they are more vulnerable. These could be either specific individuals or

45 The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, May 2005, pp. 18-19. Personal conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Craig Petrie, Project Officer for CBRR capability 1997-99, Canberra, 6 September 2005. 46 Alexander Downer (Foreign Minister), interview with Glenn Milne, Sunday Sunrise, Channel 7, 20 August 2000[cited 6 September 2006]. Available from http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/transcripts/2000/000820_downer.html. Also Daryl Williams, ‘Dignitary and Athlete Protection Olympic Conference Welcome Address,’ Sydney, 24 July 2000, para. 5. 47 Official Report of the XXVII Olympiad: Security, p. 5. 48 For example, ship underway recovery and CBR response. Ian McPhedran, The Amazing SAS, Sydney: Harper-Collins, 2005, pp. 118-9. 49 Daryl Williams, ‘Dignitary and Athlete Protection Olympic Conference Welcome Address,’ Sydney, 24 July 2000, para. 6.

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the citizens of target countries. For example, the Black September group took advantage

of the presence of the Israeli Olympic team in the Munich Athletes Village to stage its

1972 hostage siege operation. Third, there is evidence, even before 2001, of a growing

international expectation that such events would always be accompanied by elaborate

security measures. This evidence lies in the consistent practice of comparing the

security arrangements for a particular event with a benchmark established by a previous

event of the same type - successive iterations seem to be expected to exceed the previous

security benchmark. This is most evident in Olympic Games planning, over which the

spectre of Munich (1972) continues to hang. Even the Centennial Park bombing during

the 1996 Atlanta Olympics (which was unrelated to the Games except by timing and

proximity) re-surfaces in any media coverage of Olympics security.50 Meeting the latter

expectation seems to have become a ‘cost of doing business’ in the world of major event

security: Sydney’s submission for its 2000 Olympics bid included written undertakings

from the Australian Prime Minister and New South Wales Premier, and their respective

Police Commissioners, that the Games would be fully secure.51 It appears that there is

now an ‘inferred threat’ associated with major events that can demand security measures

that may not be justified by the threat as it is objectively measured:

And this is the awkward tension in Olympic security planning: the risks of violence are remote, but the results could be catastrophic.52

The last thing we want is for the success of the Games to be marred by a security incident…53

A credible international event, in other words, must include credible security measures,

regardless of the level of threat. Failure to demonstrate such measures to international

organising bodies, foreign governments or the public could adversely affect attendance

at the event with a consequent impact on its success.

50 Matt Brown, ‘Background Briefing: Dangerous Games – Terrorism and the 2000 Olympics,’ ABC Radio National, 1 June 1997, [cited 6 September 2005]. Available from http://www.abc.net.au/rn/talks/ bbing/stories/s10594.htm. 51 Official Report of the XXVII Olympiad: Security, p. 1. 52 Matt Brown, ‘Background Briefing: Dangerous Games – Terrorism and the 2000 Olympics,’ 1997.

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This inferred threat phenomenon may also influence security risk assessments by

creating an environment in which any security failure is assured of immediate

international visibility – as demonstrated by the graphic television coverage of the 1972

Munich siege or the 1996 Atlanta bombing. In states that are vulnerable to declines in

foreign investment or tourism, such public exposure of security problems can be

economically damaging.54 The potential severity of economic consequences may

therefore increase the risk associated with major security failures, even if they are very

unlikely. This in turn may motivate the implementation of elaborate security measures.

The evidence indicates, therefore, that the Sydney 2000 Games constituted a trigger

event for Australia’s homeland security settings based on ‘inferred’ threat and

international expectations rather than on a change in the demonstrated threat. Given the

national strategic importance of delivering the Games successfully, the risk associated

with Games security was high even in the absence of a specific serious threat. This is

likely to have influenced strongly the government’s assessment of the importance of

security measures and hence of the resources that needed to be applied to them. This

assessment is supported by government statements. As the ADO is included among the

resources available to a Commonwealth Government, it is therefore likely that the

inferred threat or international expectations influenced a pragmatic political decision on

how the ADO should be employed in Games-related homeland security missions.

Options

Notwithstanding the compelling importance of other political or managerial

considerations, governments will be attracted to homeland security solutions that

maximise their options and minimise political risk, especially in crises. Under

Australia’s constitutional arrangements, the states’ primacy in most domestic security

matters could be inherently limiting to Commonwealth Governments’ options unless

Section 61 of the Constitution is invoked. Even in those circumstances, options will be

limited by the capabilities available. This suggests that a Commonwealth Government

53 Daryl Williams, ‘Dignitary and Athlete Protection Olympic Conference Welcome Address,’ 2000.

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will desire recourse to capabilities that offer options. This is likely to influence decisions

on how the ADO is employed as well as on the capabilities it maintains. In the extreme

circumstances represented by, say, a terrorist siege-hostage situation, options should

include resolution of the situation by force. This generates a concomitant need for a

high-quality special recovery capability. The highly dangerous circumstances in which

such a capability would be employed dictate that little risk can be tolerated in its

availability when required: the qualitative and quantitative levels of the capability must

therefore be guaranteed with absolute reliability. This suggests that the ADO is likely to

remain a Commonwealth Government’s preferred agent to perform homeland security

roles that demand the availability of high-quality capabilities at short notice.

Managerial Factors

In addition to political factors, a quest for ‘good governance’ is also likely to influence a

Commonwealth Government’s employment of the ADO in homeland security missions.

This suggests that managerial factors will influence such decisions. This section seeks to

identify those factors, which will be sought under the broad categories of resources,

priorities and synergies.

Resources

Perhaps the most pragmatic considerations influencing the decisions of any government

are those associated with resources. Financial resources, in the form of revenues, are a

major determinant of the effort that can be devoted to any government function,

including those associated with homeland security. Given that the states have primary

responsibility for most homeland security functions under Australia’s constitutional

arrangements, the resources available to states will therefore be a major influence on the

homeland security capabilities that they possess. As discussed above, the level of state

capabilities determines the capabilities that the Commonwealth must maintain in order to

guarantee its ability to protect the states - or its own interests -against domestic violence.

54 Matt Brown, ‘Background Briefing: Dangerous Games – Terrorism and the 2000 Olympics,’ ABC Radio National, 1 June 1997.

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Resources also determine the extent of homeland security capabilities that the

Commonwealth Government can maintain. As the Commonwealth Government

receives the bulk of Australia’s tax revenues, its financial resources are obviously much

greater than those of any state: as a result, its capacity to fund expensive homeland

security capabilities is much greater.

Some resources applicable to homeland security are available to the Commonwealth

Government by virtue of its other functions: for example, those associated with Defence.

Many of the capabilities of the ADF, DSTO and other agencies, although not developed

or optimised for homeland security missions in the first place, can be adapted to

homeland security roles if required.

The relative resource levels of the various states and the Commonwealth place realistic

constraints on the homeland security capabilities they can maintain. Compared with the

Commonwealth, all states are relatively ‘resource poor’ and possess few capabilities that

are equivalent to Defence’s in their ‘incidental’ application to homeland security. As a

result, the states’ ability to maintain ‘high-end’ capabilities (such as sophisticated special

recovery) is inherently limited. Prior to 9/11, the relative infrequency of the events that

would require such capabilities would have made it difficult to justify expending the

resources needed to develop them. Even among the states, resource levels would be

expected to vary according to their respective economies, with the more prosperous

states able to afford more expensive capabilities.

The influence of state resource realities on the Commonwealth’s pre-9/11 employment

of the ADO can be seen in some of the ADO capabilities that were maintained. The

special recovery capabilities of the SASR Tactical Assault Group, for example, would

challenge the resources of state police forces, at least from a training and skills

perspective. This was put to the Commonwealth Government from the inception of the

national CT capability by Sir Robert Mark, a retired Commissioner of the London

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Metropolitan Police. Mark had been requested by the Government to advise on CT

measures in the aftermath of the Hilton bombing. In his view:

‘…the close quarter battle is a task for the most experienced soldiery, not for the police, whose role should be that of containment until the military arrives. The higher degree of training, more sophisticated weaponry, experience and fitness of specialist troops is likely to reduce rather increase the possible loss of life in a close quarter battle.’55

This view seems to have retained some resonance within the government for a long

period. As Senator David MacGibbon put it in 1999:

The skill at arms of the (SAS) counter-terrorist squad is so high and is maintained at such a high level that it is not practicable for a state police force to maintain that level.56

Although not a homeland security task as defined in this thesis, the ADO’s involvement

in the Australian Contingency Plan for Space Re-Entry Debris (AUSCONPLAN

SPRED) provides another example of employment decisions being driven by state

resource realities. In the event of the impact of a re-entering satellite carrying

radioactive sources, no state would have the capacity to perform the necessary

radiological survey to locate all debris. As part of the ADO, NDO was required to

supplement state resources in a 1982 satellite incident:

The Natural Disasters Organisation co-ordinated national preparations against the possibility of re-entry over Australia of radioactive debris from the malfunctioning Soviet nuclear-powered satellite COSMOS 1402. This was a new role for the Organisation, dictated by the possibility of a national disaster in circumstances where only the Commonwealth possessed sufficient resources and expertise for a rapid and effective response.57

55 Sir Robert Mark, Report to the Minister for Administrative Services on the Organization of Police Resources in the Commonwealth Area and Other Related Matters, 1978, as quoted in Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, p. 420. 56 Senator David MacGibbon, ‘Defence and the Parliament,’ United Service, Vol. 51, No. 2, Royal United Service Institution of New South Wales, Sydney, 1999, p. 40. 57 Defence Report 1982-1983, p. 22.

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AUSCONPLAN SPRED was developed after the COSMOS 1402 scare and relies on the

Australian Space Debris Emergency Search Team (ASDEST), commanded by an ADF

officer, which is made available to the states to address the radiological hazard aspects of

a SPRED incident.58

Resource realities, therefore, impose pragmatic requirements for the Commonwealth to

maintain certain capabilities in readiness to support the states, whose resource limitations

will effectively restrict the homeland security capabilities they can possess. In fulfilling

its ‘conventional’ function of defence against external military threats, the ADO must

maintain certain capabilities which also have application to homeland security: as a

Commonwealth asset, the ADO itself is among the resources that the Commonwealth

can commit in support of the states.

Resource limitations usually encourage efficiency or economy in the expenditure of

resources, with the aim of achieving the maximum results with the available means. In

the case of homeland security, this principle should extend to the economical provision

of capabilities. A sensible approach would be to make maximum use of existing

capabilities that have utility in homeland security and to avoid unnecessary duplication

of those capabilities. As shown above, the ADO possesses a number of such

capabilities, which are either applicable to homeland security with minimal adaptation or

which provide an excellent base for the development of specialist capabilities. Three

examples are provided by the Navy’s offshore patrol capabilities, the SASR and the

RAAOC Ammunition Technical stream.

Offshore patrol. The core business of any navy is the application of sea power in

pursuit of its nation’s interests. The skills and capabilities to do so also provide a

basis for a coastal surveillance capability: this is a traditional role for most

58 See State Radioactive Space Re-Entry Debris Emergency Response Plan’ (WESPLAN SPRED), Western Australia Police Service, December 2001 (latest version) [cited 13 September 2005]. Available http://www.police.wa.gov.au/AboutUs/pdf/SPRED_Plan2001.PDF.

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navies.59 ‘Constabulary’ tasks are identified in RAN doctrine as one of its roles,

in fulfilment of the Australian strategic task of Protection of National Interests

(PNI).60 Although the RAN’s patrol boat fleet is optimised for this constabulary

role,61 the skills needed to employ the capability in a homeland security role are

fundamental naval ‘warfighting’ competencies that the RAN must maintain in

order to fulfil its ‘conventional’ roles in inter-state conflict scenarios. These

include maritime navigation; surveillance, interception and boarding tactics; and

the application of the Law of the Sea.62

SASR. The SASR was ideally suited to the rapid development of a sophisticated

tactical counter terrorist capability because it already possessed personnel with

demonstrated high level skills and physical capacities as well as established

professional relationships with relevant overseas agencies. In imposing this task

on the SASR in 1978, the Fraser Government was making economical use of an

existing resource while adopting a course of least risk in terms of achieving the

desired capability quickly. The additional financial resources needed to acquire

the desired capability, in terms of equipment and funds for training, could be

found within the Federal budget and were modest in the context of the overall

Defence vote. For any of the state police forces to achieve the same capability

starting in 1978, the necessary investment would have consumed a

proportionately greater share of each force’s resources, especially as duplication

of aspects of the SASR selection process and training program would have been

necessary. For true jurisdictional autonomy to be preserved, each state and

territory would have needed to develop its own capability. Given the resource

realities affecting the states, it is unlikely that the capability achieved by the

SASR could have been matched either quantitatively or qualitatively in the same

59 Personal conversation with Vice Admiral Chris Ritchie, Australian Chief of Navy, Russell Offices, Canberra, 20 May 2005. 60 Australian Maritime Doctrine, Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2000, pp. 36, 65-9. 61 Personal conversation with Vice Admiral Chris Ritchie, Australian Chief of Navy, Russell Offices, Canberra, 20 May 2005. 62 Andrew Forbes, Protecting the National Interest: Naval Constabulary Operations in Australia's Exclusive Zone. Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre Working Papers (No.11). Canberra: Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre, 2002, p. 64.

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time. Sophisticated special recovery capabilities have only been achieved

recently in some jurisdictions. For example, New South Wales, which has some

of the most extensive capabilities, has only achieved a helicopter insertion

capability for its special recovery assault teams since 2004, and this involves a

single BK117 helicopter that is shared with the NSW Fire Brigades.63 By

comparison, SASR has possessed a multi-aircraft night vision goggle helicopter

insertion capability since at least 1996, as evidenced by the training being

undertaken by the Regiment when that year’s tragic accident occurred.64

Ammunition Technical stream. Similarly, in basing its IEDD capability,

initially, on the RAAOC Ammunition Technical (AT) trade, the ADO was taking

advantage of an existing investment. The core knowledge of the Army’s ATOs

and ATs is in the application of explosives engineering: that is, ‘a broad variety of

sciences and engineering technologies …(including) chemistry, thermodynamics,

fluid dynamics, aerodynamics, mechanics, mechanics, electricity, and electronics,

and even meteorology, biology and physiology.’65,66 The everyday employment

of AT personnel revolves around the design, use, storage, maintenance,

management and disposal of explosives products. Given this knowledge and

skills base, the AT trade was a logical platform on which to base and maintain an

IEDD capability. State police forces, with no equivalent to an AT specialisation,

would need to develop an IEDD capability ‘from scratch.’ Without an

occupational familiarity with explosives engineering, it is likely that such a police

capability would be qualitatively inferior to one based on AT skills, at least until

new bomb technicians had acquired significant experience. Basing the national

IEDD capability on the Army’s AT trade was, therefore similar to the decision to

63 Bob Carr, Premier of NSW, answering a question posed by Mr. Debnam in the NSW Parliament, 18 February 2004, [cited 15 September 2005]. Available from http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/la/lapaper.nsf/0/46F3B14E81C3D883CA256E3D00261438. Also Superintendent Peter Gillem, NSWPS Special Operations Group, A Current Affair, 10 February 2005. 64 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, p. 468. 65 Paul W. Cooper: Explosives Engineering, New York: Wiley-VCH, 1996, p. vii. The value of explosives engineering to IED technicians is explained in Dominic Brittain, ‘The Benefits of Training EOD Operators as Explosives Engineers,’ paper presented to Regional Bomb Management Conference, Hong Kong, pp. 185-9. Copy provided by Mr. Terry Vincent, Director, Australian Bomb Data Centre, 11 August 2005. 66 Personal conversation with Mr. Terry Vincent, Director, Australian Bomb Data Centre, 11 August 2005.

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develop special recovery within the SASR, in that it represented a least risk option

that exploited current capabilities.

Synergies

The imperative to make economical or efficient use of existing capabilities in providing

for Australia’s homeland security might encourage governments to employ the ADO in

homeland security roles rather than to develop similar but distinct capabilities in the

civilian jurisdictions. A converse effect could also influence those decisions: if the

development of capabilities to support homeland security roles within a particular

agency (either the ADO or a civilian jurisdiction) were to offer improved effectiveness in

that agency’s other roles, then the costs and benefits of the associated investment would

need to be considered in terms of the overall effect. Aside from its obvious financial

aspect, in the ADO’s case investment could include an ‘institutional’ dimension

involving the expenditure of goodwill against the risks of public or political uneasiness

with domestic security roles for the Organisation.

Conceivably, an investment in homeland security capabilities might yield greater returns

in overall effectiveness for some agencies than others. This phenomenon resembles the

concept of ‘synergy,’ whereby the overall effect of a combined effort is greater than the

sum of the constituent contributions.67 An appreciation of the synergies arising from the

development and maintenance of a particular homeland security capability could

therefore influence a decision as to which agency should acquire that capability. Where

the synergies favour possession by the ADO, governments could be encouraged to

follow that course rather than other options, such as the creation of separate, specialised

civilian (state or federal) capabilities that promised fewer parallel benefits. This might

be especially true during a period of low perceived threat.

In order for anticipated synergies to influence an initial decision on where a new

capability should be lodged, the wider benefits of that capability must be apparent. In

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some cases, the relative synergies will be obvious: for example, the RAN patrol boat

fleet has clear value in providing opportunities for experience in a wide range of

maritime skills with broad relevance to the Navy - the same opportunities would be of

much less value to, say, a state police force, with a smaller maritime workforce. In many

cases the full applications of a new capability, technique or field of knowledge will only

be found with experience. Once identified, synergies could justify the retention of a

particular capability by the ADO, even when that capability’s domestic application

might support its lodgement elsewhere.

An example of the relative value of synergies is provided by the special recovery

capabilities developed by the SASR TAG and by most police jurisdictions. Skills and

techniques developed after 1978, in pursuit of the hostage recovery capability directed

by the government, were found applicable to the SASR’s ‘green’ or warfighting roles.68

During a period when the SASR lacked green roles tasking, the focus and resources

provided by its counter terrorism responsibilities enabled it to maintain very stringent

personnel selection standards and high skill levels that might otherwise have been

eroded.69

Just as special recovery capabilities ‘fed back’ into the SASR’s more normal military

tasks, police forces also found application for them in conventional policing functions.

Whereas terrorist hostage sieges have been unknown in Australia to date, hostage

situations do arise under other circumstances (such as domestic disputes) and the

enhanced capabilities acquired for counter terrorist scenarios have proved useful in such

cases. The acquisition of special recovery capabilities thus offered synergies for both

SASR and the civilian police services in terms of their ‘normal’ functions. Given,

however, that the SASR’s ‘normal’ role can involve the application of force in warlike

situations, it is reasonable to presume that the combat-related aspects of a counter

67 Originally used in a physiological or pharmacological context, synergy has become much more widely used in the sense indicated. Concise Oxford Dictionary, Sixth Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976. 68 Personal conversations with: Major General Mike Hindmarsh, Special Operations Commander Australia, 3 May 2005; and Colonel Peter Gilmore, Commanding Officer SASR 2001-2002, Canberra, 18 May 2005. 69 McPhedran, The Amazing SAS, 2005, p. 117.

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terrorist tactical assault had much broader application for the SASR than for the civilian

police forces, which only use force on a more limited ‘last resort’ basis.70 The ‘relative

synergy’ of acquiring special recovery capabilities was therefore probably greater for the

SASR than for the police forces.

In addition to special recovery and maritime patrol, the ADO could realise synergies

from the employment in homeland security of its nuclear, biological and chemical

defence (NBCD); science and technology; intelligence; and geospatial capabilities. For

example, although historically a modest capability in the ADO, NBCD provided the

initial platform for the establishment of the ADF CBR response capability. Equally,

civilian agencies could achieve synergistic improvements in their ‘normal’ capabilities

from enhancements addressing homeland security roles. The police acquisition of

special recovery capabilities has been mentioned, but other emergency services could

also enjoy benefits. Ambulance services and fire brigades, for example, could improve

their handling of ‘industrial’ hazardous material (HAZMAT) incidents by applying

homeland security-related CBR response capabilities.

The available evidence does not support an exact assessment of the extent to which

government decisions on the employment of the ADO in homeland security roles pre-

9/11 were influenced by synergy considerations. The fact that synergies are achievable,

however, suggests that the ADO would argue to retain roles that it saw as beneficial to

its ‘core business’ while the normal governmental interest in resource efficiency would

make synergy arguments persuasive. The likelihood is, therefore, that sustained patterns

of ADO employment in homeland security roles pre-9/11 were influenced to some

degree by synergy considerations.

Priorities

Priorities are the traditional means by which governments manage conflicts between

their responsibilities, expectations, perceptions and resources. The provision of

70 Dodson, The Sharp End, 2001, p. 145.

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homeland security is a government function that competes for priority with other

functions. That priority is likely to be governed by prevailing threat perceptions.

In the pre-9/11 period, homeland security does not appear to have been a particularly

high government priority. While important, the challenges to Australia’s homeland

security do not appear to have demanded an excessive share of government or public

attention. This is indicated by, among other things, the handling of most governmental

homeland security business by senior officials (without excessive Ministerial

involvement) and by limited re-organisation of the homeland security policy machinery

up until the late 1990s. Small adjustments that began to emerge in association with the

preparations for the Olympics (for example, the investment in the development of the

JIRU and the increased national focus on CBRR) indicate a slight upturn in priority in

the few years immediately prior to 9/11.

This moderate priority appears to have led to a fairly stable pattern of ADO involvement

in homeland security for most of the pre-9/11 period. Some changes were motivated by

trigger events: these included the re-focusing of the PSCC and the establishment of a

national counter-terrorism capability after 1978, and the capability enhancement

implemented for the Olympics. With these exceptions, policy activity and associated

resource allocations reflect a general satisfaction with the homeland security situation

that enabled governments to focus most of their attention on other functions.

The Influence of the ADO

As concluded in the preceding chapter, the evidence suggests that the ADO at large (that

is, not including specialist elements such as SASR) did not consider homeland security

part of its core business pre-9/11. There are probably two reasons for this. First, the

ADF had traditionally been wary of tasks such as homeland security diverting its effort

and resources away from preparation for ‘warfighting’ or other conventional ADF

missions that are at the heart of how the ADFs conceptualises its core business. This

tension is demonstrated by the ADF’s need to man the very large INTERFET

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deployment to East Timor concurrently with Operation GOLD in 1999-2000. The two

operations were effectively in competition for the same scarce resources, but a military

operation overseas is a much more attractive task for a defence organisation than a

domestic security event at home.

Second, the ADF could damage its very good relationship with the Australian population

through a heavy-handed misapplication of force in the homeland. In seeking to avoid

this risk, the ADO is likely to avoid homeland security roles, or at least those that

involve the use of force. An note of caution in this regard was sounded by a

Commanding Officer of the SASR very early in the development of that unit’s counter

terrorist capability:

We will be called in only – and I mean only – when every other avenue has been exhausted, when all efforts of the police forces have failed. We wouldn’t have it any other way.71

Some elements of the ADO could perceive involvement in homeland security missions

as highly desirable. This is likely to apply to specialist organisations that have benefited

from that involvement. The SASR is a case in point, enjoying extraordinary resource

priority as a result of its unique national capability.72

Given its probable reluctance in relation to homeland security tasking, the ADO (and the

ADF in particular) is unlikely to have sought to influence government in favour of a new

or increased homeland security role pre-9/11. Roles that the ADO did perform are likely

to have been imposed on it, rather than sought proactively.

Summary Conclusion

Analysis of Australia’s pre-9/11 experience suggests that pragmatic political and

managerial reasons were the principal drivers of Commonwealth Government decisions

on the use of the ADO in homeland security roles. Legal factors were not a major

71 Lieutenant Colonel R.P. Beesley, as quoted in Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, p. 426. (Emphasis added).

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determinant of the ADO’s employment. Neither the Constitution nor other legislation

(such as the Defence Act) forced governments to employ the ADO for homeland security

in undesirable ways, but nor did they prevent them from using it as they saw fit.

Although some shortcomings in the existing legal framework were identified, especially

after 1978, there was no urgency to address them. The perceived threat to Australia’s

homeland security for most of the pre-9/11 period was low. As a consequence, it did not

command a high priority on the national policy agenda.

The role of the ADO (or its colonial predecessors) in homeland security over most of the

two centuries prior to 9/11 had been a declining one, especially where the use of military

force was concerned. In post-colonial Australia there had been few situations requiring

the use of such force. Both policy on the use of the ADO in homeland security and the

associated capabilities had developed in an incremental and episodic fashion:

international events motivated some relatively slow changes in policy on the

involvement of the ADO in homeland security, but rapid developments only occurred in

response to high-profile ‘trigger events’ that occurred on Australian territory. Even then,

Australia’s domestic response capabilities generally often did not address the worst

forms of violence occurring overseas.

Two trigger events occurred in the quarter-century prior to 9/11 that prompted a gradual

reversal of the ADO’s declining homeland security role. These were the 1978 Sydney

Hilton bombing and the hosting of the Sydney 2000 Games. Both of these accelerated

significantly development that had already begun, but was being pursued in a relatively

deliberate fashion. Development of a counter-terrorist capability after the 1978 Hilton

bombing was sustained through ‘sustaining events’ that occurred overseas, which served

to keep the ADO and the government focussed on the problem. Through its contribution

to the security responses to both trigger events, the ADO established a firm place in the

national ‘homeland security community,’ especially in relation to counter terrorism.

These events had also sparked the development of a national domestic security

72 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, 2002, p. 445.

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architecture that included the ADO. While embryonic in some respects, this was a good

basis for development in the ensuing period.

The slow and episodic development of policy in relation to the ADO’s use in homeland

security in the pre-9/11 period is generally consistent with incrementalist theory. For

example, the counter-terrorist hostage rescue capability and the rapid call-out legislation

apparently visualised by some policy makers in 1976 was not immediately achievable,

but was arrived at in stages over the next 24 years, with the assistance of historical

‘triggers.’ Given, however, that the early policy decisions were made by a subordinate

Committee of the Cabinet, rather than by the full Cabinet, it is likely that this was an

example of incremental policy making, rather than incremental politics.73

The next chapter begins an examination of the ADO’s involvement in homeland security

in that period.

73 See the differentiation between incremental policy making and incremental politics in C.E. Lindblom, "Still muddling, not yet through." Public Administration Review 39, no. 6 (1979): pp. 517-26, pp. 519-520.

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CHAPTER SIX

DEFENCE AND AUSTRALIAN HOMELAND SECURITY 2001-2006

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks led to a fundamental shift in our understanding of the global security climate, and brought home the changed character of the terrorist threat.1

Australia’s conceptualisation of its homeland security situation was changed drastically

by 9/11. This chapter describes the employment of the ADO in homeland security roles

since 9/11, identifying the ways in which that employment has changed. The chapter will

argue that 9/11 was far more than simply a trigger for incremental development, as had

arisen from time to time previously. Instead, it was a distinct type of causal event for

homeland security adjustments: a ‘threshold event’ for that ushered in a major national

security reform agenda that has impacted significantly on the ADO’s homeland security

role. That reform agenda has not yet run its course.

This will be approached by first providing a chronological account of developments in

the ADO’s homeland security roles since 9/11. This will include two case studies of

post-9/11 domestic event support operations, namely the support to the 2002

Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) and the Melbourne 2006

Commonwealth Games. Next, changes in relevant government policy will be analysed

before using the model established in Chapter Four to examine post 9/11 involvement of

the ADO in homeland security on a mission-by-mission basis. The post-9/11 status quo

will then be summarised. Reasons for changes in the ADO’s homeland security roles

will be considered in Chapter Seven.

The Post-9/11 Experience

The ADO’s initial involvement in homeland security after the 9/11 attacks was inwardly

focused, consisting of a precautionary increase in the security of Defence establishments

1 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 6.

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within Australia.2 There was no Australian equivalent to the very public employment of

military personnel in domestic security duties - for example, the use of National Guard

personnel to supplement airport security - that had occurred in the United States. Despite

the heightened state of national alert, there was no obvious change in ADO involvement

in homeland security matters.

Although it was not obvious, the ADO quickly became involved in Australia’s ‘offshore’

military response to the 9/11 attacks. The Commonwealth Government having invoked

the ANZUS Treaty, ADF personnel deployed to the United States within days to

commence planning Australia’s contribution to the forthcoming operations against Al

Qa’ida and Taliban forces in Afghanistan. This would become Operation SLIPPER.3

ADF personnel were involved in combat operations in Afghanistan by the end of 2001

and have remained there, in varying numbers, ever since. To the extent that the

subsequent invasion and ongoing operations in Iraq are related to the post-9/11 ‘War on

Terror,’ the ADF’s involvement in that theatre is also part of the continuing offshore

response to 9/11.

While the ADF was not engaged quickly in actual homeland security operations after

9/11, preparations for increased involvement began almost immediately:

On 13 September 2001, only two days after the al-Qa’ida attacks on New York and Washington, the ADF had commenced immediate planning to raise a second Tactical Assault Group, based on the East Coast in Sydney.4

A decision to ‘effectively double the counter-terrorist capabilities of the Special Forces,’

including the re-creation of part of the CBRR capabilities of the JIRU with an Incident

Response Unit (IRU), was officially announced on 1 October 2001.5 This was followed

2 Personal conversation with Mr. Mike Norris, Director, Domestic Security and Preparedness Policy, Department of Defence. Canberra, 19 July 2005. 3Defence. Operation Slipper Department of Defence, 2005 (cited 14 January 2006). Available from http://www.defence.gov.au/opslipper/.4 Duncan Lewis, "Guarding Australians Against Terrorism." Australian Army Journal 1, no. 2, 2003, pp. 47-8. 5 Peter Reith MP (Minister for Defence) Media Statement, ‘Defence Counter-Terrorism Upgrade,’ 1 October 2001.

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in March 2002 with a decision to establish the new incident response capability as the

Incident Response Regiment (IRR).6

Operational involvement of the ADO in homeland security roles remained on the usual

‘standby’ basis until February 2002, when that year’s CHOGM was held in south-east

Queensland. A detailed case study of the ADO involvement in CHOGM 2002 follows.

Case Study:

ADO Contributions to Australia’s Homeland Security in the Context of the 2002 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting

Australia hosted the 2002 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM

2002) in Queensland over the period 2-5 March 2002. As a significant international

event, conduct of CHOGM 2002 included a major protective security operation to which

the ADO contributed significant capabilities. This study analyses the ADO contribution

to CHOGM 2002 as an example of a post-9/11 domestic event support operation (DESO)

in Australia. In a later chapter, the ADO’s experience of CHOGM 2002 and of Operation

ACOLYTE (support to the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games) will be contrasted

with security support aspects of Operations GOLD (the ADO support to the Sydney 2000

Games) in order to identify any changes or trends in ADO employment in the post-9/11

period.

Background

Australia was scheduled to host a CHOGM in Brisbane in October 2001. As a

Commonwealth Government activity, the event was Commonwealth-led and state-

supported. The Commonwealth naturally held primary responsibility for the coordination

of the Conference itself, but its location in Queensland meant that security was

coordinated jointly between the Queensland Police Service (QPS) and the

Commonwealth.7 Planning for ADO support to the security effort began in 2000.

6 ‘The Incident Response Regiment,’ The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 20, No. 2, May 2005, p. 20. 7 ‘CHOGM 2001,’ Defence Media Release CPA 160/01, 18 May 2001.

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The ADO support for CHOGM 2001 was named Operation GUARDIAN.8 By May

2001, planning had developed to the point that an ADF commitment of approximately

1600 personnel was programmed.9 By this stage, ADF and Queensland Police Service

planning was well integrated. Relationships between ADF and Queensland Police

planners had developed to the point that a ‘CHOGM Planning Unit Mixed Dining-In

(Night)’ was held at the Army’s Gallipoli Barracks on 18 May 2001. This was attended

by military and police commanders, planning staff and their spouses.10

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 led to the postponement of CHOGM 2001 and

the suspension of Operation GUARDIAN. The activity was re-scheduled for March

2002, to be held in the Coolum area of Queensland’s Sunshine Coast. The ADO support

activity was re-named Operation GUARDIAN II.11 As a result of this re-naming, the

previous operation has come to be referred to as GUARDIAN I.

Threat environment

Operation GUARDIAN II was the first Australian protective security operation of the

post-9/11 period. As a result, there was a significant elevation of the threat level from

that on which the planning for GUARDIAN I was based. The classified threat

assessments on which preparations were based are not available. Comparing the

composition of the GUARDIAN I and II force packages, therefore, offers a useful

indication of the impact of the post-9/11 threat environment on ADO security support

requirements, although the conclusiveness of this comparison is limited by the use of

open source data on force composition and capabilities.

GUARDIAN I essentially anticipated a similar threat level to the 2000 Games and hence

the planned ADO support package was similar, although ‘scaled back’ considerably due

to the much smaller demands of CHOGM. This explains the difference between the 1600

8 Defence Annual Report 2000-01, p. 82. 9 ‘CHOGM 2001,’ Defence Media Release, 2001. Defence Annual Report 2000-01, p. 82. 10 Photograph displayed in Headquarters 7th Brigade, Gallipoli Barracks, viewed 30 June 2006. 11 Defence Annual Report 2001-02, p. 75.

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person ADO support requirement initially estimated for GUARDIAN and the 4000

required for Operation Gold.12

The threat environment for GUARDIAN II was significantly altered by 9/11. This led to

the selection of a more isolated venue (a resort area at Coolum, rather than the Brisbane

urban area) and measures to address more sophisticated threats. The most significant

new threat was the use of a civilian aircraft to attack the conference venue, although the

anthrax attacks executed through the US Postal system in late 2001 had also raised

concern about CBRN threats.

ADO support to Operation GUARDIAN I

The ADO security support requirement for Operation GUARDIAN I consisted of a

counter-terrorist assault capability and bomb management resources, including

operational and technical high risk search (THRS), explosive detection dogs (EDDs),

IEDD, CBRR and underwater search.13 The operational security elements were therefore

composed of:

the SASR TAG and supporting elements;

a CBRR element from the newly-formed CBRR Squadron;

a THRS Squadron, based on a Combat Engineer Squadron from the 3rd Combat

Engineer Regiment;14

a substantial low-risk search element drawn from the Brisbane-based 7th Brigade,

and

12 Defence Annual Report 2000-01, pp. 81-2. 13 ‘The support arrangements will include ADF helicopter support, counter terrorist support similar to the Olympics, provision of specialist night observation and personal protective equipment, as well as specialist assistance with bomb search and disposal.’ ‘CHOGM 2001,’ Defence Media Release, 2001. 14 Personal conversations with Lieutenant Colonel Russell Maddalena, Officer Commanding THRS Squadron for Operations GUARDIAN I and II, September 2005.

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IEDD teams.

Training for specialist capabilities, such as operational search and THRS, drew heavily

on recent Olympics experience. The THRS Squadron employed a training package

developed by the JIRU HRS Squadron, delivered by former HRS Squadron personnel,

and drew on ex-HRS Squadron equipment maintained by the newly raised CBRR

Squadron.15 Operational search elements utilised the OSB training package.

Command and control arrangements were also heavily influenced by Operation GOLD

experience. Non-counter terrorist ADO support was to be commanded by a Joint Task

Force (JTF) Headquarters based on Headquarters 7th Brigade, while counter-terrorist

support would be the responsibility of a special forces JTF. These Headquarters were

similar to JTFs 112 and 114, respectively, during the Sydney Games.16 ADO personnel

also advocated the adoption by the QPS of arrangements used successfully during the

Sydney Games, such as the joint ADF-Police Bomb Management Coordination Centre

(BMCC).17 In this regard, the ADO was able to facilitate the migration of useful

homeland security techniques across state boundaries.

ADO support to Operation GUARDIAN II

The post-9/11 threat environment caused a significant addition to the ADO support

package for GUARDIAN II in the defensive counter-air (DCA) capability provided by

armed RAAF F/A-18 fighter aircraft that, at key times, were airborne in a combat air

patrol, or CAP.18 Although only a limited number of airframes were involved, this was a

considerable increase in the scale of ADO support because, in order to fully employ the

F/A-18s, additional capabilities such as air-to-air refuelling and air defence radars would

15 Personal conversations with Lieutenant Colonel Russell Maddalena, Officer Commanding THRS Squadron for Operations GUARDIAN I and II, September 2005. 16 Personal conversations with Lieutenant Colonel Russell Maddalena, Officer Commanding THRS Squadron for Operations GUARDIAN I and II, September 2005. 17 Personal conversations with Lieutenant Colonel Russell Maddalena, Officer Commanding THRS Squadron for Operations GUARDIAN I and II, September 2005. 18 Defence Annual Report 2001-02, p. 75.

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also have been needed.19 The scale of additional resources can be gauged from those

required to perform a similar task in support of US President Bush’s visit in October

2003. These included, in addition to eight F/A-18s, a Control and Reporting Unit, a

Regional Correlation Centre, a Tactical Air Operations Centre, Air Command Liaison

Officers and ground support assets.20 The addition of DCA also raised legal issues in

relation to the use of force by the ADF that influenced subsequent development of

legislation regulating the employment of the ADO in homeland security, most notably the

statutory review of Part III AAA of the Defence Act.

The inclusion of DCA increased the complexity of ADO command and control

arrangements for CHOGM 2002 through the addition of a further JTF Headquarters, for

air defence. This brought the total number of JTFs commanding ADF elements during

CHOGM 2002 to three.21

Early post-9/11 ADO capability adjustments impacted on support and command and

control arrangements for GUARDIAN II. One such adjustment was the activation of the

Incident Response Unit (IRU) to augment the ADO’s CBRNR capability. CBRNR

became a more important element of the CHOGM 2002 security package in the aftermath

of the 2001 anthrax attacks in the US. Senator Robert Hill, the Minister for Defence,

drew specific attention to this capability in public statements. 22 This contrasts with media

coverage of the CBRR capability during Operation GOLD, during which it was rarely

mentioned. The creation of the IRU added another unit headquarters into the command

and control ‘mix’ for CHOGM 2002, but also added depth to the employment of the

CBRNR capability because that ‘niche’ was now represented in the command and control

process by a an experienced Lieutenant Colonel instead of a junior Major.

19 Senator Robert Hill, ‘Successful Defence Support to CHOGM,’ Ministerial Media Release MIN 87/02, 5 March 2002. 20 Senator Robert Hill, answer to Question No. 2322 (Senator Chris Evans), Senate Hansard, 1 December 2003, p. 18597. 21 “The ADF contribution will consist of three joint task forces covering the areas of general support, counter terrorism support and air defence support.” Senator Robert Hill, ‘Increased Air Security for CHOGM,’ Ministerial Media Release MIN 70/02, 22 February 2002. 22 ‘Successful Defence Support to CHOGM,’ Ministerial Media Release MIN 87/02, 5 March 2002.

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Other aspects of ADO support to GUARDIAN II remained essentially similar to those

planned for GUARDIAN I, although the total number of personnel increased by about 50

per cent over those forecast for the earlier Operation, to about 2400.23 Overall,

heightened threat perceptions had added a significant new dimension to the ADO’s

involvement.

Analysis of ADO security support to CHOGM 2002

ADO security support to CHOGM 2002 suggests a shift in the provision of special event

security capabilities, compared with practice during Operation GOLD. This is a

significant reduction in the employment of ad hoc ADO elements, rather than formed

units and (relatively) mature capabilities. Whereas the JIRU and OSB were raised

specifically for Operation GOLD, most capabilities planned for or employed in

Operations GUARDIAN I and II were based on standing unit structures. THRS, for

example, drew on existing training and equipment to convert a standing engineer sub-unit

into a THRS capability. The establishment of the CBRR Squadron (and later the IRU)

also meant that CBRR was an existing capability, albeit in some ways an embryonic one.

Similarly, the security JTF Headquarters was based on Headquarters 7th Brigade, rather

than an ad hoc organisation such as JTF 112.

This trend away from ADO ‘ad hocery’ in both capabilities and command and control

practices is largely attributable to the influence of Operation GOLD. This reinforces the

significance of the Sydney 2000 Games as a threshold event in the employment of the

ADO in homeland security roles. The similarity of many aspects of the GUARDIAN I

support package to those provided for Operation GOLD could also be indicative of a

tendency to benchmark security arrangements off those for the last operation conducted,

especially if that operation was relatively recent.

The inclusion of DCA in the ADO support package and the local reaction to the US

anthrax attacks indicate a new readiness to factor overseas experience into Australian

23 Senator Robert Hill, ‘Increased Air Security for CHOGM,’ 22 February 2002; ‘Successful Defence Support to CHOGM,’ 5 March 2002.

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threat assessments. As the Minister for Defence put it, ‘The post-September 11 reality is

that we must be prepared to respond to any threat that may arise.’24 As there were no

significant security incidents involving the ADO during CHOGM, a reliable assessment

of the effectiveness of the ADO’s contribution cannot be made. The thoroughness of

ADO preparations and the range and apparent quality of resources provided would

suggest that, in the event of an incident, they would have significantly enhanced the

response options available to government over those normally available within

Queensland.

In the post-9/11 period, a pattern is emerging in which Australia hosts major international

events relatively frequently: CHOGM 2002 has been or will be followed by a Rugby

World Cup and by visits from the US and Chinese Presidents in 2003, a Commonwealth

Games in 2006, an APEC in 2007 and a World Youth Conference in 2008. Given this

tempo and the requirement for Australia ‘to respond to any threat,’ governments may rely

on the ADO to be responsive to new threats, providing additional capabilities as required.

When combined with the ‘last event benchmarking’ tendency noted above, this could

have a cumulative effect on the composition of ADO support packages: ‘old’ support

requirements are unlikely to be removed until the states and territories can develop

adequate capabilities of their own, but new ones could be added. For example, after

CHOGM 2002, DCA was included in the security arrangements for the Bush/Hu visits in

October 2003 and the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games.25 In the post-9/11

environment, therefore, pressure to employ ADO resources in support of major event

security requirements is unlikely to decrease.

24 Senator Robert Hill, ‘Increased Air Security for CHOGM,’ 22 February 2002. 25 Senator Robert Hill, answer to Question No. 2322 1 December 2003; AAP, ‘Games security planned unveiled,’ 20 September 2005, available http://www.news.com.au/story/print/0,10119,16662566,00.html, viewed 20 September 2005.

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Post-CHOGM Developments

The rapid momentum of ADO homeland security capability development continued in

September 2002 with the formal ‘launch’ of the IRR and the new TAG (TAG East).26

This was followed, in the aftermath of the October 2002 Bali bombings, by the creation

of a two-star Special Operations Command (SOCOMD), which assumed command of all

specialist ADF counter terrorism capabilities including the new IRR. The tempo of ADO

homeland security operations involvement continued in April 2003 when the ADF’s SUR

capability was employed in the successful boarding and seizure of a North Korean ship

suspected of drug smuggling, the MV Pong Su.27 Later in the year Operation

SCRUMMAGE provided support to the Rugby World Cup competition that was

conducted in a number of Australian cities.28 2003 also saw the development of the

Reserve Response Force (RRF), which consisted of seven groups of around 150 Army

Reservists organised and trained to perform simple security tasks (such as low risk

search) for domestic security purposes.29 These groups (now reduced to six in number)

are now distributed among most of the state capitals.30 Late in 2003, fighter DCA was

again provided for the visits of US President Bush and Chinese President Hu.31

Homeland security-related structural adjustments to the ADO turned to the maritime

environment in 2004, with a small increase in the projected size of the patrol boat fleet

and changes made patrol boat basing.32 In December 2004 the establishment of the Joint

Offshore Protection Command (JOPC) was announced. JOPC was a combined Defence

(Navy) and Australian Customs agency, led by a RAN Rear Admiral, intended to

26 Senator Robert Hill (Minister for Defence) Media Statement MIN 460/02, ‘New counter-terrorist units strengthen Australia’s defences,’ 5 September 2002. Personal conversation with (then) Lieutenant Colonel Craig Petrie, former Project Officer, CBRR capability and IRU/IRR, Canberra, 6 May 2005. 27 Duncan Lewis, ‘Guarding Australians Against Terrorism,’ 2003, p. 49. 28 Defence Annual Report 2003-2004, p. 99; and Senator Robert Hill, ‘Defence Support to World Cup Security,’ Media Release 25 September 2003. 29 Brigadier Keith Jobson, ‘The Reserve Response Force,’ presentation to the 2004 Fulbright Symposium, 5-7 July 2004. 30 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 53. 31 Senator Robert Hill, response to Question No. 2322, Senate Hansard, 1 December 2003, p. 18597. 32 Liberal Party of Australia, ‘Securing Australia’s North West Shelf,’ (2004 Election policy statement), 16 September 2004 [cited 24 September 2004]. Available from http://www.liberal.org.au/default.cfm?action=plaintext&id=299.

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improve the coordination of ADF support to maritime security with special emphasis on

maritime counter terrorism.33 During 2005-2006, JOPC assumed command of

Operations RELEX II and CRANBERRY, the ADF’s ongoing border security missions.

On 17 July 2006 these were combined into a single operation, Operation RESOLUTE.34

On 23 October 2006, JOPC was renamed Border Protection Command (BPC).35

The post-9/11 period has also seen the development of homeland security roles within

non-ADF areas of the Department. This has included investment in the capabilities of

Defence intelligence agencies to better support counter terrorism and the establishment of

the CBRN Defence Centre (CBRNDC) within DSTO.36

In December 2005, the Minister for Defence introduced into Parliament a bill proposing

further amendments to Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act to facilitate the employment of

the ADF in domestic security missions.37 This bill arose out of a statutory review of the

2000 Part IIIAAA amendments. The bill progressed through Parliament quickly in early

2006 and received Royal assent on 1 March. The amendments address new homeland

security missions assumed by the ADO since 9/11 and correct some other problems

associated with the employment of the ADO in domestic security. The amendments

cover ten issues:

The use of Reserve Forces in domestic security operations. This amendment

removes the current restriction on the call-out of Reserves before much of the

full-time force has been committed. This is said to reflect the modern structure of

33 Vice Admiral R.E. Shalders, Vice Chief of the Defence Force, ‘Joint Offshore Protection Command,’ Department of Defence, DEFGRAM No. 301/2005, 6 June 2005. 34 Australian Customs Service, Annual Report 2005-2006, Canberra: Australian Customs Service, 2006, p. 116. 35 Personal conversation with Miguel Rivera, Border Protection Command, 12 December 2006. By 12 December 2006 the Australian Customs website had not been updated to reflect this change. 36 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, pp. 48-9, 53. 37 "Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Bill 2005: Explanatory Memorandum." Canberra: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2005.

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the ADF as a single force consisting of both Regular and Reserve components,

rather than as two separate organisations.38

Identification of ADF personnel engaged in homeland security operations.

This removes the current requirement for ADF personnel involved in certain types

of operations to wear name tags.

Public notification of ADF activities. This allows discretion on notifying the

public of certain ADF homeland security activities, especially where the

notification might compromise the operational security of some operations.

ADF powers to resolve mobile terrorist incidents. The previous arrangements

were designed for the use of the ADF in relation to ‘static’ incidents, such as

siege-hostage scenarios. This does not recognise some of the tactics used by

terrorists since 9/11. The amendments extend the ADF’s powers to ‘mobile’

incidents.

Expedited call-out procedures. These amendments recognise the potential for a

terrorist crisis to arise very quickly, requiring the employment of the ADF before

the current call-out procedures could be effected. The new procedures enable

‘authorising ministers’ (namely, the Prime Minister, Attorney General and

Minister for Defence) to call out the ADF under certain circumstances before the

consent of the Governor General is obtained.

Designated critical infrastructure protection. These amendments authorise the

use of force, including lethal force, by the ADF to protect designated critical

infrastructure in situations where damage to the infrastructure could lead to loss of

life. Previously, the law did not allow lethal force to used for the protection of

property, even where damage to that property could threaten life.

38 "Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Bill 2005: Explanatory Memorandum." 2005, p. 23.

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The role of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP).

These amendments effectively place ADF personnel involved in the use of force

in domestic security situations under Commonwealth jurisdiction for criminal

matters, rather than under the jurisdiction of the state in which the force was used.

Decisions on the prosecution of ADF personnel for criminal matters are the

purview of the CDPP. The Commonwealth laws used are those of the Jervis Bay

Territory. These amendments ensure that the handling of criminal matters

affecting the ADF is consistent across all the states and territories.

The creation of an ‘Aviation’ Division within Part IIIAAA. A new Division

3B is inserted into the Defence Act, which provides protections for ADF

personnel involved in the use of force in DCA situations. The amendments also

allow the Governor General to authorise the use of force in ‘specified

circumstances,’ rather than on a specific case-by-case basis. This creates the

potential for a de facto ‘standing’ call out for DCA purposes, recognising the fact

that an airborne threat could arise without warning, necessitating a prompt DCA

response. The amendments effectively codify the procedures for DCA support as

provided by the RAAF for CHOGM 2002 and the 2003 Bush and Hu visits.

The creation of an ‘Offshore’ Division within Part IIIAAA. A new Division

3A is inserted into the Defence Act, which achieves the same for the maritime

environment as the Division 3B amendments do for the aviation environment.

The amendments effectively codify the procedures for SUR support from the

SASR TAG.

The creation of a ‘defence of lawful authority’ for ADF personnel employing

force in domestic security situations. This amendment provides protections to

ADF personnel who are required to apply lethal force based on another’s

determination that force should be used, rather than making an independent

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assessment. This is effectively a ‘defence of superior orders,’ recognising that in

some situations ADF elements may need to take action based on imperfect

information, creating a risk that mistakes could be made in the use of force.

All the amendments are aimed at either simplifying the employment of the ADF in

domestic security tasks or in providing protections for ADF personnel so employed. The

new legislation is remarkable in its comprehensiveness, addressing a wide range of

problems with the existing legislation in an almost systematic fashion. This is consistent

with a very deliberate ‘audit’ of legislation and a clear understanding of the operational

improvements sought – evidence that the employment of the ADF in homeland security

roles had matured as a concept.

The timing of the introduction into Parliament of the new Part IIIAAA legislation, in

relation to a major international event on Australian soil, repeated the pattern of the

original Bill in 2000. The 2000 legislation was introduced shortly before the Olympics,

which provided a pretext for its rapid passage and enactment. The timing of the new

legislation in relation to the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games was the same. The

timing of the bill in relation to the review that established the need for it, however, is

totally different. The new bill was introduced less than four years after some new

legislative requirements were first identified. For example, the need for an Aviation

Division to cover the use of the Air Force for domestic DCA was established by its use in

that role for CHOGM 2002 and that Division was created in March 2006. This is less

than one fifth of the time required to complete the first Part IIIAAA amendments (need

identified by Hope in 1979, legislation passed in 2000). Combined with the

aforementioned thoroughness, this indicates a much greater governmental focus on the

issues surrounding the use of the ADF in homeland security roles.

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Case Study:

ADO Contributions to Australia’s Homeland Security in the Context of the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games

The Australian city of Melbourne hosted the 2006 Commonwealth Games in March

2006. Like the earlier Sydney 2000 Games and CHOGM 2002, the conduct of the

Melbourne 2006 Games included a major protective security operation to which the ADO

was a significant contributor. This case study analyses the ADO contribution to the

Melbourne 2006 Games as a further example of a post-9/11 DESO Australia. The study

stands with those of Operation GOLD (the ADO support to the Sydney 2000 Games) and

Operation GUARDIAN (ADO support to CHOGM 2002), providing data for the analysis

of the ADO’s employment in homeland security roles in the post-9/11 period.

Background

On 10 October 1999, the Commonwealth Games Federation General Assembly

announced that Melbourne would host the 2006 Commonwealth Games.39 In PSCC

terms, the Games would be a state-led, Commonwealth-supported activity. As it had

done for the Sydney 2000 Games, the Australian Federal Government anticipated that the

security of the Games would require a significant, extraordinary contribution from

Defence. 40 This was acknowledged by the Minister for Defence on 11 May 2004, and

again later that year.41

ADO support to the Games – named Operation ACOLYTE – eventually involved some

2,600 personnel in a range of security and non-security roles.42 Operation ACOLYTE

39 ‘Bidding to Host the Commonwealth Games’ [cited 1 May 2006] Available from http://www.commonwealthgames.org.au/GamesInfo/General/Bidding.htm. 40 The Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games quickly came to be referred to as ‘M2006’ in Australian and Victorian Government circles. Confusingly, this was also the shorthand title for the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games Corporation (M2006 Corporation), which was established in 2002 by the Victorian Government to organise the staging of the Games. ‘Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games,’ [cited 1 May 2006]. Available from http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/protectivesecurityHome.nsf/Page/Commonwealth_Games_2006. 41 Robert Hill, "Ministerial Media Release Min84/04 - Commonwealth Games Security," Canberra: Department of Defence, 2004. Also Winning in Peace, Winning in War 2004, p. 13. 42 ‘Operation Acolyte,’ Department of Defence official website, [cited 1 May 2006]. Available from http://www.defence.gov.au/opacolyte.

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commenced in January 2005 although the Operation’s name was not announced publicly

until late that year.43 Due to its recency, official reports on Operation ACOLYTE have

not been published. The information contained in this case study is obtained from open

source material to the greatest extent possible, supplemented by personal conversations

and observations as a participant. As some of the ADO capabilities employed in

Operation ACOLYTE are similar to those used in Operations GOLD and GUARDIAN,

they are not explained further here except to the extent that they differed from their

earlier manifestations.

Operation ACOLYTE

Operation ACOLYTE was the largest ADO operation mounted in support of an

Australian domestic event since Operation GOLD in 2000: hence, it was also the largest

since 9/11. Like Operation GOLD, a large part of the support provided was security-

related. Operation ACOLYTE therefore provides a useful comparison for pre- and post-

9/11 employment of the ADO in homeland security roles. The selection of the name

‘ACOLYTE’ was significant in itself: meaning ‘assistant,’ the name was intended to

emphasise the ADO’s supporting role in the event.44

Non-security support

The non-security support provided under Operation ACOLYTE was less than that

provided for the Sydney 2000 Games. This was a deliberate policy decision to minimise

the ADO’s ‘general’ support liability.45 Although general support was not directly

relevant to homeland security, there were some peripheral implications worthy of note.

The significant contrast between the extensive ADO involvement in general support for

the Sydney 2000 Games and the much more conservative approach adopted for

Melbourne 2006 is evidence of strain on ADO resources in the post-9/11 world.

Although not so stated in open source material, it is likely that the minimisation of

43 Defence Annual Report 2004-05, Canberra: Department of Defence, 2005, Chapter Four, Outcome One. 44 ‘Operation Acolyte,’ Department of Defence official website. 45 Personal conversation with Colonel Michael Annett, Deputy Commander Joint Task Force 636 and Operation Acolyte, Melbourne, 12 April 2005.

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general support was a force preservation measure intended to reduce the demand on ADF

personnel at a time of high operational tempo, due to the ADF’s commitments to

overseas operations.

The general support that was provided included ceremonial and communications

functions and the use of facilities.46 Decisions to provide general support generally

rested on three reasons. First, support was provided that was assessed to have positive

public relations value. For example, the ADF bands based in Melbourne provided

musical support to the Games’ Cultural Festival. Second, support was provided that

offered operational or training benefits for the ADF. For example, the provision of Venue

Communications Coordinators offered good training value for ADF personnel. Finally,

general support in the form of access to Defence facilities was provided in order to offset

requests for more personnel-intensive forms of support. For example, providing access to

ADF facilities at Laverton for the conduct of Games ceremony rehearsals afforded a

unique advantage to the Games organisers that was highly valued and appreciated, to the

extent that requests for others forms of support could be resisted.47 Some non-security

assistance, especially when it ‘saved the day’ in situations where Games organisers had

few alternative sources for that support, also facilitated the maintenance of good working

relationships between the ADF and other Games agencies. Those relationships were key

to the successful delivery of Defence support in the more important security areas.48

The ADO’s responsibilities

Australia’s normal constitutional arrangements gave the primary responsibility for the

security of the Games to the state of Victoria. With the exception of the Queen’s Baton

Relay (the Commonwealth Games’ equivalent to the Olympic Torch Relay), which

traveled throughout Australia, the other states only incurred a Games-related security

liability if they hosted preparing international teams. As for the Sydney 2000 Games,

Defence, as part of the Federal Government, technically was in a supporting role in all

46 Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston, "Moving Forward," Defence, April 2006, p. 7. 47 Personal conversation with Colonel Michael Annett, Deputy Commander Joint Task Force 636 and Operation Acolyte, Melbourne, 12 April 2005.

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these efforts. Accordingly, Defence could contribute to Games security only in response

to requests from Victoria for assistance in areas in which state resources or capabilities

were inadequate.

Planning

Detailed ADO planning for the 2006 Commonwealth Games began in 2003 – almost four

years after Melbourne was announced as the host city.49 A small, strategic-level planning

effort was maintained within Strategic Operations Division in Canberra from late 2003

which began to shape Defence involvement. A concept of operations for Defence

support was developed by mid 2004, which saw the majority of that support being

delivered through a Joint Task Force (JTF). This was numbered JTF 636, in accordance

with the conventional numbering system for JTFs.50 A Forward Command Element

(FCE) for JTF 636 was established in Melbourne from January 2005 to continue detailed

planning with Games organising agencies, notably the Melbourne 2006 Corporation

(M2006), the Office of Commonwealth Games Coordination (OCGC) and the Victoria

Police.51

Threat environment

Operation ACOLYTE was the fourth ADO protective security operation in support of a

domestic event since 9/11 – the others being Operation GUARDIAN II (CHOGM 2002),

Operation SCRUMMAGE (Rugby World Cup 2003) and Operation MIATA (the visits of

Presidents Bush and Hu in late 2003). Considerable experience had therefore

accumulated in the conduct of international events in the post-9/11 threat environment.

Both CHOGM and the Commonwealth Games were conducted under the same ‘medium’

level of assessed threat – meaning that an attack on the event was ‘feasible and could well

occur.’52,53 The Commonwealth Games differed from CHOGM, however, in that it

48 Personal conversation with Colonel Michael Annett, Deputy Commander Joint Task Force 636 and Operation Acolyte, Melbourne, 12 April 2005. 49 ‘Operation Acolyte,’ Department of Defence official website. 50 Cameron Jamieson, Games Success, Defence, 2006 [cited 1 May 2006]. Available from http://www.defence.gov.au/opacolyte/news/article001/index.htm. 51 Personal conversation with Colonel Michael Annett, Deputy Commander Joint Task Force 636 and Operation Acolyte, Melbourne, 12 April 2005. 52 Personal conversation with Commander Brendan Bannan, Melbourne, 12 April 2006 2005.

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involved large scale public participation, with the concomitant requirements for large

venues and ready public access. The Games’ security requirements, therefore, were

different from those of CHOGM, although these did not translate into a proportionately

larger ADO involvement.

ADO Support to the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games

The ADO security support requirement for Operation Acolyte consisted of a counter-

terrorist assault capability, maritime counter-terrorism and defensive counter-air

capabilities, and bomb management resources, including operational and technical high

risk search (THRS), explosive detection dogs (EDDs), IEDD, CBRR and underwater

search.54 The operational security elements were therefore composed of:

A Special Forces Task Group (SFTG), consisting of:

a Tactical Assault Group drawn from the newly-raised 4th Battalion,

the Royal Australian Regiment (Commando) (4 RAR) and supporting

elements;

a CBRR Squadron from the IRR; and

a Special Forces Aviation Element (171st Aviation Squadron) equipped

with Black Hawk helicopters.55

An Engineer Task Group (ETG) based on the Headquarters of the 3rd Combat

Engineer Regiment and consisting of:

53 Paul O'Sullivan, "Challenges of Australia's Security Environment." Canberra: Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, 2006. 54 These data were obtained from the Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts official Commonwealth Games website: specifically from Defence Support, [cited 28 June 2006]. Available from http://www.m2006.dcita.gov.au/_lib/pdf/15_defence.pdf. Also Acolyte Accolades (Operation Acolyte newsletter), Editions 1-4, February-March 2006, provided to the author by the Department of Defence; and Trevor Grant, "Operation Acolyte" (official film record) Australia: Department of Defence, 2006. 55 "Operation Acolyte" (official film record) Australia: Department of Defence, 2006.

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a THRS Squadron, based on a Combat Engineer Squadron from the 3rd

Combat Engineer Regiment (3 CER) with reinforcements from the 1st

Combat Engineer Regiment (1 CER);

an EOD Troop, providing IEDD teams on a similar model to the JIRU

teams for Operation Gold; and

an EDD Troop.

A Security Task Group (STG) providing a substantial low risk (‘operational’)

search capability. This was drawn largely from Regular Army units in Brisbane,

Army Reserve Response Force (RRF) elements from Sydney and Melbourne and

from the Royal Australian Air Force Reserve units Australia-wide.56

An Underwater Task Group (UWTG), consisting of Clearance Divers and a mine

hunter coastal, HMAS Norman.57

A Maritime Task Group (MTG), consisting of the amphibious landing platform

ship HMAS Manoora and the ANZAC frigate HMAS Warramunga. These ships

also supported the SUR capability provided by the Special Forces Task Group.58

An Air Task Group (ATG) provided by the Royal Australian Air Force,

consisting of F/A18 Hornet aircraft, air-to-air refuelers and a deployable radar.59

This operational support was enabled by a Logistics Task Group (LTG), drawn from

Army Reserve logistics units, and by a Military Police Task Group (MPTG) drawn from

the Army’s 1st Military Police Battalion. General support was provided by a Ceremonial

56 Defence Support, (website) Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts, 2006. 57 "Operation Acolyte" (official film record) Canberra: Department of Defence, 2006. 58 "Operation Acolyte" (official film record) Canberra: Department of Defence, 2006. 59 "Operation Acolyte" (official film record) Canberra: Department of Defence, 2006.

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and General Support Task Group (CTG) consisting of a composite ADF band (for

musical support) and a team involved with training civilian volunteers in the conduct of

Games flag-raising ceremonies.60 Unlike Operation GOLD, there was no general support

aviation capability and only a small capacity for the internal ‘command and liaison’

flying needs of the JTF itself. This was provided by a detachment of Army UH-1Hs and

a single Navy Sea King helicopter, normally embarked on HMAS Manoora.

Operation ACOLYTE involved a total of 2,600 ADO personnel.61 These were

accommodated at ADF establishments within Victoria, or on board Navy ships. The

draw-down of permanent ADF numbers in Victoria since the mid-1990s meant that

accommodation capacity had run down well below that required for the Operation and

needed to be re-generated. In some cases, JTF636 needed to negotiate access to

properties that had been disposed of in the draw-down in order to base its elements.62

Of the ADO elements providing security, all except the STG and the THRS and IEDD

elements of the ETG were based on standing ADF capabilities. The ETG and STG

elements were established specifically for the Operation by re-training ADF personnel for

new roles. Training for the THRS capability drew heavily on experience from

Operations GOLD and GUARDIAN and on the small THRS capability maintained by the

IRR. New equipment was purchased to establish the capability, for which training began

in late 2005. The EOD Troop utilised personnel with existing IEDD skills, but these and

their equipment needed to be concentrated and trained up in much the same way as the

EOD Squadron of JIRU. The low-risk search capability provided by Security Task

Group drew on training developed for the RRFs, although additional equipment was also

required to establish that capability.

60 ‘Operation Acolyte,’ Department of Defence official website. Also Acolyte Accolades (Operation Acolyte newsletter), Editions 1-4, February-March 2006; and "Operation Acolyte" (official film record) Canberra: Department of Defence, 2006. 61 ‘Operation Acolyte,’ Department of Defence official website. 62 Personal conversation with Colonel Michael Annett, Deputy Commander Joint Task Force 636 and Operation Acolyte, Melbourne, 12 April 2005.

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Command and control arrangements differed from previous operations in that all ADO

support (counter terrorism, non-counter terrorism security, air and maritime and general

support) were commanded by a single JTF HQ. ADO personnel were not integrated into

State Police planning or command and control arrangements to the same extent as in

previous operations, although a BMCC concept was eventually accepted.63

Legal aspects

Operation ACOLYTE was the first domestic security support operation conducted by the

ADO after the passage of the 2006 legislation amending Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act.

This legislation was utilised to authorise DCA actions by the F/A18s in ‘specified

circumstances.’64 The new legislation, with its DCA provisions, received Royal assent

on 1 March 2006.65 A report on the authorisation of the use of the ADF for DCA during

the Commonwealth Games was tabled in the House of Representatives on 30 March

2006.66 This short interval between the passage of the amendment legislation and its first

use suggests that the impending Games were a stimulus for the passage of that

legislation.

The post-9/11 ADO capability adjustments had matured by 2006, influencing the support

and command and control arrangements for Operation ACOLYTE. The incorporation of

the IRR into SOCOMD, for example, meant that the CBRNR capability provided for the

Games was part of the SFTG and, by implication, associated with the resolution of

‘classical’ terrorist incidents, such as the siege-hostage scenario, under DFACA

arrangements. This had the potential to complicate the employment of the IRR in a more

likely response to a ‘non-siege’ CBR agent release under DACC arrangements.

63 Personal conversation with Major Craig Madden, J3—3, Headquarters JTF 636, 25 March 2006. 64 Brendan Nelson, "Australian Government Strengthens Defence Legislation," Ministerial Media Release Min 011/2006, Canberra: Department of Defence, 13 February 2006. 65“Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act 2006." 66 "Defence Act-Order-2006 Report on utilisation of the Defence Force in accordance with section 51X of the Defence Act 1903 in relation to Operation Acolyte defensive counter-air support to the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games, 27 March." Votes and Proceedings, Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 30 March 2006.

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Analysis of ADO security support to the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games

When compared with Operations GOLD and GUARDIAN, ADO security support to the

Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games shows continuing evolution in Defence’s

provision of special event security capabilities. The overall suite of security support was

essentially the same as that provided for Operation GUARDIAN, with the major new

development (DCA) being retained. This suggests that DCA has become part of ‘the cost

of doing business’ when hosting major international events in the current threat

environment. As with earlier operations, some of the ADO support provided (such as the

TAG, search, IEDD and EDD) enabled the host jurisdiction to ‘surge’ temporarily to

higher levels of capability than normally maintained.

The reduced employment of ad hoc ADO elements that was observed in Operation

GUARDIAN also generally continued, although the significant re-organisation required

to raise and train the ETG and STG meant that those organisations were, effectively, ad

hoc structures, although the STG did take advantage of the ‘standing’ Army Reserve

RRFs. Significantly, the RRFs are a post-9/11 homeland security initiative. Most other

Task Groups were based on standing organisations. The FCE of the JTF Headquarters

was essentially ad hoc, although this was mitigated by its augmentation from

Headquarters 7th Brigade (a standing organisation) for the major Games operational

period in January-March 2006.

The most significant new development in the conduct of Operation ACOLYTE was the

decision to command the operation through a single JTF, rather than by multiple

functional JTFs (non-counter terrorism security, counter-terrorism, air, maritime etc.). In

this regard, the command and control model was consistent with those adopted in

‘conventional’ military operations. For example, a single JTF Headquarters, JTF 633,

commands all ADF elements assigned to Operations CATALYST and SLIPPER in the

Middle East even though these include maritime, air and ground task groups.67 This

67 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. "Report of the Iraq Delegation." Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2005, Chs 2 and 5. See also Defence, Operation Catalyst Department of Defence, 2006 [cited 30 June 2006]. Available from http://www.defence.gov.au/opcatalyst/default.htm; and

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conformation with normal operational practices suggests that the ADO is beginning to

perceive domestic event support operations as part of its normal business, rather than as

aberrations.

The conduct of Operation ACOLYTE, therefore, indicates that ADO involvement in the

security of major domestic events is maturing. This assessment is based upon the

following evidence:

The capabilities being provided for event security are more consistent: fewer new

capabilities are being added with each successive operation.

ADO support contributions tend to be drawn from standing capabilities rather

than ad hoc structures developed at the last minute. For example, the SFTG for

Operation ACOLYTE included an existing TAG, CBRR Squadron and Special

Operations helicopter squadron that were either standing capabilities within

SOCOMD or habitually associated with it (in the case of the helicopters). Where

ad hoc capabilities are raised, the process tends to draw on experience and

equipment from previous operations.

Command and control of forces committed to domestic event support operations

is becoming more ‘conventional.’

Assessments of the effectiveness of the ADO’s contribution to the security of the

Commonwealth Games are difficult to make in the absence of challenging security

incidents to test arrangements. As with the Sydney 2000 Games, the ability of low- and

technical high-risk search elements and Clearance Divers to cope with a challenging

workload suggest that those elements made a very effective contribution. Similarly, the

ability to provide DCA coverage in busy metropolitan airspace without intolerable

disruptions to civil air traffic or air safety incidents (no such disruptions or incidents have

Operation Slipper Department of Defence, 2006, [cited 30 June 2006]. Available from http://www.defence.gov.au/opslipper.

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been detected in open source reporting) suggests that that capability was, at least,

professionally delivered. The ADO capabilities provided seem proportionate when

compared with those provided for the 2004 Athens Olympics (a much larger event). In

the absence of data, even the deterrent effect of these capabilities is impossible to gauge,

but it is difficult to conceive how they could have been delivered other than by the ADO.

Accepting a threat-based assessment that it was needed, it is reasonable to conclude that

the ADO’s involvement in the homeland security aspects of the Melbourne 2006

Commonwealth Games was effective.

The post-9/11 experience of ADO involvement in Australia’s homeland security has

therefore been hectic. Operational tempo and rates of capability development have

accelerated enormously. This supports the assessment of 9/11 as a ‘threshold event’ in

Australia’s homeland security experience. The following sections will analyse that

experience in more detail.

The Policy Environment

Table 1 summarises the policy-related documents analysed in Appendix 1, in relation to

their homeland security content.

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1973-2000 2001-2006

Category Defence

Policy and Strategic Guidance

Other Government

Policy

Defence Policy and Strategic Guidance

Other Government

Policy

Homeland security 2.1 0 2 3.5 NBCD 0.7 0 0.5 3.6 WMD 1.2 4 3.3 4.568

Homeland security-related DSTO roles and capabilities

0.5 0 1 1.6

Homeland security-related ADO tasking and force structure prescriptions

0.9 0 3 3.3

Terrorism/counter terrorism references

0.9 1 4.3 967

Civil defence 1 0 1 0.6 DACP/DFACA 0.4 0 1 0.6 Total documents 16 1 3 3 Average periodicity of documents (years)

2.7 N/A 1.6 1.6

Table 1 - Average number of references to homeland security-related topics in Australian

Government policy and defence strategic guidance documents, 1973-2006

In comparing the pre- and post-9/11 policy environments, conclusions must be drawn

cautiously because of the relative brevity of the latter period: the 17 policy-related

documents analysed at Appendix 2 were produced over 32 years (1973-2005), while the

post-9/11 period covers only the last four years of that time. It is nevertheless significant

that the average periodicity of documents has reduced to eight months post-9/11: less

than a third of the pre-9/11 interval.69 It is also significant that the post-9/11 documents

were produced by three Commonwealth departments: Defence; Foreign Affairs and

Trade (DFAT); and Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C). In contrast, the pre-9/11

papers were almost exclusively produced by Defence, with a late contribution from

DFAT.70 Combined, the increased frequency of policy pronouncements and the

68 This category was the major theme of one of the documents examined and therefore the number of references is misleading. 69 Appendix 1 analyses six policy documents or statements produced between 9/11 and the end of 2005. 70 The DFAT document was In the National Interest 1997.

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widening of departmental involvement indicate a significant rise in and broadening of

government interest in homeland security. This is unsurprising if 9/11, far more than

simply acting as a trigger for incremental development, is accepted as a ‘threshold event’

for homeland security.

The most consistent and striking feature of the five substantial post-9/11 policy

documents analysed is the unequivocal embrace of terrorism as a significant threat to

Australia’s interests.71 This includes the common recognition of CBR threats to the

homeland as a major security concern. All documents also refer to post-9/11 adjustments

to the ADO’s structure, stressing that these were made to increase the utility of Defence

capabilities in homeland security roles. Significant examples are the establishment of the

IRR for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) response; and

the creation of SOCOMD. 72

A curious feature of the post-9/11 policy documents is that, of the five, the three

produced by Defence contain the least detail regarding structural adjustments to the ADO

to address the new national security concerns and are the least prescriptive in relation to

Defence’s homeland security roles. Whereas, for example, the PM&C document details

precisely how DSTO will contribute to national science and technology efforts in counter

terrorism, only the last of the Defence documents mentions DSTO in this context at all.73

This indicates a much more ‘whole of government’ approach to homeland security than

prevailed pre-9/11. In the new approach, Defence is just one of a number of participating

71 These are Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2003, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2003; Transnational Terrorism: the Threat to Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 2004; Protecting Australia against Terrorism, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Canberra, 2004; Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2005, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2005; and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Australia’s Role in Fighting Proliferation (Practical Responses to New Challenges) Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 2005. The sixth post-9/11 document analysed in Appendix 1, Winning in Peace, Winning in War, Canberra: Department of Defence, 2004, is more descriptive in its content and is not assessed as a substantial policy document. For ease of reference, these documents will hereinafter be cited as Defence Update 2003, Transnational Terrorism: the Threat to Australia 2004, Protecting Australia against Terrorism 2004, Winning in Peace, Winning in War 2004, Defence Update 2005 and Weapons of Mass Destruction 2005. 72 Defence Update 2003, pp. 13-14, 24; Transnational Terrorism: the Threat to Australia 2004, pp. 73-4, 101; Protecting Australia against Terrorism 2004, pp. x, 4, 8, 9-13, 48, 53-4; Winning in Peace, Winning in War 2004, pp. 13-4; Defence Update 2005, pp.10-11; and Weapons of Mass Destruction 2005, p. 83. 73 Protecting Australia against Terrorism 2004, pp. x, 47-9; Defence Update 2005, p. 11.

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voices. The whole of government approach is a major theme of the PM&C document.74

The articulation of a major role for Defence in the PM&C document is therefore likely to

generate a high expectation within government that Defence will play a significant in

Australia’s homeland security.

The timing of the publication of post-9/11 homeland security policy also suggests that

public articulation of policy may lag decisions, in some cases significantly. For example,

Defence Update 2003, released on 26 February 2003, cites the raising of the IRR and

TAG East as examples of government policy in action, but the creation of TAG East and

the growth of the IRR from the post-Olympics CBRR Squadron began in September

2001, within days of 9/11.75 While this suggests that the government was moving with

commendable haste to address a major capability shortfall, it may also indicate a shift

from pre-9/11 practice, in which changes to ADF capability were usually forecast some

years in advance in policy documents. This shift should not, however, be overstated: the

fact that capability changes were not telegraphed in policy beforehand could also be

explained by their relatively small scale (involving only a few hundred personnel,

virtually no net growth in ADF numbers and no long-term platform-based major capital

acquisitions) and by a sensible desire for operational security in their early stages.

A policy shift that can be reliably adduced from the post-9/11 documents is a decision to

increase the range and scale of ADO capabilities and associated force structure that are

maintained for homeland security purposes. Examples include TAG East, the IRR, the

RRFs, the CBRNDC and the ADO contribution to the BPC.76 This shift is all the more

remarkable in that it began less than 12 months after the release of the current White

Paper, Defence 2000, which was itself developed after an exhaustive process that

involved detailed government consideration and the unprecedented measure of a public

74 Protecting Australia against Terrorism 2004 (pp. v-vi, viii). 75 Duncan Lewis, ‘Guarding Australians Against Terrorism,’ Australian Army Journal,’ Vol. 1, No. 2, December 2003, pp. 47-8. 76 Although the formal establishment of the JOPC on 18 December 2004 lagged the release of Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004 by some months (‘Joint Offshore Protection Command,’ Department of Defence DEFGRAM No. 301/2005, 6 June 2005), the PM&C policy document does deal with the issue of maritime security and specifically refers to the ADF’s role in it. Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 40.

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consultation process. 77,78 Although the White Paper alludes to increased involvement of

the ADO in ‘unconventional operations’ and the threat of terrorism,79 the only obvious

connection between the post-9/11 adjustments and the force structure directions implied

in Defence 2000 was a single-line entry in the 2000 Defence Capability Plan (DCP) that

provided funding for the development of the CBRR Squadron that was to maintain the

residual capability from the JIRU.80

Later in the post-9/11 period, policy documents began to hint at more ‘systemic’

involvement of the ADO in homeland security roles. For example, Defence Update 2005

prescribes a role for DSTO in counter terrorism technologies with application beyond the

ADO.81 The document also makes extensive prescriptions for ADF involvement in

domestic security, including the development of Reserve capacity specifically for

domestic security support.82 The need for the ADF to retain a capacity to provide

domestic response options is emphasised.83 The ADO is also given a major role in the

international engagement aspects of international counter terrorism.84 Legislative

amendments to facilitate the employment of the ADF on homeland security missions is

also prescribed.85 Overall, Defence Update 2005 prescribes a much more comprehensive

ADO involvement in homeland security roles than any previous policy document.

In summary, then, the open-source documents suggest that post-9/11 decisions on ADO

involvement in homeland security were taken in a significantly different policy

environment from that which existed pre-9/11. Not only was there explicit direction to

develop and maintain capabilities for homeland security applications, but prescriptions

77 Defence 2000, p. v. 78 The outcome of this process was the report Australian Perspectives on Defence 2000. 79Defence 2000,pp. viii, 2.13; Reith, ‘Defence Counter-Terrorism Upgrade,’ 2001. 80 ‘The Incident Response Regiment,’ The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 20, No. 2, May 2005, p. 20. The DCP referred to Project Land 141, which became Joint Project 141 and was subsequently subsumed into Joint Project 2087 with the decision to raise the IRR. Defence Materiel Organisation notes on Joint Project 2087, [cited 21 September 2005]. Available from http;//www.defence.gov.au/dmo/lsd/jp141_2087/index.cfm. Personal conversation with (then) Lieutenant Colonel Craig Petrie, former Project Officer, CBRR capability and IRU/IRR, Canberra, 6 May 2005. 81 Defence Update 2005, p.11. 82 Defence Update 2005, pp.10, 11, 13, 23. 83 Defence Update 2005, pp.11, 19, 21. 84 Defence Update 2005, p.15.

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about those capabilities were being made by departments other than Defence. There is

evidence, therefore, that the homeland security policy environment had become much

more whole of government than previously and that the inter-departmental expectations

of ADO contributions to homeland security were greater.

National security architecture

The whole of government approach implied in the formal policy documents was reflected

in a new national security architecture that took shape relatively quickly after 9/11. A

striking feature of the new arrangements was the obvious and deliberate central

leadership of the Commonwealth Government:

The Australian Government’s approach to national security recognises the importance of leadership from the centre.86

This central leadership approach manifested itself several ways, including a strengthening

of the role of the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC). The NSC, chaired by

the Prime Minister, adopted a more deliberate ‘strategic focus on key counter-terrorism

issues.’87 There was also a significant revision of the national protective security

processes that had formerly operated around the PSCC and SAC-PAV. This included a

concentration of key functions in the PM&C and the Attorney General’s Department

(AGD). A decision to ‘consolidate’ coordination of counter-terrorism policy in PM&C

was announced in October 2002. A National Security Division (NSD) was established

within that department, responsible for ‘the coordination of counter-terrorism policy:’

The establishment of the National Security Division has strengthened the government’s ability to meet the challenge of terrorism on a whole of government basis. It provides strategic advice to the Prime Minister and government on counter-terrorism policy and broad-level direction to counter-terrorism activity across government.’88

85 Defence Update 2005, p.11. 86 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 9. 87 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 9. 88 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 10.

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Concentration of responsibility within AGD was demonstrated on 26 November 2001

with the transfer, from Defence, of Emergency Management Australia.89

A remarkable demonstration of centralised direction was the states’ and territories’

unanimous agreement to an arrangement whereby the Commonwealth will take control of

serious terrorist incidents. A ‘national terrorist situation’ might involve ‘Attacks on

Commonwealth targets, across State and Territory borders, civil aviation and those

involving chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials.’90

Perhaps recognising the constitutional responsibilities of the states and territories in

domestic security, the Commonwealth extended the concept of central leadership by

deliberately engaging other Australian governments at Head of Government level through

the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), consisting of the Prime Minister and

state and territory Premiers or Chief Ministers.91 The COAG members signed the Inter-

Governmental Agreement on Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Arrangements on 24 October

2002, which led to the establishment of the National Counter-Terrorism Committee

(NCTC) functioning at the senior official level. The NCTC is a broadly-based body that

replaced the SAC-PAV.92 It maintains the National Counter-Terrorism Plan (NCTP),

which replaced the previous National Anti-Terrorism Plan.93 This change in language,

from ‘Anti-Terrorism’ to ‘Counter-Terrorism’ is interesting in itself. As well as

differentiating the post-9/11 arrangements from the previous ones, it may also imply a

more aggressive approach to the problem. The first version of the new NCTP was

89 EMA Information for the Select Committee, CBR/2003/8168, EMA 297/03 dated 14 May 2003, [cited 21 September 2005]. Available from http://www.defence.gov.au/house/committee/bushfires/inquiry/subs/sub344.pdf. 90 Daryl Williams, Commonwealth Attorney-General, ‘National Move to Combat Terror,’ [cited 20 September 2005]. Available from http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/attorneygeneralHome.nsf/Page/Media_Releases_2002_April_2002_National_move_to_combat_terror_(7_April_2002). 91 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 10. 92 Daryl Williams, Commonwealth Attorney-General, ‘National Counter-Terrorism Committee Communique,’ Canberra, 15 November 2002, [cited 20September 2005]. Available from http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/attorneygeneralHome.nsf/Page/Media_Releases_2002_November_2002_Communique_-_National_Counter-Terrorism_Committee_(13-15_November_2002). 45 Attorney-General's Department, National Counter-Terrorism Plan Attorney-General's Department, 2003 [cited available 27 June 2005]. Available from

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launched on 11 June 2003.94 The NCTP is a coordinating document that assigns

responsibilities for counter-terrorism functions to various agencies at all levels of

government, including the ADO.

Mirroring the efforts of the NCTC at Commonwealth level is the Australian Government

Counter-Terrorism Policy Committee (AGCTPC). This is chaired by PM&C and ‘has a

senior membership covering 17 Australian Government departments and agencies.’95

These include organisations such as the Department of Transport and Regional Services

(DOTARS) which had not played a significant role in the pre-9/11 homeland security

processes. 96,97 The involvement of these agencies is further evidence of the widening of

government participation in those processes – Defence’s Directorate of Domestic

Security counts more than 23 Commonwealth Government agencies, spanning nine

Commonwealth departments, with roles in domestic security.98 The AGCTPC has a

subordinate committee, the Australian Government Counter-Terrorism Committee

(AGCTC). Chaired by the PSCC, the AGCTC ‘shares relevant information among

member agencies and establishes the level of national counter-terrorism alert.’99

The new security architecture also recognises that Defence has a special role in national

security. Evidence for this lies in the composition of the NSC, which includes the

Minister for Defence in its very limited permanent membership. Other members are the

Prime Minister (Chair), Deputy Prime Minister, Treasurer, Minister for Foreign Affairs

and Attorney-General.100 The presence of the Chief of Defence Force as one of an

equally small number of senior officials who normally attend the NSC further reinforces

the important status of Defence (and in particular the ADF) in national security matters:

by comparison, the Commissioner of the AFP is an invited member. Given that the Chief

http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/rwpattech.nsf/personal/8142A6DCC44C2B44CA256E39000C7CD7/$FILE/NCT+PLAN.pdf. 94 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 10. 95 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 10. 96 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 42. 97 Personal conversation with Major General Mike Hindmarsh, SOCAUST, Canberra, 3 May 2005. 98 Directorate of Domestic Security, ‘National Domestic Security Committees,’ (unclassified briefing note), Department of Defence, 26 June 2005. 99 ‘National Domestic Security Committees,’ 2005. 100 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 9.

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of Defence Force and Commissioner of the AFP occupy similar positions in relation to

their respective Ministers, and have similar status as senior experts in their respective

fields, the exclusion of the AFP Commissioner is difficult to explain. Other senior

officials who normally attend are the Secretaries of PM&C, Defence and DFAT and the

Directors-General of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the Office of

National Assessments.101

In adapting to the new national security architecture, Defence’s official representation at

the various committees that deal with national counter-terrorism business reflects a new

intra-departmental approach that mirrors the whole of government one taken at the

political level. For example, whereas at the pre-9/11 PSCC and SAC-PAV meetings

Defence was usually represented solely by the (then) one-star Commander, Special

Operations or his representative (usually a subordinate), the NCTC is now attended by

the Special Operations Commander Australia (SOCAUST – now a two-star officer) and

either the Deputy Secretary of Defence’s Strategy and Intelligence Group (a three-star

equivalent Public Servant) or his representative (usually the Assistant Secretary of

Strategy Policy Branch [ASSP], a one-star equivalent Public Servant).102 This widening

of Defence participation also applies to the more junior committees, such as the

AGCTPC, which is attended by both ADF and Defence civilian participants.103 This

reflects a Defence involvement in domestic security matters that is more senior and more

‘whole of department’ in the same way that the national one is whole of government.104

The New Status Quo: ADO Roles in Homeland Security Post-9/11

The following analysis of the employment of the ADO in Australia’s homeland security

post-9/11 revisits the model of homeland security missions used in Chapter Four.

101 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 9. 102 Personal conversation with Major General Mike Hindmarsh, SOCAUST, Canberra, 3 May 2005. 103 Usually SOCAUST and ASSP. Personal conversation with Colonel Jeremy Logan, Colonel (Counter-Terrorism), Special Operations Command, 2002-2004, Canberra, 10 August 2005. 104 Personal conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Steve Alexander, Staff Officer Plans, Special Operations Command, 15 April 2005.

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1. Regional cooperation

Regional cooperation in counter terrorism has been a major theme in Australian

Government policy post-9/11.105 Increased cooperation is evident in two ways. First,

there is greater cooperation in the ‘systemic’ measures to address terrorism, such as the

exchange of information, the organisation of regional counter terrorism agencies and the

training of their personnel. Examples of this include initiatives such as the Regional

Special Forces Counter-Terrorism Conference held in Australia in June 2004:

…this conference, the first of its kind…has provided a unique opportunity to form personal and professional links in the region. This is a crucial component of our cooperative response to the common threat of terrorism.106

Other examples are the Regional Counter Terrorism Expert Exchange hosted by the

SASR in August 2005, and the establishment of the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement

Cooperation (JCLEC). 107 This is a joint initiative with Indonesia ‘aimed at increasing

the capacity of regional countries to manage complex multijurisdictional investigations

into transnational crimes, including terrorism.’108 Skills enhancement and inter-

operability are also pursued through an active exercise program with the counter-

terrorism agencies of regional countries:109

The Australian Government places the highest possible priority on fighting terrorism at home and abroad, including with regional partners.110

105 ‘The Australian Government is pursuing international cooperation on a number of fronts simultaneously – political, diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, immigration, finance, transport and defence.’ Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 14. ‘The government attaches high priority to strengthening counter-terrorism cooperation with our regional partners.’ Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia 2004,’ p.85. ‘Our international engagement is an integral part of the government’s counter-terrorism strategy.’ Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia 2004,’ p.99. 106 Senator Robert Hill, Minister for Defence, ‘Regional Special Forces Counter-Terrorism Conference,’ Bowral, 17 June 2004. 107 Senator Robert Hill, Minister for Defence, ‘First Regional Counter Terrorism Expert Exchange to Boost Regional Security,’ Ministerial Media Release 134/2005, 22 August 2005. 108 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 16. 109 For example, Exercise Wyvern Sun, completed with the Thai Special Forces in July 2004. Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Senator Robert Hill, Minister for Defence, ‘Counter-Terrorism Highlights Regional Cooperation,’ Joint Media Release 126/2004, 4 July 2004. 110Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Senator Robert Hill, Minister for Defence, ‘Counter-Terrorism Highlights Regional Cooperation,’ Joint Media Release 126/2004, 4 July 2004.

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Second, there is evidence of improved cooperation at the ‘tactical’ level, in relation to

specific incidents or operations. For example, the collaborative approach taken by

Australian law enforcement agencies and the Indonesian Police in the investigation of the

2002 Bali bombing.111 This was repeated in the investigation of the 2004 bombing of the

Australian Embassy in Jakarta.

An obvious change is the rise of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) as an instrument for

regional cooperation:

The AFP is a major contributor to the development of counter-terrorism law enforcement capabilities in the region.112

In many ways the AFP now leads Australia’s cooperation efforts. Notwithstanding this

shift, Defence activities such as the DCP continue and may now be focused a little more

on outcomes that will benefit Australia’s homeland security. The need to secure regional

countries, particularly in the South Pacific, against penetration by threat groups is now an

influence on regional cooperation policy.113

2. Strengthen regional CT capabilities

The rise in the significance of the AFP as an instrument of Australia’s regional

cooperation is also evident in efforts to improve the CT capabilities of regional countries:

The emphasis is on building local capacity so that local police are better equipped to anticipate and respond to terrorist threats and situations.114

This is the focus of the AFP’s Law Enforcement Cooperation Program.115 With events

such the Bali nightclub bombing in 2002, the personal security of individual Australians

abroad in the region has added to the national impetus for this form of cooperation.

The ADO’s practical role in the enhancement of regional CT capabilities, through

individual and collective training, has continued:

111 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 15; Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia 2004,’ p.88. 112 Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia 2004,’ p.88. 113 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 16. 114 Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia 2004,’ pp.85-6. 115 Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia 2004,’ pp.85-6.

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Australia’s defence program of counter-terrorism engagement with our regional partners includes…a focus on improving regional countries’ national coordination between defence and other agencies in the event of an incident, and on improving the standard of consequence management responses.116

The combined exercise and reciprocal training program involving the SASR has been

maintained but a major new development has been the addition of CBRN response

(CBRNR) training, using the skills of the CBRR Squadron, IRU and IRR as those units

developed. The IRR’s regional pre-eminence in CBRNR has made it an attractive

training partner for regional countries seeking to develop CBRNR capabilities, as

demonstrated by combined exercises such as Black Orchid with the Singapore Armed

Forces.117

The existence of an Australian national ‘centre of excellence’ for CBRNR has also

facilitated effective participation in other CT-related regional activities:

The ADF Incident Response Regiment is assisting chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) response capacity-building efforts in the region.118

The success of Australia’s collective CBRNR capabilities as a regional engagement tool

should not be hailed as an example of prescient policy: rather, it was a serendipitous

outcome of the elaborate preparations for the Sydney 2000 Games, which had forged

close cooperative links between the ADF (JIRU), DSTO and EMA. These links were

strengthened with the re-invigoration of the ADO’s CBRNR program as the IRR and

CBRNDC were established post-9/11. Nevertheless, the CBRNR ‘community’ has

enabled useful participation in events such as the ASEAN Regional Forum’s (ARF’s)

2003 CBM Workshop on Managing the Consequences of a Major Terrorist Attack.

Personnel from the IRR, DSTO and EMA provided a major presentation to the

116 Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia 2004,’ p.95. 117‘Army Participates in CBR Response Training in Singapore,’ (Defence Media Release), 20 November 2004), [cited 19 September 2005}. Available from http://www.defence.gov.au/media/DepartmentalTpl.cfm?CurrentId=4382. 118 Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia 2004,’ p.95.

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Workshop, which was hosted by Australia in Darwin.119 Training in CBRNR, because of

its inherently defensive nature, is also seen as a benign form of cooperation that does not

pose the same political risks as the more combat-oriented CT training historically

practiced by the SASR. In some ways, therefore, the ADO’s new sophisticated

capabilities have facilitated military-to-military access and relationships that promise

wider collaborative benefits.120

3. Build political will among regional governments

The benefits of strengthening the political will of regional governments have not changed

in the post-9/11 environment:

Building and maintaining political commitment among regional countries is essential to the region’s campaign against terrorism.121

The importance of the ADO’s role in building political will has remained, but the

significance of other contributions has risen. Police forces and other Government

agencies have taken a more active role in improving the quality of government

institutions in regional countries, as demonstrated by efforts such as the Regional

Assistance Mission to Solomon islands (RAMSI), which is AFP-led;122 or the Enhanced

Cooperation Program (ECP) with Papua and New Guinea, which involved cooperative

capability development and training in policing as well as other government functions.123

All of these activities are aimed at improving the quality of governance in regional

countries, with benefits for Australia’s homeland security.124 While the ADO’s role

119 ‘ASEAN Regional Forum CBM Workshop on Managing the Consequences of a Major Terrorist Attack, 3-5 June 2003: Co-Chairs’ Summary Report’, available http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/terrorist/chairmans_statement.html , viewed 19 September 2005. 120 Personal conversations with Major General Mike Hindmarsh, Special Operations Commander Australia, 3 May 2005; and General Peter Cosgrove, Chief of Defence Force (Australia), 14 June 2005. 121 Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia 2004,’ p.87. 122 Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia 2004,’ pp. 109-10. Also Elsina Wainwright, ‘Responding to state failure – the case of Australia and Solomon Islands,’ Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 3, November 2003, p. 492. 123 Australian ECP participants included 210 AFP officers, 18 legal specialists, 36 economic, national planning and personnel management specialists, and up to 10 border protection and transport specialists. Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP) March 2005, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, [cited 7 May 2005]. Available from http://www.dfat.gov.au/png/ecp2004.html. 124 ‘…Australia’s broader commitment to helping regional countries improve their prospects for security and prosperity.’ Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia 2004,’ p.110.

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remains important, therefore, it now shares that importance with a wider range of

Government agencies.

4. International Coalition Against Terrorism & the US alliance

Since 9/11, the Australian Government has committed itself strongly to the US alliance as

a major component of its counter-terrorism strategy:

Australia’s alliance with the United States is a key plank of our international counter-terrorism strategy.125

The ADO’s participation in the US-led Operations Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan,

beginning in October 2002) and Iraqi Freedom (beginning in early 2003) have been the

most significant manisfestations of Australian support to the ICAT and the counter-

terrorism context of the US alliance:

At the hard edge of Australia’s whole-of-government contribution to the global campaign against terror is the use of military force.126

The initial justification for Australia’s military support to the invasion of Iraq in 2003

was the threat posed by that country’s programs to acquire weapons of mass destruction

(WMD).127 These were said to be ‘a direct undeniable and lethal threat to Australia and

its people.’128 The possibility that WMD in the hands of regimes such as Iraq’s could find

their way into terrorists’ hand made it easy to at least infer a potentail homeland security

concern from the situation.129

Subsequently, that justification has been shown to be based on incorrect intelligence

assessments, yet Australia remains committed to supporting the United States in Iraq.

According to the Government’s more recent rhetoric, the significance of these

deployments to Australia’s homeland security lies in their influence in either reducing or

potentiating the international terrorist threat:

125 Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia 2004,’ p.78. 126 Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia 2004,’ p.79. 127 John Howard. "Address to the Nation on Committing Australian Forces to War in Iraq, 20 March 2003." Canberra: Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2003. 128 Howard. "Address to the Nation on Committing Australian Forces to War in Iraq, 20 March 2003." 129 Howard. "Address to the Nation on Committing Australian Forces to War in Iraq, 20 March 2003."

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A terrorist-inspired breakdown in civil order in Iraq would have serious security implications, both globally and for Australia…The eradication of terrorist activity in Iraq would, conversely, be a major win for the global war on terrorism.130

The efficacy of Australian involvement in the ongoing conflict Iraq is contentious and the

continued commitment of the ADF to that conflict has become a point of policy

differentiation between the Howard Government and its Labor Opposition. Views that

Australia’s involvement in Iraq increases the likelihood that Australia will suffer another

major terrorist attack are widely held and the policy is unpopular.131 Overall, the

effectiveness of Australia’s military commitment to the ICAT and the US as a

contribution to Australian homeland security is, at best, difficult to gauge. While the

ADF’s involvement as the ‘hard edge’ of that commitment is obviously indispensable, its

value for Australia’s homeland security could well be negative, especially in the short

term. The strength of the Howard Government’s commitment to supporting the ICAT,

especially in Iraq, suggests other policy motivations that may not be of a strictly

homeland security nature.

5. Countering WMD proliferation

Countering WMD proliferation has risen in significance in Australian national security

policy since 9/11. All government policy documents note the interest shown by terrorists

in acquiring WMD and the threat posed by possible terrorist use of such weapons.132

Building on a long history of active Australian involvement in efforts to prevent WMD

proliferation, the post 9/11 period has seen an increase in the national focus on this aspect

of security. This has involved major contributions from the ADO.

ADO involvement has taken several forms. One has been the contribution of technical

and operational capabilities to the international Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

This has taken advantage of the ADF’s SUR capability, among other skills. The ADF

130 Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia 2004,’ p.80. 131 Morgan. Finding No. 4015: Support For Australian Presence In Iraq At All-Time Low Roy Morgan International, 2006 [cited 14 April 2007]. Available from http://www.roymorgan.com/news/polls/2006/4015/. 132 Defence Update 2003, pp. 15-6; Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia 2004,’ pp. 73-4; Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, pp. 4, 48.

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has taken a significant role in the coordination of multinational PSI exercises.133

Although unrelated to the PSI, the ADF role in the boarding and seizure of the MV Pong

Su in 2003 was an operational application of those capabilities.134

The ADO has continued to support international efforts to investigate suspected

proliferation activities and to verify treaty compliance. For example, the ADO’s

contribution to the Iraq Survey Group, investigating the alleged WMD programs of the

former Iraqi regime, involved the participation of ADF intelligence and NBCD experts.

To the extent that the regime’s suspected programs formed part of the justification for

Australia’s participation in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the ADO contribution to those

operations and the subsequent occupation are also examples of involvement in WMD

counter-proliferation.135

6. Fusing intelligence

Most analyses of the 9/11 attacks conclude that the US’ inability to detect and prevent the

terrorists’ efforts was due to flaws in the processes for ‘fusing’ threat information flowing

from diverse sources into the various agencies of the national intelligence community.

Similarly, many assessments of the requirements for successful homeland security

conclude that intelligence fusion will be critical to the prevention of future attacks. There

is a view that future efforts to defeat threats to the homeland at a distance will be

characterised by counter-insurgency warfare, as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan in the

aftermath of the 2001 and 2003 invasions, respectively. Much current thinking on

counter-insurgency also emphasises the ability to fuse a wide range of indicators into an

actionable intelligence picture.136

133 Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia 2004,’ p. 84. Senator Robert Hill, ‘Australia’s Commitment to the Proliferation Security Initiative,’ Media Release 128,2005, 16 August 2005. 134 Duncan Lewis, ‘Guarding Australians Against Terrorism,’ Australian Army Journal, Vol. 1 No. 2, Canberra: December 2003, p. 49. 135 The validity of that justification is a contentious issue that it is beyond the scope of this study to comment on: the fact of WMD containment as a justification for an ADF commitment to the war is, however, relevant. 136 For example, the emphasis on ‘intelligence cycle operations’ in the Australian Army’s current Future Land Operating Concept. Complex Warfighting. Australian Army, Canberra, 2004.

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The ADO’s intelligence organisations are members of the Australian Intelligence

Community (AIC), which consists of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation

(ASIO), the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), The Office of National

Assessments (ONA), the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO), the Defence Signals

Directorate (DSD) and the Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO).137 As

members of the AIC, the Defence organisations have a major role to play in contributing

data for fusion, and for performing some of the fusion processing. This is recognised in

government policy, which reaches directly to the three Defence intelligence bodies and

assigns them intelligence responsibilities.138

An important development in the homeland security intelligence function is the National

Threat Assessment Centre (NTAC), established within ASIO as a specific post-9/11

initiative.139 The NTAC’s role is essentially one of intelligence fusion for the production

of national threat assessments, with emphasis on terrorist threats. The ADO contributes

to this function by integrating DIO personnel into the NTAC.140

7. Assessments of threats, risks & vulnerabilities

The major change to ADO involvement in this mission has been the increased emphasis

on attention to homeland security threats against which Defence intelligence

organisations collect data, and the Defence contribution to the NTAC.141 Highly

specialised Defence intelligence expertise, such as that of the Defence Signals

Directorate, also contributes to infrastructure vulnerability assessments.142

Defence has also performed an ‘enabling’ role in the intelligence assessment mission by

providing training for civilian intelligence analysts. As the only Australian Government

organisation with a career-long training program for intelligence analysts, the ADO is

uniquely placed to provide training: for example, the Defence Intelligence Training

Centre (DINTC) developed and delivered a ‘customised’ training course to the New

137 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 20. 138 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, pp. 23-4. 139 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, pp. 21. 140 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 21. 141 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, pp. 21, 23-4.

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South Wales Police Service in support of the establishment of an intelligence capability

within its new Counter-Terrorism Co-ordination Command.143

8. Collection and dissemination of intelligence

As with other aspects of intelligence for homeland security, ASIO has primary

responsibility for collection and dissemination. The ADO nevertheless contributes to

collection through its unique capabilities and sources, as described above. There has

been little change to the ADO’s involvement in this mission in principle, but the scope of

some efforts has increased. For example, the deployment of ADF personnel to work in

the Coalition Explosive Exploitation Cell in Baghdad, as part of Operation

CATALYST,144 has been undertaken partly to source high-quality intelligence on IED

threats demonstrated in the Iraq theatre of operations. The ADO contribution is also

intended to gain experience and expertise in the forensic exploitation of evidence from

bomb sites and the use of that evidence in counter-terrorism investigations and

operations, both in Australia (for homeland security purposes) and in future ADF

deployments to similar threat environments offshore.145

10. Attribution & prosecution

Whereas previously the ADO had no role in this largely ‘law and order’ homeland

security mission, in the post-9/11 environment applications have been found for some

Defence capabilities. The most obvious example is DSTO’s collaboration with the

National Institute of Forensic Science to establish within the Australian law enforcement

community forensic laboratory capabilities applicable to CBRN.146 Successful forensic

exploitation of CBRN materials assists in the investigation of incidents as well as

consequence management, by correctly identifying the agents used. DSTO is also

142 Rachel Lebihan, ‘Software to patrol bridge,’ Australian Financial Review, 13 May 2005, p. 3. 143 Personnel conversation with Assistant Commissioner Norm Hazzard, Assistant Commissioner Counter-Terrorism, NSWPS, 24 June 2005. 144 Senator Robert Hill, ‘Explosive Specialists Return Home From Iraq,’ (Ministerial Media Release 138/2005) 3 September 2005. 145 Personal conversation with General Peter Cosgrove, Chief of Defence Force, Canberra, 14 June 2005. 146 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 49.

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involved in the development of ‘taggants’ for explosives that would facilitate

investigations of illegal use.147

11. Immigration

The pre-9/11 pattern of ADO involvement in Australia’s immigration control processes

has been maintained post 9/11. With the objective of conducting ‘air and surface patrols

across Australia’s northern approaches to deter unauthorised boat arrivals,’ the ADO

contribution has continued as Operation RELEX II since March 2002, but an anti-

terrorism dimension has entered.148 Most of the responsibility for the increased national

focus on immigration has fallen to the Department of Immigration, Multicultural and

Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA). DIMIA, now a participant in the NCTC and AGCTPC, has

enhanced its capabilities to scrutinize and control human movement through Australia’s

ports but the long coastline remains a potential avenue of undetected entry of threatening

persons and materials. The ADO provides a unique capability to monitor and control that

avenue:

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) conducts surveillance and response operations in Australia’s northern approaches in support of Customs and DIMIA border protection roles. Since September 2001, in response to an increase in unauthorised boat arrivals, the Australian Government has tasked the ADF to detect and intercept unauthorised boats entering Australian territorial waters off the northwest coast and offshore territories. The ADF’s capabilities allow the government to have a continuous presence in our north, helping to maintain the integrity of Australia’s borders.149

147 Mark Dunn, ‘Tags to trap bomb makers,’ Herald Sun, 2 March 2005, p. 15. 148 Defence Annual Report 2003-2004, p. 99. 149 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 40.

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13. Border surveillance

The border surveillance mission, especially in its peculiarly maritime dimension, is an

area of homeland security for which the ADO has made a structural adjustment since

9/11. The general pattern of ADF border surveillance activity had been established pre-

9/11, in the form of naval and air patrols and the potential application of JORN. These

efforts were consolidated as named operations, such as RELEX. The post-9/11

adjustment consisted of the establishment of Border Protection Command (originally as

the Joint Offshore Protection Command - JOPC), an increase to the size of the coastal

patrol boat fleet and changes to the patrol boat basing scheme.

Border Protection Command (BPC). BPC was initially created as the JOPC in

response to a recommendation of a 2004 review of Australia’s maritime security

conducted by the Task Force on Maritime Security, led by Mr. Rob Tonkin. The

establishment of the JOPC was announced by the Prime Minister on 15 December

2004. The JOPC Headquarters was formally opened on 30 March 2005.150 On

23 October 2006, JOPC was renamed Border Protection Command.151 A

consolidation of existing ADF and Coastwatch arrangements, the ‘jointness’ of

BPC lies in its dual chain of command and reporting requirements: the

Commander of the JOPC, a RAN Rear Admiral, reports to both the Vice Chief of

the Defence Force (as Commander, Joint Operations Command) and the Chief

Executive Officer - Customs.152 The ADF contribution to BPC consists of its

Commander and a staff of RAN and RAAF officers. There are no ADF

operational assets permanently assigned to BPC, but it ‘has access to the full

range of Defence and Customs capabilities.’153 NORCOM still exists, but is now

responsive to BPC in the provision of military support to off-shore maritime

security tasks.

150 Vice Admiral R.E. Shalders, Vice Chief of the Defence Force, ‘Joint Offshore Protection Command,’ Department of Defence, DEFGRAM No. 301/2005, 6 June 2005. 151 Personal conversation with Miguel Rivera, Border Protection Command, 12 December 2006. By 12 December 2006 the Australian Customs website had not been updated to reflect this change. 152 Shalders, ‘Joint Offshore Protection Command,’ 2005. 153 Shalders, ‘Joint Offshore Protection Command,’ 2005.

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The purpose of establishing the JOPC was to ‘achieve effective civil-military

arrangements that enhance deterrence, and provide patrolling activities that are

scalable in response to changing threat levels.’154 Implied in this is ‘seamless’

access to high-end ADF capabilities with application to counter-terrorism, such as

SUR. Rob Tonkin has cited three reasons for the Defence role in the JOPC: first,

the need for robust command and control in counter-terrorism situations; second,

because lethal force, when required, needs to be applied by a capable, trained

organisation; and third, because maritime patrol and interdiction capabilities are

needed.155,156 The timing of the establishment of the JOPC, following a

successful but less than seamless involvement of the ADO in the interception of

the MV Pong Su, may be significant.157

Patrol boats. Prior to 9/11, the RAN Patrol Boat Force Element Group (FEG)

was equipped with a fleet of 15 Fremantle Class Patrol Boats (FCPBs). Life-of-

type replacement of the FCPB was scheduled to commence in 2005. The size of

the replacement fleet of Armidale Class Patrol Boats was to have been reduced to

only 12 boats because operational availability improvements incorporated in

design of the new boats would enable the smaller fleet to achieve the same annual

sea-time as 15 FCPBs.158 Government directed, however, that an additional two

boats be purchased specifically to provide for the security of natural gas

installations on the North-West Shelf.159

The adoption of the Armidale Class boats also represents an incidental adjustment

to ADF capability that better suits it to homeland security tasking. This lies in the

154 Shalders, ‘Joint Offshore Protection Command,’ 2005. 155 Rob Tonkin, ‘Security Pressures and Preferred Options for Enhanced Offshore Maritime Security,’ (presentation to ‘Safeguarding Australia 2005’), Canberra, 12 July 2005. 156 Personal conversations with General Peter Cosgrove, Chief of Defence Force, Canberra, 14 June 2005; Vice Admiral Chris Ritchie, Chief of Navy, Canberra, 20 May 2005; Mr. Marc Ablong, Assistant Secretary Strategic Policy, Canberra, 22 April 2005. 157 Winning In Peace, Winning in War 2004, p. 13; Duncan Lewis, ‘Guarding Australians Against Terrorism,’ 2003, p. 49. 158 Senator Robert Hill, ‘First Armidale Class Patrol Boat Arrives,’ Ministerial Media Release 071/2005, 10 May 2005. 159 Liberal Party of Australia, ‘Securing Australia’s North West Shelf,’ (2004 Election policy statement), 16 September 2004, available http://www.liberal.org.au/default.cfm?action=plaintext&id=299, viewed 24

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fact that the Armidale Class Patrol Boat is a commercially-designed vessel

optimised for a ‘non-warlike’ coastal surveillance role. The selection of this

design thus confirms the Patrol Boat FEG’s dedication to naval constabulary roles

– a homeland security task, rather than a war-fighting one.160

Patrol boat basing. With the addition of two more Patrol Boats to the RAN’s

planned fleet came a requirement to establish a new ‘home port’ for those boats

on the north-western Australian coast near their North West Shelf area of

operations.161 This represents an adjustment in ADF base disposition in response

to homeland security requirements.

The requirement for border security is similar to the issue of border surveillance. This

includes tasks such as port security. Although there is no ADO role in port security,

reviews have identified vulnerabilities in Australian ports.162 Any increased focus on this

problem could lead to calls for a greater role for the ADO in port security.

One outcome of the extensive involvement of ADO assets in maritime surveillance tasks

may be an incipient degradation of warfighting skills. In the case of RAAF maritime

surveillance aircraft, for example, tasking since 2002 has been dominated by coastal

surveillance missions in support of Operations RELEX and CRANBERRY (now

combined as Operation RESOLUTE) and deployments to the Middle East as part of

Operation CATALYST. The exact nature of Operation CATALYST tasking is not

discernable from open source material, but is likely to involve surveillance missions of

some sort. The recent fitting to these aircraft of electronic warfare and self protection

(EWSP) equipment, effective against ground based air defence weapons, suggests that

September 2005. Senator Robert Hill, ‘Budget 2005-06: Securing Australia’s North West Shelf,’ Ministerial Media Release 074/2005, 10 May 2005. 160 Defence Materiel Organisation, ‘Project SEA 1444,’, [cited 24 September 2005]. Available from http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/msd/sea1444/sea1444.cfm. Personal conversation with Vice Admiral Chris Ritchie, Chief of Navy, Canberra, 20 May 2005. 161 Hill, ‘Budget 2005-06: Securing Australia’s North West Shelf,’ 2005. 162 Brendan Nicholson, ‘Port to revamp terror defences,’ The Age, 15 March 2005, p.1; Brendan Nicholson and Connie Levett, ‘Sea terror plans revealed after port security boost announced,’ The Age, 18 March 2005, p. 3.

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some missions are conducted over land.163 Lack of recent training may be degrading the

maritime surveillance force’s core capability for anti-submarine warfare.

15. Aviation transport

Given the method used in the 9/11 attacks, aviation security has received considerable

government and popular scrutiny in the subsequent period. Most changes to aviation

security measures have involved other agencies, however, and there has been little direct

ADO involvement in this role except in for special event security. The RAAF provided

F/A-18 fighter DCA coverage for the CHOGM in Queensland in 2002 and for the visits

of US President Bush and Chinese President Hu in 2004. 164, ,165 166 Provision of DCA in

a homeland security setting was unprecedented and reflects the ADF’s unique capabilities

for air defence. Security planning for the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games

includes DCA coverage,167 suggesting that this may be a normal task in support of certain

high-profile events.

Another minor area of ADO involvement in aviation security is DSTO’s role in

developing ‘countermeasures for civilian aircraft against man-portable air defence

systems.’168

16. Maritime transport

As with aviation security, the security of maritime transport has been examined

exhaustively since 9/11. Maritime transport security measures obviously overlap

significantly with border surveillance requirements that led to the establishment of the

JOPC and adjustments to the patrol boat FEG. Additional requirements have also been

163Senator Robert Hill, ‘Air Force Deploys to the Middle East,’ Media Release 148/2005, 9 September 2005. 164 ‘Increased Air Security for CHOGM,’ Media Release 70/02, 22 February 2002. 165 The employment of ‘air defence assets’ for Operation GUARDIAN II was reported in Defence Annual Report 2001-2002, p. 75. 166 Senator Robert Hill, response to Question No. 2322, Senate Hansard, 1 December 2003, p. 18597. 167 Phillip Ruddock, Commonwealth Attorney-General, 19 September 2005,as quoted in ‘Games Security Plan Revealed,’ AAP, [cited 20 September 2005]. Available from http://www.news.com.au/story/0,10119,16662566,00.html. 168 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 48. The threat from man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) is identified in Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia 2004, p. 84.

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generated by special events: for example, a maritime interception capability, including

SUR, was provided in support of the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games.169

Maritime transport security has also provided the focus of one of the major political

differences over Australia’s post-9/11 homeland security. The Australian Labor Party

Opposition has consistently argued for the creation of a Coastguard service, presumably

on a US model, to perform Australia’s maritime transport and border security

functions.170 The Liberal-National Coalition Government has resisted this, adopting the

BPC model instead. Labor’s Coastguard model, if adopted, would have significant

implications for the ADO as it would see the transfer of the patrol boat capability to the

new service.

19. Physical security (of infrastructure)

The post-9/11 environment has seen heightened government interest in infrastructure

security, to the extent that this has become a major element of homeland security

policy.171 This has not, however, significantly changed the ADO’s involvement in this

task. To some extent, the declining influence of DoA ideas on ADO activities has

reduced the Organisation’s focus on those aspects of infrastructure security that had been

associated with the ‘defeat of foreign incursions,’ such as vital asset protection in

Australia’s North. Policy documents do not identify a major role for the ADF in

infrastructure security, but the establishment of the regional Reserve Response Forces

could provide an asset with application for the task.

One area of ADO involvement in infrastructure security that has emerged in policy is

DSTO’s role in addressing the vulnerabilities ‘affecting the national critical

169 "Operation Acolyte" (official film record) Canberra: Department of Defence, 2006. Also ‘Games Security Plan Revealed,’ 19 September 2005. 170 Robert McClellan, Shadow Minister for Defence, ‘Tougher Measures Needed to Protect Australia’s Maritime Security and Economic Interests,’ Media Release 12 March 2005. Arch Bevis, Shadow Minister for Homeland Security, ‘Australia Unprepared for Terrorist Attack Four Years After September 11,’ Media Release 19 September 2005. 171 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 32.

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infrastructure, including communications networks, transport systems and power

grids.’172

An aspect of infrastructure protection that has seen increased ADO involvement is that

associated with its own infrastructure. An early response to the new security

environment was the implementation of increased security measures for ADO facilities

under the ‘SAFEBASE’ scheme. An increased security level has persisted, but has

‘normalised’ such that security is largely provided by civilian personnel, either as part of

Defence’s Corporate Services and Infrastructure Group or commercial contractors.173

Although part of the overall homeland security requirement, the ADO’s role in

addressing its own internal security needs is not considered further.

20. Information security

Post 9/11, the national aspects of information security remain a government responsibility

that does not involve the ADO from a policy perspective. The ADO does contribute to

this mission, however, through DSTO’s involvement in communications security S&T

efforts.174 Defence continues to be responsible for its internal information security

requirements.

21. Disease control, health & medical services

With the post-9/11 heightened awareness of CBRN threats has come an increased interest

in disease control, health and medical services as part of Australia’s homeland security

arrangements. The major involvement of the ADO in these missions has been in DSTO’s

growing role in the associated national S&T efforts, such as the Public Health Laboratory

Network, especially in the context of CBRN attacks.

172 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 48. 173 Geoff Hay, Director Operations (Regions and Bases), Presentation to Fulbright Symposium 2004, Brisbane, 5-7 July 2004. 174 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 48.

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22. Mass gatherings

In the post-9/11 environment, the acute vulnerability of mass gatherings and special

events has attracted greatly increased Government interest. Security planning for

‘security sensitive events’ is now a routine part of national security business - the

‘Forecast of Security Sensitive Events’ is a standard item at AGCTPC meetings and

‘major events expected to require extensive/intensive security coordination’ constitute a

discreet category of events.175 Major international events, such as CHOGM in 2002, the

Rugby World Cup in 2003 and the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games were the

focus of significant ADO support operations.176 Mass gatherings of a more ‘routine’

nature, such as major domestic sporting events, have not required ADO support. As

illustrated in Table 2, the frequency of special events requiring ADO security support

(‘DESO’) appears to be increasing post-9/11: there were four in 2002-2006 and at least

two more are expected in the next few years (APEC 2007 [Sydney] and the World Youth

Day 2008 [Sydney]).177 Planning for extensive ADO support to APEC is already under

way and support to World Youth Day would appear likely. 178 This concentration of

special events could be aberration, although this seems unlikely as Australian cities

continue to compete successfully for the right to host major events.

175 ‘Forecast of Security Sensitive Events’ AGCTPC Meeting 8 April 2004, Agenda Item 16. 176 These were Operations GUARDIAN/GUARDIAN II for CHOGM, SCRUMMAGE for the Rugby World Cup and ACOLYTE for the Commonwealth Games. Defence Annual Reports 2001-2002, p. 75, and 2003-2004, p. 99; Senator Robert Hill, ‘Defence Support to World Cup Security,’ Media Release 25 September 2003, and ‘Games Security Plan Revealed,’ 19 September 2005. 177 Susan, Ley, ‘Sydney to host 2008 Catholic World Youth Day,’ Media Release, 22 August 2005. 178 Alexander Downer and Mark Vaile, ‘Australia to Host APEC 2007,’ Joint Ministerial Media Release, 10 May 2005.

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1956-2000 2001-2006

Melbourne 1956 Olympics Operation GUARDIAN (CHOGM 2002)

Brisbane 1982 Commonwealth Games

Operation SCRUMMAGE (Rugby World Cup 2003)

Brisbane Expo 88

Operation MIATA (Presidents Bush/Hu

visits, 2003)

Operation Gold (Sydney 2000 Games)

Operation ACOLYTE (Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games)

Total: 4 Total: 4

Average Frequency (Years): 11

Average Frequency (Years): 1.25

Table 2 - ADO domestic event support operations, 1956-2006.

The consistent involvement of the ADO in mass gathering and special event security does

not indicate a ceding of state responsibility for that security: most jurisdictions have

demonstrated a keen awareness of their responsibilities and have focused considerable

effort on meeting them. Heightened threat awareness has, however, led to a better

understanding of potential capability shortfalls and of the ADO support that might be

required to address them. ADO roles in support of the states are generally the same as in

the pre-9/11 period, and continue to revolve around assistance with ‘surge’ capacity

requirements of both a qualitative and quantitative nature. New aspects of the threat

spectrum, such as the use of hijacked aircraft as weapons, have led to some new forms of

ADO support: for example, the provision of DCA coverage for the Melbourne 2006

Commonwealth Games.179

The relatively long lead times associated with most special events and mass gatherings

tend to facilitate ADO support. The establishment of new ADO capabilities, such as the

RRFs, may also have eased the provision of that support in some cases by creating

179‘Games Security Plan Revealed,’ 19 September 2005.

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formed bodies of personnel with relevant skills, such as operational (low risk) search.180

These could also provide options for short-notice requirements.

23. Dignitary protection

The ADO’s role in dignitary protection post-9/11 environment has continued to be in the

context of surge and specialist support, although the heightened threat environment has

seen an increase in the technical complexity of protection required with consequent

changes in the demand for ADF support. Operation GUARDIAN II, the support effort

for the 2002 CHOGM in Queensland, saw a significant deployment of ADO assets

including, for the first time, fighter aircraft for DCA.181 DCA was also provided for the

Bush/Hu visits in 2003.182 As many dignitary protection tasks arise in the context of

mass gatherings and special events, other aspects of ADO involvement in this task are

discussed under that heading.

24. Public awareness

The importance of public awareness in Australia’s homeland security has increased since

9/11, especially as an enabler for the national surveillance system for terrorism indicators.

Measures such as the Commonwealth’s ‘Be alert, not alarmed’ and National Security

Hotline campaigns rely for their effectiveness on public awareness of what to be alert

for.183 The concentration of national homeland security coordination responsibilities in

PM&C and the ADG has also applied to the management of public awareness, such that

Defence continues to play a supporting rather than a leading role in this mission. The

significant contribution made to homeland security by ADO capabilities nevertheless

made that supporting role important. There is evidence that public visibility of ADO

capabilities is used to reassure Australians of the effectiveness of security measures. For

example, the public ‘launch’ of security measures for the Melbourne 2006

180 Brigadier Keith Jobson, ‘The Reserve Response Force,’ presentation to the 2004 Fulbright Symposium, 5-7 July 2004. 181 Senator Robert Hill, ‘Increased Air Security for CHOGM,’ Ministerial Media Release 70/02, 22 February 2002. 182 Senator Robert Hill, response to Question No. 2322, Senate Hansard, 1 December 2003, p. 18597. 183 Australian National Security Website, AGD, 2006 [cited 15 January 2006]. Available from http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/.

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Commonwealth Games, which included disclosure of the number of ADF personnel

involved, would appear to have been carefully timed in relation to the beginning of the

Games themselves and public commentary about Games security in the wake of the July

2005 attacks on the London public transport network. The announcement occurred on 21

September 2005, two months after the London attacks but only briefly before Exercise

Mercury 05, the major multi-jurisdictional exercise (MJEX) designed to test Games

security measures.184 Significantly, disclosure of the extent of Games security

preparations (including the ADO contribution) had been resisted until this point,

suggesting that disclosure was timed to achieve a specific public information effect.185

The deterrent value of visible security preparations may also be a significant protective

effect to which ADO assets can contribute.

Public awareness of ADO involvement in homeland security may also serve a political

purpose by demonstrating a tangible and effective government response to a serious

security threat. Again, the timing of announcements supports this interpretation: the

announcement, on 1 October 2001, of the government decision to ‘effectively double the

counter-terrorist capabilities of the Special Forces’ came less than three weeks after the

9/11 attacks and before a firm design for the additional forces had been selected.186

Government statements in relation to its response to the terrorist threat consistently refer

to the increases in ADF counter-terrorism capabilities: each of the first four post-9/11

policy documents analysed in Appendix 2 enumerate at least the structural changes

associated with establishment of TAG East, the IRR and, depending on timing, the

creation of SOCOMD. Other references to these capabilities have appeared in

184 Patrick Murphy and Michael Bachelard, ‘1200 troops used for Games,’ The Australian, 21 September 2005, [cited 21 September 2005]. Available from http://www.news.com.au/story/print/0,10119,16669752,00.html. 185 Peter Ker, Jewel Topsfield, ‘Push for more Games police and cameras,’ The Age, 12 March 2005, [cited 8 April 2005]. Available from http://www.theage/com.au/news/Commonwealth-Games/Push-for-more-Games-police.... AAP, ‘Cost of Games will be a secret,’ [cited 23 July 2005]. Available http://www.news.com.au/story/print/0.10119,16024017,00.html2005. AAP, ‘Trust us on Games security: Bracks,’ 20 August 2005, [cited 20 August 2005]. Available from http://www.news.com.au/story/print/0.10119,16324002,00.html. 186 Reith, ‘Defence Counter-Terrorism Upgrade,’ 2001.

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Ministerial speeches since 2001.187 The ADO may support, therefore, a degree of

‘national security theatre’ through public awareness of its capabilities.

25. Preparedness & prevention

The ADO’s role in national preparedness and prevention for homeland security purposes

has changed significantly in the post-9/11 period due to the movement of EMA from

Defence to AGD. As a result, EMA’s important coordination role no longer falls to

Defence. Although Defence still supports EMA by providing a logistic ‘back-up’ for the

replenishment of disaster earmark stores and the maintenance of radiological detection

equipment, the Department’s profile in preparedness has diminished significantly as the

AGD’s has risen. 188

The relative importance of Defence contributions to other aspects of prevention and

preparedness has similarly declined as the state and territory capabilities have increased.

Defence’s role in training civilian responders, for example, has reduced as civilian

agencies’ training capacity has increased. Even small jurisdictions, such as the ACT, are

now delivering nationally accredited training in demanding skills such as IEDD.189 As a

result, Defence’s role in ‘benchmarking’ some capabilities has probably also declined.

Whereas national IEDD capabilities once reflected the ADO benchmark represented by

the RAAOC SATO teams, the ADO may now be pursuing a civilian benchmark. The

recent replacement of police and ADF RPD fleets provides an interesting insight into this

phenomenon. The first RPD provided to state police IEDD teams through PSCC

channels was the ADF’s Echidna.190 By late 2004, these needed replacement urgently.

Due to delays in the ADO’s scheduled replacement of its Echidnas, the PSCC pressed

ahead with its own replacement program.191 A new machine, the TEODOR, was selected

187 For example, Reith, ‘Defence Counter-Terrorism Upgrade,’ 2001. Senator Robert Hill (Minister for Defence): ‘New counter-terrorist units strengthen Australia’s defences,’ Sydney, 2002; ‘Defence Support to World Cup Security,’ 2003; ‘Regional Terrorism, Global Security and the Defence of Australia,’ 9 October 2003; ‘Australia’s Response to Terrorism,’ Canberra, 25 May 2004’ ‘Regional Special Forces Counter-Terrorism Conference,’ Bowral, 17 June 2004. 188 Personal conversation with Mr. Don Patterson, EMA, 24 March 2005. 189 ‘ACT Policing Annual Report 2001-02: Outcome 4,’ Australian Federal Police, Canberra, 2002, p. 41. 190 The Australian Army in Profile 1997, p. 103. 191 Personal conversation with Mr. Paul de Graaff, Assistant Secretary Counter-Terrorism Branch, PSCC, Canberra, 26 July 2005.

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by a civilian police panel coordinated by the PSCC and introduced into service in early

2005.192 The ADO subsequently selected the TEODOR as the replacement for its

Echidnas, based on the PSCC purchase.193

Defence’s role in providing S&T support to civilian capability development has increased

since 9/11. The technical complexity of some capabilities now being pursued by civilian

agencies, such as CBRR, has increased demands for ‘smart buyer’ advice for certain

equipment.194 The increase in demand for DSTO support to homeland security S&T

requirements has had a structural effect: the creation of the CBRNDC, for example, was

partially justified by DSTO’s growing role in national CBRR incident preparedness.

DSTO staffing is also being influenced by domestic security demands: for example,

DSTO has recruited Research Scientists for duties specifically in the civilian counter

terrorism field.195

26. Response & recovery

The greatest change in the ADO’s involvement in Australia’s homeland security post-

9/11 has been the significant increase in counter-terrorism response capabilities. Despite

the significant increase in special recovery capabilities in some state police forces, the

ADO continues to provide the ‘high end’ national capability in that area. The capabilities

added post-9/11 consist of:

A two-star Special Operations Command with a simultaneous staff presence in

Sydney (co-located with Headquarters Joint Operations Command) and Canberra

(to support the national crisis management processes).

192 Personal conversations with Mr. Bruce Schiefelbein, Australian Bomb Data Centre, Canberra, 1 April 2005 and Paul de Graaff, 26 July 2005. Mike Rann MP (Premier of South Australia), ‘Bomb Robot Signs on for Duty in S.A.’ (News Release), 9 February 2005. 193 Personal conversation with Mr. Don Williams, XTEK, 4 March 2005. 194 Dr. Brent Paul, Head, CBRNDC, presentation to Fullbright Symposium 2004, Brisbane, 5-7 July 2004. Personal conversation with Dr. Simon Oldfield, Head CBRNDC, Canberra, 16 July 2005. 195 Several appointments with Human Protection and Performance Division advertised between July 2005 and October 2006 included, in the associated job descriptions, duties supporting domestic response to CBRN incidents. One advertised in June 2006 was for a ‘Senior Research Scientist, Civilian Counter-Terrorism’ (DSTO Position Number 00519721). Job descriptions were supplied to the author by DSTO. Personal conversation with Dr. Simon Oldfield, Head, Human Protection and Performance Division, 12 December 2006.

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A second TAG, TAG East, lodged within the 4th Battalion, Royal Australian

Regiment (Commando) at Holsworthy in western Sydney.

An Incident Response Regiment, grown from the post-JIRU CBRR Squadron.

This is also located at Holsworthy. The IRR provides the national high-end

CBRNR capability, including consequence management, as well as a limited

capability for urban search and rescue (USAR).

Six Reserve Response Force (RRF) companies, each of 156 personnel. RRF

companies are based in all capitals except Canberra, Brisbane and Darwin, which

are covered either by a second company in Sydney (Canberra) or Regular units

(Darwin and Brisbane). Companies are available at 28 days notice for simple

security support tasks such as operational search.196,197

The ADF counter-terrorism force continues to include a Black Hawk helicopter squadron,

which is to re-locate to Sydney in 2006, as well as the national SUR, counter terrorism

liaison and classified technical support capabilities. The command and control capacity

of the force has been enhanced by the creation of SOCOMD. The creation of a second

TAG significantly shortens the response time for an incident on the eastern seaboard and

provides a capability to respond to two incidents simultaneously.198 In summary, the

enhancements to ADF counter-terrorism capabilities have provided a much more robust

capacity to support the response and recovery mission for homeland security.

By contrast, the response capability represented by ADF IEDD teams acting in a DACC

role appears to be declining in importance except when required for surge support to

major events. Despite an apparent decline in demand for IEDD support from civilian

agencies, the ADO is maintaining its ‘domestic’ IEDD capability. ADF IEDD response

capacity may even be increasing slightly, if only in a quantitative sense, as a result of the

RAAF’s acquisition of an IEDD capability in order to, inter alia, ‘support Australian

civil police in the non-operational environment within existing resources.’199 This does

196 Brigadier Keith Jobson, ‘The Reserve Response Force,’ 2004. 197 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 53. 198 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 53. 199 Defence Instruction (Air Force) Operations 3/2005 dated 11 April 2005, sub-paragraph. 1.b.

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not constitute a structural change to accommodate a homeland security mission, but is an

incidental application of a capability acquired for operational reasons.200

The ADF would remain available for DACC response and recovery support to

consequence management (CM) following terrorist attacks or natural disasters.

Missions with no involvement

As in the pre-9/11 period, there remain some homeland security missions identified in the

AHSRC model in which the ADO has no involvement:

9. Business & community engagement. There is still no direct ADO

involvement in this mission, although the ‘soft’ involvement of ex-ADO

personnel in business or the community may be expanding.

12. Cargo & people screening.

14. Quarantine & biosecurity.

17. Land transport.

18. Hazardous material transport & storage.

Enabling functions

ADO support to homeland security enabling functions in the post-9/11 period has

continued to focus on the People, Technology and Partnerships functions.

People. The ADO’s principle contribution to the People enabling function continues to

be through the influence of its ‘diaspora.’ The influence of this ‘soft’ form of

involvement in homeland security may be growing. Post 9/11 appointments to important

homeland security posts within the government, as well as recruitment by homeland

security-related firms in industry, has featured a number of ex-ADO people with scarce

skills and experience relevant to homeland security. Australia’s reliance on ADO skills

200 Personal conversation with Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston, Chief of Defence Force (and former Chief of Air Force), Canberra, 15 July 2005.

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for homeland security functions may be increasing. This is indicated by the ‘penetration’

of ex-ADO people into non-Defence areas of the homeland security ‘community’ that is

shown in Appendix 3. In some cases, ex-Defence people have displaced ex-police

officers as the traditional preferred source for recruitment to senior security

appointments.201 The historical preference for policing experience in private sector

security staff reflects a view of security as a profitability preservation function. Such an

approach will give priority to security against the greatest risks to profits. These have

usually been things such as fraud and theft and the prevention of these leads naturally to

the selection of security staff with a law enforcement background.

Since 9/11, firms have had to contemplate the effect on profitability of terrorist attacks.

Under these new threats, the emphasis on security changes to things such as intelligence

and physical protection. The skills required for this approach tend to be found in military

people with intelligence or operations backgrounds.202

A secondary factor influencing the choice of ex-military security personnel by larger

firms may have been a perceived new government direction in staffing the new national

security apparatus. For example, the appointment of Duncan Lewis to a senior position

in the new National Security Division of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet

(PM&C) may have been interpreted as an indicator that ex-military people might start to

dominate in government security circles. Given the well-understood value of personal

networks to the winning of information and business from government, firms may

therefore have sought people with credible military backgrounds in the interests of

remaining competitive.203

Large companies with international interests also appreciate people with the ability to

make a mature risk assessment that can secure profitability. For example, to a company

201 Personal conversation with Mr. Lester Sutton, Strategic Adviser, Security Solutions, Honeywell Australia, 13 December 2006. 202 Personal conversation with Mr. Lester Sutton, Strategic Adviser, Security Solutions, Honeywell Australia, 13 December 2006. 203 Personal conversation with Mr. Lester Sutton, Strategic Adviser, Security Solutions, Honeywell Australia, 13 December 2006.

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like QANTAS, the ability to accurately assess whether an event such as the 2006 coup in

Thailand posed a threat to its operations is worth millions. In that case, an incorrect

assessment would have led to large losses by either exposing passengers and aircraft to

injury and damage, or by unnecessarily cancelling services with the associated loss of

revenue and good will. Such assessments require experience and skill in strategic

intelligence analysis with a specific security focus and are aided by personal networks in

national intelligence circles. This tends to favour ex-Government, and especially ex-

defence, intelligence professionals.204

The longevity of this apparent preference for ex-ADO security professionals is difficult to

predict, for two reasons. First, the experience, skills and training capacity of civilian

organisations appear to be growing. The number of people with non-Defence

backgrounds who are competent in contemporary homeland security functions is,

therefore, probably increasing. Conceivably, civilian agencies could achieve the ‘critical

mass’ needed to generate sufficient suitably qualified and experienced personnel without

resorting to recruitment from Defence.

Second, the lack of major terrorist attacks against commercial interests in Western

homelands since 9/11 could cause companies to reassess their security interests along

more traditional lines, returning to the historical emphasis on crime. If this occurs, the

experience profiles of security staff could be expected to swing back to the law

enforcement sector.205

Technology. Support to the Technology function is manifest mostly through DSTO’s

involvement in homeland security S&T. The most obvious contribution is the unique

capabilities of the CBRNDC: for example, through its provision of smart buyer advice to

civilian agencies acquiring technical CBRN response equipment. The CBRNDC is also

contributing to the development of national CBR-related forensic and health capabilities.

204 Personal conversation with Mr. Lester Sutton, Strategic Adviser, Security Solutions, Honeywell Australia, 13 December 2006. 205 Personal conversation with Mr. Lester Sutton, Strategic Adviser, Security Solutions, Honeywell Australia, 13 December 2006.

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A more subtle DSTO contribution is in assisting the development of a ‘research and

development (R&D) culture’ in civilian agencies. As much of its military effectiveness

depends on high-technology capabilities with lengthy development and acquisition lead-

times, Defence is accustomed to pursuing novel technological solutions to its capability

requirements and to making the necessary investments in relatively long-term S&T

efforts. As a result, the ADO has evolved sophisticated S&T processes and capabilities –

the very existence of DSTO as an in-house R&D agency reflects this. The ADO, in other

words, has a ‘R&D culture,’ at least in the way it pursues solutions to capability

deficiencies.206 Many of the civilian agencies involved in homeland security missions do

not have such a culture, but the demands of the post-9/11 environment are generating

pressures for them to develop one. The government’s creation of a Safeguarding

Australia national research priority and establishment of a Science, Engineering and

Technology Unit (SETU) within the NSD (PM&C) recognises this need.207 The

appointment of a senior DSTO scientist as the SETU’s Head208 recognises DSTO’s

expertise in S&T coordination.

Partnerships. Under the Partnerships function, the ADO has contributed to other

agencies’ capability development by performing a benchmarking function in some key

areas. A good example of this effect is reflected in the New South Wales’ relatively

rapid development of sophisticated response and recovery capabilities since 9/11.

New South Wales has enjoyed a significant advantage over the other jurisdictions in its

post-9/11 capability development because of the large investment it made in preparing for

the Sydney 2000 Games. The ADO’s provision of certain high-end capabilities for the

Games provided New South Wales with another advantage in its subsequent capability

development, by accomplishing in advance much of the time-consuming ‘trial and error’

work, such as equipment sourcing and trials, training development and procedure

refinement. The ADO support also gave New South Wales agencies extensive exposure

to elaborate ADO capabilities, especially those of the TAG (special recovery) and JIRU

(CBRR and THRS). Although the agencies were not pursuing those capabilities at the

206 Personal conversation with Dr. Roger Lough, Chief Defence Scientist, Canberra, 21 July 2005. 207 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 47.

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time, this allowed them to visualise benchmarks and to understand arcane aspects of

them.209

The insight into capability possibilities provided by exposure to ADO assets and

techniques has enabled New South Wales agencies to focus their capability development

efforts efficiently and to make informed decisions on capability acquisition.210 The

decision to locate the post-Games ADO capabilities (CBRR Squadron/IRU/IRR and TAG

East) at Holsworthy has also facilitated the maintenance of partnerships with New South

agencies, as demonstrated by the development of a joint urban search and rescue (USAR)

training facility at the Holsworthy Army base.211 The significance of the ADO’s

benchmarking function in these areas, however, must be balanced by its decline in others,

such as IEDD.

The provision of intelligence analyst training to civilian police personnel, described

above, is another example of an ADO contribution to the Partnerships function.

Analysis of Post-9/11 Involvement

The characteristics of ADO involvement in homeland security missions post-9/11 are

discussed below.

Trigger events

The trigger event phenomenon observed pre-9/11 appears to have continued in the

subsequent period, although 9/11 itself constitutes a distinct category of event with a

much more significant impact on homeland security settings than any previous one. The

extraordinary importance of 9/11 is acknowledged as such in policy documents.212

208 This was Dr. Lynn Booth, Head, Science, Engineering and Technology Unit. 209 Personal conversations with Deputy Commissioner Andrew Scipione, NSWPS, Sydney, 17 February 2005; and Chief Superintendent Jim Hamilton, Assistant Director, Specialised Operations, NSW Fire Brigades, Sydney, 6 April 2005. 210 ‘…we would never have thought of that (in relation to an aspect of advanced CBRR training developed by the JIRU CBRR Squadron),’Chief Superintendent Jim Hamilton, NSWFB, 17 February 2005. 211 Phillip Ruddock, ‘NSW Exercise to Test Terrorism Response Capability,’ Ministerial Media Release 083/2004, 28 May 2004. 212 ‘The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks led to a fundamental shift in our understanding of the global security climate, and brought home the changed character of the terrorist threat.’ Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 6.

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Government behaviour, in implementing changes to national security arrangements of

unprecedented swiftness and scope, confirms this assessment. Previous trigger events

had stimulated only incremental and episodic change and governments appeared to enjoy

reasonable discretion in responding to them. In contrast, the changes stimulated by 9/11

have been bold, extensive and sustained and adjustments in response to subsequent

stimuli have been made much more quickly. 9/11 therefore represents a threshold

between two fundamentally different conceptualisations of Australia’s homeland security

needs.

To accommodate this new development, the hypothetical trigger event effect must be

modified by the addition of a second category of causal event - the ‘threshold’ event -

which re-calibrates homeland security settings. After a threshold event, trigger events

can continue to occur, but these are likely to be different both in terms of what constitutes

them and the responses that they stimulate.

Post-9/11 trigger events have differed from previous ones in that their periodicity has

reduced. If 9/11 itself is taken as the ‘threshold event’ of this era, then the 2002 Bali

bombing was the first subsequent trigger event, coming little more than a year later.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States and subsequently in Bali on 12 October 2002 have introduced new uncertainties to Australia’s security environment. 213

Bali qualifies as a trigger event because of its effect in prompting further adjustments to

security arrangements. It also involved the ADO directly, through the provision of aero-

medical evacuation support. Although the raising of Tactical Assault Group - East and

the IRR had already been announced, the creation of SOCOMD on 19 December 2002

was clearly triggered by the Bali bombing.214

The 2004 attack on Australia’s Jakarta Embassy followed barely two years after Bali.

Although not a trigger event in the sense that it prompted a distinct set of adjustments to

security arrangements or the development of new capabilities, the Jakarta bombing

213 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. vii. (my emphasis) 214 Personal conversation with Colonel Jeremy Logan, Colonel (CT) Headquarters Special Operations/SOCOMD 2003-2004, Canberra, 11 August 2005.

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qualifies as a ‘sustaining event,’ as identified in Chapter 4, in that it may have served to

prevent any ‘winding back’ of national commitment to homeland security measures. A

consequent impact on the ADO was to sustain its involvement in homeland security.

CHOGM 2002 and the Rugby World Cup in 2003, while not involving terrorist action,

were also sustaining events, as they may have had a similar effect in maintaining

government’s homeland security focus and the ADO’s involvement. The July 2005

attacks on the London transport network, the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games

and APEC 2007 have or will to continue this effect. The London attacks prompted

reviews of security plans for the Melbourne 2006 Games, along with other measures.215

The post-9/11 trigger events are similar to the ‘inaugural’ one in 1978, in that they

credibly convey a threat to the Australian homeland that is difficult to ignore and that

tends to demand a government response. The horrific nature of the 9/11 attacks

themselves, the proximity of the subsequent ones in Bali and Jakarta and their obvious

effects on Australia and Australians tend to discourage the historical Australian tendency

to marginalise the importance of overseas developments, while the relatively constant

burden of international events and their associated security requirements (and

expectations) requires the maintenance of substantial security capabilities. Given that the

stakes in the post-9/11 era are somewhat higher (both in terms of the threat and

international expectations), there seems little likelihood that government expectations of

ADO involvement in homeland security missions will decrease.

A further variation on the trigger event effect is the ‘residual’ effect generated by the

Sydney 2000 Games. The Games left Australia in an excellent position from which to

further enhance capabilities post-9/11 by stimulating unprecedented and extensive

capability development, providing a basis for further improvements:

215 Mark Phillips and Heather Gallagher, ‘Games security review,’ AAP, 8 July 2005, [cited 8 July 2005]. Available from http://www.news.com.au/story/print/0,10119,15862829,00.html; ‘Comm Games security safe,’ AAP, 8 July 2005, [cited 8 July 2005]. Available from http://www.news.com.au/story/print/0,10119,15861663,00.html; ‘Games security tight: Hill,’ AAP, 20 August 2005,[cited 14 July 2005]. Available from http://www.news.com.au/story/print/0,10119,15925676,00.html; ‘Trust us on Games security: Bracks,’ AAP, 20 August 2005, [cited 20 August 2005]. Available from http://www.news.com.au/story/print/0,10119,16324002,00.html.

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…the Olympic experience placed the ADF in a strong position from which to segue to a new post-11 September 2001 security environment…216

The Games established new capability benchmarks to lead development and by which to

gauge shortfalls and forced the establishment of functional relationships between

security agencies. 217

Given that the capability enhancements achieved for the 2000 Games were ‘expectation

driven,’ rather than ‘threat driven,’ much of Australia’s current preparedness is more

accurately attributed to the serendipitous effects of Sydney winning the privilege of

hosting the Olympics than to any strategic prescience by security decision-makers.

Unique national capability

The ‘unique national capability effect’ also appears to hold in the post-9/11 environment,

with the ADO continuing to maintain homeland security capabilities that are unique both

quantitatively and qualitatively. The composition of the capability set, however, has

changed somewhat. Some skills, such as domestic IEDD, have declined in importance

due to increases in Police capabilities (despite a resurgence in ADO interest in IEDs

because of experience in Iraq and Afghanistan). Other capabilities, such as fighter DCA,

have been added. There continue to be areas, such as the Patrol Boat FEG, where

government directs the ADO to maintain capabilities specifically for homeland security.

Pre-existing ‘like’ capability

The ADO continues to fulfill homeland security roles in areas in which its ‘normal’

military capabilities are similar to those needed for a particular homeland security

mission. Although these contributions will always be assessed as requirements arise, the

‘standing’ set of relevant capabilities has grown in the post-9/11 period. New capabilities

216 Major General Duncan Lewis, ‘Guarding Australians Against Terrorism,’ Australian Army Journal, Vol. 1 No. 2, December 2003, p. 47. 217 Personal conversations with Deputy Commissioner Andrew Scipione, NSWPS, Sydney, 17 February 2005; and Chief Superintendent Jim Hamilton, Assistant Director, Specialised Operations, NSW Fire Brigades, Sydney, 6 April 2005.

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include aero-medical evacuation for mass burns situations or overseas terrorist incidents

involving Australians and the provision of DCA cover for special events. 218

High risk

The importance of this category of missions has, if anything, increased in the post-9/11

period due to the heightened national awareness of threats to the homeland and

consequently greater expectations of government effectiveness in protecting Australia

against them. In this environment, the relative certainty that the ADO will deliver a

particular effect if tasked to do so will make its employment in high risk situations

attractive to governments.

Intelligence contributions

The ADO’s contribution to national intelligence is understandably difficult to gauge from

open sources, but all available indications are that the ADO’s role post-9/11 homeland

security intelligence efforts are significant, and greater than prior to 9/11.219 The three

Defence intelligence bodies are firmly entrenched in the AIC and their contributions are

acknowledged in government policy documents, which also state that each has been

allocated additional resources to better support national counter-terrorism intelligence

requirements:

The biggest change has been in intelligence. The Defence intelligence agencies now have a much greater emphasis on homeland security-related work. You’ll appreciate that, in organisations like the DSD, Defence has a unique, national capability that has to be available to meet national needs. Those sorts of specialist intelligence capabilities should be available for homeland security tasking, if necessary.220

Defence also contributes to national intelligence capabilities by providing training for

civilian intelligence analysts.

218 Personal conversation with Mr. Mark Ablong, Assistant Secretary Strategic Policy, Canberra, 22 April 2005. 219 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, pp. 23-4; 220 Personal conversation with Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston, Chief of Defence Force, Canberra, 15 July 2005.

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Summary of ADO Involvement in Australia’s Homeland Security Post-9/11

To summarise, ADO involvement in homeland security missions post-9/11 occurs in a

much more whole of government environment than previously. Many more agencies

now play an active role in Australia’s homeland security. As a result, the relative

importance of some ADO contributions may have declined.

Notwithstanding this, ADO involvement in homeland security has increased overall.

This increase is reflected in, inter alia, structural changes to increase the ADO’s capacity

to support homeland security missions. In some cases, these changes constitute

optimisation for homeland security tasks, as distinct from warfighting. A comparison of

pre- and post-9/11 ADO involvement in homeland security is at Table 3. This is

measured in terms of provision for homeland security roles in the form of force structure

(eg, military units with homeland security roles); staff and policy making capacity;

science and technology capacity; standing plans for domestic security roles; doctrine; and

education and training. In every category except for the patronage of EMA, ADO

involvement has increased. Such a comprehensive increase supports the identification of

9/11 as a threshold event, after which the employment of the ADO in homeland security

roles was fundamentally different. This also provides evidence that the ADO’s

engagement in homeland security roles is increasing, although that evidence is

insufficient to conclude that the wider ADO has yet fully embraced homeland security as

core business.

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Capability Pre-9/11 9/11 Until 2006 Crisis and Consequence Management:

Tactical Assault Groups 1 2 CBR Response Elements 1 Squadron

(c. 80 personnel) 1 Regiment

(c. 300 personnel) Reserve Response Forces 0 6

Science and Technology CBRN for Domestic Preparedness

1 Research Task within a DSTO Research Area

1 Section within a DSTO CBRND

Division Higher Defence Staff Arrangements

Emergency Management Australia Branches

1 0

Domestic Security Policy Staff Sections

0 1

Counter-IED Task Forces 0 1 ADF secondees to PM&C National Security Division

0 1

Standing Plans for Domestic Security Responses

Special Recovery 1 1 Domestic Defensive Counter-Air 0 1 CBRN Consequence Management

0 1

Doctrine Doctrine for Domestic Event Support Operations

0 Under development

Education and Training Terrorism-related ADFA courses 0 2

Table 3 - Pre- and post-9/11 ADO provision for homeland security.

All ADF services and many civilian branches of the ADO have been involved in

homeland security roles since 9/11, although the RAN, Army and DSTO have born the

brunt of the structural changes. The RAAF has made no structural changes, but has made

unprecedented contributions of unique capabilities, such as fighter DCA. Both Regular

and Reserve ADF personnel have been involved, with the Army’s structural changes

including the creation of regional Reserve elements specifically for homeland security

tasks.

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The trigger events that have led historically to changes in the ADO’s homeland security

roles may be occurring more frequently since 9/11, while special events requiring ADO

security support are definitely programmed more often into the foreseeable future.

Combined with a generally higher level of perceived threat, this may indicate a lowering

of the threshold for ADO involvement in homeland security tasks. The next chapter

analyses the reasons for the post-9/11 pattern of ADO involvement in those tasks.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

FACTORS LEADING TO THE POST-9/11 STATUS QUO

The preceding chapter detailed the ADO’s contributions to a range of homeland security

missions since 11 September, 2001. This chapter analyses the factors that led to that

pattern of involvement and the reasons why it may have changed from the one that

operated pre-9/11. For consistency in analytical approach, causal factors will be

considered in the same three categories established in Chapter Five (legal, political and

managerial factors). To provide a basis for assessing the relative importance of ADO

contributions to Australia’s homeland security arrangements, compared with those from

other sources, this chapter includes cases studies of New South Wales’ development of

counter terrorism capabilities since 9/11, and of the IRR’s contribution to national

CBRNR arrangements.

Legal factors

Australian governments’ responses to the post-9/11 security environment have involved a

number of changes to legislation aimed at improving national security, especially in

relation to terrorist threats to the homeland.1 Changes have been made at both federal

and state levels. For the constitutional reasons explained in Chapter Five, only changes

to federal legislation would impact the employment of the ADO in homeland security

roles.

Post-9/11, no changes have been made to the Constitution that would affect the

employment of the ADO in homeland security, but the amendments to the Defence Act

made under the Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Bill 2005

are extensive. Other substantial changes to federal legislation have focused on

addressing the threat of terrorism to Australia through:

1 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. ix.

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The Federal Criminal Code. Changes to the Federal Criminal Code have

criminalised specific activities that might constitute or facilitate terrorism, allowing

substantial penalties for those offences. Amendments to the Criminal Code Act 1995

were enacted to create terrorism and terrorist organisations offences (Part 5.3);

terrorist bombing offences (Division 72) and offences against Australians overseas

(Part 5.4).2 These provisions apply to both individuals and organisations.3

Intelligence and investigation. New legislation has enhanced the powers of law

enforcement and intelligence agencies to investigate terrorist activity. This includes

allowing intelligence organisations, such as ASIO, greater powers to collect

information. These include contentious powers to detain persons for questioning,

without charging them, for longer periods than previously allowable: an amendment

to the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, Part III, Division 3,

expands ASIO questioning and detention powers.4 Some state and territory

jurisdictions have passed or proposed similar laws. For example, Victoria passed

some legislation in preparation in preparation for the Melbourne 2006

Commonwealth Games and has proposed further new laws to ‘allow police…to stop

and search people and vehicles, demand identification, seize goods and cordon off

areas …’5 A proposal for significantly increased police and intelligence-related

counter-terrorism powers was a principal item on the agenda of the 27 September

2005 COAG meeting.6

Security regulation. Post-9/11 legislation has also addressed security practices

within Australia, raising standards in a number of areas and introducing measures to

enforce compliance with those standards. Examples include protection standards in

the maritime and aviation industries as well as border protection measures.7,8 The

Commonwealth has also coordinated a review and tightening of state-controlled

2 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 19. 3 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. ix. 4 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 19. 5 Michael Bachelard, ‘Police given new powers to combat terror,’ The Australian, 21 September 2005, p. 4. 6 John Kerin, ‘Terror squads for airports,’ The Australian, 22 September 2005, p. 1. 7 For example, the Maritime Transport Security Act 2003 and the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004.

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regulations relevant to terrorism. An example is a review of requirements for the

security of hazardous substances, such as ammonium nitrate: ‘In December 2002

COAG agreed to a national review of the regulation, reporting and security around

the storage sale and handling of hazardous materials.’9 The recommendations of

that review included the implementation of a licensing permit system for access to

ammonium nitrate.10

As the foregoing summary shows, the post-9/11 changes to ‘domestic’ legislation

relevant to homeland security contain no provisions that would alter a Commonwealth

government’s discretion in the use of the ADO in homeland security roles, relative to the

pre-9/11 situation. A potential impact of the new legislation is that, by creating a more

legally ‘demanding’ security environment, situations in which state or territory security

requirements outstrip their resources could occur more often, with a consequent increase

in the frequency of requests for Commonwealth support. For example, the debate about

sourcing of additional police resources for major airports generated by Sir John

Wheeler’s 2005 Aviation Security Review has included suggestions from some states that

the Commonwealth should take over the airport security function, as the new demands

now exceed states’ capacity. For example, South Australian Premier Mike Rann has

asserted that the Commonwealth Government is wholly responsible for airport security,

even at regional airports.11 This effect has yet to be demonstrated in an increased ADO

involvement in homeland security.

Although legal factors have not affected the post-9/11 employment of the ADO in

homeland security roles on Australian territory, there has been considerable debate about

the legality of ADF involvement in military operations in Iraq support of the ICAT.12

8 Through amendments to the Customs Act 1901 and the Migration Act 1958. 9 ‘COAG Review of Hazardous Materials,’ AGCTPC Meeting 8 April 2004, Agenda Item 16. 10 ‘COAG Review of Hazardous Materials,’ AGCTPC Meeting 8 April 2004, Agenda Item 16. 11 News: Regional airport security needed (Media Release) Adelaide: Government of South Australia, 15 August 2006. 12 Debate was most intense at the time of the invasion and has abated somewhat since, although many opinions are still voiced about its enduring illegality. It is difficult to cite a single source that demonstrates easily the extent of the debate, but Andrew Byrnes’ paper. "Law, Lawyers and Lattes: The (Ir)relevance of the Chattering Classes at a Time of Insecurity" gives a sense of it. Paper presented at the Law Week Lecture, Canberra 2006.

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Despite the significant legal uncertainty involved, the Australian Government decided

that an ADF contribution to operations in Iraq was in Australia’s interest, making

Australia one of very few members of the initial ‘coalition of the willing’ to commit

troops to the invasion. ADO involvement in Iraq has been sustained, and even slightly

increased, since the initial invasion despite its growing unpopularity and continuing

debate about its wisdom.13

It is beyond the scope of this study to judge the merits of Australia’s involvement in Iraq.

The fact that the Australian Government decided as it did in the face of some legal risk,

however, suggests that one characteristic of the pre-9/11 factors affecting ADO

involvement in homeland security missions persists in the post-9/11 environment. This is

that legal considerations have not significantly influenced government decisions on the

use of the ADO in homeland security missions. In the absence of evidence that legal

factors have significantly influenced the post-9/11 involvement of the ADO in homeland

security roles, other factors must be investigated.

Political and Managerial Factors

Accepting the above conclusion that, in the post-9/11 environment, the law continues to

allow Commonwealth Governments broad discretion in the employment of the ADO in

homeland security missions, it seems likely that, as in the pre-9/11 era, political and

managerial factors have determined the use of that discretion. This section will return to

the methodology used in Chapter Three to analyse the ADO’s post-9/11 involvement in

homeland security to identify those factors.

Responsibilities and expectations

Government responsibilities for Australia’s homeland security, as prescribed in the

Constitution, have not changed since 9/11. The substantial changes that have occurred in

13 The unpopularity of the Australia’s commitment increased from 2004 to 2006, with 13% more Australians believing in April 2006 that Australia should not have a military presence there. Morgan. Finding No. 4015: Support For Australian Presence In Iraq At All-Time Low Roy Morgan International, 2006 [cited 14 April 2007]. Available from http://www.roymorgan.com/news/polls/2006/4015/.

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Australia’s homeland security arrangements in the post-9/11 period, however, suggest

that governments’ appreciation of those responsibilities and attention to them have

increased. To the extent that the ADO provides means by which government

responsibilities can be met, such changes are likely to influence the employment of the

ADO in homeland security roles.

Predictably, Australian Government statements since 9/11 consistently reaffirm its

responsibility and commitment to protect Australia, its people and interests.

The primary responsibility of the Australian Government is to protect Australia, its people and its interests. 14 The government is committed to dedicating the resources necessary to defend Australia and its global interests…National security is higher on the Australian Government’s policy agenda than it has been for decades.15

State and territory governments have made similar statements. Greater government

attention to homeland security requirements is a logical consequence of heightened threat

perceptions generated by recent terrorist attacks:

The attacks in Bali on 12 October 2002 brought home the message that Australians are as vulnerable to terrorism as anyone.16

Threat perceptions are discussed in more detail separately. In the post-9/11 environment,

however, it is reasonable to presume that governments have acquired a heightened

appreciation of ‘where the (security) buck stops.’

In attending to their homeland security responsibilities, governments have been

encouraged by increased expectations on the part of their domestic ‘audience.’ The rise in

popular expectations is itself largely attributable to threat perceptions, but is partly due to

a better public understanding of the complexity of the homeland security problem. That

understanding has been fed by media attention to homeland security matters and by

14 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. vii. 15 Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia 2004, pp. xvi, 5.

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political debate on policy approaches. Governments may also have deliberately played

up those expectations.17 In the post-9/11 environment, therefore, governments are not

only more keenly aware of their homeland security responsibilities, but their constituents

are better informed on the details of those responsibilities.

International expectations of government performance in homeland security have also

increased since 9/11. The experience of the Athens 2004 Olympic Games illustrates this:

security for the 2004 Games cost at least US$1.5 billion, compared with approximately

$400 million and $150 million for the Sydney and Atlanta Games, respectively, in the

pre-9/11 period.18 The cost of security for the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games

has not yet been finalised, but open source estimates average $160 million – this is

significant for an event that involved less than half the facilities, people or television

audience of an Olympics.19 Much of the cost increase is attributable to the security

measures needed to satisfy the post-9/11 expectations of the international community. As

an illustration of international expectations, the United States’ request for ADF support

for the visit to Australia of President Bush in October 2003 included fighter DCA, a

TAG, and a CBRR element.20 The effect of these expectations on Australian government

security decisions has been compounded by the increased frequency of major

international events in Australia post-9/11.

In this environment, the Australian Government is not only more aware of its

responsibility, but it has sought more. By aggressively adopting a policy of central

leadership for Australia’s counter-terrorism efforts, the Commonwealth has increased its

involvement in homeland security matters. Examples of this are the re-vitalisation of the

16 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. v. 17 See Louis A. Delvoie, "Terrorism: Global Insecurity or Global Hyperbole," Canadian Military Journal 6, no. 4 (2006), pp. 103-4. Also George Williams, "The Law on Terror," UNSWorld, no. 5 (2006), pp. 10-11. 18 Cohn, Laura. For London, What Price Olympic Security? 15 August 2005 [cited 17 January 2006]. Available from http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_33/b3947076_mz054.htm. Jacquelin Magnay, ‘Shoring up the Games,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 22 May 2004. 19 Michael Warner and Shaun Phillips, ‘City’s Games lockdown on,’ Herald Sun, 21 September 2005, p. 2; Katrina Strickland and Glenda Korporaal, ‘Inside the Games Plan,’ The Australian, 15 September 2005, p.9; Mark Phillips and Heather Gallagher, ‘Games security review,’ AAP, 8 July 2005, [cited 8 July 2005]. Available from http://www.news.com.au/story/print/0,10119,15862829,00.html.

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national security architecture, the establishment of the NCTC, the development of the

NCTP, and the brokering of the agreement for Commonwealth leadership in a NTS. The

Australian Government’s post-9/11 behaviour, therefore, indicates that it has deliberately

taken on the mantle of responsibility for homeland security, or at least for those aspects

of it involved with counter-terrorism.

State and territory governments have also demonstrated a heightened awareness of their

homeland security responsibilities post-9/11. All jurisdictions have increased their

counter-terrorism preparedness, response and recovery capabilities, in some cases

significantly. The greatest capability development has been undertaken by New South

Wales: That state’s capability therefore provides the best baseline for comparison with

ADO capabilities and, to support that comparison, a detailed case study of New South

Wales’ arrangements follows later in this Chapter. The increase in state capabilities has

influenced expectations of the Commonwealth’s contribution to some homeland security

missions by reducing the difference between capabilities maintained routinely by the

states and those required in extremis. It has also provided state jurisdictions with

alternative sources of additional capability to meet surge requirements – instead of

turning automatically to the Commonwealth (and the ADF) for additional resources,

states can now draw on the increased capabilities of other states. This influenced

preparations for the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games21 and is observable in

contingency planning for major incidents22 and in the name of one of the types of

exercises in the post-9/11 national exercise program – the Multi-Jurisdictional Exercise,

or MJEX.23 Increased inter-jurisdictional support of this type may represent an

improvement in Australian practice since 9/11, in that the use of civilian responders,

20 Senator Robert Hill, response to Senator Chris Evans (Question No. 2322), Senate Hansard, 1 December 2003, p. 18597. 21 Personal conversation with Commander Brendan Bannan, 2006 Commonwealth Games Planning Office, Victoria Police, 12 April 2006. 22 Personal conversations with Mr. Paul de Graaff, Assistant Secretary Counter-Terrorism, PSCC, Canberra, 26 July 2005; Mr. Lindsay Hansch, PSCC, Canberra, 8 July 2005; and Chief Superintendent Jim Hamilton, Assistant Director Specialised Operations, NSW Fire Brigades, Sydney, 6 April 2005. 23 Protective Security Coordination Centre Website, Attorney General's Department, 2006 [cited 17 January 2006]. Available from http://www.crimeprevention.gov.au/agd/WWW/protectivesecurityhome.nsf/Page/Latest_News.

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albeit from other jurisdictions, is likely to be preferable to the use of ADF personnel in

civilian situations.24

Despite the capability enhancement undertaken by most states and territories, there is

nevertheless evidence that their expectations of ADO contributions to their homeland

security have increased. For example, the government of Victoria, which lost all locally

based Regular Army combat units by 1999,25 has recently suggested that elements

including ‘Black Hawk helicopters, naval destroyers and SAS forces’ should be returned

in order to better support its homeland security requirements.26 These capabilities are

similar to the counter-terrorism-related ones established by the Commonwealth

Government in response to the post-9/11 terrorist threat, suggesting that the Victorian

Government appreciates the significance of the ‘delta’ between its capabilities and those

offered by the ADO:

To have a presence here would …assist in our capacity to secure our state more ably.27

This has implications for the resource aspects of homeland security decisions, discussed

later.

The impact of government responsibilities and expectations on the involvement of the

ADO in homeland security post-9/11 is illustrated by government behaviour. In

establishing the concept of a NTS, the Commonwealth Government accepted

responsibility for managing the most serious types of terrorist incidents: by doubling the

ADO’s capacity to respond to terrorist crises, the government provided itself with the

24 Personal conversation with Commander Brendan Bannan, 2006 Commonwealth Games Planning Office, Victoria Police, 12 April 2006. 25 The last two Regular combat or combat support units based in Victoria were the 1st Armoured Regiment (equipped with tanks) and 21st Construction Squadron (an Army engineer unit), both based at Puckapunyal. The Armoured Regiment moved to Darwin in 1999, while the Engineers moved to Brisbane in 1992. The remaining Regular Army field force presence in Victoria consists of Signals units and a Transport Squadron. RAN and RAAF have no combat aircraft or vessels based in Victoria. Defence Annual Reports 1989-1999, 2003-2004, pp. 445-55. 26 Farrah Tomazin and Orietta Guerrera, ‘Station big guns down here: Bracks,’ The Age, 22 September 2005, p. 2.

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means to manage those incidents. This suggests that the government appreciates and

accepts its responsibility for homeland security, intends to respond effectively to a

terrorist attack on Australia and will tolerate relatively little risk in developing and

maintaining response capabilities. It also indicates that the government understands the

limitations of state and territory capabilities and assesses that these will be inadequate for

the more serious terrorist attacks. Finally, by investing in highly visible homeland

security capabilities, the government may also be seeking to secure the party political

benefits of championing the war against terrorism.28 This latter point will be discussed

later under ‘national security theatre.’

Collectively, these deductions explain why the Commonwealth Government has

enhanced its own national domestic counter-terrorism capabilities to the extent that it has.

The deduction in relation to risk does most to explain the government’s decision to

establish a large proportion of those capabilities in the ADO rather than to lodge them in

other agencies. The government’s inability to accept risk in dealing with a homeland

security crisis forces it to adopt those capability options that involve the lowest risk. In

the case of sophisticated response capabilities involving demanding and highly perishable

skills, such as special recovery, the maintenance of the national capability within the

ADO represents the lowest risk option. An alternative would be to develop a

Commonwealth capability outside the ADO: special recovery could, for example, be

established within the AFP, which already maintains a modest special recovery capability

within the Specialist Response and Security Group of its ACT Police arm.29 The

resource and synergy aspects of this option are explored separately, but the risk involved

in rapidly developing an elaborate capability virtually ‘from scratch’ in a relatively small

organisation with little experience in that capability weighs heavily against this course of

action. The total strength of the AFP and Australian Protective Service is 4,989

personnel, of whom only about half are employed in the type of duties that might prepare

officers for selection for specialist training in demanding areas such as special recovery.

27 Steve Bracks, Premier of Victoria, as quoted in Tomazin and Guerrera, ‘Station big guns down here: Bracks,’ 2005, p. 2. , 28 Greg Sheridan, ‘Howard on target with the military,’ The Australian, 29 October 2005. 29 ACT Policing Annual Report 2001-02, Canberra, 2002, p. 46.

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This contrasts the ADF’s regular strength of 51,813.30 Given the challenges faced by the

ADF in sourcing suitable personnel for its Special Operations capabilities, the AFP

would probably struggle to staff a high-end national special recovery capability from

within its current strength.

The realities of the states’ and territories’ abilities to establish and maintain

comprehensive and sophisticated counter-terrorism capabilities are illustrated in the

following case study of New South Wales’ capabilities.

Case Study:

Development of New South Wales’ Counter Terrorism Capabilities Since 11 September 2001

All Australian states and territories have significantly enhanced their counter-terrorism

capabilities since 11 September 2001, in fulfillment of their primary responsibilities to

protect their own jurisdictions against domestic violence.31 The most substantial

improvement has occurred in New South Wales. This case study examines the

capabilities developed by New South Wales as a means of gauging the ‘delta’ between

the domestic security capabilities maintained by the states and territories and those

maintained by the Commonwealth. This will inform an assessment of the extent to which

maintaining a capability to protect Australia against threats of domestic violence has

influenced the employment of the ADO in homeland security roles since 9/11.

The methodology employed in this case study will be to:

characterise the post-9/11 capabilities of News South Wales agencies, focusing on

a specific set of homeland security mission areas to which the ADO also

contributes, and

30 Australian Federal Police Annual Report 2004-2005, Canberra: AFP, 2005, p.124. Defence Annual Report 2004-2005, Table 3.1. 31 As established in the Constitution, Sections 107 and 108.

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compare the post-9/11 New South Wales and ADO capabilities in those mission

areas.

The mission areas for which capabilities will be assessed are:

special recovery,

IEDD,

CBRNR,

maritime security, and

intelligence.

‘Start state.’ In preparation to host the Sydney 2000 Games, New South Wales invested

heavily in sophisticated domestic security capabilities. By virtue of their close

association with ADO and international elements involved in the Games’ security effort,

New South Wales Agencies also obtained excellent exposure to benchmarks for a range

of sophisticated capabilities. For example, News South Wales Police, Fire Brigades and

Ambulance Services worked closely with the ADF Joint Incident Response Unit (JIRU)

in relation to CBRN threats.32 As a result, New South Wales was at a significant

advantage over other jurisdictions in most capability areas and was well placed to

develop those capabilities further. In a radio interview in July 2005, New South Wales

Premier Bob Carr opined that the Sydney 2000 Olympics had provided the impetus for

the state’s counter-terrorism capability development and were the reason why New South

Wales now has ‘Australia’s best counter-terrorism capabilities.’33

32 Personnel conversations with Deputy Commissioner Andrew Scipione, NSWPS, Sydney, 17 February 2005; and Chief Superintendent Jim Hamilton, NSWFB, 6 April 2005. 33 Bob Carr, Premier of New South Wales, ABC 702 News, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 25 July 2005.

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New South Wales capabilities post-9/11

Structural responses. The New South Wales Government responded quickly to the

post-9/11 security challenges with significant and sustained investment in security

capabilities: as at February 2004, the NSW Government had committed over $30 million

to counter-terrorism equipment and facilities improvements within the Police, Health and

Emergency Services portfolios, as well as increases to operating budgets.34 The NSW

Government also re-organised relevant state agencies to better deal with the threat of

terrorism. Examples of structural adjustments made by New South Wales are:

State Government. The New South Wales Government has established a

Cabinet Counter Terrorism Committee, chaired by the Premier.35

New South Wales Police Service (NSWPS):

The establishment of a position of Assistant Commissioner (Counter

Terrorism).36,37

The establishment of a Counter Terrorist Coordination Command.38

The enhancement of tactical, investigative and intelligence capabilities, such

that 450 personnel are now involved ‘full time’ in counter terrorism-related

duties.39,40

34 Response to Question 1306 – Counter-Terrorism Responses (Mr. Debnam), NSW Parliament 18 February 2004. 35 Personal conversation with Assistant Commissioner Norm Hazzard, Assistant Commissioner (Counter Terrorism), NSWPS, Sydney, 24 June 2005. 36 Response to Question 1306 – Counter-Terrorism Responses (Mr. Debnam), NSW Parliament 18 February 2004, [cited 15 September 2005]. Available from http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/la/lapaper.nsf/0/46F3B14E81C3D88CA256e3d00261438. 37 This is Assistant Commissioner Norm Hazzard. ‘Counter Terrorism,’ NSWPS website, updated 17 September 2004 [cited 21 June 2005]. Available from http://www.police.nsw.gov.au/about_us/structure/support_command/counter-terrorism. 38 Response to Question 1306 – Counter-Terrorism Responses (Mr. Debnam), NSW Parliament 18 February 2004. 39 Response to Question 1306 – Counter-Terrorism Responses (Mr. Debnam), NSW Parliament 18 February 2004.

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New South Wales Fire Brigades (NSWFB). New South Wales Fire Brigades

has created a functional focus on counter terrorism, along with a position of

Director of Special Operations.

Special recovery. New South Wales’ special recovery capability has historically been

lodged in the Tactical Operations Unit of the State Protection Group (SPG).41 Post-9/11,

the resources of this unit have been increased such that it now has in the order of 60

personnel dedicated full-time to special recovery-related duties.42 An armoured vehicle

has also been procured for use in siege situations.43 These have also been enhanced with

the addition of a BK117 helicopter to the Police Air Wing. The BK117, which is shared

with the New South Wales Fire Brigades, provides the ability to insert a limited number

of SPG personnel into an incident site.44

Bomb management. NSWPS bomb management capabilities, consisting of improvised

explosive device disposal (IEDD) and search, have been enhanced since 9/11 by the

replacement of the obsolete Echidna remote positioning device (RPD – ‘bomb disposal

robot’) with the PSCC-procured TEODOR. New South Wales matched PSCC funding

for one TEODOR with additional funding for a second.45 New South Wales also

purchased a mobile explosive containment vessel (MECV) for safely transporting

suspected unstable explosive and CBR devices – apparently the only civilian jurisdiction

40 Personal conversation with Assistant Commissioner Norm Hazzard, Assistant Commissioner (Counter Terrorism), NSWPS, Sydney, 24 June 2005. 41 ‘Counter Terrorism,’ 2004, NSWPS website. Terminology used to describe various elements of the SPG has varied over time. The most recent terms are used here, for ease of reference. 42 Superintendent Peter Gillam, Commander SPG, stated in a television interview aired on 10 February 2005 that the SPG had 59 personnel trained for special recovery assault duties at that time. A Current Affair, Nine Network, 10 February 2005. 43 Response to Question 1306 – Counter-Terrorism Responses (Mr. Debnam), NSW Parliament 18 February 2004. 44 The BK117 is briefed by the NSW Government as an eight seat aircraft, although if configured for SPG insertion (such as by ‘fast roping’) it might be able to deliver fewer than this number of personnel. Response to Question 1306 – Counter-Terrorism Responses (Mr. Debnam), NSW Parliament 18 February 2004. 45 Personal conversation with Mr. Paul de Graaff, PSCC, Canberra, 26 July 2005.

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in Australia to have done so.46,47 The NSWPS has also significantly increased its

explosive detection dog (EDD) capability. There is no evidence that the NSWPS has yet

acquired a technical and high risk search (THRS) capability. The NSWPS website states

that SPG roles include ‘undertaking searches of premises in high risk situations,’ but this

is more likely to refer to evidentiary searches. No document refers specifically to high

risk bomb search and the open source photographic record shows no images of THRS

capabilities in use by the NSWPS.48

CBRNER. Since 2001, NSWFB has improved its ‘baseline’ CBRR capability by

distributing CBR agent detection and mass decontamination capabilities more widely

throughout the organisation. These include the additional CBRR equipment provided

through the Commonwealth Government’s CBR Enhancement Program, which began to

be fielded in NSW in September 2003.49 CBR elements have been introduced into basic

fireman training. USAR capabilities have also been significantly enhanced, with the

development of two complete USAR Task Forces based in Sydney and a further two

USAR response teams based in Newcastle and Wollongong.50 Development of the

USAR capability has been aided by the establishment at Holsworthy of a joint USAR

training facility in cooperation with the ADF (IRR).51 The state’s USAR capability

continues to grow, with the addition of further trained personnel announced in September

2005.52

46 Police reveal bomb containment device, ABC, 5 August 2004 [cited 12 December 2006]. Available from http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200408/s1169583.htm. 47 Response to Question 1306 – Counter-Terrorism Responses (Mr. Debnam), NSW Parliament 18 February 2004. 48 ‘Counter Terrorism,’ 2004, NSWPS website. 49 Daryl Williams, Commonwealth Attorney-General, ‘Strengthening Counter-Terrorism Capabilities in Victoria and New South Wales,’ (Ministerial Media Release), 23 September 2003. 50 Greg Mullins (Commissioner, NSWFB), ‘Urban Search and Rescue – developing Australia’s capability.’ The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 19, No. 1, March 2004, p. 7. 51 Philip Ruddock (Commonwealth Attorney-General), ‘NSW Exercise to Test Terrorism Response Capability,’ Ministerial Media Release 083/2004. 52 NSW Premier Morris Iemma, announced on 19 September 2005 that the USAR force would grow by an additional 75 personnel to a total of 260 (from all agencies) by July 2007. AAP, ‘Anti-terror ideas should be published,’ 19 September 2005 [cited 19 September 2005]. Available from http://www.news.com.au/story/print/0,10119,16650478,00.html.

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Ambulance and health capabilities for dealing with CBR incidents have also been

significantly improved, with a Counter Disaster Unit being established as a joint effort of

the State Department of Health and Ambulance Service.53 Dedicated CBR casualty

access and recovery capabilities within the Ambulance Service and preparations made at

major hospitals to handle contaminated patients. 54,55 CBR awareness training has also

been conducted widely within New South Wales health agencies: as at 18 February 2004,

700 staff had been trained in first response skills.56 A stockpile of pharmaceuticals

necessary for the management of a major biological agent incident has also been

established, in cooperation with EMA.57

On the technical side of CBRNER, a limited forensic laboratory capability for dealing

with CBR incidents has been established.58 New South Wales still lacks a dedicated

capability for diagnosing and rendering safe CBR dissemination devices. There is no

evidence of a capability to deal with a nuclear device.

Maritime security. While not traditionally a focus of state homeland security activity,

New South Wales has responded to the post-9/11 security environment by updating its

Water Police fleet and by acquiring a new vessel enabling a limited response up to 200

nautical miles offshore and another vessel dedicated to counter terrorism tasks.59,60 This

is a significant development, which gives New South Wales a capability unique among

the states.61,62

53 Response to Question 1306 – Counter-Terrorism Responses (Mr. Debnam), NSW Parliament 18 February 2004. 54 As at 18 February 2004, 36 personnel had been trained in these skills. Response to Question 1306 – Counter-Terrorism Responses (Mr. Debnam), NSW Parliament 18 February 2004. 55 Response to Question 1306 – Counter-Terrorism Responses (Mr. Debnam), NSW Parliament 18 February 2004. 56 Response to Question 1306 – Counter-Terrorism Responses (Mr. Debnam), NSW Parliament 18 February 2004. 57 Response to Question 1306 – Counter-Terrorism Responses (Mr. Debnam), NSW Parliament 18 February 2004. 58 Response to Question 1306 – Counter-Terrorism Responses (Mr. Debnam), NSW Parliament 18 February 2004. 59 Anthony Bergin and Sam Bateman, Future Unknown: The terrorist threat to Australian maritime security, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2005, p. 78-9. 60 Water Police, New South Wales Police Service, 26 August 2004 [cited 12 December 2006]. Available from http://www.police.nsw.gov.au/recruitment/police_career/role_and_careers/careers/water_police. 61 Personal conversation with Deputy Commissioner Andrew Scipione, Sydney, 17 February 2005.

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Intelligence. The NSWPS has effectively doubled its intelligence and investigative

resources dedicated to counter terrorism, with a significant up-skilling in the intelligence

analysis area. In police practice, it is common to distinguish between intelligence, which

is developed in anticipation of an offence; and investigation, which is concerned with

offences that have already occurred. Both disciplines have obvious application to counter

terrorism and the NSWPS has developed dedicated counter terrorism intelligence and

investigation capabilities.63

ADO Comparison

The poat-9/1l domestic security capabilities of the ADO are covered in detail in Chapters

Four and Five. This section focuses on those capabilities that might be used to support

New South Wales.

Special recovery. From a New South Wales perspective, the ADO’s most significant

special recovery capability is represented by TAG East and its supporting elements.

While the precise capabilities and composition of the TAG are classified, open sources

provide some data for comparison purposes.

In terms of a quantitative comparison, the TAG required a total of 154 additional ADF

personnel, composed of 125 personnel from Army and 29 from Navy.64 Although not all

of these personnel would be special recovery ‘assaulters,’ when compared with a figure

of around 60 for the equivalent capability in the NSWPS this suggests that TAG East has,

at least, greater redundancy and probably greater capacity. When the ADF’s ability to

rotate personnel through these positions is added, the long-term resilience of the

capability would almost certainly be greater.

62 Bergin and Bateman, Future Unknown: The terrorist threat to Australian maritime security, 2005, p. 78. 63 Personal conversation with Assistant Commissioner Norm Hazzard, Assistant Commissioner (Counter Terrorism), NSWPS, Sydney, 24 June 2005. 64Response to Question W14, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislative Committee (Additional Information Received for Budget Estimates 2002-2003), June 2002 [21 September 2005]. Available from http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committees/FADT_CTTE/estimates/bud_0203/def/def_june02.pdf.

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When other elements of the TAG capability are added to the ADF ‘package,’ the

indications of significant quantitative and qualitative differences with the NSWPS

capability become more stark. An example is provided by comparing the TAG

component of the ADF support package for the visit of US President Bush in October

2003 with the capability that New South Wales could generate from its own resources.

In addition to the ‘core’ TAG element that might be similar to the NSWPS SPG

capability,65 the ADF package included: a Clearance Diving Team element, a CBRR

Platoon, a CBRR liaison officer, an Emergency Response Squadron detachment and four

Black Hawk helicopters.66 While the NSWPS might have been able to source a

quantitatively similar CBRR capability and a superior Emergency Response capability

from the NSWFB, it would have been unable to replicate the TAG’s ability to conduct an

assault in a CBR hazard environment. The clearest gap, however, is in the helicopter

support available: one BK117 (NSWPS), compared with four Black Hawks (ADF). This

suggests a significant qualitative difference between the New South Wales and ADF

capabilities, with implications for the complexity of terrorist situations that could be dealt

with.

Bomb response. ADO resources that could be used to support New South Wales in

bomb management include an IEDD capability that is qualitatively and quantitatively

similar to that of the NSWPS in the ‘steady state,’ but which could be ‘surged’ to provide

additional resources for a special event, with some notice. If anything, the ADO

‘tactical’ capability was qualitatively inferior to the NSWPS’ briefly, as the latter

received the TEODOR RPD as a replacement for the obsolete Echidna before the ADF.

Other post-9/11 enhancements acquired by the NSWPS, such as the MECV, were already

in the ADF inventory.67 Although IEDD is sometimes included in the IRR’s suite of

capabilities, this appears to be an incidental by-product of the Regiment’s ‘core’ CBRNE

65 This consisted of a TAG Headquarters, a ‘TAG Platoon’ (probably consisting of the assault element) and a TAG liaison officer. Senator Robert Hill, Minister for Defence, answer to Question No. 2322 posed by Senator Evans on 23 October 2003. Senate Hansard, 1 December 2003, p. 18597. 66 Senator Robert Hill, Minister for Defence, answer to Question No. 2322, Senate Hansard, 1 December 2003, p. 18597.

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function. The ADF’s post-9/11 IEDD capability, in other words, offers little to New

South Wales except a surge capacity.

In the search field, the NSWPS also seems to have a robust capability for explosive

detection dogs (EDDs) and low-risk search, but the possession of a high risk search

capability is not clear from the available material. In maintaining a THRS capability, the

ADF offers a significant qualitative improvement over New South Wales search

capabilities. ADF low risk search and EDD capabilities offer only a quantitative surge

capability, of relatively limited use for no-notice tasks.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive Response (CBRNER).

The CBRNER capabilities of the IRR, supported by DSTO, offer a very significant

quantitative and qualitative advance over New South Wales’ resources in the niche ‘crisis

management’ areas of CBRN device diagnosis and disposal. Although the attainment of

high relative capability levels is not a ‘competitive’ focus, the IRR is assisted in

maintaining a qualitative ‘edge’ through its access to overseas technical resources,

capability benchmarks and training opportunities: for example, specialist individual

training with the Canadian Forces or the specialist CBRR forces of regional countries,

such as Singapore.68 These links probably afford Australia its only access to technical

advice for a response to nuclear (as distinct from radiological) weapon threats.

In other aspects of CBRNER, the ADO’s capabilities offer relatively little over those of

New South Wales. The scientific capabilities of DSTO are an invaluable assistance to

capability acquisition, providing a source of technical advice that New South Wales

cannot practically replicate. DSTO’s CBR agent analysis capabilities, while first class,

are normally based at the Human Performance and Protection Branch in Melbourne and

therefore would not provide much capability in no-notice incidents. A developing

67 A 2000 photograph of the JIRU’s equipment fleet shows a MECV. The Australian Army in Profile 2000, p. 83. 68 ‘Singapore Joins Australian Army in CBRE Response Training,’ Defence Media Release CPA 231/05, 30 September 2005.

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national CBR laboratory network, once mature, will probably offer more to New South

Wales under ‘steady state’ arrangements.69

The ADO’s CBRNER consequence management capabilities (principally, mass

decontamination, CBR casualty handling and USAR) would only provide a marginal

increase over state resources. The ADO could make a useful contribution to long-term

consequence management by providing relief and augmentation, thus prolonging the

‘endurance’ of state capabilities. Assuming that the IRR is held at the same degree of

notice for tasks in support of New South Wales as other states, the formal response time

for IRR support would also probably make it only marginally useful in a no-notice

emergency, although the unit’s location at Holsworthy would enable much faster

responses to the Sydney area if necessary. For a pre-planned operation, such as in

support to a major international event (for example, APEC 2007), response times could

be shortened considerably.

In summary, ADO support offers New South Wales a qualitatively superior CBRNER

capability in the niche areas of CBRN device diagnosis and disposal and some aspects of

science and technology, but little in consequence management areas. In no-notice

situations, observance formal response times could further marginalise the value of the

IRR. The existence of the IRR as a high-end capability benchmark, to which New South

Wales agencies have ready access by virtue of its location in Sydney, is a useful source of

‘insight’ for capability development.

Intelligence. In the counter-terrorism intelligence field, the ADO enjoys some

advantages over New South Wales in the size of its intelligence ‘community’ of DIO,

DSD and DIGO, as well as the technical capabilities that those organisations

comprehend. Although the ADO’s intelligence resources are not focused exclusively on

counter-terrorism, their scale and quality offers considerable capacity that is extended

further by their standing links to overseas intelligence agencies. Through these links, the

69 Simon Kearney, ‘New labs to ward off “dirty bomb’ threat,’ The Australian, 28 September 2005, p. 4.

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ADO serves as a conduit for overseas intelligence into the Australian Intelligence

Community (AIC).

The ADO’s contribution to national counter-terrorism intelligence capabilities, however,

should be becoming ‘systematised’ by the post-9/11 integration of the AIC. Appropriate

state intelligence agencies should have access to any important information under steady

state arrangements, such as the National Threat Assessment Centre. Intelligence may,

therefore, be one field of the national counter-terrorism effort in which it is becoming

difficult to distinguish between ADO and state capabilities. The ADO has little to offer

New South Wales in the area of counter-terrorism investigation, except in matters

requiring the science and technology support of DSTO.

Overall assessment

Compared with the domestic security capabilities developed and maintained by New

South Wales since 9/11, corresponding ADO capabilities remain qualitatively and

quantitatively superior in the fields of special recovery; the CBRNER niche areas of

device diagnosis and disposal and science and technology; and offshore aspects of

maritime security. New South Wales would also be reliant on ADO surge support for

special events, especially in areas such a search (including THRS). In other areas, such

as bomb management and CBRNER consequence management, ADO capabilities offer

less except during surge requirements, such as the security efforts for major international

events.

The most significant gaps between state (represented in the best case by New South

Wales) and ADO capabilities are in areas important to the management of terrorist crises:

special recovery, niche areas of CBRNER and maritime security. Given the political risk

of a failure to respond effectively to a crisis, it is unlikely that a Commonwealth

Government would allow relevant ADO capabilities to degrade while those gaps exist.

The unclassified material does not support reliable metrics that would allow gaps

between state capabilities and desirable benchmarks to be gauged accurately. For

example, it is impossible to compare the number of hours spent training in various tasks,

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or the skill levels obtained, or equipment holdings and maintenance standards, or

selection standards. It seems unlikely, however, that in demanding areas such as special

recovery, involving high-end and perishable skills, the states will be able to fully match

the capabilities of the ADO Tactical Assault Group and all its supporting elements. This

is because of the resource demands of things such as fleets of large helicopters, the high

cost in training resources, the access to international training and benchmarking

opportunities and the size of the organisational ‘gene pool’ from which personnel with

the necessary aptitudes can be selected. To the extent that police special recovery

personnel need similar aptitudes to those of Army Special Forces soldiers, the number of

such personnel who can be selected from the much thinner ranks of police forces (13,000

for the NSWPS, compared with 26,000 for the Australian Regular Army) is apt to be

finite.

Given our population base there is a limit to how many of these enormously talented, multi-skilled, highly potent troops our country can produce.70

Even without robust metrics, the limits to which the states and territories can realistically

build their capabilities are likely to be intuitively obvious to governments. Under these

circumstances, it is unlikely that either state or commonwealth governments will

relinquish the options provided by ADO contributions. State and territory capability

realities are therefore likely to continue to ensure that the ADO remains a source of high-

end capabilities for homeland security.

Section conclusion: the relative contribution of the ADO to Australia’s homeland

security

The foregoing case study shows that, by quantitative measures alone, even Australia’s

largest and wealthiest jurisdiction could not hope to match the capability that the ADO

could generate despite a genuine and sustained government commitment. States’ need

for ADO security support when hosting major international events is demonstrated by the

consistency with which the ADO is called to provide that support – Table 4 illustrates

this in relation to the conduct of the Sydney 2000 Games, CHOGM 2002 and the

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Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games. Significantly, the ADO continues to provide

capabilities that have never seen operational use while supporting an event. This

suggests that the Commonwealth Government is acutely aware of capability realities,

leading to the maintenance and provision of a sophisticated Commonwealth capability

with low risk of failure.

70 General Peter Cosgrove, Address to the Joint Future Warfighting Conference, Canberra, 20 April 2005.

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Characteristic/Capability Operation Gold (2000) Guardian (2002) Acolyte (2006)

Leading government State Commonwealth State

ADO personnel involved 5,622 2,400 2,600

ADO support: Provided Used1 Provided Used Provided Used

Security:

Special recovery: TAG X X X CBRNR X X X Special operations aviation X X X

Ship underway recovery X X X

Defensive counter air X X

Bomb management: Operational planning2 X X X X Search planning X X X X X X Low risk search X X X X X X Technical high risk search X X X X X X Underwater search X X X X X X Explosive detection dogs X X X X X X Improvised explosive device disposal X X X X Bomb Management Coordination Centre X X X X X

General support aviation X X

Non-security: Transport X X Facilities access X X X X Venue logistics management X X Venue communications coordination X X Ceremonial X X X X

Table 4 – Defence Support to Selected Domestic Events 2000-200671

71 Detailed evidence to support these data is contained in the separate case studies of each Operation that are contained in Chapters Three and Five. Further notes to Table 1:

1. Support was used if it received real operational tasking: for example, IEDD was employed if an ADF team was despatched on a real event security task.

2. Operational planning support refers to actual ADO membership of the responsible jurisdiction’s security planning teams for the event, eg., membership of the police bomb management planning team.

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Other Political and Managerial Factors

Threat perceptions

The graphic nature of terrorist attacks and their relative frequency in the post-9/11 period

has had a predictable effect on the level of threat perceived by Australia’s people and

governments. Governments now acknowledge that Australia and Australians are terrorist

targets:

We know that Al Qaida had an active interest in carrying out a terrorist attack in Australia…and that we remain a target today.72

Australia is a terrorist target, both as a Western nation and in its own right.73

The post-9/11 threat ‘picture’ also includes highly sophisticated and massively

destructive attacks. This has placed a premium on preventive efforts in order to deny or

disrupt successful attacks, but also has major implications for response and recovery

capabilities. This influences risk calculations associated with the development and

maintenance of those capabilities. Perception of an increased threat to the homeland

explains the increased homeland security measures adopted since 9/11, including those to

which the ADO contributes.

It is too early to assess definitively whether the threat perception behaviour of Australian

governments has changed since 9/11, but there are indications of two shifts. The first is

an apparently greater discipline in maintaining a protective posture in response to a

trigger event. Commitment to increased domestic security measures and the associated

resource expenditure has been sustained since 9/11 – the longest such commitment to a

domestic security effort since the Second World War.74 This commitment may be

explained by the increased frequency of terrorist attacks globally, their proximity to

Australia (in some cases) and the number of Australians affected. 10 Australians were

killed in the 9/11 attacks in the United States and 88 in the 2002 Bali bombings. The

largest number of Australians killed in any previous terrorist attack was two, who were

72 (Introduction by John Howard) Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. v. 73 Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia 2004.’ P.66.

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mistakenly targeted by the Irish Republican Army in 1990.75 The threat, in other words,

is harder to ignore. The number of recent and prospective major international events in

Australia, with their potential and ‘inferred’ threat implications, may also be assisting in

maintaining commitment to security measures.

A second possible shift is in Australian agencies’ readiness to consider overseas threat

trends in an Australian context and to adapt protective capabilities accordingly.76

Whereas previously Australia’s domestic capabilities tended to be calibrated in

accordance with incidents that had actually happened on Australian territory, there is

evidence that state and territory agencies are now building towards benchmarks based on

overseas events. Examples include New South Wales’ development of a limited

‘offshore’ Water Policing capability; or its development of an urban search and rescue

(USAR) capability in preparation for an incident involving a major structural collapse

event.77

Heightened threat perceptions are not limited to governments - there is evidence of

increased public concern over threats to homeland security. Public threat perceptions add

to the dynamics of government responsibility and expectations by influencing demands

for effective government response to the threat situation. Governments, of course, can

stimulate public concern over threats by their handling of information. Media treatment

of all aspects of homeland security, such as incidents, capabilities and policy debate, will

also influence public perceptions. The issue of threat perception is therefore key to

homeland security policy decisions.

74 The civil defence and security effort coordinated by the Department of Home Security from 1942-46 was the previous benchmark. 75 Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia 2004, p. 5. 76 Personal conversation with Mr. Paul de Graaff, Assistant Secretary Counter-Terrorism, PSCC, Canberra, 26 Jul 2005. 77 Personal conversation with Deputy Commissioner Andrew Scipione, NSWPS, Sydney, 17 February 2005. Austal Ships, Austal to Build Six Coastal Patrol Boats for New South Wales Police 17 June 2005 2005 [cited 16 January 2006]. Available from http://www.austal.com/index.cfm?objectid=43EFCF24-A0CC-3C8C-D94CEB14CF8EED1B. Phillip Ruddock, ‘NSW Exercise to Test Terrorism Response Capability.’ Ministerial Media Release No. 083/2004, Canberra: AGD, 2004.

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A feature of Australia’s post-9/11 threat ‘picture’ until 2004 was its focus on a relatively

narrow source of threats. A single organisation (Al Qaida - although the Jemaah

Islamiyah group also became a significant factor after the 2002 Bali bombing), a single

ideology (radical Islamism) and a single enemy capability (WMD) dominated

consideration of the threat in government policy. Al Qaida is the subject of an entire

chapter (Chapter III) of Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia 2004, while

the following two chapters deal with Islamist terrorist threats in Southeast Asia.

Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004 gives these topics similar coverage. Both

documents refer to WMD proliferation and terrorist use of WMD.78

This focus has influenced decisions on the employment of the ADO by providing

‘targets’ for offshore military action. The government’s decision to deploy ADF assets

for combat operations in Afghanistan in 2001 was facilitated by the fact that operations

there involved an identifiable target for military action. The declared reason for

involvement of the ADF in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was the Iraqi regime’s suspected

illegal WMD program and links with terrorists. As a possible source of WMDs for use

by terrorists, this was a potential threat to the Australian homeland.79

Both government and popular perceptions of the threat to Australia’s homeland security

in the post-9/11 world are clearly greater than those that existed previously: significant

threats are now perceived to be credible, and perhaps imminent. Some government

language conveys a sense of inevitability in relation to a terrorist attack on Australian

soil. For example, John Howard:

…Australians are as vulnerable to terrorism as anyone…In the event of a terrorist attack, we have strong response capabilities…I cannot guarantee that we will not suffer a terrorist attack in Australia. 80

78 See the policy analysis at Appendix 1. 79 John Howard. "Address to the Nation on Committing Australian Forces to War in Iraq." Canberra: Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 20 March 2003. 80 Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, pp.v-vi.

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In this environment, there are considerable political risks for an Australian government in

failing to take visible and effective steps to protect Australia, or in failing to respond

effectively to a crisis. Given these risks, governments will look for highly reliable

sources of protective capabilities. This explains some government decisions on the

employment of the ADO in homeland security since 9/11 and indicates that significant

ADO involvement will continue into the future.

Resources

All Australian jurisdictions have responded to the post-9/11 threat situation by applying

additional resources to homeland security tasks. Not surprisingly, the Commonwealth

has made the greatest increase to its resource allocation. As at the 2005-2006 Budget, the

Australian Government had committed $5.6 billion on additional counter-terrorism

measures since 9/11.81 This contrasts with about $200 million spent by New South

Wales, the next largest investor.82 Although the additional resources have allowed

significant capability improvements, the gap between states’ and territories’ and

Commonwealth capabilities is still significant. The pre-9/11 influence of resources on

ADO involvement in homeland security missions therefore persists in the subsequent

period. If anything, the new situation has sharpened awareness of resource shortfalls and

the consequent capability gaps. Security assessments, such as Sir John Wheeler’s review

of Australian airport security, have identified a number of areas requiring improvement,

with associated resource implications. The Commonwealth Government announced the

allocation of an additional $200 million to airport security in response to the Wheeler

review.83

81 Duncan Lewis, First Assistant Secretary, National Security Division, ‘Progress in Implementing Initiatives for the Government’s 4th Term,’ (presentation to ‘Safeguarding Australia 2005’), Canberra, 12 July 2005. 82 This figure is the sum of New South Wales’ state-wide funding in 2005-06 ($187 million), plus previous increases to NSWPS, NSW Health and NSW Fire Brigades funding since 2001. John Watkins, Tony Stewart and John Hatzisgergos, New South Wales Legislative Assembly Hansard, 8 November 2005, pp. 19179-19187, [cited 3 July 2006]. Available from http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/PARLMENT/hansArt.nsf/. 83 AAP, ‘Security at airports tightened,’ 21 September 2005, [cited 21 September 2005]. Available from http://www.news.com.au/story/print/0,10119,16671397,00.html.

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One consequence of the increased resource demands of homeland security has been a

critical assessment of which level of government should take responsibility for them.

Some states have indicated that they would be prepared to relinquish to the

Commonwealth their responsibilities for aspects of domestic security, although resource

issues are not the only reasons for this. The Wheeler review of airport security, for

example, recommended that the Commonwealth take control of airport security,

appointing an AFP officer to command the security arrangements for each of 11 major

airports. Such an appointment would create inter-jurisdictional problems by placing a

Federal officer in command of state or even industry employees. Along with the

alarming resource implications of increased security measures, this has led some states to

suggest that the Commonwealth should take full responsibility for airport security,

relieving states of the burden.84 These suggestions are similar in effect to calls for local

basing of ADF combat assets for homeland security purposes, in that they indicate that

the demands of the post-9/11 environment are exceeding state resources. The ability of

any government to reallocate resources in order to fund increased security is obviously

finite: a point may therefore be reached after which states must either be allocated

additional resources by the Commonwealth, or the Commonwealth must assume

responsibility for under-resourced security functions.

The impact of resource considerations on the Commonwealth’s response to the post-9/11

environment has been to ensure that it retains at its disposal Commonwealth capabilities

necessary to meet its responsibilities for homeland security, including in domestic

security areas that would normally be a state or territory responsibility. Resources issues

have imposed this requirement because of the uncertainty that other jurisdictions will be

able to maintain adequate capabilities to guarantee their own security in the face of new

threats. This reality has led the government to increase the ADO’s involvement in

homeland security in order to guarantee the Commonwealth’s ability to respond to

threats.

84 Mike Rann,, News: Regional airport security needed, Adelaide: Government of South Australia, 15 August 2006.

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In the debate on homeland security in Australia, suggestions have arisen that the ADO

(usually, the ADF specifically) be phased out of homeland security missions. For

example, Aldo Borgu, of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, has consistently argued

for the progressive transfer of ADF counter-terrorism assault capabilities to the civilian

police forces.85 For this to occur without a net loss in national capability or government

freedom of action, the agencies taking on the ADO functions would need to be resourced

accordingly. Should this occur in a zero-sum financial environment, a transfer of

resources from the ADO would be likely. This could impact other areas of ADO

performance that will be addressed later in the discussion of synergies.

In the post-9/11 environment, therefore, homeland security has become an increasingly

expensive business, such that the Commonwealth Government seems to be the only

entity able to foot its full resource. This has ensured the ADO’s continued involvement

in many aspects of homeland security.

Synergies

The traditional government drive for economy lent weight to synergy considerations in

determining the pre-9/11 homeland security employment of the ADO. The significant

increase in resources allocated to homeland security since 9/11, however, suggests that

economy has become a less critical factor in its pursuit. State and territory jurisdictions

are spending unprecedented amounts on homeland security missions, such as domestic

counter-terrorism response, that previously commanded much lower priorities. This re-

calibration of resource considerations may have affected the power of synergy arguments

in homeland security decisions.

As discussed in Chapter Five, synergy considerations are rarely a factor in decisions as to

the absolute value of a new capability. Once identified, synergies could become powerful

arguments for the retention of established capabilities, rather than moving them to new

85 Aldo Borgu, Australia’s Defence after September 11: A Quick Guide to the Issues, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, 2002, p. 25; ‘The Future of ADF Involvement in Homeland Security,’ (presentation to ‘Safeguarding Australia 2005’), Canberra, 12 July 2005.

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homes. Synergy considerations seem unlikely, however, to tip the balance in terms of

where (within what organisation) a marginally affordable new capability is lodged.

Australia entered the post-9/11 environment with a good understanding of the synergies

associated with its various homeland security capabilities. The recent experience of the

Olympics and operations in Timor Leste had demonstrated some of the synergies bearing

on ADO capabilities, especially those associated with Special Forces and CBRR. Given

this understanding, it is unlikely that a government would be willing to forego synergistic

benefits in the development of additional capabilities (such as TAG East or the IRR). A

government would also be unlikely to accept the risk associated with stripping synergistic

counter-terrorism capabilities out of existing force elements, such as the SASR TAG,

especially when contemplating a potentially long commitment to demanding Special

Forces operations overseas. The important synergies in the post-9/11 period, therefore,

may be those associated with the optimum development of capability rather than pure

economy. Nevertheless, synergy considerations are still likely to influence government

decisions on the involvement of the ADO in homeland security.

Options

As with other political factors bearing on the employment of the ADO, the importance of

maximising government options in addressing homeland security challenges has grown in

the more dangerous post-9/11 security environment. Options are most important in a

crisis: with the increased likelihood of a serious terrorist attack on Australia, governments

have a greater need for freedom of action in their responses. Given the ‘strategic

warning’ that the post-9/11 period has afforded, failure to respond effectively to a

terrorist crisis is likely to be highly politically damaging. In such an environment, no

government will leave itself without options.

Under these conditions, the assured availability of high-end response capabilities

commands a premium from governments. This is demonstrated by the significant

investment in counter-terrorism capabilities made by most jurisdictions. Governments

are also likely to invest in those agencies that offer the best guarantee of delivering the

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required options. The characteristics of such agencies would include, first, legal

subservience to the government in question; second, reliable performance in delivering

capabilities; and finally demonstrated operational competence in high-risk situations.

Constitutionally, the ADO meets the first requirement for the Commonwealth. Since the

late 1990s, its operational achievements have earned government confidence in relation

to the other requirements. Government statements consistently assert this. It is also

indicated by the government’s readiness to employ the ADO in risky situations. Where

options and risk are important, therefore, the ADO is likely to be the government’s

preferred custodian of applicable capabilities. Specific ADF elements that have

demonstrated particular utility and effectiveness in recent times are also likely to attract

sustained investment and could be the first candidates considered when there is a need to

develop new capabilities, as demonstrated by the predominant place of Special Forces in

post-9/11 developments:

The need for very effective, elite special forces in an age of terrorism is overwhelming. One doesn’t know what hostage-taking you will face, and in that way circumstances have given them a centre-stage role. They are extremely valuable in the anti-terrorist situation. We haven’t faced hostage-taking, but we might one day face that and they’d be absolutely critical. They would be the one group that you’d have to ultimately rely on. They are the most highly trained force in the country.86

Analysis of government’s post-9/11 capability decisions supports this assessment:

virtually all new Commonwealth tactical capabilities linked to government high-risk

crisis management options have been established within the ADO. These include

SOCOMD, for tactical command and control and technical advice; TAG East, for special

recovery; the IRR, for CBRNR; the CBRNDC, for CBRN scientific advice; and the

RRFs, for surge support to crisis and consequence management. A similar conclusion

applies to the creation of BPC as a joint agency with major ADO participation: by

assuring the seamless incorporation of ADO capabilities in appropriate maritime security

tasks, BPC also provides the government with reliable options that would otherwise

86 John Howard, as quoted in Ian McPhedran, The Amazing SAS, 2005, p. 124.

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entail much greater risk: BPC, according to the Prime Minister, ‘enables the best possible

use of available resources.’87

Commonwealth Governments may also be attracted to using the ADO, rather than other

organisations, because of its unique symbolism. As well as being under direct federal

control, it projects strength and determination and there is a high degree of public respect

for the ADF.88 This image supports a belief that, with the ADO involved, security is in

capable hands.

This is not to suggest that the government plans to sideline the states in domestic security

situations by invoking its executive power. In relevant public statements since 9/11,

Commonwealth ministers and officials have been at pains to acknowledge state

primacy.89 The states and territories, for their parts, have also sought to secure their own

options by developing organic capabilities as far as their resources allow. The available

evidence nevertheless indicates that, in the post-9/11 environment, the imperative of

assuring its freedom of action in a terrorist crisis has led the Commonwealth Government

to employ the ADO in appropriate homeland security roles. This influence is likely to

continue.

Priorities

The post-9/11 environment has changed the effect of government priorities on the ADO’s

role in Australia’s homeland security. Homeland security itself has become a much a

higher priority for government, resulting in the significant increase in resources described

earlier. This change in overall priority has had an impact on the ADO, as the source of

some of the new capabilities, such as TAG East and the IRR.

87 Rob Tonkin, ‘Security Pressures and Preferred Options for Enhanced Offshore Maritime Security,’ 2005. 88 Recent surveys have ranked the ADF as among Australia’s most highly respected public institutions. 89 The Commonwealth’s supporting role has been officially emphasised in relation to CHOGM 2002 (Senator Robert Hill, ‘Increased Air Security for CHOGM,’ Ministerial Media Release 70/02, 22 February 2002) and the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games (AAP, ‘Games security plan unveiled,’ 20 September 2005); Michael Power, Director Operations, Office of Commonwealth Games Coordination, ‘Planning, Managing and Implementing Counter Terrorist Security for the Commonwealth Games 2006,’ (presentation to Safeguarding Australia 2005), Canberra, 13 July 2005.

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Additional resources have made it somewhat easier to resolve tensions between the

competing demands stemming from responsibilities, expectations and perceptions. The

increase in the ADO’s counter-terrorism capabilities may also lead to their increased use,

because there is now some redundancy that reduces the risk of committing forces. This

eases the requirement to make priority judgements between potential homeland security

tasks.

New Political Factors

In the post-9/11 environment, some new factors have become important political

influences on the ADO’s roles in homeland security. The new prominence of national

security on the political agenda has stimulated debate on homeland security. Political

entities are now required to articulate policy positions on homeland security issues.

Effective response

Popular perceptions of a credible threat have become a major political influence on

governments’ homeland security behaviour since 9/11. These have created a demand for

incumbent governments to demonstrate effectiveness in protecting Australia from the

new threat. Failure to do so could be politically disastrous.

The ADO has been an important tool for the government in demonstrating effectiveness.

The creation of new ADF capabilities provides tangible evidence of government

achievements in improving homeland security, to which it has drawn attention at every

opportunity. Similarly, ADF deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq have been concrete

demonstrations of government resolve in the ‘war on terror.’ It is significant that all three

of the Western governments that committed troops to ICAT operations in both

Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001 were re-elected in subsequent polls, albeit with reduced

majorities, despite significant public opposition to and criticism of their involvement in

those operations (especially Iraq). By comparison, their oppositions seem to have

floundered. This would suggest that incumbency offers a political advantage in times of

credible threats to national security if the incumbent can demonstrate an effective

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response. The creation of military forces and their employment on credible national

security tasks are good ways of demonstrating governmental effectiveness.

National security ‘theatre.’

‘Demonstration’ may be a key concept in understanding some government decisions on

the employment of the ADO in homeland security post-9/11. These decisions may have

been influenced as much by the political necessity of demonstrating effectiveness in the

face of threats to national security as by the necessity of achieving that effectiveness.

Critical characteristics of such demonstrations are likely to include the timeliness and

tangibility of new measures – requirements that are satisfied by a quickly-created ADO

capability, such as the IRR or a Tactical Assault Group. Some ADO involvement in

homeland security may therefore be contributing to a degree of national security ‘theatre’

for political purposes, to the extent that the value of ADO contributions may be

overplayed in government statements or that they constitute merely the first of a complex

set of measures that must be developed over time. The following case study of the IRR’s

contribution to the national CBRNR capability supports this assessment.

Case Study:

The Contribution of the Incident Response Regiment to the National Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Response

(CBRNR) Capability

The purpose of this case study is to analyse the contribution of the Incident Response

Regiment (IRR) to Australia’s national CBRNR capability in order to assess whether the

public image of that contribution projected by the government is accurate. The

analytical method is to:

characterise the ‘official’ public image of the IRR’s capability;

describe the IRR’s factual capability, based on open source data;

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describe the ‘Pre-9/11’ and ‘Olympics’ benchmarks for the ADO’s CBRR

capability;

characterise the ‘generic’ CBRNR capabilities of relevant civilian agencies;

compare the IRR’s factual capability with the public image and the two earlier

benchmarks, and

assess the contribution to national (civilian) capabilities that the IRR can make.

Public image. Significant enhancements to the ADO’s CBRR90 capability were

announced very quickly after 9/11 as part of the government’s response to the new threat

situation. From an early stage, official statements associated the new capability with the

benchmark established for the Sydney 2000 Games:

The Government has decided… to reinstate the specialist Incident Response Unit, whose capabilities in responding to chemical, biological, radiological and explosive incidents were in place during the Olympic Games.91

The announcements hinted that the new capability represented an advance on the

Olympics benchmark:

Australia developed significant CBR capabilities to respond to any potential incident during the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games and built on those immediately after September 11 …92

90 The nuclear and explosive dimensions, creating CBRNR or CBRNER, emerged later. See, for example, Senator Robert Hill, ‘New counter-terrorist units strengthen Australia’s defences,’ Ministerial Media Release 460/02, 6 September 2002. 91 Peter Reith MP, Ministerial Media Release, 2 October 2001. ‘The incident response regiment, an army unit created for the 2000 Olympics, has been reconstituted…”, ‘11 September – consequences for Defence,’ Year Book Australia 2003 (feature article), 24 January 2003. 92 Senator Robert Hill, ‘New counter-terrorist units strengthen Australia’s defences,’ 6 September 2002 (emphasis added).

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The new capability was also linked to the provision of support to civilian agencies in a

domestic CBR incident – the new ‘incident response’ capability, in other words, was to

significantly improve domestic response capabilities:

The Government has also directed Defence to raise a second tactical assault group and an incident response regiment…These units have been formed to assist civil authorities to cope with major terrorist incidents…93 …the IRR will be able to respond to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosive incidents both domestically and in support of Australian forces deployed overseas…94

…the Incident Response Regiment, which will be able to respond to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosive incidents both domestically and in support of Australian forces deployed overseas…’, 95

Australia is now more able to deal with incident response and consequence management through the establishment of…the Incident Response Regiment.96

a specialised incident response regiment to be activated in the event of a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack in Australia.97

This message has been sustained throughout the post-9/11 period, with emphasis

sometimes added on ‘consequence management’:

The establishment of…the Incident Response Regiment will give us a stronger incident response and consequence management capability.98

The projected public image of post-9/11 CBRR/CBRNR/CBRNER is therefore of a

national capability:

93 Defence Annual Report 2001-2002, p. 4 (emphasis added). 94 Senator Robert Hill, ‘New counter-terrorist units strengthen Australia’s defences,’ Ministerial Media Release 460/02, 6 September 2002 (emphasis added). 95 ‘11 September – consequences for Defence,’ Year Book Australia 2003 (feature article), 24 January 2003 (emphasis added). 96 Senator Robert Hill, ‘Regional Special Forces Counter-Terrorism Conference,’ Bowral, 17 June 2004 (emphasis added). 97 Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia 2004,’ p. 101 (emphasis added). 98 Senator Robert Hill, ‘Terrorism and the New Global Security Environment,’ (address to the Murdoch University Security, Terrorism and Counter Terrorism Course), Perth, 18 May 2005 (emphasis added).

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raise the Incident Response Regiment…to provide a national response and management capability…99

That capability is significantly enhanced over the one that existed pre-9/11 and at least

equivalent to that provided for the Sydney 2000 Games. The IRR, in particular, offers a

significant improvement in consequence management capacity over that provided by

civilian agencies:

The Incident Response Regiment will be called out only in extreme cases where police and emergency services do not have the capability to deal with a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosive threat.100

This would suggest that:

The net CBRR capability of the unit is at least equal to that available during the

Olympics. As a broad gauge of equivalence, it should, therefore, be able to apply

approximately the same number of personnel to CBRR tasks. Capability is the

resultant of qualitative and quantitative elements, and therefore equivalent

capability could be generated with fewer people if other factors, such as technology,

are improved. Given the relatively brief time interval between the Olympics and

the establishment of the IRR, it is unlikely that significant personnel efficiencies

would be achievable.

The unit’s contribution would enable a tangible improvement in the management of

a CBRNE incident over the use of civilian (state or territory) resources alone,

anywhere in Australia. Given the time-sensitive nature of CBRN incident

management, this would infer an ability to respond to incidents very quickly.

The IRR’s capability. The classified nature of the CBRNR capability prevents a

definitive analysis of the IRR’s capabilities, but open source data have been synthesised

to provide the following description:

99Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2004, p. 53 (emphasis added). 100 Senator Robert Hill, ‘New counter-terrorist units strengthen Australia’s defences,’ 6 September 2002.

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The IRR’s strength is publicly stated as being around 300.101

The unit’s personnel are divided among:

A Headquarters.102

A Scientific and Technical element staffed by DSTO.103 In the ‘steady state,’

therefore, this does not include overseas experts.

A ‘CBR squadron’ able to:

render safe CBR devices,

conduct decontamination,

treat casualties, and

provide advice on CBR agents and materials.

An emergency response squadron. This is essentially a firefighting capability

that includes capacity for aircraft crash rescue, urban search and rescue and

hazardous material response.

The unit is normally based largely at Holsworthy Barracks in Sydney, 104 with emergency

response elements also located at Darwin, Townsville and Oakey.105 Although CBRNER

101 ‘The Incident Response Regiment,’ The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 20 No. 2, May 2005, p. 18. Senator Robert Hill, ‘New counter-terrorist units strengthen Australia’s defences,’ 6 September 2002. 102 Senator Robert Hill, ‘New counter-terrorist units strengthen Australia’s defences,’ 6 September 2002. 103 ‘The Incident Response Regiment,’ 2005, p. 19. Senator Robert Hill, ‘New counter-terrorist units strengthen Australia’s defences,’ 6 September 2002. 104 Senator Robert Hill, ‘New counter-terrorist units strengthen Australia’s defences,’ 6 September 2002.

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elements might be pre-positioned elsewhere for special tasks, they would respond to all

‘no-notice’ tasks from Holsworthy. For example, elements deployed to Queensland in

support of CHOGM 2002 and to Canberra in support of the visit of US President Bush in

2003.106

Of total unit strength of 300 personnel, a smaller number would be available to respond

to a CBRNE incident. A figure of 150 is more likely to represent the total personnel

available for CBRNER tasking. This estimate is based on the number of people likely to

be ‘left out of battle’ through being out-posted to one of the remote Emergency Response

Squadron locations or committed to administration, operational continuity, training or

servicing the logistic liability created by the unit’s extensive and highly technical

equipment holdings. Applying an old ‘rule of thumb,’ the unit’s structure of two ‘sabre’

squadrons (CBRR and Emergency Response) and a Headquarters would see a rough

personnel allocation of 100 per squadron and the remainder divided between the

Headquarters and supporting ‘echelon.’

The CBRNER capability that the ‘mature’ IRR, as described, would be able to generate

for domestic tasks would probably consist of a capacity to respond at relatively short

notice to two CBRN incidents near-simultaneously. The degree of notice is,

appropriately, classified. The ‘standing’ notice is probably a matter of hours for the first

team dispatched, with a somewhat longer period for the second team. With appropriate

lead-time, the standing notice to move could be reduced for restricted periods in response

to specific threats, but very short notice could not be sustained indefinitely. The IRR can

also support ‘offshore’ ‘green roles’ tasks, and did so in Operation FALCONER in Iraq

in 2003.107 Because green roles do not generally do not generally relate to homeland

security, they are not considered further here.108

105 ‘The Incident Response Regiment,’ The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 20 No. 2, May 2005, p. 18. 106 Senator Robert Hill, ‘Successful Defence Support to CHOGM,’ Ministerial Media Release 87/02, 5 March 2002; and response to Question No. 2322, Senate Hansard, 1 December 2003, p. 18597. 107 Weapons of Mass Destruction 2005, p. 83. 108 Brigadier Mike Hannan, Defence Media Release, 13 March 2003.

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The response teams could consist of:

A Headquarters element for command and control and the provision of advice to

civilian agencies. This would include a robust communications capability and the

ability to feed technical and operational advice into the national crisis management

architecture.

A small CBRNE search capability, equivalent to THRS.

A CBRNE device ‘render safe’ capability, including elaborate diagnostic tools.

A capacity to support a TAG in a counter-terrorist assault in a CBR hazard

environment.

A decontamination capability optimised for the decontamination of trained CBRR

and TAG personnel, and casualties. This would be sufficient to decontaminate

team personnel and a limited number of other people. Untrained subjects could

not be decontaminated rapidly. This assessment is based on open-source

photographs of JIRU and IRR decontamination stations, which are not equipped

with high-capacity deluge showers or other features necessary for rapid mass

decontamination.109

A medical capability, specialising in CBR injuries and optimised for the treatment

of CBRR personnel and TAG members who become casualties. Capacity would

be insufficient for mass casualty situations.

A scientific analysis and advice capability based on DSTO’s ‘in house’ expertise

and ‘reachback’ to other Australian sources.

109‘The Incident Response Regiment,’ The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 20 No. 2, May 2005, p. 18.

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For appropriate tasks, a small emergency response (firefighting and USAR) capability

could be added to this mix.

Rapid response to incident sites outside Sydney would not be possible unless response

elements were pre-positioned. The Regiment’s ability to contribute effectively to the

time-critical ‘crisis’ phase of a ‘no-notice’ CBRN incident arising outside Sydney would

be negligible. This is because a very rapid response is most important in the pre-

detonation/pre-release phase of an incident involving a CBRN dissemination device; and

in the immediate aftermath of a chemical release. These are crisis situations that are

regarded as requiring a ‘lights and sirens’ response.110 As an incident proceeds further

into its consequence phase, speed of response has less impact on the outcome. The unit

would be able to contribute a small but high-quality capability to supplement state and

territory resources in long-term consequence management, although this would come at

the cost of short-notice response capacity. The paucity of current nuclear weapon

expertise in the Australian scientific community would also cast doubts on its nuclear (as

distinct from radiological) device disposal capabilities. With a manning of 300

personnel, the unit’s long-term viability would be reasonably assured through having

sufficient personnel to rotate through ongoing training while maintaining operational

readiness.

Pre-9/11 benchmark. For comparison purposes, the pre-9/11 benchmark for the ADO’s

CBRNR capability was the post-Olympics CBRR Squadron. This was a ‘residual’

capability based on the JIRU. With a manning of approximately 80 personnel 111 and

having inherited the bulk of the JIRU’s CBRR equipment, its domestic response capacity

would have been limited to a response to one incident with a team quantitatively and

qualitatively similar to the IRR team described above, provided that skills were

maintained. No additional Emergency Response or USAR capability would be available

and the ability to sustain long-term consequence management support would be much

less. Response time considerations would be identical.

110 Personal conversation with Mr. Don Patterson, Emergency management Australia, Canberra, 24 March 2005.

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Manned with only 80-odd personnel, the long-term viability of the capability represented

by the CBRR Squadron would have been marginal, especially given the relative newness

of the capability within the ADO (having become operational only in mid-2000, in time

for the Games). This would have allowed little ‘depth’ in the highly specialised skills

peculiar to the unit: the only source of training in those skills would have been the unit

itself. The capability would, therefore, have been highly vulnerability to personnel

turbulence.

Olympics benchmark. The Olympics benchmark was the capability represented by the

JIRU, which is described separately at Annex A. This was an organisation of 501

personnel at its peak, including forward-deployed scientific and technical personnel from

the UK and USA. Its domestic response capacity consisted of two teams with similar

capabilities to those described for the IRR, without the emergency response and USAR

option but with access to much more substantial THRS and IEDD capabilities (drawn

from the HRS and EOD Squadrons respectively). Response times for tasks within the

Sydney area were extremely short, with some command and control permanently pre-

positioned with the civilian authorities: for example, the ADF Liaison Officer embedded

in the New South Wales Fire Brigades Olympics Reconnaissance Team.112 Pre-planned

fly-away contingencies also allowed very rapid response to the other Olympic cities,

although response times to non-Olympic locations would have been similar to IRR

responses outside Sydney. Capacity for long-term consequence management support

would have been similar to the IRR’s.

As a ‘temporary’ unit, long-term viability is not relevant to the JIRU.

Civilian CBRNER capabilities

The CBRNER capabilities of civilian agencies, as at 2001-2002, varied considerably

between the jurisdictions. The capabilities described below are generic ones, based on

111 Personal conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Craig Petrie, Canberra, 6 May 2005.

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those possessed by New South Wales agencies as these were generally the best

developed.

The civilian CBRR capacity is lodged within the hazardous materials response

(HAZMAT) capabilities normally maintained by fire brigades. These have become

reasonably extensive since the mid-1990s, with some capability existing within almost

every urban fire crew. Specialised capabilities are usually maintained by a dedicated team

in each major city. Capabilities are optimised for the most common types of HAZMAT

incidents and usually emphasise chemical hazards, such as fuels and industrial chemicals,

with biological and radiological hazard response being more limited. Even with chemical

hazards, capabilities for especially dangerous materials, such as chemical warfare agents,

are generally less than for more common threats. There is usually no capability to deal

with hazards associated with dissemination devices or combined with explosives.

HAZMAT teams generally get plenty of work, albeit often on relatively simple tasks, and

therefore HAZMAT awareness and experience is at a reasonable level in most urban fire

services. The relatively broad distribution of basic HAZMAT capability among fire

teams allowed a reasonable ‘mass’ to be concentrated for larger tasks. Association of the

capability with normal fire response also meant that response times to urban areas were

very quick. The integration of HAZMAT with other ‘tactical’ response capabilities, such

as police special recovery, has been slight in most jurisdictions. New South Wales has

led in this, but the ability to conduct a sophisticated special recovery operation in a CBR

hazard environment is still extremely limited.

Associated with state and territory HAZMAT capabilities was a mass decontamination

capability. Although often unsophisticated (such as firehose-based deluges), the

association of this capability with normal fire response units meant that a reasonable

capacity was available at very short notice. Some dedicated decontamination capability,

112 New South Wales Fire Brigades, Protecting the People's Games: New South Wales Fire Brigades Post-Olympics Report Sydney: NSWFB, 2000, p.61.

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optimised for mass decontamination of the public, was being acquired from 2000

onwards but its distribution across the states was patchy.

Development of USAR had been receiving considerable attention within the Australian

Emergency Response community since 1996.113 Although the level of development

varied among the states, some capability and experience was available nationally by

2001. This was often a joint capability distributed across the ‘combat agencies’114 but

was usually led by fire brigades.

The ability to handle casualties associated with a CBRN incident also varied among the

jurisdictions, but was generally limited. Although normal ambulance services and health

facilities afforded good response times and capacity, CBR-specific training was not well

distributed and more demanding ‘hard’ capabilities, such casualty evacuation from

contaminated incident sites, casualty decontamination and even triage and CBR-specific

life support within contaminated areas, was very limited. New South Wales had

benefited from preparations for the Olympics and had some specialised ambulance and

health resources, but overall the capability was still developmental in 2001.

A response to high-yield explosive incidents requires IEDD as well as USAR capabilities

to manage the consequences of bomb-induced structural collapses. Investigative

capabilities, including specialised forensic analysis, are also necessary. All state police

forces have possessed IEDD capabilities since prior to 9/11. USAR was discussed

earlier. Some capacity to respond to the ‘E’ dimension of CBRNE incidents was thus

‘built-in’ to all jurisdictions at 9/11 and has increased subsequently. Existing capabilities

would be available at short response times. This would also facilitate inter-jurisdictional

support for surge and long-term consequence management requirements.

113 USAR History in Australia, Emergency Management Australia, 2005 [cited 12 December 2006]. Available from http://www.ema.gov.au/agd/ema/emainternet.nsf/Page/RWPDF25387B43EE368ACA25701300803EA0. 114 Combat agency is Australian emergency management jargon for an agency with an operational capability to contribute to an incident. Commonwealth and state Disaster Management Plans (DISPLANS) nominate lead and supporting combat agencies for various types of emergencies.

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Specialised capabilities for dealing with CBRN devices was, and remains, extremely

limited in the states and territories. The ability to safely search for, diagnose and render

safe such devices requires demanding skills and sophisticated equipment supported by

high-quality and equally specialised scientific and technical advice, especially for nuclear

devices. No state or territory possessed these capabilities at 9/11 and subsequent

development has been limited. New South Wales, for example, claims a unique forensic

laboratory capability for CBR hazards, but this appears to be manned by a single

specialist scientist.115,116

Specialised science and technology support is also necessary to guide CBRR equipment

acquisition, risk assessments, and training and procedure development as well as to

monitor international progress and innovations in the field. As with the capability for

support to device disposal, this capability was limited or completely absent from the

states and territories in 2001 and has grown little since.

In summary, then, the specialised CBRNER capabilities of the civilian jurisdictions were

generally limited and relatively immature at 9/11, with the exception of New South

Wales which benefited from capability development in support of the Sydney 2000

Games. Capabilities with wider application, such as HAZMAT response and USAR,

were available and developing. In all jurisdictions, however, the location of assets

applicable to CBRNER and their association with more conventional response

capabilities (such as fire crews or ambulances) meant that they were, and remain, able to

meet very short response times. This makes them highly useful for time-critical

missions. This characteristic is enhanced by the habitual command and control

relationships of the various combat agencies, which enable much smoother coordination

in a crisis.

115 Forensic Services Group, New South Wales Police Service, 2005 [cited 12 December 2006]. Available from http://www.police.nsw.gov.au/about_us/structure/specialist_operations/forensic_services. Personal conversation with Assistant Commissioner Norm Hazzard, NSWPS, 24 June 2005. 116 Personal conversation with Assistant Commissioner Norm Hazzard, NSWPS, 24 June 2005.

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Since 9/11, all jurisdictions have improved their CBRNER capabilities. A major

contributor to this has been the Commonwealth government’s CBR Enhancement

Program, coordinated by EMA. This has provided $17.8 million to supply CBRR

equipment for all states and territories, as announced by the Attorney General in January

2005:

The sophisticated decontamination systems on public display today compliment the existing caches of equipment now managed by the States and Territories, ensuring our first responders in the event of an emergency are in the best possible position to protect communities from the consequences of a chemical, biological or radiological incident.117

The new equipment includes personal protection equipment, specialist breathing systems,

equipment to detect chemicals, radiation ands bio-terrorism agents, first aid and forensic

investigation items, and three levels of decontamination systems for use in the event of

mass casualties. First responders from State and Territory emergency management

organisations were also provided with comprehensive training in the use of the

equipment.118 Some states have matched this investment with allocations of their own

funds. The CBR Enhancement Program, completed in January 2005, comprehensively

upgraded local CBRR capabilities, especially those for first response.

Capability comparison

Comparing the capabilities of the IRR and the civilian jurisdictions, it appears that the

IRR offers a relatively small but very sophisticated and high-quality CBRNER capability.

A particular, and possibly unique, niche capability is the capacity to deal with a CBRN

device. The IRR also has access to high-end, specialised scientific and technical advice.

In concert with the special forces TAGs, the IRR also offers the ability to conduct

extremely high-risk and demanding counter-terrorist operations in a CBR hazard

environment.

117 Philip Ruddock MP, ‘Equipment Boosts preparedness for a Chemical Biological Radiological Incident’ Media release 010/2005, 21 January 2005. 118 Philip Ruddock MP, ‘Equipment Boosts preparedness for a Chemical Biological Radiological Incident’ Media release 010/2005, 21 January 2005.

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The IRR’s CBR consequence management capabilities are small, but relatively high

quality although they are not optimised for mass casualty or decontamination

requirements. Their capacity would be very limited compared with purpose-designed

civilian capabilities, but they could usefully supplement civilian capabilities in long-term

consequent management tasks. The USAR capabilities of the IRR’s Emergency

Response Squadron are probably qualitatively comparable to those of similar-sized

civilian assets, but are very limited in scale. Capabilities for response to high-yield

explosive incidents are similar to those of civilian agencies, although, as noted, the

USAR component of these is small.

By virtue of its principal location at Holsworthy, the IRR could be expected to generate

quite quick responses to incidents in the Sydney Basin. These would not match the

response times of local emergency responders but might be comparable (once activated).

Response times outside Sydney would be extremely slow compared with local agencies

unless elements were pre-positioned for a specific purpose, such as a major security

event.

The IRR’s contribution

In summary, the IRR’s contribution to Australia’s CBRNER capabilities is a small but

robust and qualitatively excellent national capability optimised for crisis management and

surge support to special events. In a no-notice CBRN incident, only Sydney would

benefit from the IRR’s crisis management capabilities: for other areas, the government’s

CBR Enhancement Program has done more to improve crisis response capabilities than

the creation of the IRR. The unit offers little in the management of no-notice high-yield

explosive incidents anywhere, beyond what civilian agencies could achieve.

The existence of the IRR increases options for the management of CBR-related terrorist

incidents, given time to respond. This especially relates to incidents requiring the

integration of special recovery capabilities: there is now the ability to respond to two such

incidents concurrently. The unit has limited capacity for consequence management but

could make a useful contribution to long-term efforts anywhere in Australia.

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Quantitatively, the IRR represents a significant increase in capability over the

(immediately) pre-9/11 CBRR Squadron. It falls short of the quantitative Olympics

benchmark set by the JIRU, most notably in the absence of strong HRS and IEDD

capabilities. Its CBRN response capability is probably quantitatively equivalent,

although the lack of overseas technical expertise ‘on the ground’ could limit some

functions in no-notice situations. The IRR is unlikely to have exceeded the Olympics

benchmark, except more recently in terms of the depth of experience achieved by some

personnel.

In providing a capability benchmark, the IRR has assisted capability development in the

other jurisdictions. The creation of the IRR could also have made the long-term

sustainment of a high-end CBRR capability viable. As an ADF unit with ‘green’ roles,

the IRR also achieves synergies with other parts of the ADO and other homeland security

missions that were not obvious when it was established. These include being a very

attractive ‘drawcard’ for regional engagement and a useful tool for regional counter-

terrorism capacity-building. The unit also provides options for force packages for

overseas deployments that did not exist previously, further expanding government

options.

Case Study Conclusion: The accuracy of government statements

Government’s statements in relation to the IRR, therefore, misrepresent reality by

significantly overstating the unit’s value in managing the most likely type of CBRNE

attack – a no-notice event – especially if that event were to occur outside Sydney.

Government comparisons with the Olympics CBRR capability benchmark may also be

misleading. The unit makes invaluable contributions to special event security and as a

national capability benchmark, but the government has not offered these as reasons for its

establishment.

This is not to suggest that ADO employment decisions in the post-9/11 period have been

guided solely by ‘theatre’ motives, or that ADO involvement is ‘hollow’ or unproductive.

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It is more likely that the value of ADO involvement in demonstrating effectiveness is

seen as a synergistic benefit relative to other options. The ADO’s ability to promptly

demonstrate useful effects may therefore be a factor in decisions to employ it in

homeland security roles.

Other New Political Factors

Brand differentiation

In a pluralist political environment, political entities must differentiate their policy

positions in order to influence public support. The homeland security debate in Australia

since 9/11 has demonstrated this phenomenon. The most significant example of

political ‘brand differentiation’ lies in the differences between the Coalition Government

and the Labor Opposition over the organisation of homeland security coordination

structures and maritime surveillance and border security capabilities:

Homeland security coordination. As discussed earlier, the government has

revitalised the national security architecture, concentrating coordination

responsibility within PM&C and, to a lesser extent, AGD. While a few

organisational adjustments have been made (such as the move of EMA from

Defence to AGD), by and large agencies with homeland security capabilities and

responsibilities have remained dispersed throughout government.

In contrast to this approach, Labor has consistently advocated the creation of a

Department of Homeland Security, similar to the US model, which would assume

responsibility for national homeland security coordination. This has been a

consistent Opposition position for most of the post-9/11 period.119 Labor has

even re-organised its shadow ministry, creating, in June 2005, a Shadow Minister

for Homeland Security.120

119A recent re-articulation was provided on 12 July 2005 by Mr. Arch Bevis MP. ‘Is there a Better Way?’ (presentation to Safeguarding Australia 2005), Canberra, 12 July 2005. 120 This is Arch Bevis, MP, who is also Shadow Minister for Aviation and Transport Security. ‘Arch Bevis MP,’ (biography supplied for Safeguarding Australia 2005).

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Coastal surveillance and security. The government’s response to a perceived

need for improved coastal surveillance and security has been to maintain the

associated capabilities within Defence (the Patrol Boat FEG) and Customs

(Coastwatch), but to improve coordination by creating the JOPC (now BPC).

Labor’s consistent position has been that a paramilitary Coastguard should be

created to provide this function, with a capability transfer from Defence and

Customs.121

The consolidation of these positions is confirmed by the fact that both sides publicly

recognise and criticise each other’s position. As the Opposition, all of Labor’s statements

advocating its position constitute a criticism of the Coalition’s approach. The

government’s recognition of Labor’s position is demonstrated by statements directly

criticising it.122 Labor and the Coalition do not appear to differ on the nature and scale of

the threat, only on the proper response to it.

A subtle example of the brand differentiation effect is found in Coalition terminology,

which now uses the term ‘domestic security’ rather than ‘homeland security’ to distance

itself from the Labor position.123 Brand distinctions have formed parts of respective

election platforms.124 The influence of this phenomenon on the ADO’s involvement has

mainly been to maintain the structural status quo, especially in terms of parts of the Patrol

Boat FEG and the RAAF Maritime Patrol FEG that might otherwise have been

transferred to the new Coastguard. There is still potential for these changes to occur in

the event of a change of government, should Labor decide to implement its declared

policy.

121 Arch Bevis MP, ‘Australia Unprepared for Terrorist Attack Four Years After September 11,’ Media Release 19 September 2005. 122 For example, Phillip Ruddock, ‘Labor Homeland Security Proposals Short-Sighted,’ Ministerial Media Release No. 021/2004: Canberra: Attorney General's Department, 2004. Arch Bevis. Government lazy on homeland security, Australian Labor Party, 2005 [cited 17 January 2006]. Available from http://eherald.alp.org.au/articles/0705/natp13-01.php. 123 Personal conversation with Mr. Mike Norris, Director, Domestic Security and Preparedness Policy, Department of Defence, Canberra, 19 July 2005. 124 Interview: Robert Hill and Kim Beazley, Seven Network, 2004 [cited 17 January 2006]. Available from http://seven.com.au/fedelection04/transcripts_041005_defencedebate.

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Revision of federalism

The Constitution imposes a fundamental influence on Australia’s approach to the

delivery of government services and functions by establishing the distinction between the

federal and state or territory levels of government. This distinction also imposes

fundamental realities and limitations on the capabilities attainable by the states and the

Commonwealth. Those realities apply to virtually all government functions, not merely

homeland security.

There are indications that the current government may increase pressure on the states and

territories to improve their performance in the delivery of services: ideas of revising the

current federal model began to emerge in the media first half of 2005.125 Initially

associated with non-homeland security related functions such as health and education

delivery, debate on the division of responsibility between the state and federal levels has

begun to impinge the national security arena. An incipient trend in this direction is

reflected in the Commonwealth’s more assertive central leadership in homeland security,

dating from the beginning of the post-9/11 period. A more specific association with the

‘federal revision’ debate has emerged more recently with ideas such as the Government’s

September 2005 proposals for an increased Commonwealth role in airport security.126

Should there be a major revision of the responsibilities for domestic security, the ADO’s

involvement in homeland security roles could change significantly. Changes are more

likely to increase the Commonwealth’s role in domestic security than to decrease it. This

does not imply that an increased ADO involvement would automatically follow, as an

increased liability for Commonwealth capabilities could shift the economies and

synergies dynamics of some functions in favour of other options. It is reasonable to

conclude, however, that the current government is showing indications of an intention to

increase federal involvement in the delivery of certain government services, including

homeland security. A decrease in ADO involvement in homeland security areas is

therefore unlikely in the short term.

125 Misha Schubert, ‘PM’s federal vision of ‘inept’ states,’ The Age, 13 April 2005, pp. 1,13,25. 126 John Kerin, ‘Terror squads for airports,’ The Australian, 22 September 2005, p. 1.

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Summary Conclusion

Since 9/11, homeland security has risen significantly in importance on the national

political agenda. Australian governments have recognised and, to some extent,

encouraged its new importance to the electorate. Governments have also recognised a

major political vulnerability in being seen to fail in the face of a homeland security

(terrorism) challenge. Australian governments at state and federal levels have pursued

effective responses to homeland security challenges in order to address both these

realisations, aiming to meet public and international expectations and reduce their

political vulnerability. Consistent with the normal requirements of good governance,

governments have also sought cost-effectiveness in homeland security solutions, although

sometimes they engaged in ‘national security theatre’ by acquiring or proposing the

acquisition of elaborate capabilities, at times even overstating the effectiveness of those

capabilities in order to address public concerns. As a Commonwealth institution, the

ADO’s involvement has contributed to all of these objectives for the Commonwealth

Government. The ADO’s involvement in Australia’s homeland security has changed and

increased since 9/11, for a range of essentially pragmatic political and managerial

reasons.

In general, the achievement of policy changes on the involvement of the ADO in

homeland security became less consistent with incrementalist theory in the immediate

post-9/11 period, with bold adjustments being made in the period up until the end of

2004. As time has gone on, more consistency with incrementalism may be returning.

Some later changes may have been be associated with incremental triggers: for example,

the adjustments to the structure of Special Operations Command in the aftermath of the

Bali Bombings would have been untenable even in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, but

were achievable later as an incremental change over those that had already occurred

(with the creation of Tactical Assault Group – East and the IRR).

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CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSIONS

The preceding chapters have examined the employment of the ADO in Australia’s

homeland security with the aim of identifying those factors that have influenced that

employment since the change to Australia’s security environment heralded by the 11

September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. This chapter draws conclusions

about those factors – the central task of this study – before venturing into a few additional

areas that have arisen in the course of research:

− a predictive assessment of how ADO involvement in homeland security will

develop in the next ten years,

− a prescriptive discussion of development that is needed, including

recommendations for new policy directions, and

− a listing of questions requiring further research.

Conclusions

History

Historically, Australia has relatively little experience of the types of threats that the

contemporary homeland security imperative seeks to address. There has consequently

been little obvious involvement of the ADO in homeland security, which in turn has

provided little opportunity for adverse experiences to arise in relation to that

involvement. Unlike in some other countries, therefore, history has provided little reason

for the Australian population to develop, from its own experience, an aversion to the

sensible use of the ADO in the homeland. Although civil liberty ‘watchdogs’ raise

concerns about the dangers of excessive involvement of the ADO in domestic security,

especially where it involves the use of force, this appears to be an elite debate that does

not resonate with the general public. Any wariness of the use of the ADO in domestic

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security roles is likely to have been inherited from Britain and its political system.

Australia is thus reasonably open to the use of the ADO in homeland security roles, given

sufficient reason. The effect of historical factors on the employment of the ADO in

homeland security roles has been, therefore, to leave open the option of such

employment.

Trigger, threshold and sustaining events

The employment of the ADO in the homeland has varied over time in accordance with

causal events. Analysis of the trajectory of ADO involvement in homeland security since

1978 shows that major changes in the pattern of employment have been stimulated by

such events. The causal events that can be firmly identified are:

− the 1978 Hilton hotel bombing,

− the Sydney 2000 Games,

− the 9/11 attacks themselves, and

− the 2002 bombings of nightclubs in Bali.

These events can be classified into two further categories. Most stimulate change that is

episodic and incremental, adjusting existing threat perceptions and responses rather than

fundamentally altering them. In this thesis, these are classified as trigger events. The

1978 Hilton bombing, Sydney 2000 Games and 2002 Bali bombings fit into this

category, which is further defined by the reasonable amount of discretion afforded to

governments in deciding their response and in the urgency with which they make it.

Other events that do not themselves cause discreet, identifiable adjustments to homeland

security settings can help to sustain the influence of earlier trigger events by sustaining

commitment to the changes that they brought. This usually occurs through the

maintenance of threat perceptions or the need to sustain a certain level of capability in

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order to support the security of a special event. Such events could be classified as

‘sustaining events.’ Examples of sustaining events include some high-profile

international terrorist events of the pre-9/11 period, such as the 1984 siege of the Iranian

Embassy in London. Post-9/11, the 2002 CHOGM in Queensland, the 2003 Marriott

Hotel bombing in Jakarta, the 2004 Madrid train bombing, the 2004 attack on the

Australian Embassy in Jakarta, the July 2005 attacks on the London transport system and

the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games also functioned as sustaining events.

Forthcoming events that are likely to contribute similar effects are APEC 2007 and the

2008 Catholic Youth Conference in Sydney.

The 9/11 attacks themselves constitute a special category of causal event, in that they

produced a fundamental and enduring shift in the security environment. The response to

this shift involved the swiftest and most significant changes to standing homeland

security arrangements in Australia’s history. In the post-9/11 environment, Australia’s

sensitivity to homeland security threats has also increased, such that its responsiveness to

subsequent trigger events is now far greater than previously. In this regard, 9/11 drew

Australia’s homeland security across a threshold into a fundamentally different

environment, re-calibrating threat perceptions and acceptable risk levels. By comparison

with the trigger events identified above, 9/11 constitutes a threshold event in the ADO’s

employment in homeland security roles.

The post-9/11 environment has altered the pattern of ADO involvement in homeland

security. Although homeland security, for the purposes of this study, relates to threats of

violence, trigger events that affect Australia’s homeland security posture need not

themselves involve actual violence. Major activities such as the Sydney 2000 Games can

also lead to changes in the ADO’s homeland security roles, even if no violence

eventuates.

The trigger event effect appears to have operated both before and after 9/11, but it

changed in one important way in the post-9/11 environment. This is that offshore events

can now produce sudden changes in Australia’s homeland security arrangements. None

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of the terrorist attacks that have influenced Australia’s homeland security decisions since

9/11 have occurred on Australian soil, yet they have prompted radical changes. This

contrasts starkly with Australia’s response to international terrorism pre-9/11 and has

added a distinctly international dimension to homeland security.

Although they pre-dated 9/11, the Sydney 2000 Games also influenced the ADO’s

subsequent employment in homeland security roles by prompting the establishment of

new capability benchmarks of which the government was highly aware. Examples

include the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear response capability of the

Incident Response Regiment. In the heightened threat and risk environment that has

existed since 9/11, government’s understanding of and confidence in Defence’s ability to

build and deliver these capabilities reliably has made the ADO a preferred option when a

new response is required. This effect is demonstrated in the rapid establishment of the

Incident Response Regiment and Tactical Assault Group - East.

The policy environment

The trigger event effect is observable in the significant changes to the national security

architecture and policy environment that have come into effect since 9/11. In this setting,

the predominant characteristic of the security environment is the threat of transnational

terrorism and the homeland security policy focus is on addressing that threat. The two

most obvious features of the new environment are the re-assertion of Commonwealth

leadership in homeland security and the much more comprehensive involvement of

Commonwealth agencies. In this situation, Defence’s share of the policy agenda has

diminished relative to other agencies. Defence nevertheless retains a pre-eminent place

in the most senior fora, such as the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC.)

One effect of the new focus on homeland security policy has been to increase government

interest in capability areas to which the ADO is uniquely equipped to contribute, such as

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) response.

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ADO involvement in homeland security

The pattern of ADO involvement in Australia’s homeland security has changed

significantly since 9/11. There has been a large net increase in overall ADO participation

in homeland security missions as well as a widening of involvement from across the

Department.

Tangible evidence of the ADO’s increased involvement in homeland security is found in

the structural adjustments that have been made to it since 9/11. The most obvious of

adjustments are those affecting the ADF, especially the increases to its special operations

(now including CBRNE) capabilities, the establishment of the Border Protection

Command and the raising of the Reserve Response Force companies. Other important

changes to the ADO are less visible. These include the establishment of the Human

Performance and Protection Division within DSTO, the development of dedicated

homeland security-related capacities within Defence’s intelligence agencies and the

creation of staff branches with specific domestic security responsibilities.

Aside from changes to its own structure and capabilities, the post-9/11 environment has

also seen changes to the ADO’s roles in enabling the homeland security capacities of

other agencies. Defence’s long-standing ‘supporting’ roles in the homeland security-

related aspects of foreign relations have grown and diversified, while DSTO now

occupies a central place in national homeland security science and technology efforts.

Balancing this increased involvement is a slight reduction in the ADO’s role in

benchmarking national homeland security capabilities. The latter trend emerged in the

pre-9/11 period but has continued subsequently as other agencies have grown their

capabilities.

Categories of involvement

ADO involvement in both pre- and post-9/11 homeland security missions can be

categorised as:

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Surge support. The ADO has provided support for limited periods to assist state

and territory jurisdictions to ‘surge’ to higher levels of capability, both

qualitatively and quantitatively. Quantitative surge support may often involve

relatively unsophisticated capabilities, such as low-risk (operational) search.

Surge requirements arise in response to increases in either the ‘real’ ambient

threat or the inferred threat associated with special event security.

Unique national capability. When the ADO is the sole source of a capability

that is indispensable to a homeland security mission, its involvement becomes

inevitable. This effect applies to capabilities that are required infrequently or that

are so expensive that their duplication within a civilian jurisdiction is

unaffordable. Government may direct the ADO to maintain unique national

capabilities that are optimised for homeland security rather than ‘warfighting’ –

for example, the RAN Patrol Boat FEG or the special forces TAGs. This category

of employment can be both routine and surge.

Pre-existing like capability. Where the ADO maintains a capability with

‘incidental’ application to homeland security, that capability can be employed on

homeland security missions when required (routinely or for surge). Some such

capabilities may be unique to the ADO, or may be similar to capabilities

maintained by civilian agencies (‘like’ capabilities).

High Risk. The ADO has historically been involved in homeland security

missions that hold, for the Commonwealth government, a high risk of failure.

Governments place great value on the ability to call, with confidence, on the

necessary capabilities in high-risk situations. By implication, those situations are

normally examples of surge requirements. The ADO’s reliability as a source of

capability has ensured its involvement in the relevant mission areas. This

category of employment has become more important in the post-9/11 threat

environment.

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Factors Influencing the ADO’s Involvement in Homeland Security.

A range of factors have influenced the ADO’s involvement in homeland security. These

can be classified into the three broad categories of legal, political and managerial factors.

Legal factors

The most significant legal factor affecting the involvement of the ADO in homeland

security is the Constitution’s assignment of the national defence power to the

Commonwealth and the domestic security power to the states and territories. This creates

a ‘normalcy’ in Australian domestic security affairs in which the involvement of the

ADO requires a decision of the Commonwealth government. Any factors affecting the

involvement of the ADO in homeland security therefore must be ones that bear on

Commonwealth government decisions.

A second impact of the Constitution’s allocation of powers and responsibilities is to

create a situation whereby both the states and the Commonwealth bear some

responsibility for homeland security, including protection against domestic violence, but

only the Commonwealth can underwrite the most serious security measures because only

it is authorised to maintain military forces. This means that the involvement of the ADO

in addressing Australia’s most serious security challenges is inevitable and that the states

and territories will expect the Commonwealth to make ADO capabilities available in

those circumstances.

Other than establishing the fundamental responsibilities of the Commonwealth, there is

little evidence that legal factors have significantly constrained or directed Commonwealth

government decisions on the employment of the ADO in homeland security roles. Most

amendments to relevant legislation since Federation have acted to increase government

discretion in not providing ADO support to the states for domestic security tasks, rather

than to limit governments’ ability to so employ the ADO when necessary. The 2006

amendments to Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act, for example, provide for expedited call

out of the ADF to protect the states against domestic violence, but also formalise a

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requirement for the responsible ministers to satisfy themselves that a sufficient state of

domestic violence exists to justify call out. The principal exceptions to this

generalisation (that legislation does not limit government’s discretion) are international

agreements that impose a specific homeland security duty on the Commonwealth, such as

the law governing the protection of internationally protected persons.

The essential federal legislation, consisting of the Constitution and the Defence Act,

assigns the Commonwealth clear responsibilities for national security and gives it broad

discretion in how it fulfills those responsibilities. Legal factors, therefore, have not

exerted a significant influence on government decisions on the employment or non-

employment of the ADO in homeland security roles either before or since 9/11.

Political factors

Many government decisions on the employment of the ADO in homeland security prior

to 9/11 can be explained by pragmatic political considerations. This tendency has

continued in the subsequent period, although some new dimensions to political factors

have emerged. The tests of political pragmatism in this context are whether or not a

particular case of ADO employment is necessary for Australia’s homeland security and

whether or not it promotes or detracts from the government’s political interests.

The political considerations influencing government decisions on the employment of the

ADO in homeland security can be classified in several categories:

Responsibilities and expectations. Government responsibilities for homeland

security are determined by the Constitution, by governments’ own

conceptualisations of their responsibilities and by the domestic and international

expectations that they feel obliged to satisfy. In fulfilling their responsibilities,

governments employ the resources at their disposal – in the Commonwealth’s

case, this includes the ADO. Failure to fulfill a responsibility as important as

domestic security could be expected to be politically damaging for any

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government – as a result, governments will tend to take these responsibilities

seriously and apply the resources necessary to meet them.

Both domestic and international expectations have grown in the post-9/11 period,

largely due to the increased threat. This has increased the weight of government

responsibilities for homeland security, with a consequent effect on the resources

allocated to them. Those resources have included ADO capabilities.

Responsibility pressures have influenced state and territory governments, as well

as the Commonwealth. Although these jurisdictions cannot make ADO

employment decisions, the level of capability they generate themselves influences

the extent of the additional capability that the Commonwealth must be able to

supply in order to guarantee states’ protection in extremis. In some cases, the

increase in state capabilities has reduced the range of circumstances in which

ADO support might be required, but has not eliminated the need for ADO support

altogether. As a result, the Commonwealth government has had no option but to

continue to involve the ADO in homeland security roles as necessary to fulfill its

own obligations.

Threat perceptions. The defining characteristic of Australian homeland security

threshold events is their ability to create a perception that the threat to the

Australian homeland has credibly and significantly increased. Two types of

perceived threat appear to operate: an ambient threat that affects Australia

generally and an ‘inferred’ threat associated with significant international events –

such as the Sydney 2000 Games. These threats motivate government responses

through their effect on responsibilities and expectations.

The 9/11 and Bali attacks were threshold events because they raised the perceived

ambient threat level – 9/11 by making international terrorism a credible threat to

Western homelands generally and Bali by making it a threat to Australians in their

region specifically. These events represent a shift in Australian threat perception

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behaviour, however, in that they occurred offshore. Prior to 9/11, Australian

governments’ homeland security threat perceptions and policy decisions were

only influenced by events on Australian soil. In the post-9/11 world, Australian

governments have been prepared to re-calibrate their threat perceptions because of

international events.

Threat perceptions set the likelihood, dangerousness and complexity

characteristics of homeland security challenges for which responsible

governments must be prepared. These influence the employment of the ADO

through their impact on risk calculations – the more likely and dangerous a threat

and the more difficult it is to deal with, the less risk a government can tolerate in

responding to it. Where employing the ADO represents the least risk option in

addressing a threat, it tends to be the government’s preferred course.

A final assessment of the influence of threat perceptions must await the de-

classification of the official threat assessments on which government judgements

are based.

Options. In the new and more dangerous post-9/11 security environment, the

premium placed by governments on their freedom of action has never been

higher. This imperative applies to both the Commonwealth and the state and

territory governments. In the post-9/11 threat environment, the risk of failure in

responding to a serious homeland security challenge has driven governments to

unprecedented measures to guarantee themselves options. This trend is reflected

in investments in crisis and consequence management capabilities for terrorist

incidents.

Logic suggests that the more dangerous the potential outcomes of an incident are,

the more critical it is that governments have realistic response options. Treatment

options must be reliably available and effective – governments can tolerate little

risk in these areas. Given these requirements, the reliability of the ADO as a

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guarantor of government options in the highest risk contingencies has been

irresistible in the port-9/11 period. This is unlikely to change until alternative

sources of options enjoy the same level of government confidence as the ADO.

In the absence of real incidents to test ADO capabilities, the effectiveness of those

capabilities cannot be accurately gauged but it is reasonable to conclude, on the

basis of the resources and priority they attract, that those capabilities satisfy

government expectations of effectiveness.

New political dimensions. In the post-9/11 environment, the employment of the

ADO in homeland security roles has acquired a high political value for the

Commonwealth Government. The creation of ADO capabilities has provided a

convincing demonstration of a swift, tangible and credible response to the new

terrorist threat and the government has relied on this effect consistently. Not only

has this reduced the government’s risk of being left without options in a

dangerous crisis, it has also satisfied the electorate that ‘something is being done.’

This has bought time to find solutions to more difficult problems, such as

infrastructure security. While the increase in the ADO’s capabilities is impressive

and important, its net contribution to Australia’s security may not measure up to

all the government’s claims (as, for example, in the case of the Incident Response

Regiment). The ADO’s involvement in post-9/11 homeland security may thus

also constitute some ‘theatre’ in support of the government’s objectives.

The political debate on Australia’s homeland security has, predictably, seen the

parties seek to differentiate their policies. The different national homeland

security architecture models proposed by the Coalition and the Labor Opposition

employ the ADO differently – particularly in relation to alternatives such as a

Commonwealth Department of Homeland Security and a Coastguard. This brand

differentiation has become entrenched, such that the associated ADO employment

patterns are now linked to party policy. While the current pattern is secure for the

tenure of the current policy, a change of government could see it altered

significantly.

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There are indications that the current Commonwealth government is dissatisfied

with aspects of Australia’s model of federalism – in particular, with some states’

performance in the delivery of government services. Stresses placed on the

federal system by the post-9/11 national security challenges may have coincided

with this general dissatisfaction. Should a revision of state and Commonwealth

roles see an increased Commonwealth involvement in domestic security matters,

there could be a flow-on effect for ADO involvement.

Managerial factors

Government homeland security decisions are also influenced by the need to achieve

efficient and effective solutions to challenges. Like political considerations, these

managerial factors are also pragmatic in nature. These factors focus on what is achievable

in homeland security and how it can best be achieved:

Resources. Resource considerations are often the most pragmatic of all

influences on government decisions. A fundamental role of any government is to

determine the allocation of resources to the various functions for which it is

responsible. Homeland security is a government responsibility that competes for

resources with other functions. Its resourcing is influenced by threat perceptions.

Resources determine the extent of capabilities that can be generated. The greater

financial resources available to the Commonwealth government therefore enable

it to develop and maintain greater levels of capability than the states and

territories. Without a significant transfer of resources, the Commonwealth is thus

always likely to retain national high-end homeland security capabilities,

especially in the most expensive capability areas. Nevertheless, because of their

newly enhanced capabilities some states will be more confident in their response

to homeland security challenges and less likely to request Commonwealth

assistance.

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Since 9/11, the allocation of resources to Australian homeland security measures,

at both the state and Commonwealth levels, has been unprecedented. The ADO

has been the beneficiary of a large part of the Commonwealth expenditure on

homeland security, allowing it to increase its capabilities significantly. While the

states have also increased their spending, the relative gap between

Commonwealth and state resource levels has remained. The gap in capabilities

thus also remains, although it has been reduced in some cases.

The homeland security resource picture has influenced government decisions on

the employment of the ADO by enabling the latter to maintain qualitatively and

quantitatively superior capabilities in those homeland security areas to which it

contributes. Given this reality, Commonwealth governments are likely to prefer

to employ ADO capabilities in demanding or high-risk situations. The

establishment of the National Terrorist Situation as a means of imposing

Commonwealth control over a serious terrorist incident supports this conclusion.

In dangerous situations, state governments are unlikely to resist a Commonwealth

offer of ADO support if the capabilities on offer are superior to their own.

Synergies. Scarcity of resources and the historical government drive for

economy have also influenced the ADO’s employment in homeland security

because of the synergies that can be obtained in some areas. The incidental

benefits of establishing or maintaining a capability within the ADO (rather than

elsewhere) may not be obvious initially, but once appreciated they can become

powerful reasons for doing so. The synergistic benefits of some homeland

security capabilities developed within the ADF have recently been demonstrated

in offshore military operations in support of the International Coalition Against

Terrorism, as well as in regional engagement and capacity-building efforts.

Having been thus made aware of them, it is unlikely that a government would

relinquish those benefits lightly.

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Synergy considerations sometimes arise because of ‘critical mass’ issues: due to

the small scale of certain homeland security capabilities maintained in Australia

prior to 9/11, the relatively large size of the ADO made it an economical

organisation in which to maintain some of the more expensive and demanding

homeland security capabilities – especially those associated with the use of force.

The growth in homeland security capabilities achieved in most jurisdictions since

9/11 – raising their critical mass - could be influencing synergy dynamics.

Nevertheless, the fundamental focus of the ADO on the application of lethal force

is likely to ensure that synergy arguments involving the most extreme homeland

security roles continue to favour the ADO’s employment in those roles.

Priorities. Prior to 9/11, threat perceptions allowed much closer competition

between homeland security requirements and other government priorities. The

post-9/11 threshold event effect has clarified these priorities, such that homeland

security now contends with far fewer competitors for government attention. This

has led to significantly increased resource flows, which have funded the increases

in ADO capabilities.

The increase in ADO homeland security capabilities has created some redundancy

that may simplify priority decisions on the use of those capabilities: with two

Tactical Assault Groups, for example, a decision to use one of them is less risky.

Overall, the rise of homeland security in the government’s priorities has increased

the ADO’s involvement in it and made its employment in a homeland security

crisis situation more likely.

Theoretical consistency

The development of Australia’s policy on the employment of its Defence Organisation on

homeland security tasks, both before and since 9/11, is generally consistent with

incrementalism theory. Although the ‘threshold’ effect of 9/11 effects broke with

incremental development, the general pattern of changes has been one of incremental

policy making. Until 9/11, that process has not been highly politically charged, but the

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higher political profile of homeland security post-9/11 has added a new political

dimension to that incremental development.

Summary Conclusion

Significant involvement of the ADO in Australia’s homeland security is long-established.

Consistent with this history, the increase in real and inferred threats to the homeland in

the post-9/11 environment has led to increased ADO involvement in domestic security

matters. Government decisions on the employment of the ADO in homeland security

have, characteristically, amounted to pragmatic people making pragmatic choices for

pragmatic political and managerial reasons. Given the national (and political) importance

of effective homeland security, this is unlikely to change while the perceived threat level

prevails. A change of government could see some adjustments to Australia’s homeland

security architecture, with consequent changes in aspects of ADO involvement, but a

comprehensive ADO withdrawal from homeland security missions is unlikely.

Likely Developments

The predictive value of the social sciences is notoriously poor and the defence and

strategic studies discipline is no exception. Nevertheless, it is appropriate in a study of

this type to venture an assessment of how the area under examination may develop.

The high profile of homeland security on Australia’s political agenda is likely to endure

for several years due to the threshold event effects of 9/11 and subsequent developments.

A robust homeland security capability will, therefore, continue to be nationally and

politically important. The realities of government responsibilities and expectations and

the demand for options will keep Commonwealth governments risk averse as long as the

current perceived threat levels apply. As a result, the ADO will remain the government’s

preferred source of capabilities to address high-risk missions. The ADO is therefore

likely continue to maintain associated high-end capabilities, such as domestic special

recovery and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive response.

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The constant stream of high-profile international events scheduled to be held in Australia

over the next few years will maintain a significant level of inferred threat, generating

recurrent requirements for surge support to the civilian jurisdictions. This will continue

to exert a ‘sustaining event’ influence, ensuring that the ADO remains a major

contributor to special event security and may lead to further, incremental structural

adjustments and doctrinal development to address those requirements.

The dynamics of resources, synergies and priorities may change at the margins. If there

is sustained state and territory investment in homeland security capabilities, the

Commonwealth’s liability to maintain those capabilities on behalf of the states may

reduce, with a consequent reduction in demand for ADO support. This is unlikely,

however, to eliminate the requirement for ADO support, especially in the smaller

jurisdictions with fewer resources.

A change of government could see a significant change to the national security

architecture, most particularly if a Department of Homeland Security is created. Given

the political capital that has been invested in that part of the Opposition’s platform, non-

implementation would be unlikely. The resource and synergy arguments against the

creation of a Coastguard, however, are strong. With the benefit of incumbency, a Labor

government might be dissuaded from that course of action. If a Coastguard were to be

established, its first few years would probably be tumultuous as it underwent significant,

iterative restructuring to fix initial duplications, inefficiencies and impracticalities. The

likely long-term outcome would be a slow regression towards the Border Protection

Command model, in which the successor to the current Customs (Coastwatch)

component might retain more robust capabilities than presently.

Over the long term, there will probably be a continued slow migration of some missions

and capability benchmarks from Defence into civilian agencies, especially if the current

levels of state and territory investment are maintained.

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New legislation specifically governing the employment of the ADO in homeland security

missions could be introduced within the next few years, although the passage of the 2006

Part IIIAAA amendment package seems to have alleviated the urgency of further

amendments. Any new legislation is likely to refine or augment Section 51 and Part

IIIAAA of the Defence Act to further codify ADO domestic security roles that have

already emerged since 9/11 – such as air or maritime interception for domestic counter-

terrorism purposes.

Policy Recommendations

Through the course of this study, shortcomings in the ADO’s involvement in homeland

security have been identified both explicitly and implicitly. The following policy

recommendations seek to address those shortcomings:1

1. Develop a Defence domestic security strategy. The range of potential

ADO contributions to homeland security is extensive, including missions such as

health (aeromedical evacuation, medical support and quarantine), chemical,

biological, radiological and nuclear response (beyond the current Incident

Response Regiment capability), specialist search in response to specific threats,

critical infrastructure protection, urban search and rescue, border protection and

response to short- or no-notice incidents. Current strategic guidance, which is a

legacy of the Defence of Australia concept, does not provide sufficient direction

to plot a way ahead in all these areas. This suggests the need for a dedicated

strategy for Defence support to homeland security. Given the new, inclusive

whole of government homeland security ‘community,’ however, Defence cannot

develop such a strategy in isolation. Ideally, it should be derived as a subordinate

strategy to a comprehensive national domestic security strategy. The National

Counter Terrorism Committee process could provide the focus for such a national

strategy.

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2. Determine capability benchmarks. Research has not discovered, in any

open sources, evidence of a legitimately scientific process whereby the capability

requirements of homeland security missions are determined. This relates

especially to response and recovery capabilities, in which there are indications of

significant variations among the civilian jurisdictions and the ADO. In the

absence of robustly derived benchmarks supported by appropriate metrics, sound

capability judgements are extremely difficult. This is likely to ensure that

Commonwealth governments make conservative decisions in relation to the

involvement of ADO in homeland security, erring on the side of minimising risk.

There are good operational security reasons for the details of capability

benchmarks to be classified, but they should exist. The operations research skills

of the Defence Science and Technology Organisation could be readily applied to

the development of benchmarks and appropriate metrics. With these, it should be

possible to accurately gauge the resource requirements of each capability, to set

agreed capability levels for the various jurisdictions to maintain, to measure

performance in maintaining those levels, and to determine the additional

capability that the Commonwealth must maintain in fulfillment of its

Constitutional obligations under Section 119. Synergies should also be easier to

identify and monitor, informing judgements on the migration of capabilities and

associated benchmarking responsibilities between the jurisdictions.

There are indications that a benchmarking framework is being approached

incrementally, with the first area being individual training. For example, the

national accreditation of some applicable police skills, such as bomb response and

explosive detection dog handling. Much more needs to be done, however. Other

aspects of capability, such as personnel numbers, equipment, doctrine and skills

currency also need to be ‘codified’ and auditable. The benefit of an effective

benchmarking system will be the ability to formalise capability levels and

1 These recommendations are adapted from a set developed collaboratively with Anthony Bergin and published jointly in our co-authored Strategic Insights Paper No. 31, Australian domestic security: The role

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expectations between the Commonwealth and the other jurisdictions. As a

supporting actor in domestic security, this is in the ADO’s interest.

3. Standardise special event security. Procedures for Commonwealth,

including ADO, support to major international events held in the various state

jurisdictions should be standardised. Despite the relative frequency of these

events in recent years, there is still evidence of an ad hoc approach in negotiating

and designing the support arrangements for each. Under these circumstances

inefficiencies are inevitable, as important lessons are re-learned by different

people. Given the virtual inevitability of ADO involvement in aspects of major

event security, there are two initiatives that should be considered. First, the merit

of assigning standing responsibilities for special event support to a designated

agency should be evaluated and, if appropriate, implemented. This will reduce

‘ad hocery’ and ensure that relevant experience is retained. This could be an

appropriate task for an Army Reserve organisation, given adequate Regular

supplementation.

Second, standardised ADO special event support ‘packages,’ with supporting

doctrine, should be developed. These will make planning easier for both the

ADO and the supported jurisdiction. Packages should specify quantitative and

qualitative capability levels, command and control arrangements, logistic support

requirements and, where appropriate, costs. A capability benchmarking system

would support this effort in the long term, but the significant experience that has

been gained recently should enable initial packages to be developed without one.

4. Increase the role of the Defence Force Reserves. The ADF’s high

operational tempo places a premium on the availability of highly trained full time

personnel for overseas deployments. Some of this pressure could be alleviated by

dedicating Reserve personnel to suitable homeland security tasks. The Army

Reserve, in particular, would lend itself well to such tasks: widely distributed

of Defence, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2006, pp. 17-22.

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throughout Australia, its personnel are already strategically deployed close to

likely task sites, have local knowledge and contacts and, as members of their local

communities, bring a set of life skills and experience that is very suitable for

homeland security duties where they will have frequent contact with the public.

Effective use of the Reserve in these roles would also contribute to community

relations, with flow-on effects to recruiting.

One potential disadvantage of a more extensive homeland security role for the

Reserve is that this might encourage state and local authorities to transfer risk and

cost to the Commonwealth by leaving their own homeland security capabilities

under-developed.

5. Review training and professional military education. The delivery of

homeland security awareness and training to members of the ADO remains ad

hoc and patchy. This should be addressed with structured education and training,

much as is delivered for ADO roles that are considered core business. There is

scope to extend this into the ranks of civilian homeland security agencies by

integrating suitable Police and emergency services personnel into ADF courses

and exercises.

6. Improve local liaison and relationships. Currently, Defence invests

little in the regional liaison mechanisms that are the critical interfaces between the

ADO and civilian agencies in a crisis. This function is performed by the Defence

Support Group and is rarely supported by high quality staff. The continual

‘churn’ of military personnel rotating through these local liaison positions further

hampers the development of good working relationships. A higher priority on the

staffing of these positions would yield enormous benefits in the planning for

special events and in a crisis.

7. Develop doctrine. The current lack of doctrine for homeland security

causes inefficiency by forcing lessons to be re-learnt with every successive

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homeland security mission. The absence of doctrine also encourages the

marginalisation of homeland security in an organisation that celebrates doctrine,

sustaining the notion that it is not core business.

8. Adjust Defence culture. Despite the impressive capability development

that it has undergone since 9/11, the ADO still demonstrates a cultural aversion to

homeland security tasks in some quarters. There is evidence of a subliminal

reluctance to embrace homeland security tasks that places the ADO at risk of

failing to meet government and popular expectations in a crisis. The importance

of homeland security as core business needs to be better understood within

Defence.

9. Conduct no-warning exercises. The scope of ADO participation in

national anti-terrorism exercises needs to be broadened to test elements other than

the traditional TAGs. Exercises should be conducted with no warning in order to

test realistically the level of capability available.

Areas for Further Research

This study has focused on a specific aspect of homeland security. In the process, areas in

which further research would be useful have become evident. These include:

Capability benchmarking. As discussed in the suggestion raised above, a robust

framework of benchmarks for homeland security capabilities would support

cooperative arrangements between the jurisdictions and the Commonwealth and

facilitate decisions on the employment of the ADO. No such system appears to

currently exist, although there are indications of evolutionary efforts in that direction.

There is an opportunity for focused research to provide important early guidance in

this work before the evolutionary efforts progress too far. The research techniques

involved would require access to sophisticated operations research and operational

analysis skills. The scope of the research would include the development of

capability metrics to support the benchmarking system.

336

The necessarily classified nature of some capabilities and the sensitivity of their

status mean that this work would need to be done in a classified environment:

research might, therefore, best be undertaken by the Defence Science and

Technology Organisation or another government agency. The ‘customer’ for this

research would probably be the Protective Security Coordination Centre, on behalf of

the National Counter Terrorism Committee.

Constituency issues. Given its inevitable impact on the population, decisions on the

involvement of the ADO in homeland security should take into consideration the

expectations of the Australian people. This relates particularly to the ADF, which is

in an unusual position as a government agency in that it is also a public institution

with a public ‘constituency.’ That constituency has mostly been a collective one: until

recently the public has recognised the ADF in terms of it public ‘brands:’ Navy,

Army and Air Force. More recently, the ADF has started to become a brand in its

own right. Unlike most other Commonwealth government agencies, the ADF has a

‘personal’ relationship with the population that is affected by its actions. The ADF’s

relationship with the Australian people is currently very good, due to its highly

creditable contributions to recent operations. Maintenance of that relationship is

important to the long-term health of the ADF, especially in the light of demographic

predictions and their likely impact on personnel.

There is little authoritative material in the public domain on the public’s view of

ADO involvement in homeland security. This information would usefully inform

decisions on that involvement. Research should involve relatively sophisticated

polling of the population to determine attitudes to things such as threat perception and

expectations of the ADO in crises and in the ‘steady state.’ Research and results

should be unclassified and should be published as widely as possible, with updates at

suitable intervals. With adequate funding, this research could be undertaken by an

appropriate contractor.

337

Australia will face homeland security challenges as long as it exists, and will probably

retain a Defence Organisation for as long. Appropriate homeland security measures will

require sound decisions on the employment of all national resources, including those of

Defence. Whichever theory best describes those decision-making processes, good

decisions will only be made with the assistance of competent advisors armed with solid

research. It is hoped that this thesis has added to the knowledge on which those decisions

can be made.

338

APPENDICES

339

HOMELAND SECURITY-RELATED DEFENCE STRATEGIC GUIDANCE 1973-2005

Source Principal Themes HLS References NBCD References WMD ReferencesHLS-related DSTO roles & capabilities

HLS-related ADO tasking & force structure prescriptions

Terrorism/CT References

Civil Defence References

DACP/DFACA References

Australian Defence:Report on the Reorganisation of The Defence Group of Departments 19731

Reorganistion of the Defence group of Government Departments in the interests of greater efficiency No specific mention No specific mention No specific mention No specific mention

Civil defence responsibilities of DoD (53) No specific mention

Directorate of Civil Defence should be absorbed by a new 'National Disasters Organisation' (53)Director of Civil Defence shown in existing organisation (Annex A)National Disaters Organisation shown in revised structure under 'Outrider Organisations Supervised by a Deputy Secretary' (Annex E) No specific mention

Australian Defence 1976 Self-reliance

Only in the context of aid to the civil power in CT operations (27)

No specific reference

Reference to USSR nuclear build-up (11). No regional proliferation concerns. No mention.

Natural Disasters Organisation (25-6).Mention of natural disasters only in 'peacetime,' but also the 'core' civil defence capability.

Force-in-being should be capable of CT support under DACP (27).

Role of NDO (25).

Force-in-being should be capable of CT support under DACP (27).

The Defence of Australia 1987

Self-relianceEmphasis on 'Defence of Australia' tasks

Only in the context of foreign incursions (LLC and ELLC) (3.14). VAP role for Regular and Reserve Forces (3.14, 4.91). Military and civilian infrastructure & population in the north need protection (3.24).

No regional threat in prospect(4.35).ADF maintains only low-level 'basic' NBCD capabilities (4.36).Scientific competence maintained for policy advice and to guide training (4.36). No specific mention

Scientific competence maintained for policy advice and to guide training (4.36).

RFSUs (in DA scenarios) (4.25). No specific mention

Role of NDO (25). No specific mention

340

HOMELAND SECURITY-RELATED DEFENCE STRATEGIC GUIDANCE 1973-2005

Source Principal Themes HLS References NBCD References WMD ReferencesHLS-related DSTO roles & capabilities

HLS-related ADO tasking & force structure prescriptions

Terrorism/CT References

Civil Defence References

DACP/DFACA References

Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s (1989)2

Self-relianceDefence of AustraliaAnticipating a peace divident

Natural disaster relief (4.3)'Other activities…?' (4.3)Otherwise, only VAP and reaction to/defeat of incursions onto Australian territory (4.31, 5.9, 5.23-30) No mention

Possible proliferation in South Asia associated with India-Pakistan-China competition (1.8, 3.28). No specific mention No specific mention No specific mention

Natural disater relief (4.3) No specific mention

Force Structure Review 19913

Self-reliance.Reducing 'teeth-to-tail' ratio.Northern and western basing and focus.Maximum use of Reserves.

Only in the context of foreign incursions (LLC and ELLC). VAP in DA scenarios (emphasises role of Reserves) (pp. 22-3) No specific mention No specific mention No specific mention

Northern basing.VAP/defeat of incursions capability and structure direction. No specific mention

No specific mention No specific mention

Strategic Review 19932

Defence of Australia focus.

VAP as a Defence role (5.32).Primacy of civil authorities (5.34).

DSTO role in support of DFAT counter-proliferation efforts.'Not a priority for Defence,' but 'a modest level of expertise' maintained to support DFAT (2.22).

Counter-proliferation an important task (2.15).

NBCD 'not a priority for Defence,' but 'a modest level of expertise' maintained to support DFAT (2.22).

Defence should not develop capabilities for which other government agencies are responsible (5.34). No specific mention Some mention.

Mentioned as a role for Defence.

Defending Australia 1994

Defence of Australia focus.

maritime approaches/norther Australia could have HLS value (5.15).ADF presence in northern Australia important for the civil-

research capability supports DFAT in non-proliferation issues (12.31).Value of international copperation in

supporting non-proliferation (10.24). 'Modest' NBCD research capability supports DFAT in non-proliferation issues (12.31).

mention of NBCD expertise in DSTO (Table 12-1).No mention of support to Australian government agencies in HLS.

Coastal surveillance (13.14-15).Disaster relief (13.7-9).

authorities (mentions 2000 Olympics tasks) (13.12).CT training in Australia in the context of regional engagement (13.13).

EMA role (7.40, 13.10).

Bomb disposal support to civil authorities (13.18). NB. Conventional EO, not IED focused.

341

HOMELAND SECURITY-RELATED DEFENCE STRATEGIC GUIDANCE 1973-2005

Source Principal Themes HLS References NBCD References WMD ReferencesHLS-related DSTO roles & capabilities

HLS-related ADO tasking & force structure prescriptions

Terrorism/CT References

Civil Defence References

DACP/DFACA References

Australia's Strategic Policy 19972

focus.Growing regional military capability.Asia-Pacific focus (9)WMD non-proliferation (regional) (8)Security alliances

In context of defeating attacks on Australia (29-30)No current reason to expect an attack on Australia of any form (37)

CW protection capabilities needed At short notice in Gulf War 90-91 (40)

WMD non-proliferation a priority.Regional WMD proliferation not in prospect, but would be a concern. Missile proliferation potentiates risk of WMD (31)

Defence should continue research into defence against WMD (31)

High-end CT capabilities and coastal and maritime surveillance, fisheries enforcement etc. are standing exceptions to the principle of non-involvement in civil tasks (35)

ADF is best placed to provide high-end CT capabilities to the civil community - a standing exception to the principle of non-involvement in civil tasks (35)

No specific mention

Mentioned as a role for Defence, but as a low priority and the sense is that it is to be avoided if possible (34-5).

In the National Interest 19974

Asia-Pacific and trade liberalisation as focii of foreign policy (iii). No mention. No mention.

WMD control regimes a priority (vii).Keeping NW out of the Asia-Pacific a priority (2).In Australia's interests for CB weapons to be banned (2).WMD proliferation a key global security issue for Australia (40). No mention No mention.

In Australia's interest for terrorism to be contained (2). No mention. No mention.

Australian Perspectives on Defence 20005

Strong support for the ADF.Increased attntion to Defence required.

Concern with non-military threats (illegal immigration, drug smuggling, attacks on information systems, terrorism) and support for ADF assistance to other agencies in dealing with these (7)Defence should have an increased role in control and coordination of coastal surveillance (12)Defence presence in the North important for public perceptions of security (27) No mention. No mention.

Technological base needed to address assymetric threats (16) No mention. No mention.

Search and rescue and disaster relief (8)Role for reservists (21)

Search and rescue and disaster relief (implied) (8)

342

HOMELAND SECURITY-RELATED DEFENCE STRATEGIC GUIDANCE 1973-2005

Source Principal Themes HLS References NBCD References WMD ReferencesHLS-related DSTO roles & capabilities

HLS-related ADO tasking & force structure prescriptions

Terrorism/CT References

Civil Defence References

DACP/DFACA References

Defence 2000

Defence of Australia.Self-reliance.WMC non-proliferation.

Peacetime National Tasks' identified: - CT- EMA/civil emergency response- 2000 Olympics support (6.25)Coastal surveillance, emergency management, support to wider community needs (xii)

Threat to Australia downplayed (3.39).

Australian interest in non-proliferation regimes (x).WMD proliferation threat concern (2.2).India-Pakistan nuclear concerns (3.18).WMD proliferation as an external threat source (3.52).Strategic importance to Australia of WMD non-proliferation (4.12).

No mention of NBCD or support to DFAT efforts in relation to science & technology .

Government will use ADO capabilities in HLS where appropriate, but will continue to optimise the ADF for the defence of Australia from armed attack (2.20).

Terrorism is a threat to 'national life' (viii).Terprism is an important 'non-military' threat (2.13).Defence CT capability supports police forces (2.18).SASR will continue to provide CT caspability (8.18).No mention of Indonesian terrorism (3.23-7).

No specific mention of the term

No specific mention of the term

Defence Update 2003

Terrorism.WMD proliferation (including use by terrorists).

Domestic layer' of defence is shared between Commonwealth and States, but ADF has skills and knowledge to contribute (p.17).

Extensive mention of CBRN terrorist threats.IRR is a Government response to CBRNE threats (p.24).

Specific section on WMD threats (p. 15).Non-proliferation controls still important (16).WMD use by terrorists a major concern.

No mention of DSTO (including CBRNDC).

Increase in the size of SF.Establishment of SOCOM.Enhanced CT Capability:- Establishment of TAG East.- Advancing some intelligence projects.- Additional troop lift helicopters.Raising of IRR. (p. 24)

Specific mention of global and regional terrorist threats (pp. 11-12).Heavy mention of CT capabilities as part of Government response (pp. 13-14).

IRR role in supplementing State & Territory capabilities to respond to CBRN incidents.

No specific use of the term.

343

HOMELAND SECURITY-RELATED DEFENCE STRATEGIC GUIDANCE 1973-2005

Source Principal Themes HLS References NBCD References WMD ReferencesHLS-related DSTO roles & capabilities

HLS-related ADO tasking & force structure prescriptions

Terrorism/CT References

Civil Defence References

DACP/DFACA References

Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia 20046

Transnational terrorist threats to Australia

Impact of cooperation in multi-national counter-terrorist measures (70) Reference to NCTP (72)Threat to sovereign territory (72)International and domestic counter-terrorism efforts are complementary (77)Formation of TAG East and IRR for response to terrorist incidents in Australia (101)Infrastructure security (102)

Threat from CBRN terrorism (73-4)IRR and contribution to regional CBRN capacity-building (95)Formation of IRR for response to CBRN incidents in Australia (101)

Threat from CBRN terrorism (73-4)WMD non-proliferation linked to counter-terrorism (83)PSI & ADF involvement in combined exercises (84) No specific mention

(Implied) ADF involvement in regional counter-terrorism capability development (85-6)DIO/DSD involvement in inter-agency counter-terrorism intelligence activities (88)Formation of TAG East and IRR for response to terrorist incidents in Australia (101)

Reference to NCTP (72)International and domestic counter-terrorism efforts are complementary (77)ADF involvement in regional CT capability enhancement (95-6)ADF collaboration with EMA in regional capacity building (96)

No specific mention, but consequence management mentioned in relation to terrorist incidents (not specifically ADO-related) No specific mention

344

HOMELAND SECURITY-RELATED DEFENCE STRATEGIC GUIDANCE 1973-2005

Source Principal Themes HLS References NBCD References WMD ReferencesHLS-related DSTO roles & capabilities

HLS-related ADO tasking & force structure prescriptions

Terrorism/CT References

Civil Defence References

DACP/DFACA References

Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 20047

National counter terrorism policy and arrangements, whole-of-government approach

Principal focus on homeland security, covering all aspects

Bio-terrorism countermeasures (vi)CBRN R&D effort(x)New measures for CBRN response(8)CBRN incident could constitute a NTS (11)Australia Group is significant in CB non-proliferation (15)CBRN counter-measures a priority CT S&T research area (47)New whole-of-government approach to CBRN, with Federal funding for capability enhancement (54)

Terrorist interest in mass casualty weapons and materials(4, 48)

Part of national CT research effort (x)SETU has links to DSTO (47)Specific mention of DSTO capabilities and inter-agency collaboration for domestic security (48)CBRNDC links to Australian, state and territory government agencies for advice on incident response, equipment, exercises and operations. Also working with National Institute of Forensic Science to develop a chemical agent laboratory network across Australia (49).

ADF will respond to domestic incidents (x)ADF can be called out for domestic security under Defence Act (53)TAG (E), IRR and RRFs raised for CT response since Sep '01 (53)

domestic CT response capabilities (vi)Multiple incident ADF response capability (x)New defence capabilities for CT response(8)Defence Minister member of and CDF and SECDEF attend NSC(9-10)SASR has SUR capabilities (12)Defence involvement in Mercury 04 (13)DIO, DSD and DIGO contribute to national CT intelligence as members of the AIC (20) and DIO as a member of NTAC (21)DIO, DSD and DIGO resources and involvement increased since 2001 (23-4)ADF responsibilities for coastal security increased since Sep '01, capabilities

Multiple incident ADF response capability (x)

No specific mention of these terms, but ADF can be called out for domestic security under Defenc Act (53)

Winning in Peace, Winning in War 20048

ADF contribution to global security environment (3)

Support to whole-of-government efforts to deter unwanted arrivals in Australia (10)Southern Ocean fisheries patrols (11)Contributions to domestic security under DACC and DFACA (11-13)

IRR role in CBRNE response (12)

ADF involvement in ISG in Iraq ((9) No specific mention

Surge tasking to support special events (12-13)Pong Su response (13)SOCOMD, TAG East, IRR and RRFs added to force structure to enhance domestic security (12)

terrorist attacks…ushered in a new era of terrorism and terrorism response.' AS domestic security arrangements need strengthening (11).Force structure adjustments: SOCOMD, TAG (E), IRR, RRFs. 'responder of last resort' (pp. 12-13).

Domestic disaster relief and rescue response (27)

Contributions to domestic security under DACC and DFACA (11-13).Support to CHOGM, VIP visits, PONG SU, Melbourne C'wlh Games '06.

345

HOMELAND SECURITY-RELATED DEFENCE STRATEGIC GUIDANCE 1973-2005

Source Principal Themes HLS References NBCD References WMD ReferencesHLS-related DSTO roles & capabilities

HLS-related ADO tasking & force structure prescriptions

Terrorism/CT References

Civil Defence References

DACP/DFACA References

Weapons of Mass Destruction, Australia's Role in Fighting Proliferation: Practical Responses to New Challenges 20059

WMD counter proliferation

Domestic response as part of a comprehensive approach to WMD (7). Role of CBRN Strategy Group in policy and capability development (82).COAG role in ammonium nitrate controls (84).

Domestic response as part of a comprehensive approach to WMD (7). Role of CBRN Strategy Group in policy and capability development (82). Conduct of regional CBR mass casualty workshop (97). Defence role in hosting regional BCW workshop 2005 (97).

Defence Trade Control and Compliance Section role in non-proliferation export controls (70, 71). Defence role in Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Defence Exports (72). Defence role in PSI Exercise Pacific Protector 2003 (76). Defence role in export controls (80). Defence role in PSI (80). Defence Intelligence Group role in non-proliferation efforts and technical advice (82). Defence role in hosting regional BCW workshop 2005 (97). Role of Defence relationships in regional non-proliferation efforts (103).

Contribution of technical expertise to non-proliferation efforts (80).

IRR (83). IRR role in regional non-proliferation training (96). IRR role in regional engagement (103).

Terrorist use or pursuit of WMD (v, 1, 3, 4, 6, 10. 12, 25-27, 32, 104). Nexus between count terrorism and counter proliferation (93).

Contribution of IRR to domestic/civil response (83).

Implied role of IRR (93). Otherwise no direct reference.

346

HOMELAND SECURITY-RELATED DEFENCE STRATEGIC GUIDANCE 1973-2005

Source Principal Themes HLS References NBCD References WMD ReferencesHLS-related DSTO roles & capabilities

HLS-related ADO tasking & force structure prescriptions

Terrorism/CT References

Civil Defence References

DACP/DFACA References

Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2005

Impact of globalisation, defeating terrorism, countering WMD proliferation and supporting regional states (1, 26)

Efforts to strengthen the ADF's capacity to contribute to domestic security (2)ADF role in supporting domestic security operations for 2000 Olympics and CHOGM 2002-3 acknowledged. ADO must retain the ability to provide domestic response options (19) No specific mention

Proliferation threat has yet to be defeated. Some states will seek to acquire nuclear weapons (1)WMD proliferation danger increased by globalisation (3)Asymmetric threats such as WMD reduce the advantages of conventional capabilities (4)Proliferation in the Middle East a threat (9)Australian participation in Proliferation Security Iniative. Whole-of-government response to couner-proliferation (11)Dissuading Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons important (18)

DSTO role in counter terrorism technologies (11)Versatile, robust, joint and integrated ADF will be able to contribute with increasing effectiveness to ... domestic security (21)Army response options for Government include domestic security (23)

ADO contribution to whole-of-government national security response is expected to go far beyond warfighting (10)Establishment of JOPC (10)Increased Defence focus on domestic security to bring to bear its capabilities. Legislative amendments made to make employment of ADF quicker and easier (11)ADF directed to develop active reserves with roles and tasks specific to domestic security support (11

terrorism of the highest priority (1) Potency of the terrorist threat increased by globalisation (3) Asymmetric threats such as terrorism reduce the advantages of conventional capabilities (4)Non-state players, such as trans-national terrorist organisations, constitute a strategic threat (4)Terrorism a major security issue for all countries of South East Asia. Counter-terrorism cooperation within the region important (8)Defence intelligence agencies at the forefront of national efforts against terrorism, working more closely with

Humanitarian operations roles for Navy and Air Force? (23-4)

Increased Defence focus on domestic security to bring to bear its capabilities. Legislative amendments made to make employment of ADF quicker and easier (11)

Notes: 1. Although not a government policy document, this is included because of its significance to the civil defence function.2. This is a 'strategic basis' paper, rather than Defence policy per se.3. Not a policy document, this Review was directed by the then Minister for Defence.4. A Foreign Affairs White paper.5. The report of the community consultation process that preceded the 2000 White paper.6. Not released as a White paper, this Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade document nevertheless makes policy prescriptions.7. A Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet document.8. A Department of Defence document.9. A Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade document.

347

DEFENCE ASSISTANCE TO THE CIVILIAN COMMUNITY

AND

DEFENCE FORCE AID TO THE CIVIL AUTHORITIES

The ADO has historically supported Australian civilians and civilian organisations

through the use of its various capabilities. This has included support to homeland

security. Such support is not, however, the ADO’s normal lawful purpose and therefore

policy has emerged to govern ADO activity in the civil ‘realm.’ The purpose of this

Annex is to analyse that policy in order to assess its influence on the employment of the

ADO in homeland security roles.

Background

Through the provisions of the Constitution, the possibility of Defence support to civil

functions (especially the maintenance of domestic security) has been recognised from the

establishment of Australia. The most obvious of these is Section 119, which establishes a

duty for the Commonwealth to protect the States from ‘domestic violence’ should the

respective State governments request that protection. Up until the 1970s, the national

experience of Defence support to such functions had been relatively uncontroversial,

although some situations associated with industrial disputes were highly charged: for

example, the 1923 Police strike in Melbourne or the 1949 coal miners strike in New

South Wales. Government decisions to employ ADO assets in those cases do not appear

to have been so complicated as to warrant the development of much specific policy.

For most of the 20th century, there were three sources of official guidance on the

employment of the ADF on domestic security tasks:

The Constitution (notably Sections 61 and 119),

The Defence Act (notably Section 51), and

The Australian Military Regulations.

348

Terminology. From an early stage, ADO involvement in the civil realm was determined

to fit into two categories: support to ‘peaceful’ community activities that did not require

the application of force; and support to the enforcement of the law, which might involve

the use of force. Development of specific policy in this area appears to have begun in the

late 1970s, with the first unclassified document to concisely articulate policy appearing in

1978. That document recognised both forms of assistance.1 The ‘community’ dimension

of the former category has traditionally been recognised in Defence terminology, first as

‘Defence Force Assistance to the Civilian Community’ (DFACC) and then simply as

‘Defence Assistance to the Civilian Community’ (DACC).2 The latter term, which

emerged in the 1980s, recognises that help could come from the wider ADO and not just

the ADF.

Terminology covering the latter category of help originally recognised the lawful power

of the civil authorities in the words ‘Aid to the Civil Power.’ The distinct category of

‘Aid to the Civil Power’ was first recognised in 1927 with the addition of a section

bearing that title to the Australian Military Regulations. 3 This was subsequently

articulated in policy in Defence Instruction (Operations) 01-14 ‘Aid to the Civil Power,’

released in 1977, and updated in 1988 as ‘Defence Force Aid to the Civil Power’

(DFACP).5 Current language instead emphasises authority in the term ‘Defence Force

Aid to the Civilian Authorities’ (DFACA).6 The retention of the word ‘Force’ in the term

emphasises the fact that only members of the ADF could be required to employ force

against individuals.

1Defence Instruction (General) Operations 05-1, ‘Policy and Procedures for Defence Force Assistance to the Civil Community,’ released on 20 October 1978. 2 The current instruction governing this form of assistance is Defence Instruction (General) Operations 05-1, ‘Defence Assistance to the Civil Community - Policy and Procedures’ released on 16 March 2004 (hereinafter referred to as DI(G) Ops 5-1). 3 B.D. Beddie and S. Moss, Some Aspects of Aid to the Civil Power in Australia, Department of Government, Faculty of Military Studies, University of New South Wales, 1982, p. 3. 4 Hereinafter referred to as DI(G) Ops, 01-1. 5 This term appeared in the revised DI(G) Ops 01-1 version OPS B/2/88, released on 25 November 1988. 6 The term DFACA appeared in the late 1990s, reflecting the wording of impending Defence Act Amendment legislation. Bizarrely, the new terminology has reversed the significance of similar acronyms, with ‘DFACA’ now semantically opposed to the previous ‘DFACC.’

349

DACC

DACC policy is contained in Defence Instruction (General) Operations 05-1, Defence

Assistance to the Civil Community – Policy and Procedures. This covers ADO support to

civilians and civilian organisations that is essentially peaceful in nature. DACC includes

a wide span of assistance, from natural disaster relief to loans of equipment and facilities

to technical support in specialised areas. There are six categories of DACC, which are

broadly distinguished by the type and scale of support involved. Categories 1 to 3 consist

of ‘counter disaster and emergency assistance,’ while categories 4 to 6 cover ‘non-

emergency assistance.’ 7 DACC is normally requested by civilian groups, rather than

provided pro-actively by the ADO. Generally, the authority to commit ADO resources

for a DACC task is assigned at higher levels as the scale or sensitivity of the support

increases. For example, DACC Category 1, which involves only the organic resources of

local units, can be approved by local commanders, whereas Categories 2 and 3, which

potentially involve more significant resources, are approved by Headquarters Joint

Operations Command.

As a principle, the provision of DACC should be exceptional, rather than a normal

activity for the ADO.8 Reasons to approve a DACC request could include the training

value of performing the associated task, the public relations benefit that is anticipated or

humanitarian grounds, such as disaster relief or to save human life.9 Some DACC can be

provided on a financial reimbursement basis. In emergency situations, where there is a

substantial risk to human safety, the authority to commit resources to DACC is delegated

to low levels within the ADO.10

Much ADO support to homeland security missions is DACC. This can include some

support to ‘law enforcement,’ such as ‘routine’ search support, CBRNE consequence

management or even bomb disposal where there is no prospect of a need for ADO

members to use force against people. For pre-planned activities, such as special event 7 DI(G) Ops 05-1, pp. 3-6. 8 DI(G) Ops 05-1, Para. 4. 9 DI(G) Ops 05-1, Para. 4. 10 These situations constitute DACC Category 1, which can be authorised by unit commanders. DI(G) Ops 05-1, Para. 13.

350

security, most DACC employment decisions will have been made well in advance and

standing procedures will be in place to utilise ADO assets. Conceivably, a DACC

situation could evolve quickly into one requiring DFACA from the same ADO assets.

DFACA

DFACA policy is found in Defence Instruction (General) Operations 01-1, Defence

Force Aid to the Civil Authorities – Policy and Procedures. This is a classified document

which cannot be cited in detail in this study. DFACA involves ADF support to law

enforcement agencies. The authority to commit forces to DFACA tasks is retained at

relatively high levels, including, potentially, the Governor-General. The most likely

employment of the ADF in DFACA is in domestic counter-terrorism, for which very

elaborate procedures have been developed since a TAG capability was first developed in

the early 1980s. Some potential DFACA tasks are codified in Part IIIAAA of the

Defence Act, which was created by amendment legislation passed in 2000 and further

amended in 2006. The most recent amendments recognise the need to make decisions on

the use of force quickly and provide for expedited ‘call out’ of the ADF in those

situations.

There is relatively little ADF experience of DFACA. It is generally anticipated, however,

that DFACA tasks would be minimised, such that the ADF would only perform ‘forceful’

domestic security tasks within the homeland for the minimum amount of time necessary

and would ‘hand back’ responsibilities to civilian authorities as quickly as possible.

DACC tasks, such as consequence management after terrorist attacks, could quickly

evolve into situations requiring a DFACA response. This would require a decision by an

appropriate authority. To ensure a timely ADF response in these circumstances,

procedures for transitioning between DACC and DFACA should be pre-planned.

351

CURRENT OR FORMER ADO PERSONNEL SERVING IN NON-DEFENCE HOMELAND SECURITY-RELATED AREAS

Agency General ADF SF/CTBomb Management CBRN

Defence Civilian General ADF SF/CT

Bomb Management CBRN Defence Civilian

Federal Government

PM&C - National Security Division AS

PM&C - National Security Division FAS

PM&C - National Security DivisionHead - SETU (DSTO)

PM&C ADF Exchange

AGD - EMA2Director-General Director-General

AGD - EMA2Director, CBRN Director, CBRN

AGD - PSCC Director Director

AGD - PSCC Director

AGD - PSCC Director Director

AGD - PSCCManager, Training Centre

Manager, Training Centre

AGD - Critical Infrastructure Policy Director

AFP - ABDC Manager

AFP - ABDC Director Director

AFP - ABDC ADF LO ADF LO

AFP - ABDC ADF LO ADF LO

AFP - ABDCIntelligence Analyst

Intelligence analyst

AFP - ABDC Team leader

AFP - ABDC Team leader

Pre-11 September 2001 Post-11 September 20011

352

CURRENT OR FORMER ADO PERSONNEL SERVING IN NON-DEFENCE HOMELAND SECURITY-RELATED AREAS

Agency General ADF SF/CTBomb Management CBRN

Defence Civilian General ADF SF/CT

Bomb Management CBRN Defence Civilian

Pre-11 September 2001 Post-11 September 20011

ASIO - NTAC DIO LO

Customs - Coastwatch/BPC Director-GeneralDirector-General

BPC Chief of Staff

DOTARS - Office of Transport SecurityExecutive Director

Department of Employment & Workplace Relations

Agency Security Adviser

Industry

Industry - Special Event Security - Bortas Director

Industry - Special Event Security - Bortas Consultant

Industry - Special Event Security - Bortas Consultant

Industry - Special Event Security - Bortas Consultant

Industry - Security Suppliers - XTEK Director

Industry - Security Suppliers - XTEK Consultant

Industry - Security Suppliers - XTEKSalesman/trainer

Industry - Security Suppliers - Allan-Vanguard Salesman/trainer

Industry - Security - VELES Enterprises Salesman/Trainer

Industry - Security - Internet Security Systems

353

CURRENT OR FORMER ADO PERSONNEL SERVING IN NON-DEFENCE HOMELAND SECURITY-RELATED AREAS

Agency General ADF SF/CTBomb Management CBRN

Defence Civilian General ADF SF/CT

Bomb Management CBRN Defence Civilian

Pre-11 September 2001 Post-11 September 20011

Industry - Defence & Homeland Security - URS EG & G3

Principal, Defence Industry

Industry - Security Appointments - BHP Billiton

Head, Regional Security

Industry - Security Appointments - Shell

Group Security Adviser, Asia-Pacific

Group Security Adviser, Asia-Pacific

Industry - Security Appointments - Honeywell

Strategic Advisor, Security Solutions

Industry - Security Appointments - Kellogg, Brown & Root

Manager, Homeland Security Solutions

Industry - Security Appointments - Sinclair Knight Merz

Security Manager, New South Wales

Industry - Security Appointments - QANTAS

Manager, Group Security Intelligence & Risk

Industry - Security Appointments - QANTAS

Head, Security Operations

Industry - Security Appointments - QANTAS

Manager, Crisis Planning & Response

354

CURRENT OR FORMER ADO PERSONNEL SERVING IN NON-DEFENCE HOMELAND SECURITY-RELATED AREAS

Agency General ADF SF/CTBomb Management CBRN

Defence Civilian General ADF SF/CT

Bomb Management CBRN Defence Civilian

Pre-11 September 2001 Post-11 September 20011

Industry - Security Appointments - Sydney Airport Corporation

Manager, Emergency and Special Operations

Overseas

OPCW Medical Officer

Emergency Services - HAZMAT (Canada)

HAZMAT Specialist

Notes: 1. As at 1 November 2006 2. EMA was part of the Department of Defence prior to 9/11 3. Has a dedicated homeland security market division, managed by the Defence Industry Section in Australia

355

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The list of sources used in researching this thesis is organised according to broad categories of material. These include the customary categories such as books, book chapters, journal articles and electronic sources, but the considerable volume of government material has demanded specific consideration. Because most government sources are associated with the Australian Department of Defence, the hierarchy of sub-categories used to arrange that material has been used as the model for other types of government material. Government material from electronic sources is listed against the originating government agency and is not reflected separately under ‘Electronic sources.’ Statements and documents by individuals that are produced in a ministerial or official capacity are listed as government material under the appropriate agency. Individuals who provided information directly, either through formal interviews or other personal conversations, a listed along with brief descriptions of their roles or credentials. Books Allison, Graham, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, New York: Times Books, 2004. Andrews, Eric The Department of Defence, (The Australian Centenary History of Defence), Vol. V, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001. Ball, Desmond, and Cathy Downes, eds. Security and Defence, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990. Ball, Desmond and Pauline Kerr, Presumptive Engagement: Australia’s Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990s, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1996. Barnaby, Frank, How to Build a Nuclear Bomb and other weapons of mass destruction, London: Granta, 2004. Bean, C.E.W. Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918 Vol. 1. Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1941. Beaumont, Joan, Australian Defence: Sources and Statistics, (The Australian Centenary History of Defence) Vol. VI, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001. Beddie, B.H., and S. Moss, Some Aspects of Aid to the Civil Power in Australia, Canberra: Faculty of Military Studies, 1982. Cartledge, Garth. The Soldiers' Dilemma: When to use force in Australia, Canberra: Directorate of Publications, 1992.

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Hill, Robert, “Ministerial Media Release No. 148/2005: Air Force Deploys to the Middle East.” Canberra: Department of Defence, 2005. Hill, Robert, “Ministerial Media Release No. 198/2005: Australian and Indonesian Special Forces Begin Exercises.” Canberra: Department of Defence, 2005. Hill, Robert, “Ministerial Media Release MIN 87/02: Successful Defence Support to CHOGM.” Canberra: Department of Defence, 2002. Hill, Robert, “Ministerial Media Release MIN 460/02: New counter-terrorism units strengthen Australia’s defences.” Canberra: Department of Defence, 2002. Hill, Robert, “Ministerial Media Release No. 70/02: Increased Air Security for CHOGM.” Canberra: Department of Defence, 2002. Hill, Robert, “Ministerial Media Release No. 071/2005: First Armidale Class Patrol Boat Arrives.” Canberra: Department of Defence, 2005. Hill, Robert, “Ministerial Media Release No. 074/2005: Budget 2005-06: Securing Australia’s North West Shelf.” Canberra: Department of Defence 2005. Hill, Robert, “Ministerial Media Release No. 128/2005: Australia’s Commitment to the Proliferation Security Initiative.” Canberra: Department of Defence, 2005. Hill, Robert, “Ministerial Media Release No. 134/2005: Regional Counter Terrorism Expert Exchange to Boost Regional Security.” Canberra: Department of Defence, 2005. Hill, Robert. “Ministerial Media Release No. 138/2005: Explosive Specialists Return Home From Iraq.” Canberra: Department of Defence, 2005. Hill, Robert, “Ministerial Media Release No. 197/2005: New ADF Powers for Domestic Terrorism.” Canberra: Department of Defence, 2005. Hill, Robert, “Ministerial Media Release No. MIN84/04: Commonwealth Games Security.” Canberra: Department of Defence, 2004. Hill, Robert, “Ministerial Media Release: Defence Support to World Cup Security.” Canberra: Department of Defence, 2003.

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Jamieson, Cameron, Games Success, Melbourne: Department of Defence (Operation ACOLYTE website) 2006 [cited 1 May 2006]. Available from http://www.defence.gov.au/opacolyte/news/article001/index.htm Jamieson, Cameron, “Safe and secure.” Army 1139, 23 March 2006. Jamieson, Cameron. “That’s game over.” Army 1140, 6 April 2006, pp.12-13. Jamieson, Cameron, and Keith Miller. “Rise above the call.” Air Force 48, no. 5, 6 April 2006. McSweeney, Mike. "Task force set up to fight IED menace." Army 1147, 13 July 2006, p. 2. Turner, Catherine. "Melbourne Games to be supported." Air Force 47, no. 21, 17 November 2005. Unattributed article. "Police partnership." Army 999, 13 April 2000, p.7. Unattributed article "Game for a good time." Army 1138, 8 March 2006. Wellfare, John. "Having a blast." Army 1136, 9 Feb 2006. General Defence sources “Auster Shootdown,” Canberra: Department of Defence, 2005 [cited 21 July 2005]. Available from http://www.navy.gov.au/units/805sqn/Auster_Shootdown.pdf. The Army in Profile 1997. Canberra: Department of Defence, 1998. The Australian Army in Profile 2000. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2001. The Australian Army in Profile 2002. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2003. Australian Defence Force Operations, Canberra: Department of Defence, 2005 [cited 5 September 2005]. Available from http://www.defence.gov.au/globalops.cfm#relex2 Cosgrove, Peter, “Address to the Joint Future Warfighting Conference.” Canberra: Department of Defence, 2005.

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Cosgrove, Peter, “Address to the Sydney Institute: Good Partner, Neighbour and Ally: Reflections on Australian Defence 2003,” [cited 7 August 2005]. Available from http://www.defence.gov.au/cdf/speeches/past/speech20030610.cfm Complex Warfighting. Canberra: Australian Army, 2004. “DEFGRAM No. 301/2005: Joint Offshore Protection Command.” Edited by R.E Shalders. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2005. Department of Defence. DSTO Website, 2006 [cited 11 December 2006]. Available from http://www.dsto.defence.gov.au/page/3601/. Department of Defence, “Fact Sheets – Australia’s Response to September 11.” Canberra: Department of Defence, 2002. JIRU Scrapbook. Sydney, Joint Incident Response Unit, 2000. Joint Project 2087 (Defence Materiel Organisation), 2005 [cited 21 September 2005]. Available from http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/lsd/jp141_2087.cfm “National Domestic Security Committees.” Edited by Directorate of Domestic Security. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2005. Operation Acolyte, Canberra: Department of Defence, 2006 [cited 1 May 2006]. Available from http://www.defence.gov.au/opacolyte Operation Catalyst, Canberra: Department of Defence, 2006 [cited 30 June 2006]. Available from http://www.defence.gov.au/opcatalyst/default.htm Operation Gold. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2001. Operation GOLD – Joint Task Force 112 Handbook. Sydney: Department of Defence, 2000. Operation Slipper, Canberra: Department of Defence, 2005 [cited 14 January 2006]. Available from http://www.defence.gov.au/opslipper/ Operation Slipper, Canberra: Department of Defence, 2006 [cited 30 June 2006]. Available from http://www.defence.gov.au/opslipper/

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Downer, Alexander, and Mark Vaile. “Joint Ministerial Media Release: Australia to Host APEC 2007.” Canberra: Department of Foreign affairs and Trade, 10 May 2005. Reports and proceedings

ASEAN Regional Forum CBM Workshop on Managing the Consequences of a Major Terrorist Attack, 3-5 June 2003: Co-Chairs’ Summary Report Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2003 [cited 19 September 2005]. Available from http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/terrorist/chairmans_statements.html General Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Documents

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John Howard. "Address to the Nation on Committing Australian Forces to War in Iraq, 20 March 2003." Canberra: Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2003.

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Budget Speech 1999 (prepared by the Treasury, delivered by Peter Costello) Canberra: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1999. Commonwealth Budget 1999-2000 (prepared by the Treasury), Canberra: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1999 “Current Issues Brief 8/2000-01: The Detention of Boat People.” Canberra: Parliamentary Library, 2000.

“Defence Act-Order-2006 Report on utilisation of the Defence Force in accordance with section 51X of the Defence Act 1903 in relation to Operation Acolyte defensive counter-air support to the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games, 27 March.” Canberra: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2006. “Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Bill 2005: Explanatory Memorandum.” Canberra: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2005. “Department of Defence Submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional Inquiry into Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Bill 2005.” Canberra: Department of Defence, 2005. Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. “Report of the Iraq Delegation.” Canberra: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2005. Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade. “Watching Brief on the War on Terrorism.” Canberra: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2004.

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An Act to provide for the Naval and Military Defence and Protection of the Commonwealth and the several States 1903.

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Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons) Act 1976 Criminal Code Act 1995. Customs Act 1901. Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act 2000. Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act 2006.

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Cabinet documents Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee. "Decision No. 1657 (FAD): Policy and Organization to Counter International Terrorism." Canberra: National Archives of Australia, 1976. Ellicott, R.J., and R.G. Withers. "FAD Policy Paper No. 23 - Policy and Organization to Counter International Terrorism." Canberra: National Archives of Australia, 1976.

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New South Wales Police Service, Forensic Services Group 2005 [cited 12 December 2006]. Available from http://www.police.nsw.gov.au/about_us/structure/specialist_operations/forensic_services New South Wales Police Service, NSW Police History, 2005 [cited 24 July 2005]. Available from http://www.police.nsw.gov.au/about_us New South Wales Police Service, Water Police, 26 August 2004 [cited 12 December 2006]. Available from http://www.police.nsw.gov.au/recruitment/police_career/role_and_careers/careers/water_police Rann, Mike. "News: Regional airport security needed." Adelaide: Government of South Australia, 2006. Australian non-government political statements, announcements and releases Bevis, Arch, ‘Government lazy on homeland security, Australian Labor Party, 2005 [cited 17 January 2006]. Available from http://eherald.alp.org.au/articles/0705/natp13-01.php Bevis, Arch, "Is there a Better Way?" Paper presented at Safeguarding Australia 2005 , Canberra, 12 July 2005. Bevis, Arch, "Media Release: Australia Unprepared for Terrorist Attack Four Years After September 11," Canberra, 2005. Debnam, Peter "Response to Question No. 1306 - Counter-Terrorism Responses." Sydney: Parliament of New South Wales, 2004. Liberal Party of Australia. "2004 Election Policy Statement: Securing Australia's North West Shelf." Canberra: Liberal Party of Australia, 2004. McClellan, Robert. "Media Release: Tougher Measures Needed to Protect Australia's Maritime Security and Economic Interests." Canberra, 2005. International government sources ABCA Armies Program [cited 11 April 2007]. Available from http://www.abca-armies.org/Default.aspx?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1. Bush, George W. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, 2001 [cited 30 June 2005 2005]. Available from http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?/content=4331

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Canadian Department of National Defence, Defence Research and Development – Canada, 2005 [cited 15 August 2005]. Available from http://www.suffield.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/TesearchTech/Products/CB_PRODUCTS/RD950... Congress of the United States of America, The Declaration of Independence and The Constitution of the United States of America, New York: Bantam, 1998. Congress of the United States of America, The “Posse Comitatus” Act. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1385, 1878. Congress of the United States of America, Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) Act, 2001. Hart, Gary, and Warren B. Rudman, Phase I Report: New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century. Washington: US Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission), 1999. Hart, Gary, and Warren B. Rudman, Phase II Report: Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom Washington: U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission), 2000. Hart, Gary, and Warren B. Rudman, Phase III Report: Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change Washington: U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission), 2001. Select Committee on Science and Technology. Select Committee on Science and Technology, Eight Report: Research, Development and Procurement, London: Parliament of the United Kingdom, 2003. Spratt, John M. Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 [cited 27 Feb 05. Available from http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1996/h9606271.htm United States Department of Defense. "Department of Defense Roles and Missions in Homeland Security." in Defense Science Board Summer Study 2003, edited by Defense Science Board. Washington: Office of the Under-Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2003. United States Department of Defense (Defense Science Board). Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. Washington: United States Department of Defense, 2005. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and US House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Report of the Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001." edited by 2001 Joint Enquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11. Washington: Congress of the United States, 2002.

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Newspaper, magazine and internet media articles Australian Associated Press, “Anti-terror ideas should be published,” 2005 [cited 19 September 2005]. Available from http://www.news.com.au/story/print/0,10199,16650487,00.html Australian Associated Press, “Comm Games security safe,” 2005 [cited 8 July 2005]. Available from http://www.news.com.au/story/print/0,10119,15861663,00.html Australian Associated Press, “Cost of Games will be a secret,” 2005 [cited 23 July 2005]. Available from http://www.news.com.au/story/print/0,10119,16024017,00.html Australian Associated Press, “Games security plan unveiled,” 20 September 2005 Australian Associated Press, “Games Security Plans Revealed,” 19 September 2005 [cited 20 September 2005]. Australian Associated Press, “Games security tight: Hill,”2005 [cited 20 August 2005 2005]. Available from http://www.news.com.au/story/print/0,10119,15925676,00.html Australian Associated Press, “Local terror needs priority, says Beazley,” 20 February 2005 [cited 20 February 2005]. Available from http://www.news.com.au/story/0,10117,12312353-2,00.html Australian Associated Press, “Security at Airports Tightened,” 2005 [cited 21 September 2005]. Available from http://www.news.com.au/story/print/0,10119,16671397,00 Australian Associated Press, “Trust us on Games security: Bracks,” 2005 [cited 20 August 2005]. Available from http://www.news.com.au/story/print/0,10119,16324002,00.html Australian Associated Press, “Coastwatch - Organisation Customs,” 2005 [cited 20 August 2005]. Available from http://www.customs.gov.au/page.cfm?u=4297 Bachelard, Michael, "Police given new powers to combat terror," The Australian, 21 September 2005, p. 4. Carlson,Peter ,“The Pentagon's Homegrown Theater of War,” Washington Post, 3 January 2006, p. C01. Charlton, Peter, "Olympic military costs blowout," Courier Mail, 20 December 1999, p. 1. Chulov, Martin, "Licence to kill for CHOGM fighters," Weekend Australian, 23 February 2002, p. 3.

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Chulov, Martin, and David Kennedy, "Games security revealed," The Australian, 1 March 2000. Chulov, Martin, and Jonathan Porter, "Increase airport security: Carr," The Courier Mail, 31 May 2005. Dunn, Mark. "Tags to trap bomb makers." Herald Sun, 2 March 2005 2, p. 15. Edwards, Rod. "Aussies visit Suffield." Medicine Hat News, 10 April 2000, p. 2. Emerson, Scott. "Security blanket thrown over CHOGM venues." The Australian, 27 February 2002, p. 2. Forbes, Mark. "Armed jets lead huge CHOGM security effort." The Age, 27 February 2002, p. 3. Goold, J.J. "What do we get for our defence bucks?" The Australian, 20 December 1999, p. 12. Kearney, Simon. "New labs to ward off 'dirty bomb' threat." The Australian, 28 September 2005, p. 4. Kelly, Paul. "Ideas will be crucial to victory." The Australian, 10 August 2005, p. 12. Ker, Peter, and Jewel Topsfield. "Push for more Games police and cameras." The Age, 12 March 2005. Kerin, John. "Terror squads for airports." The Australian, 22 September 2005, p. 1. Lebihan, Rachel. "Software to patrol bridge." Australian Financial Review, 13 May 2005, p. 3. Magnay, Jacquelin. "Shoring up the Games." Sydney Morning Herald, 22 May 2004. McPhedran, Ian, "Games counter-terrorism costs $23m." The Courier Mail, 12 May 1999 1999, p. 33. Murphy, Patrick, and Michael Bachelard. "1200 troops used for Games." The Australian, 21 September 2005. Nicholson, Brendan. "Port to revamp terror defences." The Age, 15 March 2005, p. 1. Nicholson, Brendan, and Connie Levett. "Sea terror plans revealed after port security boost announced." The Age, 18 March 2005, p. 3. O'Rourke, Jim. "Games troops redeployed." Sun Herald, 26 September 1999.

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Petersen, Freya. "CHOGM brings out the big guns." The Age, 23 February 2002, p. 3. Phillips, Mark, and Heather Gallagher. “Games security review” AAP, 2005 [cited 8 July 2005]. Available from http://www.news.com.au/story/print/0,10119,15862829,00.html Schubert, Mischa. "PM's federal vision of 'inept' states." The Age, 13 April 2005, pp. 1,13,25. Sheridan, Greg. "Howard on target with the military." The Australian, 29 October 2005. Shipley, Amy, and Craig Whitlock. "In Athens, It's Safety At All Costs $1.5 Billion for Security Is Most Ever for Games." Washington Post, 12 August 2004, p. A01. Smith, R. Jeffrey. "New Devices May Foil Airline Security." The Washington Post, 21 July 1996, p. A01. Strickland, Katrina, and Glenda Korporaal. "Inside the Games Plan." The Australian, 15 September 2005, p. 9. Tomazin, Farrah, and Orietta Guerrera. "Station big guns down here: Bracks." The Age, 22 September 2005, p. 2. Unattributed article "The D'Hage Code." The Bulletin, 6 September 2005, p. 67. Unattributed article "Secret File: Operation Relex." Sydney Morning Herald, 27 October 2002. Warner, Michael, and Shaun Phillips. "City's Games lockdown on." Herald Sun, 21 September 2005, p. 2. Broadcasts Black, Phil. "Newscast - Joint Incident Response Unit," Australia: Channel Seven News, 29 July, 2000 Brown, Matt, "Background Briefing: Dangerous Games - Terrorism and the 2000 Olympics," [radio broadcast] Australia: Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio National, 1 June 1997 Carr, Bob. "ABC 702 News - Bob Carr." [radio broadcast] Australia: Australian Broadcasting Corporation News, 25 July 2005.

387

Milne, Glenn. “Interview with Alexander Downer.” [television broadcast] Australia: Channel 7 Sunday Sunrise, 20 August 2000 [cited 6 September 2005]. Available from http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/transcripts/2000/000820_downer.html "A Current Affair on NSWPS CT capability." [television broadcast] Australia: A Current Affair, 10 February 2005. "Lateline, 30 August 2004." [television broadcast] Australia: Lateline, 30 August 2004. "Operation Hollywood." [television broadcast] Australia: SBS, 7 January 2006. Interviews and personal conversations

Mr. Marc Ablong Assistant Secretary, Strategic Policy within the Strategy Division of the Department of Defence (Australia). Interviewed in Canberra on 22 April 2005. Mr. Ablong’s responsibilities include domestic security policy for the Department of Defence. Lieutenant Colonel Steve Alexander Staff Officer Grade 1 responsible for counter terrorism within Headquarters, Special Operations Command (Australia). Interviewed in Canberra on 15 April 2005. Lieutenant Colonel Alexander was responsible for development of counter terrorism plans and capabilities within Special Operations Command in 2004 and 2005. A specialist in nuclear, biological and chemical defence, his earlier association with Defence support to domestic counter terrorism includes command of the Chemical, Biological and Radiological Response Squadron within the Joint Incident Response Unit during the Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games. In that capacity, the author had frequent contact with him in 1999-2000. He went on to assume command of the Incident response Regiment in 2006. Captain Mike Angus Commander, Australian Mine Clearance Diving Force, Royal Australian Navy. Interviewed in Canberra, 27 August 2005. Captain Angus is a senior Mine Clearance Diving Officer with extensive knowledge of the Navy’s explosive ordnance disposal capabilities.

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Colonel Michael Annet Commander, Joint Task Force 636 Forward Command Element (Australia). Interviewed in Melbourne, 12 April 2005. Colonel Annett headed the team that undertook the detailed planning for the Australian Defence Organisation’s support to the conduct of the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games. Commander Brendan Bannan Commander, 2006 Commonwealth Games Planning Office, Victoria Police. Interviewed in Melbourne, 12 April 2005. Acting Commander (later Commander) Bannan was responsible for coordinating security for the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games. He is an experienced police officer with an extensive background in special operations and counter terrorism. Group Captain Geoff Brown Officer Commanding 82 Wing (F111), Royal Australian Air Force, 200302004. Interviewed in Canberra, 18 August 2005. Group Captain Brown had extensive knowledge of the employment of Air Force Armaments Fitters, who also hold explosive ordnance disposal skills. Dr. Norbert Burman Senior research scientist within the Defence Science and Technology Organisation, responsible for research and development programs associated with explosives and explosive ordnance. Interviewed by telephone on 24 August 2005. Dr. Burman was involved in forensic analysis of evidence associated with the 2002 Canberra Hospital implosion. Mr. Nigel Catchlove Executive Officer, Joint Incident Response Unit, 1999-2000. Interviewed by telephone, Canberra, 10 July 2005. General Peter Cosgrove Chief of Defence Force (Australia) 2002-2005. Interviewed in Canberra on 14 June 2005. As well as being Chief of Defence Force, General Cosgrove was Commander, 1st Division in 1998-2000 and was involved in planning and force generation for the Australian Defence Force support to the Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games.

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Mr. Paul de Graaff Assistant Secretary Counter–Terrorism Branch, Protective Security Coordination Centre, Protective Security Coordination Centre, Attorney-General’s Department (Australia). Interviewed in Canberra, 26 July 2005. Mr de Graaff is responsible for Commonwealth Government coordination of national counter terrorism arrangements. He is a former Army officer. Mr. Nigel French Chief Executive Officer and Managing Director, XTEK Ltd. Interviewed in Canberra, 4 March 2005, in a combined interview with Mr. Don Williams. XTEK supplies bomb disposal and search equipment and services to the Australian market, including the Department of Defence and state police forces. Mr. French is a former British Army officer and intelligence analyst with the Australian Federal Police. Colonel Peter ‘Gus’ Gilmore Commanding Officer of the Special Air Service Regiment (Australia), 2001-2002. Interviewed in Canberra on 18 May 2005. Colonel Gilmore has commanded or been involved with ADF counter terrorism forces for 20 years, at every rank from captain to lieutenant colonel. In 2003-2004, he was seconded to the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet as a staff officer associated with national security. He was promoted Brigadier in 2005. Chief Superintendent Jim Hamilton Assistant Director Specialised Operations, New South Wales Fire Brigades. Interviewed in Sydney, 6 April 2005, in a combined interview with Inspector Rob McNeil. Chief Superintendent Hamilton is responsible for the specialist hazardous materials and chemical, radiological and radiological response capabilities of the New South Wales Fire Brigades. He has had a long association with these capabilities in the New South Wales Fire Brigades and is a member of national expert panels on these subjects. He was responsible for developing a dedicated chemical, radiological and radiological response capability for the Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games, in which capacity the author had frequent contact with him in 1999-2000.

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Mr. Lindsay Hansch Director-General, Melbourne 2006 Security Task Force, Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts (Australia). Interviewed in Canberra, 8 July 2005. Mr Hansch is a long-serving member of the Protective Security Coordination Centre. In this capacity he has had a comprehensive involvement with Australia’s counter terrorism arrangements. A former Australian Army Officer, he also served in the Special Air Service Regiment. In 1999-2000 Mr Hansch was intimately involved in security coordination for the Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games, in which capacity the author had frequent contact with him in 1999-2000. Assistant Commissioner Norm Hazzard Assistant Commissioner (Counter Terrorism), New South Wales Police Force. Interviewed in Sydney, 24 June 2005. Assistant Commissioner Hazzard is responsible for both the Counter Terrorist Coordination Command and the State Protection Group. As such, he is responsible for the New South Wales Police Service’s dedicated counter terrorism capabilities. He has a long association with New South Wales Police Service special operations, including command of the State Protection Group and operational experience as a negotiator. He retired from the New South Wales Police Service in 2006. Major General Mike Hindmarsh Commander, Special Operations Command (Australia). Interviewed in Canberra on 3 May 2005. Major General Hindmarsh commands all Australian Special Forces, including those involved with specialised counter terrorism response (the Tactical Assault Groups and Incident Response Regiment). A Special Forces officer of more than 25 years experience, Major General Hindmarsh’s association with the ADF’s domestic counter terrorism capability spans the entire history of that capability. This has included command of the Special Air Service Regiment. Air Chief Marshall Angus Houston Chief of Defence Force (Australia), from July 2005. Immediately prior to this he was Chief of Air Force. Interviewed in Canberra on 15 July 2005, shortly after he assumed duty as Chief of Defence Force, discussing issues from both his new perspective and as Chief of Air Force. Air Chief Marshal has had a long involvement with Australian Defence Force operations and policy, including domestic security matters. He was Head, Strategic Operations Division during the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (Operation GUARDIAN II) in 2002.

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Colonel Mike Kelly A senior legal officer in the Australian Army, Colonel Kelly was involved in the development of the Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act 2000. Interviewed in Canberra on 22 April 2005. Colonel Kelly has had a lengthy involvement in military operational law. Lieutenant General Peter Leahy Chief of Army (Australia). Interviewed in Canberra on 14 June 2005. As well as being Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Leahy was involved at a senior level with the provision of Defence support to the Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games, while posted to Headquarters, Australian Theatre. Mr. Duncan Lewis First Assistant Secretary, National Security Division, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (Australia). Interviewed in Canberra on 4 March 2005. Mr. Lewis was appointed as the founding Head of National Security Division, after a 33-year career as a Special Forces officer in the Australian Army that included command of the Special Air Service Regiment. His final appointment in the Army was as the first Command, Special Forces Command, in the rank of Major General. His experience of Australia’s domestic counter terrorism arrangements spans the entire history of that field. Colonel Jeremy Logan Colonel (Counter Terrorism), Headquarters Special Operations (Australia), 2002-2003. Interviewed in Canberra on 16 August 2005. A Special Forces Officer of over 20 years experience, Colonel Logan was the senior staff officer responsible for counter terrorism policy and capability development within Headquarters, Special Operations (the antecedent to Headquarters, Special Operations Command). Colonel Logan’s experience includes command of the 1st Commando Regiment and various appointments with the Special Air Service Regiment. Dr. Roger Lough Chief Defence Scientist (Australia). Interviewed in Canberra on 21 July 2005. Dr Lough leads the Defence Science and Technology Organisation. Major General Maurie McNarn Director, Defence Intelligence Organisation. Interviewed in Canberra, 10 May 2005.

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Inspector Rob McNeil Manager, Recruit Training, New South Wales Fire Brigades. Interviewed in Sydney, 6 April 2005, in a combined interview with Chief Superintendent Jim Hamilton. Inspector McNeil has a long association with New South Wales Fire Brigades Hazardous Materials and chemical, biological and radiological response capabilities and worked closely with the Joint Incident Response Unit in the development of these capabilities in 1999-2000, during which period the author had frequent contact with him. Lieutenant Colonel Russell Maddalena Operations Officer, Joint Incident Response Unit, 2000; Officer Commanding High Risk Search Squadron for Operation GUARDIAN, 2002; and Staff Officer to Commander Special Operations, 2004. Lieutenant Colonel Maddalena assisted in clarifying information in relation to Operation GUARDIAN in various conversations in Canberra in September 2005. Dr. Bob Matthews Dr. Matthews was a Principal Research Scientist within the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence research area of the Defence Science and Technology Organisation from the 1980s until the early 2000s, during which time he was a leading expert in the technical aspects of arms control and disarmament relating to weapons of mass destruction. The author had frequent professional contact with him during 1993-1994 and 1998. Major Ron Murphy Australian Defence Force Liaison Officer, Australian Bomb Data Centre, Australian Federal Police. Interviewed in Canberra on 1 April 2005 in a combined interview with Mr. Bruce Schiefelbein. A Royal Australian Engineers officer, Major Murphy’s career includes service with the Incident Response Regiment and as an instructor in nuclear, biological and chemical defence and explosive ordnance disposal. Prior to joining the Australian Army, Major Murphy served in the British Army and saw service in Northern Ireland. Mr. Mike Norris Director, Domestic Security Policy, within the Strategic Policy Branch of the Department of Defence (Australia). Interviewed in Canberra on 17 July 2005. Mr. Norris’s Directorate, established in 2005, is responsible for Defence domestic security policy development and, subsequent to our interview, was principally responsible for the development of the Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act 2006.

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Dr. Simon Oldfield Head, Human Protection and Performance Division and former Head of Combatant Protection and Nutrition Branch and of the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Centre of the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (Australia). Interviewed in person in Canberra on 1 July 2005 and by telephone in Melbourne on 12 December 2006. Dr. Oldfield leads DSTO’s research area on CBRN hazards and countermeasures, including support to domestic preparedness. Mr. Don Patterson Assistant Director, Special Capabilities, Emergency Management Australia. Interviewed in Canberra, 24 March 2005. Mr. Patterson has a long history with Emergency Management Australia, dating to the early 1990s when the organisation was part of the Department of Defence. He has had special responsibility for Civil Defence programs, especially those associated with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear hazards, and was involved in coordinating national support in that area for the Sydney 2000 Games and Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games. As an Australian Army officer prior to joining the Australian Public Service, he received specialist training in nuclear, biological and chemical defence. Lieutenant Colonel Craig Petrie Founding Commanding Officer of the Incident Response Regiment (Australia) in 2002-2003. Interviewed in Canberra on 6 May 2005 and the author also enjoyed frequent professional contact during the establishment of the Joint Incident response Unit in 1999. As a staff officer involved in force development in 1997-1999, Lieutenant Colonel Petrie was responsible for developing proposals for the establishment of a sophisticated chemical, biological and radiological response capability to support the conduct of the Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games. He has subsequently left the Army to become the Manager of the Australian Federal Police’s Bomb and Chemical, Biological and Radiological Data Centres. Vice Admiral Chris Ritchie Chief of Navy (Australia) 2002-2005. Interviewed in Canberra on 20 May 2005. Mr. Miguel Rivera A staff member within Border Protection Command (Australia). Mr. Rivera assisted in clarifying information in relation to the new Command through a telephone conversation on 12 December 2006.

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Mr. Bruce Schiefelbein Team Leader, Australian Bomb Data Centre, Australian Federal Police. Interviewed in Canberra on 1 April 2005 in a combined interview with Major Ron Murphy. Mr. Schiefelbein is a Team Leader with special responsibilities for intelligence. A former Ammunition Technical Officer in the Australian Army, he was Officer Commanding the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Squadron (responsible for improvised explosive device disposal support) of the Joint Incident Response Unit for the Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games. He has an extensive background in improvised explosive device disposal, having also commanded the Ammunition Wing of the Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps Centre. Deputy Commissioner Andrew Scipione Deputy Commissioner (Support), New South Wales Police Service. Interviewed in Sydney, 17 February 2005. Deputy Commissioner Scipione was responsible for the New South Wales Police Service’s counter terrorism programs and has an extensive background in those capabilities. His command included New South Wales Police Service’s Counter Terrorist Coordination Command. Acting Inspector Mark Sowter Project Officer of the New South Wales Police Service’s Bomb Management Project for the Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games. In this capacity he also chaired the New South Wales Chemical, Biological and Radiological Working Group in the lead-up to the Games. His input was obtained through numerous personal conversations with the author during 1999-2000. Group Captain Margaret Staib Director Logistics, Air Force Headquarters, 2003-2004. Interviewed in Canberra, 18 August 2005. In her capacity as Director Logistics, Group Captain Staib oversaw for the formal establishment of an improvised explosive device disposal capability within the Royal Australian Defence Force. Group Captain Staib was helpful in explaining restructuring efforts affecting the Air Force’s Armament Fitter mustering. Mr. Lester Sutton Strategic Advisor, Security Solutions, Honeywell Automation and Control Solutions. Telephone conversation, 13 December 2006. Mr. Sutton is a former Colonel in the Australian Intelligence Corps (Army). He retired from the ADF in 2004. As a senior security adviser in industry, he has extensive networks with peers across the commercial security sector. He is published in security industry journals.

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Mr. Terry Vincent Director, Australian Bomb Data Centre, Australian Federal Police. Interviewed in Canberra, 14 August 2005. As Director of the Australian Bomb Data Centre, Mr Vincent is responsible for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information relating to criminal use of explosives. In this capacity he is a senior advisor to government in the field of explosive hazards. Formerly an Ammunition Technical Officer in the Australian Army, Mr Vincent has extensive experience and training in the field of improvised explosive device disposal. Mr. Don Williams Director, XTEK Consulting Services. Interviewed in Canberra, 4 March 2005, in a combined interview with Mr. Nigel French. Mr. Williams provides consulting and training services in bomb management. He is a former Australian Army Ammunition Technical Officer with extensive experience in improvised explosive device disposal. He was also the Bomb Risk Manager for the Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games. Mr. Williams is Director the Australian Chapter of the International Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators.